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Collection
Master’s Thesis of Public Administration

One-child Policy in Mainland China
- Understanding Policy Change
with the Advocacy Coalition Framework -

중국의 한 자녀 정책 변동에
관한 연구:
옹호연합모형(ACF)을 중심으로

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One-child Policy in Mainland China
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with the Advocacy Coalition Framework -

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Abstract

One-child Policy in Mainland China
- Understanding Policy Change
with the Advocacy Coalition Framework -

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The huge size of the Chinese population and the difficulties of feeding it have directed Chinese government’s attention to birth control, thus the one-child policy came into being in 1980. By the end of 2015, this highly controversial population policy was modified into a universal two-child policy. This paper will analyze the one-child policy change using the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to present a new way in interpreting the policy changes in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The theoretical framework of the study is the ACF, which has been widely used in analyzing policy change, and has been established to study intricate public policy processes involving various actors. It was originally designed for analyze policy change in democratic societies. But China’s continuous reforming promotes the applicability of the ACF at least in this one-child policy change case.

This paper will provide a general introduction also a historical review of the one-child policy in mainland China in chapter 1. It then reviews the decision making in China, the ACF and its applicability in this one-child policy case in chapter 2. Chapter 3 advances the main part of this study. It employs the ACF to interpret changes in the one-child policy of the last two stages. In chapter 4, implications, and limitations of the current study, and some recommendations for future study will be revealed.

Although there may exist some difficulties in using the ACF to interpret the policy changes with regard to China’s one-child policy due to political and social differences, it is argued that the general policy changes in the one-child policy can be explained as a competition between two main advocacy coalitions. This implies that the ACF is applicable in applying the one-child policy case, and allows providing a new way in understanding policy changes in mainland China.

**Key Words:** one-child policy, advocacy coalition framework, policy change.

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## Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY ........................................... 1

1.1 Background Statement of the study ........................................... 1

1.2 Purpose and significance of the Study .................................... 3

1.3 History of the one-child policy ............................................. 4

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................. 10

2.1 The Rational Actor Model .................................................... 10

2.2 Theoretical review of the ACF ............................................. 13

2.3 The ACF studies in mainland China ...................................... 18

CHAPTER 3: ANALYZE THE ONE-CHILD POLICY WITH THE ACF .... 22

3.1 Two advocacy coalitions and its beliefs .................................. 22

3.2 Resources and strategies of the two coalitions ......................... 27

3.3 Policy oriented learning and policy changes ......................... 33

3.4 External shock in policy change ......................................... 46

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS .......................................................... 50

4.1 Implications of the Study .................................................... 50

4.2 Limitations and recommendations ...................................... 51

REFERENCES ................................................................. 54
APPENDIX 1 AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW ..........66

APPENDIX 2 TWO INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS.................................67
2.1 Interview with a peer .................................................................................. 67
2.2 Interview with a mother ............................................................................. 72

APPENDIX 3 CHRONOLOGY OF THE ONE-CHILD POLICY ............77

국문초록 .............................................................................................................. 79
Chapter 1: Introduction to the study

This chapter will have a background statement about the one-child policy and the conceptual framework of the study--the advocacy coalition framework in section 1. Then section 2 will introduce the purpose and the significance of the study. Lastly history of the one-child policy will be presented in section 3.

1.1 Background Statement of the study

The one-child policy was introduced in 1980 as a way to stop China’s increasing population growth and to promote economic growth which “faced severe shortages of capital, natural resources, and consumer goods” (Wang, Cai, and Gu, 2013). Starting from the 20th century, however, fertility rate in China was “well below the replacement level”, and China began to “face the mounting pressures associated with continued low fertility” (Cai, 2013).

To continue this one-child policy within such a rigorous demographic situation was obviously no longer defendable. As a result, after several population policy changes made, all couples in China are permitted to give birth to two
children starting on January 1, 2016. This symbolizes the termination of the one-child policy, which has constrained the great majority of Chinese couples to only one child for the last 35 years.

The theoretical framework for this case study is provided by the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) which has been introduced to study intricate public policy processes involving various actors. It provides “a theoretical alternative to the traditional ‘iron triangles’1 of governance by allowing the inclusion of many key players in policy development process, such as journalists, scholars and other nongovernmental agencies” (Weible, 2005: 181).

This framework provides a theoretical framework for viewing coalition behaviors through “a set of belief systems that are used by coalitions as they determine who their allies or opponents are, potential sources of coordination, and potential sources of advice and information as they coordinate to achieve a common goal” (Weible, 2005: 181).

The one-child policy changes in China can employ the ACF as theoretical framework may come as a surprise. However, the applicability of ACF is wider than the time when it was first introduced and in terms of the one-child policy changes it matches many characteristics of the ACF. Thus it’s appropriate to take the ACF as our conceptual framework in this study (this will be discussed in ________________

1 Weible (2005: 181) noted that “Iron triangles composed of an administrative agency, a legislative subcommittee, and an interest group [are] well recognized as overly simplistic and unrealistic”.

2
1.2 Purpose and significance of the Study

As societies change and citizens’ participation and engagement becomes more enlightened to the topics and practices in the one-child policy development, applying the ACF to this policy change becomes appropriate. As a result, the main purpose of this study is employing the ACF to understand the policy changes of the one-child policy in mainland China, thus provide a new sight in interpreting China’s policy change.

For the purpose of this study, it is important to be knowledgeable of the one-child policy change and the theoretical framework used here the ACF. Thus many sources and documents were reviewed with the purpose of get a comprehensive understanding of the policy and the ACF. In addition, stakeholders involved to the one-child policy will be contacted for an open-ended interview to help reader have a comprehensive understanding about the one-child policy.

Although there are differences between China’s political and social situations to the western countries, basically the ACF is applicable in the one-child policy change case. Many scholars also used this framework to interpret Chinese public policy change like climate policy change and health policy change (see Huidobro
and Mai, 2012; Zhang, 2010). This framework can provide us with a new way to understand the one-child policy change in mainland China.

The main contribution of the ACF to the study of changes in the one-child policy in China is that it promotes the framework’s applicability to a wider regime type. Applying the ACF to understanding the Chinese one-child policy change process is appropriate (this will be discussed in details in chapter 2), thus analyzing the one-child policy changes with the ACF has great academic value.

### 1.3 History of the one-child policy

China has enforced population restrain policy for many years but originally the fertility restrain policy was rather mild and much tolerant than the later 1980’s one-child policy as almost all families have been limited to only one child. Only the minority Ethnic groups (the non-Han ethnic groups) were permitted to have more than one child (two children in urban areas, and no more than four children in rural areas) (Park and Han, 1990).

One notable preferential treatment ethnic minorities enjoy is their exception from the strict one-child policy. The Chinese government expects this kind of benefit will make them more grateful so that they can live peacefully together with Han people. Besides, the single ethnic of Han takes up about 92% of the whole
population while the rest of the 55 ethnics share the other 8%. Anyway, the comparatively rapid growth of 8% of the people won’t cause a great surge in the whole population.²

Despite all these exceptions, generally speaking historically this one of the harshest fertility restrain policy enforced since 1980 in mainland China could be generalized as the one-child policy. It could be further divided into 4 different stages from its beginning to its abolishment. Through this historical review, we can easily figure out that the policy has been changed gradually as more and more couples are permitted to have two children by the government. And after more than 3 decades’ modification, it finally changed into a two-child policy.

1) Stage one: from “advocate two” to “all one”

China’s one child policy was intended to balance water and food supplies and promote economic growth. In 1980 Party Chairman Hua Guofeng announced “if population growth is not controlled, it will be impossible for the economy and all our society to cope with”, “thus it’s necessary to launch a crash program calling on

² Also the policy for the minorities is very strict, for example the couple can have two children in urban area only when both of them are the minorities, and the regulations varies from province to province. And it also depends on the place where they live (like urban areas, rural areas or whether they are living in autonomous regions of some minorities). So there are some restrictions for the minorities as well. See Frederika Hu, Why were ethnic minorities in China exempt from the One-Child-Policy, https://www.quora.com/Why-were-ethnic-minorities-in-China-exempt-from-the-One-Child-Policy, accessed [23 Nov. 2016].
each couple to have a single child, so that the rate of population growth may be brought under control as soon as possible” (Tian, 2015).

