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국제학석사학위논문

**Comparative Evaluation on China and Japan's
East Asian Policy:
From the Perspective of Regional Integration Theories**

지역통합 이론의 관점에서 본
중국과 일본의 동아시아 정책평가

2013년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원
국제학과 국제지역학 전공
박 후 선

**Comparative Evaluation on China and Japan's
East Asian Policy:
From the Perspective of Regional Integration Theories**

A thesis presented

By

PARK HU SUN

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
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East Asian Policy:
From the Perspective of Regional Integration Theories**

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Abstract

Comparative Evaluation on China and Japan's East Asian Policy: From the Perspective of Regional Integration Theories

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Using the state centric and non-state centric views in the regional integration theories, this study analyzes East Asian policies of China and Japan, which are the regional powers that can significantly affect the regional cooperation of East Asia. Based on that analysis, this study compares and evaluates China and Japan's East Asian policy simultaneously. Finally, it tries to forecast the future of East Asian regional cooperation.

To use regional integration theories as theoretical framework, based on the main issues and features of regional integration theory - main actor and driving force of regional integration, peculiarity of regional institution and phased development of integration - I established three questions and rearranged China

and Japan's East Asian policy. First, do China and Japan prefer to form and operate regional institutions? Second, do China and Japan actively participate in the regional framework? What is the degree of their leadership in regional institution? Third, what is China and Japan's position in terms of phased development of regional integration? In other words, do they recognize spillover effect?

As for the conclusion of comparative evaluation of China and Japan's East Asian policy and its implication of regional cooperation in East Asia, this study argues that China and Japan's East Asian policy reflects the nature of state centric theory. Based on this argument we can predict that base of China and Japan's East Asian policy, which emphasizes ASEAN+3 and EAS respectively, will not be easily changed. Also, their behaviors which regard regional institution as a method for achieving higher goal of foreign policy will continue, at least in the short term period.

Moreover, based on the state centric view of regional integration, this study forecasts, with the unceasing state bargaining and negotiation, regional cooperation in East Asia will gradually institutionalize. However, it is hard to bridge the gap between China and Japan's different perspectives in scope of region. Therefore, the future of regional cooperation in East Asia is hardly optimistic.

Keywords: Regional Integration Theory, Non State Centric theory, State Centric theory, China's East Asian Policy, Japan's East Asian Policy, East Asia Regional Cooperation

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I . Introduction

1. Research Background and Research Question

With the undeniable process of globalization, regional cooperation is recognized as a global trend.¹ Under the current situation, where the EU has been struck by the Eurozone crisis in 2010, the global trend of regional cooperation is being challenged. However, it is no exaggeration to say that regionalism had been positioned as a general trend, i.e., a megatrend, in terms of economy and security, until the Eurozone crisis hit the world economy.²

The region that has accomplished the highest level of integration in the world is definitely Europe. If Europe is considered the region that has achieved the highest level of integration, North America, which has the North America Trade Agreement (NAFTA), is regarded as a region that has integrated at the intermediate level. In addition, the East Asia, where the mechanism of regional cooperation with explicit, systematic and formally binding cooperation does not exist, is classified as a region with a low level of integration or cooperation. Then, is it possible for the East Asia, which is far behind Europe and North America in

¹ Two different perspectives are used to analyze the relationship between regionalization and globalization. One is to see regionalization as a barrier to globalization, and the other is to see regionalization as a stepping stone for globalization. As the focus of this study is not on the correlation between regionalization and globalization, details are not discussed in this study.

² 손열, 「서론: 지역, 지역주의, 동아시아」, 정용화 등, 『동아시아와 지역주의』, p. 11.

regional integration, to create the same union as the EU in the future?

In fact, 'regional cooperation in East Asia' and 'feasibility of building an East Asian community' are obsolete subjects for research because a number of studies have already dealt with such subjects. It is a common view that regional cooperation in East Asia has been actively underway since the financial crisis of East Asia in 1997. In explaining regional integration, there are two approaches: 'regionalism' is led by governments as a top-down method, while 'regionalization' is led by non-government organizations or firms as a bottom-up method. Considering the active intra-regional trade among the East Asian countries and their dependence on the trade, and the currency swap among a number of countries since the crisis, 'regionalization' is more appropriate for explaining the regional cooperation process of East Asia. One of the biggest features of East Asian regional cooperation derived from the phenomena above is that a formal regional cooperation mechanism, like the EC, which is the predecessor of the EU, or the NAFTA, does not exist, despite the high level of regionalization in East Asia. It can be understood from the same context why many studies on the regional integration and regional cooperation of Europe and East Asia have focused on the feasibility of building an East Asian community, especially economic community, and the comparison between Europe and East Asia.

Based on the outcomes of such studies, the present study attempts to

analyze East Asian regional cooperation and forecast its future at a different angle from previous studies. As a study subject, the study investigates the actually existent ‘China and Japan’s East Asian policies,’ not a hypothetic body of regional cooperation. Often, a few theories on international relations are used as a means to analyze a country’s foreign policy, such as realism, liberalism and constructivism. In the same vein, a substantial number of studies have analyzed the East Asian policies of China and Japan from the perspectives of so-called the ‘main theories of international relations.’ Then, what would be the results if the East Asian policies of China and Japan, which are the regional powers that can significantly affect the regional cooperation of East Asia, are explained and analyzed with the regional integration theory, which was formulated to explain the regional cooperation and regional integration of Europe? Is it possible to predict the feasibility of East Asian regional cooperation and its track in a more accurate manner? In addition, if both China and Japan proved to be implementing the regional policies that can be explained by regional integration, is it possible to draw a clearer blueprint than before on the future direction of the regional cooperation of East Asia? This study starts from these research questions.

2. Scope of Research

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the East Asian policies

of China and Japan can be explained with the regional integration theory and predict the future regional cooperation of East Asia based on the investigation result. Accordingly, the scope of this study is established as follows.

First, the main subject of this study is the East Asian policies of China and Japan. In general, the foreign policy of a country consists of several areas, including politics, security and economy. Thus, the regional policies of China and Japan are also very complicated and substantial due to knots of policies from the micro-perspective. This study, however, focuses on a regional approach, rather than a functional approach, with respect to foreign policies. In other words, the subject of this study is the policies established and implemented by China and Japan targeting East Asia, regardless of whether those are security or economic policies.

Second, East Asia in this study refers to the region that combines Northeast Asia including Korea, China and Japan, and Southeast Asia represented by the 10 members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The region is consistent with the range of ASEAN+3 in a geographical sense, which includes Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.

Third, the subject periods of this study with regard to the establishment and implementation of the East Asian policies of China and Japan include the period since the reform era (1980s – present) of China and the period since 1980s of

Japan. The East Asian policy of China started emerging after the reform era, which is 1980s, under the name of *zhoubianguo* policy (周邊國政策) and has been systematically formed since 1990s.³ Therefore, the scope of this study includes the East Asian policy of China implemented after the reform era, except the period of Mao Zedong, when there was only the diplomacy by the two superpowers of the United State of America and the Soviet Union. In contrast, Japanese leaders had followed the line of *Datsu-A Ron* (脫亞入歐), the framework of which was the integration into Europe, since the Meiji Restoration. For Japan, Asia was a region it had to escape from, while the Western imperialism was a subject it had to imitate and follow. Thus the pre-war East Asian policy of Japan was more like the policy of controlling and exploitation, rather than a foreign policy. However, the pre-war East Asian policy of Japan had changed as it became a defeated country from World War II. Although there exists controversy over the period when Japan actually promoted regionalism or regional cooperation after the war, previous studies consistently agree with the fact that Japan started to recognize regional cooperation after the World War II.⁴ Therefore, this study

³ 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』, p. 267.

⁴ Regarding the period when a new regional policy and recognition on region emerged in Japan, there are two different opinions: one, asserting that it started from 1980s, (by Gilbert Rozman ‘Japanese Strategic Thinking on Regionalism’, Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo and Joshph P. Ferguson ed. 2007. *Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia*. pp. 243-268; Takayuki Kimura, ‘Japan-US Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region’, Richard L. Grant ed. 1997, *The Process of Japanese Foreign Policy: Focus on Asia*, pp.

focuses on the East Asian policy of Japan, which started to emerge from 1980s, in a sense that it includes both 1980s and 1990s, based on the results of general studies.

Lastly, the present study attempts to explain the East Asian policies of China and Japan with the regional integration theory, which is a branch of the international relations theory. Theorized the integration of Europe, the regional integration theory largely includes explanation on the reason for the integration of Europe, the analysis of EU's governance and the analysis of EU's composition.⁵ The regional integration theory is further divided into several theories, but this study employs the non-state centric view and the state centric view, which are regarded as having the most representative and common explanation power, as its theoretical framework.

3. Literature Review and Significance of the Study

A large amount of studies have already dealt with the emergence of China and its impacts on the regional order and cooperation in East Asia. Of the

37-71; 진창수, 「일본의 동아시아 정책변화」; 박성빈, 「동아시아 지역주의와 일본 지역주의 전략의 변화」; 이원덕, 「일본의 동아시아 지역 형성정책의 전개와 특징」, etc) and the other, arguing that it started from late 1990s (by 猪口孝, 「日本のアジア政策」; 최태욱, 「동아시아지역주의에 대한 일본 정책의 변화」; 김성철, 「일본 외교 정책의 역사적 전환: 대미경제외교의 변화」; 김성철 편. 2002, 『일본의 외교정책』, pp. 17-43, etc)

⁵ Antje Siener and Thomas Diez, *European Integration Theory* (Second Edition), pp. 4-5.

various discussions at home and abroad on the regional cooperation in East Asia, the existing regional integration theory and the studies on the regional cooperation in East Asia are largely grouped into the following two categories.

First category is the studies that have investigated the possibility of realizing an East Asian community (mainly economic community) and the mechanism of regional cooperation, such as ASEAN and ASEAN+3. With regard to the study on the possibility of realizing the East Asian community, a number of studies have been conducted in Korea, which is one of the members of East Asia and a major participant in the regional cooperation of East Asia. Representative studies include papers by 최영중 (2003; 2005), 하영선(2008), 정용화(2006), and 김성주(2009), most of which highlight the uniqueness of East Asia and the difference between Europe and East Asia by comparing them. Also, the forecast by the studies above on the future regional cooperation in East Asia is not basically far from the optimism asserted by T.J. Pempel and the pessimism argued by Aaron Friedberg.

Second category is the studies that have separately examined the East Asian policies of China and Japan, which have transformed under the large stream of East Asian regionalism. Representative studies conducted at home and abroad on China's East Asian policy include 김재철 (2007), 한석희(2007) and 조영남 (2006) at home and Shambough et al. (2005), Pempel (2005), Suisheng Zhao

(2011), Zhang Yunliang and Tang Shiping (2005) abroad. These studies accepted that China had an East Asian policy and focused on the strategic nature of the policy. The findings of these studies showed that China's East Asian policy has started in full swing from 1990s, with the main characteristics of proactively adopting the multilateralism and preparing for countermeasures against the China Threat Theory, which appeared due to the rapid emergence of China.

