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Why Do Russia and Europe Clash on Crimea?
A Constructivist Interpretation Focusing on
Different Conceptions of Sovereignty

왜 러시아와 유럽은 크림반도에서 충돌하는가?
주권인식 차이 중심의 구성주의적 해석

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Why Do Russia and Europe Clash on Crimea?
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Different Conceptions of Sovereignty

Thesis by

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ABSTRACT

Why Do Russia and Europe Clash on Crimea?
A Constructivist Interpretation Focusing on Different Conceptions of Sovereignty

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This thesis explores the reasons why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea focusing on different conceptions of sovereignty in Russia and Europe. In an effort to provide a Constructivist interpretation of the clash in the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, this study investigates the concepts of sovereignty adopted in Russia and Europe as a foundation for their clash.

In addressing the main research question “Why do Russia and Europe clash on Crimea?” the main thesis laid out is that Russia and Europe’s conceptions of sovereignty significantly differ, and this difference serves as a critical impetus for the clash between Russia and Europe on Crimea. The first part of the analysis demonstrates the different conceptions of sovereignty in Russia and Europe, while the second part provides the reasons for such discrepancy.

It is revealed that the conceptions of sovereignty in Russia and Europe diverge from one another at the core due to their unique national identities. Whereas the Russian concept, driven by its hegemonic identity, distinguishes legal (de jure) and real (de facto) sovereignties, the European construct of sovereignty conception, driven by the shared sense of establishing peace and equality among states, is a unitary and undiscriminating conception.

The main objective of this research was to provide a Constructivist interpretation for the clash between Russia and Europe on Crimea. This study shows that the different conceptions of sovereignty – influenced by states’ national identity – serve as a reason behind the clash, which substantiates that acknowledging national identity and discovering states’ understanding of foreign policy concepts could serve a useful purpose in understanding international relations.

Key words: Crimea, Russian Foreign Policy, European Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, National Identity, Hegemonic Identity, Isocratic Identity.

Student Number: 2014-24291
List of Abbreviations

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEAS European External Action Service
EU European Union
FPA Foreign Policy Analysis
IR International Relations
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
RSFSR Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII World War II

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I. Introduction

1. The Annexation of Crimea in 2014

In the beginning of 2014, the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea became a subject of increasing tensions between Russia, Ukraine, and the Western world. The outcome of the much-disputed Crimean crisis resulted in the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation along with a deterioration of Russia’s position in the international arena. The crisis caused more than 100 fatalities and the social, political and economic turmoil in Ukraine. It was also the venue of clash between Russia and Europe, which did not end with the formal accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation.

The West calls it an illegal infringement of Ukraine’s sovereign territory. Russia claims it as the salvation of its people from an atrocious illegal regime in Ukraine. No matter how one calls it, the annexation of the Republic of Crimea in 2014 by the Russian Federation was a critical event for the western world. The annexation was an outcome of Russia’s foreign policy, a very successful one, at least from the perspective of the Russian Federation. At the same time, it provoked serious question on why Russia was so persistent and adamant for acquiring this piece of land, despite considerable threats of sanctions and international isolation. After all, Russia already had the biggest territory in the world. Russia’s closest neighbor, Europe, simply could not understand Russia’s actions and continuously condemned its neighbor for the illegal provocations.
The difficulty in understanding Russia’s obsession over this relatively small piece of land, and the clash between Russia and Europe on this matters come from the Realist approach and explanations. According to the Realists logic, this acquisition was an irrational choice by the Russian Government because the detrimental effects it would and did bring to Russia outweigh the material gains. However, for a more comprehensive understanding, one must look deeper and go beyond what meets the eyes – more specifically, how Russia sees Ukraine’s sovereignty and the meaning of Crimea and Ukraine to the Russian Federation. The starting point of the clash between Europe and Russia on Crimea indeed resides in their different understanding of underlying conceptions and logics behind their approach on Crimea.

In this regard, this research aims to investigate why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea from a non-Realist approach. More specifically, this study intends to provide constructivist interpretation focusing on different conceptions of sovereignty.

In a broad continuum, it is expected that such a study will contribute to the broadening of academic spectrum in the Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations; it will also bring societal input, namely, supplement additional reasoning for why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea, the understanding, which could provide better understanding of Russia’s foreign policy and to help formulate more appropriate foreign policy towards Russia and potentially alleviate tension between Russia and other actors in the international society.
2. Why Russia?

Relations between Russia and the West are in decline (Morozov, 2008). Scholars and practitioners even have warned about the imminent new Cold War as Russia has exhibited assertive policies both in domestic and foreign affairs in recent years. While Russia insists on its sovereign right to conduct independent policies, the United States and the European Union remain skeptical and negative. Wary of the increasing assertiveness of Russia’s foreign policy, the Western states seem to not able to grasp what Russian policies are all about, not to mention unable to form appropriate policies towards Russia. Relentless efforts have been made to better “comprehend” Russia in order to ensure peace worldwide. Some have pointed out that the source of misunderstanding between Russia and the West come from their different interpretation of key conceptions that shape today’s international arena and policy conduct. Sovereignty and democracy stand out as two most prominent keywords in the controversy, with both sides insisting on their understanding (Morozov, 2008). As this study’s main aim is to examine reasons behind the clash between Russia and Europe with the concept of sovereignty, Russia is a perfect subject for this research. Also, there is a practical need to better understand Russia and formulate policies towards the country in pursuit of establishing more stable global environment.

One reason for studying Russia is the importance of the country itself. Though it may have lost its glory of being the superpower in a bipolar world up until the end of Cold War, Russia is still very much significant actor in the global arena. The problem is, however, many countries – especially those in the West such as the Member States of
the European Union and the United States – have failed in their attempt to establish a cooperative environment and develop mutual ties with Russia; for many western scholars and practitioners, Russia’s foreign policy has been labeled as “assertive”, especially since Russian president Putin’s second term. However, while the Russian foreign policy has repetitively been labeled as assertive and aggressive, the scholarship and well as practitioners have difficulties in understanding Russia’s foreign policy. Accordingly, many sources both in media and academia have largely stamped the West’s foreign policy towards Russia as a ‘failure’. In fact, while the United States’ “containment” policy during the Cold War is considered to be a success foreign policy case, no policy after the fall of Soviet Union was given such positive recognition. Considering the constant misunderstanding and misguidance of foreign policy towards Russia, it is no surprised that nobody had foreseen events in Russia in 2014. A recent event in Crimea – its accession to the Russian Federation from Ukraine – came across as a surprise because nobody expected such dramatic measures from Russia; “how could we let this happen?” was a general reaction from the West, both North America and countries in Western Europe. It was indeed a wakeup call for the rest of the world to come up with better foreign policy analysis and plans towards Russia. In this regard, understanding the source of Russia’s foreign policy may serve as useful knowledge to better prepare for Russia’s possible actions and plan more suited policies.

Aside from the practical necessity, the Russian Federation also presents an interesting challenge for social science academia, given its complicated history and features. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, newly independent Russian Federation, as a
successor of the world’s largest and most powerful ideological bloc, faced a tremendous challenge of having to re-establish not only its institutions and systems, but more importantly, a new identity as a “normal” state to fit in the new global circumstance. Given such conditions, in studying conception of sovereignty, which is greatly influenced by national identity, Russia is again an excellent subject of analysis. Its deeply rooted identity as an outcome of the imperial legacy it had enjoyed for centuries in combination with the Soviet history have attracted many historians and political scientists. Whereas most previous empires seized their existence well before the 19th century, Russia had enjoyed its imperial status – though debatable – until almost the 20th century. Not only such identity entrenched in Russia, but it also has simply not been very long since it had to “let go” of such identity. Indeed, it is still questionable whether Russia had detached itself from its identity as the most significant powerhouse in the neighborhood; in fact, many, including this research, demonstrate that Russia has kept its identity as a superior entity. In this regard, Russian Federation is again a perfect subject for a study that endeavors to look at national identity as a analytical variable.

A third reason for analyzing Russia is Realist-centered foreign policy studies. Given the attractiveness and usefulness of the country for foreign policy analysis, vast research has been done on Russia’s foreign policy during the last decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, most of these studies have been conducted in the language of Realism, focusing on material motives and power politics logic. The Cold War, in fact, functioned as a foundation for groundbreaking developments of
Realist paradigms and theories such as balance of power, nuclear deterrence, and in many cases served as empirical evidence verifying these Realist claims. On the other hand, national identity’s role and meaning in foreign policy in Russia – essentially given more attention in the Constructivist paradigm – have not been fully recognized or studied. Taking Russia to substantiate the Constructivist logic will serve as a useful supplement to Russian foreign policy analysis and the Constructivist school of International Relations.

3. Russia and Europe

This study compares Russia’s concept of sovereignty with that of Europe in order to find out what caused the clash in 2014 on Crimea. This raises two important questions: “What does ‘Europe’ mean?” and “Why Europe?” There are various reasons why Europe is an appropriate subject for this study as a device for comparison with Russia. These include their common history, the importance of Europe in the development of concept of sovereignty, and significance of the Europe in the international arena as a representative of the Western value.

Most importantly, the annexation of Crimea arguably brought most substantial implication to Europe, aside from the first-handedly involved parties. Ukraine has been an important part of Europe’s “neighborhood policy” as the European Union has been trying to establish the buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia. In fact, as much as Russia put special emphasis on Ukraine, the EU has also been stressing the importance of partnership between the Union and Ukraine as early as late 1990s. Since
the Ukrainian government declared that integration to the EU is the main foreign policy objective in 1994, the EU has been keeping a close eye on this former Soviet state. For Europe, Ukraine was thought to be an important partner in order to maintain peace and stability in its eastern borders and relations with Russia. Throughout the following decade after the establishment of the independent Ukraine, Europe has been maintaining the special relations with Ukraine through various measure and policies such as European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership.

Aside from the importance of Ukraine to Europe, it is also important to remember that Europe and Russia have very special relations; the two shared common history until the end of the Second World War, and significantly diverged in their paths after the War. Russia had been considered as a European nation, or at least as part of Europe for centuries before the two World Wars; yet, recently Europe has failed in its endeavor to establish “common language” with Russia. The Georgian War in 2005 and Crimean Crisis in 2014 demonstrate that Europe does not share common perspective on certain subjects with Russia as Europe’s efforts to prevent such events have failed to induce meaningful results. Since the starting point of this study was to identify what causes clash between Europe and Russia and discover foreign policy drivers to formulate a better policy towards Russia, understanding the reasons behind the discord between Russia and Europe would essentially require grasping the European conceptions and logics.

In addition, Europe is a birthplace of the concept “sovereignty”, which is an important element of this study. The first development of a system of sovereign states took place
with the Peace of Westphalia, which culminated the Thirty-Year-War between the major European countries (the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, France, Sweden and the Dutch Republic) at that time. Since then, sovereignty became a prominent in political thought through the writings of Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin, and Hobbes. Having its origin in Europe, the concept of sovereignty also has faced the most drastic transformation in the European soil with the advent and development of the European Union, where Member States had to delegate some of their sovereignty to the institutions within the Union. As will be demonstrated later, Europe’s idea of “delegated sovereignty” presents a significant difference with the concept of sovereignty in Russia. This makes Europe a very interesting topic for a study of concept of sovereignty.

Having established that this study requires examination of European conceptions, there is a need to clarify what “Europe” means in this study and whether it can be studied as a single foreign policy actor.

The word “Europe” has various connotations: geographically, Europe is a continent that comprises the westernmost part of Eurasia, being the second smallest continent, while demographically representing the third largest population of the earth; culturally, “European Culture” often refers to the cultural and spiritual heritage derived from Greco-Roman antiquity, Christianity, the Renaissance and its Humanism (Bochmann, 1990). “Europe” includes various countries, which belong to the “geographical” and “cultural” Europe, ranging from nations situated in the western part of the continent such as Germany and France and in the central and eastern parts as Poland and
Romania. However, in political science and International Relations, the most common present-day usage of the term “Europe” is the reference to the European Union, a European supranational organization comprised of 28 Member States. The European Union remains as one of the most controversial political projects in the modern world. It is usually portrayed as a symbol of successful regional integration: the triumph of voluntarily shared sovereignty over excessive nationalism, ideological division and imperial ambition (Dinan, 2004).

According to the EU’s definition of itself, “The EU is unlike anything else – it isn’t a government, an association of states, or an international organization. Rather, the 28 Member States have relinquished part of their sovereignty to EU institutions, with many decisions made at the European level” (European Union, n.d.a). These institutions include the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the European Court of Auditors. This hybrid system of supranational and intergovernmental decision-making, in combination of the Member States’ delegation of sovereignty makes the European Union act as a single actor in the international arena.

Although foreign relations and policies are still largely an intergovernmental matter, with the Union holding more weight as a single actor, it has been trying to establish a mechanism to form a common foreign policy. These efforts have been translated into the establishment of the Union’s diplomatic service – European External Action Service (EEAS) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – which is headed
by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, equivalent to the Union’s Foreign Affairs Minister on behalf of the EU Member States. Given such institutional characteristics of the European Union, this study will use “Europe” as synonym to the European Union, and as a single foreign policy actor.

4. Research Question

The starting point of this research is the attempt to understand why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea. This research endeavors to provide a Constructivist interpretation to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 focusing on the concept of sovereignty. A main principle this research accepts in explaining why Russia and Europe clash is that the different national identity and its influence on the countries’ concept of sovereignty serves as a base of state foreign policy choices. In search to answer the main research question why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea, this study therefore focuses on the national identity and conceptions of sovereignty in Russia and Europe.

In order to answer the main research question, the research is composed of a chain of questions leading to the main question. The starting point will be identifying how different conceptions of sovereignty played role in the outcome of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The research will therefore first address the question how Russia and Europe’s concepts of sovereignty different and how do these concepts influence the clash between the two on Crimea?

Next, the study will further examine reasons why Russia and Europe have different conceptions of sovereignty deriving from their national identities. With the aim to
identify important elements of Russia’s national identity, especially that driven from the imperial and the Soviet history, the questions formulated are: how has the legacy of empire and Soviet Union influenced Russia’s national identity? Has Russia maintained hegemonic components in its national identity? If so, how does Russia’s hegemonic identity influences Russia’s conception of sovereignty?

The research addresses equivalent questions in search for Europe’s identity and concept of sovereignty. While Russia’s identity is largely driven by its imperial and the Soviet Union history, Europe’s identity has been fundamentally affected by the history of World War II and the development of the European Union. Borrowing the concept of “isocracy” from studies of democracy, the study will formulate the questions how has the WWII and the European Union influenced Europe’s national identity? What are the characteristics of Europe’s “isocratic identity”? How does it influence Europe’s conception of sovereignty?

5. Structure of the Thesis

The main objective of this research is to identify why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea from the Constructivist point of view by using the concept of sovereignty. Aside from the practical need to comprehend reasons behind the clash between the two, another important motivation to undertake such study was the need to better understand the Russian foreign policy in order to prepare for its future actions and plan more appropriate policies towards Russia given the continuous assertive policies from Russia. There is also a need to identify foreign policy impetus that is outside of
traditional materialist reasoning in order to contribute to the relatively young Constructivist school of International Relations.

The principal argument of the thesis is that the different conceptions of sovereignty in Russia and Europe serve as an important cause for the clash between Russia and Europe on Crimea. An underlying base of this argument is that foreign policy is greatly influenced by national identity and different identities shape different conceptions, such as state’ understanding of sovereignty.

Since this research uses a less conventional tool for foreign policy analysis “Theoretical Framework and Methodology” following the introductory chapter will provide a rationale behind choosing the Constructivist framework and explain methods via which this research is conducted. A wide range of key conceptions and propositions are presented and elaborated; these include literature review on the conception of sovereignty, national identity, national identity’s influence on foreign policy. The last part of this chapter explains the methodological choice of the study – foreign policy analysis, history and discourse analyses. It details the research design and steps taken in conducting the study with explanations on the chosen documents for the analysis.

Following the research design, the third chapter – “Annexation of Crimea in 2014” – will demonstrate the clash between Russia and Europe on Crimea. This chapter will show how different concepts of sovereignty have influenced and were translated into different foreign policies between Russia and Europe, leading them to the clash on Crimea. In particular, this section will analyze official documents of the Foreign
Affairs Ministries in Russia and Europe – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and European External Action Service – during the Crimean crisis in 2014. By examining their stance via the official statements on the event, the difference between Russia and EU’s concept of sovereignty and foreign policy will be revealed and analyzed.

The subsequent chapter “National Identity and Concept of Sovereignty” constitute the analytical work of this thesis, finding answer to the main research question why Russia and Europe clash of Crimea. This research necessitates addressing the two following issues: (1) the historical legacy of Russia and Europe as a foundation of their identity, and the relation between the national identity and concept of sovereignty, and (2) the link between the concept of sovereignty and foreign policy. This chapter will focus on the issue of national identity in Russia and in Europe, and its implication on the concept of sovereignty. It is important to consider that nations have more than one identity; national identity is a multifaceted distinctiveness comprised of multiple ideas. Acknowledging this complexity, the this chapter will mainly focus on Russia’s hegemonic identity and Europe’s isocratic identity as a foundation of their concepts of sovereignty. After identifying hegemonic and isocratic elements in Russia and Europe’s national identity, the next part of the research will show how these particular identities have influenced and shaped the conception of sovereignty in Russia and Europe.

