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교육학석사학위논문

From Genocide to Development
- A Study on Collective Learning Process
of Gasi-ri Village, Jeju, Korea -

2013년 2월

서울대학교 대학원
협동과정 글로벌교육협력전공
고 혁 준

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이 논문을 교육학석사 학위논문으로 제출함

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Abstract

**From Genocide to Development:
A study on collective learning process of
Gasi-ri Village, Jeju, Korea**

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Through the case study of the reconstruction process of *Gasi-ri* village, this research examines the process of and motivation for collective learning in community development. Although the village was burned to the ground and more than 300 people were branded as communists and massacred by the government in 1948, the village was successfully reconstructed and received “The Best New Village Award” in the 1970s.

In order to analyze the historical singularity of *Gasi-ri* village in the perspective of learning, this study introduces Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) as a conceptual framework. By conceptualizing humans’ object-oriented behaviors as an act of learning, CHAT enables us to capture everyday activities in the context of learning. In this regard, the villagers’ interaction which occurred in the process of village reconstruction is analyzed as a collective learning system that continues to create expansive activities. Meanwhile, the central pillar of the village’s historical singularity is the memory of genocide caused by the *Jeju 4.3 Incident*. Since the relationship between the genocidal experience and village reconstruction has been raised as a crucial factor during the data collection process, this study analyzes the history of the village

based on the collective memory theory, which deals with memory and identity at the group level. With these theoretical backgrounds, the researcher conducts in-depth interview and participant observation. The results of the study are as follows.

Firstly, the village reconstruction of *Gasi-ri* can be seen as a collective learning process. The first stage of group learning occurs when a group member shares a common objective from their inner necessity. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, the discovery of economic crops which are suitable to cultivate in the village served as a momentum of common objective sharing, and the crops were identified by the “*Gasi-ri* 1.5th generation,” who mainly led all of the rebuilding activities since the early 1950s. The 1.5th generation was a few educated people who survived the genocide by virtue of their young age and they played a central role in rebuilding the village with their distinctive responsibilities. By introducing modern economic food processing techniques such as those for making sliced potato and dried slice radish, they made it possible for the villagers to set the common objective of increasing income through the mass production of economic crops. Since then, the villagers began to forge a collective learning system under a common objective. In order to realize effective mass production, they divided production, distribution, and parenting tasks according to their roles in the village. In addition, they established several sub-organizations such as the Youth Association, Men and Women’s Association, and Agricultural Cooperative to systematically implement each role, while the village’s general assembly decided on the ground rules of co-production and co-sale to respond to external commodity price fluctuations. Through this interaction process, the villagers not only learned the knowledge and skills necessary for increasing income, but also established a collective learning system that enabled them to improve their circumstances. Once the system was established, it contributed to establishment of new future objectives, not to mention the overcoming of immediate difficulties. In the early 1970s, for instance, the villagers determined to pave new mountainous road for improving the distribution of goods despite the fact that they had already achieved considerable improvement in terms of income and standard of living. In this determination, the group’s enhanced ability to learn caused by the establishment of collective learning system was heavily affected. As a result of sustained collective learning activities, the community of *Gasi-ri* village achieved

economic prosperity. Furthermore, by being recognized by the state, they could recover their self-esteem, which was severely damaged following the *4.3 Incident*.

Secondly, the genocidal memory of the *Jeju 4.3 Incident* heavily influenced the motivation of collective learning in the village. During the field study and in-depth interview processes, the researcher found that most of the villagers had an ambivalent attitude about the *4.3 incident*. It seems to be related to the contradiction caused by the recognition gap between the past-self and the present-self. Specifically, the villagers' past-selves are represented by fear and chagrin. On the other hand, their present-selves are signified by the regretful remembrance of their ignorance. Among these, the latter is directly linked to the motivation of village reconstruction. Since the villagers recognized that their ignorance had caused the genocide in the village, they felt that being freed from the fetters of ignorance was the only way to prevent future tragedies. The researcher's analysis suggests that the external (or environmental) context, which suppressed the memory of genocide, and the internal context, which endeavored to protect the unity of the community, were simultaneously affected in the process of recognition. As the decades-long military dictatorship had created an oppressive atmosphere in the village, the villagers could not mention anything about the genocide and state violence. Nevertheless, the survivors could not be thoroughly frustrated; they distorted their memories of genocide by transforming them from "resentment against the state" to "blaming themselves for being ignorant." It was the only constructive alternative to maintaining the sense of community in the situation of extreme poverty and social disgrace. Additionally, the memory of conflict and enmity between the villagers, especially the tragedy of fratricidal experiences, has become a tacit taboo in the village. Therefore, the distortion of collective memory was not only an internally attributed response to social oppression, but also self-censoring to protect the solidarity of the community. Namely, it is found that the community tried to sublimate their tragic experience into a new driving force for the village reconstruction. The newly formed collective memory caused the formation of a new collective identity characterized by diligence and austerity, responsibility, and the desire to learn. It was a catalyst to facilitate the learning activities in the village. The researcher conceptualizes the process as a collective learning mechanism in the following manner: contradiction recognition,

collective memory formation, collective identity formation, and the establishment of activity system. This process seems to be not linear but cyclical. Meanwhile, not all contradictory recognition is connected to a new formation of collective memory and identity. For a successful collective learning progress, it is necessary for group members to share recognition of the common objective. In addition, a contributory factor such as a successful experience is helpful for the recognition-sharing process. In the case of *Gasi-ri* village, the 1.5th generation, who had a different identity from the previous generation and other villagers, they could share their collective memory by being encouraged by the success of economic crop mass-cultivation in the early 1960s.

Consequently, *Gasi-ri* village reconstruction was a collective learning process which followed the procedures of setting a common objective, deciding on rules and the division of labor, and acting collectively under a common objective. In this process, the villagers' contradictory perception of the *Jeju 4.3 Incident* worked as a fundamental motivation by forming a new collective memory which blamed the villagers' ignorance to facilitate the learning process. Through the collective learning system, the villagers continuously learned and extended their objective, thereby resulting in the villagers' economic prosperity and psychological recovery. The result of this analysis implies that we need a comprehensive understanding of the cultural-historical factors of each community when it comes to implementing a community development project. In the perspective of education development studies, it offers the significant possibility for researchers to explain the development process with the integrated concept of learning rather than the existing traditional tendency in development studies, which considers education and learning simply as an instrumental factor to facilitate the development process.

Keywords: Community development, collective learning, cultural historical activity theory, collective memory, genocide, Saemaul Undong

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1. Introduction

1.1 Research background and purpose

By criticizing side effects of Official Development Assistance (ODA), particularly deepened dependence, continuing corruption and lack of governance, Community Development (CD) is being recognized as an alternative. In 2005, in particular, international society concluded that development project without partner's ownership cannot be sustainable. This explains why we are paying attention to CD. In CD, Community people are no longer engaged as mere participants in development projects. They are put at the centre and integrated in the decision making and implementation process of the development projects in their community. To ensure that whatever processes involved in the same projects are effective and efficient, capacity building and building of community members involved is being emphasized. The approach proving effective in the learning processes is non-formal education.

This research addresses the rebuilding process of a village named *Gasi-ri*. This village was completely burned down and more than 300 residents were massacred during the *Jeju 4.3 incident* in 1948. After only 20 years, however, it was prized as the best developed village by the government. Considering this singularity, we have the following two conceptual frameworks to analyze the village.

The people of *Gasi-ri* are known to have successfully rebuilt their community with almost no external assistance. This known fact brings into play the concept of ownership and integrated participation in community development which will constitute the first perspective from which the researcher will analyze the village of *Gasi-ri*. As pointed out earlier, the core of community development is resident ownership and participation. The focus will be on how the people of *Gasi-ri* village owned, participated and decided their initiatives in village reconstruction. The Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) will be used as a theoretical framework to this end.

CHAT conceptualizes the interaction between individual and society as a learning process, and draws attention to collective properties in the process. Interaction

in community development can be analyzed as collective learning that results in attainment of particular development goals of the community and individuals. Accordingly, when we expand the scope of learning beyond school and classroom, we can recognize that the learning process can be found anytime and anywhere (Sawchuk, 2003: 29; S.O. Park, 2010: 148). This tendency of emphasizing human-environmental interaction is a tradition that has been continuing since Dewey (1986) advocated experiential learning. In respect to this, Vygotsky (1978), who is the first generation of CHAT scholars, introduced the concept of “mediating artifacts.” This helps us to understand how we interact (or learn) with environment mediated (or motivated) by certain factors. At the same time, however, we face a tasking question regarding the attributes of mediating artifacts. This directly relates to the fundamental question of education, “What makes people learn?” And more specifically in this case, “What made the people of *Gasi-ri* participate in the CD and how did they learn?”

The second perspective to analyze the *Gasi-ri* village phenomenon will be collective memory. More than half of the people in *Gasi-ri* were massacred by the state. The massacre is the most tragic history of the village and a blessing in disguise as it became an important factor which motivated the people to be educated. The question of whether or not the genocidal-like experience really functioned as a motivation for learning makes us take into account psychological aspects of the phenomenon. Therefore, we will consider some studies on collective memory and collective identity.

The term “collective memory” was first used by Halbwachs (1945), who emphasized social characteristics of memory. Although memory is owned by individuals, it is formed by an interaction with others and circumstances. For this reason, he states that in essence memory is a social product. Further, Halbwachs argues that a group regulates what and how they should remember. This theory of collective memory provides critical implications to explore the memory of people who especially experienced traumatic incident. Thus, this approach particularly examines what collective memories people have, in what context the memories were formed, and how the memories affect their minds and subsequent learning activities.

This research thus has two aims. Firstly is to analyze the dynamics of collective learning in the CD process of *Gasi-ri* village. Secondly is to clarify the function of genocidal memory to the learning process of *Gasi-ri* village.

1.2 Research question and significance

This study is based on two theoretical frameworks: expansive learning and collective memory. With these two perspectives, this study specifically answers the following questions.

(1) **Collective learning in Community Development**

- What collective learning activity has been discovered in the village?
- What characteristics does the collective learning activity have?
- What changes were found after the collective learning process?

(2) **Collective memory and learning motivation**

- What collective memories did the people of *Gasi-ri* have?
- Why do they have such collective memory?
- Did the collective memory motivate them to learn?

This research begins with limitations which have been pointed out from existing studies of CD and collective memory. On the one hand an attempt is made to discern a fundamental factor of collective learning, and on the other, traumatic memory is considered in how it affects people to form collective memory and, by extension, to learn and participate in development. This could be a new venture in exploring the connection between genocide and development. With this clear intention, the focus is on the developmental aspects of learning and the identity forming aspects of genocide, rather than learning and genocide themselves.

1.3 Materials and methods

1.3.1 Site selection for field work

Since this research aims to analyze the process of collective learning in CD and fundamental motivation of collective learning, it was necessary to select appropriate site for field work. As CD is basically performed in a village set up, the researcher selected a village based on the following four fundamentals. Firstly, the village should be known to have been transformed by and through CD. Secondly, the residents' cooperative activities should be seen prominent in the progress of their village. Thirdly, the village should be easy to reach and with a record of low migration rate. Fourthly, the village should have substantial literature written about it against which cross-validation of data can be successfully conducted.

Based on the above principles, the researcher selected a village named *Gasi-ri* which is located in *Jeju* Island. *Gasi-ri* is a mountain village located in the southeastern part of *Jeju*, with a population of 1,000 people and about 450 households. The main economic activity of this village is traditional agriculture and livestock.

This village satisfies the above fundamentals in the selection criterion as follows.

Firstly, *Gasi-ri* received the best award two times in excellent village competition in 1971 and 1974. Additionally, it received Interior Minister's Award and President's Award in 1952. Accordingly, this village can be considered as an unprecedented rural development success case.

Secondly, *Gasi-ri* residents' self reliance efforts was compelling than anything else in the development of the village. The people who lived in *Gasi-ri* installed waterworks, lights and roads by themselves. Without any external support, they constructed mountainous road longer than 8km to facilitate transportation of agricultural product. All the villagers participated and collaborated with carts and wagons for carrying aggregates in the construction the road. Due to this achievement of self-help and cooperation, *Hanseok Kim*, who was the leader of the village received presidential award in 1975. *Gasi-ri* is known today as a role model of New village which were transformed into sustainable self-reliant settlements through New Village Movement.

Thirdly, *Gasi-ri* is a typical mountain village with low migration rate. Although the number of population in 2009 was reduced by nearly 60% compared to 1975, it was mostly due to the young peoples' migration to find work. Therefore, the majority of the adult population that lived at the time of the village reconstruction is still living in *Gasi-ri*. This means that it is relatively easy to find suitable narrators.

Lastly, there is abundant literature such as newspaper articles, magazine stories, private papers and administrative documents on *Gasi-ri* given its prominent fame in South Korea. Such literature has information that can richly inform this research and help the data cross-validation process between the written and oral which is the approach anchoring this research. Moreover, when there is discrepancy between memory and documents, written materials can significantly be used to analyze its implications.

The *Jeju 4.3 incident*¹ which happened in 1948 is a notable point in this research. In 1948, *Gasi-ri* became a devastated village with most of its residents labeled as leftist and massacred by the governments' army. Still, the surviving about 100 household residents rebuilt the village within 20 years. *Gasi-ri* became the best developed village in *Jeju*. Even then, it is noted that the stress and trauma of the genocide incident haunted the *Gasi-ri* villagers and throughout the period of its rebuilding, the villagers exhibited a deep level of distrust towards and fear about the government. This explains why we cannot exclude the possible relationship between the traumatic memory of the genocide and CD.

In his attempt to explain the government's New Village Movement in South Korea, B.Y. Yoo (2002) using what he called "anti-communism" phenomenon, Yoo argues that the residents of the villages anxiously accepted the Government's initiative. This is not because they saw the benefit of the initiative. It is because to deny or even just question the government's project was tantamount to a revolt or rebellion against

¹ *Jeju 4.3 incident* refers to the rebellion and subsequent heavy government suppression on *Jeju* Island, South Korea, beginning April 3, 1948. In *Jeju*, it is referred to as the "4.3 Uprising" or "4.3 Massacre" (4.3 referring to April 3); between 30,000 and 60,000 innocent people were killed in fighting between factions. Suppression of the rebellion by the South Korean army was brutal, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths, destroying many villages on the island (J.K, Oh, 1999). The brutality of the suppression had been largely ignored by the government, but after civil rule was reinstated in the 1990s, the government made several case of apologies for the suppression, and efforts are being made to re-assess the scope of the incident and compensate the casualties.

the political establishment. Yoo called this a product of “military mentality”. Military mentality is a socio-psychological force which constrains members’ rational thinking and collective action. In establishing further the cause of the outright acceptance of the Government’s New Village Movement by the village residents, Yoo argues that the political conflicts of Korean society, especially conflicts caused by Korean War, formed part of the collective unconscious (memory) of local residents who never again wanted tension between the authorities and the citizens. Arguments and findings such as the above by Yoo, amplifies the need for to examine the nature and direction of the relationship between *Gasi-ri*’s historical experience—the *Jeju 4.3 incident*— and the success of CD.

1.3.2 Research methods

In shedding a new light on a nation’s historical experience, it is important to analyze the agents’ intention and social structures which let them have such intention as well as to analyze the effects (or influences) of a certain policy and strategy. Through this process of analyzing intentions and social structures, certain attempt’s explicit or implicit functions and effects can be drawn. In this context, this research analyses the intention of government and private sector, socio-historical background, and the function or influence to the society in the structural dimension. The mechanism of activity participation is shown through this process. Regarding the participation of activity, oral historical in-depth interview, participant observation, and literature analysis are used to examine participants’ experiences and their influences to the community. In this research which takes socio-historical perspective, oral history especially could be an important method to analyze the interaction between agents and social structures.

1.3.2.1 Oral historical in-depth interview

As the purpose of this study is to observe people's rebuilding efforts in the perspective of CHAT, oral history is used as the main methodology. Oral history is a method for researching history with oral sources. It reveals new sides of history which are difficult to access through documents. In the point that non-mainstream history which is difficult to be recorded as a document could be remarked, Thompson stated that oral history is a "bottom-up history" (Thompson, 2000: 23-24). Oral history, unlike "objective" public documents, has a feature of "subjective" in terms of limited private experience and selective memory. Thus, oral records show us what the people wanted, what the people believed in and what people are thinking in the present about something they did in the past rather than the objective facts about history (S.D. Nam, 2006).

In this research, revealing local residents' subjective emotional structures and psychological status is a key point. Because the purpose of this research is to re-examine CD in the perspective of CHAT, it is difficult to find the documentation of actual activities. Nonetheless, the rebuilding activities of the village are obviously the part of history which can have implications on identifying the feature and mechanisms of participation in CD.

Although the primary data source has remained to be documentations such as periodical publications, village leaders' note, newspaper articles and administrative files, it is not easy to understand the fact that is related to actual activities in the village. In order to analyze people's intentions and their social structure which made them have such intentions, it is necessary to examine the people's experience and their situation through oral testimony of actual participants. Therefore, this research conducts an in-depth interview with people who participated in the 1970s reconstruction of the village.

In oral history research, the validity of testimony is considered significant. Unlike quantitative research, which estimates the possibility of generalization through selecting samples and statistical verification process, oral history—as a qualitative methodology—secures validity of research object by selecting a few narrators who can relevantly reveal their history and social situation related to a research question.

Since this research aims to analyze the mechanism of learning activities in *Gasiri* during the period of village rebuilding, narrators were selected as follows:

[Table 1] Narrator Selection Plan

	Number of Interviewees	Interview question examples
Ordinary Residents	5	- What activities were conducted? - How did you participate? - How was the feeling?
Community Leaders	5	- How did you start work as a leader? - What was the role of council? - What was the relationship between village and local government? - How did villagers participate? - How was the feeling?
Local Government Officials	2	- What was the government's policy? - What was the relationship between village, local government, and central government? - How was the feeling?

Gasi-ri Men's Association and Women's Association members who played a central role in collaborative activities were selected as major interviewees. These were asked about the kind of activities they conducted during the period, why they started the activities, how their approach worked, and how the feeling about the activities was.

People who were the community leaders in *Gasi-ri* during the period were narrators as well. Community leaders acted as a mediator between the state and village. Thus, they could show the relationship between the two major agents—government and rural community—in the movement. Five people who were the members of the village council organized by the late *Hanseok Kim*, a leader of the *Gasiri New Village Movement* who died in 2000, were selected for this purpose.

In addition, local government officials who had played a role in delivering government's development policy were selected as interviewees. These helped the research capture the Government's viewpoints.

Regarding oral interview process, personal interviews and group interviews were used depending on the conditions and circumstances of interviewees. Given that the *4.3 Incident* remains a sensitive issue in the community in question and has potential to actually stir strife and conflict among village inhabitants, interviewees had to be

guaranteed that their information and views would be treated as private and secured as such and only used for academic purposes of the study.

1.3.2.2 Participant observation

In order to analyze various perspectives of the village's CD, the researcher set the interviewee selection priority with reference to the government literature which includes the village's rebuilding history. In this process, the five council members of the village were first chosen, and members of village associations, local government officials, and ordinary participants were then added. It is important to note that the participants' given information proved to be limited even if several interviewees actually recommended their neighbors to the researcher for further information. For this reason, the researcher decided to spend two months as a village resident for purposes of participant observation.

During his stay in the village, the researcher introduced himself to and sought permission from the village elders to carry out the research. The researcher visited the village office where he acquired several literatures published in the village. This literature helped in getting further insights into and about the village and the subject in question

In addition, considering that our research topic invokes the memory of genocide, building trust with villagers had to be a priority. Without trust and a warm feeling of oneness, the villagers could be somewhat reluctant to testify their genocidal history as would look at the researcher as an outsider subject to misrepresenting their testimonies and history. Accordingly, the researcher decided to live in the village to understand the local culture and historical context. In order to generate a good rapport with the villagers, the researcher joined various village activities. For example, he helped managing mural painting and natural dyeing program at the cultural center in the daytime, and taught children English and Mathematics at the village library in the evenings. Every Wednesday, the researcher joined village elders' meeting, trying to understand the people's network, communication style, and their set of values. Through this process, he partly reached out to the inside outlook of issues by the village residents and reduced resistance often meted out to strangers by the locals. In particular, the

elders appreciated the point that he taught their grandchildren. For this reason, he got welcomed and established a good relationship as an integral part of the village.

Apart from understanding culture and establishing rapport, participant observation enriched the findings of the research as follows. The researcher managed to identify the network-based village operating system. This system could not be obtained without considering and participating in the conversational contexts of the villagers.

Clearly, oral historical in-depth interview and participant observation are complementary. The information collected by in-depth interview can be an analysis criterion for participant observation. At the same time, certain matters found during observation can be utilized as reference data to decide questions for in-depth interview. Further, in the process of analyzing results, records of both interview and observation are meaningful data for cross-validation.

1.3.2.3 Literature analysis

This research used oral sources and observation records as the primary source focusing on people's participation during the period of CD.

The ten-year history of New Village Movement is mainly referred as secondary data (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1980). It has various statistics during the period of reconstruction and is useful for cross-validation between other materials. Regarding success story of New Village Movement, the Ministry of Home Affairs regularly published "New Village Movement" from 1973 to 1980. Especially "A trace of glory", it contains various success stories which were attempted in various ways in different environments. These literatures published by government were used for comparative analysis on *Gasi-ri* and other cases in this study.

For understanding the process of village reconstruction specifically, the stories of *Hanseok Kim*, Men's and Women's association documents and official documents were referred to. Besides, newspaper articles that reported on *Gasi-ri* were analyzed. Basically, documents related to New Village Movement of *Gasi-ri* were used as supplementary materials of oral testimony as those documents interpret the reconstruction not in the context of CD but in the context of national development project. Thus, literature analysis was conducted to consider the mechanism of participation rather than information of historical facts.

1.4 Research structures and limitations

This research is divided into six sections. The first section introduces research background and purpose, research questions and significances, and research materials and methods.

The second section reviews, from an educational perspective, previous literature on CD and two main conceptual frameworks—cultural historical activity theory (CHAT), collective memory theory.

In section III, the selected site for case study is presented. The reason that the village's location, climate, industry, economy, lifestyle and living environment are presented here is that these factors are the basis of understanding the process of community activity.

Section IV explores the success story of CD in *Gasi-ri*. The interactions of and among agents who played different roles in village reconstruction in the 1970s—villagers, community leaders, local government officials are closely examined. Through this process, the researcher analyzed how cooperative activities started, why the village inhabitants participated in these activities, what was the mechanism of their participation and what factors—individual and social—influenced this process.

In section V, the fundamental motivation of participation based on the results from section IV are analyzed. Halbwachs' Collective Memory theory was used as a framework for interpreting activities. By exploring the villagers' collective memory, the momentum of village reconstruction, the process of participation, and ultimately the motivation of cooperative activities are analyzed. Moreover, the influences of government-driven development movement in the village are considered.

The last section summarizes the overall discussion and draws conclusions. The implications of this research and recommendations for further studies based on the research findings are also discussed.

The following are the limitations of this research.

Firstly, this research was basically a case study, aiming to answer the question of collective learning process and its fundamental motivation. Therefore although the findings of this research have implications on expansive learning theory and collective memory theory, it is difficult to generalize this case as a typical collective learning model. Regarding the relationship between collective memory and collective learning, this research merely provided an example for future studies.

Secondly, there is a problem of reliability using oral testimonies as a main data source. With several literatures, testimonies and observation records, cross-validation was repeatedly carried out to restore the village's history as close as possible to historical facts. But it is impossible to write history perfectly. In addition, there are merely three literatures about the village, and they are limited to the 1970s. These literatures do not properly represent the villager's viewpoint because government published them with its particular socio-political intention. Under these circumstances, there is no choice but to rely on actual participants' testimonies. The village history configured by subjective memories cannot be completely realistic. However, the important point is that the purpose of this research is not writing history. What is important in investigating the participants' fundamental motivation is "what they believed" and "how they felt" and not necessarily "what happened" and "what they did." Therefore, the subjectivity of memory can be a great asset rather than limitation.

Lastly, compared to the fact that CD and genocide have been studied independently in each area so far, this research attempts to discover the nexus of CD and genocide. This is a meaningful point of this research, but at the same time, works as a limitation. This research does not deal with each general area of CD and genocide, but focuses on learning aspects of CD and function of collective memory in genocide.

