

# Globalization, Cultural Traditions, and Adolescents' Value Orientations

Kim, Hyungryeol\*

## Abstract

Using data on eight-grade adolescents surveyed in the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), this paper investigates whether globalization can have an impact on adolescents' value orientations from an aggregate cross-national perspective. The results of two-level hierarchical linear models (HLM) refute the hyperglobalist thesis for the universal convergence of values as a result of globalization, i.e., more globalized countries are characterized by the declining relevance of traditional markers of identity (e.g., nationality and religion) and their replacement with values that are more democratic and tolerant. Rather, findings lend support to the skeptical and transformative theses that focus on the enduring influence of cultural traditions on adolescents' value systems. Adolescents' supports for democratic values and immigrant rights do not vary across countries in accordance with the level of globalization. The influence of a country's cultural tradition on adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, and gender equality persists, even after controlling for the effect of globalization. A supplementary analysis also reveals that what conditions the effect of globalization on adolescents' value orientations is economic development rather than democratic advancement.

Key words: Globalization, Adolescents' Value Orientations, Cultural Traditions, Cross-national research

\* First author, Assistant Professor, Seoul National University

## I . Introduction

Globalization is a contested concept. While some might point to the spread of modernization as a sign of globalization, a more nuanced analysis of globalization reveals that the interconnectedness of globalization is at the same time asymmetrical and unequal. Economic collapses, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, terrorism, cultural and military imperialism, as well as awareness of and response to these challenges have all should be regarded as part of the processes of globalization. This double-sidedness of globalization necessitates a critical viewpoint to the current historical moment in which globalization is causing inevitable changes across nations. In this sense, Kellner (1998) argues that globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon “that involves different levels, flows, tensions, and conflicts, such that a trans-disciplinary social theory is necessary to capture its contours, dynamics, trajectories, problems, and possible futures” (Kellner, 1998, p. 24).

Among diverse changes that globalization drives, the most important consideration for this article is the cultural one: can globalization create an “international regime” for democracy and human rights (Donnelly, 1986) by diffusing democratic culture and values around the world? In the existing literature, this cultural impact of globalization has received less attention than the economic and political aspects of globalization. While some authors have noted that globalization is associated with a shift away from traditional religious values toward values that are more democratic and tolerant (Castells, 1997; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997; Roberston, 1992), only a few of them have empirically investigated such claim (e.g., Inglehart, 2000). None of these studies, to my knowledge, have focused attention on whether globalization can bring systematic value changes in one’s formative years—especially during adolescence, the period which the cultural influence of globalization has been known to be particularly salient. As Jensen (2003) notes, “...adolescents are at the forefront of globalization. Popular and media culture (television, movies, music, and the Internet) contribute to the rapid and extensive spread of ideas across cultures, and adolescents have more of an interest in popular and media culture than children or adults” (Jensen, 2003, p. 191). Longitudinal research has also shown that value orientations shaped in adolescence remains relatively stable throughout one’s lifetime (Inglehart, 1997; Sears, 1981).

Using cross-national data on eight-grade adolescents surveyed in the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), this paper tests three theses that offer very

different explanations regarding whether globalization can have an impact on adolescents' value orientations. The first explanation is the hyperglobalist thesis for the convergence of values across countries, emphasizing that more globalized countries are characterized by the declining relevance of traditional markers of identity (e.g., nationality and religion) and their replacement with values that are more democratic and tolerant. By contrast, the skeptical thesis claims that a country's cultural tradition exerts an independent influence on value orientations despite the forces of globalization. Additionally, the transformative thesis pays attention to how global and domestic factors, sometimes in interaction, mediate value changes in adolescence. The results of two-level hierarchical linear models (HLM) refute the hyperglobalist thesis, and lend support to the skeptical and transformative theses that focus on the enduring influence of cultural traditions on adolescents' value systems. Adolescents' supports for democratic values and immigrant rights do not vary across countries in accordance with the level of globalization. The influence of a country's cultural tradition on adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, and gender equality persists, even after controlling for the effect of globalization.

## II. Theoretical Frameworks

### 1. Three Perspectives on Globalization

Facing fundamental uncertainties wrought by globalization, past research has led to vigorous debates over theorizing globalization. In providing an overview of different perspectives on globalization, Held, McGrew, David, and Perraton (1999) distinguishes three main theoretical responses—*hyperglobalist* thesis, *skeptical* thesis, and *transformative* thesis.

The *hyperglobalist* thesis views globalization as “a new epoch of human history” (Held et al., 1999, p. 3), which is featured by the declining relevance of state sovereignty. For hyperglobalists, globalization denotes the emergence of a single global governance and the dissolution of local cultures and patterns of life (see, for example, Albrow, 1996; Cox, 1997; Luard, 1990; Ohmae, 1990, 1995; Strange, 1996; Tomlinson, 1999; Waters, 1995). That said, hyperglobalist scholars disagree over whether such convergent effects of globalization are good or bad. At one end are neo-liberal scholars, who have posited that globalization fosters

desirable common goals worldwide by advancing free market economies, democratic governments, and the protection of human rights (e.g., Fukuyama, 1992; Sachs, 2006; Seita, 1997). On the other end, there are scholars who have maintained a more cautious stance toward globalization and claimed that the increase of global connectedness has created and reinforced inequalities within and between countries (e.g., Gill, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002, 2007).

The skeptical thesis, by contrast, sees globalization as a “myth” rather than a reality (Hirst, Thompson, & Bromley, 1996, pp. 2-4). Contrary to the hyperglobalist argument for global convergence, this skeptical thesis contends that current international processes are more fragmented than globalized (Boyer & Drache, 1996; Gordon, 1999; Weiss, 1998). For instance, skeptical authors believe that the growth of multinational corporations and international organizations does not mean that nation-states are no longer relevant for managing economic and political activities; such supranational systems are still tied primarily to their home states or regions (Allen & Thompson, 1997; Hirst et al., 1996; Ruigrok & Tulder, 1995). In so doing, skeptical authors argue that, paradoxically, globalization reinforces the importance of traditional markers of identity associated with nationality, race, ethnicity, and religion in preserving national and cultural specifics (Krasner, 1999). Globalization, in the skeptical view, is conceptualized as divergent national and regional responses to maintain their positions on the international stage, not as convergence to a universal paradigm of market capitalism and governance (Schmidt, 1999).

Between these two extremes, the transformative thesis argues for a more accommodative stance toward globalization. Although the transformative thesis does not deny that globalization is a historically unprecedented phenomenon, unlike hyperglobalists, it makes no claims about the future trajectory of globalization (Castells, 1996; Giddens, 1990, 1999; Ruggie, 1993; Sassen, 1996; Scholte, 1993). In contrast to the skeptical view where “nothing has really changed,” the transformationalists highlight the “transforming” roles of national governments and old cleavages in an increasingly borderless world (Keohane, 2002; Rosenau, 1997). For transformative authors, the processes of globalization seem much less determinate than assumed by the hyperglobalists and skeptics, because there is no single driving force behind globalization and its consequences are not yet fully determined (Hoogvelt, 1997; Mann, 1997). The intensification of global connectedness, in the transformationalist view, has changed the ways that local and global forces interact with one another, and both should adapt to new conditions brought by globalization.

## 2. Global Convergence versus the Persistence of Cultural Traditions

This study's primary focus is on the cultural impact of globalization—can globalization create an “international regime” for democracy and human rights (Donnelly, 1986) by bringing systematic value changes during one's pre-adult formative years? The three perspectives on globalization noted above help formulate this article's hypotheses.

