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국제학 석사학위논문

**A Study on the Movement for the
Establishment of Showa Day**

**Legislation Promoted by
a Religious Group and a Conservative Society**

쇼와의 날 제정운동에 관한 연구

종교단체와 보수시민단체가 추진한 법제정

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Abstract

A Study on the Movement for the Establishment of Showa Day

Legislation Promoted by a Religious Group and a Conservative Society

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This research attempts to examine implications of the revision of Japan's National Holiday Law (*Kokumin no shukujitsu ni kansuru hōritsu*), which determined April 29 as Showa Day (*Showa no hi*) in 2005, focusing on a civil movement called the "Showa Day Network." Their movement for changing the law is analyzed by dividing its activities into four stages: initial preparation, organizational development, legislation support, and post-revision celebration. The campaign, which a religious group had initiated, was subsumed by larger conservative civil groups, and evolved into collective actions involving many conservative individuals. Interestingly, although people sympathizing the movement steadily increased, only a small number of enthusiastic actors were

the anchors of the movement.

It is partially possible to conclude that creating Showa Day, an anniversary with national narrative of a specific era, was a part of Japan's nationalistic trend. However, the campaign process was filled with perseverance and compromise for the Showa Day Network, which is characterized by an emperor-centric mentality. For example, the Japanese society, in 2005, rejected the Shinto religion-related Showa Day, which resulted in a delayed implementation. In addition, the legal significance of Showa Day was neutralized in term of the emperor in order to promote a holiday that was acceptable to the general public. In this sense, people can see Showa Day as a "post-modernized" anniversary, where no dominant interpretation was allowed.

When it comes to democratic procedures in Japan, the recent revisions showed a change in the democratic justification in that it lacked public poll in the legislative process. When compared to similar movements in the 1960s and 1970s for Foundation Day and the reign-name system respectively, the Showa Day bill passed without a grasp of public opinion as a whole. Accomplishments and consequences of the campaign enabled proponents to claim their democratic legitimacy at the Diet. The movement for Showa Day exemplified that bills would pass in a democratic manner even without knowing how many opposing and indifferent people are there. Although polls are merely a reference

for legislation, it is likely that the absence of the nationwide poll survey leads to an overestimation of the opinions of groups that try to accomplish their political goals by taking advantage of organizational strength.

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Keywords: Showa Day, conservative movement in Japan, democratic legitimacy, National Holiday Law, Emperor Hirohito

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I . Introduction

The Showa era (1926–1989) had the longest time span in the Japanese reign-name system, where the historical period is divided by the reign of the emperor. For this reason, evaluations of the Showa era spanning sixty-four years are quite diverse. Showa was an era of recession and war in the early twenty years, which was followed by rapid economic growth, placing Japan as the second biggest following the United States. Given these bright aspects, people’s interests in the developments and glories of the Showa era might be natural during the Heisei era (1989–), which began with the collapse of the bubble economy and reforming international order. In contrast to the positive attention attracted to Showa’s brightness, memories of the era have been causing conflicts between the left and right. Interpretations regarding the war, colonial rules over Asian countries, responsibility of Emperor Showa (Hirohito) himself, or postwar system have culminated in friction of ideologies as domestic division has been preserved without optimistic prospect.

On May 13, 2005, the National Holiday Law (*Kokumin no shukujitsu ni kansuru hōritsu*) was amended in Japan, and as a result April 29, which had been Greenery Day (*Midori no hi*) until then, was altered to Showa Day (*Showa no hi*). This revision changed the significance of April 29 from “a day to enjoy

and thank nature” to “a day to reflect on the Showa era” although it did not increase the number of holidays. The previous emperor was deeply related to the date in the background of a request for Showa Day. During the Showa era, April 29 had been celebrated as Emperor’s Birthday. In 1989, the day lost a ground for being a holiday because of the death of Hirohito, but it was left as a new holiday: Greenery Day. In short, the date was re-revised as Showa Day in 2005. In discussion at the National Assembly, the Showa Day proponents tried to retain the former Emperor’s Birthday, which was widely familiar among the people, to look back at the era of Showa.¹

However, it was the shadow of the emperor that obstructed the enactment of Showa Day. Japan’s holidays are prescribed in the National Holiday Law (enacted in 1948) after the Second World War. In 1948, Japan revised its prewar holidays under the occupation of the GHQ, so that they conformed to a new constitutional system. As a result, anniversaries related to the emperor were removed or revised with abstracted implications (Kim Y. 2000, 350). The amendment at that time was initiated under a purpose to replace emperor-centric holidays with people-centric alternatives. Therefore, opponents of Showa Day in the twenty-first century raised the sovereignty of the people to

¹ For the meaning of Showa Day provided by promoters, see the prospectus at Appendix 2.

counteract the attempt to leave April 29 as a holiday.²

Given this opposing reaction, controversies over revision in 2005 would be a good case showing how Japan confronted not only this 64-year-age but also the emperor system. Then, under the controversies and taboos of emperor-related holidays, who were the leading actors and individuals in the recent legal change? Why was it revised in 2005, when no less than seventeen years had already passed since the reign switched? Indeed, the enactment of this new holiday was led from private sector—a civil society called the Showa Day Network.³ In order to answer the questions above and discuss implications of the legal change in 2005, this study traces the revision process with which civil society was deeply concerned. Particularly, a process of organizing the Showa Day Network is discussed. Regarding the political landscape in Japan, it has long been told that Japan is shifting towards the right. As many analysts point out, Japan in recent decades has steered itself to conservative directions both politically and militarily, compared to when economic development was

² Members of Japanese Communist Party had continuously opposed to the Showa Day bill since the beginning of the Diet session in 2000. For example, see the Diet record of the Committee on Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (H.C., May 11, 2000).

³ The word “Showa Day Network” is used as a generic term representing movement bodies. The actors not only repeated reorganizations accompanied by the movement’s development but formed other organizations subordinate to the main body. The Showa Day Network represents all of these organizational entities. Meanwhile, name of each is referred when specifying and describing each form that actors needed along the times and for issues. However, organizations (mainly external organizations) whose purposes of establishment were not to realize Showa Day are not included the word “Showa Day Network” even if they participated in the movement toward Showa Day.

prioritized during the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, conservative citizens have built a cooperative structure, and therefore the civilian-led Japan Conference (*Nippon kaigi*; formed in 1997) is believed to control the Abe administration in the shade. It is undeniable that formation of the conservative network, with the Japan Conference or the Association of Shinto Shrines (*Jinja honcho*) put on the center, is considerably advanced and that liberals are no longer able to take effective resistance measures. However, focusing only on the result of rightward trend—realizations of conservative groups or policies—could lead to misjudgment on the Japanese society that respects democratic procedures. In this sense, following the enactment would provide implications for Japan’s democracy, and prospects for likely directions in which the current Japan is headed too.

II. Literature Review and Methodology

1. Previous Research on Memorial Days

Research on memorial days has been carried out both from macro and micro viewpoints so far. Although this study is conducted with a microscopic approach, focusing on individuals involved in legislation, macro viewpoints are indispensable to call into question the current national holiday system itself.

Hence, in this section, the macro discussion on memorial days is grasped before summarizing microscopic research related to Showa Day.⁴

1-1. Macroscopic Approach

First, scholars who discuss holidays from macroscopic points of view are interested in national identities or significance of memorial days. Indeed, it is unique to focus on national memorial days as a representation of national identities. The works have pointed out the characteristics and changes of the national identities. Following historical developments of state anniversaries is one effective approach to feature the identities. Kim Yong-Eui (2000, 350–352) asserts that a close relationship between the royal family and the national holidays is preserved in Japan with ambiguous holiday titles despite a fact that many holidays were revised after the war. Here, superficial changes in the law are not regarded as a fundamental shift in terms of Japan’s national holidays. Meanwhile, Kim Min-Hwan (2000, 71) pointed out a macro social change seen through the holiday system, researching the transition of Korean national commemoration days since the liberation. He argues the meaning of Korean anniversaries changed in 1948 and 1987, when Korea faced state building and

⁴ The word “national holiday” is used as a narrow concept included in a “memorial day” in this thesis. While a certain day with specific meaning is regarded as a memorial day in a broad sense, national holidays are limited in that their meaning is determined by nation-states. Furthermore, non-off days given meaning by states is written as national memorial days.

democratization. This demonstrates that changes in anniversaries represent macro social trends, so the time classification corresponds to the experience of major social changes that a society experiences. Furthermore, international comparison through national memorial days has been another way so as to find uniqueness of each country. Kim Tae-Ho (2011, 149–150) compares and examines the historical background of national memorial days in Japan and Korea. According to him, in Korea, there are many national anniversaries derived from historical events related to the Japanese colonialism, whereas many in Japan are related to the emperor and the imperial family as Kim Yong-Eui maintains.

Researchers on memorial days argue significance of the days as well as national identities. For example, Sonoda (1994) sees the significance as a function of integration in a society. He argues that “holidays would be important pauses that mark rhythm of life in a society. Through the holidays, the people expect to refresh social vitality, and confirm communality and solidarity among them” (Sonoda 1994, 5). Simply put, religious aspects and myth related to holidays are emphasized by Sonoda. Likewise, Tokoro (2008, 2–6, 60–61) underscores a close connection between national holidays and religions discussing original meaning of holidays and establishments in various countries. Stressing this relationship between holidays and religious elements

problematizes the current National Holiday Law in Japan, which calls national holidays “*shukujitsu*” (meaning celebration day) while excludes “*saijitsu*” (implying religious ritual). Japan removed the religious color when establishing the National Holiday Law in 1948, but it is a fact that the current holidays derived from at least three types of historical origins: seasonal rituals, national events, life time events (Tokoro 2008, 61–71). For Tokoro, the current law is insufficient in that it cannot cover the religious essence of national holiday. Considering these previous studies, the national holiday system seems to reproduce historically accumulated culture in each country, and in the case of Japan, the concerned memory can be emperor-centric rituals.

However, some do not see the function of memorial days as fixed. Johnston (1991) argues that the meaning of celebration is drawing people’s attentions—referring to cases of European and American memorial days which newly emerged in the 1980s. Celebration is regarded as post-modernized, and discourses are not unilaterally reproduced through memorial days in contemporary times of individualized people. The interpretations of happenings in the past are no longer monopolized by academic historians studying specific events, so “commemoration has all but superseded less manipulative forms of collective memory” (51). Then, memorial days have meaningful in that “[s]o long as celebrands get discussed, whether in praise or censure, sponsors achieve

their goal of enhancing national identity” (47). It is impossible to seek a specific discourse in the national holiday system, which is a characteristic of post-modernized era. Johnston’s argument would give crucial suggestion if the Japanese society shows post-modern features.

1-2. Microscopic Approach

As another methodology of research related to memorial days, microscopic approach has paid attention to processes of memory politics. Establishment of an anniversary has been thought as not only creating a certain memory in an institutional way but also eliminating memories that conflict with the authorized memory. A creation of a memorial day is a result of competitions by various actors with different interests, and research with microscopic approach has revealed establishing, or fixing, processes of anniversaries by looking at campaign players. In Japan, mass media and citizens’ groups contributed as notable players.