2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review

2.1 Learning in CD: Cultural Historical Activity Theory

In CD, ownership is derived from the community's value, that is the customs shared by community, such as norms, significations, and historical identities (Song, 2001; Huh, 2006). Compared to group in metropolitan areas mainly based on individuality and anonymity, local community which shares the community value seems to have more transparency, accountability, and solidarity. These features are regarded as a necessary condition of collective action for development. In this process, it should be accompanied with group members' communication, democratic discussion, and participation (Shrivastava, 1987; Swanson & Luloff, 1990). CD occurs when people intentionally increase the universality of interaction (Wilkinson, 1991). Thus, the core of CD—solving problems with intentional interaction—has one factor in common with education, that is, the way of changing human behavior (Cheong & Lim, 1997: 67). In this regard, researchers state that CD is a process of collective learning (Julian & Lesley, 2001). In terms of development ownership of local people, the learning process is absolutely necessary in making them leading agents and not mere recipients. For this reason, education researchers have studied CD as a significant aspect of learning and social progress (Hwang, 1962; Kim, 1962; Park, 1963).

Gibb (1964) in extrapolating learning processes in CD argues that people in a group exchange information, and set a common goal by collective learning. In this process, they establish mutual trust, which can resolve potential distrust and conflict in the group. That is, by collective leaning, people share a common goal, rules, and their roles to act in and as a community (Gibb, 1964; Cheong & Lim, 1997).

Compared to Gibb (1964), who relatively put emphasis on “mutual trust” in CD, Vygotsky (1978) conceptualized human interaction in group as collective learning, and specified its process as well. He named this conceptual theory as cultural historical activity theory (CHAT) or Activity Theory. Here below are the core concepts, basic premises, and development history of CHAT.


2.1.1 Basic premises of CHAT

Vygotsky (1978) conceptualized human interaction in group as collective learning, and specified its process as well. He named this conceptual theory as Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) or Activity Theory. In CHAT, “activity” is defined as the combination of subject and object (Lompscher, 2006), or an object-oriented action system (Kuutti, 1996). An action of a person (subject) seeking goal (object) is the activity. What emphasizes the activity theory is that the object-oriented activity is conducted by interaction between humans and human and environment in cultural-historical context. According to the theory, we should focus more on the collective properties of learning, rather than individual cognitive properties, because individual consciousness extends in the process of interaction with the external environment (including other people). Based on this perspective that the expansion of consciousness through interaction is learning, CHAT contributes to the study of education by providing a starting point of learning that can be found in every condition of human life.

2.1.2 The history of CHAT


Vygotsky (1978) initiated the first generation of activity theory by proposing the basic model of activity system. He argued that activity is carried out not by simple interaction between humans (subject) and the environment (object), but by certain mediators such as tools and signs [Figure 1].

[Figure 1] Activity System Model (I.T. Kwon, 2008)



Leont'ev (1978) expanded the theory to the collective level. Leont'ev developed Vygotsky's social mediation process into the group learning theory [Figure 2], focusing on the fact that activity basically has social attribute. According to him, the aim of individual act may not be consistent with that of the group. Sometimes group's object-oriented activity can be understood and analyzed when individual act is recognized as part of a larger system. Specifically, he introduced three elements which explain activity system such as community, rule, and division of labor.


[Figure 2] Structure of Activity System (Engeström, 1987: 78)



From figure 2, we can analyze how members of a group have internal interaction to reach goal (object). Let us take a look at aircraft manufacturing company as an example. The members of the company have a common objective, manufacturing aircraft. At the same time, they belong to several departments (community) depending on their sector and responsibility. Each department has their own task or mission. The members take care of their divided task (division of labor), handling the task according to their work type (rule). Accordingly, the group divides their works and members, and formulates regulation in order to achieve their common goal. In this process, individuals (members) learn social norms and cultures on the one hand, or they influence the group and bring changes in rules, community, and division of labor on the other.

Second generation of activity theory allows us to analyze the group's object-oriented activity process. However, there are innumerable groups and communities that have each objectives and values, conflicting with each others in reality. In order to give a proper explanation, Engeström (2011) expanded the theory, and introduced a new model of activity system with more than two activity systems interacting [Figure 3].

[Figure 3] Third Generation of Activity System (Engeström, 2011: 136)



Engeström (2001) states that in the process of competence of multiple activity systems, each of the objects is transformed and synthesized with three phases. The original objectives (O1), at the first phase, face contradictory situation. By facing contradiction, original objects (O1) are moved to meaningfully reorganized objects (O2, second phase). After conflict and resolution efforts, two objects are synthesized into a new potentially shared object (O3, third phase). As can be seen, this is observed as dialectic process (Engeström, 2001; Park, 2009).

2.1.3 Contradiction as a motivation of collective learning

As was shown above, the activity theory focuses on the process of individual act's consciousness expansion in the activity system. Engeström (1987) sees the process as conducted by a string of dialectic interaction. And additionally, in order to analyze the activity system, it is important to recognize that contradiction, conflict, and discoordination inevitably occur in the process of activity.

Contradiction and conflict in the activity system can take place not only between six internal elements of system, but also between activity systems. Kuuti (1996) explains that these phenomena work as a constructive opportunity to reform the activity system. This is consistent with the dialectical discourse which understands contradiction and conflict as essential factors to development. This viewpoint provides a useful framework to understand learning in a community. Contradiction and conflict are able to function as a motivation of collective learning, resulting in new forms of activity. In

addition, if we understand the effect of collective learning, we have to examine not only the process of individual's adaptation (or socialization), but also the mechanism of emerging new learning activity. In this way, by introducing transformative philosophy in learning, Engeström opens the possibility of analyzing education in the perspective of transformation. In this context, learning can be redefined as "the process of acquiring the structure of existing activity, or creating new activity with facing contradiction." As for these attributes of learning activity, Engeström argues that if the subject recognize the contradictory nature of existing activity, and connect the recognition to a new form of activity, learning can be developed (Engeström, 1987; Sawchuk, 2001; Yoon, 2009). However, He does not mention how those subjects' recognition is connected to learning and what makes the subject want to be learned. In the same context, Yoon (2009) and Langemeyer (2006) also points out that the third generation of CHAT have not reached at the systematic analysis of fundamental motivation of learning. Therefore, examining the process of change in contradictory recognition, and analyzing motivation of learning in community, are the two core challenges of this study.

2.2 Collective memory and collective identity

If we verify the assumption that contradiction prompts learning, analyzing learning motivation becomes a requisite process. However, it is difficult to obtain information about the underlying motivation by a general survey. In this case, we essentially need a qualitative approach to consider each person's socio-historical context and then to propose in-depth questions. By using qualitative research method, what do we have to observe? It is the "memory" of people. Specifically, we need to focus on participants' "subjective memory (or psychological changes)" rather than their factual memory. It is important to capture what they felt in the past and how it has affected their lives. For that to happen, the collective memory theory is introduced as a framework of analysis.

2.2.1 Core concepts in collective memory theory

The concept of collective memory was introduced by Morris Halbwachs (1980). He focused on the aspects of society's memories. He premised his study on the fact that humans have social attributes in and by nature. Since humans cannot form their consciousness without interaction with the surrounding environment, memory cannot be freed from its social, cultural, and historical context. Halbwachs (1980) argues that the social group regulates what and how to remember. That is, collective memories exist and vary depending on groups' history (Nam, 2006:220). Multiple collective memories are formed with each groups' interest and may contradict and conflict each other.

Another core concept of collective memory theory is presentism. Each group forms memories depending on their history and interest where history does not only reflect their past but their present situation. This characteristic of collective memory can easily be found in recollections of group members. It is noteworthy here that the recollection is generally comprised of "subjective memory" rather than "factual memory." It has personal feelings, emotions, and subjective judgment. Unlike positivism history which describes history based on factual memory, collective memory theory focuses on subjective memory. In collective memory theory, our memories about

the past are continuously changed according to how the social situation is perceived at the time of recollection (Langer, 1991:157). Thus, social memory is distorted and transformed.

2.2.2 Politics of memory

The concept, “Politics of memory”, covers this mechanism. It is generally understood as “social, cultural, and political dynamics which intervene in the process of making or destroying history (S.J. Ji, 1998:191).” Multiple collective memories compete and conflict in the history according to their properties and historical situations. The results of this competition and conflict vary as follows: (1) dominant memory is incorporated as official history and the other one is forgotten or remains tenuous counter-memory (Foucault, 1977), (2) dominant memory is selected as official memory, along with the other one which is distorted in order to be incorporated, (3) one united official memory is established after fierce struggles, (4) as a conflict is now underway or terminated by certain factors, each collective memory coexists independently. In this way, collective memories can be incorporated, partly distorted, or forgotten. It is accompanied with group’s vicissitudes.

Researchers have discovered and analyzed the political nature of memory from violent incidents (mostly caused by nations or other dominant groups) and subsequent memory oppressions. In regard to the phenomenon which authority groups intend to control, manipulate, or oppress memory, Miller (1990) classified the tactics which have mainly used in oppression into four types. The first type is called denial. This is one of the most direct and insidious form of memory manipulation which, as a method, regards a violent incident itself as a fabrication or hoax. The second type is a skill which makes a perpetrator a victim by blaming others. This is called Blame-shifting. The third type, which refers to finding and presenting logical reason to explain puzzling behavior, is known as justification. Relativization is the fourth type. This is another type of justification for defending their violent behavior by giving similar examples.

Meanwhile, oppressed people develop their own strategies to survive in extremely oppressive environment as well. Des Pres (1976) stated that two concerns—how not to throw themselves to desperation and how to protect their dignity and morality—significantly affect their identity. Regarding this, Lifton (1986) argues that group of victims defend their self-esteem through “Doubling” process. This refers to a splitting of personality which enables a person to distance himself from his usual moral perceptions and behavior (Lifton & Markusen, 1990:106). It leads the victims to adapt to an extreme environment by acquiring appropriate logic and purpose of survival.

Considering the extreme experience such as genocidal incidents or other forms of conflict between groups and collective memory, we can find the fact that these two elements interact with each other dialectically. Collective memory is established by the common experience, but on the other hand, the collective memory is embedded in the group members, thereby affecting what and how they experience their circumstances. In this respect, Y.B. Kim (1998) states that the politics of memory not only works for destroying or distorting collective memory. It also gives a perception framework and direction in establishing collective memory.

2.2.3 Collective memory and collective identity

Considering the extreme experience such as genocidal incidents or other forms of conflict between groups and collective memory, we can find the fact that collective memory and collective identity (or perception framework) interact with each other interdependently. Collective memory is established by the common experience and recognition, but on the other hand, the collective memory is embedded in the group members, thereby affecting what and how they experience their circumstances.

In similar vein, collective memory with the formation of collective identity, a group of victims distort their memory by oblivion or doubling thereby adapting to the current environment, newly-adapted collective identity emerges in the middle of the process. Social norms and values come from the collective identity. And the members of the group feel a sense of belonging to the community by sharing a common recognition (Melucci, 1995: 45).

2.3 Oral history

As shown in section 2.2 above, the necessity of examining subjective memory is important to understand and analyze village reconstruction process in the viewpoint of expansive learning. Regarding this, collective memory theory offers us a theoretical framework to trace the psychological change in the human mind. This makes it possible to examine the process of identity formation. To achieve this, the study will use oral history as its methodology for qualitative analysis of the data that will be collected.

2.3.1 Concept and background of oral history

Oral history has several definitions depending on its own characteristics and researchers' perspective. In the American tradition of record management and archives, it is defined as "collecting testified memory and personal commentary through interview and documentation (Ritchie, 2003)." In the European tradition which focuses on its political aspects, it is defined as "bottom-up history or history of the oppressed." It is clear that American and European tradition differ in their definition of oral history. The difference lies in the way of "collecting oral resources" and "writing history."

The 20th Century has seen more light being cast over oral history's validity and utility as a research method. There are two main reasons that help explain this. Firstly, researchers are making an effort to bridge the gap between historical records and facts using oral data. They have intention to restore history more precisely, focusing on "factual memory" in the oral testimonies. Secondly, other researchers want to discover a "counter-history" under the viewpoint that existing positive historical science represents the interests of dominant group (Velensi & Wachtel, 1990). The definition of Thompson (1988), "history from the bottom-up" reflects this intention. According to this, many researchers of oral history have discovered "hidden voices" and reconstituted alternative history in the perspective of women, workers, minority groups, and other oppressed people (K.S. Kwon, 2006).

2.3.2 Characteristics of oral material

As mentioned earlier, oral history is differently defined depending on the properties of oral material. In order to understand oral history, it is necessary for us to explore the properties of oral material in detail. In regard to this, Yoon & Ham (2006) classified the characteristics of oral material into five: orality, subjectivity, narrativity, collaboration, and reliability. In this section, with reference to the study, it is reviewed in three aspects of orality, narrativity, and subjectivity (concerning collaboration and reliability, refer to 2.3.3).

As oral material is collected by interview or oral testimony, it basically has orality. Oral material is recorded testimony, including linguistic elements as well as semi-linguistic elements such as intonation, pitch, and tone of voice. Moreover, in recent trends of oral history, researchers tend to consider non-linguistic elements such as facial expression and gesture as multimedia equipments were developed. What dialect or accent testifier has in an interview gives us much information about his/her socio-cultural position such as class, gender, occupation, and generation (Yoon & Ham, 2006: 50). Regarding the significance of orality in oral history, Portelli (1979) states that orality is never reproduced by a transcript (Portelli, 1979; T.L. Yoon, 2006).

Oral material has narrativity as it is stated by a form of narrative. The significance of this is crucial because it has various modes of narrative depending on testifier's class, gender, origin, and cultural environment. The primary observation point related to narrativity has been the narrative's form (well-organized chronological or fragmented anecdotal) and substance (realistic fact-oriented or evaluative recollection). In regard to this, it is possible that two interviewees' testimonies of common experience can be completely different. It indicates that there are multiple viewpoints of understanding the world. In that case, 'what causes the difference in viewpoints' and 'what impacts the difference can have' are the important observation point. Oral history considers that narrative analysis is as significant as restoration of historical fact. This corresponds with the studies of collective memory that focus on narrative truth rather than factual truth.

Since oral material is obtained from personal testimony, it is subjective in nature. This subjectivity has been broadly criticized by a group of historians who emphasize historical material's objectivity and reliability. However, an Italian oral historian Portelli (1979), in his article "What makes oral history different?" argues that this "subjectivity" is unique and valuable feature of oral history. According to him, oral material tells us not only what people did, but also what they believed and what they wanted to do (Portelli, 1991; T.L. Yoon, 2010). Why the subjectivity is important in oral history? Because desires and beliefs revealed from oral testimonies' subjectivity are not only the key element of constituting their identity, but also the core of fundamental motivation which gives a direction to their action. For instance, although the statement "Martyr Yi-jun² committed suicide, disembowelling himself at the Hague International Peace Conference to announce that Korea is independent state" was turned out to be a false rumor, many Korean people believed that, and thereby independence movement was triggered (Kim & Lee, 1998). The rumor was "psychological truth" for the people. Thus, the subjectivity of oral material is a crucial feature that makes oral history a useful instrument for analyzing dynamics between the past and the present.

2.3.3 Implications and limitations of oral history in historical study

This section introduces implications and limitations of oral history, summarizing major criticisms on oral history to find ways to overcome the limitations.

Primarily, critics have questioned whether oral testimony is trustworthy. This question contains the problems of accuracy and reliability. Although we presume that decrepit testifiers have poor memory, a number of empirical studies disprove it. K.O.

² Yi Jun (December 18, 1859 - July 14, 1907) was a Korean prosecutor and diplomat. He was delegated by Emperor Gojong to attend the Second Hague Peace Conference in The Hague. He was commissioned to announce to the international community that Korea was an independent state and that the Japanese invasion was unlawful. He traveled for two months to The Hague. The Korean delegation was not officially invited, although the Netherlands is initially had planned. However, the Japanese government was able to step in and succeeded in convincing the other delegates of the conference to not let Korea participate. A few days after Yi Jun protested against the decision, he was found dead in his room at the Hotel De Jong Wagenstraat Hague. His cause of death is unknown, but in South Korea it is assumed that he committed suicide due to the rejection by the international community (Britannica Encyclopedia, 2011).

Kim(2006) demonstrates that the aged testifiers clearly remember their traumatic events or experiences, while relatively tend to forget daily lives of the past. Meanwhile, in regard to reliability problem of oral testimony, the significant point is not accuracy or consistency in terms of factual reliability. Rather, according to Ham (1999), “semantic reliability” is more crucial. Obviously satisfying reliability is important to use oral testimony as research data. Therefore, it is necessary for researchers to supplement the weakness of oral materials by obtaining a number of testimonies from several interviewees, or by comparing related documents through cross-validation procedure.

Secondly, even if the testimony is reliable, some critics pose a question, “How can it represent at social level?” This question assumes that oral testimony cannot be generalized due to its subjectivity and personal experience and history should be differentiated. However, Gramsci (1971) states that “each individuals are not only inclusive of their relationships, but also of the relationship’s history. That is, an individual existence can be seen as historical synthesis.” Hence, personal life memory is not simply limited to private experience. As it includes specific socio-historical context, individuals are historical existences as well (Yoon & Ham, 2006: 59).

Lastly, it is noteworthy that the relationship between interviewer and interviewee has been pointed out. The relationship between interviewer (in most case, researcher) and interviewee is clearly asymmetric in the aspect of power balance. The researcher makes interview questions, selects person whom to testify, and requires testimony. After the interview, researcher interprets it and draws conclusions as well. Interviewees are excluded in the whole process, except answering the given questions. In this respect, Yoon and Ham (2006) argue that we have to change our fundamental perception in doing historical research. Specifically, doing collaborative research as co-author or letting local people write their own history are being regarded as alternative ways to overcome the imbalance between interviewer and interviewee (Yoon & Ham, 2006: 59).

2.4 Previous research on expansive learning in community

As noted earlier, CHAT offers a framework for an investigative analysis of various activities in the perspective of learning beyond school education. This chapter reviews previous studies on expansive learning. The studies are classified according to their study areas. The chapter also gives practical and theoretical significances of this study in reference to current research trends.

Since the concept of activity and mediation was introduced by Vygotsky (1978), CHAT has been developed in the area of traditional education. Unlike other developmental learning theories, the most important feature of CHAT is “mediation.” This feature has attracted education technologist and researchers of linguistic education who are interested in educational mediator. Nonetheless, these technologists and researchers, because their intention is mostly to promote learning ability using mediators, tend to focus on emphasizing Vygotsky’s concept of Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) rather than that of CHAT itself.

It is noteworthy that while the 2nd generation of CHAT had only been discussed in the traditional area of education and psychology until the 1970s, the 3rd generation of CHAT is being introduced and discussed in almost every area of learning, including lifelong learning and transformative education. This is because 3rd CHAT interprets development as an expansion of recognition from individual to society (previous theories assumed that development is a cognitive process in a person). The studies of expansive learning (3rd generation of CHAT) have contributed to the extension of the scope of education research, along with the emergence of lifelong learning. In particular, the studies are categorized into workplace learning and community learning.

Workplace learning was conceived by researchers of action-based learning, who conceptualized a workplace as a field of learning. Bae (2007) however argued that theories of workplace learning have a limitation on explaining learning phenomena in a workplace. He pointed out that expansive learning theory should be introduced in analyzing the workplace learning as it is able to flexibly analyze interactions among various elements in a workplace. Following Bae’s argument a number of studies were conducted using expansive learning to analyze workplace learning. Jang et al. (2010a)

examined team learning of company (traditionally known as corporate education) in the framework of expansive learning. Through several case studies, he showed that learning activity evolves from individual level to team level, going through three steps including benchmarking, problem-solving, and experience-oriented team learning. Each step has conflict and contradiction, and evolves by resolving the contradiction. Another case study concluded that the key element in team learning is establishing shared objective, and human factors including organizational culture and members' motivation have crucial effects on promoting learning activity (Park & Jang, 2011). Also, Gustavsson (2009) analyzed the activities of Swedish local government officials for four years. He and showed that work can be organized in the aspect of learning opportunity even if the organization has limited resources. In addition, he stressed that the role of a manager is important to facilitate expansive learning in a workplace.

Furthermore, Toiviainen (2007) focused on the learning activity that occurs in the middle of establishing networks between organizations. He analyzed it in the perspective of expansive learning, conceptualizing it as "inter-organizational learning." According to Toiviainen, inter-organizational learning simultaneously occurs in vertical and horizontal level. Inter-organizational learning dialectically occurs in "horizontally" networked organizations in the process of adjusting their goals and collaborating with each other in order to deepen the synergy. At the same time, this varies with the network's innovation capability which is vertically (historically) changed. Additionally, he stated that the "Development Radar" which refers to learning network based on CHAT is required to develop the workplace learning theory.

Community learning as opposed to workplace learning, focuses on the learning of individuals and entities as a community. And several studies have explored community learning. Park (2009) analyzed housewives' ecology club activity based as community learning using activity theory. He reviewed that the housewives acquired not only knowledge and skills through continued participation, but as part of community learning their attitudes changed from being passive auditors to enthusiastic participants (Park, 2009). For this reason, he concluded that community learning involves significant change of attitude. But this does not mean expansive learning refers to changes in the attitude of the participants only, in this case housewives. It refers to consistent reproduction of ongoing activity in a local community.

Jang et al. (2010b) explored local community's co-parenting activity in the context of expansive learning. They interviewed community participants about what, how and why they learn, conceptualizing the co-parenting process as "learning together." They found that in the process of given activities, participants change from simple participants to self-directed learners. And the initial purpose of the activities—co-parenting— expanded to "individual growth and community building" due to the enhanced and sustained relationship (Jang et al, 2010b). This research is significant because the process of collective identity formation was well analyzed in great detail. Particularly, the process of resolving conflict by a "meaningful relationship" was well-described through qualitative case study method. The "meaningful relationship" refers to an emotional relationship which commands respect for one other. Han and Lee (2005) also conducted a study that focused on the relationship. They defined group activity as a "collaborative knowledge creation process", and stated that member's cognitive and emotional characteristics interactively affect the process. According to them, the reason that emotional characteristics have relatively strong effect on group's expansive learning compared to individual learning is that members' interrelation participation is indispensable in group learning. And the fact that activity theory recognizes the conflict in a constructive way considered as a resolution clue of political problems.

In this regard, Botha (2011) demonstrates that the framework of expansive learning should be introduced in CD, especially a region suffering from a severe conflict between interest groups, in order to wisely resolve conflicts and reflect local knowledge on policy initiatives.

Yoon (2009) analyzed obstacle factors to establishing a network for collective activity by looking at the establishment of a local community network in Valmont, Philadelphia. He identified the following three factors as the main obstacles in expansive learning: leveling willingness to participate down due to the difference among members; lack of social space for communication and competition and conflict among members to occupy limited resources. A recurring point in the three factors is that conflict and competition were decisive obstacles in establishing community network. This shows that not every conflict is progressive and developmental in practical situations.

As was stated earlier, CHAT is flourishing in various studies ranging from school education to non-formal learning activities in everyday life. In particular, 3rd generation of CHAT known as expansive learning is all the more meaningful in that the theory offers a framework for analyzing collective learning in the perspective of cognitive expansion. The point of expansive learning that introduced dialectical logic into education, thereby conceptualizing conflict and contradiction as developmental factor, is crucial in studying education at the transformative dimension level. However, it has its limitations. Langemeyer (2006) points out the limitation which comes from the fact that expansive learning considers conflict and contradiction as learning motivations. He argues that this assumption is unconvincing unless the theory identifies the causal relationship between contradiction and learning. As we have seen earlier from the case study of Yoon (2009), it is possible that conflict and contradiction can be a major obstacle in forming community network. In this respect, Langemeyer (2006) does not uncritically accept the functionalism or conflict theory. He understands that group members' recognition can be altered depending on their "modes of participation" and "forms of cooperation." (Langemeyer, 2006). And in order to develop expansive learning theory, he argues that we have to examine group's various modes of participation and forms of cooperation, and identify how these modes and forms are connected to learning. This study has the same perception of understanding conflict and contradiction. Based on the expansive learning theory, it will examine the village reconstruction focusing on the villagers' communication process including conflict and contradiction. By tracing their rebuilding activities with historical context, the process of conflict resolution will be described in detail. And in the last part, the relationship between contradiction and learning motivation will be analyzed.

3. The Process of Collective Learning in Village Reconstruction

This chapter considers how the villagers of *Gasi-ri* learned collectively through their experiences of village reconstruction. As the diachronic approach can explain the logical causality of the learning process pertinently, this paper approaches the development of *Gasi-ri* in a historical way.

This research recognizes the village's reconstruction as a process of collective learning activity. Therefore, Kilgore's collective learning theory and Engeström's expansive leaning theory were mainly used as the fundamental frameworks. First, Kilgore (1999) states that a group could learn collectively through the process of forming a collective identity, adding that the success of community development (CD) depends on the level of collective learning. Second, Engeström (1987) understands that group members form their common objective through interactions amongst themselves, thereby establishing an activity system. These theories offer useful reference points in analyzing the villagers' interactions and their common objective formation process.

