“Armchair Metaphysics” on Consciousness*

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1. Two Philosophical Theses

There are said to be two distinguishable features in our conscious mental states. One is the *phenomenal* character, and the other the *subjective* character. These features are often couched by somewhat imaginative phrases due to Thomas Nagel(1974): There is *what it is like to be* in a conscious mental state, and the "what it is like" is always for someone, or "essentially connected with a single point of view."(Nagel 1974, 160).

I heard two nontrivial claims purported to be *philosophical* theses capturing these two intuitions on consciousness. The *essentialism*, which I learn from Kripke, claims that *seeming* to be in a conscious state is itself being in that conscious state. Or in Kripke’s own terminology, "to be in the same [qualitative] epistemic situation that would obtain if one had a pain is to have a pain"(Kripke 1980, 152). The other thesis, which I call the *intrinsicalism* following Goldman(1993), says on the conceptual level that the phenomenal consciousness defies any relational characterization; i.e., that any functional or physical

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analysis would leave out the fundamental character of consciousness. Considering that the two intuitions are equally overwhelming, the way in which these two theses handle those features is somewhat unfair. The subjective character is only implicitly contained in the formulations, but nevertheless essentially; for the vindication of the respective theses it is essential to fix one point of view. Both theses are obviously false from the third person point of view, since he might seem to be in pain without his being in pain and his being in pain might be detectable by behavioral or psychological evidences. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness, on the other hand, is assumed to be properly entangled by the very contents of these two theses.

Both theses are appropriated for anti-materialist arguments, or rather are invented for that purpose. The famous and powerful argument of Kripke against the identity theory exploits the essentialist version. Very roughly, the argument goes as follows: Since seeming to be in pain itself is being in pain, the alleged conceivability of pain detached from body is not just appearance or seeming; it is a real possibility. But so far as the essentialism in general is regarded as incredible, the less we use it the better. Therefore some philosophers (e.g., Chalmers, Jackson, and Levine) claim that the less problematic and weaker intrinsicalism on the concept of consciousness suffices for the anti-materialist argument. Their arguments are the target of this paper. These target arguments I will call the conceptual analysis arguments, and the metaphysical maneuver resting on this kind of arguments Armchair Metaphysics. 1)

1) I don’t know if the term “armchair metaphysics,” which I borrow from the title of Jackson’s article (1993), ever makes sense, especially whether the adjective “armchair” could qualify metaphysics. Nevertheless I use this name to make it clear that my argument are primarily directed to the arguments of Jackson and of that ilk.
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I will argue that the argument from the conceptual facts to the anti-materialist conclusion is not warranted, and that the intrinsicalistic approach in general is inadequate only because it does no justice to the subjective aspect of consciousness.

2. Conceptual Analysis and Theoretical Identification

Before the discussion, let us set up a straw man, named "Aunt Sally" (Here it is a proper name, not a common noun) for an easy grasp of the ideas of the champions (e.g., Jackson and Chalmers) of our target argument. In fact no one of these champions explicitly endorses the version of Aunt Sally, but implicitly does. A starting place Aunt Sally likes is the knowledge argument. The story goes as follows: Mary, a distinguished neuroscientist in 23rd century confined to black-and-white room from the birth, learns all the physical, chemical and physiological to know in that room. However, when she is let out, she learns new facts, that is, what it is like to experience a color such as blue. By hypothesis it should not be the physical knowledge. Therefore there is other than the physical (Jackson 1982; 1986). Aunt Sally well knows that the argument is vulnerable to various objections. But for her purpose, she assumes that the massage is clear enough. Compare the original knowledge argument with a pseudo knowledge argument.