Since the establishment of groundwork in 1980s, Japan's East Asian policy has been continuously experiencing changes with respect to setting the range of region and its willingness to implement the policy due to the transfer of political power and the environmental change of international politics around East Asia. As for the specific period of formation of Japan's East Asian policy, previous studies agree that there exists an evident difference between the prewar East Asian policy, the main purpose of which was building the Expansionism Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the postwar East Asian policy. However, there is controversy over when Japan, which depended on the US not only for military and security, but also foreign policy after the establishment of the Yoshida Doctrine and the enactment of the Peace Constitution, turned its eyes toward Asia. For example, Gilbert Rozman (2007), Danaka Akihiko (2007), Kimura Takayuki (1997), 진창수 (2009), 송주명 (2001), and 박성빈 (2007) regard the point of Japan's 'Return to Asianism' as 1980s. On the contrary, Takashi Inoguchi (2002),

김성철 (2002), and 최태욱 (2012) consider 1990s as the time of actively establishing and implementing Japan's East Asian policy. In other words, the former view regards the time of establishing and implementing Japan's East Asian policy as: the period of strong yen due to the Plaza Accord in 1995 and the resulting massive investment in Southeastern Asia; the so-called Japan Bashing policy by the US due to rapid economic growth of Japan; and the increased sense of crisis within Japan toward the US as well as China due to the implementation of the engagement policy toward China by Clinton administration. The latter view, on the other hand, considers the onset of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 as the time of active implementation of Japan's East Asian policy. The issue of these two views is consistent with the controversy over whether the beginning of Japan's East Asian policy is regarded as the Asia-Pacifism centered on the APEC or as the East-Asianism centered only on ASEAN+3.

Previous studies on the future regional cooperation in East Asia, and the East Asian policies of China and Japan, this study could derive the fact that few studies have simultaneously examined the East Asian policies of China and Japan, which are actual or potential leaders for regional cooperation, and that not many studies have forecast the future regional cooperation of East Asia through the East Asian policies of China and Japan. In addition, previous studies have focused on the attitude of a country toward regional cooperation and integration or the

changes in bilateral or multilateral relationship due to the development of regionalism, rather than analyzing the flow or key elements of the macro-policy of a country with the theoretical framework. In other words, previous studies have put more weights on the correlation between regional integration and the policies and attitudes of East Asian countries from the micro-perspective.

When comparing with the results of previous studies, this study has the value of scarcity in that it attempts to macroscopically explain the possibility of the regional integration of East Asia using the East Asian policies of China, which has recently been positioned firmly as a regional power of East Asian region, and Japan, which is a traditional economic power. Moreover, the study is distinct from previous studies in that it tries to be away from the main theories of international relations and the actor centered perspective in the process of analyzing the regional policies of China and Japan.

Above all, however, the significance of this study lies in the fact that it simultaneously compares, analyzes and evaluates the East Asian policies of China and Japan. The regional policies of regional powers significantly affect the establishment of a regional cooperation system and the development of regional cooperation. It is therefore possible to forecast how the regional cooperation of East Asia will develop in the future by comparing, analyzing and evaluating the East Asian policies of China and Japan. Furthermore, it is expected that the future

regional cooperation of East Asia can be predicted with a differentiated approach from previous studies by investigating whether the East Asian policies of China and Japan can be explained by the regional integration theory.

4. Research Methodology and Sources

In order to explore whether the East Asian policies of China and Japan can be explained by the regional integration theory, studies on the East Asian policies of China and Japan, as well as the basic studies should be preceded. The regional integration theory was created to explain the integration of Europe. Thus, I have collected and studied a number of papers on the international relations theory and the papers and literature on the integration of Europe.

I then identified the contents and characteristics of the East Asian policies of China and Japan through the existing study results introducing and analyzing the East Asian policies of China and Japan, other literature and the formal announcements and documents released by the governments of both countries regarding their foreign policies.

In addition, I collected data on the regional cooperation of East Asia through papers, literature and press releases on the regional cooperation of East Asia. In particular, I attempted to widely explore the views of Korea, as well as those of China and Japan, on the regional cooperation of East Asia in the process

of collecting press releases.

II. Region, Regional Cooperation and Regional Integration

This study first aims to verify the explanatory power of regional integration theory towards the East Asia policies of China and Japan. Therefore, it is necessary to organize what is regional integration and what are regional theories that are created in order to explain the phenomenon called regional integration before analyzing China and Japan's East Asian policies of in full scale.

1. Regional Integration

In order to understand the concept called regional cooperation or regional integration, what "region" indicates must be understood first. It is because it cannot escape the major premise, "region," whether it is regional integration or regional cooperation.

The definition of region is very diverse. According to Bruce Russett, region can be defined by three criteria: first, regions are geographic ones, thus producing a definition by isolation or separateness; second, regions should be areas of relative homogeneity; third, more commonly, region is the demand for

homogeneity of economic and social structure.⁶ However, the definition of region can differ according to a scholarly perspective. For example, the region in geography indicates sub-national monomer, and in politics and international politics, it indicates sub-level in international system or supranational monomer.⁷

Although the definition of region is not unified, people generally tend to recognize region in the geographical concept. Yet, according to T.J. Pempel, the most important thing in the definition of region is that the existing free trade areas or regional organizations with several goals are established as the combination of 'neighboring nations' and that the concept of creating mutual profits through solidifying the cooperation among the 'neighboring nations' is inherent in them. Therefore, in this sense, the term, "region," carries a meaning that is not only geographic but also geopsychological.⁸

When organizing the discussion on the definition of region above, it could be learned that not only the boundary as a geographical and physical space, but also recognition of from where to where would be set as a region, economic and social mutual dependence, range of the participating countries that participate in regional cooperation mechanism within the region, and homogeneity among so-

⁶ Bruce Russett, *International Regions and the International System*, p. 2.

⁷ 손열, 「서론: 지역, 지역주의, 동아시아」, p. 13.

⁸ T.J. Pempel, "Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness", T.J. Pempel ed., *Remapping East Asia: the Construction of a Region*, p. 3

called "neighboring nations" are very important in defining region and setting the range of region. In other words, region is a fluid and complex mixture of physical, psychological, and behavioral traits that are continually in the process of being re-created and redefined.⁹ In the end, it can be seen that the definition of region differs according to which one is regarded more importantly among the aforementioned complex elements.

Next, let's examine integration. In broad definition, integration includes both social process (the shifting of loyalties) and political process (the constructions of new political institutions with a direct say in at least a part of their member states' affairs).¹⁰ However, integration is not the concept that regards only process as important. Those intergovernmentalists who are based on realistic thoughts sometimes show more focus on the birth of a new political organization that exceeds the nation-state, in other words, the state of integration.

When organizing these, integration can be understood as a concept that refers to both process and state. In other words, integration is a process of getting all the way to complete political integration, which is the final stage, and it is supposed that it goes through several steps that can be distinguished and compared during that process.¹¹

⁹ T.J. Pempel, "Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness", p. 4.

¹⁰ Antje Siener and Thomas Diez, *European Integration Theory* (Second Edition), p. 2.

¹¹ 최영중, 「동아시아 지역통합의 이론, 현황 및 전망」, 한국동북아지식연대, 『동북

Regional integration is a concept that has a long history. As we can conjecture from the organization of the concept regarding "integration," regional integration can refer to the process that a region achieves integration and also to the results of achieving integration through establishment of regional mechanism. Regional integration can be distinguished into horizontal and vertical integrations according to its direction of progress for convenience's sake. Horizontal regional integration refers to the integration in several domains such as economy, politic, society, and culture. Vertical integration can be subdivided into regionalism from top to bottom, which is achieved under the lead of government, and regionalization from bottom to top, which is achieved under the lead of non-governmental organizations. Regionalism and regionalization are also understood as two routes through which regional integration is accomplished.¹² Regionalism's biggest characteristic is the establishment of regional organization through official agreement and such, and the participant of this regional organization is definitely the nation that is the main agent of integration. On the other hand, regionalization indicates unofficial but *de facto* process that is achieved under the lead of company, non-governmental organization, and other

아공동체를 향하여-아시아 지역통합의 꿈과 현실』 p, 239.

¹² The studies that clearly defined regionalization and regionalism are: Paul Evans "Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian Institutional Identity", T.J. Pempel ed., *Remapping East Asia: the Construction of a Region*, pp. 195-215.

economic and social organizations.¹³

For regional integration, the concept that should be examined especially in regards to the process of regional integration of East Asia is regional cooperation. Unlike regional integration that indicates the change of sovereignty, regional cooperation is somewhat less complex and normally refers to joint efforts by states to solve specific problems.¹⁴ In East Asia, regional cooperation is used more than regional integration, and the attachment for the sovereignty of East Asian countries is mentioned most frequently and importantly as the reason for that.

2. Regional Integration Theories

In fact, international politics theories for international cooperation, theories for domestic policy decision process, and unique theories of the regional integration are blended complexly in the regional integration field.¹⁵ Among them, this study focuses on "the unique theories of the regional integration" which aim to explain the process, result, and the series of characteristics of regional integration.

Integration theory is the field of theorizing the process and outcome of

¹³ T.J. Pempel, "Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness", p. 19.

¹⁴ Björn Hettne, "Beyond the New Regionalism", *New Political Economy*, p. 545.

¹⁵ 최영중, 『동아시아 지역통합과 한국의 선택』, p. 40.

(European) integration.¹⁶ Basically, regional integration theory targets the integration of Europe, which is represented as the European Union (EU) nowadays, as the object of theorization. The integration of Europe is evaluated to go through the process of regionalism under the lead of the government. The fact that the European Union is far and away most thickly and systematically institutionalized among numerous regional organizations could be solid evidence that supports such development route of the EU.¹⁷

Regional integration theory, which developed modeling the EU, could be distinguished into non state centric theory and state centric theory according to main actor of integration. Literal to its words, non state centric theory emphasizes the importance of supranational actors such as supranational interest groups, transnational corporation, and labor union other than a nation as the main agent of regional integration. The functionalism that is the traditional regional integration theory, neofunctionalism, and theories centered on large companies belong to non state centric theory. From the aspect that these theories pay attention to the role of diverse actors as they focus on the process rather than structure in order to escape state-centrism, they could be said as "actor-centered" theory.¹⁸

State centric theory supposes a nation as the main actor of integration. It

¹⁶ Antje Siener and Thomas Diez, *European Integration Theory*, p. 3.

¹⁷ T.J. Pempel, "Introduction: Emerging Webs of Regional Connectedness", p. 3.

¹⁸ 구갑우, 「지역통합 이론의 재검토」, 『한국과 국제정치』, p. 167.

shows the tendency of focusing on the formation of preference, process and result of negotiation among the members within their regional cooperation body in regards to the progress of integration. Intergovernmentalism that is called as neo-realism integration theory, liberal intergovernmentalism that applied the Two Level Game theory to intergovernmentalism, liberalism integration theory, and Marxism integration theory belong here.