In regard to the mountain village named *Gasi-ri*, the villagers' farmlands were devastated, their properties were burned up, and most of the men were killed; yet, the villagers succeeded in reconstructing the village. The more interesting point is that the reconstruction was reportedly conducted with almost no external assistance. Therefore, examining the reality of the reconstruction history is the first crucial work in this research. Another point that should be particularly noted is the collective learning activity formation. In regard to the concept, the two major research questions are as follows: "How did they have such a common purpose of reconstruction?" and "What motivated them to participate in the reconstruction activities?"

Meanwhile, the reconstruction process started after the *4.3 Incident*. We can find a similar process in Korean history: reconstruction following the Korean War. Therefore, discussion for generalizing these experiences can be conducted. From a wider perspective, the relationship between the memory of genocide (or civil war) and the development could be discussed with this case.

3.1 Sufferings and scars

In 1948, about one third of the villagers of *Gasi-ri* were massacred. It was an unprecedented tragedy in the history of the village, and this *Jeju 4.3 Incident* was a significant turning point for the village. All of the villagers testified about their experiences based on the *4.3 Incident*. Then, what has the *4.3 Incident* meant to them? Introducing the history of *Gasi-ri* from the late 1940s to the late 1950s, this research shows how this small mountain village had been destroyed from state violence. This is the first step to consider how the extreme experience of genocide affected the villagers' state of mind and behaviors. Therefore, the process of looking back on the history of tragedy is one of the essential parts of this research.

For readers' better understanding, the research explains the background of the *Jeju 4.3 Incident* in the first part. And the resultant damage and situations in *Gasi-ri* are presented. Finally, the influence of the *4.3 Incident* will be considered in the last part.

3.1.1 Background of the *Jeju 4.3 Incident*

The *Jeju 4.3 Incident* is a tragic event of recent Korean history, and it resulted in about 30,000 victims of death and injury. The incident was sparked during a ceremony commemorating the Independence Movement Day on March 1, 1947. Numerous crowds had gathered to commemorate the day in front of the *Jeju* provincial government building. In the middle of the celebration, a child was hit by a mounted police officer. The police officer was attacked by the crowd and pulled down from his horse, and another police officer positioned at a tower judged the situation as an emergency and fired indiscriminately. As a result, more than 10 civilian deaths resulted. In response to this incident, citizens embarked on a general strike, and they demanded justice in the form of deserved punishment for the police officers. The strike eventually expanded from public institutions to schools and transportation companies.

The U.S military government recognized the situation as serious, and dispatched investigators to *Jeju* Island. They concluded that this situation had been

caused by the instigation of communists, and started to crack down on the strike. The governor was replaced by outsiders, and a massive police operation was launched to arrest the leaders of the strike. About 500 people were arrested in a month's time, and more than 2,500 people were detained until just before the outbreak of the *4.3 Incident*. Because of this operation, South Korean Laborites were put on the defensive. They tried to defend their organization through armed struggle in manipulating public sentiment, which was alienated from the U.S military government. The purpose of this armed struggle was to prevent the general election, which was slated for the following year in southern Korea.

On April 3, 1948, about 350 *Mujangdae* (armed communist sympathizers) began to attack the police and right-wing groups. They claimed they would stop the oppression of the police and establish a unified government. Lieutenant *Ikryeol Kim*, the commander of regiment 9, agreed to resolve the situation through a negotiation. But right-wing groups set *Ora-ri* on fire and created a fabrication to make it seem as if the Laborites were responsible for the arson. Because of this incident, efforts to peacefully resolve the situation were frustrated.

Finally, On November 17, 1948, martial law was proclaimed throughout *Jeju* Island. *Yochan Song*, the succeeding commander of regiment 9, gave the instruction to execute anyone who passed through the mountainous area (within 5km of the coastal line). As a result, more than 25,000~30,000 people went missing or were killed, a number of houses and properties were burned, and all industries went bankrupt.

3.1.2 The 4.3 Incident in Gasi-ri

When the *4.3 Incident* occurred, the village suffered enormous damage from both the *Tobeoldae* (government army and police) and *Mujangdae* (armed communist guerillas). The first victim in the village lost his life on election day on May 10, 1948. In the early morning, the *Mujangdae* made a surprise attack on the polling place, and killed the chairman of the election. Then they killed *Paengrim Kang*, the head of the village as well. After these incidents, the police let the villagers organize a *Hyangbodan*

(neighborhood watch) to defend themselves. However, the villagers were not sufficiently equipped to fight against the *Mujangdae* since they did not have any proper weapons. Thus, the village was placed in an extreme situation: it was dominated by the police in the daytime and dominated by the communists at night. The following testimony of *Jangpil Oh* illustrates the paradoxical situation.

Jangpil: Yeah, there were some people who worked for the Reds, my father said...he (the head of the village) exiled them from the village to protect the villagers. That is the reason the guerillas killed him.

Jangpil: The policemen could kill anyone whether he was left-wing or not...I've seen the village's foreman killed by the Reds, and his son was killed by the police.

According to the villagers' testimonies, two or three students who had been educated in Japan came to the village, and they taught reading and writing. After several months, however, it was revealed that they were communists. As this could have created a serious problem, the head of the village exiled them from the village during a meeting. That is the reason that the *Mujangdae* killed the head of the village although he had no direct ties to the election. If this had indeed been the case, why did his son have to be killed by the police? As mentioned earlier, the *Tobeoldae* (government army and police) regarded all of those who passed through the mountainous area as communists and killed indiscriminately. Therefore, the son who had fled to the mountain was killed in this process as well. The father and son became victims of an ideological conflict, and other villagers were placed in a similar situation. Since most of the villagers were ignorant of ideology, they had to find shelter with the fear of being killed. The reference book on *Gasi-ri* (1987) described the indescribable situation as follows.

It did not make sense that we were viewed as communists. We were just innocent farmers. We had no option but to survive between the police who suspected us of rebellious elements and the communists who became violent in their desperation.

Like this, the number of innocent victims of ideology was increasing. In the middle of November 1948, the government issued a housing eviction order to operate

the scorched-earth policy. The police and army stormed into the village at dawn and burned houses and food. They killed villagers without distinction of sex or age. On this day, 250 of 350 houses were burned down, and more than 30 villagers were massacred. The rest of the houses were burned in accordance with the instruction of burning all of the houses in the mountain village to prevent the communist guerrillas from seeking shelter in them.

The villagers who had lost their family members and homes fled to the nearby villages at the government's instruction. Most of them were temporarily housed in an elementary school in *Pyoseon* and a potato warehouse in *Tosan*. Some people who recalled that the police had killed some people did not go to coastal villages but fled to the mountains.

On December 22, 1948, villagers housed in the elementary school in *Pyoseon* were investigated by the police. When an entire family came down to the coastal village, the police regarded them as innocent and released them. But if any of the members of a family were absent, the family was classified as a 'fugitive family', and persons over the age of 15 among the family were killed. *Hyeok Kim*, who lost his parents and grandfather as a result, testified that 76 villagers were executed that day.

Hyeok: They killed almost everyone. Even if just one person was not there, they thought of him as a commie. So instead of killing him, they killed his family. When they separated me...because I was young at that time, I didn't know they would shoot my grandfather.

On April 29, 1948, the housing eviction order was lifted in the village. About 70 households returned to the village. However, as the majority of the men had been killed, most of the remaining people were women and children. All of the houses had been burnt, and food and livestock were nowhere to be found. In this state of ruin, the surviving villagers had to rebuild the village. Officially, damage to *Gasi-ri* from the 4.3 Incident is as follows: 374 casualties, 12 missing persons, 363 destroyed houses, and over 1,200 displaced people (*Jeju 4.3 Incident* investigation report, 2003). However, the villagers testified that more than 500 people, equal to one third of the village's total population, had been massacred at that time.

3.1.3 Scars of the 4.3 Incident and the Korean War

As a result of the 4.3 Incident, the villagers of *Gasi-ri* had lost their family members and property. But that was by no means the end of the tragedy. As the victims of the genocide were their family members and neighbors, the surviving villagers faced the stigma of being considered ‘Reds’ even after the 4.3 Incident. This stigma, overlapped with extreme poverty, broadly functioned through guilt by association, and deeply frustrated the villagers. People who lived in other villages avoided and ignored them, a tendency that continued until the late 1960s.

Geunjun: It's true. Other village people called us 'Reds'. They saw things that way...that made me feel bad. But because we, the Gasi-ri villagers, were poor, it couldn't be helped at that time.

Seokman: At that time, you know, even after the 5.16 revolution (military coup), there was no freedom of speech...until then... As I said earlier, we, the families of the victims were treated... like criminals.

Since the 4.3 Incident, *Jeju's* traditional communities, which were strongly tied by blood and region, have experienced mistrust and antagonism. This experience destroyed communities not just physically but mentally as well (J.S. Yang, 2006: 37).

Right after the 4.3 Incident, *Gasi-ri* was a completely socially isolated area. Villagers remember the time as ‘the period of insanity’. In order to vindicate themselves, they had to prove themselves as extremely anti-communist.

Following the outbreak of the Korean War, more than 1,500 young adults and middle-aged people in *Jeju* volunteered for the Marine Corps. Half of them were students. They made a desperate effort to vindicate themselves and their hometown, and a large number of young adults in *Gasi-ri* also volunteered. *Jangpil Oh*, a villager who volunteered for the Marine Corps, testified as follows:

Jangpil: There was a guy in the village. In order to volunteer for the army, he wrote the application using his blood...but died in the war. He was just 16 years old. I think this was caused by the incident (the 4.3 Incident). Because we were so

oppressed... No one has run away from the war. We risked our lives to fight against the Reds! If we were commies, as they've said, we would have run away to the north.

As mentioned above, the villagers in the mountain village had to prove that they were not communists. Fighting against the real communists was the only way to recover the villagers' honor and self-esteem during a time of extreme ideological confrontation.

3.2 Village reconstruction and changes in agriculture

For the emergence of a new sociological generation, Abrams (1986) states that it is possible when individuals aiming to build new identities encounter an accessible historical environment.

In the case of *Gasi-ri*, a new generation emerged in the late 1950s. The members of this generation realized the importance of education and the necessity of new knowledge. They attempted to overcome their socioeconomic inferiority caused by the genocide by tapping into their passion for reconstruction. They adopted the government's rural development plan actively, and started to rebuild the ruined village.

This chapter examines educational activities which have been conducted since the late 1950s in evening schools, youth groups, and the 4-H movement as the center. In so doing, the research analyzes how the villagers developed their agricultural system from subsistence farming into an economic crop mass-production system with newly-adopted knowledge.

3.2.1 The beginning of reconstruction

For the villagers of *Gasi-ri*, the *4.3 Incident* has functioned as a psychological trauma. In the process of collecting testimonies focused on developmental experiences, researchers have found that the trauma led villagers to share a common sentiment (regarding the formation of collective identity, refer to Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation). They blamed the *Tobeoldae* (government army and police) for the damage that resulted from the *4.3 Incident*. But at the same time, they felt regretful over their ignorance of the situation as well. This is evident from their pleading of innocence in regard to the ideological conflict as follows:

Chunghun: If we had been educated, we could have embraced and...informed the police. Then the incident could have been prevented. But we couldn't do that...um...Because we weren't educated, we weren't...

This sentiment is common among the group of people who witnessed the tragedy of genocide, the so-called “1.5th generation.” The “1.5th generation” refers to the middle of the 1st generation, which experienced the *4.3 Incident* directly. It also refers to the 2nd generation, which was born after the *4.3 Incident*. That is, although they experienced the *4.3 Incident*, they could survive by virtue of their age. Notably, the members of the generation became the driving force of village reconstruction. They shared the common thought that ignorance caused the *4.3 Incident*, and continually suffered through guilt by association. Therefore, they could recognize the importance of education, which resulted in the activation of village reconstruction.

3.2.1.1 Evening school and youth group activities

In 1959, evening school was opened for teaching uneducated people in *Gasi-ri*. In order to open the school, *Jangpil Oh*, *Jaedeok Jeong*, and the late *Hanseok Kim* played a leading role as representatives of the ‘1.5th generation’ of the village. As most of the young adults over 15 had been massacred by the communist guerrillas or the police, there were just a few young adults who could lead the village. In such circumstances, the three young men were the only intellectuals who had graduated from high school. Although they could have secured good positions such as government officials or businessmen, they all returned to the village for reconstruction.

Jaedeok: Well, at least, we had graduated from high school... But there were a lot of illiterate people...in the village. So we had to do that... in order to take care of our village. We all came back...all three of us did. But at that time, we had no members of previous generations to follow. They, especially those who had run away to the mountain... they all died due to the 4.3 Incident.

The testimony of *Jaedeok Jeong* reflects the shared sentiment of the 1.5th generation. In the situation of having no older villagers to follow, and as the only educated villagers, they felt a strong responsibility to reconstruct the village. The statement ‘we had to do that’ shows their sense of responsibility. In particular, as they witnessed the damage caused by ignorance, they also recognized the importance of

learning. For this reason, immediately following their graduation, they founded an evening school and started to educate people.

Jaedeok: We said “Let’s found the Jaegeon (reconstruction) school by ourselves.” Jaegeon school... It means, at that time, we knew that...the government was conducting a campaign, its name was...yeah, reconstruction movement. So, we named our school after that, and started teaching students at night... oh, and we also taught the elderly.

In the late 1950s, most households were in extreme poverty because of the continuous famine. The children also had to work rather than attend school and they could not graduate from even primary school. In this situation, the evening school played a significant role for many people who desired an education but did not have access to it. Students who worked on farms until nightfall ran into the school with lit candles. Impressed by their desire to learn, schoolteachers and the young adults in the village voluntarily participated as teachers. *Jeongja Kim*, the spouse of a schoolteacher in *Gasi-ri*, testified that she had taught knitting and dressmaking in the evening school.

Jeongja: School teachers taught Math and English, and...the guys who had graduated from high school taught social studies...or some other courses. As for me, because I had access to a sewing machine from the office (the headquarters of the Reconstruction Movement), I taught practical courses, like sewing or knitting...as I had learned those skills.

The evening school’s curriculum was not limited to basic courses. It included practical courses that taught skills such as knitting and agricultural skills. This shows that the evening school aimed at not only educating people through academic courses, but also aimed to inform them of various types of knowledge beneficial for the villagers.

In this context, the people who led the evening school actively responded to the government’s development plan to adopt new knowledge and skills because they believed applying new knowledge could help them develop their village. For instance, in 1961, the military government came into power and started the National

Reconstruction Movement. At this time, the leaders of *Gasi-ri* changed the name of the evening school to ‘Reconstruction School’ to receive support such as textbooks and teaching materials from the government.

Regarding the national reconstruction movement, the late *Hanseok Kim* organized the ‘Reconstruction Youth Group’, which performed various activities sponsored by the government such as the improvement of living environments, the simplification of ancestral rites, and the breaking of superstitions. However, this movement was not successful since the activities’ economic incentives were not clear. In addition, the movement was sometimes rejected by the villagers because it was viewed as a nearly top-down approach that was under the coercion of the government.

In the initial stage, we tried to edify with the following activities: the simplification of ancestral rites, the improvement of living environments, and the breaking of superstitions. However, it is difficult to do away with deep-rooted conventions in a short period of time. Some people rejected the movement (the reference book on *Gasi-ri*, 1987).

In general, the result of adopting the government’s slogan was not always a successful one. However, as the Youth Group played the role of bringing outside knowledge into the village, villagers could recognize new ways of life and selectively accept some of them according to their interests. Despite the fact that the government’s reconstruction movement had failed in the village, a village library founded by the Youth Group lasted until 1970. This reflects the villagers’ capability of decision-making. At the same time, the Youth group’s founding of the village library is a representative example of their emphasis on learning. Because of the Youth Group’s contribution, the village library housed more than 500 books in 1969. Therefore, the reference book on *Gasi-ri* evaluated that the village library was successfully viewed as a base for acquiring knowledge and productive skills.

3.2.1.2 4-H movement

The 4-H movement³ in *Gasi-ri* was mainly conducted by teenagers, and the 4-H club was organized for the first time in 1955. As a rural advisory center was installed and a rural development movement was started in 1956, the history of the 4-H movement in the village is in line with the history of village development.

At the beginning of village reconstruction in the late 1950s, *Jeongja Kim*, the leader of the *Gasi-ri* 4-H club, led the rural development movement in the village. She was born in *Shinpung-ri*, but started her life in *Gasi-ri* when her husband proceeded to his new post as a schoolteacher in the village. As her parents were relatively wealthy, she could learn practical skills and graduate from middle school.

When she first came to the village in the late 1950s, she thought the lives of the people in *Gasi-ri* were like those of animals. Therefore, she began to attempt new kinds of agriculture— cultivating economic crops for her self-reliance.

Jeongja: I was thinking...what I can do in this village, I had to stand on my own feet... So I started to grow special crops based on what I had learned from the center (rural advisory center). After about a year, I could make money from it somehow...because I used my brain after gaining knowledge from books.

Although it was difficult for her to produce and sell economic crops, she could make a profit after reading various agricultural books and receiving the rural advisory center's guidance. Since then, she thought that she ought to make contributions to the village with the knowledge she had gained. According to her testimony, she felt a sense of duty since her children would live in the village.

Jeongja: There was no water (service), no electricity...it was so miserable, like living like animals at that time...I couldn't leave the village as it was. Then...I thought, I should do this, because I will live here, my children will live here, so...It (a rural movement) was, kind of...our (leaders of Gasi-ri) mission.

³ 4-H movement: 4-H is a social education movement which helps to inspire youth to be agriculturally-minded, as well as to become well-rounded individuals by living by the 4-H club ideals of Head, Heart, Hands and Health. Unlike other youth organizations, 4-H focuses on the values of agriculture, environment and life. (quoted from the 4-H Association homepage: <http://english.korea4-h.or.kr>)

For that reason, the 4-H movement was started in the village. Since 1956, the national rural development administration began to provide the rural youth administration service. And fostering the 4-H club was one of the main projects of the service. In the case of the village, the advisory office took charge of the service. Supported by the advisory office, Kim gathered the village's teenagers, organized the 4-H club and began to perform various activities.

For the 4-H club's activities, Kim taught the village youths new agricultural skills, and gave them the opportunity to cultivate in the form of co-production. In this process, the village's younger generation could learn agricultural knowledge and practice new agricultural methods with their own hands. Sometimes, however, doing so did not come easy to them.

Jeongja: We tried to cultivate cabbage, peanuts...and um...oh, and potatoes, you know, sweet potatoes...I taught students how to farm, what to farm...kind of like that...farm-related skills. But sometimes, because they were young and immature, some kids did not complete the tasks, but avoided them. In such cases, I had to finish the tasks by myself.

Firstly, it was not easy to find economic crops suitable for the village's soil. Secondly, working with inexperienced youths was difficult because cultivating crop requires long-term regular management. In spite of these difficulties, the reason that she could spend her time and effort on this movement was the death of her husband.

Jeongja: Looking back, it could be done...because I had lost my husband, It seems to me that I put my heart into the work...so through the movement (the 4-H movement), I think I could gain confidence.

Her husband died from pneumonia 7 years after she came to the village. She was shocked, frustrated and scared since she was not only pregnant, but also already had two sons and a daughter. She tried to get over missing and loving her husband by striving to concentrate on the 4-H movement. In the daytime, she worked with teenagers and studied agricultural skills at night to drown her loneliness.

Jeongja: As I had so many things to do, I wasn't lonely...usually, when someone has lost her family, it's hard to maintain an ordinary life. But in my case, I didn't have enough time to feel sorrow; I had to read, learn, and attend lectures...and I had to gather people to do something. Especially, I felt happy to see the kids (the members of the 4-H club). So, at least in my view...they were my students, and I was their teacher.

Kim taught her club members and enthusiastically worked together with them as if they were her own students. As a result of these efforts, the younger generation of *Gasi-ri* became aware of new agricultural skills for cultivating economic crops. This contributed to the development of the village's agriculture in the late 1960s.

In the meantime, with regard to Kim's motivation for devoting herself to the rural movement, it is remarkable that she sought consolation through the movement after bereavement. She felt happiness by performing activities with club members as if she had become their teacher. In conclusion, Kim's participation in the 4-H club's activities was not just participation in a rural movement for her, but it was an action for finding meaning in her life. Like this, her motivation for playing a significant role in the movement could be interpreted in a personal context. This is different from that of the 1.5th generation—the mindset of escaping ignorance—derived from the collective experience of the *4.3 Incident*. However, if we synthesize these two cases in that they had both experienced extreme frustration, we can come up with the possibility of analyzing motivation (regarding the motivation of spontaneity, refer to Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation).

3.2.2 Changes in agriculture: mass production of economic crops

In the late 1950s, the villagers' life in *Gasi-ri* was terrible. Especially in 1957, continuous famine occurred due to extreme poverty. Traditionally, the village's agricultural structure was no more than subsistence farming. In addition, stock farming, which was a pillar of village industry, had been severely damaged by the *4.3 Incident*. Even plowing a field was a daunting task for the survivors because in addition to most

men being killed, farm animals had also been wiped out. For this reason, villagers barely managed to stay alive by selling wood and charcoal.

During this period, the government began to install advisory centers in each region, with the intention to eliminate extreme poverty in rural areas. In 1956, the Institute of Agricultural Technology was founded in *Jeju-si* as well. The institute carried out a rural enlightenment movement that involved activities such as educating village leaders and providing farming technology through the advisory center. Particularly, it focused on developing new economic crops, and popularizing it in each rural village.

As mentioned earlier, *Gasi-ri* was in poverty until the late 1950s. In the beginning of the 1960s, however, as a result of the efforts of villagers who had the desire to learn knowledge (e.g., the 1.5th generation), knowledge for cultivating economic crops could be introduced into the village. In addition, they conducted experiments on various crops to find a suitable cultivar. After selecting crops, they tried to cultivate it using a variety of methods. This entire series of processes—knowledge introduction, localization, and income generation—could be interpreted as a collective learning activity.

3.2.2.1 Sliced sweet potato (*Jeolgan goguma*)

Economic crop cultivation began to expand in the village in the 1960s. In 1961, As President Park seized power in a military coup, Admiral *Younggwan Kim* was appointed as the governor of *Jeju* Island. He prohibited the import of the raw materials of alcohol, and replaced them with the domestic sweet potato crop. This decision acted as the catalyst in improving the village's economy. *Jaedeok Jeong* speaks about the situation as follows:

Jaedeok: You know, at that time...the governor said the alcohol factory had to buy Jeju (sweet) potatoes...our village is popular for them because the soil is good for growing them. So, we thought, 'We should grow them!'...after that, without exception, all we started to grow were sweet potatoes.

The alcohol plant located in *Jeju-si* had occupied a great amount of area, about 43,000 square meters' worth. As all the alcohol on the island was produced at the plant, significant amounts of raw materials were needed. In this situation, as the entire import was prohibited and replaced with sweet potatoes, the demand was tremendous. In the meantime, *Gasi-ri*, with its vast land containing suitable soil for cultivating sweet potatoes, was the best place to produce them. Since then, the village began to reform its agricultural structure: from subsistence agriculture to economic agriculture with mass production. The villagers who first realized they could make a huge profit through this new way of farming started in earnest to produce sweet potatoes. With regard to the cultivation of sweet potatoes, the following memoir written by villagers of *Gasi-ri* shows that it brought significant wealth to the villagers. During sweet potato harvesting season, schools were closed so that students could help their parents with the harvest. This custom is one example revealing the importance of sweet potato farming.

The village was full of sliced potatoes, and it looked like the whole world was covered with snow. As it was the 'sweet potato holiday', we did not go to school. Although our village had been devastated by the 4.3 *Incident* in the past, we could earn a lot of money thanks to the potatoes. By selling the potatoes, we bought land, a cow, and paid for my tuition as well. It allowed me to have hope that I could go to middle school.

Jeolgan means sliced and dried potato. As the whole process of making *Jeolgan* is done using the hands, it was labor-intensive, hard work. Nevertheless, the villagers preferred to sell it in the form of *Jeolgan*, because it could be sold at a much higher price. On the other hand, the mass production of this economic crop also brought unexpected difficulties to the villagers since in generations past, they had grown only simple food crops.

*Jaedeok: We thought this could make us money...so, we all did it (sweet potato farming).
Then the next step was selling...(Interviewer: jointly?) Yeah, selling jointly...
But the problem was keeping the potatoes. So we made the decision to make
warehouses in every village. We built... a total of six warehouses.*

The problem was storing the products. Since the value of sliced-potato declines if it is soaked in the rain or exposed to moisture, sufficient space is required to keep it dry. For this reason, the villagers who kept their potatoes separately built warehouses in each sub-village to sell the products jointly and effectively. After that, they managed the problem by choosing a particular person to be in charge in every sub-village.