A Pseudo Knowledge Argument The most distinguished chemist in Twin Earth, Gustav, found new compound H₂O, which is so rare in Twin Earth unlike XYZ. Unbeknownst (at least initially) to him that H₂O would behavior macroscopically exactly like their "water" (or "twater," as often so called to distinguish
from our "water" concept), i.e. XYZ, he investigated all the physical and chemical details of H\textsubscript{2}O. But he in some way knew that most of our earth is covered by H\textsubscript{2}O. Suppose that he decided to travel to our Earth for the first time. Then, was he surprised at H\textsubscript{2}O playing the exactly same role in Earth as XYZ does in Twin Earth? Did he learn anything new "over and above" facts about H\textsubscript{2}O, especially the fact that most of our earth is covered by water?

Aunt Sally answers to the above questions, "yes and no." She says "yes", and agrees that facts about water cannot be directly implied by, or be deducible from facts about H\textsubscript{2}O, so Gustav should have learned something new, which could subserve the deduction. On the other hand, she says, "no," because facts about H\textsubscript{2}O entail facts about water, in the sense that the truth conditions of the statements of the respective facts coincide, since necessarily water = H\textsubscript{2}O. But one could object these accounts might allow its dual for Mary's case, and so Aunt Sally must go further. Aunt Sally focuses on the 'yes' part. She says, a "limited story" about H\textsubscript{2}O does not imply story about water, but "rich enough or complete story about the H\textsubscript{2}O way things are does enable the a priori deduction of the water way things are." (Jackson 1995, 188).

Indeed in the beginning we couldn't expect that a statement about H\textsubscript{2}O implies one about water. For the vocabulary to which "H\textsubscript{2}O" belongs could not be identical to the folk vocabulary to which "water" belongs, and so the vocabulary in which the statement is written must be in favor of one of these exclusively. Then our question slides into the problem of the theoretical identification. One obvious strategy to bridge the gap between the two statements is to posit a bridge principle or bridge law. In such an account of the theoretical identification, there is "no conceivable experiment which could decide materialism and epiphenomenalism" about H\textsubscript{2}O/water (Smart 1959, 175); empirical evidences provide us with just covariance
between two facts, but whether we are satisfied with just correlation, or rather identify them rests upon our decision. We just prefer positing bridge principle for simplicity, rather than having "nomological dangler." (Smart 1959, 170).

But, queries Aunt Sally, should Gustav invent or posit a bridge principle like "H₂O = water"? He might prefer simplicity as earthlings do, so he might be willing to stipulate that water = H₂O rather than remain to be a dual-aspect theorist about water/H₂O. However, equally he might not. He might be one belonging to such a kind that he has temptation like "as many as possible" contrary to human kind. Then could he be satisfied with the two rather than one fact, just correlated? And does our alleged identity judgement like "water = H₂O" date back to our such built-in temptation? Aunt Sally's answer is "no." Whether Gustav shares with us the methodological maxim like Occam's razor is irrelevant here. Gustav needs not make anything, but only he is compelled to identify water with H₂O, only if he has logical acumen and some relevant "rich enough knowledge" about H₂O. Aunt Sally says that our physicalist intuition about water does not stem from such a vague methodological maxim. She agrees with Smart that the empirical work alone cannot determine between identity and correlation. But the verdict comes not from Occam's razor or decision, but from conceptual analysis in armchair, she says.

In that account of the theoretical identification, Aunt Sally agrees with Lewis as to the view that "materialists need do some conceptual analysis" for the defense of materialism (Jackson 1994, 483). According to him the theoretical identification is the combination of two independent processes, one a priori part, the other empirical part. From these two parts, the identification is derived as follows:

Water = that which fills the water role (by analysis).
$\text{H}_2\text{O} = \text{that which fills the water role (by science)}.\n\text{Therefore, Water} = \text{H}_2\text{O}.$

Here the a priori part amounts to the definition of "water" by a definite description. Given this definition, only if the contingent part is established by any empirical science, that is, only if one knows "rich enough" about $\text{H}_2\text{O} \text{ way things are, the identity follows by logical implication. Thus, Lewis says, "bridge principle is not made but found."(Lewis 1972, 207).}