Satō (2005) concluded that, around 1955, mass media such as newspapers and radio exerted great influence on a formation of the end-of-war narrative of August 15 which formed the postwar Japanese identity.⁵ In the first

⁵ The End-of-War Memorial Day (*Senbotsusha o tsuitō shi heiwa o kinen suru hi*; August 15) is just a memorial day decided by Suzuki Zenkō Cabinet’s decision in 1982, but the day is memorized as the most impressive day and has worked as a meaningful institution of memory in postwar Japan.

place, there was no legal ground that August 15 was the date of concluding the Second World War, but the focal point of Japanese people's memory over the war moved from "defeat = occupation" to "the end of the war = peace" because of the mass media-led social recognition (117–118). Thereafter, while the element of the surrender anniversary of September 2 was forgotten, August 15 provided comfortable end-of-war historical views for both conservatives who believe that *kokutai* (national polity) was protected by the imperial decision and progressives who think that a revolutionary change was realized (256).

While Satō emphasized the role of mass media for a social consolidation of a memorial day, Ruoff (2001) took notice of political influence of conservative civil groups in the processes of restoration of conservative time system, namely enactments of Foundation Day (*Kenkoku kinen no hi*; enacted in 1966) and the reign-name system (*Gengōhō*; enacted in 1979). Especially, "the movement to re-establish Foundation Day (1951–66) deserves special attention because it was the first movement led by far right groups that succeeded both in attracting considerable numbers of supporters and in achieving its basic political goals" (159). Through these movements prior to Showa Day enactment, "the far right learned how to mount a successful campaign in the democratic political order" (159). It is no doubt that this socio-political change vividly exemplifies Japan's rightward trend at that time.

These two campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s offered conservative actors opportunities for their expansion, bringing them know-how about extensive collective actions. Particularly in the 1970s, the shift of movement method from targeting the political center—the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—to encouraging the grassroots actions to organize public demands greatly contributed to successful development of the rightists' movement. Leftists' traditional methods, petitions and resolution movement to local councils, organizational signature collection, and large-scale meetings, turned to be new features seen in the conservative campaigns too. Recently, the know-how has been handed down to the current conservative movements.⁶ Additionally, the religious groups, at this time, achieved a wide range of unity through commonality of worship toward the emperor. It was not until the “Emperor’s 50th Anniversary Ceremony” in 1976 that they cooperated with others. The cooperation during the 1970s for legally establishing reign-name system culminated in the formation of the Japan Conference.⁷ More importantly, however, the unity of conservatives is not monolithic in spite of solid supports from such larger groups, therefore allowing differences in their views toward

⁶ For the current movements, see Sugano (2016, 100–105, 120–128).

⁷ The Japan Conference was established in 1997 by reorganizing the Association to Protect Japan (*Nihon o mamoru kai*) and the National Conference for Protecting Japan (*Nihon o mamoru kokumin kaigi*). The former was founded in 1974 and led by religious players such as the Association of Shinto Shrines and the *Seichō no ie*, while the later was a group of a wider range of figures from academic, business, religious, and political circles. For further discrimination, see Aoki (2016, 18–23).

Yasukuni Shrine or interpretations of the current constitution (Nakajima 1980, 53–54).

Ruoff mentioned this diversity within the conservatives too, and added that the legal changes in 1966 and 1979 were possible within a framework of the postwar new constitution. It is necessary to confirm that the democratic diversity, regardless of whether it is intra-camp or trans-camp diversity, is guaranteed under the spirit of the constitution even behind the conservative reforming movements. In Ruoff's words,

Foundation Day and the reign-name system enjoyed popular backing, but only in the context of the postwar-system defined by the new constitution. [...] Although the throne has remained a central nationalistic symbol, pre-war-style *kokutai* myths have proved unappealing to the majority of Japanese citizens. Indeed, questions about how the re-established Foundation Day should be celebrated generated stark division within the political right. (Ruoff 2001, 159–160)

In light of the public sense of opposition to the far right ideas and the “stark division” within the same camp, it would be still difficult to set a certain identity for anniversaries since the division means that people do not deem acceptable to interpret the memory in a single way. This possible diversity of people's interpretations is a basis of the “post-modernized celebration.”

As seen above, interpretations infused into an anniversary cannot be standardized in one way. In the case of Showa Day, the enactment cannot be said to present Japan's national identity based only on the amendment. Rather, further studies with microscopic approach should take a look at the diversity and changes of discourse about the era of Showa or the emperor system. Nonetheless, individuals involved in establishing Showa Day have not attracted academic attentions. Although some scholars refer to significance of the amendment, intentions of the government or politicians as a whole are emphasized since it is viewed in a macro context (Brinckmann 2008, 9–10; Dower 2012, 126). It is necessary to investigate not only the governmental or legislative agents but how civil societies, mass media, and individuals interacted with one another.

As to civil engagement in Showa Day promotion, partial works have been accumulated. Han (2015) refers to the Showa Day enactment with a perspective of Japan's postwar history. According to her description, national holidays stipulated in Japan's law had lacked historical narratives since the law was enacted in 1948, but a political project aiming at infusing historical meaning into April 29 and rebuilding national identity, with the emperor placed on the center, realized in line with ideas of minor people in 2005. Han (2015, 75) concluded that "the revision was an action trying to re-historicize the National

Holiday Law that had been de-historicized.” As a journalist, Narusawa (2007) touched upon parties involved in the Showa Day movement, pointing out that participants in the campaign are activists at other existing right-wing organizations. Still, these works did not mention the relationships among actors concerned, and indications are fragmentary. After all, comprehensive and systematic research on the citizens’ organizational structure for Showa Day has not been done. Thus, this research aims to discuss macro social implications of the amendment by revealing in detail human and organizational relations that the Showa Day Network constructed.

2. Research Methodology

2-1. Materials

The amendment of the National Holiday Law (enacted in 2005 and enforced in 2007) stipulating Showa Day was initiated with a request from civil organizations called the Showa Day Network as mentioned already. Although many organizations were involved in this citizens’ movement, the Showa Day Network deserves attention as a leading role for the activities. It was originally established as the Preparation Club for Showa Day Promotion Network in 1994, and supported the process of the amendment from the private terrain, repeating

evolutional reorganizations. After the legislation of Showa Day, they got a corporate status as a Non-profit organization in 2006, and now continues activities by holding a commemoration ceremony on April 29 every year.

Among those engaging in the campaign, Aizawa Hiroaki is an unavoidable person for this research because he was a pivotal figure who initiated and led the activities of the Showa Day Network. Currently, Aizawa serves as a vice chairman of the NPO Showa Day Network, and has long led *Tendensha* (展転社), a publishing company, and the Association of Japanese National Polity (*Nihon kokutai gakkai*). These two entities with which Aizawa is deeply involved left documents about the activities for the revision. Therefore, this thesis utilizes them to examine the Showa Day Network led movement. For example, *Tendensha* published *A Record of the Movement toward Showa Day* and *A Guidebook of Celebration Days in Japan*.⁸ Meanwhile, the Association of Japanese National Polity published *Kokutaibunka* and *Risshō* as monthly bulletins. Aside from the above mentioned documents, *Kokuchūkai* (国柱会), a religious corporate sharing the same ideological origin with Aizawa, has published a monthly magazine called *Shinsekai*. Similarly, *Senshō* is a group's paper of the Youth Council of Tanaka Chigaku Successors (a previous

⁸ The original titles of the two books are '*Showa no hi' jitsugen eno michi* (*Kirokushū*) and *Nihon no shukusajitsu o kangaeru* respectively.

organization of the Preparation Club). These serial publications illustrate how the campaign was promoted from viewpoints at that time.

In addition to these written materials, an interview with Aizawa and Kaneko Munenori, the current director of the Association of the Japanese National Polity, was conducted on August 1, 2016. Also, a participatory observation at Showa Day ceremony, on April 29, 2016, also gave insight for this research. The interview and the participation is mentioned as what provide additional information. Regarding other actors than the campaigners, such as mass media and politicians, nationwide daily newspapers and the Diet record are cited.

2-2. Analytical Framework

In this paper, changing process of the movement are analyzed by dividing the Showa Day Network's movement into four stages. The first stages (–1993) is a period for initial preparation. This period is until Aizawa and his comrades set a movement's goal as revision of Greenery Day, and its origin dates back to the Meiji era when Tanaka Chigaku, a Nichirenism Buddhist in the era, led a similar movement. The Second stage (1994–1998) is a period of the organizational development. During this phase, the Showa Day Network expanded its network connection with other conservative civil societies. The third stage (1998–2005)

is defined by activities that were exclusively conducted in the National Assembly (legislation support). This stage contributed to the Showa Day Network deepening ties with the Diet members, while no remarkable social expansion is observed because they concentrated mainly on legislative negotiation in the Diet. The fourth and last phase (2005–) is a time for post-revision celebration, and an amendment of Culture Day (October 3) came up as a new agenda.

For a comprehensive analysis, a theoretical framework for social movement studies is employed for examining the Showa Day Network. By taking over MacAdam's attempt to integrate competing social movement models, Hasegawa (2008, 41) defines the social movement as "collective actions with dissatisfactions and reform intentionality." Employing Hasegawa's analytical frame, this research will pay attentions especially to the three factors of movements: reform intentionality, dissatisfactions, and collective actions found in the Showa Day Network's campaign.⁹

First of all, the reform intentionality means goal levels of movements. This is observed as names of the day or the provisions stipulated in the future law which would define the characteristics of Showa Day. In fact, although the reform goal was to realize Showa Day, the goal setting varied throughout the

⁹ For each definition, see Hasegawa (2008, 43–45).

movement. In particular, changes in the provisions are discussed because they brought completely different significance of Showa Day as a national commemoration day. Next, the dissatisfaction is defined as motivations that each movement actor felt to aims to achieve Showa Day. Roughly speaking, although the overall direction of the movement was to rename Showa Day for realizing meaningful April 29, diverse actors engaged in the movement with different motivations. Lastly, collective actions are examined as resource mobilization ability and political opportunity structure that the movement actors can utilize. In the context of the Showa Day amendment, network making among right groups and relationships with politicians are mentioned. Simply put, there are three main categories that formed the network: Aizawa's closest circle (Chigaku's pupils), scholars belonging to the National Conference for Protecting Japan (*Nihon o mamoru kokumin kaigi*; abbreviated as National Conference), and the congressmen. Hasegawa's theoretical frame is useful in that it can comprehensively analyze both why movements arise and how they are advanced.

Ⅲ. The National Holiday Law and its Revisions in the Past

Legal basis of the national anniversary of Japan is the National Holiday Law. This chapter views the process of the related revisions of the National Holiday Law from the past to the present.

1. The National Holiday Law

The National Holiday Law consists of the three articles, and the article 1 as a basic principle is defined as follows: these are days when all Japanese people celebrate, thank, or commemorate in order to raise beautiful customs, built a better society, and enjoy a more prosperous life. It should not be neglected that the anniversaries need to be for *all* Japanese people. The word “*all*” often became the point at issue in debating whether proposed days were appropriate for national holidays.

Predecessor of the 1948 National Holiday Law was the Act on Holidays (*Kyūjitsu ni kansuru ken*; enacted in 1912), and holidays determined by 1927 originated from the imperial family’s events or folk events (Kim Y. 2000, 347–348). However, because of the Shinto repeal ordinance and the sovereignty

transfer from the emperor to the people based on the spirit of the new constitution, these emperor-originating holidays inappropriate for the constitution disappeared. Otherwise, the obvious associated with the imperial tradition were inherited with new abstract titles (Kim Y. 2000, 350). *Kigen-setsu* (Foundation Day) and *Meiji-setsu* (Meiji emperor's birthday) are these examples. The former was completely abolished and the latter was renamed Culture Day in 1948.