On the one hand, the hyperglobalists assume the convergence of values with the emergence of a global governance structure. As capitalism becomes an almost universal way of life, the hyperglobalist argument goes, rising income levels give rise to the convergence of fundamental values—deeply held beliefs about what is right and wrong—across countries towards liberal democratic values (e.g., support for democracy and human rights) (Seita, 1997). More globalized countries are, it is argued, characterized by the declining relevance of traditional markers of identity such as nationality and religion and their replacement with values that are more democratic and tolerant (Castells, 1997; Meyer et al., 1997; Roberston, 1992). In this sense, the hyperglobalist argument can be construed as a continuation of its modernization counterpart in the earlier part of the 20th century (Cheung, 2000), which assumed that there is only one route of social progress, i.e., the modernization process that inevitably heads for some kind of the “Western” model (see, among others, Friedman, 1962; Lerner, 1958; Lipset, 1959; Weiner, 1966). Unarguably, both hyperglobalist and modernization debates revolve around the existence of the ultimate destiny of all humanity, and the suitability of the Western value system in non-Western societies. Based on such hyperglobalist argument for the convergence of values across countries, I formulate the first hypothesis as follows:

- H. 1. Adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, democracy, and human rights vary across countries according to the level of globalization rather than according to their historically rooted cultural traditions.
- H 1. 1. The extent to which adolescents believe the importance of religion and nation-states in society is lower in more globalized societies than in less globalized societies.
- H 1. 2. The extent to which adolescents support democratic values, gender equality, and immigrant rights is higher in more globalized societies than in less globalized societies.

On the other hand, the skeptical thesis questions the inevitability of universal convergence of values as implied by the hyperglobalists. The skeptics takes a culturalist perspective that distinctive cultural traits endure over long periods of time and continue to shape societies' value systems (e.g., Zakaria, 1994). The process of globalization, according to the skeptical view, has not been able to eradicate civilization diversity, far from increasing uniformity in the form of a universalization of "Western" liberal democracy. For instance, Huntington (1993, 1996) argues that cultural heritages exert enduring influences on the political and social outlooks of the world population, irrespective of the forces of globalization. In doing so, he further distinguishes eight major human civilization or "cultural zones," such as Western Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Islamic world, the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, and Latin American zones. Hence, the rise of "Asianization," or "Islamization" stands in sharp contrast with the converging trend of globalization, where "the very phrase 'world community' has become the euphemistic collective noun...to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers" (Huntington, 1993, p. 39). As such, the skeptical view highlights cross-cultural value differences that persist in the face of globalization. This skeptical thesis is formulated in hypothesis two accordingly:

- H. 2. Adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, democracy, and human rights are influenced by their countries' historically rooted cultural traditions rather than by the level of globalization.

Lastly, the transformative perspective proposes a middle ground, that is, the coexistence of global convergence and cultural divergence of values in a stable equilibrium. In the transformative view, although globalization brings about systematic value changes across countries, cultural heritages simultaneously affect the way people understand the world and their place within it. For instance, in his later work on social trust and obligations in Confucian Asian countries, even Fukuyama (1995) acknowledged that "if democracy and capitalism work best when they are leavened with cultural traditions that arise from non-liberal sources, then it should be clear that modernity and tradition can coexist in a stable equilibrium for extended periods of time" (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 351). Hence, the transformative perspective on globalization predicts that:

- H. 3. The influence of cultural traditions on adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, democracy, and human rights holds, even when controlling for the effect of globalization.

### III. Method

#### 1. Data

I analyzed data from the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS). As a cross-sectional, cross-national dataset with individual adolescents as the unit of analysis, ICCS 2009 is the largest-scale international study on adolescents' perceptions of democracy and citizenship ever conducted, including 140,000 eight-grade adolescents, 62,000 teachers, and 5,300 school principals from 38 countries. Countries were selected for each analysis depending on the availability of relevant information on globalization (see Table 1). Seven countries which lacked information on adolescents' attitude toward the influence of religion in society (i.e., Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Mexico) were excluded from the corresponding analyses. Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon (2011) provide additional technical details on the ICCS 2009.

#### 2. Measures

##### 1) Dependent variables

*Attitudes toward the influence of religion in society*—In the ICCS student questionnaire, adolescents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with statements about how much influence religion should have in society: (1) Religion is more important to me than what is happening in national politics; (2) Religion helps me to decide what is right and what is wrong; (3) Religious leaders should have more power in society; (4) Religion should influence people's behavior toward others; (5) Rules of life based on religion are more important than civil wars. Based on these six items, the scale adolescents' attitudes toward the influence of religion in society was derived. Higher values on the scale corresponds to

greater influence of religion in society.

*Attitudes toward one's country*—The ICCS student questionnaire included a series of statements about their country. Adolescents were asked to indicate their level of agreement (from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”) with those statements. Among them, seven items were utilized to construct a scale measuring their attitudes toward country: (1) The flag of country of test is important to me; (2) The political system in country of test works well; (3) I have great respect for country of test; (4) In country of test, we should be proud of what we have achieved; (5) I am proud to live in country of test; (6) Country of test shows a lot of respect for the environment; (7) Generally speaking, country of test is a better country to live in than most other countries. Higher values on the scale mean that adolescents have more favorable attitudes toward their country.

*Support for democratic values*—Five items from the ICCS student questionnaire were used to derive the scale measuring adolescents' support for democratic values: (1) Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely; (2) All people should have their social and political rights respected; (3) People should always be free to criticize the government publicly; (4) All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely; (5) People should be able to protest if they believe a law is unfair. These questions required adolescents to indicate their level of agreement (from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”). Higher values on the scale correspond to the greater support for democratic values.

*Support for gender equality*—The scale measuring adolescents' support for gender equality were derived from six items in the ICCS student questionnaire: (1) Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government; (2) Men and women should have the same rights in every way; (3) Women should stay out of politics; (4) When there are not many jobs available, men should have more right to a job than women ; (4) Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs; (5) Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women. Higher values on the scale denote greater support for gender equality.

*Support for immigrant rights*—The scale measuring adolescents' support for immigrant rights were constructed based on five items in the ICCS student questionnaire: (1) Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue speaking their own language; (2) Immigrant children should have the same opportunities for education that other children in the country have; (3) Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the opportunity to vote in

elections; (4) Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue their own customs and lifestyle; (5) Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in the country has. Higher values on the scale correspond to greater support for immigrant rights.

## 2) Individual-level variables

Adolescents' demographic variables that have been found to affect adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, democracy and human rights are also controlled for in the analyses. These individual-level control variables include age, gender, expected years of education, immigration status, and urbanity (see Appendix Tables A and C).

## 3) Country-level variables

*Globalization index*—To indicate cross-country difference in the level of globalization, I drew upon two globalization indices: the KOF index of globalization (2009) and the Ernst & Young index of globalization (2009). For both indices, higher values correspond to higher levels of globalization with a country.

Originally developed in 2002 and then updated on a yearly basis, the KOF globalization index captures three main dimensions of globalization, i.e., economic integration, political integration, and social integration. It was constructed based on several variables that relate to the three main dimensions of globalization. These variables have been combined to formulate six groups—actual flows of trade and investment, restrictions of international transactions, variables measuring the degree of political integration and cultural integration, variables measuring the degree of personal contacts with people living in foreign countries, and variables measuring trans-border flows of information. These six groups are combined to form the three sub-indices that refer to economic, political, and social aspects of globalization, as well as one overall index of globalization. This study employs the overall index of globalization.

In addition, the Ernst & Young globalization index was first developed in 2009 in collaboration with the Economist Intelligence Unit. The index was constructed based on five underlying drivers of globalization—openness to trade, capital flows, exchange of technology and ideas, labor movements, and cultural integration. With these key categories, a broad

range of sub-indices were combined to formulate an index indicating the degree of globalization for 60 countries.

*Cultural traditions*—Based on Huntington (1993) and Inglehart and Baker (2000), I distinguish seven cultural traditions: *Historically Protestant*, *Historically Catholic*, *English-speaking*, *ex-Communist*, *Latin American*, *Confucian*, and *Southeast Asian*. Historically Protestant countries are the reference group.

### 3. Analytic approach

The two-level hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) approach and software were applied in this study (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002a). I built five separate sets of two-level HLM models, one for each dependent variable, which treated adolescents as the first-level unit and countries as the second-level unit. In order to take into account the nested structure of data originated from the two-stage sampling framework, total student weights (TOTWGT)<sup>1</sup> were used at the individual-level (Level 1).

