국제학 석사학위논문

젠더 관점에서 본 국제 개발 협력에 대한 복지국가의 영향:

미국과 스웨덴 사례를 중심으로

The Gendered Effect of Welfare State on the

International Development Cooperation:

Focusing on the US and Sweden's Cases

2015년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

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Focusing on the US and Sweden's Cases

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Abstract

The Gendered Effect of Welfare State on the

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A gender transformative development intervention seeks to challenge given constraints that are deep-seated in a society. Following the cause-and-effect assumptions of theories of change, it is implied that the outcomes of development interventions would be successful if they conceptualize gender as reflecting social relationships and gender division of power. By the outcome being "successful", it means having a transformative impact on the society to some extent.

This paper then seeks to explore the question of why two development interventions having the same understanding of gender still result in different outcomes using feminist institutionalism as a methodological framework. By taking the case studies of the USAID and Sida programs conducted in Ethiopia, it attempts to move the attention beyond local realities from the receiving end to the donor side. In doing so, it takes on board an improved understanding of welfare state which contributed to the meaningful

evaluation of the relationship between domestic welfare policies and international development assistance.

While the US case represented a liberal model of Esping-Andersen's welfare state regime, the Swedish case revealed a social democratic model. In spite of limitations that it focused on one case study for each state of welfare state regime types, this paper provides a meaningful evaluation that outcomes of development interventions which seek to mainstream gender could depend on factors beyond conceptualization of gender. It also provided evidence that the mainstream analysis of the relationship between the domestic welfare state and international development assistance can also be applied even when reinterpreted from a feminist perspective. Given that ties exist between domestic welfare state variations and international development assistance, the findings of this study leads to another important question, whether gender balanced policies can be institutionalized in a mutually reinforcing way in both donors and recipients ends.

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1. Introduction

1.1. The Question

All development interventions are said to operate either explicitly or implicitly with theories of change based on an understanding of local realities and its structure of constraints and opportunities. This constitutes 'cause-and-effect' assumptions about the relationship between their activities and intended outcomes. Depending on their gender equality concerns, development interventions could be identified into three different types: gender blind, gender aware and gender transformative.[1] Gender blind interventions knowingly or unknowingly ignore the gender-related constraints on women's capacity for agency and serve to reinforce these constraints. It has often taken the form of defining women according to their reproductive roles and responsibilities or seeking to promote their productive roles without due attention to their reproductive and community management responsibilities. A gender aware intervention designs its goals and activities on the bases of well-informed analysis of the existing gender division of roles and responsibilities in particular contexts. What goes further is a gender transformative intervention, which seeks to challenge given constraints. Given that these constraints are deep-seated, transformations in this sense is likely to be a gradual and evolving process rather than a once-off event. Following the cause-and-effect assumptions, this analysis implies that the outcomes of development interventions would be successful if they have the "correct" definition of gender – meaning, if they conceptualize gender as reflecting

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[1] Kabeer, N., "Women's Empowerment, Development Interventions and the Management of Information Flows," *IDS Bulletin* 41(6), 2010, p. 108.

social relationships and gender division of power. By the outcome being "successful", it means having a transformative impact on the society to some extent. Then, why would two development interventions having the same understanding of gender result in different outcomes? Rather than looking at the local conditions as point of divergence, this paper sets the local condition as fixed by appointing the USAID and the Sida programs conducted in the same country, Ethiopia. By fixing the local realities as an independent variable, this 'why' question moves our attention from the receiving end to the donor side.

The relationship between domestic politics and decisions about international cooperation has been identified by various existing studies. In order to better understand the link between the two, previous studies focused on two types of governmental policies, namely, domestic welfare policies and foreign aid programs. Departing from the spending and partisan politics, which were initially claimed as indicators, an improved understanding of welfare state contributed to the meaningful evaluation of the relationship between domestic welfare policies and international development assistance. Following Esping-Andersen's welfare state regime typology, states were divided into three clusters: the liberal, corporate/conservative and social democratic welfare states. Quantitative studies proved that welfare state socialist attributes provided a strong statistical explanation for foreign aid levels, while conservative and liberal attributes did not correlate. This implied that welfare state must be seen as lasting outcomes of social and political conflicts over issues of distributive justice, from which distinct conceptions of justice are institutionalized. This in turn should influence differently internal debates

and decisions about foreign policy and development assistance.

Taking into account that such improved understanding of welfare state helped explain the effects of internally institutionalized principles on the international arena, this paper seeks to move one step further by introducing a gender perspective. If welfare programs are seen as outcomes of social and political conflicts over issues of distributive justice, struggles for gender equality clearly cut across all such conflicts. By examining the case studies of the USAID and the Sida, this paper seeks to answer why, despite the same understanding of gender, the two development interventions differ in their outcomes. In doing so, feminist insights on the welfare state studies are introduced, which reorganize welfare state variations with reference to the informal unpaid care work. The findings showed similar pattern of variations that the welfare state with liberal orientation towards managing the unpaid care work, the US in this case, applied the same understanding to their international development assistance programs. Sweden's case, a social democratic paradigm of welfare state, showed similar relationship between domestic politics and international development program.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Domestic welfare state and international development assistance

Development assistance is one obvious example of international cooperation in a global era. In an effort to better understand the link between domestic politics and decisions about international cooperation, previous studies focused on two types of governmental policies, namely, domestic welfare policies and foreign aid programs. Earlier qualitative studies identified the rise of the welfare state as a factor explaining the development of aid policies.[2] Comparing the objectives pursued by domestic income-redistribution policies and those pursued through foreign aid, these studies found that the two shared similar values. While both policies sought to address the inequalities created by the market economy, aid programs targeting developing countries have been interpreted as an international extension of the income-redistribution mechanisms that shape domestic politics in developed countries. In a similar vein, such extension was interpreted as a consequence of the internationalization of an ideology of community responsibility. Foreign aid thus appeared as "an international institution somewhat equivalent to the safety net provided by domestic welfare policies."[3] Stemming from this view, many scholars suggested that variations in national forms of participation in the international aid regime could be explained by the differences among domestic welfare policies. In other words, a state generous with its own citizens would tend to be generous as well with

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[2] Noel, A. and J. Therien, "From Domestic to International Justice: The Welfare State and Foreign Aid," *International Organization* 49(3), 1995, p. 524.
[3] Noel and Therien, p. 523.

people in developing countries.[4]

Domestic spending and partisan politics were the two main indicators suggested by existing studies concerning the relationship between aid and welfare. As an indicator of generosity within the domestic welfare state, domestic spending was measured as total public expenditures and total social transfers, both as percentages of Gross National Product (GNP). As for foreign aid level, the standard indicator is suggested as the OECD data on official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNP. Member countries of the traditional donor club, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), expresses aid targets in these terms.[5] Findings of quantitative studies showed that these two measures of generosity projected domestically and internationally were correlated in the years between 1975 and 1988.[6] It was only in 1970 that the target of ODA/GNP was first set at 0.7 percent by the donor countries. The birth of contemporary welfare state similarly dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. The correlation between welfare state expenditures and foreign aid seemed to support the conventional view that welfare programs are outcomes of a general commitment to state intervention. The problem with this notion was that it reduced the definition of welfare state to mere spenders. Hidden assumption behind such viewpoint is that policies are best understood in general financial terms and that states are consistent spenders, regardless of the program involved. Among those countries which showed consistency in their domestic

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[4] Noel and Therien, p. 524.
[5] The UN target for an ODA/GNP ratio is 0.7 percent. In 2013, five out of 29 member states voluntarily fulfilled this commitment. In 2010, development assistance of the OECD DAC recorded over 97 percent of total world aid. http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm
[6] Noel and Therien, p. 534.

and foreign policies were Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark and Norway.

This idea was challenged, however, when two sets of important exceptions emerged. There were countries that were more generous than expected in their projection of foreign aid, given their domestic expenditures, and countries that were less generous than expected. Countries in the first set were Australia, Britain, Canada, the United States, and Finland, although no country was consistently present in the periods between 1965 and 1988. In the second set were Austria and Italy.

Apart from the spending rationale, partisan politics was another indicator put forward by political scientists to account for the welfare state. This started from the assumption that parties are not equally favorable to state intervention. Generally leftist governments were associated with higher levels of total social expenditures. As a redistributive form of government intervention, it was predicted that foreign aid would follow a similar logic. Although earlier qualitative studies did suggest that parties may matter in the formulation of aid policies, quantitative studies which focused on the years between 1965 and 1988 found that left-right partisan orientations did not generate a statistically significant explanation of foreign aid behavior.

Of the two indicators suggested by earlier studies on the relationship between welfare state and foreign aid, only the spending indicator offered partial statistical evidence. As shown above, even the spending indicator failed to provide satisfying account. In order to explain the exceptions, some attempts mainly focused on the characteristics of individual states without any reference to interaction with domestic welfare state policies. For instance, Austria was viewed as an economic egoist, while Italy

was characterized as a passive country, uninterested in foreign affairs.[7] Studies that followed recognized that the definition of welfare state needed to go beyond the spending rationale and left-right party orientation. These scholarships contributed to the meaningful evaluation of the relationship between domestic welfare state and foreign aid level through applying an improved understanding of welfare state.

2.2. Mainstream scholarship on welfare state

The welfare state generally involves state responsibility for securing some basic amount of welfare for its citizens. It is also associated with goal of achieving greater equality. As mentioned in the previous section, states' spending behavior was closely associated with the conceptualization of the welfare state. The assumption that the level of social expenditure adequately reflects a state's commitment to welfare was in fact the departure point of the comparative welfare state studies. Unfortunately, these first generation comparativists failed to provide convincing cases as evidence. Moreover, it was criticized that focusing on expenditures could be misleading. The linear scoring approach was seen most problematic, since it contradicts the relational and structured dimensions of power, democracy, or welfare. Indeed, all spending cannot be counted equally. It is not difficult to find cases where a certain group within the society receives more benefit than the rest due to intentional design of the state.

