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Hegelian Consciousness and Derridian Family:
On the Theory of Consciousness in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit of 1803-04 and its Reading by Derrida in his *Glas*
Abstract

Hegelian Consciousness and Derridian Family

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Indeed, when it comes to the Hegelian concept of consciousness and self-consciousness, it has been chiefly the description of self-consciousness in the fourth chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that has attracted great attention from Hegel scholars. Especially, Kojève’s interpretation of the dialectic of lord and bondsman had a great deal of influence on the French Marxists of the early and mid-20th century (Kojève 1947). The influence of Wahl’s interpretation of the unhappy consciousness was also compelling among the post-existentialists at his time (Wahl 1929). In contemporary philosophy, we can also see that the self-consciousness in this chapter is revisited by many American Hegel scholars, representative in Pippin’s attempt to defend non-metaphysical Hegel (Pippin 1989). In contrast, relatively less attention has been paid to Hegel’s concept of consciousness, so that even in cases where it became an object of serious attention, it was
dealt with only partially or indirectly in regard to Hegel’s epistemological position as it is presented in the Phenomenology (Westphal 2009), or to the idea of “science of experience of consciousness” which concerns the peculiar methodology of the Phenomenology (Schlösser). However, Hegel’s concept of consciousness deserves more serious attention, especially in the context of his philosophy of spirit as a whole. In this regard it should first be pointed out that, entitling the second part of the Subjective Spirit in the Encyclopedia as “Phenomenology of Spirit: Consciousness”, Hegel constructs this part with the three sub-parts; consciousness as such, self-consciousness, and reason, which correspond to the first three parts of the Phenomenology. In according to this architectonics of the Encyclopedia, we would thus have to say that the consciousness is a comprehensive concept, including the self-consciousness as its moment. This point could also be defended on the fact that the thought of the practical nature of conscious being—as it is conceptualized through the second potency of the consciousness, labor and instrument, in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04—is also found in the description of the self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Thus a comprehensive study of Hegel’s concept of consciousness, especially in terms of its relation to the architectonics of the system as well as the concept of the spirit, is needed. On these bases, this paper attempts to clarify Hegel’s concept of the consciousness, especially as it is presented in the philosophy of the spirit of 1803-04. The main questions addressed in this paper are: what the subject matter that Hegel wanted to conceptualize through the concept of the consciousness was and which problems Hegel intended to think of by elaborating it.

What we call the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 indicates the third
part of the lecture notes that Hegel wrote for his lessons of the 1803-04 winter semester at Jena under the title of the “system of speculative philosophy”. It has been evaluated as a crucial work in tracing Hegel’s project of the system at Jena; given that the triple composition of this system—constituted by logic and metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit—is identical with the architectonics of the system in *Encyclopedia*. More significantly, in this “philosophy of spirit” Hegel established the thesis that the system should be that of the spirit and thereby separated himself from Schelling’s identity philosophy. This is a reason why the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 is important in elucidating the origin of his concept of the spirit and of the further progression of the system of the spirit. Admitting this point, however, this paper attempts to reconstruct it as a theory of consciousness, instead of confining its implications within the framework of the development of Hegel’s idea of the system of the spirit. This reconstructive approach can above all be justified on the composition of its content: establishing the definition of the consciousness as the concept of the spirit first, and setting forth an account for its moments with the term potencies—memory and language, labor and instrument, and family and possession. This reconstruction in terms of the Hegelian theory of consciousness, then, will hopefully contribute to elucidate the more concrete and real implications of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04—beyond its metaphysical significance concerning the system, spirit, and the absolute. Inversely, it will also be instrumental in making sense of the significance and status the concept of consciousness has in regard to the Hegelian system of the spirit.
For the supposed reconstruction this paper first defends that the particularity of the concept of consciousness in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 lies in its ontological definition. Briefly stated, consciousness is here defined as the unity of what it is conscious of and that of which it is conscious; meaning that it is the mediating whole which generates the conscious opposing relation. Contrasting to the view that what it is conscious of is in opposition to that of which it is conscious, or what is active in opposition to what is passive. Thus this consciousness, so understood, cannot be made sense of in its epistemological function of cognizing an external object. Rather it should be understood as what produces its being through such a self-meditating movement. Based on this ontological understanding of the consciousness, this paper next reconstructs the theory of three potencies of consciousness as an account about three different moments constituting the being and activity of the consciousness. Especially it attempts to defend the hermeneutical perspective that Hegel does not simply intend to present a certain combination constituted by such and such accidental elements that could probably be related to the being and activity of the consciousness, but rather to present a sequential argument to draw a more complete determination of consciousness according to the conceptual, logical necessity. Finally, it argues that this theory of the consciousness can be categorized as the Hegelian anthropology in the sense that what Hegel conceptualizes through it eventually refers to a human being who speaks, labors, runs economic life, and transmits the cultural tradition. Additionally for Hegel, this human being theorized through the concept of the consciousness is distinct from an animal being of which the singularity comes from the
internal self-feeling in sensation, in that its absolute singularity comes into being as the externalized self through speech. The distinction also lies in that the universal generated in human family, the cultural tradition is fundamentally different from the natural universal called the genus, due to its ideal character. Thus this paper adjunctively attempts to clarify this distinction by addressing how Hegel theorizes the organic unity in the last fragment of the philosophy of nature of these 1803-04 lessons, and by paying attention to its continuity with the concept of consciousness presented in this philosophy of spirit of 1803-04.

On the other hand, to justify the claim that the theory of the consciousness in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 can be determined as the Hegelian anthropology, it seems necessary to make sense of the methodological peculiarity of this anthropology, in addition to the simple interpretation that this consciousness refers to a human being. This is because the Hegelian theory of consciousness, or the Hegelian anthropology unlikely falls under an anthropological study in general sense where diverse cultural phenomena are empirically researched. In this regard, this paper takes the perspective defended by Bourgeois and Derrida that the Hegelian anthropology can be characterized as speculative. First, the “speculative” means that this anthropology does not address empirical phenomena of human beings as such, nor that its methodology can be empirically justified. But its more fundamental meaning lies in that this anthropology conceptualizes the being and activity of a human being in terms of the mediator or holder of the spirit’s movement. At this point, the second part of this paper is devoted to Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of
spirit of 1803-04 in *Glas*, noting that it outstandingly elucidates the speculative character of the Hegelian anthropology. Indeed, the main issue of the reading of Hegel in *Glas* as a whole is the Hegelian system. Especially the first half of *Glas*, which is the primary focus in this paper, sheds light on the Christian, or onto-theological origin of the Hegelian concept of the spirit and to problematize the Hegelian system of the spirit by centering on the concept of family. Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 plays a significant role for this Derridian twofold approach, since it is through a thorough analysis of it on which Derrida develops the twofold approach. Beyond that it is also in these Jena lessons that Derrida sees through the fundamental logic on which Hegel’s system stands, that is, “reappropriation of absolute loss”. On these bases, the second part of this paper first recapitulates the problem of the Hegelian system by articulating its circular structure—the identity between starting and ending point, and between the introduction to the system and the system itself, as it is argued for in the *Logic of Science, Phenomenology of Spirit*, and *Encyclopedia*. Next, the main aim of the second chapter of this section is to articulate Derrida’s two approaches by examining from which perspective and on what base he determines the Hegelian spirit as onto-theological; and how he reconstructs Hegel’s idea of *Sittlichkeit* with primacy given to the family. Finally, the last chapter of this paper is entirely devoted to Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. The main concern in dealing with this Derridian interpretation is to make sense of the thematic extension conducted by Derrida, from the family in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 to the family in the *Philosophy of Right*. Specifically Derrida’s problematization of the
Hegelian concept of love and death, which holds up the Hegelian idea of the family as a whole according to him, will offer an incisive insight into elucidating the dialectical methodology and thereby the specular character of Hegel’s anthropology.

Keywords: Hegel’s Philosophy of spirit of 1803-04, Consciousness, Sittlichkeit, family, System, Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel.
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Abbreviations

- Hegel’s texts

Where an abbreviation refers to both the German original and an English translation, I give page or paragraph references to both, with the German first and the English second, separated by an oblique (/). The philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 (JS I) and the Science of Logic (WL) are referred to with the page numbers. The reference of the Phenomenology of Spirit (PhG) includes the page number of German original and the paragraph number by English translator Miller, while the Philosophy of Right (PhR) and Encyclopedia I, II (EN, ES) are referred to with the paragraph number of the German original.


- Other’s Texts


The citations of *Glas* include the page numbers of the French original and the English translation one after another.
Introduction

Through modern western philosophy, consciousness was repeatedly thematized in a web of relationship of various concepts and problems such as mind-body or soul-body problem, personal identity, and possibility and condition of true knowledge. Decartes for example, presented the concept of the *cogito* as evidential basis of true knowledge and thereby provided an anthropological definition of a human being as *res cogitans*. In this way, consciousness was regarded as a substance for philosophers such as Decartes or Leibniz, whereas it referred to a series or association of ideas or sensation occurring only within human mind for Locke and Hume. In contrast to this empirical-psychological understanding, Kant considered consciousness in terms of a synthetic function that conditions all knowledge of object by distinguishing transcendental from empirical consciousness. It is also well known that the concept of consciousness played an important role for post-Kantian scholars such as Reinhold and Maimon to address the unresolved problem of the thing in itself in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. By extension, Fichte’s consideration of consciousness in terms of the *Tathandlung* and his continuous attempts to elaborate a meta-theory of science through conceptualization of the I or self-consciousness are still controversial themes among contemporary scholars.¹ While it is widely

¹ From the perspective of the theory of self-consciousness, Henrich highly rates Fichte’s merits, claiming that with the Fichtean idea of the self as the product of reflection, we could for the first time escape from the circularity of the modern reflective theory of self-consciousness, which presupposed the self as a reflecting and thinking subject. See: Dieter Henrich, “Fichte’s Original Insight”, (tr.) David R. Lachterman, in: (ed.) Darrel E. Christensen, Manfred Ridel, Robert Sparemann, Reiner
admitted that the Fichtean transcendental questioning of principles of true science contributed, positively or negatively, to the development of later German idealism, the Hegelian concept of consciousness has been mainly elucidated revolving around the Hegelian critique of knowledge presented in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

However, due to the manifoldness of involved issues and their complicated relations, doubt arises as to whether it would be appropriate to deal with all the previously mentioned modern thoughts under one category, consciousness; as if there has been a clear problem domain covering all of them. Furthermore, it seems impossible to draw a consistent definition of consciousness, nor to identify the object to which those thoughts are addressed in common with. The difficulty deepens when we trace etymologically the usage of the term consciousness. The Latin term *conscientia*—which is the common origin of the English term *consciousness* and the French term *conscience*, and supposed to be a translation of the Greek term *synaisthesis*—did not only refer to knowledge of something else but is also concerned with moral judgment of our activities in Scholastic

Wiehl, and Wolfgang Wieland, *Contemporary German Philosophy Volume 1*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982. According to Henrich, it is not the self but the reflective theory of the self that is involved in circularity between subject and object—which thus precludes from understanding of production or expansion of knowledge. In this context, Henrich thinks that the entire early modern theories of self-consciousness fell into the trap of circularity of reflection. In this regard, Thiel raises doubts about Henrich’s treatment of the early modern philosophy. According to Thiel, it is unfair to identify all of early modern philosophers as theorists of reflection. Early modern discussions of consciousness and self-consciousness, for Thiel, are more complicated and rich than viewed from the perspective of later thought. See: Udo Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and personal identity from Decartes to Hume*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.17-18.
thought. But with the Cartesian concept of the *cogito, conscientia* no longer had the moral connotation of conscience, but was only considered as accompanied knowledge of a subject while doing something else. Then, translating the Cartesian concept of *conscientia* into the German term *Bewußtsein*, Wolff confined it to consciousness of what is thought; which probably implies that the concept of consciousness was understood in a certain metaphysical context, thereby concerned with intellectual thought of all entities in the world. Thus, in order to adequately deal with each theory, it is needed to carefully discern diverse contexts wherein it is involved—for example, epistemological, ethical, ontological, and metaphysical contexts, etc.

In spite of all these difficulties, one can see through the crux of the matter addressed by the modern philosophers, the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness—awareness of an object and awareness of oneself. More precisely, it is compelling to see the particularity of modern thoughts of consciousness in the thematic entanglement of consciousness and self-consciousness; awareness of something else has been considered, or even identified with awareness of oneself, or self-consciousness has been regarded as condition of knowledge of an object.² In

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2 A comprehensive understanding of the modern theories of consciousness seems to be appropriately obtained in terms of the development of the concept of subjectivity. See: Udo Thiel, *The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and personal identity from Descartes to Hume*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp.1-32; Klaus Brinkmann, “Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and the Modern Self”, History of the Human Sciences, 18 (4) (2005). Both authors find the particularity of the modern concept of subjectivity in that self-consciousness became the key issue in dealing with consciousness. Specifically, Thiel affirms that discussions on the self and personal identity developed since the seventeenth century, though not explicitly thematized in terms of consciousness and self-consciousness, was essential for the following
this regard, Hegel seems to share basic concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness—awareness of an object and awareness of oneself—with modern thinkers, as well as the idea that self-consciousness conditions consciousness. The point is clear in that Hegel determines consciousness as the relation of a subject to an object, self-consciousness as a relation to oneself; and that self-consciousness is presented as the truth of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Nonetheless, Hegel’s concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be simply understood on a schematic distinction between knowledge of another and of oneself. This is because Hegel deals with these themes within the context of his philosophy of spirit, the metaphysical context of self-developing movement of the absolute. So understood in terms of the spirit, Hegel’s concept of consciousness then seems to deviate from a set of problems that we normally count for a theory of consciousness.

Let us briefly delineate the constellation of problems which the Hegelian concepts of consciousness and self-consciousness are embedded in. The first material to consider is the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the *Phenomenology*, including three sorts of epistemic activities—sense certainty, perception, and understanding—in consciousness, Hegel defines them as knowledge of another and characterizes them as grounded on a dualistic development of the theory of human subjectivity until German idealism around 1800. According to Brinkmann, subjectivity is not a discovery of modernity as far as the concept of self-referential entity is already present in the Aristotelian thought. However, widely examining the historical development of the concept of subjectivity from Aristotle via Decartes, Locke, and Kant to Husserl and Sartre, Brinkann argues that the modern concept of subjectivity is distinguished from ancient thought, in that self-consciousness has been regarded as a condition of object-consciousness and consciousness has been considered in terms of intentionality, by modern philosophers.
separation between consciousness and its object. Following this, self-consciousness is presented as knowledge of itself, of which any object does not have its independent existence (Selbstständigkeit). Self-consciousness, for Hegel, is concerned with practical activities such as desiring and laboring, and therewith, the liberty of such a practical agent becomes the core issue in his thought of self-consciousness. Specifically liberty, Hegel argues, is effectively realized only when self-consciousness becomes the spirit. It is not as a singular individual but through the universal spirit, the communal, ethical, and inter-subjective life that self-consciousness realizes its liberty. On these bases one may say that for Hegel, consciousness refers to epistemic activities, which presupposes an ontologically dualistic opposition between cognizing subject and cognized object, and self-consciousness designates an agent living in this world who is supposed to effectively realize its liberty through the spirit. However, when we examine the Encyclopedia next, the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness no longer appears so clear. Consciousness, the second chapter of the part on the subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia, includes self-consciousness, having sub-chapters on consciousness itself, self-consciousness, and reason—which are relevant to the first three parts of the Phenomenology, followed by the chapter on the spirit. It therefore seems plausible to conclude that consciousness includes self-consciousness and thus consciousness is a more comprehensive concept for Hegel. This does not imply however that consciousness is a higher-ordered concept regarding self-consciousness, nor that self-consciousness is considered in terms of consciousness for Hegel. Rather the point is definitely clear that self-consciousness is the fundamental concept supporting Hegel’s idea of the spirit. Specifically, defined as the relation to itself within a relation to the other, self-consciousness determines form and structure of the
movement of the spirit. Or, as far as what knows itself as the spirit is spirit, the Hegelian spirit is basically characterized as self-conscious. If so, the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness presented in the Encyclopedia should be specified precisely as the relation between consciousness and the self-consciousness which is not yet true self-consciousness. To put it another way, if consciousness includes self-consciousness as argued here, this is so only insofar as this self-consciousness, not being the spirit itself, only refers to a singular individual—which practically lives the world but is not capable of realizing its liberty. Henceforth, if we can appropriately discern Hegelian theory of consciousness, this theory may first be defined as anthropology in the sense that it is concerned with the existence mode and the way of life of a human being, considered in terms of a singular individual. A significant issue this theory will necessarily involve is then: in what sense consciousness is not yet the spirit and how it can become the spirit.

The philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 shows an important turn of Hegel’s thought of system and spirit.\(^3\) Diverging from Schelling’s

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\(^3\) In the 1803/04 winter semester, Hegel gave his lessons and intended to present the complete system of speculative philosophy, constituted by three parts; logic and metaphysics, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit. The lecture notes, of which the greater part was fragmentarily written, were first published with the title of *Jeneser Realphilosophie I* by Hoffmeister in 1932. Indicating only philosophies of nature and of spirit, this title seems to be inappropriate to expose Hegel’s project of presenting the complete system and to cover all parts of the system. On the other hand, the new publication of these notes with a comprehensive title was realized by Düsing and Kimmerle in 1975: G.W.F. Hegel, *Jenaer Systementwürfe I: Das System der speculativen Philosophie*, (ed.) Klaus Düsing and Heinz Kimmerle, Hambourg: Meiner, 1986. We have translated versions only of the philosophy of spirit, both in English and in French: *G. W. F. Hegel’s System of Ethical life and First Philosophy of Spirit: An English Translation of G. W. F. Hegel’s System der Sittlichkeit and of Philosophie des*
philosophy of identity, Hegel begun to develop the idea that the absolute, or
the absolute unity should be considered in terms of the spirit—rather than
indifferent substance, and so the idea was clearly present through the project
of the system of 1803-04 that the system can be completed by presenting the
movement of the spirit; the spirit, initially as logical Idea and absolute
substance, externalizes itself into nature and then becomes itself. Nature,
therefore, cannot be merely a facticity but rather the spirit for Hegel—where
the spirit, existing as its other, is concealed. But the most distinct feature of
the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 is that it, as a whole, is presented as a
theory of consciousness. This is based on the idea that consciousness is the
concept of the spirit. In other words, the idea is that consciousness directly
expresses essence of the spirit—becoming itself through being its other—in
that it is the unity of opposed terms, what is conscious and that of which it is
conscious, or the active and passive. Consciousness is, therefore, the identity
having opposition and difference as its indispensable factor. Furthermore,
Hegel put forward this theory of consciousness by conceptualizing three
potencies of consciousness; memory and language, desire and labor, and
family and possession. So considering consciousness as a singular human
being who perceives, speaks, labors, marries, educates a child, and
manages private possession, the last part of this theory of three potencies is
devoted in dealing with the problem: how does this consciousness, so
understood in terms of its singular individuality, become the spirit, more
precisely the people-spirit? In this way, this theory of consciousness in the

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*Geistes,* (ed. & tr.) H. S. Harris & T. M. Knox, New York: State University of New York
philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 addresses the problem of the becoming of the spirit, at both levels of form and content. Also it covers main issues of Hegel’s concept of consciousness mentioned before: human singular individuality as subject of epistemic and practical activities and the becoming of the spirit. Therefore, the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 is important material not only in tracing the development of Hegel’s project of the system, but also in exploring his whole concept of consciousness.

On the other hand, Derrida intensively addresses the problem of the Hegelian system in his *Glas*. In particular, we can discern two approaches in his dealing with Hegel’s system: (1) an interpretation of Hegelian onto-theology through exploring earlier theological writings of Hegel and (2) the problematization of Hegel’s speculative theory of *Sittlichkeit* through examining the *Philosophy of Right* and especially through the analysis of story of Antigone given by Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. These two approaches finally lead Derrida to reflect Hegel’s thought of religion. As it is well known, Derrida’s reading is *deconstructive* as he intends to reveal that the factor supporting the whole Hegelian system simultaneously undermines the system. More precisely for Derrida, the very factor grounding Hegelian onto-theology, that is the family, undermines the theory of *Sittlichkeit*. In this regard, Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 plays an important role in Derrida’s problematization of Hegelian system. Specifically, by characterizing Hegelian anthropology as speculative through consideration on Hegel’s concepts of love and death and by articulating the problem of sexual difference therewith, the reading of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 enables Derrida to connect the two approaches mentioned before. Through this reading, Derrida clarifies how the familial filiation grounding Hegel’s onto-theology is concerned with love as the principle of *Sittlichkeit* and
prepares a further step for his deconstructive reading of Hegel’s Antigone. This Derridian reading, then, will contribute to elucidate the problems of the Hegelian system of the spirit which the concept of consciousness of Hegel is involved in. It will also provide a suggestive interpretation in regards to the Hegelian concept of Sittlichkeit in terms of his anthropology.

On these bases, this paper first attempts to address the Hegelian theory of consciousness in his philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. We will first clarify the particularity of Hegel’s definition of consciousness as well as of his ontological dealing with it in terms of the spirit. For the second step, we will conduct a detailed reading of fragment 15, which is the last part of the philosophy of nature and is relevant to the genus-process presented in the Encyclopedia. This reading seems necessary for making sense of the Hegelian concept of consciousness as far as Hegelian consciousness is concerned with the life of a human being, distinct from an animal being. The last section of this study on the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 will be devoted to the theory of three potencies of consciousness, including a study on Hegel’s idea of recognition and the passage of consciousness to the people-spirit. The second part of this paper will mainly deal with Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. For this study, we will first recapitulate the problem of Hegel’s system as well as Derrida’s problematization of it in his Glas. Following this, we will attempt to articulate Derrida’s two approaches, that is, to the Hegelian onto-theology and to the Hegelian speculative theory of Sittlichkeit. Finally, we will exclusively examine how Derrida interprets Hegel’s theory of three potencies of consciousness.
1. Hegel’s Theory of Consciousness in his Philosophy of Spirit of 1803-04

1. The Ontological Concept of Consciousness and its Implication for the System Problem

*The essence of consciousness* is that there is absolute unity of the antithesis immediately in an aetheric identity. It can only be this *in as much as immediately, so far as it is opposed*, both terms of the antithesis *are consciousness itself*, [and are] *in themselves, as terms of the antithesis, immediately the opposite of themselves*, [i.e.,], they are the absolute difference cancelling itself, they are the superseded difference, they are simple. [...] *Consciousness* itself, although in its essence it is equally the supersession of both, appears only on one side, the side which is characterized as *active* and hence as cancelling; it posits only itself as consciousness, not that of which it is conscious; and it is therefore only singular, formal, negative, not absolute consciousness. (JS I 189/212)

The most distinct feature of Hegel’s theory of consciousness that we find in his 1803/04 lessons is the twofold definition of consciousness: absolute consciousness and empirical-phenomenal consciousness. First of all, Hegel maintains that consciousness is the absolute unity of the opposing terms—what is conscious and that of which it is conscious. But this unity is not an external connection between heterogeneous elements; since Hegel defines it as the relation in which each of the opposing terms immediately opposes itself. Such an internal relation characterizes the absolute consciousness and
further allows Hegel to conceptualize it as a whole generating itself. This is also the way that absolute consciousness forms its unity, proving it to be the previously affirmed relation in which each term is immediately its own opposite. In this sense, Hegel asserts that the difference between what is conscious and that of which it is conscious is simultaneously sublated. On the other hand, Hegel defines consciousness as empirical and phenomenal—making clear the point that consciousness appears only as one side in the opposing relation. Namely, only as what is conscious, and thus as what is active. Empirical-phenomenal consciousness is thus basically defined as the relation to the other that stands outside of it. Also, what characterizes this relation of the empirical-phenomenal consciousness to its other is the negativity, meaning that the consciousness, as empirical and phenomenal, exists only by annihilation of its other and attaining its unity thereby.

Then the question arises as to the relation between these two sorts of consciousness. However, it does not seem easy to elucidate the relationship between them. This is because the absolute consciousness determines the whole structure of consciousness and thus has no empirical aspect; whereas the empirical-phenomenal consciousness is concerned with empirical appearance as well as the negative, practical relation to the empirical other. In some sense we may then say that the relation of the empirical-phenomenal consciousness to the other originates from the internal self-relation of the absolute consciousness—the former is conditioned, or constituted by the latter, or influenced in some way. But the more fundamental idea Hegel supposes is that the relation between these two sorts of consciousness should be considered from the perspective of becoming. Thus Hegel states, “the empirical consciousness must be absolute consciousness” (JS I 189-190/212). Then, a generation of empirical-phenomenal consciousness will not
necessarily follow from an already existing absolute consciousness. Rather for Hegel, what exists is only empirical-phenomenal consciousness and what should be examined is it becoming absolute. This becoming occurs when the empirical-phenomenal consciousness negates its other so that there will be no longer any absolutely independent being from it. However, the supposed negation of the other by the consciousness does not simply mean absolute elimination of the other or even alterity itself in a violent manner. Rather, Hegel maintains that the other remains as the other even in absolute consciousness, holding the form of being-other than consciousness. What is changed to become equal to consciousness is thus its form. In other words, the absolute consciousness is devoid of its own content while maintaining the formal difference from its other, and it will gain its content when the empirical-phenomenal consciousness accomplishes its transformation, whereby becoming absolute. In this sense, the absolute consciousness is “the goal, the absolute reality of consciousness” (JS I 190/213).

Obviously, the twofold definition of consciousness exceeds what we normally consider in terms of mental state, perception, ability to relate to itself etc. The relation to the other of consciousness is negative and practical rather than epistemic, and its relation to itself forms a certain reality, beyond a formal concept. These points will be more clearly elucidated by examining the concept of the middle:

Consciousness is ideality of the universality and infinity of the simple in [the] form of opposition. [...] The two [aspects of universality and infinity] are distinct and external to one another in consciousness, they separate themselves; their unity thus appears as a middle between them, as the work of both, as the third whereby
they are related, in which they are one, but [as] that wherein they likewise distinguish themselves; the conscious being distinguishes this middle from himself, just as he distinguishes himself from what is distinguished in consciousness; but with the difference (Unterschied) that he also relates both [himself and the object of consciousness] to this middle; absolute universality comes to be the *middle* only in the subject, in the isolating of the antithesis. As this middle it [subjective consciousness] is itself an opposite, or it has therein the form of its existence; for its existence is that wherein it is an opposite. (JS I 191/214)

This citation gives a more strict definition of the unity of consciousness as the unity between two sorts of consciousness, absolute consciousness and empirical-phenomenal consciousness. This definition also suggests that each type of consciousness marks each aspect of the unity of consciousness—the ideality of universality and the infinity of the simple, respectively. Also, the *middle* here is presented as the medium in which these different aspects are separated and unified simultaneously. As such a medium the middle is relevant to the third term which is irreducible to none of them. However, this does not imply that Hegel suggests a third concept of consciousness. According to the citation above, we can probably identify the middle with empirical-phenomenal consciousness, therewith taking the empirical-phenomenal consciousness as having twofold opposition in itself: the opposition to its object and the opposition to itself. On this base it can then be said that the middle is the concept for making sense of the unity of consciousness from the perspective of empirical-phenomenal consciousness. Specifically it also presents an ontological definition of consciousness in the sense that the twofold opposition is considered in terms of the mode of
existence of consciousness therewith. To put it another way, for Hegel, consciousness exists and it exists only as the twofold opposition, or as the dynamic relation between its absolute and empirical-phenomenal moment. In this context, the definition of consciousness as the middle eventually means that consciousness exists as the middle. Which implies again the formal discordance between absolute and empirical-phenomenal consciousness and the necessity of the latter to become the former.

On this base, to clarify the ontological context in which the Hegelian thought of consciousness is involved, it appears necessary to examine it from the philosophy of nature presented in these 1803-04 Jena lessons. This is because Hegel considers the existence of consciousness in its relation to nature, affirming that consciousness exists as a part of nature. Thus Hegel states, “it [the consciousness] is at first in [a] negative relation with nature, and in this negative relation it exists as tied to nature itself within the relation; the mode of its existence is not a particular [or] a singular aspect of nature, but a universal [moment] of nature, an element of it” (JS I 192/214-5). It can then be said that consciousness is also a natural being for Hegel. Specifically, it is the universal aspect of nature, and this universality makes it distinct from a natural thing which is enclosed in singularity. Indeed Hegel does not develop a more detailed account for such universality of nature in these lessons, but only suggests therewith that consciousness has a negative relation to nature. In this regard, we will later see that Hegel considers the

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4 “It [the consciousness] exists in as much as it is that wherein both terms, the self-conscious being, and that of which he is self-conscious, are posited as one, and also oppose themselves to it; in other words consciousness itself is in this way something affected with a determinate character, as existent” (JS I 191/214). (“As existent” is italicized for emphasis by me.)
universality of nature—the natural mode of existence of consciousness—in terms of the idealization of nature by consciousness. In other words, consciousness exists as the universal aspect of nature by universalizing it.

Then, the question arises whether the supposed relation between nature and consciousness is no more than a tautology. Are not consciousness and nature merely in a conceptual circularity in which each refers to each other? Or, by affirming the identity of consciousness and of a being that is established by the activity of consciousness—universalization and idealization—does not this ontological consideration of consciousness fall under the subjective or constitutive idealism? These questions lead us to examine how Hegel accounts for the activity of consciousness. To begin with, Hegel presents a concrete account for conscious existence through the concept of the totality of three factors: language and memory, work and instrument, and possession and family. Especially, Hegel here considers the totality of consciousness in terms of dualistic opposition between ‘the being of the consciousness’ and ‘simple union [einfaches Einssein]’ (JS I 193/216), coupling the former to language, instrument, and wealth and the latter to memory, work, and family. This opposition also corresponds to the opposition between what is conscious and that of which it is conscious; language, instrument, and wealth correspond to what is conscious, whereas memory, work, and family belong to that of which it is conscious. Then, we can match the former with activity of consciousness and the latter with its passivity. However, Hegel does not think of the dualistic understanding of the activity of consciousness to be plausible as such. Rather, Hegel emphasizes that the activity in question consists in relating between them: “But the truth is that speech, instrument, and family goods are not merely the one side of the antithesis that is opposed to [the subject] who posits himself
as conscious, they are just as much related with him” (JS I 193/216). So, Hegel will admit that the activity of consciousness certainly opposes the passivity of that of which is conscious. However, he also asserts that it should essentially be considered in terms of relation to itself, within itself. Therefore, speech, instrument, and family goods mean creating a relation to the other or producing such relatedness with the other, rather than as a part of antithesis. In this way, Hegel also thinks of the activity of consciousness from a certain overall perspective of generating a conscious relation. More specifically, the idea is that the activity of consciousness does not only consist in the individual negation of the other—in particular, destroying singular beings—but in the universalization of nature occurring through it whereby it equally becomes universal. Therefore, activity means the universalization of both ideas, and therein lies the unity of consciousness.⁵

In this way, the existence, unity, and activity of the consciousness consist altogether in the relation of two terms of opposition to Hegel, instead of being just one term of opposition. From this, Hegel gives a further account on the difference between the existence modes of nature and of consciousness. For him, if natural beings exist as immediately singular beings, the existence of consciousness consists in its universality—it becomes itself universal through the universalization of nature, particularly by idealizing natural elements in its opposing, negating relation to them. In line with this, Hegel asserts that consciousness attains its absolute existence

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⁵ “[…]
the essence is the unity of both sides, and this unity is consciousness [Bewuβt/sein], which, as such, presents itself as universal on both of its universality. Each of these two sides in their opposition is the unity of both, [i.e.,] the unity of that ideal antithesis of the conscious individual and what is opposed to him” (JS I 193-4/217).
when it, as the middle, continues the activity of universalizing, whereas the natural being ceaselessly repeats generation and extinction without any durable existence.

In the 1803-04 lessons, the problem of the difference of nature and consciousness is not exhausted with such an articulation of their distinct modes of existence. On the other hand, Hegel also presents the idea that consciousness is the conjunction of nature and spirit—the two distinct realities forming the two parts of the philosophical system. What is argued here is that consciousness marks the liberation from animal existence and so the beginning of the spirit. In this sense, it can be said that Hegel does not develop his theory of consciousness only for the sake of giving an explanation about what we call consciousness. Rather for Hegel, the theme of consciousness has to do with the problem of the system, or the systemic science, which is one of the most important issues throughout Hegel’s philosophy as a whole. As a matter of fact, viewed from the perspective of the Hegelian philosophical project, the problem of the system covers many issues in various contexts in their complex relation to each other. To summarize, the system is first concerned with metaphysical issues as far as Hegel aims to present the knowledge of the absolute through the system. Secondly, the methodological issues are important in that it is explicit in his argument of the necessity of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, wherein the methodological issue is extended to the phenomenological issue in the sense that human experience takes an important role in the method. The phenomenological issue seems to be enlarged to an anthropological issue at various levels, embracing diverse themes such as history, art, religion, and philosophy as well. On the other hand, the *Science of Logic* is concerned with the dialectic method, whereby the absolute, or the truth, is described as
the internal movement of the Concept, without any reference to a certain transcendental, external entity to it. It further embraces the problem of the relationship between the disciplines; logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit, of which the systemic totality is supposed to be presented in the *Encyclopedia*. The system then problematizes an economic-political issue, as far as it claims the completion of the idealistic system at the level of human community and institutions in particular, which is the key problem of the *Philosophy of Right* based on the idea that the actual is the ideal, the ideal is the actual. From this perspective, we can estimate that Hegel’s theory of consciousness in his philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 holds a thread concerning the system problem. In particular, it seems to be important in regards to the relation of nature and of spirit, and so that of philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit—the problem of the systematic conjunction of nature and spirit. The relevant question, then, can be formulated as such: how does consciousness conjoin nature and spirit continuously into one system, weaving the two parts of the system altogether? This is the question around which we will conduct further reading on Hegel’s theory of consciousness in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. In this context, fragment 15 of this manuscript seems necessary to read because it concerns the liberation of consciousness from animal existence, thereby ending the philosophy of nature. In the following, we will examine Hegel’s idea about organism and consciousness developed in fragment 15.
2. The Organic Whole and the Transition to Consciousness in Fragment 15

The concept of consciousness that Hegel develops through his 1803-04 lessons shows an anthropological approach to consciousness—for the main problem on which Hegel’s theory of consciousness turns is the particularity of a conscious being in comparison with a natural being. Thus, we can regard the concept of consciousness presented through these lessons as referring to a human being—of which the conceptual determination we have previously drawn from the ontological argumentation of Hegel: the universal aspect of nature or the natural being universalizing nature. From this perspective, the Hegelian concept of consciousness seems to inherit the traditional understanding of human being as an intellectual animal; as a corporeal animal being and an intellectual being at the same time. In this regard, fragment 15 is important in making sense of Hegel’s concept of consciousness since in this fragment, Hegel argues for the transition from sensation (die Empfindung) to consciousness. The main question leading from our reading of fragment 15 is as follows: how does Hegel explain the particularity of consciousness from the perspective of an organism or of organic life—organic life including both human organisms and plants and animals?