And there also exists the attempt to combine the two theories, breaking away from the dichotomy of regional integration by adding upon the above discussion of state-non state, based on the actor that becomes the main agent of integration and the main driving force. As the representative study on such negotiation theory, there is a study by Sandholtz and Zysman, *Recasting the European Bargain*. And multilevel governance, which was introduced to explain day-to-day politics and governance of the EU, and institutionalism approach also belong to this category. Especially, the later one admits the fact that the government and system of the member (nation) plays an important role at the time when regional integration occurs, but also it argues that the position of the country as uniquely important actor disappears during the progress of integration.¹⁹

Among these regional integration theories, this study aims to continue the discussion by setting the state centric theory and non state centric theory as its

¹⁹ 구갑우, 「지역통합 이론의 재검토」, 『한국과 국제정치』, p. 172.

main theoretical frame.

1) Non State Centric theory

Non State Centric theory usually takes functional approaches. In other words, it focuses more on the process between the process and result of regional integration. Such characteristic can be found from the Hass' definition of integration, who is a pioneer theorist of neofunctionalism that is the representative of non state centric theory.

According to Hass, integration is “whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”²⁰ Non state centric theory deems the progress of integration as gradual, has optimistic view that the integration that is already initiated will not stop or retreat and will continue to develop, and finds the definition of integration in the fact that individual and dispersed countries come together and develop into one community.²¹

Non State Centric view has five hypotheses. First, the practitioners of regional integration are assumed as rational and self-interested actors, who have

²⁰ Arne Niemann with Philippe C. Schmitter, "Neofunctionalism", Antje Siener and Thomas Diez, *European Integration Theory* (Second Edition), p. 47.

²¹ 강원택, 조홍식, 『하나의 유럽』, pp. 30-33.

the capacity to learn and change their preferences. Second, once established, institutions can take on a life of their own and progressively escape the control of their creators. Third, early reformulations of the theory stressed the primacy of incremental decision-making over grand designs. Fourth, in the Community setting exchanges are often better characterized as positive-sum games and a 'supranational' style of decision-making. Fifth, emerging functional interdependencies foster further integration.²²

When they are organized, non state centric theory has three definite characteristics like the following. First, it emphasizes the importance of an actor other than a nation, in other words, a supranational actor such as NGO and company. Second, it emphasizes the role of supranational system and a supranational actor within the system (for the EU, it was the European Commission) in regards to regional integration. Third, it emphasizes the importance of Spillover effect that spreads to other field from one field. Among the three, aforementioned characteristics, especially Spillover effect is mentioned as the biggest characteristic of non state centric theory, which requires neofunctionalism as its head along with the establishment of supranational organization. It is because that the cause of Spillover effect is the fact that social

²² Arne Niemann with Philippe C. Schmitter, "Neofunctionalism", pp. 48-49.

phenomena are mutually dependent.²³ Such Spillover effect could be again subdivided into functional spillover that emphasizes the gradual occurrence of far out integration into politics, culture, and society after starting from the economic field, political spillover that emphasizes higher level of integration whose impetus is élites from nation and non-country, and cultivated spillover whose drive of even higher level of integration is provided by supranational organization.

However, non state centric theory is not free from criticism such as if Spillover effect is really inevitable, if it is emphasizing economic factor too much, if it views only the actor rather than integration structure, if it overlooks the importance of sovereignty and nationalism, and if it lacks the consideration towards external factors that can influence integration.

2) State centric theory

In contrast to non state centric theory that focuses on an actor other than a nation, state centric theory supposes a nation (more accurately a government) that participates in the process of regional integration as its basic actor. And it shows the tendency of focusing on the influence and role of individual country during the integration process.

Therefore, domestic political situation of an individual country, or state

²³ 강원택, 조홍식, 『하나의 유럽』, p. 30

preference, according to the Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism, works as an important variable for integration. The fact that the highest policy decision making organization in the EU is European Council, where the summits of member countries are gathered, becomes the ground that supports the validity of state centric theory. Also, on the contrary to non state centric theory, state centric theory does not agree with the fact that integration develops linearly. In other words, the movement towards integration could always get disturbed and impeded by political situation of countries.²⁴

State centric theory is based on two hypotheses. First, the actor of international relation is a nation. Second, nations are rational. The three keywords for understanding state centric theory is preference of nation, state bargaining and institutionalization through regional mechanism. The representative of state centric theory, liberal intergovernmentalism understands a nation as 'transmission belt' that aggregates and expresses the preference created by many domestic interest groups. Therefore it is liberal, from the aspect that it argues that the preference of nations which participates in regional integration could be diverse. However, it is quite realistic in the aspect that it speculates that the core agent of regional integration is a nation and that the result of negotiation between nations reflects the size of power. Above all, the analysis result of using liberal

²⁴ 강원택, 조홍식, 『하나의 유럽』, p. 31.

intergovernmentalism is not much different from that of neo-realism. In other words, the arguments of state centric theory are that the progress of integration is possible only when individual nations find the minimal common denominator upon which their interests coincide, and that supranational organization (the EU for Europe's case) is only an international organization that institutionalized the cooperation between nations. In other words, it is not that regionally integrated body replaces a nation-state, but it shows a behavior that a nation uses regionally integrated body as a tool.²⁵

State centric theory, which requires liberal intergovernmentalism as its head, has strength in that social preference can be distinguished relatively clearly, and that it can explain the policy-making regarding many issues well.²⁶ Also, it has characteristic in that it emphasized the aspects of competition and bargaining that surround the distribution of interest while considering integration as a new battle ground for national interest as it was evaluated that it solved the problem of unclear main agent of integration, which was one of criticisms that non state centric theory faces, by emphasizing the role of nation in integration. However, state centric theory developed with only five large-scale negotiations in the history of the EU as its positive cases, and therefore, it is not free from the criticism that it cannot provide clear explanation in regards to the day-to-day politics of the EU.

²⁵ 강원택, 조홍식, 『하나의 유럽』, pp. 31-33.

²⁶ Antje Siener and Thomas Diez, *European Integration Theory*, p. 76.

As the alternative for overcoming such limit of state centric theory, the approach, which focuses on the day-to-day governance of regional institution that are generated in the process of regional integration such as multilevel governance, is discussed.

3. Theoretical Framework of Analysis

The summary of the characteristics of non state centric theory and state centric theory, which were analyzed in Verse 2, is like the following.

Issues of integration	Non State Centric View	State Centric View
Main Actor	Supranational Actors	State
Driving Force	Regional Institutions	State Bargaining
Character of Regional institution	Supranational	Main Stage of State Bargaining
Types of Development	Intensified by Increasing of inter-discipline interdependence	May be hindered by State's preference and result of state bargaining

[Table 2-1: Compare of State Centric View and Non State Centric View]

The issue that Table 2-1 suggests is something that reveals the characteristic of non state centric theory and state centric theory the best, but also

it is an issue that becomes a major standard for decision when two theories are applied to the East Asian policies of China and Japan, not regional cooperation bodies.

As it is mentioned above, there are many existing studies that cover the current state of the existing East Asian regional institutions such as ASEAN and ASEAN+3 and that foresee their future by using regional integration theory. However, if it is approached to more fundamental level, the leading role of government is essential for the organization of regional institutions, regardless of where the driving force of regional cooperation comes. The attitude of government towards regional institutions can be judged through examining regional policy among its foreign policies. Then here, it begs a question whether or not a nation's foreign policy, which could decide the organization of regional institutions or the future of regional cooperation, could be explained with the regional integration theory that explains the process and characteristic of regional integration. If regional integration theory could provide valid explanations to a nation's foreign policy, then it would be possible to predict the future of East Asian regional cooperation in ways that are different from the existing ones.

For smooth analysis, based on the five issues suggested in Table 2-1, I aimed to set three questions that reflect the characteristics of two theories.²⁷

²⁷ The positions of state centric theory and non state centric theory regarding these three

First, how is the preference regarding the regional cooperation mechanism of China and Japan, and what is the reason of its preference? These are the questions related to the main actor of integration that is the first issue and the characteristic of regional cooperation mechanism that is the third issue of Table 2-1. There is no regional cooperation mechanism that is as institutionalized as the EU in East Asia, but it is not like that the presentable regional cooperation mechanism is nonexistent. Then what do East Asian countries, especially China and Japan hold the positions of regional powerhouse within the region, think is the main agent of East Asian regional integration? In order to answer this question, I will analyze the preference and its reason of regional cooperation mechanism that is reflected in the regional policies of China and Japan. If the analysis result prefers the formation of regional cooperation mechanism, and if its reason is to construct East Asian regional cooperation system, it would be possible to explain such phenomena with non state centric theory. If it does not prefer the formation of regional cooperation mechanism, and if it prefers it with a reason that strongly reflects the aspect of constructing institution for making negotiations between nations more smooth, then it could be seen that state centric theory has bigger explanatory power.

Second, do these two countries hold leading positions while actively

questions are organized in Table 2-2.

participating within the regional cooperation mechanism? This is the question that continues from the driving force of regional integration that is the second issue of Table 2-1. Whether or not China and Japan participate actively within the regional integration mechanism and hold leading positions can be analyzed through examining the two countries' regional policies. According to non state centric theory, the driving force of integration comes from the regional cooperation mechanism itself. Therefore, if a nation's regional policy shows a tendency to depend on the rule and mechanism of regional cooperation mechanism itself, it could be explained with non state centric theory. On the other hand, if they try to hold leading positions within the mechanism in order to take hold of more advantageous position in negotiations between nations, and if they are active in establishing and operating regional cooperation mechanism under the premise of taking hold of leading positions, then state centric theory that considers negotiation between nations as the driving force of integration would have more validity.

Third, what are their positions regarding the phased development of integration? In other words, do they support the role of Spillover effect? This is a question related to the phased development of integration, which is the fourth issue of Table 2-1. As it is previously explained, non state centric theory recognizes the existence of Spillover effect and considers it as the important factor

for continuing to more far out step of integration. On the contrary, state centric theory expresses negative position in regards to the phased development of integration due to Spillover effect, and it argues that integration can be disturbed and impeded by the preference of nations and result of negotiation, instead of it being phased and developing linearly. The positions of China and Japan regarding accepting Spillover effect can also be analyzed through the two countries' regional policies related to the establishment and operation of regional cooperation mechanism, and according to the analysis result, it could be conjectured that which theory would have more valid explanatory power between non state centric theory and state centric theory.

Questions	Non State Centric View	State Centric View
Q1. Preference of Regional Institution	Prefer	Result of bargaining and power distribution are more important
Q2. Whether takes to leading position in the regional institution and level of participation	Relying on rule and mechanisms of institution/ actively participate	Try to possess leading position for taking advantage in negotiation/ actively participate to possess leading position
Q3. Acceptance of Spillover effect	Accept	Doesn't accept

[Table 2-2: Three Questions as Theoretical Framework of analysis]

In Chapter 3, it will organize the basic characteristics of two countries' East Asian policies through the forming period and main contents of the East Asian policies of China and Japan. Afterwards, their policies will be analyzed through the theoretical framework that has been previously organized. And then the result will be analyzed through the comparison with Table 2-2 regarding how much the regional integration theory can provide explanatory power to the East Asian policies of China and Japan and which one between non state centric theory and state centric theory would provide more comprehensive explanatory power to the East Asian policies of China and Japan.

III. Comparative Analysis of China and Japan's East Asian Policy

1. China and Japan's East Asian Policy

Before analyzing the content and characteristics of China and Japan's East Asian policy, first we need to determine whether such policy actually exists in each country.

