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국제학석사학위논문

**A Study on Thailand's Strategy of South-South Cooperation
towards Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam**

태국의 對 캄보디아, 라오스, 미얀마, 베트남 남남협력
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**A Study on Thailand's Strategy of South-South Cooperation
towards Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam**

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Abstract

This thesis aims to identify Thailand's strategies of development cooperation as the country is emerging as a major donor in South-South cooperation. The term South-South cooperation refers to a paradigm in the field of international cooperation that pursues horizontal partnerships and solidarity within the South, which has long been the core of Thailand's foreign policy for its neighboring countries. Thus, the unique features and patterns of Thailand's development cooperation with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam were thoroughly examined.

In addition, this research investigated how Thailand's strategies of South-South cooperation have been evolving and are being threatened amidst increased tensions in Southeast Asia, due to hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China concerning economic cooperation and the South China Sea dispute. Through the analysis, it was found that the patterns of Thailand's development cooperation with its four recipients clearly differed from one another. Its development aid was not only based on humanitarian purposes but was also aimed at preserving a superior position in economic cooperation, as well as enhancing the country's status and security in Southeast Asia. Acknowledging the shortcomings of previous studies, this thesis tried to make a contribution to the field of Thailand's development cooperation.

Keywords

International development cooperation, South-South cooperation, ODA, Thailand, Southeast Asia

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I. Introduction

1.1 Background

Thailand's relations with its neighbors – Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam – are complicated by the countries' nationalism that involves antagonistic historical narratives and disagreements over border demarcation. Its foreign policies had often reflected the country's negative view towards contentious Myanmar, weak Laos and treacherous Cambodia.¹ Mainland Southeast Asian states have also been skeptical of Thailand's hegemony, rooted in harsh experiences of Siamese aggression centuries ago and its support of foreign intervention in the region during the Cold War. In spite of occasional border conflicts, however, post-Cold War mainland Southeast Asia is marked by peace and stability. Since the inception of the "turning battlefields into marketplaces" policy in 1988, Thailand has been at the forefront of restoring peace and stability in mainland Southeast Asia through sub-regional cooperation.

Thailand's foreign policy to promote sub-regional cooperation in the post-Cold War era is often viewed to be driven by the economic rationale. However, the fact that Thailand has been trying to promote its own form of regional initiatives and South-South Cooperation in mainland Southeast Asia should not be overlooked.

¹ Charnvit Kasertsiri (2003) "Thailand-Cambodia: a love-hate relationship," *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*, No.3

Sub-regional institutions such as the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Quadrangle Economic Cooperation initiative (QEC), the Emerald Triangle and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) are a few examples that were launched by Thailand's leadership.

Apart from its support for sub-regional institutions, Thailand has also been heavily investing in South-South Cooperation, which is yet another area that is of great interest to Thailand. In the form of ODA and technical assistance, the Thai Government has been helping and cooperating with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) since 1992, despite its presence on the list of ODA recipients from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). Tracing Thailand's foreign policy preferences, it is clear that the country's strategic narrative have involved an exceptional amount of resources and financial assistance especially for the CLMVs.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines South-South Cooperation as "a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains."² During the process of cooperation, governments usually play a lead role, with active participation from public and private sector institutions, non-governmental organizations and individuals. It involves different and evolving

² UNDP official webpage, "What is South-South Cooperation?" http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html (accessed April 30, 2014)

forms, including the sharing of knowledge and experience, training, technology transfer, financial and monetary cooperation and in-kind contributions. Formal initiatives that laid the foundation of South-South cooperation include the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961,³ while a more formalized recognition of this new kind of development cooperation are the Cairo Conference held in 1962 on the “Problems of Economic Development,” the cornerstone of the establishment of the Group of Seventy Seven (G77) at the United Nations. Also, the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1978 was a landmark event that “signaled a confidence in and commitment to the idea that Southern states could find their own development solutions.”⁴

Over the past few decades, the members of the OECD-DAC cut back their engagement in development cooperation, overall taking a less altruistic attitude towards recipient countries. With a conservative shift on the European continent, the long-established gumption for effective aid seems to be lost among traditional donors. As pointed out in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Summit in

³ At the Bandung Conference held in 1955, the principle of resisting subordination to the Cold War giants and insisting on the needs and rights of the newly decolonizing nations was articulated. It had considerable impact on the international system, which until then had been dominated by top-down relationships. The “Bandung Spirit” led to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 at a conference in Yugoslavia. The NAM was formed to ensure the rights of non-aligned states to resist subordination to Cold War politics and ideologies, the need for a more just, multilateral world system, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. As well as diplomatic stances and alliances, the NAM encouraged South-South trade and cooperation.

⁴ Mawdsley, E. (2012) *From Recipients to Donors*, Zed Books, p.64

2010, traditional aid donors are failing to build actual commitments.⁵ Amidst the changing atmosphere of global governance of development, the concept of South-South Cooperation is rising as a powerful tool for building new partnerships and creating more democratic and equitable forms of global interdependence and governance.

Following the first wave of traditional donors in the West and the second wave of non-traditional donors (i.e., China, India and Saudi Arabia), Thailand belongs to the third wave of development players and is perceived to be a major emerging actor in South-South development cooperation.⁶ Especially in Southeast Asia, Thailand has recently gained momentum to actively pursue South-South cooperation with its neighboring countries– Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam. Since Thailand has been a traditional recipient of ODA, it is interesting that the country has decided to become a provider in its South-South cooperation. Considering the recent change in the international perspective towards Southeast Asia that involves the emerging regional rivalry between U.S. and China, this paper will investigate Thailand’s development cooperation within this regional dynamics.

⁵ UN official webpage, “2010 UN Summit,” <http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/> (accessed April 30, 2014)

⁶ The majority of south-south partnership actors include: Thailand, Brazil, Venezuela, Egypt, India, China, Columbia, Malaysia, Mexico, Chili and the Republic of South Africa

1.2 Research Question

Thailand is well-known for offering aid despite its modest per capita income. It is a non-DAC donor that prefers to be called a ‘development partner’ rather than a ‘donor.’ Although it is difficult to find scholastic literature, many of Thai foreign aid journalistic literature do not address that the main purpose and motivation of Thailand’s ODA policy is “only for the CLMV’s socio-political, including economic and human development.” Likewise, in its ODA-related publications, the Thai government states that Thailand’s south-south cooperation contributes not only to Thailand’s national interests (i.e., security and prosperity) but also to the recipients’ socio-economic political development, in order to justify the meaning and significance of its ODA distribution. Based on the shortcomings of previous research on Thailand’s ODA, this paper will explore the following research question based on descriptive and qualitative analyses:

- *Why does Thailand give its ODA to the CLMVs even though it is still a recipient of ODA from the OECD-DAC? What national interests does Thailand pursue when it allocates its bilateral ODA to the CLMVs?*

II. Literature Review

With the aim of finding explanations for Thailand's development cooperation with the CLMVs, this research tried to discover relevant literature to first elucidate the relationship between foreign aid and national interests, as well as the patterns of South-South cooperation.

2.1 Foreign Aid and National Interests

Foreign aid, especially bilateral aid, consists of both the donor and the recipient's interests and objectives, and is therefore often described as a leverage foreign policy tool. The DAC defines bilateral foreign aid as:

Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or

insurance payouts) are in general not counted.⁷

While humanitarian and economic development issues are straightforward, calculating and analyzing donor motivations is more challenging. Because foreign aid is funded by taxpayers, ODA must be entitled to national interests that justify the usage of tax money. According to foreign aid scholars, all donors have their own targeted recipients and individual objectives when they distribute aid, especially in bilateral aid relations.⁸ In other words, aid allocations are likely to be shaped by donor's national interests. To navigate the puzzling relationship between ODA and national interests, this section of the paper will review the literature on explanations of the three major theoretical paradigms in international relations (i.e. realism, liberalism and structuralism) on foreign aid.

First of all, according to McKinlay and Mughan, Singer, and Morgenthau, realists' perspectives on aid are generally consistent.⁹ For example, Morgenthau stated that "a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda."¹⁰ In other words, as a foreign policy tool, ODA should relate itself to power or security interests. Realists' perspectives are summarized by Hook as: "[i]f an effect is identified, it is significant only to the extent that it increases the

⁷ "Glossary of terms," DAC website, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm#ODA> (accessed January 8, 2015)

⁸ For example, see Alesina and Dollar (2000), Schraeder, Taylor, and Hook (1998), and Nelson and Eglinton (1993)

⁹ See McKinlay and Mughan (1984), Singer (1972) and Morgenthau (1962)

¹⁰ Morgenthau, H. (1962) "A political theory of foreign aid," *American Political Science Review*, June, p.309

donor's political influence, military security, trade programs, and foreign investment."¹¹ He further argues that realists view foreign aid as "very problematic" when it is given in the forms of charity or free aid for economic and humanitarian development. That is, from a realist perspective, it is hard to capture the relationship between ODA and the socio-political development of the recipients, especially when "subsequently harmonious relations between donor and recipient" is not guaranteed.¹²

In addition, Doyle argues that realists focus on bilateral aid rather than multilateral and non-governmental aid. The "stick and carrot" strategy of foreign aid allows the donor country to easily leverage power that allows it to manipulate the recipient country in a way that is favorable to the former, by using political and economic conditionality.¹³ As a consequence, in the post-Cold War era, aid recipients were chosen once donors' calculations of strategic benefits were completed, which resulted in distorting aid flows far from the poorest and most needy.¹⁴

Clearly, for realists, it is better when ODA is minimized, and at the same time, it must closely relate to donors' national interests. Thus, realists interpret donor activities as to possibly forge diverse national interests, where the donor's

¹¹ Hook, S. W. (1995) *National Interest and Foreign Aid*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.34

¹² *Ibid.*, p.35

¹³ Doyle, M. (1997) *Ways of War and Peace*, New York: Norton, pp.443-445

¹⁴ Alesina A. and D. Dollar (2000) 'Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?', *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5(1), pp.33-63

security is the top priority. In other words, the major purpose of ODA, when it is strategically implemented as a political linkage tool, is to enhance the power and national interests of the donor country in the power play between states.

The second strand of studies is the liberalist school of IR. Openski, Stokke and Baldwin claim that from the liberalist perspective, foreign aid must be given in the form of grants, and more should be allocated under the premise of a positive-sum result.¹⁵ Liberal internationalists argue that multilateral institutions enable states to prosper by synthesizing donors' experience on foreign aid and recipients' self-help efforts.¹⁶ Unlike realists, they believe that multilateral aid is less dubious than bilateral, due to its relative transparency and it being less likely to be driven by donors' political, economic, and military strategic concerns.¹⁷ Schraeder, Taylor and Hook state that liberalists "[a]re particularly optimistic about the potential utility of foreign aid for ameliorating Third World poverty and promoting broadly shared economic development."¹⁸ In other words, liberal internationalists perceive that aid helps alleviate poverty, protect human rights, and improve the recipients' socio-political conditions, such as democracy and good governance.

Although liberalists admit that foreign aid may serve instrumentalist

¹⁵ See Openski (1996), Stokke (1995) and Baldwin (1985)

¹⁶ Deudney, D. and J. Ikenberry (1999) "Nature and sources of liberal international order", *Review of International Studies*, 25, pp.179-96

¹⁷ Maizels, A. and Nissanke, M. K. (1984) "Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries," *World Development*, 12, p.879

¹⁸ Schraeder, P. J., Taylor, B. and Hook, S. W. (1998), "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows," *World Politics*, 50, pp.294

purposes, they differ from the realist perception as they believe it works within a distinctive understanding of power plays, and what is meant by a “desirable set of relations between states.”¹⁹ For instance, foreign aid encourages global economic integration through liberal trade regimes, and helps enhance relations among countries that participate in foreign aid institutions.