But one could object that the scheme of Lewis is derived from his semantics of theoretical terms(Lewis 1970; 1972), which is perhaps false, or at least very problematic. The Lewis' theory, runs the objection, is especially implausible with regard to folk concepts like "water" or "pain". For it is dubious that ordinary concepts are such that they can be defined from any theory, and that even if it could be, the definite descriptions resulted ever exhausted the meaning of folk concepts; that's the very lessons from Kripke(1980) and Putnam(1975). In Kripke's locution, even if gold has turned out not to be yellow, and not to be metal, we did not cease to apply "gold" to what it had been applied to. That is, common nouns like "water" or "gold" are rigid designators. Then, we can interpret the account of Kripke and Putnam as saying that a semantic marker like "natural kind" is rooted in the concept itself as a component of meaning.\(^2\)

Thus, Aunt Sally learns also from Kripke and Putnam for that matter. She agrees willingly, following them, that natural kind terms are rigid designators; once their referents are fixed in one way or other, it refers to that in every possible world.

\(^2\) Only Putnam explicitly does it. But one could find many phrase suggesting the point like this in Kripke(1980). See especially pp.118–123 of Kripke(1980).
Now Aunt Sally notices there is a way to reconcile this view with that of Lewis. Her idea is that the mechanism whereby the references of our vocabulary are fixed in the counterfactual world is completely different from that in the actual world. In our world the referent of "water" is still determined by the intension or something like definite descriptions. But once the extension is fixed in that way in the actual world, the extension of "water" in other counterfactual worlds is determined once and for all as a function of the actual world extension. What Aunt Sally conceives is best represented using rigidifying operator "Dthat" Kaplan(1979) invented:

Water = def Dthat (that which fills the water role)

Aunt Sally contends that this identity exhausts all the components of meaning of "water", in that it includes the "internal" part of meaning as a definite description, and specifies that it is a rigid designator. Though this definition does not include as a part the extension as Putnam advised, it provides the way to fix the reference relative to the context. But once the referent is fixed in that situation, the reference is rigidified, by the operator "Dthat." We obtain from this account of natural kind concepts a well-defined conceptual analysis. The conceptual analysis is to give a semantic marker like "natural kind," and the context-dependent reference determining condition, whether this were properly called "meaning" or just gave application conditions. Then the statement "water is the occupant of water role" is contingent a priori; a priori because they come from conceptual analysis, and contingent because while the extension of "water" is rigidified, the definite description could refer to XYZ in other worlds.

After long digression about semantics of natural kind concepts, Aunt Sally finds now a relevant kind of bridge
principle, a kind of hybrid from Lewis and Kripke, which is not made but found, and whereby Gustav could be said to deduce facts about water \textit{a priori} from facts about H\textsubscript{2}O. Namely, we obtain a valid deduction as follows:

(1) Actually\textsuperscript{3)} (in the actual world), water = the occupant of water role.

(2) Actually (in the actual world), H\textsubscript{2}O = the occupant of water role.

(3) Therefore in the actual world, water = H\textsubscript{2}O.

(4) By rigidity of "H\textsubscript{2}O" and "water", necessarily water = H\textsubscript{2}O.

(5) Therefore, the statement about H\textsubscript{2}O implies that about water and \textit{vice versa}.

From the \textit{actual} world identity (3) between natural kinds, it follows that they are necessarily identical. Therefore if Gustav learns only premises (1) and (2), he can be able to deduce \textit{a priori} facts about water. But since (1) is derived from conceptual analysis (if he has concepts of "water"), all he has to learn is the premise (2); that is, the fact that H\textsubscript{2}O satisfies or realizes the descriptive meaning of "water." In turn, all he needs to know for that is our earth’s "environmental physical nature" which, Jackson contends, can be covered by a "rich enough story about the H\textsubscript{2}O way things are."(Jackson 1995, 189).

