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國際學碩士學位論文

**Discomforting Comfort Women:
The Incomplete Combustion of Reconciliation**

양면게임이론으로 분석한 위안부 문제

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柳 頌 鉉

Discomforting Comfort Women: The Incomplete Combustion of Reconciliation

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Songhyun You

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지도교수 박 철 희

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국제학과 국제지역학전공

유 송 현

진 선 백의 국제학 석사학위논문을 인준함

2014년 2월

위 원 장 김 현 철 (인)

부 위 원 장 정 중 호 (인)

위 원 박 철 희 (인)



Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

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Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

Have examined thesis entitled

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Presented by **You Songhyun**

Candidate for the degree of Master of International Studies and hereby certify
that it is worthy of acceptance.

Signature

Committee Chair



Kim, Hyun-Chul

Signature

Vice Committee Chair



Jeong, Jongho

Signature

Committee Member



Park, Cheol Hee

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ABSTRACT

Discomforting Comfort Women: The Incomplete Combustion of Reconciliation

Songhyun You

International Area Studies

The Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

In spite of growing economic and social ties between Korea and Japan, the polemic of comfort women remains as a thorny subject even to touch. The demands to resolute comfort women issue come not only from domestic constituents of both countries but also from each other. From 1990s the issue has been widely discussed by the two countries' NGOs and governments and several apologetic statements and attempts to resolute the issue were made during that time. However, despite the efforts of two countries' governments had made, those endeavors did not satisfy neither the Korean side, nor the Japanese side. When the issue reemerged in 2007 by troublesome remarks of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and his cabinet members, new phase of comfort women issue has begun. Internationalization of comfort women issue has been rapidly conducted by

Korean and Japanese civil organizations, and those efforts has exerted huge influence on governments of both countries.

Utilizing two-level game theory and the concept of win-sets, this thesis examines Japan's politics of apology and Korea's politics of apology acceptance. Korean and Japanese governments' decision making process is heavily influenced by the strong civil organizations that show robust connections with general public as well as politicians. This thesis puts emphasis on the NGOs' influence on politics of apology and how they affect the sizes of each country's win-sets. Finally, after examining complicated mechanisms among government, civil organizations, and international forces, this thesis tries to find adequate measures that can expand the win-set sizes of the two countries.

Keywords: Comfort Women, Apology, Two-level Game, NGOs, Kono Statement, Human Rights Norms

Table of Contents

Abstract

I. Introduction.....	1
1. Literature Review.....	4
2. Research Framework.....	6
3. Time Frame of the Research	11
II. The 1990s: The Emergence of the Issue.....	13
1. From Denial to Acceptance.....	13
2. The Birth of Powerful Civil Organization – Korea.....	14
3. The Full Escalation of the Controversy	16
4. The Coalition Government of LDP and SDPJ	20
5. The Backlashes	24
6. The Birth of Powerful Civil Organization – Japan	25
7. The Fading of the Comfort Women Issue	28
III. The 2000s: Internationalization of the Issue	31
1. The Reemergence of the Comfort Women Issue	31
2. Internationalization of the comfort women issue	33
3. Civil Organization’s Involvements in the Internationalization.....	38

IV. Comfort Women Issue through Two-Level Game Theory.....	44
1. The Homogeneity and Heterogeneity of the Perspectives	45
2. Political Institutions and Procedures of Ratification.....	49
3. Negotiator's Strategy.....	53
4. The New Paradigm of Two-Level Game?.....	56
5. Future Prospects	57
V. Conclusion	60
Appendix.....	64
Bibliography.....	69
Abstract in Korean	75

Chapter 1

Introduction

In December 2013, the meeting between Korean and Japanese congressmen and members of parliament finished without any substantial results leaving quintessential matters such as comfort women issue untouched and unmentioned. In fact, the thorny subjects were willfully evaded in the fear of aggregating the already sensitive relations between Korea and Japan¹. Just like this the controversies over comfort women issue has been remained as a major obstacle between Korea and Japan over half a century. Even though there were numerous attempts and endeavors of both governments and civil societies, the issue remains as a most urgent, yet most difficult issue to solve between Korea and Japan.

Comfort women issue has different sides with other problems Japan and Korea confront such as Dokdo-Takeshima issue and has its own unique characteristics. Firstly, comfort women issue is widely recognized as a human right issue, more specifically women's right issue in wartime and not as an issue

¹ “[사설]한일의원연맹의 대화 불씨, 정상회담으로 이어져야” Donga Ilbo 2 December, 2013
<http://news.donga.com/3/all/20131202/59265257/1>

of sovereignty. Secondly, the issue is not just a diplomatic problem of Japan and Korea; it involves citizens of China, Indonesia, Philippines, and even Netherlands. Therefore, it is a global issue that concerns human right of women. In these senses it should be fairly easy to resolve the issue since the issue does not evolve sovereignty like Dokdo-Takeshima issue; rather, it is an issue of human rights. Moreover, the fact that the awareness of comfort women issue and its handling of Japanese government are acutely growing world widely.

Therefore, this research tries to seek the answer for the puzzle “Why comfort women issue remains as a prime obstacle between Korea and Japan in spite of the repeated attempts by the two governments over the last twenty years?”. As mentioned above, the comfort women polemic is different from other sovereignty-related issues that Japan and Korea are now facing. Besides, comfort women issue is wartime sex-slave issue which is closely connected with human rights and international norms. However, these factors do not seem to have any positive implications in solving the issue.

This research finds the answer of the puzzling question in the extremely biased and slanted civil societies of the two countries. The civil societies of Korea and Japan are playing the quintessence role in shaping the politics of apology and apology acceptance. While the directions and claims that the two civil societies are taking are radically different from one another; the two are sharing the one

characteristic in common, there are only one large voice in the scene and the voice has tremendous influence in shaping not only the national sentiments, but also in crafting political decisions of the two governments.

Consequently, I argue that analyzing only government apologies or civil organizations' positions in regard of comfort women issue are not sufficient. In the big picture and in the realm of international relations, it is always the best for the two neighboring countries, Korea and Japan to maintain friendly relations with each other at all times. However, the governments of each nation cannot treat its international relations as a primary concern. They have to take care of the voices from within as well. With the case of comfort women issue, both Japan and Korea possess influential and extremely vocal civic groups and these groups are in charge of critical role in crafting national sentiments and state apology. Therefore, any decisions of governments and positions that government took without the consensus of these civil organizations immediately stir up the current situations and the implications can go further to the international stage. Therefore, this research seeks the entanglement of governments and civil organizations, the relations between domestic matters, and relations between international matters. By doing so, hopefully this research tries to find resolutions that both countries can make consensus that they can agree upon.

Literature Review

Many researches have been conducted in the field of politics and diplomacy regarding the comfort women issue and state apology. The types of researches concerning the issue are largely divided into two categories. The first category mainly focuses on defining the comfort women issue and pursuing truth and justice for the wartime atrocity that Japan has committed. Yoshiaki Yoshimi's work *The Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II*² is one of the most noteworthy researches among books regarding the comfort women issue, which brought the long-hidden comfort women issue back to the arena of discussion in the early 1990s. Yoshiaki Yoshimi takes a closer look into the recruiting process of the comfort women, why comfort women were mobilized by the Japanese military, how they were treated and so on by analyzing Japanese military primary sources. Many of other researches such as *Ianfu, the comfort women of the [Japanese] Imperial Army of the Pacific War: broken silence*, by Schmidt, David A., and *Hidden Horrors* by Yuki Tanaka follow similar paths with Yoshiaki Yoshimi in studying the comfort women issue. However, most of the researches that fall into the first category have put emphasis on describing the circumstances of the war, the life of comfort women in the battlefield, proving the existence of comfort women and Japanese government involvement in recruiting

² Yoshimi, Yoshiaki. *일본군 군대위안부*. Seoul: Sowha Press, 1998. Print

and utilizing comfort station than giving stress on how the comfort women issue was accepted by the Japanese and Korean governments and civil societies. Moreover, the intricate apology making processes not only between Korean and Japanese government, but also between the civil societies and the governments are rarely handled in this type of researches.

The second category analyzes the political side of the wartime atrocity issue. The researches which fall into the second category are Jennifer Lind's *Sorry States: Apologies in the International Politics*, *The Politics of Official Apologies* by Melissa Nobles, and Jane Yamazaki's *A Nation Apologizes: Japanese Apologies for World War II*. The researches focus on how politics of apology is formed and explain why it is so hard to be achieved. Jennifer Lind analyzes Japanese politics of apology in comparison with the German cases. She keenly observes the situation that Japanese government had in 1990s and depicts the formation of the Japanese official atonement for the responsibility that Japanese government has had in recruiting and mobilizing comfort women and severe backlashes which were generated within the same government that made the apology³. She analyzes that the harsh backfires were in fact produced by the apologies made by the government. Yamazaki also examines the comfort women issue and studies how Japanese government has changed its position regarding the

³ Jennifer Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in the International Politics*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 92

comfort women polemics over the circumstances. Also, she briefly explains the role of women's liberation movement in the early 1990s which provided favorable environment for comfort women issue to be raised above the tabooed issues⁴. Nonetheless, all the above researches that fall into the category put too much emphasis on the governmental level of apology making procedure and give little attention to the civil society that influence the apology crafting processes.

Research Framework

In order to analyze the mechanisms between the domestic (intra-national) level and international level negotiations and how they connect with each other, the best theoretical framework to study this flow will be Robert Putnam's two-level game theory. Even though two-level game theory is originally created to analyze state's trade strategies, the theory can be applied to the issue of comfort women as the governments of Japan and Korea pursue the point of compromise while trying to protect their national interests.

