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국제학석사학위논문

**Implications of the Coordinated Governance to  
Combating Child Labor through Education:  
A Comparative Analysis of Brazil and Cambodia**

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김 지 언

**Implications of the Coordinated Governance to  
Combating Child Labor through Education:  
A Comparative Analysis of Brazil and Cambodia**

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## **Abstract**

# **Implications of the Coordinated Governance to Combating Child Labor through Education: A Comparative Analysis**

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The pervasiveness of child labor in a country cannot be explained by a single factor. It is rather an outcome of a set of intertwined factors that are likely to discourage national development as a whole. Therefore, improving performance of a single sector would not be able to root out child labor in the country. Thus, totality approach, by which means multiple sectors of government go through development concurrently, is what is necessary to create a strong and sustainable momentum to drive child labor out of the country.

Since eliminating child labor through education takes on country-specific context, countries with different cultural, economic, political and social settings have been dealing with the issue in different ways. Cambodia, for instance, has relied heavily on external assistance such as receiving aid from international donors, implementing programs on eliminating child labor that are designed by particular

international organizations, and reforming education system in accordance with the suggestions proposed by the international development agencies. Unlikely, Brazil has decided to coordinate the government's ownership and autonomy on its effort to combat child labor by strengthening the interactions between different levels of the government. While the Brazilian case of reducing child labor through education is widely acknowledged by the international society as a great success, the Cambodian case is often addressed as an example of failure. This study examines the outcomes of the efforts to eliminate child labor through education in the two countries and observes the implications of the degree and form of government's coordination of ownership to combating child labor.

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**Key words:** Child labor, education, government ownership, conditional cash transfer programs, totality approach

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## **List of Acronyms**

ADB: Asian Development Bank

BEP: Bolsa Escola (School Grants)

CCLS: Cambodia Child Labor Survey

CCT: Conditional Cash Transfer

CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

CRDB: Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board

CSES: Cambodia Socio Economic Survey

ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

EFA: Education for All

EMIS<sup>1</sup>: Education Management Information System

ESP: Education Strategic Plan

ESSP: Education Sector Support Project

GER: Gross enrollment rate

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GMR: Global Monitoring Report

ILO: International Labor Organization

MDG: Millennium Development Goal

MDS: Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Eradication

MICS: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey

MoEYS: Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports

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<sup>1</sup> EMIS collects annual data returns from school principals, and is increasingly able to show trends, targets and to produce projections.

MOLVT: Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training

NER: Net enrollment rate

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NIS: National Institute of Statistics

OCED: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PAP: Priority Action Program

PETI *Programa de erradicação do trabalho infantil* (National Program for the Elimination of Child Labor)

PNAD: *Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios* (Brazilian National Household Survey)

RGC: Royal Government of Cambodia

SWAp: Sector-Wide Approach

SIMPOC: Statistical Information and Monitoring Program on Child Labor

UCW: Understanding Children's Work

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNGASS: UN General Assembly's Special Session on Children

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UPC: Universal Primary Completion

UPE: Universal Primary Education

WHO: World Health Organization

# **I. Introduction**

## **1. Purpose of the Study**

Neither child labor nor efforts to eliminate child labor through education is a new phenomenon. However, the root causes of child labor, dreadful situations of child laborers, education system that is incompetent to combat child labor and problems of marginalization in workplace and school, have been lasting without being fully dealt with. It is often argued that basic right to education must be protected no matter what and proper education is the most effectual means to rescue children from harmful workplace. However, while the necessity of educational reform for combating child labor has been relatively well-addressed, the way of reform that fits individual country in which child labor is prevailing and how that type of development should be pursued and attain effectiveness to the reduction and eventual eradication of child labor have not been studied in depth.

The prevalence of child labor in a country cannot be explained by a single factor. It is rather a result of a set of intertwined factors that are likely to hinder national development as a whole. Therefore, improving performance of a single sector would not be able to root out child labor in the country. Thus, totality approach, by which means multiple sectors of government go through development concurrently, is what is necessary to create a strong and sustainable momentum to drive child labor out of the country. This study supports this idea by employing Gunnar Myrdal's theoretical structure of institutionalism.

Since eliminating child labor through education takes on country-specific context, countries with different cultural, economic, political and social backdrops have been dealing with the issue in diverse ways. Cambodia, for instance, has relied heavily on external assistance such as receiving aid from international donors, implementing programs on eliminating child labor that are designed by particular international organizations, and reforming education system in accordance with the suggestions proposed by the international development agencies. Unlikely, Brazil has decided to coordinate the government's ownership and autonomy on its effort to combat child labor by strengthening the interactions among multiple levels of the national authority. While the Brazilian case of reducing child labor through education is widely acknowledged by the international society as a huge success, the Cambodian case is often addressed as an infamous example of failure on combating child labor. This study examines the outcomes of the progress of eliminating child labor through education in the two countries and observes the implications of the degree and form of government's coordination of governance to fighting against child labor.

## 2. Research Question

This study is based on the hypotheses that dependence on external assistance degrades the sustainability and overall performance of the country's reduction of child labor; and that alleviation of poverty or education reform alone

cannot eradicate child labor. Even though child labor and poor education system have been prevalent in both Brazil and Cambodia, Brazil is highly praised by the international society for its outstanding performance on reducing child labor and enhancing education system, while Cambodia is often addressed firstly as an example of failure. What explains this gap of reputation? What explains the substantial heterogeneity across settings in the extent to which the countries' effort to eliminate child labor through education translate into actual results?

### 3. Definition of Terms

While conducting research on the two countries' – Cambodia and Brazil – efforts to combat child labor through education, understanding the coherent and correct concept of child, child labor and out of school child is imperative in terms of leading to the fundamental and right direction of the research. In the interest of suggesting proper direction of any policy, program, and project to combat child labor through extending schooling opportunities for children, it is vital to conduct research under aligned conceptualization of the major terms.

### *3.1. Child*

There are numerous definitions of a “child” that have been specified by various international conventions. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Article 1 states that a child means ‘every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.’<sup>2</sup> Another definition of child is set by the ILO’s Minimum Age Convention No. 138 in 1973, in the context of child labor. Paragraph 3, Article 2 of the Convention specifies that the minimum age for work “shall not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling and, in any case, shall not be less than 15 years.”<sup>3</sup>

Yet, it is important to note that since societies have different identifications of life phases and an accurate and effective age record system is missing in many countries, age may not be an adequate criterion for defining childhood.

### *3.2. Child Labor*

Although there is no internationally consistent definition of the term ‘child labor’<sup>4</sup>, it is often referred to work that is mentally, physically, socially, or morally

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<sup>2</sup>According to Article 1 of the CRC, a child refers to everyone under the age of 18 (the definition of a child), regardless of gender, origin, religion or possible disabilities, needs special care and protection because children are often the most vulnerable (The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The United Nations General Assembly. November 1989).

<sup>3</sup> ILO Convention No. 138 (1973), Article 2.

<sup>4</sup> The concepts used to categorize child labor are at times inconsistent in published statistics and research reports, frequently creating confusion and complicating cross-country and longitudinal comparisons (UCW, 2013).

dangerous and harmful to children; and interferes with their schooling by depriving them of the opportunity to attend school; obliging them to leave school prematurely; or requiring them to attempt to combine school attendance with excessively long and heavy work<sup>5</sup>.

Borrowing the definition set by the International Labor Organization (ILO), child labor consists of (i) all children between 5-11 years of age who are economically active, (ii) children between 12-14 years of age who work in an economic activity for 14 or more hours per week, and (iii) children between 12-17 years of age who work in an economic activity that is classified as belonging to the “worst forms of child labor.”

In its most extreme forms, child labor involves children being enslaved, separated from their families, exposed to serious dangers and illnesses and/or left to fend for themselves on the streets of large cities – often at a very early age. Whether or not particular forms of “work” can be called “child labor” depends on the child’s age, the type and hours of work performed, the conditions under which it is performed and the objectives pursued by individual countries. The worst forms of child labor are defined by Article 3 of ILO Convention No. 182:

*All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict; the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances; the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international*

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<sup>5</sup> International Labor Organization

*treaties; work which, by its nature of the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.*

As the problem of the marginalized child laborers in domestic chore sector has been surfaced, the UNICEF Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) has come up with a more specific definition of child labor that includes measures of domestic activities. According to this concept, child laborers refer to<sup>6</sup>: (i) children 5-11 years of age who did at least one hour of economic activity or at least 28 hours of domestic work during the week preceding the survey (ii) children 12-14 years of age who did at least 14 hours of economic activity or at least 28 hours domestic work reflect the level of children activity beyond which work is judged to adverse implication on children human capital and social development. This definition of child labor is more specific and inclusive than that of the ILO; however, treating one hour of economic activity and 28 hours of domestic work per week as being in apposition certainly involves pitfalls. In many circumstances, the intensity of domestic work is no less than that of formal market work.

### *3.3. Out of School Child*

‘Out of school’ may refer to the children of late primary school aged and secondary school who have never enrolled in school. It may also refer to the children who have entered school but dropped out before completing the whole

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<sup>6</sup> Fares, Jean and Raju, Dhushyanth. Child labor across the developing world: Patterns and correlations. World Development Report. The World Bank. 2007.

educational curriculum and those who are in a state of moving between in-school and out-of-school status.

#### 4. Research Methodology

This study aims to explain the implications of government's coordinated governance to the reduction of child labor through education. In order to do so, this study provides a qualitative comparative analysis of efforts to combat child labor through education between Brazil and Cambodia. The rationale of selecting these particular countries as case studies is explained in the next section.

Longitudinal data on Cambodia's child labor and educational status are collected from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, the 2001 and 2006 Cambodia Child Labor Survey from the ILO's Statistical Information and Monitoring Program on Child Labor (SIMPOC), and the 2009 Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey. Data on child labor in Brazil are collected from World Development Indicators, the 2011 National Household Survey (PNAD), for the period 1992 to 2008. However, PNAD data have a serious limitation to characterize and analyze the country's trends on child labor and forms of dealing with the issue since they do not include children engaged in worst forms of child labor or child laborers in indigenous communities.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> PNAD survey from 1992 to 2003 do not cover the rural areas of the six Northern states (Rondonia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Para, and Amapa)

Both Brazil and Cambodia have been attempting to tackle child labor through education. Among various endeavors, conditional cash transfers (CCT) are one of the most investigated and evaluated forms of development intervention. Therefore, this study examines a range of CCT programs - the Education Strategic Plan (ESP)/ Education Sector Support Program (ESSP) and Priority Action Program (PAP) in Cambodia, and *Bolsa Escola* program (BEP) and *Programa de erradicação do trabalho infantil* (PETI) in Brazil. The main purpose of doing this is to distinguish the approaches taken by the two countries and observe the determining factors of success and failure of particular programs. An analysis of the selected CCT programs, including their structure, procedure of implementation, and implications to the reducing child labor, draws on documented experiences of such programs.

