Problems of Intersubjectivity in Husserl and Buber

Nam-In Lee

After the publication of the *Logical Investigations* in 1900/1901, Husserl engaged himself throughout his life with the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. He was fully conscious of its significance to the whole system of transcendental phenomenology and left many works dealing with this problem. However, his phenomenology of intersubjectivity has been sharply criticized by many interpreters. Among these critics, which include the phenomenologists after Husserl such as Heidegger, Sartre, Schutz, are the advocates of philosophy of dialogue or the critical social theory. Since the phenomenology of intersubjectivity has significant meaning for the whole system of phenomenology, some would not hesitate to draw the conclusion that the whole attempt of Husserl's phenomenology has failed.

I believe that many of the arguments of Husserl's critics are not on the mark because, in criticizing Husserl, they do not make a clear distinction among the different problems of intersubjectivity. More than anything else, philosophy deals with the most abstract of problems, so the first step to be taken is to make a clear distinction among the different problems concerning a subject. This is particularly true for the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In this respect, I agree with M. Scheler on the following insight: “The principle error till now that has been committed in the research on the problem of intersubjectivity is the fact that the different problems concerning intersubjectivity have not been clearly distinguished.”2 In this context, Scheler differentiates the following problems concerning the other person; 1. the problem of the essen-

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* Seoul National University


tial relationship between the individuals and society in general, 2. the epistemological problem concerning the validity of positing the existence of the other, 3. the problem concerning the origin of the other consciousness in general, that is, the transcendental psychological problem of the knowledge of the other, 4. the problem of empirical psychology of the other, 5. the metaphysical problem of the other and finally 6. the problem of value with regard to the other.

Husserl seemed partly conscious of this fact as well. For example, he talks about “the confusingly interwoven problems of intersubjectivity” (Hua XVII, 250) or about “the interwoven transcendental problems of intersubjectivity” (op. cit., p. 245) and attempts to make a distinction among the ontological, the transcendental phenomenological and the metaphysical problem of intersubjectivity. However, one cannot find within his phenomenology of intersubjectivity such a clear distinction among various problems as is called for by Max Scheler. I believe that, if Husserl made a clearer distinction among the various problems of intersubjectivity, his phenomenology would not have been so sharply criticized. In other words, one can say that some of the criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity are caused by this lack of distinction and, in this paper, I will attempt to reveal the existence of these types of criticisms. Although there are many such criticisms, my discussion will be limited to Theunissen's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity from the standpoint of M. Buber's philosophy of dialogue. In order to fulfill this purpose, I'll first delineate the main points of criticism of philosophy of dialogue on Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Thereafter, in order to be able to lay a basis for a critical assessment of this criticism, I'll attempt to make a clear distinction among the various problems of phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Only those problems that are necessary for the as-

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3 In this paper, Husserl's works which have been published in the Husserliana will be referred to with the abbreviation Hua and the number of the volume.

4 M. Theunissen. Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1977. In this paper, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Theunissen.
essment of the criticism of the philosophy of dialogue on Husserl will be dealt with. Finally, I'll attempt to argue that these criticisms, under scrutiny, are misguided, because they are based on a lack of a clear distinction among the various problems of intersubjectivity.

1. Criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity by the philosophy of dialogue

According to Theunissen, Husserl's phenomenology is extremely opposed to the philosophy of dialogue and, more than any place else, one can find this essential trait in his phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Since Husserl determines the absoluteness of transcendental subjectivity as "the absoluteness that means asociality" (Theunissen, p. 23), his phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot be successful. Emphasizing this point, Theunissen tells us that "the absoluteness of the original ego consists in his solitude, to be sure, in the solitude that is free from any kind of desire for society, because there are no other egos except me" (ibid.). Theunissen advocates the thesis that Husserl's phenomenology, determining the ego as a solitary being and totally free from any kind of desire for society, cannot avoid the fate of a solipsism. We know that, here, Theunissen echoes the same criticism of those who insist that, being confined to the analysis of the solipsistic ego and, thus, not being able to solve the problem of intersubjectivity, Husserl's phenomenology is nothing other than a solipsism.

Thereafter, on the basis of a "destruction of the transcendental-phenomenological model of intentionality" (op. cit., p. 278), Theunissen attempts to deepen and widen his criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Needless to say that, in this context, the destruction always contains two components, the criticism of the problematic philosophical position, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the grounding of a more original philosophical position than the one criticized. Thus, through a destructive criti-
cism of Husserl, Theunissen attempts to construct a philosophical foundation for a dialogical philosophy as a counterpart to Husserl's phenomenology.