3.2.2.2 Dried slice of radish

The radish crop contributed to the villagers' increase in income no less than did the sweet potato. After radish of good quality was cultivated, it was processed in the form of dried slices. The dried slice of radish was one of the primary economic crops in the village because not only the soil was suitable for cultivating radishes, but the village's low temperature and windy climate were optimal conditions for drying them in sliced form. Initially, in the late 1950s, the production of radishes had already been attempted by a few villagers who recognized the amount of arable land in the village. However, as it was before the reformation of the economic structure in the village, there were a lot of difficulties involved in tapping the market and distributing products. For this reason, it could not be connected to the mass production. In the beginning of the 1960s, however, the villagers who learned new agricultural knowledge began to expand the cultivation of radishes, and developed the radish as a product.

Jeongja: At that time, it (dried slice of radish) sold well, because Chinese people bought it for making dumplings. And as it was cold in the village when we cultivate the radishes, drying them is the first goal...to make a good product you know...by the way, we could make good products in just a day, thanks to the good climate. Then, we sold them throughout the country...that made us a lot of money.

Before the beginning of radish cultivation, some of the villagers wasted the winter season engaged in drinking and gambling. However, as the production of dried slice of radish was possible even in the agricultural off-season, it could improve people's lives and increase household incomes as well. But there was a problem. Unlike the stable price of the sweet potato due to the joint sales of the products to the alcohol plant in *Jeju-si*, the radish's price fluctuated widely because of retailers' bad will. So

radish famers occasionally suffered an enormous loss from the situation.

The villagers who struggle to solve the problem organized an agricultural cooperative by themselves. They purchased all of the radish products and sold them jointly at a fixed price. By doing this, arbitrary price fluctuation previously caused by merchants was prevented, and the farmers' income increased. In this way, by adopting new knowledge from the outside, the villagers were able to overcome their difficulties.

3.2.2.3 The beginning of road pavement

Since the 1960s, the village has been equipped with the system of mass production and a joint sales system. The next concern of the villagers was distribution. As the village is located in a mountainous basin area, transportation to other regions was relatively inconvenient. For this reason, the villagers decided to start the project of paving the roads. The following testimony of *Jaedeok Jeong* shows the recognition of the villagers in regard to the road pavement project at that time.

Jaedeok: To transport the products, we had to build a road...we thought that. These roads did not exist when the incident (the 4.3 Incident) happened. Then we thought...that we had to build a road so we could drive...so, that's why we constructed the road using our own hands... By picking up stones, yeah...we did that by ourselves.

By paving around Bon-dong (the main village), the villagers started expanding and paving the road. They first paved internal paths between six sub-villages to improve transportation among the village. And in 1966, they constructed the main circuit road which travels around the whole village. The total length of roads paved during this period reached over 9km. This process was carried out by the villagers' own efforts, without any outside assistance. As the road pavement process meant facilitating the distribution of their agricultural products, all of the villagers were willing to participate in the project without opposition. This road pavement project accelerated in the 1970s, the period of New Village Movement (or *Saemaul Undong*).

3.3 New village *Gasi-ri*: co-optation of the state

Gasi-ri has become famous as the best *Saemaul* (new village) since the beginning of the 1970s. Specifically, it earned its name after gaining the best village award in December 1971. The villagers have paved more than 18km of mountainous road by themselves, and this project was acclaimed as the most successful spontaneous development project ever. In 1977, President Park came to the village and praised the villagers for their reconstruction efforts. *Kyunghyang* newspaper reported this event as follows:

President Park came by the model village of *Gasi-ri* located in Pyoseon-myeon. Once the village was considered one of the most devastated villages since the *4.3 Incident*, but now it has developed into a remarkably wealthy village through the Saemaul Movement. *Gasi-ri* village residents have paved 8.3km of road leading into the village by themselves.⁴

Typical reporting repertoire is found in this article. Although the village is located in one of the most remote areas and was devastated by the genocide, it was transformed into a remarkably wealthy village by virtue of the *Saemaul Undong* (New Village movement⁵). Furthermore, the road pavement process was conducted successfully by the villagers without any outside support. As the *Saemaul Undong* was officially initiated in 1970, the devastated village of *Gasi-ri* was commended as the best village just after a year and a half following the movement's initiation. From a common-sense point of view, this commendation is incomprehensible.

First, why were these ordinary villagers engrossed in paving road rather than all the other unit projects introduced by the government?. Second, in the situation of extreme poverty, was it possible to pave more than 18km of mountainous roads by

⁴ January 4, 1977. The front page of *Kyunghyang* Daily News.

⁵ New Village Movement (Saemaul Movement): A political initiative launched on April 22, 1970 by South Korean president Park Chung Hee to modernize the rural South Korean economy. The movement initially sought to rectify the growing disparity of the standard of living between the nation's urban centers, which were rapidly industrializing, and the small villages, which continued to be mired in poverty. Diligence, self-help and collaboration were the slogans used to encourage community members to participate in the development process. (quoted from the New Village Movement homepage: <http://saemaul.com>)

themselves? And, lastly, although other conditions such as motivation, purpose, and practicality could be satisfied, can we consider this achievement as the outcome of the government's development project?

In the context of these questions, this chapter approaches the history of the implementation of the development project, particularly with respect to the road pavement project from the perspective of the participants. In doing so, the research considers the dynamics of individuals and groups, including the interactions among the villagers, and the interactions between the villagers and the government.

3.3.1 The landscape of road pavement

The need for paving road was initiated since the beginning of the 1960s, when the cultivation of economic crops started in earnest. In 1966, the pavement of internal roads that connect sub-villages, and pavement of the main circuit road travelling around the whole village were completed. At that time, as the villagers had already established their co-production and co-sale systems, they were making huge profits as full-fledged economic farmers. In this situation, it is understandable that they started to recognize the necessity of paving road with their experimental knowledge. Therefore, the newspaper article which reported that the change of the village was caused by *Saemaul Undong* is far from the truth. That is, regardless of the governmental development project, the reconstruction efforts were actively being made by the villagers independently. When it came to the necessity of road pavement, moreover, implicit consent existed among the villagers.

Jaedeok: When we first started the work (road pavement)..., it was not initiated by the government's instruction, we... by ourselves, we thought that we should do this to live (well).

In the viewpoint of the villagers, the connection made with the *Saemaul Undong* movement was an unexpected coincidence. While they were implementing road pavement to facilitate distribution, a governmental rural development project was

being promoted under the name of *Saemaul Undong*. In this situation, the people of the 1.5th generation, who had mainly led the reconstruction, had no reason to oppose the policy. So the late *Hanseok Kim*, who had been the head of the village, responded to the policy proactively in order to accelerate the reconstruction. He adopted the principle of *Saemaul Undong*, which advocates that residents determine the necessary actions and how to implement them, and organized a village council of 6 sub-village representatives. Establishing a regular consultative group was a strategy for not only enhancing cohesion among the sub-villages, but also mobilizing villagers quickly and effectively.

Geunjun: Although it's hard to hold a general meeting...yeah, we gathered frequently; then, we couldn't help but be united. As a result, in so doing...if everyone agreed to something, then we could take action and make it possible...by ourselves.

Road pavement was mainly conducted as follows: First, the village council representatives decided on what actions had to be taken and how to go about carrying them out. And the decided issue was then divided into several unit projects headed up by several *Banjang*. A *banjang* is the leader of a neighborhood association which is comprised of 5~10 households. A *banjang* distributes work to the villagers and pushes the project ahead by setting a plan in the actual places. However, a well-organized implementation system was not sufficient to ensure completion of a project. Above all things, the villagers lacked sufficient funds to cover the entire cost of paving roads in spite of their increased income.

Hence, Hanseok Kim, the head of the village, visited Japan to raise funds to pave road. At that time, a number of Korean residents in Japan were working in various fields, and some of them had displayed exceptional business acumen, achieved success and accumulated wealth. *Jaeho Ahn*, from *Gasi-ri*, was one such case. In 1956, when famine had reached an extreme in the village, he visited his hometown and brought aid to all of the villagers. Besides, he supported the introduction of electricity into the village in the 1970s. For this reason, he had gained much respect among the villagers. In particular, the anecdote about installing an amp system has been described by many people.

Chunghun: He, he must have thought... as we weren't educated... and we were ignorant about the world, that we were poor. So, first of all, in order to teach people, he sent money, installed the... amp system. Right, amp system, you know...then we broadcast news at the administration office. So, through the news, we could learn...the ways of the world.

As we can see from *Chunghun's* testimony, the 1.5th generation of the village had a collective identity, which indicates that the damage was incurred by the ignorance of the villagers. They recognized that outside help should not be wasted in momentary relief, but rather it should be invested for the village's sustainable development. Therefore, the reason for the head of the village's visit to the entrepreneur in Japan could be interpreted in this context as well. He requested that *Jaeho Ahn*—a successful entrepreneur— finance the rest of the cost for paving road. At the same time, he promised that all labor forces would be covered by volunteers from the village. In response, *Ahn* and other overseas Koreans donated 17 million won. By virtue of this contribution, the road pavement between *Gasi-ri* and *Pyoseon* started on January 20, 1974. According to the 'New Village Movement (1980)', the total project cost of this construction was 36 million won, which consisted of overseas Koreans' donations (17 million won), the villagers' common fund (15 million won), and governmental support (4 million won). More than 25,000 people in 1,314 households participated in this construction; additionally, 152 carriages, 1347 tractors, and 152 vehicles were utilized. All of the villagers voluntarily participated to lay the aggregate for road construction.

Geunjun: We've got stones from everywhere, like...a farm field. So, we paved the roads with the stones using handcarts and carriages. The banjang assigned us specific tasks for paving the road.

The villagers' major work was flattening and hardening the dirt roads with stones so that cement could be applied. They paved the road with handcarts, carriages and their hands. The entire process was manual. Furthermore, the pavement was mainly carried out in the winter season as it should not interfere with farming. For this reason, they had a challenging time finishing the work.

Geunjun: After the work...my hands had become blue all over, worn out like leather...because of the stones. As we were poor at that time, we had nothing...no gloves, and no equipment. When we felt cold, we lit a fire using twigs and thawed out.

The villagers' hands became cracked and bruised as a result of carrying the stones countless times in the icy winter wind. However, according to the testimonies, the villagers' desire to complete the pavement project was great. In addition, as the pavement operation was divided into units of 'Ban', each of which was composed of about 10 households, there was an implicit enforcement power for finishing the allocated work within a particular period. The *banjang*, the leaders responsible for the execution of the actual operations, allocated the work area by meters. For this reason, the responsibilities were clearly delineated geographically, and those who failed to finish the work during the day would work at night, often even with help from their children.

Jangpil: So, when the work was far from the village, we allocated in proportion to the population of the national village. 3 people from this village, and 4 people from that village.... Like this. All of them worked hard, and even at night.

Interviewer: Even at night?

Sansik: Yeah, they all worked to finish the work.

Such implicit enforcement power was caused by the villagers' decision rather than national coercion. That is, the villagers' economic interests—enhancing their income and quality of life by improving access to other villages—were strongly reflected in the activities. *Sangmyeon Oh*, one of the leaders in the village, testifies that the road was not only a means of transportation but also a means of the entire livelihood itself. This claim shows the significance of road pavement well.

In May 1975, after a year and four months of construction, the road pavement project between *Pyoseon-ri* and *Gasi-ri* was completed. By virtue of the pavement, the commute by bus was shortened from 40 minutes to 10 minutes, and agricultural products could be distributed much more efficiently. Moreover, the government

evaluated *Gasi-ri* as an excellent national village in the *Saemaul* competition. In this process, the late *Hanseok Kim*, the leader of the village, received a medal from the president and the village won an official commendation from the Minister of Home Affairs. Finally, the “village of the Reds” had become the “village of honor.”

3.3.2 The processes of land expropriation and persuasion

For the villagers of *Gasi-ri*, the award they received for being an excellent village of the nation was the highest honor in the village’s history. The government and police were no longer recognized as oppressors. In fact, the villagers even began to think of the government as their supporter. In this atmosphere, on January 1976, they decided to extend their road pavement plan.

Geunjun: At that time, it took almost a day to go to the city (Jeju-si) because we had to travel a roundabout way. So we thought...if we build a new road, we can go there directly.

Interviewer: You mean the road pavement was conducted for the villagers’ convenience?

Geunjun: Sure. And besides, it was better for driving a carriage after we built the road. So, we could easily sell our products by using the carriage.

As most regions included in the extended pavement plan were mountainous areas, the project required more materials and manpower. In order to begin the pavement, the villagers raised more than a hundred million won, including financial support from *Jaeho Ahn* and government funding. As for the governmental support, the principle of the New Village Movement was applied in the village. At that time, the government induced a competition between villages by providing financial support based on performance. *Sangmyeon Oh* testified that the principle was directly reflected in the process of road pavement.

Sangmyeon: If we tried to do everything at once together, we would fail, because it's not efficient. So, as we have six sub-villages, we divided the sector into six parts and gave each group certain tasks to complete...in a competitive way.

In this respect, we can find that the villagers, especially the 1.5th generation leaders, utilized the government's development policies to facilitate their work. Meanwhile, from the government's perspective, the New Village Movement succeeded to enhance efficiency by introducing various competitive tactics in the villages. This success was in contrast to the National Reconstruction Movement's failure in the past due to the government's unilateral enforcement. Regarding this, villagers who had participated in the road pavement testified that witty conversation, concession, persuasion, and sometimes even subtle coercion had been used to get the villagers to participate in the road pavement project.

Sangmyeon: (Regarding the persuasion process) Communication is really important; without it, we could not make it possible. When we work on a project, there's always a resistant person. In order to achieve our goal, sometimes we have to appease him, even if doing so doesn't directly meet our interest. We should handle such cases carefully, and wisely cope with such situations.

In most cases, resistance occurred during the process of land expropriation. In the early 1970s, although the villagers had already decided to pave their road unprecedentedly on a large scale, there was no government compensation for the villagers who owned land near the roads. They had no choice but to give up their land for free. It was an awkward situation although they knew that this selfless act would be helpful for increasing their income. In particular, most of the elderly villagers, who relied heavily on the land, valued their land above everything else. Thus, it was difficult to persuade them to donate their land. For this reason, convincing the elderly was crucial for the 1.5th generation to proceed with the pavement project. Therefore, in order to receive permission for land expropriation, the people who led the road pavement used several tactics as follows.

First, the leaders convinced people by pleading and explaining the purpose of the road pavement project. *Hyeok Kim*, the ex-leader of the *Duri-dong* sub-village, acquired permission from the father of *Jangpil Oh* (one of the three educated people in *Gasi-ri*, refer to 4.2.1.1) by pleading with him to donate his land for several days.

Hyeok: The field next to Jangpil's house... It was his father's land. Haha...I don't even remember how many times I visited him to get permission. Well...I said again and again, "Please...Please..." and finally, I got permission and succeeded to extend the road.

Apart from the fact that *Jangpil Oh* had dedicated himself to rebuilding the village, acquiring permission from his father to expropriate his land was difficult. This testimony shows how much the elderly villagers treasured their land.

Second, there is another method of taking the initiative and setting an example. *Chunghun Kim*, the ex-leader of the *Poknam-dong* sub-village, donated his land first in order to set an example.

Chunghun: If I wanted to get other people to donate their land...I felt I had to donate my land first. So, I gave up my northern land and said, "Let's extend the road from here." You want me to do something? Then you do it first. That's the way. It worked.

Third, other leaders persuaded the resistant people by using their wits. *Sangmyeon Oh*, the ex-leader of the *Saengi-dong* sub-village, watched those who resisted donating his/her land closely, and let other elderly community leaders who had power and moral influence persuade them instead.

Sangmyeon: I thought carefully about who could persuade the person...In order to convince someone, we needed a relevant person to do that. (Interviewer: More specifically..?) Okay. Let's see...a person who has power, and ability. But at the same time, who isn't wild, but folksy.

Meanwhile, he added that an indirect method was sometimes effective in convincing people. One of the methods was gaining villagers' trust by considering their feelings at ordinary times. For example, he used to pay the villagers' bus fare as follows.

Sangmyeon: As you may know, most villagers were poor at that time...so I counted the number of people on the bus and paid the bus fare, all at once. Maybe some people thought I was crazy, but many others thanked me... After the occasion, I've never heard any complaints, though someone might not be satisfied with the way things are done in the village.

He remembered that the behavior had had a positive influence on gaining villagers' consent although it had not been intended to win the villagers' favor. These tactics—pleading, convincing by proxy, taking initiative, and gaining trust—were generally used for land expropriation before the beginning of a road pavement project. Meanwhile, after the road pavement started in the village, the leaders of the village sometimes took forceful steps to make the villagers participate in the work.

Sangmyeon: One day some people didn't show up to work, and were gambling with others at their house. So I lost my temper, rushed into the house with military boots, and yelled at them. I wanted to drag them out of the house, but I didn't.

He testified that he told the people to return to their work, and rebuked them for their behavior. According to several testimonies, however, this case was unusual. In general, absentees were under subtle pressure from other villagers.

Hyeok: Yeah, of course. There were people who opposed the work. But the opposition wasn't that serious. When someone was reluctant to participate in the work, we tried to hear his situation and kept persuading him. Then in most cases, he came around and got back to work.

In conversations where others tried to persuade those who were sometimes absent, the villagers usually said, "Why don't you come and work with us?" or "We are doing this for ourselves." An interesting point from the process of persuasion was the

fact that most of the absentees finally “came around” and participated in the work. The neighbors did not force the absentees in person. Then how could that be possible? It seems that an absentee’s attitude affected his neighborhood group. As the village’s households were organized into several small-scale neighborhood groups and each group’s job performance record was open to the public, one’s absence from work would negatively impact everyone in the group. This could be a great burden for someone in rural life as one’s relationship with their neighbors was of vital importance.

In summary, the villagers’ motivation of participation can be classified into three factors as follows.

The first is economic interest. The implicit consent of the villagers seems to have been gained due to this factor. Considering the geographical position of the village, which had a poor transportation system, paving roads was regarded the same as pioneering a new market.

The second thing is socio-cultural needs. *Gasi-ri*’s living environment was not sufficient to satisfy the villagers’ needs. They had to go to a nearby village to receive medical and administrative services, buy daily necessities and enjoy culture. For that reason, improving road transportation was the most effective way in order to improve their quality of life.

Third, an immaterial binding force (B.Y. Yoo et al., 2001) had an effect on the village. This factor was as significant as the villagers’ economic interest and socio-cultural needs. It seems to be derived from the characteristics of rural society, which puts an emphasis on the emotional intimacy between neighbors. This was presented in villagers’ testimonies, for example, “Other neighbors are donating their lands, why don’t you do that too?” or “Why were you absent from work? No one ever does that.” This factor exerted its influence on the village’s working system, which clarifies where the responsibility lies, and the method of performance which put the villagers into competition with each other.

3.3.3 Discussion on the immaterial binding force

Meanwhile, this section examines the concept of “military mentality (B.Y. Yoo et al., 2001)” as one of the immaterial binding forces. The “military mentality” refers to a hierarchical and socio-psychological force including collectivism, standardization, and authoritarianism. In the case of the New Village Movement in rural communities, they analyzed that unconditional obedience was pervasive in rural communities because the military mentality influenced villagers’ form of participation. Thus, according to their analysis, most rural villagers had no choice but to participate in the government-driven development project in order not to be viewed as rebels. They added that this form of participation was closely related to political conflicts in Korea, especially to the collective memory of the conflict of the Korean War.

In a similar vein, the researcher focused on the fact that *Gasi-ri* has a tragic history of genocide. Regarding the concept of immaterial binding force, we need to examine the relationship between genocidal memory and the villagers’ form of participation. And if it is possible, further study should be focused on the influence of the force on CD.

According to several oral testimonies, it was obvious that the memory of the 4.3 *Incident* had an effect on the villagers’ participation in the New Village Movement. However, there was a difference of direction in recognizing the government’s project. Primarily, all of the interviewees agreed that the genocidal history of their village and their experiences during that time had instilled in them a subconscious fear of the government, soldiers, and police.

Jangpil: Anyway, when a policeman approached me...even though he didn't say anything, I was so scared, and broke out into a cold sweat.

Chunghun: When I heard the word “police,” my heart pounded because of my childhood experiences.

As we have seen earlier, B.Y. Yoo et al. (2001) claimed that villagers showed unconditional obedience in the New Village Movement, although none of them had been victims of the Korean War. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, however, most of the

interviewees disagreed with the possibility of unconditional obedience caused by fear even though nearly one third of the villagers had been massacred due to the state's violence. For instance, *Jangpil Oh* testifies that the villagers were not forced to participate in the village reconstruction by the government at that time.

Jangpil: No, they didn't force us... We could say anything we wanted... I never felt such a thing (oppression) at all.

Another interviewee, *Seokman Oh*, who had lost family members due to the 4.3 Incident, also denied the possibility of unconditional obedience in the village reconstruction activity while acknowledging that there was still an oppressive atmosphere at the time of the military government's reign.

Seokman: Well...even after the military coup..., we didn't have freedom to say anything we wanted.

Interviewer: Then, regarding the New Village Movement as well, don't you think the village reconstruction was carried out through enforcement?

Seokman: Hmm... No, it wasn't done in that way... We didn't work for them.

What caused this difference in community? The researcher compared two villages' historical situations and their perspectives of the government in the 1970s. First, in the case of the village observed by B.Y. Yoo et al. (2001), it had experienced failure in a government-driven development project before the New Village Movement. For this reason, the residents of the village were reluctant to participate in the project, but they had to agree to do so to avoid future trouble. In other words, due to their previous experience, they already had a negative perception of the government-driven project when they began the development project. In that situation, there was little chance that voluntary participation would occur from within the community. However, in the case of *Gasi-ri*, by virtue of agricultural innovation in the community, the villagers had a successful experience of development. And, by accident, the period coincided with the beginning of the military regime's rule; thus, the villagers overcame their negative perspective of the government.

Seokman: At that time, the movement (New Village Movement)...somehow, it seemed like a good thing. Because... Our work (farming) was going well, and we began to live well... as a result of President Park's help.

Interviewer: What did President Park do in particular?

Seokman: Nothing special... He didn't give us money. The important thing was...he just made it possible for us to succeed in selling our sweet potatoes.

In the background of this recognition, the memory of a certain historical fact—the military regime's ban of the imports of raw materials of alcohol, thereby making it possible for the villagers to sell their sweet potato crops—was firmly situated. In fact, however, the ban on the import of the raw materials of alcohol had already been planned and determined by the former regime to improve rural household incomes. Specifically, the *Jeju* local assembly proposed the bill to the government in 1958, and it was received by the military regime in 1961. Therefore, it cannot be seen that the military regime had directly intended to promote the village's development. However, it is pointless to wonder whether the military regime contributed to the village's increase of income. Rather, the significant point is that the villagers' perception of the state had begun to change from “an oppressor” to “a supporter.” This perception could have truly affected the villagers' form of participation in the development project. Namely, as long as the government is perceived as an “oppressor,” villagers cannot be active agents but instead passive or unconditional followers. However, in an environment in which the government is perceived as “a supporter,” the villagers can be real participants (or agents of activity) who recognize a project as their own mission.

In summary, it is difficult to generalize that there is a causal relationship between a community member's oppressive experience (or a villager's collective memory of political conflict) and their form of participation. An oppressive experience (war or genocide) does not cause a simple result of “unconditional obedience.” Rather, the result varies depending on what the community members' perception of the government is or how their perception has changed in a historical context. Below, the testimony of *Geunjun Hyeun*, who had lost family members due to the *4.3 Incident*, shows his view of the government and the government-driven development project.

Geunjun: You should do more than what is asked by the government. The government doesn't do everything for us. We had to do what we needed to do. For example, we needed a road, so we gathered and built a road by ourselves.

Although he had lost his family due to the state's violence, he recalls the government as a supporter from his memory of village reconstruction. This perception was the very driving force of having an active and autonomous attitude while participating in the reconstruction.

3.4 Changes in community

The road pavement between *Gasi-ri* and *Jeju-si* was completed in 1976 with the aid of land expropriation and collaboration, took eight months and was faced with many complications. It was able to be finished due to 1) the villagers' tacit agreement on the common benefit of road pavement, and 2) the immaterial binding force which comes from the nature of traditional rural communities and the craze of the national development movement. Indeed, the project was evaluated as the largest-scale self-sufficient project in the entire nation. As a result of this achievement, the village acquired a national reputation. Besides, the village's distribution structure of its agricultural products was improved, and thereby their household incomes were dramatically increased as well.

As can be seen earlier, the village's success story—by virtue of the New Village Movement—of a devastated village becoming the best developed village in the nation was basically an elaborate fabrication under the co-optation strategy of the government. As a typical example, the reconstruction anecdote of *Gasi-ri* that was introduced in “The History of the New Village Movement” was distorted to emphasize the effect of the government-driven development movement. Thus, this section examines the changes of community from socioeconomic and psychological perspectives, respectively.