However, *Kigen-setsu* was attracting popular supports in a public poll about holidays held in 1948.¹⁰ Behind the exclusion of this holiday, it is pointed out that the creation of new holidays was affected by an intention of William K. Bunce, a chief of the religious division of the GHQ.¹¹ Bunce's intention worked as pressure when the National Assembly at that time decided holidays and the framework of the national holiday system in postwar Japan (Arai 1967, 35). Consequently, politicians were unable to follow the public opinion supporting *Kigen-setsu* because a brand-new state building was requested along the GHQ's preference and new constitutional philosophy. It can be said that "national emotions" were rejected for the "new spirit" pursued at the time (Satō

¹⁰ Regarding a detailed process of the survey, see Satō (2008, 109–118).

¹¹ Arai (1967, 35) mentioned what Bunce had informed the Japanese lawmakers of: "If February 11 remains as *Kigen-setsu*, it would give both the Japanese and foreigners an impression that what the Japanese government intended with *Kigen-setsu* remains intact. Even if it is on other days, the name "*Kigen-setsu*" is not good."

2008, 111-112, 116–117). As a result, the lost commemoration day became targets that the postwar conservatives tried to retrieve, and the far right in the 1960s took advantage of the democratic legitimacy that was proved through the poll when reviving Foundation Day (*Kenkoku kinen no hi*). Meiji Day, on the other hand, is now demanded through an on-going movement in 2017.¹²

Table 1. Revisions of the National Holiday Law

	1927	1948	1966	1985	1989	2005
<i>February 11</i>	Foundation Day (<i>Kigen-setsu</i>)		Foundation Day (<i>Kenkoku kinen no hi</i>)			
<i>April 29</i>	Emperor's Birthday (<i>Tenchō-setsu</i>)	Emperor's Birthday (<i>Tennō tanjōbi</i>)	Emperor's Birthday (<i>Tennō tanjōbi</i>)	Emperor's Birthday (<i>Tennō tanjōbi</i>)	Greenery Day	Showa Day
<i>May 4</i>				National Holiday	National Holiday	Greenery Day
<i>November 3</i>	Meiji Emperor's Birthday (<i>Meiji-setsu</i>)	Culture Day	Culture Day	Culture Day	Culture Day	Culture Day

¹² Nikaido Yuki and Abe Ryutaro, “Meiji no jidai koso taisetsu, furikaeru hi ni,” *Asahi Shinbun*, November 2, 2016.

As of 2017, the National Holiday Law has revised ten times, and there are 16 national commemoration days defined by the law. Picking up days concerned with this paper, Table 1 summarizes the holidays stipulated in each revision from 1927 to 2005.¹³

2. The Revision for Greenery Day: Confirmation of Post-war Practice

One trigger for the Showa Day movement was a preceding amendment in 1989, resulting from the demise of the Emperor Showa on January 7, 1989. Accompanied by the abdication of the emperor's throne, the holiday "Emperor's Birthday" was moved from April 29 to December 23, so April 29, the previous emperor's birthday, was meant to lose a legal ground as a holiday. However, the cabinet at that time wanted to leave the date as a holiday; thus, formed the "Council on the Revision of the National Holiday Law Associated with Imperial Succession" as an advisory body under the Chief Cabinet Secretary (January 19, 1989).¹⁴ The Cabinet made a decision to leave April 29 as Greenery Day on the basis of opinions of the twenty-five experts.¹⁵

¹³ In 1985, it was stipulated that a day whose previous and next days are both national holidays becomes legal off-day (*kokumin no kyūjitsu*). As a result, May 4—sandwiched between Foundation Day (May 3) and Children's Day (May 5)—became a law-defined holiday. Therefore, the revision in 2005 that moved Greenery Day to May 4 did not increase off-days.

¹⁴ "'Showa' satte shukujitsu rongi," *Nikkei*, February 2, 1989, evening edition.

¹⁵ "4 gatsu 29 nichi o 'Midori no hi' ni," *Mainichi Shinbun*, January 25, 1989.

Consequently, the law was amended with the bill submitted by the Cabinet. At this point, this new Greenery Day was defined as “a day to enjoy nature, thank the benefit, and foster healthy mind.” As seen in this provision, no longer were there shadow of Emperor Showa left in the law.

The government at the time chose to hold a meeting of experts selected among the people for democratic reasoning. Inviting businesspersons, scholars, and journalists, the expert meeting was conducted with two points at issue: whether to return April 29 to the weekdays, and an appropriate name for the new holiday.¹⁶ The date was decided to remain a holiday because it had been Emperor’s Birthday for more than sixty years, and therefore was widely accepted as the first day of the Golden Week, consecutive holidays in Japan from April 29 to May 5. In regard to the name of the day, the government and the leading figures in the LDP was strongly pushing Greenery Day as the most appropriate plan since it befits the season and the date is close to a tree-planting festival, which Hirohito used to attend every year.¹⁷

In contrast, an issue of Showa Day was a political burden for the government. Name such as “Showa Day” or “Showa Commemoration Day” was declined from the beginning by the government being conscious of

¹⁶ The Diet record of the Committee on the Cabinet (H.R., February 10, 1989).

¹⁷ “‘Midori no hi’ wa bunanna sentaku,” *Yomiuri Shinbun*, January 25, 1989.

removing a politically tense issue.¹⁸ Rather than Showa Day, political figures were busy with managing conflicts over forms of Hirohito's funeral and Akihito's coronation ceremony.¹⁹ Reasonably, ruling and opposition parties, the Cabinet members, and governmental officials raised no objection to leave April 29 as a holiday at that time.²⁰ It is obvious that the government was reluctant to bring the politically sensitive emperor as the point of an argument, and accordingly chose less persuasive democratic justification—experts' meeting.

After the meeting and the Cabinet's decision, the 1948 holiday system was preserved inside the law at the National Assembly. Following the fact that the former Emperor's Birthday was memorized with ambiguous name like Culture Day, Hirohito's birthday was also neutralized its meaning as Greenery Day. The precedent of neutralization made in 1948 was called "the pretext of the National Holiday Law (*shukujitsuho no tatemae*)" at a Diet session in 1989 by Matoba Junzō, a representative answerer from the Cabinet.²¹ The death of Hirohito led to a confirmation of the pretext as Japan's historical practice.

¹⁸ "Goseikyo de shukujitsuho kaisei no hōshin," *Asahi Shinbun*, January 7, 1989, evening edition.

¹⁹ Regarding this political conflicts over Hirohito's funeral and Akihito's coronation, see Watanabe (2001, 88–110).

²⁰ In the Diet deliberation at the Committee on the Cabinet (H.C., February 14, 1989), Yanagisawa Renzō was the only person who was in favor of Showa Day.

²¹ The Diet record of the Committee on the Cabinet (H.C., February 14, 1989).

3. The Revision for Showa Day: Prolonged Deliberation at the Diet

The Showa Day bill, which was submitted to the Diet in the form of an act of parliament, was deliberated over a period of six years until 2005. Prior to the first bill submission in 2000, multi-partisan parliamentary league to promote Showa Day was formed in April 1998 assigning Watanuki Tamisuke, a member of the Lower House, as a president. This establishment of the politicians' group attracted mass media's concerns, so the movement became to be known among the public.²² The support for the league expanded, and 227 lawmakers had already joined immediately after its inauguration (RED 1998, 42). In 1999, the number of politicians reached the majority in both houses, so they entered a bill-making stage for legislation. The bill finalized by the league said that "Showa Day is for thinking about the future of the country by recalling (*shinobu* しのぶ) the era of Showa, when the turbulent days and recovery had been undergone."²³ Nevertheless, the bill was modified in March 2000 before the submission due to the opposition from the New Komeito in the process of checking the bill by three promoting parties. It was because the word "recall reminds people of the particular person," so the word was replaced with a

²² Articles concerning Showa Day increased in the *Asahi Shinbun* and the *Yomiuri Shinbun* from 1998.

²³ "Shukujitsuoh kaiseian, Komeito ga sansei," *Mainichi Shinbun*, March 7, 2000.

phrase “reflecting on (*kaerimiru* 顧みる) the era of Showa.”²⁴ Since this modification, the bill had not been altered.

The bill of Showa Day was submitted to the House of Councilors first in 2000. At this time, most people concerned thought that this bill would pass without any trouble since the three parties favoring the bill kept the majority seats in the Diet. This prospect was reflected in the coverage of the newspapers in spite of some opposing opinions from liberal mass media.²⁵ Submitted on March 30, the bill was deliberated in the Upper House committee in May, and passed at a plenary session on May 12. The situation, however, drastically changed because of a comment by Mori Yoshirō, Prime Minister at that time. On May 15, attending the meeting of the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership (*Shinto seiji renmei*), Mori, referring to the Showa Day bill, addressed that Japan is a country of gods centered on the emperor. This remark stimulated liberal mass media and they criticized Mori’s old-fashioned view toward the emperor, writing about Showa Day in negative ways.²⁶ In the end, opposing parties refused to attend a committee session of the Lower House on May 30, and the ruling parties also decided to forgo a vote so as not to fuel the public opposition before a snap election planned in June.

²⁴ Tensei jingo, *Asahi Shinbun*, April 29, 2000.

²⁵ The *Asahi Shinbun* (May 11, 2000) and the *Mainichi Shinbun* (May 12, 2000) supported Greenery Day on their editorials.

²⁶ Editorial, *Asahi Shinbun*, May 17, 2000; Editorial, *Mainichi Shinbun*, May 27, 2000.

In 2002, the Showa Day bill saw a second chance, submitted to the Lower House on July 17, but lacked time for deliberation. Hence, it was advanced for further discussion until the next year's ordinary Diet session. Although the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) opposed to the bill in 2000, saying that the meaning of the Showa era is unclear, it turned its stance and decided to compel its members to approve the bill in 2003, claiming that the party basically respects the imperial family.²⁷ Despite the binding for vote, ten DPJ politicians refused favoring vote in a plenary session (July 17) and four of them received punishment from the party.²⁸ This intra-party split in the DPJ gave a good opportunity to the ruling parties to criticize for its ambiguous political vision. Nonetheless, Showa Day bill which passed at the Lower House was not given time for deliberation again in the Upper House session, ending in the second rejection when the snap election took place in October.

Although the third submission realized in March 2004, the deliberation was put off again until the following year's April 1 after Showa Day was placed on the agenda at the Cabinet Committee of the House of Representatives. Finally, the bill passed at the Lower House in April and Upper House in May. Though the discussion in 2005 was smoothly advanced compared to other years,

²⁷ "Minshu, rekishikan no fuitchi ukibori," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, July 18, 2003.

²⁸ "Minshutō, zōhan 4 giin o shobun," *Mainichi Shinbun*, July 23, 2003.

it is said that the Upper House session was suspended for Japan-China summit meeting planned to be held in April.²⁹

It was likely, at the beginning, that Showa Day would be promptly legislated because the parliamentary league held enough national assembly members, but it took six years to realize. The two rejections and repeated further discussion were caused by a voluntary refrainment against far-right images and inter-party politics. First, the biggest barrier to passing the bill was Mori's remark in 2000. This statement gave power to a criticizing discourse linking Showa Day with the emperor and gods while deprived Showa Day proponents of social leverage.³⁰ No matter what Mori's real intention was, promoting politicians were forced to refrain, and the ruling parties had to abandon passing the bill in spite of the parliament majority since the religious images of the emperor emerged at the forefront.