## **II. Background Research**

### 1. Literature Review

#### 1.1. Relationship between Child Labor and Economic Circumstance

To build a comprehensive analysis on efforts to combat child labor through education and to identify potentially relevant studies that address the factors affecting children's schooling and laboring, this study starts with an extensive literature search. There have been different arguments about the link between child labor and poverty. Some scholars accord poverty the major role in determining child labor so that the international society's long-pending goal of eliminating child labor is unfeasible unless poverty is ended, while others argue that there is no clear correlation between child labor and poverty.

According to the data sets on household behavior during the 1990s, collected by the World Bank and national governments, parental poverty proves to be the most important cause of child labor (Basu, 2003). By observing poor and underdeveloped countries where wages are low and children are considered as a key source of income, Basu (2003) claim that the extremely low wages of parents leave them with no alternative but to send their children out to labor market. In the same vein, Baland and Robinson (2000) suppose that there can be intergenerational child labor traps. That is to say that people who do not get to have educational opportunities because of their involvement in laboring activities are likely to be poor as they become adults. Since parents in poor households would need income

earned by their children, the whole family would be fettered in a perpetual child labor cycle. Supporting this idea, Emerson and Souza (2003) find that in Brazil parents who worked when they were children are more likely to have their own children in the labor force. That is, parents who work as children are likely to have social norms that attach less value to children's education.

Mendelievich (1979) also argues that there is an inverse relationship to the degree of economic advancement of a society, country or region. It is considered that the distorted economic framework and the poverty faced by the child's family as the intertwined reasons for the pervasive abuse of child labor in underdeveloped countries. According to Mendelievich the only solution to break the vicious circle of child labor is to prioritize easing poverty and to adopt standards set by the International Labor Organization (ILO). In the same vein, Portela and Emerson (2000) claim that there is a poverty cycle that compels poor children to work to increase family income and as a consequence, the working children have less investment in their education than non-working children. This poverty cycle perpetuates over generations since poorly educated child laborers are likely to earn low wages when they become adults and therefore, they will have to send their own children to work.

However, many scholars recognize the complexity of the causes and factors of child labor. Those who understand the intricacy of the phenomenon of child labor claim that poverty alone cannot explain the persistence of child labor in a country. For instance, Goldbaum, Garcia and Lucinda (2000), by comparing data from

several Latin American countries, assert that poverty does not explain the incidence of child labor. Their findings impose the necessity of considering other grounds beyond poverty that play a role in causing child labor.

## 1.2. Relationship between Child Labor and Schooling

There is a growing recognition that child labor elimination and the achievement of universal basic education are interrelated challenges – that one cannot be achieved without another. Myron Weiner (1991) accords compulsory education the principal role in eliminating child labor. According to Weiner, Compulsory primary education is the policy instrument by which the state effectively removes children from the labor force.<sup>8</sup> Besides studying whether children are working or not, it is also important to study the impact of working hours on schooling. Focusing on children aged 7-18 years in Ghana in the late 1980's, Boozer and Suri (2001) found that on average, working cut down school attendance by 0.38 hours for each additional working hour.

Using evidence from Belize, Cambodia, Namibia, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, and Sri Lanka, Ray and Lancaster (2004) conclude in the case study that children's work, even in limited amounts, the school attendance rate and in the length of schooling received by the child were negatively associated with appreciable increase in children's work. In a word, the evidences pointed to a

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<sup>8</sup> Weiner, M, 1991, *The child and the state in India: Child labour and educational policy in comparative perspective*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

detrimental influence of working on school attendance and school attainment for children. Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1995) discover that factors leading to an increase in child labor also contributed to increased chance of school repetition and decreased school attendance; another further finding in a follow-up study by them was that on average for every child, working reduced educational attainment by about 2 years.

Ravallion and Wodon's (2000) study on Bangladesh provides evidence that child labor and school enrollment were not associated with the decreases of child labor, meaning that child labor have no impact on school enrollment.

Some scholars like Colclough and Lewin (1993) suggest that the implementation of free and compulsory education through legislation and enforcement is an essential part of the process of achieving the right of all children to education and the effective elimination of child labor. They claim that these goals depend on multiple factors, not least education system reform.<sup>9</sup>

This study examines several programs on the elimination of child labor through education in Brazil and Cambodia. Therefore, it would be important to comprehend the orientation of the relationship between child labor and education. The interrelation between child labor and children's schooling has been recognized by the international society only lately; when child labor took-off as an international issue in the late 1990s, very little connection was made with education. In September 1994, the ILO and UNICEF held a joint meeting in New York to agree

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<sup>9</sup> Colclough, C, and Lewin, K. 1993, *Educating all the children: Strategies for primary schooling in the South*, Oxford, Claredon Press.

the time as a step towards more effective inter-agency collaboration that would also embrace UNESCO, the World Bank and WHO. This promising initiative was not sustained. It was not until after the International Conference on Child Labor, held at Oslo in October 1997, that the ILO and UNICEF began to work broadly within a similar framework in child labor and education with resource support from the Government of Norway.

There has been a great shift in a decade in the recognition of the significance of education in combating child labor and IPEC has become a leading catalyst in this area. At the 2002 UN General Assembly's Special Session on Children (UNGASS), the connection between education and child labor was formally made outside of a purely child labor context. In the Plan Action, the connection between education and child labor is first, and finally, made: *Education is a human right and a key factor to reducing poverty and child labor...* (III, B, 2, 38). As part of the implementation strategy, reference is made to promoting...*innovative programmes that encourage schools and communities to search more actively for children who have dropped out or are excluded* (para. 40(2)). In the section of the outcome document dealing with child labor, reference is made to the importance of...*providing working children with free basic education and with vocational training and their integration into the education system in every way possible...* (para. 36). Finally, universal education is seen as an important part of international cooperation efforts, with an overriding need to: *Mainstream action relating to child labour into national poverty eradication and development*

*efforts, especially in policies and programmes in the areas of health, education, employment and social protection (para. 39).*

Agreeing upon the notion that the goal of eliminating child labor and achieving universal basic education are interrelated – that one cannot be achieved without another - Myron Weiner addresses the interconnection between the assurance of children’s right to basic education and the elimination of child labor: “compulsory primary education is the policy instrument by which the state effectively removes children from the labor force.”<sup>10</sup> Weiner claims that different countries may take different patterns of policy interventions in education. Yet the notion that the state is the principal agent that holds responsibility to assure basic education right for children is true in all the countries.

## 2. Case Selection

Both Cambodia and Brazil experienced long-term political instability caused by colonialism, corruption and mass destruction. Child labor, unfortunately, has been a permanent output of such disorder. In the case of Cambodia, the end of the French colonialism<sup>11</sup> did not automatically bring about the end of child labor in the country. Political instability has continued as the infamous Khmer Rouge regime came into power and the Vietnamese occupation followed at the end of the

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<sup>10</sup> Weiner, M. 1991. *The child and the state in India: Child labour and educational policy in comparative perspective*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

<sup>11</sup> Cambodia was a French colony from 1887 to 1953.

genocidal regime. In the Brazilian case, political corruption has been persisting and the Brazilian coup d'état in 1964 takes on a chaotic aspect of political instability in the country.

The political turmoil has forced millions of children in the countries to participate in labor activities to earn income for family survival. Consequently, children's basic right to education has been largely neglected and exploitation of children's labor force has become prevalent in both countries. The rate of child labor in Cambodia remains one of the highest in the East and Southeast Asia region. According to CSES 2003-2004, about 49 percent of Cambodian children aged 10-14 are involved in work activities.<sup>12</sup> In Brazil, the incidence of child labor had been prevalent particularly in the nine northeastern states. Even though Brazil is a middle-income country that is relatively more developed than many Third World countries in which child labor is prevailing, the nine states in Northeast region<sup>13</sup> are the poorest areas in the whole world. The poverty rate in those areas is about 58 percent and it is similar with that in poor Southeast Asian countries.

As the international society began to call for the elimination of child labor and the importance of the role of education in combating child labor in the 1990s, both Cambodia and Brazil ratified the ILO Convention No. 138 on the minimum

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<sup>12</sup> The Cambodian Socio Economic Survey (CSES) 2003-2004 was carried out from November 2003 to January 2004 by the National Institute of Statistics. CSES is a nationally representative survey conducted on a sample of 15,000 households in 867 villages, and is designed to collect information about the living standards of the population and the next extent of poverty (UCW report on *Child labor as a response to shocks: evidence from Cambodian villages*, 2008).

<sup>13</sup> Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe and Bahia, and the Fernando de Noronha Archipelago

age for work and No.182 on the worst forms of child labor. Moreover, the two countries have attempted to reduce child labor through education within their own territory by implementing strategic programs including CCT. In Cambodia, for instance, the government adopted the ESSP to reduce the incidence of child labor by providing cash transfers to children in transition from primary to lower-secondary school.<sup>14</sup> Brazil has been combating child labor through numerous CCT programs like BEP and PETI, which provide funds to households that fulfill the minimum monthly school attendance rate.

Despite the comparable political backgrounds of Cambodia and Brazil, reputation for the performance in reducing child labor differs greatly; while Brazil is often addressed as a successful case that has witnessed dramatic reduction in child labor and remarkable advancement of education system, Cambodia is often regarded as an example of failure. This study examines a number of CCT programs in the two countries and analyzes the determining factors of the effectiveness of the programs.