New developments in comparative welfare-state research came about with the distinction between residual and institutional welfare states. This approach allowed the researchers' attention to move away from expenditures to the content of welfare states. As

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[7] Noel and Therien, p. 537.

the term implies, residual model only ensures residual amount of public support to marginal and less-off social groups. In such a system, public welfare structures operate only when the so-called natural channels of welfare, the family and market, fail to function. Due to the nature of its design, this reliance is saved up for emergencies only and for a short period of time. Institutional form is an ideal type which promotes universalism. Public welfare structures assume an integral part of the society. In order to satisfy certain standards of life, an organized system of social services are provided on a regular and legitimate basis to individuals and groups. These two distinct types were further elaborated by Titmuss, who suggested three models of social policy: the residual model, the industrial achievement-performance model, and the institutional redistributive model.[8] The added industrial model was a function to provide a minimum standard of social security, where the market economy assumes an important position. Although these polar ideal types were useful distinctions, they were criticized as oversimplifying and limiting the framework of analysis to two opposite categories. What followed was the approach emphasizing the clustering of attributes, i.e. Esping-Andersen's famous welfare-state regime typology.

Esping-Andersen claims that welfare-state in itself rarely received full attention, although it was often associated with the scholarship on power, industrialization, or capitalist contradiction. Focusing on the welfare state as it stands, he starts from a re-specification of the term using T. H. Marshall's concept of social citizenship. He deconstructs the concept of social citizenship into two principles, social rights and social

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[8] Sainsbury, D. 1996. *Gender, Equality and Welfare States*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 11.

stratification. It is assumed that if social rights are given on the bases of citizenship, the resulting effect would be a de-commodification of the status of individuals vis-à-vis the market. The third principle required is the state's interaction with the market and family in social provision.[9]

To express in rights language, de-commodification could be interpreted as the right not to work. It is to do with emancipation of individuals from market dependence. It occurs when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market. A minimal definition includes settings where "citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary."[10] Condition for significant de-commodification is not as simple as the mere presence of social assistance or insurance, since those services can easily fail to target and treat various groups with an equal standard. The concept should not be confused with the complete eradication of labor as a commodity. Rather than an issue of all or nothing, it refers to "the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation." [11] In short, whether to participate in the market or opt-out of if should be a matter of free individual choice.

Welfare state should also be recognized as a system of stratification. Rather than being an external or even neutral mechanism that intervenes in the structure of inequality, it actively shapes the ordering of social relations. Social stratification would remain high in countries where residual model of social policies govern, such as means-tested

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[9] Esping-Andersen, G., 1990, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
[10] Esping-Andersen, p. 23.
[11] Esping-Andersen, p. 23.

assistance programs or where private firms are the main providers of social insurance. On the other hand, inequality would remain low where universalistic model prevails. As briefly surveyed, variations in social rights and welfare-state stratification will give rise to qualitatively different arrangements between state, market, and the family. These result in what Esping-Andersen calls clusters of welfare state regime-types.

Welfare states are divided into three regime clusters: liberal, conservative and social democratic. As indicated in the title of his book, each of these clusters constitute distinct "world" of welfare capitalism. Within each world, states share similar historical evolutions and institutional patterns, such as quality of social rights, social stratification, and the relationship between state, market, and family. In a liberal state, private sector is predominant in providing for pension, while state's provision of means-tested assistance is residual. Universal transfers and social insurance plans remain modest. Beneficiaries are targeted as low-income, usually working-class, state dependents. In these states, traditional, liberal work-ethic norms have prevented social reform from taking place. The state encourages the market, both passively and actively by guaranteeing only a minimum support and subsidizing private welfare schemes. Substantial presence of private sector inevitably creates asymmetrical relationship between people and the market. Thus, in a liberal state, de-commodification effects are minimized, making people overly dependent on the market. The degree of social inequality or stratification remains high. Such evolution has resulted in a class-political dualism, where at one end state-welfare recipients share relative equality of poverty and at the other end, the majorities have access to market-differentiated welfare. This case is best represented by the United States,

along with Canada and Australia.

The second regime type, conservative welfare states aim at maintaining the status quo. Identified by states such as Austria, France, Germany and Italy, rights are attached to class and status and are strongly 'corporatist' in that workplace becomes the organizing principle. Although the de-commodification effects are high, since the state is concerned with preserving the difference in status, the level of social inequality is also high and thus, minimizes redistributive impact. These features are related to strong presence of Church and respects traditional family-hood.

Lastly, social democratic types of welfare state, representative in Scandinavian countries, are defined by the principle of universalism. The de-commodification of social rights is extended to the new middle class. As the main driver behind social reform, social democracy did not tolerate the dualism between state and market, between working class and middle class, thereby minimizing social stratification or social inequality. Rather than waiting for markets to step in, these states initially address both market and the traditional family. Even before the family's capacity to aid is exhausted, states intervene to preemptively socialize the costs of family-hood. State aims to maximize capacities for each individual rather than as a dependent in the family. This makes commitment to a full-employment an important guarantee of the state.

2.3. Re-linking the welfare state and foreign aid

How has the improved understanding of the welfare state accounted for the outliers of spending indicator on the relationship between the domestic welfare state and development assistance? As a series of indicators to characterize the various welfare

programs of each state according to their conservative, liberal, socialist attributes, welfare indicators divide states into "strong socialism" cluster, "medium socialism" cluster and countries with little or no socialist traits. For instance, state with a universal health care program scores in the socialist attribute, while private pension gives states scores in liberal attributes. By doing so, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Netherlands become located in the first cluster, while Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, U.K. in the second. In the last cluster are the U.S., Austria, France, Japan, and Italy. As a result of the exercise, Sweden scored 8 for socialism and 0 for conservatism and liberalism. As a direct opposite, U.S. scored 0 for socialism and conservatism, and 12 for liberalism. Apart from these two extremes, the rest of the countries show mixture of traits. Following this analysis, welfare state socialist attributes provided a strong statistical explanation for foreign aid levels, while conservative and liberal attributes did not correlate.[12] This proved that welfare programs should not to be reduced to a single spending or partisan logic, but must be seen as lasting outcomes of social and political conflicts over issues of distributive justice. From these conflicts emerge different welfare states. These states institutionalize distinct conceptions of justice that in turn should influence differently internal debates and decisions about foreign policy and development assistance.

2.4. Welfare state variations: the United States and Sweden

While Esping-Andersen's typology highlights the similarities of countries within the same cluster of welfare state regime, its weakness is that it does not capture how

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[12] Noel and Therien, p. 540.

individual countries deviate from the regime. In clarifying differences between individual states, the residual-institutional distinction could be brought back, albeit with meaningful adjustments. Adapting from Mishra, Sainsbury reorganizes the dimensions of the residual and institutional models of social policy as follows: proportion of national income devoted to social purposes, level of benefits, range of statutory services and benefits, population covered, dominant type of program, importance of programs preventing needs, commitment to full employment, type of financing, role of private organizations, ideology of state intervention, need based distribution as a value (ideology of distribution).[13]

After examining these different dimensions, Sainsbury states the case of United States as "the incomplete welfare state."[14] Tracing back the limited nature of the welfare state, she identifies this particular state with economic individualism, self-help, a preference for market system and a minimum of state intervention. In terms of the system of public provision of welfare, the United States is divided into three tiers. The first two tiers represent an uneasy co-existence between a residual and an institutional conception of social welfare. In the first tier are insurance benefits, commonly known as "social security". From 1960 to 1985, these programs have attracted increasing funding, growing from 35 percent to 50 percent of social expenditures. In terms of the overwhelming public support, this could be viewed as being closer to the universal institutional model. The second tier is closer to the residual model, as it consists of non-contributory programs directed to the poor on a means tested basis. As for public support, it is not widely

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[13] Sainsbury, p. 13.
[14] Sainsbury, p. 28.

popular among the people. Note the additional third tier, the private or occupational welfare. This tier assumes an influential position in the US welfare, as is shown by the growing figures of non-public spending that pointed to nearly one-third of welfare expenditures in 1980. Such complex system of welfare could be seen as diversity or as fragmentation. Federal institutions rely heavily on a range of other actors from voluntary agencies in religious or ethnic based sector to market and firms. In short, the US welfare has an incomplete coverage, lacking statutory provision that applies to the entire population. Note the group of people the US legislated programs provide assistance to: the elderly, the blind, the disabled, and families with dependent children. Such clear line marked between the "deserving" and "undeserving poor" lies at the core of the incomplete welfare state.[15]

Sweden is another pure case at the other end of the residual-universal spectrum of welfare policies. Sainsbury terms this case as "the comprehensive welfare state."[16] In terms of the range of publicly provided benefits, services, and the population covered, it displays a comprehensive character. The scope of the effect of these features is also seen comprehensive – diminishing the impact of market forces on distribution and promoting de-commodification of wants and needs. Services related to health, education, day care, and transportation are viewed as public goods, which explains why the Swedish welfare state deserves to be called "the social service state". As for the funding, it reflects the idea of social citizenship rather than the insurance principle. Taxation is the main funding resource, while contributions by the insured and fees remain minimal. Funding matters

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[15] Sainsbury, p. 29.
[16] Sainsbury, p. 31.

have important connection to the principle on entitlement to benefits and services, which emphasizes citizenship or residence rather than need or labor market participation. In short, Swedish welfare state is about institutionalized commitment. First, it is committed to equality and solidarity as social policy goals. Secondly, to equal opportunities as well as equality of result. Last commitment is to guarantee full employment through active labor market measures.