In contrast to realists and liberalists, structuralists’ explanations of foreign aid are conceptualized in a rather distant way. Being derived from the neo-Marxian perspective, structuralists understand foreign aid as a means to ensure asymmetrical accumulation of capitalist wealth.²⁰ They agree with realists in that aid can be utilized as an effective tool for influence. But the two schools differ in the “place of observation.” As it can be noticed in the dependency theory introduced by structuralists, they analyze foreign aid from the perspectives of less-developed countries, or the recipients, while realists take the donors’ viewpoint. They denounce foreign aid as yet another field in which the pattern of asymmetry between the developed and the developing world is found. Thus, structuralists argue for the elimination of the foreign aid regime, since it is a tool used for dominance or manipulation by donors or the elite class in the recipient country.

Hook summarizes that structuralists view foreign aid as a tool that exploits recipient countries’ human resources, economy, social system and

¹⁹ Stokke, O. (1989) *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies

²⁰ Hattori, T. (2001) “Reconceptualising foreign aid”, *Review of International Political Economy*, 8(4), p.633

environment.²¹ Even in cases where grant aid is given, structuralists argue it is highly likely that recipients must accept donors' requests and orders, such as embracing Western democracy or the liberal economic system. In other words, foreign aid in such cases "further encourages the dependent development of peripheral states."²²

According to Sogge, foreign aid has been utilized as a tool to solidify the neoliberal economic order that forces open sovereign decision-making processes to assure flexible financial systems and a "business-oriented" regulatory environment.²³ Moreover, from the structuralists' lens, major ODA strategies being introduced by international regimes established by the first world imply that multilateral grant aid may not be given for the sake of the recipients' socio-political development. For instance, Ohno and Ohno argue that aid allocations and the decision-making process of aid programs at international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank are mostly under U.S. influence, reflecting U.S. national interests, since the country provides the largest funding to both of them.²⁴

The three theoretical schools of international relations agree that aid is political, although altruistic motives do comprise an important part in donor motivations. That is, foreign aid is indeed a foreign policy tool applied under

²¹ Hook (1995), pp.38-39

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Sogg, D. (2002) *Give and Take: What's the matter with foreign aid?*, London: Zed Books

²⁴ Ohno, K. and Ohno, I. (1993) *IMF and World Bank: The Inside of International Development Institutions*, Tokyo: Nihon Hyouronsya

strategic interests. Nonetheless, this should not wash out the contributions of foreign aid in alleviating poverty and economic growth of the recipients.

2.2 Patterns of South-South Cooperation

The Southern development actors often differ in their relations with each partner in development cooperation. Not only do they vary in development modalities but they also have a different positioning in international institutions. Thus, the Southern actors tend to have conflicting assemblages of interests instead of a unified stance.²⁵ Nonetheless, actors engaged in South-South cooperation are evidently different from Western actors. Chaturvedi, Fues and Sidiropoulos have elegantly compared the discrepancies between North-South and South-South development partnerships, as outlined in <Table 1>. Based on the characteristics that are observed among South-South partnerships, however, patterns of aid allocations differ among the emerging donors.

²⁵ Mohan, G. and Power, M. (2008) "New African choices? The politics of Chinese engagement in Africa and the changing architecture of international development," *Review of African Political Economy*, 35(1), pp.23-42

<Table1> Comparison of North-South and South-South development partnerships²⁶

Indicators	Aid programme (North-South)	Development partnership (South-South)
Nature and purpose of support	ODA. Stated to be altruistic in nature	Mutual benefit and growth
Philosophical perspective	Framework approach	Ingredients approach
Participants	At least one participant has very high per capita income	Both partners have very low per capita income
Level of development	Large difference in stages of economic development between donor and recipient	Both partners almost at same stage of economic development
Role of participants	Donor and recipient of ODA	Relationship of equality: both may contribute to the process
Conditionality	“Top-down” with policy conditionality and no predictability	Request-driven and generally free from conditionality of any kind, so largely within timelines
Flexibility	Multilayered time-consuming bureaucratic structures, hence added transaction costs	Highly decentralized and relatively fast with few implications for transaction costs
Priority sectors	Grant assistance and budget support for social sectors	Economic and technical cooperation largely confined to projects in infrastructure and productive sector investment
Adherence to global governance frameworks like Paris Declaration	Donors use guidelines of Paris Declaration, which they evolved as an instrument for effectiveness	Providers are out of the purview of any global arrangement such as Paris Declaration, in which they were not involved. Hinges on mutual trust of partner countries
Data, monitoring and evaluation	Peer-reviewed by DAC-OECD. Data compiled and periodically released by the national governments and DAC-OECD.	No monitoring mechanisms beyond occasional reports of data and anecdotal detail

²⁶Chaturvedi, S., T. Fues, and E. Sidiropoulos (2012) *Development Cooperation and Emerging Powers*, London: Zed Books, p.24

Clearly, sectoral preferences exist for each non-DAC actor. For instance, Brazil, along with many others, is actively engaged in social programmes such as education and health. Meanwhile, many emerging donors also focus on areas that lead to increasing growth, such as infrastructure and productive capacity, which may not directly reduce poverty.²⁷ Thus, as donors have their own set of preferences, a number of patterns of South-South development partnership are noticeable.

A major pattern that is commonly found among all emerging donors is their focus on neighboring countries.²⁸ According to Kondoh et al., unlike most Western donors, on the borders of many non-DAC actors are politically insecure and economically weak neighbors, which shape the patterns of South-South cooperation:

China borders Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam; South Korea borders North Korea; Thailand borders Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar; and India borders Bhutan, Myanmar and Nepal. These geopolitical and geo-economic circumstances both promote and constrain the aid activities of the emerging donors; for example, they often allocate relatively large amounts of aid to economic sectors such as road construction. Through their assistance to economic sectors, the emerging donors strategically intend the stabilisation of their borders, the prevention of illegal immigration, an increase in their influence over their neighbours, and improved

²⁷ Mawdsley (2012), p.111

²⁸ Davis, P. (2010) "South-South cooperation: moving towards a new dynamic", *Poverty in Focus*, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, p.11

active cross-border trade. This strategic geopolitical and geoeconomic environment is unique to them.²⁹

The trend of allocating foreign aid heavily on neighboring countries is even observed in aid disbursements of new EU donors. They try to concentrate on their neighbors in the Caucasus and the Balkans instead of on those of the South, although the two regions are relatively economically better-off than the latter.³⁰ Aid allocations of donors in the Middle East are especially guided by a region-specific direction. Development cooperation is mainly directed to their Arab neighbors, such as Morocco, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. Cases in which aid is politicized are also found among Arab donors, as conflicts among countries in the Middle East tend to direct aid allocations.³¹ Meanwhile, China and India – notably the two major emerging donors in development cooperation – have shown patterns that diverge from others in South-South cooperation. Unlike others, they pursue a “far wider spectrum of activity, as their aid allocations are relatively more directed towards recipients with massive economic resources and are guided by “ambitious geopolitical visions.”³²

²⁹ Kondoh, H., T. Kobayashi, H. Shiga and J. Sato (2010) “Impact of non-DAC donors in Aisa: a recipient’s perspective: diversity and transformation of aid patterns in Asia’s emerging donors,” JICA Research Institute, no.21, p.61

³⁰ Lightfoot, S. (2008) “Enlargement and the challenge of EU development”, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 9(2), p.130

³¹ Villanger, E. (2007) “Arab foreign aid: disbursement patterns, aid policies and motives”, CMI Report 2/2007, Oslo: Christian Michelsen Institute

³² Mawdsley (2012), p.114

Although each emerging donor's pattern of aid allocation and strategies may vary, what they all have in common is that unlike many DAC donors, they refuse to impose policy conditionality on the recipients. Based on their own experiences of having been or still being recipients of foreign aid, such conditionality is replaced by negotiations and agreements, which further enhances the donor-recipient relationship to the level of a development partnership.³³

³³ *Ibid.*

III. Analytical Framework

3.1 Hypothesis and Methodology

This research will look at Thailand's strategic motivations in its patterns of South-South cooperation in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, within the context of emerging donor behaviors. Concentrating on neighboring countries is common across all of the emerging development partners.³⁴ There are evident incentives to build relations with proximate countries in order to maximize the value of development assistance, notably in terms of trade and security.³⁵ Considering Thailand's location in a unique geopolitical and geoeconomic circumstance of being surrounded by neighbors with marked poverty as well as the external environment that is under competition between U.S. and China, this paper will touch upon two strategic motivations in particular that are argued to guide Thailand's south-south cooperation.

The first one is a strategic interest of fulfilling national security needs. One of the reasons that donor countries proceed with ODA out of their security and economic interests is that aid can be used as a preventive measure to avoid any

³⁴ Davies, P. (2010) "South-South cooperation: moving towards a new aid dynamic," *Poverty in Focus*, International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, pp.11

³⁵ Chandy, L. and H. Kharas (2011) "Why can't we all just get along? The practical limits of international development cooperation," *Journal of International Development*, 23(5)

possible security threats, especially when the recipients are border countries. The other motivation is a strategic interest of strengthening South-South solidarity, which does not give an immediate result but can possibly improve the situation in favor of the donor country in the long-run. The possible long-run benefits might come in economic and political aspects.

As evident in former studies on Thailand's foreign policy in mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand's main concerns with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are security and economic issues. This can be explained and supported by realist theories; the main purpose of giving ODA focusing on bilateral aid is to pursue its own national interests rather than that of its recipients. What strengthens this argument is that Thailand has been ignoring activities in its neighboring countries that are against global humanitarian norms and standards. Within the realist tradition, ethical or moral concern for the plight of distant others is considered an illegitimate rationale for foreign policy action, which should rather be driven by the goals of enhancing national strength and resources.³⁶ Granted these assumptions, the hypothesis of this thesis is that Thailand's ODA distributions have been driven by its security and economic interests, in order to achieve solidarity with its neighboring countries.

The methodology of this paper is mainly based on descriptive and qualitative analysis that aims to investigate the pattern of actions that the Thai government has made within the framework of the country's policies, programmes

³⁶ Morgenthau (1962)

and projects in regards to ODA and South-South cooperation towards the CLMVs. The pattern is traced through periodical sources of information that have been released by the Thai International Cooperation Agency (TICA) as well as news servers of foreign and Thai origin. Also, governmental directives issued by Thailand's Prime Ministers and ministries were researched in order to obtain the country's concepts of foreign policy and national security, and to complete the missing parts of the puzzle of Thailand's ODA. Moreover, data resources available at the UNDP, the OECD and other international organizations were used to describe the domestic developmental level and trade volumes of Thailand and the CLMVs.