Buber's distinction between the primary words “I-Thou” and “I-It” provides the starting point for Theunissen's destruction of Husserl's phenomenology. Since his aim is undermining Husserl's phenomenology, he attempts to clarify the distinction between the “Thou” and the “It” with regard to Husserl's concept of intentionality. In this context, he sometimes characterizes the sphere of the “It” as “the sphere of subjectivity” that embraces “both the acting subject and its (the subject's) constituted world which is governed by it through its intentionality” (Theunissen, p. 261). Other times, with reference to G. Marcel, he characterizes the sphere of “It” as “the sphere of having” (ibid.) that, according to him, means nothing other than “the sphere of intentionality” (ibid.) and stands out for its will to reign overall. Therefore, according to him, as the expression “transcendental-philosophical model” implies, the intentionality that is the proper theme of transcendental phenomenology is understood as the moment which holds together the sphere of the “It”. In contradistinction to the sphere of intentionality as the sphere of It, he determines the sphere of the Thou as the dialogical sphere. This dialogical sphere is distinguished as “the immediateness between person and person” (op. cit., p. 262), “the reciprocity of the inner action” (ibid.) as well as “the reciprocity of acceptance, approval and acknowledgment” (ibid.).

Theunissen points out that, in order to be able to comprehend the sphere of Thou properly, we should not let ourselves be guided by the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality. He adds, however, it is not easy for us to be entirely free from this model. According to him, even Buber himself was not totally free from this kind of danger and attempted to determine “the Thou formally in the same way as the It: as intentum, as the noematical object not of the I-Thou, but of the I-It relationship” (op. cit., p. 279). In this context, he refers to the beginning part of Buber's “Ich und Du”: “To man the world is

5 M. Buber, I and Thou, tr. R. G. Smith, Edinburgh: T&T, 1994. In this paper, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Buber.
twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude. The attitude is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks.” (Buber, p. 15) So long as the Thou is comprehended as the noematic correlate of the attitude, the essential feature of it is totally concealed. Theunissen calls the Thou, that is, the noematic correlate of the attitude as “the individual Thou in an improper sense” (Theunissen, p. 343). Therefore, the next step of the destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality is in the destruction of this individual Thou that should make it possible to bring to light the Thou that lies behind that Thou. What matters here is “the individual Thou in a proper sense that is utterly unstable” (ibid.). The individual Thou in a proper sense is not something that appears to us as an object, but something that escapes the objectification. Thus, it means something that does not appear and, for this sense, can be called nothing. In this context, Buber writes: “But when Thou is spoken, there is no thing. Thou has no bounds. When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing; he has nothing.” (Buber, p. 17)

With the discovery of the Thou in a proper sense, the destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality is not completely carried out. With respect to the possibility of discovering the Thou that lies deeply concealed even behind the Thou in a proper sense, it should be noted that I happen to meet the individual Thou in two senses, though neither I nor the Thou are able to cause this meeting. My meeting with the Thou is neither my achievement nor yours, but exclusively something that has been presented from somewhere, that is to say, a gift or a grace. The experience of meeting Thou means, at the same time, the experience of him who presents us with this meeting, that is to say, the experience of “the Thou who, owing to his everlasting presence to me, is for me an Eternal Thou” (Theunissen, 343). According to Theunissen, in this context, the Eternal Thou means God who remains an Eternal Mystery to the human understanding, because the human being cannot know, but can only “glimpse” (ahnen) (Buber, 50) or “vaguely feel” him. In this context, Buber writes: “Of course God is the ‘wholly Other’; but He is also wholly the Same, the wholly Present. Of course, he is the Mysterium Tremen-
dum that appears and overthrows; but he is also the mystery of the self-evident, nearer to me than my I.” (op. cit., 104) Thus, with a complete destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality which enables us to experience the Eternal Thou or God as a Mystery, the philosophy of dialogue ends in a negative theology.

II. Various problems of intersubjectivity

In order to lay the ground for an assessment concerning the criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity by the philosophy of dialogue, I'll attempt to make a clear distinction among the various problems of intersubjectivity. In this paper, I'll distinguish only among the following three problems of intersubjectivity that directly bear on our critical assessment of the criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity through the philosophy of dialogue: the ontological, the transcendental-phenomenological and the metaphysical problem of intersubjectivity. Other problems of intersubjectivity that have no direct bearing on our discussion below, such as the empirically scientific problem or the problem of value of intersubjectivity, will not be dealt with.