Following the analytical parts of the study, this thesis will conclude by stating key findings as well as limitations of this research and suggest further research topics.
II. Theoretical Framework and Methodology

1. Constructivism

1-1. Limitations of competing Realist Theory

The Realist School of International Relations has guided foreign policy analysis for many decades. Some (Thomas, 2005) have argued that political Realism has dominated international politics as early as the establishment of a new international system following the Treaty of Westphalia. However, concerning foreign policy conduct and new developments in the international arena in recent years, there are many reasons why Realism is an inadequate explanatory tool especially for the Russian and European foreign policy analysis. Especially when it comes to the Crimean crisis and the consequent clash between Russia and Europe, Realist explanations provides only partial and insufficient explanations, presenting the shortcoming of the oldest IR school.

First, Realism suggests that maximization of state power is a central goal of every state and, therefore, all states make “rational” policy choices to achieve this goal (Viotti & Mark, 1999). However, what comprises a “rational” choice differs from state to state. What one state perceives as a “rational choice” may be “irrational” from other actors’ perspective given different agendas and values states hold.

Second, especially when it comes to Russia, the state itself is not the only important actor; as many Russian specialists (Baturo & Elkink, 2016) have repetitively argued, Russian political decisions and politics are constructed as an outcome of political
processes and historical events in the country. Realists heavily focus on the systemic level of analysis and they are unable to spare attention at levels underneath their traditional scope such as idea, culture, and norms. This research aims to look at elements underneath the systemic level and to take into account national components, namely national identity. Therefore, a theoretical framework, which allows examining elements outside of the systemic level, is more suited for this study.

There is also an issue of changing global environment, which lead to many criticisms and sarcasm on Realism. For example, in their article titled “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” Legro and Moravscik (1999) challenged Realists, pointing out this lack of consistency and explanatory capacities of the Realist paradigm in a newly changing world.

In addition, more specific to this study, Realism is not the best analytical framework because it fails to sufficiently explain reasons behind the Crimea crisis and the clash between Russia and Europe on the incident. For example, Russia’s choice to annex Crimea despite international condemnation and sanctions was an irrational choice given the detrimental effects such action would bring to Russia. In fact, the material damage caused by such action was far greater than the gains the annexation brought to Russia. In this sense, Realism’s material reasoning fails to explain Russia’s action and the clash between Russia and Europe on Crimea.

In a similar vein, in today’s globalized world, an international isolation by any means is considered as an irrational choice. Therefore, even acknowledging Realists’ rationality argument, the annexation of Crimea contradicts to such Realist argument
because pushing the annexation while knowing the choice would put Russia in international isolation was an “irrational” choice, a contradiction to the Realist’s notion that states always make rational choices.

In addition, the Realist approach would severely limit the analysis of this research, as it will necessarily hinder focusing on the concept of sovereignty. The problem stems from the fact that Realism does not take identities into account because they assume a state as a unitary actor. It also sees states as a consistent actor, similar to that of a historic determinist approach. It provides no room for change in identity; however, since one of the important elements of this research is precisely to examine the Russia and Europe’s identity conception, such deterministic approach serves no useful purpose for this study. In other words, the Realist approach makes the research inoperable given its stance on identity as a constant variable.

It is however not the intention to claim that Realism serves no purpose in studies of International Relations of Foreign Policy Analysis. It is also not to argue that Realism necessarily prohibits examining the concept of sovereignty. Though Realists in IR have traditionally regarded sovereignty and anarchy as indisputable through a lens that concentrates on the Westphalian system of states, more recent research shows that the relative authority of states can attenuate sovereignty (Lake D., 2007) (Osiander, 2001) (Krasner, 1999). The purpose of choosing Constructivism because this study, requires a theoretical framework, which enables to look beyond the systemic level and thoroughly analyze which elements, other than states’ desire to acquire maximum power may influence their foreign policy choices.
In this regard, Constructivist theory would be useful in addressing motivations behind states’ foreign policy choices, as it takes into account more diverse and various elements of state behavior. In foreign policy analysis context, this means taking state preferences, identities, and culture more comprehensively.

1-2. Choice of Constructivism

*Constructivism in Foreign Policy Analysis*

Today’s international environment is extremely complex; with the advent and development of globalization, the world has become more interconnected and the linkages between diverse actors have nurtured a distinct environment for countries to form policies towards one another. Even the most isolated state cannot survive on its own; no matter how influential and powerful a state may be, it cannot stand alone in its pursuit of prosperity. Hence, exploring relations between countries have also become extremely important, and these attempts have translated into the study of foreign policy analysis (FPA) in academia.

While foreign policy studies have been extensive and fruitful, it has long focused on states’ rationality and pragmatism. The origins and motives behind the national foreign policy have largely been explained by the national interest in line with the Realist paradigm of International Relations (IR). However, while most countries presumably strive for rationality in foreign policy, the definition of what is ‘rational’ is up to diverse interpretations. A rational choice of a particular state may be globally understood as irrational; such gap comes from the varying perspective on the nature of
international society, how states identify themselves, and the way they perceive themselves in relation to other actors in the international arena. While the Realist paradigm is valuable in establishing the importance of state rationality, exploring other influences on foreign policy could reveal motivations, which more extensively and accurately explain these choices. In this vein, this research focuses on examining foreign policy motivation from the Constructivist point of view, which assigns importance to role of ideas in international relations; in particular, this research endeavors to analyze relations between the state national identity and foreign policy by examining different conceptions of sovereignty.

The most attractive aspect of Constructivism, at least for the fulfillment of this particular research, is the fact that it pays attention at the role of ideas because an important part of this study – national identity – is essentially accumulation of ideas about the “self”. The Constructivist approach enables to take identifies as an analytical variable. This is not to argue that Constructivism is the only framework that takes ideas into account or rejects all the other variables. In fact, neoliberalist works such as that of Goldstein and Keohane’s entitled Ideas and Foreign Policy contain an argument that ideas do play role in foreign policy decisions (Keohane & Goldstein, 1993). However, Constructivism argues that ideas may play a determining role, and therefore, should be taken more seriously. It is important to acknowledge that the main difference between Constructivism and other IR theories lies in the different degree of emphasis on material and non-material motivations behind foreign policy; whereas the former
hypothesizes that state interest are largely comprised of non-materials elements such as ideas and culture, the latter supposes the materialistic assumption on states’ interest. With the Constructivist framework, this study’s main subject of analysis is conception of sovereignty. It is argued here the reason behind the clash between Europe and Russia on Crimea in their different conceptions of sovereignty. This argument is demonstrated through a history and discourse analysis of Russia and Europe’s identity and concept of sovereignty.

*Constructivist Framework and Elements*

With the development of globalization, more scholars in the field of IR started paying attention at the non-material elements of the international politics. As a result, the Constructivism was developed as an alternative to the predominant tradition of Realism in the IR academia. The key difference between Constructivism and Realism is that the former is more flexible and encompasses more elements under a common theme, while the latter is more rigid and deterministic. Another strength of Constructivism is that it is a middle ground between rationalist approaches and interpretive approaches (Adler, 1997). This allows studies to be more comprehensive, while maintaining core assumptions and ideas of IR studies. The most attractive aspect of Constructivism, at least for the sake of this research, is the fact that it pays attention to the role of ideas. One of the important analytical subjects of this study – national identity – is essentially *accumulation of ideas* about the self. The Constructivist approach enables to take identities as an analytical variable.
This is however not to argue that Constructivism is the only framework that takes ideas into account or rejects all the other variables. In fact, neoliberalist work such as that of Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) entitled *Ideas and Foreign Policy* asserts that ideas do play a role in foreign policy decisions. However, the main difference between Constructivism and other IR theories lies in the different degree of emphasis on material and non-material motivations behind foreign policy; whereas the former hypothesizes that state interest is comprised on non-material elements such as ideas and culture and is malleable, the latter emphasizes the materialistic assumption of states’ interest. In the same vein, others (D’Anieri, 2007) have also argued that national identity issues do not make material interest irrelevant, but they crucially influence the interpretation of those issues.

In this regard, Constructivism, which takes intangible elements as important variable is particularly suitable for this study because it allows the examination of national identities. As mentioned earlier, the purpose of choosing the Constructivist framework is not to argue that other IR theories are invalid or less justified. This choice is a result of this research’s endeavor to bring added value and propose an unconventional explanation for Russia and Europe’s foreign policy actions applying some less-explored concepts such as national identity. The study will use key Constructivist terms and logics as a theoretical framework, while accepting key mainstream concepts of contending IR theories.
2. Key Conceptions and Proposition

2-1. National Identity and Foreign Policy

Issue of definition in social science is an innate problem. Given the intangible nature of many elements in this study, e.g. ‘identity’, and ‘sovereignty’, it is of utmost importance to establish a common ground upon which this research will be conducted and read. One key element of this study is the concept of ‘national identity’. However, defining what national identity is not a simple task. What exactly is national identity and how is it formed?

As Ignatieff (1998) puts it, “National identity is not fixed or stable; it is a continuing exercise in the fabrication of illusion and the elaboration of convenient fables about who ‘we’ are.” In order to cope with such characteristics of term, scholars have defined this concept by emphasizing its different aspects.

Barrington Moore, Jr. according to Ilya Prizel (Prizel, 1998) introduced the simplest and the broadest explanation of national identity: it (national identity) is the cornerstone of nationalism, as a membership in a group that can save an individual from anxieties of carving out his own meaningful place in the world, especially when the Realistic chances of doing so are tiny (Moore, 1978). Breuilly (1993), on the other hand, underlined the exclusive character of the national identity by regarding the relations between culture and nationalism distinguishing the nations from each other (İnaç, 2013), while Kymlicka (1998) refers to the civic nationalism by aiming to pinpoint its inclusive character via differentiating cultural dissimilarities. Gilroy (1993)
suggested that national identity is a melting pot, which has the assimilating character by depending on the notions of citizenship. Anderson (2006), in his book *Imagined Communities* asserted that national identity is imagined and constructed in people’s mind.

While the aforehand mentioned scholars paid attention at certain aspects of national identities, others focused on the period of formation of national identity. For example, Connor (1978) and Smith (1986) referred to the primordial character of national identity, which presented backward looking character seeking the myth of national origin. As a contrary, Bradshaw (1997) says that the national identity has a forward-looking character and this identity emerges with the politicization of an ethnic group looking to the future destiny by sharing the same soil of the homeland (Inac and Unal 2013).

A common line embracing these volumes of work is that national identity is a shifting, unsettled complex of historical struggles and experiences that are produced and translated through a variety of cultures. Given the vast choices in defining the concept of national identity, this study adopts the definition as a particular form of collective identity, which sociologists define as “a set of attitudes, commitments, and rules for behavior—that those who assume the identity can be expected to subscribe to” (Friedman & McAdam, 1992).

While there seems to be agreement that perceptions of identity are of importance as a psychological frame of reference in international relations (Prizel 2009), conceptualizing the relationship between identity and foreign policy has presented
difficulty in academic world. How, when and why do cultural norms and values matter in foreign policy? How can one operationalize the theoretical linkage between identity and foreign policy in an empirical analysis? Specifically to the Russian FPA studies, for many years after the end of the Cold War and subsequent bipolar division – where the delineation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ became increasingly ambiguous – scholars have been endeavoring to answer these questions.

Some scholars (Clarke, 1993) have argue that a sense of belonging – identity of belongingness – appears to be closely interrelated with membership of a political community that seems to offer protection from external threat. Others (Lipschutz, 1995) have argued that both identity and security – whereas security is a primary foreign policy idea – are relational concepts that imply the existence of an ‘other’ against which the notion of a collective self and conditions of insecurity are articulated. Though logics and reason differ, it is generally agreed that the national identity shapes national interest, which influences and translates into foreign policy.

Another important element is that national identity influences states’ perception on the world, where it stands and how much power it may exercise. The latter – states’ understanding of their boundary – is especially crucial in foreign policy conduct because it defines the scope of the state’s exercise of power. In today’s international relations, this boundary is closely related to the concept of sovereignty because the boundary of exercise of power is given and driven by state sovereignty. Thus, in bridging the gap between national identity and foreign policy, this study takes states’
conception of sovereignty as the element used to operationalize and demonstrate the relations between the national identity and foreign policy.

2-2 National Identity and Conception of Sovereignty

A key argument of this research is that states’ national identity shapes their conception of sovereignty, which serves as basis for foreign policy. This necessitates a clarification on how national identity influences states’ concept of sovereignty. Simply put, national identity is about how a state perceives itself: what role it should or does play with regards to its own people and outside actors, how much power/autonomy it has, how it sees itself amongst other states in the international arena. The concept of sovereignty is also essentially about what a state perceives as its sphere of influence; is about how much power a state thinks it may exercise over which territories and entities. This demonstrates that there is a clear linkage and commonality between national identity – state’s self-perception – and concept of sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty reflects the national identity of the state, which makes the conduct of this research possible. As will be demonstrated in the analysis, Russia’s hegemonic national identity results in a particular conception of sovereignty, where it sees two kinds of sovereignties – de jure and de facto; accordingly it distinguishes two kinds of states – those with legal sovereignty and those with real sovereignty. On the other hand, Europe’s history with the World War II and the development of the European Union has led to the acquisition of what this study labels as isocratic identity, where every country regardless of the actual power, is perceived as equal sovereign states.
2-3. Sovereignty

Sovereignty is a much-contested multi-dimensional concept. While it is a cornerstone to the ordering of international society, the concept can be discussed in various dimensions: external and internal, Westphalian and Post-Westphalian, popular and constitutional. However, the purpose of this research is not to explore the concept of sovereignty itself, but to use it as a vehicle to understand the relations between national identity and foreign policy. In order to use the concept in bridging the gap between the two, a keen understanding of what sovereignty means in this particular context must be established first.

Sovereignty is a basic principle underlying the dominant Westphalian model of state foundation. The history of the concept of sovereignty dates back as early as the seventeenth century, when it was introduced for the first time in Jean Bodin’s *Six Books on Commonwealth*. Since then, the concept has been discussed in various academic arenas such as political philosophy, international law, and international relations. However, a classificatory study on the concept of sovereignty is still an ongoing process, and like most of political science terminologies, a universally accepted definition of sovereignty is still lacking in academia. Although there is a general agreement that the concept of sovereignty entails a notion of supreme authority over other polities as its main attribute, different scholars have differently defined, classified, and applied the concept of sovereignty in their work. In his book with a controversial subtitle *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Stephen D. Krasner distinguished four different notions on the concept of sovereignty: domestic
sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and the
Westphalian sovereignty.

Domestic sovereignty refers to authority structures within states and the ability of these
structures to effectively control behaviors of entities within the state. The classic
theorists of sovereignty, Bodin and Hobbes, were concerned primarily with this type of
sovereignty. Initially, when Bodin introduced the concept of sovereignty, he had
divided the concept into two large and opposite theories: the Classical theory of
sovereignty and the Constitutional theory of sovereignty. Difference between the
Classical theory and the Constitutional theory lies in what or who is the source of
sovereignty. The former assumes that the state is the bearer of sovereignty, which gives
it unlimited power, while the latter suggests that the state infers its sovereign power
from the constitution and the sovereign power is not vested in any will (Heywood,
1994). Following Bodin’s work, most significant development of the concept of
sovereignty occurred during the age of Enlightenment, when it gained momentum in
legal and moral domains as the main Western description of the meaning and power of
a State. Contributors to the study of sovereignty during this period include Thomas
Bodin’s definition of sovereignty that states are the bearers are sovereignty and argued
that this supreme authority must be absolute and indivisible. On the other hand,
Rousseau – with his conception of popular sovereignty – assigned sovereignty to the
people.
Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of states to control movement across their borders. The main implication of interdependence sovereignty is the claim that globalization erodes sovereignty. Due to the advancement of technology, which reduced the cost of communication and transportation. Supporters of interdependence sovereignty argue that due to globalization, states cannot regulate movements of goods, capital, people and ideas across boarders, which results in the diminution in sovereignty of nation-states.

International legal sovereignty puts emphasis on the legal aspect of sovereignty, i.e. de jure sovereignty. It connotes that states should not intervene in or judge domestic affairs of other states. In other words, it refers to the mutual recognition of independent territorial entity. The basic rule of international legal sovereignty is that it is granted to recognized independent territorial entities, which are capable of entering into voluntary contractual agreements. Expanding on the international legal sovereignty, some scholars and practitioners have argued that the notion of sovereignty expresses plentitude and comprehensiveness in the exercise of political power (Cannizzaro, 2003). In classical international law textbooks and legal cases, sovereignty is defined by reference to intuitive notions, such as independence, plentitude of power and exclusivity in discharging the governmental authority of a territorial community. For example, in the Island of Palmas Case (United States vs. Netherlands), the case states, “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in relation to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.” (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1928).
One of the oldest and foundational concepts of sovereignty is the Westphalian sovereignty. It refers to the exclusion of external sources of authority both *de jure* and *de facto*. It suggests that states have the right to autonomously determine their own domestic authority structures and practice such authority. At the international level this implies that states follow the rule of non-intervention in the internal affairs of others.

Aside from Krasner’s definitions, there are other diverse typologies with regard to the concept of sovereignty. Stankiewicz (1976), for example, offers several dichotomies, including political and legal sovereignty, internal and external sovereignty, sovereignty *de jure* and sovereignty *de facto*, influential, limited, relative sovereignty, etc. While different definitions and descriptions of sovereign exits, it is generally agreed that a sovereign state is an entity possessing plentitude of power within its territory (Cannizzaro, 2003), entitled to establish and maintain its own lines of conduct in the international relations and is only limited by obligations arising under international law (Verdross & Simma, 1985). Stripped of its symbolic and political meaning, sovereignty could be understood as a expression that simply denotes fully-fledged entities, which can use, at their will, all the powers and prerogatives. This conception of supreme power of a state has remained almost unchallenged for centuries. What has been the contending issue is the notion of sovereignty in the dynamic of international relations with emerging topical issues such as humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect.