In addition, the large numbers of children born during China’s baby boom in the early 1960s caused Chinese leaders to become “very anxious about demographic momentum and the concomitant growth potential of this extraordinarily large cohort” (Chen, 1981). Since this large cohort will swell the number of potential parents in the decades to come. As these cohorts marry, they will substantially raise the crude birthrate even if each couple has only two children.

Consequently, a new population policy known as the one-child policy was officially introduced on September 25, 1980. On that day, an open letter to the whole country was delivered by the Communist party of China (CPC) calling for “one child per couple” rules to “keep the population below 1.2 billion at the end of the 20th century”.

2) Stage two: from “all one” to “half two”

However, it was nearly impossible to convince the majority of Chinese in rural areas that having only one child in their family, especially when girl was the first child, could be an advantage to their own families for “male have advantage in

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farm work compared with female and they can carry family name” (Davin, 1985). Thus the tension between the central government’s demand on low Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and the wishes of the rural people boiled inevitably.

To ease this tension among the people and the government, a second birth was allowed in the rural areas under the conditions that the first birth was a girl and should have several years of interval in 1984 (Merli and Raftery, 2000). This means that roughly half of the rural families would benefit to have one more child. But this new exemptions are only applied in rural areas and no longer applicable if families from the rural areas moved to urban areas.4

In addition, those who were born during the early year of 1960s were entering the marriage age by that time. Thus this policy adjustment contributed naturally to a rise in TFR which also leads to the continuity of the one-child policy. This population policy remains to be a main concern for families eager for more than one child.5

3) Stage three: from “both” to “one of”

As the implementation of the population policy, China increasingly faces the one-child policy as a main reason for social and economic problems. Low TFR has leaded to a decreasing number of people supporting a growing retired population.

4 Readers may refer to appendix 2 for a better understanding of this modified policy.
Another tragic consequence of the one-child policy is China’s growing gender imbalance. Experts predict that China will have a 30 million group more marriage-age male than female by 2020. This massive group of bachelors could subscribe to increased crime and severely social insecurity (Poston and Glover, 2006).

In response to these issues, CPC started allows couples to have two children if both of them have no siblings in 2000. However, the effect of this new exemption policy was not that huge as expected before. In Guangzhou city, Guangdong province even some 14,000 couples were eligible according to this policy only 360 additional babies were produced in 2009. As a result, the central government decided to eased more limitations in 2013, further permitting couples to have more than one children (two children) if one of the parents have no siblings (Whyte, Feng, and Cai, 2015).

4) **Stage four: from “all one” to “all two”**

However, the previous mitigation policies was simply allowing some certain couple to have more than one child does not mean they will practically do. Many

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qualified couples refused to have a second child, claiming the pressures and expense of raising more than one child in Chinese society even though some of them do have the willing to have more children.

Combined with the population problems mentioned above, a new law was adopted in the session of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (全国人大常务委员会) On December 27, 2015, effective from the very first day of 2016. This new policy letting all Chinese couples could have one more child. With continuous adjustments made during these years, this one-child policy finally and officially modified into a two-child policy.

Chapter 2 of this study will discuss the Rational Actor Model and introduce the ACF by review its main concepts like policy subsystem and policy belief, main reasons which contribute to policy change will also be revealed. Lastly studies about its application in China will be discussed.

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Chapter 2: Literature Review

In this chapter, section 1 will discuss the Rational Actor Model (RAM) is not an ideal theoretical framework for this one-child policy change study. Then give a short theoretical review of the ACF, presents key concepts of the framework also the main reasons for policy change. Last, the applicability of the theory on Chinese case studies will be addressed in section 3.

2.1 The Rational Actor Model

Starting from 1990s, however, there was a general trend from unilateral towards more multi-actor based decision making, with a greater variety of interests involved (Zheng et al., 2010). Political power and decision-making processes in China are not as centralized as many tend to believe. It is possible for provincial and local governments to adjust policies that have been established at higher levels or to develop their own policies if nothing has been stipulated from above (Lieberthal, 2004).

The decision-making process gradually depended on interaction among a
larger number of actors rather than just a few of the party leaders. Despite its continuing grip on power, the CPC is no longer able to dictate each and every decision (Dumbaugh and Martin, 2009; Lieberthal, 2004). The actual role of the private sector and the public in Chinese decision-making is growing, though limited. Interest groups and civic organizations are regularly involved in service delivery or practical implementation issues (Bell, 2008; Lieberthal, 2004).

Western theories may not necessarily be available to the Chinese context, as the country’s sociocultural background and its party-political and governmental system are basically not the same from those of Western countries. However, since 1990s’ decentralization and privatization process, institutional fragmentation and inter-organizational interdependence have come more to the fore (Groenleer et al., 2012). This has made Western policy-related theories and models more applicable to the Chinese situation.

The Rational Actor Model treats the state as a perfectly rational actor, with full information about the situation treated (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 13-19. Thereby states encounter each situation by calculating costs against potential benefits and choose the option that gives the highest payoff, thus maximize the strategic goals (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 18, 24). When given various options to the situation at hand the state selects the option that is most favourable and closest to their goals. (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 17).

Allison illustrate the core functions of the rational actor model by pointing out
that one can assume that “the state is a single and unified actor, the state has a single utility function, the state acts in relation to threats and opportunities, as well as the state’s action is to maximize value and utility” (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 27). This seems match Chinese government’s intention in policy making.

However, the rational actor model (RAM) tends to ignore a range of political variables: “political decisions, non-political decisions, bureaucratic procedures, continuations of previous policy, and sheer accident” (Clarke, 1989: 31). The RAM also does not consider that “decision-making is not always rational, or that there are actors, other than the state, in policy making” (Saikaly, 2009: 20). Thus this model is not an ideal theoretical framework for this one-child policy change study.

The ACF was created in the 1980s, mainly by authors Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. Later, this framework has been modified also added and clarified concepts and hypotheses. In this one-child policy case, this framework is highly applicable (this will be discussed in the third section of this chapter). Thus the use of the ACF may provide us not only with knowledge on decision making in China, but also with insights into the wider applicability of the framework itself.

China’s political field especially in the process of policy changes “have been going through a wide-ranging and deep-going transformation since the enforcing of the reform and opening-up policy” (Gui, 2013). Under this increasingly open environment, policy process under the authoritarian regime is going through model transformation which can helps us in employing the ACF to understand the
one-child policy change here.

2.2 Theoretical review of the ACF

The ACF was proposed as a theoretical framework by Paul Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) in their co-written Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Framework Approach. After that, Heintz and Jenkins Smith (1988) argued that “the position that is taken by these interest groups is based on core beliefs which set the groundwork for the development of the ACF”.

The ACF includes interested parties active in policy development process, along with the scholars charged with developing data, which plays a major role in driving interest group motivations and indirectly influences policy through beliefs and learning change. In addition, journalists are also able to direct and sway public opinion on policy ideas as other actors (Heintz and Jenkins-Smith, 1988; Sabatier, 1987; Weible, 2005).

Sabatier (1988) advocates that the ACF has “three basic premises for understanding and framing policymakers’ behaviors” during the policy development process. “The first premise is that the role of policy analysis in public policymaking requires a timeframe of a decade or more; the second premise is that the most useful way to frame policy changes is to identify and view them through
interactions and changes in ‘policy subsystems’; the third premise is that public policies can be conceptualized as sets of belief systems of normative and causal assumptions” (Sabatier, 1988).

The framework has been applied to both quantitative and qualitative analyses, and used to explain changes on different political systems as well as very particular policy levels (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 189, 199), spanning from water policy in Washington State (Leschine, Lind, and Sharma, 2003) to Multilevel analysis on Health Policy in EU (Carboni, 2012).

### 2.2.1 Policy subsystems and belief systems

The ACF, as originally proposed, was based on an assumption that political behavior is founded on beliefs and values. The individual actors’ beliefs are then “crucial in determining their actions, particularly in creating or joining an advocacy coalition” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 190). Different advocacy coalitions operate within different subsystems. Depending on the policy issue an advocacy coalition could constitute of a varying stakeholder such as bureaucrats, elected and appointed officials, and experts (Sabatier and Weible: 192-193).

