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국제학석사학위논문

A Study on U.S. Public diplomacy
: focusing on analyzing determinants of
cultural diplomacy success

미국의 공공외교 연구:
문화외교의 성공요인 분석 중심으로

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A Study on U.S. Public diplomacy
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Abstract

A Study on U.S. Public diplomacy : Focusing on analyzing determinants of cultural diplomacy success

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This study is to find determinants of cultural diplomacy success through examining and comparing two representing cases of U.S. Public diplomacy that were attempted with epoch-making goals to seek breakthrough when either traditional diplomacy channels were strained or in dire situations. The two cases, however, receive contrary assessments. Jazz diplomacy during the Cold War era as a successful example and Charlotte Beers' Shared Value Initiative (SVI) toward Muslims after 9.11 as a case of failure were examined and analyzed. The U.S. as a country with relatively various experiences and a long history compared to other countries applied Jazz diplomacy toward the Soviet Union and achieved a better relationship between the two countries. In

the post-Cold War era, however, the U.S. has undervalued the importance of Public diplomacy. It wasn't until 9.11 that U.S. Government placed a renewed emphasis on Public diplomacy and reached out to foreign publics. Nevertheless, SVI is still considered as a failed example among U.S. Public diplomacy precedents.

Both cases were initiated under negative relations with the counterpart country or countries when the first channel (traditional or state-centric diplomacy) was strained. In addition, the main purposes that are to enhance national image and change public opinion and attitude toward America were the same. Nonetheless, due to differences in how the policies were developed and implemented, eventually conflicting consequences and evaluations were realized. Above all, rather than sending the subject's values and ideas, based on respect, understanding of the counterpart is critical.

Also, when target setting, the young generation is flexible and open-minded and they are the ones who will take the lead in various areas in the near future. Long-term plans should be set to make exchanges last and, furthermore, cultural diplomacy involving music, art and sports that are non-verbal is effective as it uses 'culture' as a means.

Findings from this study can be applied to the cases of the Republic of Korea with Japan or North Korea where difficulties in terms of state-centric diplomacy actions have arisen. Korea recently has been emphasizing the critical role of Public diplomacy as well as cultural diplomacy since how the general public thinks of our nation affects the foreign policy decision making process. Not only Korea but also other countries can take the

determinants of successful Public diplomacy into account and expect positive results and outcomes if applied at the right time.

Keywords: Public diplomacy, Cultural diplomacy, Shared Value Initiative, Jazz diplomacy, the United States, Cold War, 9.11

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Abbreviations

| | |
|-------------|--|
| ACCD | Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy |
| CAMU | Council of American Muslims for Understanding |
| CP | Communist Party |
| DOS | Department of State |
| ECA | Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs |
| OMB | Office of Management and Budget |
| SVI | Shared Value Initiative |
| USA | United States of America |
| USIA | U.S Information Agency |
| VOA | Voice of America |

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Background

It has been stressed by a number of scholars that mutual understanding and respect from dialogue are significant to building good relations and enhance better understanding among different countries. According to Habermas' theory of communicative action (1981), however, real communication is possible only when mutual expectations involving appropriation, truth and seriousness are met. To make it possible, there should be equal opportunity among actors and all opinions should be freely expressed. Where this occurs it is called "discursive space" and how serious and true mutual communication is depends on if this space exists. Cull (2008) mentioned that arbitrary diffusion of one's ideology and value can be considered neither as a real exchange nor sharing due to its outward attribute. Dutta-Bergan (2006) emphasized that a real understanding and sympathy among different cultures comes from building relationships between cultures, foregrounding dialogue, and engaging in a process of mutual sharing of meanings between the participating cultures. The goal of the actors in the relationship is not one of persuading each other to adopt particular value frames but one of developing mutually satisfying relationships by engaging in dialogue. In this vein, regardless of countries, the importance of Public diplomacy in distinction from the traditional type of diplomacy covers various actors as effectual means when different countries communicate and its role has been emphasized through numerous studies. The

concept is not new and its use even traces back to WWI in the early 20th century but it has been receiving more attention today due to Internet and SNS development as well as diffusion of globalization and democracy (Ahn, 2007). Segal (2008) pointed out that a State Department report in the 1950s described how foreign policy wasn't solely determined by diplomats. Public opinion plays a more significant role in determining how diplomats and state heads acted towards other countries. If the US could positively affect the masses in foreign nations, it would bring about pro-American policies.

1.2. Purpose

Even though Public diplomacy as a topic has been researched in-depth, there is however a lack of study and analysis on successful determinants to achieve effective Public diplomacy. Thus, the goal of this study is to find constituents of cultural diplomacy success through examining and comparing two representative cases of U.S. Public diplomacy that were attempted with epoch-making goals to seek breakthrough when either the traditional diplomacy channel was strained or in dire situations. Jazz diplomacy during the Cold War era as a successful example, and Charlotte Beers' Shared Value Initiative (SVI) toward Muslims after 9.11 as a case of failure are examined and analyzed. Through this study it is expected to be concluded that Public diplomacy is not only significant, especially today, but also it is certified not as a substitute but as an equivalent to state-centric diplomacy, also known as traditional diplomacy.

Relevant literature including books, articles, and official documents mainly

published by US officials as well as polls were examined. Due to the situation during the Cold War, it was not easy to find official polls or public reaction that clearly showed results at a glance, so books and studies done by experts, scholars and officials, as well as budget expenditures on Public diplomacy at the time were referred to the outcome that reflected the situation, during and after Jazz diplomacy. The effectiveness of SVI was examined not only through published articles and studies but also public poll results were examined.

1.3. Research question

According to the criteria and conditions of Public and Cultural diplomacy that Department of State (DOS) officially announced, first of all, it will be determined if Jazz diplomacy and SVI apply to Public diplomacy and then each case will be evaluated to determine if they failed or succeeded. John Stuart Mill's methods of induction then will be used to examine what elements and reasons have applied to its success or fail by comparing constituents according to the procedures and outcomes of each case. In this regard, three research questions for this thesis are as follows: 1) are both Jazz diplomacy and SVI examples of public/cultural diplomacy? 2) did each case succeed or fail?; and 3) if so, what are the reasons and what are the constituents of Public diplomacy success?

1.4. Framework

John Stuart Mill's "Methods of induction" is used when comparing two cases to figure out what elements led to such a successful Public diplomacy example. Among the five basic canons, the method of difference, the second canon, was applied to both cases. The basic concept of the method of difference is that "if an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon." (Mill, 1859) Since this study deals with social phenomenon, however, both cases are not able to be compared and defined with clear-cut factors. There is not only more than one element in common, but also many more different factors that construct each case but distinguish them one from another. To verify the effectiveness of successful elements for Public diplomacy, therefore, the joint method of agreement and difference that is the third canon of Mill's study can be applied to more examples of not only U.S. Public diplomacy but also that of other countries to expand the results of this study in further studies.


Chapter 2. Public diplomacy

2.1. Public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is not a new concept in international relations and affairs. Even though people think it is a new idea because there is a large quantity of Public diplomacy actions as well as recent studies, but its historical background traces back to WW1. The U.S. government first officially acknowledged its use of Public diplomacy activities in the early years of the 20th century when President Woodrow Wilson created the Committee on Public Information to disseminate information overseas during WWI (Epstein 2006). Ahn (2007) mentioned that it just seems more active today due to development of democracy, technology of information and communication as well as dissemination of globalization spread out worldwide. In addition, however, it is generally considered as a substitute for traditional diplomacy when the classical channel has difficulties but it has critical capacity similar to the traditional route, but when a peaceful and stable state between countries returns, culture receives less attention due to lack of both public and governmental support. Public opinion in some countries today has definitely become more important than few decades ago as how they consider national image of a country certainly affects the outcome of foreign policy and its influence toward other countries. There are various definitions of Public diplomacy yet the evolution of Public diplomacy from its inception as a concept in the 1960's can be the one coined at Fletcher in 1965 by Dean Edmund Gullion. According to him, as The Edward R.