### 3. Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Program

This study examines a number of CCT programs in Brazil and Cambodia – the ESP/ESSP, PAP, BEP and PETI - on account of their extensive

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<sup>14</sup> Filmer, Deon and Norbert Schady. 2009. “School Enrollment, Selection and Test Scores.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4998. The World Bank, Washington, DC.

acknowledgment for being effective in enhancing education system as well as in reducing child labor. CCT programs stem from the notion of social protection as human capital investment. As the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) stated in 2000,<sup>15</sup> a lack of investment in human capital brings about reproduction of poverty across generations. To solve this problem, countries like Brazil and Mexico pioneered a scheme that incentivizes investment in human capital by imposing conditions to cash transfers. CCT programs, therefore, are essentially demand-side interventions that seek to encourage the use of social services.

CCT programs are designed to provide a certain amount of cash, on a regular basis, to beneficiaries that fulfill certain obligations (i.e. children's regular school attendance, vaccination and health check-ups) aimed at human development. CCT programs are expected to promote a wide range of benefits in the mid-term as well as in the long-term; in the mid-term, cash transfers can support the livelihood of poor households; in the long-term, cash transfers are expected to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty. The conditionality and payment mechanism of CCT programs set an expectation that the programs would have positive impacts on a county's education system and reduction of child labor. Indeed, existing evidence shows that receipt of a cash transfer can improve schooling opportunities by helping poor households to overcome the cost barriers to schooling, including school fees, uniforms and stationeries. Moreover, various evaluations of CCT programs have

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<sup>15</sup> ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). 2..2. *Social Panorama of Latin America*, 2001-2002, LC/G.2183-P, Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication.

implied that the education component of the CCTs is an effective means of pointing out the necessity for an alternative to child labor.<sup>16</sup> Witnessing the broad success of the approach in middle-income countries, governments in low-income countries have also started to build up CCT programs.

Although aimed at human development, CCT programs rarely include the reduction of child labor as an explicit goal. Indeed, Brazil's *PETI* remains the only CCT program in the world that aims to reduce child labor in an overt manner. Scholars have claimed that the implications of CCT programs to the decline of child labor are indistinct. According to Duryea and Morrison (2004), for example, while it is certain that CCT programs are effective in promoting certain outcomes such as school attendance, it is difficult to find definite evidence that the programs produce outcomes such as reducing child labor.<sup>17</sup> Yet, it is arguable that other primary objectives of CCT programs, including the alleviation of extreme poverty and the enhancement of capabilities and opportunities for vulnerable households, are likely to play significant roles in the reduction in child labor by alleviating the roots of the problem. Various evaluations of CCT programs have shown that the approach has been fairly successful in addressing the failures in delivering social services and has indeed been effective in reducing child labor.


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<sup>16</sup> Tabatabai, H. 2006. "Eliminating Child Labor: The Promise of Conditional Cash Transfers". ILO/IPEC. p. 8.

<sup>17</sup> Duryea, S. and Morrison, A. 2004. "The effect of conditional transfers on school performance and child labor: Evidence from an ex-post impact evaluation in Costa Rica". Research Department Working Paper No. 505. Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank. p.3.

### III. Theoretical Framework

Figure 1. Gunnar Myrdal's Institutionalism – circular cumulative causation



Child labor is not a simple problem that is grounded by a single cause; however, it is an outcome of intricately interlinked problems of cultural, economic, political and social sectors of government. Therefore, joint effort of the multiple sectors reinforced by strong institutional will and capability is necessary to solve the problem of child labor. This study employs Gunnar Myrdal's institutionalism to explain the implications of well-structured government institutions to the reduction in child labor through education.

Myrdal's institutionalism is one of the central ideas in the arena of development theory. The theory holds that if underdeveloped or developing societies are to surmount persistent poverty that impedes their development, they must struggle to solve economic, social, political and cultural problems in a

simultaneous manner.<sup>18</sup> To support this idea, Myrdal suggests the notion of circular cumulative causation, which implies that once a direction of change is set it will carry on. In other words, the general direction of social inertia is self-reinforcing so that the countries of the Third World, with their weak position within the global system and weak internal social and institutional structures, are likely to fall into an incapacitating low-level equilibrium. At the same time, the First World countries would remain on an upward development track for the same reason. Myrdal observes that the only solution for the underdeveloped countries to leap off from their current position of development is a total institutional reforms insisted by state-ordered planning: “What a state needs, and what politics is about, is precisely a macro-plan for inducing changes, simultaneously, in a great number of conditions, not only in the economic, and doing it in a way so as to coordinate all these changes in order to reach a maximum development effect of efforts and sacrifices.”<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> G. Myrdal. 1970. *The Challenge of World Poverty*, London, Allen Lane, p. 268.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* p. 21.

## IV. Cambodia

### 1. The Cambodian Response to Child Labor

#### 1.1. The Education Strategic Plan (ESP) and Education Sector Support Program (ESSP)

In response to disappointing sector performance during the 1990s and the need for more sustainable and policy-led reform<sup>20</sup>, donors<sup>21</sup> and the education sector of the Cambodian government initiated a movement towards the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp)<sup>22</sup> in 2000. SWAp was expected to increase the effectiveness of the use of government and external resources for education. The government's aspiration to shift from donorship to ownership<sup>23</sup> and partnership has been embedded in the SWAp process. Adding on to the government's new paradigm of the use of public resources devoted to education, an alliance of like-minded funding agencies, particularly the Asian Development Bank (ADB), has become a substantial momentum for the SWAp.

As a part of SWAp, the first drafts of the national Education Strategic Plan 2001-2005 and the ESSP 2001-2005 were launched by the donors and the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS). The ESP is the principal document

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<sup>20</sup> MoEYS. 2000. *EFA 2000 Assessment Report*.

<sup>21</sup> Particularly Asian Development Bank, European Commission and Unicef

<sup>22</sup> According to the Education Sector Donor Report 2002, SWAp refers to *all significant funding in the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure program, under Government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and progressing towards relying on government procedures to disburse and account for all funds.*

<sup>23</sup> Cambodia Consultative Group Meeting, 2000.

indicating the medium-term targets and strategies for education, and the ESSP is the operational plan for achieving the broad policy targets set out in the ESP.<sup>24</sup> The ESSP annually specifies progress in meeting the targets set by the ESP. The ESP targets are consistent with the framework of Cambodia's National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) and the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). The ESP/ESSPs have been operated with technical and financial support by a number of modalities. The first version of the ESP/ESSP, for instance, included an ADB sector development program loan, which was a combination of budget support and project-type capital investment.<sup>25</sup> A European Commission grant administered through a targeted sector budget support program and bilateral grants from numerous such as Sweden, Japan, and Belgium have also taken significant parts of project financing.

The Cambodian government has designed and implemented the ESP and ESSP to guarantee access to education for vulnerable children, including child laborers and those who live in remote and underserved communes, and to decentralize education service delivery by strengthening the capacity of local educational institutions to manage distributed funds effectively. The objectives of the ESP and ESSP are also to motivate and assure better qualification of teaching staff<sup>26</sup>,

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<sup>24</sup> RGC, MoEYS. 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative – Cambodia Case Study. Purcell et al. 2009.

<sup>26</sup> To motivate teachers, the government introduced a salary increase of 15 percent each year, a performance-based allowance system and extra allowances and benefits for teachers working in remote areas (Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative – Cambodia Case Study. Purcell et al. 2009.)


to bring in pre-school programs, and to expand non-formal education.<sup>27</sup> Being equipped with the donor agencies' active financial support and the government's strong political will to enhance the country's education system and to embrace the vulnerable, the perspective of the ESP and ESSP seemed encouraging.

Nevertheless, the actual system and outcome of the ESP and ESSP have not matched the ambitious goals that were addressed in the program development stage. Even though considerable progress has been made towards achieving a high enrollment rate of primary education, problems of high dropout and repetition rates have remained thus far. Moreover, there has been a significant gap between commitment of budget that would be spent on the implementation of the program and the amount of the actual disbursement (Figure 2). Although the program indicates that the government and donors would provide the funding for activities under the strategies and policies within the program framework, uncoordinated structure has failed to clarify how much money has been allocated to the policy's implementation.

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<sup>27</sup> Education Sector Support Program, November 2005.

Figure 2. Disbursement of the ESSP



Source: The World Bank, 2012

The sustainability of the program’s financing plan has been questionable not merely because of the long-lasting uncertainty throughout the program procedure, but due to the pessimistic prospects of the program budgeting that has been foreseen by the government: The ESP projected a scenario based on the assumption that the education budget would remain up to 2010. Given that education’s share of the government recurrent budget had increased dramatically, reaching 18.6 percent in 2004 compared to 17.7 percent in 2006, in fact no significant increase was foreseen up to 2010.<sup>28</sup>

As the government grasped the serious uncertainty and constraint of the program financing, it has relied on external assistance to fill the potential underperformance. According to the Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI) report, the ESP 2006-2010 targeted 50 percent of external assistance

<sup>28</sup> ESWG, 2006.

to be for budget support, and 50 percent for facilities development and capacity building.<sup>29</sup>

## 1.2. Priority Action Program (PAP)

The increase in public resources allocated to the education sector has shifted the government's focus of education policy towards demand-side factors.<sup>30</sup> The government has begun to focus on reducing the cost burden on the poor families and thus increase educational opportunities for children. Carrying this momentum, the PAP was launched in 2000 under pressure from the World Bank. PAP is a means to ensure the expenditure of budget to priority sectors of social services,<sup>31</sup> including education sector, by which means its budget would not be fluctuated by any revenue shortfall. Yet, since the use of PAP school grants is fixed by the central level of the government, transparency and flexibility of the utilization of the grants have often been questioned.

PAP was first implemented in ten provinces and then was expanded to the whole country in the following year. There are twelve PAPs that are incorporated into the ESSP. Program Based Budget (PBB) system has replaced PAPs; however, the policy focus on demand-side factors has not been changed.<sup>32</sup> The main

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<sup>29</sup> Purcell et al. 2009. *Mid-Term Evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative – Cambodia Case Study*. p. 22.

<sup>30</sup> World Bank. 2005. Human Development Sector Report: Cambodia.

<sup>31</sup> The priority sectors of the PAP are health, education, agriculture and rural development.

<sup>32</sup> Purcell et al. 2009.

objectives of PAP are to provide equitable access and improved quality and efficiency of education service, to remove registration and other school fees that were formerly imposed on households, and to improve the internal efficiency of basic education through the provision of remedial classes to the children with vulnerable economic status.

