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**Master's Thesis**

## **Hard Feelings?**

**Factors Differentiating South Korean Perceptions of Japan from Indian Perceptions  
of Great Britain**

**May 2014**

**Seoul National University**

**Graduate School of International Studies**

**Monica Chavez**

## 응어리?

한국인이 일본에 가지고 있는 의식과 인도인이 영국에 가지고 있는 의식 차이의  
주요 요소들

지도교수 은기수

이 논문을 Monica Chavez 석사학위논문으로 제출함

2014년 5월




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## **Hard Feelings?**

**Factors Differentiating South Korean Perceptions of Japan from Indian Perceptions of Great Britain**

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
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## **ABSTRACT**

### **Hard Feelings?**

#### **Factors Differentiating South Korean Perceptions of Japan from Indian Perceptions of Great Britain**

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The purpose of this paper is to explain why the attitudes of South Koreans toward Japan differ so greatly from the attitudes of Indians toward Great Britain, given that the relationships of the countries concerned both involved brutal colonial regimes that shaped the countries into the modern day. This paper uses quantitative and qualitative data to show how three effects, a historical effect, a period effect, and a structural effect, account for the negative public attitudes of South Koreans toward Japan, versus the neutral or positive views of Indians toward the United Kingdom.

Studies on Korean public opinion have found that in the short-term, it is volatile and extremely sensitive to what is perceived as Japanese aggression. Long term, however, opinion may not be so dire, and while dislike for Prime Minister Abe's administration is unlikely to subside, opinion of the country as a whole is more malleable. Koreans also show a more nuanced opinion of Japan when they are asked to break down their description of the country into adjectives that do not necessarily focus on political issues. When Koreans who dislike Japan are asked to say why, the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute is the most cited reason.

Turning to India, there is limited academic work that has been done on post-colonial and modern Indian attitudes toward Britain, but work which investigates the attitudes of modern Southeast Asians toward Japan reveals that they do not hold the same antagonism toward Japan that South Korea does, and shows some commonalities between colonized Southeast Asian countries and India. More general studies on attitudes toward Britain have found Indians tend to see the UK as a good example of governance and a desirable destination for an education. One study finds that English language ability, historical connections to Britain, and family or friends in the UK are strong predictors for a positive opinion of the UK, and all of these are relevant in the Indian case. Journalistic opinion and commentary sourced from internet forums provide some additional insight, with commenters judging that India has moved on and is more interested in other countries besides the UK.

In the next section, quantitative data from the BBC, the Pew Research Center, and other research bodies is presented. The data agree that Indians' opinions are generally positive or neutral about Britain, and the BBC data show that in addition, this opinion changes less over the years as compared with Koreans' opinion of Japan. The data also universally show a Korean public opinion that is generally negative, but also volatile over the span of a few years. Qualitative data is considered to assess public opinion in earlier

periods. Syngman Rhee's leadership in South Korea employed anti-Japanism as a political strategy and fanned the flames of an existing distrust in Japan. Meanwhile, Gandhian ideals and an affinity for British culture led Jawaharlal Nehru and India's other founding fathers to promote a conciliatory attitude toward Britain.

Using this data, the three effects are presented. The historical effect looks at India's and Korea's pre-colonial, colonial, and immediate post-colonial periods. India's lengthy colonial period has left it with a cultural and linguistic imprint different from that sustained during Korea's shorter colonial period under Japan. The penetration of British administrators into India's vast territory did not directly reach all areas of the country. In Korea's case, its history with Japan reaches back many more centuries before either India or Korea was colonized, with Korea and Japan sharing culture, technology, and violent conflict. Japan's Korean colony was just the next phase of an ancient and complex relationship. The large numbers of Japanese soldiers, bureaucrats, and settlers saturated Korean territory much more thoroughly than the British did in India, leaving a larger percentage of Koreans with a first-hand experience of the colonial regime. Finally, the South Korean post-colonial government utilized Japan and Korea's relationship as part of its anti-Japanese platform.

The period effect identifies current events as immediate causes of short-term changes in public opinion. The paper finds a continuous stream of issues in East Asia that appear to tilt Korean opinion one way or another, generally in the form of statements from the Japanese government or diplomatic fiascos. No similar correlation, and indeed no series of significant events, could be found at work between Britain and India.

The structural effect concerns parameters set by geography, economics, and politics. Korea and Japan's geographical closeness does not permit them to avoid each other and tends to generate more conflict, and any perceived military escalation by Japan seems all the more threatening due to its location right next to Korea. India and Britain, meanwhile, have a great distance between them. Stemming from this same issue, Korea and Japan have a very lucrative trade relationship that necessitates interaction. The two are also caught in a security triangle with the US, which Korea needs, but which the US maintains in part by not pressuring the Japanese to change the policies which Korea dislikes. For Korea, Japan cannot be "just another country," as Britain has become to India.

Given that the Korea-Japan relationship is generally considered in isolation, it is hoped that by employing a comparative analysis, this paper's contribution to the discourse should be to reveal what Japan and South Korea might do improve their relationship today. What this study reveals is that the causes for distrust of Japan may not be solely, or even primarily, issues like inadequate Japanese remorse or a perceived threat within the current Japanese administration, issues that form part of the period effect. This distrust could not exist without the root of history and the framework set by the realities of geography.

**Keywords:** Korea-Japan relations, India-Britain relations, post-colonialism, public attitudes, comparative study

**Student ID:** 2012-22822

## **CONTENTS**

I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION AND REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH.....	6
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY.....	21
IV. THE THREE EFFECTS AND HOW THEY EXPLAIN PUBLIC ATTITUDES.....	32
VII. CONCLUSION.....	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	49

## **TABLES**

1. South Koreans' images of Japan in 1999 and 2010.....	9
2. Reasons for negative impressions of Japan.....	10
3. Reasons for positive impressions of Japan.....	10
4. Attitudes over time.....	24
5. Attitudes of South Koreans toward Japan in three years.....	25
6. Like/dislike Japan.....	26
7. Impressions of Japan.....	27

## **FIGURES**

1. Views of different countries' influence.....	23
2. Attitudes over time.....	24
3. Attitudes of South Koreans toward Japan in three years.....	25

## I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to reveal factors that can account for differences in post-colonial attitudes among former colonies. The focus here is on India and South Korea, whose publics differ substantially in their appraisals of their former colonizers, Britain and Japan. Attitudes among the Indian and Korean publics, stretching from the immediate post-colonial period through the last several years, differ substantially from each other, with the Indian leadership and public generally displaying an attitude that is neutral to conciliatory toward Britain, and Koreans generally showing a much more negative outlook toward Japan. In this paper, I examine these differing attitudes from three different angles in an effort to find the reasons why such a difference exists. Although I try to narrow the reasons down to a few key issues, throughout the paper I also explore a variety of different factors that could have an impact.

Not all colonies were created equal, and thus, not all post-colonial relationships were created equal either. Looking just at Japan's and Britain's post-colonial relationships, we can see a variety of situations that have emerged. Taiwan, also a former colony of Japan, retains a much less antagonistic relationship with the latter, due at least in part to the "brutality and corruption" of the stridently anti-Japanese administration that took power in 1949, which was so extreme that Taiwanese began to remember the colonial period with fondness.<sup>1</sup> A number of Southeast Asian countries which were invaded by Japan in the Second World War also have publics with largely favorable

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<sup>1</sup> James Lewis, "*The Japan That Does Not Exist and The Ugly Korean: An Essay on the History of Korean-Japanese Relations and their Contemporary Images of Each Other*," in *Korea and Globalization: Politics, Economics and Culture*, ed. James Lewis and Amadu Sesay (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 149.



views of Japan, for reasons which will be discussed later in the paper. On the other hand, if there is one country more virulently anti-Japanese than the two Koreas, it is China, whose public opinion of Japan is the only one worse than South Korea's among the countries surveyed in the Pew study cited below.

Britain, meanwhile, has retained the Commonwealth of Nations, the member countries willing participants in this legacy of what was once an expansive empire. Adhering to certain democratic norms and sharing cultural commonalities, this network characterizes perhaps the most idealistic manifestation of post-colonial relations.<sup>2</sup> But by contrast, Britain's troubled relationship with Argentina over the disputed Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas and the surrounding waters brings to mind Japan and Korea's tussle over the Liancourt Rocks.<sup>3</sup>

A pair of quotations, both from the perspectives of nationals of the former colonial powers, illustrates the contrast in attitudes in the post-colonial worlds of India and South Korea. In 2007, a minor Indian actress was featured on a British reality television show known as *Celebrity Big Brother*. The show was enveloped in controversy when a number of the British contestants on the show made racist remarks about the actress. Addressing the ensuing uproar, the then South Asia bureau editor for the BBC reflected:

[T]he incident has also shown that India, contrary to the fears of British diplomats, has become comfortable enough with its position in the world to see things like the Big Brother row in perspective.

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<sup>2</sup> The Commonwealth, *Charter of the Commonwealth*, 2013, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Vaughne Miller, *Argentina and the Falkland Islands* (London: House of Commons Library, 2012), 1.

The Indian media has had a feeding frenzy on this story. It's dominated the headlines and been wall-to-wall across the dozens of new TV news channels that have sprung up over the last few years.

What there hasn't been is a knee jerk xenophobia against the British, in response to an Indian woman being abused by descendants of the old Raj.

For many years India had a real chip on its shoulder about the UK. The injustices of the colonial era were never far from the surface. Given an opportunity Indian leaders would fall over themselves to take a dig at the British for an easy bit of popular press....

... But as India this year prepares to celebrate its 60th anniversary of independent rule one thing seems to be clear.

India has stopped looking over its shoulder. It no longer views itself through the prism of its colonial past.<sup>4</sup>

Contrast this with an assessment of the South Korean popular feeling through the eyes of a Japanese journalist:

The irony of [Japan] bashing is that it demonstrates that Korea still lives in Japan's shadow and is burdened by a distorting psychological complex towards Japan. For example, a rabid Korean press focuses on nothing but victory over Japan at international sporting events; critical books... become best sellers, and nationalist actions with anti-Japanism at their core, such as dismantling the former headquarters of the Japanese Governor-General, are taken too hastily.<sup>5</sup>

It is a separate issue the extent to which these outsiders' perspectives are really understanding of the situations within the countries they are considering. Both reflect a certain amount of privilege and no small amount of condescension. Nevertheless, at their core, they are true reflections of the contrasting relationships between the countries concerned, and the attitudes the writers think they perceive in the Indian and South Korean people are born out by the data which I will be presenting here.

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<sup>4</sup> Paul Danahar, "Big Brother row points to mature India" 22 January 2007, BBC News, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/6285717.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6285717.stm) (30 April 2014).

<sup>5</sup> This is taken from a paraphrase and translation of Kuroda Katsuhiro's 1995 book critical of Korean nationalism, *Kankoku kannichi sindoromu* (South Korean's anti-Japanese Syndrome). While the book was published almost two decades ago, the excerpt is presented here because it still seems to be true of the Korean case today. See Lewis, 139-140.