1. The ontological problem of intersubjectivity

In the natural attitude, I experience the other in various ways. I can experience the other as my family, my colleague, a student, a teacher, a seller, a member of the country or even as a world citizen. In this case, I experience the other as a person. However, I can experience the other in a totally different way; in the scientific attitude, I can experience the other not as a person, but as a mere scientific object that is present among many other objects.

In the natural attitude, I can either describe the givenness of the other as a fact or I can attempt to explain the causal relationship between facts. In this
way, we can ground various empirical sciences which concern the other, e.g. sociology, history, anthropology or psychology. Furthermore, in the eidetic attitude, I can try to bring to light the essential structure of the fact concerning the other and thus, ground an ontology of the givenness of the other as a philosophical discipline.

We can find Husserl's various attempts at grounding the ontology of the givenness of the other. A typical example is the text that has been published by I. Kern as an appendix XVIII in volume XIII of Husserliana and bears the title: "The Givenness of the Concrete Social Objects and Products, and the Clarification of the Concepts Related to It. Social Ontology and Descriptive Sociology" (Hua XIII, p. 98). In this text, Husserl attempts to project the social ontology as a systematic ontology of the social givenness. It is a well known fact that the ontology of nature, for example, the pure geometry, the pure theory of number or the pure theory of motion, signifies the apriori science for the empirical sciences of nature. In a similar way, according to Husserl, the social ontology signifies the apriori sciences for the empirical sciences of the other. The first requirement in founding an empirical science of social givenness as a science is social ontology.

There are a great many tasks of social ontology. As repeatedly attempted by Husserl, it is one of the most important tasks of social ontology to clarify the general structure of the givenness of the other. For the purpose of clarifying it, Husserl grapples with two philosophical positions concerning this problem: B. Erdmann's theory of inference by analogy⁶, on the one side, and Th. Lipp's theory of empathy⁷, on the other side. Erdmann holds that the way of gaining access to the mental state of the other person cannot be called an experience, but only a kind of inference that, mediated by the bodily expressions, is carried out analogically. Correspondingly, he characterizes the mental state of the

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⁶ B. Erdmann, Wissenschaftliche Hypothesen über Leib und Seele, Köln, 1907. In this paper, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Erdmann.

⁷ Th. Lipps, Leitfaden der Psychologie, Leipzig, 1909. In this paper, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Lipps.
other which is accessible by analogical inference not as “an immediately given fact, but a hypothesis, a more probable one, because it can be verified by us at every moment” (Erdmann, p. 45). According to this theory, it is in principle impossible for us to have an experience of the other's mental state; the best we can do is to build a hypothesis about them. Contrary to this position, Lipps holds that there is no way of gaining access to the mental state of the other, because the other, as it is supposed to be experienced by me, is nothing other than the product of mental process called “duplication of myself” (Lipps, p. 36). According to him, this process of duplication of myself is released by certain sense-perceptions of the body of the other and carried out “instinctively”. Thereby different sense-perceptions motivate different ways of duplication of myself. Lipps calls this process of duplication of myself “empathy”.

According to Husserl neither Erdmann nor Lipps grasps the essence of the givenness of the other. For the other that I meet everyday is neither a mere hypothesis nor a mere duplication of myself, but the other as he/she is experienced by me. In this context, Husserl maintains that the experience of the other is not a kind of direct experience like the perception of things, but a kind of indirect experience that is mediated by the experience of the body of the other. Husserl names the indirect experience as the presentation (Vergegenwärtigung) which should be distinguished from the presencing (Gegenwärtigung) that is the direct experience of the object. Of course, except for the experience of the other person, there are many other forms of presentation such as remembering, expecting, picturing, fantasizing, etc. Husserl uses the term “empathy” (Einfuehlung) in order to distinguish the experience of the other as a form of presentation from its other forms. It is the further task of the social ontology to bring to light the concrete essential structure of the empathetic presentation in comparison with other forms of presentation.
2. The transcendental-phenomenological problem of intersubjectivity