\textsuperscript{3)} Here sentential adverb (operator) "actually" is essential, though in usual formulations it is often omitted. This operator could not be dealt with in classical modal logic without further specification on the interpreter’s part, and so Davies and Humberstone(1980) formulated enriched modal logic with operator 'A' and 'F', which are read "actually" and "fixedly" respectively. Indeed, in that system of modal logic the status of identity in our premise (1) should be evaluated as "FA (water : the occupant of waterish role)," which roughly states that "water : the occupant of water role" is \textit{a priori}. 
3. Metaphysical Gap or Epistemological Gap?

Then what about the case of the consciousness and its neural correlate? (Let’s call neural correlate of consciousness “NCC” for short) Given our earlier discussion of the intrinsicalism, you are willing to infer that this argument successfully discriminates the water/H$_2$O case from the consciousness/NCC case. For the counterpart of premise (1) in the case of consciousness cannot be made, since any causal or functional role uniquely specifying consciousness is absent. Or in Kripke’s terminology, since the way the reference is fixed as to “pain” is itself pain, the “pain role” is not factorable from the concept of pain. Therefore Mary, unlike Gustav, cannot derive that a certain brain state is the conscious experience. Furthermore, as a bonus, from this argument we learn “what it is that convinced us that ‘water = H$_2$O’ is necessarily true.” (Jackson, 1994, 488).

But so what? This argument indicates that the water/H$_2$O case and the consciousness/NCC case are different in certain respects. Yet this still does not show that the knowledge argument succeeds as an anti-materialist argument. The alleged a priori status of the above deduction is only viable under another additional substantive premise (2); then, knowledge argument of water/H$_2$O still works as well as that of consciousness/NCC, since Gustav remains to learn new facts as much as Mary. Moreover, the objection continues, Aunt Sally’s strategy is nothing but an argument from analogy; it only shows that the consciousness case cannot be identified in that way. But why is it ever relevant to the metaphysical identification that one concept is analyzable that way? At most it shows that it is a route, or rather a detour to the theoretical identification: It does not establish that the conceptual analysis is necessary for the identification.
Our dauntless Aunt Sally sways at this point. At one time Aunt Sally just bites the bullet here. She says “the physicalist is committed to there being an *a priori* story to tell about how the physical way things are makes true the psychological way things are.” (Jackson 1993, 40) Aunt Sally’s reason for this, if it is a reason, is that the necessary *a posteriori* always goes hand in hand with the contingent *a priori*; thus, the latter could be a criterion of the former. But she again swallows the bullet at this point (Or does she base this claim on the induction of other cases?4). Anyway Aunt Sally concludes on this ground that there is a *metaphysical gap*: Consciousness can not be identified with, or not supervene upon the brain process. It perhaps could be “nomological danglers” just law-likely correlated with NCC. In other words, consciousness is not logically supervenient, but only naturally supervenient on the physical (Chalmers 1996).

But at another time Aunt Sally asks to herself: How can our most humble intuitions do so much? So she is about to give up the ideas in her armchair altogether. But she soon realizes that it is only at her last instant when she is wrong, not for the whole period. It is *reductive explanation*, she corrects, not identification, that proceeds through two-stage process. “Stage 1 involves the (relatively? quasi?) *a priori* process of working the concept of the property to be reduced ‘into shape’ for reduction by identifying the causal role for which we are seeking the underlying mechanisms. Stage 2 involves the empirical work of discovering just what those underlying mechanisms are” (Levine 1993, 132) How do we reductively explain facts about water? We should characterize first “reference-fixing description” of

4) Indeed, Jackson seems to have in mind this. He alludes the fact that human being is just the one placed on the right side of the evolutionary chart (Jackson 1993, 189)
"water." (a priori part) And then we find "the structure that in this world occupies the water role." (Levine 1993, 131) (empirical process) The identification of water with H₂O is the result of such an explanation rather than the basis of reductive explanation. "Theoretical identification is justified principally on the basis of its explanatory power" (Levine, 1993, 131).