IV. Overview of Thailand's South-South Cooperation

4.1 History of Thai ODA


Thailand became a donor of foreign aid in 1992. The Thailand International Development Cooperation Agency (TICA) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Export-Import Bank of Thailand (EXIM Thailand), and the Neighbouring Countries Economic Development Cooperation Agency (NEDA) under the Ministry of Finance being the focal agencies of the Thai government, the country's ODA includes grants and concessionary loans mostly directed towards Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, as well as grants to international institutions such as the United Nations and the Asian Development Bank. By 1996, the Thai government had spent 4,250 million baht, or US\$170 million, and in that year, 90% of it was distributed to Cambodia and Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.³⁷ Since 1996, the pattern of Thai development aid has been consistent; Thailand's priority has always been put on the support for the four neighbors and sub-regional integration. The majority of Thailand's foreign aid was oriented towards promoting better education, public health, building infrastructure and reducing human and drug trafficking.³⁸ For instance, in 1997, the Thai government set US\$ 666.5

³⁷ TICA (2009) "Thailand Official Development Assistance: Report 2007-2008," Thailand International Cooperation Agency, p.1

³⁸ *Ibid.*

million for various programs directly and indirectly related to sub-regional economic cooperation. Based on a government announcement back then, more than one-third of the set budget was planned to be allocated for road and rail construction programs to promote the spatial development of regional cities and border towns in the North, the Northeast, and the East for connection with neighboring countries.³⁹

<Figure1> Total Value of TICP for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam⁴⁰



The Thai International Cooperation Programme (TICP) managed by TICA was supported by the Thai government on a full-scale since 1992 when Thailand

³⁹ Asian Development Bank (1997) *Sustaining Momentum: Economic Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion*, Asian Development Bank, p.48


⁴⁰ Author's own calculation based on TICA's statistics (2009-2013), retrieved from <http://www.tica.thaigov.net/main/en/other/4296> (accessed October 28, 2014)

became a donor of ODA. But in fact, it had begun during the 1960s when Thailand was a large recipient of foreign aid. TICP consists of grants and technical assistance, and while the amount given to the four neighboring countries recorded 500 million baht or US\$20 million in 1996, it reached US\$250 million in 2013 as shown in <Figure 1>.⁴¹

Meanwhile, Thailand's engagement in South-South development cooperation and its transition into a donor of ODA is closely related to the sub-regional institution named the "Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) economic cooperation." Having been initiated in 1992 under the support of the Asian Development Bank and other donors, the founding members at inception were Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, and China (due to Southern China's sharing the river, China also participated as a member), while Vietnam joined the next year in 1994. This was the first official institution to be established for sub-regional cooperation in mainland Southeast Asia, aiming to promote development through closer economic linkages within a 10-year strategic framework.

⁴¹ TICA (2009), p.3

<Figure 2> Map of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS)⁴²



⁴² Visit Mekong webpage, <http://www.visit-mekong.com/> (accessed January 2, 2015)

Then, the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) is yet another cooperation framework among Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. As a cooperation framework, ACMECS was initiated by Thailand in 2003 in order to bridge the economic gap among the member countries and to promote sub-regional prosperity. The reason that the four countries emphasize economic productivity is because it allows them to benefit in a direct and immediate way by investing in infrastructure and economic investment. Recently, Thailand has been increasingly engaging in the construction sector of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, as noticeable in TICA's statistics. Also, TICA's Director-General Suchada Thaibunthao mentioned during my interview with her on October 28, 2014:

Our development cooperation with the CLMVs will remain responsive to the partner countries' demands and focus on Thailand's capacity in sectors essential for development. We have refined the programming approach to ensure that our activities are efficient in accordance with the Aid Effectiveness Principles of the Paris Declaration.⁴³

That said, the reason for emerging donors' growing engagement in the construction sector has been outlined by Kondoh et al. to be of high comparative advantage in cost performance, that "[i]t is logical that these donors regard infrastructure construction as their priority."⁴⁴ However, Thailand's development

⁴³ An in-depth interview with Director-General Suchada Thaibunthao of TICA was conducted by the author on October 28, 2014, at the Thailand Government Complex, Chaeng Watthana, Thailand

⁴⁴ Kondoh (2010), p.76

cooperation with the CLMVs is also based on other equally salient objectives that go further than economic benefits, such as sub-regional integration as well as security and stability motivations. Mawdsley states that Thailand has made it clear of its interests in mitigating the marked poverty of the CLMVs. By building stronger economic ties and encouraging economic growth in them, Thailand hopes to lessen the risks of disease pandemics, political instability and large-scale migration.⁴⁵

Aside from TICA, other Thai ministries have also been actively engaging in bilateral development cooperation with the CLMVs, as it can be seen in the Appendix. The ministries' foreign aid is especially directed towards areas of energy, public health, agriculture, education, higher education, natural resources and environment, social development, and human security. Such cooperative actions have been carried out by technical cooperation mostly in the form of training, seminars and study missions, but they also involve financial investment and grants. To this day, Thailand's aid to its neighbors reflects many of the country's obligations and strategic motivations. The next chapters will delve through Thailand's diplomatic relations and patterns of development cooperation with the four neighboring countries that would help understand the development logic and choices behind Thailand's active engagement in South-South development cooperation in mainland Southeast Asia.

⁴⁵ Mawdsley (2012), p.134

4.2 Case I – Cambodia: A Troubled Relationship

4.2.1 Thailand-Cambodia Relations

Bilateral relations between Thailand and Cambodia date back to the 13th century during the Angkor Era. Due to parts of Thai-Cambodian borders being indefinite and the maritime boundary not being clearly defined, the two countries have frequently faced territorial and maritime disputes. Among them, the most well-known case is the Preah Vihear temple dispute that has been ongoing for more than a century. Border disputes in the Preah Vihear province intensified in 2008, when Cambodia listed the site as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. On November 5, 2009, Thailand recalled its ambassador from Cambodia in protest of the Cambodian government's appointment of Thailand's ex-leader Thaksin Shinawatra as an economic advisor.⁴⁶ The then Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva stated that this was "the first diplomatic retaliation measure" against the appointment, and on the same day, Cambodia also withdrew its ambassador from Thailand as a retaliatory measure.⁴⁷ The mutual withdrawal of ambassadors is the most severe diplomatic action to have occurred between the two countries. Osborne suggests that:

Discussion of Thai-Cambodian border disputes within Thailand does represent

⁴⁶ BBC, "Thai envoy recalled from Cambodia," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8343703.stm> (accessed December 15, 2014)

⁴⁷ Taiwan News, "Recall of envoys escalates Thai-Cambodian tensions," http://etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1100762&lang=eng_news (accessed December 15, 2014)

yet another instance of a readiness of some Thais, whether politicians or ordinary citizens, to adopt and advance positions that seek to undermine what they see as irrelevant and irksome Cambodian interests. The readiness of some observers to resort to describing the situation as an expression of big brother-little brother rivalry is too simple, but it would be equally wrong to dismiss this aspect of Thai and Cambodian thinking about the relationship between the two countries.⁴⁸

As an attempt to solve maritime disputes, Thailand and Cambodia signed the “Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Area of their Overlapping Maritime claims to the Continental Shelf” in 2001.⁴⁹ However, as the two sides’ stances diverge on the issue of exploration for natural gas, the possibility of tensions over natural gas persists. As a result, in 2007, Cambodia announced that strengthening its naval force is its priority policy in order to protect the country’s maritime interest.⁵⁰

Although the two countries’ relationship is widely known to be rooted deeply in a historical legacy of hostility and mistrust, there have been numerous examples in which Thailand and Cambodia have actively cooperated with each other. The main focus of cooperative activities has traditionally been placed on the

⁴⁸Open Democracy, “Preah Vihear: the Thai-Cambodian dispute,” <https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/preah-vihear-the-thai-cambodia-temple-dispute> (accessed December 15, 2014)

⁴⁹ Royal Thai Navy, “Thailand and Cambodia Maritime Disputes,” <http://www.navy.mi.th/judge/Files/Thailand%20Cambodia.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2014)

⁵⁰ Global Security, “Royal Cambodian Navy,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/cambodia/navy.htm> (accessed December 15, 2014)

problem of Cambodian refugees located in Thailand. Among those who have fled from the Khmer Rouge massacres to Thailand, only legitimate refugees were placed in refugee camps. Despite international criticism, Thai authorities sent illegal refugees back to Cambodia, although repatriation meant death.

Thai-Cambodian relations have significantly improved since 2011, when Yingluck Shinawatra became Thailand's Prime Minister.⁵¹ Whilst the heyday of Thai-Cambodian relations was during the times of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, it worsened after Thaksin was overthrown in a military coup. However, as Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen is a long-time ally of the Shinawatra family, once Thaksin's sister Yingluck came to power, the two countries' relations began to improve once again. Recently on October 30, 2014, Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha made a state visit to Cambodia in order to strengthen bilateral ties, which represents the Thai government's "uphill diplomatic battle" to enhance its legitimacy in the international community. Since the U.S. and Europe are intensifying their diplomatic pressures on Thailand to return to democracy, building confidence with the country's immediate neighbors is Thailand's top priority.⁵² Overall, the general tone of relations between the two countries has notably improved. Nonetheless, the historical legacy of hostility being coupled with domestic politics of sovereignty and nationalism, the potential for future conflict remains.

⁵¹ East Asia Forum, "Thai-Cambodian conflict rooted in history," <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/01/27/thai-cambodian-conflict-rooted-in-history/> (accessed December 16, 2014)


⁵² _____, "Thailand's Cambodian Charm Offensive," <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/11/29/thailands-cambodian-charm-offensive/> (accessed December 17, 2014)

4.2.2 Thailand's Aid in Cambodia

The focus of Thailand-Cambodia development cooperation is placed on public health, labor skill, education and human resource development implemented under the Five-Year Plan (2009-2014). The pattern of Thailand's aid in Cambodia in the past decade is shown in <Table 2>, in which the total value of Thai International Cooperation Program increased from 31 million baht in 2004 to 56 million baht in 2013. However, this figure is highly underestimated, as it only covers aid given by TICA to Cambodia, excluding a huge amount that flowed from other governmental bodies and ministries; a more comprehensive overview can be seen in the paper's Appendix. The number of TICA's bilateral programmes for Cambodia was at its highest in 2008 when it amounted to 231 programmes, but it dramatically dropped in 2009 to 119 programmes. Then, the number decreased again in 2010 to 50 programmes, and only one programme remained in 2011. Such a sharp decline in the number of bilateral programmes between the two countries was not coincidental; it was clearly affected by the worsened Thai-Cambodia relations due to border disputes. After both countries withdrew their troops from the disputed area in December 2011 and the conflict was relatively relieved, the number of bilateral programmes began to increase to 109 in 2012 and then to 81 in 2013.⁵³

⁵³ Thailand International Cooperation Agency official webpage, "Statistics: Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program According to Program (TICP)," <http://tica.thaigov.net/main/en/other/4296> (accessed December 22, 2014)

<Table 2> Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program to Cambodia⁵⁴



As mentioned above, the focus is especially on education, public health, labor skills, social development and welfare. From 2008 to 2013, projects under bilateral programmes were mostly for these areas. First, during this period (except for 2009), social development and welfare projects were operated under the title “The Project of Transit and Reception Center for Victims of Trafficking and Other Vulnerable Group.”⁵⁵ In the past few years, offences related to the trafficking of women, children and other vulnerable groups for the purpose of prostitution trade or labor trade have become a serious problem worsening each year. Hence, it was most relevant for the Thai government to adjust the cooperation by giving priority to assisting the victims of human trafficking and preventing the vulnerable groups from being exploited by such illegal acts. The two countries agreed to carry out the

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Project of Transit and Reception Center for Victims of Trafficking and Other Vulnerable Groups (TRC) in Banteay–Meanchey Province, as the problem in this region was particularly intense. In addition to the project, TICA has been supporting the construction of a reception center to shelter the returnees and provide occupational training as well as mental health rehabilitation.⁵⁶

In the area of public health, the project named “Cambodian-Thailand Collaboration on Malaria under the Initiative of Her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn” is an ongoing project since 2008.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, in 2007, the project to build the Royal Phnom Penh Hospital that targets Cambodia’s middle- and high- class patients got off the ground. The construction period was longer than expected as border conflicts and political situations between Thailand and Cambodia worsened in 2008 and 2009. Until completion, US\$50 million was poured into the project, and the hospital was inaugurated on November 18, 2014.⁵⁸ Other projects include the “Teaching of Thai Language” at Phnom Penh University, which provides teaching to government officials and employees at private enterprises, students, and the “Cambodian-Thai Skill Development Center Project,” which aims to upgrade occupational skills for the under-privileged in mechanics.