Murrow Center of Public diplomacy states, Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the processes of inter-cultural communications. As Edmund Guillion predicted, “the State Department’s culture subordinated Public diplomacy, valuing the traditional ‘cones’ (field of specializations) of politics and economics more highly” (Schneider, 2004).

Figure 1. Change of diplomacy elements




Source: Cultural Diplomacy Manual, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea (2010)

As Figure 1 shows, the major elements of diplomacy have been changed with the times. One main pillar by 1980 was about political affairs and security and during 1990's, Economy and Trade was added as a new column. Since 2000, as an entirely new but an

important element “culture” became a critical aspect when dealing with diplomacy. Figure 2 indicates how Public diplomacy is different from state-centric diplomacy, so-called, traditional diplomacy. The traditional channel on the one hand has states as both subject and object. On the other hand, Public diplomacy includes various actors as subjects involving not only governmental but also that of non-government actors. In Public diplomacy, the main object is the general public. Since how the general public thinks about a certain country truly affects consequences of foreign policy, promoting national image and broadening boundaries of subjects and objects are receiving attention.

Figure 2. Traditional diplomacy vs. Public diplomacy



Source: Cultural Diplomacy Manual, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2010)

2.1.1. Basic principles on Public diplomacy

The following premises are what the Public diplomacy Council (2008) believes

basic principles should be to improve U.S. Public diplomacy:

1. Effective Public diplomacy is essential to the nation's long-term national security interests and must have active White House oversight and commensurate importance in the U.S. budgetary and policy processes.
2. To regain credibility overseas, the U.S. must engage in genuine dialogue rather than one-directional communication.
3. Reinvigorated research on global public opinion must be available to policy-makers so they may judge the impact of policies and pronouncements.
4. Public diplomacy programs must be nimble, flexible and networked, keeping pace with contemporary geopolitical challenges and technological opportunities.
5. Significant and sustained increases in U.S. government funding for Public diplomacy programs worldwide are imperative and should include resources for robust planning, analysis and evaluation.
6. Exchange programs at all levels require increased funding, and U.S.-funded non-military international broadcasting must be restructured and reformed; these nonpartisan programs reflect the diversity of thought and opinion in the United States.
7. The Public diplomacy profession needs sustenance and recognition—more staff, more training in tradecraft, American studies and language proficiency, better career tracks, and more involvement in Public diplomacy activities from the entire foreign affairs community.
8. The continued expansion of partnerships with American businesses, citizens and the NGO community will enhance Public diplomacy programs.
9. The basic tenets of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, the Educational and Cultural Affairs Charter and the VOA Charter must continue to guide Public diplomacy activities.
10. Senior Public diplomacy leadership must be granted direct authority over personnel and budgets, and the budget separation of policy advocacy from educational and cultural activities must be maintained.
11. The Public diplomacy and strategic communication activities of all U.S. government agencies require greater coordination.
12. Instantaneous global communications make it impossible for the U.S. government to segregate information intended for domestic and foreign audiences; the Smith-Mundt Act must be amended accordingly.

Based on these principles as well as other definitions on both public and cultural diplomacy will be considered to set key words of basic factors of public and/or cultural diplomacy when analyzing public diplomacy success by comparing two different cases

with each feature and determinant later on.

2.2. Cultural diplomacy

According to the report of Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy (2005), Cultural diplomacy, which has been defined as “the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding,” is the linchpin of Public diplomacy and a nation’s idea is well represented when it comes in cultural activities. The paper also emphasized that American culture such as American art, dance, film, jazz, and literature would continue to inspire people around the world regardless of political differences and difficulties. As Figure 3 simply shows, Cultural Diplomacy is a subordinate concept of Public diplomacy by using culture made up of various kinds of art forms, knowledge, information and philosophy as means to enhance mutual understanding among countries.

ACCD (2005) indicates that cultural diplomacy reveals the soul of a nation, which may explain its complicated history in American political life when every tool in the diplomatic kit bag is employed, including the promotion of cultural activities. According to the report, cultural diplomacy:

- Helps create “a foundation of trust” with other peoples, which policy makers can build on to reach political, economic, and military agreements;
- Encourages other peoples to give the United States the benefit of the doubt on specific policy issues or requests for collaboration, since there is a presumption of shared interests;
- Demonstrates our values, and our interest in values, and combats the popular


notions that Americans are shallow, violent, and godless;

- Affirms that we have such values as family, faith, and the desire for education in common with others;
- Creates relationships with peoples, which endure beyond changes in government;
- Can reach influential members of foreign societies, who cannot be reached through traditional embassy functions;
- Provides a positive agenda for cooperation in spite of policy differences;
- Creates a neutral platform for people-to-people contact;
- Serves as a flexible, universally acceptable vehicle for rapprochement with countries where diplomatic relations have been strained or are absent;
- Is uniquely able to reach out to young people, to non-elites, to broad audiences with a much reduced language barrier;
- Fosters the growth of civil society;
- Educates Americans on the values and sensitivities of other societies, helping us to avoid gaffes and missteps;
- Counterbalances misunderstanding, hatred, and terrorism;
- Can leaven foreign internal cultural debates on the side of openness and tolerance.

Furthermore, the following are also what ACCD pointed out as suggestions and recommendations that are vital to effective Public diplomacy in the report. 1) sending people in both directions through bi-national foundations for reciprocal arrangement of exchange programs, 2) managing alumni via web sites, newsletters and surveys to maintain established state, 3) important role of cultural diplomats or everyone in the DOS to promote Public diplomacy, 4) greater use of media to break down invisible divide, 5)

tours of art works and artifacts, 6) having young artists involved when exchanging in the matter of longer and sustainable period abroad. Moreover, such as television and radio broadcasting to reach large audience and creating exchange programs that reach out to young people.

Figure 3. Relationship between Public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy



Source: Cultural Diplomacy Manual, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2010)

The Library of Congress argues that cultural diplomacy, in contrast to traditional forms of political, economic, and military interactions, assumed greater importance during the Cold War as the U.S. responded to what a State Department official called the “gigantic propaganda offensive” of the Soviet Union. In 1954, President Eisenhower established an Emergency Fund for International Affairs in part to support cultural presentations abroad. The International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956 established a permanent place for cultural diplomacy. The Library of

Congress has a section named, Blurring of the Lines which deals with Cultural diplomacy as a sub-topic. According to 'Hope for America: Performers, Politics and Pop culture page', "from 1954 through 1959, around 140 groups of American performing artists and athletes traveled to more than 90 countries." And Jazz musicians as well as dance groups in particular represented an American cultural life with the words of vibrant, fresh, and indeed inspiring to people throughout the world.

In this study, U.S. Public diplomacy is divided into two politically serious junctures when diplomatic relations were strained and the U.S. was desperate to change the situation: Cold War era and the post 9/11 era. During these two periods America endeavored to advance its national image through Cultural diplomacy.