According to Robert Putnam, any kind of international negotiations are divided into two different levels of negotiations, the international level (level 1) and the domestic level (level 2). At the internal level, the domestic interest groups seek to enhance their interests by pushing the government to take favorable


⁴ Jane Yamazaki, *A Nation Apologizes: Japanese Apologies for World War II*

policies or directions while politicians pursuing power by building coalitions among those groups. On the other hand, at the international level, the governments seek to maximize their capability to satisfy the domestic pressures at the same time minimizing the adverse consequences of external changes⁵. Moreover, he develops the term “win-sets” which represents the set of all possible level 1 agreements that would win or gain domestic approval or ratification. In the <Diagram 1> point A represents 0 gains for country X while it is the maximum gains for the country Y. On the other hands, the point B indicates the biggest gains of country X and the point A is the minimum gains to the country Y. Therefore, if the negotiation concludes on point C, the line AC represents the size of the benefits that country X can earn from the negotiation and the line BC shows the gains of country Y. Moreover, if domestically acceptable point of country X is C2, the win-set of the country X would be the line AC2, at the same time, if country Y’s internal approval point is C1, the win-set of country Y is the line BC1, accordingly, the agreement between the two countries can only be made between the point C1 and C2⁶.

⁵ Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460

⁶ *Ibid.*,

<Diagram 1. The Size of Win-set and the Possibility of Cooperation>



<Diagram 2 the Concept of Win-sets and the Zone of Agreement>



Therefore, two points can be implied by the concept of the “win sets”, the first one is that the larger the win-sets, the higher the possibility to gain international agreements. Secondly, if the win-sets are small, the country with smaller win-sets can obtain bigger leverages on the issue thus more likely to gain the desired outcomes from the negotiations. However, if two countries that participate into the negotiation both have small win-sets, the negotiation process is likely to be hostile. The above mentioned aspects of win-sets in international

negotiations and its implications can be summarized into the diagram 1 and table 1.

<Table 1> International Negotiation's Process and Results Pursuant to the Size of Win-Sets⁷

Country A/ Country B	Large Win-Sets	Small Win-Sets
Large Win-Sets	<u>Aspect 1</u> Process: Cooperative Outcome: Equal Distribution of Interests	<u>Aspect 2</u> Process: Moderate Outcome: Favorable to the Country B
Small Win-Sets	<u>Aspect 3</u> Process: Moderate Outcome: Favorable to the Country A	<u>Aspect 4</u> Process: Conflictive Outcome: Cooperation Failed

Several factors that affect win-sets' size are also mentioned by Putnam, the first factor is how domestic interest groups see the issue. Depending on the homogeneity and heterogeneity of perspectives each interests groups and

⁷ Hwasoon Cho, "국제협력의 정채경제: 1989-1992년과 1996-1997 한-미 정보통신협상의 사례분석." 국제정치논집 2004 p. 44

governments have on certain issues, the win-sets size can differ. If interests come from the negotiation differ among interest groups, perspectives to understand the issue can be different as well. Therefore, the different perspectives decrease the size of win-sets. Second factors are the political institutions of the country such as democratic institutions and autocratic state and how closely connected the intra-national interest groups and political parties are. The more influence domestic interest groups have over the political parties, the less freedom international negotiators have which cause the win-set size to be diminished. Finally, the win-set size is also dependent on the level 1 negotiator's strategy⁸.

The former Japanese military sex slave issue lays in the center of 'state apology – the international level negotiation' and 'national pride – domestic level negotiation' controversies between Korea and Japan. As comfort women issue and its related state apology negotiation is not a trade negotiation, the gains that domestic interest groups are seeking is clearly not an economic gain. However, even though the gains from the negotiation is not a monetary gains, two-level game theory is still can be applied as 'national pride' and 'national identity' are working as driving forces of the domestic interest groups and governments.

This research tries to analyze the mechanism of Japan's apology making

⁸ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460

process of liberal political parties and society which almost always end up being hindered by the conservatives of Japan. At the same time, Korea also has a strong civil organization that pressures Korean government in comfort women related matters to take their favorable directions. In understanding the complex entanglement between the domestic level and international level of negotiation, the two-level game theory by Robert Putnam is a valuable analytic frame that captures the intricate interchanges.

Time Frame of the Research

In this paper I would like to analyze the two most significant time periods by utilizing the two-level game theory, from 1991 to 1997 and from 2007 to 2014. The first time period is the time when the comfort women issue first emerged as a prime international controversy between Korea and Japan, and it is the time that the issue was most widely and actively discussed. The second time period is when comfort women issue reemerged as an international scandal once again, as Prime Minister Abe Shinzo took extremely conservative position in 2007 stating to reporters that “there was no evidence to prove there was a coercion”⁹ in recruiting or utilizing comfort station during the World War II. Since 2007, the movement to internationalize comfort women issue became active among Korean and Japanese

⁹ “Abe Question Sex Slave Coercion” *BBC News Online Edition*. 2 March, 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/asia-pacific/6411471.stm>

civil organizations. Moreover, during the time period, the third parties, the countries without direct connection with the comfort women issue have begun to raise their voices more vigorously than before.

Chapter 2

The 1990s: The Emergence of the Issue

1. From Denial to Acceptance

Up until 1990s, comfort women issue was a tabooed matter and it was rarely a topic of diplomatic discussion between the two countries. Even though Japanese people, those who participated in WWII, recognized the existence of the so-called comfort station and comfort women they failed to consider comfort women as victims of cruel war crimes who lived the same generation they did¹⁰. For Korean public former comfort women kept their secret because of the shame and consequences that might come to their family after their disclosure.

The controversy of comfort women was initiated in May of 1990 just before the then President Roh Tae-woo's visit to Japan¹¹. Korean women's organizations such as Korean Women's Association United released joint statement "The Standpoint of Women on President Roh Tae-woo's visit to Japan

¹⁰ Otaka Yoshiko, Shimomura Mitsuko, Nonaka Kuniko, Wada Haruki "Why Call for a National Fund? (なぜ国民基金を呼びかけるのか)" *Sekai*. November 1995. P. 125

¹¹ Yamashita Yeong ae "Korea's Management on the Comfort Women Issue (韓国における慰安婦問題へのとりくみ)" *Fujinshinbo*. March 1991. P. 23

and Comfort Women¹²” and called for Japanese government’s action to investigate the issue and apologize. Also, the issue was brought to the table of discussion in the Japanese parliament by a member of Social Democratic Party of Japan, Motooka Shoji.

2. The Birth of Powerful Civil Organization - Korea

Along with acceleration of the comfort women controversies, in Korea the Korean Council for the women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (정신대대책협의회), the biggest and the most influential social organization that take lead in all comfort women related matters, was formed. The Chondaehyop is the representative body of numbers of civil organizations that fought for comfort women issue, and is consisted of organizations like Korean Association of Christian Women for Women Minjung (기독교여민회), Korea Chongshindae’s Institute, and Korean Women’s Solidarity (전국여성연대)¹³. The main purposes of the Korean Council are, first, regain the impaired reputation of former comfort

¹² Originally the statement used the word “Jeongshindae (정신대)” to represent Japan’s wartime sex slaves, but as Jeongshindae is a synonym for comfort women in this context I replaced ‘Jeongshindae’ with ‘comfort women’.

¹³ 한국정신대문제대책협의회, 사람들

https://www.womenandwar.net/contents/general/general.nx?page_str_menu=0103

women, second, prevention of sexual abuse at battlefields, third, counter the resurrection of Japanese imperialism, finally, contribute to Asian and international peace. At the same time the Korean Council demands the following seven points to Japanese government, firstly, the acknowledgement of comfort women crime by Japanese government, secondly, investigation of truth by Japanese government, thirdly, Parliament's resolution on the comfort women issue and official apology, fourthly, the legal compensation, fifthly, the documentation and inclusion of comfort women issue in history textbook, sixthly, the construction of memorial and history museum, and lastly, the punishment of people who involved with the crime of comfort women¹⁴. Chongdaehyop also shares international connections with various international organizations and foreign human right organizations, range from huge international organization such as United Nations to Japan's women's organizations like Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center. The international linkages that Chongdaehyop has are crucial in dealing with comfort women issue as the comfort women issue is not all about international politics or sovereignty issue. Therefore, the Korean Council has engaged in several women's and human right international organizations and foreign nations to pressure Japan. Furthermore, the council also shows strong political relations with Korea's left

¹⁴ 한국정신대문제대책협의회, 정.대.협
https://www.womenandwar.net/contents/general/general.nx?page_str_menu=0101

wing oriented political parties such as the United Progressive Party¹⁵. With the birth of social organization that will dominate public sentiments regarding comfort women issue, the controversy of wartime sex-slave was germinated in full-scale.

3. The Full Escalation of the Controversy

However, it was a one voice of a brave former comfort woman that drew attention of Korean and Japanese public. Former comfort woman Hak-sun Kim was the first woman who gave testimony regarding being a comfort women during the war under her real name¹⁶. The provocative yet heart aching story of Kim brought about international recognition of the issue and inspired other former comfort women to stand up for their own right. Thanks to Hak-sun Kim's effort, three other former comfort women came forward and with Kim the four former comfort women brought the law suit demanding Japanese government's official apology and compensation to the Tokyo District Court¹⁷. At first Japanese government denied Japanese government's involvement and expressed great

¹⁵ 한국정신대문제대책협의회, 단체링크

https://www.womenandwar.net/contents/general/general.nx?page_str_menu=0104

¹⁶ Ministry of Gender Equality, . *일본군 '위안부' 신문기사 자료집*. 1st ed. Seoul : 2004. Print

¹⁷ "Daily Log on Comfort Women Issue" *Yonhap News*. August. 3. 2013
<http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=001&aid=0006409213>

difficulty in handling the issue¹⁸, but after Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trades requested truth ascertainment, Japanese government announced to start investigation on comfort women issue¹⁹. Meanwhile, military documents that illustrate Japanese government's involvement in managing comfort station were found by Yoshiaki Yoshimi and reported through *Asahi Shinbun* in January, 11th 1992²⁰. The impact that the documents brought was huge and Japanese government could not evade the comfort women issue any longer. Besides, it was the just before Prime Minister Miyazawa's visit to Korea. To handle this grave diplomatic crisis, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato announced a statement that acknowledges Japanese military's participation in recruiting and managing the comfort stations for the first time²¹.