As the program initially intended, the government appears to have been largely successful in removing school fees. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of PAP is still limited since very few parents know how PAP school grants are spent. Problems of cash flow have hindered the sustainability and transparency of the program. As MoEYS stated in 2003, PAP disbursement has been unreliable and unpredictable and therefore, decentralization and quality enhancement of education services have become impractical. As Table 1 shows, only 46.6 percent<sup>33</sup> of the total PAP funds allocated in 2002 was released by 2003.. Such delays of disbursement have induced some schools to recollect informal contributions from parents.<sup>34</sup> Since the fundamental purpose of PAP, which was to establish a stable and sustainable financing instrument, has fallen short, it is no longer possible to expect the program to solve prevailing social problems like child labor.

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<sup>33</sup> 59 percent for provincial budget management centers (BMCs) and 34 percent for central BMCs.

<sup>34</sup> MoEYS. 2003. *Education Sector Performance Report. ESSP Review 2003*. Phnom Penh.

Table 1. PAP allocations and releases, 2003 (Million Riels)

	<i>Allocated</i>	<i>Released</i>	<i>% Released</i>
PAP 1: Education Service Efficiency	10,530	3,371	32.0
PAP 2: Primary Education Quality and Efficiency	23,918	14,760	61.7
PAP 3: Secondary Education Quality and Efficiency	7,386	4,415	59.8
PAP 4: Technical & Vocational Education Quality Efficiency	1,576	940	59.6
PAP 5: Quality and Efficiency of Higher Education	101	51	50.5
PAP 6: Continuous Teacher Development	6,557	3,938	60.1
PAP 7: Sustainable Provision of Core Instructional Materials	13,348	3,207	24.0
PAP 8: Expansion of Non-Formal Education	1,998	808	40.4
PAP 9: Youth HIV/AIDS Awareness }			
PAP 10: Sports Development }	601	179	29.8
PAP 11: Strengthened Monitoring Systems	401	189	47.1
PAP 12: Scholarships and Incentives for Equitable Access	6,730	2,260	33.6
<i>Total</i>	<i>73,147</i>	<i>34,118</i>	<i>46.6</i>

Source: MoEYS (2003b), p.33.

Besides the weak financial management capacity of the government, the lack of autonomy and flexibility given to local authorities is seen as a cause of the overall ineffectiveness of the PAP mechanism. Since local authorities have been enforced to spend the PAP grants in the way ordered by the central government, it has been impossible for them to manage the expenditure disbursement to meet local needs.

## 2. Comprehending Child Labor Trends in Cambodia

Child labor has been a widespread problem in Cambodia. This section of the study examines the child labor trends in Cambodia in the period during which the ESP, ESSP and PAP have been implemented. Thus, the observed duration is from 1999 to the most recent year for which data are available.

Two decades of civil war since 1970 brought about economic, political, social and moral devastations in Cambodia and the country still has not fully recovered from the aftereffects of the damages. A great portion of Cambodian children have been sent to labor market as a contribution to family survival. Even though the Cambodian government ratified major international conventions to tackle child labor - the ILO Minimum Age Convention No. 138 in 1999 and the ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor in 2006 - the government's commitments on reducing child labor have never been fulfilled. Indeed, the child labor rate of Cambodia is still one of the highest in Asia notwithstanding a high economic growth that the country has undergone. According to the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) calculations from the Cambodia Child Labor Survey (CCLS) 2001 and the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) of various years, over 1.3 million children aged 5 to 14 were engaged in child labor in Cambodia and that is around 42 percent of children in the relevant age group (Table 3). The Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) 2003-2004 indicates that a total of 52.8 percent, 813,600 in absolute term, of children aged 10-14 declared to be involved in child labor activities during the period that the survey was conducted;

about 45.5 percent combine work and school, while 6.8 percent only work (Table 3). Although the child labor rate in 2009 implies a significant reduction in overall child labor rate in Cambodia, it is important to note that millions of children were still engaged in child labor activities in that year, by which implies that economic growth is not an ultimate solution to the problem of child labor.

Despite the fact that child labor has been reduced over time, the encouraging trend of the reduction in child labor has been vulnerable to national as well as global economic fluctuations.<sup>35</sup> For instance, Table 2 indicates that the incidence of child labor had risen in all major age categories between 2007 and 2009. According to the UCW report on child labor in Cambodia 2006, over 750,000 economically active children are below the absolute minimum working age of 12 year, and over 250,000 children aged 15-17 years are in the nationally-identified hazardous sectors or are working more than 43 hours per week.<sup>36</sup> That is, about 40 percent of the total number of children in Cambodia is involved in child labor in 2006. The ILO admits that nonetheless the child labor trend between 2007 and 2009 is one of few exceptional flows, therefore may not be diagnostic of long-term child labor trends in the country, this negative change of trend is likely to have serious influence on the country's long-pending goal to eliminate child labor.

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<sup>35</sup> ILO. 2009. *Decent Work Country Profile: Cambodia*.

<sup>36</sup> UCW. 2006. *Children's Work in Cambodia: A Challenge for Growth and Poverty Reduction*.

Table 2. Child labor trends in Cambodia, 2001-2009

	2001		2004		2007		2009	
<b>Child labor (5-11)</b>	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Total	831,451	34.4	na	na	390,415	18.6	402,692	18.8
Male	429,022	34.8	na	na	217,150	20.0	207,130	19.0
Female	402,429	34.0	na	na	173,264	17.1	195,563	18.7
Urban	112,161	25.6	na	na	18,863	5.7	17,899	5.4
Rural	719,290	36.3	na	na	371,551	21.1	384,794	21.3
<b>Child labor (12-14)</b>								
Total	479,148	49.5	na	na	357,210	34.0	366,939	38.1
Male	250,683	50.7	na	na	179,586	34.4	197,859	39.4
Female	228,465	48.3	na	na	177,624	33.5	169,080	36.7
Urban	64,190	34.7	na	na	27,630	13.6	21,210	13.3
Rural	414,958	53.0	na	na	329,580	38.8	345,729	43.1
<b>Child labor (15-17)</b>								
Total	228,174	24.9	na	na	272,186	27.8	352,605	34.7
Male	108,691	22.9	na	na	123,175	26.0	194,228	36.1
Female	119,483	27.1	na	na	149,011	29.4	158,377	33.1
Urban	47,266	24.0	na	na	20,207	11.1	34,818	18.2
Rural	180,908	25.2	na	na	251,979	31.6	317,786	38.5
<b>Child labor (5-17)</b>								
Total	1,538,773	35.8	na	na	1,019,810	24.7	1,122,236	27.3
Male	788,396	35.8	na	na	519,911	25.0	599,216	28.1
Female	750,377	35.8	na	na	499,899	24.4	523,020	26.3
Urban	223,617	27.3	na	na	66,700	9.3	73,927	10.8
Rural	1,315,156	37.8	na	na	953,110	27.9	1,040,309	30.5

Source: National Institute of Statistics (NIS) calculations from Cambodia Socio-economic Survey (various years) and Cambodia Child Labor Survey 2001.

As it has become certain that economic growth alone cannot bring about the end of child labor in Cambodia, the country should reflect on its development aspect and compensate the defects that would daunt its long-term development if they are not rooted out. *Education for All 2000 assessment country report* states that

most of the growth over the past in Cambodia has been urban-based and narrowly focused on industries such as garment exports, tourism and construction industry, all of which are vulnerable to the challenges imposed on the global market economy. Given that more than 80 percent of the entire population of Cambodia resides in rural or remote areas, the imbalance of the national growth and development implies that the majority of the population still struggles in poverty and has no access to basic social amenities. Indeed, the CSES 2003-2004 data reveal that the place of residence plays a significant role in determining likelihood of child labor; the number of children who live in rural area and participate in economic activity is double the number of their urban counterparts (Table 3). Yet again, the data on child labor in Cambodia's national statistics system are highly likely to underestimate the actual extent of the problem.

Table 3. Child activity status (10-14), by sex and residence

Residence	Economic activity only		School Only		Combining school and economic activity		Neither in school nor in economic activity		Total Work	
	Number (thousand)	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Urban	9.7	3.6	189.3	70.2	61.5	22.8	9.4	3.5	71.3	26.4
Rural	113.6	7.4	665.4	43.2	700	45.4	61.9	4	813.6	52.8
Total	123.3	6.8	854.7	47.2	761.5	42.1	71.3	3.9	884.7	48.9

Note: 'Total work' refers to children that work only and children that work and study

Source: UCW calculations based on Cambodia Socio Economic Survey (CSES), 2003-2004

The serious imbalance of rate of child labor between urban and rural regions implies that the CCT programs have not contributed much to the alleviation of the lasting geographical disparities in terms of the prevalence of child labor. Moreover, the volatile trends of child labor in Cambodia, during which the CCT programs have been implemented, attest that the programs have not been powerful enough to sustain the descending trends of child labor in the country.

### 3. Education Trends in Cambodia

The outbreak of civil war in 1970 and the genocidal regime of Khmer Rouge, which came into power in 1975, had caused serious national turmoil in Cambodia. During the Khmer Rouge regime, about three-quarters of its educated people became victims of the violent massacre or were managed to exile.<sup>37</sup> By the collapse of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, Cambodia's education system had been utterly dismantled. Mass destruction of schooling system and social culture by coercing the citizens into factories or collective farms have led Cambodia's educational problems to go from bad to worse.

Fortunately, the process of reconstruction and reformation of education strategies and structures had been observed throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. The aspect of the rebirth of education system is reflected in *Education Sector*

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<sup>37</sup> Asian Development Bank. 1996. *Cambodia: Education sector strategy study*. Manila.

*Investment Framework 1995-2000.*<sup>38</sup> The ESP, ESSP and PAP were designed and implemented as means to empower the restoration of human capital and reformation of education system in the country. To find whether these programs have been successful in reducing child labor by improving education system, this section of the study examines several key indicators of the program effectiveness, including primary enrollment, dropout and repetition rate from 1999 to the most recent years for which data are available. Moreover, this section examines the trend of public expenditure as well as external assistance on the education sector over the same period. The external assistance trend is reviewed since it has been playing a critical role in the whole process of educational rehabilitation and reformation.