2.5. Feminist perspectives on the welfare state

While an improved understanding of welfare state in the mainstream scholarship helped account for the effects of internally institutionalized principles on the international arena, this paper seeks to move one step further by introducing a gender perspective. If welfare programs are seen as outcomes of social and political conflicts over issues of distributive justice, struggles for gender equality clearly cut across all such conflicts. From this view, feminist analysis criticized mainstream work on welfare state as ignoring the differentiated impact of welfare state on men and women. While state-market nexus has been at the core of Esping-Andersen's work, it is pointed out that family-state nexus was not fully incorporated into the analysis. The concept of de-commodification was also seen problematic, as it scarcely addressed the gendered division of labor. In order to fill the missing hole in the mainstream work, feminist scholarship provided insights including bringing back family to the center of discussion and emphasizing the weight of unwaged or low-waged welfare services provided by women outside the formal arrangements of

economy and/or public provision.[17] Before further analysis of the feminist insight on the welfare state studies, the term gender requires some understanding.

'Gender' should not be confused as a synonym for 'women'. The term marks the departure point of a long-fought and still on-going battle over distribution of power and transformation of gender relations. Gender is defined as the cultural interpretation of biological differences between men and women. It shapes those characteristics, ideas and values which are socially determined, in contrast to those which are biologically determined. As girls and boys grow up, they learn which roles and characteristics are appropriate for them. Through reinforcements and approvals from family and significant others in the process of socialization, they internalize what is masculine and what is feminine. These normative values will vary from society to society, culture to culture and also across ethnic identity, race, class, and age. In short:

> gender defines the social relationship between men and
> women and the way in which it has been socially constructed
> and institutionalized through different roles that women and
> men play in society, …[18]

The core difference between sexual identity and gender identity is that since the latter is constructed by society, it can change and be changed. This means that gendered identities such as orientations to family and employment are not prepolitical, or "natural". Rather, gendered divisions of labor and the preferences, needs, and desires that sustain it are

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[17] Sainsbury, p. 36.
[18] Singhal, R., "Women, Gender and Development: The Evolution of Theories and Practice," *Psychology and Developing Societies* 15(2), 2003, p. 174.

shaped by various political institutions including welfare provisions.[19] Whereas early feminist interventions around social provision focused on a fixed gender identity ("being" a gender), there has been a transformation of attention from gender to gendering ("doing" or performing gender). This allows for an investigation of the processes of gendering, regendering, or degendering in which welfare states are central influences.

Feminist scholarship has contributed to the study of welfare state in various ways. In particular, this paper would like to highlight how feminist scholars emphasized the importance of family in the discussion of welfare states. This lost dimension requires attention in order to reconnect the interrelationships between the family, the state and the market in structuring the welfare state. In terms of family-state nexus, the role of the state in sustaining certain forms of family and certain types of family relationships was discovered. It was found that to better understand the more public systems of state welfare, their connections to welfare within the household and to women and men inside and outside that system must be explicated. In terms of family-market nexus, introducing family also showed how the welfare state heavily depended upon the arrangements or systems outside the formal economy and/or public provision through which women provided unwaged or low-waged welfare services.

Inserting the dimension of family in the study of welfare states also connects with the issue of care, which is central to many feminist understandings of gender and welfare.[20] Orientation towards care marks an important distinction between mainstream

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[19] Morgan, K.J. 2006. *Working Mothers and the Welfare State: Religion and the Politics of Work-Family Policies in Western Europe and the United States*. Standford, CA: Standford University Press.
[20] Daly, M. and J. Lewis. 2000. "The Concept of Social Care and the Analysis of Contemporary Welfare

researchers and gender analysts. Whereas the former address it principally as a question of women's differences from men and a barrier to employment, the latter view it as a socially necessary activity. Gender analysts have highlighted how care is predominantly situated in the field of women's work and usually comes in package with other forms of domestic labor, rather than a release of natural and biologically feminine love.[21] In a wage economy, providing care becomes the source of many women's economic and political disadvantages, as it constantly conflicts with women's opportunities or desires to enter paid work. Accordingly, understanding the social organization of care destabilizes the assumed boundaries between economy and family, public and private, paid and unpaid work, emotion and commodity, culture and state social policy, the direct state provision of services and indirect public support for caring in households.[22]

Much attention drawn to unpaid care-work is also relevant with increasing phenomena of care crises across the global north. In an aging society, the burden of care-work becomes an even more significant issue as dependent groups increase in size. Care crises put a major pressure for change in welfare and present demands for social policymakers, as the supply of familiar caregivers is surpassed by the rising demands for care. A study by European Community concluded that this would imply a growing bill for governments.[23] The problems will be twofold – for caregivers and for those who are cared for. From this view, the original concept of decommodification calls for some

States," *British Journal of Sociology* 51(2), p. 281-98.
[21] Orloff, A., "Gendering the Comparative Analysis of Welfare State: An Unfinished Agenda," *Sociological Theory* 27(3), 2009, p. 324.
[22] Orloff, p. 324.
[23] Taylor-Gooby, P., "Welfare State Regimes and Welfare Citizenship," *Journal of European Social Policy* 1(2), 1999, p. 101.

adjustments. Categorization of welfare regimes based on the concept of decommodification counts participation in paid work as a condition for emancipation, while it presupposes a support-system of unwaged work outside the labor market.[24] Research on women's participation in paid work for the US showed that the time spent in domestic work by women exceeds that spent by men by a substantial margin even when the partners' involvement in paid employment was also taken into account.[25] Similar studies conducted in Europe and Australia shared the same results. Such gender division of care coincides with patterns of access to and status in paid employment that deny women equal opportunities in this sphere, despite national variations.

Taylor-Gooby suggests that welfare policies contribute to the gender imbalance in care.[26] Most importantly, state policy assumes a major role in either challenging or accepting the conventional norm of gender ideology which identifies caring as a task for which women are uniquely qualified, and full-time waged employment as a male domain. This influences the extent to which popular values support the gender division of care work, especially concerning equal access to paid employment. If state policy fails to ensure that women have a comparable status in waged work to that of men, it becomes an irrational work strategy in many households not to pursue a gender division of unwaged work that mirrors that of waged work. The opportunity cost for men to abandon paid work in order to take up social care would be too big. Seen from another light, these suggestions at the same time reveal the potential of welfare policies to be used as tools to

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[24] Taylor-Gooby, p. 100.
[25] Taylor-Gooby, p. 101.
[26] Taylor-Gooby, p. 101.

positively influence the care sector.

While acknowledging Esping-Andersen's approach as a powerful tool for analyzing the welfare state regimes variations, Taylor-Gooby suggests reorganizing welfare state variations to include orientations to informal work in the private sphere. While mainstream analysis equates the public with the state and the private with economic enterprises and the market, feminists understand the public sphere as encompassing the state and civil society and the private sphere as the family. Esping-Andersen's analysis revealed that in the labor markets of US, Germany and Sweden, each representing the liberal, conservative, social democratic welfare regimes, women remained heavily overrepresented in the less desirable jobs.[27] Note that these countries share similar trait in this measure despite the different patterns of economic development let alone very different policies pursued in relation to equal opportunities by the governments of those countries. In Sweden, the paradigm of social democracy, women's advances in work are brought at the expense of concentration in the state sector, where by 1985 they made up two-thirds of employees, as against less than half in the United States and about a third in Germany.[28] Nonetheless, the ratio of professional to junk-jobs for women is about a fifth of that for men, as against a seventeenth in Germany and a half in the United States.[29]

To reorganize the welfare state variations with reference to the informal unpaid care-work, firstly, the liberal model highlights clear divisions among social class. In

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[27] Esping-Andersen, p. 215.
[28] Esping-Andersen, p. 202.
[29] Esping-Andersen, p. 213.

liberal societies, equal opportunities are extended through law, making the focus of conflict in relation to paid employment increasingly social class divisions. Whereas middle-class women can afford to pay for support services, struggle for the extension of welfare citizenship to cover such services is likely to be concentrated among working class women, hence creating social class divisions. Conservative/corporatist regimes will tend to impose a clear distinction between the public sphere of welfare state citizenship, where individuals have equal access to occupationally stratified rights and the private realm of the family, so that the growing division of interests in relation to paid employment between those with a secure foothold in the work of paid work and the dependent 'surplus population' identified earlier will extend into a clear gender division in relation to care work, and this will lead to increased struggles over women's welfare citizenship, parallel to struggles over paid employment. Lastly, in the social democratic model, the notion of dual earner household is extended, reinforcing work opportunities for women. As Esping-Andersen points out, it has been noticeable that equal employment for women has made most progress in the state sector, making it relatively probable that sectoral conflict in relation to economic groups will emerge, although the pressures from both sectors for the socialization of care will remain.

Thus, the three 'worlds' of welfare capitalism may be utilized to suggest how struggles about the policies implied by the need for provision for care work to guarantee equal welfare citizenship for women will develop: liberalism emphasizes the social class division; conservatism implies an emphasis on gender-based struggle; social democracy subsumes these conflicts to sectoral conflicts in relation to paid employment. Welfare

citizenship in capitalist societies is at least two-dimensional. It involves distinctions between liberal, social democratic and conservative regimes characterized by the relation between state welfare and social class conflicts and also by the way in which government manages the unpaid care work and handles issues of equality.[30]

2.6. The US and Sweden: Variations of welfare state according to the care sector management

As illustrated above, in Sweden, a representative case of social democratic regime, women's employment depends on the state both for jobs and for the services that make employment for those with caregiving responsibilities a possibility. According to Sainsbury, women do best in Sweden, home to a system with strong universal characteristics, and fare worst in the US.[31] Orloff observes that the US is moving to require paid work as the only route for the support of households.[32] Women's rising employment and the advances women have made into the upper ranks of the labor force are largely market-driven, although state's anti-discrimination activity has been important in opening opportunities in the realm of private employment. While some proportion of women have benefited from private employment opportunities and can afford private provision of services, others have suffered from the low wages and benefits of the lower rungs of the service sector in the US. Sweden's "woman-friendly" universalism appears distinctively advantageous environment for promoting gender balanced policies. However, scholars point out the important limitations of Swedish politics that as long as the bases

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[30] Taylor-Gooby, p. 103.
[31] Sainsbury, p. 49.
[32] Orloff, A., "Gender in the Welfare State," *Annual Review of Sociology* 22, 1996, p. 67.

of entitlement remain as the status of "worker citizens" and highlight women's "difference", it would be exceedingly difficult to see further progress to the extent that "women's interests go beyond or are different from the interests of workers as a whole."[33]There is uneasy tension regarding this aspect, as it is undeniable that paid work distinctly remains as women's core interest as long as it provides the means to independence from family. However, not all working women's interests could be seen homogenous. In this light, above quote should be understood in the sense that it is also important to imagine or assume women's interests beyond paid work as well as recognize the variations within working women's interests.

