



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

국제학석사학위논문

The Enigmatic Persistence of the Joseon-Ming Alliance

조·명 동맹관계 지속의 수수께끼

2017년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

박 태 섭

The Enigmatic Persistence of the Joseon-Ming Alliance

Thesis by

Taesup Park

Graduate Program in International Cooperation
In Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of
Master of International Studies

February 2017

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

Seoul, Republic of Korea

The Enigmatic Persistence of the Joseon-Ming Alliance

조·명 동맹관계 지속의 수수께끼

지도교수 신 성 호

이 논문을 국제학석사 학위논문으로 제출함

2017년 2월


서울대학교 국제대학원


국제학과 국제협력 전공


박 태 섭

박태섭의 석사학위논문을 인준함

2017년 2월

위 원 장 송 지 연  (인)

부 위 원 장 양 희 용  (인)

위 원 신 성 호  (인)

Abstract

The Enigmatic Persistence of the Joseon-Ming Alliance

Taesup Park

International Cooperation Major

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

The Joseon-Ming alliance was a special one, since it functioned as the most exemplary relationship within the tribute system and faced unprecedentedly harsh challenges. Moreover, contrary to what many contemporary people would expect, Joseon held on to the alliance at a heavy cost despite the power shift from the Ming to the Qing. Ideational factors have been extensively studied when analyzing the reasons behind Joseon's behavior, so this thesis focused on the relatively neglected domestic and situational factors. The Imjin War, the Injo Restoration, Mao Wenlong's presence in the Korean peninsula, and limited information on China were the main subjects of study, since they immensely influenced the domestic circumstances of Joseon. Overall analysis of these led to the conclusion that the domestic situation was more influential than ideology was in shaping Joseon's behavior during the

transition period. Indeed, the Joseon court's top priority was restoration of central authority and internal stabilization. Besides, due to its devastated domestic conditions, Joseon did not have much diplomatic options to begin with.

Keywords: Joseon-Ming alliance, Ming-Qing transition period, the Imjin War, the Injo Restoration, Mao Wenlong, Intelligence on China

Table of Contents

Abstract-----	i
Table of Contents-----	iii
List of Tables and Figures -----	v
I. INTRODUCTION-----	1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW-----	10
1. Existing Researches -----	10
2. Applicable Theoretical Frameworks -----	19
3. Inherent Limitations -----	24
IV. ANALYSIS -----	29
1. The Imjin War -----	29
2. Injo Restoration -----	37
3. Mao Wenlong-----	47
4. Information on China-----	57

V. CONCLUSION	65
BIBLIOGRAPHY	69
국문초록	82

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1 Timeline of Major Events ----- 9

Figure 1 *Honilkanqliyeokdaegukjido* (혼일강리역대국도지도, 1402) ----- 17

I. INTRODUCTION

The Joseon-Ming alliance—during the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century in particular—was quite a unique one that is worthy of separate attention. There is a general consensus among scholars that although not perfectly ideal, the relationship between the two represented the most model relationship within the Sinocentric tribute system in which the Ming served as the fulcrum.¹ The Ming regarded Joseon as its most exemplary tributary state, since the latter wholeheartedly participated in the regional order established by the former and went as far as adopting Chinese practices in various areas.² Indeed, in his letter to King Seonjo of Joseon in 1592, the Ming Emperor Wanli lauded Joseon for being docile and verse with academics and culture—an evaluation that is a stark contrast to his criticism on Japan, another tributary state, for barbarism.³

¹ Ji-Young Lee, “Diplomatic Ritual as a Power Resource: The Politics of Asymmetry in Early Modern Chinese-Korean Relations,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2013): 318.

² In fact, during the time span of fifteenth to eighteenth century, whereas Japan dispatched one mission every ten years, Joseon sent three embassies per year. Moreover, the Joseon court structured its political institutions and court dress based on those of the Ming. David Kang, “Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia,” *Security Studies* 19, no. 4 (2010): 605-606.

³ Kenneth M. Swope 케네스 M. 스위프, “Soonmangchihan” 순망치한 [The teeth chills without the lips], in *Imjinwaeran dongasia samguk jeonjaeng* 임진왜란 동아시아 삼국전쟁 [The Imjin War, a war of three East Asian countries], ed. Doo-hee Jeong 정두희 and

Another noteworthy aspect of the Joseon-Ming alliance during the aforementioned period is that it was markedly different from past alliances that were formed between a Korean dynasty and a Chinese one. It can be distinguished by Joseon's ideological commitment and inflexible foreign policy. Although Korea-China relationships had always been asymmetric due to China's military, economic, and cultural superiority, previous ones (e.g., Shilla-Tang and Goryeo-Song) were primarily strategic: the Korean side exerted much more flexibility than Joseon did. For example, after meeting the alliance's common objective of unifying the three kingdoms on the Korean peninsula, Shilla broke away from its alliance with the Tang that had ulterior motives to take over more than promised. The whole process of how this alliance broke down—which eventually concluded with Shilla's successfully expelling the Tang forces from Shilla territory—indicates the strategic nature of this relationship.

Furthermore, delving deeper into the case of Goryeo, the immediate

Kyeongsoon Lee 이경순 (Seoul: Humanist, 2007), 350. The direct reason for the Ming's despise of Japan in this letter stemmed from Hideyoshi's invasion of Joseon. However, even before the invasion, Japan had already begun to gradually drift away from the hierarchy, because the geographical distance and natural barrier of the sea made it difficult for Japan to enjoy the military, economic, and political benefits from the Ming. Besides, the Ming felt uneasy about the Japanese trying to extract excessively from it through the tribute relationship. Han Gyu Kim 김한규, "Imjinwaeraneui gookjaejeok hwangyeong" 임진왜란의 국제적 환경 [The international backdrop of the Imjin War], in *Imjinwaeran dongasia samguk jeonjaeng* 임진왜란 동아시아 삼국전쟁 [The Imjin War, a war of three East Asian countries], ed. Doo-hee Jeong 정두희 and Kyeong-soon Lee 이경순 (Seoul: Humanist, 2007), 311-312.

predecessor of Joseon, we can notice that although Goryeo served the Song as its superior state, such a measure was heavily focused on trying to learn from the cultural achievements of the Song. When it came to devising its foreign policy, Goryeo took a different stance by carefully examining the geopolitical situation in China. It was pretty savvy in trying to avoid being swept into the power struggle in China and adroitly switched positions according to the changing power distribution in the area.⁴

Meanwhile, despite signs of power transition from the Ming to the Qing as the Manchus rose to prominence, Joseon remained loyal to the Ming which could no longer fulfill its alliance duties. Unlike Goryeo that did not have any ideological or moral qualms about nomadic tribes conquering dynasties of the Han Chinese, Joseon viewed the Ming as the only legitimate owner of China and held steadfast to its pro-Ming policy which invited destructive Manchu invasions.⁵ This seemingly irrational behavior that Joseon displayed will be the main puzzle that this thesis attempts to understand and explain.

⁴ Ji-Young Lee, 320; Myung-gi Han 한명기, “Wonmyeonggyochae, myeongcheonggyochaewa hanbando” 원명교체, 명청교체와 한반도 [The Dynastic Change in China and the Korean Peninsula: With the Special Reference to the Political Change from Yuan to Ming and from Ming to Qing], *Saegae Jeongchi*12 세계정치12 30, no. 2 (2009): 65.

⁵ Seung-Bum Kye 계승범, “Joseonhoogi choseonjoonghwajooeuiwa geu haeseok moonjae” 조선후기 조선중화주의와 그 해석 문제 [A Criticism of the Contemporary Korean Scholarship on the Choson Elites’ View of the Chinese Confucian Culture (Zhonghua) in the 1600s to the 1800s], *Hanguksayeongu* 한국사연구, no. 159 (2012): 276.

What further highlights the relative lack of strategic nature and shrewdness in Joseon's policy during this period is the way by which early Joseon dealt with the Ming. Early Joseon came up with its policy of submitting to the Ming out of heavily strategic considerations, which will be elaborated to a deeper extent later in this thesis. Besides, although accepting its position as a lesser state to the Ming, Joseon during its early years exerted much autonomy. For instance, early Joseon established its own tribute relationship with the Jurchens and the Mongols regardless of Ming's opposition, and refused to abide by the Ming's order to punish Jeong Do-jeon for his word selections in writing Joseon's official letter to the Ming court.⁶

We should also note that the alliance between Joseon and the Ming was the most intensely challenged one at an international level through the Imjin War and the rise of the Manchus. No other prior Korea-China alliances were challenged to that extent. The Imjin War which lasted from 1592 to 1598 was one of the most significant wars in East Asian history with a handful of 'firsts.' It was the first time in which the Japanese central government initiated organized military campaigns against Korea. It was also the first time in which

⁶ Hunmi Lee 이현미, "Myeongcheong gyochaegi hanjoongwangaewa bidaeching dongmaengeui shinwaeseong moonjae: Wolsa leejeonggueui beonmusahaeng boonseok" 명청 교체기 한중관계와 비대칭동맹의 신뢰성 문제: 월사 이정구의 변무사행 분석 [Sino-Korean Relations during the Ming-Qing Transition: Reliability, Asymmetric Alliance and the Tribute System], *Gookjaejeongchinonchong* 국제정치논총 55, no. 3 (2015): 14.

the Chinese central government officially provided military assistance to Korea. Most important of all, it was the first time in which the three major countries of East Asia collided at a large scale, involving approximately 700,000 people, for a long span of time.⁷

The war had crucial consequences that drastically reshaped the geopolitical circumstances of East Asia, because it exhausted the Ming and made it fail to prepare for the rising Manchus unified by Nurhaci. The Ming already had some internal problems due to factionalism and political corruption, but it was the war that made all the underlying issues implode.⁸ Without sufficient time to recover from the challenge of the Imjin War, the Joseon-Ming alliance shortly stumbled upon another great obstacle posed by the Manchus who intended to replace the Ming as the regional hegemon.

⁷ JaHyun Kim Haboush 김자현, “Woorineun wae imjinwaeraneul yeonguhabnigga?” 우리는 왜 임진왜란을 연구합니까? [Why do we study the Imjin War?], in *Imjinwaeran dongasia samguk jeonjaeng* 임진왜란 동아시아 삼국전쟁 [The Imjin War, a war of three East Asian countries], ed. Doo-hee Jeong 정두희 and Kyeong-soon Lee 이경순 (Seoul: Humanist, 2007), 27; Gubok Jeong 정구복, “Imjinwaeraneui yeoksajeok seonggyeokgwa euimi,” 임진왜란의 역사적 성격과 의미 [The Characteristics and Meanings of Imjinwaeran], in *Imjinwaerangwa hanilgwangae* 임진왜란과 한일관계 [The Imjin War and Korea-Japan relations], ed. Han-il gwangaesa yeongunonjip pyeonchan wiwonhoe 한일관계사연구논집 편찬위원회 (Seoul: Kyungin moonhwasa, 2005), 4.

⁸ Myung-gi Han 한명기, “Imjinwaerangwa dongasia jilseo,” 임진왜란과 동아시아 질서 [The Hideyoshi Invasions and the East Asian System], in *Imjinwaerangwa hanilgwangae* 임진왜란과 한일관계 [The Imjin War and Korea-Japan relations], ed. Han-il gwangaesa yeongunonjip pyeonchan wiwonhoe 한일관계사연구논집 편찬위원회 (Seoul: Kyungin moonhwasa, 2005), 116-118.

Unlike previous Korean dynasties that coped with the altering international situations, Joseon decided to stick with the Ming, and this decision resulted in two massive Manchu invasions. King Injo of Joseon had to surrender to the Later Jin in an extremely humiliating manner after the second invasion in 1636.⁹ Eight years later, the Later Jin went on to completely conquer the Ming in 1644—the year that commenced a new era led by the Qing dynasty. Ultimately, the alliance collapsed, failing to overcome the second challenge.

Joseon's behavior during this period leaves a huge question mark. Loyalty at the expense of imminent annihilation was unprecedented in Korean history. Such a behavior during the Ming-Qing transition appears pretty irrational to the contemporary people. Indeed, Kye Seung-Bum argues that nowhere in Confucian theory is there an idea that tributary states should stay loyal even at the cost of extermination. He further claims that the type of loyalty that Joseon displayed was an anomaly which has occurred only once in not only Korean history but also East Asian history.¹⁰ For instance, in 1636, the

⁹ The Later Jin was founded in 1616 when the Manchus officially declared themselves as legitimate successors to the former Jin dynasty.

¹⁰ Seung-Bum Kye 계승범, “Gwanhaegun malyeop (1621~1622) waegyoseoneui shiljaewa geu sunggyuk” 광해군대 말엽(1621~1622) 외교노선 논쟁의 실제와 그 성격 [The Nature of Court Debate over Foreign Policy in the Last Phase of King Kwanghae's Reign in Choson Korea, 1621~1622], *Yeoksahakbo* 역사학보 193 (2007): 34.

Joseon court, including even Choi Myung-kil who was one of the eminent government officials who argued for peace with the Manchus, objected to the last moment against adding dispatch of troops to fight against the Ming as one of the conditions of surrender.¹¹

Goryeo had a similar experience of facing the new rising hegemon's invasions during the Song-Yuan transition, but Goryeo's resistance to the Yuan stemmed not from loyalty to the Song but from its own newly established military government's search for legitimacy and power solidification through war.¹² Also, even after submitting to the Yuan, Goryeo was quick to exploit the situation by recovering a portion of its lost territory and flatly rejecting the Yuan's request to send troops to fight against the Ming during the Yuan-Ming transition.¹³ In Joseon's case, although Joseon was eventually incorporated into the new tribute system led by the Qing, it ideologically remained loyal to the

¹¹ Tae Koo Huh 허태구, "Byungjahoran yihaeui saeroun shigakgwa jeonmang: Honangi cheokhwaroneui sunggyeokgwa geuae daehan maekrakjeok yihae" 丙子胡亂 이해의 새로운 시각과 전망: 胡亂期 斥和論의 성격과 그에 대한 맥락적 이해 [A new perspective to understand the Byeongja Ho'ran war, and prospect for future approaches: Examination of the "Cheok'hwa" Ideas' nature that prevailed during the war, and trying to understanding them with appreciation of the 'Nature of the Period'], *Gyujanggak* 규장각 47 (2015): 187. The Joseon court during this period was split between *Cheok'hwa* (척화) and *Ju'hwa* (주화). The former argued for resisting the Later Jin to the final end, while the latter insisted negotiation with Manchus to avoid physical conflict. Choi Myung-kil was one of the representative figures who favored the latter argument.