These subsystems are characterized by stability and the distribution of power within the subsystem is rarely challenged. Sabatier claims that “defining the subsystem is one of the main tasks in conducting an ACF analysis” (Sabatier and
Weible, 2007: 193). Defining the subsystem is essential in order to isolate the analysis unit from related or intertwined (nested) subsystems (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193).

Viewing interactions and behaviors of policy subsystems through the lens of their values and beliefs is important to understanding and assessing the causes of policy change. As a central feature of the ACF, belief systems as composed of three levels: 1) a deep core, 2) a policy core, and 3) secondary aspects (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

1) **Deep Core Beliefs**

The deep core beliefs refer to fundamental beliefs such as ideas regarding human nature (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 30, 32). Even basic issues on a left-right scale belong here, for instance regarding the size of the state or definitions of freedom (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194). There is a low probability of change of these issues.

Although the framework recognizes that not all members of a certain advocacy coalition will share exactly the same belief systems, it proposes that members’ deep core beliefs are the same, and therefore members are in considerable agreement on the policy core mentioned above.

2) **Policy Core Beliefs**
According to Sabatier, the policy core consists of “fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving core values within the subsystem” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 221). This contains priorities of policy related values such as the causes of problems in subsystem. This is the actual basis for participation in coalition (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194).

3) Secondary Beliefs

According to Sabatier, secondary aspects consist of “instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to implement the policy core” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 221). These can relate to a specific policy instrument or proposition, for example on how to realize a proposal, or demand special license for duty free. The probability of change is at the highest in these sorts of beliefs (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194).

2.2.2 Reasons contribute for policy change

As noted earlier the belief systems within the policy subsystems are fairly stable, nevertheless, changes do happen. The identified main reasons for policy change within a policy subsystem are four: Policy Oriented Learning, Internal or

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9 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) identified two paths for belief and policy change: policy oriented learning and external perturbations or shocks. Then Sabatier and Weible
External shocks and Negotiated Agreement.

1) Policy Oriented Learning

The ACF emphasizes policy oriented learning within subsystems--the process of seeking to increase understanding so as to achieve core policy objectives (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 19). This is a slow change process since it obviously demands a previous chain of events to learn from. The basic idea is that information and feedback from previous decisions affect secondary beliefs. Change in sub-level perceptions travels slowly to system level (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 198-199).

2) External Perturbations or Shocks

This can consist of changes in socio-economic conditions and regime, also products from other systems or disasters. Such an event may cause a shift in agenda and changes in resource allocations. It is “the redistribution of resources such as public opinion and information that may shift balance between minority and majority coalition” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 198-199).

3) Internal Shocks

(2007) add internal shocks and negotiated agreements as providing an alternate path for policy change.
A shock within the subsystem may tip the power balance between the majority and the minority coalition. It could presumably even cause division within the majority coalition and hence instigate change (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 204-206). An internal shock serves as “an indicator of the failings of the current policy and, therefore infuses doubt within the majority coalition and strengthens the support for the minority and galvanizes their resolution” (Weible and Sabatier, 2007: 192).

4) Negotiated Agreement

This is a later addition to the ACF, designed to address issues of policy change in the absence of shocks and perturbations. Especially in instances when previously warring, or at least clearly opposing, coalition have been locked in a stalemate for some time, only to solve the issue by negotiating. The main reasons for negotiation is an insight in the costs of the perhaps hurting, stalemate (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 204-206).

2.3 The ACF studies in mainland China

As an authoritarian regime, China’s policy change sees not appropriate to be analyzed by the ACF. However, over the years, the ACF was gradually expanded in its applicability in different political systems (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Also
China has changed a lot in many areas includes policy change decision-making process. This doesn’t mean that all policy changes in China can be interpreted with the ACF, but at least the last two stages of the one-child policy we discussed here can employ the ACF to analyze which will be discussed in chapter 3.

Since the inception of the framework, researchers have aspired to apply the ACF to different policy issues within different political systems (Henry et al., 2014). Meanwhile, doubts were raised concerning its applicability in other systems characterized by democratic corporatist policy styles or authoritarian policy regimes (Parsons, 1995).

In response, the ACF was gradually expanded (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Weible, 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014) to include coalition opportunity structures, focusing specifically on the degree of openness of political systems (a function of the number of decision-making venues and the accessibility of each venue) and the degree of consensus needed for major policy change (Henry et al., 2014).

These characteristics are assumed to “affect the resources and constraints of subsystem participants” (Henry et al., 2014). Therefore, in order to explore the applicability of the ACF across different systems, researchers should “engage in efforts to investigate empirically how processes of coalition formation, resource mobilization, and policy change may be enabled and constrained by basic coalition opportunity structures” (Henry et al., 2014).
The application of the ACF to a non-plural regime like China can be “problematic” (Han, Swedlow and Unger, 2014). However, if “a concept can be applied usefully to a wide range of empirical cases, it becomes increasingly valuable” (Collier and Mahon, 1993). China’s public policy processes during the Deng Xiaoping’s era, economic reform and opening-up policy enforced since 1979 have increasingly made China more opened in policy making process.

As Zhang Haizhu (2011) pointed out that “as one of the most important theoretical framework of policy making process and policy change, domestic scholars should pay more attention to the ACF”. As for the ACF’s application in China, “there are many favorable and unfavorable factors at the same time, but overall, in policy areas where the political influence is not very strong the ACF can be basically applied”.

That is to say policy itself matters a lot in the ACF’s application in China in the first place, if one policy change has no threat to the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s ruling party status it could be analyzed with the ACF even if China are not seen as a democratic country. Considering that population policy is not a political sensitive topic, the ACF is appropriate in analyze the one-child policy change in China especially in the last two stages of the one-child policy change which will be discussed in details in chapter 4.

Coming chapter 3 will be one of the main chapters of this study. It will
employ the ACF to analyses the one-child policy changes of the last two stages. It discussed that the key concepts of the ACF like coalitions, policy beliefs, resources, policy oriented learning and external shock are very helpful in analyze this two stages of policy change.
Chapter 3: Analyze the one-child policy with the ACF

The ACF is applicable in the last two stages of the one-child policy change considering that China has changed dramatically with the continuous reforms made by the communist party. Chapter 3 of this paper will employ the ACF to analyses the policy changes of the last two stages. Identify the two competing coalitions discussed here, their policy belief systems, resources they mobilized, and present reasons like policy-oriented learning and external shock that appear to explain the one-child policy change we discussed here.

3.1 Two advocacy coalitions and its beliefs

1) Two advocacy coalitions

In explaining policy change, the ACF treats the policy subsystem as “the most useful unit for aggregating the behavior of the hundreds of organizations and individuals involved in a policy subsystem over periods of a decade or more” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Such a policy subsystem may “consist of actors from
various levels of government, as well as private or even international organizations” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). These actors under the subsystem try to impact policies within the policy subsystem can be subsumed into advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1998).

Therefore I refer to the primary actors concerns about China’s one-child policy change in this article as the “uphold the one-child policy advocacy coalition” (the uphold coalition) and the “modify the one-child policy advocacy coalition” (the modify coalition).

By the turn of the 21st century, the TFR was much lower than the replacement level in China. Besides China started to confront the increasing burdens associated with continued low TFR. To continue this one-child policy under such a severe demographic context was “clearly no longer defensible” (Cai, 2013). Such concerns spurred the modify advocacy’s formation in 2001.

This modify coalition consist of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China (MOHRSS), local government authorities, grassroots level family planning workers and scholars also well-educated college students who support the reform of population policy. They want greater attention to be given to the demands of the people within a proper population structure.

The uphold coalition comprises the National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC), demographic experts hired at the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC)’s Social Development Institute and the Population, Resources and Environmental Economics Institution who adhere to population control. This uphold coalition is the dominate coalition for they have many advantages over the modify coalition (see analyses about their resources and strategies at 3.3 in chapter 3).

2) Policy belief systems

The ACF presumes that “policy participants seek alliances with people who hold similar core policy beliefs among various stakeholders from multiple levels of government” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194). Within the framework, policies can be treated as belief systems. In the same way, an advocacy coalition’s opinions on a certain policy issue could be understood as a bunch of beliefs. Therefor the two coalitions’ policy beliefs can be discussed as below:

2.1 Policy core belief--Human reproductive rights

The uphold coalition advocates that “citizens have the right to reproduction as well as the obligation to execute family planning policy, the State has the right to adopt a wide-ranging policy to restrain the number of the population, every couple are supposed to honestly accept contraceptive methods and take relevant guidance and services from the family planning commission” (Zhang, 2003). Reproductive rights should be respect while more realistically we shall also sacrifice if necessary
for the society’s fundamental interests (Zhang, 2003).