Before arriving at the final model, three intermediary models (Models 1 through 3) were created within each set of the outcome measures, whereby predictors were specified at Level 1 or Level 2 in an incremental fashion. By modeling these intermediary models, I was able to estimate the incremental variance explained by each of the variables of interest. Due to space limitations, only the final model (Model 4) is presented in this section. The individual-level equation predicts each outcome measure for an adolescent  $i$  in country  $j$  as follows:

$$\text{Individual-level: } Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{age}) + \beta_{2j}(\text{gender}) + \beta_{3j}(\text{expected years of education}) + \beta_{4j}(\text{immigration background}) + \beta_{5j}(\text{urbanity}) + \gamma_{ij}$$

$$\gamma_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

1) The total student weight is equal to the inverse of the joint probability of selection for a particular student (i.e., the probability that school A and class B and student C are selected). For more detailed information on sampling weights, see the technical report of ICCS 2009 (Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon 2011).

where  $B_{oj}$  represents the country average on the outcome measure for country  $j$ , controlling for all individual-level variables included in the model.  $r_{ij}$  indicates a random effect which is unique to each individual adolescent.  $B_{1j}$  through  $B_{5j}$  represent the coefficients of individual-level variables described in the earlier section. All individual-level variables were centered around corresponding group means.

In the country-level equation, the coefficients derived from the individual-level equation serve as dependent variables as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Country-level: } \beta_{0j} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\text{Globalization index}) + \gamma_{02}(\text{Historically Catholic}) + \\ &\gamma_{03}(\text{English-speaking}) + \gamma_{04}(\text{ex-Communist}) + \gamma_{05}(\text{Latin America}) + \\ &\gamma_{06}(\text{Confucian}) + \gamma_{07}(\text{Southeast Asian}) + \mu_{0j} \\ \beta_{1j} &= \gamma_{10} \\ \dots \beta_{5j} &= \gamma_{50} \\ \mu_{0j} &\sim N(0, \tau_{00}) \end{aligned}$$

In this country-level equation, the intercept  $B_{oj}$  was specified as varying across countries, while all other coefficients (i.e.,  $B_{1j}$  through  $B_{5j}$ ) were assumed to be constant. The intercept  $B_{oj}$  (i.e., the country average on the outcome measure for country  $j$ ) was predicted by the level of globalization and cultural traditions. To facilitate interpretation, each country-level variable was entered into the model centered around its corresponding grand means.

## IV. Findings


### 1. Cross-country Difference in the Globalization Index

Table 1 contains information on cross-country differences in the levels of globalization, democratic advancement, and economic development. Countries are arranged according to each country's cultural tradition, i.e., *Protestant*, *Catholic*, *English-speaking*, *ex-communist*, *Latin American*, *Confucian*, and *Southeast Asian*.

As evident in Figures 1 and 2, the top five countries in the KOF globalization index are Belgium (91.51), Ireland (91.02), Netherlands (89.92), Switzerland (89.87), and Austria (89.14).


Table 1. Cross-country differences in the levels of globalization, democratic advancement, and economic development

	KOF globalization index	Emst & Young Globalization index	Democracy index	GDP per capita (US \$)
<b><i>Protestant</i></b>				
Netherlands	89.92	5.45	9.53	46750
Switzerland	89.87	5.77	9.15	56207
Sweden	88.68	5.77	9.88	49662
Denmark	87.38	5.77	9.52	57051
Luxembourg	86.28	–	9.10	103042
Finland	84.19	5.14	9.25	46261
Norway	82.27	4.59	9.68	82480
Average	86.94	5.39	9.44	63064.71
<b><i>Catholic</i></b>				
Belgium	91.51	5.82	8.16	42609
Austria	89.14	4.88	8.49	44879
Spain	82.94	4.47	8.45	32017
Cyprus	82.70	3.96	7.70	24895
Malta	81.24	–	8.30	18203
Italy	78.80	3.96	7.98	35396
Greece	77.00	3.90	8.13	27995
Average	83.33	4.61	8.17	32284.86
<b><i>English-speaking</i></b>				
Ireland	91.02	6.87	9.01	59342
New Zealand	84.55	4.42	9.19	32086
England	79.31	4.76	8.15	45442
Average	84.96	5.35	8.78	45623.33
<b><i>Ex-Communist</i></b>				
Czech Republic	84.65	4.53	8.19	16934
Estonia	83.45	–	7.68	15578
Slovenia	82.40	–	7.96	23379
Slovakia	81.24	4.34	7.33	13891
Poland	77.96	4.02	7.30	11072
Lithuania	77.24	–	7.36	11356
Latvia	76.14	–	7.23	11930
Bulgaria	74.85	4.03	7.02	5163
Russia	65.24	2.77	4.48	9079
Average	78.13	3.94	7.17	12267.14
<b><i>Latin American</i></b>				
Chile	74.99	4.06	7.89	9878
Mexico	64.11	3.50	6.78	9715
Dominican Republic	63.83	3.33	6.20	3772
Guatemala	60.48	–	6.07	2536
Paraguay	59.56	–	6.40	1997
Average	64.59	3.63	6.67	5579.60
<b><i>Confucian</i></b>				
South Korea	65.87	4.17	8.01	20014
Taiwan	–	4.90	7.82	29800
Hong Kong	–	6.90	5.85	29912
Average	–	5.32	7.23	26575.33
<b><i>Southeast Asian</i></b>				
Thailand	66.59	3.53	6.81	3844
Indonesia	57.66	2.70	6.34	1918
Average	62.15	3.12	6.58	2881



[Figure 1] KOF Globalization Index by Country

Hong Kong (6.90), Ireland (6.87), Belgium (5.82), Sweden (5.77), and Denmark (5.77) belong to the top five countries in the Ernst & Young globalization index. By comparison, Indonesia (57.66), Paraguay (59.56), Colombia (59.56), Guatemala (60.48), and Dominican Republic (63.83) show the lowest levels of globalization in the KOF globalization index, whereas Indonesia (2.70), Russia (2.77), Colombia (3.33), Mexico (3.50), and Thailand (3.53) are the bottom five countries in the Ernst & Young globalization index. On average, Protestant countries (86.94) show the highest levels of globalization, followed by English-speaking countries (84.96) and Catholic countries (83.33), with substantial cross-country variation within each cultural zone. By comparison, Southeast Asian countries (62.13) are relatively less globalized next to the Latin American countries (64.59).



[Figure 2] Ernst & Young Globalization Index by Country

Comparing top and bottom countries in the globalization index reveals some relationships among globalization, democratic advancement, and economic development. Correlations among variables at the national-level demonstrate such relationships clearly (see Appendix B). In particular, correlations of the democracy index with the KOF globalization index ( $r = .821$ ) and with the Ernst & Young globalization index ( $r = .544$ ) are very strong or modest. Similarly, GDP per capita presents strong relationships with both the KOF globalization index ( $r = .701$ ) and the Ernst & Young globalization index ( $r = .697$ ). Although the causality of direction cannot be confirmed, this modest or strong correlations imply that globalization is linked with democratic advancement and economic development. In short, more globalized countries tend to be more democratically advanced and economically developed as well.

## 2. Effects of Cultural Traditions and Globalization on Adolescents' Attitudes toward Religion, Nation-states, Democracy, and Human Rights

Table 2 presents results from the first models as described in the Method section. These first models, which include no predictors at either the individual-level or country-level, provide useful preliminary information on how much variation in each of the outcome lies within and between countries. In particular, Table 2 shows the ML point estimates for the grand means, i.e., the averages of each outcome measure across countries, as well as the estimated values of the within-country variance and between-country variance. According to Raudenbush and Bryk (2002b), I computed the intraclass correlation (ICC) to assess the proportion of variance that is due to between-country differences. Among countries whose information on the KOF index of globalization is available (see Model 1(a)), I find that 28.8% of the variance in *attitudes toward the influence of religion in society*, 20.7% of the variance in *attitudes toward one's country*, 4.1% of the variance in support for democratic values, 11.0% of the variance in *support for gender equality*, and 9.2% of the variance in *support for immigrant rights* is due to between-country differences. By comparison, among countries whose information on the Ernst & Young index of globalization is available (see Model 1(b)), 24.5% of the variance in *attitudes toward the influence of religion in society*, 15.1% of the variance in *attitudes toward one's country*, 4.1% of the variance in *support for democratic values*, 24.8% of the variance in *support for gender equality*, and 9.7% of the variance in *support for immigrant rights* is due to the between-country variance. These ICC findings suggest that the majority of variance in each outcome is mostly due to within-country differences. That said, differences between countries still account for a statistically significant ( $p < .001$ ) portion of the variance, indicating a need for utilizing multilevel modeling.