A 2012 Gallup poll found that among South Koreans' most disliked countries, Japan tops the list with 44.1 percent of individuals polled, tens of percentage points above the second-place spot (which went to China), and more than 30 percentage points above North Korea.<sup>6</sup> Were a comparable situation at play in India, one might see more Indians professing a dislike for Britain than for India's troublesome northern neighbor Pakistan.<sup>7</sup> Polls are a fickle thing, but the fact that South Koreans think so negatively of an ally such as Japan, to the point where, at times, that distrust exceeds that even for an international pariah and perennial security threat like North Korea, contrasts starkly with the Indian attitude perceived by the British observer in the anecdote above.

This topic is being examined because while substantial research has been done on modern Korean attitudes toward Japan, no comparable research has been carried out with respect to Indians' attitudes toward Britain. From my own personal experience living in South Korea and traveling in India, my contact with South Koreans and Indians, and my perusal of the South Korean and Indian media, my admittedly anecdotal impression has been that the political and cultural climates of the two former colonies show starkly differing attitudes about their colonial periods and their relations with the invading countries. The fact that both historical documentation and recent polling bears out these

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<sup>6</sup> Gallup Korea 한국 갤럽. "Hangugin i johahaneun nara, shirheohaneun nara, tashi taeonago shipeun nara" 한국인이 좋아하는 나라, 싫어하는 나라, 다시 태어나고 싶은 나라 [The Countries Koreans Like, Dislike, and Wish they Could Be Reborn In], 26 July 2012, Gallup Korea, available online at <http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=314&pagePos=16&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=>, accessed on 1 May 2014.

<sup>7</sup> The BBC polls cited later in this study show this not to be the case; Indians consistently rank Britain as far more likeable than Pakistan. As well, over the long haul, South Koreans also show more dislike for North Korea and Japan. See the BBC polls from 2007 to 2013 referenced in the bibliography.

observations makes this an attractive question for extensive study. Rather than viewing Korean attitudes toward Japan, and more generally, the Japan-Korea relationship, in isolation, acknowledging both their parallels and divergences in comparison to other countries' post-colonial relations might do more to reveal what actually could be done to diffuse the tensions that still characterize the Japan-Korea relationship 70 years after the end of colonial Korea.

Indeed, I hope this research could be useful to that end. South Korea and Japan's simmering confrontation impedes cooperation between two allies whose relationship would be key in determining the future of the North Korea security issue, China's regional power, and East Asian trade relations with the rest of the world. For example, a South Korea that strays farther and farther from Japan may find itself allied with China instead, a shift that would not be inconsequential for the balance of power in the region.<sup>8</sup>

I begin this paper with a theoretical consideration of my subject and a review of work previously done in this area. I then present both quantitative and qualitative data to show the nature of Korean and Indian attitudes over the years. Afterwards, I present three distinct "effects" which are at work in determining public attitudes. In my conclusion, I consider what my findings might mean for resolving disputes in the uneasy Japan-South Korea alliance.

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<sup>8</sup> Max Fisher, "Japan and South Korea can't even cooperate over peacekeeping in South Sudan" 26 December 2013, *Washington Post*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/12/26/japan-and-south-korea-cant-even-cooperate-over-peacekeeping-in-south-sudan/> (28 July 2014); Kim Jiyoung et al., *Challenges and Opportunities for Korea-Japan Relations in 2014* (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2014), 15.

## **II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION AND REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH**

What creates attraction or revulsion for a country in a person's mind? An article commenting on the 2013 BBC Country Ratings Poll suggested Germany's popularity in that year was due to "diligent diplomacy" in countries with which Germany has significant trade relations. Popularity was also attributed to the country's "tough love" in its dealings with the recession-hit EU, although this was, paradoxically, also said to be responsible for the country's relative unpopularity in Greece. The UK's boost in approval was attributed to its 2012 hosting of the Olympic games. The countries with the worst ratings, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran, would seem to have their unpopularity attributable to erratic leadership, human rights violations, and/or a perceived dangerous domestic political situation that might spill over into other countries.<sup>9</sup> This and BBC polls from other years, while not focused on the reasons for a like or dislike of a country, all mentioned current events as predictors for public opinion. Meanwhile, a study focusing on trust in the UK found that the ability to speak English, having connections to the UK through friends or family, and having visited the UK were all factors that made it more likely that people from different countries would trust Britons.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> "BBC poll: Germany most popular country in the world," 23 May 2013, BBC News Europe, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22624104> (22 July 2014).

<sup>10</sup> British Council, "Trust Pays: How international cultural relationships build trust in the UK and underpin the success of the UK economy," 2012, [britishcouncil.org](http://www.britishcouncil.org), available online at <http://www.britishcouncil.org/trustresearch2012.pdf>, accessed on 31 March 2014, 5-6.

Here, we see the focus on experiences particular to individuals to be the predictors of opinion.

Although studies on general xenophobia are countless, I have found none which focus on what might make nationals of one country dislike particular countries, perhaps in contrast to their appreciation of other countries. So I can only summarize the reasons given or surmised in various studies on Japan and Korea or Britain and India, and assemble those into the three categories to which I will return throughout the paper: the historical effect, which reflects the long-term relationship between two countries; the period effect, which accounts for short-term changes in opinion due to current events; and the structural effect, which accounts for geographical, political, or economic factors that establish parameters for a relationship.

I have found no previous research comparing Koreans with Indians in terms of their attitudes toward the countries which used to colonize them. What follows is a review of studies which looked at Korean attitudes, a scholarly paper which considered Korean attitudes in comparison to those of Southeast Asians, and studies which looked at Indian attitudes. In addition, I present journalistic material pertaining to the attitudes of modern Indians regarding colonialism to supplement this latter data.

In their study investigating the flare-up in anti-Japanese sentiment in 2013, Friedhoff and Kang analyze polling data collected by the Asan Institute that shows that South Korean attitudes toward Japan are volatile, and have worsened in the years from 2010 to 2013. (I will look at polling results from this and other sources in more detail in the next section of this paper.) The most salient part of their analysis is perhaps this:

With current sentiment, the risk of public backlash for engaging Japan is thought to be embedded with no clear upside. But as the data suggests, these views are not

intractable. Unlike the ratings for the United States, China, and North Korea—the decline from 2012 to 2013 notwithstanding—the favorability of Japan is more volatile. Because the favorability of Japan declined sharply from 2010 through 2012, this also suggests that it could rebound quickly given the correct conditions. Of course, creating those conditions is tricky.<sup>11</sup>

Although the authors are focused on short-term changes in attitude, they astutely note what the data suggests for long-term attitudes, namely, that they may not necessarily be so dire viewed over the decades rather than over a few years. Friedhoff and Kang also find that negative attitudes toward Japan are less to do with the country as a whole than with the Abe administration's leadership and the concurrent drive to amend the Japanese constitution and expand the powers of the Self Defense Forces. Additionally, according to the report, although South Koreans hold an unfavorable opinion of Japan, a majority (58 percent) supports a Park-Abe summit, and this holds true across political parties and age groups.<sup>12</sup>

Two further studies carried out jointly between Japanese and Korean organizations investigated the attitudes of modern Koreans toward Japan: NHK published the first in 2011, titled “Japan-Korea Past, Present, and Future: From a Public Awareness Survey”; Genron NPO published the second, “The First Joint Japan-Korea Public Opinion Poll,” in 2013.

NHK broke down Koreans' like and dislike for Japan into several categories, reproduced below with each trait categorized as negative, neutral, or positive, displaying

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<sup>11</sup> Karl Friedhoff and Kang Chungku, *Rethinking Public Opinion on Korea-Japan Relations* (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2013), 3.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 2, 5.

data gathered in both 1999 and 2010 (subjects were asked to pick as many words as they judged described Japan)<sup>13</sup>:

Negative			Neutral			Positive		
	1999	2010		1999	2010		1999	2010
Unfair	16	19	Conservative	46	39	Democratic	19	12
Gloomy	7	10	Traditional	27	30	Prosperous	26	22
			Exclusive	11	14	Peaceful	6	6
						Free	14	17
						Friendly	9	6
						Clean	41	34

By percentage.

*Table 1: South Koreans' images of Japan in 1999 and 2010, adapted from "Japan-Korea Past, Present, and Future: From a Public Awareness Survey," Japan Broadcasting Corporation 2011.*

When broken down into adjectives which do not necessarily refer to the political disputes between Japan and Korea, public opinion looks more nuanced, suggesting that subjects take into account issues other than the bilateral relationship when they are asked to consider Japan through these different facets. They do not suggest a particularly negative or positive assessment of Japan as a whole.

The Genron poll asked the survey subjects the explicit reasons for their negative or positive impressions of Japan.<sup>14</sup> Table 3 and Table 4 list the reasons given for negative and positive impressions of Japan, respectively, in descending order according to how often they were selected by participants.

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<sup>13</sup> Kei Kono and Miwako Hara, *Japan-Korea Past, Present, and Future: From a Public Awareness Survey* (Tokyo: Japan Broadcasting Corporation, 2011), 45.

<sup>14</sup> *The First Joint Japan-Korea Public Opinion Poll: Analysis Report on the Comparative Data* (Tokyo: Genron NPO, 2013), 6-7.



<b>Reasons for negative impressions</b>	<b>Percentage surveyed</b>
The Dokdo issue	84.5
Inadequate repentance over the history of invasion	77.0
Difference between <i>tatemaie</i> (“official stance”) and <i>hon-ne</i> (“true stance”) in Japan	21.4
Discrimination against South Koreans in Japan	8.2
Uneasiness about Japan’s “conservative swing”	7.3
No particular reason	.8

*Table 2: Reasons for negative impressions of Japan, adapted from “The First Joint Japan-Korea Public Opinion Poll,” Genron NPO 2013.*

<b>Reasons for positive impressions</b>	<b>Percentage surveyed</b>
Japanese are kind and serious people	59.8
Japan is a developed nation with high living standards	46.7
Japanese products are high in quality	31.1
Interest in Japanese culture	23.8
Japan is also a democratic nation	16.4
Other	6.6
No particular reason	5.7

*Table 3: Reasons for positive impressions of Japan, adapted from “The First Joint Japan-Korea Public Opinion Poll,” Genron NPO 2013.*

Important to note is that among the reasons for a negative opinion of Japan, none were simply the existence of a past colonial relationship. Reasons which had to do with the colonial period also have everything to do with how the issues have been resolved (or not resolved) in the present, rather than the fact that they happened at all. Thus, the Liancourt Rocks dispute, which arose out of an inadequately resolved transfer of territory after Japan left Korea, is the most cited issue because it is a territorial dispute that persists today, and whose resolution has concrete implications for modern Korean and Japanese

maritime borders and access to natural resources.<sup>15</sup> The history of invasion is an issue only because Koreans feel Japan has not repented adequately for the past.

Among the reasons for a positive impression of Japan, the most oft-cited, that Japanese are “kind and serious people,” shows the differences between how Koreans perceive Japanese as individuals versus Japan as a country, the former enjoying a much more positive perception than the latter.

In both the NHK and Genron polls, the focus is on modern history and current events as a determinant of Korean attitudes. (The NHK poll was conducted to mark the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Korea’s annexation by Japan, and introduces the data with a timeline of events dating from 1905 ‘til 2010.) In the next section, I will examine data from these same two studies which look at Koreans’ feelings about Japan in simply negative or positive terms.