In fragment 15, Hegel proposes to consider an organism in terms of a triple system: the inner organism, the system of blood and lymph; the outer organism, the system of bone and muscle; and finally, the system of senses. When it comes to the distinction between inner and outer organism, they are not attached by equal weight in this fragment. Hegel is mainly interested in
giving an account of organic life in terms of the inner organism, viewing this biologically circulating system as concerned with individualization of an organism whereas the outer organism has to do with anatomic, functional formation of bone and muscle system. To briefly reconstruct the argument, Hegel first considers the lymph system in its functional aspect, stating that “the lymph becomes the fluidity of each particular organ” (JS I 170).⁶ That is, the lymph system is not an organ among others but a certain functional one that connects other organs with each other. In this sense, Hegel determines it as ‘the real universal in the particular [das real Allgemeine in Besondern]’ (JS I 170). Additionally, this function of the inner organism is culminated through the superior nerve system, that is, the cerebral nerve system: “in the superior nerve system, the fluidity liberates itself from this real being in the particular and becomes the absolute universal” (JS I 170). And finally, the system of senses is presented as being established on the basis of the systems of lymph and nerve. In the very system of senses, the universalization of an individual occurs as such. In line with this idea, Hegel also asserts that sensation should be understood as the process of generating ‘the universal oneness’—the organic life as process:

The theoretical process as a system of senses is the individual’s, as itself, becoming universal; it is sentient; the sensation is irrelevant [gleichgültig] to the proper animality, the formation-process and the relationship of the mediate system to it, and as if [the sensation is] only an accompanying, indifferent function, a universal oneness

⁶ We do not have a reliable translation in English for the part of the philosophy of nature of the 1803-04 lessons yet. So when the passage of fragment 15 is cited in this paper, my translation will be accompanied by the page number of the German original.
Therefore, what Hegel wants to articulate through his consideration of the triple system of an organism is the process of an organism making itself a universal oneness. To put it another way, the sensation does not simply refer to the corporeal reaction of external stimulation, which would then be nothing but an animal function to Hegel. Rather, what the sensation concerns here is the individuality or the unifiable self of an organism. Sensation should thus be understood in terms of individualization of an organism, which signifies generating its unifiable self. Thus Hegel’s consideration on sensation certainly touches a metaphysical issue inherent in the biological theme of the life of an organism; how to explain the fact that an individual has a number of senses and that a number of senses form an individual. In this regard Hegel seems to show a theoretical possibility to problematize the oneness of a living organism at the biological level in terms of individualization of an organism, instead of dealing with it at a purely conscious level as we observe in the Kantian explanation of apperception or in the Cartesian concept of the Cogito, for example. On this basis, Hegel further gives an account for organic life in terms of fluidity. In brief, Hegel considers individuality of an organism the universalizing process through sensation. Then, fluidity, in terms of the afore mentioned process, can be properly considered as the life of an organism.

Hegel characterizes the process occurring in the system of senses as a theoretical one, meaning that it is neither practical nor actual because the individuation occurs only inside one organism. So Hegel secondly takes into consideration sex-relation as the practical process of individualization. In
other words, for Hegel, sex-relation makes possible the individualization of an organism that occurs through the practical, actual relation between two sexually different individuals. But in Hegel’s understanding, the sex relation does not concern only the individualization of an organism, but also the generation of the universal, the genus (Gattung). Genus thus means the universal maintained through the relation between sexually different individuals. Especially, Hegel thinks of this universal as the most supreme essence of animal beings: “it [the sex-relation] is only the relation of the individual to the other; the genus is the not-emerging middle (die nicht hervortretende Mitte), which, as such, would not relate itself to the individual. But the absolute essence of the animal individual consists in being genus, Idea, the universal” (JS I 170). However, the most important idea that Hegel wants to articulate in terms of the sex-relation is that those two factors, universality and individuality, oppose each other in the life of an organism, and that the essence of the life of an organism consists in the very opposition between universality and individuality: “this side, wherein it [the animal individual] is the universal, mediating nerve, is opposed to its individuality itself” (JS I 170-1). Thus eventually, Hegel would assert that the individuality of an organism should be eliminated for the subsistence of the universal called genus, which would render the death of individuals necessary. In this way, the opposition between universality and individuality characterizes the life of organic beings at its practical level, whereas their accordance marks its internal process of individualization.

From this comes Hegel’s thesis that the discordance of individuality and universality forms an organic whole⁷. In this regard fragment 15 in the

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⁷ This idea of the strained relation of the two terms resonates throughout Hegel’s
1803-04 lessons is worth noting especially in that Hegel here considers the organic whole in terms of the life of an organism. Furthermore, Hegel asserts that disease is a necessary moment of the organic whole, and thus, to make sense of the organic whole, it is necessary to elucidate the particular significance of disease in its inseparable relationship to the life of an organism. In line with this, Hegel criticizes two theories: the humoral pathology and the stimulation-reaction theory. The error of the humoral pathology, in Hegel's view, lies in that they attempt to only separately make sense of the individual parts of an organism, as if they could be completely separated from each other. They thus do not concern themselves with the life of an organism. On the other hand, the stimulation-reaction theory, Hegel criticizes, does not consider the actual real organs beyond a quantitative apprehension of the stimulation-reaction relation. However Hegel believes that they are right in that they grasp life and disease as absolutely related to each other, which makes a great contribution to the understanding of the life of an organism. In other words, if an organic being is no different from dead material, the latter makes intelligible the bodily activity of an organic being. Despite of this, this activity, understood in the stimulation-reaction relation, is nothing but a mechanic activity, not the vivid activity that is peculiar to an organism for Hegel. Thus Hegel himself suggests to think of the integrated relation between inner and outer organism. They form a whole body in their mature works, forming the core of his logical framework and ontological insight. Hegel will give an explanation, for example, on the organization of a social space and of its mechanism as well as with the idea of inter-constitutive relationship between singular subjects and universal order. The historical development of the European community from ancient Greek to his own time which signifies the history of the development of freedom for Hegel, is also interpreted as the successive process wherein the individual freedom and the universal legal system are united, separated, and re-united.
inseparable relation. But it does not seem that Hegel matches each of these systems to a certain organ. What they represent is conceptual principles of the life of an organism. That is, ‘the indifference of the fluidity’ and ‘the difference of the moments’. In short, the life of an organism consists in their immediate connection, while disease in their separation:

The organism essentially has its life in being the movement that potentiates itself from the indifference of the fluidity into the difference of its moments and holds its different movement in the fluidity. This immediacy of the passage that this middle is not opposed to its aspects is the essence of the animal organism. As the indifference of the fluidity is separated from the absolute differentiated-becoming and is opposed to it, disease is set in this way in the organism. (JS I 171)

So affirming that each organ has its own fixed form, Hegel also argues that the articulation and formation are not fixed but always face fluidization, which means they are always involved in a probable change. If fluidization takes place, then differentiation and articulation will follow it, which is not absolutely fixed but will be fluidified again. Differentiation and fluidization take place altogether and therein lies the essence of the life of an animal organism. This is the organism’s way of constituting its life. Hence, they

8 “As the difference of the external and internal organisms, as we have cognized the former as itself in bones and muscle, the latter as itself in nerve and blood, this must not be understood therewith as if bones and muscle would be separated from nerve and blood, but rather each organic part is the whole of the organism itself, and the bone is in itself also muscle, nerve, and blood, the muscle is blood and nerve, and the nerve is the same” (JS I 170)
correspond to the inner and outer organism respectively, as Hegel states that “each part itself is likewise immediately inner and outer organism, the fluid that differentiates itself in itself and the falling back into the same” (JS I 171). Therefore, the distinction between inner and outer organism is concerned with those operations forming the life of an organism, beyond the biological or functional distinction between physical organs. Additionally, it also reveals the basic framework of Hegel’s philosophy of nature during his Jena period, according to which natural beings exist as the opposing unity of two forces or tendencies—that is, to stay in the non-differentiated state and to potentiate itself into the differentiated state. However, those two terms, fluidization and differentiation semantically do not have the same value, since Hegel regards them as two aspects of the third term, fluidity: the fluidization and the differentiation are “the two aspects of the fluidity as the middle” (JS I 171). It follows then that fluidity is not merely attributed to one of the properties such as the physical system of blood and nerve, nor to one of the constitutive principles or tendencies of the life of an organism. More significantly, it refers to a certain operation that connects two opposing tendencies, enabling the life of an organism: the operation that, however, has little to do with any empirical, physical activity, but cannot be but purely conceptualized.

We thus observe that the concept of fluidity becomes more abstract with Hegel’s argumentation proceeding as follows; what comes first is the inner organism identified with the system of blood/lymph and nerve, which is then followed by the tendency to send back the living organism to the non-differentiated state; fluidity then means the conceptual operation enabling the organic life. Thus fluidity, not differentiation, is the principle of the organic life for Hegel. In this regard, reduplication of this concept is significant. That
is, it accomplishes its role of connecting other organs by becoming the inner organism, but it is also the power to remain as the non-differentiated state, resisting to become itself a fixed organ. In the first place it is passive but in the second it is active, even destructive. Hegel’s idea would then be that one could not give any plausible explanation on the life of an organism by holding the concept of fluidity only as the one term of the opposing relation. Fluidity would then come into being with itself fixed—as the qualitatively same as the other potency—and the connection between the two terms would then be left inexplicable. Therefore, Hegel thinks of the fluidity as the universal medium wherein fluidity itself and differentiation are intertwined. Furthermore, this reduplicated concept of fluidity, Hegel would assert, is capable of explaining life and disease at once. If the life of an organism consists in the very mediation of two terms, fluidity and differentiation, the disease appears when fluidity is isolated from the differentiating operation and so does not play the role of mediating two terms. Therefore, fluidity is the principle of a life and that of its dissolution as well.

Finally, we will concentrate on Hegel’s stance with sensation, with which the transition from organic life to consciousness is asserted. As we have previously seen, Hegel regards sensation as the individualizing process of an organism. Namely, it is as the system of senses constituted by the combination of the inner and outer organism that an organism can be an individual with its unifiable self. To put it another way, it is through sensation that an organism exists as an individual, as such a whole. However, Hegel does not consider sensation only in terms of a relation to an external object. Sensation is essentially self-relational, as Hegel states that “it [the animal] has its being-other than itself in its singularity, in its simplicity, and senses itself” (JS I 179), “then, it [the animal] senses itself as the organic, the
living being for the first time (JS I 181)”. So the sensation Hegel brings into the center of his argument is self-sensation of an organism—sensing itself as an organism, as a living being, and precisely as an individual or singular being. Thus it is when it senses itself as a singular being that an organism is a whole oneness, and thus as a singular being for Hegel. On the other hand, the self-sensation also concerns the universality of an organism, in the sense that it is relevant to ‘the being-other of its singularity (das Anderssein seiner Einzelheit)’ (JS I 181). This point can be explicated by the genus-process. To begin with, the self-sensation Hegel thinks of implies the capacity of intuiting the other organism as a singular organism. To be more specific, a singular organism senses itself as a singular one when it cognizes another singular organism as a singular one. Which means that the self-sensation is a kind of reflective cognition coming into being through the relation to the other. We can then probably say that Hegel bears the concept of intuitional, sensational recognition besides the intellectual recognition between rational beings—that is, the recognition relation between sexually different organisms. It thus enables organisms to enter a sex-relation and to reproduce a new individual, which makes a certain species, the particularized genus, exist. Therefore the individuality of an organism consists in that a singular organism also exists as a generic being, one that is involved in the genus-process.

Therefore the concept of the self-sensation allows the twofold level of the organic whole: individuality understood as the oneness of a singular being and universality an organism has as a generic being; “the for-itself-being of the individual, its producing itself and formatting itself becomes empty illusion; it is, as it believes to produce itself, a product of the whole and produces the whole” (JS I 182). Obviously Hegel’s intention here is not
to affirm a substantial, independent being of the universal, or a certain transcendental or metaphysical order beyond our empirical world. Rather, what here concerns the universality is the organic whole, the whole that is constituted by the dynamic mutual relation between two orders of the organic life.

However, Hegel asserts that the genus-process does not result in genuine universality. The genus-process is, in fact, no more than a ceaselessly repeated process of reproducing a new individual and of their dying, rather than the universal in-and-for-itself. This is because the desire, which overall determines the sex-relation, only aims to eliminate the singularity of the other; and that a child, the reproduced individual, is only a singular one again. The genus-process thus in effect circulates in the chain of singularities. At this point, disease and death forms a crucial issue again. They are the moment where fluidity is separated from singularity, thereby marking the beginning of the genuine universal, the spirit. In this context the disease and death is also the watershed for the thematic transition from organism to consciousness, from sentient being to spiritual being for Hegel. Indeed this transition forms a highly convoluted issue, that of the coming into being of the spirit by the sublation of death,⁹ which we will deal with later. Instead we will examine the first potency by centering on the relation between sensation and consciousness. Through this examination we can probably gain

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⁹ “The fixed universality of disease abolishes only the infinity of the opposition and passes into the death; the universality of the spirit makes it subsist, as it has sublated the opposition in itself, the opposition, the absolute concept that emerges as sensation and is universal in itself in the opposition; the absolute essence of the animal lifts itself out of its immersed being in the subsistence and becomes the genus, which is universal in itself” (JS I 181).
a concrete insight regarding the thematic transition to consciousness, and therewith, Hegel’s thought of the continuity as well as discontinuity between nature and spirit, without giving primacy to the metaphysical implication of the concept of the spirit.
3. Consciousness as the Totality of Three Potencies

According to what we have seen so far, defining consciousness as the middle, Hegel considers it in terms of unity of opposition and activity generating opposing relation between the active and the passive. The definition also regards consciousness as the phenomenal, bringing its existence into being through the opposing relation to its object. As such, the middle defines the peculiar mode of existence of consciousness, distinct from that of natural beings. If natural beings primarily exists as an immediately singular being, consciousness exists in its opposing relation to nature by idealizing the latter, and by relating itself to such idealized elements of nature; that is, to nature as the universal, not as the singular. Hegel continues further from this to an argument that whereas the natural being ceaselessly repeats generation and extinction without any durable existence, consciousness, on the contrary, attains its absolute existence as far as it, as the middle, continues the activity of universalizing.