2.7. Understanding the "real" interests of women

This brings our attention to understanding gendered interests. It is claimed that in order to assess the impact of state policies on gender relations, specifically gendered dimensions based on an understanding of gendered interests are required. The concept of women's interests assumes compatibility of interest based on biological similarities. On the other hand, gender interests recognize the false homogeneity imposed by the notion of women's interests. Far from being a homogenous group, women's positions in society vary according to their class and ethnic identity. In short, "gender interests are those that women (or men for that matter) may develop by virtue of their social positioning through gender attributes."[34] Gender interests are differentiated between strategic and practical gender interests. In policymaking both in domestic or international fields, identifying the

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[33] Orloff, p. 67.
[34] Molyneux, M., *Mobilization Without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State and Revolution in Nicaragua.* Feminist Studies 11(2), 1985, p. 232.

different interests of women makes it possible to translate them into planning needs. The distinction and clarification of strategic and practical gender needs is essential in order to identify what can be accomplished in the planning process, as well as the limitations of policy interventions.

For feminists, strategic gender needs are women's "real" interests. These are formulated from the analysis of women's subordination to men. The ultimate goal implied is women's emancipation, a more equal and satisfactory organization of society than that which exists at present, in terms of both the structure and nature of relationships between men and women. History revealed that such goal is only attainable through the bottom-up struggle of women's organizations. Some of the examples of strategic gender needs include removal of institutionalized forms of discrimination such as right to own land and property, access to credit, the establishment of political equality, freedom of choice over childbearing, and the adoption of adequate measures against male violence and control over women.

Unlike strategic gender needs, practical gender needs does not entail strategic goals such as women's emancipation or gender equality. Rather, they derive from the concrete conditions women experience in their engendered position within the sexual division of labor. These basic needs are required for human survival such as food, shelter and water. The problem is that although these needs are not unique to women, but shared collectively by all the family and particularly children, they are still identified specifically as practical gender needs of women both by policy makers and women themselves. As socioeconomic development priorities of intervening agencies conflate with practical

gender needs identified at the local level, planners come to believe goals of delivering women's needs as successfully met. This leaves women in a difficult situation to recognize and demand their strategic gender needs.

Regarding the gender interests in welfare state studies, feminist scholars have built on Esping-Andersen's previous work, emphasizing the improvement of the de-commodification dimension. Access to paid work reflects core gendered interests of women, since paid work is a principal avenue by which women have sought both to enhance their independence from husbands and fathers in families, thereby undermining the breadwinner-housewife family form, and to claim full status as "independent" citizens. It is also a prerequisite for gaining access to work-related benefits which decommodify labor. However, in order to understand gender interests beyond workers interests and paid work, augmentation of the concept of decommodification is not sufficient. Drawing a parallel with decommodification, Ruth Lister suggests "defamilialization" as a criterion for evaluating social rights, defined as "the degree to which individual adults can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living, independently of family relationships, either through paid work or social security provision".[35]

2.8. Gender in international development

So far this section has focused mainly on the literature concerning relationship between domestic welfare state and decisions about international development assistance from the perspectives of both mainstream and feminist welfare state scholarships. Before moving

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[35] Lister, R. 1994. "'She Has Other Duties'- Women, Citizenship and Social Security," in *Social Security and Social Change: New Challenges to the Beveridge Model*, edited by S. Baldwin and J. Falkingham. London, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

on to the next chapter which explains the methodological framework, this last part of the literature review intends to highlight gender as understood in the international development. While conceptualization of gender in the context of social relations analysis, as mentioned earlier, is familiar to those within the gender and development academia, the utility and relevance of the term has been subject to heated debate in policy and activist arena.

2.8.1. Women in Development (WID) Policies

In 1975 a whole decade for women's development was declared at the first UN Conference on Women and Development held in Mexico City. This period brought women's productive role into focus, separating away from the welfare approach rationale that roles within family including motherhood were the defining roles for women. This marked the beginning of series of WID policies. The equity approach is often referred to as the original WID approach. [36] Recognizing women as active participants in development, it aimed to gain equity for women in the development process. It was acknowledged that this would be realized by increasing women's access to paid employment and the market. This approach was criticized as being heavily influenced by Western feminism. As a result this led to a toned down equity approach or the second WID approach, i.e. the anti-poverty approach. The purpose of this approach was to ensure poor women better access to productive resources. Poverty, in this sense, was seen as stemming from underdevelopment rather than from the problem of subordination. This guided the policymakers to concentrate on small-scale income generating projects. The

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[36] Singhal, p. 170.

third WID approach is linked to the emergence of neoclassical structural adjustment programmes. The efficiency approach shifted its focus from women towards development, emphasizing on the adverse outcome of structural adjustment policies if women are left out from development or underutilized. The empowerment approach, the final of the WID paradigm, came from the Third World Women's feminist writing and grass-roots organizations. It aimed to empower women through self-reliance. This approach also viewed power relations or subordination as a racial problem relating to colonial and neocolonial oppression.

2.8.2. Gender and Development (GAD) Approach

Despite various successes in improving women's material condition, WID policies were much limited in bringing up women's social and economic power relative to men as a central issue. Dealing women in isolation was also recognized as not fully delivering the intentions of development. In fact, isolating women led to labeling women as a problem to be solved. Shift from the WID to GAD approach represented a reassessment of concepts, analysis, and approaches in gender policies. Most importantly, the importance of redistributing power in social relations came into recognition. While WID scholars put a great deal of emphasis on illuminating the productive contributions that women made to the economy, GAD scholars have focused on integrating women's unpaid care work within the domestic domain into mainstream analysis of the economy. GAD approach could be summarized as a people-centered approach, which "recognizes roles of women and men and emphasizes efforts to empower women and men in a way that transforms

society as a whole."[37] Since gender differences are shaped by ideological, historical, religious, ethnic, economic, cultural determinants, these also reveal class differences and difference between societies which are specific to each society.[38]

Although such paradigm shift was crucial in advancing gender in development context, GAD advocates' approach was not without its faults. In response to resistance against mainstreaming gender equity, GAD advocates produced carefully tailored training packages, guidelines, and methodological 'tool kits' for development decision-makers. Still, authorities failed to recognize gender as an important planning issue, since it was male that dominated decision making power in the organizations. The mainstreaming agenda, a dominant theme in gender and development circles in the 1990s, evolved from the 'integration' of women in development in the 1970s. It emphasized a push towards systematic procedures and mechanisms within organization for explicitly taking account of gender issues at all stages of policy-making and programme design and implementation. Feminists from the global South criticized the agenda as donor-driven, focusing on process and means rather than ends, and finally as a "technocratic discourse with no mention on the issues of power central to women's subordination". Southern activist women disapproved of the way gender has been deployed in development institutions, since it led to a depolitization of the term. In interpreting the concept of gender to suit institutional needs of policy makers, political content of information on women's interests were lost. Bureaucracies privileged certain kinds of information

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[37] Singhal, p. 174.
[38] Moser, C. O. N., "Gender Planning in Third World: Meeting Practical and Strategic Gender Needs," *World Development* 17(1), 1989

perceived relevant to dominant development paradigms and therefore left no room to accommodate consideration of the relational aspects of gender, of power and ideology and of how patterns of subordination were reproduced.

2.8.3. Conceptualizing empowerment

Here, I would like to introduce the concept of empowerment as it is closely related to the ultimate goal of gender transformative intervention. In the following chapters, this concept will be used to analyse institutions in both USAID and Sida programmes. More on the institutional framework will be discussed in the next chapter.

In the sense that both envision women's emancipation, strategic gender needs share some common grounds with strategic life choices in the concept of empowerment. Empowerment involves a process of change whereby those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such ability. However, not all choices carry equal amount of significance in terms of their consequences for people's lives. This is where first- and second-order choices are distinguished. The former is also referred to as strategic life choices; choices which are critical for people to live the lives they want. These are the choices critical to the processes of empowerment. They could include decisions over marriage and childbearing such as whether or who to marry and whether to have children. Second-order choices are partly framed by strategic life choices, but not as consequential as first-order choices in that they do not define the parameters of the quality of one's life. Taking these distinctions in first- and second-order choices into account, empowerment could be redefined as a process of acquiring the ability to make strategic life choices in a context where it was previously denied to do so. Empowerment also suggests having

alternatives, the ability to have chosen otherwise. The ability to exercise choice can be thought of in terms of three inter-related dimensions: resources, agency and achievements.

Resources are the pre-conditions required before a process is triggered. These include not only material, but also human and social resources acquired through social relationships. Access to such resources is defined by the rules and norms that govern distribution and exchange in different institutional contexts, which in turn gives authority to certain actors over others in determining those governing rules and norms.

The second dimension of power is related to agency, the ability to define one's goals and act upon them. This has to do with processes by which choices are made and put into effect. This is something beyond observable action, but a broad concept encompassing the meaning, motivation, and purpose individuals bring to their activity, i.e. their sense of agency, or 'the power within'. It can take both tangible and intangible forms such as bargaining, negotiation, deception, manipulation, subversion, resistance, cognitive processes of reflection and analysis. It can be exercised by individuals as well as by collectivities. Agency has both positive and negative meanings in relation to power. Positive sense of the 'power to' refers to people's capacity to define their own life-choices and to pursue their goals, even in the face of opposition from others. Negative sense of 'power over' implies the capacity of an actor or category of actors to over-ride agency of others possibly through use of coercion, threat, or violence.