In another study released by the Asan Institute in 2014, Kim et al. continued to find Korean support for increased cooperation between Japan and Korea in spite of the difficulties in the two countries’ relationship.<sup>16</sup> They found that increased alienation from Japan (on top of the US’s perceived failure to roundly rebuke Japan for its behavior) could be pushing South Koreans further into the arms of China, although caution about China is also responsible for many Koreans’ wanting an improved relationship with Japan.<sup>17</sup> Similarly to the Genron study, this study found the island dispute to be the most

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<sup>15</sup> “Profile: Dokdo/Takeshima islands,” 10 August 2012, BBC, available online at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19207086>, accessed on 28 July 2014.

<sup>16</sup> Kim Jiyeon, 15.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 26, 28.

significant cause of dislike for Japan, followed by the generically termed “history & textbook” issue, followed by the comfort women issue.<sup>18</sup> The study suggested that while South Koreans were unlikely to ever come around to Prime Minister Abe’s administration, their feelings toward Japan as a whole were more malleable.<sup>19</sup> Finally, it attributed a slide in approval ratings over the 2013 to 2014 period to short-term issues in the media, such as inflammatory remarks by officials over sex slaves and claims to the Liancourt Rocks.<sup>20</sup> Helpfully, the study went so far as to enumerate all the major issues in the 2013 to early 2014 period that affected the Japan-Korea relationship, categorizing each by whether it pertained to the Liancourt Rocks issue, to the comfort women issue, or to history more generally. Clearly, their focus here was on the immediate impact that current events have on Korean public opinion, connected though those are to crimes of the past.<sup>21</sup>

Other work has been done comparing Japan’s relationship to South Korea with other territories the former occupied during World War II. In particular, scholars such as Loo have looked at Japan’s relationship with Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries and found that attitudes there toward Japan are overwhelmingly positive, despite having suffered much of the same exploitation as in Korea and China.<sup>22</sup> (A Pew

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 30-33.

<sup>22</sup>Tze M. Loo, “Historical Reconciliation In Southeast Asia: Notes from Singapore,” in *Inherited Responsibility and Historical Reconciliation in East Asia*, ed. Jun-Hyeok Kwak and Melissa Nobles (London: Routledge, 2013), 81.

study found the same; while South Koreans and Chinese surveyed view Japan in an unfavorable light by 77 and 90 percent, respectively, only six to 18 percent of Malaysians, Indonesians, and Filipinos viewed Japan unfavorably.<sup>23</sup>) In Loo's analysis of Singapore's and Southeast Asia's relationships with Japan, he finds a few factors at play:

- Japan's essential role in the post-war development of Singapore, including such factors as Japanese investment in Singaporean firms and the Singapore government's "Learn From Japan Movement," which sought to emulate Japan's business practices.<sup>24</sup>
- The fact that Japan's takeover of Singapore and other Southeast Asian territories amounted to a "war between empires"—a struggle between Japan and the European powers already in the region, rather than a struggle between Japan and a native government, as had been the case when control of Korea was wrested from the Korean monarchy. Not only that, Japan even claimed to be acting as a kind of Asian elder brother, freeing weaker Asian populaces from their western colonizers.<sup>25</sup>
- The Japanese exploited the ethnic diversity of many Southeast Asian territories in a "divide-and-conquer" strategy. Having, for instance, Malaysians recall the Japanese occupation as part of some sort of patriotic

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<sup>23</sup> Pew Research Center, "Japanese Public's Mood Rebounding, Abe Highly Popular: China and South Korea Very Negative Toward Japan," 11 July 2011, [pewglobal.org](http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/07/Pew-Research-Center-Global-Attitudes-Project-Japan-Report-FINAL-July-11-2013.pdf), <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/07/Pew-Research-Center-Global-Attitudes-Project-Japan-Report-FINAL-July-11-2013.pdf>, (19 December 2013).

<sup>24</sup> Loo, 86.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 86.

effort would also recall the ethnic tensions of the period, which the modern leadership fears would undo harmony in the nation today and utterly defeat the purpose of inciting patriotism.<sup>26</sup>

- Finally, Loo contends that in Singapore's case, the country has taken reconciliation into its own hands and proceeded to make peace with its past, choosing not to tie "the healing of wounds" to whether the Japanese make sufficient reparations.<sup>27</sup>

This comparison with the Southeast Asian case provides some clues for how Korea's case might be compared with India's as well.

I could find no studies that focused only on the view Indians hold of Britain; however, a couple of studies that looked at Indians' views toward many countries contained some relevant information. One Lowy study found that 45 percent of Indians think that Indian government and society would function better if it were more like the UK's, which is a middling percentage compared to those who thought it should be more like the US (78 percent) or like Pakistan (5 percent).<sup>28</sup> Indeed, what is remarkable about this survey is that among 27 questions, just two made any mention of Britain at all. In general, countries of most concern seem to be the US, Pakistan, China, and Australia (the Lowy Institute is an Australian organization).<sup>29</sup> Another study by the same organization

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>28</sup> Rory Medcalf, *India Poll 2013: Facing the future—Indian views of the world ahead* (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013), 6.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 4-15 passim.

found that 67 percent of Indians thought Britain was a good country from which to receive an education, which was a favorable amount, although far more (83 percent) though the US was a good place to be educated. All in all, Britain was ranked ahead of only Germany and China, with the US, Australia, Canada, and Singapore all seen as more ideal places to receive an education.<sup>30</sup>

A British Council survey which was intended to measure the effects of certain major events in Britain on world opinion, namely the 2012 Olympics, Paralympics, and Diamond Jubilee, as well as the 2011 royal wedding, showed that Indians were among the publics with the most improved opinion of the UK when compared with the other countries surveyed (those others being Brazil, China, Britain itself, India, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, and the US). They also were the public with the highest percentage of respondents saying that their impression of the UK was improved by what they saw in the media (it was not specified whether this media should be domestic, British, or of another provenance). Indians consistently were the likeliest or close to the likeliest national public to say that the Olympics and Paralympics reflected well on the UK in a variety of ways. Finally, when asked questions about British people, such as to what extent they thought Britons were tolerant, caring about the environment, or welcoming of visitors to their country, on every point Indians gave the most positive opinion out of all the publics surveyed. All in all, this particular survey showed especially warm feelings on part of the Indian public toward the UK and Britons.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Rory Medcalf, *India-Australia Poll 2013: Partners, problems and prospects—Indian attitudes to Australia* (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013), 6.

<sup>31</sup> Ipsos MORI, “2012’s Strong Overseas Impact for the UK,” Ipsos MORI, <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3094/2012s-strong->

In yet another British Council study, “Trust Pays,” ten countries of “strategic importance” to Britain were subject to a study of their trust in the country, and India was among the countries studied (the others were Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, China, Thailand, Spain, and Brazil). Unlike the other studies cited in this paper, the individuals polled were not representative of their countries as a whole; rather, they were men and women between the ages of 16 and 34 who had at least a secondary school education, lived in urban areas, and were active online. According to the British Council, this demographic “...reflect their respective societies’ ’future influencers’ and ‘young people with potential’ [and] ...are also the key group within their societies who will drive long-term international and business engagement.” As well, those surveyed were asked of their opinions of British people rather than the country as a whole. Bearing these limitations in mind, the results are still interesting.

In agreement with what I found in the other studies, the Indians surveyed did not have a particularly higher or lower opinion of the British as compared with citizens from the other ten countries surveyed, suggesting no particular impact as a result of having been a colony. Subjects also ranked Britons as somewhat more trustworthy than Germans or Americans, and were the only people among the nationalities surveyed who trusted the British government just as much as British people; overall, though, India was neither among the most trusting nations surveyed nor among the least trusting.<sup>32</sup> In a

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overseas-impact-for-the-UK.aspx (accessed April 8, 2014); my thanks to the Reputation Centre for supplying me with more detailed data than available on this website, material from Ipsos MORI for the British Council, “Global@dvisor: Impact of 2012 Survey” – see Appendix.

<sup>32</sup> British Council, “Trust Pays”, 5-6.

summary of the study's key findings, the researchers noted several factors that influenced trust. Although their focus is on the cultural interactions which the British Council facilitates, there are a few factors that perhaps speak specifically to Indian subjects more than they do to most of the other nationalities surveyed (although British Council itself never says that these apply specifically to the Indian case). All of these factors are associated positively with the degree of trust the subjects professed to having in British people:

- *the ability to speak English*: Especially given the demographic targeted for this survey, it is more likely the Indian subjects would have a facility with the English language than the other nationalities, so indeed that would explain a positive attitude toward British people, at least in the case of India's educated classes. The report also notes that parents who speak English predispose a generational transfer of good will toward the UK, and having English-speaking parents is more likely in Indian subjects than the majority of the other countries surveyed.
- *having historical family connections to Britain*: India's history as a colony suggests this could have been a factor for the Indian subjects. Given that this is correlated with a rise in trust, one must assume the researchers mean a positive experience in these historical family connections. But this factor is not elaborated in the research and it is unclear what qualifies as a "historical family connection," so it is difficult to extrapolate to the population as a whole what effect this might have on public opinion.



- *having friends or family living in the UK*: The large number of people of Indian descent in the UK ought to imply that this is especially a factor for the Indian respondents to this survey.<sup>33</sup> (The 2011 England and Wales census found that people of Indian descent accounted for 2.5% of the total population in those areas, with large concentrations in influential urban areas, especially London.<sup>34</sup>)

The relative lack of academic work on India similar to that conducted about Korea leads me to consult journalistic and other sources for clues about how Indians perceive and have perceived Britain. Writing in the August 7, 2010 issue of *The Independent*, foreign correspondent Andrew Buncombe reflected on the attitudes he found among the Indians he came into contact with working in Delhi. His words are worth reprinting in their entirety (emphasis mine):

It's been more than six decades since India secured independence from Britain, and for the younger generation of Indians at least, the role of the colonial power as some sort of cultural reference point further diminishes every year. Forget about boring, rainy old Britain, if the new, booming India is looking anywhere for ideas it is to the US, where the American Dream has provided newly-wealthy Indians with inspiration for their own dreams, complete with all the mods and cons of the consumer lifestyle.

That is not to say that Britain is not important. In the field of higher education, for instance, the UK remains in the top three of preferred destinations for Indian students, and bilateral trade and investment remains crucial. But in terms of fashion, music, television and cinema, for India – as for much of the world – America leads the pack. The Indian middle-class was transfixed by the election of Barack Obama, yet even after his recent trip there, most would probably not even recognise David Cameron.

Indeed, often when you talk to younger, educated Indians they sound almost sorry for you when they learn you're "a Britisher". They seem concerned about the weather, the cost of living, the high divorce rate and the absence of the "extended family home", complete with grandfathers, siblings and in-laws. More recently, they point to the financial crisis, polite enough not to mention India's 10 per cent growth. They blanch

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<sup>33</sup> British Council, 3, 15-16.

<sup>34</sup> *Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011* (Newport, South Wales: Office for National Statistics, 2012), 4.

when you mention the price of a single journey on the London Underground. They look horrified when you explain that should they ever go to London and travel on the Underground, they must not, under any circumstances, talk to anyone.