¹² Han 한명기, "Wonmyeonggyochaewa, myeongcheonggyochaewa hanbando" 원명교체, 명청교체와 한반도, 66.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 71.

Ming even after the Ming's demise. Joseon held on to the idea that it was "the last bastion of Confucian orthodoxy and the true civilization" and built secret shrines dedicated to the Ming in 1704 and 1717.¹⁴

Based on the aforementioned peculiarities of the Joseon-Ming alliance during the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, this thesis aims to answer the following question: why did Joseon stick with the declining Ming despite risk of annihilation by the Later Jin? Table 1 at the end of this chapter provides the timeline of major events relevant to the main topic of this thesis. Existing researches and their limitations in answering the research question will be explored in chapter 2. Then, chapter 3 will examine the domestic and situational factors, such as the Imjin War and the Injo Restoration, which could offer an explanation to Joseon's enigmatic course of actions during the Ming-Qing transition period. Chapter 4 will wrap the thesis up with a conclusion and implications derived from the covered issues.

Ultimately, this thesis argues that the studied Joseon's seemingly counterintuitive measures were not as irrational as they appear to be. Furthermore, it claims that although ideology was crucial, the main origin of such behaviors has more to do with the domestic and situational sources that

¹⁴ Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 78.

eventually converge into the Joseon court's pursuit of its primary goal of achieving internal stability and legitimacy. In other words, the domestic situation was more influential than ideology was in shaping Joseon's behavior during the transition period. The Imjin War, the Injo Restoration, Mao Wenlong's presence in the Korean peninsula, and the limited information on China will be the main subjects of study, since they immensely influenced the domestic circumstances of Joseon.

Table 1. Timeline of Major Events

1567-1608	King Seonjo's Reign
1592-1598	The Imjin War
1608-1623	Gwanghaegun's Reign
1616	The Manchus' Establishment of the Later Jin
1621	Mao Wenlong's Entry to Joseon
1623	The Injo Restoration
1623-1649	King Injo's Reign
1627	The First Manchu Invasion of Joseon (정묘호란)
1629	Execution of Mao Wenlong by the Ming Court
1636-1637	The Second Manchu Invasion of Joseon (병자호란)
1644	End of the Ming Dynasty / Beginning of the Qing Dynasty

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Existing Researches

Some of the most frequently researched subjects relevant to this topic include *sadae* (사대), Gwanghaegun's foreign policy, and the Injo Restoration. *Sadae* appears to be the subject that has received the highest amount of attention, since it served as the most fundamental ideological basis of Joseon's foreign policy from the onset of the dynasty. Since Joseon's behavior comes across as pretty much unfathomable and illogical to many contemporary people, it is natural that scholars have invested a great deal in understanding the mindset of Joseon's ruling elites. Consequently, they delved into the background for why these people back then thought in that particular way and how this way of thinking is different from that of today. *Sadae* was basically a kind of manual for dealing with a greater power and had many other thought patterns originating from it, opening up a wide spectrum of study for today's scholars.

Gwanghaegun's efforts to maintain neutrality during the Ming-Qing transition has also been a popular topic. His policies in hindsight seemed more reasonable to the contemporary people who employed counterfactual

assumptions in an attempt to search for a clue to finding a way by which Joseon could have avoided the two Manchu invasions. As much as Gwanhaegun's maneuverings in foreign policy toward China received spotlight, the Injo Restoration that dethroned Gwanhaegun also caught people's attention because it is believed to have reversed Gwanhaegun's policies, thus serving as a turning point.

As for providing an explanation to why Joseon acted as it did, many scholars blamed Joseon's misjudgment, which derived from the subservient nature of *sadae*, partisan politics, and incompetence of Injo and his government officials. Scholars such as Yi I-hwa and Park Hyunmo pointed out the slavish nature of *sadae* and how it obstructed the capability of the Joseon court to come up with an adequate response to the new situation in which the Ming was declining while the Manchus were on the rise.¹⁵ Such a view that heavily emphasizes and criticizes Joseon's incompetence deriving from blind loyalty and dependence on the Ming had been the traditionally dominant interpretation.

Other scholars such as Kye Seung Bum and Han Myung-gi took a more

¹⁵ I-hwa Yi 이이화, *Hanguksa yiyagi 12: Gukga jaegungwa cheongeu chinip* 한국사 이야기 12: 국가 재건과 청의 침입 [Korean history 12: National reconstruction and invasion by the Qing] (Paju: Hangilsa, 2000); Hyunmo Park 박현모, "Jeongmyohoraneui gooknaewaejeongchi: Gookgawigishi'eui gongronjeongchi" 정묘호란기의 국내외정치: 국가위기시의 공론정치 [Political Debates and Foreign Policy Decisions of Chosun Dynasty during Manchu Invasion of Korea 1627], *Gookjaejeongchinonchong* 국제정치논총 42, no. 4 (2002): 217-235.

holistic and systematic approach to analyzing various components of *sadae* and understanding the context for its dominance. Nonetheless, they also eventually share the conclusion of the traditional explanation that the Joseon courts' irresponsibility and misjudgments should be the primary targets of blame.¹⁶

There were other scholars who came up with different conclusions despite examining similar elements. For example, scholars such as Oh Soochang and Huh Tae Koo proposed a different view that *sadae* during the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century was not a product of Joseon's incompetence but rather a given assumption that no one could really have done much with. Ultimately, Joseon's response was a natural one because of hardly controllable elements, such as the Manchu's overly aggressive actions and deep-rooted belief systems. It was a matter of time that even Gwanghaegun's neutral diplomacy would lose its efficacy. They do criticize the Joseon court's lack of proper preparation for the expected consequences. However, although they do not explicitly state as such, it seems that they basically argue that the decision to remain loyal to the Ming was pretty much a destined course of

¹⁶ Kye 계승범, "Joseonhoogi chosonjoonghwajooeuwa geu haeseok moonjae" 조선후기 조선중화주의와 그 해석 문제, 265-294; Myung-gi Han 한명기, "[Teukjib: Hanguksa sokeui segaehwaewi minjokeuishik] Myeongcheong gyochaegi dongbuka jilseowa joseon jibaecheungeui dae'eung" [특집: 한국사 속의 세계화와 민족의식] 명청교체기 동북아 질서와 조선 지배층의 대응 [The Choson's Response to the Changes of Situations During the Period Dynasty Change from Ming to Ching], *Yeoksawahyeonshil* 역사와현실 37 (2000): 124-148.

action that could not have been changed.¹⁷

The commonality among the different schools of scholars mentioned above is that they all regard *sadae* as an essential element in deciphering Joseon's response to the Ming-Qing transition. Indeed, the ideological rationale behind Joseon's behavior has been heavily discussed. Scholarship on Joseon's ruling elites' thought process or mental algorithm employed for decision-making has a vast scope and contains numerous conflicting perspectives. This section will narrow the boundary of this wide, controversial subject to concentrate on two key factors from Joseon's belief system that greatly influenced its course of actions during the transition period: internalization of *sadae* and the world view deriving from it.

During the early years of the Joseon dynasty, *sadae* was a clearly strategic choice to not only avoid conflict with but also reap benefits from the stronger Ming. In the process, Joseon had to exhibit loyalty to the Ming at an exaggerated degree to allay the latter's suspicions. For example, King Sejong ordered the Joseon court to wear mourning dress for 27 days—instead of the normal 3 days—when Ming emperor passed away.¹⁸ However, as time passed

¹⁷ Soo-chang Oh 오수창, “Cheonggwaeui waegyo shilsanggwa byeongjahoran” 청淸과의 외교 실상과 병자호란 [The reality of diplomacy toward the Qing and Byeongjahoran], *Hanguksa Shimingangjwa* 한국사 시민강좌 36, (2005): 100-123; Huh 허태구, 163-200.

¹⁸ Han 한명기, “Wonmyeonggyochaeh, myeongcheonggyochaewa hanbando” 원명교체, 명청교

by and the relationship with the Ming became stabilized and routinized, it is likely that the Joseon elite class fell into a mannerism of blindly accepting the Confucian principles in its customs and basic moral guidelines, thus resulting in internalization of *sadae*. In other words, by the seventeenth century, *sadae* was no longer a well-thought-out strategy but rather a given assumption.

To Joseon, reverence of lofty Chinese ideals and culture, which stemmed from the regional order constructed upon Confucian doctrines, appears to have been more influential than the actual power relations in its serving as a lesser state in the hierarchy. Although the Ming's overwhelming military prowess would have definitely contributed to Joseon's accepting the Ming's supremacy, the cultural and intellectual influence, or what we today call "soft power," played an immense role in such a behavior. Roland Bleiker observed that China's "Confucian-oriented foreign policy is less likely to resort to violent means because it foresees the dissemination of influence not through wars, but via non-violent and persuasive methods such as education and indoctrination."¹⁹ Carter Eckert similarly argued that the international structure set by China was "not founded solely, or even primarily, on military might" but

체와 한반도, 76.

¹⁹ Roland Bleiker, "East-West Stories of War and Peace: Neorealist Claims in Light of Ancient Chinese Philosophy," in *The Zen of International Relations: IR Theory from East to West*, ed. Stephen Chan, Peter G. Mandaville, and Roland Bleiker (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 183.

“rather, the political relationships were embedded within a certain cultural orientation centered on the cosmological primacy of the Chinese emperor.”²⁰

As a result, a Sino-centric international system in which each unit has a defined place according to the five cardinal relationships of Confucianism was ingrained in the ideas governing Joseon which could not accept the system’s disruption accompanied by the ascent of the Manchu state.²¹ The fact that the majority of Joseon’s government officials were neo-Confucian scholar-bureaucrats called the *sarim* (사림) only strengthened such a tendency of the Joseon court which became oblivious to the power shift in China and its geopolitical consequences.²²

The aftermath of Joseon’s succumbing to the Later Jin’s campaigns is surprising and hints something about the ideological aspect of what appears to be an irrational decision during the Ming-Qing transition. Joseon entered a tributary relationship with the Qing, but its perception of the hierarchy remained unchanged: the fallen Ming was still the center of East Asia and

²⁰ Carter J. Eckert, “Korea’s Transition to Modernity: A Will to Greatness,” in *Historical Perspectives on Contemporary East Asia*, ed. Merle Goldman and Andrew Gordon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 121.

²¹ Bleiker, 191-192. In fact, these five relationships (father-son (부자), ruler-follower (군신), husband-wife (부부), elder-younger (장유), and friendship (붕우)) are almost omnipresent in the rhetoric of those who carried out the Injo Restoration and insisted on fighting against the Later Jin to the end to preserve its loyalty to the Ming.

²² Ji-Young Lee, 328.

which country in the hierarchy currently possessed the greatest power to lead the region was irrelevant. In fact, Eckert pointed out that “despite the Manchus' gradual assimilation into the Sinitic world, the ruling elite in Korea continued to look down on the Qing state as culturally inferior.” He also added that the idea of “the Ming’s grace that saved Chosun” persisted as many of the Joseon elites continued to venerate the Ming, culminating in futile attempts by some of the later Joseon kings to invade the Qing.²³ Loyalty to that extent could imply that although Joseon’s loyalty to the Ming may appear quite irrational to the contemporary people, doing the opposite could have been unimaginable to the ruling elites back then.

Joseon’s world view—which considered the Manchus “culturally inferior”—had been immensely influenced by being a lesser state to the Ming. To redeem its national pride, Joseon considered itself the second most advanced country and created its own mini tribute system within the one anchored by the Ming. Other entities in East Asia, such as the Jurchens and Japan, were perceived to be uncivilized and inferior.²⁴ Indeed, how each country is depicted or distorted in the map below (Figure 1) indirectly reflects upon the world view

²³ Eckert, 124.

²⁴ Woo-Bong Ha 하우봉, “Joseonjeongi daewaegwangae’ae natanan ja’a’inshikgwa taja’inshik” 조선전기 대외관계에 나타난 자아인식과 타자인식 [Self-perception and the perception of others shown in the foreign relationship during the Joseon Dynasty], *Hanguksayeongu* 한국사 연구, no. 123 (2003): 251-253.

that the ruling elites of Joseon possessed at the time. Firmly established perceptions are quite slow to change. This is evident in that Joseon already had a valuable historical lesson of misjudging Japan based on its own world view and paying the price through the Imjin War. Nonetheless, Joseon soon made a similar mistake toward the Manchus. Accepting the Manchus' elevated status—which became higher than that of Joseon—might have been so difficult and unfamiliar if the Joseon court's world view had been ingrained for about over 200 years since the foundation of the dynasty.

Figure 1. *Honilkangliyeokdaegukjido* (혼일강리역대국도지도, 1402)



Source: Ha 하우봉, “Joseonjeongi daewaegwangae’ae natanan ja’a’inshikgwa taja’inshik” 조선전기 대외관계에 나타난 자아인식과 타자인식, 252.

As we can see from above, many prominent scholars have already done remarkable research on the ideological facet of the Joseon-Ming relations. However, the domestic and situational sources are not often thoroughly and sufficiently taken into consideration when explaining why Joseon made the decision to stay loyal to the Ming in spite of obvious threats coming from the stronger Later Jin. This thesis aims to add to the existing scholarship, which somewhat focuses on the ideological factors, by specifically highlighting the relatively neglected factors regarding Joseon's domestic situation. It also attempts to reconcile the different views of different scholars when it comes to interpreting the same elements.

Furthermore, although research on the Imjin War has recently begun to generate much literature in English with the rise of the strategic importance of East Asia with the ascent of China, the following period during which Joseon struggled between the two great powers and experienced two massive invasions from the Later Jin has not reaped similar amount of success. This research could contribute to enabling a wider readership on this topic from those who cannot read Korean.