Following the Chief Cabinet Secretary's apology, Prime Minister Miyazawa also apologized through his speech during 1992 Korea-Japan summit

¹⁸ Kato koichi Chief Cabinet Secretary stated "There is no evidence that shows Japanese government's participation and for now it is difficult to handle the issue (日本政府が関与した資料はなく今のところ政府が対処するのは困難)" regarding the trial

"Chief Cabinet Secretary's Statement, aggravate Korean Public" *Yomiuri Shinbun* December. 12. 1991

¹⁹ "Chief Cabinet Secretary Says to Give His Full Power in Collecting Evidence (韓国の慰安婦問題 資料収集に全力 加藤官房長官) *Yomiuri Shinbun* December 12. 1991

²⁰ "Documents Indicate Military Involvement: Library of Defense Agent" *Asahi Shinbun* January. 11 1992

²¹ "Formal Apology by the Government to be Announced by PM Miyazawa in Korea (政府が正式謝罪 宮沢首相訪韓時に表明 慰安婦問題" *Asahi Shinbun* January. 14. 1992

and press conference.

“Through this precious partnership, we must build unwavering trust between us. One fact we must not forget through many years of our relationship is that once Japan was an assailant and Korea was a victim. I sincerely apologize once again for the hardship and grief that people of Korean Peninsula suffered because of Japan’s deed. These days, the issue of comfort women is emerged between Korea and Japan. For that matter I feel deep remorse and regret.

Moreover, I, as a person who experienced the WWII, wholeheartedly believe that it is our duty to deliver the true history and teach the next generation not to repeat such tragedy. (Omit)

We must have the courage to face the fact, the understanding to feel the pain the victims had, and the determination not to reiterate the same mistake²²”

In July 6 Japanese government announced the investigation result and Kato Chief Cabinet Secretary declared the statement that acknowledges the Japanese military’s involvement in creating and recruiting comfort women. However, the statement only admits the participation of the Japanese military, but not the forcibleness of the recruitment²³. Korean government independently announced its own report on comfort women issue and specified that coercion took place during the recruitment and pledged to demand compensation aside from

²² The Policy Speech of PM Miyazawa (Korea Visit)
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1992/h04-shiryou-2.htm#b2>

To see the Japanese version of the speech see the appendix

²³ “Government Admits its Involvement While Denying the Forcible Recruitment (「従軍慰安婦」に政府関与認める 強制連行は否定 調査結果を公表) *Asahi Shinbun* . July. 7. 1992

1965 Korea-Japan compensation fund²⁴. With disagreement with each other, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei suggested to conduct an oral-testimony investigation saying “Investigation only on document is not enough, so we are considering the oral-testimony investigation as well ²⁵” The oral-testimony investigation was started from July 1993, conducted in Seoul with sixteen former comfort women. After finishing the investigation, Japanese government reported a statement which admits coercive measures took place in recruiting and utilizing the sex slaves. The statement is Kono Statement, the first statement that Japanese government officially acknowledged the forcibleness of the comfort women issue. Following paragraph is the summary of Kono Statement.

“Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and

²⁴ “Government Concludes Comfort Women Investigation: Full Participation of Japanese Military in Utilizing Comfort women 1938 [Human Trafficking] → 1940 [Forcible Recruitment] → 1943 [Slave Hunt]” *Donga Ilbo* July 7. 1992

²⁵ 「文書を探す調査だけでは十分でないという部分もございますから、関係された方々のお話をお聞きをするということを考えております」

126th House of Councilors Committee on Budget Minutes 7 March. 23. 1993

that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.

As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.²⁶

However, despite the amazing step forward in acknowledging the coerciveness of comfort women issue, Kono Statement does not indicate any practical measure or methodology to deal with the problem²⁷.

4. The Coalition Government of LDP and SDPJ

With growing international pressure to deal with comfort women issue, Japanese government underwent a massive transformation. The ideologically

²⁶ "Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the result of the study on the issue of "comfort women" August 4, 1993

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html>

To see the whole version of the statement, see the appendix

²⁷ The means and measures to show Japanese government's sincere atonement shall be considered thoroughly 「お詫びと反省の気持ちを（中略）我が国としてどのように表すかということについては、（中略）今後とも真剣に検討すべきもの考える」

contradicting Liberal Democratic Party and Social Democratic Party of Japan had to make coalition to counter increasing Ozawa's influence in political arena of Japan. This unusual combination of ideologically distinctive coalition between the LDP and SDPJ came in the middle of political and economic havoc; Japanese economy has lost its robust growth after the collapse of the bubble economy and international pressure to confront its wartime misdeeds are growing rapidly²⁸. As the first non-LDP government in three decades, the cabinet expressed the will to "change its perception to conceive history differently and showed strong will to make 'apology' as a prime strategy for new government".²⁹ The non-LDP Prime Minister, Hosokawa claimed that Japan should deal with past history in an appropriate and acceptable manner in his speech at 127th session of National Diet meeting³⁰. Also, when PM Hosokawa visited Korea, at the summit with President Young Sam Kim, he once again expressed his regret and contrition naming specific wartime wrongdoings such as deprivation of right to learn Korean mother tongue, changing names into Japanese names, and sex-slavery during the war. Many politicians and Prime Ministers had showed their remorse and regret,

²⁸ Takayama, Yuki. "Crafting State Apology: The Dynamics Between International and Domestic Forces in Japan's Response to the Comfort Women Issue." MA thesis. Seoul National University, 2009. Print.

²⁹ Yamazaki, Jane. A Nation Apologizes: Japanese Apologies for World War II. p.154

³⁰ "Policy Speech by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro to the 127th Session of the National Diet, August 23, 1993" *Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet*. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/127.html#sec5>

but PM Hosokawa was the first Prime Minister who mentioned Japanese atrocities with specification³¹.

However, Hosokawa cabinet lasted only for eight months without any practical or realistic improvement in solving comfort women issue. It was the next Prime Minister of the coalition government, who brought significant step forward to the comfort women polemic. Prime Minister Murayama, who was a president of the Socialist Democratic Party of Japan, took the opportunity to reach out to the Asian neighboring countries by acknowledging and reconciling the historical issues of Japan's colonial rule³². After the death of Emperor Hirohito, the domestic debates on Japan's wartime wrongdoings and responsibility were conducted rigorously. Furthermore, the international attentions on Japan's handling of the atrocities against humanity are pushing Japan as well. In other words, the coalition government was in the perfect timing to realize its long-held hope of Asian diplomacy. In August 1994, Prime Minister Murayama announced the speech "Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative" urging Japanese to take square perception toward the historical issues with neighboring Asian countries and to make genuine friendship among Asian nations. More importantly, he specifically

³¹ Wakamiya Yoshiyumi, "Asia Consciousness – In Post War Politics (戦後政治における「アジア意識」) *Chuokoron* 1996

³² Park, Cheolhee. "일본의 대외정책 결정패턴의 변화 - 반응형 국가 모델에 대한 비판적 고찰." *일본의 국가 재정립*. 1. (2006): n. page. Print.

mentioned comfort women issue and expressed his remorse to the victim who suffered great deal of pain during the war³³.

In the same vain with the reconciliation project of Japanese government, the Asian Women's Fund was established in July 19th 1995 to compensate the sufferings that the victimized comfort women had gone through. Furthermore, movements to depict Japan's wartime atrocities including comfort women issue in middle and high school students' history textbook were emerged³⁴. Nevertheless, after the several steps for achieving SDPJ's long-hoped-for Asian diplomacy, there were strong and severe backlashes among conservative politicians including not only members from the opposition parties but also from inside of the coalition government.

³³ "Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the 'Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative" *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. (August 15th, 1995) <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/state9408.html>
To See the whole statement, see the appendix

³⁴ "Textbook Screening – Comfort Women is in All Textbooks- Middle School from Next Spring (教科書検定 「従軍慰安婦」 全社が記載 中学生用、来春から)" *Yomiuri Shinbun* June 28. 1996
"Comfort Women Issue will Appear in the High School History Textbooks from Next Year: Teachers Look for Ways to Teach the Issue (「従軍慰安婦」問題 来年度、高校日本史の全教科書に登場 教え方模索中の教師)" *Yomiuri Shinbun* July 18. 1993

5. The Backlashes

In spite of Japanese government's official apology and contrition toward many issues regarding its colonial rule, the dissensions among Japanese politicians and civil society got bigger and bigger. Even Murayama's own cabinet members such as Eto Takami confronted Japan's official position claiming that Japan also did many good things to its colonized countries, such as building infrastructures, improving education level and so on. His remarks caused a huge diplomatic upheaval which almost blocked important summit between South Korea and Japan which was planned to be held in that year³⁵. Moreover, Diet member Okuno Seisuke argued in 1996 that the comfort women were prostitutes who voluntarily served Japanese military; hence there is no need for compensation³⁶. Fifty LDP members, powerful members of the Diet, rejected to sign the Prime Minister Murayama's resolution on 50th Anniversary of the end of the WWII³⁷. The contrasting actions that right-wing politicians took became even more contradicting with government's official position when middle school and high

³⁵ CNN "World News Briefs"
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/Newsbriefs/9511/11-10/> [accessed January 10 2014]

³⁶ Russell Skelton, "Comfort Women 'Did it for money,'" *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 June 1996.

³⁷ "Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History" *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan* (June 9, 1995) [accessed January 14, 2014]

school history textbook approved. The newly approved versions of the history text books contain comfort women issue as a part of Japan past wrongdoings and it brought massive upheavals not only from conservative politicians, but also from civil activists, and scholars. Politicians from Liberal Democratic Party formed “Bright Japan; Unions of Members of Parliament (明るい日本・国会議員の連盟)”, and “Institute of Junior Assembly Members Who Think about the Outlook of Japan and History Education (日本の前途と歴史教育を考える若手議員の会)” aiming for revision of history textbook that contain ‘self-torturing historical views’³⁸.