By and large, Indians are very friendly and forgiving of foreigners, overlooking what they must consider eccentricities. Beyond this, there are – I delude myself – a few areas where being British in particular is still a good thing. Strike up a conversation on the train and you'll be reminded that the British built the railways; raise a peg of whiskey in a bar and you'll be told it was the British who brought whiskey-drinking to the sub-continent; and during any Test match, expressing one's love of cricket puts you in front of any American or mainland European. Many Indians have friends or family who emigrated to the UK.

There are other examples where Britain's traditions linger. At any garrison town you'll find Indian army officers more stereotypically British than any British soldier could ever be. (I was recently refused entry to a military-run private club in the hill station of Kasauli until I had tucked my shirt in. "We have to keep up the discipline," explained the club secretary, a uniformed officer with a very proper accent.) And in places such as Shimla, the former summer capital of the Empire, you'll encounter Anglophile Indians in three-piece tweed suits taking an evening walk.

**What you rarely hear is people complaining about the British Empire, which, given the 250 years of exploitation, starvation and neglect that ensued, I always find surprising. Occasionally, an Indian will tell you that things were better under British rule, though that is a conversation I never wish to pursue.**

Yet such people are rare; as a nation, India is more confident than it has ever been. People are aware that the country faces a myriad of problems – corruption, poverty, malnutrition – but they are confident India will be able to tackle them. They are not looking to Britain, or anywhere else, for help.<sup>35</sup>

Given the relative paucity of data on Indian opinion of Britain, this kind of opinion piece is useful even as one keeps in mind that it is only one observer's perspective on the issue. Though Buncombe does not elaborate on why he believes Indians think so positively, or at worst, ambivalently about Britain, he does illustrate the persistent cultural affinity with the old colonial power that is embraced in India to this day. But from Buncombe's perspective, it seems that, if nothing else, whatever its impact was in the relatively distant past, Britain has been eclipsed in modern times by the influence of other countries,

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<sup>35</sup> John Lichfield, Shaun Walker, Tony Paterson, David Usborne, Andrew Buncombe, Robert Fisk, Daniel Howden, David McNeill, and Holly Williams, "Little Britain: How the rest of the world sees us" 7 August 2010, The Independent, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/little-britain-how-the-rest-of-the-world-sees-us-2043190.html> (22 March 2014).

particularly the United States. With no recurrent disputes, and no recurrent cultural or economic exchanges that are any more significant than those maintained with other countries, Britain seems to have simply fallen off the radar of younger Indians.

The question-and-answer website Quora, which solicits user-generated answers to user-generated questions, found similar responses to the question, “Do Indian people feel animosity towards England / UK? [sic]” Respondents, who mostly appear to be either Indian or of Indian descent, generally concurred that with the exception of perhaps some elderly Indians in the northern part of the country who experienced brutality first-hand on part of the British and the partition of the subcontinent, Indians had moved on and gave little thought about the UK at all. To quote one commenter, “Where are these people [who hold animosity toward Britain] you speak of? I've lived in India for 18 years and not once have I met a person who hated England. Maybe sometimes when India loses a cricket match against them but that's about it.” Other commenters credited Gandhi, Nehru, Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, and others who helped establish post-independence India with choosing not to emphasize the horrors of the colonial period within the Indian education system that they built, and with choosing to keep the aspects of British culture which had gained popularity in India. They also noted that Gandhi’s popularity in Britain itself helped make independence a somewhat less antagonistic process than it could have been.<sup>36</sup>

I did mention that I referred to this last pair of sources due to the lack of academic research into India comparable to that into Korea. I think this lack speaks for itself. Vast

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<sup>36</sup> "Do Indian people feel animosity towards England / UK?," Quora, <http://www.quora.com/Do-Indian-people-feel-animosity-towards-England-UK>, (3 July 2014).

quantities of research into the modern Korea-Japan relationship and Koreans' views of Japan exists because the Korean perspective is so negative, because such a perspective is so consequential, and because there is constantly conflict to analyze. This relationship attracts significant attention. On the other hand, India's modern relationship with Britain and Indians' views of Britain seem to cause so little stir that they barely get any academic attention. Their relationship is practically a non-issue.

With this in mind, my paper will try, through collection of both qualitative and quantitative data, to help fill in the gaps in research in this area, particularly to look more deeply into the Indian case and then link the findings therein to the Korean situation. The following section presents a collection of quantitative data and a review of relevant historical literature, and then presents the methodology which will be used to analyze the information.

### **III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY**

In this section I will present recent polling data that reflects a simple positive or negative attitude about Britain and Japan on the part of India and South Korea. Then, because similar polls do not seem to exist for earlier decades, I will examine the attitudes of key Indian and Korean leaders who would have influenced the attitudes of their publics in years past, and infer from that public attitudes from the more immediate post-colonial period. Afterwards, I will discuss the methodological approach I will employ in analyzing the subject of this paper.


The BBC World Service, Globescan, and PIPA (Program on International Policy Attitudes) conduct an annual Country Ratings Poll which surveys publics around the world on their attitudes toward several influential or high-profile countries. The data for

2013 find a 49 percent positive versus 16 percent negative view of Indians toward the United Kingdom, alongside a 21 percent positive versus 67 percent negative view of South Koreans toward Japan. This occurs even as Japan is one of the most popular countries internationally, with South Korea having one of the few publics giving overwhelmingly negative ratings.<sup>37</sup>

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
<sup>37</sup> BBC World Service, "Country Ratings Poll," 22 May 2013, World Public Opinion.org, <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/2013%20Country%20Rating%20Poll.pdf> (19 December 2013).

### Views of the United Kingdom's Influence By Country, 2013



The white space in this chart represents "Depends," "Neither/neutral," and "DK/NA."  
Asked of half of sample


### Views of Japan's Influence By Country, 2013



The white space in this chart represents "Depends," "Neither/neutral," and "DK/NA."  
Asked of half of sample

### Views of Different Countries' Influence

Average of 22 Tracking Countries, 2012–2013



Note: average ratings exclude the target country's rating of itself, meaning some of the averages are based on 21 and not 22 countries.

\*Average of 21 tracking countries

The white space in this chart represents "Depends," "Neither/neutral," and "DK/NA."

Asked of half of sample


Figure 1: Views of different countries' influence, reprinted with permission from BBC World Service, 2013.

The uniformity of this data makes it useful for comparative purposes. Additionally, since the poll is taken yearly, with data reaching back to 2005, it serves as a useful gauge of how attitudes might be changing as the years wear on in concert with current events. I have here gathered data for the years from 2007 to 2013, the most recent year for which data is available as of the time I am researching this paper.

Year	Indian Views of U.K.	S. Korean Views of Japan
2007	37 + / 19 -	31 + / 58 -
2008	22 + / 14 -	37 + / 52 -
2009	37 + / 16 -	N/A
2010	33 + / 18 -	64 + / 29 -
2011	40 + / 28 -	68 + / 20 -
2012	29 + / 23 -	38 + / 58 -
2013	49 + / 16 -	21 + / 67 -

By percentage. “+” indicates a positive perception, “-“ indicates a negative perception.

*Table 4: Attitudes over time, adapted from BBC Country Ratings Polls, 2007-2013.*




*Figure 2: Attitudes over time, adapted from BBC Country Ratings Polls, 2007-2013.*

The Pew Research Center has conducted similar research regarding views of Japan. As in the BBC poll, views have worsened as of the collection of the most recent data in 2013.

	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused
2007	2	23	39	33	3
2008	3	44	38	13	2
2013	1	21	39	38	1

By percentage.

*Table 5: Attitudes of South Koreans toward Japan in three years, adapted from "Japanese Public's Mood Rebounding, Abe Highly Popular," Pew Research Center 2013.*



*Figure 3: Attitudes of South Koreans toward Japan in three years, adapted from "Japanese Public's Mood Rebounding, Abe Highly Popular," Pew Research Center 2013.*



The Asan Institute measured the favorability of Japan on a scale of zero to ten. The organization reported an overall decline in favorability from September 2010 to January 2014, from 4.2 to 2.4, in agreement with the previous two polls.<sup>38</sup>

NHK presented data stretched out over longer periods, showing levels of “like” and “dislike” over an almost twenty-year period. Summing the number of Koreans who either “disliked” or “somewhat disliked” Japan, the number was shown to have increased over the decades at the expense of Koreans who either “liked” or “somewhat liked” Japan.

	Like	Somewhat like	Somewhat dislike	Dislike	DK/NA
1991	6	33	37	21	3
1999	5	31	44	19	0
2010	2	26	57	14	1

By percentage.

*Table 6: Like/dislike Japan, adapted from “Japan-Korea Past, Present, and Future: From a Public Awareness Survey,” NHK 2011.*

Unfortunately, given that these were samples taken once during each of the given years, and we cannot compare with any of the other intervening years in case any of these years is an aberrance, it is hard to know whether this apparent decline in favorability is a true long-term trend.<sup>39</sup>

The Genron poll referenced earlier found a largely negative opinion about Japan on the part of South Koreans, though its only results are from the spring of 2013.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Kim et al., 10.

<sup>39</sup> Kono, 24, 45.

<sup>40</sup> *First Joint Japan-Korea Public Opinion Poll*, 5.

Favorable impression	Relatively favorable impression	Neither	Relatively unfavorable impression	Unfavorable impression	No response
1.0	11.2	10.1	38.7	37.9	1.1

By percentage.

*Table 7: Impressions of Japan, adapted from “The First Joint Japan-Korea Public Opinion Poll: Analysis Report on the Comparative Data,” Genron NPO 2013.*

A 2012 Gallup Korea poll that asked South Koreans about the countries they most liked, most disliked, and would most like to be reborn in, found that Japan was the country South Koreans cited as most disliked, ahead of China and North Korea, the second and third most disliked. Moreover, the percentage of South Koreans who said they disliked Japan had increased from 33.4 percent in 2002 to 44.1 percent the year of the survey, although Japan was the leader in both years in any case.<sup>41</sup>

Turning toward the Indian case, the 2013 Lowy study found that on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being a cold, unfavorable feeling, and 100 being a warm, favorable feeling, Indians ranked Britain at 53, ahead of most other Asian countries, but almost 10 degrees behind the US, the most-liked country in the survey.<sup>42</sup>

As we can see, these data are useful in general for understanding attitudes over the recent past and for seeing how current events can impact the public’s short-term

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<sup>41</sup> Gallup Korea 한국 갤럽. “Hangugin i johahaneun nara, shirheohaneun nara, tashi taenago shipeun nara” 한국인이 좋아하는 나라, 싫어하는 나라, 다시 태어나고 싶은 나라 [The Countries Koreans Like, Dislike, and Wish they Could Be Reborn In], 26 July 2012, Gallup Korea, available online at <http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=314&pagePos=16&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=>, accessed on 1 May 2014.

<sup>42</sup> Medcalf, *India Poll 2013*, 5.

attitude toward Japan. Unfortunately, this type of polling data is lacking for earlier periods, so we must turn to other means of inferring the attitudes of those times.