Due to the globalization, a number of political scientists have put efforts to re-examine and re-evaluate the concept of sovereignty. Wide ranges of terms have been proposed
to capture its transformation: ‘reconfigured sovereignty’ (Ilgen, 2003), ‘complex sovereignty’ (Grande & Pualy, 2005), ‘late sovereignty’ (Walker, 2003) and ‘post-sovereignty’ (Keating, 2003), to name but a few. However, the purpose of this study is not to examine the concept of sovereignty itself, but to utilize the concept as a vehicle to investigate motivations behind different foreign policy and the inter-state clash. In this vein, given the multi-dimensional characteristic of the research, this research will look at the conception of sovereignty as a ‘basis’ upon which states conduct their foreign policies; conception of sovereignty is understood here as reflection of states’ view on the strength and limitation of its own and other states’ exercise of power.

2-4. Concept of Sovereignty in Foreign Policy

Sovereignty, as mentioned above, is one of the oldest yet contested concepts in the scholarly arena. To start with the history of the notion of sovereignty in international law, it is almost identical with the full-scale history of international law itself (Steinberger, 2000). Despite its longstanding history, more recently, the idea of sovereignty has been questioned with the advancement of globalization. Some argue that the meaning of sovereignty has been decreasing, while others claim that it has been sustained (Krasner, 1999). However, the purpose of this study is not to explore the concept of sovereignty itself. The aim of this research is to use the concept of sovereignty as an analytical tool to understand why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea. The reason for examining sovereignty to understand the clash is because the concept of sovereignty of a state reflects its understanding of itself and other states and
most often serves as basis for foreign policy. The concept of sovereignty is essentially about what a state perceives as its sphere of influence; more specifically, it is about *how much* power a state thinks it may exercise *over which* territories and entities. In this regard, concept of sovereignty is a fundamental element in states’ foreign policy conduct; in this study, sovereignty serves as an analytical tool to bridge the gap between states’ national identity and foreign policy.

3. Research Methodology

3-1. Foreign Policy Analysis

In examining relations between states’ conceptions of sovereignty and foreign policy, the most widespread and traditional instrument for such a study is foreign policy analysis. How one identifies oneself becomes more obviously articulated in the way of behaving towards others (Laenen, 2008). While the study of IR is as old as the existence of nation-states themselves, the FPA is a comparatively new field in the study within IR (Hudson & Vore, 1995). However, the development in the FPA field has been rather rapid and fruitful; three paradigmatic works developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s – James Rosenau’s *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy*, Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin’s *Decision-making as an approach to the study of International Politics*, and Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956)’s *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* – built cornerstones upon which scholars in the following decades constructed more diverse approaches. The core learning of the paradigmatic works rests in the argument that
particularities of the human beings making national foreign policy are vitally important in understanding foreign policy choices.

In his work, Rosenau (1966) created five levels of analysis from individual leaders to the international system as a framework to understand foreign policy. In his view, explanation of foreign policy needed to be multilevel and multi-causal, synthesizing information from a variety of social science knowledge system. In this vein, his work – where he provides idiosyncrasy, role, society, government, and system as the five levels of analysis – intended to point out the direction in which it would be possible to establish a testable theory to examine foreign policy.

On the other hand, Snyder and his colleagues (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1954) emphasized the role of the actual players involved in foreign policy below the nation-state level. More specifically, their main focus laid in decision-making as opposed to foreign policy outcomes. They wrote "If one wishes to probe the ‘why’ questions underlying the events, conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary" (Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, 1954).

Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956) tried to incorporate the concept of ‘contextualization’ in their foreign policy analysis, by emphasizing the need to refer to foreign policy undertakings, which they associated with strategies, decisions, and intentions. Their arguments highlighted the relationship between the international environment and the decision-maker's perception of it. In essence, they suggested that understanding foreign policy output – which they associated with the analysis of power capabilities within an interstate system – without reference to foreign policy.
undertakings was misguided. They wrote: “Explanations of achievement and estimations of capabilities for achievement invariably and necessarily presuppose antecedent undertaking. Unless there is an undertaking, there can be no achievement - and nothing to explain or estimate” (Sprout & Sprout, 1956). To explain this important concept of 'undertakings', they addressed the 'psycho-milieu' of individuals and groups making foreign policy choices, where the psycho-milieu is the international and operational environment or context as it is perceived and interpreted by these decision-makers (Hudson V. M., 2005). From this insight has grown a substantial literature on the role of perceptions in decision-making, political psychology and, in broader terms, international relations theory.

Level of Analysis

This study adopts the Constructivist framework as an all-encompassing idea behind the proposition and argument of the research. However, as mentioned before, this does not imply a complete rejection of the traditional Realist approach. In fact, a state-centric approach, central to the Realist theory, serves a useful purpose. The main question this study attempts to answer is “Why do Russia and Europe clash on Crimea?” from a Constructivist point of view focusing on different conceptions of sovereignty. This means the research must consider Russia and Europe as a subject of analysis; in other words, the systemic level of analysis is most helpful in fulfilling the objective of this study. Therefore, the study will take a systemic (outside-in) approach as oppose to a reductionist (inside-out) approach. Whereas the reductionist approach focuses on the
national or subnational levels and study the attributes that consist a state – such as financial institutions, bureaucracies, leaders, etc. – a systemic approach analyzes the attributes of the system as a whole (Descalzi, 2011). The latter approach allows examining of why Russia and Europe behaves in certain ways as an outcome of internal processes. Also, a state-centric approach, according to Weldes (1996), allows conceiving state identity and interest as a product of social interaction on the inter-state level. Since the analysis takes Russia and Europe’s behaviors as a subject, such approach is most appropriate for the conduct of analysis. Besides the operational aspect, it must be acknowledged that states are still the most predominant actor and primary sources of foreign policies. Indeed, even the most opposite-opinionated scholars in IR – namely Kenneth Waltz and Alexander Wendt – often commonly adopted state-centric approach in their analyses (Laenen, 2008).

While studying Russia with the state-centric approach is self-explanatory, examining the European Union with the systemic level approach requires more clarification. The fundamental reason why the EU can be and is examined through the state-centric approach is driven by the nature and structure of the European Union as mentioned in the introductory chapter of this study.

In the international level, the European Union acts as a single actor; the evolution of the organization – from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Economic Community (EEC) to the current Union – reflects that the ultimate goal of the EU has been establishing a supranational organization as a single political actor. Even before the advancement to the “European Union”, the Copenhagen
Declaration on the European Identity claimed that the Member States aim to construct a “Union Europe” and “act as a single entity” (Office for official publications of the European Communities, 1973).

The European Union’s policy-making structure also makes it possible to analyze the EU as a single actor in the international level. The European Court of Justice has established the supremacy of EU law over Member States’ national law, the European Parliament – whose members are directed elected by the “European citizens” – has gained in importance and influence in legislative matters, the European Commission enjoys exceptional autonomy and legislative power on the Member States. Throughout its institutional development, the EU’s decision-making and subsequent policies have gained significance as the number of EU policies and legislations continuously has been increasing in volume. Also, the Union has been aiming to cover more and more policy areas as a singular actor, especially regarding global affairs. Although foreign relations is still a largely intergovernmental matter, the establishment of the Union’s diplomatic service – European External Action Service (EEAS) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – equivalent to the Union’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, demonstrates that the European Union can be seen as a single foreign policy actor. Such structure and characteristic of the European Union have resulted in common policies in different Member States, making it possible to use the EU as a single actor in this state-centric approach analysis.

Another reason why Europe can be analyzed as a single entity is the fact that majority of the Member States’ citizens view themselves as “European” citizens. According to
the most recent Eurobarometer survey taken in Spring 2014, close to two-thirds of Europeans “feel that they are citizens of the EU (65% replied ‘yes’)” (Ballas, Dorling, & Hennig, 2014). With the institutional structure of a single actor and its citizens viewing themselves as solitary “European” citizens, this research will take the European Union as a single foreign policy actor and a representative for Europe’s foreign policy.

3-2. History Analysis

The main task of this study is twofold: (1) to demonstrate that Russia and Europe’s different conceptions of sovereignty contributed to the clash between the two on Crimea; (2) to show that Russia and Europe respectively possesses different concepts of sovereignty according to their national identities. In order to fulfill the first challenge, pathways Russia and Europe took in the acquisition of the their identities should be revealed first.

Key events from Russia’s history will be considered as a subject for analysis to build an argument that Russia, throughout its history, has followed a trajectory via which it acquired certain identity. This study will especially focus on looking at institutional changes during the Soviet era because much of the legacy from the USSR remains in nowadays Russia. In the same vein, in order to establish the European identity, the study will also look at historical events, which had led Europe to develop its particular identity. The events namely include the Second World War and the history of EU’s institutional development.
Through the history analysis, the research will establish that the historical events have led Russia and Europe to arrive at their national identity conception today, which serves as foundation for their understanding of sovereignty.

3-3. Discourse Analysis

This study devices discourse analysis as the main research methodology, given the Constructivist theoretical assumptions and the research question this study undertakes. Discourse analysis is chosen to be most appropriate as this particular methodology and Constructivist theoretical framework share a common ontology as both sees reality as a combination of “social facts, which are dependent of collective understandings and hence on discourse and language, which in turn allow for an interpretation of physical reality” (Lupovici, 2007). Also, discourse analysis enables to more flexibly examine and analyze macro concepts such as national identity, which is an imperative element in this this study.

This study mainly consists of qualitative analysis of official government documents. A wide range of foreign policy sources present difficulty in choosing what exactly can be and should be considered as foreign policy document. This research chooses the official documents published by the main foreign policy bodies in Russia and Europe – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation and European External Action Service – as subject of analysis for number of reasons. Most importantly, since the aim of this research is to reveal how the Russia and European Union’s conceptions of sovereignty shaped by national identity influence foreign policy, their identification of
‘self’ is extremely important. The official documents reflect how Russia and Europe “wants to be perceived”, which is a critical point in examining national identity.

Scope
Given the changing and adaptable nature of the concept of national identity, this research will focus on the period since Russia and EU have established their identity as it is today. For Russia, this period covers from the Soviet era, whereas for Europe, the end of World War II denoted the development of European Union. Therefore, historical events and documents prior to the advent of Soviet Union and European Union are beyond the scope of this analysis. Also, it is not the intention of this study to investigate deeply the concept of sovereignty itself. Legal documents such as the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Treaty of European Union, where “sovereignty” is explicitly defined does not serve a useful purpose for this study. The documents analyzed in this study comprise official statements and publications, which directly or indirectly reveal Russia’s Europe’s national identity and subsequent conception of sovereignty.

Sources
In examining the national identity and concept of sovereignty, this study will extensively analyze official publications published by Russia and EU’s Foreign Ministries. The documents are extracted from the websites of the relevant government bodies – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the European External Action Service. Also, aside from the foreign policy documents, other official
records such as presidential speeches, speeches of key policy makers such as Foreign Affairs Minister will be considered as subject for the analysis. The complete list of official documents that are analyzed in the study is stated in the Annex.

The major Russian foreign policy documents subject to the discourse analysis are:

- Alma-Ata Declaration (1991)
- Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (2000)
- Declaration on Russian Identity (2014)

The key EU foreign policy documents subject to the discourse analysis include:

- Manifesto di Ventotene (1941)
- Declaration of Robert Schuman (1950)
- Declaration on European Identity (1973)
- Official statements by the European External Action Service (2014)

### III. Annexation of Crimea in 2014

#### 1. The Annexation of Crimea in 2014

**1-1. Overview**

In the beginning of 2014, the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea was the subject of increasing tensions between Russia, Ukraine, and the Western world. The outcome of the much-disputed Crimean crisis resulted in the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation. The crisis caused more than 100 fatalities and the social, political and
economic situation in Ukraine descended into chaos. It was also the venue of conflict between Russia and Europe as the two diverged in their perspectives on the Ukrainian sovereignty, which led to different logic and policies towards the event in Crimea.

The West called it an illegal infringement of Ukraine’s sovereign territory. Russia called it the salvation of its people from an atrocious illegal regime in Ukraine. No matter how one calls it, the incident occurred in the Republic of Crimea – a peninsula located in the southern part of Ukraine – in 2014 was a critical event for the western world as well as for scholars in FPA and IR fields. The annexation was an outcome of Russia’s foreign policy, a very successful one, at least from the perspective of the Russian Federation. At the same time, it provoked serious question on why Russia was so persistent and adamant for acquiring this piece of land, despite considerable threats of sanctions and international isolation. After all, Russia already had the biggest territory in the world.

The difficulty in understanding Russia’s obsession over this relatively small piece of land comes from the Realist approach. According to the Realists logic, this acquisition was an irrational choice because the detrimental effects it would and did bring to Russia outweigh the material gain. In a similar vein, Realists find it difficult to provide a concrete reason why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea because the conflict is difficult to see as a power struggle. However, for a more comprehensive understanding, one must look deeper and go beyond what meets the eyes – more specifically, how Russia sees Ukraine’s sovereignty and the meaning of Crimea and Ukraine to Russia.
It is this different perspective on Ukraine’s sovereignty that caused failure of Europe’s effort to de-escalate the situation and led to the clash between Europe and Russia.

Throughout history, Ukraine has been particularly important to Russia due to their shared history. For example, Kiev, the modern capital of Ukraine, is often referred to as “a mother of Russian Cities or a cradle of the Russian civilization” owing to the once powerful Kievan Rus’ state, a predecessor of both Russian and Ukrainian nations (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2007). In the 2014 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin confirmed this notion when stated, “Crimea is as sacred to Russia as Temple Mount to Islam and Judaism” (President of Russia, 2014). However, although Ukraine has been an unalienable part of Russia’s history, their relations have never been as those between equals. In fact, Ukraine has mostly been a ‘little brother’ to Russia, while Russia accounted for the superior position. During the Soviet years, the USSR purposely distributed the power to other republics including Ukraine; yet, Russia never de facto considered Ukraine or any other republics as an equal counterpart. This convoluted history is even more extending when it comes to the Western region of Ukraine, where a large population of Russians minorities – so-called ‘compatriots’ (sootechestvenniki) – have been residing for decades even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Such background on the relations between Russia and Ukraine had an important policy implication with regards to Russia’s behavior towards Crimea; because Russia perceived Ukraine’s sovereignty as “less sovereign” than its own, Russia allowed itself to infringe the sovereign territory of Ukraine. For Russia, the Crimean crisis and the
subsequent annexation were not about a conflict between equal sovereign entities. In contrast, because the European Union recognizes all sovereign states as equal sovereignties, it saw the conflict as Russia’s violation of sovereignty of Ukraine, which the EU perceives as “sovereign” as Russia. Such different conceptions of sovereignty contributed to the deteriorated situation in the Crimean peninsula, and eventually led to the failed European foreign policy towards both Russia and Ukraine.

This chapter will examine how the different conceptions of sovereignty in Russia and Europe have influenced their foreign policy conduct with regards to the Crimean crisis and the subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014.

1-2. The 2014 Crimean Crisis

The crisis in Crimea was not a spontaneous incident. The tension in Ukraine had been built up from the year before the actual crisis as the Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych abandoned a proposed Association Agreement with the EU, in favor of developing closer economic ties with Russia in November 2013. The abandonment of the agreement caused the civil unrest between pro-Russian and pro-European Ukrainians; the protests in the capital city Kiev and other major cities involving 800,000 people resulted in violence and over 100 fatalities. Subsequently, Mr. Yanukovych was forced to flee to Russia for fear of his personal safety, resulting in the formation of a pro-European and anti-Russian government, amidst issues of the legitimacy of the new unelected government.
The protests continued throughout 2013 and continued in the beginning of 2014. While the situation deteriorated in the capital city, Russian military personnel infiltrated various parts of Crimea, outside of their agreed position inside the Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol, sparking concern about a Russian invasion of Crimea, and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Although the Russian President stated troops only intended to protect the Russians living in Crimea, the West had accused Russia of transgressing international law by infringing Ukraine’s sovereignty. Nonetheless, Russian military presence in the peninsula enabled Moscow to establish control over Crimea.

The European Union, on the other hand, while criticizing Russia for the violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, did not take direct measures in the Ukrainian soil. Although some of EU’s high ranked officials visited Kiev during the crisis, no substantial involvement in Kiev of Crimea took place. From the public statements, it can be inferred that Europe did not want to infringe Ukraine’s sovereignty by dispatching personnel without Ukraine’s explicit request. As equal sovereign states, the EU understood the situation as a conflict between the two sovereign states, and refrained from interfering. It is not to say that Ukraine is simply not important to the European Union. Ukraine has been a priority country for the European foreign policy, within the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. Europe’s noninvolvement in this regard is not due to its inattention, but because of Europe’s full respect towards Ukraine’s sovereignty. Although smaller in
size and political significance, Europe perceived Ukraine as a partnering country and recognized its full (de facto) sovereignty.