2.3. U.S. Public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy

The U.S. seems to have had many changes on its Public diplomacy flow with often change or alteration with the issue of maintenance and abolition of the institution according to the nation status in the international level. To make a long history short, therefore, before dealing with specific case studies, a brief stream on U.S. Public diplomacy is introduced as follows:

Establishment of USIA

As a control tower of foreign public affairs programs, USIA was established in 1953. Educational and cultural exchange programs that used to belong to the state

department were additionally transferred to USIA in 1978. General evaluations on U.S. Public diplomacy that USIA conducted are positive as America achieved good outcomes and consequences from the Cold War era. During the Cold War, Public diplomacy gained significant attention. In the war of ideas, it was seen as essential to win the hearts and minds of people living under communist regimes. Those engaged in Public diplomacy efforts already realized the importance of maintaining stable and positive relationships and dialogues across culture. Nevertheless, the immediacy was lost as the Cold War ended. It wasn't until September 11, 2001 that the U.S. Government placed a renewed emphasis on public diplomacy and reaching out to foreign publics. After the Cold War, however, when cultural diplomacy had lost its priority position, budget, staff, and overall funding for its programs sharply decreased. Sablosky (2003) indicated that since 1993, budgets on cultural diplomacy have fallen by nearly 30%, staff has been cut by about 30% overseas and 20% in the U.S., and dozens of cultural centers, libraries and branch posts have been closed.

Abolishment of USIA and 9.11

Twenty-five years later, USIA was integrated into the State Department in 1999. Drastic cuts in the USIA budget indicated how the U.S. considered it less important. Among public affairs programs, media related parts were separated to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Thus basically all categories which were bunched up under one control tower were separated from each other and began to lose legitimacy and attention. Likewise, cultural diplomacy ceased to be a priority and funding for its

programs fell dramatically. Since the abolishment of USIA in 1999, official American cultural presence abroad was significantly reduced; cultural programming was slashed even before the dispersal of USIA personnel through DOS destroyed the institutional memory necessary for the maintenance of cultural ties. (Waller, 2007)

Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA)

What remains now is an ad hoc congeries of programs, administered largely through the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) at DOS, with a reduced budget and staff, and a diminished position in the hierarchy of diplomatic values (Waller, 2007). After less than 2 years, 9.11 occurred and since then the United States set public diplomacy as a core diplomacy objective and established the Under Secretary for Public diplomacy and Public Affairs that has three bureaus; Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, Bureau of International Information Programs and Bureau of Public Affairs.

In the following chapter, two different US Public diplomacy cases are going to be examined; Jazz diplomacy during the Cold War era and the post 9/11 Shared Value Initiatives (SVI).

Chapter 3. Case study

In this chapter, Jazz diplomacy during the Cold War and SVI after 9/11 will be introduced and then both analyzed and evaluated to elements with key words that reflect each case. After verifying if each case applies to Public diplomacy, evaluations of the outcomes and results will follow.

3.1. Jazz diplomacy

“Jazz is our own American folk music that communicates with all peoples regardless of language or social barriers.” — John Birks (1956)

“Music costs so much less and produces so much better a result than any propaganda or weaponry.

There are no warmer feelings than those engendered by music.” — Leonard Bernstein (1959)

U.S. Jazz musicians in the Soviet Union

Under the name of Jazz diplomacy, the U.S. sent Jazz musicians also known as “Jazz Ambassadors” consisting of mainly African-Americans to the Soviet Union as well as the Third World where many developing countries were exploring political identity. The first Jazz Ambassador was trumpeter Dizzy Gillespie, and after him, Brubeck, Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, Benny Goodman and Miles Davis joined. It was not a smooth start at all from the beginning due to the dishonor of jazz and its negative perception as it was considered as low form of culture in America since it had been originated among the segregated African Americans as opposed to high culture that

was enjoyed by the elite in America. Nevertheless the U.S. decided to use jazz as a representative art form for cultural diplomacy as a solution to its negative image derived from the civil rights issue in America that was rampant throughout the world back then. At the same time the U.S. tried to deliver the image of freedom and to do so Jazz was chosen as the best example.

America was a country confronted with a radical dilemma since it was not committed to black equality at all. In addition, the American civil rights movement spurred the Soviet's anti-Americanism and the Soviet harshly criticized American culture as "decadent, amoral, materialist and individualistic" (Davenport, 2010). The soviet media even characterized the U.S. as a cultural wasteland. Jazz in the Soviet Union was viewed negatively and was even called "the music of gross" and considered as bad influence that would cause disadvantages on the Soviet public. However, its potential was acknowledged by remarkably increasing audiences and the U.S. found that it had great appeal especially to the Soviet youths called, 'Stilagi', groups of urban youngsters who were looking for new trend and stylish fashion of culture (Osgerby, 2004). Starting from Jazz musician tours, Jazz was unofficially but naturally accepted by the younger generation first and in accordance with the demand of the Soviets America launched regular radio jazz programs so that it actually could link two different places and exchange culture and ideas as well as worked to change attitudes and established thoughts of people in the Soviet Union towards the U.S.

Jazz became popular especially among the youths in the Soviet Union

Jazz symbolized expressive freedom of America and was embraced by the U.S. government as a uniquely American art form. Thus dissident Soviet youths became strong proponents of American Jazz, and the U.S. started to feel a stronger need to attract the Soviet youths with more specific Jazz diplomacy programs (Starr, 1994). As time went by, the Soviet Union officially decided to accept Jazz from America and concert tours, and the reality that the Soviet youth's major interest in this style of music was acknowledged. As the demand of the counterpart country increased, the U.S. sent much larger number of tours and launched daily radio program; music itself entirely as a mean, was dealt without mentioning political comments at all, at least while Music USA was on air. Jazz diplomacy eventually killed two birds with one stone and made a win-win situation for itself. The younger generation in the Soviet Union became influential people afterwards and so having them as main target worked for the U.S.

Voice of America's Radio Jazz program, Music USA

The U.S. government had a thirty-year vision for VOA to eventually foment pro-American opinions in distant lands. Jazz club USA was popular among the Soviet listeners. In 1954, Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen suggested the making of a jazz program targeting the Soviet youths in particular. In 1955, Willis Conover launched *Music USA* for the Voice of America in the Soviet Union. VOA was aired on January 6, 1955 and began to broadcast in the Soviet Union in 1947, as the USIA distributed thousands of radios. The USIA became the operator of VOA during the Cold War (Sehgal,

2008). VOA is still the official international broadcasting unit of the U.S. VOA was established under the USIA and the most popular new program was *Music USA* hosted by Willis Conover, America's premier jazz expert. *Music USA*, as well as Jazz music shared with people in the Soviet Union soon became immensely popular behind the Iron Curtain. According to the official Voice of America website, during his four decades with VOA, Conover recorded more than 10,000 shows and interviewed numerous music greats. After the 1958 Cultural Agreement, more transmissions were authorized to be broadcast into the Soviet Union. As the escalation of the Cold War and hostile international broadcasting by the Soviet bloc occurred, the State Department emphasized the preparation and dissemination abroad of information about the United States, simply its culture; its people, its policies through press, publication, radio, motion pictures and other information media. VOA, later on, was placed under the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) after USIA's abolishment in 1999.

Michael Gallant (2010) mentioned that Mr. Conover called jazz "the music of freedom" and a "symbol of hope," especially for those who had no freedom at the peak of the Cold War. It was estimated that he had 30 million regular listeners in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and as many as 100 million worldwide. Mr. Conover talked about music itself and interviewed musicians but never mentioned politics while the program was on the air (Thomas, 1996). The program was like an invisible bridge that actually linked people in different places. VOA radio broadcasts paved the way for jazz ambassadors and it was very influential in spreading jazz and American culture beyond the Iron Curtain. USIA attempted to promote American culture and defend U.S. foreign

policy by distributing thousands of transistor radios throughout Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (Von Eschen, P.M., 2004). It was realized that VOA's cultural programs such as jazz music programs were more welcomed by the Soviet Union than didactic programs that could be rather outward approach.