Resources and agency together constitute what Sen calls 'capabilities' – the potential that people have for living the lives they want, of achieving valued ways of 'being and doing'. Hence, the third dimension, achievement, is about outcomes. Only

when the failure to achieve one's goals reflects some deeply rooted constraint on the ability to make choices can it be taken as a manifestation of disempowerment, not when it is related to laziness, incompetence or individual preferences and priorities.

3. Methodological framework: institutionalism

This chapter will first sketch the theories of feminist institutionalism, which is a new institutionalism with a gendered approach. Then, it will lay out what kind of institutions this paper intends to deal with in its case studies.

What are the standard hypotheses about the relationship between foreign aid and welfare states? Realists see foreign aid as a foreign policy instrument employed by donor states to pursue their national interests. For neo-Marxists, aid is a manifestation of colonialism and imperialism which helps reproduce capitalist relations between developed and developing countries. The liberalist tradition emphasizes the interactions between domestic politics such as national values and social forces and international relations. The examination of the relationship between welfare and development assistance policies confirms the liberal intuition that "state structure matters," and suggests that comparative politics can provide useful insights to account for foreign behavior. [39] Institutionalized principles such as universality function as causal mechanisms and help explain why welfare states act predictably in the international arena. Institutional factors capture the sociological dimension of political processes because they reproduce what, in a given society, stands as the legitimate or hegemonic consensus. Institutionalists do not deny the broad political forces that animate various theories of politics, but they point to the ways that institutions structure these battles and in so doing, influence their outcomes. As is shown with the case between domestic welfare policies and projecting foreign aid abroad, institutions promoting domestic and international

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[39] Noel and Therien, p. 548.

justice complement each other. In other words, institutionalism explains how domestic politics play a role in the definition of international cooperation.

3.1. Feminist institutionalism: Integrating new institutionalism with a gendered approach

This paper applies feminist institutionalism, a new variant of institutionalism, as an analytical framework. Before explaining a gendered approach to new institutionalism, it is necessary to first understand its key concepts. New institutionalism calls for a re-emphasis on institutions as a central explanatory variable in political analysis. It could be rephrased as institutional trends in mainstream political science taking 'the institutional turn'. It is also interpreted as an attempt to rebalance the structure agency scales 'back toward the former without losing important insights about the role and impact of political actors'. In other words, new institutionalism provides a useful framework to analyze the co-constitutive nature of politics, the interplay between institutions and actors. Through applying this framework, it is possible to capture the various ways in which actors bring about or resist change in institutions, without undermining the extent to which the nature of actors' behavior is shaped by institutions through the construction of rules, norms and policies.

Generally, new institutionalism has four different schools of thought: the historical, the rational choice, sociological (or organizational), and discursive (or constructivist) approaches. Aiming to apply a gendered lens to the new institutionalism and to prove that there exists an emergent feminist institutionalism, Mackay et. al focus on commonalities of these variants rather than the contentions between them. By

identifying these similarities, feminist institutionalism seeks to engage with both the strengths and limitations of existing paradigms. The authors identify four areas where variants of new institutionalism are commonly preoccupied with: namely, formal and informal institutions, perspectives on institutional origins, change and stability, structure and agency, and power. According to Mackay et. al, these core preoccupations of new institutionalism also converge with feminist political scientists' areas of interests. While identifying these core concepts from the perspectives of mainstream new institutionalism, authors focus mainly on the limitations of these concepts and how feminist political scientists can contribute to the field.[40]

3.1.1. Areas of convergence: Formal and information institutions

Institutions could be defined as 'the rules of the game in a society or … the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'.[41] Despite their differences, all of the new institutionalisms claim to pay attention to formal and informal institutions. However, in practice, new institutionalism seems to privilege formal institutions over informal ones in their theoretical as well as empirical studies.[42] It is only recently that informal institutions have come to take a more significant place in their research. Work on emphasizing the interplay between 'rules-in-form', i.e. formalized rules, and 'rules-in use', i.e. the do's and don'ts that actors learn on the ground, is one of the examples in the field. Then what insights can feminists bring into the field of formal and informal

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[40] Mackey, F., M. Kenny and L. Chappell, "New Institutionalism Through a Gender Lens: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism?" *International Political Science Review* 31(5), 2010, pp. 573-584.
[41] North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[42] Mackey et. al, pp. 573-584.

institutions? Feminist scholarship claims that only by acknowledging the gendered patterning of institutional rules and norms can new institutionalism scholars fully discern the nature and interplay of formal and informal institutions. Engendering institutionalism would reveal how men and women operating within these environments are differently affected by the interplay between both types of institutions. Moreover, it would be clearer to identify products of these institutions, such as the norms, rules, policies and laws. Since 'the rules of the game' have a gender bias, they prescribe (as well as proscribe) 'acceptable' masculine and feminine forms of behavior, rules and values for men and women within institutions. These, in turn, structure gendered assumptions in political and policymaking institutions, producing outcomes including policies, legislation and rulings influenced by gender norms. These outcomes again feed back into reproducing broader social and political gender expectations.

3.1.2.   Areas of convergence: Institutional origins, change and stability

What explanations do institutions provide for institutional origins, change and stability? Mackay et al. claim that it has been the central ambitions of institutionalists to answer these questions, although they have not been particularly successful.[43] Again it is only recently that scholars working in all four new institutionalism schools have moved towards more dynamic concepts of institutional change. For instance, historical institutionalisms have proposed 'the normal, everyday implementation and enactment of an institution' as the main driving force of institutional change, which stems from a 'realistic' conception of political institutions. This has generated new concepts relating to

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[43] Mackey et. al, pp. 573-584.

change such as layering (some elements of existing institutions are renegotiated but other elements remain), conversion (existing institutions are redirected to new purposes), drift (institutional arrangements are actively neglected or co-opted), and displacement (existing rules are discredited in favour of new institutions or logics). Analysts observe that these insights into a more dynamic concept of institutional change are also shared by other schools of thoughts such as sociological approach and discursive institutionalists. Such call for better or perhaps additional explanations of change seems to be met by contributions from feminist studies. Since a transformative agenda is at the core of feminist political science, the question is not limited to how institutions reproduce gendered power distributions, but also with how these institutions can be changed.

Mackay et. al introduces important insights of feminist approaches to institutional transformation that could assist NI to model causality. First, the gender relations and gender norms are part of the wider legacies and ongoing dynamics with which reform efforts must contend; second, gender relations and norms of masculinity and femininity provide important mechanisms by which particular arrangements and power asymmetries are naturalized and institutionalized, or resisted and discarded; and third, changes to the structuring of gender relations are important potential causes for broader institutional change.[44]

3.1.3. Areas of convergence: Structure and agency

The co-constitutive relationship between structure and agency has already been highlighted above as one of the main analytic concerns of new institutionalism. Although

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[44] Mackey et. al, pp. 573-584.

the structure agency question is still an ongoing issue, new approaches to explaining institutional changes outlined in the previous section point to an emerging framework which posit structure and agency as a dynamic relationship. This is realized by injecting more structure at the 'front end' of the analysis of institutional change and development, meaning explaining how structures limit actors' choices at critical junctures, as well as injecting agency into the 'back end' of these arguments, emphasizing the ways in which institutions operate both as constraints as well as strategic resources for actors through dynamic processes of daily contestation. Structure and agency is understood as a dynamic relationship between 'institutional architects, institutionalized subjects and institutional environments' where agency is understood to involve strategic, creative and intuitive action as well as calculating self-interest.[45] Here, in order to complete the framework, feminist political scientists would insert the term 'gendered' in front of every 'institutional'.

3.1.4. Areas of convergence: Power

The conceptualization of power is perhaps one of the weakest areas of new institutionalism, and where a feminist institutionalist approach could fill in the most. There has been some recent work, particularly in the field of historical institutionalism, to examine a more dynamic way of institutional power relations. Still, the implications of specific gender power relations have been ignored. Feminists view gender relations as an inevitable power relations, and are, therefore, political, extending beyond formal 'public' structures, for instance, paid work, to include 'private' structures, such as the family.

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[45] Hay, C. and D. Wincott, "Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism," *Political Studies 46*, 1998, p. 952.

Connell's conception of gender regime as the patterns of gender relations within a particular institution is useful here.[46] Gender regime, then corresponds to a set of wider social patterns, known as the gender order.

Despite such sophisticated theoretical work on gender, feminists still seem to have gaps on empirical gender research. It is this gap which precisely opens up possibilities for a dialogue between feminist political science and mainstream new institutionalism, and eventually an emergent feminist institutionalism. Regarding the conceptualization of power, new institutionalism and feminist political science share an understanding that seemingly neutral institutional processes and practices are in fact embedded in hidden norms and values, privileging certain groups over others. In other words, both recognize that institutions reflect and reinforce asymmetrical power relations. Moreover, these institutional power relations are perceived as deeply historical and constantly evolving. Such emphasis on the historicity of power relations implies that they are exposed to and affected by agency, change, resistance and transformation. In short, new institutionalism research is gender blind, while feminist political science, albeit its institutional focus, does not use new institutional theory. Thus, integrating both feminist and institutional theory generates an emergent feminist institutionalist approach.

To sum up, above review directs our attention to a developing feminist institutionalism which operates across four different schools of new institutionalism. While new institutionalism is prepared to offer useful tools and frameworks such as concepts like layering, conversion, drift, and displacement, feminist political science

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[46] Connell, R.W. 1994. Gender Regimes and the Gender Order in *The Polity Reader in Gender Studies*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

establishes gender as a crucial dimension in the study, enhancing the understanding of the interaction between institutions and institutional actors. Although it is premature to discern at this stage, it is anticipated that a gendered perspective would not only enrich new institutionalism, but potentially transform it, challenging the gendered foundations of mainstream institutional theory.