On the 6th of March, the Crimean parliament asked the Russia Government to join Russia and set referendum for 16 March, which would allow Crimeans to vote on whether they wished to become part of the Russian Federation, or whether they would instead prefer to strengthen ties with the EU as part of Ukraine. “The referendum was organized in such a way as to guarantee Crimea’s population the possibility to freely express their will and exercise their right to self-determination,” the Kremlin’s statement issued (Das, n.d). On the other hand, the EU claimed that the referendum was against the Ukrainian constitution and therefore illegitimate because it excluded the Ukrainian government and the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens.

Despite the condemnation from the outside world, the referendum was held on the 16th of March as scheduled where the unquestionable majority (97%) of Crimeans who voted expressed their wish to rejoin Russia. The result was agreed upon and finalized the following day, completing the annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation.

As a consequence of the crisis, the Western states such as U.S. and EU have imposed sanctions on Russian officials, Russia has been excluded from the Group of 8 (G8) and related diplomatic talks; the 2014 G7 Summit which was to be held in Russia has been boycotted, and Western nations refused – and are still refusing – to recognize or accept the annexation of Crimea into Russia (Walker, 2014).

Nonetheless, consequent to the finalized results of the referendum in Crimea, the Treaty on Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia was signed between
representatives of the Republic of Crimea and the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014 to lay out terms for the immediate admission of the Republic of Crimea as federal subjects of Russia and part of the Russian Federation (President of Russia, 2014). Subsequently, President Putin signed a decree that Russia recognizes Crimea as a sovereign and independent state. The document reads, “According to the will of the peoples of the Crimea on the all-Crimean referendum held on March 16, 2014, [I order] to recognize the Republic of Crimea … as a sovereign and independent state,” (Katz, 2014). Since then, the peninsula has been administered as the de facto Crimean Federal District, constituting Russian federal subjects with a republican order.

2. Different Conceptions of Sovereignty in Russia and Europe

Different scholars have provided different reasons for the clash between Russia and Europe on Crimea. These include Russia’s desire to expand its territory and acquire the Black fleet in the Crimean Peninsula, threat of the NATO. From the European side, scholars have argued that Europe feels threatened by Russia’s assertive foreign policy and find the need to create and strengthen the buffer zone between the EU’s border and former Soviet territories. However, as part of Constructivist work for reasons mentioned in the research design chapter, this study pays particular attention at the concept of sovereignty. More specifically, the research sees different conceptions of sovereignty in Russia and Europe as a main trigger that provoked and intensified the conflict between the two parties. The interpretation of this study suggests that different
conceptions of sovereignty constructed by their national identities serve as reason for
the clash between Russia and Europe regarding the Crimean crisis.

2-1. De jure and de facto Sovereignty

**Russia’s Conception of Ukraine’s Sovereignty**

It is revealed that Russia’s concept of sovereignty is dualistic, where *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignties are distinguished. Russia and Ukraine are both formally recognized sovereign states by the international law. They are members of the United Nation and conform to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Formally, Russia recognizes both Russia’s and Ukraine’s legal sovereignties. As is the case with other CIS countries, Ukraine is acknowledged as a sovereignty state, whose sovereignty and territorial integrity requires full respect. However, a careful scrutiny of Russia’s foreign policy conduct reveals that while Russia recognizes *de jure* sovereignty of Ukraine, it differentiates Ukraine with actual, *de facto* sovereignty. As a state with hegemonic identity, Russia sees Ukraine as a subordinate country, which deprives of the *de facto* sovereignty.

In the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, Russia insisted international actors to respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty. For example, targeting United States, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “the United States, hiding behind appeals not to prevent the Ukrainian people from making a free choice, are in fact attempting to impose a ‘western vector’ on their development, dictating to the authorities of a sovereign country, what they should do” (MFA, 2014a). However, as the crisis intensified, the
Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry revealed it true perspective on Ukraine’s sovereignty. Whereas it acknowledges Ukraine as a state with legal (de jure) sovereignty, it does not assign Ukraine the real (de facto) sovereignty, undermining Ukraine’s power to determine and rule itself. The mere fact that Russia annexed Crimea – sovereign Ukrainian territory – proves this point. Such tendency is also disclosed, as Russia does not mention sovereignty of Ukraine in its foreign policy statements later in the crisis, purposely refraining from the notion of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Rather than complying with the logic of sovereign equality, Russia appeals to more cultural and historical legitimacies to justify its involvement in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. Sovereignty of Ukraine became a secondary issue for the Russian Federation as its hegemonic identity views Ukraine’s sovereignty less “powerful” than its own.

If Russia does not see Ukraine as de facto sovereign entity, where does sovereignty of Ukraine stand and what is the basis of Russia’s understanding of Ukraine? Driven by the hegemonic identity, Ukraine is a legally sovereign state, whose sovereignty is less powerful – thus compromisable without consent – than that of Russia. Its constant reference to Ukraine as “fraternal state” or “friend” and disrespect of Ukraine’s sovereignty suggests that Russia does not see Ukraine as an equal partner in the international arena. In fact, some scholars (Hille, 2013) have asserted that Russia often does not recognize Ukraine as a separate state because it has long been the “fraternal country” to Russia. In 2013, Mr. Putin himself stated, “Let me tell you absolutely seriously and without any irony that we often use the phrases ‘fraternal country’ or ‘fraternal nation’. If we really say that it is a fraternal nation and a fraternal country,
then we should act the way close family members do and support the Ukrainian people in this difficult situation.” (Hille, 2013) Referring to the danger Crimean residents were facing against the “ultranational Banderovite”, the Russian Foreign Ministry also claimed it had no choice but to take measures for the sake of people of Crimea though legally, they were the citizens of Ukraine. It stated that the illegitimate authority have denied the right of the Crimean population to free will and gives out strong tone that Russia will not tolerate such violation of rights in Crimea. However, not only are the life and security of Crimean residents principally Ukraine’s domestic issue, Russia simply does not have a jurisdiction over Ukrainian people or Russian nationals who are citizens of Ukrainian. Despite these facts, Russia disrespected Ukraine’s sovereignty, refraining from using the notion of “sovereignty of Ukraine”.

Instead of complying with principle of equal sovereignty, Russia uses other reasons to justify its intervention in Ukraine’s domestic affairs. Of many commonalities the two countries share, one that stands out and was constantly “used” by Russia is their religion, the Russian Orthodoxy. Religion, in fact, played as a key motivation for Russia’s involvement in Crimea. The first notion of church in its statement regarding Ukraine appeared on the 24th of February – at an early stage of the crisis – when it denounced the national radicals in Kiev, who are “threats to Orthodox sanctities”, which is also a threat to “sanctities of the entire Russian world.” The message it displays here is clear: if the (Russian) Orthodoxy is threatened in Ukraine, Russia will consider it as its own problem and threat. This notion demonstrates that Russia perceives itself as more than an ordinary state, perhaps a country with great ambition to
occupy a very powerful – hegemonic – position. At the same time, it shows how Ukraine is not perceived as a completely independent sovereign state; rather, it is seen an affiliation, or at least a part of the Russian World.

Shared religion is also used as a reference point to invigorate memories of the two countries’ shared Soviet history. In its statement on the 27th of February, the Ministry stated, “…we must stop interference in church affairs, the besmearing of Orthodox temples, memorials in honor of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, who freed Ukraine from fascism, and other monuments.” Three distinct features are noteworthy in this statement: first is the usage of the Orthodox Church to criticize Ukraine’s domestic affairs as mentioned above; second trait is its reference to the Great Patriotic War. Better known as conflicts though in the Eastern Front during the World War II, the word “Great Patriotic War” is only used in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union. By mentioning the event in the certain way, Russia was appealing to their shared history, when they fought a common enemy together. More importantly, it was referring to the time when Russian and Ukraine were a one country, when the boundary between Ukrainians and Russians were much blurrier; third, the statement also mentions that Ukrainians were freed from fascism; indirectly, it is implied that the Soviet Union – which the Russian Federation is the successor of – emancipated Ukraine. According to such perspective, where Ukraine is perceived as a part of Russia, sovereignty of Ukraine becomes a substandard issue.

Also important is the choice of words Russia used concerning the events in Crimea in 2014. While most western countries saw the Crimean crisis as Russia’s infringement of
Ukraine’s sovereignty, Russia used more positive and emotional vocabularies such as “reunification” and “acceptance”. The Russian Foreign Minister vividly exhibited such tendency in his speeches on the 20th of March 2014, where, he began his speech in the plenary session with “I present for your consideration documents about the reunification of the Republic of Crimea and the Russian Federation.” Here, the word “reunification” presents a central connotation because nowhere in other foreign media or Government publications the annexation is described as “reunification”. The way Russia describes the situation is very different from the rest of the world. By using the term “reunification” Russia sent a message that Crimea had only been separated temporarily and now has united back to Russia, which necessarily undermines the sovereignty of Ukraine.

Such attitude towards Ukraine’s sovereignty is extremely contradictory to Russia’s stance on its own sovereignty. In fact, as explained earlier in this study, Russia has been using “sovereignty” as synonymous to “unlimited state power”. The notion of “sovereign democracy” has been used to deter international actors from involving themselves to Russia’s sovereign affairs. While such dual interpretation of sovereignty could be seen as a mere contradiction, it could also be the case – as is argued in this study – that Russia’s concept of sovereignty is twofold, where not all de jure sovereignties possess de facto sovereign power. The official statements of the Russian Foreign Ministry has shown that Russia used cultural and historical reference as justifications for the intervention in Ukraine’s domestic affairs, while formally recognizing Ukraine’s sovereignty. This demonstrates that Russia sees Ukraine’s
sovereignty as *de jure* concept, while it lacks the recognition of *de facto* power (sovereignty).

In contrast to its perception of sovereignty of Ukraine, Russia does recognize *de facto* sovereignties of more “significant” states such as Western European states and United States. It is important to note that while it is important to acknowledge a special relations between Ukraine and Russia, brought to the international arena, Ukraine is as equal of a state as other sovereign states such as Member States of the European Union or United States. However, Russia’s treatment of sovereignty of these different states significantly varied during the Crimean crisis. Most notably, Russia regarded the western countries as “partners”. The Member States of the European Union and United States, which were actively involved in criticizing Russia with regards to the Crimean crisis, are referred to as “western partners”, a term entailing much respect in Russian foreign policy documents. For example, during the interview on the situation in Ukraine in March of 2014, the Ministry stated, “We hope that the European Union, which is attempting to play the leading role in Ukraine, although not always successfully, will not take any steps, which may disrupt trust in it as a strategic partner”. Shortly after, the Russian Foreign Ministry used the word “partner” referring to the United States when it stated, “We have reminded our Western partners, in particular the United States, many times that such ill-considered actions are counter-productive”. As such, Russia has demonstrated that Russia’s treatment of equally sovereign states differ according to its understanding of what kind of sovereignty a particular country possesses: states with only *de jure* sovereignty e.g. Ukraine
perceived as inferior, and those with *de facto* sovereignty e.g. United States recognized as equal actors.

**European Concept of Sovereignty Applied in Ukraine**

Contrary to Russia, Europe sees all sovereign states as “equally sovereignty”. Europe does not distinguish Ukraine’s *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignties, and accept it as a fully sovereign state, equivalent to Russia, and the Member States of the European Union. Therefore, while Russia saw the crisis in Crimea as a conflict between sovereign superior Russia and Ukraine with inferior sovereignty, Europe saw the event in Crimea as a conflict between equally sovereign states. Also, because Ukraine’s sovereignty is as authoritative as that of European Union, the EU refrained from intervening in the matter without a request from Ukraine itself. Such understanding of sovereignty is well demonstrated in the statements of the European External Action Service regarding the events in Crimea.

Most important reason for the clash between Russia and Europe with regards to Crimea is their approach towards sovereignty of Ukraine. In Europe, sovereignty of Ukraine is treated equally as sovereignty of Russia and the Member States of the European Union. While Russia does not mention sovereignty of Ukraine is its foreign policy, Europe consistently appealed to the notion sovereign equality. Emphasizing equality among sovereign states, the EEAS stated, “The (European) Council emphasizes the right of all sovereign states to make their own foreign policy decisions without undue external pressure”. As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine
intensified the EEAS High Representative Catherine Ashton reasserted that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine “must be respected at all times and by all sides”. For Europe, Russia had no right or legitimacy to intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign Ukraine. In contrast to Russian Foreign Ministry’s public statements, which used culture, history and other common features between Russia and Ukraine to justify its intervention in Ukraine, the European counterpart’s logic is strictly legal and impassive. Condemning Russia for the infringement of Ukraine’s sovereignty, the EEAS listed multiple international agreements and treaties Russia had breached upon Russia’s intervention in Crimea. The list included the UN Charter, the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, as well as of Russia's specific commitments to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 1997 between Russia and Ukraine. From the perspective of the European Union, for whom legal sovereignty is identical with de facto sovereignty, what happened in Crimea was “an unprovoked and unacceptable violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and its territorial integrity”.

In addition, in many instances, the EEAS confirmed that the EU sees both Ukraine and Russia equally and criticized Russia for not sharing the same perspective on state sovereignty. For example, President of the European Commission Barroso insisted that Russia needs to “accept fully the right of these countries (countries under the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood policy) to decide their own future and the nature of relations they chose to have with Russia” (Barroso, 2014). Also the Union stressed that bringing
stability and prosperity to Ukraine required recognition of the sovereign right of the Ukrainian people to make their own choices about their future, which Russia lacked due to its view on Ukraine’s sovereignty. The EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht’s statement also revealed Europe’s viewpoint when he stated, “For us, Ukraine is a sovereign country that can decide for itself with whom and to what extent it has relations. For us, Russia is not an opponent - I think we better should be partners with respect to Ukraine”. Also, although the EU highly disapproved Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, because Russia’s sovereignty is also as important as that of any other state, instead of taking direct actions, the Union mainly condemned Russia and sought to establish dialogue between Russia and Ukraine; this way, Europe avoids violating neither Russia’s nor Ukraine’s sovereignty. In this vein, although sanctions were imposed later in the crisis, major effort from the European side were made with the aim to facilitate political dialogue between Russia and Ukraine to de-escalate the situation. In a statement published by the EEAS after the High Representative Catherine Ashton’s visit to Ukraine, it is revealed that the EU’s effort is aimed at establishing the dialogue between the conflicting actors, rather being directly involved in the matters of the two sovereign states. The statements wrote, “the EU follows the situation in Ukraine closely and calls on all sides to continue engaging in a meaningful and inclusive dialogue leading to a lasting solution of the crisis; to protect the unity and territorial integrity of the country;” As such, Europe’s concept of sovereignty is unitary, where it sees one and only kind/type of sovereignty. For Europe, driven from
its isocratic identity, sovereignty is a concept that has an equal application and meaning to all sovereign states.

2-2. Absoluteness of Sovereignty

Different Absoluteness of Different Sovereignties in Russia

The dual conception of sovereignty had an important policy implication regarding the Crimean crisis in 2014. There is no agreement between Russia and Ukraine on Ukraine’s delegation of its sovereignty to Russia. However, because Russia’s concept of sovereignty separates de jure and de facto sovereignties, Ukraine’s sovereignty is different from that of Russia’s in terms of absoluteness. While Russia’s sovereignty is an absolute concept, which cannot be interfered and require full respect at all times, Ukraine’s sovereignty is subject to compromise and contravention.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation ceased using or referring to the sovereignty of Ukraine as Russia started directly engaging in Crimea. In fact, during the analyzed period, Ukraine’s sovereignty was only mentioned once by the MFA in its first public statements. When the events intensified in Crimea and the Federation Council of Russia authorized the use of the armed forces on the territory of Ukraine, Russia stopped bringing up sovereignty of Ukraine, neither affirming nor denying of its existence. The fact that Russia, where sovereignty lies at the core of its political ideology – “sovereign democracy” – and is characterized as absolute concept, infringed Ukraine’s sovereignty demonstrates that the power and limitation of de jure and de facto sovereignty considerably vary.
Whereas Russia’s determination for the absolute sovereignty has been repetitively asserted, “another” sovereignty (exclusively de jure) entails extremely different degree of absoluteness. In a public statement by the MFA regarding the Declaration of Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Russia announced that it recognized Crimea as a “an independent and sovereign state with a republican order”; had Russia a unitary understanding of the concept of sovereignty, it would have been extremely unlikely for Russia to assign “sovereignty” to the territory of Crimea. In this vein, Russia’s dual concept of sovereignty, which allows them to incorporate sovereignty of subordinate entity in the grand concept of Russia’s sovereignty, the Russian Government was able annex another sovereign state’s territory and claim it a “sovereign” territory while claiming it as part of Russia.

**Unitary Concept of Sovereignty in Europe**

For the European Union, sovereignties of Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union are identical. There is no distinction between their power, limitation and absoluteness; all sovereign states’ sovereignty are absolute concepts that oblige nonintervention and require full respect. In this vein, in contrast to Russia, which assigns absoluteness in its sovereignty and sees Ukraine’s sovereignty as subject for imposed compromise, the European Union perceives sovereignty of Russia and Ukraine as equally absolute concepts. Therefore, the Crimean crisis from the European perspective is an intolerable infringement of Ukraine’s sovereignty by the Russian Federation. Full respect of
involved states’ sovereignties is revealed in the public statements, where Europe provides options to Ukraine, rather than impose measures.