The Cambodian government has maintained pro-poor strategy as a priority of the national reformation of education system. This includes a plan to remove the schooling fees for poor households. The reduction in costs of schooling has been resulted in a significant increase of primary enrollment rate. The gross enrollment rate (GER)<sup>39</sup> for primary education in Cambodia had increased from 100.98 percent in 1999 to 124.18 percent in 2012 (Table 4).

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<sup>38</sup> UNESCO and the International Bureau of Education. 2010 and 2011. *World Data on Education: Cambodia*. 7<sup>th</sup> education. p. 5.

<sup>39</sup> GER illustrates the general level of participation in the primary education system and shows the actual overall coverage of the primary system in relation to the population eligible for primary education. A GER above 100 implies high participation of students. Yet, it does not show the proportion of correct age to overage students enrolled. (National Education for All Committee. 2007. *National EFA Mid-Decade Assessment Report 5*)

Table 4. Primary gross enrollment rate<sup>40</sup>, 1999 to 2012

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
School enrollment, primary (%gross)	100.99	106.34	115.05	128.40	131.00	132.73	133.52
Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
School enrollment, primary (%gross)	133.51	134.53	131.17	130.48	129.89	126.45	124.18

Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators

To observe GER trends in different demographic areas in the early phase of the ESP, ESSP and PAP, this study employs data from EMIS (Table 5).<sup>41</sup> The trends of primary gross enrollment in Cambodia are upward in all regions. Above all the increments across regional categories, the 41.3 percent of growth in remote areas from 1999 to 2006 is the most dramatic. The Cambodian government deems these trends as both opportunity and risk since the number of teaching staff has not been increasing so much.<sup>42</sup> This may have serious implications to the long-term educational development in the country since teacher-pupil ratio is a decisive factor of the quality of education.

Table 5. Primary gross enrollment rate, 1999/00 to 2005/06

School Year	Urban	Rural	Remote	National
1998-1999	99.5	93.9	50.6	89.7
1999-2000	Na	na	Na	na
2000-2001	112.1	110.5	79.1	109.8
2001-2002	121.7	127.0	97.3	125.1

<sup>40</sup> GER refers to the number of pupils or students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for the same level of education.


<sup>41</sup> World Development Indicators do not assort data by region.

<sup>42</sup> National Education for All Committee. 2007. *National EFA Mid-Decade Assessment Report 5*. p. 49.

2002-2003	109.5	120.7	97.3	118.0
2003-2004	117.3	120.9	108.0	119.9
2004-2005	118.6	120.2	114.3	119.7
2005-2006	122.5	124.4	122.3	124.0

Source: MoEYS, EMIS, 1998-99 to 2005-06

Figure 3. Trend changes in primary gross enrollment rate, 1998-99 to 2005-06



Source: MoEYS, EMIS, 1998-99 to 2005-06

The net enrollment rates (NER) for primary education indicate the number of primary school-aged children enrolled in primary school, regardless of their success in the system.<sup>43</sup> This study observes the NER to measure the enrollment of correct age – not overage or underage – children in the country. As the World Development Indicators indicate, the NERs for primary education have increased from 86.44 percent in 1999 to 98.38 in 2012 (Table 6).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p. 59.

Table 6. Primary net enrollment rate, 1999-2012

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
School enrollment, primary (% net)	86.44	91.96	na	na	97.35	na	na
Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
School enrollment, primary (% net)	98.28	98.31	98.20	na	98.19	98.28	98.38

Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators

Yet, a combined data from the EMIS 2001-01 to 2005-06 and UNESCO's *Education for All 2000 Assessment: Cambodia* indicates somewhat different data from those of the World Development Indicators. The former source suggests that the coverage of the primary net enrollment rate in 2006, which is the most recent data available for the case, is far from universal even though the NERs have recently undergone a significant increase (Table 7). Unlikely, data from the World Development Indicators illustrate that the NER for primary education in 2006 over 98 percent. The gap of data between different sources is indeed significant and implies the erroneousness of the data on Cambodia in general.

Table 7. Primary net enrollment rate<sup>44</sup>, 1996/97 to 2005/06


School Year	Urban	Rural	Remote	National
1998-1999	84.6	82.6	45.5	78.3
1999-2000	na	Na	na	na
2000-2001	86.4	84.1	62.3	83.8
2001-2002	87.8	87.5	70.6	87.0
2002-2003	85.3	90.3	75.6	88.9
2003-2004	88.5	90.8	78.6	90.1

<sup>44</sup> Net enrollment rate (NER) means the number of pupils or students in the theoretical age group for a given level of education enrolled in that level, expressed as a percentage of the total population in that age group.

2004-2005	91.6	92.4	82.5	91.9
2005-2006	91.2	91.7	83.7	91.3

Source: Combined data from MoEYS's Education Management Information System (EMIS), 2000-01 to 2005-06 and UNESCO's *Education for All 2000 Assessment: country report: Cambodia*.


Figure 4. Trend changes in primary net enrollment rate, 1996/97 to 2005/06



Source: Combined data from MoEYS's Education Management Information System (EMIS), 2000-01 to 2005-06 and UNESCO's *Education for All 2000 Assessment: country report: Cambodia*.

The steadily increasing primary net enrollment rates do not explain the complete picture of educational trends in Cambodia. As Figure 5 shows, the primary net enrollment rates suddenly drop between the primary and secondary cycle. These trends imply that a great portion of the students drop out of school between the two educational cycles.

Figure 5. National net enrollment rate by cycle, 2006/07 – 2010/11



Source: Education Management Information System, 2010-11

Indeed, recent data from the EMIS indicate that dropout rate in Cambodia radically increased in the transition between grade 6 and grade 7. Regarding that lower secondary education begins from grade 7, this data set proves that a sudden fall of enrollments is directly linked with the rise of dropout rates. The sudden fall of the NER stems from the government’s failure on removing informal costs of schooling, which have been a significant constraint on equitable access to education services. It implies that the indirect costs of schooling are often incurred between the educational cycles and they are likely to produce a critical barrier for the poor. Even though the basic education system in Cambodia is officially compulsory and free of charge, the fact that the government did not purge the room for informal costs of schooling has been a serious loophole of Cambodia’s education system that brings about high dropout rates and children’s participation in economic activities.

Table 8. National dropout rates by grade<sup>45</sup>, 2009-10

Grade 1	Grade 1	Grade 3	Grade 4	Grade 5	Grade 6	Grade 7
9	7.4	7.8	8.7	10.4	9.7	20.2

Source: Education Management Information System 2010-11

While the pattern of enrollment rates indicates the product of children entering school, it does not illustrate for how long those children remain in school once they enrolled. Since universal completion of basic education is important as much as universal enrollment rate that signifies equal opportunities for all children on access to basic education system, effort to support children to complete the full cycle of basic education is essential. At this point, precise understanding and managing of repetition rates as well as dropout rates are necessary. Repetition rate is an important educational indicator that shows how well educational resources are managed; repetition rates over 0 percent signify inefficiency of educational resources. Repetition represents a diminution in the desired output, which is promoted students for given expenditures in education. Therefore, examining the trends of repetition rates for the period during which the ESP, ESSP, and PAP have been implemented would inform how efficient and effective the programs have been. Yet, it is important to note that interpreting data on repetition rates in Cambodia requires a great caution since the validity of data vary with management system of schools.

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<sup>45</sup> Dropout rate by grade refers to proportion of students from a cohort enrolled in a given grade at a given school year who are no longer enrolled in the following school (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Technical Guidelines, (2009)).


Table 9 Primary Repetition Rates by Grade for Selected Years

Students' grade	1992-1993	1995-1996	1996-1997	1997-1998	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005
1	42.7	42.7	41.2	40.9	17.5	17.7	19	23.6	21.8
2	29.6	29.6	26.7	24.9	10.3	10.9	11.6	16.1	14.4
3	23.1	22.1	19.2	18.5	8.1	7.9	9.1	13.2	11.8
4	18.8	17.7	12.6	12.2	5.6	5.4	6.4	9.2	8.5
5	29.8	25	7.5	7.5	3.5	3.6	4.2	5.9	5.8

Source: Combined data from MoEYS's Education Management Information System (EMIS), 2000-01 to 2004-05 and UNESCO's *Education for All 2000 Assessment: country report: Cambodia*.

The pattern of descending repetition rate with increasing grade level is observed in Figure 6. This trend may indicate that students' academic momentum gets increased as they move from lower grade to higher grade level. Another interpretation of this trend is based on the assumption that many students in Cambodia drop out of the primary education cycle as they grow older; the stratification of the repetition rates by grade level may suggest that a significant proportion of the students who failed in their lower grade levels eventually drop out of the primary education system and the students remaining in school are likely to continue and finally complete their primary education.

Figure 6. Trend changes in primary repetition rates by grade, 2000/01 to 2004/05




Source: Combined data from the EMIS, MoEYS, 2000-01 to 2004-05 and UNESCO's *Education for All 2000 Assessment: Cambodia*.

Notwithstanding the progress in primary enrollments and reduction in repetition rates over grade level, the trends of primary dropout rates have not been corresponding. According to UCW report on *Children's Work in Cambodia: A Challenge for Growth and Poverty Reduction*,<sup>46</sup> about one in four children that start primary school drop out before completing the primary cycle, and about one in two fail to graduate from basic education.<sup>47</sup> Figure 7 indicates a comparison of the dropout rates for grades 1 to 6 between the periods of 1998-1999 and 2002-2003. It is observed that the overall dropout rates in all grade levels are fairly stagnated. The stagnation of primary dropout rates implies that there has been no effectual step forward from this setback.

<sup>46</sup> UCW. 2006. *Children's Work in Cambodia: A Challenge for Growth and Poverty Reduction*. p.20.

<sup>47</sup> Basic education includes primary and lower secondary schools.

Figure 7. Trends of primary school grade- specific dropout rates for 1998/99 and 2002/03



Source: World Bank, 2005

More precise interpretation of the education trends in Cambodia would be obtainable by observing trends in public expenditures as well as external assistance allocated to education sector. As a share of gross domestic product (GDP), government expenditures in education increased from 1.67 percent in 1999 to 2.6 percent in 2009 (Table10). Public spending on education as a share of total government expenditure increased from 11.08 percent to 13.08 percent between 1999 and 2009 (Table11). While the increasing public expenditures in education sector itself seems a positive sign to the further educational development in Cambodia, the stagnating primary dropout rates implies that the amount of money spent on education may not be an automatic solution for the problem.

