



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

**Degree of Master of International Studies**

**(International Area Studies)**

**US PIVOT TO ASIA:  
Indonesian Diplomacy Perspective**

August, 2016

Development Cooperation Policy Program

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

**JUANG AKBAR**





**US PIVOT TO ASIA:  
Indonesian Diplomacy Perspective**

A thesis presented

by

**Juang Akbar**

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of International Studies

**Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University  
Seoul, Korea**

August 2016



Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

**THESIS ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE**

The undersigned, appointed by

Development Cooperation Policy Program  
The Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University

Have examined a thesis entitled

**US PIVOT TO ASIA:  
Indonesian Diplomacy Perspective**

Academic Advisor: Professor **Sheen, Seong-Ho**

Presented by **Juang Akbar**

August 2016

Candidate for the Degree of Master of International Studies (International Area  
Studies) that is worthy of acceptance

Signature



Committee Chairman

**Park, Tae-Gyun**

Signature



Committee Vice-Chairman

**Kim, Taekyoon**

Signature



Committee Member

**Sheen, Seong-Ho**



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>I. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. BACKGROUND OF STUDY.....	1
1.2. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH .....	7
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION .....	11
<b>II. LITERATURE REVIEW.....</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1. SOCIO-CONSTRUCTIVISM THEORY .....	13
2.2. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICIES .....	17
2.3. US DOMINATION .....	23
2.4. CHINA (PEACEFUL) RISE (?).....	30
<b>III. RESEARCH.....</b>	<b>38</b>
3.1. INDONESIA FOREIGN POLICY .....	38
3.2. NAVIGATING A TURBULENCE OCEAN FOREIGN POLICY .....	45
3.3. INDONESIA CURRENT’S POSITION.....	51
3.4. INDONESIA POSITION BETWEEN US AND CHINA.....	55
<b>IV. CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>V. REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>81</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

The changes in the US foreign policy “Pivot to Asia” may affect stability in the region. The most critical issue is the contradictory interests of China and the US in Southeast Asia. The US has special attention on the development of territorial disputes in the region. It also wants to guarantee the security and control freedom of navigation and extending its power and better control of its operational areas. The US new foreign policy for rebalancing in Asia Pacific raised questions among scholars in the region. Many believed that it is such a new contest for US to tackling the rising Chinese hegemony in the Asia Pacific. Within the US allies in the region, China rise is seen suspiciously, because the US alliances sees it more competitive in economy, politic and security situation from emerging to threatening.

The contest has started since China has desire to block access and neutralises the US power projection throughout Asia Pacific. Nevertheless, the release of the Chinese nine-dotted-line map of the South China Sea in 2009 has created tension in the region and led to territorial disputes. In response to this, Indonesia should project its political security policy toward the US presence in the Asia Pacific correctly because it is also affect Indonesia’s relationships with other countries. Although Indonesia is not one of the claimant states, the maintenance of peace and security in the South China Sea is still part of Indonesia’s national interests of regional stability. Indonesia’s foreign policy towards China in the South China Sea issue has always been projected through ASEAN. In the light of the deadline of the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015 and faced by the vulnerable environment in the South China Sea, ASEAN is in challenge. As an ASEAN leading player, Indonesia is confronted by a dilemma about how to respond China’s maritime policy in the South China Sea through ASEAN, given the fact that ASEAN and China are in the process of implementation of the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) as part of the ASEAN Community building, yet some ASEAN countries still have pending issues with China.

In paper, it will be illustrated that Indonesia should be able to maintain fine foundations, build endurance on its political security cooperation, analysing further development between the US, China and the Asia Pacific, and then speed up the cooperation to create regional stability and enduring partnership. A constant, consistent cooperation on common interest has the potential to transform Indonesia in maintaining its foreign policies.





# I. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. BACKGROUND OF STUDY

During the state visit of President Obama to Australia on November 2011, Obama delivered remarks in front of the Australian Parliament in Canberra that the United States (US) was shifting its focus to the Asia-Pacific after a decade of excessive war in the Middle East.<sup>1</sup> Being one of Pacific nations, US will build region and its future by playing a larger and long-term role through maintaining its core principles and accelerating partnership with allies and friends. Due to the current turns in geopolitical power from West to East, the Asia-Pacific region now is more important to the US than in previous days. The region's growing economic and political weight, not to mention China's rise, marked the shift. Since Barrack Obama became the US President, America's foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific has changed considerably.

Before Obama's remarks, Hillary Clinton, as Secretary of State at that time, labelled the new focus a 'pivot' for the US presence in Asia in an article

---

<sup>1</sup> Whitehouse (17 November 2011), *Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament*, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, Whitehouse. Online Version Available (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>)

for *Foreign Policy*<sup>2</sup>, the new term of American Foreign Policy for ‘rebalancing’ in the Asia Pacific. As stated by Clinton in the aforementioned article, the US sees the Asia Pacific as a key driver of global politics that are progressively connected by shipping and strategy and home to several of the US key allies. However, the Obama administration is still doubted to have a strategic vision to preserve the Pivot in the long term despite the fact that the Pivot establishes ‘a comprehensive plan to step up US engagement, influence and impact on economic, diplomatic, ideological and strategic affairs in the region’.<sup>3</sup> Basically, the US engagement with the Asia-Pacific countries relies on the traditional defence cooperation with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. However, this engagement now is not merely based on defence cooperation. US also broaden the cooperation in economic sector by concluding Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) with other 11 countries in Asia Pacific, which represent roughly 40 percent of global Gross Domestic Product. Including the US, the countries that join the TPP are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Viet Nam.<sup>4</sup> Aiming to set a new and high standard for trade and investment in the Asia Pacific and toward regional integration across the region,

---

<sup>2</sup> Hillary Clinton (11 October 2011), *America’s Pacific Century*, Foreign Policy.

<sup>3</sup> Arvind Gupta (2014), *Forward*, in Muni and Chadha, eds, p. vii.

<sup>4</sup> Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers’ Statement (<https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/trans-pacific-partnership-ministers>)

Obama Administration consider the TPP as the cornerstone for its economic policy in the Asia Pacific.<sup>5</sup> The Obama administration itself has always presented the Trans-Pacific Partnership as crucial to its “pivot” toward the increasingly prosperous Asian region.

In Southeast Asia, ASEAN has become priority, and now is seen as one unified actor and treated as such. The US even participated in East Asia Summit (EAS) after acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. In addition, the US also involves in ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting – Plus (ADMM–Plus) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This interest in ASEAN was not only based on a multilateral approach but also a political consideration for reinforcing the US military presence to control global stability and maritime rim land in particular. Thus, bilateral relations with the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia remain critical as well.

From the US point of view, Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia by geography, population, and economy, where lies close to the US Traditional Ally, Australia, and the Awakening Giant, China. Moreover, its location at the southern entry point makes it vital to South China Sea strategically and economically. It plays an important role in the Southeast Asian regional diplomacy. It is a thriving democracy with strong constitutional

---

<sup>5</sup> (<https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP>)

underpinnings. As the world's largest Moslem-majority, Indonesia has a tradition of constitutionalism and pluralism that well complement the US global interest. Indonesia is also a critical partner in the global war on terrorism. Therefore, the bilateral relationship is extended with the US – Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, which was concluded during Obama's state visit to Indonesia in 2010. Among many issues in the Partnership, the US extended its appreciation to the development of democracy and counter-terrorism efforts in Indonesia as well as normalization of US – Indonesia military cooperation.<sup>6</sup>

However, the US presence in the Asia Pacific can cause problems for Indonesia if it is not properly managed. Indonesia should see not only the opportunities, but also challenges that may arise, as notably the shifting of China's security strategy from continental orientation to maritime orientation. In the report of the President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), President Hu Jintao, to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2012, emphasized the greater importance of maritime security as well as space and cyber security to China.<sup>7</sup> This phenomenon could

---

<sup>6</sup> Barack Obama (10 November 2010), *Speech of President Barack Obama in Jakarta, Indonesia 'President Obama in Jakarta: "Indonesia's Example To the World"*, Jakarta, Indonesia, Whitehouse. Online Version Available (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/11/10/president-obama-jakarta-indonesia-s-example-world>)

<sup>7</sup> Hu Jintao (2012), *Full text: Constitution of Communist Party of China (Adopted on Nov. 14, 2012)*, Beijing, China, Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Online

be seen as part of the shifting attention of the China's maritime strategy, which has transformed from coastal defence to exploration of far seas. It also can be seen from China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Many perceive these claims as the evidence of the rise of China in the Asia Pacific in terms of military and security. The release of the unilateral territorial claim of Chinese nine-dotted-line map of the South China Sea in 2009 has created tension in Southeast Asia and led to territorial disputes.

In addition, the deal on the TPP is related to the US' attempt to balance against a rising China in the Pacific and beyond, since China is excluded to join with TPP.<sup>8</sup> In Statement by the President on the TPP, Obama obviously mentioned that the US should take over the rules of global economy from countries like China.<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless, China's absence from the TPP has potential to stimulate the maritime disputes in the Asia Pacific, in particular South China Sea, though the substance of the TPP fall outside the maritime security issue. TPP is deemed as a counterbalance to China's efforts to expand its influence in

---

Version Available ([http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th\\_cpc\\_congress/2012-11/16/content\\_27138030.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm))

<sup>8</sup> Shintaro Hamanaka, Trans-Pacific Partnership versus Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting, ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 104 December 2014

<sup>9</sup> Barack Obama (5 October 2015), Statement by the President on the Trans Pacific Partnership (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-trans-pacific-partnership>)

economy area as well as in other area such as its island-building in the disputed South China Sea.<sup>10</sup>

Despite the fact that Indonesia does not share maritime borders with China, Indonesia has deep interest in China's current maritime policy that is considered aggressive to some countries. The unilateral territorial claim of China in the South China Sea that is called as nine-dotted-line has brought tension in the region. Countries, which share borders with China in the South China Sea, especially the Philippines and Viet Nam, respond negatively to the Chinese claim, since it is overlapping with their territories. The tension worsened because of a set of incidents involving the navies, the coastguards and the fishermen of China, the Philippines and Viet Nam in the disputed areas. The recent development shows that the Philippines has brought the case to be settled by an international tribunal in July 2013 and the notification cannot bind China because China has optionally excluded itself from compulsory arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The dispute and tension in the South China Sea have brought serious attention over the world and Indonesia. Although Indonesia is not one of the

---

<sup>10</sup> Jane Perlez, U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on China ([http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html?_r=0)) also in Zack Bluestone, What the TPP Means for the PRC (<https://www.lawfareblog.com/water-wars-what-tpp-means-prc>)

claimant states, Indonesia has interest in the maintenance of security and stability in the South China Sea since it serves as one of the main sea lines of transportation and communication that connects East Asia and the rest of the world. If the stability of the sea were threatened, then the world's trade and service would be at risk. Together with other ASEAN countries and China, Indonesia has long anticipated this potential tension by establishing ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002. The declaration demonstrates a commitment of ASEAN and China to maintaining stability and security in the region through implementation of a range of cooperative activities. Following the adoption of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC in 2011, ASEAN and China are now working on the implementation of the DOC with two main priorities, namely the drafting of the Regional Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China and the execution of some maritime-related practical cooperation. At the same time, however, the growing tension between China and some ASEAN countries, mainly the Philippines, on the territorial claim in the South China Sea has not been resolved yet.

## **1.2. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH**



The new focus of America's Foreign Policy for 'rebalancing' or 'pivot' in the Asia Pacific raised many questions amongst Asian pundits in International Relations, whether it is as a new containing diplomacy of the US against China or merely a new focus in engagement of Asian countries in Politic and Security issues. Moreover, the US 'pivot' to Asia seemed biased due to the exclusion of China in the strengthening of military ties and the economy as well. Americans may like to say that the pivot is actually intended to improve disaster-relief readiness than aimed against any country. Nevertheless, it could be seen to answer the growing China's attention and its aggressiveness claims on some of the islands and reefs in the South China and East China Seas.

Professor Joseph Nye, Jr. of Harvard University mentioned in his article in *New York Times* that the US' pivot-like strategy is not "integrate but hedge". One of the intentions of the pivot is likely to hedge China's military invasion on its neighbours.<sup>11</sup> Beijing noted that Washington has arranged too much emphasis on the military dimension around the region and answered it by accelerating its military build up as a result of its economic growth. To the average Chinese, the US is notably showing off its hegemon power and reinforcing China to take more assertive actions. At this time, China puts its attention and observes carefully every action taken by the US in their

---

<sup>11</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr. (25 January 2013), *Work With China, Don't Contain It*, New York Times.

surrounding border. Perhaps China will never challenge the US, because China exactly uncovered its intensifying reliance on the international system dominated by the US, by which its purposes to maintain current neo-liberalist economic development model for the purpose of legitimation of the authoritarian regime.<sup>12</sup> In addition, China also appreciated the US as the guarantor of international order in East Asia, but it will take assertive actions if the US would not respect its core interests in maritime domain, whereas the US allies in this region are facing intricate disputes, particularly after the released of the Unilateral Nine-dotted-line Map of the South China Sea and East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone. Observing from this potential long-lasting conflict, the miscalculations of the region's political leaders could also trigger to become an armed conflict, which the US, with its new foreign policy strategy and military commitments to Japan and the Philippines, could be involved into the conflict. Thus, the peace and stability in the region could also be disrupted.