In accordance with this definition of consciousness, in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04, Hegel develops his theory of consciousness with the idea of the totality of three potencies (die Potenz). The term potency plays a methodologically important role in developing this consciousness theory, although both its terminological use and the methodological idea itself remain obscure, even inconsistent. In this regard, Hegel’s criticism of epistemological attitude in general attempting to grasp consciousness on the basis of the dualistic presupposition of the subject-object opposition is worth of noting. For Hegel, to ask whether the color determination of a perceived object exists as such without any relationship to the consciousness would be
absurd because the color determination in this question does not refer to the color itself, but is already interpreted as a concept. So the idealism based on such an opposing presupposition could not but fail to realize its project of explaining in a proper way the unity of the passive moment and of the active moment in consciousness. On the other hand, Hegel argues that color should be considered in the totality of three potencies: “Color is in its three potencies: in sensation as the determinacy of blue (for example), and then in formal ideality [of imagination] as concept, and as name [in memory] as related to others, which it is opposed to and which it is at the same time like in this respect that they are colors; and at this level [memory] it is simply, universally, as color” (JS I 204/225). 10 So Hegel presents on his own part the consciousness model with its three potencies, i.e. memory and language,  

10 English translator H.S. Harris interprets on the other hand that Hegel presents his own understanding of color-perception and, as such, sensation in general with synthesizing the antithesis between idealism and realism with this concept: the sensation, as long as it is surely an event occurring in the thing (the determinacy of blue) justifies the realism, and also justifies the idealism, because color is an imagined concept. Further, it is by the name, signifying such an activity that discriminative perception of color is completed in Hegel’s view. See: System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit: An English Translation of G.W.F. Hegel’s System der Sittlichkeit and of Philosophy des Geistes, (ed. & tr.) H.S. Harris & T.M. Knox, New York: State University of New York Press Albany, 1979, p.192. On the other hand, Hegel also explains the absolute essence of an organism in terms of the color perception, according to which the essence consists in that “the blue that is felt immediately ceases to be the blue” and “immediately becomes color” (JS I 181). From this, Hegel goes on to argue the passage from sensation to consciousness and the becoming intellectual of animal organism: “it [the sensation] has passed into the consciousness, and the animal becomes rational” (JS I 181). As a matter of fact, Hegel often uses the color perception problem in some analogous way in his text, which will need further research exceeding the scope of this paper—further research on Hegel’s concept of potency (die Potenz) employed to give his own account on consciousness in general and on the color perception problem as well, on the one hand, and a separate research on the dispute concerning the color perception problem made by Goethe against Newton in particular, on the other.
labor and instrument, and family and wealth. Nevertheless, it is still unclear how methodologically the potency concept functions in Hegel’s consciousness theory as a whole. Furthermore, in the example above, the most concrete reference concerning the terminology potency probably does not cover the whole of consciousness, but is only concerned with the first potency of the consciousness. More precisely, it is by no means clear whether what Hegel lists as the potencies above, that is, determinacy, concept, and name correspond to the three potencies of consciousness, memory and language, labor and instrument, and family and possession, respectively. Thus, it is undeniable that there remains some conceptual confusion in regards to the terminology of potency. Nevertheless, Hegel’s exposition of the first potency of consciousness, including that of the term potency, carries an important significance because it especially centers on the question of how to deal with consciousness, which ultimately matters for the spirit and its relation to consciousness as well:

But properly speaking we ought not to talk about either a subject, or an object, of this kind, but about the spirit; and in that perspective, we have seen how qua totality it comes to be nature, and how it comes to be spirit. Subject as such, it only is as sensation, that is, as singularity whose immediate other-being is outside it; and the articulation of consciousness is how it comes itself to consciousness, [or] how the inner concept of consciousness posits itself as consciousness proper. Sensation becomes concept of consciousness when it elevates itself to memory and language; but it reaches only the concept, that is, only formal consciousness. (JS I 205-6/226)
Hegel’s main argumentation would then be that consciousness should be dealt with in terms of the movement of the spirit, of externalizing as nature and of returning into itself as the spirit, instead of the epistemological framework of subject-object relationship. In particular, consciousness pertains the returning of the spirit into itself from nature. It has been previously shown that, for Hegel, consciousness is relevant to the threshold in the passage from nature to spirit, whereby the main issue was to make sense of how universalization occurs in the life of organisms, determined as the system of senses. From this, Hegel goes on to argue the existence of the spirit: the spirit, Hegel emphasizes, does not belong to a natural being, since the spirit is relevant to the existence of the universal whereas natural beings is characterized by its singularity. In this context, Hegel conceptualizes that consciousness refers to the existence of the spirit. However, it does not mean that Hegel would give conceptual precedence to the concept of the spirit in order to establish his consciousness theory, by presupposing its justification in some metaphysical way.

On the contrary, through the 1803-04 lessons, Hegel holds sensation as the starting point of his consciousness theory, putting emphasis on the determination that the subject of sensation remains singular and has its other-being outside itself. Thus after defending his own definition of consciousness, Hegel starts his consciousness theory by dealing with the problem of intuition in terms of space-time determinations and empirical imagination; and extends it to that of memory and language. At the end of this explanation, Hegel concludes that the concept of consciousness is attained therewith. To reformulate Hegel’s idea, sensation should be sequentially comprehended with memory and language, instead of being limited, in a narrow sense, in the epistemological framework. It is through such an extended consideration
on sensation that the essence of consciousness is properly presented for Hegel. To put it another way, consciousness theory should certainly include a sensation theory in Hegel’s view, but precisely in such an extended sensation theory; the proper concept of consciousness can be attained for the first time through the extended sensation theory, in which the main issue of the first potency consists.

In spite of all of this, Hegel determines the first potency as only being theoretical, meaning that the consciousness cannot effectively exist as the first potency. We could say, then, that the first potency gives only a proper understanding of the singular being of consciousness: the absolute singularity that brings its singular existence into being through the negative, practical relation to its other or object, the natural thing. So for Hegel, consciousness can only effectively exist as a singular being only in a practical manner. In other words, the first potency should be realized as the second potency, labor and instrument—the practical consciousness. However, Hegel determines that both of the two potencies and the practical realization of the theoretical consciousness therewith as ideal. Consciousness can be real, then, through familial processes, including love and marriage, education of a child, a parent’s death, and struggle for possession. The singularity of consciousness is then understood as the becoming of the third singular consciousness. That is, the child who is educated by parents, inherits the knowledge of his/her parents, and so keeps the death of his/her parents in its ideal form. With this, Hegel includes the struggle for possession in the third potency, with which he argues for the passage to the universal consciousness—the people’s spirit in this case— or the elevation of singular consciousness to the universal one. In this way, these three potencies as a whole constitute Hegel’s theory of consciousness. Thus, it is also within such
a wholeness of the three potencies that the formulation that consciousness is the existence of spirit could be properly understood. In the following section, we will follow Hegel’s description of three potencies of consciousness one by one.

1) First potency: language and memory

Consciousness in its ideal potency, as concept, has elevated itself immediately out of sensation; sensation, posited as ideal or as sublated is a singularity for which other-being is something else outside it, not immediately itself. The ideality of sensation, or its coming to be consciousness, has as its immediate goal that [active] sensation shall become in consciousness something inwardly opposed that has its other-being, and hence precisely the object sensed, in itself, and the sensing [subject] shall become in himself a universal. Sensation as singular is to become infinitely singular. (JS I 197/218)

For Hegel, consciousness is distinct from sensation. As it is explicit in the citation above, their difference lies in that consciousness concerns universality whereas sensation is characterized by its singularity. However, this does not mean that Hegel thinks of them as if they would be absolutely different from each other—as if we could deal with them thus in their complete separation. Rather, to appropriately formulate Hegel’s idea, consciousness has sensation as its moment and sensation is the moment of consciousness. The issue becomes clearer when we pay attention to the
expression ‘elevate out of’: consciousness has elevated itself out of sensation, meaning that consciousness, which was actually sensation, has freed itself from its previous state, namely, from sensation. So, for Hegel, sensation is one moment constituting consciousness, which cannot however be identified with consciousness itself. Then, we can rightly draw a conclusion that when it comes to theory of consciousness, we should dwell on sensation first, but we should then extend the consideration of sensation to explain what consciousness is like in its proper meaning. Additionally, these two parts of consciousness should be neither entirely separated from nor just paralleled to each other; the former should retain continuity with the latter. So, Hegel begins his explanation of first potency of consciousness by dwelling on sensation in terms of empirical imagination, and proceeds to explain the conscious process in terms of symbolization, externalization, and conceptualization through memory and language. This covers the issues dealt with in the first potency.

Hegel’s point should be clarified once again that sensation is characterized by its singularity—which means ‘for which other-being is something else outside of it, not immediately itself’ (JS I 197/218) or ‘having an external contextual dependence on other to their [causal] necessity (ein äußerer Zusammenhang mit andern nach ihrer Notwendigkeit)’ (JS I, 198/219). Following from this the elevation of consciousness out of sensation refers to the process of universalization or of becoming infinite for singularity in sensation, meaning that sensation immediately has its opposite in itself so that its being-other is immediately itself. In this context, Hegel first deals with sensation in terms of the empirical intuition. Empirical intuition, Hegel articulates, has the following two moments: space and time and particularization of these forms of intuition. In particular, Hegel puts
emphasis on the point that space and time are in fact nothing but empty forms of intuition; they are thus concepts and relevant to universality accordingly. By extension, Hegel terms space and time as positive universality, meaning that they are: they are as universal, which designates, as such, the being of consciousness. But also Hegel sees that empirical imagination has the practical and negative aspect, of particularizing these forms of intuition. And this particularization is the way sensuous representation occurs according to him. So Hegel thinks that empirical imagination includes the universal aspect of consciousness on the one hand in so far as space and time, as the forms of intuition, is characterized by its universality—wherein consists the being of consciousness. Empirical imagination, however, is involved in the singularity of sensation in so far as it concerns the generation of particularized sensuous representation, the referential ‘this’ in Hegelian terms.

On this basis it could be said that, if sensation falls short of consciousness for Hegel, the deficiency consists in its internality and subjectivity. Hegel namely thinks that space and time, though they designate the being of consciousness, are only internal and thus only subjective; the case is the same with empirical imagination insofar as it only remains an internal state of the subject who senses. This dumb consciousness, Hegel states, is actually nothing but animal sensation: “and consciousness as this empirical imagination is a waking or sleeping dream, empty and without truth, [occurring in human experience] either as permanent derangement, or as a transient state of sickness, as consciousness falls back into the animal organism, and only is as its concept” (JS I 199/220). In other words, for Hegel, sensation that we consider in terms of empirical imagination is in fact no different from the animal sensation. Therefore, when it comes to human
consciousness that is not reduced to animal sensation, it is necessary to consider it in terms of its external existence. So, Hegel proposes to consider consciousness in terms of the *middle* in earnest—more precisely in terms of the existing middle. While the point is still clear that consciousness should be considered in simultaneity of the opposition and the unity between two opposing terms—what is conscious and that of which it is conscious, Hegel makes clear the point that consciousness, as the middle, should be an ‘externally existing one’. In short, consciousness exists, having its own externally materialized form according to Hegel. To put it another way, consciousness, so understood as an externally existing one, does not only cover some purely internal experience or mental state, of which the internality and subjectivity Hegel terms as ‘dumb’. Consciousness includes naming of what is intuited and enunciating through articulated sound, according to Hegel; and also linguistic reality such as sign, name, and language are the being of such consciousness.

In this way, Hegel develops his idea of the consciousness as the existing middle with a series of linguistic factors such as sign, name, and language/speech (die *Sprache*); maintaining the idea that memory is the activity of transforming what is intuited into a thought. Above all, sign for Hegel means a thing in which unity of consciousness is externalized: “consciousness as this existing middle of its concept is thus just a *sign* in general, in which something intuited, wrenched out of its connection, is posited as related to another, but [only] ideally, because it still subsists in truth in its connection” (JS I 200/220). This citation seems to be too compressed and subtle, but if we can take the term ‘connection’ as a referential relationship to the object of intuition, one important point can be plausibly drawn; that the sign, which certainly is also a conscious factor,
guarantees at any rate its referential relation to the object as it is. So, by introducing the signing problem into his consideration on sensation, Hegel probably thinks of intuition in the framework of a tri-relationship between the object in itself of intuition, the referential relation of consciousness to it, and the conscious operation of mediating them—instead of the dual relation between the object in itself that is intuited and the intuiting subject. In other words, if the conscious factor of intuition was exclusively understood as belonging to the intuiting subject in its opposition to its object, it is duplexed with Hegel’s understanding of it as a sign: an external thing outside of consciousness on the one hand, and mediating it to its referential on the other. If so, not only the referential relation, but also the semantic relation seems to be involved herein, since the mediating operation here would mean in fact signification. Regarding this, it is worth noting that Hegel strongly supports arbitrariness of signification, stating that “the meaning of the sign is only in relation to the subject; what the subject thinks by means of the sign depends on this caprice, and is only comprehensible through the subject” (JS I 200/221). The arbitrariness, however, represents in Hegel’s view, the infinity of signification, meaning that through the signification, a sign proves itself to have its own independent existential value, independent from the signifying subject. What is signified, once it is signified, takes a totally different form from what was originally intended, so that the sign and what is originally intended to signify are incommensurable, untranslatable to each other. But Hegel finally argues that the sign, though infinite, is not absolute because the sign cannot help but depend on the signifying subject. In this context, Hegel argues the distinction between sign and name:
This sign was previously, qua [natural] sign, a name which is still something else that a name on its own account; it was a thing, and what is signified has its sign outside it, it was not posited as something superseded, so that the sign does not have its meaning in itself, but only in the subject, one must still know specifically what the subject means by it; but the name is in itself, it persists, without either the thing or the subject. In the name the self-subsisting reality of the sign is nullified. (JS I 201/222)

So if the sign, as a thing, needs a signifying subject for its meaning, instead of having its own signification it itself, the name holds its meaning by itself, which is more objective, more durable in comparison with signification, so that it does not need to depend on a signified object, nor on a signifying subject for its meaning. To put it in another way, if a sign holds the referentially objective relationship to its referential but semantically depends on the relation to a signifying subject, name is supposed to be objective, not only referentially, but also semantically. But this distinction between sign and name has a close relation to the distinction between cognitive faculties. If sign concerns intuition as we have seen above, name has to do with thought.11 In this context, Hegel introduces memory into the center of the

11 The intuition-significance combination is dealt with in a more detailed, organized way in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel opens the first chapter of the Phenomenology by introducing a common understanding of immediate, sensual knowledge, termed as sense-certainty, in which the immediate knowledge is supposed to be the richest, truest knowledge. It proves, however, the poorest, most abstract knowledge according to Hegel. Hegel’s main argumentation consists in revealing that the sense-certainty, as an immediate, singular relationship to a singular object, can enunciate only the simplest universal, such as, ‘this’, ‘now’, ‘here’, and ‘I’. So it is the discordance between what is originally intended and the enunciation of it that characterizes the sense certainty—rather than the plentitude or poverty of its knowledge.
problem, defining it as a process of turning sensual intuition into a thought as the wordplay that a memory-thing (die Gedächtnissache) is a thought thing (das Gedachte) (JS I 201/221) explicitly expressed. In other words, memory has little to do with recalling a certain past event stored in consciousness to Hegel, but rather it is relevant to changing the form of what is intuited from the intuited to the thought—namely, from the singular form to the universal form. To put it another way, for Hegel, it is the alternation of ontological forms of what is intuited which memory is involved in. In this context, Hegel maintains that memory refers to giving a name to what is intuited, determining name as the idealized being of something intuited: “in the name its empirical being as a concrete internally manifold living entity is cancelled, it is made into a strictly ideal, internally simple, [factor]” (JS I 201/221). Hegel thus interprets Adam’s anecdote in the bible that his activity of naming of natural beings is relevant to “nullifying them as beings on their own account, and making them into ideal [entities]” (JS I 201/221). Then, in addition to the introduction of the concept of sign and the problem of signification into sensation theory, Hegel’s second strategy is clear: to break out of the semantically subjective relation, which is the case of the sign, by

Hegel makes clear this point when he analyzes the cases of pointing-out [aufzeigen] of something, which would be understood as signification [bezeichnen] here: the sentence written on a paper, “now is night” would not always hold the truth of that sentence; a now is no longer the now as soon as one enunciates “now”, because with the enunciation it already becomes what was so and no more what is so. Thus, Hegel finishes his whole consideration on sense-certainty by giving prominence to such a paradox of signification: “But if I want to help out language—which has the divine nature of directly reversing the meaning of what is said, of making it into something else, and thus not letting what is meant get into words at all—by pointing out this bit of paper, experience teaches me what the truth of sense-certainty in fact is: I point it out as a ‘Here’, which is a Here of other Heres, or is in its own self a ‘simple togetherness of many Heres’; i.e. it is a universal” (PhG, 66/85).
giving ontological prominence to the name, which is considered holding its own meaning in a more objective, more durable way in comparison with sign. Name is so understood as holding its own meaning independently from the signifying subject, but this does not connote that it would fall under abstract concept or common noun. Rather, if the name designates a persisting being of the conscious ideality, such a being of consciousness, according to Hegel’s further argumentation, concretely exists as language, the system of articulated sounds:

Language as articulated sounding is the voice of consciousness, because every tone within it has meaning, i.e., because there exists in it a name, the ideality of an existing thing; [in other words] the immediate non-existence of the thing. (JS I 202/222)

The citation above partially exposes Hegel’s understanding of language, according to which human language is different from animal sound in that it has the interrelation between articulated sounds as the source of signification. If an animal sound has, as such, its meaning and so does not need any relatedness to another sound for signification, the meaning of one sound, in the case of human language, comes from the phonetically differential interrelation between back and forth connected phonemes. Therefore, if name is effectively real or even exists as such only when it is enunciated as an articulate sound, this implies that we do not need to appeal to a referential object, nor to a signifying subject. Meaning will rather come from such a linguistic difference, and this is the way that language proves its semantic objectivity according to Hegel. To briefly sum up Hegel’s argumentation on
the first potency of consciousness so far; the first point was that consciousness is fundamentally ideal, meaning that it should be ultimately considered the universalization of the intuited singular, and that it should be considered having its being in an externally existing form. The main issue then consists in giving an account on this being or existence of consciousness while simultaneously developing a theory of sensation of intuition here based on that account. For this, Hegel introduces the problem of language into the framework of intuition, provides consciousness with its external being—specifically, sign, name, and language—and thereby enlarges the problem of the objectivity of consciousness from referential objectivity to semantic objectivity. In this way this whole process is relevant to the very elevation of consciousness out of sensation, which is characterized by its ideality: “consciousness in tis ideal potency, as concept, has elevated itself immediately out of sensation” (JS I 197/218).