From the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, the European Union repetitively claimed that the Union is ready to provide assistance to Ukraine if requested by Ukrainian authorities. It requested Ukraine to proactively “invite” the European authority for support i.e. give Europe the legitimacy to be involve instead of infringing Ukraine’s sovereignty. By stating that the Union “invites Ukraine to reach out for international mechanisms for crisis resolution” in the first Council conclusion on Ukraine, the EU made it clear that it would only intervene if Ukraine itself requests the Union for assistance. It also insisted Ukraine to retain the ownership of the situation and asserted that only Ukraine should and can manage the circumstances. For instance, in the public statements titled “Only a Ukrainian plan can work”, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy asserted that the only plan that could work is a “Ukrainian plan agreed by Ukrainians” (Füle, 2014).

Also, instead of imposing measures to either Ukraine or Russia, Europe volunteered to be the bridging gap and a venue for constructive dialogues between the conflicting states. Such attitude can be seen as an outcome of Europe’s reluctance to infringe Ukraine’s sovereign matter. During the crisis and even after the annexation of Crimea, Europe consistently did not take direct measures and insisted that the involved parties hold a dialogue for a peaceful solution. These claims demonstrate that Europe’s unitary concept of sovereignty – which fully respects absoluteness of all sovereign states’ sovereignties – influences Europe’s foreign policy conduct. Simply put, one of
the reasons for Europe’s noninvolvement could be due to the fact that Europe does not wish to infringe Ukraine’s sovereignty by intervening in the domestic affairs of Ukraine as Crimea is recognized as part of sovereign Ukraine’s territory.

The different actions as well as tone and contents of public statements in Russia and Europe verify that the two have very different conceptions of sovereignty. The case of the annexation of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated that this difference serves as an important element in their understanding of foreign policy circumstance and ultimately influences their foreign policy conduct.

IV. National Identity and Concept of Sovereignty

1. Different Conceptions of Sovereignty

Different conceptions of sovereignty served as a reason for the clash between Russia and Europe regarding Crimea in 2014. Then, how and why are the conceptions of sovereignty different in Russia and Europe? This study finds that the concept is largely shaped by countries’ national identity. In essence, different identities shape different conceptions that are basis of foreign policy, which may lead to a clash in the international arena. Such was the case of the clash between Russia and Europe, where the spoke of a same concept with different meanings.

If Russia and Europe clash on Crimea due to their different conceptions of sovereignty, and such concept is based on their national identity, one must trace the origin by investigating national identity of the two entities. However, as mentioned above,
identifying national identity is not a simple task. It is a constantly changing and constructed concept, comprised of various traits. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the well-established characteristics of Russia and Europe’s identity, which are deeply rooted from its history.

2. Russian National Identity

2-1. National Identity in Russia

Different scholars have suggested diverse views on what comprises Russian national identity. In general, many authors have indicated an ambiguity in defining Russian national identity. In his book published in 1902 *All the Russians: Travels and Studies in Contemporary European Russia, Finland, Siberia, the Caucuses, and Central Asia*, Henry Norman (1914) – a member of British Parliament who specialized in Russia-related Affairs for fifteen years – wrote “It would be easier to say what is not Russia” to the question of “What is Russia?” (Franklin & Widdis, 2004). Former Russian Ambassador to the United States, Vladimir Lukin, in giving his definition of Russian identity, provided an equally confusing response by stating that Russia is “less a choice than a fate” (Allensworth, 1998). Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1996), in his essay *The Russian Question at the End of the 20th Century*, wrote that national identity in the case of Russia is not determined by blood or geographical boundaries, but rather by spirit or consciousness, and whoever belongs to such spirit and culture by consciousness is Russians. In the same vein, Andrei Tsygankov (2010), in his manuscript *Honor in International Relations: Russia and the West from Alexander to*
Putin, wrote that the key to understanding the Russian identity lies in the sense of national honor that determines Russia’s behavior as international actor.

Even Russia itself recognizes the complexity in Russia’s national identity conception. For example, the Declaration of Russian Identity (2014) states that it is impossible to describe belongingness to a Russia, and acknowledges that Russian identity genetically entails complexity. The Declaration states, “Citizens of Russia may be Russians, Karels, Tartars, Avars or Buryats, meanwhile Russians may be citizens of Russia, the U.S., Australia, Romania or Kazakhstan” (Russian Orthodox Church, 2014) admitting that the national and civil overlaps exist in various phenomenological planes.

However, although Russia’s identity may be confusing and complex, there are components one could investigate in order to find out what the identity entails. In fact, the Declaration of Russian Identity recognizes some key component in Russia’s national identity. It states, “belonging to the Russian nation is determined by a complex of relationships: general and marital, linguistic and cultural, religious history” (Russian Orthodox Church, 2014). In fact, religion and history has played an important role in Russia’s identity construction. More specifically, the Declaration (2014) confirms that the orthodoxy fate played a key role in forming Russian identity, and, referring to the Victory in 1945, states that historic events have created a deep emotional bond amid the Russian people. These elements serve as a useful starting point to examine what and how Russia’s sees its national identity construction.

An examination of Russia’s history provides a useful insight in understanding Russia’s national identity concept. Most notably, one that stands out is its history as an empire
and the subsequent ‘imperial identity’ as Russia had become an empire before it became a state (Prizel, 1998). The history of the Russian Federation suggests that it had been called an “empire” for centuries until the end of Romanov dynasty. In fact, many events in its history bolstered Russia’s imperial identity such as the annexation of Ukraine in 1654 and Vilnius in 1795. Later on, the Napoleonic wars made Russia even more imperial than it had been in the eighteenth century (Suny R. G., 2001).

Some scholars have investigated such impartial identity in Russia. Pipes (1996), for example, focused on Russia’s imperial identity, and led an intellectual school that outlines significant chronological continuities that run through Russian history from the Middle Ages through the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union to post-Soviet times. Suny (2007) also investigated whether Russia has detached itself from imperial past. Rejecting the idea that foreign policy is historically predetermined, he argued that it is formed by ‘national interests’ that are made up of perceptions, ideas and identities. Applying the Constructivist approach, he argues that between 1700 and 1991, Russia identified itself as some kind of empire, and that such identification been fundamental to the construction of its interests. Though no longer imperial, Russia post-1991 had to deal with the crises that fractured many of the new republics. Suny called these crises the ‘legacies of empire that present both problems and opportunities for Russia’ (Suny R. G., 2007). Bugalski (2004), in the similar vein, argued that Russian domestic and foreign policy remains infused with imperialism and the ‘greatness syndrome’ (Bugalski, 2004). Russia’s post-imperialist identity is tied to self-proclaimed spheres of
influence; the ambiguity of what constitutes as ‘Russian’ means that these spheres can also expand.

2-2. Imperial Legacy and Hegemonic Identity

Imperial identity and Hegemonic Identity

In relation to Russian national identity, it is imperative to distinguish two similar, yet different conceptions: concepts of imperial and hegemonic identities (see Table 1). In essence, both are driven from the idea of a powerful and influential state – an empire and a hegemon; however, there are noteworthy differences between the two. In order to examine whether Russia possesses the former or latter will clarify Russia’s national identity today and provide a basis for understanding its concept of sovereignty. Therefore, in order to understand these different identities, one must first recognize the different characteristics of an Empire and a Hegemon. Examining these two contested concepts will help to understand how Russia has arrived to the current identity conception and what this particular identity entails.

Many scholars (Doyle, 1986; Take, 2005) have continually emphasized the controversial nature of the term “empire” in international relations. While it is a contentious term, it is generally accepted that the word “empire” connotes a large-scale dominance by one state based on the use or threat of military intervention. More specifically, Doyle (1986) provided a widely cited definition of empire as “a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy – the effective sovereignty – of
the other, the subordinate periphery.” Under this formal-legal definition, the subordinate periphery states lack in international legal personality and nominally independent government, therefore, unable to set own policies or represent themselves in the international arena (Take, 2005).

On the other hand, a “hegemon” is a state that has the capacity and the will to lead and overpower other states without depriving them of nominal sovereignty or absorbing them into the hegemon’s territory (Shyam, 2014). The word was first used to describe the relationship of Athens to the other Greek city-states when they leagued together to defend themselves against the Persian Empire; Athens led, but did not rule over the others (Johansson, 2002). In the contemporary IR setting, a hegemon implies more than a mere leadership as demonstrated in the case of Athens. The hegemon would use both hard, military power and soft, diplomatic, economic and cultural power to establish and maintain itself as a dominant actor in the region. Some authors (Wallerstein, 2002; Lake, 1993) have defined it as “hegemony is necessarily coercive and based on the exercise of power; the hegemon must effectively change the policies of other states to satisfy its own goals” (Wallerstein, 2002; Lake, 1993), which results in the confusion between the concept of the hegemon and empire. However, there are still fundamental difference between an empire and a hegemon.

While the center-periphery dichotomy of empire and hegemon presents resemblance between the two concepts, the core difference lies in the fact that while surrounding states at least have nominal sovereignty under a hegemon, empire dispossesses them of over-all sovereignty. Also, in contrast with a hegemon, an empire would actively seek
to form a territorially large polity by absorbing other territories. While an empire acts upon the goal of dominating the region, a hegemon bases its behavior on pursuit of its interest, often times the goal being establishing itself as an influential actor in the region.

Table 1. Main Features of Empire and Hegemony

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Empire</th>
<th>Hegemon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal</strong></td>
<td>System of domination</td>
<td>Establishment of an order for the realization of the hegemon’s goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means</strong></td>
<td>Military intervention, Threat of intervention</td>
<td>Sanctions, threats, political pressure; Material benefits/inducements; Normative persuasion, socialization;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-representation</strong></td>
<td>Aggressive, threatening, compelling subordination</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subordinate’s Sovereignty</strong></td>
<td>No sovereignty</td>
<td>Nominal (legal) sovereignty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own completion based on Destradi (2008)

**Hegemonic Identity in Russia**

Scholars as well as practitioners (Prizel, 1998; Reagan, 1983) have persisted on the idea of Russia as an empire for decades, even after the formal cessation of the Russian Empire in 1917. However, it is important to acknowledge that Russia’s concept of national identity is subject to constant changes; though it may have possessed the ‘imperial identity’ in the past, a careful scrutiny reveals that Russia’s current national identity conception more resembles that of a hegemon (see Table 2).
Russia’s identity has evolved during the past several centuries; from the sixteenth century Tsarist Russia to a Soviet Republic, and the post-Soviet democratic Russia, it has gone through different stages of transformation and such state transformation has constructed and molded Russia’s national identity conception. In order to understand the evolution of Russia’s conception of national identity, one must understand the pathway through which it arrived to the current conception.

The Russian Empire – also known as the All-Russian Empire – was established in 1721 and was the one of the largest empires in world history, stretching over three continents on the globe. Having conquered the biggest territory, it lasted until execution of the Romanov family by the short-lived liberal February Revolution in 1917. As an Empire, Russia during this period consequently had acquired the identity of an empire. With the imperial national identity conception, Russia’s external policies had been largely characterized as expansionist and hostile towards other states. While it is clear that the Russian Empire behaved consistent with the imperial identity, national identity conception during the Soviet period is more complicated in both its construction and content.

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Russia vigorously strived to establish a new system, a new path, and accordingly, a new identity to differentiate itself from the Russian Empire. However, during the Soviet Union era, while the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) strived to institutionalize Communist ideology grounded on the idea of equality with no superior entity, the analysis of the Soviet
policy demonstrates that the Soviet institutionalization, in fact, had resulted in the development and strengthening of the hegemonic identity in Russia. The USSR was a socialist state on the Eurasian continent, comprised of multiple subnational Soviet republics. Although it was a union of states, it had a one-party system with highly centralized government and economy, governed by the Communist Party with the capital of RSFSR – Moscow – as its center. After the overthrow of the Romanov dynasty, the Soviet Union searched to construct its new identity based on the Communist ideology and ethno-territorial principle of Soviet federalism. As Brubaker noted “no other state has gone so far with sponsoring codifying, institutionalizing, even (in some cases) inventing nationhood and nationality on the sub-state level, while at the same time doing nothing to institutionalize them on the level of state as a whole.” (Brubaker, 1994)

However, as much as Lenin and Stalin wanted to separate the Soviet Union from the Russian Empire, as a successor of an Empire that lasted for over a century, the USSR failed to completely alienate itself from the hegemonic elements in its identity conception. On the contrary, Soviet institutionalization process and policies had led to the development and enforcement of a hegemonic identity, with the main source being Soviet nationality policy (Korenizatsiya). Soviet nationality policy was aimed at blurring Russian and Soviet identity in order to construct a ‘Soviet identity’. The problem with this policy, however, was that it resulted in assigning the ethnic Russians the role of what might be called the imperial glue of the Soviet state (Suny, 1993), resulting in the construction of hegemonic identity for Russia.
When it comes to nationality policies in Russia it is important to make a distinction between the Russian (Rossiiskiy) and ethnic Russian (Russkiy). The Soviet nationality policy was subjected towards the ethnic Russians with the purpose to discriminate against the RSFSR. The reason was that the Russians were by far the largest ethnic group, constituting approximately 82 percent of the republican population; the Soviet Union as a whole was fearful of the possible unbalance between the RSFSR and other Union republics, which could have compromised the Communist ideology. In this vein, the RSFSR did not have its national anthem, communist party, ministry of foreign affairs or a television channel; it was also not permitted to establish national library or academy of science. However, while such institutional structure was designed to discriminate against the Russians, the outcome was quite the opposite. Contrary to all other union republics, the RSFSR was not the republic ‘of’ and ‘for’ Russians (Brudny & Finkel, 2011) and this has resulted in ethnic Russians perceiving the entire Soviet Union as their own. In other words, by blurring the Russian and Soviet identities for ethnic Russians, it reinforced Russian national identity that essentially blended Russian and Soviet into one, resulting in the continuation and reinforcement of the hegemonic nature of identity as far as the ethnic Russians were concerned. In short, the institutional structure of the Soviet Union resulted in the construction of Russian national identity conception, which made Russians perceive themselves as a center – hegemon – of the Soviet Union.
Table 2. Main Features of Empire and Hegemony

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Hegemon 1)</th>
<th>Russia 2)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Establishment of an order for the realization of the hegemon’s goals</td>
<td>Establishment of the Russian World (&quot;Russian Civilization&quot;)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Sanctions, threats, political pressure; Material benefits/inducements;</td>
<td>Appeal to the common history of the Soviet Union; Political and Economic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normative persuasion, socialization</td>
<td>pressure; Use of threatening language; Military Intervention;</td>
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<td>Self-representation</td>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Cooperative towards the peripheries; Hostile towards other great powers;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subordinate’s</td>
<td>Nominal sovereignty</td>
<td>Nominal sovereignty (de jure sovereignty granted to the former Soviet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
<td>Republics, but de facto unrecognized)</td>
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Source: 1) own completion based on Destradi (2008)  
2) own completion

The evolution of the imperial identity to hegemonic identity in Russia demonstrates that while Russia’s concept of national identity has changed throughout its history, the core of hegemonic self-perception has remained unaffected on the whole. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has been endeavoring to maintain close ties with the former Union member states in reflection of its hegemonic identity. As the bipolar Cold War world ended, Russia lost its status as one of two hegemonic powers and duly the international bargaining power that came along with such position. The widespread
sense of loss of great power status encountered by policymakers opened many questions regarding how Russian foreign policy could be most effective in establishing the country’s new role as a competing international force (Descalzi, 2011). So far, no institutional or structural changes have been made in Russia to reverse the Soviet legacy with regards to Russia’s national identity; Russia today still sees itself as a hegemonial entity in the territory of former Soviet Union, and such tendency is largely evident in Russia’s foreign policy today. Vladimir Putin’s speech ascertained point, when he stated that Russia needs a strong state power and must have it (Putin, 1999). Russia’s hegemonic identity conception is best shown in its foreign policy towards the Commonwealth of Independent States, which it evidently perceives as a group of subordinate states. In early 2000s, Russia had relaxed its ties with the CIS to a certain extent, while loosely maintaining the “special ties”. In an official statement after the informal meeting of CIS heads of state in 2000, President Putin stated, “…expanded multi-lateral and bilateral cooperation between CIS countries matched global trends at the turn of the 21st century, as well as CIS national interests. The CIS, which is an inalienable part of the international community, is open for large-scale constructive cooperation with all countries in the search for an adequate response to modern challenges” (Putin, 2000). From this statement, it seems Russia is acknowledging the CIS countries as equal parts and strives for cooperation. Also, in the next Summit in 2006, Mr. Putin, commenting on bilateral energy sector relations with Belarus, stated, “Russia’s Gazprom and Belarusian company ‘Beltransgaz’ would create a joint venture on a parity basis” (President of Russia, 2006). Nonetheless, by Putin’s second term,
Russia exhibited different attitude towards the CIS. For example, in the 2006 CIS Summit, Russia proposed some significant changes to the organization, which during the following several years resulted in assigning Russia a pivotal actor in the Commonwealth; they proposals range from agreements on economic cooperation, especially in the energy sector, which inevitably gave Russia much leverage over the other CIS countries. In addition, an introduction of chairmanship presented an opportunity for Russia to systematically influence other CIS members, a behavior typical to a hegemon in pursuit of establishing an environment to achieve its interest. It is explicitly indicated that adopting the Statute on the Chairmanship in the CIS is “designed to strengthen the political and practical role of this institution and (it is) about introducing an institution of national coordinators for the CIS in member states” (MFA, 2009). Consequently, this chairmanship position along with other economic agreements placed Russia in the proportionate influential position over other members. In fact, as Mr. Putin’s presidency continued, Russia’s display of hegemonial identity intensified.