2. Applicable Theoretical Frameworks

There exist several theoretical frameworks that Joseon's behavior during the transition period could possibly fit to. Alliance theories can be employed to analyze the relationship between Joseon and the Ming. Among such theories, the ones on asymmetric alliances would be adequate for the Joseon-Ming case, since the two had formed a close relationship despite wide discrepancies in their national capacities.²⁵ James Morrow is a leading scholar in asymmetric alliance theory, as he proposed the autonomy-security trade-off model in which the stronger state provides security to the weaker state in exchange for the latter's autonomy which can enable the expansion and flexibility of the former's policy options.²⁶

Although Morrow's theory was formulated through case studies primarily on the modern era and the West, the essence of his argument can be applied to defining the Joseon-Ming relations. Indeed, the basic structure of the

²⁵ An alliance is considered asymmetric if the national power of the stronger ally is more than five times greater than that of the weaker ally. There is no definite standard or rule but this is the commonly-used measuring stick. Yongho Kim 김용호, "Bidaechingdongmaeng'ae itseo dongmaeng shinrwaesung'gwa hoogidongmaeng dilemma: bookjoong dongmaeng'gwa bukhan'eu daemi'jeobgeun'eul joongshim'eu'ro" 비대칭동맹에 있어 동맹신뢰성과 후기동맹 딜레마: 북중동맹과 북한의 대미접근을 중심으로 [Trust and dilemma in asymmetric alliances: A case study of North Korea-China alliance and North Korea's response to the U.S.], *Tongilmoonjaeyeongu* 통일문제연구 13, no. 2 (2009): 7.

²⁶ James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991): 904-933.

relationship has its foundation in the bargain between the stronger Ming that provided security and the weaker Joseon that conceded its autonomy to a certain degree in exchange.²⁷ However, the asymmetric alliance theory has its limits in explaining the Joseon-Ming alliance, because the alliance continued on despite the Ming's loss of ability to provide its promised security against the Manchus and Joseon's awareness of it.

There were recent attempts in the academia to come up with a theory that concentrates on East Asia-specific characteristics. An example of such efforts would be the hierarchy theory of which David Kang is one of the leading scholars. Just like the asymmetric alliance theory did, Kang's theory explored an unequal relationship between different states, but he takes it to another level by examining the ideational elements and its interplay with the material ones. In the process, he emphasized how important the perception of legitimacy is, claiming that China was able to maintain a relatively peaceful relationship with its tributary states like Joseon through the common acceptance of Confucianism.²⁸

Although this theory does provide quite a relevant model to analyze Joseon's behavior, it is not without shortcomings. The theory does consider but

²⁷ Samsung Lee 이삼성, *Dongasiaeui jeonjaenggwa pyeonghwa 1* 동아시아의 전쟁과 평화 1 [War and Peace in East Asia 1] (Paju: Hangilsa, 2009), 172; Hunmi Lee 이현미, 13.

²⁸ Kang, "Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems," 591-622.

tends to downplay the significance of the material factors and is primarily based on a hypothetical situation that assumes the presence of a clear hegemon in a stable hierarchy. As a result, Kang's theory may not be adequate in explaining the ambiguous situation of the Ming-Qing transition period when the hierarchy was unstable and the title of hegemon did not undisputedly belong to a single entity.

Besides, Kang argued that contrary to "the realist predictions about state behavior that emphasize that lesser states will be fearful of and balance against the central state's capabilities, in hierarchy the lesser states flock to its side with a view toward gaining benefits."²⁹ However, when analyzing Joseon's response to the power transition, there seems to be something that both the realists and Kang overlook: Joseon sided with the declining Ming instead of the rising Manchus. Neither "balancing against" the Manchu state nor "gaining benefits" from the Ming prompted such a decision. Joseon yielded to the new order only after experiencing demolition from two massive military campaigns against it by the Later Jin, which eventually toppled the Ming and established the Qing.

²⁹ David Kang, "Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations," in *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, ed. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 167. Joseon definitely had some intangibles that it could indirectly gain from the Ming as later discussed in this research. However, it could no longer expect concrete material benefits.

Neoclassical realism also endeavors to take a balanced approach that examines both material and ideational factors in its analysis on interaction among different states, though there is much room for improvement in studying the link between the two. In this respect, neoclassical realists could be considered to “occupy a middle ground between pure structural theorists and constructivists.”³⁰ As for the neoclassical realists’ analysis on the states’ response to power shifts, Randall Schweller argued that bandwagoning for profit is as common as balancing against threat.³¹ In addition, he elaborated that “the aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension.”³²

Unfortunately, such an insight may also not be a well-suited explanation on Joseon’s behavior. As mentioned previously, Joseon clearly did not bandwagon to the Later Jin for profit. Furthermore, its act of siding with the Ming cannot be neatly categorized as balancing against the Later Jin from the neoclassical realist standard, because Joseon was in most part not directly involved in the military and economic clash between the Ming and the Later Jin. Joseon’s support to the Ming was mainly characterized by its refusing to sever

³⁰ Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 152.

³¹ Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 79.

³² *Ibid.*, 74.

ties with the Ming and provide assistance to the Later Jin rather than actively fighting against the Later Jin on the Ming's side.

Nonetheless, the neoclassical realists' emphasis on "the systemic realist elements and the domestic level factors" could be extracted and employed in understanding Joseon during the transition period.³³ People rarely act solely based upon their ideas without facing situational restraints. As a result, delving into not only the belief system but also the given domestic circumstances of the Joseon court at the time is indispensable to figuring out why it responded in a manner that appears puzzling to the contemporary people.

Therefore, instead of using an existing theoretical framework to analyze the topic that will be explored, this thesis plans to take an opposite direction with an approach that resembles a historical narrative. It will go through the important domestic and situational factors of the time period and derive observations or analyses from them. This does not mean that the ideational elements are insignificant, as they are intertwined with the situational ones and will be repeatedly resorted to. It is simply that the purpose here is to cast the spotlight on the relatively marginalized aspect of Joseon during the Ming-Qing transition.

³³ Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic Pressure and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2010): 121.

3. Inherent Limitations

Anyone who is already engaged in or plans to delve into this topic inevitably face some inherent limitations in doing so. Pointing out and being aware of such limitations appear necessary before moving on to the main analysis on Joseon's seemingly enigmatic behavior. The first problem is lack of evidence. The time period of this research was one during which Joseon went through the most tumultuous and violent experience generated from both external and internal forces. As a result, there was immense loss of documents due to frequent wars and battles at the time. For instance, many official government records including the *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* (조선왕조실록), which scholars most often resort to as their primary sources, had been unwittingly destroyed by the people of Joseon during this period. This was a result of the people's burning down the royal palaces out of anger toward King Seonjo and the ruling elites' irresponsible escape to the northernmost area of the country upon Japanese invasion.³⁴

Besides, the Joseon court had a separate organization of those who took

³⁴ Gubok Jeong 정구복, "Imjinwaeran saryo'ae daehan sahasajeok geomto: Seonjosillokgwa ahnbangjoon'eui yeoksagisooleul joongshimeuro" 임진왜란 사료에 대한 사학사적 검토: 선조실록과 安邦俊의 역사기술을 중심으로 [Historiographical review on historical records on the Imjin War: Focusing on Seonjo Sillok and writings of Ahn Bangjoon], *Jeonbuchsahak* 전북사학 35 (2009): 100.

sole responsibility of recording history, and this organization halted completely for about a year and was not able to function properly during wartime.³⁵ In addition to the fact that only an extremely limited type of people could write on and record historical events, high illiteracy rate resulted in small production of documents in the first place and narrow representativeness of the Joseon people's thoughts. Indeed, the documents remaining to this day are predominantly authored by the upper class that was able to write.³⁶

Another issue is the reliability of evidence. Because of the aforementioned destruction of documents during times of national chaos, most of the existing documents—even *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* which historians consider to be a relatively reliable primary source—are rewritten versions or were newly written many years after the actual events occurred. To make matters worse, the restoration projects had been carried out without sufficient, systematized efforts to obtain accuracy and objectivity. Consequently, the authors often failed to properly carry out fact checks and were greatly susceptible to political interests and biases.³⁷

³⁵ Ibid., 101.

³⁶ John B. Duncan 존 B. 던컨, “Imjinwaeraneui gi’ukgwa minjok’euishik hyeongseong” 임진왜란의 기억과 민족의식 형성 [Memories of the Imjin War and formation of national awareness], in *Imjinwaeran dongasia samguk jeonjaeng* 임진왜란 동아시아 삼국전쟁 [The Imjin War, a war of three East Asian countries], ed. Doo-hee Jeong 정두희 and Kyeongsun Lee 이경순 (Seoul: Humanist, 2007), 151.

³⁷ Jeong 정구복, “Imjinwaeran saryo’ae daehan sahaksajeok geomto” 임진왜란 사료에 대한

In fact, for instance, *Seonjo Sillok* (선조실록) contains numerous erroneous dates, data, and course of events due to disorganized and delayed reports to the central government that had escaped to the northern borders of Joseon.³⁸ The *Corrected-Seonjosillok* (선조수정실록) that was written after the second Manchu invasion in 1636 provides a better overall picture of historical events of the time. Nevertheless, it is flawed in that it was a product of review that took only about a month and focused on reevaluation of certain people instead of extensive and accurate fact checking.³⁹ Moreover, the *Injo Sillok* (인조실록) also reveals a kind of manufactured memory of the second Manchu invasion in 1636, as it tends to place the entire blame of such a disaster on the government officials who supported *Cheok'hwa*. Unfortunately, this historical record is devoid of careful, thorough examination of Joseon's mistakes that could reveal problems other than *Cheok'hwa*, such as lack of coordinated defense preparation.⁴⁰

Other relevant historical documents such as *Sanseong Ilgi* (산성일기)

사학사적 검토, 98.

³⁸ Ibid., 105-106.

³⁹ Ibid., 109.

⁴⁰ Jeong-nyeo Kim 김정녀, "Byeongjahoraneui chaegim nonjaenggwa gi'ukeui seosa: Injoeui gi'ukgwa daehanggi'ukeuiroseoeui gangdomongyurok" 병자호란의 책임 논쟁과 기억의 서사: 인조의 기억과 '대항기억'으로서의 <강도몽유록> [The debate on the responsibility about the Manchu war of 1636 and narrative of memory: The King Injo's memory and Gangdomongyurok as the fight memory], *Hangukhakyeongu* 한국학연구 35 (2010): 214.

and *Kyechook Ilgi* (계축일기) that were written by the upper class or those that likely reflect the thoughts of the general public like *Bakssiyeon* (박씨전), *Gangdomongyurok* (강도몽유록), and *Imjinrok* (임진록) also share a common problem: historians have failed to accurately locate the authors and written dates of these documents.⁴¹ Such a fact can seriously limit the study on whatever scholars intend to figure out by using these documents as their evidence, because information on the author and time period during which it was written can offer invaluable assistance to better analyzing and interpreting the contents of the documents.

As for the latter group of documents in particular, they have additional problems in terms of reliability, since they were fictions to begin with and were likely to have been written by the *yangban* (양반), the upper class of Joseon society, who transcribed folktales for a living.⁴² Also, it is highly likely that

⁴¹ *Sanseong Ilgi* is on the 50 days of Joseon's resistance against the Later Jin at the Namhansanseong (남한산성) during the second Manchu invasion; *Kyechook Ilgi* is on the court politics during Gwanghaegun's reign; *Bakssiyeon* and *Gangdomongyurok* are pretty much satires that reflect the people's wrath and discontent with the Joseon court and the Later Jin; and *Imjinrok* is a satire of similar nature but with the Ming and Japan replacing the Later Jin.

⁴² Moon Jung Choi 최문정, *Imjinrok Yeongu* 임진록 연구 [A Study on the Imjinrok] (Seoul: Bakijeong, 2001), 487. Although the *yangban* had retained their social status as the upper class of Joseon, many of its members have lost their economic base that commensurate with their social status, since the Imjin War and the Manchu invasions created much devastation to the extent of plunging the entire country into extreme poverty. However, the majority of the *yangban* members refused to lose face by engaging in agriculture or commerce, so the only way by which they could earn a living while preserving their self-esteem was making use of their ability to write, a skill that most commoners did not possess.

they were subjected to heavy censorship.⁴³ This leads to the universal and fundamental problem of studying historical events that are far removed from the present. The idea of searching for objective evidence to grasp an accurate overview of historical events may be an aloof and unattainable task in the first place. It would be more realistic for scholars to do their best within the given circumstances by focusing on finding the fallacies of their given historical materials and analyzing the background behind such fallacies.⁴⁴

⁴³ There is no direct evidence on the Joseon court's censorship, but it can be indirectly inferred based on (1) how the content of the later versions of the *Imjinrok* that were further removed from the Imjin War in terms of time period becomes more explicitly critical of the Ming and King Seonjo and his followers, and (2) the overall atmosphere of the Joseon society which was a kingdom in which free circulation of various ideas was greatly restricted. Choi 최문정, 457-459. Indeed, *Gangdomongyurok* also appears to have chosen the setting of the story as a dream and the main characters as dead spirits and women to circumvent government censorship. Jeong-nyeo Kim 김정녀, 215.

⁴⁴ Jeong-nyeo Kim 김정녀, 207.

III. ANALYSIS

1. The Imjin War

The Imjin War is one of the two seminal historical events that extensively shaped the conditions under which Joseon made its decisions during the Ming-Qing transition. *Jaejojieun* (재조지은) was one of the most noteworthy legacies of the Imjin War that later affected Joseon's foreign policy during the early seventeenth century. The Ming provided military assistance to Joseon's defense against Japanese invasion in 1592. The Joseon court regarded this Ming aid during the Imjin War as a huge debt and inestimable benevolence which it had to pay back during the Ming's struggle against the Manchus. This idea was manifested in the concept of *Jaejojieun* that constantly surfaced whenever the government officials of Joseon argued for remaining loyal to the Ming regardless of the threat posed by the Manchus.

It is likely that at least King Seonjo and many of his followers felt grateful and indebted to the Ming to a certain degree. Otherwise, they would have been remembered as the leaders of Joseon's last regime after the Japanese wiped out the entire Korean peninsula. Countless records of Seonjo's

glorification of the Ming are found in *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty*.⁴⁵ Indeed, the assistance from the Ming military and the combined effort of the Joseon navy and righteous army were inarguably the driving forces for the Joseon-Ming alliance's success in fending off Japanese invasion. Japanese historical sources reveal that although the Japanese army overpowered the Chosun army, fighting against the Ming army and the Chosun navy was a different story. The Japanese army gradually became terrorized after the Ming's participation in the war, because the Ming army was much more powerful than it was expected to be.⁴⁶

The indebtedness and appreciation deriving from *Jaejojieun* may seem to provide an obvious, simplistic answer to the question of why Joseon remained so loyal. However, the reality of *Jaejojieun* is not as rosy as it is portrayed. If we refer to the alliance and hierarchy theories mentioned above, Ming's assistance during the Imjin War was a fulfillment of its basic tributary or alliance duty—not a lofty generosity—and primarily served its own interest of

⁴⁵ Han 한명기, “[Teukjib: Hanguksa sokeui segaehwaeui minjokeuishik] Myeongcheong gyochoegi dongbuka jilseowa joseon jibaecheungeui dae'eung” [특집: 한국사 속의 세계화와 민족의식] 명청교체기 동북아 질서와 조선 지배층의 대응, 131.