At this point, Hegel’s concept of consciousness should be formulated more explicitly henceforth, as Hegel draws his own definition of consciousness following the consideration on language and memory. Hegel’s argumentation on the first potency of consciousness can thus be regarded as a theoretical process of deriving his own concept of consciousness; more precisely, the process of purifying the concept of consciousness from the dimension of sensation and intuition. The last step of such purification is to distinguish consciousness from language, which was previously presented as the existential being of consciousness. Strictly speaking, being a semantically differentiating system, language exemplifies the being of consciousness, but it is not, as such, consciousness itself. Or it can be said that consciousness itself stands on a totally different dimension than such a determining relationship, and that consciousness itself has in fact, in Hegel’s
view, little to do with determination. Rather, what ultimately defines consciousness is, for Hegel, the absolute indeterminacy, or “the abolished determinacy of relation, pure relation, the absolute emptiness of the infinite, the formal aspect of rationality, the simple, absolute abstraction of unity” (JS I 206/227). That means, consciousness nullifies all determinations of relation and holds its own absolute unity only through such nullification. Consciousness is thus ‘the absolutely empty unit’ which faces against all determinations or ‘the totality of being’. The question arises then if this concept of consciousness does not actually repeat the epistemological, dualistic understanding of consciousness according to which it would be nothing but a formal, logical, functional unity as, mutatis mutandis, the Kantian definition of apperception. As to this point, one thing should be made clear above all which is that Hegel first characterizes consciousness as an opposing relation to the other. This opposition, however, has little to do with epistemological subject-object opposition, as it concerns the self-organization of consciousness itself as consciousness. The idea can be more precisely formulated that consciousness inevitably stands in an opposing, negative relationship to its object, world or totality of beings, whatsoever it is, in order for it to exist as a singular individual. So consciousness is not simply a term of a fixed opposing relationship, but what produces its own existence through its opposing relationship to the totality of beings. Thus its singularity should be understood as what is intermediately posited through the negative relation, far from the singularity of the immediate given. Its being can also only be produced by its own activity of making itself an existing thing. Therefore, the opposition of consciousness, as Hegel presents, is concerned with the practical opposition and practical definition of consciousness as well in this sense.
2) Second potency: instrument and labor

Consciousness, as absolute reflection, has only changed the form of the opposition and relation; it is related to an absolute opposite, a dead thing, and it is the contradiction of a relation to something absolutely unrelated; the relation must be realized, and the absolutely singular consciousness is directed against itself as if it were its own nullification as this absolute singularity; and consciousness is as practical relation. (JS I 209/229)

To begin with, Hegel derives the concept of consciousness as absolute singularity through previous consideration on the first potency: consciousness is absolute singularity which stands in opposition to the totality of beings and so brings itself into existence by negating all such objective determinations. In this sense, consciousness is termed as ‘the absolute unit of reflection’. Additionally, opposition is brought into the center of the consciousness problem as its core factor, since the absolute singularity or absolute reflexivity of consciousness connotes its opposition to all others for Hegel. But Hegel clearly makes point that this opposition is not real, but only a theoretical one: two opposing terms previously presented as forming consciousness, the absolute singularity and the totality of beings, are just suggested to be as such, while no account is yet given as to which relation they are making, how they negatively relate to each other, or what the opposition can be. So, the first issue to inquire is on their relation. Then the ‘absolute reflexivity of consciousness’ above can be properly formulated as the self-relation through the relation to others; or in this case, relation of consciousness is directly equivalent to reflexivity as so defined. However,
this reflective relation is not possible for the first potency of consciousness because this theoretical potency is in fact a relation to dead things. Here is an interesting point concerning relation: strictly speaking, for Hegel, a relation cannot be made to a dead thing because a dead thing is not capable of making a relation. To put it another way, in order for a relation to be made, each involved term should be capable of making a relation—they should be alive. In this strict sense, relation is only possible as interrelation. Thus Hegel’s characterization of consciousness, or conscious relation as practical implies the effective production of a relation, namely an interrelation between conscious beings. So, a condition for a relation being able to be real is derived from this: each term of relation should be capable of making a relation—of making a reflective interrelation, more precisely. What deserves a special mention here is that Hegel draws a further condition from this: each term should be capable of opposing itself, not the other. In other words, if the reflexivity of consciousness consists in its opposing relation, the opposite of consciousness is not the other, but its own self, its own singularity more precisely. This is why only the form of opposition and relation has changed. In short, consciousness can be practically realized only as interrelation between those who equally have the capacity of making relation, and they should be capable of making a negative relation to its own self. Following from this, Hegel elucidates this practical relation of consciousness through the structure of desire. First, defined as ‘an ought-to-be nullified [ein sollendes Vernichtwerden]’ (JS I 201/229), desire means a certain necessity: the necessity of the object of consciousness, whether it is its other or its own self, to be nullified. In this sense, desire is synonymous to the practical relation, practical consciousness. In other words, if consciousness is practical, this means that it desires. Then, the question arises as to whether the desire,
so defined, implies the elimination of the whole existence of the object, by eating it away. Hegel however argues that the object of desire should not be absolutely nullified. The reason is that with the other absolutely eliminated, consciousness would then lose its opposite, namely, what it is going to nullify. Therefore, for Hegel, nullification should be inhibited in order for the practical relation of consciousness to be possible. Hegel thus formulates the structure of desire, which conditions practical consciousness, with the following two moments: the actual sublation of object and the inhibition of the nullification—the desire and its ideality. By extension, Hegel sees the difference of animal and human desire through the relation between these two factors. More specifically, these two factors are simultaneous in human desire, whereas they cannot synchronize in animal desire. Or it is appropriate to say that the inhibition of nullification cannot occur in animal desire; animal beings satisfy their desire by immediately sublating its object without ideally preserving its existence. In contrast, the object, though sublated, does not absolutely disappear but remains in human desire, and this enables consciousness to exist as the middle of this whole opposing relation. In this case, consciousness is not merely an opposing term of the relation, but rather it is the operation of holding the opposition relation itself—of bringing itself into existence by doing a double operation: to nullify its object and to let it

12 “Die Begierde ist ein sollendes Vernichtwerden, das Begehrte ebenso, das wirkliche Aufgehenwerden selbst und seine Idealität, eine Hemmung desselben, sind in der Zeit auseinander gerückt” (JS I 210/229-30). English translator, H.S. Harris selected the English term “cancel” or “suspend” in some cases for the German term “aufheben” and “restricted” for “hemmen sich”. In this paper, “sublate” is preferred for “aufheben” given the custom that this technical term, which is highly controversial, is normally translated as “sublate”. Additionally, “inhibited” is chosen for “hemmen sich” in this paper.
abide in an ideal manner: “human desire must be [only] ideally sublated [even] in the sublating itself, and the object must abide even when it has been sublated, and the middle as the abiding sublated-being of both, must exist as opposed to both; the practical relation is a relation of consciousness, i.e., the simplicity of nullification must even in its simplicity go apart from itself, it must be inwardly inhibited and opposed [to itself]” (JS I 210/230).

Giving an account of the practical relation of consciousness in this way with the structure of desire, Hegel maintains that it is through labor that this practical relation structured by desire is effectively realized. Thus, to be practical is directly equivalent to labor. Or, as long as there is desire, consciousness is necessarily practical. Specifically, being involved in a relation; this practical relation of consciousness being labor. So, for Hegel, consciousness precisely involved in the opposing and reflective relation to the other, to desire, to be practical, to labor, all carry the same indication:

*Labor* is this practical consciousness as [the] relation, [the] universal union of both [terms]; it must likewise be as middle, in which they are connected as opposed, and wherein they abide as separately subsisting; hence labor as such has its abiding existence; [it is] itself a thing. The *instrument* is the existing rational middle, the existing universality, of the practical process. […] It is that wherein laboring has its permanence, that which alone remains over from the laboring and the product of work, that wherein their contingency is eternalized [immortalized]; it is propagated in tradition, whereas both the subject and the object of desire subsist only as individuals, and pass away. (JS I 211/230-31)

Labor means making a relation above all. Namely, the active term of relation
works on the passive term, taking place effectively, and then this is called labor. Hegel thus imparts a particular meaning to labor, according to which through it, its object is posited as related to desire, breaking out of the natural connection it had as a natural thing. This is the way desiring consciousness nullifies its object while letting it abide. The object is negated, but remains subsisting at the same time instead of being totally nullified. But this does not mean in any case that the labor would be a one-sided relation where the active term changes the passive term without itself being changed. The sublating by labor does not concern only the object, but equally the laboring consciousness, so that it is also in this sublating, Hegel argues, that consciousness exists as laboring. Thus, so understood, the labor cannot be identified with the activity itself of consciousness such as working on its object, changing the form of this object for example. Rather, what it means is that a certain relation is effectively realized whereby two opposing terms are involved in their interrelation and bring themselves into an abiding existence, as subsisting through this relation. In this sense, the labor is termed as the middle. Therefore, labor refers to the effectively practical form of the consciousness as the middle. By extension, Hegel goes on to assert that this practical consciousness as the middle has its own external, material existence, namely, instrument. But the instrument here does not merely refer to such and such a tool we use for laboring. It rather refers to a certain material holder wherein labor has its permanent existence with its necessity. And this establishes traditional customs in Hegel’s view.
3) Third Potency: possession and family

To begin with, the definition of consciousness as the middle is still of important to note. According to this definition, briefly, consciousness exists as the relation between two opposing terms, that is, what is conscious and that of which it is conscious, or in other words, what is active and what is passive. Evidently it is opposition that primarily defines consciousness for Hegel. But this point does not seem to be significant per se, as long as Hegel puts more emphasis on giving an account of how the opposition can be a relation, how the opposing terms really make a relation. In this context, Hegel first demonstrates that this opposition, which consciousness as the middle is involved in, cannot be a one-sided relation of the active side to the passive side and it is thus totally different from the presumed opposition between a given world and a cognizant subject, for example. For Hegel, the opposition of consciousness, in fact, comes into being between an individual having the form of absolute singularity and the totality of beings. In this context, consciousness is understood as a point of reflection—the absolute singular coming into being by negating all external beings and determinations. In this way, consciousness is first considered a relation, the negative relation to others more precisely, through the first potency. And then the second potency is concerned with how these opposing terms effectively make a relation. According to Hegel, in order for this opposing relation to be possible in a practical manner, the condition should be satisfied that the object which is opposed to and thus negated should not only be nullified but also reserved. In other words, nullification should be inhibited. By extension, Hegel also argued that nullification is not unilaterally conducted in this
practical relation, by the active consciousness against the passive object one could say, but consciousness itself, more precisely the singularity of consciousness, is also nullified. Specifically, what is sublated in such a relation is not only the totality of beings but also consciousness itself as a singular one. And so consciousness, Hegel might argue, can be seen as absolute reflexivity, that is, as the relation to itself in the relation to the other. In this respect, it is worth noting that Hegel equally regards both of the two potencies as ideal, meaning that all of them stand in abstraction of only one form of the opposites: “the theoretical level posits it in the abstraction of indifferent simple universality, the practical level that we are now discussing in that of the absolutely differentiated, absolutely opposed relation” (JS I 209/229). To put it another way, if the first potency concerns only the absolute singularity of consciousness without itself being effectively connected to diversity of beings, the absolute reflexivity of consciousness remains unexplained in the second potency while the necessity of practical relation is demonstrated and its conditions are presented therewith. In short, the former is only concerned with the simple unity of consciousness while the latter only the relation, so that the reflective relation of consciousness to itself in the relation to the other remains only conceptual so far. Furthermore, if the asymmetry that consists in the opposition of consciousness is only conceptual without being an effective relation in the first case, the second case has asymmetry in the fact that the practical relation of consciousness is established at the natural level, namely as the relation to natural things. So if absolute reflectivity of consciousness is not possible through the practical relation of labor, it is because labor is a relation to external things of nature, which will thus eventually remain outside of the reflective movement of
consciousness. And so Hegel considers certain relations in which two terms equally exists as conscious beings; sex-relations. From this, Hegel also argues for the passage to the third potency: possession and family.

As we just saw, the passage from the first to the second potency comes from the necessity of demonstrating the possibility and conditions of the real practical relation, whose opposing terms and their opposing relation were conceptually grasped in the first potency. The passage from the second potency to the third, though more complex but less clear, is explained by the sex-relation and love:

The freedom of consciousness supersedes this need, and inhibits the nullification in enjoyment through consciousness itself; it makes the two sexes into consciousness for one another, into being on their own account, being that subsist; and [they subsist] in such a way that in the being-for-self on the other, each is him/herself; so that each is conscious of their own singularity for self in the consciousness of the other, that is, in his/her singularity, or being for self; and the relation of the sexes comes to be one, in which in the being of the

13 It seems to be clear that Hegel considers the second potency as the relation to natural things, to external objects, whereas the third as a spiritual relation, in his specific terms: “whereas in the first potency [i.e. memory and language] it proved its ideal lordship over nature, here it proves its real lordship and thereby constitutes itself as spirit for itself withdrawn from nature and independently self-shaped; it has superseded the antithesis on the external side, so that it falls apart within itself and realizes itself in mutually differentiating moments, each of which is itself a consciousness, in the difference of the sexes” (JS I 195/211). This is the reason for putting the term “labor and instrument” in place of the omitted subject of the first sentence in fragment 21, instead of “sexual desire” as suggested in the English version. Then, the complete sentence would be: “[Labor and instrument] is an inhibited nullification through need, or something absolutely external” (JS I 212/231).
consciousness either party, each is him/herself one with the other, or [there is]… Desire thus frees itself from its relation to enjoyment, it comes to be an immediate union of both in the absolute being for self of both, i.e., it becomes love; and the enjoyment is in this intuiting of oneself in the being of the other consciousness. The relation itself becomes in the same [way] the being of both, and something that abides as much as they do [separately], that is, it becomes marriage. (JS I 212/231-32)

The main issue concerning the passage from the second potency to the third would be, above all, the inhibition of nullification, meaning that the negation of an object should be conducted in a way that the existence of the object is simultaneously preserved. Labor satisfies this condition, being the transformation of the existential form of related objects; that is, from its natural form to a cultivated one. Nevertheless, Hegel does not think that the reflectivity of consciousness, the reflectivity being consciousness as such, would consist in labor, because labor, in fact, is a relation to natural things. Hegel instead maintains that reflectivity of consciousness is made possible by the negative relation to itself, which would be included in its relation to others. In the citation above, which is the first paragraph on the third potency, Hegel presents the relations between two different singular consciousnesses. In this relation, tow singular consciousnesses are supposed to be conscious of one another, to be conscious of its own singularity precisely in this consciousness of the other, and to constitute its own singular being for itself through such self-consciousness in the consciousness of the other. Furthermore, Hegel maintains that they form oneness in the relation as far as the consciousness of one’s own singularity comes into being in the consciousness of the other. In other words, the two singular consciousnesses
are as one in this relation. For Hegel, such is sex-relation and love. Thus, it
would be proper to say that Hegel sees in this way the recognition relation in
the sex-relation by directly reading the constitution of a singular being for
itself in it.\(^\text{14}\) Love then, ontologically interpreted as the immediate union of

\(^{14}\) Above all, a widely admitted point is that recognition, regarded as the interaction
between individuals, is the proper principle of spirit, precisely the objective spirit which
concerns the inter-subjective world of normativity. It also gives an ontological account
of how an individual, as a human being, constitutes its own independent existence in
his/her communal life. In this context, a majority of studies on Hegel’s recognition
concept have focused on its social connotation, while regarding it, consciously or
unconsciously, as a purely human process without any reference to nature. For the
development of the theory of recognition, see: Ludwig Siep, “Recognition in Hegel’s
Phenomenology of Spirit and contemporary practical philosophy”, in: (ed.) Hans-
Christoph Schmidt am Baush and Christopher F. Zurn, The Philosophy of Recognition:
Historical and Contemporary Perspective, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2010;
Emmanuel Renaut, “Reconnaissance, Lutte, Domination: le Modèle hégélien”, Politique
et Société, vol. 28 (3) (2009). But what we find in Hegel’s Jena writings is pre-spiritual
recognition involved in sexual polarity and sexual desire, which is thus an issue of the
philosophy of nature for Hegel. This gives the ground for some scholars to affirm that
the recognition concept in the Jena writings does not only cover the problem of spirit,
but rather it addresses the problem of the nature-spirit relation. See for example: Italo
Testa, “How Does Recognition Emerge from Nature? The Genesis of Consciousness in
Hegel’s Jena writings”, Critical Horizon 13(2), (2012). According to Testa, in Hegel
recognition emerges from nature, from sexual differentiation and interaction. From this
perspective, sexual intercourse, which Hegel deals with in order to explain the
individualization of living organisms, represents the proto-sociality, meaning that
“mates recognize themselves as belonging to the same genus or species, and
simultaneously that they recognize their sexual difference and the other’s individuality”.
For a more detailed study on the development of recognition concept in the Jena
writings, see: Henry S. Harris, “The Concept of Recognition in Hegel’s Jena
emphasizes the fact that Hegel sees the recognition structure in sexual polarity. The
author goes on to argue that Hegel’s recognition concept, the formulation of self-
cognition in the other, is originated in his understanding of sexual polarity, and that the
dialectic of life and death in the Phenomenology of Spirit should be decoded centering
on the problem of sexual desire.
both in the absolute being for self of both, takes over the place of desire, regarded as the practical relation of consciousness to natural things. In this way, love refers to a denaturalized sex-relation to Hegel: it is certainly a male-female relation, not based on the natural desire. Obviously, the hermeneutic problem as to how to interpret this love, so understood, is not the issue here. The main question is still the existence of consciousness as the middle, and more precisely the existence of the relation here. To sum up briefly, centering on the problem of relation, Hegel first considers consciousness as having an opposing structure while putting emphasis that opposition must be a relation. Then, the opposing relation must be a practical one, the real relation with a living thing capable of making a relation. Following from this, opposition of consciousness, namely, its practical relation, is conceptualized as the relation between two individuals wherein each of them attains a reflective self-relation in her/his relation to the other. Hegel observes this relation in a male-female relation, whose essence does not consist in natural desire, but in the oneness constituted by it. If love characterizes consciousness as opposing relation in this way, or as the middle on the one hand, Hegel develops this consideration to that of the existence of that relation on the other. Such is marriage. The idea would be reformulated in the following way that the relation of consciousness, as the opposing one exists and abides as marriage. In this context, Hegel strongly opposes the point of view of the social contract, clearly making the point that marriage has nothing to do with such and such particular interests or purposes: “just as in marriage each [partner] is mutually in the consciousness of the other, so each is mutually consciousness in the other, as his/her whole singularity; and the spouses give themselves a wholly communal existence, in which they are one not in the linkage with any one singularity (a particular purpose), but as
individuals, according to the totality in which they belong to nature. This bond, as involving the totality of someone’s consciousness, is just for this reason sacred, and is wholly removed from the concept of a contract, which some have wanted to view marriage as” (JS I 213/232).