Jazz ambassadors' tours

Jazz Ambassadors of Goodwill were Louis Armstrong, Dizzy Gillespie, and Duke Ellington. Dizzy Gillespie led the first state-sponsored international jazz tour in 1956, at the request of President Eisenhower. The Emergency Fund for International Affairs which supported cultural presentations abroad was established in 1954 and the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act in 1956 gave cultural diplomacy in the U.S new teeth. At the Republican National Convention speech on 23rd of August in 1956 President Eisenhower said he hoped that little by little, "mistrust based on falsehoods will give way to international understanding based on truth." Blurring of the Lines section of the Library Congress official webpage states that from 1954 to 1959, groups of American artists and athletes traveled to more than 90 countries and Jazz musicians in particular represented an American culture life that was vibrant, fresh, and inspiring to artists and audiences throughout the world. Jazz musicians, therefore, did not only play music outside the United States but also played a role in transcending American democracy and pushing the democratic ideal on people not only who had bad image about the U.S. but also many parts of the world.

In the beginning, as mentioned earlier, the Soviet officials banned American jazz,

but Soviet citizens, especially young group of people, continued and wanted to listen to jazz music. At first, the Soviet Union had banned jazz, both the music and the word itself, during the last years of Stalin rule. Nonetheless, jazz still vigorously spread especially the Soviet youths, and finally the Soviet government had to admit that their efforts to suppress and to censor American jazz would be meaningless. Consequently, in the 1970's jazz became officially accepted in the Soviet society and developed further by the Soviet jazz musicians (Hixson, 1997). Jazz tours offered the Soviet youth chances to both directly and indirectly communicate with American jazz musicians in person, which was unimaginable in the Soviet Union back then. The Jazz Ambassadors program is a model of what can be achieved through cultural diplomacy in a period of international tension. As the image published in 1958 shows below, Jazz itself became an important issue when dealing with diplomatic affairs during the Cold War era in the U.S.



"This is a diplomatic mission of the utmost delicacy. The question is, who's the best man for it—John Foster Dulles or Satchmo?"

“This is a diplomatic mission of the utmost delicacy. The question is, who is the best man for it—John Foster Dulles or Satchmo?”
(Cartoon by Mischa Richter, published in the New Yorker, April 19, 1958.)

3.1.1. Analysis and evaluation

(I) Non-verbal, culture as means

People-to-people diplomacy has successfully achieved improved relationships among countries by using culture as means. Cultural diplomacy undertaken by people directly affects not only art, academic or sports, but also economics and political affairs. During the interview in the spring 2006 issue of the American Interest, Dave Brubeck who is the last surviving band leader from the Jazz programs mentioned one of the reasons he believes in jazz is that “the oneness of man can come through the rhythm of people’s heart.” Richmond (2013) mentioned that the end of Cold War and the collapse of communism were consequences of Soviet contacts and cultural exchanges with the West. Jazz connected people from the two distant countries and as a non-verbal art form, it helped to change attitudes towards segregation within the United States through the jazz ambassadors and contributed to the financial successes of African Americans and the triumphs of African American culture (Davenport, 2009). To open a cultural door is to create an exchange of ideas. In this vein, the U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange as in Jazz diplomacy case allowed both nations to learn and know more about each other. Ted Gioia (2006) suggested the idea of the “connectedness principle” explaining that all music creates linkages with our daily life experiences. He added that art can always be reinterpreted and recast, thus, the connectedness of music to our daily lives serves as a timeless mirror that presents us with a challenging vision. Jazz music was naturally

penetrated those in the Soviet Union without antipathy towards America as in Cold War era situation.

As non-verbal interaction, culture as means proves how much it was crucial. According to the Global Attitudes Project interim report (2002), the most the influential viewed American culture as at most a minor reason for the rate of hospitality. When using culture, different from others, it covers sensitivity of human being and that moves people's minds and hearts and this is such an important fact that not only US should keep in mind but also other countries when dealing with Public diplomacy or cultural diplomacy. In addition, culture is the right measure that naturally and friendly works when the first diplomacy channel is especially not working well.

(2) Media use: Music USA radio program

Western music penetrated the Iron Curtain through the nightly programming of *Music USA*, hosted by Willis Conover from 1955 to his death in 1996. People now even think that one of VOA's greatest contributions to world culture is not in language but in music and Willis Conover is the most famous and beloved voice who is also known as voice of the 'Voice of America' for much of the world. President Barack Obama has mentioned that from its very first broadcast during WWII, the Voice of America has been the voice of freedom. He added that the U.S. even talked about the power of public diplomacy since long time ago and Willis Conover helped America communicate with the world through VOA to show the true character of the U.S. and the ideals and liberties.

The soviet youth listeners used to say that every night they shut the doors and windows, turn on Willis Conover, and had two hours of freedom. Whatever their origin, these various modes of creative expression formed part of an overall portrayal of the United States as a country of individual freedoms, opportunity, and tolerance (Schneider, 2004)

(3) Reciprocity enhancement: Cultural Agreement (1958) and Jazzocracy

Under the U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement, performing arts exchanges became a recurring feature in U.S.-Soviet relations. Richmond (2013) mentioned the three watchwords of the exchanges: equality, reciprocity, and mutual benefit and in terms of U.S. Jazz diplomacy; the two countries were to treat each other as equals, approximate reciprocity was to be sought in the various exchanges, and benefits to the two countries should be comparable.

During the Cold War era, there hardly used to be real dialogue between the Soviet Union and the U.S. until 1956 when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced Joseph Stalin's crimes and the Soviet Union opened up to peaceful co-existence with the United States. The first concrete step in this direction was the signing of the Lacy-Zarubin agreement which is named after the chief U.S. and Soviet negotiators which allowed for closely monitored academic and technical exchanges of students and scholars. Rojansky mentioned at the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (2011) held in Moscow that the rest of the Cold War period was marked by summit diplomacy covering various areas such as health, agriculture, the environment, and disarmament. The Iron Curtain

was almost impenetrable but over a 30-year period (1958-1988), more than 50,000 Soviet citizens came to the United States under various exchanges of the U.S.-Soviet Cultural Agreement (Richmond, 2013). According to NSC 5607 (1956), the U.S. objectives were to:

- broaden and deepen relations with the Soviet Union by expanding contacts between people and institutions of the two countries;
- involve the Soviets in joint activities and develop habits of cooperation with the United States;
- end Soviet isolation and inward orientation by giving it a broader view of the world and itself;
- improve U.S. understanding of the Soviet Union through access to its institutions and people;
- obtain the benefits of long-range cooperation in culture, education, science and technology.

Ultimately, the proliferation of jazz in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe helped determine the course of the Cold War cultural rivalry between the superpowers. At this critical moment in Cold War history, Jazz diplomacy profoundly helped reshape perceptions of the American identity throughout the world (Davenport, 2009). The United States could not ignore the paradox of race on the world stage because it undermined its ability to counter Soviet cultural initiatives and promote cultural understanding between nations. The United States began to appropriate black cultural, jazz music in cultural tours and by employing jazz to exemplify U.S. race relations as a positive feature of American life. Jazz became another instrument in the effort to “contain” criticism about America’s

cultural and racial identity. Racial equality and integration became emblematic of American democracy. As a result, international acceptance of ideas of racial equality and black citizenship gained momentum during the Cold War, and desegregation in American progressed further. According to Elliot Bratton (1998), the period from the mid 1950s to the early 1970s marked the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, which brought a dramatic increase in racial incidents in the South, which were widely reported and exploited for anti-American sentiment abroad. As Louis Armstrong sang in his landmark 1961 collaboration with Dave Brubeck, "The Real Ambassadors," this anti-Americanism caused the U.S. government to "discover" jazz as an antidote. In 1954, President Eisenhower beseeched policy makers to embark upon a new path in foreign affairs by employing the performing arts "to create a more positive image of the United States worldwide." American performers created a new international language with culture, broke down cultural barriers, and engendered mutual understanding among nations. Sehgal (2008) indicated in his book "Jazzocracy" that the U.S. spread their music as in African American form, music of cultural democracy, to foreign lands even while circumstances at home were negative and criticized by people around the world. Jazz performances and concerts, however, talked about America to the world and reminded the people of America of the racial issue that their country faced. These jazz ambassadors reminded America, on the other hand, that it wasn't a mosaic but a melting pot. According to the author, taken to the jazz as democracy metaphor, so called Jazzocracy helped people re-think of the prevailing image of America. Perhaps jazz was just in the right place at the right time but Jazz was the first melting music. Segal underlined two

points of jazz music through Jazz diplomacy. First, jazz was a language of freedom. Second, jazz was a sonic abstraction of America. Jazz abroad was a case of American possibility and the beauty of American resiliency. Jazz music was more democratic than American democracy. Likewise, jazz was played to deliver invisible value that America wanted to send as a message through Jazz diplomacy.