2.1. The transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity and the problem of motivation

From about 1905, after the transcendental turn in his phenomenology, the transcendental phenomenological problem, that is, the problem of the condition for the possibility of the constitution of objects, signified for Husserl his most important task. In this context, the phenomenology of intersubjectivity is no exception; in this case also, more than anything else, he engaged himself with the transcendental phenomenological problem, that is, the problem of the condition for the possibility of the constitution of the other. Husserl formulates this problem in a more concrete way as follows: “How is it possible that in a pure consciousness in a certain form of its experiences an experience, and along with it, an experiential knowledge of other stream of consciousness and of foreign experiences and subject of experiences can emerge?” (Hua XIII, p. 29)

Before I deal with the transcendental phenomenological problem of the other, I would like to clarify the relationship between this problem and the ontological problem of the other discussed above. It should be noted that the transcendental phenomenological research of the other cannot be launched, if I have not experienced the other and I don’t know the ontological structure of the givenness of the other. The ontological structure of the givenness of the other offers the so-called transcendental guiding thread (Leitfaden) to its transcendental phenomenological research; if the ontological structure of the givenness of the other is not known ahead, its transcendental research is not only impossible, but also meaningless. Thus, the ontological research precedes necessarily the transcendental phenomenological one. Corresponding to the right order of research, in section 43 of *Cartesian Meditations*⁸ where the transcendental phenomenological research into the intersubjectivity begins,

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⁸ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, tr. D. Cairns, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. In this paper, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation CM.
Husserl deals with “the noematic-ontic mode of givenness of the other as transcendental clue for the constitutional theory of the experience of someone else” (CM, p. 90). With respect to the meaning of the ontological research of the intersubjectivity for its transcendental phenomenological one, he writes thereafter in section 59 as follows: “Starting from the experiencial world given beforehand as existent and (with the shift to the eidetic attitude) from any experiencial world whatever, conceived as given beforehand as existent, we exercised transcendental reduction - that is: we went back to the transcendental ego, who constitutes within himself givenness beforehand and all modes of subsequent givenness [...]” (op. cit., p. 136)

As already mentioned, the other can be experienced or given in various ways. Since each of these various ways of givenness of the other can provide a transcendental clue for the transcendental phenomenological research, it is possible to develop so many types of transcendental phenomenology of the other as there are ways of givenness of the other. In this context, Husserl tells us: “First of all, my ‘transcendental clue’ is the experienced Other, given to me in straightforward consciousness and as I immerse myself in examining the noematic-ontic content belonging to him. [...] By its remarkable and multiplicity, that content already indicates the many-sidedness and difficulty of the phenomenological task.” (op. cit., pp. 90-91) In this paper, I cannot develop all the possible types of transcendental phenomenology of the other. Instead, taking the above discussed empathetic presentation as a transcendental clue for the transcendental phenomenological research, I’ll sketch briefly the tasks of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

Since the general ontological structure of the givenness of the other is the empathetic presentation, the transcendental question concerning the constitution of the other can be formulated as follows: What is the condition for the possibility of the empathetic presentation? In this context, the condition for the possibility of constitution means the ground, that is, the motivation for the constitution. Accordingly, Husserl formulates the transcendental phenomenological problem of the other in general as follows: “How can appresentation of
another original sphere, and thereby the sense ‘someone else’, be motivated in 
my original sphere and, in fact, motivated as experience - as the word ‘appre-
sentation’ (making intended as co-present) already indicates? (op. cit., p. 109)
Thus, the transcendental phenomenology deals with the problem: “How does 
the motivation [for the experience of the other] run.” (op. cit., p. 110)

However, the task of the transcendental phenomenology of the other as the 
clarification of the motivation for the constitution of the other should be deter-
mined more concretely. In this context, it should be noted that, as I discussed 
in detail on another occasion⁹, the motivation means something different in the 
static phenomenology and the genetic phenomenology as two different types 
of transcendental phenomenology. The constitution of objects means in the 
static phenomenology the logical validity-grounding of the less evident/valid 
forms of consciousness through the more evident/valid forms of consciousness. 
It should be emphasized that in the static phenomenology motivation as 
grounding should be understood from a purely logical standpoint of validity. 
Among the various forms of intentionality, only the objectifying intentionali-
ties or the acts of reasoning can be the bearer of validity/evidence and, as such, 
only they can serve as the motivation for the constitution of objects. Thus, in 
the static phenomenology, motivation means always rational motivation, that 
is, motivation of the less rational acts through the more rational acts. In this 
sense, Husserl tells us: “Position belongs to any appearing ‘in person’ on the 
part of a physical thing; it is not just somehow one with the appearing [...] ; it is 
one with it in a peculiar manner: it is ‘motivated’ by the appearing and again, 
not just somehow, but ‘rationally motivated’.”¹⁰ In the genetic phenomenology, 
however, the motivation means something different from that in the static phæ-
omenology. The motivation for the constitution means in the genetic phæ-
omenology the grounding of the genetically derivative through the geneti-

