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Interpersonal Attention through Exemplarity

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Abstract

In this article, I discuss the constellation of issues that concern the interpersonal nexus of attention. I do so by (1) drawing a distinction between presentation and revelation as modes of givenness, (2) characterizing the emotional sphere as peculiar to person, and describing person as essentially interpersonal, (3) articulating the phenomenon of exemplarity (a) in distinction to leadership, (b) in terms of its efficacy, (c) with respect to the types of exemplars, and (d) with a view to how they are related to one another. I conclude by (4) delineating the distinctions between perceptual and epistemic attention and interpersonal attention, and **rooting** the former in the latter.

Introduction

Someone on the street is lonely or frightened: One person keeps his mind on business affairs, another approaches to talk. Two people

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are watching images of war on the local news: One is troubled about how it will effect tomorrow's stock market, another is overjoyed with patriotism. Someone tells a joke: One person titters out of embarrassment, another laughs explosively with a resounding contentment that seems to exceed the matter of the joke. In a waiting room, someone utters a cry of emotional distress: One patiently listens, another continues reading, and still another is preoccupied with payment.

The situations described here are unique, not merely because they involve turning toward others in a particular manner, but because in each instance they embody certain values that guide the very way in which we approach others. They occupy what I call the sphere of interpersonal attention.

Inquiries into the phenomenon of attention have generally taken their point of departure from the nature of consciousness in its relation to things in the world. This basic approach is shared by both empirical-psychological and philosophical-phenomenological approaches. In the former instance, attention is regarded as a mental response to a stimulus on the part of an object that in turn illuminates a thematic field.¹⁾ In the latter instance, attention is described as a lived-through process that is not caused, but rather “motivated” by the affective force of objects exerting an allure on us, issuing in a symbiotic relation between the foreground and background vis-à-vis an incarnate

1) G. Th. Fechner, Elemente der Psychophysik. (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1860/1889). W. James, The Principles of Psychology. Vol. 1. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Press 1890/1981). T. Lipps, Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens. Bonn: M. Cohen. Chs. IX and XXIX (1883). Wilhelm Wundt, Grundriß der Psychologie. (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1896). Carl Stumpf, Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen. (Berlin: Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1907).

perceiver.²⁾

Such analyses make contributions to the phenomenon of attention by showing how we turn our attention to something, how the world can lure us in this direction or that, how some things can modify our perceptual or epistemic orientation, how objects of thought can be provoked and become explicit themes for adjudication, how perceptual objects can come into focus while others recede into the background, how several things or aspects of things can rival to be present, and how others can coalesce to form an prominent image.

Rather than focusing in this essay on how things affect us and move us this way and that, I am interested in how we are able to speak of one person being drawn to another or to things the other likes; how a person can get or hold our attention in explicit and implicit ways; how someone can incite our actions or behavior; how someone can stir our personal growth and transformation, or inspire our sphere's vocation. These issues belong primordially not to the perceptual and epistemic sphere, but to the emotional sphere of experience, which in its turn even structure the way in which things (perceptual and epistemic) are attractive and repulsive, and hence guides what becomes affectively significant for these other modes of attention. Accordingly, not only is the field of interpersonal attention different from perceptual and epistemic attention, but the former

2) A. Gurwitsch, A. The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1964). A. Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1966). Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, trans. Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer, forthcoming 2001); hereafter, Analyses. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, (Paris: Gallimard, 1945); hereafter, Phénoménologie.

founds the latter and ultimately influences what becomes perceptually and epistemically significant.

In this essay, I discuss the constellation of issues that concern the interpersonal nexus of attention. I do so by (1) setting up the problem in phenomenological terms by drawing a distinction between presentation and revelation as modes of givenness, (2) characterizing the emotional sphere as peculiar to person, and describing person as essentially and originally interpersonal, (3) articulating the phenomenon of exemplarity in distinction to that of leadership, in terms of its efficacy, with respect to the types of exemplars, and with a view to how they are related to one another. I conclude (4) by delineating the distinctions between perceptual and epistemic attention and interpersonal attention, and by noting its significance for a phenomenology of attention.

1. Presentation and Revelation

Whether it concerns things in the world, beings other than human, or persons, the issue of attention has traditionally been dominated by a particular mode of givenness, namely, what I call here “presentation.” Presentation is the way in which objects or aspects of objects are provoked into appearance as they come into appearance in relation to a perceiver or a knower. As they are given, they come into an affective relief against a background and their meanings are determined only within a “context.” The context is precisely the interplay of perceivers and explicitly or implicitly perceived objects. Since the modes of givenness of objects, or senses, are determined according to the interplay of appearing and concealment, the objects

becoming prominent as others simultaneously retreat into the horizon have the structure of “depth.”³⁾ Here things are subject to interpretation to acquire the meaning they have explicitly.

Moreover, objects that are “presented” are given through functions and acts peculiar to this very order of givenness, namely, through perception, moving, thinking, believing, remembering, anticipating, etc. In each instance the object is presented in conjunction with the perceiver or thinker who orchestrates a schema of possible presentations that are, in turn, concordant with those aspects or those objects already presented. When they are concordant, we have the experience of the same thing being given and confirmed as such over time; we have a “normal” perception; when they are discordant, they are abnormal where the constitution of sense is concerned.⁴⁾ The objects’ identical sense here can be understood in terms of its genetic style of presentation as it remains identical in and through variations of perspective. This is not a one-sided operation, as we know, since the objects themselves function as allures and affectively motivate my turning towards them so that they can be ushered into appearance. In fact, in order for something to come into being as prominent it must be affectively significant and exercise an affective pull on the perceiver or thinker, whether or not it actually comes into being as an explicit theme.⁵⁾ This salience and turning toward can be more or less gradual or sudden.

3) Merleau-Ponty writes in the *Phénoménologie* that depth is the most existential dimension (296), and suggests in the *Le visible et l’invisible* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964) that depth is the very structure of Being (272).

4) See my “The Phenomenological Concepts of Normality and Abnormality,” in *Man and World*, Vol. 28, 1995, 241-60.

5) See Husserl, *Analyses*, esp., Part 2, Division 3.

It is not necessary to describe this structure any further here, since it is quite well known — at the very least — through Husserl's genetic phenomenological investigations, Heidegger's descriptions of Dasein and the structure of *aletheia*, the early writings of Gestalt psychologists, and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception. As far as this order of givenness is concerned, it is legitimate in its own right.

The difficulty has been and continues to be that “presentation” is assumed to be the only mode of givenness. This has two regrettable consequences. First, if one were not attentive to any difference in the way matters give themselves, he or she could attempt to apply presentation to anything that has the potential of being given. Thus, for example, animals other than human, the other person, God, etc., would be described as being able to be presented, believed in, and subject to an interpretative nexus to gain their meanings; they would be understood as being susceptible to the same kind of intention or fulfillment, verification and disappointment that we find in the case of perceptual objects.