Previous studies that analyse China's foreign policy affirm that there exists East Asian policy in China. There is a slight difference in terminology used by scholars, but in general, China's East Asian Policy is referred to as '*zhoubianguo* policy', 'East Asian regional policy', etc. Among these, '*zhoubianguo* policy' is a

translation of the Chinese word 周邊. As this term refers to Asian region other than China as ‘periphery’, it can be regarded as a term that reflects Sino-centric thinking.

Likewise, Japan also has its own East Asian Policy, and there also is a slight difference in terminology used by scholars. For example, ‘East Asian regionalism’, ‘Asian policy’ and ‘East Asian regional policy’, etc.

In this study, instead of using various terms, the term ‘East Asian policy’ will be used to refer to all regional policies undertaken by China and Japan.

1) China’s East Asian Policy

During the 1990s, China began a systematic approach in establishment and execution of its East Asian policy. In particular, three events - the Tiananmen incident of 1989, the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, and 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis that resulted in a military confrontation between the United States and China – are often regarded as the ones that significantly influenced China in establishing as well as actively implementing East Asian policy.

China’s East Asian policy is also referred to as ‘Good Neighbor Policy’. The key principle of this policy is to build an amicable, tranquil and prosperous neighborhood” (睦鄰、富鄰、安鄰), with an intention to become a good

neighbor and a good partner in the region”(與鄰為善、與鄰為伴).²⁸

① Formation and Time of enforcement

Previous studies commonly acknowledge that China's East Asian policy was systematically established and executed during the 1990s. These studies argue that East Asian policy is what China came up as a breakthrough to the threat it perceived by the Western powers' containment policy against China after the Tianamen Square protests of 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. On the other hand, David Shambaugh takes following five factors - the muted Asian reaction to the Tianamen Square protests of 1989, the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, China's re-evaluation of its view on regional institutions, demand for the elimination of alliance, and the reconfirmation of Deng Xiaoping's theme 'peace and development'- as the reasons behind China's promotion of its East

²⁸ About the 'Good Neighbor Policy' refer, 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』, pp .265-306; Suisheng Zhao, "China's Approaches toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: Motivations and calculation", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 20, No. 58 (January 2011), pp. 53-67; 人民網, 2004, "匯錦濤在亞太經濟合作組織第十二次領導人非正式會議上的講話(全文)", <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1037/3003097.html> (Access Date: 2012. 10. 11); 中華人民共和國外交部, 2003, "把握機遇, 迎接挑戰, 實現共贏——在博鰲亞洲論壇第二屆年會上的講話". <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/zlb/ldzyjh/t39953.htm> (Access Date: 2012. 10. 11); 人民網. 2005, "溫家寶出席亞洲合作對話外長會議開幕式", <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/46242/46248/3303891.html> (Access Date: 2012. 10. 11).

Asian policy. In addition, some studies, in relation to China's security threat, point out 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis as the cause behind China's active promotion of its East Asian policy.²⁹ However, this should be seen as more direct cause for China's establishment and execution of its East Asian policy. More comprehensive origin of China's East Asian policy formation goes back further, to the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee held in 1978. In other words, East Asian policy has been established under the circumstances of having reform and open as its background. In the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, led by Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders chose to adopt the policy of reform and opening up, and at the same time, modified the theme of the era from the Mao's "Revolution and War" to "Peace and Development". Accordingly, China's foreign policy goals shifted to that of creating a peaceful and stable international environment to concentrate on economic development, and East Asian policy was introduced as a strategic measure in order to achieve such goals.³⁰

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²⁹ 류동원, 「중국의 다자안보협력에 대한 인식과 실천」, 『國際政治論叢』, 제44집, 4호, p. 129; 김재철, 『중국의 외교전략과 국제질서』, p. 141.

³⁰ About the China's foreign policy in 1980s, refer 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』, pp. 273-276; Zhang Yunliang and Tang Shiping, "China's Regional Strategy", David Shambaugh ed, *Power Shift*, pp. 48-68; Suisheng Zhao, "China's Approach toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: Motivations and Calculations", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 20, No. 58 (January 2011), pp. 53-67.

Common findings in the previous studies of China's East Asian policy contents are the response to the China threat theory and the expansion of multilateralism. As for the means of responding to the China threat theory, measures such as enhancing soft power using foreign policy ideologies such as 'responsible power theory', 'new security concept', 'peaceful development', 'harmonious world', developing its state image as the one that will not seek hegemony, as well as providing economic incentives such as FDI.³¹

As previous studies universally point out, expansion of multilateralism and the participation in various intra-regional institutions are the main theme as well as the characteristics of China's East Asian policy. It can be estimated that China's stance on the intra-regional institutions was relatively negative in the beginning of the post-Cold War era. However, in the 1990s when China began establishing and actively implementing its East Asian policy, China's stance on the intra-regional institutions makes a change towards more active participation, with China starting to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as its momentum. Many studies regard China's preference of multipolar system and attitude change as the biggest reason why China changed its stance on the intra-regional institutions.

First of all, China perceives that the global system in the post-Cold War era

³¹ 김재철, 『중국의 외교전략과 국제질서』, pp. 142-146; 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』, pp. 280-289; Zhang Yunliang and Tang Shiping, "China's Regional Strategy", pp. 51-52.

will change from so-called the U.S.-centered unipolar system to the multipolar system in which many actors such as the U.S., EU, Russia, China and Japan can exercise similar amount of influence in the global setting. China, in actuality, prefers multipolar system as the form of world order that can guarantee global peace and stability in the future³², and such preference strongly reflects China trying to counterbalance against the U.S. In other words, it is to say that China started to participate actively in the intra-regional institutions under the goals of containing the excessive proliferation of the U.S.-led Hub and Spoke in the East Asian region as well as further weakening of the U.S. influence in the region. On the other hands, there are studies that emphasize China's perception has been changed as a result of a series of learning effects from its participation in the intra-regional institutions.³³ According to these studies, by participating in the intra-regional institutions, China not only was able to increase its influence, but also learned by experience that it could shift regional order to their advantage. As a result, China progressed from being mere participant in the intra-regional institutions to being an active player that can create new institution and occupy a leading role in it. Notable examples include Shanghai Cooperation Organization

³² 한석희, 『후진타오 시대의 중국 대외관계』, p. 156.

³³ 김재철, 『중국의 외교전략과 국제질서』; 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』; 한석희, 『후진타오 시대의 중국 대외관계』; 차창훈, 「중국의 부상과 동아시아 협력: 국제정치 이론적 해석을 중심으로」, 『현상과 인식』 Vol. 34, No. 4. pp. 149-168; David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order", pp. 78-83, etc.

(SCO) and Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program.

Besides China's active participation in the intra-regional institutions and its efforts to dispel growing concerns over China threat theory, alleviating border disputes with its neighbors³⁴ as well as expansion of bilateral relations based on partnerships³⁵ as part of China's East Asian policy in the 1980s are also considered as the characteristics of China's East Asian policy.

To summarize, China's East Asian policy contains the following four aspects: 1) expansion of multilateralism (or active participation in the intra-regional institutions), 2) providing coping mechanisms in response to China threat theory, 3) alleviation of border disputes with its neighbors, 4) strengthening of bilateral relationship through the establishment of active partnership. It is interesting to note that these four characteristics are closely connected with one another, rather than being independent. For example, in the case of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which China has established and is taking lead of, it includes aspects of border dispute alleviation with its neighbors, expansion of multilateralism, and response to China threat theory. As for the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, all four aspects mentioned above are included.

³⁴ 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』, p. 280.

³⁵ 조영남, 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』, p. 280; 홍정표, 장쯔룽, 『현대 중국 외교론』, pp. 377-383; Zhang Yunliang and Tang Shiping, "China's Regional Strategy", p. 50; David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order", pp. 78-83.

③ Characteristics

By reviewing previously conducted studies, we can derive the basic characteristics of China's East Asian policy as following.

First, China's East Asian policy is a part of finding a base or a stepping-stone for becoming a world power for China. This is in line with the goals of China's East Asian policy, and is the clearest characteristic of China's East Asian policy.

Second, China's East Asian policy is a part of China's strategy on becoming a world power, thus, in a larger sense it becomes inevitable that this policy should remain dependent to the Superpower policy, for instance foreign policy toward United States, Russia, etc. This characteristic is closely related to the geographical features and members constituting East Asian region, as almost all of the China's presumed 'superpowers' are either members of East Asian region or have quite close relationship with this region, with an exception of the EU.

Third, as China's East Asian policy is dependent on its world power policy, therefore, unless so-called core national interests are under a direct threat, China will not try to gain supremacy or seize initiative in the region and make the U.S. and East Asian nations uneasy in the process. This is because the establishment and execution of China's East Asian policy, as mentioned above, is

mainly to dispel China threat theory as well as the U.S. blockade of China, therefore, its main goal is to disarm China's neighboring nations of their fears toward China's rapid rise.

2) Japan's East Asian Policy

① Formation and Time of enforcement

It is universally recognized that Japan's East Asian Policy began establishing during the 1980s, not in the 1990s. The reasons for this are as follows. First, the Plaza Accord of 1985 triggered the strengthening of Yen, and this paved the way for Japan to expand direct investment into other Asian nations. As a result of this, the issue of Japan's economic cooperation with other Asian nations reemerged. Second, Japan's rapid economic growth resulted in growing US perception of Japan as its rival, and in response to this, various demands to Japan appeared, such as the so-called Japan Bashing policy of the U.S. Third, this period saw the rapid growth of regionalism in the U.S and Europe (but not in East Asia). Fourth, there have been widespread anti-Japanese protests in Bangkok and Jakarta in reaction to a state visit by Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in 1974. To Japan, such reaction came as a huge shock, and it was against this backdrop that Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda asserted the so-called Fukuda Doctrine that aimed at Heart-to-heart understanding and equal partnership between Japan

and ASEAN. Fifth, the growth of the Asian economy has aroused a kinder feeling toward Asia among the Japanese.³⁶

Nevertheless, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 was much more important than these changes that took place in the 1980s. The Asian financial crisis put Japan in such condition that allowed (and also forced) Japan to display its ability to take the leadership role. That is to say that the international society led by the U.S. began calling for Japan to play more active role in handling the crisis.³⁷ The U.S. reluctance to intervene in East Asian issues and its policy considerations, as well as the passive responses by the Japanese government at the early stage of the financial crisis can be blamed as the causes for such calls. Yet such demand by the international society calling for Japan's more active policy remedies can also be interpreted in a way that in some part, the international society regarded Japan as financially capable of resolving the Asian financial crisis. Although Japan took a passive attitude in the beginning, later under the Obuchi cabinet Japan showed active participation, from laying plans for Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) as well as designing New Miyazawa Initiative, since the Asian financial crisis demonstrated

³⁶ 진창수, 「일본의 동아시아 정책 변화: 아시아주의로의 복귀」, p. 41; Gilbert Rozman, 'Japanese Strategic Thinking on Regionalism', pp. 243-244; Takayuki Kimura, 'Japan-US Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region', p. 59-62; 소에야 요시히데 저, 박철희 등 번역, 2006, 「일본의 미들파워 외교」 p. 157.