Among those, the most critical is the contradictory interests of China and the US in Southeast Asia. The US has special attention on the development of the South China Sea, because the US wants to guarantee the security and

---

<sup>12</sup> Jianyong Yue (2008), *Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality*, International Politic. Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.

control freedom of navigation. Considering Chinese policy in the region, which possibly endangers free passage of various sea-lanes. Consequently, there is a desire from China to block access and neutralize the US power projection throughout the Asia Pacific. This is important for the US because if China exercises greater control over the region, it will limit US from extending its power and better control of its operational areas.

These cross-purposes between China and the US have created a dilemma for Indonesia. Albeit the current government led by Joko Widodo does not stress “thousand friends zero enemy” policy as adapted by the previous government, the cross purposes still call attention on how to respond to the US interests in the Asia Pacific. The US attention in the region would be profitable for Indonesia, especially considering political-security policy that the US already has with its alliances over the region. Indonesia also had the need to ameliorate its military relationship with the US. Growing strength of China’s military has alarmed Indonesia, but on the other hand Indonesia also depends on China for its economic growth. If Indonesia establishes a faulty political security policy in regards to the US presence in Asia Pacific, it might lead to quaint events between Indonesia and the US, harm Indonesia’s relation with other countries in the region, China in particular, and might also disrupt stabilization in the region. The escalation of tension could be more serious if it

is reviewed the US policy that the strengthening of military ties over the past years with virtually every Asian country, but it is excluding China. It could be seen that Washington is surrounding China with the US allies and strategically located military bases and sowing the seeds for the war. At this occasion, China stands that the issue of territorial dispute should be settled with the claimant states through bilateral channels, not regional mechanism.

Being confronted by the fact that the DOC is in the process of implementation, yet some ASEAN members still have some pending issues with China, Indonesia as the leading actor in the region is facing a dilemma about how to respond to the Chinese maritime policy in the South China Sea. Since this issue existed in 2009 following the release of the nine-dotted-line map of China, Indonesia's foreign policy towards China on the development of the situation in the South China Sea has always been projected through the forum of ASEAN. In this sense, Indonesia could actively play its important role in the region in response to the Chinese maritime policy in the South China Sea.

### **1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION**

The general objectives of the research is to identify the terms of 'pivot' in the US Foreign Policy in Asia Pacific region particularly in Southeast Asia due to the escalation in tension in the region. The study will also examine the

position of Indonesia in between the US and China as well as Indonesia active contribution to the maintenance of world and regional peace and stability through many regional mechanisms such as ASEAN, ARF, and EAS, where Indonesia has always underscored the importance of resolving any disputes in amicable manner.

Therefore, the basic research questions that the paper would like to address are:

1. What is the potential of conflicts in the region due to US 'pivot' to Asia?
2. How does Indonesia play its role in the region?
3. How does the US engage Indonesia in their Foreign Policy?
4. What should Indonesia do in the contest of US and China?

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1. SOCIO-CONSTRUCTIVISM THEORY

The notion to explain the US recent foreign policy for pivot in Asia to the theory of International Relation could be seen from the perspective of socio-constructivism. The relationship among the states might be examined in three principal ways, which are the actors and bureaucracies' role play in shaping current foreign policy, the decision-making process, and the effect of international system or society on the conduct of foreign policy by states.<sup>13</sup> The rational usually concentrate on the ways in which “various cognitive processes” impact upon foreign policy construction, as well as on agency and agents, either “state-based foreign policy elites” or “non-state norm entrepreneurs” that affect and direct foreign policy practices.<sup>14</sup> Categorised as constructivist, constructivism International relations theories have produced wide explanations for change in international relations. Most commonly, Alexander Wendt explains in two tenets: "that the structures of human association are determined

---

<sup>13</sup> Maysam Behravesh (17 July 2011), *The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis*, e-International Relations Journal. Online Version Available (<http://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/17/the-relevance-of-constructivism-to-foreign-policy-analysis/>)

<sup>14</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel (2008), “*Constructivism and Foreign Policy*,” in *Foreign Policy: Theories. Actors. Cases*, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 73.

primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature", where the process of social interaction constructs international system. Constructivist theorists stress on specific aspects of social interaction, which influence continuity and change within international society. Behaviour of state in the international system emerges from the shared identities of individuals, institutions and organisations interacting within it.

Constructivism has recently moved in constructing cross-level models and emphasizing the interplay between agents, developments and structures at the national, regional and international levels. From an alternative perspective, constructivism as evolved during the 1990s has also been categorized into three different forms: "systemic," "unit-level," and "holistic."<sup>15</sup> Systemic constructivism, which is exemplified by the influential writings of Alexander Wendt,<sup>16</sup> follows the Waltzian neo-realist "third-image" level of analysis and thus concentrates particularly upon "interactions between unitary state actors" and what happens between them at the expense of what happens within them,

---

<sup>15</sup> Christian Reus-Smit (2005), "Constructivism," in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. Scot Burchill and others. Basingstoke: Palgrave, p.199.

<sup>16</sup> Alexander Wendt (1992), *Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, *International Organization* 46, no. 2; Alexander Wendt (1994), *Collective Identity Formation and the International State*, *American Political Science Review* 88; Alexander Wendt (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

that is, this type of constructivism is believed to have bracketed or de-emphasized states' domestic politics and its role in constructing or transforming their identities and interests.<sup>17</sup> The important thing is to look at how identities and interests are constructed, how they are made or produces in and through specific international interactions.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, if states find themselves in a self-help system, this is because their practices made it that way. Changing the practices will change the inter-subjective knowledge that constitutes the system.<sup>19</sup> So even if alter and ego make anarchy conflicted by creating a self help system, they can always escape this self-help system by changing the ways they think about and then act in this system. This is why a scholar for socio-constructivism like Wendt argues 'that the meaning in terms of which action is organized arise out of interactions' and explicitly illustrates on how 'identities and interests are transformed under anarchy; by the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities.'<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> Reus-Smit, Christian (2005), "*Constructivism,*" in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. Scot Burchill and others. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005, p.199.

<sup>18</sup> Wendt, Alexander (1995), *Constructing International Politics*. International Security, Vol. 20, No.1, pp. 71-81, p. 72.

<sup>19</sup> Wendt, Alexander (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46, pp 391-425.

<sup>20</sup> Loc. Cit.



Being the “inverse” of systemic constructivism, unit-level constructivist theory, which is well represented by the views of Peter Katzenstein, focuses on the states’ domestic political realm, or in the words of Reus-Smit, on “the relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states,” and thus their national security strategies.<sup>21</sup> And finally, holistic constructivists stand at the intersection of unit-level and systemic constructivism and in fact strive to bridge the divide between the domestic and the international in explaining how state identities and interests are constituted. Epitomized by the writings of John G. Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil, holistic constructivism sets to integrate the domestically constituted corporate identities of states and their internationally driven social identities into “a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and the international as two faces of a single social and political order.”<sup>22</sup>

As discussed above, constructivist not only connects the international system to national actors, institutions and policies, but also impacts upon identities and interests of state actors. To some extent, it also shapes the foreign policy practices in a certain way, as like Wendt’s posit that ideas are not mere variables but constitutive of “brute material forces”.

---

<sup>21</sup> Reus-Smit, *Op. Cit.*, p.200.

<sup>22</sup> Reus-Smit, *Op. Cit.*, p.201.

## 2.2. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICIES

The US and allies in the region have invigorated and broadened their cooperation in multi-level cooperation in order to create a similar perspective uniquely suited to solving the region's problems. It is indeed, as Alexander Wendt explains, a continued inter-state alliance as a transformation of each state's norms through the principle of 'reflected appraisals'. If one state treats the other as if it were a friend, then, according to this principle, it is likely that the state in question will internalize that belief.<sup>23</sup> Thus, the countries could establish mutual understanding to invigorate their mutual interests and to pursue common interests. Moreover, if there is a threat towards the allies, it should gather all the resources to ease the tension around the allies, and if one of member country feels insecure towards the opponent, the allies should also respond it to secure it. On its development, the US together with its allies has come to be fiercely challenged China by responding it through Washington's defence commitments around China. It would seem be obvious that the US see China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the US economy and security in a variety of ways.

---

<sup>23</sup> Wendt, A. (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 327; Nabers, 'Social Construction', p.115.

One of the clearest statements of the US intentions in Asia for its 'rebalances' is made in a January 2012 document published by the US Department of Defense, *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense*. Introducing the review, the US President Barack Obama states, "We seek the security of our nation, allies and partners. We seek the prosperity that flows from an open and free international economic system. And we seek a just and sustainable international order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld, especially the fundamental rights of every human being. Indeed, as we end today's wars, we will focus on a broader range of challenges and opportunities, including the security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific...". Reviewing this statement, the US foreign policy is specifically shifting its focus from Europe and Middle East to Asia by stressing on how important of Asia for the US. Washington sees the relationship with Asian allies and key partners as a critical value to the future stability and growth of the region. Therefore, the recent US foreign policy emphasizes the existing alliances, which offers a fundamental basis for Asia Pacific security. It also expands their networks of co-operation with emerging partners throughout the Asia Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests, where investing in a long-term strategic partnership with many countries around China such as India, the Philippines,

Viet Nam, Singapore, South Korea and Japan to support their ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the region. In addition, the US will also continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that it maintains regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with the treaty obligations and with international law. Washington does realize that working closely with its network of allies and partners could also continue to promote its domination based on the rules of international order through underlying stability and constructive defence co-operation.

Obama administration not only prepared to identify the opportunities in Asia, but also understood that continuing the US leadership would be necessary to brace up regional peace and prosperity, as its belief has done for decades. The administration believes that the rebalancing may sow unintended consequences, even though the policy is claimed not to aim for destabilize the region, but to achieve a dynamic equilibrium. However, the broad policy of rebalancing may not prevent criticism. Many critics worry the policy could exacerbate and spread the tension over the region. The opponents also put attention about neglecting other interests or advancing confrontation with China. For instance, some critics clam that it will create and invite further violence or shift it to Asia Pacific from Middle East, and other critics claim that the attempt by the US to step up its engagement in the Asia Pacific is aimed at containing

China's rise and will inevitably lead to polarization and force Asian countries to take sides. The 'regional-global nexus' runs implicitly through the often dichotomous debates over China's (re-)emergence and its broader strategic implications.<sup>24</sup> Constructivist scholars believe that the socialisation which occurs when institutions expose Chinese policy-makers to regional and global norms will ultimately lead to positive shifts in their underlying beliefs, interests and conceptions of China's national identity.<sup>25</sup> A leading exponent of this view is Alastair Iain Johnston. In his study of China's participation in a selection of global and regional institutions during the period 1980-2000, Johnston concludes that 'there is considerable, if subtle evidence of socialization of Chinese diplomats, strategists, and analysts in certain counter-realist norms and practices as a result of participation in these institutions'.<sup>26</sup> In policy terms, the constructivist logic is reflected in characterizations of China as a country that is moving inexorably towards becoming a more 'responsible stakeholder' both globally and within its own Asian region.<sup>27</sup> Hugh White and Brendan Taylor in their article 'A rising China and American perturbations' in the book

---

<sup>24</sup> Hugh White and Brendon Taylor, (2009) "A Rising China and American Perturbations," in William Tow, ed. *Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.85-98.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 86

<sup>26</sup> Johnston, Alastair I., (2008) *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>27</sup> Zoellick, Robert B., 2005. 'Whither China: from membership to responsibility?', remarks to National Committee on US–China Relations, New York, 21 September.

of William T. Tow (2009), *Security Politics in the Asia Pacific: A Regional – Global Nexus*, mentioned that

the ‘engagement’ of China, as opposed to the ‘containment’ which those of the realist persuasion will typically advocate, is therefore ultimately seen as a preferable policy approach by those of both the liberal and constructivist schools. The dominant intellectual approaches to problematizing China’s (re-)emergence illuminate various dimensions of the regional–global nexus. However, none of these theory-driven perspectives sets out to explicitly encapsulate the multidimensional, multidirectional impact of China’s rise in driving this nexus between Asian security and global security. Indeed, due to the theoretical strictures they respectively self-impose, it remains questionable whether any of these paradigms is necessarily appropriate for fully capturing those complexities.<sup>28</sup>

As Aaron Friedberg has observed in his useful overview of the academic literature addressing the US–China relations,

driven by a desire to construct parsimonious theories and to establish the preponderance of one paradigm or school, scholars have been inclined to adopt an all or nothing attitude, asserting the overwhelming importance of the causal mechanisms central to their preferred paradigm while downplaying or ignoring the possible significance of others.<sup>29</sup>

The main point in this issue is the lack of efficiency and trust in promoting regional security, which creates security dilemmas among countries. The uncertainty situation may produce insecurity and cause more problematic disastrous action-reaction sequence in the region. Security dilemmas are situations, in which both sides have defensive, or status quo, intentions and

---

<sup>28</sup> Reus-Smit, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 86

<sup>29</sup> Friedberg, Aaron L., 2005. ‘The future of US–China relations: is conflict inevitable?’, *International Security*, 30(2): 7–45.

would prefer to avoid costly and destabilizing competition and mutual arming.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, the United States and its Asia Pacific security allies and partners are engaging in extensive efforts to hedge against both uncertainty and Beijing's specific policies by balancing against China.<sup>31</sup> Despite severe domestic pressure to reduce defence spending, Washington has enhanced what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called "forward-deployed" diplomacy, strengthening security ties with and among its allies and partners and generally buttressing its military presence throughout the Asia Pacific.<sup>32</sup> Seen from Washington, it is obviously seen as a defensive strategy towards China growing power, where Beijing sees it as an action to challenge its 'peaceful rise' grand strategy. Yet, regardless of Washington's actual intentions, the associated policies and rhetoric may appear threatening to Beijing and, consequently, could trigger unwanted defensive counter responses.<sup>33</sup> In addition, the tensions of the region appear with escalating competition between Washington and Beijing. In short, at least on

---

<sup>30</sup> John H. Herz. (January 1950), "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 157– 180; and Robert Jervis. (January 1978), "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 167–214.