However for Hegel, marriage does not merely entail a dyad relation between husband and wife, but the triad relation including a child as well. Through this triad relation, the theme of the existence of consciousness as the middle in marriage is addressed for the first time; the theme of the oneness of consciousness as the sublation of opposition, beyond the framework of the existence of relation itself, which we have seen above. First of all, Hegel determines a child as “that in which they [husband and wife] recognize themselves as one, as being in one consciousness, and precisely therein as sublated, and they intuit in the child their own coming sublation” (JS I 213/233). In this sense, the child is also termed ‘the unity which is became (die gewordene Einheit)’ which is also a consciousness. To put it another way, the unity of consciousness is, for the first time, realized as the child which thus signifies the becoming of consciousness. But this becoming of conscious unity in the child does not merely connote the biological reproduction of a new individual belonging to the same genus, as Hegel conceptualizes that this becoming of consciousness as the child consists in its cultural formation by education. The idea is that consciousness, distinctively from natural beings, has its own peculiar existence mode precisely through its formation by education. So here the becoming of consciousness is considered at the level of its content, as education signifies to pass down the content of parent’s consciousness to their child, so that the learned content constitutes as such the content of the child’s own consciousness. Or, in Hegel’s own terms, “consciousness that is posited for
him [the child] as other than that which he is himself, shall become his own” (JS I 214/233). By extension, identifying in this way the effective becoming of consciousness to its cultural formation, that is, education of the child, Hegel makes another point as to the parent’s death, stating that “as they [parents] educate it [child], they posit their achieved consciousness in it, and they generate their death” (JS I 214/233). Another way to put it, “consciousness is here the coming-to-be of another consciousness in him, and the parents intuit in his evolution their own passing into sublation” (JS I 215/234). The idea is that the parent’s consciousness becomes the child’s consciousness through education, and so becomes the material for the child’s formation and the cost that should be paid for as well. Certainly, Hegel’s own account is too brief to decipher how much, metaphorically, the term death is used here, whether it also connotes the biological death or not. Additionally, the conceptually controversial relation between the terms death and sublation remains unclear here. But the most clear point regard to the death and sublation of parents is that Hegel formulates the issue that is the ideality of the world therewith. In other words, the opposing term to which the consciousness relates itself, in this third potency, is the ideal world, or inorganic nature constituted with the consciousness and knowledge from parents. Thus, the opposing relation in the third potency is distinct from conceptual, abstract opposition in the first potency between the absolute singularity and the totality of beings; and from the opposition to natural things, the objects of desire and labor in the second potency, in that it opposes itself to the consciousness, namely, the ideal world from the consciousness of parents. Hegel briefly formulates this opposition as that between the singular and the ideal, comparing it to the previous opposition between the singular and the external (JS I 215/234). Thus the becoming of
consciousness means the realization of this ideal world by the child. This realization is not one-sided, as if an already complete ideal world preexists, so that realization would be no more but transformation of its form without any change in content, from which any new content would not be generated. It should rather be understood as much more dynamic, as Hegel argues that it includes the contradiction between the real world of the child on the one hand and the ideal world of the parents on the other. The realization, namely, can be said to be the dynamic resolution of this contradiction.

When it comes to an account of consciousness and of its singularity, we can then say that Hegel identifies the educational relation in family and the cultural formation made through it as the minimum conditions for consciousness existing as singular. Namely, if consciousness is considered a certain singular being having its own totality, the consciousness as such exists, only as the cultural individual formed by education. And then, the becoming of consciousness, the term through which Hegel gives an account of the unity of consciousness, catches the particular mechanism through which singular consciousness is culturally formed as individual. So Hegel characterizes the becoming of consciousness as for itself as such:

In this way the totality of consciousness is in the family the totality as an evolution into being for itself [ein für sich selbst Werdendes]; the individual intuits himself in the other; the other is the same whole of consciousness, and it has its consciousness in the other, […]. (JS I 215-16/234-35)

If this is the case, the totality of consciousness here does not only concern
the singularity of an individual. Rather, the totality, as far as it is involved in the becoming of consciousness or the cultural formation of consciousness, also signifies the totality of this whole process of formation itself.

4) **Consciousness, recognition, and sprit.**

The whole theory of three potencies of consciousness, as we have seen above, resolves itself into the concept of consciousness as totality. In short, consciousness is totality and this addresses the issues of the ideality of the world and singularity of consciousness. The first thing to be made clear here is that consciousness is no longer understood in terms of the opposing relation to natural things as it was the case for labor. Instead, the external world to which consciousness is related is now considered ideal; it is relevant to the cultural world formed through the educational relation in family, and this ideal world is where the becoming of consciousness occurs for itself. In line with this, the so-called natural thing as it stands is meaningless here and there is nothing that would have its own being for itself and value independently from consciousness. All beings and determinations constituting the external world, to which consciousness relates itself, have their being and value only if they are related to consciousness. In this sense, Hegel’s formulation, which is dispersed in a somewhat discursive way, can be reformulated as the world is the extension of the being and possession of consciousness. In Hegel’s own terms: “the thing, the determinate [property], does not come into consideration as to its value, or as a thing at all; it is, rather, wholly nullified, wholly ideal; the point is just this, it is connected
with me, that I am one consciousness [and it] has lost its antithesis status against me” (JS I 217-218/236-237).

The thesis that consciousness is totality, however, does not merely concern such ideality of social or cultural space: this space, distinctively from natural space, is constituted by conscious elements, conscious beings and determinations. More significantly, what this thesis is rather concerned with is the singularity of consciousness. Obviously, there seems to be an underlying idea that consciousness should be regarded as what exists as the singular. Consequently, Hegel’s idea is that if the world is such an extension of the being of consciousness, it is only when it makes such ideal elements in the world its own that consciousness actually exists as a singular being. In this regard, Hegel’s idea on the singularity of consciousness is highly worth noting. First, Hegel argues that the singularity, when it comes to consciousness, is attained only when consciousness ties its possessions and being with its own essence as a whole. In this sense, that consciousness is the singular also means that it is the whole (das Ganze). But this process through which consciousness attains its singularity, according to Hegel’s further argument, must be in line with depriving other consciousness from its singular aspect. The opposing consciousnesses to each other must cognize the other as the one who will deprive itself from its singularity, and it is through such exclusion of the other consciousness from its singularity that consciousness, as a singular being, can be a true totality: “that each appears in the consciousness of the other as someone who excludes him from the whole extension of his singular aspects; that he is an actual totality in this exclusive agency of his” (JS I 218/227). Thus for Hegel, it is necessary to damage the other consciousness in order for a consciousness to be able to be a singular being, and thus there is supposed to be a struggle for singularity
and this struggle is termed recognition. In Hegel’s own formulation: “each posits himself in the consciousness of the other, cancels the singularity of the other, or each [posits] the other in his consciousness as an absolute singularity of consciousness” (JS I 217/236). The third point regarding the singularity of consciousness lies in the previous determination that consciousness, as far as it is a singular being, is the whole. Thus for Hegel, it is hardly ever the case that the damage is partially possible. If one injures some singular aspect of the other, what is injured is in fact the consciousness as the whole itself, as the united integrity. In this sense, Hegel determines such injuring as infinite: “the injuring of any one of his single aspects is therefore infinite, it is an absolute offense, and offense against integrity, an offense to his honor; and the collision about any single point is a struggle for the whole” (JS I 217/236).

For Hegel, consciousness exists as a singular totality only when it is recognized as such by the other consciousness and thereby cognizes itself as such: “it is absolutely necessary that the totality which consciousness has reached in the family recognizes itself as the totality it is in another such totality of consciousness; in this cognition each [family head] is for the other immediately an absolute singular” (JS I 217/236). In this regard Hegel certainly affirms the difference of the conscious singularity from the singularity of natural beings as a given thing, as such static facticity. So, after arguing the ideality of the world with the thesis that consciousness is totality, Hegel goes on to describe the recognition struggle for the singularity. First, Hegel stresses that the recognition should be effective (wirklich). Namely, recognition cannot occur as some type of verbal activities such as assurance, threat, or promise, but rather must be the actual activity of practically doing harm to the other. More precisely, Hegel maintains that recognition occurs
through injuring the being and possessing the other. So evidently Hegel considers recognition as some violent injuring which will actually be done to the other rather than a certain verbal, cognitive activity, a certain peaceful agreement: “Hence they must injure one another. The fact that each posits himself as exclusive totality in the singularity of his existence must become actual; the offense is necessary, [since] the other can only make his exclusion of another actual because I disturb him in his apparent phenomenal being” (JS I 219/238).

The actual struggle surrounding private possession per se, nevertheless, is not the main issue here. What Hegel wants to articulate rather is the relation between the singular consciousnesses because it is through the mutual relation between consciousnesses that each should prove itself a singular totality, and it is through injuring the other that they enter into this relation. More precisely formulated in Hegelian terms, in this relation, each should negate the other and at the same time affirm what is so negated in the other to be his/her own. Furthermore, the idea that recognition actually occurs when it accompanies the violent process of injuring the being and possession of the other is based on the unique view of the singularity and totality that Hegel develops here; the idea that consciousness, as the singular totality, is the whole, so it is hardly ever the case that injuring is partially possible as we have seen above. From here, Hegel makes his second point: that recognition occurs through the death of the other, while holding the determination of the life of consciousness as “the whole apparent totality” (JS I, 219/239). In other words, the life of consciousness, as far as it consists in constituting his/her singular totality, necessarily requires the death of the other, since consciousness attains the singular totality by negating the totality of the other and by affirming what is negated as such in the other as its own.
Regarding this, the point should be clarified once again that partial injuring or partial negation is hardly ever the case when it comes to the singular totality of consciousness. That the death of the other is required means that the whole of the other should be negated. Hegel thus argues that some partial negation would make the other a slave, who proves him/herself to be a non-totality. This consciousness, only partially negated, would then be disqualified from being in the opponent’s party of the recognition. From this comes the particular contradiction of recognition: “the internal absolute contradiction” that “the recognition is just the being of consciousness as a totality in another consciousness, and thereby the recognition is suspended too; it is not realized, but rather ceases to be, just when it is” (JS I 221/240).

Indeed the paradox comes from the fact that the other, being the partner of recognition, should not be negated because then the recognition itself would be impossible. Thus Hegel asserts that the consciousness should risk his/her own life while going for the death of the other, since the death of the other signifies the loss of the totality of extension of the being and possession of the consciousness. To be strict, then, it would be impossible for recognition to be realized because of this contradiction, and if possible, only with some added conditions, with some change, or on a different framework than from which recognition is understood so far.

[...] in that I posit myself as totality of singularity, I suspend myself as totality of singularity; I want to be recognized in the [outward] extension of my existence, in my being and possessions, but I transform this will in affirming it, because I cancel this existence and get recognition only as rational, as totality in truth, since when I go for the death of the other, I myself wager my own life, too, and
cancel this extension of my existence, the very totality of my singularity. (JS I 220-21/239-40)

To reconstruct the idea, recognition is impossible as far as what is at stake in recognition is the singularity of being and possession, which has the form of external extension. This impossibility is, however, not absolute, as far as the content of recognition, what will be recognized, is just changed at the very moment when consciousness tries to be recognized of his/her singularity in terms of being and possession; the totality as singularity is sublated, and therewith, the true totality as rational will come into being. Nevertheless this supposed idea never lessen the peculiar tension of recognition, the absolute contradiction in Hegelian terms in that it cannot be realized because its realization directly means its suppression. Thus what Hegel intends to is not proposing an explicit solution regarding the contradiction. The central issue concerning the maintained tension and contradiction rather consist in a certain additional event, occurring at the very moment the contradiction arises. This event is namely sublation, through which the true totality, which is rational, comes into being.

Sublation [Äufhebung]\textsuperscript{15} is the very one which enables recognition,

\textsuperscript{15} Being one of the most notorious terms of Hegel’s philosophy, the term ‘aufheben’ is generally understood as having three meanings at once: (1) abolish, (2) preserve, and (3) raise up. See: Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. But Hegel does not explicitly mention the third meaning ‘raise up’ but only points put the twofold meaning of this German word: “Sublation (Äufhebung) has the two-fold sense in [the German] language so that it equally means preserving, conserving as well as ceasing to be, putting an end to it[. . .] . The two cited determinations of sublation can be lexically listed as two meanings of this word. However, it must be striking that a language has reached the point where one and the same word is used for two opposed
or in other words it is the same with the recognition: to be recognized is namely to be sublated [aufgehoben]. First it should be clarified that recognition is presented from the outset as the only way that consciousness can actually exist as a singular totality. But we have seen above that recognition implies a particular paradox: that consciousness risks its possibility of being a singular totality or the foundation on which it can constitute itself as a singular totality once it tries to attain its singular totality through the recognition relation, since it is necessary for him/her to negate the totality of the other and to make this its own, which should not however be absolutely negated in order for the recognition relation to hold. In short, consciousness exposes itself to death once it tries to constitute its own life. Being involved in such a paradox or contradiction is the first meaning of the sublation. Sublation, thus, means the occurrence of the diametrical opposite to what is originally due to happen, and so to become the diametrical opposite to what is originally supposed to become. So if recognition is the only way consciousness can exist as a singular totality, then, for Hegel, the contradiction above is the only way. In this context, the “sublated-being [Aufgehobensein]” means that consciousness renounces itself and exists as the other of itself in the consciousness of the other. Thus the sublated-being is relevant to the peculiar way consciousness exists: in Hegelian terms, “it [singular totality (of consciousness)] can only be itself as a sublated state (als eine aufgehbene); it cannot maintain itself as a being, but only as one that is posited as sublated (als aufgehbene); and posits itself herewith as a sublated determinations. It is gratifying for speculative thought to find words which have a speculative meaning in themselves” (WL I 114/107). In this paper, the English term ‘sublate’ is used for this German term given the general terminology of contemporary Hegel scholarship, whereas the English translator prefers ‘supersession’.
state (als eine aufgehobene) and can only gain recognition in the status[…]” (JS I 222/240). And then, the structure of recognition, being the only way consciousness exists as a singular totality, is more explicitly explained: “I am absolute totality in that the consciousness of the other as a totality of singularity is in me only as sublated; but likewise my own totality of singularity is one that is sublated in others” (JS I 222-23/241). Thus, recognition refers to the state in which each consciousness is sublated into the other, ceasing to be itself and existing as the other of itself in the other. Obviously, both of sublation and recognition occurring between consciousnesses cannot be understood in terms of an immediate transformation of one side into the other as if one side literally becomes the other, and the other becomes it. If consciousness ceases to be itself and is sublated into the other, this other into which it is sublated does not refer to the other consciousness, the partner of recognition, but what is no longer the singular totality. Thus, sublation here rather means here raising up, and so appears as the distinct order from singular consciousness, which Hegel terms ‘universal consciousness’ or ‘spirit’:

It [singular totality (of consciousness)] is a self-sublating [consciousness] and it is a recognized consciousness, one which is in the other consciousness as it is in itself, thus it is absolutely universal consciousness. This being of the sublated-being of the singular totality is the totality as absolutely universal, or as absolute spirit; it is the spirit, as absolutely real consciousness. (JS I 222/240)