Second, inter-party politics delayed the deliberation even after people had forgotten Mori's comment. It is noteworthy that the DPJ changed its position between 2000 and 2002 (see Table 2). Indeed, it was a difficult task for the DPJ to unify the views of the emperor within the party with members from

²⁹ “‘Showa no hi’ hōan, shingi iri o enchō nitchū kankei ni hairyo,” *Asahi Shinbun*, April 16, 2005.

³⁰ For example, the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, which had took a positive stance on the revision (in a column on April 29, 2000), stopped writing articles encouraging Showa Day after Mori's remark.

the former Social Democratic Party of Japan, a liberal political party which existed until 1996. Hence, a leading member in the DPJ even said that “we should pass a bill related to history without raising oppositions.”³¹ In order not to allow the ruling-coalition to criticize the DPJ for the party’s ambiguous stance, the DPJ had to even decide a compulsory adherence to the approving party in voting. This intra-party division lasted until progressive members decreased while conservative rookie lawmakers increased in the DPJ through the elections done in 2003 and 2004.³² In reality, a bill that would not increase actual off-days did not bring profit to specific interest groups; therefore, whether or not the bill pass was not considered to affect the ruling parties’ political operation. Consequently, the bill was used for inter-party politics as a trump card to shake the opposition party, resulting in the postponed deliberation for Showa Day.

³¹ Emura Jun’ichiro, “Showa no hi to nidai seitōka,” *Asahi Shinbun*, April 7, 2005, evening edition.

³² “Kaisei shukujitsuhō seiritsu ‘Showa no hi’ 3 dome no shōjiki Minshu nai de ‘gunkoku’ rensō usureru,” *Yomiuri Shinbun*, May 14, 2005.

Table 2. Diet Sessions and Party Structures

Submission	Process at the Diet	Party Structure	
		Approval	Disapproval
<i>First Bill</i> <i>(submitted to the Upper House on March 30, 2000)</i>	2000 May 12: Passed at the Upper House June: Rejection accompanied with the Lower House resolution	LDP, New Komeito, Liberal Party	DPJ, SDP, JCP
<i>Second Bill</i> <i>(submitted to the Lower House on July 17, 2002)</i>	2002 July: Carried over to the next extraordinary Diet session December: Carried over to the next year's ordinary session	LDP, New Komeito, DPJ	SDP, JCP
	2003 July 17: Passed at the Lower House July: Carried over to the next extraordinary Diet session October: Rejection accompanied with the Lower House resolution		
<i>Third Bill</i> <i>(submitted to the Lower House on March 12, 2004)</i>	2004 June: Carried over to the next extraordinary Diet session December: Carried over to the next year's Diet session	LDP, New Komeito, DPJ	SDP, JCP
	2005 April 5: Passed at the Lower House May 13: Passed at the Upper House		

Note: SDP and JCP stand for the Social Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party respectively.

IV. Revision Movement Process

As described in chapter 2, the movement led by the Showa Day Network is divided into four stages. In the process of achieving step-by-step growth, the Showa Day Network experienced a diversification of the playing actors. In the first phase (–1993), until Aizawa initiated the movement, the actors had been limited to those who shared a religious doctrine with him. During the Next period (1994–1998), when the movement evolved from a religious activity to a national movement, the playing actors emerged even from well-known conservative civil groups. Then, the following phase (1998–2005) witnessed that Aizawa and his comrades concentrated on managing the assembly members, so the nationwide grass-roots support hardly expanded. In the last stage of the post-enactment (2005–), though the quantitative changes of movement actors cannot be found as like the previous phase, qualitative transformation of activities became possible by acquiring an NPO corporate status.

This time span division is relevant to repeated reorganizations of the Network. When the movement of Greenery Day revision petition began in 1993, the exclusive actors were those in a group called the “Youth Council of Tanaka

Chigaku Successors (abbreviated as Chigaku Council).”³³ After the “Preparation Club for Revising Greenery Day to Showa Day (abbreviated as Preparation Club)” were formed by Chigaku’s pupils in 1994, the “National Network for Revising Greenery Day to Showa Day (abbreviated as National Network)” and the “National Network for Showa Day Promotion (abbreviated as Promotion Network)” were established in 1996 and 1998 respectively. After accomplishing their goal, the Promotion Network was dissolved, and activities for commemorating Showa Day were taken over by the “Non-Profit Organization Showa Day Network (abbreviated as NPO Showa Day Network).” Table 3 shows the correspondence between the time span classification and the organizations.

Table 3. Organizations Corresponding to Each Stage

Stage	Organization
<i>Initial Preparation</i>	Chigaku Council
<i>Organizational Development</i>	Preparation Club / National Network
<i>Legislation Support</i>	Promotion Network
<i>Post-revision Celebration</i>	NPO Showa Day Network

³³ “‘Midori no hi’ kaimei seigan undō hakkaishiki o kyokō,” *Senshō*, October 13, 1993.

1. Initial Preparation (–1993)

The first phase was a nascent period until the launch of the Preparation Club in 1993. The leading actors of the movement at this time were Chigaku's pupils, and what triggered the Showa Day movement was the past experience of legislation led by Tanaka Chigaku during Taisho and Showa era. The pupils started imitating the sect founder.

1-1. Tanaka Chigaku's Movement

Tanaka Chigaku (1861–1939) was a Nichiren sect religionist who engaged in movements during a period between Meiji and Showa, and now known as the founder of the Japanese national polity studies (*Nihon kokutaigaku*). In 1912, the year of Meiji emperor's death, Chigaku began to stress the philosophical importance of the emperor based on a Nichiren-sect interpretation.³⁴ Therefore, he started to aim at strengthening people's national consciousness by celebrating November 3, Meiji emperor's birthday, as *Meiji-setsu* (Ōtani 2001, 351). He made speeches and collected signatures in the purpose of dissemination of his ideas, and founded the Meiji Club (*Meijikai*) which promoted a petition campaign (Ōtani 2001, 347–350). During the same period, there were other citizens' movements for *Meiji-setsu* than Chigaku did, but he

³⁴ For Chigaku's reaction to the death of Emperor Meiji, see Ōtani (2001, 193–196).

is evaluated as a pivotal leader who succeeded in the legislative campaign (Tokoro 2008, 16).

Chigaku established several organizations, and some of which are continuing their activities until now. Among them, there are three groups that was directly related to the Showa Day movement. First of all, a religious organization called *Kokuchūkai* was founded in 1914 and keeps Chigaku's doctrine. *Kokuchūkai* is known as a distinctive right-wing religious group with nationalistic ideology, having given a considerable impact on Ishihara Kanji, a ringleader of the Manchurian Incident (Aoki 2016, 36). Second, Chigaku founded *Rikken yōseikai* (立憲養正会) to challenge political terrain in 1923. Although this political party has little leverage in the present Japanese society, the members have been making far right speeches. Third and last, following Chigaku's teachings, his third son, Satomi Kishio (1897–1974), also established the Association of the Japanese National Polity (*Nihon kokutai gakkai*) in 1936. This association is currently a merely small-scale group (Kaneko, pers. comm.), but according to its website (AJNP 2016), it is working for the sake of enlightenment of ordinary people.

1-2. Foundation of the Chigaku Council and the Initiation of the Movement

Aizawa, who studied Chigaku's thought, took initiative to form the Chigaku Council in 1977. It was because he was told by a leftist who did not know much about Nichirenist religious circles that Chigaku's thought is now inherited by *Sōka gakkai*, a different religious corporation from Chigaku-oriented groups (YC 1998, 296). Being shocked at this misunderstanding, Aizawa felt the necessity of cooperation among Chigaku's pupils, and established the Youth Council of Tanaka Chigaku Successors with people from the three organizations mentioned above. Committee members were selected from each group, and they started studying Chigaku's thought together.³⁵

Until Chigaku's successors initiated the Showa Day movement, they were devoting their efforts to other social activities. In the early Heisei period, when the ways of Hirohito's funeral and Akihito's coronation became controversial issues, Chigaku pupils also claimed protecting traditional rituals; therefore, Greenery Day had not been regarded as the point of an argument yet. Instead, their crucial interests were concerned with problems like *Daijōsai* festival, the first harvest festival solemnized by a new emperor, or "open royal family (*hirakareta kōshitsu*)" dispute, which emerged at that time because

³⁵ "Monseikyō jūgonen no ayumi," *Senshō*, July 16, 1991, November 3, 1991.

people expected new images for the emperor and the family.³⁶ As they repeatedly addressed the issues on their monthly magazines, their theme for a social movement was connected to people's enlightenment during such a monarchical transition period. Just before the ignition of the Showa Day movement, they tried to publish an English pamphlet for foreign press about *Daijōsai* festival and its significance explained with emphases on the basis of Nichiren doctrine (YC 1990, 60–71). However, the English translation came to a deadlock due to technical difficulties, so Chigaku pupils were forced to redefine a theme for their outward movements (Kawamoto et al. 2005, 49).

After the failure of the translation campaign, the Chigaku Council, reaching its 15th year in 1992, started Greenery Day revision movement. It was Aizawa who was inspired by the Chigaku's preceding movement when he read Chigaku's biography (Kawamoto et al. 2005, 50). Although members of the Chigaku Council are from different groups, religious pupils honoring the founder could get united by following his past feat. Finally, the history of Showa Day revision began as a rename petition movement in April 1993.³⁷ At this first stage, *Kokuchūkai* and *Tendensha* were two indispensable organizations that enabled the party to ensure broader approach to other actors.

³⁶ For example, several Chigaku successors wrote articles on the issues in *Risshō* from 1989.

³⁷ ““Midori no hi' kaimei seigan undō hakkaishiki o kyokō,” *Senshō*, October 13, 1993.

The former was an influential medium capable of calling for supports to its believers, and the latter connected Aizawa with prominent scholars through publishing activities.³⁸

1-3. Summary: Following Founder's Precedent

In the first stage, inspired by the achievement of the religious founder, the movement of the Chigaku Council only aimed at amending the problematic Greenery Day. Then, the consensus within the group was not reached, so the goal of the campaign (reform intentionality) was still vague at this time. Regarding possible revised names, there were still candidates such as Showa Day, Showa Commemoration Day, and *Showa-setsu*. One clear goal was to eliminate Greenery Day from calendar's April 29.

During this period, the activists' awareness of the issue tended to be doctrinal, and the movement was still relatively closed. As to their motivation for the revision, it was cultivating *kokutai* consciousness among the Japanese (YC 1993, 41). Behind it, there was *kokutai* idea of the Chigaku School which placed the emperor and Nichiren's scriptures before anything else (Aizawa 1989, 45–46). It is undeniable that the Chigaku Council had many people with

³⁸ Even before the beginning of the movement in 1993, eloquent rightists, such as Ōhara Yasuo and Takamori Akinori, had written their books with *Tendensha*, and these writers adopted cooperative attitudes throughout the campaign.

conservative mindset since Chigaku's thought is distinctive in that it emphasizes national polity honoring the emperor system. Interestingly however, their concerns for the movement were directed less to a historical revisionism than to a past experience of a religious leader who had attempted to enhance people's loyalty to their monarch. Taking account of the fact that they once failed an attempt to distribute an English pamphlet as their social action, the dissatisfaction that caused the movement could arise from the feeling of emptiness that they had.