⁵⁶ TICA (2009), p.14

⁵⁷ Thailand International Cooperation Agency official webpage, “Statistics: Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program According to Program (TICP),” <http://tica.thaigov.net/main/en/other/4296> (accessed December 22, 2014)

⁵⁸ Global Times, “Thai hospital inaugurated in Cambodia,” <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/892389.shtml> (accessed November 28, 2014)

4.3 Case II – Laos: The Largest Recipient of Thailand’s Aid

4.3.1 Thailand-Laos Relations

Thailand-Laos diplomatic relations were established back in 1950. Due to the two countries’ sharing border lines, occasional border disputes existed during the 1980s. Since 1988, however, when Thailand’s former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan announced to open the Thai economy to Laos, the conflicts quickly turned into a positive wave full of expectations for future business ventures. Due to the two countries’ sharing the same language, Thailand’s economic cooperation with Laos is considered to have more potential than that with other neighboring countries.

That said, Thailand having the largest harbors in the Mekong region that are even listed in the “Top 50 World Container Ports,” economic relations with the country is crucial for landlocked Laos. On the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries on December 19, 2010, Thailand once again reiterated its commitment to further enhancing and strengthening long-standing bilateral relations with Laos.⁵⁹ On Thailand’s side, maintaining close ties with Laos is crucial to ensure its energy security. As Laos has tremendous potential in the energy sector, its vision is to become the “battery of Asia,” or “an energy

⁵⁹ The Government Public Relations Department, “Thailand’s Firm Intention to Strengthen Relations with Laos,” http://thailand.prd.go.th/view_news.php?id=5405&a=2 (accessed November 30, 2014)

reserve hub for the region.”⁶⁰ Since Thailand desperately needs Laos for maintaining its energy security and deepening bilateral economic relations are welcomed by Laos, the two countries’ relationship is better than ever.⁶¹

4.3.2 Thailand’s Aid in Laos


Laos is the largest recipient of ODA from Thailand. During 2007-2008, Laos received 73 percent of the entire Thai foreign aid, and the trend still persists.⁶² Regarding Thailand’s close relations with Laos, Thai international development cooperation programme established since 1961 has been designed to strengthen bilateral economic, social and cultural ties, while also focusing on poverty reduction and promoting sustainable development. The pattern of Thailand’s aid in Laos is described in <Figure 3>, which clearly shows that during the past ten years, the amount of aid given by TICA to Laos has steadily increased.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Hunt, L., “Laos Cozies up with Thailand” *The Diplomat*, August 15, 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/laos-cozies-up-with-thailand/> (accessed November 28, 2014)

⁶² TICA (2009), p.17

<Figure 3> Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program to Laos⁶³



The total sum given in 2013 was 116 million baht, marking an increase by 68 million baht when compared to the figure in 2008. However, again, it would be worthy to mention that this figure is highly underestimated, as it only covers aid given by TICA to Laos, excluding a huge amount that flowed from other governmental bodies and ministries. For instance, <Table 3> shows ODA provided by Thai government ministries other than TICA under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although such data is not available for all periods and for all CLMV countries, this gives an idea of what the entire picture of Thai ODA would look like.

The programmes embrace key areas of agriculture, trade promotion, investment and industry, as well as human resource development. The cooperation

⁶³ Thailand International Cooperation Agency official webpage, “Statistics: Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program According to Program (TICP),” <http://tica.thaigov.net/main/en/other/4296> (accessed December 22, 2014)

form was developed by TICA in response to the Vientiane Declaration on the cooperation between Laos and its donor countries in 2010, and also in regards to Lao government’s policy that encouraged donor countries to implement a programme-approach in development cooperation.⁶⁴ This approach took off with the inception of the Country Programme for Education for the period of three years (2010-2012), with emphasis on human resource development of Lao academic institutes.

<Table 3> Thai ODA to Laos in 2007-2008⁶⁵

Ministry or Agency	Purposes of ODA	Total Amounts (millions, in Thai baht)
Bank of Thailand	Central Bank development	0.8
Commission on Higher Education	University programs and exchanges on HIV/AIDS, health care, cattle production, technology and tourism	4.7
EXIM Thailand (2008)	Hydro Electric Project (USD 100 million)	3,490.0
Office of the Prime Minister	Middle management training	0.1
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	Irrigation, hybrid seed production, plant system improvement, corn production, animal husbandry, and fisheries	6.7
Ministry of Commerce	Training and capacity development for exports	1.3

⁶⁴ TICA (2013), “TICA Highlights,” Thailand International Cooperation Agency, p.7

⁶⁵ TICA (2009), p.17

	including handicrafts, AEC and ASEAN Hub participation	
Ministry of Education	Teacher training for vocational education, educational tools, scholarships and staff exchanges	1.0
Ministry of Energy	Solar energy, biomass and bio diesel (Jan-June 2007 only)	51.9
Ministry of Public Health	Clinical Training	0.3
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare	Social security and rehabilitation	0.2
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	Geology and mineral resources	0.1
Ministry of Science and Technology	ICT training, linguistics, biotechnology	0.6
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security	Human trafficking prevention, disability rehabilitation	2.4
Ministry of Tourism and Sports	Tourism development	0.2
NEDA	Road construction, railroad construction	720.9
TICA (bilateral programme only)	Fellowships and training (agriculture, education, industry, information, technology, public health, public administration), technical assistance, and equipment	57.0
Total		4,338.2

The number of bilateral development cooperation programmes operated by TICA has been relatively consistent in the case of Laos during the 2008-2013 periods, when compared to that of Thailand's other three immediate neighbors. It more than doubles the amount of Thai bilateral programmes with the others; 448 programs were in progress in 2008 while the most recent data in 2013 shows that there are 457 bilateral cooperation programmes in progress between Thailand and

Laos. Such programmes being comprised of projects, prime activities include education, public health, agriculture, and public administration. Thai ODA listed in <Table 3> were given in the form of grant aid, and much of it directly addressed the seven national Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Laos to be attained by 2015, which are as follows: reducing poverty by half, attaining universal primary education, promoting gender equality and empowerment of women, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, and ensuring environmental sustainability. That said, large construction projects operated with EXIM Thailand's loans and NEDA's loans and grants, such as building roads, dams, and hydro-electric power stations help provide those living in the most impoverished regions in Laos. They allow access to markets, alternate employment, and agricultural inputs at a lower cost. Such "rural and feeder roads" have a strong effect on the everyday life of the Lao people and on the domestic economy, since they connect isolated communities and residents to road corridors, employment and trade opportunities.⁶⁶

Currently, the form of cooperation has been adjusted to focus on sector-specific programmes, such as the Country Programme for Education. This programme was initiated in 2009, also as a response to the Vientiane Declaration. It was to be implemented on two levels: higher education and vocational education. At the moment, the programme is operated on the second level. This position was reaffirmed in my interview with the Director-General Suchada Thaibunthao of

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.18

TICA:

Educational programmes and projects are part of Thailand's national plan to focus on human resource development in the neighboring countries. Education is the foundation for national development upon which further development for institutions, curricula and lecturers can be advanced in a sustainable and effective manner, and will generate multiplier effects on the country's social and economic conditions. This will in turn bring about broader impacts in Thailand.⁶⁷

The largest projects among all the activities that are currently undertaken by TICA in Laos are the vocational school projects, such as the "Project of Developing Savannakhet Technical School" that began in 2010. The target of the project is to develop the Savannakhet Technical School into a vocational school model in the southern part of the country. TICA's role in this project is to prepare for the transition of Savannakhet Technical School into The Savannakhet College of Technology, under the policies of the Lao government. In doing so, the Thai government will help develop human resources in need for the new vocational school, including Faculty of Electronics, Faculty of Machinery, Faculty of Construction, Faculty of Accounting, Faculty of Food, Hotel and Tourism, and Faculty of Information Technology. Its budget amounting to about 20 million baht, the project is to be completed in 2016 including the two-year training phase.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ An in-depth interview with Director-General Suchada Thaibunthao of TICA was conducted by the author on October 28, 2014, at the Thailand Government Complex, Chaeng Watthana, Thailand

⁶⁸ Data and information on the "Project of Developing Savannakhet Technical School" was given

Likewise, three more projects are also undertaken with yet another budget of 20 million baht and within the same time limit include: the Development Project for the Vientiane Provincial Technical College, The Vocational School of Luang Pra Bang, and the Dongkhamsang Agricultural School.” Apart from constructing the school buildings and providing learning materials and equipment, Thai experts and government officials are assisting apprenticeship workshops that are urgently needed for the Lao economy.

4.4 Case III – Myanmar: A Crucial Partnership for the Thai Economy

4.4.1 Thailand-Myanmar Relations

Thailand and Myanmar established diplomatic relations in 1948. Since the late 1980s, Thailand changed its foreign policy towards Myanmar from a buffer policy to constructive engagement, supporting the latter’s military regime that is highly criticized by the international community. The policy placing priority on maintaining amiable relationships with Myanmar’s junta, Thailand has been maintaining silence on human rights issues and democracy in Myanmar. At an

EEC-ASEAN meeting in July 1991, the then Thai Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin officially declared that Thailand and Myanmar were “inseparable,” and that constructive engagement was Thailand’s only option to deal with the country due to the importance of maintaining border security.⁶⁹ Sarasin’s statement clarified the dilemma that Thailand had with Myanmar in its diplomatic relations, bridging the gap between the two countries’ interests as well as answering to the world’s severe criticism on Myanmar’s junta. Thailand’s friendly stance still continues to this day, and when Myanmar was once again condemned by the U.S., Europe and Japan, the Thai government reiterated by its Foreign Minister Surakiart saying that “We would like to promote democracy in Myanmar, but we would like to do it in the Asian way.”⁷⁰

Thailand’s foreign policy towards Myanmar supports Bunbongkarn’s claim that Thai politics is the “politics of power interests, both in domestic and international domains.”⁷¹ For instance, Myanmar has long been projected as Thailand’s number-one enemy. However, during the periods of Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-91), Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (1996-97), Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-6), Samak Sundaravej (2008), and Somchai Wongsawat (2008), Myanmar was transformed into the country’s “new best friend,” and the heyday of the two countries’ relationship was observed during the Thaksin government.

⁶⁹ Buszynski, L. (1998) “Thailand and Myanmar: the Perils of ‘Constructive Engagement,’” *The Pacific Review*, vol. 11, no.2, p.293

⁷⁰ Crispin and Vatikiotis (2001), “Back to Business,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 22, p.27

⁷¹ Bunbongkarn, S. (1996) *State of the Nation: Thailand*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p.78

Chachavalpongpun argues that the reinvention of Myanmar was “purely on the basis of commercial interests.”⁷² Thailand being the “biggest single buyer of Myanmar gas,” the country has long been heavily relying on Myanmar’s gas, as 50 per cent of the country’s supply depends on gas imports from Myanmar. To Thailand, Myanmar is a country replete with natural resources, and Thailand obviously hopes to take advantage of resource-rich Myanmar.⁷³

During Thaksin’s government, even the Thai military’s leader was replaced in order to support the intimate relations between Thailand and Myanmar. Thailand’s Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces from 2002 to 2003 was Surayud Chulanont, who had long been a hardliner in dealing with Myanmar and who later became Thailand’s Prime Minister. Under Surayud, the Thai army insisted a tough policy on Myanmar’s border issues, which Thaksin perceived as an action undermining his efforts to further encourage business and diplomatic ties with Myanmar.⁷⁴ Once Surayud was replaced by Somdhat, a politically-oriented soldier who had intimate relations with Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party, the Thai army announced that “the military would do nothing that could damage Thai-Burmese relations.”⁷⁵ In order to ease tensions, the Thai government sent Somdhat

⁷² Chachavalpongpun, P. (2010), “Thailand-Myanmar Relations: Old Animosity in a New Bilateral Setting,” *International Relations in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p.117

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.122

⁷⁴ Ganesan, N. (2006) “Appraising Democratic Consolidation in Thailand under Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Government,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 7, no.2, pp.30-31

⁷⁵ Masaki, T. (2008), “The Diplomacy of Thailand with Burma (1988-2006),” Niigata University of International and Information Studies, p.78

and military officers to Rangoon in January 2003, which resulted in affable talks to cooperate in drug suppression, conduct joint military patrols on the Thailand-Myanmar border, and solve border demarcation disputes.⁷⁶


4.4.2 Thailand's Aid in Myanmar

Since 2005, bilateral cooperation between Thailand and Myanmar has made a solid progress. <Figure 4> shows the pattern of the total value of Thailand's cooperation programs in Myanmar. While the value was approximately 6 million baht in 2004, it dramatically increased during the past decade, reaching 59 million baht in 2013. In line with the pattern, the number of TICA's bilateral programmes operated in Myanmar increased from 195 in 2008 to 500 in 2013.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Thailand International Cooperation Agency official webpage, "Statistics: Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program According to Program (TICP)," <http://tica.thaigov.net/main/en/other/4296> (accessed December 22, 2014)

<Figure 4> Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program to Myanmar⁷⁸



Thailand's aid in Myanmar focuses on agriculture, responding to the need of the most impoverished regions in Myanmar, home to most of the refugees and immigrants who have been pouring into Thailand during the past few decades. For instance, in 2008, all development projects that TICA operated under its bilateral programme in Myanmar were for the development of agriculture, such as the Cultivation and Post Harvest Technology of Kenaf & Kenaf Pulp Manufacturing Project, The Livestock Village Development along Thai-Myanmar Border Project, and the Tropical Fruit Development Project. Afterwards, in 2009, education was added to the development project, namely the project for Curriculum Development in Teaching Thai Language at Yangon University of Foreign Language.