<sup>31</sup> Adam P. Liff. (2014), "Whither the Balancers? Reconsidering Methods and Metrics in Contemporary Security Studies and Secondary State Military Balancing Responses to China's Rise," working paper, Princeton University.

<sup>32</sup> Hillary Clinton. (11 October 2011), "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011. Online Version Available: ([http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas\\_pacific\\_century](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century))

<sup>33</sup> A former vice minister at the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs warns, "Should this ill-thought-out policy of rebalancing continue and the security environment worsen, an arms race would be inevitable." See He Yafei, "The Trust Deficit: How the U.S. 'Pivot' to Asia Looks from Beijing" *Foreign Policy*, May 13, 2013. Online Available ([http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/13/how\\_china\\_sees\\_the\\_us\\_pivot\\_to\\_asia](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/13/how_china_sees_the_us_pivot_to_asia))

the surface, it is increasing political tensions and military competition unfolding in the contemporary Asia Pacific. It also appears to lead largely by action-reaction dynamics emblematic of a structurally that could drive a security dilemma, particularly in military competition, however, can have different causes and take different forms.

### **2.3. THE US DOMINATION**

The US plays its role too dominant in the region, while China has historically preferred to handle all disputes bilaterally without any interference from outsiders, the resumption of negotiations between Beijing and ASEAN still holds promise for reinvigorating a multilateral framework toward greater cooperation and conflict resolution, where Indonesia is one of the respected member countries.

Obama mentioned that the US foreign policy shifted from West to East and would focus more on Asia Pacific in front of the Australian Parliament in Canberra on November 2011. Along with the US allies, it will shape the region and its future by playing a larger and long-term role in the region. The region's growing economic and political weight, not to mention China's rise, marked the shift. Since Barack Obama became the US President, America's foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific has changed considerably. Obama administration seems



to put their attention to Asia due to its geo-political and economic interests, where Asia is considered as the region in which the current global order will face its most profound challenges, also because it is the region where power relations shift fastest and most conspicuously.

Another remarks delivered by Hillary Clinton which has been published in an article for Foreign Policy<sup>34</sup> a month prior to Obama's remark shows that the US has new focus a 'pivot' in Asia. Clinton mentions that the Asia Pacific is deemed by the US as a key driver of global politics that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy and home to several of the US key allies. However, this policy gains criticism whether or not it has the strategic vision or the resources to maintain the Pivot in the long-term though the Pivot establishes a comprehensive plan to step up the US engagement, influence and impact on economic, diplomatic, ideological and strategic affairs in the region',<sup>35</sup> this criticism may be caused by recent events in the Middle East and Ukraine which continue to preoccupy the US planners thus the observers have questioned the viability of the Pivot in an era of fiscal constraint.<sup>36</sup> The Pivot itself aims to increase the presence of the US Navy's fleet in the Asia-Pacific from 50 to 60

---

<sup>34</sup> Clinton, Op.Cit.

<sup>35</sup> Arvind Gupta (2014), *Forward*, in Muni and Chadha, eds, p. vii.

<sup>36</sup> Zachary Keck (5 March 2014), *Can the US Afford the Asia Pivot?*, The Diplomat. Online Version Available (<http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/can-the-us-afford-the-asia-pivot/>)

per cent by 2020.<sup>37</sup> The Pivot will see the number of ships deployed in the region in 2020 increase to approximately 67, notably including a majority of the US aircraft carriers, but also its cruisers, destroyers, submarines and Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) designed specifically for operations close to shore.<sup>38</sup>

According to Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth, who have offered the most detailed case for deep engagement, the United States should maintain the global leadership role it has played for more than sixty years.<sup>39</sup> It is including establishing new partnership and invigorating deepest established relationship with allies and friendly countries with a rule-based system favourable to the US interests in order to sustain stability in key regions. Therefore, the most significant factors of deep engagement are the US' extensive confidence assurances. Basically, the US engagement with countries in the Asia-Pacific relies on the traditional defence cooperation with Japan,

---

<sup>37</sup> Julian E. Barnes, *U.S. Plans Naval Shift Toward Asia*, The Wall Street Journal. Online Version Available (<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303552104577439943137674490>)

<sup>38</sup> Jonathan Greenert (27 March 2014), Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, US Navy Chief of Operations, 2014 Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, pp. 1-3, 20.

<sup>39</sup> Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment," *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51; and Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 1 (January/February 2013), pp. 130–142. Deep engagement shares many similarities with selective engagement, particularly in terms of U.S. security commitments. See Robert J. Art, "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 79–113; and Robert J. Art, "Selective Engagement in the Era of Austerity," in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, eds., *America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2012), pp. 15–27.

South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Here, Washington dispatch reinforcements from afar to sustain its military units over lengthy air and sea lines of communication, and operate them from a handful of main operating region.

**Picture 1: The US Strategy to Encircle China**



Resource: Laura Canali, “How America Wants to Check China’s Expansion,” Heartland: Eurasian Review of Politics, April 2005

By given its geographically isolated location and diverse commitments, the US can devote only a portion of its available forces to any particular region at any one time, additionally; military operations in the vast and distant Western Pacific would pose logistic hurdles to the US warfare strategy.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, in order to limit China's growing political influence and economic power in the region, the US promotes alliances having the dual purpose of containment and balance of power. The containment strategy as the first map shows consisting a series of extensive engagements with countries that could be trusted and share borders with China stretching an arc from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia to South Asia to Central Asia. After announced to shift its attention from Middle East and Atlantic, the US puts more attention to Asia and Pacific, establishes and invigorates the existing treaties between its traditional allies, and expands it to the former opponents, Afghanistan and Vietnam. It also tries to deepen and widen its cooperation with the new coalition around China in gaining its influence in the region due to the awareness of declining. In addition, the US' support to India also contains politic and economy motives, where the US aware that India as a biggest democracy country, natural rival and direct neighbouring country of China, could give more benefits for the US to gain its

---

<sup>40</sup> Evan Brandon Montgomery, "Contested Primacy in the Pacific: China's Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection," *International Security* 38:4 (Spring 2014), pp. 115-149. (pp. 124-126)

influence in the region by promoting free market economics and giving military assistance. During Obama's visit to India on January 2015, the two countries agreed to strengthen the regional dialogues, invest in making trilateral consultations with third countries in the region more robust, deepen regional integration, strengthen regional forums, explore additional multilateral opportunities for engagement, and pursue areas where the two countries can build capacity.<sup>41</sup> At this point, Delhi has become comfortable with seeing Washington spends a lot of money in providing its ambition to be one of the balancer of Chinese hegemony in the region. Therefore, the new pledge is making a clear status of India in the Washington's point of view.

Mention should also be made of the most recent policy to tackle China's dominance in region by concluding the TPP among a dozen of Asian Pacific countries on 5 October 2015.<sup>42</sup> TPP, which considered as the most ambitious free trade agreement in history is intended to be the economic instrument of the US strategic pivot to Asia Pacific to encircle and confront China.<sup>43</sup> This might be explained by the exception of China within five years of the TPP

---

<sup>41</sup> Tanya Somanader (26 January 2015), The Highlights of President Obama's Visit to India, Whitehouse. Online Version Available (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/01/26/highlights-president-obamas-visit-india>)

<sup>42</sup> [Matthew P. Goodman](#), [Scott Miller](#), "The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations Conclude" (<http://csis.org/publication/trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations-conclude>)

<sup>43</sup> Mike Head, "US Dominated Pacific Trade Pact Agreed" (<https://www.wsns.org/en/articles/2015/10/06/tppt-o06.html>)

negotiations.<sup>44</sup> Obama's statement on the TPP clearly shows the ambition of the US to prevent countries like China write the rules of the global economy.<sup>45</sup> The US aggressive promotion of the TPP may be caused by China's growth over the past two decades and China's desire on accelerating negotiations on economic integration since the 21<sup>st</sup> century for instance signing Bangkok Agreement and Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN.<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile, China has also responded to sooth the TPP's effect by enhancing negotiation on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with 10 ASEAN member nations as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Compared to the TPP, which represents 40 percent of global GDP, RCEP will cover a third of global GDP.

In Southeast Asia, the US actively engages in ASEAN forum such as East Asia Summit, ADMM-Plus, and ARF. More detailed study shows that beside based on multilateral approach; the US' interest is also based on political consideration. The US reinforces its military presence to control global stability and maritime rim land. However, none of the ASEAN member countries has willingness to criticize the pivot and jeopardize the chance of somehow gaining

---

<sup>44</sup> Shawn Donnan (<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7339123e-ee88-11e4-88e3-00144feab7de.html#axzz3qrVSzP8X>)

<sup>45</sup> Barack Obama (5 October 2015) *op. cit.*

<sup>46</sup> Ronglin Li and Yang Hu, "RCEP, TPP and China's FTA Strategies" ([http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload\\_files/Report\\_3\\_54\\_RCEP,\\_6192294083.pdf](http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload_files/Report_3_54_RCEP,_6192294083.pdf))

from it. Some wished for American support for aid, but virtually all realised of potential advantage they might reward from being reached out by a powerful ‘other’ power.<sup>47</sup> The shift of Washington’s attention from Middle East and Europe to Asia could easily be perceived by ASEAN’s leader as a way to tackle the rising China’s domination in the region and gain more potential benefit for the region’s interest. Thus, bilateral relations within ASEAN countries remain significant as well.

#### **2.4. CHINA (PEACEFUL) RISE (?)**

China is one of the largest countries in the region<sup>48</sup>, known for long time ago as a continental power, making a new movement by upgrading its strategy in politics, economy, military and diplomacy. A diverse population (around 56 ethnic groups and dominated by more than 90% of Han Chinese) has developed its own strategy to survive by dominating and influencing the small states around its border. Chinese people have built not only advantageous power relationships, but also challenging. It has had the fruitful relationship, in contiguous territories and in far-flung locales rich in the resources that it

---

<sup>47</sup> Donald K. Emmerson, “Challenging ASEAN: The US Pivot Through Southeast Asia’s Eyes”, *Global Asia Vol.7, No.4* (Winter 2012), pp 22-25. (pp. 23)

<sup>48</sup> China is the fourth largest country in the world after Russia, Canada and the United States with total around 9,596,960 km<sup>2</sup> and population around 1.35 billion people (World Bank).

requires to fuel its growth. Nevertheless, a large number of other countries surrounded around, with whom it has complicated and not always friendly relations. China's relations with its neighbors have more complex and multifaceted affairs than any other country. On land, China shares borders with seventeen states (Picture 2). The most important of these are Russia, North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Myanmar (Burma), Laos, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and three states of Central Asia. At sea, Chinese claims abut or overlap with some of the same states plus six others, including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Viet Nam. China has had border disputes with many of these countries, leading to military clashes in the post-1949 period with India, Russia (at that time the Soviet Union), and Vietnam, among others.



Picture 2: China's Map and its Neighbour



Source: economist

China's blessed geography is so obvious a point that tends to get overlooked in discussions of the country's economic dynamism and national assertiveness.<sup>49</sup> Overlooking to its history, it has developed its own strategy to secure its national interest by establishing the great wall in the north of Han Chinese land. Chinese people indeed understood on how to preserve their national sovereignty for thousands years. They integrated their neighbour states into a disciplined and elaborate cultural system with a unique experience in,

<sup>49</sup> Robert Kaplan, "The Geography of Chinese Power," *Foreign Affairs* 89:3 (May/June 2010): 22-41. Available Online at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-05-01/geography-chinese-power>

among other things, forming tributary relationships with other states.<sup>50</sup> It is related to the constructivism that is inclined to focus on ideational forces shaping international relations not just by material forces such as power and wealth, but also by subjective and inter-subjective factors, including ideas, norms, history, culture, and identity. As Amitav Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia,” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda. eds. *International Relations of Asia* mentioned that

Constructivism takes a sociological, rather than “strategic interaction”, view of international relations. The interests and identities of states are not pre-obtained, or a given, but emerge and change through a process of mutual interaction and socialization. Conditions such as anarchy and power politics are not permanent or organic features of international relations, but are socially constructed. State interests and identities are in important part constituted by these social structures rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics. Norms, once established, have a life of their own; they create and redefine state interests and approaches.<sup>51</sup>

China’s relations have offered unique characteristics in international relations in Asia. It has presented an idea of collective identity through interaction and socialization, wherein normative conditions, may allow it to overcome power politics and the security dilemma. In China, aside from regional institutions, local discourses about China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ play an

---

<sup>50</sup> Ibid

<sup>51</sup> Amitav Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia,” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda. eds. *International Relations of Asia* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 57-84, p. 69.

important role behind the emergence of constructivism as the most popular international relations theory among the younger generation academics. Constructivism has given an alternative theoretical platform to Chinese scholars wary of realist (power transition) perspectives from the West (as well as other parts of Asia), which sees the rise of China as a major threat to international stability.<sup>52</sup>

Some analysts argue that China's security strategy has shifted from continental orientation to maritime orientation. In the report of the President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), President Hu Jintao, to the 18<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2012, emphasized the greater importance of maritime security as well as space and cyber security to China.<sup>53</sup> Beijing has its own definition and rule of the international game. In July 2012, China's State Council approved the establishment of a new national prefecture on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, which is disputed territory between Vietnam and China. China's Central Military Commission announced that it would deploy a garrison of soldiers to guard the Paracel Islands, announced a new policy of "regular combat-readiness patrols" in the South

---

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p. 72.