2. Organizational Development (1994–1998)

The second phase can be characterized as organizational development, during which the Showa Day Network strengthened external connections with other conservative civil groups and expanded the fields of the movement. As a result of this expansion, other actors than Chigaku pupils appeared in the frontline. Especially, conservative figures from the National Conference were influential and eloquent.

2-1. Connections with Other Conservatives

It was Takamori Akinori, a researcher at Kokugakuin University, who contributed to the expansion of the Showa Day Network during the second

period. Having engaged in the movement since the first stage, he suggested, at the end of 1993, that the Showa Day Network have absorbed outside groups in order to succeed in the campaign (Aizawa 2005, 24). This led the family-like circle to seek for help from outside. In fact, Takamori's performance was not limited to this proposal. Before this suggestion, he once provided an opportunity for the Chigaku Council to connect them with bigger civil groups. He sent a member of the Chigaku Council to the "Club to Celebrate National Foundation of Japan," which consisted of famous conservative groups.³⁹ For instance, the National Conference and the Association of Shinto Shrines were there. At crucial turning points, Takamori broadened the group's horizons.

On April 29, 1994, the Preparation Club was established, and they set their goal as a revision which is proper enough to cherish the memory of Hirohito and to reflect on the era of Showa (National Network 2005, 17). It is notable that the Showa Day Network was aiming to leave both Hirohito and the Showa era as objects of commemoration. By cooperating with members from the National Conference, the Preparation Club began broader external activities. The first remarkable event, "National Meeting to Change Greenery Day to Showa Day," was held on May 14, 1994. They invited politicians and well-known conservative scholars, such as Uno Seiichi and Odamura Shirō, to the

³⁹ "Kigen-setsu hōshuku ni mukete," *Senshō*, February 1, 1992; National Network (2005, 40).

conference (National Network 2005, 26–31). Chigaku successors state that *Kokuchūkai* did not mobilize its believers, so less people came to the meeting place than they expected (Kawamoto et al. 2005, 51–52). Nevertheless, Showa Day was raised for the Diet discussion by Nishimura Shingo for the first time since the 1989 revision, who attended the meeting.⁴⁰ The session at the National Assembly was spread through several conservative media (RED 1994, 42), providing Showa Day with opportunities to be known. From 1994, the Showa Day Network began to make announcement calling for Showa Day through the *Sankei Shinbun*, and the same newspaper, in 1995, reported “Memorial Symposium of Post-war Fifty Years,” in which the Preparation Club were involved as an assistant group.⁴¹ In a way that Showa Day was mentioned by panelists at the symposium, Showa Day advocates gained a chance to diffuse the issue broadly. They made it possible to approach a wider range of people than before with the help of these larger civil groups and mass media. After the two big conferences in 1994 and 1995, the connection with the National Conference became strong by 1996.⁴²

⁴⁰ The Diet record of the Committee on the Cabinet (H.R., August 23, 1996).

⁴¹ “Hitoriaruki shita ‘ningen sengen’ ‘Midori no hi’ wa ‘Showa no hi’ ni,” *Sankei Shinbun*, May 29, 1995.

⁴² This strong tie with the National Conference can be found based on a member list of the organization’s committee. Moreover, an increase in *Risshō*’s articles by the National Conference’s members proves this trend too. Primarily, most of the articles in *Risshō* was written by specific writers, but other debaters, like Ōhara Yasuo, and Odamura Shirō, started to contribute to it from 1995.

2-2. Repeated Reorganization and a Sharable Topic

This second period witnessed frequent reorganizations. When the Preparation Club was established in 1994, the requirements of the campaign, such as regulations, an office, and a symbol mark etc. were completed (National Network 2005, 15–21), but restructuring for development was needed to progress the growing supports in a private sector. After the two big events in 1994 and 1995, Preparation Club was reorganized into the National Network in 1996 with almost same members at the managing seats. This reformation became possible because the members reached an agreement in terms of the name of the future April 29, Showa Day (Aizawa 2005, 25). A difference seen in this new organization was that it had a representative committee that consisted of influential well-known figures.⁴³ In order to form a parliamentary league for Showa Day, it was necessary for them to appeal that their movement was supported by many people from a wide range of fields.

As lawmakers' league became prospective, they began to move toward a new organization. The next form, the Promotion Network, was established for the sake of supporting politicians from a private sector (Aizawa 2005, 25). Prior

⁴³ Through two selections, thirteen people were chosen as the member of representative committee. Among them, Suzuki Hideo, a chairman of Showa Day Network from 1998, was also listed together with Mayuzumi Toshirō, Odamura Shirō, and so on (see Appendix 1).

to the reorganization in January 1998, Chigaku's successors asked the famous to join in steering positions in the movement, not just representatives. Kawamoto Gakushirō, one of the successors, attended a foundation meeting of the Japan Conference in May 1997, and he, half a year later, asked Ōhara Yasuo, a professor at Kokugakuin University, to participate in the steering committee of the Promotion Network.⁴⁴

Accompanied by this increase in actors involved in the movement, an original motivation for the movement—recharging *kokutai* consciousness—was pushed to a corner. Instead of sticking to the *kokutai* doctrine, broader discourse for the legal revision turned to be useful through the second stage. Prominently, the most repeated justification for the revision was that the National Holiday Law had been enacted during the period of GHQ's operation, and that it did not reflect Japanese tradition at all. Ōhara (1994, 30) claimed that “a traditional holiday system had been distorted by the National Holiday Law which had been made as a part of the occupation policy. Greenery day had been enacted in the same context, so it was relevant to the darkness of postwar Japan's mental history.” Although Chigaku pupils had also mentioned GHQ operation in negative ways, the argument to deny the current National Holiday

⁴⁴ Report on the Head's Movement, *Risshō*, July 1997; Report on the Head's Movement, *Risshō*, February 1998.

Law was spread more strongly by these famous conservatives like Ōhara.⁴⁵ Ironically, such famous figures whom Chigaku successors drew to the campaign did not always mention *kokutai* thoughts as a fundamental reasoning for Showa Day.

2-3. Summary: Dilution of *Kokutai* Thoughts by Sharing Awareness

In the second phase, the Showa Day Network could expand the range of activities with Takamori's advice, and the issue started to be mentioned by conservative mass media. Consequently, civic supports have steadily expanded, and a great development of network was achieved. This can be observed in the number of signatures they collected with the help of the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership; advocates increased from forty thousand in 1994 to more than one million by 1998 (Kokuchūkai 1994, 69; National Network 2005, 71). When it comes to the reform intentionality of the campaign, a law to recall Emperor Showa and his period was decided as a goal. Accordingly, these two objects—Hirohito and his reign—had been requested to be put in the provision until the official bill was announced in 1999 by the league of the assembly

⁴⁵ For example, Chigaku successors in 1993 claimed that “the naming of Greenery Day was identical with the spirit of the constitution imposed by the General Headquarters. [...] The naming was defective in that it was unable to fully express the traditional diversity and complexity” (YC 1993, 40).

members. At the same time, complaints about the Holyday Law system diffused, so Greenery Day was to be seen and denied in a context of postwar Japan's primitive experience.

3. Legislation Support (1998–2005)

In the third phase from 1998 to 2005, the campaign was done exclusively in the Diet. While the Showa Day Network activists struggled to gain leverage on the politicians during this period, general citizens' support for the law amendment was stagnant. Moreover, more mass media began to pick up on this revision issue than before, making Showa Day bill subject to the inter-party politics as described in chapter 3. Put in a different way, it was a time of compromise and realistic stance for activists in order to be accepted by wider citizens for passing the bill. Through this compromising process, the accomplishments and consequences of the campaign enabled the proponents to win a democratic justification to defeat oppositions.

3-1. Division of Roles within the Network

In January 1998, the promoters built the Promotion Network which was reorganized from the previous group structure in order to cooperate with the Diet members. One big feature of this new entity was that it had a steering

committee composed of the twelve members from different conservative groups; these members can be categorized into Chigaku pupils, prominent conservatives from the Japan Conference, and those from religious groups.⁴⁶ The steering committee was an institution to decide the direction of the movement. In other words, the movement was no longer controlled only by those from the Chigaku School. Three months after the formation of the Promotion Network, a multi-partisan parliamentary group was formed on April 10, with Watanuki Tamisuke appointed the president. For this launch, the first politician who cooperated in it was Itagaki Tadashi, a member of the Upper House, who had had an old relationship with Chigaku's successors through *Kokuchūkai* and *Tendensha*.⁴⁷ Starting from Itagaki, Murakami Masakuni, Watanuki Tamisuke, and Nagase Jin'en are counted as leading, also influential, congressmen who promoted the bill (Aizawa, pers. comm.). Immediately after the beginning of the league which started with 192 Diet members, the Promotion Network held briefing sessions on Showa Day at each political party in order to encourage lawmakers to favor the amendment. Also, for promoting the legislation, the steering committee functioned as a pressuring venue to the lawmakers too. The Promotion Network held steering committee meeting at the

⁴⁶ For the member, see Appendix 1.

⁴⁷ Itagaki (1994, 41) wrote that he had kept a relationship with *Kokuchūkai* since his father died in the Sugamo Prison after the war. Also, he was writing a book with *Tendensha*, therefore was asked to address Showa Day (Kawamoto, Aizawa, and Nakamura 2005a, 49).

Diet members' office building inviting concerned politicians many times. Looking back on this period, Aizawa (Kawamoto, Aizawai, and Nakamura 2005b, 53.) said that he even felt sorry that he had intimidated Nagase at a committee meeting.

While the steering committee was comprised of influential figures and worked as a brain of the movement, the actual lobbyists were mainly those among Chigaku pupils. There were no more than three members for lobbying, and Aizawa considerably devoted his efforts, making good relationships with secretaries of politicians.⁴⁸ Actually, their lobbying was inefficient at the beginning, but the six-year lobbying turned out to be a learning process for effective pressuring (Kawamoto, Aizawa, and Nakamura 2005a, 55–57). Now, the know-how is applied to the next Meiji Day revision.

In addition to the steering committee and the actual lobbyists, the Showa Day Network created the Mothers' Society for Desiring Showa Day (*Showa no hi' o negau hahaoya no kai*) as a substructure before the launch of the politicians' league. One purpose of this ladies' group was to strengthen their appealing (pressuring) activities to the Diet members, and the other one was to devote to the social enlightenment by claiming that mothers must teach their

⁴⁸ Aizawa, Kawamoto, and Nakamura Shin'ichiro, a journalist, took charge of the Diet affairs. The former two were activists from the beginning of the movement, and Nakamura was asked to help them because he used to be a member of the Democratic Socialist Party (Kawamoto, Aizawa, and Nakamura 2005a, 46–48).

children the significance of Showa Day at home (MS 1998, 61–62). Although the mothers' activities are insufficiently recorded, Kobayashi Sachiko, a leader of the Mothers' Society, engaged in pressuring Diet affairs chiefs with three comrades in charge of lobbying. Even politicians who did not use to take the three men seriously listened to what women petitioned them (Aizawa 2007, 72). By visualizing women's participation, the Showa Day Network tried to exert more influence on the politicians.

By November 1999, when a year and a half had passed since the commencement of the league, the number of participants reached the majority at both the Lower and Upper houses, so that they entered the next stage, namely the bill making to submit the following year.⁴⁹ This growing parliamentary group drew mass media's concerns, making the issue discussed in a wider public arena. Until 1998, it was only the *Sankei Shinbun* that gently dealt with Showa Day, but because of the formation of the political group, other newspapers such as the *Asahi Shinbun* and the *Yomiuri Shinbun* started to write about this topic.