⁹ N.-I. Lee, Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte, Dordrecht/Boston/ 
¹⁰ E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Pure Phenome-
nological Philosophy, First Book, trans. F. Kersten, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1982, p. 328. In this paper, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation Ideas I.
cally more original forms of consciousness. In the genetic phenomenology, not only the acts of reasoning, as it is the case in the static phenomenology, but also other forms of non-objectifying intentionality such as willing, feeling, mood, or even instincts or drives, can play the role of the motivation for genetic constitution of objects.

In developing the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity, one should make a clear distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. The static phenomenology of intersubjectivity is clearly distinguished from the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. However, I cannot help feeling that, unfortunately, even Husserl does not make a clear distinction between them. For example, Husserl declares that in section 49-58 of the V. CM he will develop a static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. He explicitly tells us: “Here it is not a matter of uncovering a genesis going on in time, but a matter of ‘static analysis’.” (op. cit., p. 106) However, contrary to this declaration, one can find that in many places Husserl attempts to make a genetic analysis of the intersubjectivity. In what follows, confining my discussion to the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity that has the general structure of empathetic presentation as the transcendental clue, I will try to make a clear distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity and clarify the main tasks of both of them.

2.2. The static phenomenology of intersubjectivity

As mentioned above, it is the task of the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity to clarify the motivation for the empathetic presentation from a purely logical standpoint of validity. Therefore, the transcendental question about the motivation for the empathetic presentation can be formulated as follows: From a purely logical point of view, what kinds of validity motivate the validity of the positing that the other is experienced by me? The static phenomenology of intersubjectivity aims at explaining the motivation on which the positing that the other is experienced by me can have its own validity. In
the static phenomenology, the validity of the positing of the existence of the other is something that is incomprehensible and should be explained further.

Since the validity of the positing of the existence of the other is something incomprehensible and needs an explanation, the first methodical step to be taken is to exclude that validity from the thematical area. This methodical procedure can be called the static dismantling of the constitution (der statische Abbau der Konstitution) of the other. The validity of the positing of the existence of the other is something that I share with other persons in the natural attitude, so the exclusion of that validity means, at the same time, the exclusion of all my intentionalities that are related to other persons, that is, the intentionalities through which I can influence the other persons or I can be influenced by them. Through this methodical procedure, it is possible for every reflecting subject to secure “the total nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiar ownness” (op. cit., p. 92). Husserl calls this region of intentionalities “transcendental sphere of peculiar ownness” (op. cit., p. 93) of the reflecting subject. The next methodical step to be taken is to analyze the intentionalities that can be found in the transcendental sphere of peculiar ownness and function as the motivations for the incomprehensible validity in the positing of the existence of the other. In this context, the following points should be noted.

1. In my transcendental original sphere, I can posit a primordial world that is valid only for me. My primordial world should not be confused with the objective world that is not only valid for me, but also for other persons. The objective world has already been excluded.

2. I find in my primordial world many things. However, these things are not homogeneous and among them there is one that stands out, my body. My body is “the only Object ‘in’ which I ‘rule and govern’ immediately, governing particularly in each of its ‘organs’” (op. cit., p. 97) For this reason, I experience my body not merely as a thing, but as a living body that is connected with my soul and, with it, makes a person. Thus, in my primordial world, I can posit a
thing as my body and myself as a psychophysical entity.

In my primordial world, a thing that resembles my body can occasionally appear. In this case, due to the resemblance between the thing and my body, I can conceive it as a living body and as a psychophysical entity. Thus, the resemblance between them motivates me to conceive a thing as a living body of the other and, further, the other as a psychophysical entity.

The static phenomenological analysis of the empathetic presentation makes it possible for us to comprehend how various kinds of intentionality function as the motivations for the validity of the existence of the other.

2.3. The genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity

It is the task of the genetic phenomenology of the other to clarify the motivations for the empathetic presentation from the standpoint of transcendental genesis. Therefore the transcendental question about the genetic motivation for the empathetic presentation can be formulated as follows: From the standpoint of the transcendental genesis, what kinds of intentionality motivate the genesis of the positing that the other is experienced by me? The genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity aims at explaining the genetic motivations on the ground of which the positing of the existence of the other has been generated. In the genetic phenomenology of the intersubjectivity, the genesis, not the validity, as in the static phenomenology, of the positing of the existence of the other is something incomprehensible and needs explanation.