Take cases of reduction in other disciplines. A biological concept "reproduction" can be reductively explained by adverting to genetic and cellular mechanisms by which organisms produce other organisms; that is, by specifying the physical mechanism playing "reproduction role." Someone objects: "This explains how the cellular processes can lead to the production of a complex physical entity that is similar to the original entity, but it doesn't explain reproduction" (Chalmers 1996, 43) In reply to this, one says, "It does, because 'producing other organisms' is itself all that 'reproduction' means." There should not be any further question. The question, "why does that cellular mechanism accompany the reproduction?" makes no sense. But in the case of consciousness, why consciousness is ever correlated with the NCC remains mysterious. There seems to be an explanatory gap, as Levine (1983) puts it, since consciousness is not subject to such a conceptual analysis.

Note that the theoretical identification is justified by its explanatory power, not deduced, according to Levine. But why is the explanatory power the sole route to the identification? Why could not other considerations like simplicity or economy be the source of identification, or rather why couldn't those considerations constitute the explanatory power Aunt Sally calls for? If Levine is to achieve what he intends, that is, that the theoretical identification is not derived from Aunt Sally's scheme, he should also agree that other factors than explanatory power could lead to our identity judgement. The explanatory
power is one reason among many for the identification.

But if we identify consciousness with NCC in favor of considerations of simplicity or parsimony etc., it is trivial that the facts about NCC "epistemologically" necessitate the facts about consciousness. As Levine thinks, explanation is said to be a deduction. But if "Necessarily, consciousness = NCC" is given on some grounds, the explanation of consciousness in terms of NCC is straightforward. The upshot is that the explanatory gap without the metaphysical gap is not possible, if one bears in mind something like deductive explanation. Given identification, a deductive explanation follows. If this is not the explanation Aunt Sally wants, what kind of explanation does she expect? But we have more to say about theoretical identification. After that we will return to the problem.

4. Recapitulation and Objection

Whether consciousness as we know it and NCC are one or two, as far as the two are conceptually independent, our problem turns out to be a part of the general problem of the theoretical identification. And we concluded that Aunt Sally's scheme might be sufficient for the identification, though not necessary, so the analogy with the water/H\textsubscript{2}O case is just an analogy and does not give any compelling reason to give up the identity between consciousness and NCC.

However, Aunt Sally protests, if it is the sufficient condition, and moreover any other features of the world than consciousness are capable of identification in this way, the analogy is at least a good reason for the property dualism about consciousness. But does it really constitute the sufficient condition? It was in the for-simplicity view (let's thus call the
view like Smart's) where our Aunt Sally was first faced with difficulty. Aunt Sally's discussion about the antagonism between the for-simplicity view and Aunt Sally's "armchair" view was somewhat intuitive, but we let her run on without seizing her for inquisition. But our intuition that Gustav just comes to know "water = \text{H}_2\text{O}\) with little effort might be due to the weight we ourselves put to that identity statement. So when a full-fledged unified theory of consciousness will be available, we might take for granted the identity between consciousness and NCC as much as the water/\text{H}_2\text{O} case.

Many philosophers prefer such an account of the theoretical identification. According to P. S. Churchland, Aunt Sally (in her first alternative) "fails to appreciate why scientists opt for identification when they do." (P. S. Churchland 1994, 132) It is a historical fact that scientists have opted for the identification for the reason of "explanatory power, coherence and economy" (P. S. Churchland 1994, 133) That is, her argument for identifying consciousness and NCC amounts to a piece of futurology. But I am unwilling to agree to this view either, for what counts is not a historical matter of fact, but a matter of rational reconstruction. The problem is whether it is really capable of reconstruction as Aunt Sally thinks.