⁴⁹ When the parliamentary league held the general meeting on November 30, 1999, 265 Lower House members (out of 500), and 141 Upper House members (out of 252) already belonged to the group (Kawamoto, Aizawa, and Nakamura 2005a, 52; the total number of the seats added by the author).

3-2. Bill Modifications

The political maneuvering continued after the league was established, and the provision wording was a crucial controversy. The bill unveiled for the first time at the general assembly of the league in 1999 was different from what the Showa Day Network had been requesting.⁵⁰ It was diverged from their original plan in two points; Emperor Showa was not mentioned at all; the Showa era was defined as a period when Japan had recovered after the wretched disasters of the war. Regarding the reason why Emperor Showa was erased, Nagase Jin'en (2011, 3) describes that "if he had persisted in recalling Emperor Showa, it would have been impossible to gain a number of approvals from lawmakers." Meanwhile, when it comes to the second unexpected, the phrase "the wretched disasters of the war" was requested to be revised to "turbulent days" on the spot (National Network 2005, 81–83). This change means that the activists refused to make the commemoration reminiscent of the miserable war. In this first modification, they were able to erase the direct reference to the war whereas they had to give up leaving Hirohito in the provision.

The second wording correction happened in a process of the deliberation among ruling parties before submitting the bill to the Diet. The New Komeito

⁵⁰ At this time, the bill was designed by eight people elected from four parties: LDP, DPJ, New Komeito, and Liberal Party (Kawamoto, Aizawa, and Nakamura 2005a, 57).

rejected “recalling (*shinobu* しのぶ) the Showa era” because it reminds people of the specific person, Hirohito. Accepting the New Komeito’s modification plan, ruling parties submitted the bill including the phrase “reflect on (*kaerimiru* 顧みる) the Showa Era.”

About these two modifications, those in the Showa Day Network now give positive evaluations. First, even though the word “emperor” disappeared from the provision, they appreciated the fact that the word “Showa” remained. Aizawa (2007, 62) argues that the enactment of Showa Day means the existence of the reign-name, which enables people to make sure that the country and the nation are being governed by the emperor. On the other hand, when the New Komeito proposed the modification, the steering committee held a meeting to discuss the rights and wrongs of this change. On this occasion, they decided that “*kaerimiru* (either in a Chinese character or in Japanese *kana* 顧みる/かえりみる)”—meaning “reflecting on,”—is within the permissible range, while “*kaerimiru* (in a different Chinese character 省みる)”—implying regret—is not allowable because it is likely to lead to a self-tormenting historical view, the so-called *jigyaku shikan* (National Network 2005, 88). Having confronted the second modification, although they could not keep the word “recall,” they avoided the so-called self-torturing memorization which emerged as an unacceptable factor. Furthermore, Aizawa (2012, 171–172) justifies the

Chinese character “顧” by asserting that this character means “recall” in a Japanese prestigious classic, *Nihon Shoki*. He says this modification enabled people to recall Emperor Hirohito in a purer way.

3-3. Discussion in the Diet

In the Diet sessions, Sudō Ryōtaro, Koyama Takao, and Nagase Jin'en were the main promoters in charge of answering the questions on the bill; therefore, they sometimes needed to head toward the opposite direction to the civil groups. This was because they, as national politicians, are less free from the postwar system in Japan even though the far right criticize this forced structure. Consequently, Sudō adopted a stance on the new holiday that both good memories and tragic problems should be looked back on to have resolute will for peace.⁵¹ Likewise, Nagase had to deny any intentions unwritten in the provision and prospectus when he was criticized by the opponents for a goal the league held at the beginning—to enact a law for remembering the emperor.⁵² Moreover, when he was asked by the conservative advocates about the further intention to revise Culture Day to Meiji Day, he could not assent to the idea

⁵¹ The Diet record of the Committee on the Cabinet (H.R., May 30, 2000).

⁵² When Hirano Hirofumi, a member of the DPJ, asked a question on the original purpose of the parliamentary league, Nagase explained the modifying process of the bill to be widely accepted by the people at the Committee on the Diet (H.R., July 16, 2003).

which did not conform to the prospectus.⁵³ Dodging these suggestive attacks from both the left and right, he had to say that the necessity of enacting Showa Day was to acquire a “guideline for Japan in the transitional period to create a peaceful country in the future.”⁵⁴ In other words, though Nagase was also one movement agent, he could not uncover dissatisfactions clearly. Instead, the motivation for revision was connected to a principle of the peaceful state.

As the civil activists had to accept text modifications, parliament deliberation neutralizing the significance of April 29, and repeated rejections of the bill, it was a time of compromise and perseverance for the Showa Day Network. However, the accomplishments and consequences of the campaign enabled proponents to claim their democratic legitimacy at the Diet. Indeed, the remorse to the emperor was a target of the oppositions in the legislative discussion. The opponents criticized the launching purpose of the parliamentary league that Hirohito should be recalled, but it was refuted on the basis of the fact that the bill had been modified and abstracted. Furthermore, against criticism that the debate was still insufficient, the movement’s long history and the diversity of the participants justified the claim of the promoting faction.⁵⁵

⁵³ At the Committee on the Cabinet (H.R., July 16, 2003), Nishimura Shingo, a member of the Liberal Party, was too hawkish for the bill promoters to accept his assertions. For the prospectus along which Nagase answered to questions, see Appendix 2.

⁵⁴ The Diet record of the Committee on the Cabinet (H.R., July 16, 2003).

⁵⁵ Yoshii Hidekatsu claimed that Showa Day was being led by a specific group (Showa Day Network) and that the movement was reflecting opinions of the partial people. However, Nagase stressed that a very wide range of people were involved in the national movement at the

In addition to this diversity, democratic legitimacy was backed by the fact that the bill was submitted by the parliamentarians and there were more than 400 advocates in the politicians' league. The lawmaker-initiated bill was regarded as a ground swell of public opinion that proved that the holiday was determined on the basis of the national consensus (*kokumin no sōi*).⁵⁶

3-4. Summary: Compromise and New Rationalization

During this period, the Showa Day Network confronted a process of compromising their demand in order to pass the bill. For the promotion, a gap of claims between civil and legislative actors became obvious. When interpreted based on Nagase's replies in the Diet, the purpose and necessity of Showa Day's enactment are not along what the Showa Network was saying. This gap illustrates that even hawkish politicians pushed by a conservative civil society are to be bleached in terms of ideology in the Diet sessions. Even if conservative citizens interpret the provision in positive ways, the Diet record would not always be helpful to them, possibly allowing liberal leftists to challenge opposite interpretations. For example, revision prospectus says that Japan needs a guiding principle in a "transitional period," but a meaning of the

Committee on the Cabinet (H.R., April 1, 2005).

⁵⁶ At the Committee on the Cabinet (H.R., July 16, 2003), Hirano Hirofumi attached importance to the legislative procedures and tried to clarify how the national consensus would be proven.

word “transitional” is unclear.⁵⁷ Lacking a clear vision about why Showa Day is necessary for Japan, the ambiguous law-making process caused different stances toward Showa Day among individuals.

However, civil activists did not see that only in negative ways. The remarkable feature seen in this period was the revised goal settings (reform intentionality) that the Showa Day Network held. Although the wording was corrected twice, the movement actors adjusted their goals by opposing the worst provision possibly implying the so-called self-tormenting historical view. Also, they recognize significance of the reign-name and the Chinese character “顧” in their own ways.

Regarding the movement mobilization, this period saw somewhat limited expansion in the public fields. On the one hand, the lobbyists held briefings for political parties to increase proponents while gave pressure to politicians by utilizing subordinate organizations too. On the other hand, a slow increase in signatures demonstrates that the grass-roots public supports hardly expanded in this phase. 157 thousand signatures in 1999 reached no more than 163 thousand at last in 2005 (Akiba 1999, 35; Aizawa 2005, 27). This was a time when they placed organizational development for efficient lobbying above broadening public supports. However, their achievements through the movement were

⁵⁷ For the prospectus, see Appendix 2.

sufficient to refute opposing opinions at the Diet.

4. Post-revision Celebration (2005–)

After the legal revision in 2005, the most important activities for the NPO Showa Day Network turned into organizing a commemoration ceremony on April 29 every year. Put differently, actors continue the movement so as to confirm Showa Day in their own way. On April 29, 2016, the 10th annual ceremony was held in Tokyo, and then, greatness of Hirohito was repeatedly mentioned at the spot.⁵⁸ The ceremony seemed emperor-centric, so the event itself and the guest speaker were even reported with criticism by a liberal journalist in 2014 (Showa Day Network 2017).

The movement members no longer engage in Showa Day activities except for the annual ceremony; however, the NPO status provided them with opportunities to advance Meiji Day restoration movement. Now most of the activists who were previously in Showa Day campaign are supporting another organization, the Meiji Day Promotion Council. This group, which is still a voluntary organization, is about to repeat the successful experience of the Showa Day Network.⁵⁹ It was often pointed out that the enactment of Showa

⁵⁸ The author attended the annual ceremony in 2016.

⁵⁹ Nikaido Yuki and Abe Ryutaro, “Meiji no jidai koso taisetsu, furikaeru hi ni,” *Asahi Shinbun*, November 2, 2016. As of November 2016, the Meiji Day Promotion Council had collected 638 thousand signatures favoring Meiji Day, and was aiming to establish a

Day would be the first step toward the realization of Meiji Day and the revision of the National Holiday Law itself (YC 1993, 41; SJCD 1994, 80–82).

In promoting their new activities, the Showa Day Network, incorporated into an NPO, has provided places for the campaign. In the interview with the author, Aizawa stated that the Showa Day Network became an NPO in order to act as a responsible organization. In reality, the NPO Law, stipulating accreditation standards of NPO corporations, does not give legal personality to groups involved in political activities. Now that their original political goal was accomplished, legal and social assurance is given to the NPO Showa Day Network which continues their missions under the name of promoting social education (Showa Day Network 2016a). At the annual ceremony of 2016, the socially recognized NPO was collecting signatures favoring Meiji Day, where Ōhara stressed the necessity of the next legal amendment.

V. Implications of the Revision

So far, the revision process of the National Holiday Law and the movement by civil actors are covered in chapter 3 and 4. Then, what did the amendment in

parliamentary league.

2005 leave in the Japanese society? How can the Japanese democracy be seen in light of the process above? This paper focuses on the movement's goals, motivations, and networking features seen through the campaign. Table 4 shows how the factors of the movement developed throughout each period. In short, it can be confirmed that the goal had changed and the motivations for legislation became gradually abstracted, and that the connections with specific people (groups) got stronger after achieving the social spread to some extent.