6. The Birth of Powerful Civil Organization - Japan

Ironically, the official position of contrition that Japanese government took gave massive motivations for the widely scattered Japanese right wing oriented intellectuals and civic groups to conjoin their forces together in order to pressure the government not to take such self-torturing historical perspective. Civil organization that entirely dedicated to the revision of history textbook, Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (新しい歴史教科書を作る会)

³⁸ 44 Members joined 'The Formation of Association of Young MPs that Concern for Japanese Future and History Education (日本の前途と歴史教育を考える若手議員の会)' *Politics Briefs Asahi Shinbun* February 28, 1997

was formed with members from various backgrounds. More importantly, during the process of unification, the Nihon Kaigi (日本会議), the biggest and most influential right wing NGO that connects all the other conservative civil organizations, was created by combining conservative religious civic groups 「日本を守る会」 - *Group that Protect Japan* and 「日本を守る国民の会議」 - *Council for Protecting Japan* in 1997. It states the organization's essential points as follows, firstly, honoring the royal family of Japan, secondly, the normalization of Japanese education by reviewing and editing history textbooks, thirdly, honoring the combatants who fought on the behalf of Japanese emperor while creating co-prosperous life with neighboring Asian countries, lastly support the peace keeping operations by the Self Defense Forces of Japan³⁹. Nihon Kaigi holds various events all around Japan; the events are composed with public lectures, forums and seminars. It also shares close ties with members of parliament through 「日本会議国会議員懇談会 Nihon Kaigi Kokkai Giin Kondankai – The Council of Japanese Members of Parliament」.

However, even though Nihon Kaigi states it seeks to find ways to co-prosper with Japan's Asian neighbors, it is easy to find its true stance on many Asia related issues just by visiting their website. For example, the sensational red

³⁹ Nihon Kaigi home page <<http://www.nipponkaigi.org/about/mokuteki>>

words in the banner say “*Protect Senkaku! – A Campaign for Obtaining Signatures*”⁴⁰ and the mostly debated topics of the council are the rise of China, Senkaku dispute, and Takeshima dispute. Nihon Kaigi also publishes the magazine *日本の息吹- Nihon no Ibuki (the Breath of Japan)* which deals with various Japan’s foreign affairs. In accordance with the Nihon Kaigi’s original positions with several Asian foreign affairs related matters, the Nihon Kaigi keeps its right wing oriented nationalistic perspective toward comfort women issue as well. The *Nihon no Ibuki* publicized article by the writer of *ほんとうは「日韓併合」が韓国を救った！- The Truth: Korea Was Saved because of Japan’s Annexation of Korea* Matsugi Kunitoshi. Kunitoshi argues that Korea’s endless

⁴⁰ Nihon Kaigi home page <http://www.nipponkaigi.org/activity/archives/1589>



会員ログイン

ホームページ以外から入会された方で初回登録がお済みでない方は、以下の[初めてログインする方]内の該当する会員Noより初回登録を行ってください。



demand for apologies and compensation should be stopped because it will eventually harm Korea's reputation in international society as the controversies of comfort women are fabricated lies⁴¹. He claims that the evidence of so-called coercive measures that were taken during the recruitment process cannot be found in anywhere. Moreover, he also argues that there should be massive repercussions and demonstrations among Koreans if there were coercive recruitments such as recruitment by violence and kidnapping in Korean peninsula. The articles by Kunitoshi show the Nihon Kaigi's overall sentiments toward comfort women issue. Thusly, Nihon Kaigi is actively working on spreading its own ideas not only domestically, but also internationally.

7. The Fading of the Comfort Women Issue

The acute backlashes from politicians and civil society put another light on the comfort women issue. Korean publics were becoming confused by the contradicting Japan's posture on history issues, and the controversies on the forcibleness of comfort women were brought back to the table of debate in Japan. Due to the troublesome remarks of Japanese politicians and activists, Korean government and people had a hard time digesting apologies and contrition of

⁴¹ Nihon Kaigi home page <<http://www.nipponkaigi.org/activity/archives/1589>>

Japanese official statement. In spite of several Prime Minister's apologetic speeches and statements, the denials that were produced shortly after the contrition made Japan untrustworthy. Moreover, the compensation by the Asian Women's Fund also did not make any substantial breakthrough as large number of former comfort women declined the compensation from the AWF. The attempts to resolute comfort women issue with Asian Women's Fund hit the dead lock with severe opposition from Korean civil organization, the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery (정대협). Korean government decided to create its own compensation bureau and provided monetary assistance to former comfort women who did not receive compensation from Asian Women's Fund. The Korean Council also started fund-raising from Korean public to counteract the Asian Women's Fund and pressure Japanese government to take legal responsibility and indemnification⁴².

Furthermore, the coerciveness of comfort women issue has risen above the surface once again as Foreign Minister's Secretariat Hirabayashi mentioned that "document that directly prove forcibleness of the comfort women issue is yet to be found" in the parliamentary meeting⁴³. For this comment Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei also mentioned that document was not found, but based on

⁴² Korea Chongshindae's Institute, "Action and Prospects"
http://www.trueth.org/know/know_04.htm#3

⁴³ 140th House of Councilors Committee on Budget Minutes March 12. 1997

the testimony of the former comfort women it can be inferred that means of coercion took place during the recruitment⁴⁴. Despite the fact that testimonies from former victims prove existence coerciveness of the sex-slavery, lack of formal documents made the conservatives doubt the comfort women issue even more than before.

The 1990s was the period that comfort women issue was most heatedly discussed and debated. Japanese government's position was changed over time from denial to acceptance and finally in confusion. In spite of numerous attempts to resolute the issue from both Korea and Japan, the comfort women issue disappeared from the topic of diplomatic discussion from late 1990s without any fruitful resolution.

⁴⁴ “The Inerasable Facts of Comfort Women, Government’s Involvement are Clear (従軍慰安婦、消せない事実 政府や軍の深い関与明白)” *Asahi Shinbun* March 31. 1997

Chapter 3

The 2000s: Internationalization of the Issue

1. The Reemergence of the Comfort Women Issue

For almost ten years, comfort women issue was rarely mentioned in diplomatic discussion between Korea and Japan. Also there were no particular mentioning of the Kono Statement during the Obuchi Cabinet, Mori Cabinet, and even Koizumi Cabinet⁴⁵. It was the first Abe Cabinet that brought the long-hidden comfort women issue back again. Abe Shinzo, who constantly and actively participated in the right-wing oriented political movements, Abe particularly devoted himself to the revision of history textbook. He served as a Secretary General of the Institute of “Junior Assembly Members Who Think about the Outlook of Japan and History Education” and as a head of “Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Tsukuru Kai)”.

In October 2006, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hakubun Shimomura announced the launching of new investigation on the comfort women issue. Shortly after the announcement, LDP installed Committee to Consider Japan’s

⁴⁵ Yamamoto Kentaro, *従軍慰安婦問題の経緯 —河野談話をめぐる動きを中心に*、(National Diet Library Reference) September. 2013

Future and declared that “currently there is no evidence to prove that the military, the strongest expression of state authority, took women away and forced them to do things against their will”⁴⁶. The committee also released its first proposal which claims that the forcibleness by the government part of the Kono Statement should be altered. Even though Kono Statement itself remained unchanged, the committee attempted to put paragraphs that say:

“Although there may have been forced recruitment of women against their will by [private] traders, there was no forced rounding up of women by the military or other authorities⁴⁷”

“The grounds [for the Kono Statement’s apology to comfort women] are only the investigation of the oral testimony of former comfort women; no documentary proof was ever disclosed”⁴⁸

Along with Abe cabinet’s movement to amend Kono Statement, Nariaki Nakayama, member of the Liberal Democratic Party and head of the “120 Lawmakers Who Want to Revise the Declaration” outraged Korean publics by saying “Some say it is useful to compare the brothels to college cafeterias run by

⁴⁶ “Tokyo Denies Coercion in War Brothels” *The Korea Herald Online*. March 14, 2007

⁴⁷ Japan’s Military ‘Comfort Women System’, Congressional Research Service Memorandum, April 3, 2007 http://japanfocus.org/-Congressional_Research_Service-/2405

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*,

private companies, who recruit their own staff, procure foodstuffs and set prices,” and “Where there’s demand, business crops up, but to say women were forced by the Japanese military into service is off the mark. This issue must be reconsidered, based on truth, for the sake of Japanese honor.⁴⁹”

The beginning of Abe cabinet came with the sudden change in Japanese government official position on comfort women and numbers of ultra-right-wing politicians’ troublesome comments on comfort women issue. The controversy over comfort women became significantly aggravating since the prime minister, the representative of Japanese Archipelagos, denied the essence of comfort women issue

2. Internationalization of the comfort women issue

The aggravated controversies brought unexpected guest to the polemics; the third parties, countries without any direct connection to the comfort women issue began to raise their voices. The United States’ House Resolution 121 was the first resolution that made by the third party which does not have any direct connectivity with the issue. The final version of the “comfort women” resolution

⁴⁹ Norimatsu Onisi “Abe Rejects Japan’s Files on War Sex” *The New York Times*, March 2, 2007

(H.Res.121) reads in pertinent part as follows:

That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan

(1) should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as “comfort women”, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II;

(2) would help to resolve recurring questions about the sincerity and status of prior statements if the Prime Minister of Japan were to make such an apology as a public statement in his official capacity;

(3) should clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual enslavement and trafficking of the “comfort women” for the Japanese Imperial Armed Forces never occurred; and

(4) should educate current and future generations about this horrible crime while following the recommendations of the international community with respect to the “comfort women”⁵⁰

Following the U.S. resolution, Parliament of European Union also

⁵⁰Kinue Tokudome “Passage of H.Res. 121 on “Comfort Women”, the US Congress and Historical Memory in Japan” <http://japanfocus.org/-Kinue-TOKUDOME/2510>

released a resolution on comfort women issue that urges Japanese government to recognize the magnitude of wartime atrocity that it committed during World War II and apologize properly⁵¹. The resolution reads:

“Calls on the Japanese Government formally to acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical and legal responsibility, in a clear and unequivocal manner... (Omit)”

“Calls on the government of Japan to refute publicly any claims that the subjugation and enslavement of ‘comfort women’ never occurred; Encourages the Japanese people and government to take further steps to recognize the full history of their nation and to foster awareness in Japan of its actions in the 1930s and 1940s, including in relation to ‘comfort women’; “

“Calls on the government of Japan to educate current and future generations about those events”⁵²

Along with numerous congressional and parliamentary resolutions on comfort women issue from various nations, international media also started to criticize Abe and his cabinet’s attitude towards the issue and toward the Kono Statement. *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Los Angeles Times*

⁵¹ European Parliament “European Parliament Resolution on ‘Comfort Women’”

⁵² Ibid.,

reported the incident in details and *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times* put editorial regarding Abe's denial that criticizes Abe and his cabinet members' remarks. *New York Times* editorials criticizes Japan's act asking "which part of Japanese army's sex slaves issue does Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, have so much trouble understanding and apologizing for?", and warns Japanese government that the United States is not the only country that expect Japan's belated but candid apology⁵³.