⁴⁶ Moon-ja Kim 김문자, “Imranshi hangwaemoonjae,” 임란시 항왜문제 [A Study on the Japanese Soldiers who Surrendered during the Japanese Invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598], in *Imjinwaerangwa hanilgwangae* 임진왜란과 한일관계 [The Imjin War and Korea-Japan relations], ed. Han-il gwangaesa yeongunonjip pyeonchan wiwonhoe 한일관계사연구논집 편찬위원회 (Seoul: Kyungin moonhwasa, 2005), 332.

maintaining Joseon as a buffer zone to protect its own territory. Even that came after a series of Ming's suspicion toward Joseon's warning about Japanese invasion. The Ming surprisingly did not have much trust—an important element in maintaining a solid alliance—in Joseon. For example, when Joseon reported Japanese invasion and asked for help, there were opinions in the Ming court insisting that Joseon might be conspiring with Japan to take over the Liaodong area of the Ming.⁴⁷ Also, King Seonjo himself admitted difficulties in communicating with the Ming court, because many Ming government officials thought that Joseon has a habit of lying.⁴⁸

It is questionable whether the Joseon government's blind respect toward the Ming was genuine as it was projected by *Jaejojieun*. As mentioned above, the Ming already had its own sufficient motivation to participate in the war. The main reason why the Ming participated in the Imjin War was because it would be the next target of Japanese invasion. Thus, fighting against Japan while Joseon can serve as a barrier in any way before the theater shifts to the Ming territory was an obvious choice and the most rational decision it could

⁴⁷ Harriet T. Zurndorfer, "Wanli China Versus Hideyoshi's Japan: Rethinking China's Involvement in the Imjin Waeran," in *The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory*, ed. James B. Lewis (Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2015), 198.

⁴⁸ Wan Bom Lee 이완범, "Imjin waeraneui gukjaejeongchihak" 임진왜란의 국제정치학 [The Politics of the Japanese Invasion of Korea: Japan's Proposal for the Division of Korea, 1592-1598], *Jeongshinmoonhwa yeongu* 정신문화연구 25, no. 4 (2002): 114.

make.⁴⁹ Moreover, the Ming entered peace negotiations with Japan during the Imjin War but excluded Joseon from the process. The Ming went as far as toying with the idea of dividing half of Joseon territory to Japan as a compromise for ending the war, and the Joseon court was aware of it and tried desperately to dissuade the Ming from doing so.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the Ming definitely did not provide military aid for free and rather pressured Joseon into covering an inordinate amount of the cost for supporting the Ming forces during the war.⁵¹

Nonetheless, the Ming never forgot to take advantage of *Jaejojjeun*, which was wrapped in a false cover of genuine benevolence, by coercing the Joseon court to follow its requests.⁵² Were all the high government officials of Joseon that ignorant not to have sensed the ulterior motives of the Ming during the war? Or did they have no choice but to leave only positive official records on the Ming?

Before we delve into these questions, we should note that the Ming

⁴⁹ Han Gyu Kim 김한규, 294.

⁵⁰ Wan Bom Lee 이완범, 111-112.

⁵¹ Nam-Lin Hur, "The Celestial Warriors: Ming Military Aid and Abuse During the Korean War, 1592-8," in *The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory*, ed. James B. Lewis (Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2015), 245.

⁵² Han 한명기, "[Teukjib: Hanguksa sokeui segaehwaeui minjokeuishik] Myeongcheong gyochaegi dongbuka jilseowa joseon jibaechungeui dae'eung" [특집: 한국사 속의 세계화와 민족의식] 명청교체기 동북아 질서와 조선 지배층의 대응, 129.

forces were as brutal as the Japanese were toward Joseon, and Joseon's ruling class was well-informed about this fact through numerous reports on the atrocities of the Ming forces in Joseon.⁵³ Ironically, despite being Joseon's ally, the Ming was accountable for a large portion of the tremendous amount of damage done to Joseon during the Imjin War. The atrocities of the Ming army included murdering, raping, and plundering to an exorbitant extent, and were sometimes more intense than those of the Japanese army that the Joseon people came up with a popular saying, "The Ming army is a fine-tooth comb and the Japanese army is a wide-tooth comb."⁵⁴ In fact, about 10,000 Joseon civilians were slaughtered not by the Japanese army but by the Ming army who were frustrated by the difficulties it faced during the military campaign to recover the Pyongyang castle.⁵⁵

Not only the Ming army but also the people of the Ming were sources of the Joseon people's rancor toward the Ming after the war. The Ming refugees began to flock to Joseon after the Qing began to encroach upon the Ming. By 1621, 100,000 refugees had crossed over to Joseon and pillaged Joseon villages,

⁵³ Hur, 249.

⁵⁴ Myung-gi Han 한명기, *Gwanghaegun* 광해군 [Gwanghaegun] (Seoul: Yeoksabipyongsas, 2000), 67-68. This is a translated version of "왜군은 얼레 빗, 명군은 참 빗." The saying meant that when the Ming army plundered a village, it was more thorough than the Japanese army as if a fine-tooth comb swept by taking away almost every single thing that could be taken.

⁵⁵ Hyunshin Do 도현신, *Yeotsaram'aegae jeonjaengeul mootda* 옛사람에게 전쟁을 묻다 [Asking about war to the people of the past] (Seoul: Time Square, 2009), 55.

escalating the tension between the people of the two countries.⁵⁶

The Joseon government itself had many direct incidents in which it might have been greatly offended by the Ming's attitude. For example, in 1595 when Seonjo was still in throne, the Ming emperor sent a royal letter to Gwanhaegun, the son of Seonjo, requesting him to take charge of defending the southern areas of Joseon because the current king is too incompetent to do so.⁵⁷ Gwanhaegun himself developed an anti-Ming sentiment as a prince when he interacted extensively with the Ming forces to fight against the Japan because he often witnessed how the Ming army was arrogant and vicious toward the Joseon army and the Joseon people.⁵⁸

Moreover, in his *Jingbirok* (징비록), a self-reflective account on the war by Yoo Sung-ryong who had a position equivalent to today's prime minister, Yoo recalled that a Ming general kicked one of the Joseon generals when they could not agree on a joint military strategy.⁵⁹ Despite being the highest government official of Joseon, Yoo himself, along with other Joseon high government officials, was often forced to kneel down in front of Li Rusong—

⁵⁶ Han 한명기, *Gwanhaegun* 광해군, 219-220.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 200-201.

⁵⁹ Sung-ryong Yoo 유성룡, *Jingbirok* 징비록 [Book of Corrections], trans. Heungsik Kim 김흥식 (Paju: Seohaemoonjip, 2003), 155. The *Jingbirok* referred to here is a translated version into Korean by Kim Heungsik in 2003. The original source was first published during the mid-seventeenth century.

the highest commanding general of the Ming army sent to help Joseon in fighting against Japan—who even threatened to order physical punishment on them whenever there was a disagreement on crucial issues.⁶⁰ However, Yoo did not express any sign of hostility toward the Ming throughout his book. It is difficult to find out what the Joseon government exactly thought of the Ming, but one thing for sure is that reverence of the Ming was necessary both in terms of foreign policy (tribute relationship with the Ming) and domestic policy (providing justification for the sociopolitical structure of Joseon).

Taking a closer look at the domestic factor mentioned above, we could guess that *Jaejojeun* was possibly more of rhetoric for political purposes than a genuine admiration of the Ming. Seonjo and the government officials needed this concept to justify their disgraceful wartime actions and restore their damaged authority. As a result, they tried to cover up their mistakes and downplay the achievements of the Joseon generals and righteous army by insisting that Joseon was saved singlehandedly by the Ming forces whom the Joseon court successfully persuaded. In fact, *Seonjo Sillok of The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* has a record directly stating that (1) help from the Ming forces was the only factor which enabled Joseon's victory against the Japanese forces, (2) Joseon's military merely followed them slaying several enemies by luck,

⁶⁰ Ibid., 156-157.

and (3) the Joseon court deserved highest credit among domestic entities for successfully bringing in the Ming military.⁶¹ Since the king of Joseon derived his legitimacy in domestic politics from the Ming, such an emphasis might have been natural measures to take in order to redeem himself.⁶² Also, Seonjo and his established followers were possibly wary of potential challenges from a new rival force consisting of those with distinguished military achievements during the Imjin War and made use of *Jaejojieun* to stifle its emergence.

Domestic instability was a serious issue because after the Imjin War, two-thirds of Joseon's arable land was destroyed, leading to various problems such as the disruption of an effective tax collection system and widespread famine among the people of Joseon.⁶³ Such problems were thorny concerns for Seonjo and his followers, since the national environment became susceptible to

⁶¹ National Institute of Korean History 국사편찬위원회, "Seonjo sillok 135gwon, seonjo 34nyeon 3wol 14il imja 8beonjjaegisa" 선조실록 135권, 선조 34년 3월 14일 임자 8번째기사 [Seonjo Sillok 135, Seonjo March 14th Imja 8th article], *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* 조선왕조실록, accessed November 28, 2016, http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kna_13403014_008. The original excerpt from the online Korean translation of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* is: "이번 왜란의 적을 평정한 것은 오로지 중국 군대의 힘이었고 우리 나라 장사(將士)는 중국 군대의 뒤를 따르거나 혹은 요행히 잔적(殘賊)의 머리를 얻었을 뿐으로 일찍이 제 힘으로는 한 명의 적병을 빼거나 하나의 적진을 함락하지 못하였다. 그 중에서도 이순신과 원균 두 장수는 바다에서 적군을 섬멸하였고, 권율(權栗)은 행주(幸州)에서 승첩을 거두어 약간 나은 편이다. 그리고 중국 군대가 나오게 된 연유를 논하자면 모두가 호종한 여러 신하들이 어려운 길에 위험을 무릅쓰고 나를 따라 의주(義州)까지 가서 중국에 호소하였기 때문이며, 그리하여 왜적을 토벌하고 강토를 회복하게 된 것이다."

⁶² Samsung Lee 이삼성, 172-173.

⁶³ Jeong 정구복, "Imjinwaeraneui yeoksajeok seonggyeokgwa euimi," *임진왜란의 역사적 성격과 의미*, 15.

internal revolts. After going through near demise of the dynasty during the war, Seonjo's regime would have been primarily focused on recovering its central authority and cooperating with the Ming that could facilitate the process. *Jaejojeun* as one of the answers to the research question is valid but for reasons different from and more complicated than the one mentioned in the beginning of this section (moral obligation to return its favor to the Ming). Unfavorable domestic conditions after the Imjin War resulted in top priority on restoration of central authority through the Ming. This immensely limited Joseon's diplomatic options in dealing with the rising Manchus which could not be effectively dealt with in accordance to its priority.

2. The Injo Restoration

Another significant event was the Injo Restoration in 1623 which is often considered a turning point in Joseon's foreign policy in response to the Ming-Qing transition period. The traditionally established view on this event is that it reversed Gwanhaegun's policy of maintaining neutrality toward the power struggle between the Ming and the Later Jin. As a result, Joseon became mired into choosing the policy of worshipping the Ming and rejecting the Later

Jin (승명배금).⁶⁴ It is believed that such a policy provoked the Later Jin and culminated in two massive invasions that further devastated Joseon that had yet to recover from scars of the Imjin War.

The change in Joseon's policy after the restoration was inevitable because of the justifications that the rebelling forces presented for dethroning Gwanhaegun. The restoration derived legitimacy predominantly from claims on Gwanhaegun's violation of Confucian principles: (1) neglecting *Jaejojeun* by betraying the Ming which is Joseon's ruler and father country, (2) committing atrocities against his family members by deposing and incarcerating his stepmother, Queen Dowager Inmok, and banishing and killing his stepbrother, Prince Young-chang, and (3) failing to be a benevolent and wise ruler to the people of Joseon by overburdening them with many unnecessary construction projects.⁶⁵ In the early seventeenth century, the Joseon court had

⁶⁴ Park 박현모, 218.

⁶⁵ Byeong-ju Shin 신병주, "1623nyeon injobanjeong'eui gyeonggwawa geu hyeonjaejeok euimi" 1623년 인조반정의 경과와 그 현재적 의미 [The progression of the Injo Restoration and its contemporary meaning], *Tongil'inmoonhak* 통일인문학 46 (2008): 54. In fact, Gwanhaegun did not order the murder of Prince Young-chang and was reluctant to even banish him in the first place, but his followers regarded the prince as a potential threat to Gwanhaegun's throne and ended up killing the prince. Nevertheless, he ultimately took the blame for the prince's death. Han 한명기, *Gwanhaegun* 광해군, 131. The primary motive behind Gwanhaegun's orders to construct royal palaces could be understood in the context of the time period. Gwanhaegun reigned in the period shortly following the Imjin War and the majority of the main royal palaces had been burnt down due to the war. However, although many other policies of Gwanhaegun focused on salvaging the distraught people of Joseon, Gwanhaegun abnormally revealed obsession with the construction works. It is speculated that

not yet extricated itself from the lingering nationwide hardship caused by the Imjin War. Naturally, like the Seonjo regime right after the Imjin War, the new Injo regime desperately needed the Ming to quickly establish itself as the legitimate successor and strengthen its central authority.

Although it is true that the Injo regime was vastly dependent upon the Ming for stabilization of authority in the domestic realm, claiming that the change in foreign policy after the restoration was primarily accountable for the Manchu invasions could be problematic. The Injo regime was definitely much more pro-Ming than the Gwanhaegun regime was, but it was hardly anti-Later Jin at least until before the first Manchu invasion in 1627. This newly established regime had a long way to go in solidifying its central authority and recovering from the debilitated economic conditions and social unrest. So it did not have the luxury of being bold and adventurous enough to adopt a risky policy that could instigate hostility from a more powerful entity.⁶⁶

Interestingly, the foreign policy toward China under Injo started to

this originated from the psychological insecurity that he experienced as growing up as a son of Seonjo's concubine which was severely despised upon in Joseon society. The royal family was no exception to this perception of social status. So it is likely that he intended to emanate and assert his royal authority through magnificent palaces. Ibid., 140-141.