Tables 3 through 7 demonstrate results from the HLM models estimating the effects of cultural traditions and globalization on each outcome measure, holding individual-level variables constant. In what follows, I will focus discussion mainly on the key variables of interest—the dummy variables of cultural traditions and the two indices of globalization.

Attitudes toward the influence of religion in society. As presented in the second column of numbers in Table 3 (see Model 2(a)), the dummy variables of *Catholic* (6.516, SE = 2.008), *ex-Communist* (3.943, SE = 1.844), *Latin American* (10.495, SE = 2.007), and

<Table 2> Estimation of One-Way Random Effects ANOVA Base Models

	<i>Attitudes toward the influence of religion in society</i>	<i>Attitudes toward one's country</i>	<i>Support for democratic values</i>	<i>Support for gender equality</i>	<i>Support for immigrant rights</i>					
<i>Fixed effects</i>										
Intercept	50.197*** (1.02)	48.870*** (1.04)	52.627*** (1.503)	49.689*** (.739)	49.547*** (.629)	49.513*** (.642)	47.282*** (1.353)	47.497*** (1.439)	49.408*** (.879)	49.461*** (.923)
<i>Radom effects</i>										
Within-countries	72.139	73.565	87.591	83.074	92.782	92.957	61.020	61.578	76.797	77.786
Between countries(df)	29,188*** (27)	23,890*** (21)	22,859*** (34)	14,731*** (26)	3,969*** (34)	4,021*** (26)	18,809*** (34)	20,337*** (26)	7,805*** (34)	8,357*** (26)
Total variance	101.33	97.455	110.450	97.805	96.751	97.978	79.829	81.915	84.602	86.143
Intraclass correlation (ICC)	28.8	24.5	20.7	15.1	4.1	4.1	11.0	24.8	9.2	9.7
<i>N</i> adolescents	94675	78447	121561	98764	123091	99983	122696	99446	121935	99001
<i>N</i> countries	28	22	35	27	35	27	35	27	35	27

Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors.  
\*\*\**p* < .001.

&lt;Table 3&gt; HLM analyses on adolescent' attitudes toward the influence of religion in society

	Model 2 (a)	Model 2 (b)	Model 3 (a)	Model 3 (b)	Model 4 (a)	Model 4 (b)
<i>Cultural traditions</i>						
Catholic	6.516** (2.008)	3.279 (2.277)			3.524** (1.203)	3.147* (1.467)
English-speaking	2.706 (2.707)	2.614 (2.609)			.243 (1.772)	1.161 (1.938)
Ex-communist	3.943* (1.844)	4.159* (1.972)			3.974* (1.653)	5.110* (1.929)
Latin American	10.495*** (2.007)	8.067** (2.608)			6.376* (2.377)	7.266** (2.153)
Confucian	-2.744 (3.579)	.507 (2.277)			-5.753* (2.574)	-1.255 (1.504)
Southeast Asian	14.172*** (2.706)	14.083*** (2.608)			10.677*** (2.516)	13.105*** (2.324)
<i>Globalization index</i>						
KOF			-.346*** (.073)		-.161+ (.085)	
Ernst & Young				-4.684** (1.260)		-.606 (.799)
<i>Individual-level variables</i>						
Age	.110* (.048)	.106+ (.058)	.110* (.048)	.039 (.093)	.051 (.087)	.036 (.093)
Gender	.293*** (.055)	.445*** (.061)	.293*** (.055)	-.287** (.099)	-.332** (.098)	-.285** (.099)
Immigrant	5.459*** (.111)	5.134*** (.122)	5.459*** (.111)	4.149*** (.214)	4.516*** (.218)	4.202*** (.212)
Expected education	-.481*** (.047)	-.542*** (.055)	-.481*** (.047)	-.014 (.089)	.010 (.088)	-.016 (.089)
Urbanicity	-.622*** (.067)	-.550*** (.071)	-.622*** (.067)	-.386*** (.105)	-.417*** (.106)	-.386*** (.105)
Intercept	50.196*** (.626)	48.870*** (.664)	50.196*** (.763)	49.082*** (1.051)	50.183*** (.369)	49.280*** (.424)
<i>Variance components</i>						
Within-countries	70.176	71.786	70.176	55.830	54.713	55.315
% explained	2.7	2.4	2.7	24.1	24.2	24.8
Between-countries (df)	10.941*** (21)	9.678*** (15)	16.283*** (26)	14.747*** (20)	2.253*** (20)	2.883*** (14)
% explained	62.5	59.5	44.2	38.2	92.3	87.9
N adolescents	94675	78447	94675	78447	94675	78447
N countries	28	22	28	22	28	22

Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors.

\*\*\* $p < .001$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \* $p < .05$  + $p < .10$ .

*Southeast Asian* (14.172, SE = 2.706) have positive and significant effects on the attitudes

toward the influence of religion in society measure. This means that adolescents' in Catholic European, ex-Communist, Latin American, and Southeast Asian countries tend to attribute greater importance to religion than those in Protestant European countries. For instance, adolescents in Southeast Asian countries show more than one standard deviation higher score (14.172 points) on the attitudes' toward the influence of religion in society scale compared to their counterparts in Protestant European countries, holding all other variables constant. Similarly, the positive and significant coefficients of *ex-Communist* (4.159, SE = 1.972), *Latin American* (8.067, SE = 2.608), and *Southeast Asian* (14.083, SE = 2.608) countries in Model 2(b) indicate that adolescents in ex-Communist, Latin American, and Southeast Asian countries are more likely to believe the importance of religion in society than those in Protestant countries.

In Models 3(a) and 3(b), the two indices of globalization are entered into the equation, one at a time. The negative and significant coefficients of globalization in Model 3(a) (-.346, SE = .073) and Model 3(b) (-4.684, SE = 1.260) indicate that adolescents in countries with higher levels of globalization are less likely to believe the importance of religion in society. Note that in Table 1, Belgium and Indonesia, the most and least globalized countries in the sample, differ by 91.51 points in the KOF globalization index and by 3.12 points in the Ernst & Young globalization index. Therefore, the coefficient of -.346 in Model 4(a) suggests that adolescents in Indonesia demonstrate 11.712 points ( $-.346 \times 91.51$ ) higher score on the attitudes toward the influence of religion in society scale than their counterparts in Belgium, controlling for all other variables. In a similar vein, the coefficient of -4.684 in Model 3(b) indicates that the difference in the same outcome is larger by 14.614 points ( $-4.684 \times 3.12$ ) in Indonesia than in Belgium, holding all other variables in constant. The two indices of globalization account for 44.2% and 38.2% of the between-country variance, respectively, compared to 62.5% and 59.5% of the between-country variance explained by the dummy variables of cultural traditions. This finding suggests that the dummy variables of cultural traditions are stronger predictors that account for a great amount of variance in the outcome than the indices of globalization.