³⁷ 진창수, 「아시아 경제위기 이후 일본의 외교정책의 변화: 적극적 대외경제정책으로 전환」, 김성철 편, 2000, 『일본의 외교정책』 (세종연구소), p 83.

continued Japanese optimism about wide-ranging economic regionalism exclusive of the United States.³⁸

In summary, in a broader context, Japan's East Asia Policy began its primary development and was carried out as a result of five changes that took place during the 1980s. Yet, in measuring its importance, Japan's East Asia policy still remained secondary, with the U.S. – Japan relations being considered most important. However, Japan began enforcing its East Asian Policy more actively, with the Asian financial crisis of 1997 as its starting point of such change.

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Japan's East Asian Policy had its highs and lows due to the changes in the ruling party and international conditions surrounding East Asia as well as individual characteristics of Japanese Prime Ministers. To put it differently, since the 1980s, Japan's foreign policy looks as if it had been lost between its extreme emphasis on the U.S. – Japan alliance and its plans of pursuing more active policy towards East Asia. As many studies point out, such hesitance comes from the tradition of Japan's 'dual identity' of the 'West' and 'Asia'. Thus, Japan's agitation between the policy lines of U.S.-Japan alliance emphasis and active pursuit of East Asian Policy can be considered as distinguishing characteristics of Japan's foreign policy as well as its East Asian Policy. Needless to say, we cannot assert

³⁸ Gilbert Rozman, 'Japanese Strategic Thinking on Regionalism', p. 250.

that such frequent changes in its foreign policy are the distinctive feature of Japan only. Due to the nature of democracy in which there are two or more major parties that argue for policies different from each other, it can be regarded as quite natural to have the keynote change in the foreign policy as regime changes. However, separate from the debate on the qualities of democracy, we need to take a closer look at how the implementation of Japan's East Asian policy has been changing in different time periods, in order to comprehend the contents of Japan's East Asian policy.

First, it can be interpreted that the groundwork for Japan's East Asian Policy in the 1980s has been laid during the period of Yasuhiro Nakasone(中曾根康弘) cabinet. Unlike his predecessors, Prime Minister Nakasone put an emphasis on building equal partnership with the U.S. He also tried to improve Japan's relationships with Korea, China and ASEAN using economic measures such as ODA.³⁹

In general, however, Japan's East Asian Policy has not been actively implemented. Rather, Japan's policy during this period took the form that compromised between Japan's relations with developed countries led by the U.S. – Japan alliance and Japan strengthening its relationship with other Asian nations. Japan's continued security reliance on the U.S. can be interpreted as the biggest

³⁹ Gilbert Rozman, 'Japanese Strategic Thinking on Regionalism', p. 246.

reason for this. Such characteristics can be inferred from the fact that Japan took initiative in founding APEC as well as ARF. Considering its member composition and characteristics, it is too much to say that APEC is mechanism for East Asian regional cooperation.⁴⁰ On the other hand, ARF is an ASEAN-centered, rather relaxed security forum for the East Asian region. The reason why Japan favored so-called ‘Open-Regionalism’⁴¹ in the 1980s is because this was the best strategy to satisfy Japan’s two separate policy lines of emphasizing East Asia and maintaining relationship with the U.S. simultaneously. Therefore, Japan’s East Asian Policy in the 1980s was closer to Asia Pacific Policy rather than East Asian in a sense, and Japan’s definition of East Asia region category was not ASEAN+3, of which this paper relied as the definition, but rather, Asia Pacific region with APEC as its representative. In this respect, most of the previous studies analyze that Japan in the 1980s was promoting ‘Asia-Pacificism’.

Second, Japan’s East Asian Policy in the 1990s can be divided into active and not-so-active implementation periods. Let’s take a look at the active implementation period first. In the Postwar Japan, East Asian Policy was

⁴⁰ 최태욱, 「동아시아 지역주의에 대한 일본 정책의 변화」, pp. 88-89.

⁴¹ According to 진창수(2009), Japan's trade policy is esbalised upon the self-reflection and awareness that the formation of regional economic bloc lead WW2. Therefore, when arguing regionalism, Japan certainly use the word 'open'. It also weakens the afterimage of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. About Japan's 'loose regionalism', refer 손열, 「일본의 지역인식과 전략」, 정용화 외, 2006, 『동아시아 지역주의』, p. 144.

implemented most actively under the cabinet of Keizo Obuchi (小淵恵三). His predecessors put greater emphasis on APEC, however, under the changes in the international conditions, in particular, of coping with the Asian financial crisis, the Obuchi cabinet literally sought the promotion of 'East Asia' diplomacy, with newly established ASEAN+3 as its main mechanism for regional cooperation. East Asian Policy implemented by Obuchi cabinet can be summarized in a single word, as 'economic cooperation'. Its core contents are such as establishment of AMF to prevent recurrence of the Asian financial crisis and the planning of New Miyazawa Initiative. Additionally, it is well known that Prime Minister Obuchi maintained very friendly relationship with President Kim Dae-Jung, who was highly enthusiastic about East Asian regional cooperation. He was also active in participating in the establishment of East Asian Summit (EAS) and Chiangmai Initiative (CMI). More important, however, is that the Obuchi cabinet established theoretical basis for Japan's East Asian policy. Prime Minister Obuchi reemphasized that the revitalization of Japanese economy, New Miyazawa Initiative and Special Yen loans were in fact progressing towards 'Regenerating Asia', the goal of Japan's East Asian Policy. And he also emphasized that to meet this goal, 'human security' must be taken seriously.⁴² The Asian financial

⁴² 진창수, 「아시아 경제위기 이후 일본의 외교정책의 변화: 적극적 대외경제정책으로 전환」, 김성철 편, 『일본의 외교정책』, pp. 100-101.

crisis and passive response of the U.S., as well as changes within Japanese domestic politics (a lift on the restrictions under financial structure reform law, which has been promoted under the previous regime of Hashimoto cabinet) are the main reasons that allowed the Obuchi cabinet of active implementation of its East Asian Policy.⁴³

Even under the Yoshiro Mori (森喜郎) cabinet that succeeded after the sudden death of Prime Minister Obuchi, East Asian Policy seemed to continue in certain parts. However, because by this time the Asian financial crisis has been calmed down in considerable amount, thus it also became quite hard to anticipate the same level of motivational forces seen in the Obuchi cabinet period.

The final period in which Japan's East Asian Policy was promoted relatively active was during the time of Yukio Hatoyama(鳩山由紀夫) cabinet, who became the first Prime Minister from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), in 2009. As mentioned in the DPJ Manifesto, strengthening Asian Diplomacy with goals of 'building a close yet equal U.S. – Japan alliance' and 'building an East Asian Community' were the main foreign policy objectives of the Hatoyama cabinet. ⁴⁴ Unlike previous LDP regimes that rather neglected East Asia, the tradition that began from the time of the Koizumi cabinet, Prime Minister

⁴³ 진창수, 「아시아 경제위기 이후 일본의 외교정책의 변화: 적극적 대외경제정책으로 전환」 pp. 83-110.

⁴⁴ 民主党 MANIFESTO, 2009, p. 12.

Hatoyama chose a policy line that emphasizes East Asia, and although there are more than two reasons behind his choice, however, we can classify them into the larger two. One is in the regime change itself. Regime change usually accompanies extensive policy changes. Prime Minister Hatoyama also sought to differentiate his cabinet from that of LDP government by breaking away from Japan's excessive dependence on the U.S. and improving Japan's relationship with its East Asian neighbours such as Korea and China, which from the time of Koizumi's rule, has been steadily worsening. Another is the global financial crisis of 2008, which began in the U.S. The crisis caused European and American markets to plummet, yet East Asian nations such as China and Singapore showed their underlying strength in their rapid recovery from the crisis. This highlighted the importance of East Asia as an export area to supplement extensive reductions in both Europe and American markets.⁴⁵ But, the Hatoyama cabinet was forced to step down in 2010, after the Cheonan incident that led to highlight the importance of strengthening Japan's relationship with the U.S, as well as his failure to coordinate between the demands of the U.S. and benefits for locals in Okinawa in the same year, in regard to controversies regarding the move of Futenma Air base.

On the other hands, instead of implementing an active East Asian Policy, cabinets other than above three (Obuchi, Mori, Hatoyama) rather concentrated on

⁴⁵ 최태욱, 「동아시아 지역주의에 대한 일본 정책의 변화」, p. 96-97.

balancing between East Asian Policy and the U.S. – Japan relation.

The cabinet of Junichiro Koizumi (小泉純一郎) is regarded as a turning point of Japan's East Asian Policy in the 1990s. In his early days, Prime Minister Koizumi did not express his opposition to the East Asian Policy, and instead, he revealed his plans of coming up with an ASEAN and FTA-centered East Asian community. However, unlike Prime Minister Obuchi who regarded ASEAN+3 very high and took active part in planning for the establishment of East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), East Asian community presented by Prime Minister Koizumi included Australia and New Zealand. In other words, ASEAN+3 has been expanded to ASEAN+5. Taking this into consideration, the EAS was launched with not only its original members of ASEAN+3, but also with Australia, New Zealand and India included. The important factors behind Koizumi cabinet's decision to pursue such East Asian Policy are the emergence of Bush administration and the visible signs of China's rise. The U.S.-Japan relations became close as they both began to have shared threat perception against the rise of China, and this in turn made it hard for Japan to have that East Asian Policy that excludes the U.S.

Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe (安倍晋三), Yasuo Fukuda (福田康夫), Taro Aso (麻生太郎), all of whom came after the Koizumi cabinet, promoted East Asian policies similar to that of the Koizumi cabinet. In other words, their policy

was also based on the EAS that is not the original form of ASEAN+3 but in the extended version of ASEAN+6. DPJ Prime Ministers Naoto Kan (菅直人) and Yoshihiko Noda (野田佳彦) who came into prominence after the step down of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, have been implementing policy lines similar to that of LDP governments in the Post-Koizumi era. That is to say, they have all been expressing their stance that although the East Asian Policy that includes the establishment of East Asian Community, it is far more important to maintain the stability of the U.S – Japan relations, keep China in check against its rise, and resolve domestic issues at hand. Especially, Prime Ministers Kan and Noda go one step further than their LDP predecessors, by expressing positive intentions in joining Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). If Japan joins TPP, there are strong suspicions that Japan's regional category definition will expand beyond ASEAN+6, into the category of Asia Pacific as seen in the 1980s.

③ Characteristics

Japan's East Asian Policy is regarded as having following characteristics. First, Japan's East Asian Policy has been acting as if it had been lost between two extreme policies of placing its emphasis on the U.S. – Japan alliance and pursuing active policy towards East Asia. And it is highly probable that Japan's East Asian Policy will continue to do so in the future as well. As pointed out earlier, such hesitance comes from the problem of Japan's dual identity between Asia and the

West, which began emerging in the Meiji Restoration era and yet to be solved.⁴⁶ To make an additional remark, in a sense, active promotion of East Asian Policy purely for itself was implemented only under the Obuchi cabinet. Although Hatoyama cabinet did use ‘equal U.S. – Japan alliance’ and the ‘roadmapping of East Asian Community’ as its slogans, but as this government was too short-lived, it was not possible for Hatoyama to establish a clear and definite East Asian Policy. For the Mori cabinet, on the basis of its emergence, it was in a position where it must inherit most of the basic framework on the foreign policy of the Obuchi cabinet.