In order to maintain its influence over the neighboring countries, the Russian government adopted a new Foreign Policy Concept in 2008 that reaffirmed the “fundamental importance” of the CIS and characterized “the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with CIS member-states” as “the major thrust of Russia’s foreign policy” (MFA, 2008). Constantly emphasizing the importance of the CIS, in the Summit with the leaders of the 12 member countries of the CIS in 2014, Mr. Putin urged “Whatever the length and tediousness of the search for new forms of work
within the CIS, we mustn’t put up obstacles to work in the areas where tangible achievements have already been reached” (Xinhua, 2014). The above quotes demonstrate Russia’s ambition to strengthen the CIS as an institution and a tool to impose influence in the region as well as its desire to establish a more superior position within this institution. It is evident that Russia sees the CIS as a useful instrument to maintain connections with and influence over its former peripheries. However, Russia’s policy towards CIS countries has not been very fruitful. In fact, the CIS Free Trade Zone, which was established in 2011 failed to further develop into a total multilateral free trade agreement. Without the ratification of some signatories of the CIS, Russia’s ultimate goal of establishing a Common Economic Space naturally could not be materialized. Given these difficulties, Russia in recent years has been diversifying its efforts to maintain its position amongst the former Soviet states.

As part of such effort, more recently, Russia has been expanding on the idea of CIS cooperation, pushing forward with the establishment of Eurasian Economic Union (EurAsEc), that is “capable of becoming on the of the poles in a future multi-polar world” (Putin, 2011) Some (Krickovic, 2004) argue that such push for Eurasian integration is a direct response of the Russian government reacting to the rapidly changing global political environment. In fact, Russia had acknowledged “There are tectonic shifts in the geopolitical balance of forces, which are related to the formation of a new polycentric system of international relations” (MFA, 2014a).
2-3. Hegemonic Identity and Concept of Sovereignty

De jure and de facto Sovereignties

Russia’s hegemonic identity results in a particular understanding of state sovereignty that considerably influence Russia’s foreign policy. Sovereignty as a legal terminology is an absolute concept. There is no variation in the degree of “sovereignty”. All sovereign states have equal sovereignty; there are no superior and interior sovereignties. However, sovereignty as a political concept may entail variations; such is the concept of sovereignty in the Russian Federation. While Russia recognizes legal sovereignties of nation-states, this does not automatically assign them de facto sovereignty. In other words, Russia sees different kinds of sovereignties and states: equal states with de facto sovereignty, and subordinate states with only nominal (de jure) sovereignty. The former include countries in the Western Europe and the United States, while previous Soviet republics e.g. the CIS countries fall under the latter category. Russia’s Declaration on Sovereignty of the RSFSR, first Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2000, and the Alma-Ata Declaration exhibit such characteristic in Russia’s understanding of sovereignty.

First evidence that shows Russia’s dual understanding of sovereignty can be found in the Declaration of Sovereignty of the RSFSR issued in 1991. The Declaration claimed that the sovereignty of the RSFSR prevails that of the Soviet Union, where it established priority of the constitution and laws of the RSFSR over legislation of the Soviet Union. The USSR, excluding the RSFSR, merely represents 14 other Soviet
Republics including Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Georgia and such. By claiming its superiority over the USSR, Russia in effect had declared supremacy of Russia’s sovereignty over the rest of Soviet Republics.

The evidence that Russia does not perceive sovereignties of the former Soviet Republics is also found in the Alma-Ata Declaration, which established the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991. On one hand, the preamble of the Declaration states that it seeks to establish relations between the CIS states on the basis of mutual recognition and respect for state sovereignty. It is implied that the signatories’ (de jure) sovereignties are recognized in the Declaration. On the other hand, the content of the Declaration contains provisions that deprive the CIS of de facto sovereignty. It also claimed that the aim of this regional organization is to construct “relations of friendship, good neighborliness and mutually advantageous co-operation, which has deep historic roots, meets the basic interest of nationals and promotes the cause of peace and security” (Council of Heads of State and Council of CIS Heads of State, 1991), appealing to the CIS states’ common history and culture as a foundation for the inter-state relations. With Russia having the most influence in the drafting of the document, rather than using terminologies with equal connotation it uses towards the Western countries e.g. ‘partners’, more emotional words such as ‘cooperation’ and ‘friendship’ are frequently used to describe desired relations between Russia and the members of the Commonwealth. Also, the Declaration requires the participating states to guarantee to fulfill obligations “stemming from the treaties and agreements of the former USSR” (Council of Heads of State and Council of CIS Heads of State, 1991),
which necessarily positions Russia in a superior position compared to other signatories of the Declaration because Russia had been the central actor and *de facto* policy-maker in the Soviet Union. Aside from the key components of the Declaration, it also enforces the usage of the Russian language as the official working language and the Russian alphabetical order is used to decide the order of the meetings of the Council. Article IV of the Agreement on Strategic Forces in the Alma-Ata Declaration also demonstrates that sovereignties of the former Soviet Republics are not recognized as *de facto* conception. Significant authority and autonomy is given to the Russian Federation in managing matters of the sovereign member states neighboring the Russian Federation. For example, the Agreement conditions that until the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the president of the Russian Federation takes the decision on the need for their use. (Council of Heads of State and Council of CIS Heads of State, 1991). Furthermore, the process of destruction of nuclear weapons located on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Ukraine is instructed to take place with the participation of the Russian Federation (Council of Heads of State and Council of CIS Heads of State, 1991). Although the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine assume *de jure* sovereignty by the Declaration’s Preamble, in practice, the two lack *de facto* sovereignty since they are unable to manage matters in their own territory and require Russia’s approval.

In defining regional priorities in the Alma-Ata Declaration, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses terminologies such as ‘cooperation’ and ‘good neighborly relations’ rather than ‘partners’ with equivalent connotation. While it states, “Practical
relations with them (CIS) should be structured with due regards for reciprocal openness to cooperation and readiness to take into account in a due manner the interest of the Russian Federation” asserting principle of reciprocity, it adds, “…including in terms of guarantee of rights of Russian compatriots” (MFA, 2000). This excerpt provides the Russian Federation with legitimacy to get involved in domestic affairs of the CIS member states. In the same vein, the Declaration of sovereignty supports this view by stating that citizens of the RSFSR outside the Republic remain under protection and patronage of the RSFSR (Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, 1990). While Russia repetitively emphasizes the importance of “respect for sovereignty” with regards Russia’s own sovereignty, the CIS states are not guaranteed equivalent autonomy or authority, e.g. lacking the de facto sovereignty.

On the other hand, Russia’s attitude towards Western European states’ sovereignty significantly differs from that of CIS; these states are perceived as equal actors and given both de jure and de facto sovereignty. The constant reference to the EU as ‘partners’ demonstrates this point. For example, in the same article IV. Regional Priorities of the Agreement on Strategic Forces, the language used in describing the relations and aim with the European countries considerably vary from that used for the CIS. The Article states, “The Russian Federation views the EU as one of its main political and economic partners and will strive to develop with it an intensive, stable, and long-term cooperation devoid of expediency fluctuation” (italicize emphasis added; MFA, 2000). While large countries in Asia such as India and China are also dealt with the same line of language as the European Union Member States, notions on Central
and Eastern Europe and the Balkan resemble that used for the CIS states present a different line of language and attitude under the notion of “cooperation”.

**Absoluteness of the Concept of Sovereignty**

Another important element in Russia’s hegemonic conception of sovereignty concerns absoluteness of the concept. Russia’s distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* sovereign states results in different understanding of absoluteness of sovereignty as well: whereas *de facto* sovereignty is an absolute concept, states granted only *de jure* sovereignty is subject to compromise. Here, absoluteness or absolute concept of sovereignty is related to the notion that sovereignty entails ultimate supremacy. In accordance with this logic, Russia’s absolute sovereignty requires full respect and cannot be infringed, whereas its subordinate states’ sovereignty is inferior, and thus, is a subject for compromise (“compromisable”). In its foreign policy documents, Russia reaffirms that sovereignty of the Russian Federation and other equivalent sovereign states’ sovereignty are absolute concepts and should be respected at all times.

Notably, the Declaration of Sovereignty of the RSFSR states, “The State sovereignty of the RSFSR is a natural and essential condition for the existence of the statehood of Russia” (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 1991). From the very beginning of Russia’s existence as a sovereign entity, it saw the sovereignty as an absolute and essential element for the Russian state’s existence. It has been over two decades since Russia declared it sovereignty; such understanding of sovereignty still persists at the core of political philosophy of the Russian Federation. In fact, Russia has been using
‘sovereignty’ synonymous to ‘unlimited state power’. The development and usage of “sovereign democracy” to deter international actors from involving themselves to Russia’s sovereign affairs evidences Russia’s conception of its own sovereignty is an absolute conception.

According to the general principle of the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, the first main objective of Russia’s foreign policy efforts included, “to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve firm an prestigious position in worlds community…” (MFA, 2000) It also stated that attempts to belittle the role of a sovereign state as the fundamental element of international relations generate a threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs (MFA, 2000). Emphasizing the importance of sovereignty, the Foreign Affairs Ministry claimed it would conduct “independent and constructive” foreign policy.

It is important to note that Russia participates in international organizations and follows international law. This may appear as Russia’s willingness to compromise its sovereignty. However, although Russia complies with the rules of international organizations such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization, it has never given up or delegated its sovereignty to the IOs. In fact, the Foreign Policy Concept states, “Attempts to introduce into the international parlance such concepts as ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘limited sovereignty’ in order to justify unilateral power actions bypassing the U.N. Security Council are not acceptable” (MFA, 2000), clearly demonstrating that Russia’s concept of its own sovereignty is never a subject for negotiation or infringement.
On the other hand, Russia exhibits different attitude towards sovereignties of states it perceives as subordinates. In many instances, Russia has acted aggressively towards the periphery states, intervening their sovereign rights. Russia’s foreign policy towards the former Soviet Republics as demonstrated previous evidences that Russia has not only infringed in the CIS’ sovereign affairs, but also constructed a system via which their sovereignty may be disregarded. More specifically, the 2008 Georgian War and the recent annexation of Crimea, where Russia violated sovereignties of Georgia and Ukraine, clearly displays that Russia’s understanding of sovereignty’s absoluteness is two dimensional: there are sovereign states with absolute sovereignty, and there are also other “less” sovereign states.

3. The European Identity

3-1. Identity of Europe
The Member States of the European Union share common history, which enables them to form a common identity; the common history includes a combination of Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, the feudalism of the Middle Ages, the Hanseatic League, the Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment, 19th century liberalism, Christianity, secularism, colonialism and the experience of the two World Wars. During the course of development, Europe has fostered a sense of belongingness to the idea of “Europe”. Akin to Russia, Europe has both experienced similar political evolutions throughout history. Both European and Russian identities are products of historical construction. From the imperial era and ideological turmoil to today’s modern liberal democracies,
both have gone through an extensive transformation in their political system and ideology. However, whereas Russia never alienated itself from the legacy of an empire, Europe took a completely different path. Europe, having experienced atrocities of the two World Wars, has purposely abandoned imperial elements from nation-states for they saw the WWII as a side effect of the imperial legacy. Throughout the 20th century, Europe’s estrangement of imperial components with its determination to establish stable peace has shaped Europe’s identity, which this study views as ‘isocratic’.

In relation to foreign policy and concept of sovereignty, the most influential event in the contemporary European history was the Second World War. In fact, the European Union itself claims that the EU was created in the aftermath of the Second World War (European Union, n.db).

After the Second World War, most parts of Europe were completely destroyed. Not only damaged were the cities and buildings in Europe, but also the perception of the world and where Europe stood in the international arena. Subsequent to the World War II, Europe searched for a new identity, which would ensure peace and stability in the region. In this process, Europe attempted to identify the causes of the War in order to establish an environment where such event would never occur again. This pursuit and determinism to prevent such violence and destruction became the historical root for the development of the European Union. In this vein, the formation of the European identity goes parallel with the development of the European Union. The efforts to establish Europe as a peaceful and stable region, eventually translated into the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first predecessor of what
has now become the European Union. With the underlying idea that countries that trade with one another would become economically interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict, as of 1950, the regional organization began to unite European countries economically and politically in order to secure lasting peace. This intention is clearly pronounced in the Declaration Robert Schuman presented by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, who proposed the establishment of the ECSC. The principal idea of the ECSC was that the atrocities of the WWII were results of individual states’ attempt to seek selfish national interest. In order to prevent possible future conflict Schuman proposed establishing an institution where individual states in Europe would become a ‘united Europe’. As of 1950, Europe’s construction of common European identity started taking place, and in the following several decades successfully became a supranational institution with a shared value and identity.

3-2. Legacy of the WWII and Isocratic Identity

*Democracy, Isocracy, and Isocratic Identity*

The European Union’s fundamental ideology is liberal democracy. The founding principles of the European Union as stated in its Treaties include respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights (European Union, n.d.c); EU has been working on nurturing the democratic elements in its institutions given the supranational characteristic of the institution. Most recently, the Lisbon Treaty – which serves as a basic rulebook for the Union – included explicit provisions on democratic principles, which shows these efforts. However, rather than
seeing European identity as “democratic”, this study focuses on one particular element that comprises democracy: isocracy.

The first reason why this study choses to use the term ‘isocracy’ over ‘democracy’ is because the latter is most often used as a term within a national level. By definition, democracy is “a system of government in which all the people of a state or polity ... are involved in making decisions about its affairs” (Oxford English Dictionary). Although the concept of democracy has been defined various ways, etymologically, democracy means rule by the people, where “δῆμος” means ‘people’ and “κρατεῖν” means ‘rule’ or ‘power’. At its core, most scholars agree that democracy refers to a political practice in which individuals govern themselves through some form of equitable decision-making process. The issue that arises from the etymology is that the term requires notion of “people”. This research intends to be a work of International Relations with a state-centric approach; the subject of this study’s analysis is ‘states’ and not ‘people’. The term “democracy” with its necessity to explicitly address “people” in application is thus a less appropriate terminology to be used for this system-level analysis.

The “isocratic identity” this study uses to describe Europe’s identity is not a conventional terminology; it is, in fact, this study’s own invention. In its purest form, ‘isocracy’ is a form of government – a political thought – within a more comprehensive ideology of democracy. In this research, however, isocracy is treated as an independent element that has its own significance. While the term is most often used to describe national level governance, in this study, it is brought to the international level with its main elements applied to relations between different states.
and foreign policy. Rather than seeing individuals as subject where the idea of isocracy applies, this study will bring the idea to the international level and apply the concept to inter-state interactions. Hence, isocracy, which is a form of government where all citizens have equal power, here means, seeing states as equal powers, having equal sovereignty. In order to make this adjustment, the term “isocratic” must be clarified first; the following section will explain the meaning of “isocracy” by providing a contextual background, and clarify what this study denotes by “isocratic identity”.

An isocracy is derived from ancient Greek word “ἴσος” meaning ‘equal’ and “κρατεῖν” meaning “to have power/rule”. As one of the three i’s of democracy – isokratia, isigoria, and isonomia – isocracy is responsible for “equality to rule” in the dominant political ideology. It expands from the legal right of isonomia to political and economic systems, from equality of law, to equality in governance. To achieve this, an isocracy both combines and expands features of liberal rights and those in democratic rule. As a political term, isocracy claims to avoid the common criticisms of democracy (e.g., Tyranny of the Majority and Demagogy) by limiting public governance to the public sphere and private governance to the private sphere. With protections embodied through constitutions, thus not being subject to the vagaries of popular opinion, an isocracy is secular, republican, and does not discriminate on the basis of race, sex etc. (isocracy.org, 2013) The core propositions of isocracy include self ownership, informed consent, a common wealth of resource values, decentralized government, civil participation. As is for all the elements of democracy, peace and stability is considered as a virtue in isocracy.
Another reason why this study does not label the European identity as “democratic” is because calling it “democratic” would necessarily assume that all three elements of the term isokratia (equality to rule), isigoria (equal right to speak) and isonomia (equality under the law) are clearly present in the institution. Attesting all three elements in the European identity, however, is beyond the scope of this analysis. While the Treaties which the EU is based upon explicitly state that the Member States are guaranteed equality in power, whether their voice is represented equality in the EU institution is subject for debate; for example, in the European Parliament and the European Council, where the representatives from the Member States are given the right to speak, the number of representatives and the policy area they may express their opinion significantly vary. In this regard, some may argue that not all Member States in the EU interpret the concept of isigoria – equal right to speak – in the same way; thus, whether isigoria is part of the European identity cannot be confirmed. With regards to the isonomia – equality under the rule – although the Member States usually have obligations to transpose the EU law to the national level, the degree of obligation and scope may differ from Member State to Member State according to the nature of EU law and the policy area. Therefore, isonomia cannot be granted as an element of identity in the European level. Therefore, the study only uses a particular element of democracy, which has lead to the construction of the European identity encompassing all the Member States in the European Union, and assigns such quality in Europe’s identity.
Isocratic Identity in the European Union

While Russia’s hegemonic identity was largely developed as a result of the Soviet nationality policy, Europe’s isocratic identity is an outcome of the Second World War and strands of policies implemented to establish peace and stability in Europe. In fact, the construct of Europe’s isocratic identity goes parallel with the development of the “united” Europe, which has now become the European Union.