Due to the incomprehensibility of the genesis of the positing of the existence of the other, one should first exclude that positing from the thematic area and analyze the remaining intentionalities that work as the genetic motivations for that positing. With regard to the remaining intentionalities, the same methodical procedure should be repeated, until all the genetic motivations are brought to light. This methodical procedure can be called the genetic dismantling of the constitution (der genetische Abbau der Konstitution) of the other.

First, we get the active layer of the empathetic presentation through its ge-
netic dismantling. The intentionality that is directed to the existence of the other cannot work, if some intentionalities are not working as its motivations such as the intentionality that is directed to the fact that there is a close relationship between my mental states and my bodily expressions or the intentionality that is directed to the fact that there are similarities between my bodily expressions and those of the other. Furthermore, these intentionalities cannot be working, if they are not closely related to and motivated by willings that are aiming at contacting the other. There are many such willings, for example, the will to learn from the other, the will to inform the other, the will to love the other, etc. All these willings that are aimed at contacting the other persons can be called social willings. However, these willings are not the final genetic motivations for the positing of the existence of the other. Through a further genetic dismantling of the empathetic presentation, it is possible to reveal that these willings are genetically motivated by the intentionalities of the social drives and instincts\footnote{In this context, Husserl talks about social instincts ("soziale Instinkte", Manuscript A V 5, p. 134) or intersubjective instincts ("intersubjektive Instinkte", Manuscript E III 9, p. 18).} as the genetic roots of the social willings.

3. The metaphysical problem of intersubjectivity

In Ideas I, with respect to the essential character of his phenomenology, Husserl writes: "If 'positivism' is tantamount to an absolutely unprejudiced grounding of all sciences on the 'positive', that is to say, on what can be seized upon originaliter, then we are the genuine positivists." (Ideas I, 39) Form this statement, one can arrive at the impression that Husserl's phenomenology is antimetaphysical, and it has nothing to do with metaphysics. However, in this context, it should be mentioned that phenomenology excludes only the groundless metaphysics in the past, and not metaphysics in general. Needless to say that it is one of the most important tasks of phenomenology to properly deal with metaphysical problems such as the problem of Being in itself, the
facticity of the transcendental life, the death, the fate, the history or the teleology of the transcendental genesis.

In his later phenomenology, Husserl grapples with the metaphysical problems with increasing intensity. One can say that his phenomenology, that begins with ontological phenomenology, develops into transcendental phenomenology, which, when mediated by this, ends up as a metaphysics. Thus, transcendental phenomenology builds the so-called spring-board to a true metaphysics that Husserl calls a "transcendental-phenomenologically founded metaphysics" (Manuscript B II 2, p. 23) or a "transcendental metaphysics" (CM, p. 144). It is an important task of Husserl's phenomenology to rebuild a true metaphysics in place of the traditional metaphysics that has been decapitated by the physicalistic positivism in the twentieth century. Phenomenological metaphysics can be called the highlight of the transcendental phenomenology. Just for this reason, according to "The Plan of 'the System of Phenomenological Philosophy' of Edmund Husserl" (Hua XV, p. XXXVI) sketched by Eugen Fink in 1931, "The Outlines of a Phenomenological Metaphysics" should be dealt with as the last step of a pure phenomenology. Below, confining my discussion to the problem of transcendental idealism, I would like to briefly sketch some metaphysical problems of intersubjectivity.

In Ideas I, formulating the basic thesis of the phenomenological-transcendental idealism, Husserl tells us that the transcendental ego "nulla 're' indiget ad existendum" ("that the transcendental ego, in order to exist, needs 'nothing'"). According to this thesis, the transcendental ego, as the first Being in itself, is the ground of Being of the constituted world and, for its existence, needs 'nothing', that is, neither the world nor the things in it. At the beginning stage of the static phenomenological analysis, the transcendental ego was conceived as a quasi-solipsistic one. A testimony to this fact is "the illusion of a solipsism" (CM, p. 150) which will be discussed in more detail below. However, through further phenomenological analyses, both static and genetic, it

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12 Ideas I, p. 110.
could be revealed that there is no solipsistic ego. Corresponding to this discovery, the basic thesis of the phenomenological-transcendental idealism should be reformulated as follows: “The intrinsically first being, the being that precedes and bears every worldly Objectivity, is transcendental intersubjectivity: the universe of monads, which effects its communion in various forms.” (op. cit., p. 156)