Second, if one were attentive to a difference in givenness, one could conclude that there are “matters” that do not conform to this kind of givenness in principle or that there are matters that are in principle not accessible to perception or thought (e.g., the psyche of an ape, another person, God). In this instance, they would be described as being accessible, but in the mode of inaccessibility, given as not being able to be given, experienced as not being able to be experienced; hence, they would be characterized as on the “limit” of phenomenal givenness.⁶⁾ And if one still wanted to speak of these matters, he or she would

6) See my “Limit-Phenomena and the Liminality of Experience,” *Alter: revue de phénoménologie*, Vol. 6 (1998), 275–96.

be accused of “speculation,” or “theology,” or “dogmatic metaphysics,” or “essentialist thought,” or “foundationalism,” or “metaphysics of presence,” or a nostalgia for a “philosophy of origins,” etc.

Although the dominance of presentation and the effacement of other modes of givenness is evident in the vast majority of work from classical phenomenology to post-modern philosophy, the adherence to a monolithic order of givenness — which either covers everything or defines via negativa what cannot count as givenness — has been called into question in contemporary thought.

The most inchoate attempts can be seen in the struggle to broaden the sphere of evidence to include moral and religious experience though the presupposition is that one expand the field of presentation to cover now religious or moral themes, and only then possibility brush up against various limits to such an approach. Exemplary of this approach is Adolf Reinach who writes that “religious experiences, especially sudden ones, cannot be ‘understood.’ They are not ‘motivated.’” For this reason he calls for us above all to respect the sense that religious experiences have of their own accord, “even if [their sense] leads to enigmas.”⁷⁾ Under this general style, we also find Jean Hering’s phenomenological study of the unique nature of religious consciousness,⁸⁾ and Kurt Stavenhagen’s research into the possibility of an absolute personal comportment vis-à-vis an absolute sphere.⁹⁾

7) From 1916. Adolf Reinach, Sämtliche Werke, ed., Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith (Munich: Philosophia, 1989), 593.

8) Jean Hering, Phénoménologie et philosophie religieuse (Paris, Felix Alcan, 1926). See especially 87–140.

9) Kurt Stavenhagen, Absolute Stellungnahmen: eine ontologische Untersuchung über das Wesen der Religion (Erlangen: Philosophischen Akademie, 1925). Gründler’s work is a good example of the problematic

These should be distinguished from other attempts that merely describe empirically the variety of religions and religious experiences — whether to catalogue their types or advance a philosophy of religion — because they not only presuppose attributes of the Divine, they fail to ask how they the Holy or the other person can be given. This is the case despite the fact that even these approaches can provide a genuine starting point if they yield (or were to yield) an inquiry into modes of givenness. As examples of this kind we would include the likes of William James,¹⁰⁾ and G. van der Leeuw, Phänomenologie der Religion (1933).

Ultimately both kinds of attempts are unsatisfactory, either because of their implicit and explicit adherence to presentation even when they are trying to challenge its bounds.

There are however other figures who have been able to mount the challenge to the dominance of presentation in a more forceful and explicit manner. Most notably are the writings of thinkers who distinguish between givenness as revelation and givenness as manifestation or disclosure: for example, Michel Henry's monumental work, L'essence de la manifestation, which criticizes as “ontological monism” this kind of limitation of givenness (=monism) to one kind of being, and which understands the very essence of manifestation to be revelation.¹¹⁾ I also have in mind Emmanuel Levinas's work.

attempt in early phenomenology simply to apply a phenomenology of presentation to “religious” phenomena. See Otto Gründler, Elemente zu einer Religionsphilosophie auf phänomenologischer Grundlage (Munich: Kösel & Pustet, 1922)

10) William James, The Variety of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature (New York: Random House, 1999).

11) L'essence de la manifestation, second edition (Paris: PUF, 1990). See “The Problem of Forgetfulness in the Phenomenology of Sphere,” in Continental Philosophy Review, The Philosophy of Michel Henry, ed.,

Totalité et infini, which, despite the fact that it seems to qualify the Other as what is not able to given, makes a clear distinction between givenness as disclosure and absolute givenness or givenness as revelation, and thus describes the Other positively as “teacher.”¹²⁾ Following in this tradition is also Jean-Luc Marion, who draws a similar distinction between manifestation and revelation in his work Dieu sans l'être.

But by far the most forceful exposition of this problem has been provided by the phenomenologist, Max Scheler, already in his writings spanning the first two decades of the Twentieth Century.¹³⁾ For Scheler, the difference between revelation and manifestation are culled from his notion of person who is qualified as such most profoundly through loving as an act of the emotional sphere (I take up his notion of person in the next section). Despite the fact that his writing style and terminology might be less familiar to us today, he expounds upon these issues in such a profound and consistent manner that it is worth our while to sort through this material, and in the face of our

Anthony J. Steinbock, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1999), 271-302. And see his C'est moi la vérité: pour une philosophie du christianisme (Paris: Seuil, 1996).

12) Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et infini (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961). After all, it is Levinas himself who writes that not every transcendent intention has the noesis-noema structure (xvii)! See also xvi. See my “Face and Revelation: Teaching as Way-Faring,” in Addressing Levinas, ed., Eric Nelson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, forthcoming).

13) For example, Max Scheler, Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik, [Gesammelte Werke Vol. 2], ed., Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1966); Max Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie [Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 7], ed., Manfred Frings (Bern: Francke, 1973); Max Scheler, Vom Ewigen im Menschen, ed., Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1954).

present post-modern (and even post-post modern) sensibilities, for us to bear the burden of his articulation of the problem.

2. The Emotional Sphere and Loving: Calling Person to Person

Scheler addresses the distinctiveness of a different mode of givenness by appealing to the emotional sphere (not the cognitive or perceptual one) as constitutive of person; he does this further by understanding loving as the most profound and concrete act of the emotional sphere, namely as a movement in which the person is qualified and revealed as absolute; and he contributes to the problem of attention (although he would not call it that), by describing the interpersonal dynamic of exemplarity, which is ultimately rooted in loving.

We would be lost under the sway of western ancient prejudices to hold that the human spirit is exhausted by the contraposition between reason and sensibility, or that everything must be subordinated either to one or to the other; it is just as harmful to maintain that the emotional sphere be equated with sensibility, and further, that meaning and evidence are the province of the rational sphere, and finally, that anything belonging to the emotional sphere — however conceived — is simply “other” to it, i.e., as irrational, confused, unclear, blind, “subjective,” without sense or direction.