Finally, Models 4(a) and 4(b) include the cultural and globalization variables in the equations at the same time. As shown in Model 4(a), the dummy variables of Catholic (3.524, SE = 1.203), ex-Communist (3.974, SE = 1.653), Latin-American (6.376, SE = 2.377), Confucian (-5.373, SE = 2.574), and Southeast Asian (10.677, SE = 2.516) have strong and significant impacts on adolescents' attitudes toward the influence of religion in society, even after controlling for the effect of globalization. Model 4(b) shows the similar pattern: the positive

&lt;Table 4&gt; HLM analyses on adolescent' attitudes toward one's country

	Model 2 (a)	Model 2 (b)	Model 3 (a)	Model 3 (b)	Model 4 (a)	Model 4 (b)
<i>Cultural traditions</i>						
Catholic	-.859 (1.275)	-2.167 (1.524)			-2.342* (1.102)	-2.303+ (1.270)
English-speaking	-1.206 (1.691)	-.155 (1.780)			-2.933* (1.434)	-1.891 (1.495)
Ex-communist	1.955 (1.368)	-1.487 (1.524)			-1.937 (1.351)	-.648 (1.513)
Latin American	4.146** (1.317)	2.744+ (1.486)			-1.371 (2.025)	1.421 (1.701)
Confucian	-4.325* (1.889)	-3.785* (1.779)			-9.369*** (2.191)	-4.346** (1.250)
Southeast Asian	9.769*** (1.629)	8.871*** (2.054)			3.277 (2.101)	6.395** (1.826)
<i>Globalization index</i>						
KOF			-.350*** (.089)		-.226** (.071)	
Globalization index Ernst & Young				-3.823** (.972)		-1.349* (.604)
<i>Individual-level variables</i>						
Age	.008 (.092)	-.018 (.096)	.008 (.092)	-.018 (.096)	.008 (.092)	-.018 (.096)
Gender	-.554*** (.103)	-.599*** (.104)	-.554*** (.103)	-.599*** (.104)	-.555*** (.103)	-.599*** (.104)
Immigrant	-2.036*** (.229)	-1.853*** (.223)	-2.037*** (.228)	-1.853*** (.223)	-2.037*** (.228)	-1.853*** (.223)
Expected education	.037 (.088)	.066 (.089)	.036 (.088)	.066 (.089)	.036 (.088)	.066 (.089)
Urbanicity	-1.587*** (.113)	-1.498*** (.110)	-1.574*** (.111)	-1.498*** (.110)	-1.574*** (.111)	-1.498*** (.110)
Intercept	50.340*** (.442)	49.688*** (.484)	49.637*** (.771)	49.077*** (.786)	49.783*** (.342)	49.400*** (.351)
<i>Variance components</i>						
Within-countries	86.867	82.142	86.868	87.282	86.868	87.282
% explained	0.8	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Between-countries (df)	2.835*** (28)	6.304*** (20)	9.308*** (33)	9.892*** (25)	1.857*** (27)	2.164*** (19)
% explained	87.6	57.2	59.3	32.8	91.9	90.9
N adolescents	121561	98764	121561	98764	121561	98764
N countries	35	27	35	27	35	27

Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors.

\*\*\* $p < .001$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \* $p < .05$  + $p < .10$ .

and significant effects of *Catholic* (3.147, SE = 1.467), *ex-Communist* (5.110, SE = 1.929), *Latin American* (7.266, SE = 2.153), and *Southeast Asian* (13.105, SE = 2.324) remain substantial, once controlling for the effect of globalization. Together, the combination of cultural and glob-

&lt;Table 5&gt; HLM analyses on adolescent' support for democratic values

	Model 2	Model 2	Model 3	Model 3	Model 4	Model 4
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
<i>Cultural traditions</i>						
Catholic	2.913**	2.955**			2.382*	3.039**
	(.834)	(.969)			(1.068)	(.884)
English-speaking	-.255	-.239			-.514	-.109
	(1.104)	(1.273)			(1.256)	(1.149)
Ex-communist	.900	.892			-.203	1.232
	(.894)	(1.065)			(1.271)	(1.082)
Latin American	2.281*	2.431*			1.452	2.751
	(.860)	(1.103)			(1.428)	(1.620)
Confucian	5.316***	3.425**			3.066**	5.746**
	(1.229)	(1.059)			(1.050)	(1.751)
Southeast Asian	-.783	-.767			-2.081	-.230
	(1.062)	(1.225)			(1.533)	(1.680)
<i>Globalization index</i>						
KOF			.038			.019
			(.057)			(.057)
Ernst & Young				.416	-.512	
				(.608)	(.507)	
<i>Individual-level variables</i>						
Age	-.289**	-.283**	-.290**	-.284**	-.283**	-.289**
	(.091)	(.096)	(.091)	(.608)	(.096)	(.091)
Gender	-.218*	-.236*	-.218*	-.236*	-.236*	-.218*
	(.104)	(.105)	(.104)	(.105)	(.105)	(.104)
Immigrant	-.714**	-.628**	-.713**	-.627**	-.628**	-.714**
	(.230)	(.226)	(.230)	(.226)	(.226)	(.230)
Expected education	1.901***	1.943***	1.901***	1.943***	1.943***	1.901***
	(.88)	(.090)	(.088)	(.090)	(.090)	(.088)
Urbanicity	1.430***	1.401***	1.430***	1.400***	1.401***	1.430***
	(.112)	(.112)	(.112)	(.112)	(.112)	(.112)
Intercept	49.908***	49.881***	49.935***	49.940***	49.722***	49.956***
	(.288)	(.320)	(.494)	(.492)	(.295)	(.274)
<i>Variance components</i>						
Within-countries	90.690	90.843	90.690	90.843	90.843	90.690
% explained	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
Between-countries	1.183***	1.579***	3.803***	3.846***	1.515***	1.176***
	(28)	(20)	(33)	(25)	(19)	(27)
% explained	70.2	60.7	4.2	4.4	62.3	70.4
N adolescents	123901	99983	123901	99983	123901	99983
N countries	35	27	35	27	35	27

Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors.

\*\*\* $p < .001$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \* $p < .05$  + $p < .10$ .

-alization variables explain 92.3% and 87.9% of the between-country variance. In a nutshell, these results are consistent with the transformative hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), which predicts that the influence of cultural traditions on adolescents' attitudes toward religion persists, even when controlling for the effect of globalization.

*Support for democratic values.* As presented in the second and third column of numbers in Table 5 (see Models 2(a) and 2(b)), the dummy variables of *Catholic*, *Latin American*, and *Confucian* exert positive and significant effects on the support for democratic values measure, holding all other variables constant. These significant positive coefficients of *Catholic*, *Latin American*, and *Confucian* indicate that adolescents in Catholic, Latin American, and Confucian countries tend to show higher levels of support for democratic values than their counterparts in Protestant countries, once controlling for all other variables. These cultural variables account for 70.2% and 60.7% of the between-country variance. Contrary to the hyperglobalist hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) that globalization is linked with the spread of democratic culture and values among adolescents, however, the two indices of globalization do not have a significant impact on this support for democratic values measure (see Models 3(a) and 3(b)).

Turning to Models 4(a) and 4(b), the positive and significant effects of *Catholic* and *Confucian* remain when the globalization variables are additionally controlled for; the coefficients of Latin American becomes nonsignificant, once controlling for the globalization index. The cultural and globalization variables taken together account for 62.3% and 70.4% of the between-country variance, while the KOF index of globalization and the Ernst & Young index of globalization alone explain only 4.2% and 4.4% of the between-country variance, respectively. From these findings, it can be said that the extent to which adolescents support democratic values are influenced by their countries' cultural traditions rather than by the degree of globalization, thereby supporting the skeptic hypothesis (Hypothesis 2).

*Support for gender equality.* The results of Models 2(a) and 2(b) in Table 6 show that the dummy variables of *ex-Communist*, *Latin American*, and *Southeast Asian* have negative and significant impacts on the support for gender equality measure. In other words, adolescents in ex-Communist, Latin American, and Southeast Asian countries are significantly less likely than their counterparts in Protestant countries to support gender equality, holding all other variables constant.