3.2. Charlotte Beers' Shared Value Initiative

Shared Value Initiative (SVI) was a public relations campaign organized by the U.S. State Department to combat anti-American sentiment in Arab countries. SVI consisted of numerous communication elements including speeches by diplomats to International audiences, Internet sites and chat rooms, and various mass media elements (Hayes, 2002). Among these, the primary mass media element of SVI, namely the five commercial spots which the State Department called "mini-documentaries," was considered as the representative feature of SVI. Fullerton (2006) who did a research on the effectiveness of SVI explains that the testimonial-style commercials feature "slice-of-life" treatments of happy and prosperous Muslim Americans in various personal and professional roles such as school teachers, doctors, firefighters, bakery owners and so on. In each features Muslim Americans were actively practicing their religion and commenting positively on the tolerance Americans have for the Muslim faith. On January 16, 2003, at the daily press briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman of the State

Department announced a list of countries where SVI has aired or a speaker tour that has occurred as below:

Table 1. Types of SVI and targeted countries

| Type | Countries |
|--|--|
| Paid television, radio, print spots (October 28-December 10) | Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Kuwait, Pan-Arab – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania |
| Television, radio, print spots placed by embassies (Free Placements) | Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan |
| Speakers tours | Jordan (December 15-17, 2002) Lebanon (December 17-19, 2002) Kuwait (January 13-16, 2003) |
| Special events | Lebanon – Future TV Roundtable on Shared Values (aired December 18, 2002) Indonesia – US -Jakarta Town Hall Meeting (February 7; airing in February) Malaysia – Digital Video Conference featuring Dr. Malik Hasan, Chairman of the Council of American Muslims for Understanding (CAMU) (November 27, 2002) |

Source: U.S. Department of State

The campaign mainly used television advertising as well as radio broadcasts, speaking tours, town-hall meetings and print publications. Charlotte Beers, a former advertising executive became U.S. undersecretary for Public diplomacy right after 9.11. It was a \$15 million dollar advertising campaign by hiring advertising agency McCann-

Erickson to produce the SVI commercials strategically and buy the right media time in the targeted countries that broadcast TV spots in Muslim countries. The ads, which attempted to ease anti-American sentiment by featuring happy Muslim Americans talking about their positive experiences living in the United States, began broadcasting October 29, 2002 in Indonesia which is the largest Muslim nation in the world. However, the commercials were discontinued not only in Indonesia but also in other targeted countries after only a month due to Muslims' strong refusal. There was a prevailing misunderstanding in America that more information leads to better communication. In other words, the idea of "they hate us because they do not understand us. If they just knew more about us through increasing information about us then they would like us more," existed and the way to solve this problem was to make people in other countries know more about America, Muslims life in America in particular.

This campaign originally was an attempt to dispel myths about persecution and discrimination of American Muslim, and was broadcast in several Muslim countries starting from the end of 2002. However, the SVI television campaign was discontinued in early December 200 and this \$15 million dollar effort was abandoned in early 2003 and has seriously raised fundamental questions and problems regarding American Public diplomacy efforts. When Charlotte Beers became the U.S. Undersecretary for Public diplomacy and Public Affairs in October of 2001, under the name of "Brand America," she embarked upon the most challenging campaign of her professional life. She was making an attempt to make a new brand for America, however considering a country as a product was not an appropriate approach in the end. Including Price Floyd, a number of

experts emphasized that Public diplomacy is not PR. In March 2003, Beers resigned for health reasons yet at the same time, SVI ended with her resignation. Chiu (2007) indicates people who saw the campaigns, both domestically and abroad, felt that SVI was merely propaganda, distorting the truth about the motivations behind the war and the way Muslim were really treated in the U.S.

3.2.1. Analysis and Evaluation

(1) Outward approach

SVI provided repeated verbal and visual representations of the American ideology of universal egalitarianism. It made Muslims frown because it looked and sounded insincere and arbitrary at the same time. Muslims in the video clips talked according to the script and the viewers could not feel “truth” while watching it. Even though appropriate languages were used, there is no way to avoid language barriers as well as cultural difference as one language used. For Muslims watching other Muslims saying they are happy with their lives in America, speaking in English may not been as good as what Americans thought. This one-sided delivery type can hardly enhance both reciprocity and mutual understanding.

The one-sided way toward Muslim perceptions and supposedly misperceptions that may have cultivated individuals such as those who orchestrated the 9.11 attacks was deluded that it could totally change in a short period of time. Images made by the U.S.

however served to underscore individual Muslim successes by suggesting how they have been embraced and honored by American culture offended Muslims both in America and other Islamic countries. Furthermore, the Council of American Muslims for Understanding (CAMU) tag that appeared after each advertisement was just a mere PR front group and as a third party technique. Without sharing true hearts or truth, it eventually only made perfunctory effort. As SVI ended, therefore, CAMU also has naturally faded. Muslims who watched SVI commercials felt uncomfortable when CAMU appeared and mentioned at the end of each commercial because they know it did not take any supportive or helpful action at all for themselves as well as any effort to building a better relationship with Arab countries in the end.

(2) Target: means not end

Beer's strategy can be described as treating people as means rather than as ends-of pursuing a goal of changing the opinions that Muslims have of the U.S. because it benefits the U.S. to do so rather than seeking a genuine, more comprehensive mutual understanding. Although the SVI commercials obviously have as its purpose the "expansion" of Muslim viewers' perceptions of American egalitarianism, the campaign certainly "narrows" and over-simplifies the reality of that ideal, presenting an awkwardly stable and ideal vision that ignores fundamental truths of historical and continuing inequality and discrimination. Thus Beers' seemed to have some misconceptions that:

- selling a product simply was the same as promoting a belief, national image and its value;

- anti-America/n sentiment both toward people and the country itself was based on a misunderstanding of America and that to know America is to love it.

(3) Mistake: seeing a nation as a product

Colin Powell who appointed Beers as an undersecretary mentioned, “There was nothing wrong with getting somebody who knows how to sell something and America needed someone who could rebrand American policy” (Klein, 2003). Afterwards, brochures that detailed, with the photos of the 9.11 attack were produced as print material and Beers said “the whole idea of building a brand is to create a relationship between the product and its user.” Consequently, however, this idea proved wrong since before and after 9.11 people worldwide still were showing that unfavorable attitudes which even increased after Beers’ SVI and many of criticisms on SVI came from the State Department where its own staffs were not actually convinced about the direction and effectiveness of this campaign. (Chiu, 2007)

(4) World’s negative opinion toward the U.S.