In contrast to this, and appropriating an insight from Pascal, Scheler contends that there is a distinctive “order of the heart,” an ordo amoris that is peculiar to the givenness of person, one that will have its own style of evidence, illusion, deception, fulfillment, powers

of discernment, “clarity,” murkiness, etc. It concerns not functions and acts of perception and judgment, which have an integrity of their own, but those of the emotional sphere, like sympathy, co-feeling, loving, hating, etc. It is simply an act of unequaled arbitrariness, to summarize Scheler, to carry out philosophical investigations only in the case of thinking and to hand over to psychology the remaining part of spirit.¹⁴⁾

Of the many acts and functions belonging to the emotional sphere, like pity, benevolence, co-feeling, sympathy, etc., it is loving that is most profound because it is in and through loving that person is revealed as such. By loving, Scheler does not mean a sentimentality, an aimless gushing, something that happens to us passively, like “falling in love.” Rather, loving is what he calls an “act” as distinct from a “function” because it is a movement peculiar to the level of spirit; it is oriented, expressive, “spontaneous,” and initiatory, not in the sense of being in control, exercising freedom of choice, or exerting power over another, but in the sense of being creative, of being improvisational, as it were, and not being subject to the normativity of rational laws.

As being given fully but not exhaustively in acts of the emotional

14) Max Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” in Schriften aus dem Nachlaß, Vol. 1, [Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 10] ed., Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1957), 362–65; hereafter, Schriften. English translation, Max Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” in Selected Philosophical Essays, trans., David R. Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 118–122; hereafter, Essays. See also Max Scheler, Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik, [Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 2], ed., Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1966), 82–4; hereafter, Formalismus. English translation, Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value, trans., Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 63–5; hereafter, Formalism.

sphere, person is never an object, but rather, a dynamic orientation who lives in and through acts and develops creatively and historically as an intrinsic coherence.¹⁵⁾ Because the whole person is and lives fully in each act without exhausting him- or herself in one act or the sum of these acts, there is no act whose performance does not enhance or diminish the content of the person's being.¹⁶⁾ Further, just because the person is not susceptible to givenness on the order of objects does not mean that person cannot be given; it does mean, however, that the person cannot be given in the mode of presentation, like a watch, a backside of a chair, a past event, a number, a geometrical figure, etc., and that as long as we attempt to “objectify” someone, his or her person will continue to elude our grasp. (Hence, we have in the moral sphere what Levinas called the impossibility of committing murder.) The person as such is only given in the mode of revelation whereby the absoluteness (which is intrinsically dynamic) or again the uniqueness of the person (“individuum ineffabile” as Scheler writes) — which cannot be described in concepts — is only revealed fully in loving.¹⁷⁾

Person is revealed in loving in a two-fold sense. There is strictly speaking no “lover” or “beloved” prior to the act of loving. This is the sense in which the person is revealed in loving and loving can be said to be “creative”: It qualifies the lover and beloved as such in and through loving. Second, the beloved cannot be provoked as a lover, that is, to self-givenness, charity, etc., like an object can be

15) See A. R. Luther, *Persons in Love* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).

16) Scheler, *Formalismus*, 525-26; *Formalism*, 537.

17) Max Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* [*Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 7*], ed., Manfred Frings (Bern: Francke, 1973), 163; hereafter, *Sympathie*. English translation, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans., Peter Heath (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1970), 160; hereafter, *Sympathy*.

provoked into appearance, say, when I turn on a light and call a friend's attention to an ashtray. It is possible, however, for one to evoke the givenness of the other as person, but then this has the sense of an invitation on the order of the moral or religious sphere of experience. The evidence, disappointment, illusion, etc., of revelation is internal to the experience of the emotional sphere itself and the kind of givenness it is (e.g., absolute as opposed to relative, immediate as opposed to mediate). This is why giving reasons (or excuses) for why one loves another or does not love another always comes after the experience of loving, not loving, hating, and so forth. It is impossible to get outside of acts in which someone is revealed in order then to justify that givenness from the order of presentation. Finally, to say that the person is absolute and given in the mode of revelation is to say that the person as absolute is not open to debate, to historical interpretation, to hermeneutics. (This is not to say that we cannot describe the structure of personhood.) To assert the possibility of the hermeneutics of the person qua singular person, however, would make the absoluteness of the person if not arbitrary, then relative: relative to a context in which things appear and become meaningful, relative to me and to my control, be it in the guise of nourishments or tools. Levinas captures this insight by saying that the face attends its own manifestation (or rather, revelation), whereas things or texts do not and cannot. The face "teaches"; an object can be interpreted but cannot teach.

Loving, as a movement and oriented act, can of course be directed toward any thing. Thus, one can love ideas, knowledge, beauty; one can love honor and nobility; one can love animals (e.g., our pet hamster), trees (e.g., old growth forests), even cars, and utensils (e.g., my favorite fountain pen). This as we will see is essential for

understanding the role of exemplarity. In each case, loving is an dynamic orientation toward this “other” such that its intrinsic value is not exhausted in the loving; rather, as allowing it to unfold of itself, it is open toward infinity such that this “other” realizes the highest possible value peculiar to its own being. But it does so precisely where the quality of this “higher value” is not and cannot yet be “given.”¹⁸⁾ The higher value can in no way be “given” in advance because it is only revealed in and through the movement of loving. We love the other in the fullness of what the thing is or who the person is, which is simultaneously an opening of possibilities and an invitation “to become.” Accordingly, loving is not an occasion for the promotion of higher values in the other (which would be correctly sensed as patronizing or controlling), and it does not “create” higher values in the other.¹⁹⁾

Although loving can be directed toward any thing, the highest form of loving relates to that which bears the intrinsic value of the Holy. And this is peculiar to the sphere of person.

Person is given immediately as interpersonal. We customarily take

18) Sympathie, 164, 191; Sympathy, 165, 192.

19) Sympathie, 151, 161 ff; Sympathy, 148, 158 ff.

(For Levinas, of course, it would be absurd to speak of animals or things having a “face” [visage] since they only have a “side” [face]. But this points to a limitation in Levinas’s analysis, or at least to a restriction of his purposes. In my terms, we would have to reserve the expression “revelation” for the person to person givenness, which is strictly moral, and describe different modes of givenness, namely, what I call “disclosure” and “manifestation” for the unique modes of givenness respectively of animals and earthly elements, and cultural things in order to understand the movement of infinity peculiar to loving other than the person or “face” of the Other.) This is something I develop in my current work, Verticality and Idolatry.

such a statement to mean something like people are always with one another socially, that we are inherently dependent upon others, that “no man is an island,” etc. Phenomenologically, however, this statement expresses a primordial interpersonal relation, namely, that we, as finite persons, are given to ourselves, and in this self-giveness, are immediately in a relation (an absolute relation) to infinite person or the Holy. Accordingly, self-discovery is always already interpersonal, and it is impossible in this regard to start off with an isolated individual. The primordial interpersonal relation is foundational for individual self-awareness, which originally can be understood as “vocation,” as the “good-in-itself-for-me.” It is precisely this original interpersonal relationship that is the primordial instance of interpersonal “attention” and “affective force” that now has to be understood most profoundly in terms of loving, which is generative, and the evocation of love as a moral invitational force.