<sup>53</sup> Hu Jintao (2012), *Full text: Constitution of Communist Party of China (Adopted on Nov. 14, 2012)*, Beijing, China, Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Online Version Available ([http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th\\_cpc\\_congress/2012-11/16/content\\_27138030.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm))

China Sea, and began offering oil exploration rights in locations recognized by the international community as within Vietnam's exclusive economic zone.<sup>54</sup> This phenomenon could be seen as part of the shifting attention of the China's maritime strategy, which has transformed from coastal defence to exploration of far seas. It also can be seen from China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Many perceive these claims as the evidence of the rise of China in the Asia Pacific in terms of military and security.

China recently builds airstrips, moves oil rigs and redefines its airspace on these disputed territorial without any clear program for turning such assertion into acknowledged status it sees as its due. On this occasion, it is clear that China's high demand of energy could be the main reason why China's maritime policy in the South China Sea seems to be more assertive. The spokesman of the Ministry of Defence of China pointed out that China's orientation in maritime is to enhance its capacity for exploiting marine resources, developing marine economy, safeguarding China's maritime rights and interests as well as ensuring sustainable economic and social development. According to the report of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China promotes the use of natural gas in its energy mix from 3 per cent to 10

---

<sup>54</sup> James Webb (20 August 2012), "*The South China Sea's Gathering Storm*," Wall Street Journal. Online available (<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444184704577587483914661256>)

per cent by 2030 and the South China Sea offers the great potential for significant natural gas discoveries, creating an incentive to secure larger parts of the area for domestic production. It is estimated that there are approximately 190 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves in the South China Sea. As comparison, China's current gas natural reserves are "only" 15 Tcf and the Chinese production of natural gas in the South China Sea in 2011 was "only" 600 billion cubic feet.

These issues trouble its neighbours, and trouble the US too. Put together China's desire to regain itself and the US' determination not to let that desire unsettle its interest and those of its allies that can be very problematic indeed. Moreover, recently many scholars argue the China's claim of its foreign policy as a peaceful rise movement, where as mentioned in the Economist, one of Renmin University in Beijing professor, Shi Yinhong, one of China's most eminent foreign-policy commentators, said that 'five years ago, he was sure that China could rise peacefully, as it says it wants to. Now, he says, he is not so sure'.<sup>55</sup> Chinese leaders believe their own rhetoric about the islands of the East and South China Seas having always been part of their territory since the empire's maximum extent under the Qing dynasty. Contrarily, China's leaders

---

<sup>55</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, *China Future*, the Economist Essay, online available at (<http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21609649-china-becomes-again-worlds-largest-economy-it-wants-respect-it-enjoyed-centuries-past-it-does-not>)

are convinced the neighbouring countries that they have no intention to seek a quarrel in the region. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian nations express a fair amount of scepticism at the idea and some nations even obviously invite and welcome the US' attention on the region.

### **III. RESEARCH**

#### **3.1. INDONESIA FOREIGN POLICY**

After proclamation of independence in 1945, Indonesia's foreign policy was expressed by its First Vice President, Mohammad Hatta at a session of the Central National Commission on September 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1948, as an active participation in the dominant issues at that time such as the struggles against colonialism, apartheid and the eradication of the dehumanizing devastate of poverty. Hatta used the words "*Mendayung di antara Dua Karang*" or rowing between two reefs to exemplify independent and active position. As a Vice President, (concurrently) Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the young Republic, Hatta explained Indonesia's position in the Cold War between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the US, where stationed Indonesia as an object of the two superpowers. Hatta stated:

"The Government is of the firm opinion that the best policy to adopt is one which does not make us the object of an international conflict. On the contrary, we must remain the subject who reserves the right to decide our own destiny and fight for our own goal, which is independence for the whole of Indonesia."

The foundation of Indonesia's foreign policy is based on the principles above, which is independent and active. Independent means Indonesia does not

side with world powers while active means Indonesia seeks active participation in the settlement of international issues and does not keep a passive or active stand on those issues. The key point to note is that Indonesia's independent and active policy is not a neutral policy; rather the country would seek to find a different way in the world, neither neutralized nor aligned with one of the evolving power blocs.<sup>56</sup> Essentially, the policy is designed to serve the national interest while simultaneously allows Indonesia to cooperate with other nations to abolish colonialism and imperialism in all their forms and manifestations for the sake of world peace and social justice, as stated in the country's 1945 constitution to mandate opposition to colonialism.<sup>57</sup> It is also one of the reasons why Indonesia hosted such a high level meeting like Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and one of active countries which against Israel in occupying Palestinian land. Moreover, Indonesia would not recoil from world affairs. It would contribute to make a better international system by putting forth the nation's views and goals whereas do so without any alliances.<sup>58</sup> In facing the issue, Indonesia would decide it on its merits and in accordance with Indonesia's interests, as stated by Hatta: "The policy of the republic must be

---

<sup>56</sup> Hatta's September 2, 1948 speech was "*Mendayung di antara Dua Karang.*" Yudhoyono, "An Independent and Active Foreign Policy", p.386.

<sup>57</sup> Republic of Indonesia, *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (1945 Constitution), available from the Asian Human Rights Commission, online at [indonesia.ahrchk.net/news/mainfile.php/Constitution/22](http://indonesia.ahrchk.net/news/mainfile.php/Constitution/22).

<sup>58</sup> Embassy of Indonesia in Ottawa, Canada, "Indonesian Foreign Policy," undated, online at [www.indonesia-ottawa.org](http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org).



resolved in the light of its own interests and should be executed in consonance with the facts it has to face”.<sup>59</sup> The independent and active policy along with the focus on Indonesia’s own interests in world affairs reflects a belief that Indonesia has the right to be the ‘subject’ of its own history rather than just an ‘object’ in someone else’s.<sup>60</sup> Therefore, the foreign policy reflects Indonesia’s national interests *vis-a-vis* the rest of the world. It is comprised of country’s geopolitical strategy. The declaration of independence in 1945 was a starting point for Indonesia’s founders to express the values that would establish the foreign policy. Based on these premises, the main objectives of Indonesia’s foreign policy are<sup>61</sup>:

1. To support national development with priority on economic development, as set out in the Five-Year Development Plans;
2. To preserve internal and regional stability conducive to national development;
3. To protect the territorial integrity of Indonesia and safeguard the peoples place of abode.

---

<sup>59</sup> Quoted in Philips Jusario Vermonte, “Pragmatism in Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership”, *Jakarta Post*, April 23, 2005.

<sup>60</sup> Hatta’s speech is quoted in Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Soeharto* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), p.25.

<sup>61</sup> USA International Business Publication, *US Indonesia Diplomatic and Political Cooperation Handbook* (Washington: Global Investment Centre, 2008), 57.

To pursuit of the abovementioned objectives, Resolution No. II/MPR/1993 of the People's Consultative Assembly outlined Indonesia's foreign relations as follows<sup>62</sup>:

1. Foreign relations shall be conducted on the basis of the independent and active foreign policy and dedicated to the national interest, especially to supporting national development in all spheres of life, and for the purpose of establishing a world order based on freedom, lasting peace and social justice.
2. International relations should aim to strengthen international and regional friendly relations and cooperation through various multilateral and regional channels, in accordance with the national interest and potentials. In this regard, the positive image of Indonesia abroad should be enhanced such as by way of cultural activities.
3. Indonesia's role in settling international problems, particularly those threatening peace and contrary to justice and humanity, shall be continued and intensified in the spirit of the Ten Principles of Bandung.
4. Any international developments and changes shall be watched carefully in order that appropriate steps can be promptly taken to protect national stability and development from any possible negative impact. At the

---

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 58.

same time, international developments that provide opportunities to assist and speed up national development should be seized and fully exploited.

5. Indonesia's international role in promoting and strengthening friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation among nations should be intensified. The country's effort to achieve national targets, such as the realization of the Archipelagic Principle and expansion of its export markets, should be continued.
6. In order to help in the establishment of a New World Order, based on freedom, lasting peace and social justice, greater efforts should be made to strengthen solidarity and develop a common stand and cooperation among developing nations through various international organization, such as the United Nations, ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference Organization, etc.
7. For the specific objective of building a new world economic order steps should be continued with other developing nations, to speed up the realization of an international agreement on commodities, to remove trade barriers and restrictions imposed by industrial countries on the exports of developing countries, and to broaden economic and technical

cooperation among developing countries. Efforts to establish a new information and communication order should also be continued.

8. Cooperation among the public and private sector of ASEAN member-countries should be intensified with a special emphasis on economic, social and cultural cooperation. This, in turn, would reinforce the national resilience of each member-country and the regional resilience of ASEAN, thus enhancing the common endeavour to build a South Asian Zone of peace, freedom, neutrality and prosperity. Furthermore, greater cooperation should be fostered among the countries of the South Asian and Southwest Pacific regions.

From its independence day to the end of the cold war, Indonesia changed several government systems that impacted to its fundamental foreign policies orientation. Nevertheless, the foreign policy was linked each other, even though it experienced several time internal politic turbulences, from Old Order (Soekarno) to New Order (Soeharto) and then changed to Reformasi (reformation) Era (Post-Soeharto Era) lately. In 1988, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas remarked that the time had come “for Indonesia to play a more active and assertive role” in world affairs, as stated “As a founding member the host of the Afro-Asian Conference and the founder of NAM; as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference, OPEC, ASEAN, the Group of 77, the

Conference of Disarmament, and other international organizations; and as a major producer of raw materials, Indonesia has a remarkable position and potential among the Third World states”.<sup>63</sup> It indicated that Indonesia’s right to lead flowed naturally and once more, showed its foreign policy as active and independent. After the fall of the Soviet Union, which means the end of the cold war, the world system faced the significant change, where also posed challenges for Indonesia. Some challenges were opportunities, such as leading NAM and ASEAN, which would have been more difficult had ideological lines still been so tightly drawn.<sup>64</sup>

After the Reformation Era embarked in 1998, Indonesia for the first time promulgated its foreign policy in Law 39/1999. The law emphasizes constitution mandate to foster world peace and is inspired by founding ideology, *Pancasila*, to find unity in diversity, both domestically and internationally. According to the law, foreign relations are “conducted on principles of equality, mutual respect, mutual advantage, and non intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations, as implied in the *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution”. Therefore, Indonesians value independence, justice, freedom, and equality that are harking back to the great anti-colonial struggle.

---

<sup>63</sup> Quoted in Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Soeharto*, p. 177.

<sup>64</sup> Paige Johnson Tan, *Navigating a Turbulent Ocean: Indonesia’s Worldview and Foreign Policy*, Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No.3 pp. 147-181, (Lynne Rienner Publishers: 2007), p. 161.

### **3.2. NAVIGATING A TURBULENCE OCEAN FOREIGN POLICY**

Based on the domestic changes, Indonesian foreign policy is affected primarily in three important areas: the process of foreign policy decision-making, the actors involved, and the issues.<sup>65</sup> The changing domestic context presents tremendous challenges for the making and conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy in the interrelated ways.<sup>66</sup> Indonesia's foreign policy now should run within a new, more pluralistic and competitive environment of policy making. It was different when Indonesia was under the authoritarian governments. It could ignore people's objectives and opinions in framing and implementing government policies. As Indonesia has moved to be more democracy, its foreign policy is no longer an exclusive domain for the few elites. In the context of Indonesia's democratization process, foreign policy has to be formulated within a complex power structure where the government is no longer the only dominant actor.<sup>67</sup> Therefore, to legitimate its new strategy of foreign policy, states are required to allow more partaking of other stakeholders

---

<sup>65</sup> Dosch, Jörn, 2006, "The Impact of Democratisation on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines", *Südostasien aktuell*, 5, pp.42-70

<sup>66</sup> Rizal Sukma, 2011, "Indonesia: Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: the Case of Indonesia", in *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*/ ed. By Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen, Palgrave Macmillan: NY, pp 91-115, pp. 97

<sup>67</sup> Ibid

in the policy-making process. Indeed, it has been pointed out “every government must be concerned about how its actions are perceived by the mass national public in relation to the national identity dynamics”.<sup>68</sup>

Foreign policy decision-making is also influenced by systemic factors, such as the international power structure.<sup>69</sup> After six decades of independence, in response to the continuing and rapid changes of world politics, Indonesian Former President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, elected in 2004, introduced his own metaphor, "navigating a turbulent sea", to describe the new strategies of Indonesian foreign policy. It is actually based on the core of Indonesian foreign policy to be independent and active in maintaining its relationship in regional and multilateral. He called Indonesia's foreign-policy worldview in its “international identity”,<sup>70</sup> a new transformation of independent and active foreign policy to the new realities of a 21st century world order. Vice President Jusuf Kalla then joined the exhortation of Indonesian foreign policy, when commenting on the current international position of Indonesia under the leadership of President Yudhoyono. He admitted that Indonesia could be a

---

<sup>68</sup> William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 81.