The attitudes of prominent figures and political leaders can be taken as one lens through which the attitudes of national publics can be estimated. Turning first to Korea, we can look at the effect of Syngman Rhee's presidency on the southern half of the peninsula. Particularly after his reelection in 1952, Rhee revved up an anti-Japanese propaganda machine that touched issues that continue to trouble Japan-Korea relations today, including demands for reparations which Rhee had failed to secure by not participating in the negotiations for the San Francisco Peace Treaty.<sup>43</sup> South Korea's first president also instilled in the public historical memories of Japan's *waegu* roots and civilizational indebtedness to Korea, and chose a confrontational relationship through policies such as the "Rhee line," which marked the maritime boundary between the two countries, which no Japanese fisherman was to cross.<sup>44</sup> Cheong, arguing that Rhee's motive for inciting anti-Japanese sentiment was not personal ill will but rather political gain through rallying Korean support around his own presidency, cites the so-called "peace line" as "the single most provocative issue [that] inflamed Japanese-Korean relations in the postwar period."<sup>45</sup> Cheong also credits (or perhaps blames) Rhee with establishing the Liancourt Rocks dispute firmly in the public's mind, making it more

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<sup>43</sup> Sung-hwa Cheong, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-Korean Relations Under American Occupation, 1945-1952* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 142-143.

<sup>44</sup> Lewis, 118.

<sup>45</sup> Cheong, 139.

difficult to fix diplomatically in the early years.<sup>46</sup> Given his 12-year tenure as president, we can surmise this attitude would have been key in setting perceptions of Japan in many Koreans for some decades to come. It took the ascension of President Park Chung-Hee for the relationship with Japan to thaw, and it was his administration that also began South Korea's rise from impoverished, war-torn state to economic heavyweight.<sup>47</sup> (Along the way, one of Park's key difficulties was in convincing the Korean public that the Rhee line was not actually recognized as a legal boundary internationally.<sup>48</sup>)

Meanwhile, as the Quora forum participants commented, India's post-independence leadership took a rather different path. Unlike Korea, whose own independence movements were unable to come to fruition before Japanese dominion was undermined by defeat in the war, India's agitation for independence did succeed in finally removing the British from power. And although the Indian struggle included both violent and nonviolent elements, Mohandas K. Gandhi's hugely influential philosophy of *satyagraha* emphasized sympathy for the British rather than hatred. Readers need not be reminded of Gandhi's larger-than-life impact on Indian society up through the present day.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 143.

<sup>47</sup> Lewis, 118.

<sup>48</sup> Cheong, 139.

<sup>49</sup> Anthony da Silva, "Through Nonviolence to Truth: Gandhi's Vision of Reconciliation," in *Forgiveness & Reconciliation: Public Policy & Conflict Transformation*, ed. Raymond G. Helmick and Rodney Petersen (Radnor, Pa.: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001), 316; Therborn, 14.

An early disciple of Gandhi's, of course, was another fighter for Indian independence, and the country's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru's leadership combined Gandhian philosophy with his own early upbringing, in which he was immersed in British culture.<sup>50</sup> His Anglicized family employed a British tutor and later sent Nehru to school in Britain, where, ironically, he was drawn into the politics of Indian independence.<sup>51</sup> Upon his return to India, he was initially a firm adherent of Gandhi's, although he later became more of a pragmatist and felt the need for India to absorb all the accoutrements of the Western state, including a British-style parliamentary democracy, along with a modern military and industrial framework.<sup>52</sup> In the end, where once Nehru had been a dangerous revolutionary and "thorn in the side of the British bureaucracy," writes a biographer, "It was not difficult for Nehru to forget and forgive past bitterness after it became clear that the British had decided to part with power." Nehru saw the conflict not as one between two countries or between two people, but rather a conflict with the ideology of imperialism itself. Seeing the advantages of Dominion Status, Nehru and his party accepted membership in the British Commonwealth upon independence in 1947. After independence, he would characterize himself as "the last Englishman to rule in India."<sup>53</sup> The difference with the attitude of Rhee's tenure in Korea could not be more pronounced.

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<sup>50</sup> B.R. Nanda, *Jawaharlal Nehru: Rebel and Statesman*, 1995 (Reprint, Oxford: Oxford India Paperbacks, 1998), 51, 263, 254.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 254.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 256, 51.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 256, 257, 260-263.

*Education in New India*, a text first published not long after independence, presents some interesting commentary on the educational climate in the republic's early days. In it, the author notes that there was, prior to independence, much interest in Western (i.e. British) education on behalf of the Indian leadership, for the very reason that they hoped such knowledge would allow India independence and the ability to conduct itself successfully as a modern state.<sup>54</sup> As well, the author remarks upon the actual *increase* in interest in English language education since independence, particularly from the perspective that knowledge of the old colonial power's language is necessary for political mobility.<sup>55</sup> Finally, although the author does not discuss the subject in detail with respect to India's particular situation, he is clearly referencing Gandhian ideals when he reflects on the teaching of history:

Much of the conflict and bitterness in the modern world is due to a wrong teaching of history. Till very recently history has been regarded as little else than a record of war and conquest. Men and nations have therefore been judged, not by their contribution to human welfare, but by their success on the battlefield....

...It is therefore a matter of urgency that students today should get a better perspective of the world and realize that the history of man is an age-long march toward greater light, freedom and sweetness on which men and women of different nations, countries and ages have co-operated....<sup>56</sup>

These sentiments reflect a post-independence atmosphere that did not reject a continuing influence from Britain, as well as a fundamentally conciliatory attitude, in words if nothing else. In India's overall attitude, it seems that it took reconciliation into its own hands, much the way Singapore did.

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<sup>54</sup> Humayun Kabir, *Education in New India*, 1956 (Reprint, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1961), 44.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 116, 118.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 183-183.

Using the above evidence and a comparative methodology, in the next section I will try to narrow down which factors are most at play in determining the difference in Indian and Korean attitudes. I categorize the evidence into three main “effects” which are at play in influencing modern attitudes: the historical effect, the period effect, and the structural effect.

#### **IV. THE THREE EFFECTS AND HOW THEY EXPLAIN PUBLIC ATTITUDES**

Here I will reflect on how the attitudes of each populace are influenced by the three effects just enumerated. The first is the historical effect, encompassing what actually happened in the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods of the countries concerned. These determine attitudes on a long-term scale, over decades or even centuries. The second is the period effect, which refers to “current events,” or issues that have taken place more recently and have a micro-influence that may fluctuate from month to month or over the span of a few years. The last is the structural effect, or the impact of factors such as economic interdependence, security alliances, geography, and continuing territorial disputes. Each of these effects, of course, can have an impact on the others.

##### *Historical Effect*

Korea’s colonial period should not be considered a one-off, isolated historical interaction between the peninsula and its eastern neighbor. Rather, Korea’s proximity to Japan means that the colonial period did not arise after centuries of mutual ignorance, but was the next in a series of interactions dating back to ancient times. Korea, starting from at least its Three Kingdoms Period, had considerable influence on contemporaneous Japan,

particularly via the kingdom of Baekje. Archaeological evidence shows that the imperial lineage of Japan likely traces its roots to early Baekje settlers. For centuries before regular direct contact with China was possible, Korean envoys and immigrants brought Chinese culture and language to Japan, as well as Indian religion. Particularly, early Japanese art and architecture owe an incredible debt to Korea, which brought techniques and styles hitherto absent from Japan. Even as Japan became more insular, it still imported significant artistic material from its mainland neighbor.<sup>57</sup>

Military conflict, of course, was another aspect of this relationship. Japanese pirates began pillaging Korean artifacts during the eighth century, and these incidents only worsened as the centuries progressed.<sup>58</sup> The term “waegu,” today a Korean slur against Japanese, dates from this period, and originally meant “Japanese pirate” or “dwarf pirate.”<sup>59</sup> More than half a millennium later, and importantly for the collective memory of modern Koreans, the Hideyoshi invasions of the late sixteenth century resulted in immense loss of life and extensive destruction of Korean land, infrastructure, and cultural assets, although the Japanese were turned away at the end with the help of Ming China.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Jon Carter Covell and Alan Covell, *Korean Impact on Japanese Culture: Japan's Hidden History*, 1986 (Reprint, Elizabeth, NJ: Hollym International, 1993), 6, 46, 21, 36, 26-27, 44-45, 7, 55-56, 96-97.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 94-95.

<sup>59</sup> Community Wiki. “Waegu” 왜구, Wikia, available online at <http://ko.community.wikia.com/wiki/%EC%99%9C%EA%B5%AC>, accessed on 2 May 2014; Korean Dictionary 국어사전. “Waegu” 왜구, Naver, available online at [http://krdic.naver.com/search.nhn?dicQuery=%EC%99%9C%EA%B5%AC&x=0&y=0&query=%EC%99%9C%EA%B5%AC&target=krdic&ie=utf8&query\\_utf=&isOnlyViewEE=](http://krdic.naver.com/search.nhn?dicQuery=%EC%99%9C%EA%B5%AC&x=0&y=0&query=%EC%99%9C%EA%B5%AC&target=krdic&ie=utf8&query_utf=&isOnlyViewEE=), accessed on 2 May 2014

<sup>60</sup> Lewis, 112; Stephen Turnbull, *Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, 1592-98*, (London: Cassell & Co., 2002), 8, 230, 236, 203, 226; Yung Sik Kim, “Problems and



Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910 after spending half a decade as a Japanese protectorate. The peninsula's subordination to its neighbor came ultimately as a result of a change in the balance of power in East Asia, which had finally shifted away from China after that country had been the undisputed regional hegemon for centuries, if not millennia.<sup>61</sup> At the same time, Japan, that backwards land of pirates, became the most modernized country in the region and the only one able to compete with European powers.<sup>62</sup>

During the half century of colonization, Japan accomplished the usual goals colonial powers seek: extraction of natural resources (particularly agricultural products, in this case), land for Japanese immigrants, human labor (put to use not just in Korea, but also in Japan and its other territories, and later in the war effort as well), and a foothold on the Asian continent conducive to further spread of the Japanese Empire.<sup>63</sup> Among the most egregious offenses which continue to trouble Japan-Korea relations today is the use of forced Korean labor, particularly the deception or outright coercion of Korean women

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Possibilities in the Study of the History of Korean Science,” *Osiris* 2<sup>nd</sup> series, vol. 13 (1998): 55.

<sup>61</sup> Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 240, 196, 21-23.

<sup>62</sup> Andre Schmid, *Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 57; Duus, 21-22.

<sup>63</sup> Edwin H. Gragert, *Landownership Under Colonial Rule: Korea's Japanese Experience, 1900-1935*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 53; Duus, 364; Library of Congress Country Studies. “North Korea: The Rise of Korean Nationalism and Communism,” June 1993, Library of Congress, [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+kp0022\)](http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kp0022)), accessed on 25 April 2014; John W. Dower, *Throwing off Asia III: Woodblock Prints of the Russo-Japanese War* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008), p. 5-1.

for use as “comfort women” for Japanese troops before and during the Second World War.<sup>64</sup> Further, as was the case in the Hideyoshi Invasions, Japanese occupation resulted in destruction of significant aspects of Korea’s tangible and intangible cultural heritage. Buildings and monuments were either destroyed or desecrated willfully by the Japanese (as was the case with Seoul’s Joseon palaces), or else harmed in misguided attempts at restoration (as occurred at the Seokguram Grotto in Gyeongju).<sup>65</sup> Use of Korean language was restricted, and Koreans were made to take up Japanese names as well as compelled to worship at Shinto shrines.<sup>66</sup>

As with any colony, natives worked with the colonizing power to administer the territory, and many would later be labeled “collaborators.”<sup>67</sup> Kohli notes that (emphasis mine):

While other colonial powers in other parts of the world also created a competent civil service (e.g., **the British in India**), the Japanese colonial project was qualitatively

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<sup>64</sup> Chunghee Sarah Soh, “The Korean ‘comfort women’ tragedy as structural violence,” in *Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean Experience*, ed. Gi-Wook Shin, Soon-Won Park, and Daqing Yang (London: Routledge, 2007), 17-31 passim.