That this relation is essentially interpersonal is attested to by unique acts peculiar to the emotional sphere that bear the stamp of interpersonality. As generative, loving is a movement that extends beyond what is presently given such that — on the side of the beloved — even what was experienced as “highest” or most fulfilling or “saturated” up until now can be overcome in the direction of what is still higher, now as “highest,” most fulfilling, saturated, and so on, without any precise limits. This is the way, for example, the mystics experience the “presence” or givenness of God. St. Teresa of Avila, more specifically, compares the experience to a surfeit of water or intensity of flames that leads the individual in the direction of a “perfection” peculiar to that unique person beyond all boundaries. One develops in depth as person correlative to the intensity of the experienced personal presence.²⁰⁾

This relation to the Holy through which I am given to myself places me in this immediate relation as me, uniquely, in terms of an “ought” which comes to me and to me alone; it is a “call,” a “vocation,” that as experienced is experienced in reference to me as a good-in-itself-for-me.²¹⁾ This intimate, unique relation is expressed, for example, in the Shir HaShirim where we read Solomon/Israel saying to his God, Hashem: “My beloved is mine, and I am His” (2.16), or alternately, “I am for you, and you are for me.” The relation is absolute since it is not confined to past or present, or a certain period of time, but unconditionally, for all time. Only loving is commensurate to this unconditionality. Hence, we can characterize this movement as an absolute relation to an absolute where this absoluteness is susceptible neither to numerical singularity nor plurality — a relation each person as person has precisely because of its uniqueness, not because of its universality. This is the sphere of interpersonal solidarity.

This “call” becomes “ideal” for me, in Scheler's terms, because it lies not only in the direction of the love of the Divine, but also in the direction of this divine givenness to me: as a consequence, this places me in a unique (again, not numerically particular) position in the moral cosmos and obliges me with respect to actions, deeds, and works.²²⁾ The degree to which human beings are persons, i.e., absolute, unique, is the degree to which finite persons are different. In terms of this unique personal “ideal” each person comports him-

20) See Scheler, Schriften, 358-59; Essays, 112-13. And see The Collected Works of St. Teresa of Avila Volume One, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh O. C. D. and Otilio Rodriguez O. C. D. (Washington D.C.: ICS Publications, 1976); hereafter, Collected Works.

21) Scheler, Formalismus, 482; Formalism, 490.

22) Scheler, Formalismus, 482, 483 fn; Formalism, 490, 491fn.

or herself as ethically different and different in person from every other person under otherwise similar circumstances. The development of this given solidarity takes place in and through the essential diversity and absolute distinctiveness of vocations. And it is precisely this spiritual or personal diversity that demands a true democracy as providing the material conditions for the realization of each vocation in acts. In this way, the unique personal absolute differences will not be forced to be concealed by relative and finite goods.²³⁾

Moreover, this uniqueness is not merely given as a point in time or as a simple origin, since through my acts and personal sphere, I continue “to accomplish” this individuation historically. And for this reason: it is not the body, sensuous nature, the spatio-temporal order, etc., that individualizes, but rather, “spirit” as the personal orientation that has generative density. Because the absolute relation mentioned above springs from the emotional sphere as loving, and because it is the emotional sphere and most profoundly, loving, that qualifies the human being as person, this relation is qualified not as intercorporeal or even intersubjective, but precisely as interpersonal (and hence as foundationally religious and moral).

One cannot, on the one hand, “grasp” the sense of the loving act and, on the other, merely comport myself as if it were not experienced. I must somehow affirm or deny any reply to the felt love. While I experience the act of kindness, for example, I simultaneously co-experience a requirement for some kind of reply of love that belongs to the nature of this act.²⁴⁾ But this does not mean that in loving there is an intention toward a counter love, for it

23) Scheler, Formalismus, 499-500; Formalism, 509-10; Sympathie, 136; Sympathy, 129.

24) Scheler, Formalismus, 524-25; Formalism, 536.

belongs to the nature of loving that it cannot be commanded; and if this intention were present, it would destroy the very invitational “demand” of reply, and what we would be talking about would no longer be loving. Likewise, an automatic reply to the loving would be completely inadequate, since loving is “initiatory” and not ruled by compulsion from without.

In the case of this founding interpersonal relation, exemplified by the mystics, our personal comportment would be to love as the Godhead loves, not only in the direction of the love for the Godhead, but simultaneously in the direction of the divine givenness, which includes love of other persons and an authentic love of self such that in one's own act of love he or she would experience the intersection of the divine and finite person's love.²⁵⁾ This loving is elicited from the other person's presence and not, e.g., from me wanting to do something nice. As such it instores or expresses the moral sphere of experience and founds acts that are likewise personal, be they social, political, economic, or sexual.

This entire dynamic that belongs to the interpersonal sphere of experience, which is colored both religiously and morally, could not be an issue if the interconnection just described were a monistic or a pantheistic one, and this for these reasons.

First, the generative character of loving does not entail God thinking, willing, loving, etc., in the human being, just as the volitional act of the human being is not the mere obedience to divine imperatives and commandments. Hence, loving God as infinite Person who in generative loving gives us to ourselves cannot fuse with us. And it is only because of this that there can be a moral sphere of experience and moral activity.

25) Scheler, Schriften, 347; Essays, 99.

Second, persons as such are absolute, which is to say, one cannot posit God as somehow absolute and human beings qua persons as relative. The relation is absolute to absolute (person to person), not absolute to relative. Thus, as opposed to Michel Henry, the distinction cannot be between an absolute Sphere as self-affection that gives the ego to itself, and a relative self-affection which is only the self-affection absolute Sphere²⁶); rather it would have to be expressed as a relation between an absolute self-affection that is infinite, and an absolute self-affection that is finite.

Third, because the individuating principle is spirit qua the emotional sphere, not sensuous nature or the spatio-temporal order, we can speak meaningfully of both individual and collective persons.

The person to person relation as I have described it here enables us now to address the phenomenon of attention in an interpersonal framework, and not to confine it to a mode of presentation peculiar to perception or intellection, merely. I say merely, for ultimately even perceptual and epistemic attention will be colored by interpersonal experience, infinite-finite and finite-finite: Interpersonal attention is foundational for perceptual attention. The task of section 3 will be to show how this is the case by treating the phenomenon of exemplarity.