<sup>69</sup> Langhorne, Richard, 2005, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 16, 331-339

<sup>70</sup> Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “An Independent and Active Foreign Policy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, Jakarta, May 19, 2005, in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, *Transforming Indonesia: Selected International Speeches* (Jakarta: Office of the Special Staff of the President for International Affairs in cooperation with PT Buana Ilmu Populer, 2005), p. 390.

"mover and shaker" for regional security and world peace.<sup>71</sup> In April 2005, Indonesia hosted the fiftieth-anniversary meeting of the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono spoke movingly on the values of the movement, as stated "Today, the sons and daughters of Asia and Africa stand together in this Hall as equals. And we stand tall, proud, and free".<sup>72</sup> According to him, the nation treats all nations fairly, "We treat big, medium and the small-sized powers with equal respect".<sup>73</sup>

Due to its long history of colonization, Indonesia's worldview is based on the values of its anti-colonial revolution: independence, justice, freedom and equality. The constitution gives Indonesia a mandate to promote world peace and centre to the principles of equality, mutual respect, mutual advantage and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations, where value of freedom, justice, fairness, tolerance and diversity are seen as a basic foundation of Indonesian to see the world. In the Indonesian worldview, tolerance is hallmark trait of the nations because the need for tolerance is a core survival

---

<sup>71</sup> The Jakarta Post, Oct. 19, 2006. See more at: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/10/19/kalla-highlights-economy-peace.html#sthash.Zs7J96SL.dpuf>

<sup>72</sup> Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Let Us Build a New Strategic Partnership between Asia and Africa", remarks at the opening of the Asia Africa Summit, Jakarta, April 22, 2005; in Yudhoyono, *Transforming Indonesia*, p319.

<sup>73</sup> Yudhoyono, "And Independent and Acive Foreign Policy", p. 391.



skill learned as a result of Indonesia's own heterogeneity.<sup>74</sup> Indonesia also uses its local wisdom and traditional values to see its counterparts. An Indonesian local wisdom of *duduk sama rendah, tegak sama tinggi* (a cat may look at the king), gives Indonesian people a spirit to see other nations in equity and mutual respect. This value is so significant for them in carrying their daily life to achieve a good relationship amongst the societies. Yet Indonesian diplomat recognize they must tread softly and carefully, given the political complexion of the neighbourhood and ASEAN's own tradition of non-interference.<sup>75</sup>

Moreover, Indonesia sees the global system is still operated by and for the most powerful nations, recalling its experience of colonialism. In 1965, Under Soekarno's command, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations membership as his criticised the organization under the thumb of the rich nations that having status quo powers. In recent example, during the Asian Financial Crisis, Indonesia struggled to take burden from its IMF loan package because IMF aid was seen as humiliating as well as instructed by the United States government. At the apex of the world system, Indonesian foreign policy

---

<sup>74</sup> Indonesia has fourteen different language groups with more than a million speakers spread across 17,000 islands. Major ethnic groups include the Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Batak, Minahasans, Makasarese, Acehnese, Papuans, and Dayak.

<sup>75</sup> Hassan Wirajuda, Keynote Address at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN: Challenges and Opportunities for Human Rights in a Caring and Sharing Community", December 18, 2006, [http://www.aseanhrmech.org/conferences/summary\\_of\\_proceedings\\_final.pdf](http://www.aseanhrmech.org/conferences/summary_of_proceedings_final.pdf)

makers and analysts see the United States as the “only super power” that writes the rules of international order to suit itself.<sup>76</sup> Despite the unilateral power of the United States, Indonesia has common interests with the US, such as in fighting the hollow of terrorism and religious extremism, dealing with weapons of mass destruction, strengthening of democratic society, and maintaining regional balance, peace and stability in East Asia and Pacific. Indonesia perceives balance of power changes and sees that world system is not fixed. The Soviet Union was once at the top of the global rankings with the United States, but Russia, as the heir of Soviet’s legacy, today is no longer ranked on par with the United States. As power ebbs and flows in the world system, it is also unevenly distributed among states. Indonesia acknowledges Russia, the European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, and China as ‘big countries’ with the ability to influence the international society, where Indonesia is not ranked in the same rung of global power.

While the United States is still unchallengeable as a military power, rising economic powers presage military power in the future and economic opportunities for present. Of primary importance to Indonesia is the Asian theatre. Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia concluded strategic

---

<sup>76</sup> Quotation from Department of Defense, Indonesia, *Buku Putih: Mempertahankan Tanah Air: Memasuki Abad 21*”, 2003, online at [www.dephan.go.id/buku\\_putih](http://www.dephan.go.id/buku_putih), p. 30.

partnership agreements with both China and India in 2005. As part of the strategic partnership agreements, the Chinese promised US\$300 million in credit and loans for Indonesian infrastructure projects along with US\$10 billion in other investment including in energy.<sup>77</sup> Defence cooperation is also planned, with the Indonesian defence minister implying that China planned to offer extensive aid (in contrast to the scraps offered by the United States) and that the aid would be offered more pleasurably, with ‘no conditionality’, which is a swipe at the terms the Western nations require.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, many of whose defence officials long viewed the country as Indonesia’s number one threat. However, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said that Indonesia does “not have a country which we consider a threat or an enemy”.<sup>79</sup> One observer does cite China as a ‘factor of uncertainty’ in the security realm.<sup>80</sup> At present time, Indonesia is hedging, moving away from its tacit Western alignment under Soeharto to establish a more balance foreign policy.<sup>81</sup> As Evelyn Goh recognises, it is not in the interests of any Southeast Asian States that the region

---

<sup>77</sup> Evelyn Goh, “China and Southeast Asia,” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, December 12, 2006, online at [http://fpif.org/china\\_and\\_southeast\\_asia/](http://fpif.org/china_and_southeast_asia/)

<sup>78</sup> Jane Perlez, “Bush Seeks to Heal Long Indonesia Rift,” *New York Times*, February 8, 2005.

<sup>79</sup> Yudhoyono, “An Independent and Active Foreign Policy,” p. 387.

<sup>80</sup> Hadi Soesatro, “Hakikat ‘Kemitraan Strategis’ Indonesia and China,” *Kompas*, August 1, 2005, Center for Strategic and International Studies, online at [www.csis.or.id](http://www.csis.or.id)

<sup>81</sup> Irman Lanti, “Indonesia: Accomplishments Amid Challenges”, in Daljit Singh and Lorraine Carlos Salazar, eds., *Southeast Asian Affairs 2006* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p. 103.

be dominated by any one power,<sup>82</sup> benevolent or malevolent as it may be. Indonesian foreign policy spokesmen often highlight the golden word “multilateral” as describing the desirable complexion for the world system, observing that there should be “more Europe”, “more China”, and “more multi polar” direction in the management of global affairs.<sup>83</sup>

### **3.3. INDONESIA CURRENT’S POSITION**

Indonesia is a country that has struggled in many phase of development since gained the independence after World War II. Indonesia has been conducting as a leader for freedom and justice during the Cold War through Asia-Africa Conference and Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), which was a platform and idea of the colonized nation to get freedom from injustice of the colonization. Today, Indonesia is well known for emerging power of 21<sup>st</sup> century Asia and world order, but it is not moving towards that position in a traditional manner. The term “emerging power” recognizes the growing, primarily economic, but also political and strategic, status of a group of nations most, if not all of which were once categorized as (and in some accounts still

---

<sup>82</sup> Goh, “China and Southeast Asia”.

<sup>83</sup> Makarim Wibisono, Former Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, “UNSC Membership to Make RI’s Foreign Policies More Visible, Says Envoy”, Antara, September 27, 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), Landasan, Visi, Misi Polugri, July 2006, online at [www.deplu.go.id/category\\_id=12&news\\_id=684&main\\_id=1](http://www.deplu.go.id/category_id=12&news_id=684&main_id=1).

are) part of the “Third World” or “global South”.<sup>84</sup> Based on scale, Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world after China, India and the United States. Indonesia’s economy is the tenth largest on the global scale, and will become the seventh largest by 2030 as predicted by McKinsey Company. Indonesia already held three free and fair presidential elections since the fall of Suharto’s dictatorship in 1998, which positions it as the third largest democracy country in the world. Among the emerging economies, within a decade, Indonesia’s economic growth is on the third position after China and India thus surpassed other BRICS countries such as Brazil, Russia, and South Africa.

The term “emerging power” today refers to countries that have thrived mainly by embracing capitalism.<sup>85</sup> Even though, Goldman Sachs analyst mentioned BRIC in 2001 for emerging markets, but the term “emerging power” is also applicable to other non-BRICS (with South Africa in 2010) nations who show a high degree of economic potential and diplomatic dynamism. Indonesia along with Mexico, Argentina, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Turkey belongs to this category.<sup>86</sup> Nevertheless, some analysts make a distinction between ‘emerging power’ and ‘rising power’, associating the latter with countries that have a clear potential to become great power, such as China,

---

<sup>84</sup> Amitav Acharya, (2014), *The End of American World Order*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Amitav Acharya, (2015), *Indonesia Matters: Asia’s Emerging Democratic Power*, London, UK: World Scientific Publishing, pp. 3

India, and Brazil. ‘Emerging powers’ are not necessarily seen as heading for international great power status.

In general, Indonesian leaders are enjoying their status as an emerging power. Aside from the BRICS, there have been plenty of other clubs; whose acronyms designate status as emerging markets/powers. Indonesia has been occasionally, be part of such acronyms, such as BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa), BASIC (BRIC minus Russia), CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa), “breakout nations”<sup>87</sup> (Turkey, Philippines, Thailand, India, Poland, Colombia, South Korea, Nigeria), MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey), and MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia)<sup>88</sup>. At broader level, the key point of reference is the G20,<sup>89</sup> a club known for its importance in global finance, membership in which almost automatically earns a country label of emerging power. Therefore, Indonesia is defined as ‘middle power’, along with other well-known ‘middle power’ countries such as Canada, Australia, the Scandinavian countries, Japan and South Korea, which play an active role in

---

<sup>87</sup> Ruchir Sharma, *Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012).

<sup>88</sup> MIKTA is an innovative partner that brings together five middle powers Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia. It was formed under Seoul leadership in 2013. It is a consultative forum based on shared values and interest at International Level.

<sup>89</sup> G-20 members include: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

promoting international cooperation, and lead with ideas and example rather than hard power. Some define middle powers as countries whose material capabilities are neither great nor small, yet seek to bolster international institutions as a means to manage power relations.<sup>90</sup> In addition, middle power leadership is defined by a country's political clout within a region or sub-region as well as its ability to show expertise and push forward a particular issue that is of interest to the international community.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, Indonesia plays its role carefully in the international fora to maintain and manage its good manoeuvre and relationship in line with its foreign policy core, independent and active.

In spite of being included in these exclusive groups, Indonesia still focuses on playing in the region, such as ASEAN and East Asia. In the interview of Amitav Acharya for the book of *Indonesia matters: Asia's Emerging Democratic Power*, one Indonesian previous Foreign Minister from 2001 to 2009, mentioned: "It is more important to be part of East Asia – the centre of gravity of the world, the region of the 21<sup>st</sup> century".<sup>92</sup> Nevertheless, in

---

<sup>90</sup> Robert Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and the Future World Order," *International Journal*, 44, Autumn 1989, pp. 826-827.

<sup>91</sup> Hussein Solomon, "South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership," *Fairy-Godmother, Hegemon, or Partner?: In Search of a South African Foreign Policy* [Monograph No 13], Hussein Solomon, ed. (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 1997).

<sup>92</sup> Hassan Wirajuda, interview with Amitav Acharya, Jakarta, 12 March 2014. A similar view is offered by Mahendra Siregar, the G-20 "Sherpa" for Indonesia who is also the chairman of Indonesia's Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM). When asked by the author if Indonesia should seek to join the BRICS, his answer was: "I don't think so. It already has the strong ASEAN organization. ASEAN plus, so BRICS [is] not needed." Mahendra Siregar, interview

the meantime, Indonesia has been included into the ‘fragile five’, which includes Turkey, Brazil, South Africa and India for the dependency on foreign investment and vulnerability to financial market turmoil,<sup>93</sup> but recent assessment of the Indonesian economy have been rather upbeat. Furthermore, Indonesia also resides at the global level, where the focus of Indonesia still remains on developments in the region.

### **3.4. INDONESIA POSITION BETWEEN US AND CHINA**

#### **3.4.1. Indonesia – US Relations**

As discussed in the previous chapter, Indonesia is deemed by the US as the largest country in Southeast Asia by geography, population, and economy. Its position is important because it lies close to the US allies in Asia Pacific as well as the US rival country, China. Furthermore, its location at the southern entry point to South China Sea is very vital strategically and economically. Indonesia is an active player in the Southeast Asian regional diplomacy. Indonesia shares common interests with the US in the global war on terrorism.