⁶⁶ Han 한명기, “[Teukjib: Hanguksa sokeui segaehwaeui minjokeuishik] Myeongcheong gyochoegi dongbuka jilseowa joseon jibaecheungeui dae'eung” [특집: 한국사 속의 세계화와 민족의식] 명칭교체기 동북아 질서와 조선 지배층의 대응, 142-143.

closely resemble the one under Gwanhaegun after the first Manchu invasion.⁶⁷ It is possible that the Injo regime began to realize the infeasibility of the foreign policy—which was primarily modeled with consideration to Confucian ideals rather than accurate assessment of the geopolitical situation in China—that it first proposed after the restoration. Also, many of the major figures who contributed to the success of the Injo Restoration, such as Choi Myung-kil, Chang Yu, Kim Ryu, Yi Kwi, and Hong Seo-bong, were those who argued for establishing peace with the Manchus under Gwanhaegun’s reign (*Ju’hwa*).⁶⁸

The role that the ideological conflict between those who respectively supported *Ju’hwa* and *Cheok’hwa* played in impeding formation of a peaceful relationship with the Later Jin is also somewhat exaggerated. Such a conflict became a serious issue only right before and during the second Manchu invasion.⁶⁹ The general consensus was that Joseon could not afford to directly clash with the Later Jin and thus, the fundamental objective of Joseon’s foreign policy to stay out of the war in China remained the same even after the restoration took place. Consequently, it appears likely that the idea of

⁶⁷ Kyeong-Lok Kim 김경록, “17saegicho myeongcheonggyochaewa daejoongguk sahaengeui byeonhwa: daehoogeum sahaengeul joongshimeuro” 17세기초 명청교체와 대중국 사행의 변화: 대후금 사행을 중심으로 [The Ming-Qing Transition and the Change of Sahaeng toward China in the early 17th century], *Hangukmunhagwa Yesool* 한국문학과 예술 15 (2015): 31.

⁶⁸ Oh 오수창, “Cheonggwaeui waegyo shilsanggwa byeongjahoran” 청과의 외교 실상과 병자호란, 107.

⁶⁹ Jeong-nyeo Kim 김정녀, 209.

worshiping the Ming and rejecting the Later Jin was a mere rhetoric in the wake of dethroning Gwanghaegun to justify what could have otherwise been perceived as an illegal coup.

However, the split within the Joseon government actually existed in other forms. The Injo regime proclaimed to distance itself from Gwanghaegun's reign that was tainted by numerous issues arising from lack of unity within the Joseon court. Although he adhered to the basic rules of *sadae* and had no intentions of becoming enemies with the Ming, Gwanghaegun was not obsessed with staying loyal to the Ming and planned to carry out a neutral policy to avoid another disaster like the Imjin War. In response, many government officials were extremely reluctant to be associated with anything that could damage Joseon's self-proclaimed loyalty toward the Ming, and some of them even went as far as reporting to the Ming court instead of their own king.⁷⁰ Gwanghaegun initially intended to set a balanced political atmosphere in the Joseon court and transcend the existing partisan politics. He was pretty much accommodating by appointing government officials from all different sectors, including even those who did not share his views and opposed his succession to throne.⁷¹

However, as time passed by and his goals of achieving unity within the

⁷⁰ Kye 계승범, "Gwanghaegun malyeop (1621~1622) waegyoseoneui shiljaewa geu sunggyuk" 광해군대 말엽(1621~1622) 외교노선 논쟁의 실제와 그 성격, 7.

⁷¹ Han 한명기, *Gwanghaegun* 광해군, 103-106.

Joseon court remained aloof, he gradually became frustrated. Consequently, Gwanghaegun and his followers later became adamant and uncompromising toward opposition forces, but this only aggravated the situation, since opposition was much larger and stronger than his supporters.⁷² Eventually, during the final year of Gwanghaegun before the Injo Restoration, the king was literally isolated and abandoned by the ruling elites, resulting in countless deadlocks and suspension of certain important organizations' regular operation.⁷³

The new Injo regime promised to address such problems arising from divisions within the government. Unfortunately, there were intense internal conflicts among those who carried out the Injo Restoration. They were severe to the extent of provoking the Yi Gwal's Rebellion in 1624 which was large and serious enough to threaten the very existence of the Joseon court. The Yi Gwal's Rebellion was caused by those who felt bitter toward Injo and his major advisors' distribution of compensations for those who participated in the restoration. Such feelings of discontent were not limited to people within Injo's inner circle, as those who failed to be in the mainstream had their properties

⁷² Oh 오수창, "Cheonggwaewi waegyo shilsanggwa byeongjahoran" 청淸과의 외교 실상과 병자호란, 107.

⁷³ Kye 계승범, "Gwanghaegun malyeop (1621~1622) waegyonoseoneui shiljaewa geu sunggyuk" 광해군대 말엽(1621~1622) 외교노선 논쟁의 실제와 그 성격, 30.

confiscated for the purpose of rewarding those who carried out the coup.⁷⁴ The government still remained far from being united and well-coordinated. Such continuing and even worsening internal instability seems to have forced the Injo regime to rely on the Ming's help more than it originally intended to.

When it comes to dealing with the Later Jin, the tumultuous process of power solidification after the restoration definitely disrupted internal coordination in proper execution of diplomatic measures toward the Manchus and left Joseon ill-prepared for potential Manchu invasions.⁷⁵ The regime also failed to seize multiple opportunities of peace negotiation before and during the early phase of the second Manchu invasion.⁷⁶ Such mistakes tragically resulted in about 600,000 skilled workers of Joseon sent to China as hostages and a mandatory tribute relationship which only aggravated the economic hardships that the Joseon people were going through after the Imjin War.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, there are opinions claiming that people place criticism on the Injo regime more than necessary. Joseon's behavior of remaining loyal to the Ming during the Ming-Qing transition cannot be purely attributed to the

⁷⁴ Shin 신병주, 46.

⁷⁵ Soo-chang Oh 오수창, "Ohae sok byeongjahoran, shidaejeok hangae apeui injo" 오해 속 병자호란, 시대적 한계 앞의 인조 [Misunderstanding of Byeongjahoran and Injo's facing the limits of the era], *Naeileul yeoneun yeoksa* 내일을 여는 역사, no. 26 (2006): 41-42.

⁷⁶ Park 박현모, 231.

⁷⁷ Andrew C. Nahm, *A History of the Korean People* (Elizabeth: Hollym, 1988), 125.

flaws of the regime. For example, Oh Soo-chang insisted that the situation in China that the Injo regime faced was completely different and more complicated than the one that Gwanhaegun dealt with.⁷⁸ Because the Manchus accomplished rapid military growth and became more aggressive since the Injo Restoration, the Injo regime was forced to choose between the Ming and the Later Jin without the option of remaining neutral. He questioned whether Gwanhaegun would have chosen the Later Jin over the Ming in order to avoid Manchu invasions. Kim Kyeong-Lok brings up a similar point that Hong Taiji's succession to Nurhaci as the head of the Manchus was more critical to the conflict between Joseon and the Later Jin than Joseon's policy under Injo was, as the new Manchu leader was much more assertive and uncompromising than his predecessor.⁷⁹

In addition, Huh Tae Koo argued that singling the Injo regime out when blaming lack of proper defense against the Later Jin could be unfair, as military preparedness during Injo's reign did not differ much from that under Gwanhaegun.⁸⁰ However, this does not mean that the Injo regime could be exempt from such a criticism. Indeed, the engine behind Goryeo's success in

⁷⁸ Oh 오수창, "Ohae sok byeongjahoran, shidaeyeok hangae apeui injo" 오해 속 병자호란, 시대적 한계 앞의 인조, 37-38.

⁷⁹ Kyeong-Lok Kim 김경록, "17saegicho myeongcheonggyochaewa daejoongguk sahaengeui byeonhwa" 17세기초 명청교체와 대중국 사행의 변화, 40-41.

⁸⁰ Huh 허태구, 178.

dealing with power transitions in China was that it had a solid economic and military basis to back up its flexible foreign policy.⁸¹ In contrast, Joseon during the Ming-Qing transition was pretty much helpless in terms of both economy and military prowess, restricting its diplomatic options.

The previously mentioned opinions are quite valid. However, a more important and relevant issue that we should pay attention to is how the unstable domestic situation partially contributed to the Ming's change in attitude toward Joseon. In addition to the domestic situations that increased Joseon's reliance on the Ming, the Ming also influenced Joseon's behavior through measures that it had rarely taken before. Indeed, the Ming often got what it wanted from Joseon by deliberately taking advantage of the aforementioned Joseon's domestic circumstances that required the Ming's help.⁸² Loyalty to the Ming by the Injo regime could be partly explained by external pressure resulting from the Ming's coercive diplomacy and usage of negative soft power, since the Ming itself was desperate in its campaign against the overwhelming Later Jin. This was a noticeable shift away from the two countries' traditional tribute relationship that was somewhat tacitly maintained through customary rituals for confirmation purposes.

⁸¹ Han 한명기, "Wonmyeonggyochae, myeongcheonggyochaewa hanbando" 원명교체, 명청교체와 한반도, 65.

⁸² Ibid., 40.

For example, the Ming did not meddle with the succession issue in Joseon and usually approved the new king without objection except in four cases: Taejo, Jungjong, Gwanhaegun, and Injo.⁸³ It was no coincidence that half of such cases occurred during the Ming-Qing transition period.⁸⁴ We can infer that Injo experienced the most difficult situation. He succeeded the throne in a period during which the Ming resorted to coercive diplomacy. Furthermore, he did so through an illegitimate method that the Ming already had a precedent of expressing reservations toward approving even when the relationship between the two countries was stable. Injo also frequently received pressure from the Ming court that hinted at replacing him as the king of Joseon whenever he was not obedient.⁸⁵ It is also noteworthy that some government officials of the Ming court even proposed invading Joseon to advance the Ming's interests in times of crisis.⁸⁶

Ultimately, the Injo Restoration created an environment similar to that of the Imjin War that required the Ming's provision of legitimacy due to serious

⁸³ Taejo was not an anomaly, since he was the first king of Joseon when the Ming and Joseon that were both recently founded had not yet dampened suspicions toward each other and settled down on a proper tribute relationship. After the tribute relationship was established and until the sixteenth century, the Ming had questioned only the succession of Jungjong, because it was a result of a coup in 1506 called the Jungjong Restoration that dethroned Yeonsangun.

⁸⁴ Ji-Young Lee, 323-325.

⁸⁵ Han 한명기, "Wonmyeonggyochaewa, myeongcheonggyochaewa hanbando" 원명교체, 명청교체와 한반도, 92.

⁸⁶ Ji-Young Lee, 327.

domestic instability and brought in heavy interference by the Ming that saw the event as a golden opportunity to exploit Joseon. As mentioned above, consolidation of power in the domestic realm for regime survival was the highest priority so consequently, this placed Joseon in a situation that made it so difficult to abandon the Ming.

3. Mao Wenlong

Mao Wenlong is one of the most crucial sources that influenced the circumstances for Joseon's loyal behavior that appears irrational to the contemporary people. Oh Soo-chang claims that the greatest motivation behind the Later Jin's invasion of Joseon had to do more with the threat posed by the presence of Mao Wenlong than with Joseon's anti-Later Jin policies.⁸⁷ Regardless of what the greatest motivation actually was, Hong Taiji indeed professed that one of the four major reasons for the first Manchu invasion of Joseon was to eliminate Mao Wenlong and his forces on the Korean peninsula.⁸⁸ Overall, Mao, even as a mere individual, was significant to that

⁸⁷ Oh 오수창, "Cheonggwaeui waegyo shilsanggwa byeongjahoran" 청淸과의 외교 실상과 병자호란, 103.

⁸⁸ Kyeong-Lok Kim 김경록, "17saegicho myeongcheonggyochaewa daejoongguk sahaengeui byeonhwa" 17세기초 명淸교체와 대중국 사행의 변화, 41. The four reasons were: (1) invasion of the Manchus in assistance to the Ming, (2) protecting and supporting Mao Wenlong and his

extent and requires separate efforts in studying his impact.

Mao, a Ming general, first rose to prominence by regaining former Ming territory through ambush on the Manchus in 1621. He invaded the Later Jin from the rear via Joseon to achieve such a military victory which was highly regarded, as the Ming was on a losing streak to the Later Jin since 1619. However, his victory was quite brief, as he was ousted from the regained territory by the Manchu forces that quickly recovered from the surprise attack. Mao escaped to Joseon, causing a huge disturbance in the Joseon court.

There was a huge discrepancy between Gwanghaegun's thoughts and those of the government officials, especially those concerned with the military affairs. Whereas the government officials saw hope in Mao believing that he could serve as an effective shield in case of future Manchu invasion, Gwanghaegun felt despair regarding Mao as an unnecessary provocation that could invite Manchu invasion without providing any actual help.⁸⁹ The *Bibyeonsa* or the Border Defense Council of Joseon (비변사) did agree with Gwanghaegun on the idea that Mao could provoke the Later Jin. However, its focus was on how to serve Mao well during his stay in Joseon and protecting

forces, (3) accepting Manchu refugees, (4) failure to express condolence to the former Khan's death. Samsung Lee 이삼성, 541.

⁸⁹ Kye 계승범, "Gwanghaegun malyeop (1621~1622) waegyonosoneui shiljaewa geu sunggyuk" 광해군대 말엽(1621~1622) 외교노선 논쟁의 실제와 그 성격, 19.

him properly in case of Manchu invasion.⁹⁰

It appears that Gwanghaegun was correct in his view that Mao would cause overwhelmingly more harm than benefits if any even existed. Despite having a small force with barely substantial fighting capability, Mao kept announcing that he will recover the Liaodong area from the Late Jin and even occasionally shot cannons toward the Manchu army from the borders of Joseon. Moreover, a large number of Ming refugees perceived the presence of Mao in Joseon as a safeguard to depend on, resulting in a rapid increase in their influx to Joseon. These refugees only caused more trouble by uncontrolled plundering to the Joseon people who were already experiencing scarcity of resources after the Imjin War.