As presented in the fourth and fifth columns of numbers in Table 6 (see Models 3(a) and 3(b)), the two globalization variables exert positive and significant effects on the outcome. Given that Netherlands and Thailand differ by 1.92 in the Ernst & Young index of globalization, the coefficient of 4.010 in Model 3(b) indicates that adolescents in Netherlands show 7.699 points ( $4.010 \times 1.92$ ) higher on the support for gender equality scale than their

&lt;Table 6&gt; HLM analyses on adolescent' support for gender equality

	Model 2	Model 2	Model 3	Model 3	Model 4	Model 4
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
<i>Cultural traditions</i>						
Catholic	-.296 (1.158)	-.261 (1.163)			.954 (1.036)	1.577 (1.106)
English-speaking	.362 (1.535)	.354 (1.528)			1.818 (1.348)	1.234 (1.301)
Ex-communist	-7.654*** (1.242)	-7.842*** (1.279)			-4.371** (1.269)	-4.327** (1.318)
Latin American	-5.857*** (1.196)	-5.819*** (1.326)			-1.200 (1.904)	-2.677+ (1.482)
Confucian	-2.490 (1.716)	-.954 (1.273)			1.767 (2.060)	.192 (1.088)
Southeast Asian	-10.246*** (1.479)	-10.255*** (1.473)			-4.766* (1.975)	-6.035** (1.591)
<i>Globalization index</i>						
KOF			.343*** (.069)		.191** (.067)	
Ernst & Young				4.010*** (.692)		1.647** (.526)
<i>Individual-level variables</i>						
Age	-.365*** (.072)	-.323*** (.076)	-.365*** (.072)	-.323*** (.076)	-.365*** (.072)	-.323*** (.076)
Gender	3.990*** (.082)	4.064*** (.082)	3.990*** (.082)	4.064*** (.082)	3.990*** (.082)	4.064*** (.082)
Immigrant	-1.082*** (.179)	-1.005*** (.177)	-1.082*** (.179)	-1.005*** (.177)	-1.082*** (.179)	-1.005*** (.177)
Expected education	1.706*** (.069)	1.747*** (.070)	1.706*** (.069)	1.747*** (.070)	1.706*** (.069)	1.747*** (.070)
Urbanicity	1.103*** (.088)	1.105*** (.087)	1.103*** (.088)	1.105*** (.087)	1.103*** (.088)	1.105*** (.087)
Intercept	49.365*** (.402)	50.055*** (.385)	50.244*** (.605)	51.046*** (.560)	49.836*** (.321)	50.567*** (.306)
<i>Variance components</i>						
Within-country % explained	54.887 10.1	55.306 10.1	54.887 10.1	55.306 10.2	54.887 10.1	55.306 10.2
Between-country es (df)	2.340*** (28)	2.311*** (20)	5.725*** (33)	5.007*** (25)	1.647*** (27)	1.647*** (19)
% explained	87.6	88.6	69.6	75.4	91.2	91.9
N adolescents	122696	99446	122696	99446	122696	99446
N countries	35	27	35	27	35	27

Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors.

\*\*\* $p < .001$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \* $p < .05$  + $p < .10$ .

similarly situated counterparts in Thailand, holding all other variables constant. Comparing the between-country variance explained by the two globalization variables (i.e., 69.6% in Model

3(a) and 75.4% in Model 3(b)) and the between-country variance explained by the cultural variables (i.e., 87.6% in Model 3(a) and 88.6% in Model 3(b)) reveals that, again, the cultural variables are considered to have greater practical significance than the globalization variables.

As Models 4(a) and 4(b) in Table 6 demonstrates, the *ex-Communist* and *Southeast Asian* dummy variables have a strong and significant impact on the outcome, controlling for the effect of globalization. That said, the previously negative and significant effect of Latin American disappears in Model 4(a) and becomes significant only at .10 level in Model 4(b). These findings indicate that the negative effect of growing up in Latin American countries with regard to advocating equal rights for women is mostly attributed to those countries' lower levels of globalization. In contrast, the fact that adolescents live in ex-Communist and Southeast Asian countries make a supplementary contribution to the extent to which they support gender equality, *net of* their countries' level of globalization. The cultural and globalization variables taken together account for 91.2% and 91.9% of the between-school variability. Once again, the results provide strong grounds for supporting the transformative hypothesis (Hypothesis 3)—the extent to which adolescents support gender equality varies across countries in accordance with the level of globalization, but the influence of countries' cultural traditions remains, even after controlling for the effect of globalization.

*Support for immigrant rights.* The HLM results for adolescents' support for immigrant rights measure are summarized in Table 7. Among 35 countries whose information on the KOF index of globalization is available (see Model 2(a)), the dummy variable of *Latin American* (6.178, SE = .819) has a positive and significant effect on the outcome. This means that adolescents in Latin American countries are significantly more likely to hold favorable attitudes toward immigrant rights than their counterparts in Protestant countries, holding individual-level variables constant. Among 27 countries whose information on the Ernst & Young index of globalization is available, the two dummy variables of cultural traditions, i.e., *Latin American* (6.448, SE = 1.089) and *Confucian* (3.355, SE = 1.046), have positive and significant effects on the outcome. Put it in another way, adolescents in Latin American and Confucian countries tend to show higher levels of support for immigrant rights than their counterparts in Protestant countries, controlling for individual-level variables. However, the dummy variables of cultural traditions account for only 9.6% and 10.3% of the between-country variance, suggesting that they have weak practical significance in this measure. Further, rejecting the hyperglobalist hypothesis of the universal convergence of

&lt;Table 7&gt; HLM analyses on adolescent' support for immigrant rights

	Model 2 (a)	Model 2 (b)	Model 3 (a)	Model 3 (b)	Model 4 (a)	Model 4 (b)
<i>Cultural traditions</i>						
Catholic	1.158 (.793)	1.187 (.956)			1.394 (.834)	2.064+ (1.022)
English-speaking	-1.153 (1.050)	-1.127 (1.256)			.888 (1.084)	-.707 (1.202)
Ex-communist	1.267 (.850)	1.300 (1.051)			1.888+ (1.020)	2.978* (1.217)
Latin American	6.178*** (.819)	6.488*** (1.089)			7.058*** (1.528)	7.989*** (1.367)
Confucian	1.014 (1.170)	3.355** (1.046)			1.819 (1.652)	3.903** (1.005)
Southeast Asian	-.974 (1.010)	-.946 (1.209)			.061 (1.585)	1.069 (1.468)
<i>Globalization index</i>						
KOF			-.020 (.081)		.036 (.054)	
Globalization index Ernst & Young				.377 (.890)		.787 (.485)
<i>Individual-level variables</i>						
Age	-.170* (.085)	-.170+ (.089)	-.170* (.085)	-.170+ (.089)	-.170* (.085)	-.170+ (.089)
Gender	1.073*** (.096)	1.092*** (.096)	1.073*** (.096)	1.092*** (.096)	1.073*** (.096)	1.092*** (.096)
Immigrant	4.063*** (.211)	3.979*** (.208)	4.063*** (.211)	3.979*** (.208)	4.063*** (.211)	3.979*** (.208)
Expected education	.972*** (.081)	1.018*** (.083)	.972*** (.081)	1.018*** (.083)	.972*** (.081)	1.018*** (.083)
Urbanicity	.477*** (.103)	.499*** (.102)	.477*** (.103)	.499*** (.102)	.477*** (.103)	.499*** (.102)
Intercept	49.653*** (.274)	49.494*** (.316)	49.269*** (.707)	49.818*** (.720)	49.742*** (.258)	49.739*** (.282)
<i>Variance components</i>						
Within-countries % explained	75.416 1.8	75.767 2.6	75.416 1.8	75.767 1.8	75.416 1.8	75.767 1.8
Between-countri es (df)	1.073*** (28)	1.543*** (20)	7.836*** (33)	8.293*** (25)	1.048*** (27)	1.391*** (19)
% explained	86.3	81.5	-	0.8	86.6	84.8
N adolescents	121935	99001	121935	99001	121935	99001
N countries	35	27	35	27	35	27

Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors.

\*\*\* $p < .001$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \* $p < .05$  + $p < .10$ .

values as a result of globalization, both KOF and Ernst & Young indices of globalization do not exert a significant impact on adolescents' support for immigrant rights (see Models 3(a) and 3(b)). That is, the extent to which adolescents support immigrant rights does not vary across countries according to the level of globalization.

When both cultural and globalization variables are simultaneously added in the models, the previously nonsignificant coefficient of Catholic becomes significant at .10 level in Model 4(b) (2.064, SE = 1.022). In a similar vein, the previously nonsignificant coefficients of ex-Communist become significant at .10 level in Model 4(a) (1.188, SE = 1.020) and at .05 level in Model 4(b) (2.978, SE = 1.217), once controlling for globalization. Another interesting finding concerns that the positive effects of growing up in Latin American and Confucian countries in supporting equal rights for immigrants become stronger when the globalization indices are additionally controlled for (see Models 4(a) and 4(b)). Here, the combination of cultural and globalization explain less than 10% of the between-country variance in the outcome (i.e., 9.6% in Model 4(a) and 9.8% in Model 4(b)). In short, the findings are consistent with the skeptical hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), which argues that the degree to which adolescents support equal rights for immigrants are influenced by their countries' historical-cultural traditions rather than by the degree of globalization.