The second Abe cabinet also started with serious disputes over Kono Statement since Abe pledged to revise Kono Statement once again. In December 2012, The Liberal Democratic Party announced through its campaign pledges "various opinions on compensation trials and so-called comfort women issues are considered to be right regardless of its historical facts and those opinions are hurting Japanese honor. We pledge to conduct new research on such matters and counter existing discourses on such matters⁵⁴." Moreover, Abe claimed during an interview with *Sankei Shinbun* that Kono Statement was not a statement that

⁵³ "No Comfort" *New York Times*. March 6 2007

<<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/06/opinion/06tues3.html>>

⁵⁴ 「J-ファイル 2012 自民党総合政策集」p. 41

<http://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/j_file2012.pdf>

……各種の戦後補償裁判やいわゆる慰安婦問題の言説などにおいて、歴史的事実に反する不当な主張が公然となされ、わが国の名誉が著しく損なわれています。これらに対しても新機関の研究を活用し、的確な反論反証を行います

decided upon by the cabinet⁵⁵. Needless to say, Abe's ceaseless attempts to revise Kono Statement and to spread extreme right wing thoughts on comfort women issue infuriated Korean government and Korean public. Repeatedly, international media once again began to pay attention to Abe's attitude toward Japan's wartime atrocity and criticize him and his cabinet's problematic remarks⁵⁶.

After winding up in dealing with numerous diplomatic havoc not only with its neighboring countries, but with other nations like the U.S., Abe decided to keep silence with the matters related to comfort women issue and Kono Statement. Nevertheless, the international attention on comfort women issue and Japan's apology did not cease. During the press conference between Japan and Australia, Foreign Minister Bob Carr mentioned "Kono Statement of 1993 was an acknowledgement of an episode that is one of the darkest in modern history and we believe that the acknowledgement be revisited⁵⁷". The movement to push Japan to take more contrite and apologetic posture on wartime responsibility is

⁵⁵ "Interview with PM Abe, Japan is now insulted by other countries (安倍首相インタビュー詳細 日本は今、多くの国々から侮られている) *Sankei Shimbun* December 31, 2012

⁵⁶ "Another Attempt to Deny Japan's History." *The New York Times*, January 2, 2013
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/opinion/another-attempt-to-deny-japans-history.html?_r=0>

⁵⁷ Press Conference - Australia-Japan Ministerial talks, Transcript. January 13th 2013
<http://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/2013/bc_tr_130113_press_conference.html>

becoming more and more evident. In January 17th of 2014 President Barack Obama signed spending bill that includes comfort women issue. The bill does not have legal binding or direct influence to press Japan but has a symbolic importance that shows United States' concern over the issue⁵⁸.

3. Civil Organization's Involvements in the Internationalization

As mentioned above, civil organizations that concern comfort women issue have been actively participating in spreading out their own opinion regarding the issue. The movement to internationalize the comfort women controversy was conducted even during the period when comfort women issue was rarely a diplomatic havoc between Korea and Japan⁵⁹. Chongdaehyop mainly has focused on notifying the international community with the cruelty and seriousness of the human rights violation in comfort women issue while Japanese conservative civil organizations such as Nihon Kaigi has concentrated on publicize their own agenda domestically. The Korean Council also actively participated in UNCHR meetings and other human right related international meetings from 1992⁶⁰. Thanks to the

⁵⁸ "Obama signs spending bill including 'comfort women' issue" *Korea Herald*. January 17, 2014 <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20140118000028>

⁵⁹ Mostly Korean civil organizations, Japanese right wing oriented civil organizations rarely show any linkage with international organization during that period of time

⁶⁰ 김 정란. (2004). *일본군 위안부 문제의 전개와 문제의식에 대한 연구: 정대협*

Korean Council's effort, Radhika Coomaraswamy published an extensive report on military sexual slavery between Republic of Korea and Japan during war time⁶¹ in UNCHR.

In 2000s, the movements to internationalize the issue become more vivid and active from both Korean and Japanese side than in the 1990s. The significant difference in the directions that the NGOs are taking is that the organizations are now trying to directly connect with certain foreign local governments and media. These movements are prominent especially in the United States, even though the United States does not have any direct connection with the comfort women issue, utilizing the United States has a symbolic meaning; for Korea, most influential country in the world sees the comfort women issue as a human rights violation rather than a two countries' diplomatic concern, and for Japan, the United States always has been Japan's utmost diplomatic partner that has huge impacts on Japanese economy and politics.

의 활동을 중심으로 Ewha Women's University

⁶¹ Radhika Coomaraswamy *“Report on the mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the Issue of the Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime”* UNCHR 1996

The report states that Japan should 1) recognize that sexual slavery is a violation of international law 2) compensate the victims 3) release all the relevant documents 4) make a public apology through individual letters to the victims 5) identify and punish any individual involved in the forcible recruitment and in the establishment of comfort station

One of the most prevailing civil movements that are now being conducted to improve people's awareness on comfort women issue in America is to build monuments remembering the sufferings of the comfort women in several spots of the United States. In 2010 the first monument was erected in Palisades Park, New Jersey and three other monuments have been established in the State of New York, and California. In January of 2014, the first monument with engraving of 2007 resolution that calls on the Japanese government's sincere apology was erected in New York City. Japanese comfort women deniers have taken several measures to counter such movements and attempted to take down the comfort women monuments several times. Two delegations of Japanese officials and civil activists visited Palisades Park to demand local leaders to remove the monument offering cherry trees and other endorsements from the Japanese government⁶². Moreover, when the first two attempts appeared to be a failure, the right wing civil organizations and politicians turned their attention to the White House and started a petition. The petition reads "we petition Obama administration to: remove the monument and not to support any international harassment related to this issue against the people of Japan" and "False accusations regarding the South Korean comfort women issue have disgraced the people and Japan for decades. Over the

⁶² *New York Times* "In New Jersey, Memorial for 'Comfort Women' Deepens Old Animosity" May 19, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/nyregion/monument-in-palisades-park-nj-irritates-japanese-officials.html?_r=0

past few years it has come to light that many of the original charges were false or completely fabricated⁶³.” The petition successfully gathered more than 28,000 signatures through various web sites, including Nihon Kaigi and Nippon Kaigi Local Government⁶⁴.

The other methods to notify comfort women issue to global public are to raise advertisements in newspapers or gathering signatures from supporters on-line and off-line. In April 17th, 2007 Korean activist Kyungduk Seo and Janghoon Kim post an advertisement on *The Washington Post* that notifies comfort women issue to the US public and urges Japanese government to take serious action to resolute the controversy. Following the first advertisement, the two activists once again publicized advertisement of comfort women issue on *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*. The advertisement asks questions ‘Do you remember’ and ‘Do you hear’ to the world and to Japan with pictures of victimized Korean women protesting in front of Japanese Embassy in Seoul and German Chancellor

⁶³ We the People

<https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/remove-monument-and-not-support-any-international-harassment-related-issue-against-people-japan/FPfs7p0Q>

⁶⁴ “Japanese comfort women deniers force White House response” *Foreign Policy* June 6, 2012

http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/06/japanese_comfort_women_deniers_force_white_house_to_weigh_inresponse

Willy Brandt kneeling before the Polish commemoration monument⁶⁵.

Japanese right wingers again had a counter measurement to deal with the wide spread of comfort women issue, they had published an objection advertisement says “ The Facts” on *The Washington Post* on June 14th of 2007, and “Yes, we remember the facts” on New Jersey local newspaper *Star Ledger* November 4th 2012. The main organization that conducted this mission is Committee for Historical Facts, also known as Society for the Dissemination of Historical Facts, a sister organization of Nihon Kaigi, and its sole purpose of foundation is to inform English-speaking world with more accurate and contemporary history of Japan⁶⁶. However, the comfort women deniers’ attempts to raise the awareness of the issue and to propagate their own idea has backfired and resulted in stirring not only Korean public’s emotion on the issue, but the westerner’s concern over Japan’s ability to contrite and its human right awareness. In the interview with *Foreign Policy* Mindy Kotler, an American expert on the comfort women issue, argues that “Abe and his supporters who signed ‘the fact’ ad hold antiquated views of women, war and just human rights”, also she expresses her apprehension saying that Japan’s view on the comfort women issue

⁶⁵ Ad Placed in NYT Demands Japan’s Sex Slavery Apology, *Korea Herald* 2012.

⁶⁶ Mission Statement, Society for the Dissemination of Historical Facts
<http://www.sdh-fact.com/mission.html>

is out of touch with contemporary values, and the gap between Japan and the world can engender distrust in Asia⁶⁷.

As this chapter described, from the midst of 2000s, the comfort women issue has met a new phase of its development. Along with the hawkish first and second Abe cabinet the controversies over comfort women and Kono Statement are reignited and the problems are no longer mere diplomatic nightmares between Korea and Japan. Japan's continuous denials of its wartime misdeeds and its lack of sincerity dealing the issue have triggered the international community to have more interests in comfort women issue. Moreover, thanks to the tireless efforts of civil organizations either from Korean side and Japanese side, the awareness of comfort women in countries that do not share any immediate linkages with the polemics has risen sharply. To analyze these developments and its prospects more thoroughly, and to find out the mechanisms that hamper resolving the issue, it is crucial to observe the complex matrix between government and civil organizations and how the organizations affect each others' win-set sizes.

⁶⁷ White House: Japan should do more to address 'comfort women' issue, *Foreign Policy*, February 21, 2013

Chapter 4

Comfort Women Issue through the Lenses of Two-Level Game Theory

Robert Putnam metaphorically describes a diplomat as a union representative in labor negotiation in his famous theory of international negotiation, two-level game theory. The union representative should bring satisfactory deals to the labor union, while pulling off deals that the firm can accept⁶⁸. In the same sense, international negotiators are seeking to make an agreeable deal with their opposite country which can be approved domestically.