3.2. Institutions to be dealt with in this paper

As discussed above, new institutionalism is an appropriate framework to capture the interplay between institutions and actors. Stemming from this view, this paper will first focus on the structure of development projects in the chosen case studies, that is, the processes of development interventions from design, implementation to monitoring and evaluation. Secondly, it will look at the hierarchical system of decision-making bodies. In any development project, various actors are involved throughout the processes, and how these actors engage in each stage would provide some clue to the research question. Lastly, I intend to include the gender perspective by looking at the dimensions of empowerment, i.e. resources, agency and achievement. These three types of institutions will provide guidance to comparing the two case studies.

4. Case Studies

4.1. Ethiopia: Fixed local realities

According to the World Bank data, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Sub-Saharan Africa with a population of approximately 85 million. The country is one of the poorest in the world with annual per capita income of 380 US dollars as of 2012.[47] Diversity could be an appropriate term to describe the country, as this feature extends from ethnicity, religion and culture to environment and agro ecological zones. In terms of ethnic diversity, the country is home to more than 85 ethnic groups, and represents most major world religions as well as animist belief systems.[48] Due to ecological diversity, farming systems vary dramatically around the country. Agriculture plays a central role in the economic development of Ethiopia. 80 percent live in rural areas and subsist principally on agriculture. Only 6 percent of land is currently irrigated. There are weak market linkages on both the input and output sides.

Regarding formal institutions promoting gender equality, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has a well structured mechanism for women's affairs (Ministry of Women's Affairs). MOWA has principle responsibility for supporting ministries (Woman's Affairs Departments) and local governments through the Women's Affaris Bureaux (WAB) and Women's Affairs Offices (WAO) at the regional and Woreda levels respectively. Although the structure is comprehensive, MOWA is fairly new and not to date been particularly strong. In terms of funding, donors have been major sources.

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[47] The World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia
[48] Kumar, N. and A. R. Quisumbing, "Policy Reform toward Gender Equality in Ethiopia," IFPRI Discussion Paper, 2012

Despite the formal arrangements, conventional norms related to property ownership, inheritance, and the division of assets after divorce display major gender disparities. In Ethiopia women do almost half of the labor required for agricultural production. Despite this women have been left out of the formal agriculture extension process and the formal structures for rural development. By preventing women equal access to agriculture extension advice, inputs and financial credit, household food insecurity has been exacerbated. A research on contested identities of women farmers in Ethiopia states that throughout Ethiopia, both within government bureaus and communities, the term 'farmer' is used synonymously with the word for 'man'. It is clear that whether rural women contribute to the process of agricultural production to a greater or lesser extent, they are generally perceived as marginal players, particularly by those individuals with significant influence on development activities such as bureau heads, development agents and peasant associations.

While progress toward gender equality has been slow in Ethiopia, there have been some developments at the beginning of last decade. Prior to 2000, legal reform had a limited impact on local traditions regarding patrimonial issues. For example, although the 1960 Civil Code gave women more rights than their contemporaries in the United States or United Kingdom, it also maintained the tradition of dispute settlement by personal arbitrators, normally older men within the family or community selected by the disputants. The arbitrators, unfamiliar with or unsympathetic to the new laws, continued to apply old customary laws, as a result favoring men in the decisions. The de jure system had nothing

to do with the de facto reality that existed for the next 30 years.[49] The major exception was the distribution and control of land, an area in which the Ethiopian state has played a dominant role throughout the centuries. In 2000, however, the revised Family Code was passed, giving equal rights to spouses during the conclusion, duration, and dissolution of marriage. It also required equal division of all assets between the husband and wife upon divorce.[50] As of 2011, all regions now apply the revised Family Code.[51] In 2003, the Ethiopian government also embarked on a process of community-based land registration, which led to joint certification of husbands and wives, giving stronger land rights to women.

A research on these two policy reforms in Ethiopia found that different policy reforms, i.e. the land registration process and the reform of the Family Code, may have mutually reinforcing effects on women's rights and welfare. Ethiopia is one of many developing countries devoted to promoting gender equality. The important development objective of closing the gender gap may be complemented with other development goals including policy reforms.

To sum up the opportunities and constraints that Ethiopia presents regarding the enabling environment for gender transformative agenda, women's machinery such as Ministry of Women's Affairs and legal arrangements such as revised Family Code 2002 and community-based land registration could be seen as possible opportunities. However, constraints persist in that MOWA is weak in its political strength and conventional norms

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[49] Kumar and Quisumbing, p. 2.
[50] Kumar and Quisumbing, p. 2.
[51] Kumar and Quisumbing, p. 2.

disadvantaging women are still there to be won over.

4.2. The Sida

> Gender equality is central to Sweden's development cooperation. Gender equality is achieved when women and men, girls and boys, have equal rights, conditions, opportunities and power to shape their own lives and affect society. It is about fair distribution of power, influence and resources in everyday life and society.[52]

Sweden's international policy for gender equality has four main areas, as identified in the 2007 Budget Bill: the political participation of women, economic empowerment of women, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and lastly, women's security, including combating all forms of gender-based violence and human trafficking. Over these four thematic priority areas, women's empowerment is the cross-cutting issue. Recognizing women's empowerment as a multi-dimensional process, it is stated that interventions in one area will often have impact on others. Sida understands and explicitly mentions the concept of empowerment as a process defined by Kabeer in previous literature review section.[53] While noting the importance of women's economic empowerment for overall development, it acknowledges that market forces alone – which tend to reinforce existing deep seated inequalities – will not necessarily lead to women's empowerment. It gives special attention to women's overwhelming responsibility for unpaid reproductive work,

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[52] Sida www.sida.se/en
[53] Kabeer, N., "Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women's Empowerment," *Development and Change* 30, 1999, pp. 435-464.

less access to education and training and inequality under the law. Simply put, women may have increased access to land, jobs and credit in ways that are demeaning and exploitative and do nothing to change their subordinate status in the household.

According to the Sida definition, working towards gender equality in Sida's work and interventions through mainstreaming can take place by the following three measures: actively applying and integrating the gender perspective, targeting specific groups or issues, conducting a gender-aware dialogue with partners. The Sida Amhara Rural Development Programme (SARDP) is a case representing a successful implementation of such mainstreaming approach overall. Mainstreaming gender equality has been considered essential in all parts of Swedish development cooperation since 1996 when Gender in Development approach was adopted by the Swedish Parliament.

4.2.1. The Sida Amhara Rural Development Programme (SARDP)[54]

SARDP was globally one of the Sida's largest programs, receiving approximately 900 million SEK over its twelve years of operation from 1997 to 2008. The program is selected by Sida as a successful case combining targeting and integration of gender and dialogue with partners through large involvement of local government gender agencies in program design and decision-making.

Starting from only 2 in the beginning stage in 1997, SARDP expanded to operate in all 30 Woredas in two zones (South Wollo and East Gojam). At the beginning of the final phase, population of these 30 Woredas was approximately 4.4 million. As the

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[54] Cathy R. Franworth, et. al, *Gender aware approaches in agricultural programmes – Ethiopia country report: A special study of the Sida-Amhara Rural Development Programme (SARDP III) and the work of selected agencies in Ethiopia*, 2010, Sida.

project built the capacity of the regional government, it had potential indirect effects on the 18 million people living in Amhara. Overall in Phase 3, it aimed to contribute to poverty reduction of the Amhara Region by improving the food security conditions of the population in 30 Woredas of East Gojjam and South Wollo. It was an integrated rural development program with following four pillars: Agricultural and Natural Resource Management (ANRM); Infrastructure and Social Service Development (ISSD); Economic Diversification (EDC), and; Decentralization.

In terms of partner ownership, SARDP illustrated a best practice. The program in itself was implemented by the regional government of Amhara with technical support from the Sida. Compared with programs with less diversified approaches, large partner ownership was found to achieve more sustainable gender outcomes. Through the SARDP technical team, the Sida voiced influence in dialogue with the regional government, which led to important results such as the inclusion of the WAB and the Women's Affairs Offices in all decision making bodies. The project supported the strengthening of the WAB/WAO in their role of gender mainstreaming and training in all government bureaus.

The program has been effective in keeping with the four pillars Sweden's international policy for gender equality. First, women's political participation is both seen as an end in itself as well as a means to an end, as increased participation in this field is connected with greater reflection of women's needs and priorities in community, regional and national policy and planning. Women's forums and women's associations were widely established. These gatherings were proven very important in giving women experience and confidence in leadership, especially since women's self esteem in the

region visited was much affected by early marriage and limited access to education. It was found that more women trusted the Social Courts, intervention designed to address non-criminal complaints at the community level, as shown evident from increasing participation. To see if increased participation made real difference in the kinds of decisions made, a more in-depth study would be required.

As for women's economic empowerment, SARDP assured women were 39 percent of beneficiaries in the economic diversification projects. Women also received 47 percent of the decentralized community development funds (CDF). An important intervention was implementing equal land title with men and legally enforcing it in case of divorce. This gave women access to and control over these critical resources. Moreover, the program sought to reduce reproductive workload through strategic investments in water and fuel efficient stoves and by promoting greater sharing of reproductive work load with men. This allowed women time for more profitable activities. Infrastructure development such as provision of roads also contributed to bringing buyers closer to women farmers as well as decreased time spent at markets. It is assessed that the integrated approach of SARDP has been the most effective in recognizing the complexity of women's economic empowerment.

Although women's sexual and reproductive rights were not targeted in the project, it indirectly helped to promote this area. Through the establishment of health posts, people had increased access to pre/post natal care and family planning. Sustainable and community based approach to eliminating harmful traditional practices (HTP), particularly early marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM), were implemented. For

both cases, monitoring of the changes has not been systemized, although stakeholders' perceptions generally agreed that things have relatively improved. For example, one Woreda reported early marriages had dropped from 570 to 28 in the 2 years the HTP Commission was working.