With the reformulation of the basic thesis of the phenomenological transcendental idealism, in his later phenomenology, Husserl attempts to deepen and widen the idea of the totality of the monads. For example, the totality of the transcendental monads was conceived as including not only the monads of human beings, but also those of animals, plants and, even inorganic nature. The deepening and widening of the idea of the totality of the monads have caused the revelation of the various new aspects of the phenomenological-transcendental idealism. At the same time, there arose various metaphysical problems of intersubjectivity such as the following:

1. What is the relationship among the totality of the monades, the individual monads and their constituted worlds?
2. Are the totality of the monads and the individual monads mortal or immortal?
3. Is there a historicity or a teleology of the individual monads and also of the totality of these monads?
4. Is there a God as the creator and preserver of the totality of the monads?

III. Buberian criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity reassessed

In his criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity, Theunissen overlooks the fact that Husserl deals not with one, but with various problems of intersubjectivity that should be clearly distinguished from one another. For example, Theunissen tells us that “the intersubjectivity is interesting for
Husserl only in the context of the question of subjectivity and its constituted world" (Theunissen, p. 257). From this statement, it is obvious that some assumptions about the essential character of Husserl's phenomenology have been made by him. For example, he assumes that, for Husserl, who is interested only in the transcendental-phenomenological problem of intersubjectivity, it would in principle be impossible to deal with the problems of intersubjectivity brought to light by the dialogical-philosophical destruction of the transcendental-phenomenological model of intentionality. Furthermore, by ignoring the distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, he assumes that there is only one form of transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Regarding these assumptions, which arise from lacking a clear distinction among the various problems of intersubjectivity, his criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity cannot be on the mark. This matter will be discussed in more detail below.

In his criticisms of Husserl's phenomenology as a solipsism, he overlooks the distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This confusion does not allow him to fully grasp the true meaning of the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As mentioned before, the task of the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity consists in the clarification of the structure of the motivation of validity that works in the experience of the other. In order to fulfill this task, the reflecting phenomenologist must go back from the objectively constituted world to his primordial world which can function as the motivation of validity for the positing of that objective world. Since this primordial world signifies a world which is valid only for him, this methodical procedure awakens the impression that Husserl's transcendental ego is a solipsistic one that should have no desire for society. Husserl even openly admits that his static phenomenology of intersubjectivity may cause the illusion of solipsism. However, this illusion is only the expression of the fundamental fact "that everything existing for me must derive its existential sense exclusively from me myself, from my sphere of consciousness" (CM, p. 150). This fact holds not only for me, but also for everybody who has the claim to the validity or truth and, for this reason, is
or truth and, for this reason, is able to build or take part in a society of research. This reference to the society of research can make the illusion of the solipsism disappear. The static phenomenology of intersubjectivity has nothing to do with the position that Husserl's transcendental ego must be a solipsistic one that has no desire for society and whose absoluteness means "an absoluteness as an asocial".

It should be noted that, in the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, it is impossible for us even to observe the illusion of solipsism. In other words, the illusion of solipsism has no place in the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. A systematic genetic dismantling of the motivations of the genetic constitution of the other reveals that the social intentionalities work on every moment of the genesis of the ego and, thus, it is influenced by the other transcendental egos and, at the same time, has an influence on them. Is is obvious then that, from the standpoint of a genetic phenomenology, there cannot be a pure solipsistic ego. The existence of the social intentionalities that work incessantly in the process of genetic constitution means that every transcendental subjectivity has various kinds of desire for society. In this respect, in an unpublished manuscript, Husserl depicts the genetic constitution of the Life-World as follows: "However, as we already know, it is constituted as a world for the society of this ego, as a world that has in itself the human beings and, at the same time, is the world for them. In his primitive instinct, every individual ego has his entire development not as a solipsistic one, but as a development of the entire human being, as the development of whole transcendental societies, the development of whole transcendental subjects. Implicitly, the ego bears all the others who can appear to him and all their works, the whole world as humanized, as a cultural world." (Manuscript A VI 34, p. 37)

Neither the static nor the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity can be determined as a solipsism. The criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity as a solipsism has been caused partly by the fact that Husserl did not make a clear distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. I believe that Husserl was fully conscious of this fact. In
this context, he tells us that “if one has grasped the essential meaning of my description, one would have raised the objection of solipsism not as an objection against the phenomenological idealism, but only as an objection against the imperfect character of my description” (Hua V, p. 151).