Since Aunt Sally's deduction in her scheme is a valid argument, we should scrutinize whether the premises of the deduction are established as Aunt Sally thinks they are. The premise (2) of Aunt Sally's scheme "Actually, \text{H}_2\text{O} = \text{the occupant of water role}" states that \text{H}_2\text{O} realizes, or satisfies the definite description of water. But what is it for \text{H}_2\text{O} to satisfy or realize the water role or descriptive meaning in question? Does the relevant empirical work on the environment alone reveal that \text{H}_2\text{O} satisfies the water role? To the logically minded like Lewis it might be self-evident, but to me not. What kind of knowledge is needed for knowing the realization
fact?

Suppose that Gustav takes water sample to his laboratory, and that he finds the molecules constituting water are really H₂O. Then does he know that H₂O is the occupant of the water role? Might not he think that H₂O property causes water property rather than that the two is the same? Suppose again that to prove for Gustav that water = H₂O, an earthling arranged a demonstration. He presented H₂O molecules one by one to Gustav. Then he collected them step by step, without forgetting convincing Gustav that there was no trick. As a result there appeared a huge aggregation of H₂O molecules, which we know is water. And he demonstrated to Gustav that that aggregation of H₂O behaved as water. Then would Gustav assent with a nod that water = H₂O? I think he might not. He might think, say, that water property is emergent from aggregation of H₂O.

The thought experiments were highly contrived, but I think this kind of thing does really happen in science class in elementary school, and even in the every day discourse. Test yourself: Do moving electrons give rise to electric current, or are these identical? Is heat generated by the faster movement of molecules, or is this that? Are you right? Scientists prefer the latter. It is not until we learn from the teacher with an eye of suspicion that water = H₂O when we can know the water role is realized by H₂O.

Perhaps some would think that my argument capitalizes on the vestiges of the description theory of meaning in Aunt Sally’s story. The same tenor of the Aunt Sally’s semantic theory, she suggests, could receive a more elegant representation. What she has in mind is the two dimensional framework, which assumes that we have two notions of

5) Indeed the two dimensional framework is main tool in the arguments of
possible worlds, one considered as actual, and the other considered as counterfactual (Davies and Humberstone 1980), and then represents the reference condition of a concept in a two-dimensional matrix of possible worlds. She contends that this might work well in the way that eludes this criticism. While it leaves the argument place of the operator "\textit{D}\text{that}" blank, instead it represents the argument, which Chalmers names as the primary intension (Chalmers 1994; 1996), as a function: from the possible worlds considered as actual to the referents in those worlds. Then the concept of "water" refers to \textit{H}_2\textit{O} in the actual world, and refers to \textit{XYZ} when the Twin Earth world is considered as the actual world.

![Fig.1. Adapted from Block and Stalnaker (1997).](image)

But the two dimensionalism, as far as it is only a framework and it doesn't tell what mechanism implements the "function," can be resources neither to Aunt Sally nor to me. For, again, how and why are we forced to conclude that actually \textit{H}_2\textit{O} is water? Indeed what the advocates of the two dimensionalism achieve is no more than a groundless presumption:

In certain cases, the decision about what a concept refers to in the actual world involves a large amount of reflection about what is the most reasonable thing to say \cdots{} So consideration of just

Chalmers and Jackson. For detailed discussions of it, see the original version of this paper.
what the primary intension picks out in various actual-world candidates may involve a corresponding amount of reflection. But this is not to say that the matter is not a priori: we have the ability to engage in this reasoning independently of how the world turns out.(Chalmers 1996, 58).

True, we might decide anyhow purely on reflection, only because the empirical alone underdetermines what a concept refers to in the actual world. But this is not to say that the decision is constituted only by relevant conceptual facts. Perhaps, again, something other than conceptual facts, like simplicity consideration, might play a role. My bet is that these other considerations, whatever they really turn out to be, are not such a kind that excludes the consciousness/NCC case.