The isocratic identity entails recognizing states as equal actors with equal right to rule in pursuit of peace. It is important to note that isocracy is not innate to Europe and thus neither is isocratic identity; on the contrary, the region had long been a major battlefield of small and large-scale conflicts for centuries, where states suppressed and oppressed other states based on different power. It was only after the World War II that Europe ceased its longstanding conflicts and established stable peace in the region.

There are namely two texts, which laid a cornerstone for the construction of the European Union: The Manifesto of Ventotene and the Declaration of Robert Schuman.

Although different authors from different countries, with varying ideologies wrote the two documents, there are some key elements shared between the two. The most important foundation stated in both documents is the idea of “United Europe” based on equality between states.

In the Manifesto, Spinelli and Rossi (1941) refer to Nazi Germany to criticize how the unbalanced power the country had acquired would lead to a totalitarian civilization. The authors assert that even if Germany “concedes … generosity towards other European people” the reality would still be “a new division of humanity into Spartans
and Athenians” (Spinelli & Rossi, 1941). The Manifesto also exhibits a negative view towards the accumulated power of allies against the Nazi Germany, as it is also a product of unequal state power. Having established that such asymmetry between states brings disruption on peace and stability, Spinelli and Rossi (1941) argue for the “Movement for a free and united Europe”, where the European states enjoy equal right to power. The document’s key idea is in other words the establishment and guarantee of isocracy in Europe with the aim to bring peace and stability. This idea was well recognized by the European community upon its publication and was further developed by the founding fathers of the European Union.

The Schuman Declaration, which laid the foundation of the first supranational European institutions that would ultimately become today’s “European Union”, shared the same substance with the Manifesto di Ventotene. The declaration suggested formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first predecessor of what has now become the European Union, with the underlying idea that countries that trade with one another would become economically interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict. The Declaration presented by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, asserted that creating “a more united Europe” by merging economic interests would make wars between historic rivals France and Germany “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Schuman, 1950). The ECSC aimed to offer raise in living standards and promote peaceful achievements “as a whole without distinction of exception” (Schuman, 1950). Recognizing the different starting point for Germany and France as the aftermath of the WWII, the Declaration offered
“transitional measures” in order to achieve “equalization”. In addition, the Declaration explicitly insists the representation of the member states be established based on equality; it stated, “the common High Authority… composed on independent persons appointed by the governments (will be given)... equal representation” (Schuman, 1950). Although one Member State is given a chairmanship position, the chairman is chosen by a common agreement with all participating states. All these elements lead up to and demonstrate that even before the European Union became a supranational organization with twenty-eight Member States as it is now, the basic principle guiding the institution has always been the idea of equal right to power, i.e., isocracy.

After the establishment of the ECSC, subsequent treaties and amendments have strengthened and advanced the European supranational institution. In 1993 it officially became the “European Union” with the adoption of Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The treaty created what is commonly referred to as the “three pillar” structure of the European Union, which expanded the scope of EU policies to include areas of foreign policy, military, criminal justice, and judicial cooperation. The institutions created within the Union – the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice – were guided by the principle of equality amongst the Member States. For example, article IV of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) explicitly states, “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security” (European Union, 2012). With more and deeper cooperation between the Member States, acknowledging equality to rule amongst the states had become more and more imperative in order to sustain the system of such supranational governance. It can be inferred that the advancement of the EU as a supranational institution has resulted in strengthening of the isocratic identity.

Along with the development of the European Union, the institutional structure of the Union has laid a foundation where isocracy established itself as a fundamental value in the Europe identity. As a result of the policies to foster equality amongst sovereign member states, the Europe acquired the isocratic identity, and the isocratic elements can be witnessed in Europe’s declaration on its identity. The Declaration on the European Identity claims that European identity values harmony among states, and specifically asserts, “unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization” (European Political Cooperation, 1988). The declaration also demonstrates that respecting the principle of equality in power is not only limited to the Member States of the European Union, but also goes beyond to other states. In other words, the European isocratic identity encompasses key values such as peace and stability, ensuring equality to power to states, establishing unity and harmony.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – the EU’s organized and agreed foreign policy – exhibit the isocratic identity of the Union. Recognizing that there are significant disparities amongst countries outside of the EU, it aims to “encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy; assist populations, countries and
regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance” (European Union, 1993). In stating its aims, the European Union does not draw distinctions between less and more developed countries and acknowledges equality in their statehood.

According to the principle of equality in power, the CFSP missions have been implemented in different parts of the world with the same guidelines and standards. Ranging from missions in Europe itself and Eurasia to Africa and Middle East, the CFSP missions acknowledged all involved sovereign states as equal partners. These missions include the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, the civilian police-training mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a rule-of-law-mission in Georgia in Eurasia, a military training operation in Mali, a maritime antipiracy mission off the coast of Somalia in Africa, and a civilian monitoring mission to Aceh-Indonesia in Asia (Mix, 2013). Although the countries involved in the EU’s policy significantly differed from political, economic status and position in the world politics, the EU Member States treated them as equal actors.

3-3. Isocratic Identity and Concept of Sovereignty

Undiscriminating concept of Sovereignty

The European Union was created in the aftermath of the Second World War (European Union, n.db), and has acquired the isocratic identity, where all states are recognized to have equality in power. In the process of Europe’s efforts to build peace and stability
in the region, the European states collectively found the need to establish an environment that would deter the atrocities experienced during the World War II. Having experienced the brutalities triggered by the states absolute sovereignty, Europe developed the institutional framework, which gradually nurtured isocratic identity. This identity has since the end of Second World War consequently molded concept of sovereignty in Europe.

In line with the isocratic identity, the concept of sovereignty also embraced elements of equality and there is no distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* sovereignties. The European concept of sovereignty is undiscriminating in dealing with different states. Unlike Russia, which sees different countries with two different kinds of sovereignties—those with real (*de facto*) sovereignty and those with only nominal (*de jure*)—the European Union assumes that all sovereign states inherently have equally real (*de facto*) sovereignties. For Europe, all *de jure* sovereignties assume *de facto* sovereignty.

**Delegated Sovereignty**

A second difference in the concept of sovereignty between Europe and Russia rests in their approach towards the absoluteness of the concept of sovereignty. On one hand, Russia’s concept of sovereignty in terms of absoluteness is twofold corresponding to its dualistic concept of sovereignty; whereas *de facto* sovereignty is an absolute concept, sovereignty entailing only a legal aspect is more negligible. On the other hand, because Europe’s sovereignty conception is an undiscriminating concept, the EU sees all sovereignties as equally absolute concepts. There is no “less” sovereign state,
whose sovereignty is subject to infringement. All state sovereignty, regardless of their status, political or economic power assumes equal absoluteness.

However, one may assume that the European Union itself infringes sovereignties of the Member States because EU legislations, as explained above, often have supremacy over the Member States’ national law. Nonetheless, the dynamic between Member States’ sovereignty and the European Union’s institution is very different. Although the Member States are sovereign actors, they have explicitly agreed to delegate partial sovereignty to the EU through the membership agreement. Therefore, comparing Russia’s infringement of state sovereignty of other sovereign state with EU’s involvement in Member States’ sovereign issues would be a mistake. In the same vein, asserting that EU does not have sovereignty as an absolute concept because it allows infringement of Member States’ sovereignty would also be an invalid argument.

Europe, while acknowledging all states’ sovereignties as equal and absolute, after the Second World War found the need to limit state sovereignty in order to bring peace and stability in the region. In fact, the idea of “delegating” sovereignties to the supranational institution was the foundation of the European Union. The concept of limiting sovereignty served as a cornerstone for the development of the supranational sovereign institution. Even before the advent of the ECSC, the idea of giving up partial state sovereignty had been suggested by the Spinelli and Rossi (1941), where they argued the compromise was essential for bringing peace in the European region. In the Manifesto, the authors stated, “The absolute sovereignty of national states has given each other desire to dominate… As a consequence … the state was
transformed into the master of vassals bound into servitude, and it held within its power all the faculties needed to achieve the maximum war-efficiency” (Spinelli & Rossi, 1941). Criticizing the principle of non-intervention based on the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, the forefathers of the EU claimed that the guarantee of absolute sovereignty causes “multiple problems which poison international life on the continent” (Spinelli & Rossi, 1941). As a solution to eliminate such problems, they suggest European states to construct a “united Europe” based on equality and compromise of sovereignty.

The idea was further developed and materialized by Robert Schuman when he proposed that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority. The pooling of Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole necessitated compromise from the participating countries regarding the authority on the economic affairs. In the same vein, three largest founding states of the European Communities (France, Italy and Germany) had inserted provisions in their national legislation that allowed for limitations of sovereignty or transfer of powers to international organizations by means of a treaty. During the following years, all the other Member States, apart from the United Kingdom and Finland, have enacted similar constitutional clauses prior to their accession to the European Union (Lehmann, 2010).

The idea of delegated sovereignty should not be mistaken for “compromisable” sovereignty. The fundamental difference between Russia’s concept of sovereignty and that of Europe is that while both agree that sovereignty is subject to compromise, the
behind logic and conditions are very different. Russia’s interference of other states’ sovereign issues is an infringement of state sovereignty due to its distinction between legal and real sovereignties; Europe’s intervention in the Member States’ sovereign affairs is based on the mutually agreed delegation of the states’ sovereignties based on the need to establish peace. Only through an official delegation, Europe would see state sovereignty – while still an absolute concept – as subject for intervention.

V. Conclusion

1. Different Conceptions of Sovereignty in Russia and Europe

The main objective of this research was to identify why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea from the Constructivist point of view by using the concept of sovereignty. The motivation to undertake such research aside from the need to understand such international conflict was the need to identify foreign policy impetus that is outside of traditional materialist reasoning. With the main research question laid out – Why do Russia and Europe clash on Crimea – the study considered different national identities and concepts of sovereignty in Russia and Europe as a basis of their foreign policy, thus, the reason for their conflict on the Crimean Peninsula.

The principal argument and propositions of the research was shown through the analysis of official foreign policy documents in Russia and Europe on the Crimean Crisis in 2014. Russia and Europe exhibited distinct approach and understanding on the situation in Ukraine and Crimea because of their varying understandings of the
concept of sovereignty. Whereas Russia did not see the incident either as a non-recognition of or infringement of Ukraine’s sovereignty, the EU condemned Russia for a clear violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty.

The study has revealed that the conception of sovereignty in Russia and Europe differ from one another at core due to their unique national identities. Whereas the Russian concept, driven by its hegemonic identity, distinguishes legal (*de jure*) and real (*de facto*) sovereignties, the European construct of sovereignty conception, driven by the shared sense on establishing peace and equality among states, is a unitary and undiscriminating conception (Table 3).

On one hand, Russia appealed to the shared history and culture to justify its involvement in Ukraine’s domestic affair. On the other hand, the European Union spoke strictly in legal terms. Russia did recognize Ukraine’s legal sovereignty, yet failed to recognize it as an equal *de facto* sovereign state. This caused Europe’s confusion because the EU understands the concept of sovereignty as a unitary and undiscriminating, where legal sovereignty and real sovereignty are inseparable. Unless explicitly delegated like is the case of the European Union, sovereignty – as Europe cognizes it – cannot be compromised by a foreign state. In other words, all recognized sovereign states possess absolute sovereignty that should not be violated by another sovereign state because their power and limitations are identical. From Europe’s perspective, Russia had no supremacy or legitimacy to infringe Ukraine’s sovereignty. In the same vein, the EU itself also refrained from the intervention without an explicit request from Ukraine.
While Russia recognizes legal sovereignty of sovereign states in accordance with international law, the real, *de facto* sovereignty is not granted to those countries that are perceived as periphery or subordinate. In the same vein, Russia’s dualistic conception of sovereignty influences its perspective on the absoluteness of sovereignty; only *de facto* sovereignty is an absolute concept with unlimited authority, and *de jure* sovereignty is subject to compromise. The former is given to the Russian Federation, and counties it perceives as equally powerful such as the United States, and Member States of the European Union; the latter is assigned to the former Soviet Republics, most of which are members of the CIS.
The study also conducted equivalent analysis on Europe’s identity and its conception of sovereignty. The development of the EU has served as a foundation for the European identity, which this study characterized as “isocratic”. The isocratic identity entails recognizing different states as equal actors with equal right to rule in pursuit of peace. The idea the Union is built upon has encouraged the nations to create equality among states and delegate part of their sovereignty in order to avoid violence and establish stable peace in Europe. The Manifesto di Ventotene and Declaration of Robert Schuman, which served as a foundation for the European Union, have demonstrated that the European leaders believed that peace and stability in Europe was only possible with the elimination of imbalance between state power and delegation of sovereignty to a supranational entity. Consequently, the concept of sovereignty also embraced elements of isocracy. According to the European concept of sovereignty, there is no distinction between de jure and de facto sovereignties. Unlike Russia, which sees different countries with two kinds of sovereignties – those with real (de facto) sovereignty and those with only nominal (de jure) – the European Union assumes that all sovereign states inherently have equally real de facto sovereignties. The European concept of sovereignty was identified as an undiscriminating and resolutely absolute conception throughout this research.

In search for the reasons for such discrepancy between Russia’s conception of sovereignty and that of Europe, the study focused on the influence of national identity in states’ formation of key foreign policy concepts. The underlying reason for different conceptions of sovereignty in Russia and Europe, which led to their clash on Crimea,
was their different national identities. The analytical part of this research (Chapter IV) has established that Russia’s outstanding identity conception is its hegemonic identity. The analysis of Soviet history and its nationality policy confirmed that the Soviet period had resulted in assigning the RSFSR the role of what might be called the imperial glue of the Soviet state (Suny, 1993), resulting in the construction of the hegemonic identity in Russia. With such national identity, Russia’s conception of sovereignty also retained similar elements; namely, its distinction between equal and subordinate states came parallel with the division between \textit{de jure} and \textit{de facto} sovereignties. The foreign policy documents such as Russia’s Declaration on Sovereignty of the RSFSR, first Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2000, and the Alma-Ata Declaration was analyzed to reveal that Russia does not view sovereignty of the CIS states equally with that of Russia.

The study has shown that different concepts of sovereignty caused discrepancy between Russia and Europe with regards to their foreign policy towards another sovereign state, which is identified as the main cause for their clash regarding the annexation of Crimea. The study has also shown that national identity does have a significant influence over state’s foreign policy, supporting the assertions of Constructivist school of IR, insisting that ideas should be taken more seriously. However, the ambitious purpose and complexity of this study presented numerous limitations and convinced further study should be conducted to further validate the key assertions of this thesis.
2. Limitations of the Study and Further Research

This research contains several limitations due to the nature of the theoretical framework, methodology, and subject of analysis. The first limitation concerns the choice of Constructivist framework this study has adopted. Constructivism is a less explored theory in the International Relations academia. Compared to the Realist school, the Constructivist theory has many loopholes and limitations that needs to be addressed; yet, because this research’s approach to Constructivism is an attempt to use a less conventional theoretical framework that would assign importance to the role of ideas, it did not sufficiently address these issues in justifying why Constructivism was a better tool for the conduct of this study.

A second limitation of this study stems from the twofold construction of the research. The core task of this study’s analysis was to combine two scholarly fields: (1) the historical legacy of Russia and Europe as a foundation of their identity, and the relation between the national identity and concept of sovereignty, and (2) the link between the concept of sovereignty and foreign policy. As the research contains several contending conceptions and propositions, more elaboration and thorough clarifications of the components of the research would have facilitated to a more constructive understanding of the topic.

Given the intangible nature of many elements in this study, e.g. ‘identity’, and ‘sovereignty’, using these concepts with insufficient explanation is one of the key weaknesses of this research. There is an abundant volume of literature on these concepts such as national identity and sovereignty available, which could be used to
elaborate. While exploring these concepts deserves a concentrated study of its own, because that was not the purpose of this particular research, a relatively brief overview and explanation of the concepts is shortcoming of this thesis. A more thorough scrutiny of the key conceptions and propositions could establish a firmer foundation for studies of similar aim and objective. In the same vein, a more extensive analysis of the key linkages such as the connection between national identity and concept of sovereignty, and between sovereignty and foreign policy in relation to national interest formation could provide a clearer logic behind the argument presented in this study.

In addition, more specific to the case of Russia, several terms have been used without a sufficient explanation they require. These include the regional organizations such as the CIS, EurAsEC, and CSTO, and important terminologies used in Russian political philosophy such as “Russian World”. The limitation of this study is that it only provided just enough clarification needed for comprehending this study. Exploring these terms and history of the regional organization could further present supports for this study’s main argument, as well as possibility to better understand Russia’s foreign policy. Furthermore, elements that are particularly important to Russia’s political dimension – such as role of political elite, power of the president – could further elaborate the construction of Russia’s hegemonic identity conception. In a similar vein, comparison of behaviors of states with imperial identity with those of hegemonic identity could further buttress the claim that Russia’s identity conception more resembles the latter. More specifically, comparing behaviors of Russian Empire, the
RSFSR during the Soviet era, and the Russian Federation could illustrate how diverse identities have differently influenced the foreign policy in Russia.

Lastly, comparing one nation-state (Russia) with a group of states (the European Union) should have been further justified. While there are numerous reasons and previous studies justifying the EU as a single foreign policy actor, the study did not fully elaborate on different aspects that makes its possible to have a systemic level analysis with the European Union. In the same vein, similarities and differences between Russia and Europe could have been stated to explain such comparison. For example, the imperial history both in Russia and EU Member States could have been used for this purpose.