Now, I would like to focus on Theunissen's destructive criticism of Husserl's transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality. Theunissen's criticism results from lacking a clear distinction among the various problems of the intersubjectivity. His criticism of Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity that it can deal only with the sphere of the It but is unable to touch upon the sphere of the Thou, results from confusing the ontological with the transcendental-phenomenological problem of intersubjectivity. The other as an It as well as a Thou is a fact that can be given to us in the natural attitude and it is the task of the phenomenological ontology of intersubjectivity to clarify the essential structure of the other as the It as well as the other as Thou. Without qualification, phenomenology admits that, according to the way I make contact with the other, I can experience him/her as an It or as a Thou. The phenomenology is not, as Theunissen insists, a philosophy that is governed by the will to rule and, therefore, admits the other only as an It. Like Buber, Husserl acknowledges that, in the dialogical sphere which stands for “the immediateness between persons”, the other can appear to us as a Thou. In this sense, he writes: “Thereby, the other souls appear to me in a totally different way as things. Things appear to me as mere objects, the souls appear to me as persons who address me or whom I address, as my lovers or those who love me. I don’t live isolated, I live, with them, a common and united life.” (Hua XIII, p. 92)

Of course, it is an important task of an ontological phenomenology of the other to determine properly the concept of the “immediateness” that Theunissen talks about to characterize the givenness of the other as a Thou.

Since the other as an It or as a Thou has its ontological structure, it is definitely possible to make a transcendental-philosophical investigation concerning him/her. This can be carried out in a static and a genetic way. In this case, the other as an It or as a Thou can provide us the transcendental clue with re-
pect to which we can inquire into the condition for the possibility of its givenness. Through this kind of investigation, it would be possible for us to reveal various kinds of intentionality that function as the motivations for the experience of the other as an It or as a Thou. We can do the transcendental research not only of the Thou in an improper sense, but also of the Thou in a proper sense as well as the Thou as a Mystery or God. Needless to say that, in this context, the intentionality as the motivation for the experience of the other in various forms should not, as Theunissen believes, be identified with the will to rule. Of course, the will to rule is a kind of intentionality, but there are many other forms of intentionality that cannot be categorized as a will to rule, i.e., the attitude in which I meet the other as an individual Thou. Another example is the vague feeling (die Ahnung) with which I meet the Eternal Thou or God as a Mystery. This would be a kind of intentionality in the wider sense. In this context, it should be noted that, in Husserl's later phenomenology, the concept of intentionality in his Logical Investigations or Ideas I, as "the property of referring to something objective" that can be found in a group of experience, has been changed to a great measure.

In his destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality that enabled Theunissen to find out gradually three kinds of the Thou, he assumes that, being confined to the research of the sphere of the It, the phenomenology is, in principle, unable to clarify the structure of the Thou in the above three senses. Contrary to this assumption, it has been shown earlier that the Thou in these three senses can be the theme of the phenomenological ontology of the other as well as of the transcendental phenomenology of the other. In this context, I would like to emphasize that the individual Thou in a proper sense and the Eternal Thou or God as a Mystery are important themes of the phenomenological metaphysics of the other. It should be noted that the totality of the transcendental subjectivity or the transcendental World, as a bearing ground for the constituted world, can be determined as a world that is not yet objectified and, for this reason, can be defined as nothing. Therefore, Husserl's transcendental subjectivity turns out to be something that is similar to
Theunissen's individual Thou in a proper sense, although the term "Thou" is never used.

Furthermore, in Husserl's phenomenology, the idea of the totality of the monads is closely related to the idea of God. God means for Husserl the final ground of Being of the totality of monads and corresponds to Buber's Eternal Thou. Thus, finally, the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity ends in a theology, as it is the case with Buber's philosophy of dialogue. In this sense, Husserl characterizes the transcendental phenomenology as "a way to God without confession of faith" (Manuscript E III 10, p. 18). The process of gradual development of the ontology of intersubjectivity, then, the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity and, finally, its metaphysics formally corresponds to the process of Theunissen's destruction of the transcendental-philosophical model of intentionality. Deepening the transcendental phenomenology of the other into its metaphysics, Husserl also attempts to carry out a destruction of the model of intentionality developed in Logical Investigations or Ideas I, a destruction similar to that which was strived for in the philosophy of dialogue.