3. Exemplarity

We love or hate what the exemplar loves or hates, in the manner of loving or hating along with the exemplar. What is significant to us, even what startles us and turns our head can be discerned by the

26) Michel Henry, C'est moi la vérité: pour une philosophie du christianisme (Paris: Seuil, 1996), 212-15.

styles of our loving and hating. This is the reason Scheler writes that whoever has the ordo amoris of a person has the person him- or herself. “Nothing in nature which is independent of man can confront him and have an effect on him even as a stimulus, of whatever kind or degree, without the cooperation of his ordo amoris.”²⁷⁾

We read in our exemplars our ordo amoris. Exemplars are not norms, but “personal models” on the basis of the value seen in the content of the exemplar. Exemplars, however, are given pre-judicatively and prior to the sphere of choice, and express a particular value-dimension (e.g., the Holy, spirit, the vital, use, the agreeable), and how those values are ordered.

Because exemplarity is fundamental for understanding the phenomenon of interpersonal attention, I develop the phenomenon of the exemplar in several stages. First, I show the uniqueness of exemplarity by contrasting it with the phenomenon of leadership (another mode of interpersonal attention, but which is ultimately rooted in exemplarity); second, I specify the efficacy of the exemplar; third, I describe the order and rank of exemplars; and finally, I address the relation between different modes of exemplarity.

A. Exemplarity and Leadership: The Meaning of Exemplarity. Reflecting on the problem of the leader nearly two decades before the explicit rise of National Socialism in Germany, Scheler saw the importance of clarifying the phenomenon of leadership for all domains of sphere, not just with respect to the political state, but to religion, economy, ethics, aesthetics, civic sphere, etc. His analyses of the relation of leaders and followers not only foreshadowed many insights won by the Frankfurt School in their momentous work on the leader-follower relation, but simultaneously pointed to another form of

27) Scheler, Schriften, 348; Essays, 100.

“power” and efficacy peculiar to the sphere of the individual and community that is much more fundamental than that of leadership. This other form of power is exemplarity.²⁸⁾ In relation to the problem of leadership, exemplarity is more fundamental because the exemplar determines the very leaders we choose. I will not enter into the detail of Scheler's analyses of leadership, even though leadership is a mode of interpersonal attention, but only mention some basic characteristics in order to distinguish exemplarity sufficiently from it, and to show how leadership is itself rooted in exemplarity.

1. Whereas the relation of leadership is reciprocal, the relationship of exemplarity is asymmetrical. The relation of leadership is reciprocated by followers through knowledge and through volition. The leader must have followers, and the followers must consent to follow, even implicitly, if the leader is to be leader. This is the case even though quite often the leader will try to dissimulate the reciprocity of the relation (we only need think here of the logic of Totalitarianism and its politics of dissimulation).²⁹⁾ Thus, leaders can only be leaders if there are simultaneously followers who willing consent to follow.

In order for a leader to be a leader, he or she must know him- or herself as a leader. Without this self-recognition, the leader cannot function as such. Moreover, there must be some type of recognition on the part of the followers that the leader is the leader, even if they do not like this particular figure or figures, do not agree with what they stand for, or do not like the sphere they lived, etc. Thus, a sergeant can “lead” a platoon, and still be despised by his followers.

Finally, leaders must want to lead. This does not mean that the

28) See Max Scheler, “Vorbilder und Führer” in *Schriften*, 255-344.

29) See Anthony J. Steinbock, “Totalitarianism, Homogeneity of Power, Depth” in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* Vol. 51, No. 4 (1989), esp. 621-30.

leader set out explicitly to be a leader; he or she may have been or may be even now be reluctant to be “in the spotlight,” but as leader, he or she must take up this role, and in this sense leadership is volitional.

In contrast to leadership, exemplarity is not reciprocal; exemplars do not have “followers,” but “emulators” in a relationship of emulation [Gefolgshaft]. The difference between followers and emulators will be discussed below. Let me state here that whereas the leader must know that he or she is a leader, the exemplar does not have to be cognizant of this fact, and most often is not; in any case, knowing or not knowing does not constitute the relation of exemplarity. The fact that this is not a relation grounded in knowledge functions both ways. First, the exemplar does not need to know that he or she is an exemplar in order to function as one. One person can hold someone else as an exemplar without the exemplar knowing it. Second, someone can emulate an exemplar without him- or herself being conscious that this person or figure is functioning as exemplary. This is in part why Scheler writes that the relationship of exemplarity is much more mysterious than that of leadership. In fact, writes Scheler, we seldom recognize the exemplar as a positive idea that we could clearly describe; and the less we recognize it, the more powerfully is the efficacy of the exemplar on our lives.³⁰⁾

2. Whereas leadership is a real, sociological relation, the relationship of exemplarity is, in Scheler's words, an “ideal” one. In order to function as leader, the leader must be a real person, and the leader must be present here and now. Pope John Paul II may function as a leader, but as a leader, he must exist and be present to his followers even though the “here” in which he exerts his

30) Scheler, Schriften 267.

leadership may extend far beyond the Vatican.

Unlike the leader, however, the exemplar can function as such independently of spatio-temporal conditions. For example, someone can be an exemplar who lived years before us: Caesar, Socrates, Jesus, Buddha, Gandhi, or at present, a parent, a boss, even Bill Gates or Michael Jordan. Moreover, an exemplar need not be an actual historical person; an exemplar could be a literary figure who reveals or expresses a particular value modality, like Goethe's Faust, Shakespeare's Hamlet, Dante's Beatrice, Dostovesky's Aloysha Karamazov, Toni Morrison's Sula, Andrei Tarkowski's Andrei Rubelov, not to mention Star Trek's "Captain Kirk" or Silvester Stallone's "Rocky Balboa."

3. Whereas the leader is a value-free concept, exemplarity is value laden. For example, the leader can be either a savior or a unconscionable demagogue; he or she can be the leader of a group of virtuous people or of mercenaries; a leader can lead in a positive manner and have a "positive" value, or can be a seducer, a "Ver-führer," one who leads astray. In any case, in this "sociological" sense, he or she is a leader.

But some kind of love and some kind of positive comportment with respect to value binds the person with his or her exemplar. Forming the personal center before one wants this or that, it is ultimately through a loving that our willing and our actions are determined.³¹⁾ Insofar as someone emulates his or her exemplar he or she regards the exemplar as good. Whereas one can despise a leader even though he leads, one cannot despise one's exemplar. Of course, exemplars can, "objectively speaking," be good or bad, and a counter-exemplar can emerge that is in direct opposition to a

31) Scheler, Schriften 267-68.

prevailing exemplar. But it is only through a kind of disorder of the heart or deception where the order of values are concerned that one can prefer bad models. In either case, however, the orientation toward the exemplar is always one with a positive, ardent relation.³²⁾

4. Whereas a leader affects followers on the level of behavior, the exemplar summons a shape of "person."³³⁾ The leader calls for action, accomplishments, behavior or directs action, either good or bad. The point for the leader is not to get the followers to change their lives, etc., but to perform certain things: for example, acts or things that will be beneficial to the environment or on the contrary that will reap as much profit as possible without getting caught by environmental controllers; to work for a better sphere of grape farmers and immigrants, or to exact the highest level of production from workers regardless of their health or general spiritual well-being. In any case, the leader is directed toward altering actions and toward getting certain results.