This study also brings some further research suggestions. First, the study proposes that it is not only the case of Russia and European Union, where national identity influences states’ foreign policy. In recent years, China, for example, has been exhibiting similar logic as that of Russia’s “sovereign democracy”. Given its longstanding hegemonic history in Asia, its presents and interesting subject for a similar study. Although today’s global environment is relatively stable and peaceful, it is also changeable and uncertain. Exploring China’s national identify and its potential influence on foreign policy may serve as a useful empirical foundation for foreign policy scholars as well as practitioners.

Second, the issue of sovereignty has resurfaced in recent years with the development of some key conceptions such as “humanitarian intervention” and “responsibility to protect”. Despite the centuries-old history of the concept, sovereignty is still one of the
most contested ideas in the international relations. There is a need to re-establish or re-defined the idea of state sovereignty in order to nurture these new guidelines for different actors in the international society.

3. Concluding Remark

This study aimed to search for the reasons why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea, focusing on conceptions of sovereignty as an effort to provide a Constructivist interpretation to their clash. The motivation to undertake this research was the need to better understand Russia’s foreign policy in order to prepare for its future actions and plan more appropriate policies, while contributing to the less traditional school of thoughts in Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations.

This study has provided supports that different concepts of sovereignty between Russia and Europe serves as one of the reasons for the clash between the Russian Federation and the European Union on the issue regarding Crimea. The different concepts of sovereignty, induced by varying national identities led to the clash, which verifies the claim that understanding national identity serves a useful purpose in comprehending states’ foreign policy and dynamic of international relations. If states can understand what lies underneath the state actions, they can perhaps formulate better policies towards each other as well. In this research, the concept of sovereignty was examined as a critical element in states’ foreign policy conduct.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a mere example of a case, where distinctive national identities and conceptions of sovereignty in Russian and Europe influenced
and shaped their different foreign policies and led to the clash. It can be inferred that in today’s evermore changing global environment, understanding different states’ conception of sovereignty serves as a useful purpose in understanding state foreign policy and international relations.

All the contestation and debate around the concept of sovereignty makes the topic extremely interesting and challenging for foreign policy studies. In this study, understanding the concept of sovereignty has contributed to the finding out why Russia and Europe clash on Crimea. Further exploration of the concept of sovereignty may bring additional value to academia as well as foreign policy practices in a similar vein.

Neil MacCormick (1999) famously wrote, “Is sovereignty like property, which can be given up only when another person gains it? Or should we think of it more like virginity, something which can be lost by one without another gaining it and whose loss in apt circumstances can even be a matter for celebration?” In search of a profound understanding of what sovereignty is, the quest for answers must continue.
Annex I. Declaration of Sovereignty of the RSFSR (1991) (Original Russian text)

ДЕКЛАРАЦИЯ О государственном суверенитете Российской Советской Федеративной Социалистической Республики

Первый Съезд народных депутатов РСФСР,

– сознавая историческую ответственность за судьбу России,
– свидетельствуя уважение к суверенным правам всех народов, входящих в Союз Советских Социалистических Республик,
– выражая волю народов РСФСР,

торжественно провозглашает государственный суверенитет Российской Советской Федеративной Социалистической Республики на всей ее территории и заявляет о решимости создать демократическое правовое государство в составе обновленного Союза ССР.

1. Российская Советская Федеративная Социалистическая Республика есть суверенное государство, созданное исторически объединившимися в нем народами.
2. Суверенитет РСФСР – естественное и необходимое условие существования государственности России, имеющей многовековую историю, культуру и сложившиеся традиции.
3. Носителем суверенитета и источником государственной власти в РСФСР является ее многонациональный народ. Народ осуществляет государственную власть непосредственно и через представительные органы на основе Конституции РСФСР.
4. Государственный суверенитет РСФСР провозглашается во имя высших целей – обеспечения каждому человеку неотъемлемого права на достойную жизнь, свободное развитие и пользование родным языком, а
каждому народу – на самоопределение в избранных им национально-государственных и национально-культурных формах.

5. Для обеспечения политических, экономических и правовых гарантий суверенитета РСФСР устанавливается:
полнота власти РСФСР при решении всех вопросов государственной и общественной жизни, за исключением тех, которые ею добровольно передаются в ведение Союза ССР;
верховенство Конституции РСФСР и Законов РСФСР на всей территории РСФСР;
действие актов Союза ССР, вступающих в противоречие с суверенными правами РСФСР, приостанавливается Республикой на своей территории. Разногласия между Республикой и Союзом разрешаются в порядке, устанавливаемом Союзным договором;
исключительное право народа на владение, пользование и распоряжение национальным богатством России;
полномочное представительство РСФСР в других союзных республиках и зарубежных странах;
право Республики участвовать в осуществлении полномочий, переданных ею Союзу ССР.

6. Российская Советская Федеративная Социалистическая Республика объединяется с другими республиками в Союз на основе Договора. РСФСР признает и уважает суверенные права союзных республик и Союза ССР.

7. РСФСР сохраняет за собой право свободного выхода из СССР в порядке, устанавливаемом Союзным договором и основанным на нем законодательством.

8. Территория РСФСР не может быть изменена без волензывания народа, выраженного путем референдума.
9. Съезд народных депутатов РСФСР подтверждает необходимость существенного расширения права автономных республик, автономных областей, автономных округов, равно как краев и областей РСФСР. Конкретные вопросы осуществления этих прав должны определяться законодательством РСФСР о наationally-государственном и административно-территориальном устройстве Федерации.

10. Всем гражданам и лицам без гражданства, проживающим на территории РСФСР, гарантируются права и свободы, предусмотренные Конституцией РСФСР, Конституцией СССР и общепризнанными нормами международного права. Представителям наций и народностей, проживающим в РСФСР за пределами своих наationally-государственных образований или не имеющим их на территории РСФСР, обеспечиваются их законные политические, экономические, этнические и культурные права.

11. На всей территории РСФСР устанавливается республиканское гражданство РСФСР. За каждым гражданином РСФСР сохраняется гражданство СССР. Граждане РСФСР за пределами Республики находятся под защитой и покровительством РСФСР.

12. РСФСР гарантирует всем гражданам, политическим партиям, общественным организациям, массовым движениям и религиозным организациям, действующим в рамках Конституции РСФСР, равные правовые возможности участвовать в управлении государственными и общественными делами.

13. Разделение законодательной, исполнительной и судебной власти является важнейшим принципом функционирования РСФСР как правового государства.

14. РСФСР заявляет о своей приверженности общепризнанным принципам международного права и готовности жить со всеми странами и народами в мире и согласии, принимать все меры к недопущению конfrontации в
международных, межреспубликанских и межнациональных отношениях, отстаивая при этом интересы народов России.

15. Настоящая Декларация является основой для разработки новой Конституции РСФСР, заключения Союзного договора и совершенствования республиканского законодательства.

Председатель Верховного Совета РСФСР Б. Н. ЕЛЬЦИН
Москва, Кремль. 12 июня 1990 года.
Annex II. Declaration of Sovereignty of the RSFSR (1991) (English translation)

DECLARATION Of State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

The First Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR,
- Aware of its historical responsibility for the fate of Russia,
- Bearing witness to respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
- Expressing the will of the peoples of the RSFSR,

Vows and declares the State sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic throughout all of its territory and announces its resolve to create a democratic rule-of-law State within a renewed USSR.

1. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic is a sovereign State, built historically by the peoples combined therein.

2. The State sovereignty of the RSFSR is a natural and essential condition for the existence of the statehood of Russia, which has centuries-old history, culture and traditions.

3. The carrier of the sovereignty and the source of State power in the RSFSR are its multinational people. The people shall effectuate State power directly and through representative bodies on the basis of the Constitution of the RSFSR.

4. The State sovereignty of the RSFSR is proclaimed in the name of the highest aims – to ensure every person his inalienable right to a decent life, to free development and use of his native tongue, and to each people, self-determination within national-state and national-cultural forms which it has chosen.

5. For the purpose of the establishment of political, economic and legal guarantees for the sovereignty of the FSFSR, it states:
Full authority of the RSFSR in determining all matters relating State and public life except for matters voluntarily placed under the responsibility of the Union of SSR;
The Supremacy of the Constitution of the RSFSR and Acts of the RSFSR throughout its territory; Acts of the Union of SSR conflicting with sovereign rights of the RSFSR are suspended by the Republic in its territory.
Disagreements between the Republic and the Union are settled according to the Treaty of Alliance;
Exclusive right of the nation to own, use and dispose Russian national wealth;
Plenipotentiary representative office of the RSFSR in other Union Republics and other foreign countries;
The right of the Republic to participate in exercising power on matters, placed under the responsibility of the Union of SSR.

6. The RSFSR is unified with other Republics in Union based on the Treaty. The RSFSR recognizes and respects sovereign rights of Union Republics and the Union of SSR.

7. The RSFSR preserves its right to freely withdraw from the Union according to the Treaty of Alliance and legislation based on it.

8. The territory of the RSFSR cannot be changed without the will of the people, expressed through referendum.

9. The Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR confirms the necessity to expand the rights of autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs as well as krays and oblasts of RSFSR. Specific issues on realization of such rights should be determined by legislation of the RSFSR on national-state and administrative-territorial structure of the Federation.

10. The rights and freedoms of all citizens and stateless persons residing within the territory of the RSFSR are guaranteed according to the Constitution of the R
SFSR, Constitution of the USSR and generally accepted norms of international law. Political, economic, ethnic and cultural rights of representatives of nations and nationalities, residing in the RSFSR outside of its national-state entity or who do not have such entity in the territory of the RSFSR, are guaranteed.

11. Republican citizenship of the RSFSR is established throughout the RSFSR. Each citizen of the RSFSR preserves the citizenship of the USSR. Citizens of the RSFSR outside the Republic remain under protection and patronage of the RSFSR.

12. The RSFSR guarantees equal legal opportunities to participate in administration of state and public affairs for all citizens, political parties, public organizations, mass movements and religious organizations operating under the Constitution of the RSFSR.

13. The separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary powers is the essential principle of the RSFSR’s operation as the rule-of-law State.

14. The RSFSR proclaims its commitment to generally accepted norms of international law and its willingness to live in peace and harmony with all countries and nations, to take all actions to prevent confrontations in international, inter-republican, interethnic relations, while preserving the interests of Russian people.

15. Current Declaration is the basis for the development of the New Constitution of the RSFSR, conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance and improvement of the republican legislation.

Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR  B.N.Yeltsin

Moscow, Kremlin. June 12, 1990
Каждая нация — сложное динамичное явление. Принадлежность к ней невозможно описать с помощью узкого набора критериев. Чем крупнее народ, чем более деятельную роль в истории он играет, тем шире его генетическое и социальное разнообразие.

Самым очевидным критерием национальности является самосознание. Наиболее точно соответствует русскому народу совокупность тех людей, кто называет себя русскими во время переписи населения.

Очевидно, что общее российское гражданство, объединяющее на протяжении долгих веков представителей самых разных народов, не упразднило многонациональный состав нашего государства. Граждане России могут быть русскими, карелами, татарами, аварцами или бурятами, в то время как русские могут быть гражданами России, США, Австралии, Румынии или Казахстана. Национальные и гражданские общности существуют в разных феноменологических плоскостях.

Русский народ исконно имел сложный генетический состав, включая в себя потомков славянских, финно-угорских, скандинавских, балтских, иранских и тюркских племен. Это генетическое богатство ни разу не стало угрозой для национального единства русского народа. Рождение от русских родителей в большинстве случаев является отправной точкой для формирования русского самосознания, что, однако, никогда не исключало возможности присоединения к русскому народу выходцев из другой национальной среды, принявшим русскую идентичность, язык, культуру и религиозные традиции.

Уникальность этногенеза русского народа заключается в том, что на протяжении веков подобное принятие русской идентичности урождеными представителями других национальностей было не результатом принудительной ассимиляции тех или иных этнических групп («русификации»), а следствием свободного личного выбора конкретных людей, связывавших с Россией свою жизнь и судьбу.
Именно так в состав русского народа часто входили татары, литовцы, евреи, поляки, немцы, французы, представители других национальностей. Примеров подобного рода — великое множество в русской истории.

В русской традиции важнейшим критерием национальности считался национальный язык (само слово «язык» — древний синоним слова «национальность»). Владение русским языком обязательно для всякого русского. Вместе с тем, обратное утверждение — принадлежность к русскому народу обязательна для всякого русскоговорящего — неверно. Так как русский народ выступил государствообразующим народом России и народом-строителем Российской цивилизации, русский язык получил широкое распространение. Существует немало людей, считающих русский язык родным, но при этом ассоциирующих себя с другими национальными группами.

В формировании русской идентичности огромную роль сыграла православная вера. С другой стороны, события XX века показали, что значительное число русских стало неверующими, не утратив при этом национального самосознания. И все же утверждение о том, что каждый русский должен признавать православное христианство основой своей национальной культуры, является оправданным и справедливым. Отрицание этого факта, а тем более поиск иной религиозной основы национальной культуры, свидетельствуют об ослаблении русской идентичности, вплоть до полной ее утраты.

Таким образом, принадлежность к русской нации определяется сложным комплексом связей: генетическими и брачными, языковыми и культурными, религиозными и историческими. Ни один из упомянутых критериев не может считаться решающим. Но для формирования русского национального самосознания обязательно, чтобы совокупность этих связей с русским народом (независимо от их природы) была сильнее, чем совокупность связей с любой иной этнической общиной планеты.

Ощутить это, в конечном итоге, может только сам носитель национальной идентичности, совершая свой личный выбор. При этом национальное
самосознание неизбежно означает солидарность с судьбой своего народа. Каждый русский чувствует глубинную эмоциональную связь с главными событиями своей истории: Крещением Руси, Куликовской битвой и одолением Смуты, победами над Наполеоном и Гитлером. Особо отметим, что гордость за Победу 1945 года является одним из важнейших интегрирующих факторов современной русской нации.

На основе программных тезисов настоящего документа, предлагается следующее определение русской идентичности: русский — это человек, считающий себя русским; не имеющий иных этнических предпочтений; говорящий и думающий на русском языке; признавший православное христианство основой национальной духовной культуры; ощущающий солидарность с судьбой русского народа.
Annex IV. Declaration on Russian Identity (2014) (English translation)

Every nation is a complex dynamic occurrence. It is impossible to describe belonging to a certain nation with the help of a narrow list of criteria. The bigger the nation, the more influential it is in history, the broader its genetic and social diversity. The most obvious criterion of nationality is self-consciousness. The group of people who correspond the most with the Russian nation are those who call themselves Russian during the population census. Obviously, the general Russian citizenship that has united representatives of the most varied nations throughout centuries did not eliminate the multinational nature of our state. Citizens of Russia may be Russian, Karels, Tatars, Avars or Buryats, meanwhile Russians may be citizens of Russia, the U.S., Australia, Romania or Kazakhstan. National and civil overlaps exist in various phenomenological planes. The Russian people has a complex genetic composition, as it includes offspring of Slavic, Finnish-Hungarian, Scandinavian, Baltic, Iranian and Turkish tribes. This genetic variety never threatened national unity of the Russian people. Birth from Russian parents in most cases is the starting point for the formation of Russian consciousness, which, however, never excluded the possibility of people who come from another national environment joining the Russian nation by accepting Russian identity, language, culture and religious traditions. The unique nature of the ethnogenesis of the Russian nation lies in the fact that throughout centuries such acceptance of Russian identity by representatives of other nationalities was never the result of forceful assimilation of certain ethnic groups (“russification”), but the result of free personal choice of certain individuals, who tied their lives and fates to Russia. This is how the Russian nation frequently included Tatars, Lithuanians, Jews, Poles, Germans, French, representatives of other nationalities. There is a great number of such examples in Russian history. In Russian tradition an important criterion of nationalities is the national language (the very word “language” is an ancient synonym of the word “nationality”). Every Russian
has to master the Russian language. However, the contrary, that the belonging to the Russian nation is compulsory for every Russian speaker, is erroneous. As the Russian people stood as the state-forming nation of Russia and the nation which constructed Russian civilization, the Russian language has become widespread. There are many people who consider Russian their first language but associate themselves with other national groups.

The orthodox fate played a key role in forming Russian identity. On the other hand, the events of the XX century showed that a big number of Russian became non-believers, having not lost their national consciousness at the same time. And the claim that every Russian person should accept Orthodox Christianity as the basis of their national culture is justified and fair. Denying this fact, and what is more, seeking another religious basis for national culture, is evidence to the weakening of Russian identity to the extent of its complete loss.

As such, belonging to the Russian nation is determined by a complex of relationships: genetic and marital, linguistic and cultural, religious and historic. None of the aforementioned criteria can be decisive. But for the formation of the Russian national self-consciousness, it is necessary for the complex of these relations with the Russian nation (regardless of their nature) is stronger than the complex of relations with any other ethnic community on the planet.

In the end, this can only be felt by the person who adopt national identity by making their personal choice. National self-consciousness inevitably means solidarity with the fate of one’s people. Every Russian feels a deep emotional bond to the main events in their history: the Christening of Rus, the Battle of Kulikovo and the defeat of the Time of Troubles, victories over Napoleon and Hitler. We especially note that pride for the Victory in 1945 is one of the most important integrating factors of the modern Russian nation.

Based on the program theses of this document, we propose the following definition of Russian identity: a Russian is someone who considers themselves Russian; who has no other ethnic preferences; who speaks and thinks in the Russian language; who acknowledges Orthodox Christianity as the basis of the national spiritual culture; who feels solidarity with the fate of the Russian people.

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