Table 4. Development of the Movement

Stage	Goal (Reform Intentionality)	Motivation (Dissatisfaction)	Network (Collective Action)
<i>Initial Preparation</i>	- Revision of Greenery Day - Cultivating <i>kokutai</i> awareness	- External activities - Reconsidering the National Holiday Law (Chigaku pupils)	- Limited to a religious circle - A few connections through a publishing company
<i>Organizational Development</i>	- Recalling Hirohito and his reign	Revising the postwar National Holiday Law (most right wingers)	National Conference
<i>Legislation Support</i>	- Leaving a word "Showa" - Avoiding the self-torturing historical view	Acquiring a guiding principle to create a peaceful country (politicians)	- Legislative circle - Subordinate organizations
<i>Post-revision Celebration</i>	- Confirming their "Showa Day" - Further revisions	Absence of the governmental celebration	Meiji Day Promotion Council

1. Changed Goals

The movement of the Showa Day Network which started from Greenery Day revision campaign had changed the goal levels for the amendment. In short, activists had to accept more realistic memorizing than they thought at the beginning. In the first period, they simply wanted to revise Greenery Day, and they could not reach an agreement even within the Chigaku pupils, only promoting the campaign with unfixed goals. In contrast, during the second stage, they set an official target of the revision that included recalling Emperor Hirohito and the Showa era. Nevertheless, this ended up being modified in the third period; thus, they reset the goal to avoid the so-called self-tormenting historical view.

As a result of modifications of the provision, only the ambiguous significance, “reflecting on the Showa era” is left in the wording in the law, enabling people to interpret “Showa” in various ways. This, on the one hand, allows activities of rightists such as the NPO Showa Day Network which repeats the emperor-centric event on April 29 every year, while leftists, on the other hand, also hold events reminiscent of the dark shadow of the emperor system in the era.⁶⁰ This diversity of how people see the reign was recognized

⁶⁰ “‘Showa no hi’ seitei ni taishi hihan no koe mo,” *Asahi Shinbun*, April 30, 2007, Tokyo

even at the National Assembly. Nagase had to emphasize that Showa Day would give people opportunities to think on the era from each standpoint.

The changes in movement's goal resulted from the environment of "postmodern celebration," where no dominant interpretation was allowed. Rather than concluding that the conservative national identity was strengthened by Showa Day, it is significant that the flexibility would keep the conflict between the left and right camps, giving both of them clues to justify their own assertions. In a sense that Showa Day caused disputes over Japanese history, the end must be "re-historicizing" memorial days as Han (2015, 75) states. It is obvious that the national holiday is now viewed in the context of national history, compared to a holiday like Greenery Day. However, this re-historicization is left to each interpreter, so some would re-historicize their April 29 in a similar way that Chigaku pupils do while others could do it in an opposite way. In looking at a stance of the government, it avoids bearing a burden of interpreting. Although the current Showa Day Network is unsatisfied with a lack of a government-initiated celebration as an ideal form (Aizawa, pers. comm.), it is still unlikely to be realized.

edition. About 100 liberal citizens gathered to address issues concerning Emperor Hirohito and the war.

2. Multi-layered Complaints

In this study, multiply layered dissatisfactions are observed throughout the movement by examining each actor group, that is to say, the Chigaku Council, the National Conference (the Japan Conference from 1997), and the congressmen. In particular, Chigaku successors' crucial concern was to cultivate *kokutai* awareness among the general people, so they necessarily saw memorial days in connection with their philosophical teachings. However, there was a difference in the fundamental complaints between the Nichiren sect—the Chigaku Council—and other conservative civil societies because they do not always share the same recognition of the Japanese national polity and religion.

Regardless of this discord, it was a discourse of “anti-1945 system” that banded the diverse conservative citizens, and this inflammatory narrative was repeatedly produced by the scholars from the National Conference such as Ōhara. This “anti-GHQ occupation system” was a congregation point where the diverse conservatives intersected, and the National Holiday Law was recognized as a hateful target because it encompassed the point. When the previous Emperor's Birthday was revised to Greenery Day in 1989, the 1948 holiday system was preserved inside the law. It was an amendment to reconfirm the precedent of neutralization called “the pretext of the National Holiday Law (*shukujitsuhō no tatemae*),” which Ōhara and other scholars have tried to beat.

The revision of the law in 2005, however, created as a counter legislative custom in the National Holiday Law against “the pretext.” The first dissatisfaction felt by the Chigaku Council—disappointment that *kokutai* thoughts scarcely penetrated into society, and the feeling of frustration accompanied by Greenery Day which would erase the memory of Emperor Hirohito—gained chances to be removed through denial of the postwar regime.

Although the conservatives were able to find a uniting point, it was a guiding principle for peaceful country that justified a necessity of Showa Day in the legislative deliberation. While Chigaku pupils and far right conservatives sought for a state based on Nichirenism or post-occupation independence, politicians still had to stick to a discourse of the peace-loving state. It can be said that the constitutional philosophy has still worked as a benchmark of legislation in Japan.

3. Conservatives’ Network

In terms of civil networking, this study gave us insight about a structure of interdependence among the right. It was the Chigaku Council that initiated the movement, and the enthusiastic staffs were always from this small-scale circle even though they invited those from other schools for the Promotion Network’s steering committee during the third period. Aizawa explains the importance of

the small body in the following way:

We had a clear goal [revising the National Holiday Law], and asked advocates to participate in the movement. At first there were not so many comrades. At most five or six. Those who engaged in planning until the end were such people. However, as these people worked as the core members and the central base [for the movement] was ready, it was possible to lead to a wide range of national campaign. Moreover, the target was clear. Even if we got inconsistent within us, it was surprisingly easy to reconcile the opinions because we only do this. [...] For any movement, not so many people should take the central seats. I learned this lesson afresh. (Aizawa 2007, 69; added and emphasized by the author)

Though it seems that prominent groups, such as the Japan Conference or the Association of Shinto Shrines are leading conservative social movements, their role should not be overestimated. In the process of Showa Day enactment, the National Conference and the Japan Conference are merely supporting organizations regardless of deep connections.

Aizawa said at the interview that “the Japan Conference is like a general trading company but we are mere a specialized store.” A specialized store needs to initiate and lead a movement because general trading companies are too busy to concentrate on a single issue. Meanwhile, a larger group helps the smaller expand the support base and attract mass media’s interest (see Figure 1). In this


case, for example, the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership collected a large number of signatures for the Showa Day Network, and the *Sankei Shinbun* devoted space to large-scale meetings concerned with Showa Day.⁶¹ By inviting well-known lecturers from a larger community to events, Showa Day promoters were able to create news to be reported. Aoki (2016, 212) lists up five major topics that raise motivations of the Japan Conference: protecting and honoring the emperor system, overcoming the current constitution and the postwar regime, promoting patriotic education, adhering to traditional family view, denying the self-torturing historical view. As long as small groups engage in movements regarding these topics, the issue-oriented networking structure is likely to be reproduced.

More importantly, as a result of cooperation with larger civil groups, the Showa Day Network succeeded in gaining a name list that made democratic justification possible. By appointing those from various fields as the representative committee members, the movement justified the revision, emphasizing nationwide public supports. In 2000, there were sixty-two representative members, and when one looks at their diverse vocation, ranging from designer to scholar, it seems persuasive to claim that the movement was

⁶¹ For example, “Torimodose shin no Nihon,” *Sankei Shinbun*, May 29, 1995.

widely supported.⁶² Their participations were stated as a backing of national support in the Diet sessions.⁶³ The core promoters were able to justify the revision by taking advantage of the organizational network to collect pieces of democratic legitimacy—the volume of 1.7 million signatures and the diversity of committee members’ participations.

Figure 1. Relationships within Conservatives



⁶² For the members of the representative committee, see Appendix 1.

⁶³ The Diet record of the Committee on the Cabinet (H.R., April 1, 2005).

VI. Conclusion

This study attempts to reveal implications of Showa Day by focusing on the movement process and actors who led the Showa Day Network. The campaign that one religious group had initiated was subsumed by larger conservative civil groups, and evolved into collective actions involving many conservative individuals. Despite this certain expansion, it was seventeen years after the death of Hirohito that Showa Day bill successfully passed at the both houses in the Diet. One reason for this delay was that the movement was gradually, but steadily, led by a small number of enthusiastic people. Also, it also resulted from antipathy that Japanese people felt against the religious emperor—which people sensed through a remark of the former Prime Minister Mori—and the inter-party politics in the early 2000s.

By and large, the amendment broke the custom (pretext) of the National Holiday Law that the former emperors' birthdays were left with globally comprehensible meaning like Greenery Day. Meanwhile, it established a precedent of commemorating through historical experiences of Japan, namely memories of Showa. Put differently, the new celebration established a legal identity, infusing the National Holiday Law with national discourse while diluting globally sharable spirits. This new legal practice, which the Showa Day

Network desired, would be a sufficient factor to regard the movement as successful. It is partially possible to conclude that creating an anniversary with national narrative of Showa was a part of Japan's nationalistic trend.

However, it should not be neglected that the legal significance of Showa Day was neutralized in the process of the movement's expansion, so that Showa Day became acceptable to more people who see the day in their each position. The diversity of the interpretations resulted from the wording modifications of the law and a principle of a peaceful country that the proponents held although these consequences did not along with the far right citizens' original claims. Furthermore, Showa Day in reality has been a day for private retrospective reminiscence rather than opportunities for the political left and right to criticize each other.⁶⁴ In this sense, people see the "post-modernized cerebation" in Showa Day when looking at the written provision.

The legislation process is also a case that exemplifies Japan's self-refining procedure to remove extremism. Then, what was the extremism for contemporary Japan that was rejected and removed in the process? It was the emperor spoken of religiously. Ruoff (2001, 187) points out that whether conservative movements were achieved depended on whether it infringed the

⁶⁴ For example, a woman, who were born after the war, sent a letter to the *Asahi Shinbun* saying that she reflects on the era of Showa as a time when she felt a sense of hope for her future (Correspondence column, *Asahi Shinbun*, May 16, 2005).

separation of religion and state. Showa Day also needed to avoid the religious problems. The public did not accept Mori's statement mentioning Showa Day, the emperor, and Shinto at the same time, making his remarks a big obstacle to realize the revision.

Contrary to the principle of separation of religion and country abided by for sixty years until 2005, an alternative practice appeared in terms of democratic methods. In short, democratic justification lacking a viewpoint of the civil majority was repeated. Regarding the enactment of Showa Day, there has been an impression that the revision progressed with people unnoticed.⁶⁵ In the 1960s and 1970s, it was possible to prove based on polls that many assented to the legislations of Foundation Day and the reign-name system (Ruoff 2001, 178, 196). However, neither the government nor mass media did a systematic public survey for Greenery Day and Showa Day in the Heisei era.⁶⁶ In 1989, the government avoided political issue concerned with the emperor, and attempted to reflect democratic opinions by holding a meeting of twenty-five experts selected from the public. After that, other democratic ways were

⁶⁵ A woman in Hyōgo prefecture stated that she felt that Showa Day was realizing without her notice (Correspondence column, *Yomiuri Shinbun*, April 29, 2003, Osaka edition). Likewise, the *Mainichi Shinbun* reported that young people did not know the fact that Greenery Day was revised ("Hatsu no 'Showa no hi' kaiko to kaigi to," *Mainichi Shinbun*, April 26, 2007, evening edition).

⁶⁶ Although a questionnaire was conducted by TBS, a broadcasting station, it was not opinions systematically totaled. Therefore, politicians never touched upon it after the last reference in 2000. For the debate, see the Diet record of the Committee on Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (H.C., May 11, 2000).

pursued by the Showa Day Network, which had been led by a few core members. Eventually, the democratic legitimacy was given based on diverse faces of campaign participants appealed through the representative committee or the Mothers' Society; a large number of signatures (1.7 million) and advocates for the parliamentary league (more than 400); and a fact that the bill submission was initiated by lawmakers. Consequently, the submitted idea passed without knowing how many opposing and indifferent people existed. It can be said that this is a result of democratic justification that relies on the number and diversity of supports collected through organizations, but not on the ordinary majority. Although public polls are merely a reference for legislation, it is likely that the absence of the nationwide survey leads to an overestimation of opinions of groups that gather pieces of democratic legitimacy well by taking advantage of organizational strength. Recently, political indifference of the young and an increase in non-partisan people have been a growing trend in Japan. For a further developed democracy, a significant issue would be whether or not political leaders can pay attention comprehensively to both organized civil societies and the fluid silent majority.