### 3. A Supplementary Analysis

Earlier, I pointed out that more globalized countries tend to be more democratically advanced and economically developed as well. Further, both hypoerglobalist and transformative arguments suggest that the advancement of globalization, coupled with democratic advancement and rising income levels, gives rise to the convergence of adolescents' value orientations across countries. This raises a question about whether it is actually democratic advancement or level of economic development that underlies the explanatory power of globalization in accounting for the cross-national variations in adolescents' value orientations. To address this question at least in part, I conduct a supplementary analysis (results not shown). In particular, additional HLM models are built to examine whether globalization continues to be associated with the cross-national variations in adolescents' value orientations (religiosity, nationalism, and support for gender equality where significant relationships were identified in prior analyses), after controlling for democratic advancement and economic development. The results indicate that the level of globalization, both measured by the KOF globalization index and Ernst & Young globalization index, is systematically associated with cross-national variations in adolescents' religiosity, nationalism, and support for gender equality as expected, even after controlling

for the level of democracy. For the same three outcome measures, however, the globalization indices do not underlie the cross-national variations in adolescents' religiosity, nationalism, and support for gender equality, once the level of economic development is controlled for. Thus, the results support the claim that economic development, not democratic advancement, should be what conditions the effect of globalization on adolescents' value orientations.

## V. Discussion and Conclusions

Using cross-national multi-level analyses, this article has tested three hypotheses that provide contrasting explanations of the impact of globalization on adolescents' value orientations. The findings show that countries' historically rooted cultural traditions, e.g., Protestantism, Former Communism or Confucianism, continue to exert independent influences on adolescents' value systems despite the forces of globalization. In particular, the extent to which adolescents support democratic values and immigrant rights are influenced by their countries' historical-cultural traditions rather than by their level of globalization. While global advancement is linked with the decline of religiosity and nationalism and their replacement with support for gender equality, cross-cultural variations in those value orientations persist, even after controlling for the effect of globalization. In summation, the results support the skeptical and transformative theses that emphasize the enduring influence of cultural heritages while largely rejecting the hyperglobalist thesis of the universal convergence of values as a result of globalization. Further, my supplementary analysis reveals that economic development, not democratic advancement, should be what conditions the effect of globalization on adolescents' value orientations.

This study's findings contradict the dominant neoliberal view that the homogenizing effect of globalization can transform "traditional" societies in a common direction, especially toward Western-style liberal democracy as "the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution," or even "the final form of human government" (Fukuyama, 1992). Although globalization has its all-powerful force to make issues regarding democracy and human rights universal (Torres, 2002), it does not necessarily mean that the forces of globalization turn world citizens into one giant, homogenous culture, thereby eroding local cultures and patterns of life. At the same time, however, adhering to an essentialist view of culture is not enough to better

understand the new world order that globalization has brought about; “culture” itself is not static, but interacts with the irresistible forces of globalization to constantly adapt to new situations. While this study’s cross-national comparison shows that adolescents in Catholic European and Southeast Asian countries tend to attribute greater importance to religion than those in ex-Communist or Confucian countries, previous analyses using time-series data also reveal that today’s adolescents view religion as less important, regardless of their countries’ historical-cultural heritages (Schwartz, 2012). For a more complete understanding of the cultural impact of globalization on adolescents’ value systems, therefore, future research can benefit from time-series analysis that examines whether and how adolescents’ worldviews has changed over time across countries with increasing globalization.

## &lt;Appendix A&gt; Coding of variables

<Appendix A> Coding of variables	
<i>Dependent variables:</i>	
<b>Influence of religion on society</b>	Scaled index derived from questions regarding students' attitudes toward the influence of religion on society: (1) Religion is more important to me than what is happening in national politics; (2) Religion helps me to decide what is right and what is wrong; (3) Religious leaders should have more power in society; (4) Religion should influence people's behavior toward others; (5) Rules of life based on religion are more important than civil wars. Higher values denote greater influence of religion in society.
<b>Attitude toward one's country</b>	Scaled index derived from questions regarding students' attitudes toward their country: (1) The flag of country of test is important to me; (2) The political system in country of test works well; (3) I have great respect for country of test; (4) In country of test, we should be proud of what we have achieved; (5) I am proud to live in country of test; (6) Country of test shows a lot of respect for the environment; (7) Generally speaking, country of test is a better country to live in than most other countries. Higher values denote greater support for their country.
<b>Support for democratic values</b>	Scaled index derived from questions regarding students' level of agreement (ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree") with statements about what a society should be like: (1) Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely; (2) All people should have their social and political rights respected; (3) People should always be free to criticize the government publicly; (4) All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely; (5) People should be able to protest if they believe a law is unfair. Higher values denote greater support for democratic values.
<b>Attitudes toward gender equality</b>	Scaled index derived from questions regarding students' attitudes toward gender equality (ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree"): (1) Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government; (2) Men and women should have the same rights in every way; (3) Women should stay out of politics; (4) When there are not many jobs available, men should have more right to a job than women; (4) Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs; (5) Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women. Higher values denote greater support for gender equality.
<b>Attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants</b>	Scaled index derived from questions regarding students' attitudes toward equal rights for immigrants: (1) Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue speaking their own language; (2) Immigrant children should have the same opportunities for education that other children in the country have; (3) Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the opportunity to vote in elections; (4) Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue their own customs and lifestyle; (5) Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in the country has. Higher values denote greater support for equal rights for immigrants.
<i>Individual-level variables:</i>	
<b>Age</b>	Calculated as the difference between the year and month of the testing and the year and month of an adolescent's birth.
<b>Gender</b>	1= girl; 0= boy
<b>Immigrant</b>	1 = adolescents who were born abroad or born in the country of test but whose parents had been born abroad; 0= native-born

<b>Expected education</b>	1= less than high school; 2= high school; 3= college
<b>Urbanity</b>	1= living in a city with a population of more than 100,000; 0=otherwise
<i>Country-level variables:</i>	
<b>KOF Index of globalization</b>	An overall degree of globalization within a country, encompassing economic, political, and social aspects of globalization, as reported by KOF Swiss Economic Institute (2009). Higher values correspond to higher degree of globalization.
<b>Ernst &amp; Young globalization index</b>	A degree of globalization within a country, as reported by Ernst &Young (2009). Higher values correspond to higher degree of globalization.
<b>Cultural traditions</b>	Based on Huntington (1993) and (Inglehart and Baker (2000)), six cultural traditions are distinguished: <i>Historically Protestant, Historically Catholic, English-speaking, ex-Communist, Latin American, Confucian, and Southeast Asian.</i>

<Appendix B> Correlations among globalization index, democracy index, and GDP per capita

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) KOF index of globalization			
(2) Ernst & Young index of globalization	.882**		
(3) Democracy index	.821**	.544**	
(4) GDP per capita	.701**	.697**	.757**