Due to Myanmar's geographic position that makes the country prone to natural disasters, improving the country's capability in weather forecasting and

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

alerting systems has been a priority. In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis that caused serious damage to Myanmar in 2007, Thailand and Myanmar developed the “Programme of Capacity Building of People and Institutions for Weather Forecast and Early Warning System” as well as “Rehabilitate the Cyclone Affected Area” programme in 2009-2013 periods.⁷⁹

Meanwhile, the Thai government currently hosts refugees from Myanmar in nine temporary shelters along the border. Most of the refugees from Myanmar have fled from armed conflicts and have sought refuge in Thailand for more than three decades. According to UNHCR statistics, the total number of refugees from Myanmar is to reach 72,900 and people in refugee-like situations is to reach 51,500 by January 2015, amounting to nearly 150,000 as a whole when counting all UN-recognized refugees.⁸⁰ However, following the May 2014 military coup, immigration measures in Thailand were tightened and the policy restricting the movement of undocumented people in border areas is more strictly implemented.

⁷⁹ TICA (2009), p.15

⁸⁰ UNHCR official webpage, “2015 UNHCR country operations profile – Thailand,” <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e489646.html> (accessed December 27, 2014)

V. The Pivotal State: Vietnam

5.1 Thailand-Vietnam Relations

The two major countries of mainland Southeast Asia – Thailand and Vietnam – established diplomatic relations in August 1976, soon after the Vietnam War ended. Before Vietnam joined the ASEAN in 1995, Thailand-Vietnam relations used to be the “barometer” of Vietnam’s relations with other Southeast Asian countries.⁸¹ Maisrikrod asserts that “regional order in Southeast Asia during most of the 1980s was centered around the Thai-Vietnamese relationship.”⁸² Although rivalry over the area of what is today Laos and Cambodia in the past and Thailand’s stance as a front-line state to oppose Vietnamese expansion in Cambodia have marred the Thai-Vietnamese relations by animosity, the relationship has turned toward greater cooperation since the end of the Cold War. Nguyen Vu Tung argues that such an improvement in the relationship is mainly due to the change in Vietnam’s foreign policy priorities after the disintegration of the socialist bloc and its compliance with the so-called ASEAN Way of regional cooperation.⁸³ In June 1992, a new orientation of Vietnamese foreign policy was

⁸¹ Nguyen, V. T. (2010) “Vietnam-Thailand Relations after the Cold War,” *International Relations in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p.67

⁸² Maisrikrod, S. (1994) “The Peace Dividend in Southeast Asia: The Political Economy of New Thai-Vietnamese Relations,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 16, no.1, p.47

⁸³ Nguyen, V. T. (2010), p.74

mentioned in a resolution adopted at the Third Plenum of the CPV Central Committee, which stated that the country should prioritize the development of its ties with ASEAN countries due to its “geo-strategic nature.”⁸⁴

Because Thailand and other mainland Southeast Asian countries suffered from mutual suspicion as a result of territorial and maritime disputes, in the case of Vietnam, such conflicts were given first priority to be solved in order to build mutual trust. On August 9, 1997, the two countries signed an agreement on the demarcation of the overlapping sea zones in the Gulf of Thailand, which came into force on February 27, 1998.⁸⁵ Meanwhile, Thailand was the first among Southeast Asian countries to have intensive high-level defense exchanges with Vietnam. After General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the then Supreme Commander and Chief of the Thai army in 1992, suggested Vietnam to observe the annual “Corbra Gold” Thai-U.S. military exercise, Vietnam has been observers to Thailand beginning from 2002.⁸⁶

With Vietnam’s rapid economic growth, the status of Thai-Vietnamese cooperation advanced more than that of the other three neighboring countries. In 2013, Thailand and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a strategic partnership, including a target of US\$15 billion in trade by 2020. As a result of such cooperative efforts, bilateral trade is estimated to have reached US\$10 billion in

⁸⁴ Nguyen, M. C. (1995) “Towards the implementation of the new foreign policy,” Hanoi: National Politics Publishing house, p.161

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.79

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.81

2014.⁸⁷ In November 2014, Thailand's Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha made an official visit to Vietnam in order to reconfirm the trade target and thus bolster the strategic partnership.


Before becoming an ASEAN member, maintaining an affectionate relationship with Thailand was Vietnam's priority in order to assure positive strategic and economic conditions that would allow amiable relations with other Southeast Asian countries. Now, Vietnam has not only become a member of ASEAN but has also been building stronger ties with its fellow member states, and Thailand and Vietnam seem to have a cordial relationship both economically and politically. However, the regional dynamics in Southeast Asia involving the competition between two great powers – the U.S. and China – seems to forecast conflicts and constraints in Thailand-Vietnam relations in the future. Since Thailand is turning to China as its ties with the U.S. has cooled due to Thailand's military coup whilst Vietnam is opening a new era in U.S.-Vietnam relations by establishing a strategic partnership in 2013, the durability of the current Thailand-Vietnam partnership is uncertain.

⁸⁷ Jikkham, P., "Thailand, Vietnam confirm \$15bn trade target," *The Bangkok Post*, November 28, 2014, <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/445816/thailand-vietnam-set-15bn-trade-target>, (accessed December 29, 2014)

5.2 Thailand's Aid in Vietnam

Instead of a donor-recipient relationship, development cooperation between Thailand and Vietnam takes the form of partnership. As depicted in <Figure 5>, the amount of ODA given by Thailand to Vietnam is significantly less than those given to the other three neighboring countries. Also, the amount of aid has been relatively consistent during the past ten years. This is mainly due to the fact that Vietnam's economic status is higher than that of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Naturally, less amount of financial aid has been given to the country. The number of bilateral programmes operated by TICA in Vietnam recorded 70 in 2008, which was the lowest among the CLMV countries, while 128 programmes were ongoing in 2013, still a low number when compared to that of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.

<Figure 5> Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program to Vietnam⁸⁸



⁸⁸ Thailand International Cooperation Agency official webpage, "Statistics: Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program According to Program (TICP)," <http://tica.thaigov.net/main/en/other/4296> (accessed December 22, 2014)

Earlier, Vietnam received a large volume of concessional loans and grants from Thailand in various sectors. During the period of 1995-2000, Thailand provided Vietnam with 300 million baht in the form of ODA.⁸⁹ Among them are sectors that will promote trade and investment expansion. As a result, bilateral trade in 2007 reached US\$4.8 billion, a 21.3 percent increase when compared with the amount in 2006. In other words, trade with Thailand took up 20 percent of Vietnam's total foreign trade. Also, Thailand operated 160 investment projects in Vietnam with a registered fund of US\$1.56 billion.⁹⁰ Seven years later, in 2014, Thailand was the ninth largest foreign investor in Vietnam, and as of October 2014, Thailand's investment in Vietnam amounted to 365 projects, while total registered capital was US\$6.63 billion.⁹¹

Currently, TICA's development projects for Vietnam under the bilateral programme are focused on education. Until 2010, social development & welfare and public health were also core areas of development. For instance, in 2008-2010 periods, a public health project named "The Project on Health Personnel Development and Health Station in Vietnam" was operated by TICA. However, the number of education projects has always outweighed that of projects for other development areas, which is similar to the case of Laos. The difference is that while a large part of Thailand's education projects in Laos is the construction of

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Vietnam (2002) *Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1945-2000*, Hanoi: National Politics Publishing House

⁹¹ Vietnam Plus, "Thai Premier's visit to boost strategic partnership with Vietnam," November 26, 2014, <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Thai-premiers-visit-to-boost-strategic-partnership-with-Vietnam/201411/58446.vnplus> (accessed November 28, 2014)

vocational schools, TICA only focuses on teaching the Thai language at Vietnamese universities such as “Teaching Thai Language at the College of Foreign Languages at VNU, Hanoi” “Teaching Thai Language at the University of Social Sciences & Humanities, VNU, Ho Chi Minh City,” “Teaching Thai Language at the University of Foreign Language and Information Technology, Ho Chi Minh City,” and “Teaching Thai Language at the University of Danang.” Also, a great portion of financial aid for education projects goes to the project “Scholarships under the Celebration of the 30th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Thailand and Vietnam” since 2006 to present. As of 2013, under the bilateral programme, TICA operates only education projects in Vietnam.⁹²

5.3 Rivalry between Thailand and Vietnam in South-South Cooperation

An interesting scene observed since 2010 is that the CLMVs are cooperating closely than ever under Vietnamese leadership. While the CLMV Summit is held annually since 2005, the CLMV Economic Ministers Meeting

⁹² Thailand International Cooperation Agency official webpage, “Statistics: Total Value of Thai International Cooperation Program According to Program (TICP),” <http://tica.thaigov.net/main/en/other/4296> (accessed December 22, 2014)

began on August 28, 2010 in Da Nang, Vietnam, which is convened twice a year. Since it is difficult to find organized data for cooperation among the CLMVs, it is not clear but still, it can be said that this institution marks the beginning of multilateral South-South cooperation among the CLMVs that leads to tangible outcomes. According to the documents that I received from the Ministry of Investment and Planning of Vietnam, the aim of the meeting is to “further enhance the intra-economic and trade relations within CLMV countries, coordinate activities in sub-regional, regional and international forums, fully utilizing the their potentials to narrow the development gap between the four countries and other countries in the region and in the world, and accelerate the implementation of agreements reached at the CLMV Summits.”⁹³ At this meeting, the Ministers agreed to develop border markets and establish Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) along CLMV border areas, by providing appropriate incentives for CLMV investors. Also, the vital roles of vocational training and public administration capacity building programmes were underscored, due to the urgent need of human resource development in the four countries. As a whole, such projects were to enhance the capacity of the CLMVs, so that the development gap between the CLMVs and the ASEAN-6 would be narrowed, which would support the four countries’ sustainable integration into the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015.