Addressing HTP also improved women's security, which is the fourth pillar. Through strategies to promote girl school attendance and to promote girl-friendly, secure school environment, the program managed to raise awareness with families and communities. Girl club in schools provided peer support to girls at risk and an early warning system was linked to responsible adults. Girls' dormitories were also opened up for preparatory studies. SARDP also supported a local university study on HTP to provide reliable information and raise awareness.

All in all, the Sida recognizes the importance of addressing formal as well as informal power structures. Formal structures include political participation and pursuit of legal rights. Informal structures refer to attitudes, behaviors and social norms. The Sida gender policy asserts the necessity of changing power relations, and that these begin in the home. SARDP is a good case demonstrating the Sida's policy that changes in social norms must go in tandem with legal equality. It is perceived that community conversations involving both men and women community leaders, as well as exchanges in women's forums and training have led to smoother implementation of joint land titling and sharing of women's reproductive workload. Although it is intangible and unmeasurable due to the lack of systemized monitoring, there is still evidence of a new attitude that equality and cooperation between women and men is a formula for

improving the family.

4.3. USAID

Based on its years of previous work, USAID released its new policy on gender equality and female empowerment in 2011. The policy aims to harvest following three overarching outcomes: first, to reduce gender disparities in access to, control over and benefit from resources, wealth, opportunities and services – economic, social, political, and cultural; second, to reduce gender-based violence and mitigate its harmful effects on individuals and communities; third, to increase capability of women and girls to realize their rights, determine their life outcomes, and influence decision-making in households, communities, and societies.

The agency understands gender equality to mean something more than parity in numbers or laws on the book, to embrace expanding freedoms and improving overall quality of life. Gender equality should be accompanied by changes in attitudes, behaviors, roles and responsibilities at home, in the workplace, and in the community, ensuring that quality is not reached at with any cost of gains for males or females.

The concept of empowerment is also similar to how it is perceived in the Sida. It is about the process of acquiring the power to act freely, exercise their rights, and fulfill their potential as full and equal members of society. It echoes Kabeer's conceptualization, referring to the agency dimension, as empowerment coming from within (the power to), as well as the resource dimension of empowerment, as influenced by cultures, societies, and institutions that facilitate or undermine the possibilities for empowerment.

USAID recognizes the importance of addressing the issues of roles and power

relations between men and women on an ongoing basis, as these affect how an activity is implemented. With this in mind, it appoints the gender integration approach to identify and address gender inequalities through each project stage from design, implementation to monitoring and evaluation.

4.3.1. Financing women-owned SMEs[55]

The Development Credit Authority (DCA) is a flexible tool that allows USAID to mobilize local financing through the US Treasury-backed partial credit guarantees to underserved markets. In September 2008, USAID signed a DCA Agreement with the Bank of Abyssinia (BOA), the third largest in the country, to offer loan financing assistance specifically targeting women entrepreneurs and Diaspora members. To briefly look at the background of the program, the African Growth and Opportunity Act was enacted in May 2000 to assist and encourage the economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and to improve economic relations between the US and the region, of which Ethiopia was a beneficiary. In support of the AGOA legislation, USAID solicited proposals to facilitate trade-led job creation in Ethiopia in partnership with the private sector and the Government of Ethiopia. The AGOA program was awarded to Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA) and its implementing partner, International Executive Service Corps (IESC), in July 2005. Main activities of the VEGA AGOA+ program including building trade capacity and export promotion for firms, strengthening institutional capacity for business membership organizations and government agencies; and promoting access to finance – first through investment finance from the global Diaspora, followed

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[55] Heather Kipnis, *Financing women-owned SMEs: A cast study in Ethiopia*, 2013, USAID

by loan finance through USAID's DCA loan guarantee program. Given that limited access to markets, growth financing, and technical knowledge are major barriers to expansion for women entrepreneurs, particular focus was placed on women-owned SMEs.

In Ethiopia, women represent up to 30 percent of all small and medium enterprise (SMEs) owners. Despite the lack of current data on the SME sector, the Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency reports that women own 73.5 percent of microenterprises, 13.7 percent of small enterprises in manufacturing industries, 14 and 30 percent of medium and large enterprises in industrial activities. Yet women-owned SMEs have reported a 78 percent failure rate due to particular disadvantages in meeting their business growth needs, ranging from the inability to secure loans from formal lenders such as commercial banks, poor managerial skills, low levels of education, and limited access to networking opportunities and information. What exacerbates these challenges is a cultural bias that lending to women is too risky based on the perception that women do not run businesses as effectively as men. Such biases arise from embedded social norms that prevent Ethiopian commercial banks from seeing women-owned SMEs as a significant, viable, and profitable market segment.

The USAID DCA Agreement with BOA included a guarantee, which was in addition to DCA Agreements previously signed with three other Ethiopian commercial banks, Awash, Dashen, and Nib International, targeting Diaspora members and SMEs in manufacturing, agriculture, and tourism. Prior to the DCA guarantee for women-owned SMEs, BOA was already lending to SMEs and was a DCA partner for lending to agricultural SMEs. Executive management supported the idea of lending to women-

owned SMEs as an expansion of its existing portfolio with the same terms and conditions. BOA was selected as partner bank for the DCA guarantee targeting women-owned SMEs, given BOA's demonstration as an effective partner in terms of utilization and development impact and its interest in women entrepreneurs as a target market. The DCA Agreements were designed to mitigate the perceived risk of lending to Diaspora and women entrepreneurs by supplying a 50 percent risk-sharing mechanism to cover defaults. In exchange, banks also lowered or eliminated burdensome collateral requirements for loans up to 17.12 million US dollars. By guaranteeing up to 4.3 million US dollars in loans over seven years with an average tenor of two years and average size of 40,000 US dollars, USAID hoped to demonstrate to BOA and the larger banking community that women-owned SMEs are a viable and profitable sector. The guarantee was also meant to accelerate income and employment generation, complementing USAID's activities in trade and investment and private sector competitiveness with the AGOA+ program.

In order to drive synergy effects, technical support for women-owned SME beneficiaries was also provided coupled with the VEGA AGOA+ program. This sought to address the problem of the human capital gap and gender imbalance of information faced by women in many developing countries, which in turn contribute to the idea that women are unbankable. Activities included training to improve management and strategic planning skills, business counseling services such as feasibility studies, market analysis and due diligence support in the course of the loan approval process, and facilitation of market linkages to international markets. In addition, loan packaging and applicant screening to participating banks was also provided. Finally, the VEGA AGOA+ program

worked to improve women's association capabilities so they could provide business development services after the program's completion.

The program ended in September 2011 and is now being managed by an Africa-focused asset management and investment advisory firm. The DCA Agreement is assessed as a stepping stone towards a culture change in the financial sector toward women borrowers. The DCA guarantee has positively influenced the perception of women's capacity as clients by initiating a commercial bank's involvement in the women-owned SME market. Although a demonstration effect cannot be directly attributed to the DCA Agreement, available research on the interviews with stakeholders suggest that the DCA Agreement was a result of Women's Entrepreneurship Group (WEG)'s, local women's entrepreneurship network. Due to the lobbying efforts to the United States Embassy and USAID, the program has sparked a broader sectoral interest in women-owned SMEs. Financial institutions are more open to conversations regarding women's access to finance. Some banks, such as Awash, Nib, and CBE, are supplying separate tellers for female customers. According to the Center for African Women Economic Empowerment (CAWEE), some banks are hiring gender experts. Finally, there has been as a successful launch of Bank Enat, a new commercial bank focused solely on the needs of woman.

5. Findings

5.1. Structure of a development project: From design, implementation to monitoring and evaluation

Figure 1. Processes of the Sida Amhara Rural Development Program

Design
- Explicitly mentions concept of empowerment
- Recognizes the importance of addressing formal and informal power structures
- To promote strategic & practical gender needs of women farmers

Implementation
- Women-friendly extension services
- Land-titling program
- Credit program

Evaluation
- Not clear due to a lack of gender-sensitive data
- Anecdotal evidence on notable behavioral change

Monitoring
- Lack of a coherent monitoring and evaluation framework

Figure 2. Processes of the USAID Financing Women-owned SMEs

Design
- Explicitly mentions empowerment concept
- Explicitly mentions the issues of power relations
- To mitigate perceived risk of lending to women entrepreneurs

Implementation
- Credit program
- Technical assistance

Evaluation
- Women have comparatively low default rate

Monitoring
- Demonstrated that women are credit worthy (BOA report)

As shown above in figures 1 and 2, both agencies, the Sida and the USAID, share similar understanding and conceptualization of gender equality, women's empowerment and gender mainstreaming approach at the design stage. Both explicitly claim gender equality as central to development objectives. The idea of fair distribution of power is discussed in each case. Both emphasize the dimension of choice, to be given alternative options in decision-making and shaping their own lives. The notion of freedom is also shared by both agencies, how gender equality is about expanding freedoms in the case of USAID, and how empowerment is about the process of acquiring the power to act freely in the case of the Sida. As for the approaches, both emphasize the importance of integrating the gender perspective throughout the project, from design and implementation to monitoring and evaluation. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, the case of Sida, being a larger scale of a project, lacks a systemized way of collecting data, whereas a relatively smaller scale of USAID had a monitoring reported by BOA.

5.2. Actors: Hierarchy of decision-making bodies

Figure 3. Decision-making system of the Sida project

Figure 4. Decision-making system of the USAID project

In terms of decision-making players at these two cases, it is easily detectable from above figures that there is much heavier involvement of government in the case of Sida's project. The Amhara Regional Government approved a regional gender mainstreaming strategy in late 2009. The strategy provides a framework to enable all government institutions to mainstream gender in their work. It mandates the Women's Affairs Bureau (WAB) to review plans and reports and provide advice on how to better integrate gender issues/capacity building support. The WAB is empowered to report progress to the Regional Council on a regular basis. The Regional Council can institute penalties for lack of progress. However, the WAB and its structures at district level are weak and require capacity development themselves if they are to provide adequate evaluation and capacity development services to the government offices. The WAB requires the 'soft skills' of communication and negotiation in order to put across its messages and work effectively

with sector staff. Designated by each government sector, gender focal points present information on how their respective sectors are mainstreaming gender. These include the strategies used, the reception of these gender mainstreaming efforts by administration and general staff of the sector, the outcome of these strategies, including their pros and cons, and any further action taken. Although gender focal points are very passionate and committed individuals, there is a major weakness in utilizing these key resources. Gender focal points operate at the fourth administrative level, the bottom rank in the decision-making hierarchies of the governmental structures. This greatly affects their ability to influence the decision-making system in widely distributing their gender expertise harvested at the field level.