\*\* $p < .01$

&lt;Appendix C&gt; Descriptive statistics of variables by country

	Protestant										Catholic				
	DNK	FIN	LUX	NLD	NOR	SWE	CHE	AUT	CYP	GRC	ITA	MLT	ESP	BFL	
Influence of religion on society	43.87 (8.80)	-	45.08 (10.26)	45.66 (9.38)	45.85 (9.75)	44.92 (9.89)	45.84 (9.80)	47.46 (9.64)	58.84 (8.15)	52.54 (8.34)	-	55.80 (7.78)	-	45.48 (8.46)	
Attitudes toward one's country	48.42 (8.29)	51.86 (9.06)	49.04 (9.58)	46.56 (7.88)	52.06 (9.51)	48.27 (9.42)	51.37 (9.73)	51.81 (9.85)	48.97 (10.05)	46.05 (8.43)	48.41 (8.18)	50.02 (9.73)	47.92 (9.30)	43.90 (7.10)	
Support for democratic values	50.03 (10.05)	48.72 (9.49)	50.70 (10.07)	46.01 (9.35)	50.57 (10.29)	50.68 (10.77)	50.16 (9.61)	51.01 (10.83)	50.08 (10.70)	51.27 (11.03)	51.31 (9.40)	48.70 (9.29)	52.44 (9.78)	47.27 (9.27)	
Attitudes toward gender equality	54.20 (9.90)	53.38 (10.02)	52.32 (10.18)	51.27 (10.22)	53.59 (10.23)	55.29 (10.31)	52.27 (10.16)	51.88 (10.56)	47.81 (10.53)	50.12 (10.88)	51.77 (9.61)	51.18 (9.94)	54.57 (9.84)	52.20 (9.69)	
Attitudes toward immigrant rights	48.58 (9.34)	48.06 (9.91)	51.71 (10.64)	45.41 (9.07)	50.37 (10.83)	52.22 (11.91)	48.79 (10.34)	48.03 (11.11)	49.15 (10.70)	50.94 (10.35)	48.44 (9.39)	48.75 (10.18)	50.60 (10.55)	45.91 (8.94)	
Age	14.89 (.39)	14.73 (.34)	14.49 (.66)	14.29 (.54)	13.73 (.81)	14.75 (.35)	14.59 (.64)	14.35 (.53)	13.86 (.42)	13.68 (.39)	13.81 (.50)	13.91 (.44)	14.08 (.70)	13.94 (.56)	
Female (%)	50.4	51.2	51.1	52.4	49.9	49.5	49.7	48.4	48.2	50.9	47.9	47.2	50.3	49.4	
Expected education	2.81 (.46)	2.45 (.61)	2.54 (.68)	2.47 (.67)	2.49 (.69)	2.63 (.58)	2.09 (.76)	2.30 (.59)	2.63 (.71)	2.79 (.52)	2.48 (.62)	2.52 (.87)	2.43 (.87)	2.74 (.50)	
Immigrant (%)	9.2	2.4	58.9	11.2	9.9	17.8	24.9	18.2	7.2	10.6	6.9	1.7	10.8	11.0	
Urbanicity (%)	13.1	29.4	-	13.5	14.0	25.5	8.5	18.5	21.2	21.4	15.2	-	36.0	13.7	
Total N	4508	3307	4852	1964	3013	3454	2824	3385	3194	3153	3366	2143	3309	2968	

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

&lt;Appendix C&gt; Descriptive statistics of variables by country (cont'd)

	English-speaking				Ex-Communist							
	IRL	ENG	NZL	BGR	CZE	EST	LVA	LTU	POL	RUS	SVK	SVN
Influence of religion on society	-	46.88 (9.93)	48.82 (9.69)	50.79 (8.73)	41.44 (9.30)	-	47.22 (8.88)	49.36 (7.85)	53.89 (8.11)	51.60 (7.54)	49.01 (9.53)	-
Attitudes toward one's country	50.46 (8.86)	47.14 (8.41)	51.31 (9.57)	48.35 (9.99)	44.55 (7.76)	49.03 (10.04)	43.30 (9.21)	46.30 (8.88)	48.09 (9.15)	53.20 (10.11)	47.74 (9.30)	50.59 (9.74)
Support for democratic values	50.90 (9.98)	48.00 (10.02)	47.90 (10.30)	51.85 (10.44)	49.26 (9.30)	48.87 (9.50)	49.47 (9.74)	50.71 (9.64)	50.93 (9.95)	48.64 (9.18)	49.57 (9.17)	48.77 (9.18)
Attitudes toward gender equality	54.42 (10.16)	53.14 (10.13)	51.65 (10.30)	45.96 (9.00)	47.99 (8.84)	48.89 (8.62)	46.22 (8.46)	47.63 (8.79)	47.63 (6.96)	43.66 (6.96)	47.90 (8.56)	51.94 (10.63)
Attitudes toward immigrant rights	49.90 (10.26)	46.28 (10.70)	50.96 (10.52)	51.80 (9.89)	48.09 (8.67)	47.62 (8.81)	46.97 (8.27)	51.04 (8.65)	50.10 (8.92)	48.90 (8.88)	49.73 (8.33)	50.36 (10.22)
Age	14.28 (.44)	14.03 (.30)	14.06 (.35)	14.69 (.47)	14.39 (.48)	15.02 (.46)	14.79 (.49)	14.69 (.47)	14.88 (.37)	14.75 (9.52)	14.36 (.46)	13.70 (.33)
Female (%)	48.5	51.3	49.0	50.4	46.0	50.3	51.1	49.2	50.3	50.0	50.3	49.4
Expected education	2.63 (.65)	2.69 (.52)	2.66 (.52)	2.62 (.67)	2.40 (.55)	2.46 (.67)	2.56 (.65)	2.66 (.63)	2.65 (.57)	2.74 (.68)	2.57 (.59)	2.67 (.55)
Immigrant (%)	11.5	14.0	21.9	0.7	2.4	7.1	5.5	4.6	1.4	5.6	0.6	10.5
Urbanicity (%)	30.8	28.5	48.6	33.5	16.0	26.6	28.7	40.2	25.2	38.8	9.8	14.5
Total N	3355	2916	3979	3257	4630	2743	2761	3902	3249	4295	2970	3070

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.



&lt;Appendix C&gt; Descriptive statistics of variables by country (cont'd)

	Latin-American				Confucian				Southeast Asian		
	CHL	COL	DOM	GTM	MEX	PRY	KOR	TWN	HKG	THA	IDN
Influence of religion on society	52.24 (9.09)	54.26 (7.28)	58.46 (7.15)	57.07 (6.41)	-	55.80 (6.78)	42.32 (9.70)	52.24 (9.08)	46.39 (8.68)	57.96 (5.86)	60.53 (5.65)
Attitudes toward one's country	50.11 (9.05)	55.27 (9.41)	56.63 (10.55)	53.84 (8.62)	52.35 (10.24)	52.05 (8.67)	44.66 (8.22)	50.11 (9.05)	46.83 (9.26)	58.86 (9.50)	58.46 (9.34)
Support for democratic values	54.10 (9.67)	51.18 (9.68)	49.23 (9.90)	50.30 (9.46)	50.42 (10.19)	52.17 (10.07)	53.90 (10.85)	54.10 (9.67)	47.15 (9.84)	46.20 (8.94)	48.27 (9.27)
Attitudes toward gender equality	51.63 (9.66)	49.59 (8.88)	43.71 (7.51)	48.93 (8.62)	45.57 (6.56)	48.79 (8.86)	50.51 (8.78)	51.63 (9.66)	51.53 (9.45)	43.93 (6.72)	42.52 (6.16)
Attitudes toward immigrant rights	54.15 (9.49)	54.31 (9.21)	51.60 (9.60)	54.50 (9.45)	54.71 (10.03)	53.39 (8.84)	49.15 (8.81)	54.15 (9.49)	53.24 (9.88)	47.96 (7.41)	46.93 (6.39)
Age	14.18 (.60)	14.38 (1.01)	14.86 (1.15)	15.52 (.96)	14.08 (.59)	14.82 (.81)	14.73 (.31)	14.21 (.31)	14.23 (.76)	14.36 (.48)	14.28 (.73)
Female (%)	51.1	53.4	54.1	48.9	52.1	52.1	43.3	47.9	47.4	53.4	52.3
Expected education	2.77 (.50)	2.82 (.48)	2.41 (.69)	2.67 (.55)	2.65 (.66)	2.64 (.67)	2.91 (.33)	2.79 (.49)	2.79 (.56)	2.70 (.66)	2.59 (.63)
Immigrant (%)	0.8	0.5	2.0	1.6	1.5	2.0	0.1	0.8	33.9	1.10	1.3
Urbanicity (%)	57.5	57.5	16.4	22.9	49.4	32.8	16.6	50.1	74.5	34.2	25.4
Total N	5192	6204	4589	4002	6576	3399	5254	5167	2002	5263	5068



Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

<Appendix D> Scatterplots of outcome measures vs. globalization index



a. Adolescents' attitudes toward the influence of religion in society vs. globalization index





b. Adolescents' attitudes toward one's country vs. globalization index





c. Adolescents' support for democratic values vs. globalization index



d. Adolescents' support for gender equality vs. globalization index



e. Adolescents' support for immigrant rights vs. globalization index



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\* Kim, Hyungryeol: Assistant Professor, Department of Ethics Education, Seoul National University

\* E-mail: ksyhr70@snu.ac.kr