Various survey and poll results show that Anti-Americanism was even increasing both during and after SVI. Even though it was such an epoch-making attempt conducted by the State Department as the second largest scale of Public diplomacy after the Jazz diplomacy, it could not effectively affect U.S. image, nor change not only attitudes of Muslims but also that of general people from all over the world. It was a firm commitment by the American people and the American leadership to all the painstaking

work required to build lasting relationships overseas and advance U.S. visions of fairness and opportunity (Schneider, 2004). Some denied that the advertising campaign was a failure. In June 2003, however, the U.S. State Department launched an inquiry into the failure of SVI to polish America's image in Muslim countries, after an opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for The People & The Press found that that negative views of the U.S. were on the rise in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, positive opinions about SVI exist. Alice Kendrick from Southern Methodist University and Jami A. Fullerton from Oklahoma State University argued that SVI helped to change thoughts and attitudes about America (2004). According to their article, 105 international students from different countries at Regents College in London in 2003 constituted the sample for the study. Respondents with various majors were visiting London for three to five weeks for summer programs. Researchers indicated that the site was considered appropriate for selecting a convenience sample of international students. Even though participants represented 25 different countries, however, nationality and religious background of respondents were as below:

European countries accounted for almost 70% (n=73), 10.5% (n=11) from the Middle East/India, 9.5% (n=10) from East Asia, 5.7% (n=6) from Africa and 3.8% (n=4) from South America. More than half of participants were Christian (57.1%, n=60), 5.8% (n=6) were Muslim, 12.4% (n=13) checked "other" as a religious option, 20% (n=21) said they were "not religious," and five respondents refused to answer.

In addition, respondents were to answer the questions as follow:

1. Do viewers' attitudes toward the U.S. government change after seeing the SVI commercials?
2. Do viewers' attitudes toward U.S. people change after seeing the SVI commercials?
3. Do viewers' attitudes toward how Muslims are treated in America change after seeing the SVI

commercials?

4. Do viewers feel that the SVI commercials are believable?

5. Do viewers believe that it is appropriate and helpful for the U.S. government to air the SVI commercials in Muslim countries?

6. What is the perceived effectiveness of the SVI commercials?

7. How do viewers evaluate the SVI commercials in terms of main message, first impressions, likes and dislikes?

8. Do differences exist among subgroups of viewers (such as gender, nationality, religion, fluency in English, visitation to the United States) regarding their reactions to the SVI commercials?

As easily recognized, due to unbalanced and small sample size, subgroup analyses were performed with even lower sample sizes. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher clearly announced that SVI was not targeted at general international audiences. SVI's main aim was to change opinion in Muslim countries. Among respondents, however, only six students were Muslims, therefore making the survey target inappropriate. Other factors were also inappropriate concluding religious affiliation, age, gender and family income level.

Besides, showing how happy Muslims are living in America was not the point to winning hearts and minds. SVI should have been focused more on how Muslims not only in the United States but also around the world would think about the advertisement. Pintak (2004) mentioned that feel-good ads that ignore Muslim perceptions of U.S. policy are not going to change the existing serious mood. Global Attitude Project conducted by Pew Research shows that even up to 2003, it was reported that "criticisms of U.S. foreign policy were still almost universal; overwhelming majorities disapprove of President Bush's foreign policy and the small boost he received in the wake of 9.11 has disappeared." In this kind of situation, SVI even made the image of U.S. foreign policy

more negative and other countries believed America was far from building partnerships as well as relationships with trust.

Table 2. U.S. image plummets Favorable view of the U.S. (%)

| | '99-00 | 2002 | 2003 |
|---------|--------|------|------|
| Britain | 83 | 75 | 48 |
| France | 62 | 63 | 31 |
| Germany | 78 | 61 | 25 |
| Italy | 76 | 70 | 34 |
| Spain | 50 | -- | 14 |
| Poland | 86 | 79 | 50 |
| Russia | 37 | 61 | 28 |
| Turkey | 52 | 30 | 12 |

(1999/2000 trends provided by Office of Research, U.S. Department of State)
Source: Global Attitude Project, Pew Research

As Table 2 indicates, favorable views of America continuously declined. Although “View of a changing world (2003)” implies that democratic aspiration in Muslim countries was high_ Turkey (83%), Mali (80%), Bangladesh (79%) and Nigeria (72%)_ at the same time, these countries with high aspirations of democratic dislike American ideas about democracy as well as their policy and political system. Moreover, just 2% of Pakistanis and 6% of Egyptians see the trend of the spread of American ideas and customs as a good thing. Even in a pro-American country, Uzbekistan, more than half respondents (56%) object to the spread of American ideas and customs. From additional results of a part of Global Attitudes Project (2003), most respondents think that American

policy negatively affects their own countries. It was, however, specifically determined in the research that the president is to be blamed, not the America public in general. In this regard, a number of results from polls and surveys done by different countries demonstrate that there are two contradictions when seeing America. First, countries especially Islamic countries do not agree with spread of American ideas, customs, and values. At the same time, however, they agree that they like U.S. pop culture and a sense of freedom that rhythmical music brings. Second, what people hate is simply America is not American. (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2003) The underlining conclusion here is that people-to-people exchange again, can be almost the only effective antidote as there is still possibility that American people have been perceived relatively better than either image of the country itself or policies made by America. Moreover, culture as a measure to accomplish the intended goal is essential as it is the sole attribute that is viewed favorably in America.

Even though it ended quickly, Beers' campaign was considered as the best approach to reach the U.S. goals back then. However according to the surveys and polls above, global attitudes declined during the time she served as Under Secretary. It does not mean that SVI is the main reason why the global opinion towards America declined but due to lack of appropriate approach and plan, SVI did not work to change negative image of the U.S. In addition, what is worse, the Bush administration proposed a net decrease in State Department spending on Public diplomacy despite the universally recognized need to improve the country's image abroad. The criticism focused on the charge that the advertisement did not address the main problem with America in Muslims' eyes-its

policies toward Iraq, Israel and the Middle East generally. (Weisman, 2003) Beers also had difficulties getting the message to hundreds of public affairs officers in embassies around the world. A Republican aide in Congress said there was a “cultural problem” between her office and the bureaucracy she tried to influence. (Martin, 2007) Even though major criticisms came from the State Department itself since they were not sure about SVI in the end, the government staffs also lacked knowledge, experience especially in the media and campaign fields so they could not suggest appropriate solutions.

Chapter 4. Comparative Analysis

Based on the principles of Public diplomacy, the recommendations and suggestions, or what can be inferred about effective factors that help cultural and Public diplomacy be successful are able to be summarized as follows:

People-to-people contact, genuine dialogue, a flexible network, cooperation, participant management, a critical role of those at high-levels, practical use of media, exchange programs, having young people targeted or involved in the exchange itself.

Table 3. Jazz diplomacy vs. Shared Value Initiative

| Success/Failure | | Success | Failure |
|-----------------|--------------------|---|---|
| Type | | Jazz diplomacy | SVI |
| Difference | target | The youth | General Muslims |
| | period | Long term, 14 years | Short term, 1 month due to Muslim's refusal |
| | type | Non-verbal (music) : Dialogue | Verbal (TV commercial)/ testimonial way to be interviewed : Monologue |
| | Directi on | Reciprocity: Jazz radio programs, Jazz tours, Cultural Agreement etc. | Outward delivery : "make them learn about us", unilateral action |
| | adminis tration | Eisenhower, Support for cultural diplomacy | Bush, Less focused on cultural diplomacy |
| Commonality | Media | Radio | TV(mainly), radio, print ads etc. |
| | Budget | Increased | Increased |

Table 3 shows elements of both Jazz diplomacy and SVI. Even though the case of Jazz diplomacy and SVI have some factors in common such as that they both used media as means and had sharply increased budgets in particular as referred to earlier, to accomplish the intended goals. Needless to say, media took on a great role during the

Cold war era to launch radio jazz programs. Klein (2003) says Beers and Colin Powell repeatedly described the need for a mass-media-based diplomacy effort and SVI was actually mainly focused on media based approach yet it has brought different result from Jazz diplomacy. Media is definitely an advantageous factor to reach people of all ages yet currently its power is even stronger. It can cause hazardous situations as more people are now exposed to the media environment meaning that more skeptical and hostile audiences are expected. Using media itself is ideally helpful but in the case of SVI, the videos were targeted to be broadcast in Muslim countries to coincide with Ramadan the traditional period of fasting and reflection for Muslims, as well as the holy five weeks that lasts from early November to early December, in Indonesia, Pakistan, Kuwait and Malaysia.