Recognition, therefore, has little to do with epistemic or cognitive
activity, for example, as if a consciousness is recognized as a singular totality by recognizing in its turn the other as a singular totality. Or, even if recognition implies some cognitive activity as it is the case of sex-relation where it is necessary for the involved organic beings to cognize the other, and so itself as well, as belonging to same genus in order to begin their sexual relation, the eventual signification of recognition, for Hegel, always lies in the appearance of universal order. Furthermore what more fully elucidates the concepts of the recognition as well as generation of universal order is ontological context, since they are primarily concerned with the being or the existence mode of consciousness. To be briefly, consciousness is not as what is in-itself, but it is for-itself, meaning that the being of consciousness is dynamically constituted through contradiction and sublation, different from the immediate given or such facticity of natural being; the being-for-itself of consciousness is no other than the universal order or space or simply the spirit. And Hegel himself formulates such ontologically peculiar framework of consciousness as the oneness between being, sublate, and being as sublated-being: “these three forms of being, sublating, and being as sublated being (Sein, Aufheben, und Sein als Aufgehobensein) are posited absolutely as one” (JS I 223/241). In effect, the citation compresses the idea of the being for itself of consciousness by recognition that we have previously examined: that consciousness is as what is posited through sublating the other, and it is for itself since it is also sublated therewith, meaning that it exists thus as sublated-being. Such is recognition, and therefore consciousness is only as what is recognized. Following, as much as the concept of recognition is concerned with the existence mode of consciousness, the being for itself, universal order or the spirit which is supposed to be generated by the recognition also has the ontological
connotation:

This *absolute consciousness* is thus a sublated-being of the consciousness as singular; a sublated being which is at the same time the eternal movement of the one coming to itself in another (Bewegung des Zu-sich-selbst-Werden eines in einem andern), and coming to be other within itself (des Sich-anders-Werden in sich selbst); it is universal, subsisting consciousness; it is not [the] mere form of the singulars without *substance*, but the singulars are no more; it is *absolute substance*, it is the *spirit of a people*, for which consciousness qua singular is itself only [the] form that of itself immediately become another, the side of spirit’s motion, the *absolute ethical life*. (JS I 223/241)

To recapitulate, sublating and recognition consist in negating the singular totality of the other to affirm it as its own, and in becoming other of itself through sublating itself thereby. This corresponds to what Hegel describes as the double movement in the citation above: becoming itself in the other and becoming the other in itself. Recognition thus goes through not only the destruction of the other, but ultimately self-destruction. But Hegel’s main argumentation here is that a new type of consciousness emerges therewith: the universal, subsisting consciousness. If so, recognition can be properly understood as self-destruction through the destruction of the other as we just formulated, and above all as self-raising-up through the destruction of both. It would then signify a raising up of both since it should symmetrically occur between two singular consciousnesses. Likewise, sublating should be eventually understood in its meaning of raising up rather than destroying, or more precisely raising up through destroying. The issue here is precisely
which aspect of the consciousness is destroyed, and while being destroyed what the other—the other to which the consciousness becomes—is like. In short, Hegel’s idea would be that consciousness as a singular being is destroyed and so the universal consciousness emerges. This new type of consciousness, Hegel highlights, has its own substance: in other words, the universal consciousness is the substance of consciousness or of what is called the singular consciousness so far. And this universal consciousness as substance, for Hegel, is identified as the spirit; more precisely the spirit of a people, namely, what he calls the ethical life [Sittlichkeit].

The conclusion can now be properly drawn that it is at the communal level, termed as the Sittlichkeit, that consciousness exists with its substance. It also then means that consciousness, as far as it is a singular one, does not have any substance in fact, although the whole theory of three potencies is oriented to an account of the existence mode of consciousness as a singular totality. Therefore, if the thesis that consciousness has its substance in the spirit of a people can be read as presenting an ontological understanding concerning consciousness, the ontological connotation does not consist only in the simple fact that consciousness is explained thereby with the term substance, the traditional category of ontology. The more significant point is rather that consciousness, as far as it is singular one, would be nothing but a certain potential form, namely an ineffective form it

16 The term Sittlichkeit is generally translated as ‘the ethical life’ in English. In this paper, the German term is used without being translated in light of its particularity. Specifically, the English translation might cause some confusion of subtle nuance for readers by decomposing two elements of the term and by employing the term ‘life’—which has certainly more than a grammatical function of nominalization, in contrast to the German suffix ‘-keit’.
could be said, because it does not have any substance, it is not yet realized as such. That is, what is really effective [wirklich] is in fact the universal. This does not imply however that Hegel would totally disregard singularity here, especially when it comes to especially human existence, by giving prominence to universality or even totality, which forms one of the dominant preconceptions of Hegel’s philosophy in general. For the singularity would be, in accordance with this life of Hegel’s idea, the ontologically potential form whose realization will give rise to universal consciousness. To put it another way, there is no hierarchy between singularity and universality in this framework because these concepts consist of a certain ontological movement altogether, the actualization of the virtual form. So, it might be appropriate to say that Hegel’s strategy of counting the communal level in the theory of consciousness contributes in fact to give an ontological account regarding consciousness on the basis of the idea of the actualization of virtual form. The conclusion seems to be clearly drawn from this: that for Hegel, it does not make sense that there would be pure singularity—the purely singular consciousness. Which theoretically meaningful tool this idea offers could probably be examined only issue by issue, text by text. Though, it seems to be agreed upon that the theory of consciousness presented through this 1803-04 lessons are mainly based on the idea that consciousness should be considered through its singular totality, but that this singular totality is only real as a universal one, the Sittlichkeit: and the ontological transformation from singularity to universality would be the eventual significance of sublating. Even though we need to allow for the fact that the 1803-04 manuscript of this lessons is a lecture note and the edition also has to be dealt with carefully, the structure of the theory of consciousness presented through these lessons can now be analyzed in the following way:
(1) Hegel first develops the definition of consciousness as the middle and the whole; (2) in accordance with this, the three potencies theory follows it to conceptualize the singular totality of consciousness; (3) and then, the third part, separately written in fragment 22, gives an account of the conditions for the real existence of this consciousness as a singular totality. In this way, putting emphasis on the necessity of taking into consideration the consciousness as subsisting, as having its substance, the concept of consciousness in this theory also means an agent who is living their communal life.
II. Derrida’s Reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit of 1803-04 in *Glas*

4. circularity and Derrida’s approach to Hegel’s System Problem in *Glas*

Obviously, system is of main interest to Hegel. He believes science is only possible and meaningful as system and thus establishing a scientific system under the name of philosophy was the important goal throughout his academic career. The idea is apparent in the preface of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: “the true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be actual knowing—that is what I have set myself to do” (PhG 6/5). Also, we observe that the idea of completing science as system resonates from earlier writings such as the 1801/02 manuscript for logic and metaphysics lecture, *Difference between Fichte’s system and Schelling’s system*, to mature works such as *Phenomenology of Spirit, Science of Logic*, and *Encyclopedia*. But this does not mean that Hegel would have consistently held a clear concept of what the system should be like or how he would have fulfilled the aim. It seems rather that his conception of the system remains somewhat obscure while the idea that science is only meaningful as system is constantly maintained. Ambiguity of the concept of system is apparent, for example, in the confusing role the *Phenomenology of Spirit* plays; whether *Phenomenology* is just an introduction to or constitutes a part of the system. It is widely
admitted, Hegel himself left this confusion unresolved by restricting its role to the introduction of the system in the *preface* of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* on the one hand and by including it in the system as a part of the subject spirit in the *Encyclopedia*.\(^{17}\)

In spite of all of this, it is clear that Hegel retains the idea that the system should be presented only as the system of spirit. Certainly the spirit should first be understood in its metaphysical connotation given that it is the Hegelian concept of the absolute. Nevertheless the spirit cannot be simply regarded as inheriting the traditional metaphysical understanding of the absolute, since what Hegel intends to with this concept is the substitution of the very traditional understanding of the absolute by fitting it with subjectivity. Thus this Hegelian absolute is no longer related to a transcendental entity inaccessible by our experience, nor to a fundamental principle governing the world beyond our intelligence. Rather, the spirit, as a self-constituting, dynamic reality, does not have any other place than nature and social, cultural, or historical space constituted by human conscious activity for its reality. And this is as far as it manifests itself as a phenomenon according to Hegel. By extension, the particularity of this concept consists especially in that the self-constitution of this subjective reality is presented as a kind of an ideological movement of knowing therewith—the self-knowing of the absolute. From this perspective, it would not be proper to interpret the

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\(^{17}\) The problem of the floating status of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was dealt with in detail through comparatively recent philological studies on the initial plan for the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the actual writing and editing process of it. For a summary of the disputes, see: Robert Pippin, “You Can’t Get There from Here”, in: (ed.) Frederick C. Beiser, *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, 1993
Hegelian project of the system—to complete the scientific system by constructing it as the movement of the spirit—only as intending to give a probable conceptual explanation of the world; as if the spirit can be regarded as one of such and such concepts to make sense of the reality we live in; and as if the reality, or whatever it is called is already completely established so that we only need to develop a proper conceptual framework to give an explanation of it. Rather, for Hegel, the system is actually involved in the movement of the spirit, so that it constitutes itself as a part of the movement of the spirit. More precisely, it is the final part of the whole movement of the spirit in so far as philosophy occupies the last spot where the spirit recognizes itself as the spirit. In short, the system or philosophy, for Hegel, cannot be but the movement of the spirit, where the spirit constitutes itself as the spirit.

As to such identification of the philosophical system in regards to the movement of the spirit, we can first of all consider it to revolve around the epistemological problem of the justification of true knowledge. Indeed the idea that true knowledge is possible through system was a great issue among German idealist. What comes to the first is the Kantian idea of the critique: the insistence and request of the preliminary studies on the possibilities and conditions of true knowledge and of our faculties as well. So, the epoch-making idea would have been that a philosophical theory, in order for it to be considered a science of true knowledge, should set the epistemological critique at the head, which then would simultaneously need to clarify what methodology is used for it. The question is then followed by how this scientific knowledge, which is not only knowledge about true knowledge but also true knowledge itself, should be presented. As this topic actually stirred heated controversy among post-Kantian idealists, we also see
that the meta-epistemological question about true science was being explicitly thematized by Fichte’s theory of science. In fact, Fichte made great contributions to the development of the problem of true science by clarifying the point that the initial principle, in order to be capable of establishing true science, must not be placed out of science itself. Otherwise, it is possible for an infinite regression between the principle and what should be founded by the principle to arise. It means then that science itself should be prepared with its own foundation, its own justification, so that true science should be capable of conducting critique rather than critique and true science being separated as preliminary work and genuine work respectively. In this respect, Fichte’s work is invaluable in theorizing the reflexivity of the I: the effort ultimately demonstrating what the self-founding science could be through bringing the concept of reflectivity of the I to its extreme. But Schelling and Hegel’s rejection was evident in their theoretical dissatisfaction of Fichte’s conceptualization of the I as, in fact, remaining nothing but a subjective principle.

For Hegel, the system should be capable of justifying and thereby grounding itself. This idea is apparent in *Science of Logic*, of which the aim is to describe the movement of pure thought producing its content from its own self and thereby grounding itself: the life of the logical Idea or of the Concept. This logical Idea, however, has nothing to do with finite self or formal reflexivity that we might understand under the term self-consciousness. Instead, it should be taken as the absolute reflexivity of the spirit and it is this very absolute reflexivity of the spirit that the system is capable of justifying, grounding itself. Thus for Hegel, the system does not merely define a certain ordered college of knowledge in accordance with the principle, as Kant would: the system should rather be the concrete whole
possessing an internal source of development while it provides a bond and principle of unity (EL §14). The system, which is comprised of three parts; logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit, should not be then simply regarded as a college of diverse knowledge but as the movement of the spirit that reflects into itself. In this respect, it would be helpful to recapitulate the construction of the Encyclopedia in making sense of the reflective movement of the spirit. The first part of the Encyclopedia is the Logic, which is the abridged edition of Science of Logic. This is then followed by the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit, each of which has three sub-parts: mechanic, physics, and organism for the philosophy of nature, and subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute spirit for the philosophy of spirit. These three parts, for Hegel, represent the dynamic and reflective movement of the spirit: the spirit first as the logical idea as it is in-itself, externalizes itself into nature and the human conscious life at various levels as well, and cognizes itself as the spirit by returning into itself. In short, implying the monist ontology of the spirit in this way, Hegel’s system theorizes this monism through the logic of dynamic movement, distinct from a certain static substantialism or essentialism.

On the other hand, it seems that there have not been many systematic studies done on Hegel’s system problem.¹⁸ The difficulty first arises regarding the logical complexity and high-degreed abstractness of the presented dialectic on the one hand, and in the encyclopedic wideness of the treated themes on the other. But the worst problem is the circular structure of

Hegel’s argumentation as a whole. The circularity is first apparent at the level of logic, since Hegel establishes his *Science of Logic* on the basis of the idea that the result to be founded is not different from the initial starting point\(^{19}\): “absolute truth must be a result, and conversely, a result presupposes a priori truth” (WL 69/70), “the advance [in the logic itself] is a *retreat into the ground*, to what is *primary* and *true*, on which depends and, in fact, from which originates, that which the beginning is made” (WL 70/71). The circularity brings forth a more complicated problem especially concerning the self-becoming of the spirit. The question here is what the absolute spirit, the spirit proving itself to be the spirit, would be like. Certainly this concept of the absolute spirit seems to be strongly associated with the theological

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\(^{19}\) Actually the circularity model, when it comes to epistemological justification and of systematization of knowledge, is not monopolized by Hegel. See: Tom Rockmore, “Dialectic and Circularity: Is Hegelian Circularity a New Copernian Revolution?”, in: (ed.) Nectarios G. Limnatis, *The Dimension of Hegel’s Dialectic*, New York: Continuum, 2010. Rockmore first attempts to examine the issue of the epistemological circularity in the context of its historical development. The circularity of Hegel’s system then, according to him, can be considered in particular from the perspective of the endeavor to reconstruct the Kantian critical philosophy. More precisely speaking, Hegel’s argumentation can be counted as third one, alongside Fichte and Reinhold. Rockmore first clarifies that it was by Fichte that the circularity was rehabsited: Fichte holds, according to the citation (p.57) that “philosophical explanation is intrinsically circular”. This position of Fichte, according to him, arises from Schulze’s objection to Reinhold. But while accepting Reinhold’s idea of the basic rationalist model of system in terms of as an initial principle, Fichte makes the circularity that was set aside by Reinhold, as constitutive of the process of knowledge. And then, Hegel, who was actually aware of this debate, sides with Fichte against Reinhold, in contending that knowledge is an essentially circular process, according to Rockmore. But Hegel’s position is distinct from that of Fichte in that he denies traditional understanding, according to which the outcome of the process is less than the full form of knowledge, at any rate. So Hegel’s argument can be reconstructed as “an effort to attain the goal fixed by Reinhold by means of the counterargument advanced by Fichte”.

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concept of the absolute as a lot of readers of Hegel have taken notice, mostly in a critical manner. But it also implies more important issues that cannot be set aside simply for the reason of its theological nuance, and which actually exceeds the previous theological framework. In this respect, it is highly worth noting that the concept of the self-becoming of the spirit, in Hegel’s system, has an intimate relation with establishing, a philosophical anthropology; for the main idea is that the reflectivity of the spirit, whether it means self-becoming in an ontological sense or self-recognition with some epistemological nuance, first needs to exteriorize itself to become the other of itself. That is, externalizing itself to nature and then to human consciousness and to the social, historical, and cultural space constituted by it. Concerning the human consciousness and the world constituted by it, Hegel develops the concepts of consciousness or of self-consciousness with the great effort, of which the main issues dealt with are: the proper mode of existence of human beings, self-relation and the inter-subjective relation between self-conscious agents, the construction of human communities and institutions at various levels, the historical development of human society and so on.