The interesting part of the statement, however, was that the CLMV

⁹³ The Joint media statement released by the CLMV governments was given by the Ministry of Investment and Planning of Vietnam to the author

Ministers emphasized the four countries' need to enhance policy coordination in sub-regional, regional and international forums, and they viewed that "policy coordination among CLMV countries" should be one of the main themes of CLMV economic cooperation."⁹⁴ Besides, Vietnam was officially nominated by Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar to take a permanent role as a CLMV Project Coordinator.⁹⁵ Although Thailand borders on Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and has given assistance to the three countries, it seems that the recipients tend to align more with Vietnam in terms of cooperation and coordination, which Thailand aims to achieve under its leadership.

At the second CLMV Economic Ministers Meeting held on February 27, 2011 in Vientiane, Laos, the "CLMV Action Plan 2011" was adopted, with the aim of implementing the outcomes of the first meeting. Among the 16 projects that were newly initiated, seven of them were organized and sponsored only by the Vietnamese government, while no other single government played the same role for the remaining projects. Although most of the projects were economy-related, human resource development was also included as a critical part of cooperation. The table below shows the cooperative activities related to human resource development.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ The "Terms of Reference of CLMV project proposals for the 2011-2015 period" was given by the Ministry of Investment and Planning of Vietnam to the author

<Table 4> CLMV ACTION PLAN 2011 for Human Resource Development⁹⁶

Activities	Participating Countries
Human Resource Development	
I. Capacity enhancement on public administration	
Organizing seminars on market administration on a rotational basis	V (organizer), C, L,M
II. Scholarship programs	
Scholarships programs for CLM countries	V (sponsor), C,L,M
III. Vocational training	
Encouraging private sector to provide and expand short-term and long-term vocational training scholarships for CLM countries	C,L,M,V
IV. Study visits	
Organize study visits of government officials who are in charge of trade and investment, on a rotational basis	C,L,M,V

Then, the progress report of the CLMV Action Plan 2011 distributed at the third CLMV Economic Ministers Meeting held on August 14, 2011 in Manado, Indonesia, shows that the Vietnamese government announced to give 20 annual scholarships to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Thus, Cambodia and Laos sent 17 and 20 students respectively to Viet Nam, during 2010-2011 periods.⁹⁷ That having laid the foundation, the most recent progress reports released in 2013 and 2014 show that 80 scholarships were given to Laos and 57 to Cambodia, while those nominated by Myanmar are not yet to receive scholarships.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ The “Annex 3, CLMV Action Plan 2011” was given by the Ministry of Investment and Planning of Vietnam to the author

⁹⁷ The “Progress Report for CLMV Action Plan 2011” was given by the Ministry of Investment and Planning of Vietnam to the author

⁹⁸ The “Progress Report for CLMV Action Plan 2013 and 2014” was given by the Ministry of

That said, Cambodia and Laos have been dependent on Vietnam for the past several decades. As former “red brotherhoods,” the brotherly solidarity seems to continue until today, and Vietnam enjoys its political influence on the two countries. Emblen argues that 10 out of 11 members of the Lao Politburo speak fluent Vietnamese, and it is widely accepted by the general public that “what Vietnam does today is what Laos will do tomorrow.”⁹⁹ Vietnam’s strong brotherly relationship with Cambodia and Laos is very different from Thailand’s ties with the two countries; Thailand has had an uncomfortable relationship with Cambodia until recently and has been maintaining a tranquil (but definitely not “brotherly”) one with Laos. Thus, Vietnam’s recent active participation in development cooperation with its neighboring countries can trigger competition between Thailand and Vietnam for regional hegemonic power, and may ultimately lead to an “aid dilemma” in the Mekong region.

As mentioned earlier, Laos is the largest recipient of Thailand’s financial aid. However, Vietnam is catching up fast with Thailand’s stance in Laos ODA. According to Faming, the Vietnamese government changed its role towards Laos from a “revolutionary brother” to a “donor” because of the fear of losing the dominant role that it has had in the country.¹⁰⁰ Bourdet also asserts that Vietnam’s

Investment and Planning of Vietnam to the author

⁹⁹ Emblen, V. (2009) “Donor-Aided Reform of the Lao Education System? The Role of Vietnam,” *NORRAG News*, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, p.57

¹⁰⁰ Faming, M. (2009) “A New Role for an old Tale: Vietnam as a Donor to Laos,” *NORRAG News*, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, p.59

aid to Laos is “only given to expand the Vietnamese influence in Laos.”¹⁰¹ With Thailand having been a heavy investor and China’s recent investment boost, Vietnam is working fast not to lose its dominance in Laos. For example, the country is covering the northern part of Laos with oil palm plantations, while investing in agriculture, road building, dam construction and mining at the same time.¹⁰²

However, the sector that interests the three countries the most is education. It is unclear exactly how much Thailand gave to Laos concerning education since there is no systemized data for each sector before 2008, but when considering the fact that human resource development has been defining Thailand’s South-South cooperation, it can be inferred that Thailand had started to invest in the education sector since earlier periods. In 2009, TICA gave Laos a total value of 101.59 million baht, in which its main assistance activity was under scholarship and fellowship programmes.¹⁰³ As mentioned earlier, Thailand is giving its largest financial support for vocational training in Laos, where US\$3 million was given this year only to cover expenditure for equipment purchase for the four vocational colleges that are in the process of construction.

Likewise, Emblen argues that education is an “important tool” for China as well, as it aims to wield influence and cultivate future leaders through

¹⁰¹ Bourdet, Y. (2000) *The economics of transition in Laos: from socialism to ASEAN integration*, Cheltenham, The United Kingdom

¹⁰² Emblen (2009), p.57

¹⁰³ TICA (2009), p.10

scholarships, educational and vocational training.¹⁰⁴ As far as education is concerned, however, Vietnam has been the oldest assistant and investor in the education sector of Laos. Vietnam's educational assistance for Laos began in the 1930s, and the Vietnamese government played a big role in helping Laos to build the first Teacher Training College in the country during the 1940s.¹⁰⁵ During 2000-2005 periods, Vietnam invested US\$1.4 million and from 2006 to 2010, its investment amounted to US\$67.5 million grant aid in the education sector in Laos. Comparing the time periods of Thailand and Vietnam's assistance in this sector, Vietnam was the pioneer in education assistance to Laos in the 1930s but Thailand was the one who initiated official programmes and projects with large amounts of financial aid. However, Vietnam is heavily investing in recent years in order to catch up with the amount given by Thailand in the past.

Meanwhile, another area of focus in the two countries' strategy of South-South cooperation is public health. As mentioned earlier, Thailand's public health project to build a royal hospital in Cambodia's capital was initiated in 2007 and completed on November 18, 2014. Yet another hospital was built in Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese government with an initial cost of US40 million when the project was initiated in May 2010. The Cho Ray-Phnom Penh Hospital was inaugurated on January 13 2014, marking the first health cooperation project to be completed between Vietnam and Cambodia.

¹⁰⁴ Emblen (2009), p.57

¹⁰⁵ Faming (2009), p.59

Nonetheless, after June 2013 when the leaders of Thailand and Vietnam officially declared a strategic partnership, Thai-Vietnamese relations have been making speedy progress. This year's bilateral trade is estimated to reach US\$10 billion, with a target of US\$15 billion in trade by 2020.¹⁰⁶ As both countries are crucial markets for each other's agricultural products, despite such implied rivalry, Thai-Vietnamese relations are expected to maintain the current status-quo, at least for the time being.

¹⁰⁶ Jikkham, P., "Thailand, Vietnam confirm \$15bn trade target," The Bangkok Post, November 28, 2014, <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/445816/thailand-vietnam-set-15bn-trade-target>, (accessed December 29, 2014)

VI. Analysis

Like most countries involved in South-South cooperation, the discourse of Thailand's development cooperation with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam is couched in terms of "South-South solidarity" or the virtue of mutual benefit and recognition of reciprocity. According to Mawdsley, this includes the enhancement of areas such as trade, training, capacities and skills, infrastructure and diplomatic solidarity in international forums, for both donors and recipients.¹⁰⁷ In the post-Cold War period, mainland Southeast Asia has been significantly marked by peace and stability, despite occasional bilateral tensions among neighboring countries. Within this environment, Thailand has been a primary advocate for various sub-regional cooperation initiatives since the early 1990s. Interestingly, these regional projects have mainly been Thailand's own self-initiated versions, in which Thailand acts as the main coordinator, sometimes bypassing broader regional entities, especially the ASEAN. Such a phenomenon can be explained by resorting to the economic rationale in Thai foreign policy; however, in some circumstances, economic benefit is not the ultimate goal when considering associated costs. In this sense, Thailand's active engagement in South-South cooperation with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam should be scrutinized in the context of broader dynamics in mainland Southeast Asia.

The country's intentions to lead regional cooperation first came to surface

¹⁰⁷ Mawdsley (2012), p.152

under Anand Panyarachun, Thailand's Prime Minister during 1991-1992. The "Thai vision of a mainland role with ASEAN regionalism" being the core of Anand's grand scheme, Thailand promoted the enlargement of ASEAN, actively asserting that the entire mainland Southeast Asia should be included in the association.¹⁰⁸ As a result of Thailand's actively taking the lead in promoting its fellow mainland Southeast Asian countries to gain membership, Vietnam and Laos were given the observer status of ASEAN in 1992, and in 1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN as the first country to be admitted among the CLMVs. Laos and Myanmar were accepted in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999.¹⁰⁹ Especially in the case of Vietnam, Thailand paved the way for ASEAN-Vietnam rapprochement.¹¹⁰

In the late 1990s, when Thailand was yet to be actively involved in bilateral South-South cooperation in mainland Southeast Asia, fears of spillovers of domestic tumult from its neighboring countries prevailed among the Thai public. For instance, approximately one million illegal immigrants and refugees poured into Thailand following human rights violations, civil war, economic crisis and ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar.¹¹¹ In order to prevent further spillovers, in 1998, the then Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan suggested at the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) that the ASEAN should adopt a new approach of

¹⁰⁸ Buszynski (1998), p.295

¹⁰⁹ Narine, S. (2002) "Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia," Boulder, pp.113-123

¹¹⁰ MOFA, Vietnam (2002)

¹¹¹ Ruland, J. (2000) "ASEAN and Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian Regionalism," *The Pacific Review*, vol.13, no.3, p.441

“flexible engagement.”¹¹² This proposal suggested that ASEAN members would be able to discuss other members’ domestic affairs in case they may have impact on its neighbors or the entire Southeast Asia. In regards to this proposal, Busbarat argues that:

Thailand’s proposal of ‘Flexible Engagement’ during the second Chuan government tried both to preserve its material interest and to maneuver foreign policy to emphasize Thailand’s identity as a regional leading player.¹¹³

Although the proposal was directly opposed by Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, Thai foreign policy-makers at that time viewed that such a rejection had a positive influence on the country’s leading status in the association.¹¹⁴ In fact, Busbarat asserts that it was “the politics of identity-making” of Thailand, as the country ardently wished to take a leading role in the region. The proposal showed the international community that Thailand had the potential to become one, demonstrating that the country “could lead on democracy and human rights issues.”¹¹⁵ After its proposal was denied by ASEAN, Thailand turned to active engagement in bilateral South-South cooperation in the early 2000s as a means to prevent spillovers and fulfill its interests in mainland Southeast Asia.

¹¹² Masaki (2008), p.75

¹¹³ Busbarat, P. (2012) “A Review of Thailand’s Foreign Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia: Exploring an Ideational Approach,” *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 11, p.139

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.140

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Since then, South-South cooperation with Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and Vietnam has been Thailand's foremost priority. When tracing the pattern of development cooperation, Thailand clearly has multifaceted strategic intentions in providing ODA to these four countries, which seems apparently humanitarian but contains realist intentions. Its technical and financial assistance in areas that are of urgent need in the recipient countries have greatly helped strengthen its position and influence in mainland Southeast Asia. The Thaksin government's foreign policy during 2001-2006 made it clear that Thailand aims to further advertise its leadership role in Southeast Asia.¹¹⁶ New regional initiatives that were established at this time under Thailand's own self-initiated variant, such as the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Agency (ACMECS) and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), neglect guidance from broader regional institutions.