The modify coalition holds that, however, reproductive rights of a citizen are natural rights which take precedence over the state and the law. As the basic right of a person, “the right to reproductive is different from other political rights, for instance, the right to vote and the right of association and under no circumstances should reproductive rights be deprived”.

As demographer Liang Zhongtang (2010) points out “We need to have a common understanding that the government has no right to intervene right of reproductive, it is a fundamental rights of every human beings”. Administrative mandatory policy tools such as forced abortion, forced ligation and the fine for over-planned children so called social support expenditure should “never be the choice for population control” (Liang Zhongtang, 2010).

2.2 Secondary Belief--Situation of China’s population

The uphold coalition claims that “the economic and social issues we confronted boiled down to the over speed population expansion” (Cleland et al., 2006). They believe that “although China has achieved remarkable successes in population control, changed from ‘three high’ to ‘three low’ over the past few

\[ \text{Accessed 29 June 2016}. \]

\[ \text{The “three high” refers to high birth rate, high mortality, and high natural growth rate.} \]
decades, it does not, however, really solve the massive population base problem, so we must continuing control the population, and the family planning policy should not be loosened” (Cleland et al., 2006).

Hou Dongmin, the director of Population, Resources and Environmental Economics Institution, argued that “we must always adhere to the stability of the current family planning policy otherwise the great sacrifices and costs made by the Chinese government and people in order to enforce family planning policy will become fruitless”, “the environment itself simply can’t afford to the relief of the policy change since China’s population base is so large”. 12

However, the modify coalition believes that “the economic and social issues we confronted actually attributed to the execution of the strict one-child policy and the low birth rate and low natural growth rate are the fundamental reasons for the population structure problems we faced, thus urgent need for policy reform is pressing” (Cai, 2010). Besides, the desire of couples to have children is very low nowadays due to “the child raising pressure, late marriage trend and other wide variety of reasons”. Thus, the one-child policy in mainland China should be “modified the earlier the better” (Cai, 2010).

Hu Angang (2003), director of the Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences for

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On the contrary, the “three low” refers to low birth rate, low death rate and low natural growth rate.

China Studies indicates that “the goal of the first generation of population policies and the current social situation is incompatible”. Chinese society is “facing challenges of an accelerated low birth rate and accelerated aging society in the 21st century”, “the time is now for the one-child policy to totally reform” (Hu, 2003).

3.2 Resources and strategies of the two coalitions

Since the ACF’s foundation, the flow diagrams describing the policy subsystem and external factors have always illustrated advocacy coalitions as “having both 1) policy beliefs and 2) resources” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Many researches have “concentrated on the content of belief systems itself, but nearly no one has focused on advocacy coalition resources” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 203). Analyses different coalition’s resources and strategies are also very important in the application of the ACF.

Advocacy coalition resources are resources that participants of the policy can take advantage of in their attempts to impact public policy which includes 1) formal legal authority, 2) public opinion, 3) information, 4) mobilizable troops, 5) financial resources, 6) skillful leadership13. In this study, we revealed six kinds of policy-relevant mobilizable resources that advocacy coalitions can take advantage

13 These terms are used by Paul A. Sabatier, and Christopher M. Weible, the Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications, Theories of the Policy Process [M], 2007, Page 201.
of to impact the one-child policy.

1)  *Formal legal authority*

The ACF takes actors in the position of legal authority as the potential member of certain advocacy coalitions, and also it is one of the major resources to the advocacy coalition (Sabatier and Pelkey, 1987). One of the greatest significant characteristics of a leading advocacy coalition is that “it has much more of its participants in the position of formal authority than the other minority advocacy coalitions do” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 201).

The uphold coalition have a big advantage in this part for its member--the NHFPC. One of its responsibilities is to “draft laws and carry out development planning and policies and regulations for health and family planning, and offer guidance for the formulation and implementation of regional planning of health and family planning”, besides, they also “in charge of formulate and supervise the implementation of family planning service and management system”.

The modify coalition’s MOHRSS is one of the ministries under the State Council (SC) which in charge of standards and regulations of national labor policy, and dealing with the national social security system (NSSS). Responsibility of

this ministry emphasized more on population services itself rather than population policy making. So their formal legal authority on make one-child policy decision is weaker than that of the NHFPC.

2) Public opinion

Another major resource for policy participants is opinion polls which show support for the advocacy coalition’s policy positions. One classic approach for advocacy coalitions is to employ a lot of time and energy in order to obtain public support (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 202).

The uphold coalition did a lot of work on publicizing health and family planning policies, and carrying out population education to convince the mass that one-child policy is inevitable and fundamentally good for the country in the long term. Their effects did make some differences in widen the acceptance of this unwelcome policy over the mainland China (Chen, 2010).

The modify coalition gained more and more support on the necessity of the one-child policy reform through publicity over television, newspaper and internet. They pointed out that “confronting with the population problems like aging, gender imbalance, ‘4-2-1’ family structure, only true solution for this is the reforming of the one-child policy”. Otherwise, unprecedented big population crisis is in for us all (Hesketh, Li, and Zhu, 2005).
3) **Information**

Information which regard to the harshness of problem and reasons and the prices and paybacks of policy alternatives is also a very significant resource for a coalition. The ACF assumes that “information is a resource utilized by policy participants to win political battles against opponents which consists of solidifying coalition membership, arguing against an opponent’s policy views, convincing decision making sovereigns to support their proposals, and swaying public opinion” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 202).

Both of the coalition have their own statistic center and did a lot of researches about population concerned questions. The Planning and Information Division of NHFPC compiled health statistics through investigation and constructed a national population database. While as the member of the modify coalition, the School of Sociology and Population Studies (SSPS), affiliated with Renmin University of China, did abundant researches about china’s population. They have undertaken state key projects for many times, and also won many important prizes.\(^\text{16}\)

Members of the modify coalition also use social media such as Weibo micro blogging (Chinese Twitter) to attract public attention. The deputy editor of the Guangxi Daily News tweeted via Xinlang Weibo (新浪微博): “the fundamental solution of dealing with the social problems of an increasing aging society is

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allowing couples in China to have one more child instead of reschedule the retirement age” on March 16, 2013.\textsuperscript{17}

4) Mobilizable troops

Elites of the coalition tend to use members of the considerate public who “share their policy belief systems to participate in various political events” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 202). The uphold coalition’s mobilizable troop is unbelievable huge. Just take a look at the NHFPC, it have 21 affiliated divisions including Family Planning Grassroots Guidance Department, Family Planning and Family Development Department, and Propaganda Department. Also it has many employees, in-staff personnel is 545 according to its Institution Setting Rules while its off-staff personnel is considered several times more than its in-staff personnel.\textsuperscript{18}

Comparatively the modify coalition’s mobilizable troop is less than that of the uphold coalition. Most of them are scholars with scientific advantage rather than number of personnel. Well-educated college students who prefer a more friendly and looser population policy also contribute to the available mobilizable troops of the modify coalition (Ku and Ho, 2010).

\textsuperscript{17} Adam Minter, China takes one step away from the one-child policy, http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/341781/, [Accessed 11 Nov. 2016].
5) **Financial resources**

An advocacy coalition with sufficient financial resources is able to “subsidize research and establish think tanks to produce information; fund sympathetic candidates, thus gaining inside access to legislators and political appointees; launch media campaigns to earn public support, and advertise their policy positions to strengthen their number of mobilizable activists” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 202).

Obvious the uphold coalition also have a big advantage over this part since it consists of government departments and state founded institutions while the modify coalition mostly consists of individuals and small institutions. Departmental budget of the NHFPC in 2016 on expenditure was more than 140 billion Yuan (nearly 20 billion dollar) almost half of the budget of the Ministry of Education in 2016.\(^{19}\)

6) **Skillful leadership**

Literatures concerns about policy entrepreneurs demonstrate skilled leaders are able to “make an eye-catching vision for a coalition, tactically use resources competently, and draw new resources to a coalition” (Vergari, 1996; Muller, 1995). Public policy researchs also refer to how skilled entrepreneurs are required to produce real changes in policy (Minstrom and Vergari, 1996; Kingdon, 1995).