Whereas a leader calls for a display of action, the exemplar is effective on the person as person, i.e., as revelatory. The exemplar solicits the transformation of person; it is on the basis of this transformation that particular acts of volition, behavior or accomplishments will follow.³⁴⁾ Since the power of the exemplar functions guidingly, implicitly or explicitly, for the choices and commitments we make, the power of the leader is founded in that of the exemplar.

5. Finally, whereas followers stand in a relation of imitation or copying to leaders through acts of striving and willing, emulators live

32) See Scheler, *Formalismus*, 584-85; 561; *Formalism*, 583-4, 575-76.

33) Or what Scheler in his terminology calls a shape of "being."

34) Scheler, *Schriften* 263.

in a manner of emulation to the exemplar, which is founded in love for the exemplar. This characterization bears on the mode of givenness of the leader and the exemplar.

Where the leader is concerned, one copies what the leader does or what the leader wants; and the relation of imitation concerns the manifestation of external actions and results. Here the followers can act "like" the leader, can do "like" the leader does, etc. Whereas willing and choosing are directed toward obedience or copying, in the case of the exemplar, one "freely" devotes oneself to the content of personal value, which must be seen for the person him- or herself. Thus there is nothing of psychic contagion, identification, obedience, etc., where the exemplar is concerned. The emulator lives as or becomes in manner of the exemplar in the direction or orientation of the sphere lived, emulating the sense of the sphere, keeping the exemplar's spiritual or personal "shape" at the center of his or her person.³⁵⁾ Rather than being rooted in educational directives, commands, advice, the modification of the person's orientation and sense, the formation of the person's moral tenor, or the transformation of the moral tenor of the individual (what we would call "conversion," positive or negative) are only consequences of the growing adaptation of the person to the exemplar.³⁶⁾

35) Scheler, Schriften 273.

36) Scheler, Formalismus, 566; Formalismus, 580-81. In this way, leadership is founded in the relationship of exemplarity. For loving the exemplar may lead to acts of striving and willing, and only in this instance may we "follow" the exemplar whom we love, or even a leader who embodies those values (constituting the leader in this case an exemplar). But simply following a leader through acts of striving and willing is not sufficient to qualify this individual as an exemplar worthy of love.

In short, we will as the exemplar wills, not what he or she wills; we become as the exemplar, not what the exemplar is. Creatively or inventively appropriating the respective sense of the exemplar, perhaps with entirely different “external” works and actions, within different milieus and historical situations, with different talents, duties, etc., the emulator him- or herself becomes a revelation of the way or manner of the exemplar. However, emulation does not amount to doing just anything one likes, if this means disregarding the sense or way of the exemplar’s sense; it is not liberated from historical actions in the sense that revelatory emulation must get “said.” But it does mean that the relation of exemplarity is liberated from copying just these particular actions in the sense that there are innumerable ways in which the revelatory core can get “said.” Whereas the “as” or “way” of exemplarity is open, the “like” of leadership has restricted venues.

B. Efficacy of the Exemplar. By virtue of its very givenness, the exemplar is experienced as an “ought-to-be,” as an invitation or a draw, or pull, or “enticement” [Lockung] that originates in the exemplar. One does not actively move toward exemplars, rather, the exemplars draw persons toward them. The exemplar is not a goal after which one strives, rather, the exemplar functions as goal determining. The invitational quality of exemplarity at the core of personal becoming corresponds to the temporal dimension of the future and the experience of hope. This enticement however is not like in leadership compulsive or gained by suggestive powers, but functions by letting one see for him- or herself through the exemplar. Otherwise, the efficacy of exemplarity is destroyed.³⁷⁾

Even though the exemplar is experienced as a kind ought or invitation, the personal exemplar, who is absolute and unique, cannot

37) Scheler, Formalismus, 564; Formalism, 578-79.

be equated with a norm, which is universal by virtue of its validity and content. All norms as universal, according to Scheler, have their foundation in the value of person as absolute value. By this he means that there can be no norm of duty without a person who posits it, no rightness of a norm of duty without the essential goodness of the person who posits it. There can be no norm of duty without the person for whom this norm should be valid, and if he or she lacks the insight to see by him- or herself what is good. There can be no “reverence” for a norm or moral law that is not founded in love for the person who functions as an exemplar. Rather than being efficacious on the level of normative actions, the efficacy of the exemplar pertains to the being (or to-be) of a person; to the extent that the emulator experiences the invitation or requirement on the basis of the value seen as exemplified in the exemplar, the emulator tends to become in the manner of the exemplar by loving along with the exemplar. And this is done and must be done without the intention of “education” in the sense of “improving” another.³⁸⁾

Despite the fact that the emulator is guided by the exemplary person and “required-to-be” in a certain way, his or her autonomy is preserved because unlike the relation of leadership, it is based on an autonomy of insight. Moreover, through an alternation in the direction of loving, exemplarity is the primary vehicle for the transformations pertaining to the person, be they moral, religious, and otherwise. As such, it is the foundation for the phenomenon and experience of conversion.

C. Types and Order of Exemplars. Exemplars embody the entire range of value spheres, covering the saint (the value modality of Holy), the genius (the value modality of spirit), the hero (the value

38) Scheler, Formalismus, 558-60; Formalism, 572-74.

modality of the vital), the leading spirit (the value modality of the useful), and the connoisseur (the value modality of the agreeable).³⁹⁾ Not only are there different types of exemplarity, but they exist in orders of foundation in relation to each other. The deepest mode of exemplarity is the saintly one, and all the others are dependent directly or indirectly upon the governing religious exemplars. The reason for this can be summarized as follows. While all exemplars have the same “form” (see all the qualities of exemplarity mentioned above in distinction to leadership and concerning the efficacy of exemplarity), only the saintly exemplars have the form as the “content” of their movement. “Form” and “content” coincide, as it were. The other types of exemplarity can be understood in terms of degrees of “slippage” or “abstraction” from the dimension of saintly exemplarity. Before elaborating upon this point, let me now describe the respective characteristics of this range of exemplarity.

Saintly Exemplar and the Modality of the Holy. Within the sphere of the saintly exemplar Scheler distinguishes between the so-called original saint who becomes the personal original image for the respective religion or “founder,” and the saint or holy person who both emulates the “original” saint and who can function in his or her own right as exemplar.⁴⁰⁾ Like all the exemplars, the saintly exemplar has a orientation of loving. In the case of the saintly person, the original orientation is toward the Holy in loving, which is to say, toward persons. In this case, the loving orientation toward the Holy disposes this person to a new revelation and to an “expansion” of the nature of the Godhead from the perspective of finite persons.