Likewise, Thailand's South-South cooperation during this period that took the mode of bilateral programmes with each CLMV country can be explained as the Thai government's efforts to substantiate its leading role in the entire Southeast Asia by further increasing its influence in the mainland and by leading sub-regional integration. Aside from the grand scheme, it is also noticeable that several other strategic motivations also exist, such as security and economic concerns. Clearly, security interests outweigh other interests in Cambodia, while economic interests were outstanding in the cases of Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, although Vietnam is not considered as a recipient in Thailand's rhetoric.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

First of all, in the South-South context, Thailand's strategic motivations in Cambodia are to maintain border security. Cambodia being an economically weak and politically unstable country, such a geopolitical circumstance has both promoted and constrained Thailand's South-South cooperation with Cambodia. In the analysis, it was identified that during times of territorial disputes on the Thai-Cambodian border, Thailand's aid in Cambodia dropped significantly, and even some construction projects were paused. However, it has also encouraged Thai-Cambodian cooperation on developing border markets. Clearly, through development cooperation, Thailand intends to stabilize the Thai-Cambodian border and thus prevent illegal immigration, while simultaneously enhancing its influence in Cambodia by developing cross-border trade and increase the latter's economic dependence.¹¹⁷ Such a pattern is found in the strategic motivations of other emerging donors such as China and India, and Thailand also faces this unique geopolitical and geoeconomic environment with Cambodia.

Meanwhile, the fact that Thailand has been granted opportunities to develop hydroelectric dams in Laos and that it is the largest trading partner with its recipient can be explained as "counter-gifts" offered by Laos, in return for Thailand's making Laos as its foremost recipient of ODA.¹¹⁸ Thailand has repeatedly stated that the country cannot risk conflicts with Laos due to energy security, which is critical in fueling the Thai economy. This is also the case for Myanmar. Thailand has long been a corridor to ASEAN for both Laos and

¹¹⁷ Kondoh, Kobayashi, Shiga and Sato (2010), p.61

¹¹⁸ Mawdsley (2012), p.152

Myanmar and a hub for their trade with the world. Thailand's bilateral cooperation programmes have greatly devoted to Myanmar's agricultural and social development in order to prevent further refugees and illegal immigrants and in return, the country granted Thailand a multi-billion dollar deal to develop the special economic zone in Dawei, a region in Southern Myanmar.¹¹⁹ The importance of keeping Myanmar under Thailand's influence has remained consistent in Thailand during the past decade, as all Thai governments aimed to cooperate on "all matters of bilateral trade and development" with Myanmar.¹²⁰ Thailand's interests in Myanmar are becoming more economic than ever after Myanmar opened up its economy in 2013, a market that the world views to be full of potential and growth. As of October 2014, Thailand became Myanmar's second-largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI), reaching US\$10 billion, following China's US\$14 billion.¹²¹

While Thailand seems to have a sound relationship with Cambodia at the moment, it has not improved beyond the shadows of doubt due to the prolonged territorial and border conflicts that existed in the past. Several assistance projects for Cambodia had even stopped temporarily during 2008 and 2009 as the relations

¹¹⁹ Bangkok Post, "Thailand, Myanmar renew Dawei Push," October 9, 2014, <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/436745/thailand-myanmar-renew-dawei-push> (accessed November 10, 2014)

¹²⁰ Pongsudhirak, T. (2013) "Myanmar and Thailand in a mainland great game," East Asia Forum, July 14, 2013, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/14/myanmar-and-thailand-in-a-mainland-great-game/> (accessed December 30, 2014)

¹²¹ Deboonme, A., "Investment boom in Myanmar," The Nation, October 20, 2014, <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Investment-boom-in-Myanmar-30245753.html> (accessed December 30, 2014)

between the two countries deteriorated. Thus, although the leaders on each side are shaking hands for mutual benefits, the possibility of conflict and mistrust is consistently dangling down from their diplomatic ties.

On the contrary, Vietnam's strategies of South-South cooperation towards Cambodia, although they take forms similar to that of Thailand, the brotherly solidarity goes beyond the influence of Thai ODA in the country. For instance, on November 17 2014, an aid package of US\$100,000 was given by the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense to its counterpart in Cambodia, to help the country to renovate policy and personnel works until 2019. Also, a bilateral agreement was signed with the Ministry and the Cambodian Royal Army for another aid that amounts to US\$21.6 million for staff training, health care, equipment procurement and basic construction.¹²² Apart from the aid package, 300 Royal Cambodian Army officers at all ranks were enrolled at Vietnam's military academies in 2014. On September 9 2014, a four-month training course was opened by the Academy of Politics under Vietnam's Ministry of National Defense, in order to teach high-ranking Cambodian military officers theories and practical knowledge needed to build a politically strong army and the way carry out military and political work, and to exchange experience with several units of the Vietnam People's Army.¹²³ Such cooperative events concerning military training and aid to happen between

¹²² Vietnam Plus, "Vietnam helps Cambodian defence ministry in personnel work," November 17, 2014, <http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Vietnam-helps-Cambodian-defence-ministry-in-personnel-work/201411/58068.vnplus> (accessed December 3, 2014)

¹²³ People's Army Newspaper, "High-ranking Cambodian officers trained by Vietnam," September 10, 2014, <http://en.qdnd.vn/defence-cooperation/high-ranking-cambodian-officers-trained-by-vietnam/320967.html> (accessed December 5, 2014)

Thailand and Cambodia, it would be safe to say, are impossible to imagine.

Despite Vietnam's brotherly solidarity with Cambodia and Myanmar, however, the only possible area of conflict that can be predicted at this point is the three countries' position towards the South China Sea disputes. Back in July 2012, Cambodia was condemned by its ASEAN partners for its pro-Chinese position on the issue at a summit of ASEAN foreign ministers when it held chair. It turned out that three months prior to the summit, former Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged Hun Sen to double the two countries' bilateral trade to US\$5 billion within five years, and promised to provide loans amounting to US\$70 million. In return, Hun Sen agreed to limit the scope of Chinese-related discussions at the summit and to keep the South China Sea disputes off the agenda. Political analysts claim that China clearly tried to protect its political interests through its influence and pressure on Cambodia.¹²⁴ Nonetheless, the summit was overshadowed by the issue as Vietnam and maritime ASEAN members such as the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are directly related to the territorial disputes. Cambodia's pro-Chinese stance was criticized by Vietnam and the Philippines who insisted to include language on the disputes and consequently, ASEAN members were unable to release a joint statement at the end of the summit, which marked the first time in decades.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Phorn, B., "Cambodia cashes in on China's New Silk Road initiative," ASIAN Correspondent, November 12, 2014, <http://asiancorrespondent.com/128180/cambodia-cashes-in-on-chinas-new-silk-road-initiative/> (accessed December 5, 2014)

¹²⁵ McLaughlin, T., "ASEAN unites to condemn rising South China Sea tensions," Myanmar Times, <http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/10406-asean-unites-to-condemn-rising-south->

The implied rivalry between Thailand and Vietnam is becoming apparent as a new “CLMT” grouping appears in formation among Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand as opposed to the traditional “CLMV.”¹²⁶ According to Pongsudhirak, CLMT refers to the mainland-based sub-region that is increasingly under China’s influence. One of the reasons that Thailand is a strong candidate for Southeast Asia’s hegemon in the future is because of the country’s special relationships with the major powers – the U.S., China and Japan – that are the region’s “movers and shakers.”¹²⁷ Especially with China, Thai-Chinese relations have reached a level unseen since the Thailand’s anti-Vietnam years when China supported the communist parties in Vietnam and Cambodia. For sure, Thailand and the U.S. have been maintaining cozy ties with each other. The largest Asia-Pacific military exercise “Cobra Gold” is held in Thailand every year since 1982 as a bilateral U.S.-Thailand exercise. However, the two countries’ relationship has been hindered by U.S. requirements of input-output bottom lines and accountability, as well as Thailand’s relative drift from Washington to Beijing due to interest-driven, hedging and heritage reasons that are understandable on Thailand’s side.¹²⁸

In contrast, Vietnam is veering towards Washington as the latter is trying

china-sea-tensions.html (accessed December 17, 2014)

¹²⁶ Pongsudhirak (2012) “Thailand’s Foreign Policy in a Regional Great Game,” LSE IDEAS Reports, The London School of Economics, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR015/SR015-SEAsia-Pongsudhirak-.pdf>, p.87

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.85

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

to forge close ties and bring a “new era” in U.S.-Vietnam relations.¹²⁹ According to the recent remarks of Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 20, 2014, a series of practical measures are to come in order to further promote the bilateral comprehensive partnership in 2015. The U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership was launched on July 2, 2013 by presidents Barack Obama and Truong Tan Sang, opening a new era in bilateral relations. Three areas are of strategic importance under the partnership: human rights, the South China Sea, and defense cooperation. While Vietnam is a major claimant in the South China Sea disputes, strategic interests of Washington concerning the issue also align with that of the leaders in Hanoi, which is welcomed to balance China’s increasing aggressiveness.¹³⁰

All in all, Thailand is maintaining its status-quo in the sub-region and is perceived to be playing a major role in Southeast Asia, which largely owes to its active involvement in development cooperation and eagerness to manifest its soft power. However, the finding that Vietnam is emerging as Thailand’s potential rival in mainland Southeast Asia should not be dismissed, and would need further analysis.

¹²⁹ Hiebert, M., G. Poling and P. Nguyen (2014) *A New Era in U.S.-Vietnam Relations*, Center for Strategic & International Studies, p.7

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.8

VII. Conclusion

This thesis focused on exploring national interests that Thailand tries to fulfill when it allocates its bilateral ODA to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, although it still remains as a recipient of ODA from the OECD-DAC. The patterns of Thailand's South-South cooperation from the early 2000s to 2013 in regards to the four recipient countries were closely examined. In addition, this paper also looked into the country's foreign relations with them in the 2000s in line with its foreign policies towards mainland Southeast Asia during this period.

Like many other emerging donors of South-South cooperation, Thailand clearly has multifaceted strategic intentions in providing ODA to these four countries, which seems apparently humanitarian but definitely contains realist intentions. In short, the 2001-2013 Thai ODA disbursement enabled Thailand to meet its security and prosperity interests. Here, prosperity interests refer to economic interests and Thailand's ambition in Southeast Asia. Thailand has long perceived itself to be the only country that is capable of leading mainland Southeast Asia, and thus its active engagement in South-South cooperation within this region had taken place simultaneously with the inception of the country's new grand scheme to have a leading role in the entire Southeast Asia and lead regional integration. Therefore, another interest that Thailand pursues through its ODA disbursements is South-South solidarity, which will enhance its position in the region that is about to face a new era of a regional community.

First, the unique geopolitical circumstance with Cambodia by sharing

borders has led Thailand to use its bilateral aid to maintain border security. By allocating a huge amount of foreign aid to Cambodia, Thailand intends to stabilize the Thai-Cambodian border and thus prevent illegal immigration, while simultaneously enhancing its influence in Cambodia and developing cross-border trade, which are strategic motivations also found in cases of China and India that have unstable neighbors on their borders. However, economic interests were outstanding in Laos and Myanmar. Apart from the fact that the two countries are Thailand's largest sources of energy supply, huge construction deals that are to boost in Laos, a country that is rising as the "battery of Asia," and immense economic prospects of Myanmar's open economy are of Thailand's interests. At the moment, Thailand is enjoying a first-comer advantage as a result of its efforts to increase investment and ODA in Laos and Myanmar.