Table 10. Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
%	1.67	1.72	1.71	na	1.72	na	na	1.60	na	na	2.60

Source: World Development Indicators, the World Bank

Table 11. Public spending on education, total (% of government expenditure)

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
%	11.08	11.38	10.14	na	12.40	na	na	11.06	na	na	13.08

Source: World Development Indicators, the World Bank

In the whole progress in national educational development, Cambodia has been heavily dependent on external assistance. As Table 12 indicates, donor assistance to education had consistently exceeded the government's own education expenditure until 2005. Even though net ODA received as a share of central government expenditure has been descended since 2006, the government still lacks adequate resource to develop or reform its education system by itself.

Table 12. Net ODA received (% of central government expenditure)

Year	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12
%	-	-	-	120.75	119.76	111.16	112.12	84.75	95.21	83.83	63.25	61.38	55.78	49.06

Source: World Development Indicators, the World Bank

As the government realized the need to establish a framework for negotiation and coordination among the government, donors and civil society, it attempted to initiate the SWAp. However, the new plan of the government had only a limited achievement, since the internal capacity of the government was too weak and unstable to impose ownership on the coordination of external assistance. The major donors that have provided aid to education sector in Cambodia include ADB

and World Bank.<sup>48</sup> Donor funding to the education sector for the period between 2001 and 2007 is estimated at USD 321 million, with USD 39 million (actually spent) in 2001, USD 45 million (actually spent) in 2002, USD 45 million (estimated) in 2003, and USD 193 million (projected) for 2004-07.<sup>49</sup>

In summary, the overall enrollment rates have increased since the ESP/ESSP and PAP were implemented. Yet, the daunting transition rates from primary education to lower-secondary education make the sustainability of the programs questionable. The unsystematic way in which the programs have been implemented and the government's lack of capability to take control of it have left the country with no alternative but to rely on external assistance. If CCT programs are to succeed, there should be effective, well-funded public services available to amplify supply in response to a CCT-induced rise in demand for social services. The under-funded services have severely constrained capacity for government coordination and supply-side intervention. They, as a consequence, have precluded the government to take a totality approach, which is required to bring about real and sustainable development.

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<sup>48</sup> [http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/practices\\_chapter6.htm](http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/practices_chapter6.htm)

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

## V. Brazil

### 1. National Response to Child Labor – Efforts to Eliminate Child Labor through Education

#### 1.1. *Bolsa Escola* (Education Grant)

As the Brazilian government recognized that persisting poverty in the country would not be eradicated unless it overcomes problems of the low human capital development and policy-led social reforms, it designed and implemented a CCT program called *Bolsa Escola* (BEP) in 1995 at its municipal level.<sup>50</sup> The BEP was designed to provide cash transfers to ensure a minimum income level for poor families, conditional on school attendance rate of child of beneficiary household. Through the implementation of the program, the government has aimed to remove extreme poverty in the country, and to accumulate human capital. The successful performances of the local BEP have drawn active support from the federal government and the program has been scaled up to the whole country since 2001.

The way that BEP is operated represents the general scheme of CCT programs. Any family who has at least one member aged from 6 to 15 and whose per capita income is below one-half of the Brazilian minimum wage<sup>51</sup> is eligible to the program. Cash transfers are provided to beneficiaries in a conditional manner

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<sup>50</sup> *Bolsa Escola* was first implemented in the Federal District of Brazil and in the city of Campinas.

<sup>51</sup> De Janvry et al., 2005.

that all school aged children in the household should attend at least 85 percent of monthly classes. If a beneficiary fulfills the program conditionality, the government pays 15 Reais<sup>52</sup> for each child, for a maximum of three children per family. BEP is mostly funded by federal resources, but individual municipalities had autonomy, including the collection of data, the selection and registration of beneficiaries of the program, the monitoring and enforcement of conditionality, and the organization of local accountability.<sup>53</sup> Schools are required to inform the MoEYS about the attendance of beneficiary students. Then, the MoEYS consolidates the data collected from schools and send them to the Ministry of Social Development. The Ministry of Social Development orders the payments directly to the beneficiaries through magnetic cards. Finally, beneficiaries can withdraw cash from Federal Bank tellers, ATMS, Mail Offices and Authorized Retail Stores.<sup>54</sup> This structure of payment is expected to avoid corruption and fraud, as beneficiaries have direct access to cash so that they do not need a third party to intervene in the process of cash transfer.

The World Bank has found the program to be well designed and administered.<sup>55</sup> To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the program, the BEP has been incorporated into the *Bolsa Familia* Program (BFP); while the gist of the BEP remains, conditionality that all children in the beneficiary households must be vaccinated was added in the BFP. The positive impact of the BEP can be

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<sup>52</sup> 15 Reais is approximately 6 USD.

<sup>53</sup> UCW. 2011. *Understanding the Brazilian success in reducing child labor: empirical evidence and policy lessons*.

<sup>54</sup> Ferro, A. and Nicollela, A. 2007. *The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs on Household Work Decisions in Brazil*. University of Sao Paula. Brazil.

<sup>55</sup> World Bank. 2001. *Brazil: An assessment of the Bolsa Escola Programs*.

estimated by observing the trends of education in Cambodia during the implementation period of the program.<sup>56</sup> Several educational indicators such as enrollment rate, attendance rate, and dropout rates imply that the program's contribution to the improvement of the country's education system has been significant. According to the DFID report<sup>57</sup>, participants in the program are 20 percent less likely than children in non-participant households to have a one-day absence from school in any given month. Moreover, dropout rate of the participants is about 63 percent lower than that of the non-participants.<sup>58</sup>

From the standpoint of child labor, it is important to note that while the reduction of child labor was a stated goal but stopping the work was not a part of conditionality. Even though the impact of the program on child labor might be limited, the strength of the program lies on the outcome that boys and girls from beneficiary households had probabilities of working lowered by 0.9 and 0.5 percentage points, versus their control counterparts.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> The education trends in Brazil are explicated in the following sections.

<sup>57</sup>Arnold.C., et al. 2011. *Cash Transfers Literature Review*. Department for International Development.

<sup>58</sup> Veras, F., et al. 2007. *Evaluating the Impact of Brazil's Bolsa Familia: Cash Transfer Programs in Comparative Perspective*. Brasilia.

<sup>59</sup> Gee, K. 2010. *Reducing Child Labor Through Conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from Nicaragua's Red de Proteccion Social*. Blackwell Publishing. Oxford, UK and MA, USA.

## 1.2. National Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (PETI)

In addition to BEP, the Brazilian federal government launched PETI in 1996. The PETI was first implemented on pilot basis in the poorest Northeast States of Brazil. By 2008, the PETI was extended to various activities in more than 60 percent of total municipalities of Brazil and it provides assistance to almost 900,000 children.<sup>60</sup> The PETI is an innovative program for the elimination of child labor. It is a CCT program which aims to keep children between 7 and 15 years of age in school and out of hazardous workplace. The program officially states its condition as follows: “All children who are less than 16 years old must be withdrawn from any form of child labor.”<sup>61</sup> Payments are given to households with per capita income lower than half the minimum wage, and are conditional on children stopping their participation in labor activities, having a school attendance record of at least 80 percent and participating in after-school activities.<sup>62</sup>

According to Yap et al. (2002), PETI resulted in a significant reduction in child labor; the authors find that PETI reduced child labor by 5 to 25 percentage points in different regions. The authors estimate that “the probability of working among the participating children aged 7-14 fell from 17 percent to 10-13 percent in the state of Pernambuco, from 17 percent to 4 percent in Sergipe, and from 38 percent to 12 percent in Bahia, the state with the highest child labor force participation rate in the country.”<sup>63</sup> PETI’s successful performance in the reduction

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> ILO, 2008.

<sup>62</sup> UCW, 2011.

<sup>63</sup> Yap et al., 2002, pp.13-14 and 27.

of child labor and improvement of academic success of children in rural states of Brazil is often attributed to its mandatory after-school program named *Jornada Ampliada*. This is a part of supply-side intervention that simply doubled the length of the time that children spend in school in order to restrict the hours that children could be engaged in child labor.<sup>64</sup>

## 2. Comprehending Child Labor Trends in Brazil

Brazil is often addressed as an exemplary case that has undergone a remarkable progress towards eradicating child labor and universal enrollment in primary education. According to the UCW report on the Brazilian experience in reducing child labor,<sup>65</sup> the trends of child labor in Brazil have been steadily downward in the past two decades (Table 13). The numbers of working children decreased at a significant rate, from 6.0 percent to 0.5 percent. The reduction in the numbers of children participating in both economic activity and schooling has also reduced a lot, from 11.5 percent to 6.1 percent in the period between 1992 and 2008. In both urban and rural areas, child labor was reduced by more than half. However, children's involvement in economic activity remains still significantly high in rural areas of Brazil. While the overall trends of child labor have been descending, school

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<sup>64</sup> Gee. 2010. p.727.

<sup>65</sup> UCW. 2011. *Understanding the Brazilian success in reducing child labor: Drawing policy lessons from the Brazilian experience*.

attendance increased – from 84.7 percent to 97.1 percent in the same period and for the same age group.


Table 13. Trends of child labor in Brazil, 7-15 years age group, by residence, 1992, 1999 and 2008 reference years

Activity status	Sex						Residence						Total		
	Male			Female			Urban			Rural					
	1992	1999	2008	1992	1999	2008	1992	1999	2008	1992	1999	2008	1992	1999	2008
Only employment	7.9	2.2	0.8	4.1	1.1	0.3	3.4	1.0	0.5	13.9	3.6	0.9	6.0	1.6	0.5
Only schooling	68.4	79.7	89.0	78.2	87.4	93.2	81.1	89.3	93.3	48.8	65.1	80.4	73.2	83.5	91.0
Employment and schooling	15.1	14.6	8.0	7.8	7.6	4.2	7.6	6.2	4.0	23.5	26.8	16.0	11.5	11.1	6.1
Neither activity	8.7	3.5	2.2	10.0	4.0	2.4	7.9	3.5	2.2	13.9	4.6	2.6	9.3	3.7	2.3
<b>Total in employment<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>37.4</b>	<b>30.4</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>6.6</b>
<b>Total in school<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>83.5</b>	<b>94.3</b>	<b>97.0</b>	<b>86.0</b>	<b>95.0</b>	<b>97.4</b>	<b>88.7</b>	<b>95.5</b>	<b>97.3</b>	<b>72.3</b>	<b>91.9</b>	<b>96.4</b>	<b>84.7</b>	<b>94.6</b>	<b>97.1</b>

Notes: (a) Refers to all children in employment, regardless of school status; (b) Refers to all children attending school, regardless of employment status.  
Source: UCW calculations based on Brazilian PNAD Surveys, 1992, 1999, and 2008


The reduction in child labor and the increase in school attendance became more noticeable as children got older (Figure 8 and 9). Figure 8 shows the increased school attendance rates over years. Figure 9 illustrates that the level of child labor fell considerably however; the minimum age of entry in the labor market has increased. At the same time, it illustrates that children have gotten to enter school earlier and leave school later over years.