I cannot review all the stories suggested as a theory of intension or mode-of-presentation implementing the primary intension. But I think that the point would apply to all of them. Any internal dimension of meaning plus the empirical is incapable of establishing the actual world identity as expected. It is only after we decide that water = H₂O when we come to know that H₂O satisfies or realizes the intension of the "water." Even if Aunt Sally partially reconstructs the connection between the intension and the extension Putnam and Kripke once destructed, still the relation is not so strong as Aunt Sally expected to be.

Perhaps the last and the most promising resort Aunt Sally would take up is the causal theory of reference. The above matrix is filled by considerations of causal interactions with environment. What we apply "water" to in the actual world is H₂O since our "water" concept is de facto causally related to H₂O, and XYZ in Twin Earth world mutatis mutandis. Although I think that this is a plausible account, this attractive theory would not help Aunt Sally in this context. For, if the
connection between "water" and H₂O is not so solid, and if we can only expect just de facto covariance relationship, why cannot our consciousness concept refer to NCC directly, and why cannot we infer from the correlation of consciousness/NCC to the identity?

The upshot is that the theoretical identification cannot be reconstructed in the way that rules out only the consciousness/NCC case as Aunt Sally thinks. As in any other subject of reconstruction of scientific theory, the conceptual and the empirical alone turn out not to be sufficient for reconstruction. The bridge law is to be posited, not implied, in favor of other considerations like simplicity. Then even in this initial stage of scientific research of consciousness, there are ample reasons to think that consciousness is nothing but one kind of brain process, rather than to think that consciousness is "nomological dangler" just correlated with it, only if the correlation fact is well-established. In this picture, consciousness as we know it from within would be just one mode of presentation under which our brain state appears to the first-person.

5. Conclusion

Then what is the explanatory gap? Is there still a sense of mystery? We concluded earlier that given identities the reductive explanation follows. Then what could Aunt Sally mean by it? Sometimes the explanatory gap is vividly expressed by quoting a passage from Thomas Huxley:

How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nerve tissue is, just as unacceptable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin
rubbed his lamp. (From McGinn 1989, 1).

Now, given our above conclusion, should we reply to Huxley that it is "unacceptable" and mysterious in the exactly same degree that H₂O shows such a macro property as of water rather than ammonia, or that the lattice structure of a crystal yields the macro property solidity rather than liquidity? I think not, for there remains another great problem of consciousness; namely, its subjectivity.

Even though identities need not be explained, there should be "explanations how the two terms and their modes of presentations can denote the same thing." (Block and Stalnaker, 1997) Then here we should face with the asymmetry between the first person and the third person perspectives. For, why do only I experience and refer my brain state under such a unique mode of presentation? Why does my brain state appear to me in the way that other persons are never permitted to access? The sense of mystery, I submit, seems to lie in the subjective aspects of consciousness, which the intrinsicalism systematically ignores from its very formulation. And this is why I think the intrinsicalist formulation of the consciousness problem is ill-posed.

Let me emphasize one point as my last argument to make sure that the dualism based on the intrinsicalism has misled discussions about consciousness. The new property resulting from the conceptual analysis argument is something like "ghost in the machine." There exists consciousness, something like ghost, over and above the brain state, of which brain or psychological capacity of cognition is directly or essentially aware without mediation of a mode-of-presentation. The most problematic in such a conception is that how one directly aware of his "ghost" (or is this "ghost" him himself?) and why his "ghost" is only subjectively accessible remains mysterious
still, even though their motivation of the intrinsicalism is their own acquaintance with it from the first-person point of view. But then what good of this "ghost"? That is, even if their anti-materialist argument based on the conceptual analysis would succeed, and so some kind of "naturalistic dualism" (Chalmers 1996) were true, another great problem of consciousness, its subjectivity remains to be solved. No doubt, in this picture our problem on subjectivity would be insolvable without ad hoc assumptions.

I have no idea how to tackle the problem of subjectivity, even how to define the subjectivity. But, if I am correct, I have done really something, for I freed discussions of consciousness from such an a priori argument.

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