The uphold coalition’s NHFPC have tried “draw up a science and technology

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development plan for health and family planning, and carry out scientific research programs related to health and family planning to consolidate their leadership in this area”, besides they also “participate in planning medical education and give collaborative instruction to universities on teaching medical science and family planning”.

The modify coalition also did a lot in leadership building to expand their influences over this policy issue. Wu Simin, former vice director of State Ethnic Affairs Commission, also one of the deputies of the National People's Congress (NPC) suggested terminate the one-child policy for solve the population problems we are facing nowadays in the National People’s Congress at 2013. His proposal gave rise to people’s attention and led to a wide discussion about the reforming of the one-child policy.

3.3 Policy oriented learning and policy changes

The ACF describes policy-oriented learning as “relatively enduring alternations of thought or behavioral intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy

objectives” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 123). In other words, policy-oriented learning is one of the main reasons which contribute to policy change.

During this last two one-child policy changes both of the coalitions mentioned above have undergo policy oriented learning to serve the continuous changing population situations of mainland China. In this study, policy-oriented learning appeared to have only happened within coalitions, resulting each coalition’s modification in terms of policies and approaches. Learning between the two coalitions did not happen by reason of profoundly opposing policy belief systems and policy-related favorites.

1. Preliminary of the modify coalition

Different from the hasty introduction of the one-child policy in September 1980, which was mainly a political choice based on few consideration about existing state of demography and society, this time researchers have “carried out a much more dynamic and significant part in advocating for alterations to the one-child policy” (Greenhalgh, 2008; Wang, Cai, and Gu 2013).

In 2001, the modify coalition convened experts and scholars together for a meeting, achieved a consensus that “nowadays China have to renovate its current one-child policy considering all its problems like human rights abuses, the gender unbalance at birth and abnormal population structure” (Hvistendahl, 2010). After
this meeting, scholars and experts from primary institutions of population-related research in China established an academic group in 2001 (Hvistendahl, 2010).

Their studies about China’s current demographic situation and the damaging costs of enduring the one-child policy, accompanied by hard works from many other parts of society, “informed the public of China’s new demographics and corrected the many misconceptions about population growth” (Hvistendahl, 2010). Besides, their joint demands to Chinese population-related policymakers to lessen and finally to terminate the one-child policy worked as the base for one-child policy-related disputes in mainland China (Basten and Jiang, 2015).

2. Argument about the population problems

The modify coalition argued that China’s contemporary one-child policy has resulted “a quickly aging population society, an increasing decreasing labor force, and a unbalanced gender distribution at birth, dangers that could damage economy growth and social security in China” (Reuters, 2012). As Joe Biden criticized this population policy as “God-awful”, and “China’s economic growth would begin to slow because there will not be enough people to sustain the production of goods and services and support a large, retired workforce”.22

2.1 Structure of the population – an aging society

China is clearly ageing very rapidly. From the start of the 21th century to 2050, the median age of Chinese will increased from beneath 30 years old to approximately 46 years old, resulting China to one of the oldest societies in the whole world (Deng et al., 2015). Besides, the people older than 65 years old is estimated to upswing from approximately 0.1 billion in 2005 to over 0.329 billion in 205—surpass the combined populations of Germany, France, Japan, and the UK (Deng et al., 2015).

Besides, Chinese ages from 16 to 59 (also known as the working age population) are decreasing; comprising 66.3% of the whole population in 2015 (the number has dropped from 67% in 2014, 67.6% in 2013 and 69.2% in 2012). Some demographers cautioned Chinese top leaders about an approaching labor force deficiency, but Chinese government’s original plan was to handle it by delay the retirement age in spite of many citizens’ against (Feng, Hu, and Moffitt, 2015).

Aging society in China is “a problem not only for Chinese society as the support proportion between the working age population and the old age population drops, but also for many of working age who are only children” (Wang 2011). As the first generation of the only-children of each families came of marriage-age for becoming parents themselves, they are supposed to support both his or her two parents and also four grandparents, so called the “4-2-1 Problem” (Archer et al.,
2.2 Sex ratio of the population--serious gender imbalance

Traditional favorites for boy means that couples restricted to only one child frequently conducted sex-based abortions or just abandoned newborn girls. After the one-child policy was introduced, pregnant women were using ultrasound technics to identify the gender of the fetuses and abort female babies. Subsequently China has had 30 years’ uneven gender ratios at birth, as couples conduct sex-based abortion. Consequently, ratio of male to female births in China has been “surely increased by the one-child policy”, said by Shuzhuo Li (2007) who is a demographer worked at Xi’an Jiaotong University (西安交通大学).

On the basis of China’s 2010 Census, Chinese men outnumbered women by more than 34 million and ratios of birth-sex still very high (120 boys for every 100 girls born in 2010) in the world in spite of the Chinese government’s efforts to discontinue the usage of sex-selective identify machines to control the gender of children. Experts predicted that there will be almost 30 million more marriage aged men than women by 2020 and more than one quarter of them (in their late 30s) will never have the chance to marry before 2030 (Poston and Glover, 2006).

What’s worse this approaching marriage-related congestion will probably be

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even more severe in countryside area, as the poor, not well-educated rural population is expected to be more easy to drop down in this severe competition for girls (Eberstadt, 2010). As a result, this massive surplus of bachelors will have a significant effect on China. This subsequent big generation of unmarried men could subscribe to severe crime and social insecurity for male criminal behavior drops significantly upon marriage.24

2.3 Pain of the population--the “lost” one-child family

This one-child policy has created more than ten million’s one-child families in its 35 years of existence. Up to 2010, a total 2.41 million families nationwide have experienced deaths of their only child, and it is expected to rise with 76,000 per year (Wei and Hong, 2015). For the families discussed above, the damage triggered by this population policy is long-lasting and irreversible.

In Chinese society, parents are mainly depend on their children for taking care of them when they are old, this sad phenomenon may have destroy all the effects to all those “shidu (失独)” parents (parents who have lost the only children they have) especially in the rural areas for children are the main source of elderly support for them. Many so called “shidu” parents are suffering from both psychological

problems and economic difficulties after losing the only child they cherished so much.

Some “shidu” parents went to the capital city Beijing trying to have their voices heard by the government. In May 2013, approximately 400 people staged a sit-in outside the NHFPC’s headquarter. “The biggest fear I have is that someday I might end up die alone at home and nobody even know about this happened many days later”. “The slogan went that ‘birth control is good, the state will look after the old (计划生育好，政府来养老’) at the time, I hope the government fulfill the promise they said before”, said 53-year-old Xu one of the sit-in demonstrators.25

The Chinese’s more than 150 million one-child families have made the greatest sacrifices under the one-child policy but losing their only child, they would basically lose all hopes in life (Yang, 2014). As the families losing only child increased yearly, the needs of social assistance both psychologically and financially will become a major concern for Chinese society.

3. Debate about the real effects of the one-child policy

Despite all these population problems mentioned above, fundamentally dispute between the two coalitions about the one-child policy was how exactly this population restrain policy actually contributed to the slowing down population

growth. Member of the uphold coalition, Zhao Baige, also the vice minister of the NPFPC argued that “the one-child policy has led to 400 million fewer people which would have been born otherwise”, it is one of China’s environmental contributions since “such a decline in population growth leads to a reduction of 1.83 billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions in China per annum at present”.

Contrary to his claim, the modify coalition declares “much of China’s TFR decline was recognized previous to the promotion of the one-child policy and the real number of births evaded over the last 30 years is about 100 million” (Whyte, Feng, and Cai, 2015). Besides, in countries once had about the same levels of fertility rate in the early 1970s with no harsh measures, for example, the one-child policy, TFR also decreased.

From 1970 to 1980, fertility rate in China fell from 5.5 to 2.3, Thailand’s fertility rate also dropped dramatically from 5.6 to 2.1 and Brazil’s fertility rate fell from 5.0 to 2.8. According to these data, the modify coalition claimed that “the one-child policy was not mainly accountable for the quick fertility rate drop in China” (Whyte, Feng, and Cai, 2015). In other words, China’s fertility rate would have dropped at a about the same rate without the implementation of the one-child

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4. Dispute about problem-solving methods

The modify coalition points out that “the one-child policy is simply an obstacle to the health of the population, which when removed will help in handling those problems” (Zeng, 2007). In April 2004, the modify coalition distributed a report to the Family Planning Commission and other agencies (Hvistendahl, 2010). They hoped the report would later “lead to relief of the one-child policy to solve problems like severe gender imbalance, growing aging society and so on” (Zeng, 2007).