Second, the U.S. – Japan relationship and the hedge against the rise of China as well as the domestic political factors are the main elements that affect the formation and execution of Japan’s East Asian Policy⁴⁷. Previous studies all point out to the importance of these three elements, in particular, the U.S-Japan relationship and the hedge against the rise of China should be seen as the main elements. It is true that the U.S. exerted great influence over Japan’s foreign relations in the Postwar period, whether it is a mere regional policy or policy at the global level. As it is well-known, foreign policy includes policies from many

⁴⁶ Takyuki Kimura, ‘Japan-US Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region’, pp. 50-51.

⁴⁷ Gilbert Rozman, ‘Japanese Strategic Thinking on Regionalism’, p. 243; 猪口孝, 「地域主義化する日本」, 猪口孝 編. 2002. 『日本のアジア政策—アジアから見た不信と期待』, p. 13; 박성빈, 「동아시아 지역주의와 일본 지역주의 전략의 변화」, pp. 220-227, etc.

different areas, such as economic, security, and military. Therefore, as long as the remnants of Yoshida doctrine and the U.S. – Japan alliance continue to exist, Japan cannot be free from American influence. In this respect, it can be seen that Japan and the U.S. share a considerable part in their stance against the rise of China. Both the U.S. and Japan try to implement policies of participation and containment towards China simultaneously, as there are visible signs of China's rise since entering the 21st century. The reasons behind Japan's designation of ASEAN+6 as the main stage for its East Asian Policy in the post-Koizumi period and its display of interest in 'Asia-Pacific', not in the 'East Asia', could be also interpreted as Japan's intention of diluting China's strengthening position relatively by widening its regional sphere.

Third, the center of Japan's East Asian Policy lies in ASEAN and also in Korea. Based on the ASEAN-emphasis policy line that became clear in the 2002 Koizumi plan of East Asian Community as well as the previous studies that suggest Japan to strengthen its relationship with Korea, Japan is putting an emphasis on both ASEAN and middle power countries because by doing so, Japan can achieve higher goal of 'containing China'. For example, Yoshihide Soeya, who asserts that Japan is practicing 'middle power diplomacy', argues that Japan should suggest a meaningful alternative on the current formation process of East Asian community that is being led by China, and thus, Japanese diplomacy should

take a strategic aim at promoting the formation of a counter-balancing, middle power coalition by inviting Korea, Southeast Asia as well as Australia and New Zealand and acquire their approval.⁴⁸

Fourth, Japan's perception of East Asian regional category is highly flexible, unlike that of China. As mentioned earlier, East Asian Policy as implemented by the LDP cabinets during the 1980s and 1990s, both before and after the Koizumi cabinet, and policy implemented by DPJ cabinets after the Hatoyama cabinet were closer to either 'Asia' or 'Asia Pacific' policy, rather than 'East Asian Policy'. East Asian Community as designed by the Hatoyama cabinet shows clear distinction from that of the Obuchi cabinet. If we take a look at provisions under the foreign policy that says Japan 'strengthens Asian diplomacy with the goal of building an East Asian Community', we cannot say with a certainty that the Hatoyama cabinet was trying to establish East Asian Policy clearly based on the ASEAN+3.⁴⁹ Rather, it can be interpreted as the Hatoyama cabinet is also setting ASEAN+6, and Asia-Pacific to be further as a main extent of regional sphere.

Lastly, Japan's East Asian Policy is mainly focused on the economic policy. The plans of AMF and New Miyazawa initiative by the Obuchi cabinet, internationalization of the Yen, and active promotion of establishing FTA are some examples of this. Such characteristics of Japan's East Asian Policy can be traced

⁴⁸ 소에야 요시히데, 『일본의 미들파워 외교』, p. 155.

⁴⁹ 民主党 MANIFESTO, 2009, p. 12.

back to the fact that Japan is relying on the U.S. in terms of its security. In other words, diplomatic leverage that can be used by Japan is limited to economic sector, thus the separation of economic and security domain is noticeable in the overall foreign policy of Japan.

2. Theoretical analysis of China and Japan's East Asian Policy

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an answer of following two questions through analysis of China and Japan's East Asian Policy using theoretical framework proposed in this study and comparison of the results shown in Table 2-2, in order to explain China and Japan's East Asian Policy in terms of the regional integration theories.

First, is it possible for the regional cooperation theories to provide appropriate explanation of China and Japan's East Asian Policy? Second, if yes, which is more influential theory between two main regional integration theories for China and Japan's East Asian Policy?

1) China

Q1. Does China prefer regional cooperation framework?

The answer is yes. First of all, the representative content of China's East Asian Policy is to active involvement in multilateralism and multilateral

organizations. However, there is a certain limitation in positive attitude of China to multilateral organizations. Especially, it is hard to be believed that China agrees that entities other than government organizations (e.g. multinational corporations and NGOs) lead regional cooperation initiatives, considering that China still sticks to socialist party-state system. In other words, major players in regional cooperation which Chinese government thinks of are governments. Serious consideration of China on sovereign power is clearly found in several diplomatic slogans suggested by China. For examples, both the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence⁵⁰ and ‘New Security Concept’⁵¹, the well known Chinese diplomatic principles, emphasizes the completeness and safety of sovereignty. However, this characteristic does not belong to China only. Rather, it is shared by several countries in East Asia. In addition, the evidence showing that China considers a nation as a major player in regional cooperation comes from the fact that protection of sovereignty and emphasis of national identity by East Asian countries are mentioned as obstacles in establishing a regional community in East Asia.⁵²

⁵⁰ Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. (互相尊重领土主权、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处)

⁵¹ Mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation (互信、互利、平等、协作)

⁵² Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry”, *International Security* 18:3(Winter 1993/1994) pp. 5-33; Suisheng Zhao, “Soft Versus Structured Regionalism: Organizational Forms of

Q2. What is the degree of leadership and participation of China in regional cooperation framework?

China wants to take a leading position in regional cooperation framework to the extent that ‘China Threat’ is not emerged again and member states do not worry about hegemonism of China and shows active participation in regional cooperation framework with expectation of taking a position as a leader in the framework. As explained earlier, removing ‘China Threat’ is one of four main contents of the East Asian Policy of China. On the other hand, Chinese East Asian Policy aims to prevent expansion of American influence and create the regional order and environment that are beneficial to China. With these two controversial objectives, it is inevitable that China tries to create beneficial regional environment and order to the extent that member states think that China does not seek to become a hegemon in East Asia. The fact that China prefers ASEAN + 3 to APEC and original EAS in an early stage concept to extended EAS and regards SCO and the Six Party Talks as the most important multilateral organizations can be understood in this context.⁵³

Cooperation in Asia-Pacific”, *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1(1998), pp. 96-134; Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Approach toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: Motivations and Calculations”, pp. 53-67.

⁵³ Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Approach toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: Motivations and Calculations”, p. 57; Zhang Yunlinag and Tang Shiping, “China’s

In addition, characteristics of Chinese regional policy, which indicate that China's East Asian Policy follows the policy relating to major powers and, therefore, it makes its best efforts to avoid conflicting with neighboring countries and U.S. that is the major stakeholder and rule setter in the East Asia, unless its core interests are violated, can be presented as supporting evidences for expected China's behaviors in the regional cooperation framework.

Q3. Does China accept Spillover effects?

The answer is no. Even if China seems to accept Spillover effects, what Chinese government accepts is superficial meaning of Spillover effects, rather than actual meaning of that. The main cause to make China actively participate in multilateral organizations is the existence of ASEAN way. ASEAN way means the way that emphasizes consultations, dialogue and consensus and explicitly resists building enforcement or punitive mechanisms that could interfere in the internal affairs of member states.⁵⁴ Generally speaking, it is known that violation of sovereignty in the course of regional integration occurs when there is a high level

Regional Strategy”, p 53, 한석희, 강택구, 「Formation of East Asian Community and Recognition of China: Policy Implications on EAS」, 『Korean Political Science Review』, Volume 43, First Book, pp. 283-300.

⁵⁴ Suisheng Zhao, “China's Approach toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: Motivations and Calculations”, p. 64; Amitav Acharya, “Multilateralism: Is There an Asia-Pacific Way?”, *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 11-15.

of integration between member states. In other words, it is inevitable that a certain level of sovereignty of a member state is violated when a regional institution covering security integration, as well as political integration, is made. From this point of view, preference of China to ASEAN Way can be interpreted as preference to a low level of integration without violation of member state's sovereignty. In other words, China prefers cooperation in the nontraditional security sector covering economy, environment and countermeasures of drug smuggling and terrorism, which allows cooperation between member states without violation of their sovereignty. However, the fact that China prefers cooperation in the nontraditional security sector does not indicate that it recognizes Spillover effects as 'Main driving power of regional integration' as suggested in the non-state centric theory. Ultimately, China's East Asian Policy is a mean to accomplish higher goals, which are to form the beneficial environment to China and remove the 'China Threat' theory. Considering of concern of China on sovereignty and the fundamental characteristics of China's East Asian Policy that is to create favorable environment for China, it is difficult to say that China's current active participation in the economic nontraditional security sector continues in the political traditional security sector. Of course, it can be expected that the so-called 'Learning Effect' obtained through experience of continual cooperation in the economic nontraditional security sector plays a certain role in

the political traditional security sector. However, it takes time for the learning effect to change China's perception of sovereignty and the nature of China's East Asian Policy and it is necessary for recognition and diplomatic behaviors of other East Asian countries to be changed. As a result, it is expected that China would not accept actual meaning of 'Spillover effects' in a short and a medium period of time at least.

2) Japan

Q1. Does Japan prefer regional cooperation framework?

Preference of Japan to regional cooperation framework is very ambiguous. It is true that Japan prefers multilateralism as it is one of the main pillars supporting foreign relations of Japan.⁵⁵ However, it does not necessarily mean that Japan prefers regional cooperation framework as the country cannot be free from influence caused by the relationship between U.S and Japan. As mentioned earlier, Japan has placed importance on APEC that includes U.S. and ASEAN+6 that includes Australia and New Zealand (both countries are friends of U.S.) and India to prevent dominance of China in the region since the 1980s, rather than a regional institution consisting of regional states only, except for the period of the Obuchi cabinet. In fact, it is difficult to regard APEC, ASEAN+6 and TPP (which

⁵⁵ Takayuki Kimura, 'Japan-US Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region', p. 64.

is currently discussed) as a regional institution from a pure point of view. As this study defines that East Asia is ASEAN+3, an East Asian regional institution, by definition, consist of ASEAN+3 countries. Therefore, the attitude of Japan to regional cooperation framework shall be interpreted that it is just participating in the framework as it needs, rather than preferring to participate in the framework.

Q2. What is the degree of leadership and participation of Japan in regional cooperation framework?