3.4.1 Socioeconomic changes

The efforts of the village reconstruction that started in the late 1950s led to several changes in the village. First, as result of the introduction of modern agricultural knowledge, the villagers could start cultivating economic crops and reforming their system into mass production in the late 1950s. And in the beginning of the 1960s, the agricultural changes brought about innovations such as road pavement and the introduction of agricultural machinery. Like this, the village's process of innovation, which resulted from the introduction of knowledge, can be interpreted with the

expansive learning theory—knowledge introduction, knowledge sharing, and collective action in an activity system.

3.4.1.1 Income increase due to economic crop cultivation

As described in 4.2.1, in the 1960s, the village's income was dramatically increased by virtue of modern agricultural innovation. The village's small-scale self-sufficient agriculture was reformed into a mass production system as well as a sales system during this period. And in the background of these innovations, members of the "1.5th generation" of the village played a significant role in the development of the village. They tried to cultivate new economic crops in the village by accommodating the government's rural enlightenment policy in the late 1950s. As a result of making a continuous exchange with the agricultural advisory center, they eventually succeeded in discovering economic crops, the sweet potato and radish, which were suitable for the village's soil.

Jangpil: We earned a lot by selling sliced sweet potatoes. They (the alcohol factory) paid us generously. At that time, if we had eight sacks of sweet potatoes, we could buy a large sack of rice. So, since then, the economy (of the village) had been doing well.

Hyeok: After growing the sweet potato, we grew the radish, dried radish. We became rich because of it...the reason was that...we have vast lands... farmlands here. So by growing radishes, we could earn a lot.

By selling the mass-produced economic crops all throughout the country, the villagers realized that they could make large profits through agriculture for the first time. According to a testimony, for example, eight sacks of sweet potato were comparable to a sack of rice at that time. It was beyond their imagination, because until the mid-1950s, the rice was a very precious grain which could be eaten only on important holidays.

To sum up, the process of discovering suitable economic crops in the village can be interpreted as an object-oriented activity. From the situation of extreme poverty, the villagers set the common goal of increasing their income, and learned to achieve the goal by communicating with each other. As time passed, the initial goal has changed

from producing economic crops to promoting distribution. In other words, the villagers elaborated the activity system by extending a new activity. From those activities, we can identify the characteristics of a learning activity—creating or extending its object continuously—defined in the expansive learning theory as well. Thus, in the process of economic crop introduction, the villagers formed a learning activity system.

3.4.1.2 Improvement of transportation

The mass-production system gave rise to the road pavement activities. As can be seen earlier, the villagers of *Gasi-ri* paved a total of 18.2km of mountainous road to facilitate product distribution in the 1970s. This has contributed to increase the villagers' income by improving the rate of use of pastures as well. The advantages of road pavement were not limited to economic benefits. *Jaedeok Jeong* testified that almost all of *Jeju* Island had yet to be paved before the 1970s. According to his testimony, he and his friend were attending high school located in *Jeju* city. Every weekend, they had to come to the village on foot to buy food, and the trip took almost half a day from the city.

Jaedeok: We had to come to the village every Saturday to get food. If we started in the morning, we arrived at the village at night...I think it took almost a half day. Like that...we (three people) went to school on foot for three years.

This situation was the same as traversing the road between *Gasi-ri* and *Pyoseon-ri*. As the road was not paved, villagers mainly walked or used ox-carts to carry loads. However, since the road pavement was completed, the villagers did not have to walk anymore. By virtue of the bus service, the villagers' accessibility to other villages was greatly improved, which was directly linked to their quality of life. Regarding the improvement of the transportation system, *Beomyoung Oh* testifies as follows.

Beomyoung: We used to walk to Pyoseon (center village), and it was more than 7km... but after the road pavement, it was really comfortable, because the bus service was started....let's see...it operated maybe...twice a day.

Regarding the bus service, the fact that students in the village could go to school by bus is written in history books and the reference book on *Gasi-ri* as well. Therefore, for the villagers of *Gasi-ri* at that time, the road pavement was really significant in that the enhanced accessibility indicated the improvement of the villagers' overall quality of life in terms of their access to medical, administrative, and cultural services.

3.4.1.3 Mechanization of agriculture

One of the changes resulting from the introduction of new agricultural knowledge was the mechanization of agriculture. Until the 1960s, major farming implements were not modernized along with the use of livestock such as cows and horses. The villagers used livestock to plow their land, grind grain, and carry loads of products. However, since the early 1970s, modern agricultural machinery such as water pumps, threshing machines, and crop protection machines were introduced to the villagers. Agricultural productivity was greatly increased by virtue of these machines. In particular, the villagers regarded the tractor as a transformative machine for agriculture. It was versatile, able to be used not only for carrying materials but also for threshing and cultivating grain. *Taegyeong Oh* testifies as follows.

Taegyeong: It was a phenomenal development...because the introduction of the tractor. Many people got loans to buy them. By paying back the loans...our lives were improving.

In the early 1970s, the mechanization of agriculture was started in the village. As the tractor was too expensive to buy, villagers jointly purchased the machine by arranging loans with the bank. For this reason, it played a role of increasing the gap between farmers although it brought a surge in agricultural productivity. Since mass-production caused the depreciation of unit prices in agricultural products, farmers who successfully utilized agricultural machines were able to make huge profits, while farmers who could not use such machines were deprived due to low productivity and prices.

Regarding this phenomena, studies which took a critical approach to agriculture mechanization understand that the capitalist economy accelerated the dissolution of traditional rural communities. Meanwhile, as loans for agriculture machines increased, so did farming household debts. By using government statistics, D.H. Han (1999) critically analyzed that from the 1970s to 1980s, farming household debts increased by 21 times, while farming household incomes increased by 10.5 times. Thus, the mechanization of agriculture improved the farmers' agricultural productivity on the one hand, but on the other hand, they had to bear the corresponding liabilities.

Meanwhile, *Gasi-ri's* agriculture mechanization can be evaluated as a relatively successful case. In addition to the fact that the villagers made a huge profit as a result of the mass production of economic crops in the 1960s, they already had coordinative response experience by establishing an agriculture cooperative. Therefore, they could prepare for the high price of agricultural machinery by jointly lending money and paying off their debts. From this perspective, we can see the possibility that the side-effects of capitalist agriculture—rich-poor gap increase, and dissolution of community—can be overcome by the mutual solidarity and cooperation of community members.

3.4.2 Psychological changes

During the process of village reconstruction, the psychological changes of the villagers were as significant as the socioeconomic changes. Right after the *4.3 Incident*, the villagers were living in pain and frustration on a daily basis. Survival was indeed an end in itself. In the late 1950s, however, the attitude of the villagers gradually changed, especially by the beginning of the village reconstruction centering on the members of the 1.5th generation of the village. In this section, the researcher focuses on the villagers' psychological changes that came about due to the learning activities begun in the evening school and the introduction of modern agricultural knowledge. And at the end of this section, the researcher examines how the activities affected the villagers' attitude.

3.4.2.1 Proactive attitude

In the late 1950s, the village reconstruction activity played a role as a starting point in changing the villagers' attitude. The activity led by the members of the 1.5th generation was basically based on the perception that their ignorance had caused the genocide. Therefore, they introduced and applied modern knowledge to the village. However, it is difficult to understand that the majority of the villagers experienced an attitude change at this period because the experience of genocide and continued famine made the villagers focus on surviving in extreme poverty. In the early 1960s, by experiencing the success of cultivating economic crops, a proactive attitude began to spread throughout the village. Therefore, it is analyzed that the economic change was the crucial momentum responsible for changing the villagers' attitude. After the agricultural reform in the 1960s, the villagers proactively responded to the external environment to increase their income. They focused on producing only sweet potatoes at the initial phase. After realizing the importance of achieving economic sustainability, however, they tried to find other economic crops to cultivate in the village. During this process of finding alternatives, radish and canola were identified.

This proactive attitude came in handy when difficulties arose for the villagers. For instance, when their sweet potatoes were exposed to rain and thereby were threatened to depreciate in value, the villagers collected money and built warehouses in every sub-village to protect their products. In the 1960s, moreover, they established an agricultural cooperative to respond to merchants' unjust price cutting attempts.

In this situation, the success of road pavement accelerated their change of attitude. At the initial stage, the fact that they decided to pave over eight kilometers of roads by themselves shows that they were independent and assured. In addition, their proactive attitude was also noticeable in the case of the late *Hanseok Kim*, who mainly led the village reconstruction as a leader in the 1970s.

Jeongja: As we didn't have enough money to finish the road, he (Hanseok Kim) went to Japan several times to borrow money...I think it's the same situation...If we just stick around and are passive, we can't do anything.

Hanseok Kim visited Japan several times to solicit funds for the road pavement project from Korean residents in Japan. He took the bull by the horns in order to solve the problem faced by the village. In this way, when we consider the history of the village reconstruction, it was obvious that the villagers' proactive attitude was reflected in their prominent achievements.

3.4.2.2 Perception changes about the government

Another crucial change of the villagers was their change in perception of the government. Until the late 1950s, the villagers feared the government (or state). .

Jangpil: When a policeman approached me...even though he didn't say anything, I was so scared, and broke out into a cold sweat.

Jaedeok: Oh, they were terrible at that time, but not now.

Since hundreds of villagers had been massacred and the village was completely burned by the state's violence, this perception seems reasonable enough. If the implementation of a government development project were to begin in that situation, it could fail due to the lack of participation or unconditional obedience. However, as can be seen in 4.3.3, it is difficult to view the village's reconstruction activity as having been conducted in obedience. First, it has been confirmed that the villagers' reconstruction effort was started before the government-driven development project; at the same time, villagers who participated in the activity also testified that they did not rebuild their village in response to the government's request. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the reconstruction was conducted for the villagers' internal purposes and expectations.

Even so, the question regarding their motivation of participation still remains. If it was not a show of unconditional obedience, how had they overcome their fear? Evidently, it was true that their genocidal memory had affected the villagers until the late 1970s. But we should focus on *Jaedeok's* testimony at this moment. He answered that he no longer views the police (or government) as terrible. However, it is noticeable that his perception had changed for some reason.

When we look at the history of the village's reconstruction, it seems that the villagers' perception had changed since the early 1960s. Most of the villagers thought that the military regime had allowed them to hugely benefit by forbidding the import of the raw materials of alcohol at that time as is described below.

Jaedeok: The governor...who was sent by President Park, said the alcohol factory had to buy our sweet potatoes.

Regardless of whether it was true or not (in fact, it was proved to be groundless), they perceived that as a contextual truth. Therefore, as long as this perception existed in the village, the military regime could be viewed as a “supporter” and a “facilitator” of reconstruction. For this reason, the villagers strongly trusted the military government, and supported its development project in the 1970s.

3.4.2.3 Restoration of self-esteem

From the 1970s on, *Gasi-ri* began to be recognized as a well-developed village. More specifically, the village was selected as the best village of *Jeju* Island in 1971, and honored with the best new village award in 1974. In addition to that, the village received a commendation from the Minister of Home Affairs in 1975. In the same year, the late *Hanseok Kim*, who was the leader of the village, won a medal from President Park for his efforts in the village reconstruction. Since the village had been awarded a several prizes from the government, it began to be recognized by its surrounding villages. Regarding the change in the village's reputation, *Sansgsik Oh* testifies as follows.

Jangpil: Since then, people in nearby villages...(Interviewer: Did they still underestimate you?) No, they began to change their attitude.

Since the *4.3 Incident*, the villagers of *Gasi-ri*, labeled as communists, were neglected and avoided by nearby villagers. In that harsh situation, they had to work hard to barely survive and without any protest. As even mentioning the *4.3 Incident* was forbidden by the government, the villagers had to hold their breaths.

Seokman: That was really unfair...I resented them, but even though I was full of emotion, I couldn't protest against them. There was no one to complain to. No one... I couldn't judge at all...so rightly or wrongly. Just...somehow, I endured...in that way, I have managed to live, focusing on just survival.

Although *Seokman Oh* had lost his family due to the *4.3 Incident*, he had no one to complain to. There was no organization that received such complaints as genocide was largely committed by the state itself. For that reason, the surviving villagers had to suppress their resentment in an unjust situation. This means that the villagers experienced extreme frustration, which deprived them of basic self-esteem and dignity as follows.

Interviewer: When you heard them calling you a communist, how did you feel?

Seokman: Well. I had no choice but to be treated like that. I just had to endure it.

Since the 1970s, however, the villagers began to regain their self-esteem. The military government bestowed upon them the title of “the best new villagers,” which changed their perception of the government into a more favorable one. Since then, they were proud of their village and themselves as they accumulated wealth and received the best village award from the government. Meanwhile, the memory of being labeled as communists drove them to have a strong urge to overcome their extreme situation. Such collective emotion was a driving force for them to participate in the village reconstruction.

Hyeok: They despised us...though, we are now living well. As you know, Gasi-ri became the best village. I also think our village is the best.

Hyeok's testimony shows his change in perception in regard to the village. As a result, the villagers of *Gasi-ri* were able to live with self-esteem, and escape from the dishonor and frustration of the past. After wisely responding to the government's development project, the villagers saw their decades of efforts finally come to fruition.

3.5 Sub-conclusion

It is apparent that the *4.3 incident* left tremendous frustration and unforgettable scars to the villagers. The extreme experience resulted in the emergence of the “1.5 generation” who realized the importance of education in the village. They did not only actively accepted and diffused modern agricultural knowledge through education. They constantly attempted to cultivate commercial crops that had economic value and finally they succeeded. This transformed the village from a small, self-sufficient economy to an industrial mass-production economy. Besides this enhanced income generation caused by the industrial change, the psychological framework of the villagers was transformed. In this section, the study reviewed the reconstruction history, analyzing it based on the framework of expansive learning.


3.5.1 What collective learning activity has been discovered?

The village reconstruction was a collective learning activity which continuously extended its object and meaning. The first attempt of the three educated people in *Gasiri* validates this assertion very well. According to their testimonies, when they first opened their small evening school, their purpose was not the reconstruction of the village. It was just an “offering learning opportunity to villagers who did not complete their school because of the *4.3 incident*.” Similarly, the villagers who attended the evening school answered that their purpose of learning was only “having three meals in a day.” Although someone might consider the surviving itself as their common object, this cannot be seen as a collective purpose because it is more of an individual instinct. Yet, it is this instinctive desire for survival that in the beginning of the 1960s, began to extend to a newly organized collective purpose. The success of discovering economic crop mainly triggered the formation of the common purpose. After realizing that sweet potato is not only a high income crop but also suitable to cultivate in the village, the villagers started to establish a new system—under the common purpose of producing sweet potato—including rules, community, and division of labor.

3.5.2 Characteristics of a collective activity

From the establishment of evening school to the introduction of modern agricultural knowledge, nearly all the reconstruction activities were led by the “1.5 generation of the village” who were very few educated people in the devastated village. They played a significant role of facilitating village reconstruction with high responsibility (with respect to the motivation of reconstruction, refer to chapter 5). They played a significant role of facilitating village reconstruction with high responsibility (with respect to the motivation of reconstruction, refer to chapter 5). Although the beginning of reconstruction was mainly conducted by them, the collective learning activities could not be progressed without ordinary people’s participation. As was explained earlier about learning activity which constantly creates expansive activities, it critically requires group members’ active participation and interaction. Thus, it is indisputable that the collective learning activity was performed by all members of the village who shared a common object and actively participated in the reconstruction. Based on the activity system model structured by Engeström (1987), the activity system of the *Gasi-ri* community can be presented as below.

[Figure 4] Collective Activity System of Gasi-ri Community



The learning activity in the village was made possible by the participation of all villagers. They shared a common object, income increase, in order to achieve their outcome, improving quality of life. Specifically, they first set common rules for storing and selling their crops jointly (rules), and made sub-organizations for production, sales,

and co-parenting (community), thereby divided their work depending to their roles (division of labor). In each location, they focused on their work. All this process can be interpreted as an object-oriented activity which aims to achieve their object (income increase). New cultures and social norms were created during this course. The culture and norms were stipulated in the articles of village associations including Agricultural Cooperative, Men's and Women's Association. These associations were a result of community interaction, and at the same time, those were the main factor in maintaining the community's future interaction. The associations were not simple object-oriented organizations, but the "object-oriented organization for learning" which worked for continuous expansion of the activities.


For example, in case of the village's agricultural cooperative, villagers were not resting on their enhanced income. After establishing mass-production system of sweet potato, the members of the cooperatives continuously attempted to cultivate new economic crops to find new sources of income, thereby sustaining their prosperity. They set a new goal, and collectively learned to achieve the goal. In the 1970s, the member of the cooperative succeeded to introduce the daikon's cultivating and processing technique. After that, they even went over to Japan and learned *canola* cultivation technique. These newly-introduced economic crops became the village's new income sources, being commercialized and jointly sold by the villager. And the subsequent road pavement was conducted to maximize the distribution of goods. By using learning organizations in this way, the villagers learned new knowledge to tide over a difficult situation, and set their object expansively to make their development sustainable.

Another notable point is the villagers' emotional solidarity. By sharing a common object in the process of collective activities, the entire community had been emotionally bonded. Unlike the individual object-oriented action, the importance of emotional element in collective activity has been emphasized by Han & Lee (2005). The strong bond among community members worked as the driving force of sustaining collective learning. We can call this relationship a virtuous circle in the collective learning activity, that is, the organization strengthens the member's solidarity, and the solidarity sustains the learning activity.

Meanwhile, the activity system is influenced by its external environment (Kwon, 2008). In case of the village, external factors had an effect on the initial and

middle period of reconstruction respectively. First, when the villagers experienced extreme conflict and contradiction, the external oppression of the *4.3 Incident* affected the villager's collective identity which was the community's core motivation of collective learning (with regard to the motivation of learning, refer to chapter 4). Second, during the period of mass production of sweet potatoes in the early 1970s, the government-led development movement worked as a powerful incentive, causing the expansion of a common goal of the activity system in the village.

[Figure 5] Interaction between Activity Systems



This external influence symbolized by the New Village Movement could also be explained by another activity system presented as Figure 5. The military government intended to usurp the endogenous reconstruction effort of the village as a development slogan by using co-optation strategies such as enticement or coercion. In this way, the government deceived the villagers and the general public by misconstruing the history of village reconstruction as an achievement of national development movement. However, it was also the fact that this prompted the expansion of the village's activity system by suggesting a basis for incentives of village activities including financial support and rehabilitation. Therefore, it is analyzed that the village's community development has resulted from interaction between two activity systems with different objects, although the objectives implies several conflicts and contradictions.

3.5.3 Changes found after the collective learning process

As the village reconstruction activity has been conducted over 30 years, the objects and other elements of activity system have been constantly changing and expanding. This makes it difficult to generalize the outcome of reconstruction activity. In this study, the outcome was analyzed in terms of improvement of the quality life of the village and this was divided into two categories: socio-economic and psychological as presented below.

Firstly, the villager's quality of life improved socioeconomically. There are increase in income and access to life basic needs. This resulted from one explicit and common goal of having increased income. The collective learning activity system started in the 1960s and has constantly changed and expanded its object and elements to develop the village. Primarily, by introducing modern agricultural knowledge including cultivating and processing techniques, the village income dramatically increased. And the road pavement carried out to facilitate the distribution of products accelerated the trend. This enabled the villagers to live a better life with improved housing, clean water supplies, nutrition, and agricultural machinery. It is noteworthy that the change and expansion of the main object of the villagers, income increase, can be summarized according to specific times throughout the reconstruction period. In the 1950s, at the time of evening school and 4-H movement, the activity's object was relatively ambiguous as the system of collective activity had not been clearly formed. In the beginning of 1960s, several sub-organizations and the division of labor were found, aiming at the "mass-production of sweet potatoes" as their main object. And in the 1970s, the villagers had focused on paving roads and processing crops as the main object was the "distribution of the goods."

Secondly, the villagers' quality of life improved psychologically as well. By participating in the village reconstruction, the villagers developed a sense of belonging to the village and internalized a positive attitude by facing their purposes being achieved through cooperation. This mental development was so significant for a village that had been devastated by the undemocratic state violence. Although they were completely frustrated and oppressed by the state, they overcame their situation by establishing a

learning community. This psychological change was a bedrock for any economic change. Besides, it is this mindset that quickly helped the villagers to change their perspective of the government from “an oppressor” to “a helper” immediately the government supported the reconstruction efforts in the 1970s. Even if the government’s stance over the village was likely to be a strategy for propaganda campaign, it was a golden opportunity for the villagers which they exceptionally utilized. The villagers accepted the government’s development project and also their judgment about the 4.3 *incident*. In this way, the village could be transformed from “a den of commies” into “a best developed village” in only 25 years, and the villagers were able to get released from the decades-old-restraints and regain their self-esteem.

4. Learning Motivation in Village Reconstruction

In an earlier chapter, the process of the village reconstruction was analyzed in the framework of expansive learning, centering on the villagers' purpose and how they achieved the purpose in relation to the learning activity system. In this process, the researcher introduced oral history as a major research methodology, and utilized narrative analysis to interpret the interviewees' testimonies. When it comes to this method, which uses narratives as research data, some researchers argue that it can be a cursory examination, and criticize its lack of theoretical analysis and generalization. Historical sociologist Abrams (1980), however, demonstrates that a narrative includes significant analysis points, and its form of constitution does not differ from that of other descriptive discourses. In the meantime, historians who generally adopt the narrative analysis are also engaged in discussions about how to explain certain social phenomena beyond the scope of traditional historical research fields. Regarding this, Elton (2002) explains as follows.

In order to understand a human action, its motivation, background, and surrounding environments should be clearly identified. These can be discovered in various aspects, including psychology, administration, and preconceptions about time and economy. Organizing this task, which requires an analytic process, is a challenge for future historians.

Therefore, it is necessary to analyze both psychological motivation and socio-historical environment to reach an in-depth theoretical analysis beyond a so-called cursory narrative description. For this reason, in this chapter, the researcher examines the villagers' psychological motivation and their socio-historical situation.

Primarily, by focusing on the point that the participation of reconstruction stemmed from learning activities, the fundamental motivation of such learning activities should be examined. Based on the theories of collective learning and collective memory, the researcher tried to consider the process of collective identity formation caused by the villagers' psychological dynamics in order to analyze their learning motivation.

Secondly, the researcher examines the environmental aspect which interacts with the agent's (or subject's) intention. That is, external factors, including national policies and social situations, are examined. This process is aimed to adopt a sociological analysis framework into the village's historical narratives. Besides, it is intended to inquire into the fundamental motivation of collective learning in the socio-historical perspective as well. Since the motivation of collective learning is formed in the relationship between the villagers' intentions and their external environment, it should be analyzed from a structural perspective.

4.1 Internal factors of a learning activity

As can be seen in chapter 4, the villagers of *Gasi-ri* introduced modern agricultural knowledge into the village by actively responding to the government-driven development project to fulfill their own interests. In particular, a series of their reconstruction activities—economic crop cultivation, agricultural cooperative establishment, and mountainous road pavement—were achieved as a result of the villagers' participation along with collective learning. Therefore, the major questions of this section are as follows: “What was their fundamental motivation?” and “Why did the villagers form such motivation?”

Kilgore (1999), who studies CD in terms of learning, reinterpreted Vigotsky's CHAT in the perspective of adult education. He argued that the level of CD depends on a community's learning capability. He stated that several elements—collective identity, collective consciousness, solidarity, and organization—contribute to the level of CD, and with these elements, according to him, collective action can occur.

Particularly, he emphasized collective identity formation and community members' solidarity. Collective identity is defined as “sharing an understanding of goals, means, and directions.” Once a collective identity is formed, it is hardly changed (Conway, 1997). For this reason, it allows a community to have certain continuity and permanence (Melucci, 1995:49). Meanwhile, solidarity, as an element of cultural aspect, functions to let the members of a community participate in collective learning (Kilgore, 199: 199). However, a lack of solidarity can cause a low level of participation in the community. Therefore, in this section, the researcher examines (1) the villagers' collective identity formation, and (2) its impact on the members' solidarity and the community.

4.1.1 The advent of the 1.5th generation and collective identity

In the late 1950s, after the *4.3 Incident*, there were three educated people in the village. Although they could easily have secured decent jobs at that time, they all

returned to the village after graduation, and played a crucial role in educating the villagers by introducing modern knowledge and skills. They had a strong sense of mission for the village reconstruction that reflected a certain common recognition of community rather than a personal motive. It is shown by the testimony of *Jangpil Oh* as follows.

Jangpil: There is an old story. When a young girl cried, people said, "If you keep crying, you'll get married to a man from Gasi-ri." Then she stopped crying. That means...we, the people of Gasi-ri, toil and moil.

Interviewer: From the old days? Originally?

Jangpil: No, since the 4.3 Incident...

According to him, the villagers became tough and diligent after the *4.3 Incident*. He understood their reconstruction activities in the same context. In other interviews, especially when the researcher questioned them about their motivation of participation, many interviewees only recalled instead of answering the exact question, saying, "Not just in my case, but everyone strived after the incident." All those answers were connected, to a greater or lesser extent, to the memory of genocide. This signifies that the genocidal experience played a decisive role in changing their attitude. Therefore, it is important to examine what memories they had and how the memories affected the village reconstruction. To make this possible, the concept of generation is introduced.