Instead, the uphold coalition’s response was not very favorable. They refuted that the part played by the medical profession in conducting illegal sex-selective abortion in terms of the gender imbalance, is usually overlooked and is certainly an field demanding further policy consideration rather than reform the one-child policy itself. They also argued that enforcement of the population policy is vital in maintaining low TFR, and if the one-child policy were relaxed it would inevitably cause a baby boom which would “strain schools, hospitals, and the future job market” (Hesketh, Li, and Zhu, 2005).

However, the response of the uphold coalition did not stop the modify coalition’s passion over the reforming of the one-child policy. Members of the modify coalition like Ye Tingfang, a professor working at the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS), with other some 30 delegates submitted one more proposal in March 2007 called on the government in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC 中国人民政治协商会议) to abolish the restriction of one-child per couple.28

With the facts presented by the modify coalition, the uphold coalition have gradually acknowledged the fact that TFR has fallen to below replacement level (2.1 children per couple). However, as the member of the modify coalition Gu Baochang, a demographer working at Renmin University (中国人民大学) in Beijing and also a former adviser to NHFPC pointed out: “the argument between us is taking longer than expected”, “but our group has a much powerful ally—the empirical evidence” (Hvistendahl, 2010).

5. Experimental two-child zone

During the competition of the two coalitions, in 2009, the modify advocacy coalition submitted another modified proposal to the central government, advising that exemption policy experimentation of two-child per couple start at some developed areas like Shanghai (上海市) and Jiangsu province (江苏省). Wang feng (2011) from the modify coalition claims that “decade-long effort of debate is having an effect”, he says, “government officers have begun asking opinions from

28 Consultative Conference: “The government must end the one-child rule”,
the outside on a possible alteration, they are started thinking lessening the policy, the course is fairly slow right now”.

But the modify coalition’s proposal did make some difference. In 2009, if one of the husband or wife were only children themselves they are allowed to have one more child in Shanghai. However, the actual couple taking this chance has been quite not high in general, only about 8 percent of couples are allowed to have one more child really have a second child in 2012 (Wang, 2012). In 2011, Xuanwei Prefecture (宣威市), Yunnan Province (云南省), a city with approximately 1.25 million citizens, also started to reform the one-child policy as an experimental two-child zone. However, there were “just 36 applicants for an allowance to have a second child in the first 3 months of the modified policy taking into effect” (Liu et al., 2014).

In order to figure out this modified policy’s outcome, a bunch of researches conducted by the uphold coalition’s NHFPC have examined why fertility rate are not high. These researches uncovered undoubtedly that “the primary reasons are difficulties in terms of the cost of raising a child: the extra expenditure in education, high costs of bearing a child for couples, and insufficient childcare welfare services” (Merli and Morgan, 2011). The uphold coalition started to realize that allowing Chinese to have more than one children may could be a choice (Liu et al., 2014).

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6. The uphold coalition’s no dissent

As a result, in November 2013, the government changed the policy to if one of the spouse was an only child, then the couple can have one more child (Feng, Cai, and Gu, 2013). However, the modify coalition claims that this new exemption policy has attracted fewer applications than expected. By May, approximately 1.45 million couples (only about 12 per cent of the number qualified) had applied to have one more child, many qualified couples refused to have one more child, indicating the real expenditure and stresses of raising two children in this extremely stressful Chinese society (Basten and Jiang, 2015).

In response, one of the members of the modify coalition Mei Zhiqiang, deputy head of NHFPC of Shanxi province believes “the one-child policy shall completely abolished with all couples in China being asked to have one more children”. Liang Zhongtang (2015), a retired demographer from the modify coalition claimed that “the government should lessen the one-child policy and the modified policy had come too late”. Some scholars of the modify coalition even started believe that the completely eliminating of the one-child policy will end up with little help. Zheng Zizhen, former director of Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences (GASS)

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said: “the issue now is not about having children, but about not having children”.\textsuperscript{31}

In January 2015, the modify coalition put forward another proposal that every couple should be allowed to have two children to obtain a well-adjusted growth of population \cite{Feng2016}. On October 29, Xinhua News Agency conveyed the modification in the current law to a two-child policy citing a declaration from the CPC, and will takes effect from January 1, 2016 which marks a new era for all the Chinese are allowed to have two children.\textsuperscript{32}

The uphold coalition showed no dissent on this policy change. The NHFPC which implements the one-child policy, said in an announcement delivered after the CPC’s meeting that “put an end to the one-child policy would rise labor force supply and lessen the increasing burdens from an aging society”, “this new population policy will helps in sustaining and promoting future economic growth”.\textsuperscript{33}

3.4 External shock in policy change

The ACF has also argued that “a necessary but not sufficient condition for major policy change is significant external perturbations or shocks to the policy subsystem which can shift agendas, focus public attention, and attract the attention of key decision making sovereigns” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In the case of the Zhang Yimou’s “social maintenance fees (社会抚养费)”, public discussion have been triggered and attracted the central government’s attention, thus contribute to the reforming of the one-child policy in 2013.

1) Zhang Yimou’s largest fine ever

The film-maker Zhang Yimou (张艺谋), 62, who presented the impressive Beijing Olympics opening and closing ceremonies in 2008, was reported that he had violating the one-child policy in May 2013 for gave birth to three children with his wife. After that, Zhang gave an interview to Xinhua News Agency, he claimed that his wife gave birth to two boys and one girl separately, and described his helpless of keeping distance from his children in public over the years in case the authorities to find out about the extra births. And said he wanted more children

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for the births can gave pleasure to him and his wife and also their old parents.\textsuperscript{35}

In reaction to his violation of China’s one-child policy, the NHFPC bureau of Binhu District of Wuxi City (无锡市滨湖区) send a letter to Zhang saying that he and his wife Chen Ting (陈婷) “have gave birth to three children, which is a severe against of the one-child policy”, and demanded that he pay a penalty (also known as the “social maintenance fees”) for having two “beyond-the-quota” children, of nearly 7.49 million Chinese Yuan ($1.23 million). This was the biggest penalty ever since 1980 when the one-child policy was first announced.\textsuperscript{36}

People caught breaking one-child policy must pay a “social compensation fee” in China, but Zhang’s historical largest fine have led a wide discuss about the reproductive rights and the validity of the fine. Some observers have come to Zhang’s defense, saying that he was forced to make a contested of the absurd one-child policy, “despite the fact that the social maintenance fee is a unreasonable and shameless overcharge, which nobody acquainted with how it will be used, Zhang knows as a public figure he leaves with no other choice, but to take the


\textsuperscript{36} The bureau said it calculated the figure based on Zhang’s and his wife’s income in the three years prior to the birth of each of their children, in accordance with the law. The children are aged 12, 9 and 7 respectively. In total, Zhang made more than 3.58 million yuan in those three years while his wife had no income. At midday on Feb. 7, the Binhu district population and family planning bureau received 7,487,854 yuan ($1.235 million) from Chen Ting and Zhang Yimou for their additional birth fee and social upbringing fee. From Laura Zhou, China slaps largest one-child policy fine, 7.5 million yuan, against director Zhang Yimou, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1401596/china-slaps-largest-one-child-policy-fine-75-million-yuan-against, [Accessed 21 Nov. 2016].
outrageous bill with an earnest attitude”.

2) The “social compensation fee”

The eagerness of many NHFPC officers for collecting fines for disobeying the policy is very much related to the means in which China’s local government is financed. In 2001, the central government restructured much of its tax system, bringing about a severe drop in taxes imposed for the local government (Tian, 2008). This collection of the “social maintenance fees” has become considerable revenue for local administrations. It is estimated that the “social maintenance fees” could be more than 4 billion dollars in total (Li 2012; Wei 2013).

Furthermore there is growing indication that local NHFPC officials are keener on imposing fines, or the so called “Social Maintenance Fee”, to enlarge local incomes or to cover daily operational costs, than to encourage couples to have only one child (White, 2006; Cao, 2010). In addition, the exact fine people need to pay when violate the one-child policy is not that specific, thus gives the enforced officers chance of corruption which leads them more interested in this “cash cow”.