---

with the author, Jakarta, 10 March 2014. Stated in Acharya, *Indonesia Matters: Asia’s Emerging Democratic Power* pp. 4

<sup>93</sup> Landon Thomas Jr., “‘Fragile Five’ is the Latest Club of Emerging Nations in Turmoil”, *New York Times*, 28 January 2014. Online access on [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/business/international/fragile-five-is-the-latest-club-of-emerging-nations-in-turmoil.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/business/international/fragile-five-is-the-latest-club-of-emerging-nations-in-turmoil.html?_r=0)



During Obama's state visit to Indonesia in 2010, the bilateral relationship between the two countries is extended through concluding the US – Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership. Among many issues in the Partnership, the US extended its appreciation to the development of democracy and counter-terrorism efforts in Indonesia as well as normalization of the US – Indonesia military cooperation.<sup>94</sup>

The US 'pivot' policy in the Asia Pacific may bring a problematic issue for Indonesia. This is because China, as the hegemonic player in the region, will feel threatened. Indonesia should manage this event to prevent any further dilemmatic situation. Indonesia may consider this situation as opportunities as well as challenges since China has shifted its security strategy from continental orientation to maritime orientation. Additionally, current Indonesian government has announced its current focus to develop the nation to be 'Global Maritime Axis' to postulate the 'rise of Asia', tracking back Indonesian historical glory as a maritime nation.<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup> Barack Obama (10 November 2010), *Speech of President Barack Obama in Jakarta, Indonesia 'President Obama in Jakarta: "Indonesia's Example To the World"*, Jakarta, Indonesia, Whitehouse. Online Version Available (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/11/10/president-obama-jakarta-indonesia-s-example-world>)

<sup>95</sup> In October 2014, Joko Widodo, Indonesian 7<sup>th</sup> President, while taking the oath, called upon Indonesia 'to work as hard as possible to turn it into a maritime nation' due to its glorious historical background back then to the Srivijaya and Majapahit era. A month later, during East Asia Summit in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, he highlighted his vision of Indonesia being a 'global maritime axis' with assuming immense relevance for his month.

However, the release of the unilateral territorial claim of Chinese nine-dotted-line map of the South China Sea in 2009 has created tension in Southeast Asia and led to territorial disputes. Escalatory actions would likely trigger ramped up diplomacy and increase tensions over the region. Therefore, Indonesia initially served in a mediation role in the event of crisis erupting in the South China Sea with regards Indonesia is a neutral actor within the region. As a nation that lies in the most precious and busiest trade line in the world,<sup>96</sup> it automatically holds main responsibility of dealing with the Chinese maritime policy in the South China Sea. As mandated by its constitution, Indonesia attaches utmost importance to peace, stability and security in the region and beyond. Indonesia's national interests in the region are the maintenance of peace and stability as well as the promotion of peaceful dispute settlement and conflict resolution. It also believes that a cooperative relationship pattern among the major powers is crucial for the stability and prosperity in the region. Therefore, establishing further partnership and engage with the US, it would contribute to regional efforts to ensure a stable and predictable regional order in

---

<sup>96</sup> Indonesia geographically lies within Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, where Malaca strait is a key to link these two oceans. There are more than 200 vessels passing through the strait on a daily basis and this gives an annual throughput of approximately 70,000 ships, carrying 80% of the oil transported to Northeast Asia as well as one third of the world's traded goods including Chinese manufactures, Indonesian coffee, etc.

Asia-Pacific considering the nations in Southeast Asia are medium and small power.

From a strategic point of view, Indonesia has pointed out that the centre of gravity of global politics has shifted to Asia Pacific. By virtue its strategic geography and stable economic growth, remarks Indonesia as a substantial position amongst ASEAN member states. However, territorial disputes in the region are a cause for concern for Indonesia. Ongoing diplomatic tensions and political spats over a number of territorial issues point to a worrying future for peace and stability in the region. Indeed, territorial disputes have begun to emerge as a serious flash point, raising regional concerns about the future of the region as a whole. These territorial problems, if not manage properly and in a restrained manner, will seriously undermine peace, stability, and prosperity in East Asia. Moreover, there is also an emerging strategic rivalry between China and the US at the background that might make any attempt to manage the problem even more challenging. This territorial problem between China and ASEAN member countries has brought the US different policy toward Indonesian and put it in the US main interest. Thus, a number of initiatives have boosted more engagement of the US in the region. It is a mean and strategy of the US current foreign policy in Asia without obviously bullying China. The US strategic policy makers do realize that the US cannot play alone and harshly

tackle China ambition to expand its exploration in the sea. Hence, embracing Washington's "Rebalancing" strategy without annoying China represents one of Asia's core challenges today.<sup>97</sup>

Indonesia's foreign policy 'navigating a turbulence ocean', which was projected by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in a statement released in January 2010. It clearly articulates the importance to improve relations with every nation through bilateral ties and multilateral institutions. It also aspires to promote justice and order in the international forum. In addition, former Indonesia Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, also stated about the 'dynamic equilibrium' concept, in which there are more possibilities for nations to become powers in international relations. This will allow Indonesia to improve its political and economic strength through the regional cooperation. As a middle power in the region, it is important for Indonesia to have a creative foreign policy, which is entirely relevant. It becomes more applicable because the international environment has become so crowded, complex and fast changing that a country like Indonesia need to constantly review its assumptions. When the country clings to false assumptions, it ends up making wrong strategic and tactical policy decisions. In a world marked by a myriad of

---

<sup>97</sup> Amitav Acharya, "Why Two Asias May be Better Than None", World Politics Review, January 8, 2013, at <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12603/why-two-asias-may-be-betterthan-none>

problems, state must avoid a mind-set that insists on policy retrenchment. As a key actor not only in ASEAN, but also in IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association), maintaining fine relations between the two major powers, the US and China, shows Jakarta's significant triumph over the region. Over decades, Jakarta has taken more responsibilities for the upkeep of ASEAN by playing a proactive role during the escalation crisis of South China Sea through establishing ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002 with regards to freedom of navigation echoed by the US.

The US Rebalancing towards Asia is essential for Indonesia for maintaining regional stability and peace, it esteems a benevolent manifestation of the US and other major powers. Indonesia believes that a cooperative relationship pattern among the major powers is crucial for the stability and prosperity in the region. The Comprehensive Partnership with the US is believed to contribute to regional efforts to ensure a stable and predictable regional order in Asia-Pacific. In this stage, Indonesia does not want to see the region dominated by any major power or a group of powers. Therefore, the significance of Indonesia-US relations needs to be placed also within the emerging new regional order in East Asia. In that context, Indonesia pre-existing policies toward the US expect the partnership with the US to contribute

in the realization of such a vision. Thus, to embody that vision, the US has granted 30 Excess Defence Articles F-16s to Indonesia, with Indonesia refurbishing them with national funds. This is a landmark case of defence cooperation.<sup>98</sup> Moreover, in early September 2013, the US and Indonesia participated in joint counterterrorism exercise, part of a trend of growing military ties between the two countries.<sup>99</sup> Even though, it is believed that “sustained attention and commitment of sufficient resources to the Asia-Pacific region will be the key to assuaging the doubts of regional friends and allies about US staying power”.<sup>100</sup> Indeed, such mutual training would support Indonesian national power and further encourage the goals of the Global Maritime Fulcrum.

The level of relationship between Indonesia and the US expanded far beyond its current level. There are common interest around which two countries that build a strong mutually beneficial partnership such as trade, counter terrorism, military to military cooperation, and promotion of democracy. Although, the relation and partnership between two countries must be given

---

<sup>98</sup> “United States-Indonesia Relations”, September 3, 2012, at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197277.htm>

<sup>99</sup> “Global Insider: Indonesian Military Seeks Partnerships to Help It Modernize”, World Politics Review, October 17 2013, at <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13309/globalinsider-indonesian-military-seeks-partnerships-to-help-it-modernize>

<sup>100</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser, “Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 22-24.

time to develop and remain focused on the big picture to build an enduring relationship. In this term, there are limitations on Indonesia and the US relations that take time to navigate. Differences in priority and political context are not to be ignored. The democratic political system of the two countries is different where there is no American equivalent to Indonesia's democracy marked by Islam in politics. There is also history of the US involvement in Indonesia that remains very much alive in the Indonesian consciousness. The US involvement in Indonesia has created a vague suspicion in the minds of many Indonesians that at any given time, the US may be manipulating events behind the scenes. Being too close to the US is a charge that must be accounted for by any future leaders in this democratic era.

Given this fact, Indonesia is advancing the relationship with the US in a constant speed, keeping the expectations not high, and stressing on broad areas and large picture of common interest such as counter-terrorism. Jakarta and Washington priorities intersect most closely in the area of counter terrorism. Indonesia, like or not, is the home to religious extremist group called Jemaah Islamiyah. This group is responsible for some horrendous conflicts and bombings in multiple Indonesia Cities. However, there is international praise for Indonesian counterterrorism measures where many high priority terrorists were captured or killed by Indonesian authorities. Indonesia's interest in

combating terrorism domestically is apparent. It is an interest the US shares for several reasons. First, the protection of American citizens is a top priority. Second, the terrorists have regional connections and aspirations. Third, the US has an interest in Indonesian stability. Indonesia is an example of successful democracy as well as of the compatibility of liberal democracy and Moslem-majority. Indonesia's political stability is also important to its role as keeper of the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits through which more than half world's annual merchant fleet passes. While one may argue that Indonesia's significant role in the region is critically important, its role will largely depend on several factors including the fine relations with the major powers, neighbouring countries and domestic stability as well as economic prowess.

Indonesia and the US need to have enduring partnership. It will become the basis for much closer relationship through constant speed. If Indonesia can play well, a true partnership can develop to serve a range of common interest such as economy and counter terrorism. Thus, a constant and consistent cooperation on common interest has the potential to transform Indonesia and the US relations.

### **3.4.2. Indonesia – China Relations**



Recently China's economy growth positioned it as the second largest economic power in the world, after the US. China's remarkable economic growth, which initiated by tremendous changes to open its economy led by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, has made it as an influential country in the world. However, the stunning economic growth has invited more worrisome for the major power like the US and allies, where it is seen as a challenge to constitute a threat following by economy, political and military expansion. Chinese government issued a new concept to assure the neighbouring countries that China is now rising up peacefully and will not threaten any nation in the world. This concept is known as China's Peaceful Rise which indeed on Chinese leader consideration to rebut any allegations.

It is a China's recent overseas political step, which is the way of Beijing carrying soft power. Since 1997, China has boosted its soft power in Southeast Asia and enhanced its ability to influence Southeast Asian countries through persuasion, not through coercion, even though the region was turbulent meddled with the Chinese government in the past. Beijing also understood that the historical distortions in the region could damage its new concept of diplomacy. Therefore, Chinese diplomats work hard ensuring the world about Chinese resurrection, which is more blessing than threatening, particularly to the developing countries with regards similarity fate, interest, and opinion,

where the world led by western power and domination. Thus, the implementation of Chinese soft power is directed to support its economic development that is being promoted and fuelled along with region stability and economic growth.

From Beijing's strategic point of view, Indonesia has special position for actualising it. The relations between the two countries grow significantly when both announced to conclude a strategic partnership in 2005. Indonesian leaders believe that attaching and establishing a concrete partnership with China could seize the opportunity in maintaining regional stability and promoting economic growth as well. It is becoming vital, since China has solidified its position in the international system along with its national strength an international status on the rise.<sup>101</sup> Meanwhile, Beijing also concerns Indonesia as a priority in its diplomatic relations due to its position as major developing countries and economic growth, and reiterates to comprehensively deepen bilateral cooperation, so as to realize collective development for the benefit of both countries.<sup>102</sup> This strategy of 'Charm Offensive' is the way in instilling its influence to attract and persuade, and without going through the imposition of

---

<sup>101</sup> Antaranews, October 7, 2013, Indonesia, China forge comprehensive strategic partnership in various field, at <http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/91035/indonesia-china-forge-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-in-various-field>

<sup>102</sup> Ibid

military rule, but through culture, political values, and foreign policy,<sup>103</sup> so it could further enhance its image abroad and obtain a benefit. Therefore, to prove its good deeds, Chinese government actively participated in humanitarian, economic and socio-culture. It is important to show good gestures and goodwill. During Aceh Tsunami's relief assistance in 2004, Beijing provided funding of US \$ 60 billion. It also sent other substantial financial assistance worth US \$ 2 million during Yogyakarta earthquake.<sup>104</sup> The cooperation between the two countries has experienced significant stances since 2005. It also implemented more comprehensive and extensive, which provided opportunities not only economically, but also expanded and deepened in all sectors. Moreover, in line to solve Indonesian basic problem in infrastructure, Jakarta and Beijing agreed to build several stimulus projects to tackle the regional and global slow growth and to encourage national and regional economic activity on March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2009. National Development Planning Agency of Indonesia on August 2015 announced that China is ready to finance up to US \$ 100 billion Indonesian infrastructure projects.<sup>105</sup> It is a follow up of Memorandum of Understanding

---

<sup>103</sup> Joseph S Nye Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), preface page.x.

<sup>104</sup> Tuty Enoch Muas, "Hubungan Cina-Indonesia: Secara Historis, Dinamis!" in I. Wibowo (ed), *Merangkul Cina: Hubungan Cina-Indonesia Pasca-Soeharto*, (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2009), pp. 44

<sup>105</sup> CNN Indonesia, August 11, 2015, *China Janjikan Investasi Rp1.361 Triliun di Infrastruktur RI*, at <http://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20150811161559-92-71438/china-janjikan-investasi-rp1361-triliun-di-infrastruktur-ri/>

(MoU) that was signed during the visit of President Joko Widodo in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing in November 2014. In addition, Beijing has also won the latest project for Indonesian first high-speed train that will link Indonesia capital city, Jakarta, and its third largest city, Bandung with the total amount of US \$ 5.2 billion. It also shows how Beijing sees Jakarta on their strategic view, particularly attracting its neighbouring countries to change their opinion about China rise.