In response, Gwanghaegun removed Mao from the northern borders of Joseon to an island called Gado (가도). He took such a measure to control the number of Ming refugees crossing the border in hope of joining Mao and reduce the possibility of Manchu invasion, since Mao will no longer be able to provoke the Later Jin as much as he did while residing in the border area. Besides, the Later Jin did not have a navy that could attack an island by crossing a water body, so it is less likely initiate a war in the first place if the

⁹⁰ Ibid., 16-17.

main reason is capturing Mao.⁹¹ Such a decision appears to have been somewhat successful in mitigating the Later Jin's wariness. The number of instances involving interaction with the Qing, which definitely would not be positive ones given the historical context, mentioned in *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* noticeably decreased from 1623 after Mao was relocated to Gado in December of 1622.⁹²

Meanwhile, the Ming court attempted to take advantage of Mao's presence in Joseon. It projected the image of Mao's forces as an extension of itself and ordered Joseon to provide supplies to Mao. However, Gwanghaegun found a way to follow the Ming's orders to the bare minimum and did his best to confine Mao in the island in order to avoid further drainage of national resources and provocation toward the Later Jin.⁹³

Gwanghaegun's efforts ended up in vain, since the Injo Restoration that heavily depended upon the Ming court's approval led to the Joseon court's treating Mao lavishly. As the Ming court tried to use the delay of approval of Injo as the king of Joseon to its advantage, the desperate Injo regime turned its eyes toward Mao, an extension of the Ming court. The regime openly criticized

⁹¹ Myung-gi Han 한명기, "Yieosonggwa Momoonryong" 이여송과 모문룡 [Lee Ru-sung and Mao Wen-lung], *Yeoksabipyong* 역사비평 (2010): 370.

⁹² Kye 계승범, "Gwanghaegun malyeop (1621~1622) waegyonoseoneui shiljaewa geu sunggyuk" 광해군대 말엽(1621~1622) 외교노선 논쟁의 실제와 그 성격, 15.

⁹³ Han 한명기, "Yieosonggwa Momoonryong" 이여송과 모문룡, 370-371.

Gwanghaegun for mistreating Mao and vowed to support him to the utmost which is a promise that both the Ming court and Mao had craved for and were pleased to hear.⁹⁴

Consequently, Joseon which was already depleted through the Imjin War had to supply about one third of its entire grain to Mao's troops. Mao ignored the Joseon court's plea to reduce the amount of supply which was excessively burdensome and went as further as accumulating more wealth than the Ming court had originally allowed him. In doing so, he resorted to illegal means, such as smuggling and asking for compensations on fake achievements of slaughtering the Manchus who were actually the ordinary people of Joseon.⁹⁵

Mao was obviously a cancerous presence to Joseon not only domestically but also diplomatically when concerned with the Later Jin. Joseon's exorbitant supply of goods to Mao's forces could have sent wrong implications to the Later Jin. The Later Jin might have misunderstood such efforts as Joseon's genuine intention to invade the Later Jin in collaboration with the Ming whenever possible. It also got the idea that Joseon could serve as a reliable supplier of goods to assist the war efforts as it did to Mao. Having Joseon play that role for the Later Jin instead of the Ming would tremendously

⁹⁴ Ibid., 371.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 372-374.

work to its advantage.⁹⁶

Moreover, it is likely that although partially and temporarily successful, Mao's recovery of Ming territory by ambushing the Later Jin from behind via Joseon made the Later Jin vigilant toward Joseon. After the Mao incident, the Manchus may have begun to think that having an ally country of the Ming behind its back makes them vulnerable to a two-front war that could negatively affect its war efforts against the Ming. Besides, Joseon could provide its navy to the Later Jin which lacked one. Overall, Mao attracted unnecessary attention from the Later Jin to Joseon, making Joseon's proclaimed loyalty to the Ming as a means of dealing with its top priority of domestic stabilization more difficult and problematic to maintain.

The course of actions that Mao took during and after the first Manchu invasion is also noteworthy. Instead of providing support to Joseon in defense against the Later Jin, Mao and his forces used the chaotic situation as an opportunity to pillage Joseon villages and as mentioned above, to carry out a massacre of Joseon people to fake them as the corpses of the Manchu army.⁹⁷ The Ming court was too preoccupied with its own war with the Later Jin that it was not able to afford sending troops to Joseon like it did during the Imjin War,

⁹⁶ Samsung Lee 이삼성, 542.

⁹⁷ Han 한명기, "Yieosonggwa Moomoonryong" 이여송과 모문룡, 375.

and there was stiff opposition to doing the same anyway.⁹⁸ So the only channel of help that Joseon could resort to was Mao who simply remained a spectator—or a hyena to be precise—to the fight between the Joseon and Manchu military forces despite periodically receiving inordinate amount of offerings for defense purposes. Mao's actions remind us of the Ming forces' atrocities during the Imjin War. The difference is that the Ming forces during the Imjin War actually did produce the result of eventually contributing to ending the war by making the Japanese military retreat back home.

Even after the first Manchu invasion, Mao impudently criticized the Joseon court for signing a peace treaty with the Later Jin. Mao was ultimately sentenced to death in 1629, as his neglect of military duties and corruptions were disclosed. Mao's death was a fortunate event for Joseon and the Later Jin both to whom Mao served as a thorn in the side. Unfortunately, the relationship between Joseon and the Later Jin had already been strained with distrust which can be largely attributed to Mao. Indeed, the second Manchu invasion occurred without the presence of Mao.

Given how Mao was a disastrous factor to Joseon, this leads to several questions on the Injo regime's handling of Mao. Was putting up with such

⁹⁸ Samsung Lee 이삼성, 544.

atrocities by Mao for such a long period a reasonable decision made by the Injo regime? How much benefit did the Injo regime expect from the presence of Mao? It seems that despite the Injo regime's public rhetoric of serving Mao as the extension of the Ming court, it had different thoughts behind the scene. The intangible benefits, such as gaining legitimacy within the domestic realm by expediting the Ming court's approval of Injo, that Mao could provide as a middleman between the Joseon court and its Ming counterpart was a separate issue.

Indeed, there was a general consensus among Injo and the government officials that Mao's forces did not have much to offer in case of actual Manchu invasion and its fighting capability was not worth the immense amount of offerings that Joseon regularly provided. For instance, *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* mentioned the insight of Lee Jeong-gu—one of the three highest government officials under Injo—during the king's discussion of national affairs with his advisors, that pointed out that (1) Mao's public assertions to reinvade the Later Jin were empty claims used as a political maneuvering against Gwanghaegun who tried to avoid war at all cost, (2) Mao's presence had attracted a large number of Ming refugees whom Joseon cannot welcome, and (3) Mao's forces have achieved nothing militarily during their stay in Joseon

and have even fallen into idleness without the will to fight anymore.⁹⁹ There were even opinions about subjugating Mao's forces. Although such opinions were not taken seriously because offending the Ming was not an option, they do indicate that Joseon did not think highly of the military prowess of Mao's forces. Even during the first Manchu invasion, the Joseon court was more concerned about Mao's possible conspiracy with the invaders instead of expecting military assistance.¹⁰⁰ This indicates that in reality, the Joseon court did not have much faith in and high evaluation of Mao and his forces in Joseon.

This brings us to the question of why the government officials under Gwanghaegun were so vehemently against his policies of distancing Joseon from Mao. First, it is possible that the government officials began to agree with Gwanghaegun's early analysis of Mao's forces only after time passed by and

⁹⁹ National Institute of Korean History 국사편찬위원회, "Injo sillok 3gwon, injo Inyeon yoon10wol 25il shinhae 3beonjjaegisa" 인조실록 3권, 인조 1년 윤10월 25일 신해 3번째기사 [Injo Sillok 3, Injo Yoon October 14th Shinhae 3rd article], *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* 조선왕조실록, accessed November 28, 2016, http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kpa_10110125_003. The original excerpt from the online Korean translation of *The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty* is: “폐조가 가장 꺼린 것이 전쟁이었는데 도둑이 그 뜻을 알았기 때문에 늘 진초(進剿)니 협격(夾擊)이니 하는 등의 말로 우리에게 소리 높여 외친 것이지 실은 본시 그렇게 할 뜻은 없었습니다. 모문룡(毛文龍)이 처음에 외로운 군사를 이끌고 멀리 바다를 건너와서 오랑캐를 섬멸하겠다고 외치면서 요동(遼東) 백성을 불러 무마한 바 수년 사이에 요동 백성으로서 귀화한 자가 1만이라는 숫자에 이르렀습니다. 그래서 오랑캐도 그가 후방을 끊을까 의심하여 감히 임의로 서쪽을 향하지 못하였습니다. 그러니 중국과 성세를 서로 의지하면서 의각(倚角)의 형세를 이룬 공 역시 작지 않습니다. 그러나 오늘날에는 부귀만 누릴 뿐 진취하려는 뜻이 없으므로 지각 있는 자는 모두 끝내 중국에도 이롭지 못하고 우리 나라의 깊은 걱정거리만 되지 않을까 걱정하고 있습니다.”

¹⁰⁰ Huh 허태구, 169-171.

after Mao began to show obvious indications of uselessness. Another explanation is that regardless of the actual effects of Mao's forces in foreign affairs related to the Later Jin, the government officials were primarily focused on avoiding offense toward the Ming at all cost. The second answer might be more plausible if we consider how the Imjin War and the Injo Restoration resulted in the Joseon court's need for an outsourced legitimacy. Even though the Injo regime was aware of the negative impacts of Mao's forces, it ended up enduring the troubles that Mao generated during his stay in Joseon until it involuntarily parted with Mao when the Ming court executed him. It ultimately found more value in maintaining a decent relationship with the Ming court if that meant putting up with all the nuisances that Mao created.

In sum, the Mao-led Ming forces stationed in Joseon were extremely detrimental to Joseon. They had no substantial capability to fight against the Manchus, but continuously requested inordinate amount of offerings and plundered the Joseon people. Although the Joseon government was aware of such facts, it could not expel Mao and his forces because they were considered representatives of the Ming court. Moreover, the corrupted Mao aggravated Joseon's plight by taking advantage of his position as the middleman between the Ming and Joseon court. The Manchus were highly sensitive toward Mao's forces and became more wary about Joseon's intentions (i.e., Joseon

unintentionally provoked the Manchus because of the mere presence of Mao's forces which was pretty much beyond Joseon's control). The presence of Mao made it even more difficult for Joseon to take an independent course of diplomatic actions, since Mao basically had a surveillance function toward Joseon. Ultimately, like the Imjin War and the Injo Restoration, the Mao factor immensely contributed to shaping the domestic environment of Joseon. It forced the Joseon court to express loyalty to the Ming, which was impertinent to internal power consolidation, in a manner that was highly offensive to the Later Jin whom Joseon could not really satisfy given its uncontrollable conditions.

4. Information on China

Did the Joseon court behave the way it did during this transition period with no other better alternative despite its accurate assessment of the international circumstances? Or was it erroneously informed or uninformed which could have led to narrow-mindedly focusing on its top priority of domestic stabilization? This section plans to explore the state of information on China available to Joseon and its relationship with and impact on the domestic situation.

Intelligence activity towards the Jurchens, those before Nurhaci conquered and united under his leadership, had been active since the early phase of the Joseon dynasty. In fact, contrary to the common belief that Joseon was enjoying an extended era of peace that debilitated its military capacity, Joseon had kept vigilant due to constant invasions by the Jurchens to varying degrees.¹⁰¹ Min Deak-Kee argued that even in the late sixteenth century before the Imjin War, Joseon was too deeply preoccupied with preparing against the real threats from the Jurchens in the north—who actually confounded Joseon with the Nitangeu’s Rebellion in 1583—that it failed to properly cope with the newly surfacing danger from the Japanese.¹⁰²

Such a tradition of vigilance toward the Jurchens grew even stronger during the reign of Seonjo and Gwanhaegun. Gwanhaegun in particular was well aware of the devastating consequences of war and the importance of

¹⁰¹ It was peaceful in a sense that there was no massive invasion from a regular state, but the countless invasions from the Jurchens throughout Joseon history before the Imjin War prove that using the adjective ‘peaceful’ literally is misleading. Besides, Japanese invasion to that extent was unprecedented in the entire East Asian history and no one back then was able to even come close to expecting a military campaign at that scale. Therefore, simply blaming Joseon for its lack of defense readiness could be a narrow-minded view. Deak-Kee Min 민덕기, “Imjinwaeran jikjeon joseoneui guk bang inshikgwa dae’eung’ae daehan jaegeomto: dongbukbang yeojinae daehan dae’eung’eul joonshimeuro” 임진왜란 직전 조선의 국방 인식과 대응에 대한 재검토: 동북방 여진에 대한 대응을 중심으로 [Joseon’s Perception of National Defense Right Before Hideyoshi’s Invasion of Korea (Imjin Waeran) and Review of Its Response: Mainly on Response to Yeojin’s Intrusion of Northeastern Area], *Yeoksawa damron* 역사와 담론 57 (2010): 344-345.

¹⁰² Min 민덕기, 346.

national security than any other king in Joseon history was. This awareness stemmed from his experiencing the Imjin War and spending most of his life as a prince fighting in the battlefield along the ordinary people against Japan.¹⁰³ Both Seonjo and Gwanhaegun had detected unusual signs of Manchu expansion when they had the opportunity to observe the Manchus closely from Joseon's northern borders during the Imjin War and thus emphasized active intelligence activities on this nomadic tribe.¹⁰⁴

As a result, Gwanhaegun made utmost efforts to carry on with the organized intelligence activities when he ascended to the throne. The purpose was to accurately assess the formidability of the Manchus by investing heavily in collecting information on them and developing a defense plan to prepare for contingency.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, being aware of the potential threat from the Manchus, he even attempted to normalize relations with Japan to avoid a two-front war in case of the Manchus' invasion and import advanced military technology from Japan.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Indeed, Gwanhaegun was the only king in Joseon history to have actually lived among and interacted with the ordinary people of Joseon. Han 한명기, *Gwanhaegun* 광해군, 186.

¹⁰⁴ Han 한명기, *Gwanhaegun* 광해군, 186-189.

¹⁰⁵ Oh 오수창, "Ohae sok byeongjahoran, shidaejeok hangae apeui injo" 오해 속 병자호란, 시대적 한계 앞의 인조, 36.