<sup>65</sup> Lee Sangbae, “The Japanese Imperialists’ Destruction of Korea’s Cultural Heritage,” in *The Foreseen and Unforeseen in Historical Relations between Korea and Japan*, ed. Northeast Asian History Foundation (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2009), 336-337; World Heritage Centre, “Seokguram Grotto and Bulguksa Temple,” 2014, UNESCO, available online at <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/736/>, accessed on 28 April 2014.

<sup>66</sup> Library of Congress, June 1993; Lee Jingu 이진구, “Shinsa chambae e gwanhan Joseon Gidokkyogyae eui daeeung yangsang yeongu: Shinnyeomchegye bunseok eul jungshim euro” 신사참배에 관한 조선기독교계의 대응양상연구:신념 체계 분석을 중심으로 [A Study on the Responding Attitude of Korean Christians to Shinsa Shrine Worship], *Jonggyohak Yeongu* 종교학연구 [Journal of Religious Studies], vol. 7 (1988): 67.

<sup>67</sup> Lewis, 115.

distinct in both the extent and the intensity of its bureaucratic penetration. There were some 10,000 officials in the Japanese-Korean government in 1910; by 1937 this number had reached 87,552. Contrast this with the French in Vietnam,... who ruled a colony of similar size with some 3,000 Frenchmen; in other words, there were nearly fifteen Japanese officials in Korea for every French administrator in Vietnam. The presence of Korean bureaucrats, trained and employed by the Japanese, was also sizable: Nearly 40,000 Koreans qualified as government officials on the eve of the Second World War. While most of the Koreans did not occupy senior positions in the colonial government, there can be little doubt that they became an integral part of a highly bureaucratic form of government over the four decades of colonial rule. Moreover, during the Second World War, as the demand for Japanese officials grew elsewhere, many Koreans moved up in the bureaucratic hierarchy. This sizable cadre of Japanese trained Korean bureaucrats virtually took over the day-to-day running of a truncated South Korea, first under American military government and eventually when a sovereign state was formed.

One further characteristic of the colonial government that needs to be underlined is the successful link the Japanese created between a highly concentrated power center in Seoul and a densely bureaucratized periphery....

...Ruling arrangements in Seoul were highly authoritarian—the power of the Japanese governors-general in both policy making and implementation was absolute. Nearly all of them were senior military men, and Korea was not a very large country in terms of both population and size (**again, for example, not[e] the contrast with the role of the British in India**).<sup>68</sup>

As we shall discuss later, Britain also enlisted Indians extensively in its administration of its colony, but the size and population of India meant that the feeling of a colonial presence could not penetrate the people of India as deeply as the Japanese did in Korea, although the British presence in India was for a much longer period.

Japan introduced important infrastructure, including factories and railroads, and perhaps more importantly, organizational principles that informed South Korea's later economic development. During the colonial period, though, these innovations benefited Japanese residents of Korea much more than they did native Koreans, and the extent to

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<sup>68</sup> Atul Kohli, *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 34-35.

which Japan is responsible for South Korea's later economic rise is, naturally, hotly disputed.<sup>69</sup>

The colonial period ended with Japan's defeat in the Pacific Theater, but having been officially part of Japan during the war, Korea received no reparations according to the San Francisco Treaty.<sup>70</sup> It was on the heels of this long and convoluted history that Syngman Rhee came to power, implementing the staunch anti-Japanese policy remarked upon in the previous section. As a result, we have not only a very lengthy and complicated historical relationship between two neighboring countries, but also a modern leadership that would not allow the South Koreans to forget this history, and set the stage for the conflict that would continue to fester up until the present.

Unlike Japan and Korea, Britain and India did not have a millennium-plus of direct relations leading up to the colonial period, and India did not have any direct "civilizing" effect on Britain the way Korea had on Japan in ancient times. Although Europeans had had contact with Asians since antiquity, England only became involved in earnest in South Asia beginning in 1600 with the English East India Company, which established trade with the Mughal Empire, as well as with the various kingdoms that

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<sup>69</sup> Mark Peterson and Phillip Margulies, *A Brief History of Korea* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2010), 147; Göran Therborn, *The World: A Beginner's Guide* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011), 98; Booth, Anne. "Did It Really Help to be a Japanese Colony? East Asian Economic Performance in Historical Perspective," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, available online at <http://japanfocus.org/-Anne-Booth/2418>, accessed on 8 May 2014.

<sup>70</sup> Soon-Won Park, "The politics of remembrance: The case of Korean forced laborers in the Second World War," in *Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean Experience*, ed. Gi-Wook Shin, Soon-Won Park, and Daqing Yang (London: Routledge, 2007), 58.

made up the Indian subcontinent.<sup>71</sup> In the late eighteenth century, the by then British East India Company began to directly govern the various territories, and in 1858, the British government itself took direct control over India in response to the Indian Revolt of 1857.<sup>72</sup>

India provided Britain with a source of silk, cotton, spices, opium, and other goods, either for its own consumption or to be sold off to other markets. It eventually also became a source of tax revenues, many of the taxes crippling the native population.<sup>73</sup> Indian labor was employed by the British not only in India, but also abroad in colonies as far-flung as Jamaica, Fiji, and South Africa, and later, as Koreans did on Japan's behalf, Indian troops participated in the Second World War, but on the Allies' side.<sup>74</sup> Britain was able to crowd out most other European competition in the same territory, and subdued China, the last remaining non-European world power, through forcing it to import opium cultivated in the Indian colony.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> British Library, "Trading Places: Timeline," British Library, available online at <http://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/trading/timeline/timeline.html>, accessed on 9 May 2014; Peter Marshall, "The British Presence in India in the 18th Century," 2011, BBC, available online at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire\\_seapower/east\\_india\\_01.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/east_india_01.shtml), accessed on 9 May 2014.

<sup>72</sup> British Library, "Trading Places"; Peter Marshall, "British India and 'The Great Rebellion'," 2011, BBC, available online at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/indian\\_rebellion\\_01.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/victorians/indian_rebellion_01.shtml), accessed on 9 May 2014.

<sup>73</sup> British Library, "Trading Places."

<sup>74</sup> The National Archives, "Indian Indentured Labourers," The National Archives, available online at <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/indian-indentured-labour.htm>, accessed on 9 May 2014; British Library, "Indian Independence: World War II," British Library, available online at <http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/india/indianindependence/ww2/>, accessed on 9 May 2014.

Britain is blamed for having allowed, or even “manufactured” several famines in South Asia from the 17<sup>th</sup> century to the 20<sup>th</sup>, including the 1943 famine in Bengal, which resulted from the British diversion of food to the military effort, even as Bengalis starved.<sup>76</sup> Britain is also held responsible for violent suppression of native uprisings, most famously the 1919 Jallianwala Bagh Massacre.<sup>77</sup> Similarly to the Japanese in Korea, Britain sought to repress various aspects of Indian culture: traditional Indian dance was almost a lost art due to social reforms promulgated by the British Crown, and missionaries sought to instill “rationality” in Indians by replacing their native religions with Christianity.<sup>78</sup>

Although the Crown was ultimately in charge, for a long time, administration of British India at all but the highest levels was largely carried out by Indians.<sup>79</sup> It seems the British could not exercise as tight direct control over such a large territory, and in effect, some have argued that Indians living in the more remote areas of the expansive territory might have barely known the difference between British and native rule (whereas, in contrast, Japan could have a much more direct impact on everyday people’s lives within a

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<sup>75</sup> Therborn, 45.

<sup>76</sup> British Library, “Trading Places”; Marshall, “British India”; Shashi Tharoor, “The Ugly Briton,” 29 November 2010, Time, <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2031992,00.html> (9 May 2014).

<sup>77</sup> Philip Reeves, “Amritsar Massacre a Fresh Memory for Last Witness,” 27 December 2006, NPR, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6687085> (9 May 2014).

<sup>78</sup> “History of Bharatnatyam,” Rangashree Dances of India, 2008, available online at <http://rangashree.org/bharatanatyam-history.html>, accessed on 9 May 2014; Peter Marshall, “British Presence.”

<sup>79</sup> Therborn, 60.

small territory like Korea). As in Korea's case, though, the colonial power is also credited with having brought infrastructure and modernization to India, including the country's extensive railway system. And unlike Korea, due to Britain's lengthy presence on the subcontinent, it bequeathed to the Indian middle and upper classes the English language and a British education.<sup>80</sup>

Although the Allies won the Second World War, Britain, along with other combatants, still had to relinquish control over its colonies, and India (and Pakistan) became independent in 1947. At this point, as explained above, the Indian leadership's comparatively conciliatory split with the British government put British-Indian relations on an entirely different course than those between Japan and Korea. In this way, although India endured a much longer colonial presence, it does not inform India's foreign relations the way it does in Korea.

Thus, we can explain the historical effect in two ways: first, India's large territory meant that the immediate effects of colonialism were not felt in many areas, or at least, that any negative impacts brought by the British were not attributed to them by Indians in areas remote from centers of power. For this reason, modern Indians living in those same areas or with families from those places might have little historical animosity for the British, and they make up a not insignificant portion of the population polled. Meanwhile, Korea's small size and the micro-management of the Japanese colonial regime could mean that hardly a Korean alive today does not have some familial recognition of the colonial period. Second, the post-independence government of Korea chose to emphasize the historical cruelty and perceived cultural inferiority of the old colonial

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<sup>80</sup> Therborn, 60.

power, and therefore reinforced these bad memories, or perhaps created them for people who did not have them, and this effect persists until today. This effect is all the stronger because Japan and Korea have a lengthy and complicated relationship that goes back centuries before the UK and India's. Because the Indian government did not engage in such politics, and historical memories are more limited there, a similar effect is not found in India.