In the case of comfort women polemic the negotiations' dynamic mechanisms between two governments and domestic interest groups can be vividly observed throughout the two decades of its development. Therefore, this chapter focuses on analyzing the Korean and Japanese sides of win-sets in three perspectives; the political institutions of the negotiating countries, the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the perspectives among interest groups and government, and the negotiators' strategies. Finally, through these three points this chapter analyzes components that make rapprochement between Korean and Japan on comfort women issue so difficult, and presents newly developed stage of

⁶⁸ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460

international movement that affects negotiation between two countries.

1. **The Homogeneity and Heterogeneity of the Perspectives**

Whether the perspectives toward particular issue are homogeneous or heterogeneous can be a great criterion to test the size of one country's win-set. On Korean side, the viewpoint to look at the comfort women controversy seems to be homogeneous as Korean government as well as Korean civil society including NGOs, intellectuals and general public call on Japan's official apology and hope to resolve the issue as soon as possible. However, on how to handle the situation and what is appropriate measurement to deal with the situation, Korean domestic level shows their differences among them.

From 1991 to 1995, the level II negotiation of Korea seemed to be homogeneous. With the initiative by women's movement organization the comfort women issue has surfaced after three decades of slumber. At the beginning Japanese government changed its stand point from denials to acceptance and released numbers of statement that express Japan's regret. Korean government presented three principles when dealing with the issue to Japanese government which are first, Japanese government's acknowledgement of coercion, second, full investigation of the truth of comfort women issue, finally, learn from the history

and teach its people never to repeat same mistakes⁶⁹. The three principles of Korean government overlap with several claims of civil organizations and Korean public's sentiments. Especially the sentiment toward 1993 Kono Statement and 1994 Murayama Statement Korean public opinion and government opinion were united and welcomed Japan's contrite posture.

However, different from civil organizations which claim legal and monetary compensation from Japanese government, Korean government did not demand compensation to Japanese government. In March of 1993, President Yongsam Kim announced that "We can have moral high ground when defining new Korea-Japan relationship" and "It is more important to obtain sincere apology and truth ascertainment from Japanese government than receive compensation⁷⁰". The dissension within Korean domestic level got even worse when Japan founded Asian Women's Fund in 1995 and announced to release compensation which was collected as a civilian fund, not an official fund. Korean government expressed its satisfaction after the release of Kono Statement⁷¹ and evaluated the Asian Women's Fund as a sincere rapprochement measure that reflects victims' demand⁷². On the other hands, Chongdaehyop has manifested its opposition to the

⁶⁹ "정신대 해결/ 3대 원칙 제시" *Kukmin Ilbo*, June 30. 1993

⁷⁰ "종군위안부 보상문제 관련/ "물질적 요구 안 해" *Chosun Ilbo* March 14. 1993

⁷¹ "더 이상의 외교문제화 없을 것/ 일 정신대 강제 시인 - 정부입장" *Choong Ang Ilbo*, October 5, 1993

⁷² "일 위안부기금 민간 모금 최종안 확정/ 의료, 복지 기금은 정부서 지원"

foundation of the civilian fund from 1992⁷³, and consistently demanded Japanese government's official apology, reparations and punishment of people who were involved in the recruitment and management of comfort women. 22 women's movement organizations including Chopdaehyop declared the opposition statement on the private compensation in 1995⁷⁴ and started its own fund raising to counterbalance the Japanese action. Nevertheless, there were small numbers of people who supported AWF and encouraged the victims to take the private compensation⁷⁵. Several victims expressed their willingness to take the compensation and some of them actually took the compensation. Like this, Korean domestic level suffered serious division among their perspectives of suitable resolutions of Japanese government and government had to make deals that can satisfy the domestic constituencies without jeopardizing diplomatic relations with Japan. Consequently, Korean win-set size was diminished significantly.

Japanese case is a lot clearer than Korean case. The view points to digest comfort women issue obviously divided into two lines of thinking. The split among Japanese domestic level is prominent not only in Japanese civil society but

Hankook Ilbo June 15. 1996

⁷³ “일본 정신대 위로기금 추진/ 정대협 등 국내단체 큰 반발” *Hankyoreh* September 2. 1992

⁷⁴ “위안부민간기금 철회” *Hankyoreh* June 16. 1995

⁷⁵ Yong-sook Shin, The Responses of the Korean Society and Damaged Women to the Japan's Asian Women's Fund (AWF), *Women and History* 12th Book. June. 2010

in Japanese government as well. As described in chapter 2, during 1990 to 1997, several Prime Ministers and cabinet members such as Murayama, Hosokawa, Miyazawa, and Kono shared liberal perspective toward comfort women issue and expressed their remorse and atonement through numbers of statements. In the meantime right wingers of Japanese government acutely condemned its own government's action calling it a 'self-torturing historical view'. Furthermore, the segregation is also vivid among civil societies. Along with the coalition government's movement to reconcile with its neighboring countries, Japanese civil organizations that seek justice for the victimized comfort women has established. The Center for Research and Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility (JWRC) was established in April 1993 and has been working on finding documentations regarding Japan's wartime atrocities, publishing quarterly journal *Study on War Responsibility* and reporting the relevant documents to the government as well as international organizations⁷⁶. On the other hand, the biggest and most influential right-wing extremists' organization Nihon Kaigi was born in the midst of the government's contrition and actively participated in spreading their own ideas that deny forcibleness of comfort women and even its existence. Therefore, the contrasting perspectives toward the comfort women issue works as

⁷⁶ JWRC Homepage, <<http://space.geocities.jp/japanwarres/center/english/index-english.htm>>

a decreasing factor of its win-set size.

2. Political Institutions and Procedures of Ratification

The political institutions of one country can determine the size of win-set of the country since certain political system can grant greater autonomy to the negotiator than others. For example, President Park Chung-hee was able to conclude the 1965 Korea-Japan normalization treaty in spite of the vigorous opposition from Korean civil society thanks to its authoritarian political institution⁷⁷. However, as Korea underwent democratization through 1980s, general public, mass media and civil organizations of Korea have become to actively raise their voice to the government and become the major factor in defining the size of win-sets in international negotiations. In early 1990s Korea's win-set size in international negotiations shrunken considerably since Korea's head negotiator no longer had great autonomy in making international choices. Moreover, in order to pursue political power and support from its constituents it is quintessential to listen and pay attention to the general public's sentiments and demands. For example, the decreasing public support rate of President Moohyun

⁷⁷ Cheol Hee Park "Historical Memory and the Resurgence of Nationalism: A Korean Perspective," in Toshi Hasegawa and Kuzu Togo, eds. *East Asia's Haunted Past* (New York: Palgrave, 2008)

Roh soared sharply after his hawkish maneuver in dealing with historical controversies of Japan⁷⁸ accordingly; the administration continued the unyielding diplomacy with Japan.

Also, civil organizations like Chongdaehyop have huge influences on government decision making procedure as most of Korean public sympathize with the organizations' demands. Together with the general public's empathy to the organization, tight linkages between the civil organizations and politicians are notable as well. Large numbers of politicians have participated in the activities of Chongdaehyop and have supported its agendas. <Table 2> below indicates percentages that participated Chongdaehyop's signing campaign, and it shows more than half of politicians in Korea, regardless of their political inclination, support the civil organization's movement. Consequently, these factors diminish the negotiator's autonomy, hence the win-set size of Korea.

⁷⁸ [얼어붙은 한·일관계] 감정만 쌓인 '우정의 해' *Chosun Ilbo* December 5, 2005
http://weekly1.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2005/12/07/2005120777042.html

<Table 2. Ration of Signed Congressmen per Parties⁷⁹⁾>

	No. of Seats	No. of Signed Members	Percentage
Saenuri	154	95	62%
Democratic	127	126	99%
United Progressive	6	6	100%
Justice	5	5	100%
Independent	8	6	75%

Compare to Korean case, Japan's head negotiators seem to enjoy greater autonomy than Korea. Even with the existence of liberal civil organizations and activists that push Japanese government to compensate and make amends with Korea, troublesome remarks of politicians and visit to Yasukuni Shrine are yet to be stopped⁸⁰⁾. However, these behaviors of Japanese government are more likely to be interpreted as behaviors to attract and impress conservative constituents, rather than true autonomous decisions of the government. Japanese liberal forces of politics started to lose their power from the middle of 1990s as SDPJ and LDP coalition government took place. As a ruling party, SDPJ had to completely alter

⁷⁹⁾ "정대협의 "일본군 '위안부' 문제 해결을 위한 세계 1억인 서명운동"에 국회도 동참" <http://blog.naver.com/peace_hong?Redirect=Log&logNo=150173955917>

⁸⁰⁾ 최은미, "양면게임이론으로 분석해 본 한일 과거사 문제: 교과서 문제를 중심으로" 비교민주주의연구 제 7집. 2011

many of its key political directions such as Japan-US security treaty, opposition to the dispatch of Self Defense Forces, and so on⁸¹. Because of the sudden transform of SDPJ's identity, liberal forces of Japan discarded the linkages with politics and chose to take independent directions as grassroots organizations⁸². Contrarily, the voice of right-wing activists and politicians became even larger since the coalition government and especially when it comes to history controversies of Japan. Unlike liberal forces the conservative force of Japan, chose to work closely with political parties. Nihon Kaigi maintains robust relationship with conservative politicians through 「日本会議国会議員懇談会- The Council of Japanese Members of Parliament」 and large numbers of Japanese MPs supported international advertisements that deny forcibleness of comfort women⁸³ with extreme right wing civil organizations. Like Gerald Curtis puts in his interview with *Foreign Policy*, “even though the extreme right wing voice is not a majority sentiment in Japan, it happens to be a dominant sentiment among the group that is in power in Japan”⁸⁴. Therefore, the head negotiators ability to make decisions is heavily

⁸¹ 박철휘, “사회집단 구성의 동태적 발전과 정치적 연계에 관한 한일비교” *시민 사회의 정치과정: 한국과 일본의 비교* 아연출판부 2005

⁸² Ibid.,

⁸³ List of MPs that support “The Fact” advertisement in The Washington Post <<http://www.ianfu.net/sinjitu/rekishijijitu.html>> 29 members of LDP, 13 members of DPJ, 2 independent members are included in the list

⁸⁴ “Seven Questions: Japan’s Sex Slaves Problem” *Foreign Policy*, April 6, 2010. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/03/27/seven_questions_japans_sex_s

dependent on the influential groups of Japanese constituents and the strong influence of certain powers on government works as a diminishing factor of Japanese win-set size.