¹⁰⁶ Tae Hun Kim 김태훈, "Gwanhaegundae choban dae'iljeongchaekui jeongaewa geu teakjing" 광해군대 초반 대일정책의 전개와 그 특징 [The Japan policy of Joseon during the early days of King Gwang'hae-gun's reign, and its characteristics], *Gyujanggak* 규장각 42 (2013): 132.

However, during Injo's reign, intelligence activity on the Later Jin drastically decreased. This was somewhat expected, since even during Gwanhaegun's reign, many government officials including those of the Border Defense Council of Joseon underestimated the capacity of the Later Jin and held steadfast to their belief that the Ming was still capable of providing security.¹⁰⁷ As the succeeding Injo regime was way more sensitive to appearing loyal to the Ming, it refrained from continuing existing intelligence activities on the Later Jin that could be misunderstood by the Ming as attempts to make peace or conspire with the Later Jin.¹⁰⁸

Consequently, to make matters worse, the government officials—many of whom obstinately stuck with their ideologically-based belief in the predominance of the Ming despite being presented with collected current information on the strength of the Later Jin—no longer had updates disturbing their belief due to suspended intelligence activities. Even through full consideration of collected information, many government officials during Gwanhaegun's reign might have judged that the Ming still had a chance to put down the rise of the Manchus. Unfortunately, power equilibrium had clearly started to break down during Injo's reign when Joseon was not able to even

¹⁰⁷ Hunmi Lee 이현미, 36.

¹⁰⁸ Han 한명기, “Wonmyeonggyochae, myeongcheonggyochaewa hanbando” 원명교체, 명정교체와 한반도, 92.

properly notice such a shift.

The Later Jin already had a much more advanced and sophisticated intelligence system than Joseon did before Injo's reign in spite of Gwanghaegun's strenuous efforts to conduct effective intelligence and counter-intelligence activities toward the Later Jin.¹⁰⁹ The fact that the Injo regime did not even once send an envoy to the Later Jin in attempt to grasp the accurate level of threat that it could pose corroborates the observation that Joseon was nearly destined to lose under any type of invasion by the Later Jin.¹¹⁰

Overall, Seonjo and Gwanghaegun had directed extensive intelligence activities on the Jurchens/Manchus and reaped some success from doing so. However, during Injo's reign, such activities were hindered by diplomatic failures in balancing between the Ming and the Later Jin. Diversion of resources due to handling domestic chaos was also a huge impediment. As Huh Tae Koo pointed out, even a successful intelligence on the Later Jin was quite unlikely to have changed the result of Joseon's military clash with the opposing

¹⁰⁹ This may have been a result of endless internal struggles among different Jurchen tribes and their nomadic lifestyle that required constant vigilance. Also, the Manchus had been carefully preparing for an opportunity to challenge the Ming throughout the Imjin War period. Gwanghaegun was aware of the high level of Later Jin's intelligence and warned his and the Ming's envoys to pay extra attention not to fall prey to the Later Jin's intelligence activities, as Manchu spies were literally planted almost everywhere in Joseon. Park 박현모, 230. Indeed, the Joseon envoys to the Ming during Injo's reign made some critical mistakes of having important government documents and letters intercepted by the Later Jin.

¹¹⁰ Park 박현모, 230.

side during its two massive invasions. He argued that Joseon was too depleted to take any substantive measures to augment its military and economy to the extent of fending off Manchu invasions through prepared strategies based on its collected information.¹¹¹

But at least an accurate assessment of the Later Jin's capability and intentions would have enabled Joseon to come up with a contingency plan to minimize the risk of conflict or damage if it actually occurs, even if Joseon stubbornly decided to stick with the Ming. This is so considering the fact that the uninformed boldness of Joseon during the second Manchu invasion was not backed up materially and only generated further destruction than the invasion originally should have.

In addition to lack of information to accurately evaluate the Later Jin, it is unclear whether Joseon had a clear assessment of the Ming either. The Ming court had always been suspicious toward their tributary states and took rigid measures to tightly restrict foreigners' activities in Ming territory, especially Beijing (this applied even to diplomatic envoys). The Joseon court had been fairly successful in trying to circumvent this restriction to collecting information on the Ming by increasing the frequency of sending its envoys to the Ming court and resorting to other various routes, including the Ming's local

¹¹¹ Huh 허태구, 178.

governments and naturalized people from the Ming.¹¹² However, since the beginning of the Imjin War, effective intelligence activity on the Ming became even more difficult, as the Ming court felt a heightened sense of threat and took measures to reinforce its own counter-intelligence activities while sending more spies to its tributary states including Joseon.¹¹³

We can infer from above that the Injo regime was largely limited in carrying out intelligence activities on the Ming—maybe much more than its predecessors were. It was still possible to observe the Ming emperor—the source of information that the previous Joseon regimes were most interested in—by sending envoys, so Joseon was not completely left in the dark. It is likely that Joseon did detect some signs of the Ming’s decline, since the Ming emperor back then was quite incompetent.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, the eyes of the Ming in Joseon overwhelmingly outnumbered the eyes of Joseon in the Ming during this time period. So in an inferior situation like this one, the best that the

¹¹² Kyeong-Lok Kim 김경록, “Joseonshidae daejoongguk waegyomoonseowa waegyo jeongboeui soojipbogwan chaegae” 조선시대 대중국 외교문서와 외교정보의 수집보관체계 [The diplomatic documents relations with China and the diplomatic information gather-storage system in the Joseon dynasty], *Dongbukayeoksanonchong* 동북아역사논총, no. 25 (2009): 296, 299.

¹¹³ Hyewon Cha 차혜원, “Joseonae on joongguk cheopbowon: Imjinwaeran’gi dongasia’eui jeongbojeongwa joseon” 조선에 온 중국 첩보원: 임진왜란기 동아시아의 정보전과 조선 [A Chinese spy in Joseon: Espionage Warfare during the Imjin-year War Period (1592-1598)], *Yeoksabipyong* 역사비평 (2008): 353-354.

¹¹⁴ Kyeong-Lok Kim 김경록, “Joseonshidae daejoongguk waegyomoonseowa waegyo jeongboeui soojipbogwan chaegae” 조선시대 대중국 외교문서와 외교정보의 수집보관체계, 299.

Injo regime might have done was avoiding activities that could generate suspicion which could unnecessarily lead to hostility from both the Ming and the Later Jin.¹¹⁵

Along with the aforementioned failure to keep information on the Manchus updated, unavailability of accurate assessment of how much the Ming had declined made Joseon unable to precisely evaluate the situation in China. Such uncertainties and lack of information were likely accountable for the Joseon court's hesitance to make significant changes to its foreign policy. Oh Soo-chang posed a counterfactual question on what would have happened if Joseon switched sides to the Later Jin and the Ming eventually succeeded in striking back and regaining its position.¹¹⁶ In a poorly informed situation like the one that the Injo regime faced, making a bold bet against status quo that could result in its collapse was definitely not a rational one to take. It was even more so considering that the regime itself was established on a weak foundation and had to deal with greatly volatile and devastated domestic situations.

¹¹⁵ Cha 차혜원, 355-356.

¹¹⁶ Oh 오수창, "Ohae sok byeongjahoran, shidaejeok hangae apeui injo" 오해 속 병자호란, 시대적 한계 앞의 인조, 38.

IV. CONCLUSION

When explaining Joseon's seemingly enigmatic choice to stay loyal to the Ming at a heavy expense, situational elements appear to have been more influential than ideational ones. Ideology and belief systems were inarguably crucial in shaping Joseon's behavior, but they seem to have been directed by the domestic situation and political priorities deriving from it.

The Imjin War tremendously undermined the Joseon court's power base. Seonjo and his followers had to cover up their wartime mistakes and suppress internal opposition in order to restore their authority. Making use of the Ming was vital to achieving such an objective. The Injo Restoration aggravated the unstable domestic circumstances, as it was an illegal coup that required appropriate justifications. The Joseon court again had to resort to the Ming to make up for such a deficiency. Unfortunately, on both cases, the Ming fully exploited Joseon's desperate situation. Besides, since the end of the Imjin War, the Joseon court itself was too preoccupied with solidification of its political power base that it failed to recuperate national strength in economics and military. As a result, it was quite difficult to carry out a proactive foreign policy based on strategic consideration of not only domestic but also international sources.

Mao Wenlong's presence in the Korean peninsula and limited information on China only added to restricting available diplomatic options of the Joseon court, which was already mightily struggling through its domestic problems. Without providing substantial help and only unnecessarily provoking the Later Jin, Mao and his troops served as the Ming's shackle to Joseon while inflicting profound damages in its relationship with the Later Jin. Lack of information on China (both the Later Jin and the Ming) during Injo's reign further deterred Joseon from making changes to their traditional pro-Ming foreign policy due to uncertainty and fear of making a wrong bet.

Interestingly, the Joseon court eventually collided with the Later Jin like the military government of Goryeo did against the Yuan during the Song-Yuan transition period as mentioned in the introduction chapter. Both had the common goal of bolstering their legitimacy. However, contrary to the military government of Goryeo that saw the transition period as an opportunity, Joseon was embroiled in the Later Jin's power expansion rather with reluctance and unpreparedness. Joseon had become immensely dependent on the Ming, and extremely distracted and under-resourced to properly prepare for the power transition in China because restoration of royal authority and internal stabilization had the higher priority.

However, simply understanding Joseon as a passive, destined victim of

an uncontrollable situation could be unproductive. The misjudgment of the Joseon ruling elites is understandable to a certain degree, given the whole context of the international and domestic circumstances. Nevertheless, their neglect of Confucian duties to take full responsibility of rightfully governing and protecting their own people—which is quite contradictory considering the extent to which they employed Confucian rhetoric to insist loyalty to the Ming—and inflexibility to adapt to the changing international setting cannot be left unpardoned. Lessons should be derived from such tragedies for the contemporary ruling elites. Nonetheless, we should not overlook the fact that the Later Jin was the ruthless aggressor of the military conflicts and deserves greater condemnation. Although it is possible to learn from Joseon's mistakes, we should refrain from inadvertently blaming the whole disastrous events on the victim.

Moreover, this research case provides further complications to the existing asymmetric alliance theories, hierarchy theories, and neoclassical realist theories. Joseon during the Ming-Qing transition period would be an interesting case to delve into for scholars of these theories. It could also have implications for the Republic of Korea that faces many dilemmas involving its current ally (the U.S.) and its rising neighbor (China). South Korea's position between the U.S. and China is not perfectly analogous to Joseon's position

between the Ming and the Later Jin. Nevertheless, parallels could be drawn to varying degrees between the two. Ideological reverence for a superpower that goes beyond the reasonable boundary at times, intelligence activities that require vast improvements, issues with foreign troops stationed in their own territory are some examples of such parallels. Referring to Joseon's mistakes, South Korea should definitely be able to exert flexibility in its policies according to the changing international dynamics to effectively deal with its uneasy position between the two influential countries. More importantly, as we can see from how the domestic situation decisively restricted Joseon's flexibility, stabilization of domestic factors should be a prerequisite to devising a successful foreign policy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bleiker, Roland. "East-West Stories of War and Peace: Neorealist Claims in Light of Ancient Chinese Philosophy." In *The Zen of International Relations: IR Theory from East to West*, edited by Stephen Chan, Peter G. Mandaville, and Roland Bleiker., 177-201. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
- Cha, Hyewon 차혜원. "Joseonae on joongguk cheopbowon: Imjinwaeran'gi dongasia'eui jeongbojeongwa joseon" 조선에 온 중국 첩보원: 임진왜란기 동아시아의 정보전과 조선 [A Chinese spy in Joseon: Espionage Warfare during the Imjin-year War Period (1592-1598)]. *Yeoksabipyong* 역사비평 (2008): 332-359.
- Choi, Moon Jung 최문정. *Imjinrok Yeongu* 임진록 연구 [A Study on the Imjinrok]. Seoul: Bakijeong, 2001.
- Cumings, Bruce. *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2005.
- Do, Hyunshin 도현신. *Yeotsaram'aegae jeonjaengeul mootda* 옛사람에게 전쟁을 묻다 [Asking about war to the people of the past]. Seoul: Time

Square, 2009.

Duncan, John B. 존 B. 던컨. “Imjinwaeraneui gi’ukgwa minjok’euishik hyeongseong” 임진왜란의 기억과 민족의식 형성 [Memories of the Imjin War and formation of national awareness]. In *Imjinwaeran dongasia samguk jeonjaeng* 임진왜란 동아시아 삼국전쟁 [The Imjin War, a war of three East Asian countries], edited by Doo-hee Jeong 정 두희 and Kyeongsoon Lee 이경순, 145-164. Seoul: Humanist, 2007.

Eckert, Carter J. “Korea’s Transition to Modernity: A Will to Greatness.” In *Historical Perspectives on Contemporary East Asia*, edited by Merle Goldman and Andrew Gordon, 119-154. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Ha, Woo-Bong 하우봉. “Joseonjeongi daewaegwangae’ae natanan ja’a’inshikgwa taja’inshik” 조선전기 대외관계에 나타난 자아인식과 타자인식 [Self-perception and the perception of others shown in the foreign relationship during the Joseon Dynasty]. *Hanguksayeongu* 한국사연구, no. 123 (2003): 247-270.

Han, Myung-gi 한명기. *Gwanhaegun* 광해군 [Gwanhaegun]. Seoul: Yeoksabipyongsas, 2000.

_____. “[Teukjib: Hanguksa sokeui segaehwaeui minjokeuishik] Myeongcheong gyochaegi dongbuka jilseowa joseon jibaecheungeui dae’eung” [특집: 한국사 속의 세계화와 민족의식] 명청교체기 동북아 질서와 조선 지배층의 대응 [The Choson’s Response to the Changes of Situations During the Period Dynasty Change from Ming to Ching]. *Yeoksawahyeonshil* 역사와현실 37 (2000): 124-148.

_____. “Imjinwaerangwa dongasia jilseo,” 임진왜란과 동아시아 질서 [The Hideyoshi Invasions and the East Asian System]. In *Imjinwaerangwa hanilgwangae* 임진왜란과 한일관계 [The Imjin War and Korea-Japan relations], edited by Han-il gwangaesa yeongunonjip pyeonchan wiwonhoe 한일관계사연구논집 편찬위원회, 103-128. Seoul: Kyungin moonhwas, 2005.