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Risshō 立正, monthly published by the Association of Japanese National Polity until 2005.

Senshō 宣正, published by the Youth Council of Tanaka Chigaku Successors from 1991

Shinsekai 真世界, monthly published by *Kokuchūkai* from 1983.

Daily Newspapers

Asahi Shinbun

Mainichi Shinbun

Nikkei (Nihon Keizai Shinbun)

Sankei Shinbun

Yomiuri Shinbun

Appendix 1

Listed members

(1996) National Network for Revising Greenery Day to Showa Day

Executive Secretary
高池勝彦（弁護士）
Executive Director
三堀清（弁護士）
Planning Committee
相澤宏明（展転社代表取締役）、石川水穂（産経新聞編集委員）、江崎道朗（『祖国と青年』編集長）、小川力（昭和天皇の御盛徳を仰ぐ会幹事長）、高森明勅（国学院大文学部講師）、長島歆一（新日本協議会事務局長）、三澤浩一（板橋区柔道連盟理事）、柚原正敬（展転社編集長）
Representative Committee
黛敏郎（作曲家）、境川尚（日本相撲協会理事長）、西村尚治（昭和聖徳記念財団理事長）、小田村四郎（拓殖大学総長）、富田朝彦（元宮内庁長官）、柳澤錬造（元参議院議員）、船村徹（作曲家）、岡崎久彦（外交評論家）、加藤芳郎（漫画家）、春風亭柳昇（落語家）、三波春夫（歌手）、鈴木英夫（兼松株式会社名誉顧問）、小山五郎（さくら銀行相談役名誉顧問）

Source: National Network (2005)

(2000) National Network for Showa Day Promotion

President
鈴木英夫 (兼松名誉顧問)
Vice-president
天池清次 (元同盟会長)、小田村四郎 (拓殖大学総長)、加藤芳郎 (漫画家)
Chairman of Steering Committee
中尾哲雄 (インテック代表取締役社長)
Steering Committee
相澤宏明 (展転社社長)、石見良教 (国柱会事務局長)、伊藤哲夫 (日本政策研究センター所長)、打田文博 (神社政治連盟事務局長)、大原康男 (国学院大学日本文化研究所教授)、椛島有三 (日本青年協議会代表)、河合一充 (キリストの幕屋)、河本学嗣郎 (日本国体学会事務局長)、倉林和男 (英霊にこたえる会中央本部事務局長)、宮澤作太郎 (日本郷友連盟副理事長)、三輪和雄 (日本世論の会長)、百地章 (日本大学教授)
Executive Secretary
高池勝彦 (弁護士)
Executive Director
三堀清 (弁護士)
Diet Affairs
相澤宏明、河本学嗣郎、中村信一郎 (ジャーナリスト)
Consultant (<i>komon</i>)
出雲井晶 (作家)、宇野精一 (東京大学名誉教授)、瀬島龍三 (伊藤忠商事特別顧問)、富田朝彦 (元宮内庁長官)、末次一郎 (新樹会代表)
Advisor (<i>san'yo</i>)
板垣正 (日本遺族会顧問)、杉田幸三 (作家)、鈴木正男 (不二歌道会代表)、副島廣之 (明治神宮常任顧問)、名越二荒之助 (高千穂商科大学前教授)、富士信夫 (日本世論の会顧問)、宮西惟道 (東京都神社庁長)、柳澤錬造 (元参議院議員)
Representative Committee
渥美堅持 (東京国際大学教授)、飯田経夫 (中部大学大学院教授)、石堂淑朗 (脚本家)、石原慎太郎 (作家)、井尻千男 (拓殖大学日本文化研究所所長)、市田ひろみ (服飾評論家)、市村真一 (国際

東アジア研究センター所長)、入江隆則(明治大学教授)、東條由布子(昭和記念館代表)、宇佐美忠信(富士社会教育センター理事長)、大野健雄(元宮内庁総務課長)、岡崎久彦(外交評論家)、岡田聖珠(崇教真光教え主)、桶谷秀昭(文藝評論家)、小野田寛郎(小野田自然塾理事長)、加瀬英明(外交評論家)、河合一充(キリストの幕屋)、草柳大蔵(評論家)、工藤伊豆(神社本庁総長)、栗栖弘臣(静岡新聞論説委員)、黒川紀章(建築家)、黒住宗晴(黒住教教主)、小林節(慶應義塾大学教授)、小堀桂一郎(明星大学教授)、境川尚(日本相撲協会理事)、桜井勝之進(多賀大社名誉宮司)、桜井よしこ(ジャーナリスト)、佐藤和男(青山学院大学名誉教授)、重枝琢巳(元同盟書記長)、柴田正(日本世論の会顧問)、清水馨八郎(千葉大学名誉教授)、春風亭柳昇(日本演芸家連合会長)、園田天光光(各種婦人団体連合会会長)、瀧藤尊教(総本山四天王寺元管長・第百五世)、竹田五郎(元統合幕僚会議議長)、竹本忠雄(筑波大学名誉教授)、田中暉丘(国柱会会長)、田中正明(興亜観音を守る会会長)、谷沢永一(関西大学名誉教授)、坪井栄孝(日本医師会会長)、中村粲(獨協大学教授)、中村鴈治郎(歌舞伎俳優)、中村慶一郎(政治評論家)、西鋭夫(麗沢大学教授)、西部邁(評論家)、幡掛正浩(伊勢神宮崇敬会理事長)、平川祐弘(東京大学名誉教授)、総山孝雄(日本学士院会員)、船村徹(作曲家)、ペマ・ギャルポ(岐阜女子大学教授)、堀江湛(杏林大学教授)、堀江正夫(日本郷友連盟会長)、松本健一(評論家・麗沢大学教授)、三田政吉(明治会会長)、宮崎義敬(神道政治連盟会長)、村尾次郎(歴史学者)、森英恵(ファッションデザイナー)、柳家小さん(落語協会顧問)、湯澤貞(靖国神社宮司)、若井勲夫(日本教師会会長)、和田春生(評論家)、渡部昇一(上智大学教授)

Source: Showa Day Network (2016b)

Appendix 2

Prospectus of the Showa Day bill proposed by Koyama Takao at the Committee on the Cabinet (H.R., May 30, 2000)

The era of Showa for sixty years was a period of unprecedented turbulence, change, suffering and reconstruction in the history of our country. Japan of peace and prosperity where we are today is built on a cornerstone of such times.

Now the twenty-first century is close at hand, Japan is in a new transitional period. It is very meaningful for Japan's future to think about a future of peaceful country and learn a guiding principle toward future by reflecting on the Showa era and taking a look at historical lessons.

From this point of view, this bill declares April 29, which was widely popular with the people as Emperor's Birthday in the Showa era and symbolizes the time, as a new holiday "Showa Day" to commemorate Showa.

Currently, April 29 is fixed as a national holiday "Greenery Day," and the purpose of the holiday is "to appreciate nature and its benefits, thereby creating a rich heart" It is very meaningful for Japan abounding in greenery plants, and it is established among the people. In consideration of significance of such Greenery Day and influence of an increase in holidays, Greenery Day is moved to May 4, a day in a season of young leaves and in the Golden Week.

In addition, an adjustment on the current substitute holidays will be made

if holidays and Sundays coincide.

Next, I will explain the main contents of this bill.

First of all, Showa Day is added as a new national holiday with the date fixed at April 29, and its significance is described as “a day to reflect on the era of Showa, when people went through turbulent days and accomplished recovery, and to think about the country’s future.”

Second, Greenery Day is moved to May 4.

Third, when national holidays fall on Sunday, following days that are closest to the days and not national holidays are to be holidays.

국문초록

쇼와의 날 제정운동에 관한 연구

종교단체와 보수시민단체가 추진한 법제정

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본 연구는 일본에서 2005 년에 이루어진 ‘국민의 축일에 관한 법률(国民の祝日に関する法律)’의 개정으로 새로 제정된 ‘쇼와의 날’(4 월 29 일)과 그 개정이 갖는 의미에 대하여 살펴보는 것을 목적으로 한다. 개정과정을 알아보기 위하여 시민운동단체 ‘쇼와의 날 네트워크’의 활동을 중심으로 다루었다. 이 개정운동은 ‘초기 준비기’, ‘조직적 발전기’, ‘제정 촉진기’ 그리고 ‘개정후 활동기’의 네 단계로 나눌 수 있다. 처음에는 종교적 집단이 시작한 개정운동이었으나, 대규모 보수 시민단체를 끌어들이며 많은 보수 인사와 협력하는 집단적 활동으로까지 발전되었다. 그 과정에서 단체의 전체적인 규모는 확대되었으나 주도적으로 활동한 열성 운동가의 수는 크게 변하지 않았다.

천황주의적 성향이 강한 ‘쇼와의 날 네트워크’가 실현시키고자 했던 ‘쇼와의 날’의 제정은 특정 역사적 시기를 기념한다는 점에서 국가주의적인 성격을 드러냈다고 지적할 수 있다. 그러나 넓은 국민들의 지지를 받기 위한 ‘쇼와의 날 네트워크’의 운동과정은 타협을 감수해야만 했다. 예를 들어, 2005 년의 일본 사회는 ‘쇼와의

날'이 신토(神道)와 함께 종교적으로 언급된 것에 대하여 거부반응을 보였으며, 그 결과 '쇼와의 날' 실현은 연기되고 말았다. 심지어 '쇼와의 날'의 법적인 의의는 일반 대중이 받아들일 수 있도록 천황에 관하여 중성적인 표현이 선호되었다. 즉 '쇼와의 날'은 어떤 특정 담론의 지배적 해석을 허용하지 않는 '포스트모던한 기념일'이라고 할 수 있을 것이다.

이 운동을 민주적 절차의 관점에서 보면, 개정과정에서 여론조사를 통한 국민 의견 조사가 없었으며, 대중적 인식을 파악하지 못한 상태로 입법이 이루어졌다. 이는 1960 년대와 1970 년대에 펼쳐졌던 유사 운동과는 다른 '쇼와의 날'에 관련된 법개정의 특징이라고 지적할 수 있다. '쇼와의 날'을 요구하는 주장은 여론조사가 없었음에도 불구하고 운동의 결과로 인해 민주적 정당성을 가지게 된 것이라고 간주되었다. 다시 말해, '쇼와의 날 네트워크'의 운동은 반대 및 무관심 세력이 얼마나 있는지에 상관없이 집단의 조직화로 인해 민주적 정당성을 부여받을 수 있었다는 것을 보여주고 있다. 여론조사는 입법을 위한 참고자료에 불과하다고 여겨질 수도 있으나, 그 결여는 조직의 힘으로 목표를 달성하고자 하는 특정 집단의 주장에 대한 과대평가로 이어질 가능성도 있다.

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주요어: 쇼와의 날, 일본의 보수시민운동, 민주적 정당성, 국민의

축일에 관한 법률, 쇼와천황

학번: 2014-24364