Without reform of the role of the “social compensation fee” played in the one-child policy, such practices and misuses of this penalty could be lasting. In 2013, Liu Daoping, vice-chairman of the NPC’s Standing Committee of Sichuan

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Province (四川省全国人大常委会) also acknowledged that “the one-child policy were only harshly carried out on the middle classes actually for the lower class could not have enough money to pay and the upper class could pay the penalty without difficulty or just give birth to their children in Hong Kong\(^{38}\) or Saipan” (Basten 2013; Li 2013).

Soon after that the Chinese central government announced in November 2013 that the modified policy would further permit couples to have one more child under the conditions that one of the parents has no siblings. This announcement marked the most noteworthy lessening of China’s population restrain policy in more than 30 years.\(^{39}\) Thus it is reasonable to say that Zhang’s incident could be taken as an external shock for its huge influences.

Next also the last chapter of this paper will review how ACF helped in explaining the one-child policy’s change processes in mainland China. And limitations of this study also recommendation for further study will be discussed.

\(^{38}\) Hong Kong has a different political system from Mainland China because of Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems” policy. One of the major differences of the laws in Hong Kong and in Mainland China is that the one-child policy is only applicable in Mainland China. A child born in Hong Kong is granted permanent residence in Hong Kong despite the fact that both parents are Mainland China citizens. As a result, pregnant women from Mainland China have been flocking in Hong Kong to have children (Li, 2013).

Chapter 4: Conclusions

Chapter 5 will review how ACF helped in interpreting the changes of the one-child policy in mainland China first, then discuss some limitations in our arguments, and recommendation for further study to extend the ACF’s applicability in an authoritarian regime like China.

4.1 Implications of the Study

The study employed the main conceptions and system of beliefs of the ACF to interpret the decision making procedures that led to the one-child policy change in mainland China. With this study, the framework verified helpful in illustrating the extreme competition between the two advocacy coalitions and in interpreting the one-child policy changes lasted over ten years. Many state and non-state components united into the modify coalition, and hold dissenting policy beliefs compared with the uphold coalition regarding the one-child policy.

The emergence of the modify coalition consists of largely of non-state entities such as demographic scholars caused one-child policy related policy debates.
Members of the modify coalition shared policy core belief also secondary belief and involved in competing the uphold coalition consists of powerful alliance of state entities.

In terms of the ACF’s applicability difference in different stages of the one-child policy change, it was mainly contribute to the changed pattern of Chinese government’s policy making process. China may still an authoritarian country under the leadership of the CPC today but it has changed a lot since Deng came to power and released numbers of social and economic reform.

Last but not least, as an authoritarian state, China limits the foundation and action of coalitions consists of societal entities. Thus the modify coalition discussed here stayed as an unfixed network instead of establishing a tight, longstanding organization. The modify coalition also cautiously organized resources to criticize the population problems itself instead of the central government and its governance in promoting the policy change process of the one-child policy.

4.2 Limitations and recommendations

Despite this study’s contributions to the ACF’s application in China, it is also essential to admit the limitations of the study. By identifying the limitations of the
applicability of the ACF, it will help in avoiding possible defects of framework enlarging which could have happened from applying the framework to the study of policy making process in China.

The first limitation is associated with the challenges in applying the framework to China, an authoritarian regime. Scholars study about China’s policy making normally “do not have adequate information on what kinds of actors, interactions, and processes shape policy making” (Han, Swedlow and Unger, 2014). With inadequate information about the policy making process, it was rather challenging in describing coalitions. Thus, it’s fairly to say that the ACF research in China confronts bigger challenges than in a more opened, democratic society.

Secondly, it is also significant to be aware of that the policy subsystem discussed here not that developed. A mature subsystem is defined by “having specialized subunits at all levels of government to deal with a policy issue” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 193). However, only some evidence of obvious anti-one-child policy movement in local governments in this study. Thus this study could be treated as an initial stage in assessing the framework’s applicability in studying the shifting features of policy making process in China.

Interaction between actors within the public sector and those outside it appears more limited in China. This study was not able to uncover it completely in this case and it certainly deserves more in-depth investigation. Besides, the influence of ordinary Chinese citizens seems to be increasing in decision making
process as a result of new information and communication technologies are more available to them. This calls for their role in decision making to be paid more attention in further study.

Despite this ACF’s one-child policy change application case here, this study does not mean that the framework is also applicable to some other Chinese policy subsystems. Policy itself also matters a lot in its application in China, sensitive topics which could be a potential threat to the CPC’s leading party statue in China like nationalization of military; multi-party system is definitely not applicable in this case.

The modify coalition observed in this paper have emerged might because of the one-child policy change making involves various state and societal stakeholders. That is to say, the feature of population policy may have formed a chance for the modify coalition came into being under an authoritarian regime like China. Thus future study could try identifying whether this framework are also applicable to a number of other policy subsystem more productively than other theoretical frameworks. With the purpose of enlarge the range of the ACF’s applicability to an authoritarian region like China.
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Appendix 1 Agreement to Participate in Interview

I agree to be interviewed for the project entitled *One-child policy in mainland China: understanding policy change with the advocacy coalition framework* which is being produced by Pan Yu student of Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University.

I certify that I have been told of the confidentiality of information collected for this project and the anonymity of my participation; that I have been given satisfactory answers to my inquiries concerning project procedures and other matters.

I understand that such interviews and related materials will be kept completely anonymous, and that the results of this study may be published in an academic journal or book. And that I have been advised that I am free to withdraw my consent and to discontinue participation in the project or activity at any time without prejudice.

I agree that any information obtained from this research may be used in any way thought best for this study.

Signature of Interviewee _____________ Date _____________
Appendix 2 Two Interview Transcripts

2.1 Interview with a peer

S is a 25-year-old girl from Anhui Province the second child in her family. She has a sister who is five years older than her. After graduating from college in Beijing, she went back to her hometown--a small county in Suzhou city, Anhui province, and work as a civil servant in a local government department.

Question (Q) 1: Can you talk about yourself first?
Answer (A): Sure, my name is S, I was born 1991, 25 years old. I have an old sister who is five years old than me. And now I’m working at the local government.

Q2: Why did your parents want to have one more children under the strict one-child policy?
A: You know I have an older sister rather than an older brother, that’s the reason.

Q3: What did you mean?
A: My father’s family is very traditional, and it is important for him to have a son in order to inherit the family name. Otherwise, in traditional Chinese values, the family bloodline is broken. After my mother gave birth to my older sister, my parents, especially my father, were not happy. So they decided to have one more child. That’s the reason why I came to this world.

Q4: So your parents have to pay the “social compensation fee” because of you?
A: Not really. My parents do not live in a rural area where couples are allowed to have one more child if the first-born was a girl. My mother was a middle school teacher, and my father worked in a state-owned factory. They are supposed to have no more than two children whether the child is a boy or a girl. (So I’m not qualified for the honourable “social compensation fee” actually, hahaha…)

Q5: So how your parents did gave birth successfully to you? Any fight against the government?
A: It’s a long story which I was told by my grandmother. They have planned this extra birth for two years. After delivering my sister, the hospital put a birth control device inside my mother’s uterus to prevent future pregnancy. But mother went to a private clinic afterwards to take out the birth control device secretly. My parents also worked out a schedule: since the middle school had a two-month summer vacation every year, my mother got pregnant in November in 1990. When the due
date was approaching, my parents had my father’s mother come over to help with the delivery at home.

Q6: Yes, it sure was a big day for you family. But what did you mean that your grandmother came to help with the delivery? Not in a hospital?
A: They decided to deliver me at home for the hospital would not accept them without a legal document proving that it was their first child. And if the hospital informed the local Population and Family Planning Commission, my parents will be in trouble.

Q7: So what’s your father feel this time after they found out you are a girl?
A: He was disappointed once again when I was born--he wanted to have a son. My father did not pay much attention to me at first.

Q8: So how did you get alone with your older sister?
A: I did not see my sister or my parents very often because I lived with my grandmother until I was 6 years old.

Q9: Why? Because your father didn’t like you since you are a girl?
A: I hardly agree so. Because if they were find to have a second child, they would both lose their jobs according to the one-child policy. Because of this, I was hiding by living with my grandmother in a far rural area.