### *Period Effect*

As we saw in the work done by the Asan Institute, frequent disputes between Japan and Korea today tend to set off short-term plunges in approval ratings from Koreans. (And attitudes may rebound just as quickly in light of some other foreign relations issue that attracts more attention, such as threats from North Korea or some provocation by China.) The Asan Institute identified 59 separate incidents just from February 2013 to July 2014 which it identified as significant issues in relations between the two countries.<sup>81</sup> In my own research combing the events which took place leading up to each BBC poll, I was able to find a constant stream of news reports that seemed to correlate with the continuous ups and downs of public opinion. From Japan's voicing firm support for South Korea in the wake of the North Korean attacks in 2010, which yielded improving Korean opinion of Japan in the 2011 BBC poll, to its reassertion of its claim to the Liancourt Rocks in 2012, which was just one of the events in 2012 that led up to 2013's

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<sup>81</sup> Kim Jiyeon, 30-33.



dismal numbers, the continuous back-and-forth between the two countries seems to explain the short-term fluctuation we see over recent years.<sup>82</sup>

Yet, when I examined the same period to see what popped up in the media with regards to relations between India and Britain, I found very little. Far more prominent in the Indian press are concerns about neighboring Pakistan and China, and interest in the US runs high. When I looked at what few salient events characterized relations between Britain and India (David Cameron's 2013 visit to the site of the massacre in Punjab state, the Indian Tata Motor Company's 2008 buyout of the British Jaguar Land Rover), I could find no correlation.<sup>83</sup> It makes sense, then, that in the short term, Indian opinion of Britain fluctuates considerably less than Korean opinion of Japan does. In fact, the lack of events covered in the media is more interesting than what those events constituted. Whether Britain has done wrong or right by India in recent times (it has, for example, never issued any apology for the colonial period, unlike Japan), the Indian media is not paying attention anyway. The main exception appears to have been in the 2013 poll, wherein the BBC acknowledged that Britain had received a bump in ratings around the

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<sup>82</sup> Helene Cooper and Sharon LaFraniere, "U.S. and South Korea Balk at Talks With North," 29 November 2010, *New York Times*, [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/world/asia/30seoul.html?hp&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/world/asia/30seoul.html?hp&_r=0) (16 July 2014); Choe Sang-hun, "South Korean's Visit to Disputed Islets Angers Japan," 10 August 2012, *New York Times*, [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/world/asia/south-koreans-visit-to-disputed-islets-angers-japan.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/world/asia/south-koreans-visit-to-disputed-islets-angers-japan.html?_r=0) (16 July 2014).

<sup>83</sup> Ishaan Tharoor, "David Cameron in India: Should U.K. Apologize for Its Imperial Past?," 20 February 2013, *Time*, <http://world.time.com/2013/02/20/david-cameron-in-india-should-u-k-apologize-for-its-imperial-past/> (16 July 2014); "Tata Motors completes acquisition of Jaguar Land Rover," 2 June 2008, *Tata*, <http://www.tata.com/article/inside/mCgnlgckTZw=/TLYVr3YPkMU=> (16 June 2014).

world thanks to its hosting of the 2012 Olympics, and Indians indeed showed the highest jump in opinion of all the years surveyed.<sup>84</sup>

One key point to note is that within this recent period, although Koreans had some very low opinions of Japan at many times, there were also years, such as in 2011, when overall opinion of Japan ran extremely high, with more Koreans professing positive opinions about Japan and fewer professing negative opinions than the Indians did about Britain, thus bucking the overall trend. This reinforces the idea that Korean opinion is malleable and very dependent on the present, even if it is rooted in the past. Whether these on-and-off feelings of good will could be harnessed to create a more long-term positive effect—or whether they are indicative of one already in existence—is an important question for Japan-Korea relations.

### *Structural Effect*

The structural effect designates the effect that results from geographical, economic, and political issues that create the framework for relations between these two countries.

Whereas Indians may be able to regard Britain as just another country, it would be hard for Koreans to do the same about Japan, even if they wanted to. To begin with, the two countries' territorial proximity means that interaction is unavoidably frequent, as it has been for thousands of years. If Japan were to present a military threat, it would be right on Korea's doorstep. Meanwhile, the British have a pair of continents to traverse if they want to threaten India. Additionally, territorial proximity by itself may play a significant role in the popularity of any given country with another. A research director for the polling firm Ipsos MORI commented as much when he found through the agency's

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<sup>84</sup> BBC, 22 May 2013.

research that the farther away geographically a country was from the UK, the more likely it was to view it in a positive light. Britain's European neighbors viewed it more skeptically than publics in more distant countries.<sup>85</sup>

Stemming from this colocation are the two other issues. The first is economic. Japan's earlier industrialization made it at first a role model to Korea, and then its conqueror. With Japan still the third largest economy in the world and located a lucratively short distance away, South Korea cannot afford not to trade with it: Japan is Korea's third-largest destination for exports and its second-largest source of imports.<sup>86</sup> Talks continue with the ends of a China-Japan-Korea FTA in mind.<sup>87</sup> The second issue is security. Joined by the US-led security triangle in East Asia, it may actually be more difficult for Japan and Korea to resolve their differences. South Korea is counting on Japan and the alliance as a whole for protection against North Korea; completely ignoring Japan as a way of forcing some kind of justice is unfeasible, and the US has been unwilling to support Korea in its protests against Japan's expansion of its collective self-defense. Where otherwise the US or another country might be able to preside over some resolution to this and other disputes, the situation effectively ties the hands of the US, as

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<sup>85</sup> Ben Marshall, "How does the rest of the world view Britain?" 19 December 2012, *New Statesman*, <http://www.newstatesman.com/staggers/2012/12/how-does-rest-world-view-britain> (20 February 2014).

<sup>86</sup> The World Factbook, "Korea, South," 2013, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>, (24 January 2014).

<sup>87</sup> Shannon Tiezzi, "China-Japan-South Korea Hold FTA Talks Despite Political Tension" 5 March 2014, *The Diplomat*, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-japan-south-korea-hold-fta-talks-despite-political-tension/> (24 July 2014).

it is not willing to alienate one of its partners.<sup>88</sup> This uneasy mutual interdependence keeps Japan and Korea necessarily close, and at the same time may be making it more difficult to resolve their differences.

India's case is quite different. Britain is not even within the top 15 of the nation's trading partners.<sup>89</sup> India's most prominent military partner by far is Russia, with Britain and others falling far behind.<sup>90</sup> While certain segments of Indian society may have close family and cultural ties to Britain, the country does not figure largely into Indian foreign policy. British aid to India is set to end in 2015.<sup>91</sup> In essence, the structural ties between India and Britain are now weak, which leaves less opportunity for conflict.

## V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have tried to show why two countries with superficially similar histories have produced publics with divergent attitudes. I have shown quantitative and qualitative evidence that South Koreans have a largely negative view of Japan over the long term, even as short-term volatility shows the potential for more amicable attitudes. I have shown, meanwhile, that Indians think of Britain in positive terms, or at worst, do not give

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<sup>88</sup> Kim Jiyeon, 27-29.

<sup>89</sup> Export Import Data Bank, "Total Trade: Top n countries," 2014, Department of Commerce, <http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnttopnq.asp>, (28 July 2014).

<sup>90</sup> Gardiner Harris, "World's Biggest Arms Importer, India Wants to Buy Local" 6 March 2014, *New York Times*, [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/business/international/worlds-biggest-arms-importer-india-wants-to-buy-local.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/business/international/worlds-biggest-arms-importer-india-wants-to-buy-local.html?_r=0) (28 July 2014).

<sup>91</sup> Mark Tran, "End of UK aid to India divides opinion" 18 February 2013, *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/18/uk-aid-india> (28 July 2014).

the country much thought at all. I classified the reasons for these divergent views into three effects:

- The historical effect accounts for the complete history of relations between the countries concerned, including the way the post-colonial leadership represented that history to the newly independent people. Nehru and others' conciliatory stance encouraged the same in the Indian public, whereas Rhee harnessed anti-Japanism as a tool to maintain his power in office. These post-colonial attitudes set the stage for modern attitudes.
- The period effect explains the influence current events do or do not have on short-term attitudes. The constant interaction between Japan and South Korea, and with other East Asian neighbors as well, produce a fluctuating opinion which has been overwhelmingly negative in the last few years. Meanwhile, the lack of significant interaction between India and the UK means that this effect has limited impact in the Indian case.
- The structural effect encompasses the parameters that economics, politics, and geography set for these countries. All of these aspects tightly bind South Korea's fate to Japan, making interaction unavoidable and prolonging conflict. India's great distance from Britain, meanwhile, is both literal and figurative.

I hope I have shown by this comparison that South Korean attitudes are not solely or even primarily determined by oft-cited issues such as Japan's failure to adequately apologize, or even the territorial dispute. Even if the issue of the islets had been resolved, who knows how long it would take for more than half a century of anti-Japanese rhetoric to

wear off? And given the two countries' continuous interaction, once one dispute got resolved, might not another arise?

This is not to say that efforts should not be made to resolve these issues. The Genron poll cited earlier also questioned Japanese and Koreans about what they believed were the greatest “barriers to bilateral relations,” and while their other opinions differed, both publics believed that a resolution of the Liancourt Rocks dispute would do the most to ease tensions. We should remember that the islet dispute is the number-one reason cited by Koreans for dislike of Japan, and that current events aggravate historical ill will among Koreans. The goal of this paper is not to make policy recommendations, but it seems clear that a resolution of the territorial dispute, however difficult, would probably go the farthest to resolving tensions, even if it might take another generation for all traces of ill will to truly dissipate.<sup>92</sup>

I must comment on my limitations in writing this paper. In reality, this topic is so vast that there were issues which I could not address that are nevertheless relevant. For example, to what extent does it make a difference that Britain was a European colonial power while Japan was Asian? Might the psychological impact of being colonized by another Asian country rather than a western power have felt more demeaning, given the inferiority complex felt in relation to the west? Additionally, although I made mention of the issue of education as an outgrowth of the historical effect, the impact of education could be termed its own effect, and examined in even deeper detail. I made mention of Syngman Rhee's manipulation of anti-Japanism in an effort to solidify his hold on the presidency, but surely manipulation of anti-Japanese sentiments for political gain could

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<sup>92</sup> *First Joint Japan-Korea Public Opinion Poll*, 7, 11-12.

make an entire thesis on its own. Perhaps, as Loo suggested about Southeast Asia, such manipulation was not so useful within the Indian political sphere, given India's similar ethnic diversity versus Korea's homogeneity. These and perhaps countless other issues could be examined in more detail.

We should also not forget that British India and Korea under Japanese rule encompassed much larger territories than the ones on which I have focused here. For the sake of simplicity and due to a lack of relevant data, I have omitted Pakistan, Bangladesh, and North Korea from my analysis, although these countries present opportunities for further research.<sup>93</sup> Here again, I'll reference Loo's work on the impact of ethnic tensions on post-colonial relations. India's ethnic tensions, after all, were so great that they tore the country into two, and they still exist within modern India. What role they might have played in lessening anger at the British would be a great question to address in Pakistan's case as well.

Finally, I must point out that as I was completing my manuscript for submission, the BBC released its latest Country Ratings Poll. As of 2014, South Koreans' view of Japan had plummeted yet further, to a whopping 79 percent expressing a negative opinion and a mere 15 percent judging the country positively. Indians continued to hold positive to neutral views of Britain, with 43 percent of those surveyed rating the country positively and just over a quarter expressing a negative opinion.<sup>94</sup> Even as we view South Korea's bleak numbers, however, we should remember how positive they were just

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<sup>93</sup> I should also acknowledge that Burma, Yemen, Singapore, and Somalia, having included land that had been part of the British Raj at some point, are also technically successor states to British India.