_____. “Wonmyeonggyochae, myeongcheonggyochaewa hanbando” 원명교체, 명청교체와 한반도 [The Dynastic Change in China and the Korean Peninsula: With the Special Reference to the Political Change from Yuan to Ming and from Ming to Qing]. *Saegae Jeongchi*12 세계정치12 30, no. 2 (2009): 61-97.

_____. “Yiyeosonggwa Moomoonryong” 이여송과 모문룡 [Lee Ru-sung and Mao Wen-lung]. *Yeoksabipyong* 역사비평 (2010): 356-383.

Huh, Tae Koo 허태구. “Byungjahoran yihaeeui saeroun shigakgwa jeonmang: Honangi cheokhwaroneui sunggyeokgwa geuae daehan maekrakjeok yihae” 丙子胡亂 이해의 새로운 시각과 전망: 胡亂期 斥和論의 성격과 그에 대한 맥락적 이해 [A new perspective to understand the Byeongja Ho’ran war, and prospect for future approaches: Examination of the “Cheok’hwa” Ideas’ nature that prevailed during the war, and trying to understanding them with appreciation of the ‘Nature of the Period’]. *Gyujanggak* 규장각 47 (2015): 163-200.

Hur, Nam-Lin. “The Celestial Warriors: Ming Military Aid and Abuse During the Korean War, 1592-8.” In *The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory*, edited by James B. Lewis, 236-255. Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2015.

Jeong, Gubok 정구복. “Imjinwaeraneui yeoksajeok seonggyeokgwa euimi,” 임진왜란의 역사적 성격과 의미 [The Characteristics and Meanings of Imjinwaeran]. In *Imjinwaerangwa hanilgwangae* 임진왜란과 한일관계 [The Imjin War and Korea-Japan relations], edited by Han-il gwangaesa yeongunonjip pyeonchan wiwonhoe 한일관계사연구논집 편찬위원회, 23-40. Seoul: Kyungin moonhwasa, 2005.

_____. “Imjinwaeran saryo’ae daehan sahasajeok geomto: Seonjosillokgwa

ahnbangjoon'eui yeoksagisooleul joongshimeuro” 임진왜란 사료에 대한 사학사적 검토: 선조실록과 安邦俊의 역사기술을 중심으로 [Historiographical review on historical records on the Imjin War: Focusing on Seonjo Sillok and writings of Ahn Bangjoon]. *Jeonbulsahak* 전북사학 35 (2009): 97-137.

Kang, David. “Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations.” In *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific*, edited by John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, 163-190. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.

_____. “Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern East Asia.” *Security Studies* 19, no. 4 (2010): 591-622.

Kim, Han Gyu 김한규. “Imjinwaeraneui gookjaejeok hwangyeong” 임진왜란의 국제적 환경 [The international backdrop of the Imjin War]. In *Imjinwaeran dongasia samguk jeonjaeng* 임진왜란 동아시아 삼국전쟁 [The Imjin War, a war of three East Asian countries], edited by Doo-hee Jeong 정두희 and Kyeong-soon Lee 이경순, 285-316. Seoul: Humanist, 2007.

Kim, Jeong-nyeo 김정녀. “Byeongjahoraneui chaegim nonjaenggwa gi’ukeui seosa: Injoeui gi’ukgwa daehanggi’ukeuroseoeui gangdomongyurok” 병자호란의 책임 논쟁과 기억의 서사: 인조의 기억과 ‘대항기억’으로서의 <강도몽유록> [The debate on the responsibility about the Manchu war of 1636 and narrative of memory: The King Injo’s memory and Gangdomongyurok as the fight memory]. *Hangukhakyeongu* 한국학연구 35 (2010): 205-235.

Kim, Kyeong-Lok 김경록. “Joseonshidae daejoongguk waegyomoonseowa waegyo jeongboeui soojipbogwan chaegae” 조선시대 대중국 외교문서와 외교정보의 수집보관체계 [The diplomatic documents relations with China and the diplomatic information gather-storage system in the Joseon dynasty]. *Dongbukayeoksanonchong* 동북아역사논총, no. 25 (2009): 291-323.

_____. “17saegicho myeongcheonggyochaewa daejoongguk sahaengeui byeonhwa: daehoogeum sahaengeul joongshimeuro” 17세기초 명청교체와 대중국 사행의 변화: 대후금 사행을 중심으로 [The Ming-Qing Transition and the Change of Sahaeng toward China in the early 17th century]. *Hangukmunhagwa Yesool* 한국문학과 예술 15 (2015): 31-73.

- Kim, Moon-ja 김문자. “Imranshi hangwaemoonjae,” 임란시 항왜문제 [A Study on the Japanese Soldiers who Surrendered during the Japanese Invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598]. In *Imjinwaerangwa hanilgwangae* 임진왜란과 한일관계 [The Imjin War and Korea-Japan relations], edited by Han-il gwangaesa yeongunonjip pyeonchan wiwonhoe 한일관계사연구논집 편찬위원회, 327-368. Seoul: Kyungin moonhwasa, 2005.
- Kim, Tae Hun 김태훈. “Gwanhaegundae choban dae’iljeongchaekkeui jeongaewa geu teakjing” 광해군대 초반 대일정책의 전개와 그 특징 [The Japan policy of Joseon during the early days of King Gwang’hae-gun’s reign, and its characteristics]. *Gyujanggak* 규장각 42 (2013): 129-165.
- Kim, Yongho 김용호. “Bidaechingdongmaeng’ae itseo dongmaeng shinrwaesung’gwa hoogidongmaeng dilemma: bookjoong dongmaeng’gwa bukhaneui daemi’jeobgeun’eul joongshim’eu’ro” 비대칭동맹에 있어 동맹신뢰성과 후기동맹딜레마: 북중동맹과 북한의 대미접근을 중심으로 [Trust and dilemma in asymmetric alliances: A case study of North Korea-China alliance and North Korea’s response to the U.S.]. *Tongilmoonjaeyeongu* 통일문제연구 13, no. 2 (2009): 5-37.

Kim Haboush, JaHyun 김자현. “Woorineun wae imjinwaeraneul yeonguhabnigga?” 우리는 왜 임진왜란을 연구합니까? [Why do we study the Imjin War?]. In *Imjinwaeran dongasia samguk jeonjaeng* 임진왜란 동아시아 삼국전쟁 [The Imjin War, a war of three East Asian countries], edited by Doo-hee Jeong 정두희 and Kyeong-soon Lee 이경순, 23-40. Seoul: Humanist, 2007.

Kitchen, Nicholas. “Systemic Pressure and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation.” *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 1 (2010): 117-143.

Kye, Seung-Bum 계승범. “Gwanhaegun malyeop (1621~1622) waegyonseoneui shiljaewa geu sunggyuk” 광해군대 말엽 (1621~1622) 외교노선 논쟁의 실제와 그 성격 [The Nature of Court Debate over Foreign Policy in the Last Phase of King Kwanghae’s Reign in Choson Korea, 1621~1622]. *Yeoksahakbo* 역사학보 193 (2007): 1-37.

_____. “Joseonhoogi chosonjoonghwajooeuiwa geu haeseok moonjae” 조선후기 조선중화주의와 그 해석 문제 [A Criticism of the Contemporary Korean Scholarship on the Choson Elites’ View of the

Chinese Confucian Culture (Zhonghua) in the 1600s to the 1800s].

Hanguksayeongu 한국사연구, no. 159 (2012): 265-294.

Lee, Hunmi 이현미. “Myeongcheong gyocheagi hanjoongwangaewa bidaeching dongmaengeui shinrwaeseong moonjae: Wolsa leejeonggueui beonmusahaeng boonseok” 명청교체기 한중관계와 비대칭동맹의 신뢰성 문제: 월사 이정구의 변무사행 분석 [Sino-Korean Relations during the Ming-Qing Transition: Reliability, Asymmetric Alliance and the Tribute System]. *Gookjaejeongchinonchong* 국제정치논총 55, no. 3 (2015): 7-52.

Lee, Ji-Young. “Diplomatic Ritual as a Power Resource: The Politics of Asymmetry in Early Modern Chinese-Korean Relations.” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2013): 309-336.

Lee, Samsung 이삼성. *Dongasiaeui jeonjaenggwa pyeonghwa 1* 동아시아의 전쟁과 평화 1 [War and Peace in East Asia 1]. Paju: Hangilsa, 2009.

Lee, Wan Bom 이완범. “Imjin waeraneui gukjaejeongchihak” 임진왜란의 국제정치학 [The Politics of the Japanese Invasion of Korea: Japan’s Proposal for the Division of Korea, 1592-1598]. *Jeongshinmoonhwa yeongu* 정신문화연구 25, no. 4 (2002): 89-137.

Min, Deak-Kee 민덕기. “Imjinwaeran jikjeon joseoneui gukbang inshikgwa dae’eung’ae daehan jaegeomto: dongbukbang yeojinae daehan dae’eung’eul joonshimeuro” 임진왜란 직전 조선의 국방 인식과 대응에 대한 재검토: 동북방 여진에 대한 대응을 중심으로 [Joseon’s Perception of National Defense Right Before Hideyoshi’s Invasion of Korea (Imjin Waeran) and Review of Its Response: Mainly on Response to Yeojin’s Intrusion of Northeastern Area]. *Yeoksawa damron* 역사와 담론 57 (2010): 343-378.

Morrow, James D. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances.” *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991): 904-933.

Nahm, Andrew C. *A History of the Korean People*. Elizabeth: Hollym, 1988.

National Institute of Korean History 국사편찬위원회. The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty 조선왕조실록. “Injo sillok 3gwon, injo Inyeon yoon10wol 25il shinhae 3beonjaegisa” 인조실록 3권, 인조 1년 윤10월 25일 신해 3번째기사 [Injo Sillok 3, Injo Yoon October 14th Shinhae 3rd article]. Accessed November 28, 2016. http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kpa_10110125_003.

_____. The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty 조선왕조실록. “Seonjo sillok 135gwon, seonjo 34nyeon 3wol 14il imja 8beonjjaegisa” 선조실록 135권, 선조 34년 3월 14일 임자 8번째기사 [Seonjo Sillok 135, Seonjo March 14th Imja 8th article]. Accessed November 28, 2016. http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kna_13403014_008.

Oh, Soo-chang 오수창. “Cheonggwaeui waegyo shilsangwa byeongjahoran” 청淸과의 외교 실상과 병자호란 [The reality of diplomacy toward the Qing and Byeongjahoran]. *Hanguksa Shimingangjwa* 한국사 시민강좌 36, (2005): 100-123.

_____. “Ohae sok byeongjahoran, shidaejeok hangae apeui injo” 오해 속 병자호란, 시대적 한계 앞의 인조 [Misunderstanding of Byeongjahoran and Injo’s facing the limits of the era]. *Naeileul yeoneun yeoksa* 내일을 여는 역사, no. 26 (2006): 33-45.

Park, Hyunmo 박현모. “Jeongmyohoraneui gooknaewaejeongchi: Gookgawigishi’eui gongronjeongchi” 정묘호란기의 국내외정치: 국가 위기시의 공론정치 [Political Debates and Foreign Policy Decisions of Chosun Dynasty during Manchu Invasion of Korea 1627]. *Gookjaejeongchinonchong* 국제정치논총 42, no. 4 (2002): 217-235.

- Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy." *World Politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144-172.
- Schweller, Randall L. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): 72-107.
- Shin, Byeong-ju 신병주. "1623nyeon injobanjeong'eui gyeonggwawa geu hyeonjaejeok euimi" 1623년 인조반정의 경과와 그 현재적 의미 [The progression of the Injo Restoration and its contemporary meaning]. *Tongil'inmoonhak* 통일인문학 46 (2008): 43-65.
- Swope, Kenneth M. 케네스 M. 스위프. "Soonmangchihan" 순망치한 [The teeth chills without the lips]. In *Imjinwaeran dongasia samguk jeonjaeng* 임진왜란 동아시아 삼국전쟁 [The Imjin War, a war of three East Asian countries], edited by Doo-hee Jeong 정두희 and Kyeongsoon Lee 이경순, 317-354. Seoul: Humanist, 2007.
- Yi, I-hwa 이이화. *Hanguksa yiyagi 12: Gukga jaegungwa cheongeu chinip* 한국사 이야기 12: 국가 재건과 청의 침입 [Korean history 12: National reconstruction and invasion by the Qing]. Paju: Hangilsa, 2000.
- Yoo, Sung-ryong 유성룡. *Jingbirok* 징비록 [Book of Corrections], translated by Heungsik Kim 김홍식. Paju: Seohaemoonjip, 2003.

Zurndorfer, Harriet T. "Wanli China Versus Hideyoshi's Japan: Rethinking China's Involvement in the Imjin Waeran." In *The East Asian War, 1592-1598: International Relations, Violence, and Memory*, edited by James B. Lewis, 197-235. Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2015.

국문초록

조·명 동맹관계 지속의 수수께끼

박대섭

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

조선과 명나라는 중국을 중심으로 한 조공체제 내에서 가장 이상적인 조공·책봉 관계를 구축하고 전례 없는 안보 위기를 함께 직면했다는 점에서 특별하다. 조선은 명에서 청으로 세력 전이가 이루어지는 시기에도 두 차례의 호란을 겪으면서까지 명과의 우호적인 관계를 고수하였다. 현대인들의 눈에는 반직관적으로 비추어질 수도 있는 조선의 결정에 대한 원인을 학계에서는 주로 사대를 포함한 사상적 요인들로부터 찾아왔었다. 본 논문은 임진왜란, 인조반정, 조선 영토에 주둔했던 모문룡 세력, 그리고 중국에 대한 제한된 정보를 살펴보며 국내 상황적 요소들에 더 집중하고자 한다. 이들을 분석한 결과, 국내 상황이 사상보다도 명·청 교체기 당시 조선의 결정에 더 막대한 영향을 끼쳤다고 판단되었다. 국내적 요인들로 인해 조선 왕

실은 권위 복구와 내부 안정 도모가 최우선 정책적 목표였다. 또한, 쇠약해진 국력과 불안정한 국내 사정 때문에 대중국 외교 정책에서의 행선지가 애초에 많이 존재하지도 않았다.

주제어: 조·명 동맹, 명·청 교체기, 임진왜란, 인조반정, 모문룡, 대중국 첩보