If a regional institution is limited to ASEAN+3, it is hard to say that most Japanese administrations actively participate in ASEAN+3 and try to take a control of the institution, except for the Obuchi cabinet. However, in terms of taking a controlling power of regional cooperation, rather than focusing on a regional institution, it is confirmed that Japan tries to prevent China from taking a dominant position in East Asian cooperation framework and to reduce China's influence to cooperation initiatives. Japan's intention to reestablish its controlling power and constrain China from expanding the influence is clearly found in the following facts; Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed a East Asian community consisting of ASEAN+5 in 2002; Japan expanded EAS, which originally consisted of ASEAN+3, to ASEAN+6 including Australia, New Zealand and India; and Japan recently expressed positive intention of joining TPP

and participated in the entry talks.⁵⁶

Q3. Is Japan accepting Spillover effects?

The answer is no. Strictly speaking, the current position of Japan does not allow accepting Spillover effects. As indicated above, one of the characteristics of Japanese East Asian Policy is that the policy focuses on economic features. Japan is not able to make policy and exercise its influence on the region independently in the security sector unless it becomes a normal country that can have the military forces. This indicates that there is a gap between economic policy and military and political policy of Japan for the East Asia, which cannot be overcome. This gap in Japan's East Asian Policy plays the most significant role to prevent it from accepting Spillover effects that aim to achieve 'a security and political community, starting from an economic community'. In other words, although it might be possible for Japan to establish a close cooperation relationship with East Asian countries with its own will, it is certain that Japan is not going to start establishing a regional security organization that has institutional power binding its member states like NATO, with East Asian countries, excluding United States of America. Therefore, it is very difficult for Japan to accept Spillover effects suggested by the non state centric theory.

⁵⁶ 진창수, 「Changes in Japan's East Asia Policy: Return to Asianism」, p. 36; p. 42.

With comparison of these results shown in Table 2-2, this study draws the followings.

With regard to the analysis of East Asian Policy of China, although China prefers a regional cooperation framework in terms of the preference, it clearly shows that a main player in regional cooperation initiatives should be a country in the region. This fact shows a mixed type of state centric and non state centric theories in China.

Second, China tries to take a leading position in regional cooperation framework to the extent that U.S, Japan and other East Asian countries do not worry about China becoming a hegemon and the ‘China Treat’ theory is not emerged again. In addition, taking a position as a leader is preposition of active involvement in a regional institution. This tendency strongly shows the influence of state-centric theory.

Third, China use Spillover effects as a method to focus on a low level of cooperation, which provides protection of member state’s sovereignty, rather than comprehensively accepting the concept of Spillover effect presented by the non state centric theory in the course of regional integration. In this case, the state centric theory may provide more appropriate explanation then the non state centric theory.

Next, according to the analysis of Japan's East Asian Policy, Japan has a negative opinion on ASEAN+3, which is the regional institution consisting of East Asian countries only, and participates in a regional institution as it needs to do, except for the period of the Obuchi cabinet. However, it shows relatively active and positive attitude to TPP in which U.S. is directly involved and EAS that allows to restrain China by participation of India and guarantees indirect influence of U.S. by participation of Australia and New Zealand. This controversial behavior of Japan can be more accurately explained by the state centric theory.

Second, Japan tries to maintain its influences to the region and take a control power of East Asian regional cooperation by securing influence of U.S. to the East Asia and diluting a leading power of China in the East Asia (e.g., obtaining an approval for its proposal to expand the original concept of EAS to ASEAN+6 by adding New Zealand, Australia and India). With this reason, Japan does not show an active attitude to ASEAN+3. Although the characteristics of Japan's East Asian Policy do not exactly match with those of the state centric theory, the fact that the reason why Japan is not actively involved in a regional institution is to secure a controlling power in the East Asia can be explained by the state centric theory. If a country can actively participate in a regional institution to secure its controlling power, it is also not going to participate in a regional institution intentionally with the same purpose.

Third, as Japan relies on U.S. in the military and security sector and cannot have its own military forces due to the Peace Constitution, there is a clear division between economic affairs and military and security affairs in overall foreign policy, as well as East Asian Policy. Strictly speaking, Japan could not accept Spillover effects because of this circumstance.

According to the analyses mentioned above, it can be concluded that East Asian Policy of both China and Japan strongly reflects characteristics of the state centric theory, rather than those of the non state centric theory.

3. Evaluation of China and Japan's East Asian Policy

Based on the contents of the East Asian policies of the two countries summarized in Section 1, the analysis results of Section 2 and the comparison in Table 2-2, a comparative analysis will be made on the East Asian policies of China and Japan in this section.

Before performing a full comparison and evaluation, the analysis results of China and Japan's East Asian policies using the regional integration theory are summarized in the following tables.

Questions	China	Result of Comparison
Q1. Preference of Regional Institution	Prefer, but state is still the main actor of integration	Both
Q2. Whether takes to leading position in the regional institution and level of participation	Try to possess leading position unless other countries don't worry about China Threat/ Actively participate to possess leading position	State Centric theory
Q3. Acceptance of Spillover effect	Doesn't Accept	State Centric theory

[Table 3: China's East Asia Policy analyzed by Regional Integration Theory]

Questions	Japan	Result of Comparison
Q1. Preference of Regional Institution	Participate, but under the necessity/ Actively participate in EAS and TPP but not in ASEAN+3	State Centric theory
Q2. Whether takes to leading position in the regional institution and level of participation	Try to possess leading position/ As a measure of possessing leading position, doesn't actively participate in ASEAN+3	State Centric theory
Q3. Acceptance of Spillover effect	Can't Accept	State Centric theory

[Table 4: Japan's East Asia Policy analyzed by Regional Integration Theory]

Analysis results on the 2 questions raised in the first part of Chapter 3 present the following conclusion.

First, it is possible to explain the East Asian policies of China and Japan with the regional integration theory. With regard to the characteristics of the East Asian policies of China and Japan reorganized with a theoretical framework, at least one of the two regional integration theories could provide a full explanation.

By further investigating the results above, an answer could be obtained on the second question, that is, which theory has a better explanatory power between the non-state centric theory and the state centric theory. China's East Asian policy summarized in Table 3-1 shows that two characteristics of China's policy could be explained with the state centric view, while one characteristic has the nature of both views. In case of Japan, all three items reflect the characteristics of the state centric view. This indicates that the state centric theory is more valid in explaining the East Asian policies of China and Japan.

Based on the results above, the following macroscopic evaluation can be made on the East Asian policies of China and Japan. As can be seen from the summary in Section 1, China's East Asian policy, since its establishment in 1980s, has become consistent in its contents and been stably implemented in 1990s. As a result, the China Threat Theory has considerably subsided and the perception of

neighboring countries toward China has positively changed to a great extent.⁵⁷ Moreover, the economic and diplomatic influence of China on East Asian region has increased, and at the same time, its soft power has also been enhanced. In addition, China has recently not only actively participated in multilateral organizations, such as the SCO and the Six-Party Talks, but also ‘utilized’ it for its national benefits. Therefore, China’s East Asian policy can be evaluated as very successful, as it has enhanced its influence in East Asian region and successfully blended itself into East Asian region.⁵⁸

While China’s East Asian policy has been stably and consistently implemented, Japan’s policy has been basically a tug of war between the US and East Asia. Of course, it cannot be denied that such diplomatic behaviors of Japan, which could cause confusion, were the results of a strategic choice, for the most part, to secure Japan’s benefit and ensure its security.⁵⁹ From this viewpoint,

⁵⁷ However, it should be considered that the China Threat Theory has been on the rise around the year of 2010. It is believed that the newly re-merging China Threat Theory is significantly affected by the diplomatic behaviors of China with respect to territorial disputes over Senkaku/Daioyu and the Spratly Islands.

⁵⁸ With regard to the fact that China’s East Asian policy has been successful, previous studies are also in the same line in their analyses. Refer to 김재철, 『중국의 외교전략과 국제질서』; 조영남, 『21세기 중국이 가는 길』; David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order", pp. 64-99; Suisheng Zhao, "China’s Approaches toward Regional cooperation in East Asia: motivations and calculations", pp. 53-67; Zhang Yunliang and Tang shiping, "China’s Regional Strategy", pp. 48-68, etc.

⁵⁹ 진창수, 「일본의 동아시아 정책 변화: 아시아주의로의 복귀」, p. 35.

Japan's East Asian policy cannot be considered as a failure because the US-Japan Alliance remains strong, and thus Japan is assured of its security by maintaining its close relationship with the US. At the extreme end of spectrum between the emphasis of the US-Japan relationship and the aggressive implementation of East Asian policy, Japan has put more weights on the US than East Asia since 1980s, when its East Asian policy started to form, and strategically chosen a policy that can assure the influence of the US. As summarized earlier, only the East Asian policy of the Obuchi cabinet had a clear vision and been actively implemented. Thus, Japan's East Asian policy cannot be evaluated as successful only because it is the very 'East Asian policy.' There are grounds that Japan's East Asian policy cannot be regarded as successful: the diplomatic conflicts occurring in 2012 between Japan and East Asia, especially Northeast Asian countries, such as the territorial dispute with China over Senkaku/Daiouyu and the diplomatic dispute with Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima, and the gradually decreasing influence of Japan as opposed to China which has increasing economic, diplomatic and military influence.

In addition to the macroscopic evaluation above, more detailed comparison between the East Asian policies of the two countries can lead to a few interesting facts that can be helpful for explaining the current status of regional cooperation of East Asia and predicting its future. First, most prominent is the fact

that there exists a clear difference in the mechanism of regional cooperation emphasized by the two countries. As mentioned earlier, China considers ASEAN+3 important, while Japan regards the EAS, which is expanded to ASEAN+6, as important and recently has expressed its intention to join the TPP. The fact that the regional cooperation mechanism emphasized by the two countries is different means that the scope of 'region' set by the two countries is different. China perceives 'East Asia' as the same scope with ASEAN+3. For China, 'East Asia' is a region where the influence of the US is directly and indirectly excluded. In contrast, the boundary of 'region' of Japan is very flexible. The term region in Japan has changed with the different names of *Toyo*(東洋), *Toa*(東亞), *Dai-toa* (大東亞) and Asia, and its boundary was also varied.⁶⁰ Generally, the concept of Northeast Asia in Japan includes the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which includes Mongolia, Manchuria, the Korean peninsula, Japan, China and Russia, and even includes the US in a broad sense. To Japan, East Asia includes the concept of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia.⁶¹ Thus there is a considerable gap in the perspective of 'region' between China and Japan. This indicates that a very fundamental conflict cannot be avoided between the two countries over regional cooperation, that is, there exists a very severe

⁶⁰ 손열, 「일본의 지역인식과 전략」, p. 140

⁶¹ 김성철, 『일본외교와 동북아』, p. 549.

conflict on the issue of who will be the members to establish a regional cooperation mechanism or to participate in the mechanism. Therefore, some argues that there have been conflicts and confrontations over the development of regional cooperation in East Asia between ‘China’s ASEAN+3’ and ‘Japan’s EAS’ until now.⁶²

Next, it should be also noted that both countries have considered ASEAN as the core of East Asian policies. Japan has put stress on the relationship with Korea, New Zealand and Australia, with which it shares the allied countries of the US and similar value and political system, in addition to ASEAN, to achieve the goal of containing China. In contrast, China focuses on ASEAN for its East Asian policy and as a driving force for regional cooperation. One important aspect that can be figured out from the emphasis on ASEAN and middle powers is that the focus of the regional policies of China and Japan is on the third middle powers, not on each other, although both are regional superpowers that can significantly affect the development of regional cooperation.