39) Scheler, Schriften see especially 269, 274 ff. And see Formalismus, 493-94; Formalism, 502.

40) See the discussion in Schriften, 278-87.

The saintly exemplar is not given as one among others (as in the case of the genius), but as unique precisely through that special relation with the Holy, and as exemplary of that relation understood either in terms of grace, wisdom, enlightenment, etc. For this level of exemplarity, there is no universal measure for the person of the saint, no norms with respect to his or her actions and efficacy. These are only established after the fact and on the basis of a “faith” in relation to them. Virtue, actions, works, deeds, are only expressions of the being and holiness of the person. Likewise, the things that he or she does are not proofs, but witnesses to his or her uniqueness. What one “obeys” is the style of sphere, the shape of the person, not rules or laws; or rather, one only “obeys” the latter insofar as they are ways of achieving free loving devotion of oneself.

Further, because saintly exemplars directly and indirectly encompass and “inspire” all other exemplars, and the norms and laws that arise (i.e., as “religious” ones) do so on the basis of this creative personal movement, they found cultural sphere and are not confined or reducible to it.

The saintly exemplar works on those who emulate the saint not through his or her works (like the genius who is present in them) or deeds (like the hero whose deeds have to be related), but through his or her personhood as being present with his or her emulators. Or rather, the shape of the person, his or her works and deeds, all coincide in the personality of the saintly person. For the “material” of the saintly exemplar is the person of the human being him- or herself; this is why the saintly exemplar is present as embodied in those who come after in the personal shape of the persons now living. The saintly person can only exist in actual persons; he or she is only given secondarily through authority or tradition, which is tied

to the person's historical appearance in the past. This relation is realized not by copying the saint, but by living along with the exemplar in the same orientation, etc. This is how the saintly exemplar can evoke a Liebesgemeinschaft (or a loving-community) for all persons.

The Genius and the Modality of Spirit. The directedness of loving for the genius is not immediately oriented toward the Holy like the saint, but directly toward the being and logos of the world.⁴¹⁾ Because he or she has a spiritual loving comportment toward the world, the genius does not have the freedom either to create or not to create; the philosopher is “compelled” by the love of wisdom, the artist, by the love of bringing a world into being, etc. Through the genius' creative love of the world, we experience an opening up of things, an inexhaustible process of allowing newer and newer values to flash forth that are peculiar to this sphere. He or she brings about the realization of spiritual goods of culture in an indispensable and irreplaceable way, and does so without conscious rules and methods.

The world as a whole is given through each work (the single work of art, the single philosophical book, the parts of a system of right, etc.), and in this sense is itself a microcosm. Thus, whatever the genius loves becomes something through which the world as a whole can be embraced in a loving manner. But whereas the saint is given as “unique” in the sense specified above, the genius is given as “individual” in the peculiarity of his or her way of seeing. As individual, the artist, philosopher, lawgiver, etc., can stand as one among others as given in the work.

But as individual, the efficacy of the genius is more restricted than that of the saint whose content spans the spatio-temporal world and

41) See especially Schriften, 290-297, 307-8, 321-26.

the “eternal” and “infinite.” The genius is limited to unending time and space, and in this sense is cosmopolitan; the genius is directed not toward a possible personal Liebesgemeinschaft, but to the realm of spiritual persons insofar as they appear in the unity of the world.

Finally, whereas the “material” of the saintly exemplar is the shape of the person, which as absolute is not open to interpretation (there is strictly speaking no hermeneutics of the person as such), the material of the genius is the work, which as a whole precisely demands interpretation to let the work speak its meaning. The task of the one interpreting the work is to carry out a re-seeing and a co-seeing of the “spirit” of the work in order to rediscover, in a creative and personal manner, the meaning(s) of the work. As such, it is open to an endless historical hermeneutics.

The Hero and the Modality of the Noble. Whereas the saintly exemplar's orientation of loving is the Holy, and thus the person, and whereas the genius exemplar is oriented toward a love of the world as spiritual culture, the heroic exemplar's loving and responsibility is directed toward the sphere and being of his or her people, and the enhancement of its environing world [Umwelt].⁴²⁾ According to Scheler, the hero is given in two possible modalities, in terms of the noble, and thus sphere-enhancing development, and in terms of welfare, and thus oriented toward technical values or maintenance.

Here we do not have an overflowing of spiritual acts as an opening to grace, not an overabundance of spiritual thinking and seeing beyond merely vital needs, but we do have the exuberance of spiritual willing over the drive of sphere. The hero is the person of volition and power.

42) See Schriften, 306-7, 311-313, 340; Formalismus, 568-69; Formalism, 585-6.

Leading Spirit of Civilization and the Modality of the Vital. The leading spirit also has a loving orientation, but now the loving is directed toward “humanity” or human society. Here we see the figures of the technician, the researcher, the scientist, or the doctor.⁴³⁾ It is not the shape of the being of the person that is significant here, i.e., what is taken as exemplary, but his or her actions and accomplishments. It is on this level of exemplarity that we can actually first speak of “progress.” There is no progress in works peculiar to the genius, but there is progress for the technician or the scientist.

Moreover, although one can be oriented toward the person as holy or as spiritual when one functions, for example, as a medical doctor or technician, the approach is indirect, since the direct orientation is the vital well-being of the individual as a societal being. This is why the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) can see itself as making progress in formulating and distributing vaccinations and setting immunization policies that in instances are deleterious for some, but “as a whole” seem to eradicate certain illnesses (like polio), and thus advance the “health” of human beings as a societal whole. This is also why one can assess and take what are deemed “necessary risks” as a medical doctor, whereas no parent who sees his or her child as a unique person (and not just as a member of society) could come to the same conclusions.

The Connoisseur and the Modality of the Agreeable. The connoisseur is the one who loves the agreeable such that enjoyment can become a supremely good art.⁴⁴⁾ He or she is not oriented toward the fulfillment of needs, since needs arise only where

43) See Schriften, 314–16.

44) See Schriften, 317–18.

something agreeable was initially given in enjoyment. Thus, overabundance or luxury precedes need. In the connoisseur's love of the agreeable he or she expands and discovers new values of the agreeable over the disagreeable.

D. The Relation between the Types of Exemplars. As I noted above, the difference between these levels of exemplarity is expressed in a kind of slippage between form and content where the person as such is concerned. All of the exemplar-types just discussed have a loving orientation, which is constitutive of person, and qua exemplar, exercises a transformation on the emulator in terms of his or her personal shape, etc. In terms of what we might call the "form" of exemplarity, outlined above in distinction to leadership, all persons who function as exemplars bear on the core of the person or function "personally" as unique, absolute, and so forth. But when we move from level to level the transformations that take place are fundamentally different depending on the rank of the value of the exemplar.