Figure 8. Trends of child labor, by age, 1992, 1999 and 2008 reference years



Source: UCW calculations based on Brazilian PNAD Surveys, 1992, 1999 and 2008

Figure 9. Trends of school attendance, by age, 1992, 1999 and 2008 reference years



Source: UCW calculations based on Brazilian PNAD Surveys, 1992, 1999 and 2008

It is important to note that active government interventions including policy reforms and grand-scale CCT programs have been conducted at federal, state and

municipal levels since the early 1990s. They have brought about substantial changes in the country's economy, politics, and social structure in a concurrent manner.

### 3. Education in Brazil

Brazil had suffered with serious economic, political and social inequalities until thirty years ago. Even though the inequalities have not yet been overcome, the country's tremendous effort to redress the problems on its own has opened the way towards reducing child labor and achieving universal primary education. As Table 14 indicates, the share of children participating in schooling has increased from 84.7 percent to 97.1 between 1992 and 2008. From the data, it can be assumed that the Brazilian education system has been successful in attaining universal primary education by attracting children who were previously working or inactive; the share of children participating only in economic activity fell from 6 percent to 0.5 percent; and the share of children involved neither in school nor in economic activity fell from 9.3 to 2.3 percent. The numbers of children subtracted from those categories are supposed to start participating in school.

Table 14. Children's activity status, 7-15 years age group, 1992, 1999, 2003 and 2008 reference years

Year	Economic activity only	School only	Combining school and economic activity	Neither in school nor in economic activity
1992	6	73.2	11.5	9.3
1999	1.6	83.5	11.1	3.7
2003	0.8	88.2	8.1	2.9
2008	0.5	91	6.1	2.3

Source: UCW calculations based on Brazil PNAD survey, 1992, 1999, 2003 and 2008

What is particularly astonishing in the Brazilian success in reducing child labor and improving education system is that these progresses have been achieved without dramatic economic growth or economic stability; as Table 15 indicates, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and Gross National Income (GNI) per capita have been rather fluctuating.

Table 15. Economic Trends in Brazil, 1995-2012

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	2.83	0.60	1.81	1.47	-1.22	2.81	0.10	1.27	-0.17
GNI per capita growth (annual %)	3.06	0.58	1.37	1.78	-2.23	3.29	0.83	1.22	0.11

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	4.42	1.97	2.85	5.06	4.20	-1.22	6.59	1.83	0.00
GNI per capita growth (annual %)	4.65	2.14	3.26	5.50	3.85	-0.81	6.73	1.72	0.36

Source: World Development Indicators, the World Bank

Withstanding the unhelpful economic situations, the Brazilian government has worked hard to uphold educational development with its own capacity. For instance, the country has made a huge increase in its expenditure on education in the

share of GDP invested in education – from 10.5 percent of total public expenditure in 2000, to 14.5 percent in 2005, and to 16.8 percent in 2009.<sup>66</sup>


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<sup>66</sup> OECD. 2012. *Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators 2012*. The OECD.

## VI. Analysis of Findings

### 1. Analysis of Brazil's Success Factors


Figure 10. Brazil's success factors



Brazil's success story, which involves noteworthy development of its education system and decline of child labor in the last two decades, was not initiated from supportive settings at first. Due to highly decentralized nature, the country has faced difficulty of coordination of political and social systems. As it is reflected in the way in which broad-scale CCT programs – BEP and PETI – have been carried out, the government has put enormous efforts to clarify the accountability of each level of government to ensure that those programs as well as national security reforms to be carried out efficiently (Figure 11). Added to this the government has

played a central role in formulating and implementing policies aimed at increasing children’s schooling opportunities and reducing child labor. In close cooperation with relevant government agencies and international partners, the Brazilian government has successfully arbitrated high-level leadership with an initiative-taking ministerial leadership.<sup>67</sup> The strongly coordinated government resulted in a comprehensive political and social mobilization for the development of education and the reduction in child labor.

Figure 11. Brazil’s Procedure of Conducting Programs on Eliminating Child Labor through Education



The absence of legislation that properly assigned duties among the three tiers of the Brazilian government as to supplying education to the citizens had been

<sup>67</sup> World Bank. 2006. *Grandes pasos en un gran país: Brasil consigue importantes logros en el proceso de educación para todos. En breve ; no.84.* Washington D.C.

a serious national dilemma for a long time. Brazil had surmounted these obstacles by implementing CCT programs that were designed to bridge the gap between the different levels of government. The well-coordinated and stabilized government structure has not only contributed to facilitating smooth interactions among different levels of government, but also to enhancing accountability among them.<sup>68</sup> As figure 11 illustrates, the federal government is responsible for transferring sources of revenue to the twenty-five states and monitoring how the states manage the use of funds. The states support and supervise the municipalities in the same way. The federal administration is also required to play a normative role, by which means coordinating educational policies to be followed by the entire government. When different tiers of government make joint efforts to execute any program, full autonomy is ensured to each level of the government. Once cash gets released, the beneficiaries have a direct access to the allocated money. Such structure is likely to improve transparency in the procedure that the government reallocates finance of education and programs on tackling child labor. With equipping itself with stable institutional structure as well as coordinated ownership, the government is able to carry out a long-term planning for eliminating child labor and reforming their education systems.

The Brazilian experience in reducing child labor and improving education system is also endorsed by the totality approach that has been led by the government. The Brazilian government has designed and implemented strategic CCT programs that have mobilized multiple parts of society – cultural, economic,

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<sup>68</sup> The allocation of responsibilities among different levels of the Brazilian government is written in detail in chapter 4 of this study.

social and political – all together. The CCT programs have not only contributed to the enhancement of education system, but also to the improvements in the living standards in Brazil. Moreover, by providing financial support to the population that belongs to lower quintiles of economy, the CCT programs have been successful in removing the cost barriers for the poor, particularly the indirect costs from child labor. Since the CCT programs have focused on providing equal educational opportunities to the poorest population in the country, the long-lasting problem of regional imbalance has been largely resolved. Furthermore, as child laborers residing in rural or remote areas have been given chances to participate in schooling, the overall child labor in Brazil has been declined. Indeed, the UCW project report points out that these progresses are accounting for about 17 percent of the decline in child labor.<sup>69</sup>

Brazil's success story is characterized by the combination of strongly coordinated government ownership, clearly defined accountability among relevant authorities, sustainable financing for the programs on combating child labor, and totality approach toward the problems that the country was facing. As the Brazilian government has faced the problems of child labor and education system squarely, it realized the necessity of a strong state institution that could deal with those problems simultaneously and properly. Since the government has strengthened its supply-side development intervention by re-examining policies and establishing educational facilities, it has become capable of taking totality approach to the


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<sup>69</sup> UCW. 2011. *Understanding the Brazilian success in reducing child labor: empirical evidence and policy lessons*. p. 80.

problems of child labor and poor education system and this has led to the success of demand-side intervention as well.

## 2. Analysis of Cambodia's Failure Factors


Figure 12. Cambodia's failure factors



Cambodia is often considered as an example of failure on dealing with child labor and educational problems appropriately. The fact that state institutions in Cambodia remain weak and underdeveloped has played a decisive role in the country's unsuccessful performance in reforming education and reducing child labor. Unclearly defined authorities, roles and duties of different tiers of government reflect the weakly coordinated government ownership of endeavor to

solve the problems of education and child labor. Without clear allocation of responsibilities between various levels of government, it is impossible to draw rewarding outcome of anything and the problem of child labor is not an exception. The uncertainty of the Cambodian government's accountability has undermined transparency as well as efficiency of political procedures. Moreover, it has brought about corruption, weak institutions and ineffective policies (Figure 12).

Figure 13. Cambodia's Procedure of Conducting Programs on Eliminating Child Labor through Education



The Cambodian government's supply-side intervention in the CCT programs' problems-solving procedure has not been competent enough to make the demand-side intervention work. For instance, policies do not specify what constitutes child labor in terms of type of work, conditions of work, or work hazards.

The enforcement of child labor laws is another major challenge facing the Government. The Government by its own admission currently does not have the capacity to properly enforce and monitor law relating to child labor. Even though Cambodia ratified international treaties such as ILO Convention No.138 on minimum age and ILO Convention No.182 on the worst forms of child labor, the commitments that the country made when ratifying the treaties have been hardly fulfilled. Of particular concern, the Cambodia Labor Law has not been extended to informal sector enterprises or settings, where the overwhelming majority of child laborers are concentrated.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, policy priorities are not affirmed in Cambodia. For example, Pirnay (2007) points out that the ESSP contains too many priorities that cannot be carried out simultaneously.<sup>71</sup> Since the Cambodian government does not have a distinct order of policy priorities, its spending is likely to be inconsistent.

Moreover, basic education is free, but not compulsory, through grade nine in Cambodia.<sup>72</sup> The lack of compulsory schooling makes children under age 15, the legal age to work, susceptible to the worst forms of child labor because they are not required to attend school. Furthermore, the law does not assure adequate salaries for teaching staffs and this, therefore, induces instructors to charge informal fees to

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<sup>70</sup> “Children’s Work in Cambodia: A Challenge for Growth and Poverty Reduction”. UCW. Dec 2006.

<sup>71</sup> PIRNAY, E. (2007), Increasing Aid Effectiveness in the Cambodian Education Sector: Analysis and Recommendations, prepared for submission to the European Union.