Jangpil: It relates to the 4.3 Incident...in any case, because we suffered so much, we...those in our seventies and older (behavior) are related to the incident.

Gwangch : After the 4.3 Incident, everyone around our age has such a strong mind...to live like others...like a normal person.

In chapter 2, the researcher conceptualized the survivors of the *4.3 Incident* who were around 10 to 15 years old at that time as the "1.5th generation" of the village. However, this division is not defined by their age, but by their genocidal experience in their adolescence. Mannheim (1970) explained that a generation is determined by a common experience which the group members share. Therefore, based on the majority

of testimonies which define themselves by the common experience of genocide, the researcher examines their collective identity formation process and its characteristics.

From *Chunghun Kim's* testimony, we are able to find that people of the 1.5th generation share a certain collective identity. At the same time, this corresponds to the definition of Mannheim. That is, a social group forms its collective identity by sharing a particular experience. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, it is concluded that the villagers, who had the shared memory of the *4.3 Incident*, formed a collective identity characterized by diligence, austerity, a proactive attitude, and a desire for education. The collective identity formation equipped the villagers with a strong sense of solidarity, and thereby offered them a collective learning opportunity.

4.1.1.1 Diligence, austerity, and responsibility

The *4.3 Incident* brought deep frustration and a sense of loss to the villagers. Nearly half of the villagers were massacred, but the survivors were deprived of dignity as nationals of Korea, despised by even their neighbors as supposed communists. And the younger generation of the village had to scrap their dreams of securing a public office position due to the continued guilt-by-association until the late 1970s.

Geunjun: Who knows? Nobody knows about the suffering... there was nothing left in our village. We didn't have clothes to wear, and we didn't have food to eat. Literally nothing... It was a miracle that we didn't die in that situation.

Originally, the residents of *Gasi-ri* engaged in dry-field and stock farming on their vast land. After the *4.3 Incident*, however, the lands were devastated and most of the labor force was unable to work. It was difficult for the remaining survivors to boost their industry in that situation. In addition, consecutive droughts in the mid-1950s led them to extreme poverty. The villagers had to internalize diligence and austerity to survive in the harsh environment. They made charcoal or gathered firewood from nearby mountains for their sustenance. But doing so was not enough to make a living as there was no means of transportation. They suffered from destitution not only economically, but also due to a lack of human resources. As the majority of young capable people had been killed, no one person seemed able to take care of the village.

In this situation, the “1.5th generation” took responsibility for the village. As they had been in their twenties and attained adulthood in the late 1950s, they could have organizational power in the village. Since they had to rebuild the village without the support of those older than them, they espoused the possession of a tough mind and the spirit of self-reliance in order to survive in the extreme environment. In this regard, *Jaedeok Jeong* testifies that the circumstances at that time urged them to change their attitude.

Jaedeok: People’s attitudes changed...we gritted our teeth and lived on. (...) It was hard to start a job... We didn’t have power, because most of the influential persons had been killed. So, after that incident...naturally we hardened ourselves, and have lived with a do-or-die attitude.

Another characteristic of the collective activity which was displayed by the 1.5th generation is a sense of responsibility for protecting the village. This not only stemmed from the village’s internal factors, but also external factors which restricted the villagers from holding official jobs due to guilt by association. Since the government was too oppressive, it was impossible for the villagers to directly resist against it. Therefore, particularly for the few educated people of the village, a homecoming seemed an unavoidable choice as well as the responsible choice. At the same time, ordinary villagers expected them to be the leaders of the village. For this reason, the 1.5th generation, which consisted of three highly educated people of the village, organized a Youth Association and embarked on rebuilding the village.

Jaedeok: We had to take care of the village... All three of us returned here for this reason. At that time...you know, there was no person in our village...No educated person, no police, and no public officer. All of the influential persons from our village had been killed...due to the 4.3 Incident.

To sum up, the presented characteristics of their collective identity including diligence, austerity, and responsibility were not assigned to them by the government, but by the extreme situation which the villagers had to face. In other words, they had to

form a collective identity with those characteristics as their way of life. The government referred to this way of life as the “spirit of self-help.” This term was basically defined in relation to economic survival skills in the 1970s. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, however, it also included political and societal significance as they had been stigmatized as communists by the government and their surrounding neighbors. Thus, the villagers had an intense desire to overcome not only extreme poverty but also political dishonor as noted in the above testimonies.

4.1.1.2 Proactive attitude

Meanwhile, the researcher presents significant evidence to confirm and define a particular group of people as the 1.5th generation. Compared to the fact that a pliable attitude or defeatism is commonly found in people who have experienced war or genocide, a unique active attitude, so-called “a desire for reconstruction through knowledge introduction,” was found in the particular group of villagers. And another interesting point is that this attitude was not found in other people in the village. Therefore, it is reasonable to see this attitude as a distinctive trait of the 1.5th generation. According to several interviews, in fact, most people of the first generation in the village expressed resignation and frustration. Considering the fact that they had been the direct targets of state violence, such a result is a predictable one. And the proactive attitude which distinguishes the 1.5th generation from others was hardly found in them.

Seokman: We didn't have the freedom to complain...if you are haunted by fear, you can't think about anything. So, at that time, I couldn't judge or decide at all. I was just...I followed what other people did.

According to *Seokman Oh*, who had lost his family due to the *4.3 Incident*, he did not actively lead and participate in the work even when other villagers were eager to rebuild the village. Instead, he supported the 1.5th generation and supported their opinions. Through this testimony, we are given access to the attitude of the first generation of the village, most of whom were massacred by the state. This characteristic of the first generation can be shown in the following testimony of *Jeonghui Han*, who was tortured and sent to jail for giving a bowl of barley to the guerillas.

Interviewer: After the incident, have you ever tried to complain about your situation?

Jeonghui: Me? No, for I must not speak of it.

Since the state's oppression continued after the *4.3 Incident* for decades, they were afraid of mentioning the incident. In the same context, when the researcher asked the interviewee, "Have you ever tried to complain about your situation?" she replied, "I must not speak of it." This reflects their strong distrust and fear of the government. Therefore, the proactive attitude, which could never be exhibited in the first generation, was a privilege for the 1.5th generation.

In the meantime, according to several testimonies, the second generation (those born after the *4.3 Incident*) did not show an active attitude comparing to the 1.5th generation, although they participated in the reconstruction as well. This result can be stemmed from the fact that they had not directly experienced the *4.3 Incident*. For that reason, they could not suffer genocidal trauma. Besides, when they participated in the reconstruction, they already had an older generation—the 1.5th generation—to follow. As a result, the sense of strong responsibility and active attitude were unique to the 1.5th generation, and it is concluded that this singular trait was caused by their special socio-historical situation.

4.1.1.3 Desire for education

The core of the villagers' collective memory was the perception that their ignorance caused the genocide. The majority of interviewees emphasized that they were innocent, and indifferent to ideology or politics. At the same time, they conceded that there were people who were called leftists in the village. According to *Jangpil Oh's* testimony, the villagers listened to their suggestion for opening an evening school in the village as they were not educated. Thus, according to him, they suffered damage because the villagers were ignorant about ideology.

Jangpil: When the Daedong Youth Association (a right-wing organization) recruits its members in the village, many People's Committee members (a left-wing organization) stamped a seal on the application document. We didn't know anything about politics. Just...when someone asked for help, we just did it.

Before the *4.3 Incident*, for the people of *Gasi-ri*, the ideological confrontation between the left and the right was merely “the act of stamping a seal,” nothing more or nothing less. In addition, compared to the villagers who did not know their letters, the visitors (leftists) were highly educated. Therefore, the villagers tended to follow them in making decisions about daily issues.

When it came to the visitors, *Chunghun Kim* recalled more specifically that the visitors came to the village after the liberation of Korea. They first opened an evening school and educated the villagers in how to read and write (*Gwanchu* himself learned his letters from them). After that, they educated the villagers about leftist ideology, and the villagers came to follow them because their teachings seemed worth pursuing. However, it turned out that they were leftists who had studied communism in Japan. After the visitors were killed by the police, conflicts arose in the village. *Chunghun* testifies that if the villagers had had more sense, they could have avoided the *4.3 Incident*.

Chunghun: Looking back on it now, that happened...because, we hadn't learned. Why? At that time, we, the Gasi-ri people, couldn't even write our names. What we were is completely illiterate. So, we thought...we have to follow those men (leftists) because they seemed very intelligent. But clearly, we didn't know anything about the right or the left, not to mention about communism.

In fact, many villagers ran away to mountainous areas merely in fear of being killed by the police, although some of them might have helped the guerrillas. In most cases, unfortunately, the villagers froze to death in the mountains, or were killed by the guerrillas or the police. Aware of these facts, the surviving villagers began to commonly perceive that their ignorance had brought about the tragedy. Therefore, “ignorance” primarily signifies that the villagers were innocent. At the same time, however, it represents that they were not knowledgeable about the ways of the world. In the same context, the fact that the few educated survivors immediately attempted to open an evening school in the village shows that they had a strong desire for education from the beginning of the village reconstruction. For them, educating (or introducing) new knowledge was the most urgent task to prevent another potential tragedy.

Jangpil: you know...at that time, we were so despised; for example, when I went to a nearby village, people called me a “commie.”... So, anyway, we needed to educate our children very well.

Jangpil's testimony reflects the villagers' desire for education as well. The government's oppression and the surrounding villagers' discrimination drove the villagers' desire to learn and educate their children. Judging by the devastated lands, lack of labor force, and loss of property, it was impossible to rebuild their economic foundation in a short period of time. They finally concluded that learning actively and educating their children was the only way to improve their economic situation and overcome their political dishonor. Based on this perspective, the villagers began to adopt new agricultural knowledge by learning from the local advisory center in the early 1960s. With the newly-adopted knowledge, they could modernize their agriculture into a mass-production system. Thus, by sharing the view about the importance of education, the villagers could form a collective identity. And thereby this identity functioned as a learning motivation.

Meanwhile, regarding the fact that the existence of a collective identity strengthened the villagers' solidarity and caused their participation in the reconstruction, Kilgore's (1999) collective learning theory is applicable as follows. As the level of collective development depends on the group's collective learning capability and aspiration, it is believed that the villagers of *Gasi-ri* had a strong desire for education. And this strong desire had an effect on the formation of a collective identity, and finally let the villagers participate in the village reconstruction (or community development activity).

4.1.2 The process of collective identity formation

As can be seen earlier, after sharing the memory of genocidal experience, the villagers of *Gasi-ri* formed a collective identity by espousing certain characteristics including diligence, austerity, a proactive attitude, and a desire for education. And this collective identity formation affected the whole process of reconstruction, and helped

the villagers to participate in collective learning. The following testimony of *Jeongja Kim* confirms this point as well.

Jeongja: The 4.3 Incident was clearly... a tragedy, but... at the same time, in my opinion, it was...a kind of opportunity for future generations to live well. I don't know what other people think...other villagers might feel differently, but I think so.

She testified that the *4.3 Incident* had clearly served as a momentum for the villagers to embark on the village reconstruction. To be more specific, the villagers had begun to embrace the described characteristics of their collective identity after the *4.3 Incident*. But regarding the process of collective identity formation, we can raise the following question in detail, “Why did the villagers believe that their ignorance had caused the genocide?” As was described in 5.1.1.3, the villagers’ desire for education largely stemmed from a sense of remorse. In the same manner, when we consider the fact that the characteristics commonly require a change in the attitude of the villagers, other characteristics of collective activity can be interpreted in the same context. Namely, the villagers seemed to attribute the occurrence of genocide to their own ignorance (or internal factor), rather than to other external factors such as the police, military, or the government. That is, by taking responsibility for the *4.3 Incident*, they attempted to change their attitudes and behaviors.

According to the collective memory theory, this mode of response is strongly related to the group’s intention. An individual’s act of remembering is the process of attaching subjective meaning and interpretation to his/her experience, and the process is crucial in establishing his/her identity (S.J. Lee, 2011). Collective memory, likewise, plays a key role in the formation of a collective identity. That is, a group’s collective identity is determined depending on how the group members remember and signify their common experience. Therefore, in this section, based on the framework of the collective memory theory, it is examined why the villagers of *Gasi-ri* attributed the responsibility of genocide to internal rather than external factors. And based on such examination, the researcher analyzes what elements were affected in the formation of a collective identity in the village.

4.1.2.1 Internal attribution as a response to social oppression

In regard to the transmission of collective memory, Kwon (2006) stated that it is important whether a memory is able to go public or not. She explains that an oppressed memory is transmitted longer than an ordinary memory. And when a memory is oppressed by powerful institutions such as the government and the military, it tends to be confidentially transmitted, rather than formed into a public memory (K.S Kwon, 2006). The reason is explained as follows. If a collective memory can be made into a public memory, it should be preceded by communications and discussion in the group. In an oppressive social environment, however, the communication process is prohibited by the power system. In the testimony of *Seokman Oh*, likewise, the oppressive situation regarding the memory of the *4.3 Incident* is evident.

Seokman: No, there was no way to complain...for a long time. When I was in the army, we couldn't blame anyone or complain about anything... Even after the 5.16 revolution (a military coup), we didn't have the freedom to express our opinions. Until then, we (the families of victims) were treated like criminals.

Because of the government's oppression, mentioning the incident was prohibited. Therefore, the memory of genocide had to be distorted and transmitted privately. Particularly, in regard to the phenomenon of the villagers' attribution of the occurrence of the genocide to their ignorance, Table 5 provides significant information. According to the results of a survey including several questions about the major cause of the *4.3 Incident*, less than 30 percent of those surveyed answered that the government and military was the major cause of the *4.3 Incident*. Meanwhile, more than half of the people said that internal factors (ignorance, distrust, or selfishness) and situational factors (state of affairs, ideological confrontation) were major causes.

[Table 2] Major Cause of Genocide

Major cause	No. of responses	Rate (%)
Internal factors (ignorance, distrust, selfishness)	21	23%
External factors (government, military, police, US military government)	23	25%
Internal & external factors	13	14%
Situational factors (ideology, violence)	26	28%
Etc.	9	10%
Total	92	100%

Source: reorganized from K.S.Kwon (2006)

Likewise, *Seokman Oh* testifies that the *4.3 Incident* was caused by the ideological confrontation between powerful nations. Therefore, it is presumed that this tendency of internal attribution was generalized across the entirety of *Jeju* Island in an environment of government oppression for more than 30 years.

Seokman: I think the incident broke out, because the powerful nations...were involved in Korean politics. If America and the Soviet Union, the powerful nations had the same thought (ideology), the incident would not have occurred. But they didn't, you know...so, I think...the result was the incident.

In regard to this result, K.S. Kwon (2006) analyzed that the oppressed people established a double-memory because the sense of oppression remained even after the incident and it directly influenced the people's everyday life in the form of guilt by association. This analysis can be applied to the case of *Gasi-ri* as well. Although the villagers knew the military government had massacred their families, they had no choice but to attribute the responsibility to internal factors (the villagers' ignorance and distrust) due to the government's oppression of them. Not only in the case of *Gasi-ri*, but in every village of *Jeju* Island, all efforts to establish a public memory of the *4.3*

Incident were completely frustrated by the powerful military regime. Meanwhile, the more this oppression continued, the more the memories of genocide were strengthened and confidentially transmitted by the people, resulting in various forms of a victim mentality⁶, including a red complex, nihilism, distrust and exclusivity.

At the same time, in the case of *Gasi-ri*, it is analyzed that the internal attribution was a part of the mechanism of collective identity formation as well. As the first generation of the village was completely frustrated by the state, the 1.5th generation had to find an alternative to overcome the extreme situation. Therefore, they decided to distort their collective memory and utilize it for rebuilding the village. In this process, the necessity of a double-memory emerged. In the viewpoint of the 1.5th generation, the process of attributing the genocide's occurrence to the villagers' ignorance was necessary, for it was a driving force for getting the ordinary villagers to learn new knowledge and skills and participate in the village's reconstruction. Therefore, apart from the original experience, they began to interpret that their ignorance was the major cause of the tragedy. And after the success of economic crop cultivation in the early 1960s, this recognition began to be shared among everyone in the village. In summary, the villagers intended to re-organize their genocidal memory in favor of rebuilding the village in the sustained oppressive situation. This analysis corresponds to the theory of collective memory. According to the collective memory theory, a group's collective identity varies depending on how they interpret and signify their experience.

4.1.2.2 Self-censoring of memory

Another reason that the researcher considers the villagers' internal attribution as their active response for the purpose of the village reconstruction is because they tended to control the indiscriminate transmission of their genocidal memory. In regard to the manipulation of collective memory, Halbwachs (1980) stated as follows.

Memory is influenced by the social group (or generation). Although an individual owns memory, the individual memory is imprinted by the society. That is, a social group determines what and how to remember (Halbwachs, 1980).

⁶ In regard to victim mentality, refer to "50 years after the 4.3 Incident" (J.M. Kim, 1999).

In the same context, the people who experienced the *4.3 Incident* could actively control or distort their memory and determine whether they would transmit the memory or not. Through this self-censoring process, the villagers accepted the filtered memory as a part of their collective identity. Paradoxically, the self-censoring process was conducted in an oppressive situation that did not allow for public debates. Memories about discord among the villagers such as conflicts and acts of squealing to the police became something taboo which should not be mentioned in the village. Therefore, naturally, memories considered to be taboo were excluded from the village's collective memory. Although someone's family members or relatives were killed due to a neighbor's betrayal, the memory could not be transmitted. In this process, in order to protect the village and its traditional order, the community of the village played a role to prevent the disclosure as well. For that reason, it was difficult to obtain information about the betrayal of neighbors in the process of conducting the oral interviews, although such information was easily found in the anonymous surveys in previous studies. Therefore, various elements, not only the state ideology but the group's power relations and cultural aspects, influenced the process of collective memory formation (Schwartz, 1996). When the researcher was conducting a field study in the village, several interviewees were afraid their interviews would bring about problems in the village, and repeatedly emphasized that their interviews related to the feuds among villagers must not be revealed.

Geunjun: The experiences about being involved in the Incident, and conflicts among the villagers...we must not talk to our children about these things. Think about it; it can cause serious trouble in the future. What if they want to seek revenge because of what happened to their families? I'm afraid such things may happen.

According to *Geunjun's* testimony, the villagers were concerned that their memory would cause discord among the future generation of the village. As was stated in 5.1.1.3, leftist thinking was introduced by a number of visitors after the liberation, and it caused conflicts and discord between the villagers at the time of the *4.3 Incident*. And at the same time, the suppression strategy of the government was relevant to the discord in the village as well. After the bloody suppression, the government let the

villagers organize a neighborhood watch and guard the village. If there were people who cooperated with the guerrillas, the villagers had to inform the police about these people. This strategy disfigured the community's trust and made the villagers suspect each other. Such a consequence was indeed a tragedy because it could result in making the villagers' descendants bear a grudge as well. According to the testimony of *Chunghun Kim*, there was a conflict among the descendants after the *4.3 Incident*.

Chunghun: After the incident, conflicts broke out in the village. there were people who knew that a certain person had contributed to the deaths of their family members... Like I've told you...in that situation...they thought, "Your father killed my father."

Similar examples were found throughout *Jeju* Island. For example, there were several cases where local police officers were forced to participate in the genocide against their will. In those cases, although the police officers already knew that the villagers were not leftists, they had no choice but to kill their neighbors and relatives. They can be viewed as "unintended perpetrators." After the *4.3 Incident*, however, the unintended perpetrators could not move to distant places as they could not move outside of *Jeju* Island. The perpetrators and victims had to live in the same village as neighbors. Therefore, it became tacitly taboo to mention the incident, as it evoked past grudges among the villagers. Since then, and for decades, the memory of the *4.3 Incident* was literally extremely painful for both the perpetrators and victims.

Consequently, the villagers' alternative was to sublimate their genocidal memory in favor of their village's reconstruction, rather than to cause disharmony and pass down the grudge to the future generation. In this perspective, conflicts among the villagers were excluded from the collective memory, and the ignorance of the villagers was pointed out as the major cause of the genocide. By sharing this perspective and recognition, the villagers formed a collective identity characterized by certain attributes including diligence, austerity, and a desire for education. And by virtue of the collective identity, the village could maintain its cohesion, which was the focal point to propel the village reconstruction after the genocide.

4.2 External factors of a learning activity

When we analyze the process of the village reconstruction from the perspective of the expansive learning theory, the major driving forces were 1) modern agricultural knowledge introduced in the early 1960s and 2) the villagers who proactively adopted and localized the knowledge into the village. In particular, learning and education activities played a prominent role in this development process. Therefore, regarding the learning activities, the researcher attempted to analyze the fundamental motivation of learning, and focused on the villagers' high rate of participation in the reconstruction activities in the early 1960s and the 1970s. As a result, it was confirmed that the motivation which accelerated the villagers' participation was highly related to the villagers' internal factor—the memory of genocide.

In this chapter, the external factors of the village reconstruction are examined. When we examine a phenomenon from a structural perspective, basically two major variables—the agent's intention and the agent's surrounding environment—are considered. Of these, external factors such as the national standpoint and the historical context of the time can be applied to the surrounding environment. Especially considering the fact that the introduction of new knowledge and learning activities in the early 1960s were closely related to the national rural development policy, it is obvious that the reconstruction was not conducted purely as a result of internal factors. Therefore, the researcher examines several factors involved in the reconstruction (or learning) activities by dividing them into three categories: the introduction of modern knowledge, education for leaders, and awards and propaganda.

4.2.1 Introduction of modern knowledge

The reconstruction of *Gasi-ri* can be summarized as “the process of introducing and localizing new knowledge into the village.” In this process, the 1.5th generation of the village played a decisive role. Based on the strong desire for education, they made an effort to introduce modern agricultural knowledge. The role of the government was

to supply knowledge to the village. Specifically, the contribution of the government can be divided into the establishment of local advisory centers and the support it provided for a reconstruction school.

4.2.1.1 Modern agricultural knowledge

After liberation, the population of South Korea rapidly increased, but the nation's agricultural structure remained at the level of self-sufficiency. People suffered chronic food shortages. Moreover, in the early 1950s, the food shortages were aggravated due to the Korean War. In this situation, the Korean government undertook an agrarian reform for increasing food production in rural areas. During this period, local advisory centers were installed in each village in order to develop and introduce modern agricultural technology and educate village leaders.

Meanwhile, in November 1956, an Agricultural Research and Development Center was established on *Jeju* Island. This center began to implement economic crop research, an enlightenment project, and agricultural technique dissemination. By receiving modern agricultural knowledge from the center, the 1.5th generation of the village brought the knowledge into the village. As they were actual farmers as well as educated people in the village, they could mediate between the government and the village. Regarding the introduction of modern agricultural knowledge, *Jeongja Kim* testifies as follows.

Jeongja: At that time...the advisory center was in charge of the rural development project. When the officers were visiting us one by one...suggesting new ways of farming, I started to learn farming techniques from them.

As can be seen from the testimony, advisory centers were operating under the umbrella of the Agricultural R&D Center. Usually two to three facilitators were sent to each advisory center to oversee agricultural technology. In the late 1950s, these facilitators visited every small village to introduce new agricultural methods. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, as the people of the 1.5th generation were receptive to new knowledge, they first received the knowledge and began to localize it into the village. As a result, the villagers, who had traditionally grown barley and beans for self-sufficiency in the past,

began to grow new economic crops such as cabbage, peanuts, sweet potatoes, and tomatoes after the introduction of new agricultural knowledge.

The process of cultivating economic crops was not all smooth sailing. For example, cabbage requires a fertile place and pesticides to grow. However, the devastated soil of the village was not suitable to cultivate it. Several livestock in the village were harmed due to the use of pesticides as well. For these reasons, the villagers had to give up growing cabbage. After many instances of trial and error, in the end, the villagers discovered that sweet potatoes could make them a huge profit through a mass-production system. In this process, the government played a significant role by introducing and disseminating advanced agricultural knowledge, and the villagers received the knowledge and adapted it to their environment.

Since developing agricultural knowledge or researching economic crops was a time-consuming and expensive process, it was mostly handled by the government. In addition, the development of agricultural technology was not directly connected to an increase in production. Therefore, the importance of knowledge dissemination and localization was becoming a greater priority at that time. In accordance with this national need, the government installed an “Agriculture Education Center” that specialized in agriculture education and training in every province in the 1970s. The training centers implemented agricultural technology education, vocational training, and leadership education (also known as mental training) under the national slogan of “fostering new farmers.” And its chief characteristic was community-based education. As a result, by establishing an agricultural education facility, the government could receive the village leader’s support, and achieve its purpose of agricultural development.