Nevertheless, the fine relationship built by the two countries has been disrupted by the announcement of nine-dash line of China on South China Sea. The dispute and tension in the South China Sea have brought serious attention over the world. Although Indonesia is not one of the claimant states, Indonesia has interest in the maintenance of security and stability in the South China Sea since it serves as one of the main sea lines of transportation and communication that connects East Asia and the rest of the world. If the stability of the sea were threatened, then the world's trade and service would be at risk. Together with other ASEAN countries and China, Indonesia has long anticipated this potential tension by establishing ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002. The declaration demonstrates a commitment of ASEAN and China to maintaining stability and security in the region through implementation of a range of cooperative activities. Following

the adoption of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC in 2011, ASEAN and China are now working on the implementation of the DOC with two main priorities, namely the drafting of the Regional Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China and the execution of some maritime-related practical cooperation.

At the same time, however, the growing tension between China and some ASEAN countries, mainly the Philippines, on the territorial claim in the South China Sea has not been resolved yet. Philippines and Vietnam respond negatively to the Chinese claim since it is overlapping with their territories. The tension worsened because of a set of incidents involving the navies, the coastguards and the fishermen of China, the Philippines and Vietnam in the disputed areas. The recent development shows that the Philippines has brought the case to be settled by an international tribunal in July 2013 and the notification cannot bind China because China has optionally excluded itself from compulsory arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Philippines versus China case before the arbitral tribunal set up under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has attracted worldwide attention for a number of

reasons, one of which being China's refusal to participate in the proceedings, which were initiated by the Philippines.<sup>106</sup>

Being confronted by the fact that the DOC is in the process of implementation, yet some ASEAN members still have some pending issues with China, Indonesia as the leading actor in the region is facing a dilemma about how to respond to the Chinese maritime policy in the South China Sea. Since this issue existed in 2009 following the release of the nine-dotted-line map of China, Indonesia's foreign policy towards China on the development of the situation in South China Sea has always been projected through the forum of ASEAN. In this sense, as the national focal point for foreign policy's formulation and implementation, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds main responsibility of dealing with the Chinese maritime policy in the South China Sea. As mentioned earlier, Indonesia's national interests in the region are the maintenance of peace and stability as well as the promotion of peaceful dispute settlement and conflict resolution. In the case of South China Sea, Indonesia has focused its foreign policy towards China through the mechanism of ASEAN instead of Indonesia-China bilateral relations. Indonesian official did not explicitly condemn the claim of Beijing of nine-dash line, but they

---

<sup>106</sup> The Diplomat, July 27, 2015, *South China Sea: Philippines v. China*, at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/south-china-sea-philippines-v-china/>

concerned that the dragging tension could trigger further vicious cycle of tension in the region. Thus, Jakarta always urges Beijing to settle the issues with the claimants in peaceful manner without disrupting the trust building in the region. The main reason is that the development of situation in the South China Sea has been the common interests of countries in the region, including ASEAN Member States and China. In the context of ASEAN, the issue of South China Sea is mainly mentioned in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. It is stipulated that ASEAN shall fully implement the ASEAN-China DOC as part of the action lines that should be done by the Member States to achieve the ASEAN Community. In this regard, since the establishment of ASEAN Community 2015 becomes Indonesia's main priority, the realization of the action lines is very crucial to Indonesia. As consequences, Indonesia's foreign policy towards Chinese policy in the South China Sea is always projected through the framework of ASEAN.

Since 1990, Indonesia's MOFA has conducted track-2<sup>107</sup> diplomacy through a series of Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea which was held once a year in Indonesia and involved representatives from ASEAN Members and China. The objective was to help

---

<sup>107</sup> It refers to non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called 'non-state actors'

prevent conflict in the South China Sea by increasing mutual understanding and explore potential cooperation that could be done by the countries in the region. Following the adoption of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the ASEAN-China DOC in 2011, it has been decided that the workshop is to be integrated as one of the cooperative activities under the framework of DOC. In 2002, ASEAN and China adopted the ASEAN-China DOC as non-legally binding political document that demonstrates both parties' commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. As follow-up of the Declaration, both parties adopted the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, which was one of the ASEAN's most important achievements during Indonesia's chairmanship in 2011. The Guidelines was later translated into several cooperative activities, which are soon to be implemented, including the drafting of the COC with China. ASEAN has also released another momentous political document, namely ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea, which came as the result of shuttle diplomacy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia to some ASEAN countries in mid-2012. This achievement illustrates not only the ASEAN's common position toward current development in the South China Sea, but also its progress in taking further steps for the discussion on the COC.



Image 1: South China Sea and Nine-dash Line of China



Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/CIA

Essentially, the Indonesia's current foreign policy towards the situation in the South China Sea is that all parties, including China, could together maintain the security and stability in the sea by avoiding any armed conflicts, resolving

any disputes peacefully, respecting international law, implementing joint cooperative activities under the DOC and working toward the adoption of the COC. Moreover, Indonesia has focused on its foreign policy towards China through the mechanism of ASEAN instead of Indonesia-China bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Indonesia current government has also focused on its national security while the escalating tension in the region cannot be settled in the meantime by announcing the establishment of new military base to guard border areas near the South China Sea, Natuna Island.<sup>108</sup> This new base is aimed to synchronise Indonesian national interest in guarding and protecting the sovereignty of its territory. Jakarta at this point has endeavored to invigorate its capabilities to protect national interest in the region and obviously showed the signal where it positions on sovereignty. It also shows that Indonesia attracts the attention of South China Sea as national's key security contests, which is needed to be concerned about.

---

<sup>108</sup> The Jakarta Post, July 10, 2015, *Govt Build Military Base Near South China Sea*, at <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/07/10/govt-build-military-base-near-south-china-sea.html>

## IV. CONCLUSION

The implementation of the US rebalancing strategy in the Asia Pacific region invites more cautiousness in the region, particularly in the disputes area, where Asian leaders are divided on facing the current situation. This situation is seen from the spectacles of strategic point could escort potential conflict and competition between major powers or even lead the proxy wars in the region. Despite the fact that Asian nations are now fragmented to bandwagon, stand aside and oppose, by neglecting the escalation issues, indeed, could undermine region and world stability and peace, and even world order. At this point, Indonesia, as mandated by its constitution to promote world peace and stability as well as value of freedom, justice, fairness, tolerance and diversity, has played significant role to maintain those values in the region through its active role by implementing its foreign policy jargon, independent and active foreign policy. It is indeed giving Indonesia the challenges as well due to its strategic position geographically and politically. As mentioned by one of Indonesian founding father, Dr. Mohammad Hatta, on the speech on September 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1948, “The standpoint that must be taken is to stand on our position without being an object in the arena of international politics, but we must be able to be a subject that has

the rights to determine our own actions and to fight our own purposes, a fully independent of Indonesia”, assurance its foreign policy to be impartial and independent. It also shows how the country determines the direction of foreign and economic policy, where currently is dominated by the US and China.

Even though Indonesia sees the global system is still operated by and for the most powerful nations, it has enough strong position for being stand aside from the contest of hegemonic power. Being the world biggest Muslim country by population, third largest world democracy country and the largest economic power in Southeast Asia, Indonesia also has a significant role in promoting peace and stability in the region as well as its tactic to the continuing the US – China competition. Nevertheless, this interest also has to do with Indonesia’s role in ASEAN, as Indonesia endeavours to increase the sub-regional grouping’s influence in its engagement with the rest of the world. Albeit, ASEAN has principle to non-intervention each member domestic affairs, Indonesia, as a natural leader of ASEAN, reiterated to work together in the framework of ASEAN and played significant role to reduce the tension over the region by persuading every claimants to conclude Declaration of Conduct of South China Sea, which is a fundamental base for maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Recognising its position, Indonesia as a middle power, indeed, could not

be alone to handle the meddled situation. Jakarta has urged other ASEAN members to establish a tangible cooperation. In connection with recent China's strategy over the South China Sea, Indonesia shows its deep attention, even though it does not share maritime border with China and a non-claimant state through diplomatic channel. Indonesia is also aware at chances with other ASEAN members, which wish the presence of the US as a balancer to China's rising hegemony in the region. As mentioned earlier, Jakarta has also managed a fine relation with Washington by appreciating the recent US strategy in Asia. As Jakarta's encouragement in favour of the US participation in the EAS, giving a significant signal that Jakarta sees the important role of Washington in guaranteeing the stability and supports the US deep engagement strategy in the region, which the US finally fulfilled during the 2011 EAS in Bali.

However, Indonesia has continued to demand on ASEAN cooperation with China, without necessarily inviting the participation of other actor, where China several times showed its fiercely objections. If Indonesia can manage being tugged back-and-forth by the region's two giants, navigating this challenge may actually further raise Indonesia's significance in regional affairs. As well, it should enhance ASEAN's profile in taking a lead on addressing regional issues of common concern through its own means and approaches. In doing so, Indonesia will be able to further consolidate its ideals on developing a

regional architecture that is centred on ASEAN.

In this case, Indonesia has been active in encouraging efforts to prevent an escalation of conflict and assure the confidence building among the disputants. It also pushes the issue to be addressed within the context of ASEAN – China through amicable means and peaceful settlement. Indonesia also believes that a protracted conflict in the region could emanate and affect regional stability and growth, where the outer border of it, Natuna Islands, lies at the southern end of the South China Sea. Therefore, it sees a potential damaging conflict could further escalate if the claimants do not resolve it in the meantime. Hence, the further tensions could be reduced by elaborating the recent policies initiated by Indonesia and by collaborating with the claimants to overcome a more severe condition in the future. In sum, Indonesia still uses its independence and active foreign policy in maintaining its relations. It could be seen that Jakarta using a strategy as socio-constructivist believed that the countries could establish mutual understanding to invigorate their mutual interests and to pursue common interests.

#### **4.1. SUGGESTION**

##### **4.1.1. Indonesia – US Relations**

With regards to prioritizing relationships with strategic partnership in Asia Pacific, the US set it out with treaty allies particularly Japan and South Korea. The relationship are big and robust, which accommodate tens of thousands troops and dozens of the US military bases. Other US alliance countries in Southeast Asia are the Philippines and Thailand. In the Pacific, the ally is Australia. Nowadays, Indonesia is not on the same priority list compare to Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand. Therefore the relation with the US should be deeper and more specific through Security alliances in a treaty. Indonesia may one day assume the same level of priority with other US allied countries in Asia Pacific. In the overall analysis, the success of the US rebalancing strategy would ultimately be determined by factors such as its higher levels of economic growth, its enhanced levels of capability building processes, and its success in forging deeper cooperative relationships with nations the Asia-Pacific region.

One most critical yet important element of geopolitical challenge faced by the East Asia and Pacific region is the rise of China. Its massive economic growth, rapid military modernization, and weighty presence in the diplomatic world are things that Indonesia must take into account. In terms of political security cooperation, Indonesia has already expanded its defence cooperation

with China. Therefore, Indonesia should do the same cooperation by laying stronger foundation for its continued existence relation with US, in order to achieve comprehensive and long-standing political security relationship with the US. Indonesia – US should also have more enhanced and stronger cooperation, broader forms of cooperation that could be achieved, such as counter terrorism, non-traditional threats like disaster relief cooperation and technology transfer on drone and military industries and invigorating more strategy on defence cooperation.

#### **4.1.2. Indonesia – China Relations**

To resolve the disputes in the region, this paper suggests Indonesia to urge the continuation of the implementation of the DOC and urge territorial disputes between the ASEAN countries and China settled through bilateral channel. ASEAN should not postpone the implementation of the DOC any longer because it has been postponed for more than one decade since its adoption in 2002. If the implementation were about to be postponed once again, ASEAN-China would lose its good momentum and the commitment of ASEAN and China in creating peace and stability in the region would be in question. At the same time, ASEAN also should not bring the dispute settlement issues to



ASEAN-China consultation because it would potentially complicate ASEAN-China relation, which is supposed to be maintained for the sake of the implementation of the DOC.

Therefore, it is recommended to Indonesia to encourage ASEAN to expedite the implementation of the DOC given that the deadline of the ASEAN Community by the end of 2015 or at the earliest terms of 2016. It includes early engagement with China in the drafting of COC and finalisation of the proposal for cooperative activities. ASEAN has already agreed with the basic elements of the COC that will be proposed to China. Therefore, ASEAN is supposed to be ready with its common position thus it may engage China to start the negotiation on the COC as soon as possible. In addition, the proposal of cooperative activities, like workshop, working group and other maritime-related cooperation, should also be agreed and finalized by the ASEAN Members and China, so that all of the projects could be carried out soon. Regarding some pending territorial dispute issues between China and some ASEAN countries, Indonesia could play its active role in approaching respective ASEAN countries to start the COC negotiation. Jakarta could emphasize the issue of COC that should be separated from the issue of territorial dispute. This paper also suggests ASEAN to move forward in accordance with the Six-Point Principles.