<sup>72</sup> UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. *Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties in accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations: Cambodia*. Geneva; June 12, 2009. Report No. E/C.12/KHM/CO/1.

students for exams, snacks, and even class time.<sup>73</sup> Likewise, the underdeveloped regulatory mechanism creates indirect costs that directly become burdens on parents. Under the vulnerable laws and regulations, neither ensuring children's basic right to education with good quality nor protecting the children from exploitations would be feasible.

Cambodia's weak state institutions and legal system imply that the government lacks coordinated ownership of problem solving procedure. In consequence, the burden of problem solving is passed on to parents of the poor households and external donors. The problem is that the former are not likely to have capacity to endure such burden and that the sustainability of the latter's assistance cannot be guaranteed. A Khmer Rouge survivor Sophal Ear (2013) asserts that child labor is one outcome of Cambodia's history and reliance on external assistance has exacerbated it.<sup>74</sup> Exclusive dependence on external assistance in dealing with the country's own problems may stabilize the situation in a short-term; however, the external funding given to a country of weak institutional foundation is only a trembling sandcastle that is likely to crumble at any time.

To make things worse, available statistics on child labor and education system in Cambodia are largely limited and outdated. Most data available for time series analysis are only from the general population census; however, there are only two census data sets available: 1998 and 2008. Also, survey data referencing

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<sup>73</sup> Integrated Regional Information Networks. "Cambodia: Children miss out on school because of corruption." IRINnews.org [online] Dec.5 2008. [cited May 12, 2014] [www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=81825](http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=81825).

<sup>74</sup> Ear, Sophal. 2013. *Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy*. Columbia University Press. New York.

different years are largely not comparable due to differences in terms of sampling, methodology and the questionnaire used. The only national survey on child labor was conducted in 2000. Also, the Government lacks standardized guidelines on how to conduct labor inspections, and it is unclear how inspectors verify the age of children in the workplace.<sup>75</sup> Child labor inspections are only conducted in the framework of ILO funded programs, and only in some provinces. The Cambodian government does not publicly release data on the number of child labor inspections or the number of children assisted. Without reliable data about the long-term impact of child labor programs, it is not possible to conduct precise monitoring and evaluation. It is thus extremely challenging to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of the efforts under these poor conditions.

### 3. Comparative Analysis of Brazil and Cambodia

The outcomes of CCT programs in Cambodia, mainly in terms of their performance of reducing child labor through expanding schooling opportunities for children, have been poorer than those in Brazil. Yet, the gap of the outcomes cannot be simply attributed to the different economic status of the two countries. Indeed, the positive progresses of the CCT programs in Brazil were made in spite of low economic growth and economic instability (Figure 14). Unlikely, the economic trends in Cambodia since the ESP/ESSP and PAP were launched have been

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<sup>75</sup> ILO-IPEC. *Note on Revisions Proposed for Enforcement Frameworks on Child Labor, with a View to Achieving the Twin Goals in Cambodia*. Geneva; July 12, 2010.

relatively steady, with one exception in 2009 (Figure 15). It is plausible to assume from the non-matching economic trends and outcomes of CCT programs in Brazil and Cambodia that poverty itself is not the ultimate barrier to the goal of reducing child labor and enhancing education system.

Figure 14. Economic trends in Brazil, 1992-2012






Figure 15. Economic trends in Cambodia, 1999-2012



Then, what determines the success or failure of national efforts to combat child labor through education? Bringing back Myrdal's Institutionalism, multiple factors comprising the structural mechanism of each country turn out to be apparent. The Brazilian case exemplifies a model that took a totality approach as solution for overcoming the trap of circular cumulative causation, as being suggested by Myrdal's theory. The Cambodian case, in contrast, represents a real picture of a state that did not, or could not, follow Myrdal's solution and is stuck in low-level equilibrium of development (Figure 16).

Figure 16. Application of Myrdal's Institutionalism to the Brazilian and Cambodia cases



The Brazilian experience demonstrates that well-designed policies on child labor and education, backed by active government response and adequate resources, can overcome the obstacles that poverty presents. The most crucial factor of the Brazilian success in reducing child labor and improving educational system is that the country has been strongly committed to forms of social and economic policies which promote universal access to education whilst protecting and promoting livelihoods of households. Rather than concentrating on a single sector to deal with the problems of child labor and incompetent education system, the Brazilian government has put active policy efforts to extend and improve schooling as well as efforts to implement broad-scale CCT programs, which have helped improve living standards and shift incentives structures in favor of schooling.

In Cambodia, such a well-coordinated and inter-locking system of institutional mechanism does not exist. The Cambodian government has attempted

to organize its policy, strategy and aid planning in the education sector through a SWAp. As a part of this new paradigm, the MoEYS embarked on a policy-led reform process on the first ESP/ESSP in 2000. Notwithstanding the government's strong political will to succeed in CCT programs, the actual outcomes of the programs have not been sustainable. Weakly coordinated government ownership has been a decisive factor that has led Cambodia's unsuccessful performance on tackling child labor and enhancing education system. Structural weaknesses particularly in designating accountability to each level of the government, linking the capital budget and external resource with the programs, organizing policy priorities, and upholding monitoring and evaluation system have made the government be highly vulnerable to internal as well as external challenges. Regarding the trends of the program outcomes that vary depending on the outer circumstances, sustainability and effectiveness of CCT programs in Cambodia are questionable.

Cambodia's heavy dependence on external assistance has impaired governance over time by waning accountability, encouraging corruption, and lessening urgency to solve problems by the government itself. Since the Cambodian government lacks a governance system that is capable of taking a totality approach to solve the problems of child labor and education, the momentum of the reduction in child labor and improvement of schooling opportunities for children could not have been sustained. As a consequence, the country still belongs to low-equilibrium position of development and the problems of child labor and poor education system remain to be tackled by more active and autonomous response from the government.

## **VII. Conclusion**

This study attempts to explore the implications of the way in which Brazil and Cambodia have coordinated their institutional capacity to the goals of reducing child labor and improving education system. This study reviews the range of CCT programs in the two countries as examples of national efforts to tackle child labor through education; the ESP/ESSP and PAP are analyzed as part of the Cambodian case study; and the BEP and PETI are examined as part of the Brazilian case study. While both Brazil and Cambodia had similarly instable backdrops by the time the CCT programs were implemented, the outcomes of the programs have been greatly differed in the two countries; while child labor has undergone double dimensional reduction and school enrollment rates have reached almost universal level in Brazil in spite of volatile economic trends in the country, the problems of child labor and poor education system in Cambodia have been remaining notwithstanding relatively stable economic trends.

Based on the understanding of the complexity of the problem of child labor, this study acknowledges that it cannot be solved by a single-sector's effort. Since child labor is an outcome of intricately interconnected problems of cultural, economic, political and social sectors, joint effort of the multiple sectors buttressed by strong institutional will and capability is necessary to address and solve the problem effectively. Key lesson from the comparative analysis of implications of national efforts to combat child labor through education between Brazil and

Cambodia is drawn from Myrdal's Institutionalism. By analyzing the structures, procedures and outcomes of particular CCT programs in Brazil and Cambodia, this study has found that the most decisive factor for the elimination of child labor is not the economic wealth of a country; however, it is well-coordinated ownership of government, backed by institutional will and capacity.

Taking account of Myrdal's Institutionalism, the result of national efforts to solve the problems of child labor depends on whether government can take totality approach to the problem solving procedure. Hence, from the perspective of Myrdal's Institutionalism, Brazil could accomplish the goal of reducing child labor and reaching universal access to basic education since the government has successfully mobilized multiple sectors to totality approach to attain its objectives.

Cambodia's efforts to combat child labor could not have been as effective as those of Brazil since it lacked capacity for taking a totality approach to solve the problem of child labor and poor education system. The different tiers of the Cambodian government has failed to effectively consult with one another and affected stakeholders before the governmental efforts to combat child labor through education were initiated. The Government that does not have capacity to coordinate its own governance to deal with any socio-economic problem cannot have political ownership of its problem-solving procedure.

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## VIII. Abstract in Korean

### 교육을 통한 아동노동 퇴치에 대해 협조된 거버넌스가 갖는 함의: 브라질과 캄보디아 사례 비교 연구

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많은 저개발국가와 개발도상국은 아동노동 착취 현상이 극심한 빈곤의 산물이며, 따라서 빈곤이 완전히 퇴치되지 않는 한 아동노동 역시 사라질 수 없는 문제라고 주장해왔다. 국제사회는 오랜 시간 동안 교육이 아동노동 퇴치의 가장 효과적인 방편이라고 여겨왔고, 많은 나라가 실제로 교육을 통한 아동노동퇴치를 위해 노력해왔으나 교육을 통한 아동노동퇴치 프로그램의 결과는 나라마다 다르게 나타났다.

이 연구는 교육을 통한 아동노동퇴치 프로그램들이 시행되었을 당시 비교적 안정적인 경제성장률과 국가발전 양상을 보였던 캄보디아의 사례와 그와 반대로 매우 불안정한 상태에 놓여있던 브라질의 사례를 비교 분석하였다. 아이러니하게도 캄보디아는 비교적 안정된 경제상황에도 불구하고 교육을 통한 아동노동 퇴치에 대한 노력은 실패하였고, 브라질은

열악한 경제상황에도 불구하고 아동노동 감소와 교육수준 향상에 성공한 것으로 나타났다.

분석 결과, 정부 차원에서 협조적인 거버넌스 체계를 구축하여 다양한 정부 부문의 동시다발적인 발전을 이룩한 브라질은 아동노동 퇴치를 지속적해서 추진할 수 있는 바탕을 마련하였고, 협조적인 거버넌스 체계를 갖추지 못한 캄보디아는 외부적 지원에 의존하여 아동노동 문제를 마주할 수밖에 없는 상황에 부닥치게 되었음을 확인하였다. 이 연구는 아동노동이 단순히 빈곤이라는 한 요소만의 결과물이 아님을 입증하며, 브라질의 사례가 보여주듯이 빈곤국가들도 자주적인 거버넌스 체계 확립에 비중을 둔다면 아동노동 퇴치 목표에 다가설 수 있음을 주장한다.

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**주요어:** 아동노동, 교육, 관유권, 조건부 현금 이전 프로그램, 전체적 접근

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