<sup>94</sup> BBC World Service, "Country Ratings Poll," 3 June 2014, BBC, <http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/country-rating-poll.pdf> (24 July 2014).

a few years ago. This period effect will likely subside, but how soon the historical and structural aspects shift remains to be seen.

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## APPENDIX

	Great Britain	United States	South Africa	Poland	Thailand	<b>India</b>	Brazil	China	Spain	Turkey	Russia	Saudi Arabia
The 2012 London Olympics improved my view of the UK	49%	18%	38%	27%	49%	<b>67%</b>	35%	34%	19%	25%	23%	37%
The 2012 London Paralympics improved my view of the UK	50%	20%	38%	41%	50%	<b>56%</b>	35%	54%	16%	29%	30%	44%
The Diamond Jubilee improved my view of the UK	35%	18%	29%	28%	56%	<b>39%</b>	21%	67%	7%	17%	27%	35%
The 2011 royal wedding improved my view of the UK	30%	21%	28%	29%	53%	<b>51%</b>	23%	55%	9%	21%	19%	29%
Learning about the UK from the media has improved my view of the UK	n/a	32%	29%	29%	59%	<b>64%</b>	63%	53%	12%	25%	32%	39%
I think the UK did a good job at organizing the Olympics	81%	57%	82%	69%	77%	<b>78%</b>	65%	36%	56%	65%	65%	55%
I think the Olympics opening ceremony reflected the best of a traditional and modern UK	60%	42%	62%	53%	75%	<b>75%</b>	54%	54%	47%	57%	51%	52%
I think the Olympics have shown the UK to be a confident, multi-ethnic society	70%	46%	71%	53%	72%	<b>75%</b>	46%	46%	41%	47%	54%	51%
I think the Olympics will leave a lasting positive impact on UK Society	56%	47%	69%	48%	64%	<b>72%</b>	56%	42%	45%	45%	47%	51%
I think the UK should be more confident about its global standing in the future	57%	36%	59%	33%	66%	<b>72%</b>	43%	37%	27%	36%	35%	55%
The Olympics have made me more likely to visit the UK	61%	22%	46%	26%	46%	<b>66%</b>	38%	29%	20%	32%	23%	45%
The Olympics have made the UK more attractive to me as a place to study or do business	50%	22%	39%	22%	51%	<b>65%</b>	39%	24%	20%	31%	23%	45%

(continued on next page)

The 2012 Olympics and Paralympics had a positive effect on how I think UK people view disability	77%	30%	66%	60%	77%	<b>66%</b>	59%	48%	38%	64%	62%	51%
The 2012 Olympics and Paralympics had a positive effect on how good I think the UK is at sports	73%	30%	55%	49%	67%	<b>78%</b>	50%	46%	28%	56%	54%	54%
The 2012 Olympics and Paralympics had a positive effect on how I view the arts scene in the UK	45%	30%	54%	53%	76%	<b>77%</b>	57%	51%	42%	50%	48%	55%
The 2012 Olympics and Paralympics had a positive effect on how friendly I think UK people are	65%	36%	53%	57%	76%	<b>73%</b>	52%	52%	25%	41%	56%	47%
The 2012 Olympics and Paralympics had a positive effect on how I perceive the sense of humor of UK people	60%	33%	53%	40%	66%	<b>67%</b>	48%	49%	26%	32%	45%	45%
I think UK people welcome people to their country	61%	53%	62%	43%	68%	<b>70%</b>	49%	50%	36%	42%	52%	54%
I think UK people are open to new ideas	55%	44%	51%	49%	64%	<b>72%</b>	45%	52%	36%	49%	50%	58%
I think UK people respect the beliefs, values and culture of people from other countries	46%	48%	54%	46%	62%	<b>72%</b>	45%	45%	32%	42%	50%	53%
I think UK people are concerned about the global environment	47%	41%	55%	37%	58%	<b>70%</b>	45%	51%	30%	48%	50%	51%
I think UK people generally give a good impression of the UK when they travel abroad	31%	48%	59%	45%	59%	<b>73%</b>	46%	45%	21%	46%	52%	54%
I think UK people have a good understanding of international issues	43%	42%	58%	35%	64%	<b>72%</b>	50%	41%	32%	40%	44%	49%
I think UK people are tolerant of people from other countries	51%	46%	52%	44%	68%	<b>65%</b>	37%	39%	34%	36%	48%	45%
I think UK people take seriously the concerns and priorities of people from other countries	41%	42%	50%	29%	58%	<b>69%</b>	43%	29%	24%	32%	42%	50%

*A1: 2012's Impact for the UK on Overseas Opinion, adapted from 2012 data supplied by Ipsos MORI for the British Council.*

## 요약

이 논문의 목적은 무자비한 식민지배체제로 인해 현재의 체재를 갖추게 된 인도인들과 한국인들이 영국과 일본에 대해 가지고 있는 인식 사이의 차이를 설명하는 데 있다. 본 논문은 양적자료와 질적자료 연구를 통해 그 차이를 역사적 영향, 시기적 영향, 구조적 영향으로 나누어 살펴보고 이러한 영향으로 인해 형성된 일본에 대한 한국인들의 부정적인 태도와 영국에 대한 인도인들의 긍정적 혹은 관조적인 태도를 설명한다.

지금까지의 조사들은 단기적 측면에서 한국 여론이 일본에 대해 매우 변덕스런 자세를 취하고 있고 그들의 행동에 매우 예민하다는 것을 보여주고 있다. 그러나 장기적 측면에서는 여론이 지금과 같이 부정적이지 않을 수 있다. 현 아베 정부에 대한 한국 국민들의 반감은 진정될 기미가 보이지 않음에도 일본이라는 국가 자체에 대한 의견은 변동할 수 있다. 특히나 비정치적인 이슈에 관해서는 여론이 더 다양한 의견을 보이고 있다. 일본에 반감을 품고 있는 한국인에게 질문했을 때 가장 많이 꼽은 반일 감정의 이유는 독도/다케시마 영토 분쟁이다.

인도의 경우에는 인도인의 영국에 가지고 있는 포스트식민주의 및 근대의 인식과 관련된 조사가 많지 않다. 그러나 일본의 지배를 받은 동남 아시아 국민들의 의식을 탐구한 조사들에 따르면 일본에 대한 그들의 적대감은 한국만큼 심하지 않으며 인도와 비슷한 양상을 띠고 있다. 한 조사에 따르면 영어를 사용할 줄 알거나 영국과 역사적인 관계를 가지고 있다거나 혹은 영국에 사는 친척이나 친구가 있는 사람들이 영국에 대하여 더 긍정적인 인식을 보이고 있다. 위 특성을 가진 사람들이 많은 인도에서는 이 조사의 내용이 더욱 의미가 있다. 다른 나라들에 대한 일반 인식 조사에서도 인도 국민들은 영국에 대해 국정 운영과 교육 시설이 좋다고 밝혔다. 이러한 조사뿐만 아니라 인터넷 포럼에 기반한 네티즌들의 논평과 기자들의 의견에서는 그들이 과거에서 벗어났으며 영국 이외의 다른 나라들에 더 관심이 많다는 추가적 의식 태도를 보여주고 있다.

이어지는 부분에서는 BBC와 퓨 리서치 센터 등 여러 연구소의 양적자료를 소개한다. 이러한 여러 자료에 비추어 볼 때 인도 국민들은 영국에 대하여 긍정적이나 관조적인 태도를 보이고 있다. BBC 정보에 따르면 인도인들의 이러한 태도는, 전반적으로 부정적이지만 자주 변하는 한국인들의 대일 감정에 비해 변동성이 적다.

이보다 이전 시대의 여론을 이해하기 위해서는 정성적(질적) 자료를 사용하였다. 이승만 대통령이 반일감정을 정치적 전략으로 사용했고 국민 불신의 불길을 부채질했다. 그에 반해 간디즘과 영국 문화와의 친밀성 덕분에 자와할랄 네루와 인도의 다른 헌법 제정자들은 영국에 대한 자국 내 협조적 태도를 고취시켰다.

위 자료들을 통해 세 가지 영향을 제시한다. 인도와 한국의 식민지 시대 전과 식민 시대 그리고 식민기 바로 이후 상황을 설명하기 위해서 역사적 영향을 고려하였다. 인도의 긴 식민지 시대가 남긴 문화와 언어의 영향은 한국의 짧은 식민지 기간의 영향과는 다르다. 인도의 넓은 영토로 인해 영국 공무원들이 인도

전역에 직접적인 영향을 미치는 것은 불가능했다. 반면 한국과 일본 사이의 관계는 식민 지배 훨씬 더 이전 세기로 거슬러 올라갈 뿐 아니라 그 기간은 인도가 영국의 식민 지배를 받은 기간보다 훨씬 더 길다. 그 동안 한국과 일본은 문화와 과학 기술뿐만 아니라 극심한 갈등을 공유했다. 식민지배는 이러한 복잡하고 오래된 관계의 다음 단계일 뿐이었다. 인도를 지배한 영국인들에 비해 훨씬 더 많은 비율의 일본 군인과 관료 및 정착민이 한국 땅을 채워 대부분 한국 사람들이 직접 식민 정권의 지배를 경험했다. 독립 직후 이승만 정부는 자국 내 통제력을 키우기 위해 반일감정을 정책적으로 활용했다.

시기적 영향은 여론의 단기적 변동성에 대한 직접적 이유와 같은 현상을 규명하는데 유용하다. 보통 일본 정부에서 나온 발표나 외교의 대실패와 같이 동아시아에서 끊임없이 생기는 시사 문제는 여론을 바꾼다. 이와 유사한 상관관계나 중요 시사 사건이 영국과 인도 사이에는 없다.

구조적 영향은 정치, 경제, 지리적 요인에 따른 제한과 관련이 있다. 한국과 일본 영토는 서로 인접해 있어 회피가 불가능하고 갈등이 더 자주 생긴다. 또한 지리적 밀접성으로 인해 일본군의 증강이 의심될 경우 한국에 더 큰 위협이 될 수 있다. 지리적 요인으로 인해 한국과 일본은 상호작용을 필요로 하는 수익성 무역 거래 관계에 있다. 또한 두 나라는 한국의 필요해 의해 미국과의 삼각안보 체제에 속해있고 미국은 이를 유지하기 위해 일본에 한국이 반대하는 정책을 바꾸도록 압박하지 않는다. 반면에 인도와 영국에 사이에 거리는 크다. 때문에 인도가 영국에게 느끼는 것과 달리 일본은 한국에 우리나라가 아닌 “단순히 또 다른 나라”가 될 수 없다.

지금까지 한일 관계에 대한 분석이 주로 개별 분석으로 이루어진 데 반해 본 논문은 비교 분석을 통해 한일 관계를 개선하기 위해 무엇이 선행돼야 하는지를 밝히고자 하였다. 이번 연구를 통해 두 나라 간의 불신의 이유는 부족한 사과나 현재 일본 정부의 행동과 같은 시기적 영향의 문제만이 아님을 보여준다. 역사적 뿌리와 지리적 현실 등의 뼈대가 없었다면 이러한 불신이 존재하지 않았을 것이다.

**주요어:** 한일 관계, 인도 영국 관계, 포스트식민주의, 여론, 비교 분석

**학번:** 2012-22822