So, in the case of the saint, there is a personal loving directly oriented toward person as Holy in which the exemplar is given as "unique," witnessed in terms of the being of the person; in case of the genius, there is a personal loving directly oriented toward the world in which the exemplar is given as "individual," witnessed in terms of works, deeds, and actions; in the case of the hero, there is a personal loving directly oriented toward the environing world in which the individual is given as relative to a historical situation, in terms of will, power, and welfare, and so forth. For this reason we can see a saintly sphere of service come into conflict with the sphere of a connoisseur. St. Teresa of Avila writes: "On another day the Lord told me this: 'Do you think, daughter, that merit lies in enjoyment? No, rather it lies in working and suffering and loving.'⁴⁵⁾

However —and this is an important qualification— even though we witness something like a slippage from level to level, and even though these levels are essentially distinct, we are still indirectly oriented in a loving manner toward person as Holy in any modality of exemplarity. The mode expressed by the exemplar becomes the way that we participate in the movement of the Holy. Depending upon the level of exemplarity concerned, we say, “I love this,” “this is not what I love.” This is why Scheler can write that the givenness of the exemplar is experienced in various levels as a “delimitation,” as a specific way or directedness (that is more or less encompassing) into the generative movement of the Holy as a whole.⁴⁶⁾ Thus, we participate in the movement of the Holy as vitally concerned, as an immunologist, etc. And this means that the delimitation that is a specification of the way of loving is thereby a de-limitation as an openness to the Holy.

The Holy as generative is infinite and encompasses or “founds” all other spheres of value experience. Accordingly, the saint is not the most general form of exemplarity, but is the most profound “way.” The saintly exemplar founds all other modes of exemplarity, all other “vocations,” while remaining irreducible to them, because its way of pointing “reveals” the Infinite most deeply; this style of exemplarity most dramatically emulates in a way that implicitly includes the other levels of exemplarity. From its perspective, the other modes of exemplarity “reveal” to greater or lesser degrees: as hero, connoisseur, etc., but “reveal” nonetheless.

The problem arises when we restrict the participation just mentioned by confining, say, the technical sphere to the technical

45) St. Teresa of Avila, Collected Works, 336.

46) See Formalismus, 564-65; Formalism, 579.

sphere merely, and not allowing it point beyond itself, as it does, in the direction of the Holy. The problem arises when the delimitation of a way is not simultaneously realized as a de-limitation. Thus, for example, the ecological movement is (or should be) ultimately oriented toward the love of the Holy, but precisely as or in and through the love of, say, the rain forests. Otherwise it becomes mere “environmentalism.”

4. Exemplarity and Attention

I began this paper with various examples of interpersonal attention, and noted that the problem with most analyses of attention is that they focus exclusively on the perceptual or epistemic presentation of objects, and only obliquely address the interpersonal field of experience. In order to understand the interpersonal field of experience as it pertains to the phenomenon of attention, it was necessary to draw the distinction between presentation and revelation, and to describe the structure of exemplarity: in relation to leadership, exemplarity's efficacy, its types and orders, and the relation between levels of exemplarity.

In these final pages, I delineate the major features of interpersonal attention that can be gleaned from this description of exemplarity; to bring out its distinctiveness, I contrast it with the structure of perceptual attention:

- Whereas things and ideas are given in the mode of presentation, persons are given in the mode of revelation.
- Whereas the import of attention as it relates to presentation is perceptual and epistemic, the interpersonal dimension peculiar

to revelation introduces both a religious and a moral tenor to the problem of attention, and as consequence a perceptual and epistemic one.

- Whereas it is peculiar to objects or things that are objectlike to be presented thematically against a background and to be given with inner or outer spatio-temporal horizons such that what is implicit can in principle become explicit or present, persons live fully but not exhaustively in acts peculiar to spirit, as a movement which is most profoundly generative.
- Whereas perceptual and epistemic attention can admit of a gradation or degrees of attention and prominence, where interpersonal attention is concerned there are no degrees; rather, one is struck “in one stroke,” as it were, by the person.
- Whereas the passage of appearances in the economy of appearing and concealing presents the sense of the objects that can be read-off from its genetic concordance or Einstimmigkeit, person as a generative movement is a dynamic orientation, given absolutely but in an unfinished manner through its intrinsic coherence or Einsinnigkeit. But it is given in a self-revealing manner, and not by virtue of the interplay of appearing and concealing.
- Whereas the thematic presentation of objects emerges as affectively significant, the self-revelation of persons is emotionally significant.
- Whereas particular perceptual and epistemic objects are relative to a universal and to a context, and derive their meanings precisely within a hermeneutic field, persons are revealed as absolutely unique such that their meaning and value cannot be determined as presentation in a context (there is no hermeneutics of the person as such), but rather in interpersonal solidarity.
- Whereas the thematicity of objects or aspects of objects emerges in the mode of affective prominence against a background, the fullness of a person’s presence is given as absolutely unique in the mode of annunciation peculiar to the emotional sphere, and most profoundly, loving.
- Whereas the affective prominence of objects exercises an allure on the perceiver or thinker, the annunciation of persons

in their exemplary value modalities functions as an invitational or evocative “ought to be.”

- Whereas an allure can “motivate” a perception or a thought, an annunciation “requires” a loving or hating, or a mode of personal comportment grounded in loving or hating.
- Whereas an object is the end to be seen through its affective force, an exemplar through its “tug” is the way to see as an invitational force.
- Whereas, I can prompt or motivate (though not “cause”) something into presentational appearance, I can never force or prompt or motivate the revelation of another person. The revelation of a person is a freely self-giving movement, that is at most inspired or aroused through acts of loving.
- Whereas in the perceptual field we turn-toward something, passively or actively, either continuing or instigating a new flow of appearances or actions, in the interpersonal sphere the shape of our person is transformed. And rather than speaking of turning toward, we speak here of a turning-around, literally a conversion or revolution of the “heart” through a co-loving or co-hating.

By way of conclusion, let me note that these two modes of attention — the perceptual/epistemic and the personal — are not merely two different modes of attention. Exemplarity as a mode of interpersonal attention is foundational for perceptual attention, and sketches the basic contours behind each instance of willing and doing, of perceptual and epistemic attraction and repulsion. For, ultimately, things only emerge as affectively prominent through the ordering of what we love and hate, since the latter open the space for such a prominence in the first place; and this bears on the emotional sphere of experience as personal. Something can exercise an affective allure on us and motivate our turning-toward it in this particular way “because” we have already turned-around in this way rather than that.