In the case of USAID's project, although government is at the highest rank of decision-making hierarchy and one of the partners of USAID, the private financial sector played the most significant role. Considering that it was the Bank of Abyssinia that actually signed USAID's DCA agreement, the main actor in the project could be viewed as BOA and its broader banking community. Apart from a strong private sector participant, it is also worth noting the presence of Women's Entrepreneurship Group (WEG), a local women's entrepreneurship network. WEG could be compared to gender focal points in SARDP in that they remain at the bottom level of decision-making hierarchies. However, WEG could be seen to have more direct relationship with the main actor of the project.

5.3. Gender: Dimensions of empowerment

The last type of institutions to be analyzed is the dimensions of empowerment. In terms

of resources provided to the women, the two cases present similar findings including credit and human network. However, there are key differences to be discussed concerning the dimensions of agency and achievement. As seen below, figures 5 and 6 present how women's empowerment was changed or affected by each project.

In case of the Sida's project, through participation in women's forum groups and gender analysis group, women experienced more strength added to their voice. Women's forums and gender analysis groups are innovative methodologies developed by SARDP at the community level to involve both women and men farmers and to strengthen their agency. Women's forums aim to develop women's voice, particularly with respect to extension requirements and consist of only women members. It is about empowering farming women to ask for their rights to benefit from the programme. It has been reported that sometimes their voice has become so strong to the point that the women's associations organized at kebele (lowest level of administration) by the Women's Affairs Bureau have felt threatened. Women's forum is seen as an example of successful bottom up approach to empower women.

A similar methodology is the gender analysis groups, which aims to lead behavioral change among male farmers. Including almost 10,000 men and 10,000 women, gender analysis training covered almost 90 percent of target woredas (third administrative level) in two intervention zones. This led to the creation of 178 gender conversation groups. Under the guidance of Sida staffs and Women Affairs Office experts, these groups discussed classic gender analysis within households: who does what in production, reproduction and in the community, and decision-making patterns and ownership of

resources. Farmers were asked to analyze themselves and when they had come up with results, they were then asked to make decision for the next step. While facilitators only played a supporting role, the community identified the problems themselves as well as the solutions. This also led to other positive impacts such as female-headed households benefiting because taboos on ploughing, harvesting and threshing were alleviated. They experienced an increase in income through doing work themselves rather than paying for laborers, sharecropping or renting their land to wealthier households. In some cases women reported that they started to control more household resources and men have decreased expenditure on personal consumption like alcohol. All in all, women felt increased self-esteem and confidence to speak up.

In case of USAID's project, impact at the agency dimension was only limited to technical assistance. This is linked to viewing women as a consumer, customer and a buyer and in the background of such view is the idea that women are tools to be used in order to broaden the horizon of private financial sector's customer pool. This is confirmed by the achievement dimension. Although both cases witnessed behavioral or perception change, in case of the USAID, this was limited to viewing women as credit worthy. In case of the Sida's project, it is assessed that it effectively recognized the complexity of women's economic empowerment and reaped success in causing men to question their cultural norms, although evidence is anecdotal.

Figure 5. Gender empowerment in the Sida's project

Resources
Land, credit,
human network

Empowerment

Agency
Women's
forums, gender
analysis groups
(increased voice,
participation)

Achievements
Behavioral
change

Figure 6. Gender empowerment in the USAID's project

Resources
Credit, human
network

Empowerment

Agency
Technical
assistance
(greater
confidence)

Achievements
Perception
change

5.4. The relevance of the welfare state regime types of Sweden and the US

Here, at the last section of the findings, we return to the main research question of the paper. The main findings of the paper revealed that despite the shared values on gender equality and women's empowerment, the Sida and USAID projects showed contrasting results in terms of arrangements toward women's economic empowerment. How can this difference be explained?

From a mainstream welfare state scholarship, the US and Swedish cases each represent a liberal model and a social democratic model of Esping-Andersen's welfare state regimes. In terms of the effect of decommodification, which indicates the quality of social rights, the US is worst off while Sweden enjoys it in its fullest extent. The concept of decommodification, however, was criticized by feminist scholarship as counting participation in wage-labor as a condition for emancipation, at the same time presupposing a support-system of unwaged work outside the labor market. Through highlighting the importance of family and establishing care as women's work, gender analysts proposed reorganization of the welfare state variations with reference to the informal unpaid care-work. In the US, women's rising employment and the advances women have made into the upper ranks of the labor force were largely market-driven. This allowed only some proportion of women to benefit from private provision of services, while others suffered from the low wages and benefits of the lower rungs of the service sector in the US. Thus, liberalism emphasized social class divisions. In Sweden, the notion of dual earner household was extended, reinforcing work opportunities for

women, although equal employment for women made most progress in the state sector. Following this view, it was seen that social democracy subsumed sectoral conflicts in relation to paid employment.

The USAID program financing women-owned SMEs was largely focusing on the potential of women as significant, viable and profitable market segment. From a broader frame, assisting women entrepreneurs was a strategy to vitalize the financial sector and exploit the underserved market in order to boost trade-led job creation in Ethiopia. The program targeted the 30 percent of women who own small and medium enterprises, and therefore, are potential clients of the bank. As for the Sida's SARDP, it recognized the complexity of women's economic empowerment and asserted the necessity of changing power relations, which should begin in the realm of family within home. From this viewpoint, the USAID program showed liberalist, market-driven arrangements toward women's economic empowerment. On the other hand, the Sida program emphasized a dual earner household model, recognizing the importance of unpaid household and care work.

6. Conclusion

6.1. Limitations and further implications

This study has limitations in that it focused on one case study for each state of welfare state regime types and so has difficulty of generalizing the findings to the cluster-level. Another main limitation is that for the data required to analyze the processes of development projects and assessments, it relied on the official documents of the respective organization, i.e. USAID and Sida. There was little information on the actual reception of the program from the recipient country's point of view. As pointed out above, the official reports of the organizations reflected on the lack of systemized monitoring and evaluation processes.

In spite of these limitations, however, this paper provides a meaningful evaluation that outcomes of development interventions which seek to mainstream gender could depend on factors beyond conceptualization of gender. It also provided evidence that the mainstream analysis of the relationship between the domestic welfare state and international development assistance can also be applied even when reinterpreted from a feminist perspective.

More importantly, it throws a new question whether claims of gender equality and women's empowerment promoted by development agencies are mere rhetoric that hovers around the international atmosphere without being institutionalized in the local setting, failing to exert any influence over pre-existing institutional ties between the domestic welfare state and international development assistance. This question could be put in other words: given that ties exist between domestic welfare state variations and

international development assistance, could gender balanced policies be institutionalized in a mutually reinforcing way in both donors and recipients ends? As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of Beijing Women's Conference 1995, strategies to institutionalizing gender balanced policies throughout different processes of intervention as well as among main actors still remain a major assignment in the field of development.

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요약 (국문초록)

젠더 전환적 개발 협력이란 한 사회에 깊게 뿌리내려 있는 제약 조건들에 대한 도전을 목표로 한다. 인과 결과에 대한 가정을 바탕으로 한 변화 이론은 어떠한 개발 협력 프로그램이 젠더에 대한 개념을 사회적 관계와 성에 따른 파워의 균형을 반영하는 것으로 이해했을 경우 젠더 주류화가 성공적으로 이루어질 것이라고 함축하고 있다. 여기서 성공적이란 그 결과가 한 사회에 있어 어느 정도 전환적인 영향력을 갖는다는 것을 뜻한다.

본 논문에서는 그렇다면, 젠더에 대해 같은 개념을 갖고 있는 두 개의 개발 협력 프로그램이 왜 서로 다른 결과를 얻게 되는지 페미니스트 제도주의를 분석틀로 사용하여 연구해보고자 한다. 사례 연구로 미국 국제개발처 (USAID) 및 스웨덴 국제개발협력청(Sida)의 이디오피아 프로그램을 각각 살펴봄으로써, 본 연구는 현지 상황에서 더 나아가 그 초점을 수원국에서 공여국으로 옮기고자 노력했다. 그 과정에서 복지 국가에 대한 향상된 이해가 어떻게 국내 복지 정책과 국제 개발 협력의 관계를 연결시켜 주는지 살펴보았다.

연구 결과, 미국 사례의 경우 에스핑 엔더슨(Esping-Andersen)의 복지국가 유형 중 자유주의적 모델을, 스웨덴 사례는 사회민주적 복지국가 모델을 따르는 것으로 나타났다. 각 복지국가 유형 별로 하나의 사례만을 살펴보았다는 것에 그 한계가 있지만, 그럼에도 불구하고 젠더 주류화를

목표로 하는 개발 협력 프로그램의 성공 여부가 단순히 젠더에 대한 올바른 이해와 개념화에만 달려있는 것이 아닌, 그 외 다른 요소들의 영향을 받을 수 있다는 것을 드러냈다는 데에 본 연구의 의의가 있다. 또한 국내 복지 정책과 국제 개발 협력간에 관계에 대한 주류 분석이 페미니스트 관점에서 재해석 되었을 때에도 적용될 수 있다는 것을 증명하였다. 국내 복지 정책과 국제 개발 협력 정책간에 연결 고리가 있다는 사실은 더 중요한 질문으로 이어질 수 있겠다. 바로 젠더 정책이 어떻게 하면 공여국과 수원국에서 상호 간에 균형적으로 제도화 되어갈 수 있는가에 대한 질문이다.