4.2.1.2 Support for a reconstruction school

Reconstruction schools were government-led adult education institutes installed in rural areas since 1964, as part of the National Reconstruction Movement. They were mainly operated in the form of an evening school. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, however, an evening school was established before the national movement by the villagers in 1959, and the name of the evening school was not “reconstruction school” at that time. It was called an “evening school” or “civic school” until the late 1950s. By the beginning of the national movement in the early 1960s, however, the villagers had renamed the

school as a “reconstruction school.” Therefore, it makes sense that the reconstruction school in the village was voluntarily established and operated by the villagers who realized the importance of education. In the meantime, however, when we consider the fact that they renamed their evening school a “reconstruction school,” we can see that the villagers were focused on receiving support from the government. Although the evening school was established by the villagers, they lacked sufficient funds and educated people who could teach the villagers. For that reason, they changed the name of the evening school into a reconstruction school and tried to receive support from the government.

Jangpil: Well...when we were running the reconstruction school, books and materials were provided by the government. But, the government didn't supply us with teachers; we had requested elementary school teachers to help us, because we had no teachers at that time. So, our friends taught some easy subjects, and the teachers taught hard subjects such as mathematics and English.

By adopting the national development project, the villagers were able to request support for the public school in the village. As a result, the elementary school teachers volunteered at the evening school. In this way, the institute was operated by volunteers even after they renamed the school. However, the government did not provide as much support as expected. The villagers received some curriculum support and just a few teaching materials from the government. Nevertheless, for those who had not received any formal education, reconstruction school was a great learning opportunity at that time.

Students of the reconstruction school took a two-year course, and the reconstruction school's curriculum was quite different from that of ordinary schools. Table 6 shows the characteristics of the reconstruction school's curriculum as follows.

[Table 3] The Percentage of Time Assigned for Each Subject

Subject	Percentage	Monthly time		
		12 hours	18 hours	24 hours
Practical Arts	25%	10 hours	15 hours	20 hours
Social studies	25%	10 hours	15 hours	20 hours
Science	10%	6 hours	9 hours	12 hours
Korean	10%	6 hours	9 hours	12 hours
Mathematics	10%	6 hours	9 hours	12 hours
English	5%	3 hours	4 hours	6 hours
Arts	2%	1 hour	2 hours	3 hours
Gymnastics	4%	2 hours	3 hours	3 hours
Recreational activity	2%	1 hour	1 hour	1 hour
Orientation	5%	3 hours	5 hours	7 hours
Total	100%	48 hours	72 hours	96 hours

Source: H.D. Lee (1997)

The government's intention for establishing a reconstruction school was to foster a skilled labor force. For that reason, the proportion of basic subjects such as Korean, English, and mathematics was 25% of the total, while practical courses related to labor ability including practical arts, science, and social studies accounted for 65%. But that does not mean that the principle was adhered to in all cases. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, for example, it seemed that they were allowed to manage the class hours depending on their situation.

In summary, in the situation that most of the villagers were completely uneducated, the evening school (reconstruction school) was a valuable opportunity for the villagers to learn various skills such as dressmaking, knitting, and cultivating economic crops. In this way, the villagers started to learn modern knowledge that would enable them to overcome poverty.

4.2.2 Education for leaders (New Village Education)

In the 1970s, the craze of *Saemaul Undong* (New Village Movement) swept across the entire nation. The government advocated physiocracy and strongly promoted the movement as a national policy. Since then, the term “New Village” had begun to be added to almost every rural development policy. A number of “New Village Projects” were implemented in the village as well. In the initial stages of the movement, the government tried to wrap many developed villages in the mantle of the New Village movement. In this process, *Gasi-ri* was advertised as a successful case of the New Village Movement, although the success had largely been achieved even before the movement by the villagers’ autonomous rebuilding activity.

As a major co-optation strategy, the government let several leaders of the village repeatedly attend an intensive training course named “New Village Education,” and bestowed each of them with the title of “New Village Leader.” The purpose of the training course was to develop leaders who would have the spirit of the New Village Movement instilled in them.

Interviewer: Do you remember the Saemaul (New Village) education?

Jeongja: Ah, we gathered for it frequently...once a week. And I especially went to the district office once a month since I was on the board...as a leader of our village.

As can be seen in the testimony, *Jeongja Kim*, who was recognized as a successful farmer in the village, went to the district office and agricultural training center to attend lectures and share her successful story with other farmers. This New Village Education was mainly carried out in a regional agricultural training center. However, in the case of large-scale training, the education was conducted in the National New Village Leader’s Training Center, which was located in the central part of South Korea. In this section, based on several testimonies of village leaders who attended the large-scale training course, the researcher examines the characteristics of New Village Education, which had a positive impact on the village reconstruction. The researcher divides these characteristics into “mental training” and “mutual learning.”

4.2.2.1 Mental training

In the training course, the most emphasized part was not the introduction of agricultural information or farming techniques, but the spirit of the New Village Movement including diligence, self-help and cooperation. With the training course, the government intended to instill the spirit in all of the village leaders across the nation by reconstructing their consciousness. The aim was for the village leaders to follow the government’s order and to devote themselves to the movement (J.W. Park, 2010). For that purpose, the government put emphasis on patriotism in the entire program.

Jeongja: Before starting class, they turned off the lights and shone the spotlight on the national flag. I could see only the national flag...It was like...paying a silent tribute. I think they wanted to implant the “New Village Spirit” in all of us.

Before the start of class every day, the trainees had to pledge that they would dedicate themselves to the nation in front of the national flag. This ceremony signified that the trainees were not just rural villagers anymore, but the new village leaders who had been assigned a task by the nation. This ritual can be seen as a part of the government’s co-optation process. In the same context, we can find the government’s intention in Table 7, which contains information about the lectures and lecturers of the mental training program as follows.

[Table 4] Lecturers and Subjects

Name	Position	Subject
Jinhwan Park	Special Assistant to the President	New Village Spirit and our attitude
Dalyoung Ryu	Professor (Seoul National University)	The creation of new history
Yongki Kim	Principal (Cannan Farmhand School)	Why don’t we live like this
Banghyeon Lim	Special Assistant to the President	Guiding ideology and the Revitalizing Reform
Jongtaek Jeong	Special Assistant to the President	New Village Movement and Guiding ideology
Kyoungwon Kim	Special Assistant to the President	Guiding ideology and the Revitalizing Reform
Jongho Kim	Chief Manager of Finance (Ministry of Home Affairs)	New Village Movement and Guiding ideology

Source : The ten-year history of the New Village Leader’s Training Center (1982), J.W. Park (2008)

As can be seen in Table 7, most of the lecturers were government officials, and their lectures were related to the government's guiding ideology and the spirit of the New Village Movement. These facts lend weight to the criticism that they utilized the training program to justify the military government's dictatorship. Besides, it can adversely affect the villagers' autonomous effort for reconstruction, because fostering pliable people ultimately brings about the result of destroying communities' unique identities and residents' spontaneity in the long-term perspective.

Despite these adverse effects, it is difficult to deny that the mental training contributed to the villagers' adopting a positive mind and willingness to participate in the village reconstruction. The emphasis on the state and the Korean people allowed the leaders to have a deeply-moving experience and a sense of duty to the nation.

Jeongja: We attended the mental training for two weeks. After finishing the course, I felt ...that I had to do this, I had to rebuild my village...it was like a religion. They placed the trust in my mind about how to develop our village.

Above this, there were other several virtues emphasized in the program such as a pioneering spirit, self-sacrifice and tolerance. The promotion of these virtues had a positive effect on the village leaders as well. In regard to the positive effects of New Village Education, *Chunghun Kim* recalled that it was an ideological education worthy of reference as follows.

Chunghun: The movement's spirit was... like this. If you failed at something, just never give up. Try again, again and again...and then there would be nothing you couldn't do. The training was the same, because it was mental training. When I was at the training center, I heard this type of thing quite often. I think those things were greatly beneficial after coming back to the village.

To sum up, obviously the mental training of New Village Education was open to criticism for its intention of justifying the government's dictatorship and fostering pliable people. However, we cannot overlook its positive aspects that motivated the villagers to participate in the village reconstruction.

4.2.2.2 Mutual learning through group discussion

In the education program, group discussions and presentations of successful cases were as important as the mental training. After trainees were admitted to a training camp, they engaged in a group discussion every evening. Basically the group discussion was carried out using the process of “sharing an experience – finding a problem – having a mutual discussion – deriving a solution.” A notable point of the group discussion was that it was largely conducted by the trainees’ autonomous participation, although the program itself was assigned by the institute. And since there was no time limit, trainees tended to continue with their discussions until after midnight. Such behavior seemed to be contradictory to the mental training, which was conducted in a relatively coercive manner. Regarding the reason that the group discussion was conducted by the trainees’ autonomy, *Kimyeong Kim*, who worked as a trainer of the institute, recalls as follows.

Kimyeong: As they were working in the same time period and situation, the trainees tended to have the common view that certain problems must be solved. And in the process of exchanging ideas, they shared successful experiences and sometimes found a reasonable solution.

According to his testimony, autonomous discussion was the most appropriate way for the trainees to derive a solution, because they had much in common to share as the leaders of the villages. Moreover, because of the autonomous nature of discussion, they could learn the democratic manner of decision-making without reluctance. By virtue of this learning opportunity, they could also democratically manage their village works after returning to their respective village.

Another benefit of group discussion was the emotional exchanges between the trainees. Even if they could not derive a good solution through a discussion, sharing the experience itself was an emotional consolation because the villagers shared common problems. For that reason, the majority of the trainees tended to feel that the group discussion was the most meaningful experience during the training period. *Gangchu Kim*, who was the first attendee of New Village Education in the village, was impressed by the successful stories presented in the group discussion session.

Chunghun: The successful case presentation...I think it was really helpful. I heard many tearful stories from people.

During the group discussion session, the trainers chose a number of successful cases for presentation. According to several attendees' testimonies, the successful case presentations made the deepest impression on them, despite the fact that the government's emphasis was placed on the mental training. By listening to stories of overcoming difficulties in harsh environments, the trainees emphasized and displaced the so-called spirit of "we can do it." Meanwhile, after the government recognized the effectiveness of successful case presentation, it began to find and extensively advertise such cases. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, likewise, *Jeongja Kim* testified that she went to the agricultural education center to present successful stories once a week.

Jeongja: I gave a lecture to the farmers at the education center (agricultural education center) once a week for an hour. I was busy at that time.

Consequently, the group discussions and successful case presentations can be interpreted as mutual learning processes from an educational perspective. Indeed, the trainers and professors of the institute considered the group discussion session as mutual learning time. In the aspect of motivation, mutual learning was really effective as it was based on a person's autonomy. In addition, the group discussions allowed learners to share their problems and exchange their emotions, thereby helping them form a network and feel synergy. Therefore, it is believed that the establishment of a national training center was an effective strategy as the government could foster a mutual learning environment for the village leaders.

4.2.3 Awards and propaganda

Another external factor of learning activity in *Gasi-ri* was the government's distribution of awards, which was an effective way to persuade the villagers of *Gasi-ri* to participate in the national development project. It was part of the military

government's co-optation strategy to propagate the New Village Movement in the 1970s. At the same time, it was the government's goal to reduce the budget allotted for the agricultural sector since the government prioritized heavy chemical industry. This strategy shows the two sides of the military regime, which superficially claimed to advocate agriculture, but hardly provided financial support and instead emphasized self-help and the mental reform of the people. Following is the testimony of *Yeonhwa Kim*, daughter of the New Village Award winner *Mija Lee*, which shows the government's role in the reconstruction activity at that time.

Yeonhwa: They (the government) couldn't give money because I think they also had no money at all. Just, what the government did was...give motivation by giving awards or...broadcasting the people. So, I mean, people participated in the reconstruction eventually, but the government motivated them to do that.

She recognized that the role of the government was to motivate the villagers by congratulating and awarding them. Similarly, several interviewees recalled that the amount of the government's financial support was insignificant. However, they positively assessed the government in that the government had recognized them the first time. Indeed, being recognized was a crucial factor of learning motivation in the village as the villagers had been despised for more than 20 years since the *4.3 Incident*. Therefore, the New Village Movement was a golden opportunity for the villagers to be vindicated and reborn as patriots.

4.2.3.1 Awarding the village and leaders

In the process of implementing the New Village Movement, the government's act of awarding was carried out for both individuals and villages. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, the village was awarded several times since the beginning of the movement in April 1970. In December 1971, the village was selected for the first time as the best village on *Jeju Island*. And in 1974, it received the New Village award again. The following year, in 1975, the village was selected as the nation's best village yet again and received a commendation from the Minister of Home Affairs. This record was unprecedented across the nation at that time. Meanwhile, as awards brought not only honor to the

village but also signified the recovery of the villagers' rights, all of the villagers were greatly pleased. In addition, the leaders who had contributed to the village reconstruction received individual awards as well. For example, *Jangpil Oh*, who had helped open the evening school in the late 1950s as one of the only three educated villagers, received the Evergreen Prize, which is granted to an individual for his outstanding contribution to the rural movement. And the late *Hanseok Kim*, who had made brilliant contributions to the village reconstruction as the leader of the village, was honored with the presidential medal in 1975. In particular, *Jeongja Kim*, a successful female farmer of the village, received the Halla Volunteer Award from the governor and a commendation from the Minister of Home Affairs.

Jeongja: Actually...when I was lying down at night, all I could think about was the movement and village work... Because at that time, you know, it was a kind of race...between leaders. I didn't even think about my late husband.

After receiving the awards, *Jeongja Kim* became even more dedicated to the village reconstruction. According to her testimony, she buried herself in rebuilding the village after being recognized as the New Village Leader. It is analyzed that the government's awarding effectively motivated her to participate in the village reconstruction.

Meanwhile, the government intended to facilitate the movement by introducing the principle of competition in every phase of the movement. They not only promoted a policy which focuses its support on successful villages as a priority, but also pitted village leaders against those in other villages. The act of awarding itself was based on each village leader's performance as well. For that reason, the introduction of the element of competition produced several side effects as follows. Some village leaders tended to be excessively engrossed in the movement, and exaggerated their achievements in order to receive awards. In the case of *Gasi-ri*, however, the movement seemed to have a positive role in accelerating the village reconstruction.

4.2.3.2 The government's propaganda

As the village was developed without almost any financial support from the government, the village closely reflected the ideals of the New Village. However, the achievement was largely the result of the villagers' own efforts, rather than that of the New Village Movement. Still, the government decided to link the villagers' achievements with the movement. For that reason, the government propagated the village as a successful case of the national movement. Local government officials had to take a field trip to the village and sing a song named after the village as below.

Gasi-ri was the most successful case of the New Village Movement on the island. For that reason, government officials who had started their careers in the 1970s used to go on a field trip to the village and sing a song named after the village. (*Jeju Daily News*, April 11, 2005)

Additionally, the government let the village leaders present their successful experiences at every mass meeting. As the presentations were repeatedly reported on by several newspapers and broadcasts, the village became famous throughout the entire nation. Many people came to the village to have new experiences or to find a job. The villagers were embarrassed at first. But on the other hand, they began to look after the village more carefully by recognizing themselves as the titleholders of the best village.

Jeongja: When there was a boom of the movement, I made a presentation every time a movement rally was held. So, I used to be featured in the newspapers. And maybe...in 1979, KBS (Korean national broadcasting station) featured our village for 30 minutes. The title was...ah right, "Human Victory." Haha...I received much publicity at that time. But I had a tough time because of the program. After the broadcast, many people came to learn, and some people even asked me to find them a job.

In 1977, President Park visited the village to see the villagers' achievements. The villagers were really proud that their once devastated village now had the distinction of being the best village—one that would even prompt the president's visit.

The reason that the government advertised the village as a successful case was because they wanted to mask the villagers' autonomous efforts and falsely publicize the village as a successful case of the national development strategy. However, this situation paradoxically motivated the villagers to continue making achievements in the village. After becoming famous, the villagers were no longer viewed as communists. They were instead seen as patriots who were actively participating in developing the village. Therefore, it is analyzed that the village reconstruction benefited from the interaction between the villagers and the government. The government helped the villagers to regain their self-esteem (whether they had intended to or not) by successfully advertising the village as a best village. At the same time, the villagers actively cooperated with the strategy of the government to overcome their decades-old disgrace.

4.3 Sub-Conclusion

In the previous chapter, the history of the village reconstruction activity was analyzed in the perspective of expansive learning. By examining the reason of conceptualizing the activity as learning, the elements of learning system, and the changes of activity system in a historical context, we concluded that the village reconstruction was achieved by a collective learning and the learning activities improved the villager's quality of life. However, an unsolved question regarding the village reconstruction is that what made them participate in the reconstruction activities. This question indicates the "fundamental motivation of learning" in the expansive learning. As were explained in the chapter 2, Engeström argued that "contradiction" can be the catalyst of learning, but he did not specifically explain the relationship between the contradiction and learning. For this reason, the study examines how the contradiction prompts learning activity based on the collective memory theory, thereby advancing theoretical discussion of expansive learning theory. The result of the analysis is described by way of answering three core questions: what memories did they have, why did they have such a collective memory and did the collective memory motivate them to learn. .

4.3.1 What memories did they have?

During the field study, all interviewees were questioned about their motivation for participating in reconstruction. It was found that most testifiers linked their motivations to the *Jeju 4.3 incident*. The genocidal memories of the villagers were accordingly explored in order to investigate what relationship was there between the tragedy and the beginning of reconstruction.

With respect to the incident, the majority of the villagers have what can be called "dual-recognition." This corresponds to the concept of "doubling" by Lifton (1986) which generally comes from the recognition gap between "the self of the past" and "the self of the present". For the self of the past, the memory of the *4.3 incident* was

riddled with doubts and contradictions. They had no idea why their families and neighbors had to be killed by utter strangers. They just remembered, "...a father was killed by a police, and his son was killed by a communist." One villager summarized the incident as follows:

When we gave a bread to the guerrillas (under coercion), we had to be killed by the police in the morning, and when we report the guerrillas to the police, we had to be killed by the communist at the night.

They described the time as "crazy days." These testimonies show that the villagers could not have any rational decision to make. In this contradictory extreme confrontation, more than 300 villagers were massacred and the village was burnt out.

Compared to the self of the past, the memory of "the self of the present" was filled with bitter regrets. The villagers had four main regrets. The first regret was that they accepted the communists to live in the village. The second regret was that they could not prevent feared sons escaping to the mountain. Conforming to the rules of police without thinking was the third regret and the mistrust and atmosphere of suspicion which resulted in betrayal of each other was the last regret. In all this, many villagers explained that things turned out this way because of their ignorance and lack of information to inform their decisions during the turbulent times.

In summary, the *4.3 incident* is remembered as a contradiction itself for the self of the past on the one hand, and remembered as a regrettable tragedy for the self of the present on the other hand. This recognition gap shows that the villager's collective memory was changed within a historical context, and several interests surrounding the incident deeply involved in the change.

4.3.2 Why did they have such collective memory?

It is inevitably difficult to say that the innocent villagers' death stemmed from their ignorance when it is well documented that the perpetrators of the genocide were the communist guerrillas and in most cases the state military and the police. The

villagers were literally helpless in this situation whether educated or ignorant. Thus, what explains the villagers' memory of the genocide as a product of their own ignorance?

Firstly, it is clear that an internal attribution mechanism affected their memory process. Due to a military dictatorship lasted for almost 30 years, the villagers could not even mention the name of the incident. They—especially remaining families of the victims—were disadvantaged by the guilt-by-association system. According to the theory of collective memory, a collective memory is distorted when the oppression upon the memory is sustained by a powerful dominant group. In this case, although the villagers recognized the fact that the genocide was caused by the state violence, they formed another collective memory which has different narrative due to the sustained memory oppression. The tendency is evident from the “1.5 generation of the village.” As their parents' generation were completely ruined by the genocide, they had to alter (or distort) their collective memory in order not to be frustrated. In the extremely oppressive situation, the villagers distorted their memory in favor of the reconstruction rather than blaming the state. This was their inevitable choice to overcome the extreme poverty and the disgrace of labeling them as the reds. Like this, the state's memory oppression and extreme poverty had an effect on the distortion of their collective memory. At the same time, from the perspective of community, distorting memory was the only constructive alternative. Therefore, it was conducted by the villagers as well. For an example of their surviving effort, a number of young men vigorously volunteered for the military at the time of Korean War in order to prove that they were not communists.

Secondly, there was a self-censoring process to protect and maintain their community. From several testimonies, the villagers tended to be vigilant and restricted an indiscriminate transmission of genocidal memories. This reflects the theory of collective memory which explains that a group decides what and how to remember depending on its interest. In this case, the genocidal memory of the *4.3 incident* was self-censored, thereby distorted and forgotten with the intention of protecting the community. Although the incident was triggered by external forces, it caused numerous conflict points and enmity between and among the villagers. This was seen to be definitely harmful for their descendants residing in the village if recalled as it happened. In particular, the memories of fratricidal struggles between neighbors were turned into

absolute taboo which should never to be mentioned in the village. This seemed to be an implicit consent. In the middle of this study and during interviews, villagers were reluctant to describe the specific situations, being concerned about the village community.

Accordingly, it seemed that both contexts of oppressive external environment and the community's internal will to maintain their solidarity simultaneously got affected in the formation of collective memory. Although the villagers recognized that the violence was perpetrated by the state, they could not blame the government due to the oppressive situation. Therefore, they had to be resigned and kept silent. Meanwhile, the most important mission for the succeeding generation was not blaming the perpetrator, but licking their wounds and regaining dignity. Therefore, they constructed a new collective memory by attributing the cause of the damage to their ignorance. This collective memory was strongly affected by the community's intention of rebuilding the village. And it was the driving force for the villagers to participate in the reconstruction activity.

4.3.3 Did the collective memory motivate them to learn?

Based on the villagers' collective memory, new collective identity was formed, and the identity was the catalyst for precipitating any learning activity. There was a causal relationship between collective memory and learning activity in the case of the *Gasi-ri* reconstruction. It was not a direct relationship, but rather an indirect process which needed mediating phases including collective identity formation and recognition sharing. At the same time, the relationship was a cyclical process which continued to evolve within a historical context. And as Langemeyer (2006) stated, "modes of participation" and "forms of cooperation" affect the relationship. This is well explained below.

There is always an important question of "Who are we?" The answer to this constitutes a collective identity which is formed by sharing the peoples' recognition generated in the process of retrospective interpretation of events. The villagers of *Gasi-*

ri formed their collective identity through “doubling process” in order to protect their community. And the “1.5 generation”—the young survived victims of the 4.3 *incident*—played a significant role in the process of identity formation. As the majority of older generation was massacred, the youths had to be leaders, being responsible for the village despite their tender age. In the late 1950s, the stigma which labeled them as communist was too strong to move other villages. They had no choice but adapting to the extreme situation by distorting their memory. For that reason, instead of blaming the state, they recognized their “ignorance” as the cause of the genocide, and began to struggle against it.


Struggling against ignorance was the only alternative for them to overcome extreme poverty and the harsh fetters of ideology. Therefore, the struggle should not be simply understood in the aspects of knowledge acquisition, but rather the overall transformation of their recognition. Their saying, “It was the only way to survive”, symbolizes their situation. By sharing the new recognition, the villagers united and internalized constructive attitudes (originated from the collective identity) including responsibility, diligence, and desire for education. Like this, the new collective memory played a crucial role in forming their collective identity and facilitating village reconstruction.

However, this is not enough to perfectly explain the villager’s participation. In fact, the new collective memory mainly originated from the 1.5 generation was not accepted until the late 1950s, and it could not be a driving force for participating in reconstruction as well. For instance, at the initial stage of reconstruction, the 1.5 generation introduced the government’s “National Reconstruction Movement” into the village, but failed due to lack of participation. This intensifies the question of what made the villagers decide to participate in the reconstruction. The crucial factor was the “experience of success” in introducing an economic crop. After the villagers realized the 1.5 generation’s success and confirmed that it could enhance their income, the entire village began to be organized into a mass-production system.

This shows that a “real incentive” is necessary to establish a strong activity system, along with the collective memory to solidify the group members. Thus, participatory and collaborative relationship can be formed when the two conditions are met in a community.

The researcher indicated earlier that contradiction triggers learning activity (Engeström, 1987). The relationship between contradiction and learning motivation is very evident in the village reconstruction of *Gasi-ri* given that the experience of the 4.3 *incident* was a contradiction itself. The contradiction went through three internal stages in the process of creating learning activity system: formation of collective memory through “doubling”, formation of collective identity (the frame of recognition), and recognition sharing. This is shown in figure 6 below.

[Figure 4] Formation Process of Collective Learning Activity System



In the process of the village reconstruction, the villagers did not recognize the contradictory experience as a learning motivation at the beginning. Few educated people of “1.5 generation” sought to form the new collective memory and link it to the reconstruction. Until the stage of contradictory recognition, however, it cannot be analyzed that the activity system was established as the new memory had not been shared yet. In order to establish a collective object-oriented activity system, the memory should be shared in the community and connected to the collective identity, thereby shared and accepted as a common recognition.