That said, the story for Vietnam is quite different, as Thailand has economic interests in the country but the relationship between the two are not considered as a "donor-recipient relationship" by both sides. Thus, only an insignificant amount of ODA has been given to Vietnam during the past decade. An interesting fact that was found out during research is that Vietnam is emerging as Thailand's competitor, not only in South-South cooperation but also in leading mainland Southeast Asia, a status that Thailand has maintained since the end of the Cold War.

Vietnam's strategic move comes in line with the major powers, China and the U.S., in the region's orbit. By forming a strategic partnership with Vietnam in

2013 and announcing a “new era” in U.S.-Vietnam relations, the U.S. is clearly trying to check China’s power in mainland Southeast Asia. As Thailand, on the other hand, turned to China as a result of the pressure from the Western bloc after its military coup in 2014, the rivalry between Thailand and Vietnam in the regional game of South-South cooperation may have only marked its beginning. Thailand was able to maintain its status as a strong candidate for Southeast Asia’s hegemon in the future because of the country’s special relationships with the major powers, namely the U.S., China and Japan. However, as Thailand has taken sides with China while Vietnam is strongly backed by U.S. and is increasing its influence in mainland Southeast Asia, variations in the patterns of Thailand’s aid disbursements in this region are expected to appear in the near future, in the face of a new challenge.

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Appendix

Thailand Official Development Assistance (January-December 2009)¹³¹

Ministries	Grant/Technical Cooperation	Contributions to Int'l Org.	Loans	Total (Thai Baht)
Ministry of Transport	259,861,712.32	13,736,869.64		273,598,581.96
NEDA	2,505,488.90		766,765,599.55	769,271,077.45
Ministry of Education	7,300,000.00	56,812,343.91		64,112,343.91
Commission on Higher Education	36,239,552.66	12,802,000.00		49,041,552.66
Ministry of Science and Technology	2,791,774.35	31,339,194.67		34,130,969.02
Ministry of Industry		24,049,373.42		24,049,373.42
Ministry of Energy	11,258,360.00			11,258,360.00
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology		27,066,002.12		27,066,002.12
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	674,656.00	3,158,586.54		3,833,242.54
Ministry of Justice	413,934.88	2,310,000.00		2,723,934.88
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	3,291,430.00			3,291,430.00
Ministry of Tourism and Sports	1,418,000.00			1,418,000.00
Ministry of Defence	1,856,569.00			1,856,569.00
Bank of Thailand	1,287,287.00			1,287,287.00
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security	822,841.10	448,016.00		1,270,857.20
Ministry of Commerce	1,614,970.17			1,614,970.17
Office of the Prime Minister		35,560.00		35,560.00
Ministry of Labour		24,869,709.87		24,869,709.87
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excl. TICA)	750,000.00	10,296,478.70		11,046,478.70
TICA	468,624,000.00	34,291,015.86		502,915,015.86
Ministry of Public Health				
Ministry of Interior				
Ministry of Culture				
Exim bank				
Total (Baht)	800,710,565.38	241,215,150.83	766,765,599.55	1,808,691,315.76

¹³¹ TICA (2009) "Annual Report," p.9

Thailand Official Development Assistance (January-December 2010)¹³²

Ministries	Grant/Technical Cooperation	Contributions to Int'l Org.	Loans	Total (Thai Baht)
NEDA	16,001,618.18		504,047,554.90	520,049,173.08
TICA	374,533,000.00	26,071,560.00		400,604,560.00
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excl. TICA)	36,737,552.00	313,747,029.56		350,484,581.56
Commission on Higher Education	35,030,897.44	12,775,062.50		47,805,959.94
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology		47,354,203.65		47,354,203.65
Ministry of Labour		24,189,702.75		24,189,702.75
Ministry of Industry	101,030.00	23,981,275.75		24,082,305.75
Ministry of Finance	409,544.12	17,298,500.00		17,708,044.12
Ministry of Transport	422,500.00	15,834,277.22		16,256,777.22
Ministry of Commerce	13,157,360.90			13,157,360.90
Ministry of Education	3,699,876.35	2,721,370.00		6,421,246.35
Ministry of Justice	246,434.50	5,282,000.00		5,528,434.50
Ministry of Science and Technology	2,932,783.00	256,563.50		3,189,346.50
Ministry of Energy	2,428,123.00	105,000.00		2,533,123.00
Ministry of Culture	1,930,630.00			1,930,630.00
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	1,661,507.00	64,600.00		1,726,107.00
Ministry of Tourism and Sports	1,418,000.00			1,418,000.00
Bank of Thailand	1,143,614.50			1,143,614.50
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security		844,216.80		844,216.80
Ministry of Defence	571,641.00			571,641.00
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	290,000.00			290,000.00
Office of the Prime Minister	250,000.00	32,470.00		282,470.00
Ministry of Public Health				n/a
Ministry of Interior				n/a
Total (Baht)	492,966,111.99	490,557,831.73	504,047,554.90	1,487,571,498.62

ODA/GNI

0.0145

¹³² The data were given directly to author by TICA

Table: Thailand Official Development Assistance (January-December 2011)¹³³

Ministries	Grant/Technical Cooperation	Contributions to Int'l Org.	Loans	Total (Thai Baht)
NEDA	89,963,621.76		336,377,048.47	426,340,670.23
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excl. TICA)	25,822,808.75	310,068,678.87		335,891,487.62
- TICA	272,984,100.00	41,841,110.00		314,825,210.00
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	1,807,365.00	87,776,220.00		89,583,585.00
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology		47,792,021.66		47,792,021.66
Commission on Higher Education	25,285,869.00	12,711,250.00		37,997,119.00
Ministry of Labour		26,086,519.10		26,086,519.10
Ministry of Industry	14,500.00	23,812,898.61		23,827,398.61
Ministry of Finance	18,046,698.19			18,046,698.19
Ministry of Transport	2,717,852.11	14,896,569.23		17,614,421.34
Ministry of Education	5,000,000.00	2,517,356.88		7,517,356.88
Ministry of Public Health	2,098,706.00			2,098,706.00
Ministry of Science and Technology	1,759,295.75			1,759,295.75
Ministry of Culture	1,426,862.45			1,426,862.45
Ministry of Defence	1,337,098.00			1,337,098.00
Ministry of Justice		1,246,510.00		1,246,510.00
Ministry of Commerce	1,143,746.83			1,143,746.83
Office of the Prime Minister	1,035,000.00	10,335.00		1,045,335.00
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security	425,336.00	412,100.00		837,436.00
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	560,000.00	274,912.16		834,912.16
Bank of Thailand	715,934.00			715,934.00
Ministry of Energy	427,617.00	90,660.00		518,277.00
Ministry of Interior				n/a
Ministry of Tourism and Sports				n/a
Total (Baht)	452,572,410.84	569,537,141.51	336,377,048.47	1,358,486,600.82

¹³³ *Ibid.*

ODA/GNI	0.0131
ODA/GDP	0.0122

Thailand Official Development Assistance (January-December 2012)¹³⁴

Ministries	Grant/Technical Cooperation	Contributions to Int'l Org.	Loans	Total (Thai Baht)
TICA	328,460,200.00	33,647,958.40		362,108,158.40
NEDA	74,846,457.55		211,787,582.11	286,634,039.66
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excl. TICA)	2,000,000.00	273,870,922.52		275,870,922.52
Commission on Higher Education	86,585,021.20	12,000.00		86,597,021.20
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology		43,530,774.72		43,530,774.72
Ministry of Labour		25,884,158.29		25,884,158.29
Ministry of Industry		18,506,600.16		18,506,600.16
Ministry of Finance		15,701,000.00		15,701,000.00
Ministry of Transport		13,096,413.00		13,096,413.00
Ministry of Education	5,200,000.00			5,200,000.00
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment		2,938,079.42		2,938,079.42
Office of the Prime Minister	2,733,961.20			2,733,961.20
Ministry of Commerce	2,667,256.00			2,667,256.00
Ministry of Justice		2,223,200.00		2,223,200.00
Bank of Thailand	1,391,875.87			1,391,875.87
Ministry of Defence	1,151,815.00			1,151,815.00
Ministry of Energy	856,830.00			856,830.00
Ministry of Culture	741,077.00			741,077.00
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	637,570.00			637,570.00
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security		520,800.00		520,800.00
Ministry of Public Health	452,395.00			452,395.00
Ministry of Science and Technology	117,100.00			117,100.00
Ministry of Interior				n/a
Ministry of Tourism and Sports				n/a
Total (Baht)	507,841,558.82	429,931,906.51	211,787,582.11	1,149,561,047.44
ODA/GNI				0.0107
ODA/GDP				0.0103

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

Table: Thailand Official Development Assistance (January-December 2013)¹³⁵

Ministries	Grant/Technical Cooperation	Contributions to Int'l Org.	Loans	Total (Thai Baht)
NEDA	254,417,931.97		692,514,489.51	946,932,421.48
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excl. TICA)		363,059,934.46		363,059,934.46
- TICA	431,373,500.00	31,948,560.04		463,322,060.04
Ministry of Public Health	3,822,476.00	43,047,840.00		46,870,316.00
Commission on Higher Education	46,606,751.33	12,000.00		46,618,751.33
Ministry of Labour	6,415,390.00	32,016,142.26		38,431,532.26
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology		38,272,935.54		38,272,935.54
Ministry of Finance		34,986,000.00		34,986,000.00
Ministry of Industry		19,099,066.34		19,099,066.34
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment	3,357,741.00	7,893,409.00		11,251,150.00
Bank of Thailand	3,387,799.29			3,387,799.29
Ministry of Justice	583,836.00	2,766,999.89		3,350,835.89
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives	2,550,000.00			2,550,000.00
Ministry of Education	2,475,869.32			2,475,869.32
Ministry of Commerce	1,472,000.00			1,472,000.00
Office of the Prime Minister	661,450.00	16,095.00		677,545.00
Ministry of Science and Technology	498,531.00			498,531.00
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security		399,797.30		399,797.30
Ministry of Transport				n/a
Ministry of Energy				n/a
Ministry of Defence				n/a
Ministry of Interior				n/a
Ministry of Tourism and Sports				n/a
Ministry of Culture				n/a
Total (Baht)	757,623,275.91	573,518,779.83	692,514,489.51	2,023,656,545.25

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

Abstract (Korean)

국 문 초 록

성명: 강민경

학과 및 전공: 국제학과 국제협력전공

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본 논문은 최근 남남협력의 주요 주자로 대두되고 있는 태국의 개발협력 전략에 대해 알아보고, 공여국 역할을 하는 태국과 수원국인 캄보디아, 라오스, 미얀마, 그리고 베트남의 개발협력 특징을 비교분석 하였다. 남남협력은 개발도상국 사이의 경제적·기술적 협력을 중심으로 ‘수평적 파트너십’과 ‘연대의식’을 추구하는 국제협력의 패러다임으로, 태국의 주변국 외교정책의 핵심이라고 할 수 있다.

나아가 본 연구는 최근 동남아시아 신흥시장과의 산업협력 및 남중국해 분쟁을 두고 미·중 간 패권경쟁이 본격화되며 급변하고 있는 동남아시아 정세 속에서 태국의 남남협력 전략이 어떻게 변화하고 있는지, 또 어떠한 위협을 받고 있는지에 대해 알아보았다. 분석결과 태국의 대(□) 주변국 공적개발원조는 수원국별로 다른 패턴을 보였으며, 인도적 차원에서의 개발원조와 더불어 산업협력에서 우위를 차지하고 동남아시아에서의 태국의 입지와 안보를 강화하는 것을 목적으로 하는 것으로 확인되었다. 이러한 과정을 통해 본 논문은 기존 연구가 비교적 부족한 태국의 개발협력 패턴을 체계적으로 분석하는 데 기여하고자 하였다.

핵심어: 국제 개발협력, 남남협력, 공적개발원조, 태국, 동남아시아

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