Table 4. Increase in Public diplomacy resources by region for fiscal years 2001 through 2003 (\$ Million)


| Regions | 2001 | 2003* | Percentage change |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------------------|
| South Asia | | | |
| Funding | \$24 | \$39 | 63% |
| Authorized officers | 27 | 31 | 15% |
| Near East | | | |
| Funding | \$39 | \$62 | 58% |
| Authorized officers | 45 | 57 | 27% |
| Africa | | | |
| Funding | \$55 | \$65 | 18% |
| Authorized officers | 79 | 89 | 13% |
| Western Hemisphere | | | |
| Funding | \$77 | \$80 | 4% |
| Authorized officers | 92 | 99 | 8% |
| Europe and Eurasia** | | | |
| Funding | \$161 | \$160 | 0% |
| Authorized officers | 161 | 180 | 12% |

Source: U.S. Department of State

*The 2003 funding estimates include approximately \$20 million in reprogrammed funds for educational and cultural exchanges from 2002

**Estimates for Europe and Eurasia include costs for two staff assigned to the European Office of the UN and Other International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland

Figure 4. U.S. Government Expenditures on Public diplomacy, FY1980-2007



Source: U.S. Department of State

According to John Stuart Mill's Methods of difference, however, factors in the category of difference distinguish the two different cases with different outcomes regardless of the commonalities that both examples have in common and this study insists that those classified in the category of difference of Jazz diplomacy indicate effective elements for Public diplomacy success. The following chapter finds the successful determinants of Public diplomacy.

4.1. Findings

(1) Period: long-term

Public diplomacy needs to be regarded as a long term commitment to encourage trust-building and maintain relationships between countries. Of course some criticize Jazz diplomacy even though it is taken as a successful example and yet some praise SVI. When looking at the results, however, SVI ceased due to Muslims' refusal and backlash whereas Jazz diplomacy kept reshaping itself according to the demand and changing situation for almost 15 years. It can also be said that Jazz diplomacy could continue for such long time because it suited a feature of Public diplomacy that changes with fluctuating situations.

(2) Target: young generation

The Young generation is adjust to face changes and new fashions and trends and is expected to change and accept new values, ideas, attitudes towards typical customs and beliefs. In addition, they are the ones who will lead society in the near future as influential people. Richmond (2003) mentioned the most effective force for long-term change in Russia is its younger people, who are now moving into positions in business and government. They need to travel, break out of their country's historic isolation, visit other countries, see how other people live, and how Russians are seen by other people. As George Kennan counseled, whatever relations exist between Russia and other countries, there also has to be a meeting of the people. Condoleezza Rice stated that Western

openness to Russia's people, particularly its youth, in exchange programs and contact with the private sector and educational opportunities and help that process. Irina V. Alyoshina, a former Fulbright Scholar in the United States, who is now an associate professor of marketing at Moscow's State Univ. of Management commented that her students back then were a new generation of Russians, and even for her they seemed to be too independent. Five to ten years or later, the older generation will be retired and the younger generation will take leading positions in government, business and education. Likewise, the youth with infinite potential is expected to change attitudes of its generation and society. Jazz diplomacy mainly targeted the youth and mediated the number of jazz tours and even launched a jazz radio program. In contrast, SVI broadly mentioned that its target was general Muslims and women yet SVI was not really able to manage the targets they set. No matter how many countries or people are targeted, having them in the appropriate position is important for achieving such a long-term action plan.

(3) Using culture as means and exchange programs

To enhance mutual understanding among different countries with different languages and backgrounds and have effective dialogue, non-verbal means is effective. Non-verbal communication does not have a language barrier and can lead to strong interactions and real communication. Verbal programs may tend to bring immediate effects yet it is still an outward delivery style that is monologue rather dialogue.

In this vein, culture as means can be included in various exchange programs. Familiarity through exchange programs such as traveling or communication in various

ways increases favorability. In the Jazz diplomacy case, it had both direct and indirect contacts and these were well balanced. Directly, America sent jazz musicians and people actually met each other and were exchanged in music and indirectly, the radio program maintained the link and interaction. A U.S. favorability survey (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2002) shows that those who have traveled to the United States, or are in regular communication with Americans have a more favorable opinion of the U.S. compared with those who have had no comparable exposure involving visit or contact. Besides, historically, people around the world tend to have a more positive view of Americans than of the United States, but this distinction has been fading. Thus, focusing on people-to-people exchange both directly and indirectly will naturally work for establishing familiarity and favorability rather than a one-way delivery type of action and approach.

“Exchanges are strategic activities that build mutual understanding and strengthen relations between the United States and other countries. They establish the trust, confidence, and international cooperation necessary to advance the full range of U.S. national interests.” (Bureau of resource management, 2004) Jazz diplomacy sent Jazz tour groups as a route of direct communication and in an indirect way the U.S. kept interacting with people in the Soviet Union, especially the younger generation, through radio programs. That was mainly how the U.S. made the Soviet Union not to lose attention and interest toward Jazz as well as keep a naturally good image of the United States. SVI, however, was a one-sided or biased method and direct exchanges such as speaker programs or town hall meetings that are still a monologue way of approach were not

effective due to the indirect exchanges not being balanced with each other.

(4) Mutual understanding and dialogue

Maintaining communicative elements to know what the counterpart country wants and needs before sending what we want to deliver is effective to gain their hearts and minds. Without mutual understanding, a real exchange would not happen and even though it does, it must be a fake one that seems to work on the surface but is really ineffective. "Engagement" approach that involves listening, dialogue, and relationship building increases the amount and effectiveness of public opinion in other countries. Traditionally, U.S. public policy has been communicated via a push-down method, which suffers from limited reach and inadequate explanation to foreign media (Peterson, 2002). The original goal to rebrand America itself was good but the plan should not have considered a nation as a product as business corporations do. Thus, national image is not something to be sold but something that should be mutually shared allowing for it to be naturally accepted by the counterparts. Having a chance to share, deliver, and exchange values and thoughts is important rather without knowing who they are what they want. Jazz was sent abroad as a cultural affirmation of optimism. Jazz ambassadors hoped to change the very worst part of America by celebrating the best. In this vein, the U.S. reversely used its adverse condition. The U.S. was criticized for civil rights issue and the struggle harmed America's national image. By using the most risky element as a foothold, they decided to send black music as a representative American art form. Moreover, the U.S. "respected" existing cultural values and the ethos of the Soviet Union at the time and

based on that, they began disseminating its own culture. On the contrary, in the case of SVI, Muslims in the video clips were mostly being viewed as “tools” for promoting American image. To add insult to injury, the original goal of SVI which was winning Muslims minds and hearts instead caused offense to them. Lack of empathic understanding and respect for their counterpart’s values ended up failing to accomplish the intended goal. Rather enhancing reciprocity, SVI, from the beginning, was set by a one-way power dominance order instead of reciprocity and mutual understanding. Geert Hofstede wrote in *Cultures and Organizations Software of the mind* that if people from different backgrounds want such a true integration, an environment that encompasses and treats those from both sides as equal beings. Besides, global problems need cultural cooperation and the disasters we face today are about cultural disaster and the only way out is to achieve cultural cooperation is thus that common interests and shared values are needed. Its treatment of Muslim audiences as means to achieve broader policy objectives rather than as populations to be engaged on their own terms was what the U.S. overlooked when proceeding with SVI.