3. Negotiator's Strategy

Because the negotiation to settle comfort women issue is not a trade negotiation that seeks monetary or economic benefits but a negotiation between two countries' national identity, the yielding point of the negotiation is rather smaller than that of trade negotiation. Especially for Korea, comfort women issue is directly linked to Korea's modern national identity that evolved from the experience of colonization by Japan. Korea's head negotiator utilizes "tying hands" method to decrease the size of domestic win-set and to enlarge the bargaining power⁸⁵. "Tying hands" is a strategy that appeals to hawkish constituents of its country, and it can be utilized by making strong public statements to hardliners. The public statement works as a constraint that blocks the enlargement of its win-set and gives more leverage to the negotiator. For example, after vicious opposition from civil organizations to the Asian Women's Fund, Korean

[laves_problem](#)>

⁸⁵ 김태현 "외교와 정치-양면게임의 논리와 세계화 시대의 국제협상전략" *세종연구* 1998

government announced that “the government of Korea feels sorry that the AWF looks away the victims’ demands and fails to recognize the gravity of the matter. Japanese government should seek proper measurements that can meet victims’ claims in a timely manner⁸⁶”. Moreover, strategies to bring the issue to the international organizations or other foreign nations are prominent these days. By politicizing the comfort women issue and reporting the unrepentant attitude of Japan internationally, Korean side can widen the size of Japanese win-set. Both strategies are continuously employed by Korean government and a recent statement by President Geun-hye Park serves the two purposes well; in a meeting with the US senator Marco Rubio she states that “without any forward looking measurement on comfort women issue, the summit between Korea and Japan cannot be taken place, even if the summit happens it would be meaningless without it”⁸⁷.

On the other hand, Japan’s head negotiators tend to look for strategies that can expand the win-set size of Japan and Korea. Domestically, the right wingers may have powers, but internationally, the right wing oriented behavior of Japanese government can harm relationships not only with neighboring countries but with many other countries including the US. In 1990s, the coalition

⁸⁶ “일, 위안부 위로금 전달 강행” *HanKuk Ilbo*, January 12, 1997

⁸⁷ “朴대통령 "日 위안부 문제 조치없는 한일 정상회담 의미 없어" *Kukmin Ilbo*, January 25, 2014

government of SDPJ and LDP enlarged the domestic and international win-set size by defining the new government's prime agenda as reaching out to the Asian countries⁸⁸. The coalition government perceived the emergence of comfort women issue as an opportunity to make peace in Asia and clearing past history of Japan. The strong will of head negotiator enlarged the win-set of Japan and eventually made several repentant statements and attempts of reconciliation possible. Both of the first and second Abe cabinets seem to act a dangerous tightrope walk between attracting conservative domestic public and gaining international trust. Even though the Abe's cabinet member and himself produced numerous controversial remarks on Japan's wartime history and Kono Statement, Japanese government managed to gather the thoughts and retracted several comments on revisal of Kono Statement. Moreover, Prime Minister Abe openly expresses his willingness to have summit meeting with Korea and China while showing his will to maintain Kono Statement, which can be understood as a strategy to expand its own win-set size as well as Korea's win-set size. However, Abe's repeated visit to the Yasukuni Shrine had diluted the effectiveness of the strategy and led the failure of the strategy.

⁸⁸ Park, Cheolhee. *자민당 정권과 전후 체제의 변용*. 1st ed. Seoul : 서울대학교출판문화원, 2011. Print.

4. The New Paradigm of Two-Level Game?

Putnam did not specify the transnational lobbying as a factor that affects size of win-set in detail, however, the role of domestic interest groups is not a mere recipient of government's decision, but a leading participant that affects government's negotiating process⁸⁹. Kim Taehyun recognizes the importance of transnational lobbying in defining win-sets size, but he restricted the range of transnational lobbying to only between two nations that are participating in the negotiation⁹⁰. However, because the comfort women issue is transnational issue of human right, the participating nations in the resolution negotiation cannot be limited to Korea and Japan. As demonstrated in chapter 2, the internationalization of comfort women issue is now widely conducted throughout the world and the movement is not restricted to the nations that have direct linkages with the issue or international organization. Korean civil organizations' attempts to raise the awareness of comfort women issue in abroad can be a great example of the transnational lobbying that goes beyond the scope of two nations. The international pressures generated by civil organizations' efforts work as a factor that enlarges Japanese win-set size. However, Japanese extreme right wing

⁸⁹ 김태현 “외교와 정치-양면게임의 논리와 세계화 시대의 국제협상전략” 세종연구소 연구논문 1998

⁹⁰ Ibid,

oriented civil organizations' endeavors to spread their own ideas of comfort women issue in third party nations do not expand Korea's win-set size. The attempts can diminish the size of Japanese win-set by politicizing the issue domestically, but internationally, it rather works as a factor that enlarges Japan's win-sets as it is extremely rare to find sympathetic sentiments toward Japan's history amnesia.

5. Future Prospects

As described above, both of Korea and Japan have extremely small win-sets in dealing with comfort women issue. The nature of comfort women issue is widely accepted as a national identity problem by the general public of two countries and it makes the negotiation even harder than trade negotiation. Moreover, powerful civil organizations that show strong interconnection with politicians and public sentiments will not fade away any time soon. The small win-sets of both nations make the negotiation procedure hostile and uncooperative which eventually bring out the failure of the negotiation. Therefore, in order to find adequate resolutions between Korea and Japan it is necessary to utilize the existing win-sets and make them bigger.

Among all the factors that determine win-sets size of Korea and Japan, the negotiators strategy can be a crucial factor that makes great improvement in

comfort women issue. Two countries' Powerful civil organizations' stand points in comfort women issue are so radically contrasting it is virtually impossible to find its meeting points; Korean civil organization demands not only official compensation, but also legal punishment of people who collaborated with the recruitment and management of comfort women, while Japanese civil organizations deny the whole comfort women issue. Therefore, head negotiators' role in making peace is essential in creating zone of agreement between Korea and Japan. As shown in 1990s, the strong will of head negotiators enlarged the win-sets of Japan and made slight overlap between Japan's and Korea's win-sets possible. Even though the success did not last long, and the effort was tainted by the troublesome remarks of extremists, it was the only time that Japanese and Korean win-set overlapped. If Japan's head negotiator gives more weight to the international cooperation than domestic pride, and shows his willingness to accept victims' demand in proper manner, ultimately it can expand Japan's win-set and reach out to Korean win-set.

The other option that can magnify win-sets size is uniting Korean government's and civil organizations' perspective into one direction. The divisions between the strong NGOs and Korean government not only hamper the negotiation process but also make the victims suffer even more by delaying the resolution and drawing lines between people who received the AWF compensation

and who did not⁹¹. For the comfort women issue to be settled, it is crucial to find a half way meeting point between the NGO's demands and realistic demands that can be realized by Japanese government. For example, the legal punishment of people who collaborated with recruiting and managing the comfort women is extremely hard to be achieved. If Korean government and civil organizations can compromise on this demand, it could enlarge Japanese win-set significantly since other demands by the NGOs are reasonable and achievable.

⁹¹ 신영숙 “일본의 아시아평화국민기금에 대한 한국사회의 대응” *여성과 역사* 제 12집. 2012

Chapter 4

Conclusion

This thesis has analyzed the development of comfort women issue in 1990s and 2000s and attempted to examine the factors hinder the resolution negotiation between Korea and Japan. This thesis finds that governments as well as civil organizations of each nation are playing significant role in shaping one country's decision making process. By utilizing two-level game theory, this research studies three factors that affect the size of win-sets; homogeneity and heterogeneity of perspectives within domestic level, political institutions, and negotiator's strategy. Moreover, because comfort women issue is human right related controversy, other countries that do not share direct connection with the issue are participating in the development of the issue. Therefore, this research argues that transnational lobbying to the third party nations can be another factor that affects the size of win-sets hence the negotiating process.

To sum up, the comfort women issue between Korea and Japan can only be solved if there are overlapping zones between Japan's and Korea's win-sets. However, both Korea and Japan show very small win-sets when it comes to the comfort women issue. First of all, Korea as well as Japan shares diverging perspectives to look at the comfort women issue. Even though Korea seems to

have united viewpoint to look at the issue from outside, in the inside perspectives on what is appropriate measure to handle the issue, opinions diverged among Korean civil organizations and government. Needless to say, Japanese case is much clearer than Korean case. Perspectives on comfort women issue are dramatically contradicting in Japan between right-wingers and liberalist, and the dissensions among Japan diminish the win-set size of Japan. Secondly, both of Korean and Japanese government are democratic countries and cannot evade people's influence on them. Powerful civil organizations with loud voices connect closely with each of the government and restrain its power to make autonomous decisions. Consequently, the loss of head negotiators' autonomy brings about the reduction of win-sets sizes. The last factor is the only factor that shows difference between Korea and Japan. Korean head negotiator utilizes "tying hands" strategy to decrease the size of win-set while boosting up his bargaining power. Moreover, Korean head negotiators tend to report Japanese unrepentant attitude to other countries to expand Japanese win-set size. On the other hands, Japanese head negotiators try to enlarge both of domestic win-set and Korean win-set. Japanese head negotiator has repeatedly and publicly shown his willingness to have summit meeting with Korea and announced that Japanese government will not alter Kono Statement in order to expand Korean and Japanese win-set size simultaneously. However, the efforts of Japanese government tend to loss its effectiveness because of reiterated Yasukuni Shrine visit and problematic remarks of Japanese

politicians.