First, this indicates that either of the two countries cannot hold the lead in the implementation of regional cooperation. In fact, both countries cannot actively involve in regional cooperation because China is concerned about the China Threat Theory which can recur anytime soon; Japan has a strategic reason to

⁶² 최태욱, 「동아시아 지역주의에 대한 일본 정책의 변화」, p. 95.

contain the emerging China and considers the influence of the US. Thus, the regional policies of the two countries naturally focus more on ‘making friends’ than actively implementing the regional policy. For China, it must be natural to choose ASEAN as its target because ASEAN can still have a significant effect from China’s assistance as it still has bureaucratic governments and its economic condition is lower than Northeast Asia. On the contrary, Japan, in some aspects, has reinforced the traditional relationship with ASEAN, which started from the postwar compensation in 2000s and developed into economic assistance, as a reaction to the aggressive approach of China to ASEAN.

Second, the regional policy in the form of ‘making friends’ indicates that the East Asian policies of China and Japan are somewhat ‘self-centered.’ In fact, the regional hegemonic rivalry between China and Japan is a charade game of power politics within the region to take a dominant position, rather than transforming the shared benefits into the regional ones.⁶³ In other words, the regional policies of China and Japan have a tendency to create a region to be beneficial to them, rather than creating benefits to the region. This is largely consistent with the nature of the state centric theory, which considers regional cooperation as the venue of negotiation where a power struggle is taking place between countries.

⁶³ 손열, 「일본의 지역인식과 전략」, p. 146.

The fact that the East Asian policies of China and Japan strongly reflect the nature of the state centric theory indicates that it will be difficult to create changes in the behaviors of China and Japan, which ‘use’ the regional cooperation mechanism and utilize it as a ‘tool’ at least within a short period of time. In other words, the regional cooperation mechanism for China and Japan is a ‘venue of negotiation’ where they can measure their influence and directly and indirectly coordinate their interests with neighboring countries in a multilateral framework. The issue here is that the power game in Europe, which provided the background for the state centric view, has taken place within the boundary of the institutionalized ‘EU’ (then EC), while the power game of China and Japan is taking place in ASEAN+3 or the EAS, in which institutionalized limitations are rarely existent. If this is added by the fact that each country prefers a different type of regional cooperation mechanism, it will be very difficult to find a common ground for the blueprint of regional cooperation. This is the very fundamental reason why the regional cooperation of East Asia is not advancing, compared to the US or Europe.

Lastly, it should be noted that both countries are actively implementing economic policies, emphasizing the importance of economic cooperation in regional cooperation. This not only is related to the background of the rapid development of regionalism since the financial crisis of East Asia in 1997, but

also has a close association with the consideration of domestic politics, in which both countries try to secure their export markets and eventually promote economic development through the cooperation of regional economies. It once again shows the 'self-centered' nature of the East Asian policies of China and Japan. Of course, both countries have different reasons for actively implementing economic policies. China implements its economic policy under the logics of spillover effect, in which it can start from the economic cooperation, which is easy to negotiate, and then achieve a higher level of regional cooperation. However, it is more accurate to see that China is using regional cooperation as a cause rather than having its spillover effect. Fundamentally, China's East Asian policy has a clear purpose of 'eliminating the China Threat Theory' by 'making friends' to 'create a stable surrounding environment.' The most effective tool to make friends with the countries, which are threatened by the political and military influence of the growing China, is providing the opportunity of economic development through economic aids and economic cooperation in various areas, not the cultural attractiveness or the value of human rights, democracy or freedom. China, which ranked the first in the GDP of 2010 in East Asia, surpassing Japan, and the second in the world, is fully capable of doing that. In contrast, the reason why Japan is actively pursuing economic policy is quite different from that of China. Due to the explicit limitation of military and security assigned by the US-Japan alliance,

Japan can only implement its economic policy independently and actively, among its East Asian policy and other economic policies. Interestingly, unlike China, Japan implements cultural diplomacy and value diplomacy in addition to economic policy. At this point, however, the value diplomacy claiming ‘democracy, human rights, and freedom’ is less appropriate for ASEAN, which is viewed as having the hegemony of the regional cooperation of East Asia. It is also unreasonable for cultural diplomacy to exert influence on the decision-making of the government and appeal to the political elites, although it can enhance the favorable feeling of the general public toward Japan. This is the reason why Japan shows interests in connecting Korea, New Zealand and Australia as well as ASEAN.

IV. Conclusion

After the end of the Cold War, one of the biggest changes of international politics is that the ground of realism, which took a strong, or almost absolute, theoretical position under the bipolar system of the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the Cold War, is gradually decreasing. The reality is progressing in a somewhat different direction than the world that the realism views. In other words, the world has become too complicated and diversified to analyze today's

phenomena with three simple assumptions of anarchism, selfish and self-centered nation, and what that nation considers the most important would be relative profit and security.

A nation's foreign policy analysis shares the same context. For many reasons, a nation enacts and executes foreign policies. Numerous factors such as domestic politics, dynamics with other nations, values, and ideologies influence the enactment and execution of foreign policies. Just as complicated as the world has become, policies for the world could only get complicated.

From this perspective, this study aims to exuviate the frame called the analysis of nation's foreign policy by using major international relations theories— the existing realism, liberalism, and constructivism. It was for this reason that it strived to explain nation's regional policy with the regional integration theory, which was created in order to explain the establishment and operation method of regional integration and regional cooperation.

This study reconstructed two theories of state centric theory and non state centric theory, which are considered to be the most persuasive among the regional integration theories, through three questions that are thought to be the major issues surrounding the regional integration theories so that they would be applicable to regional policies. And it reviewed whether it would be possible to explain the characteristics that the East Asian policies of China and Japan have

with the reconstructed state centric theory and non state centric theory. According to the analysis result, state centric theory among the regional integration theories was able to provide more comprehensive explanation to the East Asian policies of China and Japan. As it is known, the result of regional cooperation and regional integration cannot be drawn with the key assumptions of the realism. Basically, the realism supposes that the cooperation between nations is impossible because of the essential structure of international politics, which is anarchistic status, and the nature of the actor called the nation that is selfish and seeks only its interest, survival, and relative profit. However, it is also true that realism cannot be excluded in order to explain the East Asian regional cooperation, especially, foreign policies regarding the regional cooperation process and mechanism of China and Japan, in other words, the East Asian policies and two countries' attitudes. It is because both China and Japan strongly adhere to 'state centric' ways of thinking. From this aspect, the state centric theory of regional integration has strength that it could effectively explain the East Asian policies of China, who has the purpose of creating a stable environment for the development of domestic economy and dispelling "China Threat," and that of Japan, who has two purposes of securing the influence of the U.S.A. in East Asia and keeping China that is rising in check, and where different views among the domestic political groups collide regarding these two purposes.

Thus, the fact that both China and Japan's East Asian policies strongly reflect the characteristics of the state centric theory provides a new perspective for drawing a relatively clear blueprint regarding what would become the most important driving force in the development of the regional cooperation of East Asia and how the direction of development of regional cooperation will be like. If China and Japan's East Asian policies mostly reflected the characteristics of the non state centric theory, then it could have been judged that future regional cooperation of East Asia would be accomplished under the establishment and lead of supranational organizations such as European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (EEC), European Community (EC), which are the European Union's forerunner. However, according to the result of the analysis, China and Japan's East Asian policies reflect the characteristics of the state centric theory more strongly, and according to the state centric theory, it could be conjectured that "nation" would function as an important actor in future development of regional cooperation of East Asia and that negotiation between nations would become the most important driving force for developing the regional cooperation of East Asia. A significant portion of this agrees with the most of the existing study results that say that since the East Asian countries consider sovereignty as important, they show hesitation in institutionalizing regional cooperation and that therefore, the regional cooperation in East Asia

could not develop fast despite the high level of regionalization.

This study judges that, as the state centric theory argues, regional cooperation in East Asia has high possibility of getting developed in a form of nations' continuous negotiation, bargaining, and gradual institutionalization of them. However, the fundamental difference on setting the regional range, which exists between China and Japan, and a gap because of it will not be easily overcome or filled in a short period of time. It will work as the biggest obstacle that impedes the development of the East Asian regional cooperation; therefore, it could be seen that there are still some problems in viewing the future of the East Asian regional cooperation positively.

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국문 초록

본 논문은 탈국가중심적 지역통합이론과 국가중심적 지역통합이론을 이론적 분석틀로 사용하여 동아시아 지역협력에 막대한 영향력을 끼칠 수 있는 두 지역 강대국인 중국과 일본의 동아시아 정책을 분석하고 이를 통해 중국과 일본의 동아시아 정책을 동시에 비교 평가하며 동아시아 지역협력의 미래를 전망해 보는 것을 목적으로 한다.

지역통합 이론을 지역정책에 적용하기 위해 본 논문은 지역통합 이론의 중요한 쟁점들 - 통합의 주체, 통합의 추동력, 지역협력 기제의 특징, 통합의 단계적 발전 - 에 근거하여 다음의 세 가지 질문을 설정하여 중국과 일본의 지역정책을 재정리하였다. 첫째, 두 나라의 지역협력 기제의 형성 및 운영에 대한 선호도는 어떠한가? 그리고 선호의 이유는 무엇인가? 둘째, 두 나라는 지역협력 기제의 형성 및 운영에 적극적으로 참여하며 그 안에서 주도적인 위치를 점하려 하고 있는가? 셋째, 통합의 단계적 발전에 대한 두 나라의 입장은 어떠한가? 다시 말해, 확산효과를 수용하고 있는가?

중국과 일본 동아시아 정책 비교분석의 결과와 그것이 동아시아 지역협력의 발전에 갖는 함의로서 본 논문은 다음과 같은 점을 주장한다. 첫째, 중국과 일본의 동아시아 정책은 국가중심적 지역통합이론의 색채를 더 반영하고 있다. 이러한 사실은 단기간 내에 ASEAN+ 3를 중시하는 중국의 정책기조와 EAS를 중시하는 일본의 정책기조가 쉽게 변하지 않을 것이라는 점을 예측 가능하게 하며, 이들 지역협력 기제를 보다 상위의 목표달성을 위한 수단으로 이용하는 중국과 일본의 외교적 행태 또한 지속될 것이다.

둘째, 본 논문은 국가중심적 지역통합이론의 논리에 근거하여 동아시아에서의 지역협력은 국가들의 끊임없는 협상과 흥정 그리고 그것을 점진적으로 제도화시켜 나가는 형태로 발전할 것이라고 전망한다. 그러나 중일 간에 존재하는 지역범위 설정에 대한 근본적인 차이와 그로 인한 간극이 단기간 내에

쉽사리 극복되고 메워지지 않을 것이기에 동아시아 지역협력의 미래를 낙관적이라고 전망하기는 어렵다

주제어: 지역통합이론, 탈국가중심이론, 국가중심이론, 중국의 동아시아 정책, 일본의 동아시아 정책, 동아시아 지역협력

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