As an effort to enhance Reciprocity, Cultural Agreement (1958) proves that the U.S. took a timely approach; it certainly satisfied their counterpart’s needs using common interest. Through this win-win strategy, the agreement had been amended and revised and the two countries’ relations developed. When the Cultural Agreement was signed as an executive agreement rather than a treaty, it did not require Senate approval thereby avoiding a prolonged domestic debate. The accord was titled “Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on Exchanges in the

Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields. In addition, the Soviets were accustomed to putting things on paper, signed by their political authorities at an appropriately high level. In a country where the government and the communist party controlled practically everything, it would have been inconceivable to conduct exchanges with another country, particularly the leader of the capitalist West, without a formal agreement which spelled out exactly who and what would be exchanged, under what conditions, and how the cost would be shared. (Richmond, 2003)

(5) Leadership

Different styles of administration and its interest must have also influenced the results of each program. Eisenhower considered cultural exchanges as a critical part and that affected the next two administrations whereas Bush was indifferent to culture focused diplomacy. How much the leader considered cultural exchange and its value and importance critical definitely influenced policy makers, individuals, and personal desire to promote the national image through cultural exchanges. In the Jazz diplomacy case, U.S. diplomats understood the importance of cultural expression to the Soviet Union and respected their literary and artistic achievements (Schneider, 2004). Likewise, based on respect and correct understanding of the counterpart country, favorability occurs and increases in both countries. In addition, in 1954, President Eisenhower established an Emergency Fund for International Affairs in part to support cultural presentations abroad and the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956 established a permanent place for cultural diplomacy. Upon signing the act, Eisenhower stated he hoped that “little by little, mistrust based on falsehoods will give way to

international understanding based on truth.” Even in the Soviet Union that also depended on different leadership styles, culture itself was differently perceived. As mentioned earlier, the Soviets contained the growing influence of Jazz but after the death of Joseph Stalin, the enigmatic jazz bans of Nikita Khrushchev were reversed and the radio transmissions were allowed (Sehgal, 2008).

Chapter 5. Conclusion

Determinants of Public diplomacy success through examining and comparing two representing cases of U.S. Public diplomacy that were attempted with epoch-making goals to seek breakthroughs when traditional diplomacy channels were strained or in cases of dire situations were examined. The two cases, however, received different assessments and outcomes. Jazz diplomacy during the Cold War era as a successful example and Charlotte Beers' Shared Value Initiative (SVI) toward Muslims after 9.11 as a case of failure were analyzed and there were some commonalities and differences when viewing each plan. Using John Stuart Mill's Methods of difference, this study affirms that different factors determined whether the program succeeded or failed.

Jazz diplomacy was conducted under the administration that considered culture crucial and focused on the counterpart country's demand based out of respect for the established value and culture of the Soviet Union. Having the Soviet youth targeted, the U.S. carried forward Jazz diplomacy as a long term action, and to meet the demand of the Soviet youth, jazz radio programs were launched. It was a non-verbal type of approach and cultural diplomacy in general, that naturally infiltrated into people's minds and influenced their attitudes and thoughts. It also naturally enhanced reciprocity and mutual understanding. Above all, the elements were combined and linked well together.

Based on mutual understanding, a real dialogue could occur and then trust-building naturally comes afterwards. When a virtuous cycle of the elements exists,

successful Public diplomacy is to be expected, yet the elements of SVI were not harmonized well together. In this vein, Jazz diplomacy was timely and it managed an applicable plan and set the right target so its purpose was able to be accomplished. In the end Jazz was accepted by the targeted people, those in the Soviet Union as well as the communist-bloc countries. Improvisation that is one factor of jazz which separates it from other styles of music naturally delivered the idea of democracy and freedom and sending Jazz Musicians especially African-American players also helped to change prevailing and established images of the U.S. The cultural approach was used as they were actually “sent” to directly communicate in music with people in the Soviet Union. Therefore, throughout culture, or cultural diplomacy to be specific, the U.S. could achieve to deliver their message, values and ideas and that changed people’s minds and thoughts toward America. The factors found through the comparison and analysis in this study can be applied to meet the goal of Public diplomacy to achieve success. Arts envoy and sports envoy programs that are organized by ECA, for example, meet the determinants for successful Public diplomacy today. More cases need to be studied in further studies, either more elements for successful Public diplomacy can be found or the factors found in this study can be verified as premises of successful public or cultural diplomacy.

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국문초록

미국의 공공외교 연구: 문화외교의 성공요인 분석 중심으로

양혜진

본 논문은 미국이 외교적으로 가장 불안정했던 두 시기에 획기적 돌파구를 피하며 시도되었지만 정반대의 평가를 받고 있는 두 공공외교 사례 비교 분석을 통하여 성공적인 공공외교를 위해 효과적으로 작용하는 요소를 취하고, 공공외교의 성공요인을 제시하는데 의의가 있다. 성공사례로는 냉전시기 대 소련 재즈외교를, 실패사례로는 9.11 이후 이슬람국가를 대상으로 전개되었던 Charlotte Beers 의 Shared Value Initiative(SVI)를 비교 분석하였다. 공공외교/문화외교 분야에 있어 상대적으로 다른 국가들에 비해 긴 역사를 갖고 있고, 비교적 많은 경험을 한 미국은 냉전시기 대소련 재즈외교를 통해 전통적 외교노선이 불안정하던 시기 소련과의 관계개선에 문화외교를 적절히 활용한 바 있다. 하지만 탈냉전이 도래하자 공공외교의 필요성을 느끼지 못하고 그 중요성을 경시하다 다시금 9.11 이후 그에 대한 반성으로 기존의 정부 대 정부로만 이루어지던 ‘전통적 외교’ 방식을 넘은 ‘공공외교에’ 상당한 노력을 기울이는 모습을 보였다. 하지만 2001 년 또 한번의 획기적 성과를

기대했던 SVI 는 아직까지도 부정적 평가를 받으며 미국 공공외교의 대표적 실패사례로 꼽히고 있다.

국가 이미지를 제고하고 상대국 여론을 변화시켜 자국의 안정에 기여하겠다는 본래의 목적도, 당시 전통적 외교노선 상황의 심각성도 모두 비슷했지만, 상반되는 결과를 가져온 데는 두 공공외교 전개방식에 차이점이 존재했기 때문이다. 대표적으로는 공공외교의 실질적 성과를 이루고 소기의 목적을 달성하기 위해 자국의 가치와 사상을 일방적으로 전파하는 방식에서 벗어나 상대를 먼저 알고 그들의 문화와 가치를 존중하는 것이 기본 바탕을 이루어야 한다. 타겟 설정 또한 중요한데, 사고의 유연성과 비교적 열린 태도를 보이는 젊은 층이 장기적으로도 볼 때에도 효과적이다. 또한 일회성에 그치지 않고 지속될 수 있는 교류인 동시에 비언어적인 음악, 미술, 스포츠 등을 매개로 한 ‘문화외교’의 형태가 타 요소들과 잘 어우러질 때 성공적인 공공외교가 이루어질 수 있을 것이며 이를 잘 충족한 것이 냉전시기 재즈외교라고 볼 수 있다.

나아가 최근 공공/문화외교의 중요성을 강조하는 한국도 이 논문의 결과를 활용해 대 일본, 대 북한 등 현재 전통적 외교방식 진행에 어려움을 겪는 상황에 적절히 활용할 수 있을 것이다. 최근 우리나라뿐 아니라 세계적으로 강조되고 있는 공공외교는 자국에 대한 상대국 국민들의 태도와 인식이 자국이익에 직결되는 경우가 많아짐에 따라 오늘날 그 중요성이 더욱 증대되고 있다. 따라서

본 논문이 제안하는 공공외교 성공요인을 고려해 상황에 맞는 공공외교를 전개한다면 보다 긍정적인 결과를 기대해 볼 수 있을 것이다.

주요어: 미국, 공공외교, 문화외교, 재즈외교, 냉전, SVI, 9.11사태

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