## V. REFERENCES

- Whitehouse (17 November 2011), *Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament*, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, Whitehouse. Online Version Available (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>)
- Hillary Clinton (11 October 2011), *America's Pacific Century*, Foreign Policy.
- Arvind Gupta (2014), *Forward*, in Muni and Chadha, eds, p. vii.
- Zachary Keck (5 March 2014), *Can the US Afford the Asia Pivot?*, The Diplomat. Online Version Available (<http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/can-the-us-afford-the-asia-pivot/>)
- Julian E. Barnes, *U.S. Plans Naval Shift Toward Asia*, The Wall Street Journal. Online Version Available (<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303552104577439943137674490>)
- Jonathan Greenert (27 March 2014), Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, US Navy Chief of Operations, 2014 Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, pp. 1-3, 20.
- Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers' Statement (<https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/trans-pacific-partnership-ministers>) (<https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP>)
- Barack Obama (10 November 2010), *Speech of President Barack Obama in Jakarta, Indonesia 'President Obama in Jakarta: "Indonesia's Example To the World"*, Jakarta, Indonesia, Whitehouse. Online Version Available (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/11/10/president-obama-jakarta-indonesia-s-example-world>)
- Hu Jintao (2012), *Full text: Constitution of Communist Party of China (Adopted on Nov. 14, 2012)*, Beijing, China, Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Online Version Available ([http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th\\_cpc\\_congress/2012-11/16/content\\_27138030.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm))

- Shintaro Hamanaka, Trans-Pacific Partnership versus Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting, ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 104 December 2014
- Barack Obama (5 October 2015), Statement by the President on the Trans Pacific Partnership (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/05/statement-president-trans-pacific-partnership>)
- Jane Perlez, U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on China ([http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership-china-australia.html?_r=0)) also in Zack Bluestone, What the TPP Means for the PRC (<https://www.lawfareblog.com/water-wars-what-tpp-means-prc>)
- Joseph S. Nye Jr. (25 January 2013), *Work With China, Don't Contain It*, New York Times.
- Jianyong Yue (2008), *Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality*, International Politic. Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
- Maysam Behravesh (17 July 2011), *The Relevance of Constructivism to Foreign Policy Analysis*, e-International Relations Journal. Online Version Available (<http://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/17/the-relevance-of-constructivism-to-foreign-policy-analysis/>)
- Jeffrey T. Checkel (2008), "Constructivism and Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy: Theories. Actors. Cases*, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 73.
- Christian Reus-Smit (2005), "Constructivism," in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. Scot Burchill and others. Basingstoke: Palgrave, p.199.
- Alexander Wendt (1992), *Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, International Organization 46, no. 2; Alexander Wendt (1994), *Collective Identity Formation and the International State*, American Political Science Review 88; Alexander Wendt (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reus-Smit, Christian (2005), "Constructivism," in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd ed. Scot Burchill and others. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005, p.199.
- Wendt, Alexander (1995), *Constructing International Politics*. International Security, Vol. 20, No.1, pp. 71-81, p. 72.

- Wendt, Alexander (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46, pp 391-425.
- Wendt, A. (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 327; Nabers, 'Social Construction', p.115.
- Hugh White and Brendon Taylor, (2009) "A Rising China and American Perturbations," in William Tow. ed. *Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.85-98.
- Johnston, Alastair I., (2008) *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zoellick, Robert B., 2005. 'Whither China: from membership to responsibility?', remarks to National Committee on US–China Relations, New York, 21 September.
- Friedberg, Aaron L., 2005. 'The future of US–China relations: is conflict inevitable?', *International Security*, 30(2): 7–45.
- John H. Herz. (January 1950), "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 157– 180; and Robert Jervis. (January 1978), "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 167–214.
- Adam P. Liff. (2014), "Whither the Balancers? Reconsidering Methods and Metrics in Contemporary Security Studies and Secondary State Military Balancing Responses to China's Rise," working paper, Princeton University.
- Hillary Clinton. (11 October 2011), "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011. Online Version Available: ([http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas\\_pacific\\_century](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century))
- *Foreign Policy*, May 13, 2013. Online Available ([http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/13/how\\_china\\_sees\\_the\\_us\\_pivot\\_to\\_asia](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/13/how_china_sees_the_us_pivot_to_asia))
- Zachary Keck (5 March 2014), *Can the US Afford the Asia Pivot?*, *The Diplomat*. Online Version Available (<http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/can-the-us-afford-the-asia-pivot/>)
- Julian E. Barnes, *U.S. Plans Naval Shift Toward Asia*, *The Wall Street Journal*. Online Version Available (<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303552104577439943137674490>)

- Jonathan Greenert (27 March 2014), Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, US Navy Chief of Operations, 2014 Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, pp. 1-3, 20.
- Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,” *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51; and Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 1 (January/February 2013), pp. 130–142. Deep engagement shares many similarities with selective engagement, particularly in terms of U.S. security commitments. See Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 79–113; and Robert J. Art, “Selective Engagement in the Era of Austerity,” in Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, eds., *America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration* (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2012), pp. 15–27.
- Evan Brandon Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” *International Security* 38:4 (Spring 2014), pp. 115-149. (pp. 124-126)
- Tanya Somanader (26 January 2015), The Highlights of President Obama’s Visit to India, Whitehouse. Online Version Available (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/01/26/highlights-president-obamas-visit-india>)
- [Matthew P. Goodman](#), [Scott Miller](#), “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations Conclude” (<http://csis.org/publication/trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations-conclude>)
- Mike Head, “US Dominated Pacific Trade Pact Agreed” (<https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2015/10/06/tppt-o06.html>)
- Shawn Donnan (<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7339123e-ee88-11e4-88e3-00144feab7de.html#axzz3qrVSzP8X>)
- Ronglin Li and Yang Hu, “RCEP, TPP and China’s FTA Strategies” ([http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload\\_files/Report\\_3\\_54\\_RCEP,\\_6192294083.pdf](http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload_files/Report_3_54_RCEP,_6192294083.pdf))
- Donald K. Emmerson, “Challenging ASEAN: The US Pivot Through Southeast Asia’s Eyes”, *Global Asia Vol.7, No.4* (Winter 2012), pp 22-25. (pp. 23)

- Robert Kaplan, “The Geography of Chinese Power,” *Foreign Affairs* 89:3 (May/June 2010): 22-41. Available Online at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-05-01/geography-chinese-power>
- Amitav Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia,” in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda. eds. *International Relations of Asia* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 57-84, p. 69.
- Hu Jintao (2012), *Full text: Constitution of Communist Party of China (Adopted on Nov. 14, 2012)*, Beijing, China, Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Online Version Available ([http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th\\_cpc\\_congress/2012-11/16/content\\_27138030.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27138030.htm))
- James Webb (20 August 2012), “*The South China Sea’s Gathering Storm*,” Wall Street Journal. Online available (<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444184704577587483914661256>)
- Alastair Iain Johnston, *China Future*, the Economist Essay, online available at (<http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21609649-china-becomes-again-worlds-largest-economy-it-wants-respect-it-enjoyed-centuries-past-it-does-not>)
- Mohammad Hatta, *Mendayung di antara Dua Karang* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1976).
- Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “An Independent and Active Foreign Policy”, p.386.
- Republic of Indonesia, *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* (1945 Constitution), available from the Asian Human Rights Commission, online at [indonesia.ahrchk.net/news/mainfile.php/Constitution/22](http://indonesia.ahrchk.net/news/mainfile.php/Constitution/22).
- Embassy of Indonesia in Ottawa, Canada, “Indonesian Foreign Policy,” undated, online at [www.indonesia-ottawa.org](http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org).
- Philips Jusario Vermonte, “Pragmatism in Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership”, *Jakarta Post*, April 23, 2005.
- Leo Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Soeharto* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), p.25.
- USA International Business Publication, *US Indonesia Diplomatic and Political Cooperation Handbook* (Washington: Global Investment Centre, 2008), 57.

- Paige Johnson Tan, *Navigating a Turbulent Ocean: Indonesia's Worldview and Foreign Policy*, Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No.3 pp. 147-181, (Lynne Rienner Publishers: 2007), p. 161.
- Dosch, Jörn, 2006, "The Impact of Democratisation on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines", *Südostasien aktuell*, 5, pp.42-70
- Rizal Sukma, 2011, "Indonesia: Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: the Case of Indonesia", in *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*/ ed. By Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen, Palgrave Macmillan: NY, pp 91-115, pp. 97
- William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 81.
- Langhorne, Richard, 2005, "The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 16, 331-339
- Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "An Independent and Active Foreign Policy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", Jakarta, May 19, 2005, in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, *Transforming Indonesia: Selected International Speeches* (Jakarta: Office of the Special Staff of the President for International Affairs in cooperation with PT Buana Ilmu Populer, 2005), p. 390.
- The Jakarta Post, Oct. 19, 2006. See more at: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/10/19/kalla-highlights-economy-peace.html#sthash.Zs7J96SL.dpuf>
- Hassan Wirajuda, Keynote Address at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Roundtable Discussion on Human Rights in ASEAN: Challenges and Opportunities for Human Rights in a Caring and Sharing Community", December 18, 2006, [http://www.aseanhrmech.org/conferences/summary\\_of\\_proceedings\\_final.pdf](http://www.aseanhrmech.org/conferences/summary_of_proceedings_final.pdf)
- Department of Defense, Indonesia, *Buku Putih: Mempertahankan Tanah Air: Memasuki Abad 21*", 2003, online at [www.dephan.go.id/buku\\_putih](http://www.dephan.go.id/buku_putih), p. 30.
- Evelyn Goh, "China and Southeast Asia," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, December 12, 2006, online at [http://fpif.org/china\\_and\\_southeast\\_asia/](http://fpif.org/china_and_southeast_asia/)
- Jane Perlez, "Bush Seeks to Heal Long Indonesia Rift," *New York Times*, February 8, 2005.
- Hadi Soesatro, "Hakikat 'Kemitraan Strategis' Indonesia and China," *Kompas*, August 1, 2005, Center for Strategic and International Studies, online at [www.csis.or.id](http://www.csis.or.id)

- Irman Lanti, “Indonesia: Accomplishments Amid Challenges”, in Daljit Singh and Lorraine Carlos Salazar, eds., *Southeast Asian Affairs 2006* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p. 103.
- Makarim Wibisono, Former Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, “UNSC Membership to Make RI’s Foreign Policies More Visible, Says Envoy”, Antara, September 27, 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia), Landasan, Visi, Misi Polugri, July 2006, online at [www.deplu.go.id/category\\_id=12&news\\_id=684&main\\_id=1](http://www.deplu.go.id/category_id=12&news_id=684&main_id=1).
- Amitav Acharya, (2014), *The End of American World Order*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press
- Amitav Acharya, (2015), *Indonesia Matters: Asia’s Emerging Democratic Power*, London, UK: World Scientific Publishing, pp. 3
- Ruchir Sharma, *Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012).
- Robert Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and the Future World Order,” *International Journal*, 44, Autumn 1989, pp. 826-827.
- Hussein Solomon, “South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership,” *Fairy-Godmother, Hegemon, or Partner?: In Search of a South African Foreign Policy [Monograph No 13]*, Hussein Solomon, ed. (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 1997).
- Landon Thomas Jr., “‘Fragile Five’ is the Latest Club of Emerging Nations in Turmoil”, *New York Times*, 28 January 2014. Online access on [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/business/international/fragile-five-is-the-latest-club-of-emerging-nations-in-turmoil.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/business/international/fragile-five-is-the-latest-club-of-emerging-nations-in-turmoil.html?_r=0)
- Barack Obama (10 November 2010), *Speech of President Barack Obama in Jakarta, Indonesia ‘President Obama in Jakarta: “Indonesia’s Example To the World”*, Jakarta, Indonesia, Whitehouse. Online Version Available (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/11/10/president-obama-jakarta-indonesia-s-example-world>)
- Amitav Acharya, “Why Two Asias May be Better Than None”, *World Politics Review*, January 8, 2013, at <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12603/why-two-asias-may-be-better-than-none>
- “United States-Indonesia Relations”, September 3, 2012, at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197277.htm>
- “Global Insider: Indonesian Military Seeks Partnerships to Help It Modernize”, *World Politics Review*, October 17, 2013, at



<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13309/globalinsider-indonesian-military-seeks-partnerships-to-help-it-modernize>

- Bonnie S. Glaser, “Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 22-24.
- Antaranews, October 7, 2013, Indonesia, China forge comprehensive strategic partnership in various field, at <http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/91035/indonesia-china-forge-comprehensive-strategic-partnership-in-various-field>
- Joseph S Nye Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), preface page.x.
- Tuty Enoch Muas, “Hubungan Cina-Indonesia: Secara Historis, Dinamis!” in I. Wibowo (ed), *Merangkul Cina: Hubungan Cina-Indonesia Pasca-Soeharto*, (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2009), pp. 44
- CNN Indonesia, August 11, 2015, *China Janjikan Investasi Rp1.361 Triliun di Infrastruktur RI*, at <http://www.cnnindonesia.com/ekonomi/20150811161559-92-71438/china-janjikan-investasi-rp1361-triliun-di-infrastruktur-ri/>
- The Diplomat, July 27, 2015, *South China Sea: Philippines v. China*, at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/south-china-sea-philippines-v-china/>
- The Jakarta Post, July 10, 2015, *Govt Build Military Base Near South China Sea*, at <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/07/10/govt-build-military-base-near-south-china-sea.html>