Q10: So what happened when you were 6 years old?
A: Grandma took me back to my parents for I reached the age for school. But I can’t just study at school like other kids, I’m so called “black child (黑孩子 or 黑人口)”.

Q11: Yes, I bet you are. The policy would not be easy for you out-allowed children.
A: You are right. I studied at school without registration until my parents paid the penalty for household registration by the time I went to junior high. I was very sorry for my parents; I’m such a burden for them. I was in depression for quite a long time.

Q12: I am really sorry to hear that. So how did you overcome it?

40 The term denotes children born outside the one-child policy who are not registered in the national household registration system(also called Hukou). Being excluded from the family register, they do not legally exist and as a result cannot access most public services, such as education and health care. Other children of such illegal birth, whose parents choose to properly report the birth and pay the monetary penalty imposed, are not black child. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heihaizi, [Accessed 29 Nov. 2016]
A: Study hard. I read as many books as possible, and was always one of the top students in my class. I thought if I did really well in school, my parents would be proud of me.

Q13: You have a decent job now, I’m sure your parents are very proud about you.
A: Thank you. It is not a career I really like, but it provides a stable salary and also people think it is a respectable job, especially for a girl. My father is also pleased.

Q14: So how do you think of your family?
A: I know I didn’t have a perfect family when I was a child, but I try to keep a positive attitude towards everything. I always tell to myself that when I have my own family I will make sure my children enjoy a happy carefree childhood.

Q15: Thank you very much for your time. Anything else you want to say about the one-child policy?
A: I heard that since this year every couple is eligible to have two children. I’m glad for this loosed policy, but what I really look for is the day when we can have as many children as we like.
2.2 Interview with a mother

M is a 50-year-old woman from Anhui Province. She is a farmer living in a rural area. She married in 1989 and gave birth to her first children the next year. After that she tried to have one more children but failed because of the family planning commission’s obstruction.

Q1: Could you introduce yourself first please?
A: My name is M. I’m a farmer, 50 years old. I was born in 1966, and married in 1989. I have only one child, he was born in 1990.

Q2: I guess your husband must be very happy when you gave birth to your son.
A: Yes, he is. Having a son meant that a woman is more “capable” than those mothers of only girls. Women who could not have sons were looked down upon, and the family would blame her.

Q3: Yes, that does happen. So one child is just good for you since you have a son rather than a girl?
A: Well, I did feel very grateful when I gave birth to my son. But later I gradually changed my mind.
Q4: Gradually changed your mind?

A: Yes, as time goes by, I feel like it would be happier if I have more children. A big family is what Chinese people always prefer and I just love child I want to have more.

Q5: So, did you make it into practice?

A: I tried and failed, it was a long story. After I gave birth to my son, the hospital also put an intrauterine device inside my body afterwards. If I want to have baby again, I shall get rid of it in the first place. So illegally I went through the surgery and started prepare for my later pregnancy.

Q6: That must be not easy for you.

A: You bet. After recovered from that surgery, I got pregnant again in 1994. But it was only the start of a nightmare.

Q7: Pregnant a nightmare?

A: Pregnant is grateful of course. The process of it definitely was not. There was a huge chance to get caught by the family planning commission so my whole family paid even more attention to people around, someone might tell on me secretly.

Q8: So how was it going?
A: Bad…There is an old saying “fire cannot be wrapped up in paper;” I could not keep my pregnancy as a secret at last, and people knew about it in June after my five-month pregnancy.

Q9: What happened then?
A: Then here came the Family Planning Commission officers. They took turns trying to “educate” me into having an abortion. They said I should comply with the glorious policy and set up a good example for our village or they will do what they supposed to do.

Q10: So you had the abortion after the conversations?
A: I fled away after that. I was five months into pregnancy already, and an abortion might harm my health inevitably. I went to a village far away from my hometown--my husband has relatives there. I was planned to give birth to the baby and come back afterwards.

Q11: That’s not that bad. Did it work?
A: Sort of…They did can’t find me not to mention a forced abortion. But they are eviler than you could possibly think.

Q12: What do you mean eviler?
A: As the saying goes “a monk may run away, but the temple remains”, they came to my parents. Their wing-room got torn down and they were held in custody under the conditions that I come back surrendered to what they said before.

Q13: So you came back eventually?

A: How could I give birth to my child having my own parents in pains?! It was torturing and frustrating for me, and I saw no hope of escaping from their hands. I finally came back and agreed to do the abortion. My husband was angry to see me back, but he knew well there was nothing we could do to stop what’s going to happen. I went to the hospital and did what I have to do.

Q14: I feel so bad for your suffering. Did the abortion go well since you have been pregnant for five months?

A: How I wish I could forget all what happened! Sorry… I don’t want to talk this part. Anyway it was… hell.

Q15: I am really sorry to hear that. So are you informed that the policy have changed into two child per couple starting from this year?

A: Yes, I watched the news from TV before. I am glad that the allowed number goes up into two this year even though I have no chance to take it at least my son can have one more child if he wants.
Q16: Thank you very much for your time. Is there anything else you would like to say?

A: You are welcome. Well…If this is so called destiny, I wish I can have as many children as I like in the next life.
Appendix 3 Chronology of the one-child policy

1978 The central government approves a proposal to slow population growth, and family planning offices encourage couples to have one child, or at most two. Some areas go further and begin to enforce a “one-child” rule.

1979 A national conference of family planning officials pushes forward proposals for couples to have only one child, and state media promote the idea. Chinese provinces experiment with measures to curb population growth, including providing additional food rations for couples pledging to have only one child in Sichuan Province.

1980 The Communist Party ordered its 38 million members to have only one child with an open letter. It was aimed at curbing population growth to zero by the year 2000.

1982 The National People’s Congress endorses a new Constitution that for the first time enshrines birth control as every Chinese citizen’s duty.
2008 Chinese officials say they will begin studying how to move away from the country’s one-child restriction, but caution that any changes would come gradually and would not mean an elimination of family-planning policies.

2013 The Chinese government eases the one-child policy, permitting couples nationwide to have two children if one of the spouses is a single child. Despite those changes to the law, many only-child couples say they will not take advantage of the new rule because of the rising costs of child-rearing.

2016 China ends the one-child policy, announcing that all married couples would be allowed to have two children, in a bid to reverse the rapid aging of the labor force.

국문초록

중국정부는 중국의 거대한 인구와 식량 문제로 인해 1980 년부터 한 자녀 정책을 시작했다. 2015 년 말, 이 논란이 많은 인구 정책은 보편적 두 자녀 정책으로 바뀌었다. 이 논문의 목적은 옹호연합모형(ACF)으로 한 자녀 정책을 분석하고 중화인민공화국(PRC)의 정책 변화를 해석하는 새로운 방법을 제시할 것이다.

이 연구의 이론적 배경은 ACF 이다. ACF 는 정책 변화를 분석하는 데 널리 사용되고 있으며, 여러 구성원과 관련된 복잡한 공공 정책 프로세스를 연구하기 위해 개발되었다. ACF 는 원래 민주주의 사회에서 정책 변화를 분석하기 위해 설계되었다. 그러나 중국의 지속적인 개혁으로 적어도 이 한 자녀 정책 변화의 경우에 ACF의 적용가능성을 촉진했다.

이 논문은 먼저 제 1 장에서 일반적인 서론하고 한 자녀 정책의 역사를 제공할 것이다. 제 2 장에서는 ACF의 적용가능성을 검토한다. 제 3 장은 이 연구의 주요 부분이고 ACF를 사용하여 한 자녀 정책의 변화를 해석한다. 제 4 장에서는 현재 연구의 함의와 한계점, 향후 연구를 위한 권고사항이 밝혀 될 것이다.

정치적, 사회적 차이로 인해 중국의 한 자녀 정책에 관한 정책
변화를 ACF를 적용하여 설명하는데 어려움이 있을 수 있지만, 한 자녀정책의 일반적인 정책 변화는 두 가지 주요 옹호연합 간의 경쟁으로 설명 될 수 있다. 이는 ACF가 한 자녀 정책을 설명하는 데 적용 가능하며 중국본토의 정책 변화를 이해하는 새로운 방법을 제공 할 수 있음을 의미한다.

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