The new factors that play significant role in defining win-set sizes, but has not been gained focus in original two-level game theory is transnational lobbying to the third party nations. NGOs' and activists' endeavors to raise awareness of comfort women issue in countries like the US, Europe and so on can actually affect win-set sizes. Korean NGOs' efforts to notify the cruelty of comfort women issue has generated international pressure to push Japanese government to contrite and enlarge Japan's win-set sizes, on the other hand, Japanese NGOs attempts to spread out their own version of comfort women issue tend to backfire and produce more international pressure to Japan.

The history controversies between Korea and Japan have been continued for more than five decades. However, among all the problems Japan and Korea share, the comfort women issue needs to be solved as soon as possible as the victims of the vicious war crimes do not have much time. Time period between 1991 and 1995, the only period that Japan and Korea had zone of agreement can present great insight to resolute the issue. Thanks to the strong initiative by Japanese head negotiators and NGOs of both countries' in this time period, Korea and Japan could enjoy small overlaps between their win-sets. The strong will and strategy of Japanese head negotiator to resolute the comfort women issue can be a key to solve the long-held problem once again in the near future. The forward

looking attitude of Japanese head negotiators can enlarge the win-sets of Japan and eventually reach out to the Korean side of win-sets. And when it reached Korean win-sets, less rigid and pragmatic attitude of Korean side can make the negotiation successful.

Comfort women issue is a three dimensional challenge and it cannot be solved by looking at one direction. To draw successful and satisfactory results from the resolution negotiation, domestic factors, bilateral international factors, and multilateral international factors must be considered simultaneously. Since the comfort women issue requires prompt treatment, all the factors that affect apology making procedure must be utilized to enlarge win-sets sizes. Even though sudden changes in Japan's head negotiators' strategy is hard to be expected, ceaseless efforts of Korean government, civil organizations, and international forces can eventually make dramatic changes in Japanese head negotiator's strategy and bring justice to the victims.

Appendix

Relevant Documents

Statement by Prime Minister Miyazawa in Japanese

宮澤内閣総理大臣の大韓民国訪問における政策演説

(於ソウル)

(アジアのなか、世界のなかの日韓関係)

(日韓関係)

御列席の皆様、

日本国民は、貴国が世界の平和と自由と繁栄のため、努力してこられたことを知っています。1988年のオリンピックも、湾岸危機における多国籍軍への協力も、先般のアジア・太平洋経済協力閣僚会議の開催も、その一例だったと思います。日本国民は、貴国のそのような努力を高く評価し、その成功を心から喜んでいます。

貴国は今や世界の有力な国家であります。世界が貴国に期待する国際的役割もますます大きなものとなるでしょう。新しい世界への困難な航海をするに当たって、我が国が、そのような貴国を、歴史的、文化的な共通点の多い隣国として持っていることを、私は実に心強く感じます。このような貴国と我が国との間のゆるぎのない関係は、両国はもとよ

り、アジア、ひいては世界を大きく裨益するであります。そして、そのようなパートナーシップを、私は、「アジアのなか、世界のなかの日韓関係」としてとらえたいと思います。

このように重要なパートナーシップの基礎として、私たちは、何よりも両国間の信頼関係を確固たるものとしなければなりません。我が国と貴国との関係で忘れてはならないのは、数千年にわたる交流のなかで、歴史上の一時期に、我が国が加害者であり、貴国がその被害者だったという事実であります。私は、この間、朝鮮半島の方々が我が国の行為により耐え難い苦しみと悲しみを体験されたことについて、ここに改めて、心からの反省の意とお詫びの気持ちを表明いたします。最近、いわゆる従軍慰安婦の問題が取り上げられていますが、私は、このようなことは実に心の痛むことであり、誠に申し訳なく思っております。

さらに私は、先の大戦時に生きた人間の一人として、21世紀を担う次の世代に、私たちの世代の過ちを過ちとして伝え、これを二度と繰り返すことのないよう、歴史を正しく伝えていかなければならないと感じています。それは、私を含めて、私たちの世代の責任です。我が国はこれまでも日韓関係の正しい理解の普及に努めてまいりましたが、今後ともこのような努力を重ねてまいりたいと考えております。私は、過去の事実を直視する勇気、被害を受けられたひとびとの感情への理解、そして、二度とこうした過ちを繰り返さないという戒めの心を、国民のあいだ、とりわけ青少年たちのあいだにさらに培ってまいる決意です。

**Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama
on the "Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative"**

(August 31, 1994)

Next year will mark the 50th anniversary of the end of the war. With the anniversary approaching, I visited the Republic of Korea in July this year, and I have just completed a tour of Southeast Asian countries. Taking this opportunity, I would like to say a few words of explanation on the basic thinking behind Japanese external policy to make the historic anniversary truly significant.

1. Japan's actions in a certain period of the past not only claimed numerous victims here in Japan but also left the peoples of neighboring Asia and elsewhere with scars that are painful even today. I am thus taking this opportunity to state my belief, based on my profound remorse for these acts of aggression, colonial rule, and the like caused such unbearable suffering and sorrow for so many people, that Japan's future path should be one of making every effort to build world peace in line with my no-war commitment.

It is imperative for us Japanese to look squarely to our history with the peoples of neighboring Asia and elsewhere. Only with solid basis of mutual understanding and confidence that can be built through overcoming the pain on both sides, can we and the peoples of neighboring countries together clear up the future of Asia-Pacific.

With next year's historic 50th anniversary of the war's end, I believe it is necessary that such views are solidified and that we redouble our efforts for peace.

2. In keeping with this view, I would like to announce "Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative" to start in the 50th anniversary, 1995. I see this as a two-part Initiative.

One part consists of support for historical research, including the collection and cataloging of historical documents and support for researchers, to enable everyone to face squarely to the facts of history.

The other part consists of exchange programs to promote dialogue and mutual understanding in all walks of life through intellectual exchange, youth exchange and so on.

I would also like to include such other programs as deemed appropriate in light of the Initiative's objectives.

In addition, I would like to consider the establishment of an Asian Historical Document Center, which has been advocated, within this Initiative.

While this Initiative will focus primarily upon the neighboring Asian countries and areas where Japan's past actions have left deep scars even today, I also want to include other regions as appropriate in light of the Initiative's objectives.

This Initiative calls for the disbursement of about 100 billion over the next ten years, with the details now being worked out within the government for inclusion in the next year's budget.

3. On the issue of wartime "comfort women", which seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women, I would like to take this opportunity once again to express my profound and sincere remorse and apologies.

With regard to this issue as well, I believe that one way of demonstrating such feelings of apologies and remorse is to work to further promote mutual understanding with the countries and areas concerned as well as to face squarely to the past and ensure that it is rightly conveyed to future generations. This initiative, in this sense, has been drawn up consistent with such belief.

Along with the Initiative by the government, I would like to find out, together with Japanese people, an appropriate way which enables a wide participation of people so that we can share such feelings.

4. The government is keenly aware of the importance of international cooperation in such fields as the advancement of women and the enhancement of women's welfare.

I have been strongly concerned with the issues of women's human rights and

welfare. Knowing that the Fourth World Conference on Women is scheduled to be held in Beijing next year to formulate new guidelines for the advancement of women toward the 21st century, the government intends to place even greater emphasis on economic cooperation in such fields as the advancement of women and the enhancement of women's welfare, including, for example, vocational training centers for women, particularly in relation to the neighboring Asian countries and areas.

5. With this "Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative" as the basic framework, the government also intends to make good-faith efforts in the following areas.

a. One is the issue on permanent repatriation of ethnic Koreans residing in Sakhalin. This issue cries out for our attention particularly from a humanitarian perspective, and the government intends to decide upon the support policies as soon as possible, in full consultation with the governments of Republic of Korea and Russian Federation, and to implement them as they are firmed up.

b. The other is the issue of "established financial obligations" to the people concerned in Taiwan, including the non-payment of wages and the status of military postal savings accounts, which have long defied solution. Considering the facts including that the creditors are increasingly aging year by year, the government intends to work to meet these established obligations as soon as possible.

6. While almost half a century has passed since the end of the war, a vast majority of people today have not experienced the war. In order to make sure that the horrors of war be never again repeated, we should not forget about the war. It is all the more essential in this time of peace and abundance that we reflect on the errors in our history, convey to future generations the horrors of war and the many lives that were lost, and work continuously for lasting peace. I believe that this is the responsibility which the political leadership and the Administration of Japan should bear together with each and every Japanese.

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국문초록

양면게임이론으로 분석한 위안부 문제

본 연구는 독도-다케시마 문제와 같이 한국과 일본의 주권 문제가 아닌 여성인권 문제로 새롭게 부각되고 있는 위안부 문제를 중심으로 한 일관계의 쟁점이 되고 있는 사과의 역학관계를 살펴보고자 한다. 연구의 대상이 되는 시기는 위안부 문제가 한일양국 사이에 외교적 쟁점으로 떠오르기 시작한 1990년대와 위안부 문제가 또 다시 국제적 문제가 되기 시작한 2000년대 중반부터 현재까지이다.

위안부 문제를 해결하기 위해 한일양국의 정부와 시민단체의 많은 노력이 있었음에도 불구하고 위안부 문제는 아직도 한일양국의 외교적 관계를 위협하는 가장 큰 요소로 자리잡고 있다. 그리고 위안부 문제는 한일양국의 강력한 시민단체들이 문제의 발전과 해결에 막대한 영향력을 행사하는 문제이다. 따라서 위안부 문제를 이해하고 그 해결책을 모색하기 위해서는 각국의 정부의 교섭과정만을 분석하는 것이 아닌 정부와 시민단체들의 관계, 시민단체들간의 관계 등을 종합적으로 살펴봐야 한다. 따라서 본 연구는 양국의 정부간 교섭과 정부와 국내 트 퍼트남의 양면게임이론과 윈셋의 개념을 활용한다. 그리고 윈셋의 크기에 영향을 주는 국내집단의 이해, 정치적 제도와 비준 절차, 국제

협상담당자의 전략을 한일양국의 각각의 상황에 대입해 위안부 문제와 관련한 사과와 협상이 어려운 이유를 설명하고자 했다. 또한 2000년대에 들어서 위안부 문제가 한일양국만의 문제가 아닌 국제적 이슈로 부각되고 있는 것을 중심으로 양면게임이론의 새로운 가능성을 알아보하고자 한다.