It must be noted that not all recognitions are shared and form an activity system. An incentive mechanism affects the recognition sharing process. In *Gasi-ri*, internal

successful experience (introduction of economic crop in the 1960s) and external support (the government's credit in the 1970s) worked as the major incentives in establishing the learning activity system. If an incentive is not enough to let the group members have a common recognition, the activity system would be destroyed or remain at individual level. This corresponds to the understanding of Langemeyer (2006) that recognition of contradiction varies according to the group members' modes of participation and forms of cooperation.

The three internal stages have a non-linear, cyclical structure which continues to be created and destructed in history. Therefore, based on the cyclical process of forming and sharing a certain collective memory, the elements of activity system including subject, object, communities, rules, and division of labor are changed as well. This indicates that the activity system is not an everlasting existence which extends permanently, but a historical organism which experiences expansion and contraction, and creation and destruction depending on the interaction between the will of agent and its surrounding environment.

It is clear that the fundamental motivation of learning cannot be explained by the contradiction itself. It can be examined when the overall activity forming process—including contradictory recognition sharing and collective identity formation—is considered.

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to examine CD and learning in the context of development cooperation, a phenomenon that puts premium on local or recipient ownership of the development process to ensure that it is sustainable and effective. In CD, local or recipient ownership and engagement rather than participation, is known as self-help development. This approach has been relatively neglected although its history is much longer than the development aid. It is with this perspective – development cooperation – that the study examined the village of *Gasi-ri* in South Korea.

After being devastated by state violence, the village was successfully reconstructed by the efforts of the village inhabitants. Using oral in-depth interviews and participant observation over a period of two months, the researcher engaged these inhabitants of *Gasi-ri* to establish the underlying motivation for their participation in the village reconstruction activity of their village.

A. Collective learning in community development

The study analyzed the village reconstruction as an object-oriented learning process which continues to expand its object and produce the meaning of activity. Right after the village was ruined by the *4.3 incident*, an evening school was opened to educate the villagers. The main objective of the evening school was educating surviving skills to the villagers. It offered not only the school curriculum but practical skills including sericulture, knitting, and farming. At the beginning of the 1960s, there was a structural change in agricultural production. Small scale of self-sufficient agricultural economy had completely changed in mass-production of economic agriculture. Several significant learning organizations—Agricultural Cooperative, Men’s Association, Women’s Association—were organized as well. These changes were mainly led by the “1.5 generation” of the village. In particular, three educated members of the generation first attempted to open the evening school and introduce a new agricultural knowledge.

This played a crucial role in establishing the learning activity system in the village. Above this, the 1.5 generation succeeded to cultivate economic crops, and thereby giving a strong incentive to the ordinary villagers to have a shared objective (income increase) and to participate in the reconstruction activity. In the middle of participating in reconstruction, their solidarity became stronger. This strengthened solidarity contributed to the sustenance of the activity system and its expansion into additional activities.

The villagers' quality of life improved as a whole. Their socioeconomic status improved as their income increased and living standards arose as they could afford to finance their basic needs and still remained with surplus money. With surplus money, they were able to change their roofs to overcome water shortage, introduced farming machines to save the labor force, paved roads to enhance accessibility and distribution of products. Psychologically, their self-esteem was rejuvenated. By cooperating with each other and achieving the reconstruction of the village, they had an optimistic attitude about their lives. And especially, after the government recognized the village as the "best new village," they overcame their old aged stigma and bitterness.

B. Collective memory and learning motivation

It was established in this study that the fundamental learning motivation for the villagers of *Gasi-ri* was their collective memory of genocide. Interviews were accordingly conducted to examine in-depth the connection between genocidal 4.3 incident and the village reconstruction. The testimonies that were given largely comprised of two elements: contradictory memory and regretful recollection. People were ruthlessly massacred without knowing why they were being killed, and the remaining villagers had to betray their families and neighbors to survive from the genocide. Therefore, the memory was absolutely contradictory (memory of the self of the past), as well as regretful (recollection of the self of the present) for the villagers. The doubling process occurred from the gap between the two selves. By facing the horrendous reality, the villagers distorted their memory in order not to be frustrated in

the extreme situation. For that reason, the newly-distorted collective memory had strong effect on the villagers. They began to think the cause of genocide was their “ignorance”, and therefore chose that, as well summarized by one respondent, “They should educate their children even if they starve to death.” That is, the memory of the *4.3 incident* functioned as a driving force to learn. More specifically regarding the process of collective memory formation, it was analyzed that the two mechanisms—internal attribution and self-censoring mechanism—worked in the process. The new collective memory was formed with interaction between the oppressive external environment and the community’s will to protect their self-esteem. At the same time, however, it was clear that relatively the community’s will more reflected in forming the collective memory, rather than its external environment. The reason is that the villagers succeeded to share a new recognition although the majority of people including the survivors of 1st generation were completely frustrated.

Finally, based on the collective memory, a new collective identity represented by its characteristic of “struggle against ignorance” was formed as well. This indicates that like the arguments of criticizing the expansive learning theory, not all recognitions of contradiction motivate learning. Thus, we need to analyze the process that connects recognition of contradiction to learning activity. In this case, it was analyzed that there were three internal stages including “collective memory formation,” “collective identity formation,” and “recognition sharing.” At the same time, it seemed that a collective activity system could be established after the members shared their recognition. And in regard to the “modes of participation” and the “forms of cooperation”, which is known to determine a direction of the recognition of contradiction, it is heavily influenced by an incentive mechanism such as a successful experience.

In summary, in the reconstruction of *Gasi-ri*, the contradictory recognition about the *4.3 incident* worked as a motivation which triggered expansive learning activities, going through the internal stages of collective memory formation, collective identity formation, and recognition sharing.

C. Discussion and implications on the study

From the analysis, we can draw the following conclusion and implications for future studies. Firstly, as CD is a dynamic process which creates an activity system with the interaction between local people and their environment, it should be performed based on a thorough understanding of regional history and culture. Unilateral approaches must be sublated. Moreover, considering the fact that a local community is capable of forming a collective identity based on their historical context, thereby establishing a collective learning activity system to achieve its common goal, the importance of understanding the cultural-historical context of community is increased. In particular, with relation to perform a development project in community, that can be helpful to devise a method for giving ownership to local people.

Secondly, it is necessary to reconsider our history of education development in the context of the postwar generation's collective memory formation. Until now, the majority of education development studies have been focused on the education generalization process of accommodating Korean's passion for education. However, few studies have been conducted to find the fundamental motivation of the educational enthusiasm in the context of postwar trauma or collective memory. Although it is not enough to generalize this case study to entire society, traumatic memory obviously can be a powerful motivation for participating in learning activity. Besides, this analysis can have the same significances in many countries where they have ever experienced genocide, civil war, or colonization.

Finally, education development researchers need to consider the CHAT and the perspective of expansive learning theory. By focusing on collective object-oriented activity system, expansive learning theory defines learning as an activity system which continues to create another activity. If this perspective is introduced in the study of education development, we can understand every forms of learning activity (formal, informal, and non-formal education) in a unified framework. In the perspective of expansive learning, learning is not an instrumental medium anymore, but the object-oriented action process itself. Therefore, education and learning is considered as an intrinsic value and analyzed in a broader spectrum. In addition, by recognizing learning

as “an activity which creates another activity”, researchers of education development can understand learning as “ensuring the sustainability of development activities.” In the similar vein, the effort of examining the fundamental motivation of learning corresponds to exploring the roots of local people’s ownership and participation in CD. Consequently, with the perspective of expansive learning, in particular by introducing a framework capable of explaining the overall process of development as a learning activity, we can expand our study area as well as its method.

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APPENDIX A
LIST OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWEES

No.	Name (pseudonym)	Gender	Year of birth	Level of education	Background
1	Jeonghui Han	Female	1922	None	- Harmed by the <i>Jeju 4.3 Incident</i>
2	Seokman Oh	Male	1934	Primary school graduate	- Harmed by the <i>Jeju 4.3 Incident</i>
3	Beomyoung Oh	Male	1934	Primary school graduate	- <i>Korean War</i> veteran - Head of the village
4	Chunghun Kim	Male	1935	High school dropout	- Head of the village - <i>Saemaul</i> leader - Worked at <i>Pyoseon</i> District Office
5	Hyeok Kim	Male	1935	Primary school graduate	- Harmed by the <i>Jeju 4.3 Incident</i> - <i>Saemaul</i> leader - Head of <i>Gasi-ri</i> Senior Citizens Association
6	Mija Lee	Female	1936	Primary school graduate	- <i>Pyoseon-ri</i> resident (nearest coastal village) - <i>Saemaul</i> leader - Awarded by the Secretary of Interior
7	Geunjun Hyeon	Male	1936	Middle school graduate	- Captain of <i>Gasi-ri</i> Police Station
8	Jangpil Oh	Male	1938	High school graduate	- Marine Corps (5 th) - Founded evening school - Recipient of <i>Sangnoksoo</i> Award
9	Jaedeok Jeong	Male	1939	High school graduate	- Head of the village - Founded evening school
10	Jeongja Kim	Female	1941	Middle school graduate	- <i>Saemaul</i> leader - Recipient of <i>Hanra</i> Volunteering Award
11	Sangmyeon Oh	Male	1945	High school graduate	- Head of the village - <i>Saemaul</i> leader
12	Yeonhwa Kang	Female	1957	College graduate	- <i>Pyoseon-ri</i> resident (nearest coastal village)

APPENDIX B
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTION EXAMPLES

Subject	Question example	
Pre-interview checklist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Year of birth - His / Her birthplace - Family relations - Level of education - Occupation at the time of reconstruction 	
Common Questions	Postcolonial experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How was your life in the village after Korea's independence? - Did you have any educational experience (formal or informal) at that time?
	Memories of the Jeju 4.3 Incident	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How old were you when the <i>Jeju 4.3 incident</i> occurred in the village? - What happened in the village? - How did you feel at that time? - What do you think about the incident? (at the present time)
	The beginning of village reconstruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How was your life when the village reconstruction began? - What motivated you to participate in the village reconstruction? (Was there any external coercion?)
	The process of village reconstruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Why did you decide to found the evening school in the village? - Memories of evening school (Who / What / How did they teach or learn?) - Was there organization for reconstruction? (i.e., cooperative, men/women's association) - Was it helpful for making profit? - Was there any compensation for the work? (voluntary participation / govt. payment)

	<p style="text-align: center;">The result of village reconstruction</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Do you think the village reconstruction was successful? Were there any changes caused by the rebuilding activities? - If it was successful, in what ways? (economic changes / sociocultural changes) - If it was unsuccessful, in what ways? (economic changes / socio-cultural changes) - What made the village reconstruction plan successful (or unsuccessful)?
<p style="text-align: center;">Village leader</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Communication and conflict resolution</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Did you lead villagers to participate in the village reconstruction? - If so, why did you think it was needed? - If not, who started it? - How did you decide the details of the village reconstruction plan? (i.e., road pavement, warehouse construction) - Were there active discussions among villagers? Did you gather the opinions? - What were the relationships like among the villagers? - Were there any conflicts between the villagers? - How did you resolve the conflicts?
<p style="text-align: center;">Local government official</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">The relationship between village reconstruction and national development project</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What was the government's standpoint on the <i>Gasi-ri</i> village reconstruction? - Did the government support the village? - What kind of support did the government provide? (financial / administrative / technical assistance / etc.) - Do you think the national development project influenced the village reconstruction? - What did you do for the village to be


		<p>selected as the best “new village”?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Do you think the village’s stigma was removed after the village received the new village award? - What do you think about the relationship between the national development project and the village’s reconstruction activity?
Neighboring village resident	Changes in recognition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Before the 4.3 incident, what was the relationship like between the mountain village and the coastal village? - After the 4.3 incident, what did you think about <i>Gasi-ri</i> village? - Has your recognition of the village changed after the village reconstruction? - What do you think about <i>Gasi-ri</i> village right now?
Victim of the Jeju 4.3 Incident	Genocidal memory and village reconstruction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - What was the extent of the damage? - How did you survive? - How did you feel about the military and police at that time? - Did you actively participate in the village reconstruction? Was there any coercion? - What did you think about the government’s national development movement? - Do you think there was a relationship between the village reconstruction and the national development project at that time? - What do you think about “<i>Gasi-ri</i>, the best new village in the nation”? - Do you think the memory of the 4.3 Incident has influenced your attitude about life?

APPENDIX C

Regional Information of *Gasi-ri* Village

1. Location and climate

[Figure 7] Location of *Gasi-ri*



Gasi-ri is located in southeast *Jeju* Island with an average elevation of about 300 meters above sea level. It is bordered on the north by *Jocheon-eup*, the south by *Sehwa-ri*, the west by *Namwon-eup*, and the east by *Seungeup-ri*. Especially, the village has 4,420ha of vast land in the basin area, and is surrounded by 13 *oreum* (parasitic volcanoes). This amount of land composes about half of the entire amount of land in *Pyoseon-myeon*. Although the village is characterized by a vast amount of land, the agricultural area covers only about 15 percent of the entire land. The reason is that the soil of the village is composed of volcanic ash. Moreover, it is impossible to cultivate rice even in the agricultural area due to the lack of water necessary for agriculture. So, all the agricultural land is used for dry-field farming.

As the village is located in a basin area, the village receives a large amount of rain and snow. The annual precipitation rate in this area amounts to 1,600 millimeters. For this reason, in summer, river flooding often occurs as a result of heavy rainfall.

2. Structure of population

Gasi-ri consists of six natural sub-villages: *Bon-dong*, *Anjwa-dong*, *Duri-dong*, *Yeokji-dong*, *Poknam-dong* and *Saenggi-dong*. There were seven sub-villages before the 4.3 Incident in 1948; however, a sub-village named *Sinseol-dong* was burned by the government, and the villagers who had been residing there moved to other sub-villages.

[Table 5] Population of *Gasi-ri*

Year	Household	Male	Female	Total
1929	340	772	819	1,591
1946	350	798	830	1,608
1950	180	335	474	809
1957	234	392	534	926
1965	326	594	697	1,291
1971	300	748	847	1,595
1980	356	867	938	1,805
1987	371	750	767	1,517
2004	422	641	553	1,194
2009	450	640	543	1,173

Source: *Jeju-do* (2009)

Regarding demographic change, small increments have been found right after the independence of Korea in 1945. This is because of the returned draftees from Japan. In 1948, however, as a result of the 4.3 Incident, the population was reduced to less than half. More than 300 villagers were massacred, and the survivors fled to nearby villages. At the beginning of the village reconstruction in 1949, only about 80 households returned to rebuild the village, but the majority of these households were composed of women, the elderly, and children. Since the 1960s and 1970s, the population has steadily increased as a result of the reconstruction. In 2009, a total of 449 households and 1,172 villagers were living in *Gasi-ri*.

국문초록

학살에서 발전으로

- 제주 가시리 마을의 집단학습에 관한 사례연구 -

이 연구는 제주 가시리 마을의 재건 과정에 대한 분석을 통하여 주민 주도형 지역사회개발 과정에서 발생하는 집단 학습의 양상과 성과, 학습이 발생하게 된 동인을 탐구한다. 연구 지역인 제주 가시리는 1948년 제주 4.3사건으로 인해 마을 전체가 전소되고 300여 명의 인명피해가 발생했음에도 불구하고, 20여 년 만에 자체적으로 마을을 재건하여 1970년대 국가로부터 최고 새마을 칭호를 받은 특징적인 역사를 지니고 있다.

연구자는 가시리 마을의 역사적 특이성을 학습의 관점에서 면밀히 분석하기 위하여 문화역사적 활동이론을 개념틀로 도입하였다. 문화역사적 활동이론은 개인과 집단의 목표 지향적 행위를 학습의 과정으로 개념화함으로써 일상의 활동들을 학습의 맥락에서 포착할 수 있게 한다. 이러한 관점에서, 재건 과정에서 발생했던 주민들의 상호작용과 역동들은 지속적인 활동을 창출하는 집단학습의 과정으로 분석되었다. 한편 가시리 마을 역사의 특이성을 구성하는 또 다른 중요한 축은 제주 4.3사건 즉, '집단 학살의 기억'이다. 자료 수집의 과정에서 집단학살의 경험과 마을 재건의 연관성이 중대한 탐구요소로 제기된 바, 연구자는 집단의 기억과 정체성의 문제를 다루는 집합기억이론을 토대로 마을 재건 과정을 분석하였다. 이같은 이론적 배경을 바탕으로 심층면담 및 참여관찰, 문헌분석을 수행한 결과는 다음과 같다.

먼저, 가시리 마을의 재건 과정은 마을 공동체가 지속적으로 목표를 확장하며 의미를 산출해 나가는 집단학습의 과정으로 분석된다. 일차적으로 집단 내에서 학습활동이 발생하기 위해서는 집단적 필요에 의해 구성원이 공유할

수 있는 공통의 목표가 설정되어야 한다. 가시리의 경우 1960년대 초 마을의 토양과 기후에 적합한 경제작물의 발견이 목표 설정의 계기가 되었다. 경제작물 발견의 주체는 4.3사건 직후 야학 설립에서부터 70년대 초 도로확장에 이르기까지 마을 재건활동의 전반을 주도했던 ‘가시리 4.3 1.5세대’였다. 이들은 4.3의 참상을 직접 목격하였으며, 15세 미만의 어린 나이 덕분에 생존할 수 있었던 마을 내 소수의 교육받은 인재들이었다. 이들은 ‘마을을 재건해야 한다.’는 특유의 책임감으로 재건 활동의 촉진자 역할을 담당했다. 이들은 농업기술원으로부터 ‘절간 고구마(주정원료)’, ‘무말랭이’ 등 경제작물 가공기술을 도입, 마을 내에 소개함으로써 마을 공동체에 ‘경제작물 대량생산을 통한 소득 증대’라는 공통의 목표 형성을 가능케 했다. 이러한 공통 목표 아래 가시리 마을 공동체는 집단학습체제를 구축하기 시작한다. 효율적인 생산과 유통을 실현하기 위한 ‘생산 - 유통 - 육아’의 분업구조를 마련하는 한편, 각자에게 주어진 역할을 수행하기 위한 청년회, 부녀회, 협동조합 등의 세부 실천조직이 마련되었다. 마을 총회를 위시한 공동체 내 이러한 조직들은 여러 차례의 토론 과정을 거쳐 “공동생산, 공동유통을 통해 상품 가격 변동에 대비하는 동시에 마을 전체의 소득을 증대시킨다.”는 내부규칙을 정했다. 이러한 의사소통과 상호작용의 과정 속에서 마을 주민들은 소득향상을 위한 지식과 기술을 학습했을 뿐 아니라, 지속적인 현실 개선을 가능케 하는 학습체제를 구축할 수 있었다. 일단 구축된 집단학습체제는 눈앞에 주어진 난관의 해결뿐 아니라, 미래의 새로운 목표를 설정하는 데에도 기여하였다. 1970년대 초 이미 상당부분 소득 증대를 이루었음에도 마을 주민 전체가 상품유통 개선을 위한 산간도로 확포장을 추가적으로 결의하게 된 배경에는 학습체제 구축으로 인한 집단의 학습능력의 증대라는 요인이 작용하였던 것이다. 이처럼 4.3으로 폐허가 된 땅을 일구어 집단적 학습체제를 20년 이상 유지하며 지속적으로 학습한 결과, 가시리 공동체는 소득 증대라는 경제적 목표를 성취했을 뿐 아니라, 국가의 인정을 받아 4.3으로 인해 심각하게 손상되었던 심리적 자존감 또한 회복할 수 있었다.

다음으로, 가시리 마을에서 집단학습이 발생하게 되는 과정에 4.3이라는 집단학살의 기억이 하나의 계기로써 작용한 것으로 분석된다. 연구자는 증언 수집 과정에서 대다수의 주민들이 과거의 자아와 현실의 자아의 괴리에서 발생하는 4.3에 대한 이중적 인식을 지니고 있음을 확인하였다. ‘이유 없이 가족들이 죽임을 당해야만 했던 원통함’, ‘그로 인한 군경과 빨치산에 대한 분노’ 등이 과거의 자아를 대변한다면, ‘이 모든 것이 자신들의 무지로 인한 것이었다는 후회’가 현실의 자아를 대변하고 있었다. 이 중 후자의 서사구조가 마을 재건의 명분으로 직접적으로 연결된다. 4.3의 비극이 주민들의 ‘무지’로 인한 것이라면, 무지로부터 벗어나는 것이야말로 미래에 있을지 모르는 비극을 방지할 수 있는 유일한 길이 되기 때문이다. 연구자는 이러한 인식에 이르게 된 과정에 학살의 기억을 억압하려는 환경적 맥락과 공동체의 결속을 유지하려는 주민집단의 내부적 맥락이 동시에 작용한 것으로 분석한다.

4.3사건 발생 이후 수십년 간 계속된 군사독재정권은 가시리 주민들로 하여금 집단적 추모 행위는 물론 집단 학살과 국가 폭력에 대한 어떠한 언급도 할 수 없도록 억압적 분위기를 조성하였다. 거대한 억압적 환경 속에서 생존자들은 자신들의 부모 세대처럼 철저하게 좌절당할 수만은 없었다. 그래서 이들은 4.3에 대한 자신들의 기억을 ‘국가에 대한 원망’으로부터 ‘무지에의 자책’으로 왜곡하였다. 극도의 빈곤과 ‘폭도 마을’이라는 불명예 속에서 이러한 집단 기억의 왜곡은 마을 공동체 유지를 위한 유일한 건설적인 대안이었다. 더불어 4.3사건 당시 마을 내에서 서로 갈등하고 반목했던 기억들, 경찰과 주민, 주민과 주민 간에 서로 죽고 죽여야만 했던 참담한 기억들은 마을 주민들 사이에서도 절대로 발설해선 안되는 암묵적 금기였다. 따라서 집단 기억의 왜곡은 사회적 탄압에 대응하기 위한 내부 귀인의 과정이자, 공동체의 유지를 위한 자기 검열 과정이었던 것이다. 여기에는 참상의 기억을 마을 재건을 위한 새로운 동력으로 삼으려는 마을 공동체의 의도가 강력하게 반영되어 있다.

4.3에 대한 변화된 인식은 근면과 내핍, 책임감, 배움에의 열망 등의 특성을 지닌 새로운 집단 정체성의 형성을 가져왔고, 이는 재건을 위한 학습활동을

을 촉진시키는 기폭제가 되었다. 연구자는 새로운 집단 기억의 형성이 학습 활동을 촉진시키기까지의 과정을 ‘모순 인식 - 《인식의 공유 - 집단 기억 형성(이중화) - 집단 정체성 형성》 - 활동체제 구축’으로 개념화한다. 모순을 인식함에서부터 새로운 집단 기억이 등장하여 집단 정체성으로 형성되는 내부 과정은 단선적이기보다는 순환적이다. 한편 모순적 상황에 대한 인식이 모두 새로운 집단 정체성의 형성으로 이어지는 것은 아니다. 이 과정에는 새로운 집단 기억을 확산시키려는 의도에 공감하는 많은 구성원들의 인식 공유가 필요하며, 인식 공유에는 성공경험과 같은 일종의 유인 기제가 요구되는 것으로 분석된다. 가시리의 경우 이전 세대와 다른 새로운 집단 기억을 가진 ‘가시리 4.3 1.5세대’가 경제작물의 도입에 성공함으로써 인식공유를 이루고 새로운 집단 정체성을 형성할 수 있었던 것으로 분석된다.

요컨대, 가시리의 경우 4.3에 대한 모순적 인식이 ‘무지’를 자책하는 새로운 집단 기억을 형성함으로써, 마을 재건 참여의 동인으로써 작용하였던 것으로 볼 수 있다. 그리고 마을 재건의 과정은 집단의 구성원들이 토론을 통해 공통된 목표를 설정하고, 그러한 목표 아래 규칙과 세부 조직 분업관계를 설정하여 추진하는 집단적 학습의 과정이었다. 이러한 집단학습체제의 구축으로 마을 주민들은 지속적으로 자신들의 목표를 확장해 나가며 학습함으로써, 경제적 성취뿐 아니라 잃었던 마을 공동체의 자존 또한 회복할 수 있었던 것이다. 이러한 분석 결과는 지역사회개발에 있어 지역 공동체의 역사와 문화에 대한 폭넓은 이해가 필요함을 다시 한 번 시사하는 한편, 학습이 개발을 촉진시키기 위한 수단이라는 도구적 개념을 넘어 개발 과정 전반을 설명할 수 있는 통합적 개념틀로 발전할 수 있는 가능성을 제공한다.

주요어 : 지역사회개발, 집단 학습, 문화역사적 활동이론, 집합 기억,
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