In these circumstances, Derrida’s *Glas* presents a suggestive interpretation of Hegel’s system. What we observe in this monumental work in the history of the reading of Hegel so far is the highly skillful weaving of the intricate issues which we just formulated, which are never easy to think of in a synthetic manner: the paradoxical logic on which the system is based and the circular structure of the whole system on the one hand, and the various, concrete themes of nature and of human spirit, on the other. But the most remarkable thing in Derrida’s reading of Hegel in *Glas* is that Derrida holds on tight to the logical problem of Hegel’s system without resolving it
at all in his reading. And it is with this issue of the paradoxical structure of Hegel’s system at the center that various involved themes are intertwined along with his reading. And the problem on which the whole reading pivots, is the problem of the introduction to philosophy, which Hegel develops methodologically to support his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but of which the metaphysical implication can be made more clearly, as we will see later, when it is seen with the problem at the starting point of philosophy developed in *Science of Logic* altogether. Through these problems, Derrida sees through the fundamental paradox:

*Einführung*, as German philosophers say, introduction into Hegel. *Einführung* demands the accusative and so indicates the active movement of penetration. Not to stay here at or be content here with the skirt of the Hegelian thicket. Not to stop immediately in all the difficulties, intrinsic or extrinsic, intrinsically extrinsic—and supplementary—that the decision of such a stroke [coup] instigates. There have been many introductions to Hegel for sale and generally available. And the problem of the introduction in/to Hegel’s philosophy is *all* of Hegel’s philosophy: (the) already posed throughout, especially in his prefaces and forewords, introductions and preliminary concepts. So, already, one would be found entrained in the circle of the Hegelian beginning, sliding or endlessly atrip there. (GL 10/4)

In short, in Derrida’s view, we can formulate the paradox of Hegel’s system as following: that the introduction to the system is already the system. Indeed, this paradox has been occasionally taken as revealing the teleological or even theological character of Hegel’s system as Heidegger characterizes it to be
the delegate of onto-theology. But the problem here, in Derrida’s reading, does not cover only the questions as to which position Hegel’s system occupies in the context of the history of occidental metaphysics or as to which particularity Hegel’s ontology has. What Derrida sees through the paradox above is also a hermeneutical problem: amongst the concepts Hegel presents as an entrance or threshold to the system, which is the best suitable to properly deal with the so-called Hegelian system? However, in so far as Hegel’s system establishes a circular relation between the starting point and the whole system, once any such starting point of the reading is chosen, it is also true that one would find in the circularity that the starting point is already the whole system in some way. If this is the case, one might say that it does not matter much of a difference for making sense of Hegel’s system which concept to begin the reading with. Derrida will also make clear the point that for reading Hegel, for dealing with Hegel’s system, we must make a decision in choosing the most appropriate entrance to the system to start the reading. But for Derrida, this decision cannot be made arbitrarily. On the contrary, Derrida affirms that there is a particular concept, which should properly take as the starting point of Hegel’s system, which can be so identified with the system itself, and thus from which the reading should proceed and converge onto: the family.

Prior to considering Derrida’s questioning, we will examine which idea Hegel himself developed concerning the problems of the introduction to philosophy in the preface of the Phenomenology of the Spirit. Hegel starts the preface by posing the question as to which contents would be proper for the preface of a philosophical work. Listing the author’s intention or purpose, establishing the relation of his presented work to the previous works by others that deal with similar themes, and asserting the particular significance
the author’s own work has are first dismissed. For philosophical writing, according to Hegel, cannot be a set of arguments justifying a particular position of the author, which would then also contain some counterarguments against the opposing position. Hegel supports this idea on the basis of his viewpoint about truth that it is impossible and even meaningless to absolutely distinguish true and false. Instead, for Hegel, truth is like the organic whole in which what is regarded as false knowledge or even what turns out to be an error constitutes the truth at that moment, and in this sense, it can be regarded as relatively true. As far as truth means the organic whole constituted by every part having its own necessity, philosophical knowledge can be considered fundamentally different from anatomy for example, as nothing but “an aggregate of information” (PhG 3/1). Actually, this Hegelian view of truth initially justifies the phenomenological method, in Hegelian sense of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: describing of the repetitive discordance between consciousness and its object—or between object and its concept—at various levels, on various spheres, under the title of “experience of consciousness”. That is, the *Phenomenology* does not address truth itself but it is concerned with only what is not yet true: this being the reason why the *Phenomenology* is “the pathway of doubt, or more precisely as the way of despair” (PhG 61/78).

More significantly, the presented view also supports Hegel’s historical perspective that every philosophical system so far constitutes the whole truth altogether. But the most important connotation of this view is that there is no need for preliminary work in completing the system of truth. Or, if there is some need for a preliminary work, in whatever sense, such preliminary work should not be conducted completely separately from the construction of the system as such; there cannot be a totally external introductory part to the
completed system, but rather the introductory part should constitute a part of the system. In the same context, Hegel asserts that the essence of philosophy lies in directly rushing into the state of affairs itself to deal with its internal necessity—rather than in developing the preliminary method to then successively grasp the truth.

The formulation that the introduction to the system is the system itself can be then made sense of on the basis of argument on the starting point of philosophy that Hegel presents in the short, but intensive article at the head of *Science of Logic*: “With What Must the Science Begin?”. In this article, Hegel highly values the methodological thought presented in his own time—alluding to Reinhold’s idea in particular: that philosophical knowledge starts with positing a hypothetical, probable truth and then to proceed then to demonstrate its truth as the result. Hegel appreciates this position in that it reveals the speculative nature of a philosophical beginning, as far as it clarifies the point that what is absolutely true cannot be but a result, but what is initially posited as true also cannot be but true, in any case, as far as it proving it to be true. So, the point that Hegel wants to bring in relief is that the starting point of philosophy, even though it is posited as a hypothetical one, is in fact already true. To put it another way, what we normally regards as the proceeding process from the hypothetical starting point to a proven truth, which is the result, is in fact the regressing process into the starting point; the process of founding the initial ground as ground:

The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first also the last and the
last is also the first. We see therefore that, on the other hand, it is equally necessary to consider as result that into which the movement returns as into its ground. In this respect the first is equally the ground, and the last a derivative; since the movement starts from the first and by correct inferences arrives at the last as the ground, this latter is a result. Further, the progress from that which forms the beginning is to be regarded as only a further determination of it, hence that which forms the starting point of the development remains at the base of all that follows and does not vanish from it. (WL 70-71/71)

Hegel therefore admits the idea that the first step in constructing the system is to justify the initially posited hypothesis and to ground it as ground. But for Hegel, the process of this grounding cannot be done anything other than by proceeding to the result in a straight line. Rather, the process of grounding cannot be but return back to the starting point, which thus remains true throughout the whole process.

On this basis then, we can say that it is the identity of the content and the difference of the form that characterizes both relations: between the introduction to the system and the system itself on the one hand, and between the beginning and the result on the other. This point is concerned with the metaphysically controversial affirmation of the absolute differentiating itself—the absolute in which the difference is implied only as its moment—and this affirmation explicitly assures the self-completedness of Hegel’s system. Namely, according to Hegelian logic, the system does not need any exterior factors than itself for its justification and foundation, since the process of grounding it is nothing else than returning back to itself. However, this self-completedness sprung forth many critical interpretations that
Hegel’s system would represent a teleological project presupposing the result from the outset, and that it was no more than a theological system taking the very beginning as the absolute. In short then, Hegel’s system would be no more than a repetition of traditional metaphysics. In this regard, Derrida seems to take over Heidegger’s critical interpretation of Hegel’s system, which saw it as onto-theology. What seems more important than the usage of the term onto-theology itself, however, is the point that Derrida draws a methodological proposition for reading Hegel from the circularity between starting the point and ending point—and the absolute self-completedness that it implies as we have seen above. In this regard, the point should be pointed out that Hegelian theology is not a one-sided movement going in a straight line to the destination. Instead, what characterizes the Hegelian teleology is the circular movement through which, and at the end of which the initial ground that was posited is proved to be ground and so founded as ground. But Derrida implicitly makes this distinction between two different sorts of teleology paralleled with two different ways of reading Hegel. According to him, we can identify Hegel’s system, as his mature works such as the *Science of Logic*, the *Philosophy of Right*, or the *Encyclopedia* while regarding the earlier writings before the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the materials showing the developmental process of Hegel’s thought—with the mature works as the goal. In this case, the earlier writings would merely show Hegel’s immature thought and unstable conception as to what the system should be like. Derrida determines this way of reading as the teleological approach, which is however unnecessary in reading Hegel.

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To speak of several states of Hegelian thought, of a youthful Hegel or an accomplished Hegel, is at once both Hegelian and anti-Hegelian. Thus Bourgeois’s book on Hegel at Frankfurt applies Hegel’s most preformationist categories to its subject. It opposes, to be sure, the “arrival of the mature Hegelianism” to the “incipient Hegelianism”, but precisely states that the latter “is engaged on the path of Hegelianism properly so called, on which we will formulate at Jena the ingenious intuition in writing that the absolute must be conceived as the ‘identity of identity and nonidentity’”. In this one sees Hegel “anticipating … future themes”, [...]. Nothing more Hegelian. But nothing less than Hegelian: in distinguishing the old from the young, one sometimes dissembles the systematic chains of the “first” texts; and above all one applies a dissociating and formal analysis, the viewpoint of the understanding in a narration that risks missing the living unity of the discourse; how does one distinguish philosophically a before from an after, if the circularity of the movement makes the beginning the end of the end? And reciprocally? (GL 96-97/83-84)

As apparent in the passage above, Derrida believes there is support in the differing readings of Hegel directly corresponding to young Hegel’s distinction between Judaism and Christianity —that is, the distinction between religion of command and that of love, and likewise, the distinction between the intellect [Verstand] of morality and the spirit of the ethical life [Sittlichkeit] as well. Derrida says, “the risk, then, is the Jewish reading” (GL 97/84). Derrida, thus, does not think that there is a linear progression between the young Hegel and the old Hegel. According to him, the relation between these two Hegels is analogous with that between the starting and ending point that Hegel establishes at the level of the system. And this is why
Derrida holds the following methodological idea: the earlier texts written in Frankfurt and Jena already contain all of the main ideas, conceptions, and features of the system as they are developed in the mature works. From this perspective, it is highly fitting to refer to the earlier texts in order to clarify what the system of Hegel is like. In actuality it can be seen in *Glas* that Derrida uses the earlier text in Frankfurt, *The Life of Jesus*, as the starting point of his reading of Hegel, and devotes the first third of his book to the reading of earlier writings such as *The Positivity and Destination of Christianity* and *Reason in History*, in order to determine the fundamental character of Hegel’s system.

Obviously, the idea of equating the character of the system and the method for reading the system seems to be strange. So the question still lingers as to if it could be possible, or meaningful to pass over the chronological gap among the texts and the probable gap in the development of Hegel’s thoughts as well. If so, we need to return to the question of what Hegel’s system is. Or, we can ask whether Hegel did actually complete the system and publish it in textual form? Previously, we have mentioned the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia* as sources that seem to show Hegel established the system himself—while identifying the system as the absolute reflective movement of the spirit which goes from its immediate form, externalizes itself into nature and human spirit, and finally returns into itself. But it becomes problematic to identify those texts as the system itself when we take into consideration the fact that the *Logic* alone cannot be taken to be the system itself without its enlargement to the spheres of nature and of human spirit. Furthermore *Encyclopedia* was originally written as lecture notes and published later with an editor’s addition of the lecture note from the students. In addition to this, the *Philosophy of Right*, which is often
equated to the system, was also written for the sake of lectures. By extension, we can also raise the question about the absolute spirit, which is presented as the summit of the system at the end of the Encyclopedia. Indeed, it is well known that Hegel presented his main idea of the absolute spirit in the last part of the Encyclopedia while giving a brief explanation of its three sub-parts; art, religion, and philosophy. However, for accurate ideas and explanations of the absolute spirit, we should depend on his historical lectures which are also published later: the lectures on the history of art, religion, and philosophy, respectively. On these bases, we can hardly say that Hegel actually presented what would be the absolute spirit in a systematic manner in relations to the Logic and the philosophies of nature and of human spirit in an organic and consistent way. Of course, the hermeneutic burden commentators take is another question: to chase, to make clear, and to make sense of Hegel’s true idea of the system on the basis of the transmitted manuscripts. The question here at stake is if Hegel himself actually presented the system in a systematic way. We can even add in these doubts: what we normally have in mind in regards to the term the ‘Hegelian System’ is that it is nothing but a myth.  

Furthermore, was the idea that Hegel completed the system an exaggeration? To be more gently, if they actually overlook the complexity of Hegel’s conception of the system, which seems nonetheless to be properly dealt with properly once a comprehensive understanding of the concept of the spirit is first secured.

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5. Family: Conjunction of the Onto-theology of the Saint-Family and of the Speculative Theory of Sittlichkeit

Up to this point, we can agree that the legitimacy of the teleological and linear reading, or what Derrida calls ‘the Jewish reading’, is questionable—reading centered around the assumed complete system of the Encyclopedia, or the Philosophy of Right, and to understand the progressive development of Hegel’s thought through his earlier texts. However, this does not mean that Hegel would have maintained the same idea or conception of the system throughout his academic career, as if we could thus recognize what the system would be in his earlier works in the same manner as it is presented in the mature texts. Nor does it imply that the concept of the so-called Hegelian system would be absurd, since it is certain that Hegel himself presented the system of the spirit with the Encyclopedia. Thus, as Derrida affirms, if the earlier texts anticipate the mature system, it first means that we have sufficient reasons for ignoring the chronological order, but it also signifies that there is some chronological gap. To put it another way, the earlier texts hold all of the main features of the mature system, but it is not analogous to mature system. From this perspective, Derrida formulates the particular difficulty in reading Hegel as following: “we can neither avoid nor accept as role or principle teleological anticipation, neither accept nor avoid as rule or principle the empirico-chronological delay of the narrative, the récit” (GL, 12/6). Then Derrida’s strategy consists in what he calls ‘the bastard course’. Which, briefly summarized, is a strategy consisting in taking a certain concept which is capable of playing the role of introduction or entrance into the whole system, and reconstructing the concept of the system
and its related problems. Furthermore, we can analyze the involved texts with these concepts and problems at the center instead of focusing on the chronological order of the texts. In line with this, what we observe throughout the whole reading given by Derrida in *Glas* is the extension of the chain of the main problems and the change of their constellation as well while all of the extensions and changes are repeatedly referred to the most essential issue: the entrance to the system. By extension, Derrida certainly organizes his reading of Hegel on the basis of an explicit concept of Hegel’s system: the movement of the spirit. In this regard, it is worth noting that Derrida maintains a particular question around which he organizes his whole reading: how the spirit having externalized itself returns back to itself, in what manner the most natural spirit sublates its natural aspect to become the spirit in its proper meaning. This is the question on sublation [Aufhebung].

The family is a party to the system of the spirit: the family is both a *part to* and the whole of the system. The whole system repeats itself in the family. *Geist* is always, in the very production of its essence, a kind of repetition. Coming to, after losing itself in nature and in its other, spirit constitutes itself as absolute spirit though the negative process of a syllogism whose three moments are subjective spirit (anthropology, phenomenology of spirit, psychology), *objective spirit* (right, morality, *Sittlichkeit*), and *absolute spirit* (art, religion, philosophy). Each of the three moments itself includes three syllogistic moments. So the family is the first moment of the third moment of objective spirit, *Sittlichkeit*’s first moment. Family forms its still most natural instance and accomplishes itself by destroying itself in three stages: marriage, patrimony, education. (GL 27/20)
Derrida explicitly points out ‘the family’ as the paradoxical core of Hegel’s system—the paradoxical logic and structure on which Hegel’s system is based, which we have previously examined with the thesis that introduction to the system is already the system, and that progression is in fact regression. First of all, what supports Derrida’s idea is the location that the family occupies within the whole system of the spirit: the first moment of the Sittlichkeit, wherein the externalized spirit as nature returns back to itself as the spirit. So, Derrida regards the family as a part of the system, more precisely, as the entrance to the system in the sense that it marks the point where the spirit ceases to be as the other of itself and becomes itself. But the more fundamental moment in supporting the idea, is the particular perspective of Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit Derrida defends. Certainly, the issue here does not lie in discussing which moment among others one should attach the weight on to properly treat the concept of Sittlichkeit. For Derrida, it is indisputable that the family is the core of Sittlichkeit and finally of the system itself; the necessity of the relation of the family and Sittlichkeit comes from the theoretical demand that Sittlichkeit should be considered in the very context of the movement of the spirit, instead of being restricted to its social or political horizon as it is normally done by many commentators. So, the family is a concept concerning the system problem, and thus it is an ontological, or onto-theological theme, according to Derrida: “the concept family very rigorously inscribes itself in the system: within the Encyclopedia and the Philosophy of Right, those final forms that are subsequent to the great Logic” (GL 11/5). In line with this, Derrida asserts that sociological or politico-economical interpretations, which dwell on the spheres of the bourgeois society and the state than on the family, do not have any ‘philosophical foundation’ (GL, 23/16), even though it could be worthwhile.
So, defining *Sittlichkeit* as ‘a spirit-nature’, Derrida takes the whole development of *Sittlichkeit* to be the process of removing such naturalness from the spirit. Explicit here is the second feature of Derrida’s perspective: it is not only within the framework of the movement of the subjective-objective-absolute spirit, but rather, more fundamentally, within the higher order framework of the nature-spirit that the concept of *Sittlichkeit* is problematized.

As this point, it seems we can make overall sense of how Derrida problematizes the paradoxical structure of Hegel’s system in his *Glas*. And for this, we should ask the question left above in what sense Derrida thinks that the family can also be regarded as the whole of the system. As we just saw, Derrida deals with the circular structure of Hegel’s system in terms of the movement of the spirit instead of devoting himself to its logical paradox. From this perspective, it is self-repetition of the spirit in terms of which the issue of the circularity of the system can be adequately thematized—in so far as the movement of the spirit consists in returning into itself following its externalization. To recapitulate the thematization, Derrida first pays attention to the determination of the spirit that Hegel gives in the *Reason in History* and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, that is, ‘self-knowing through the knowing the object’. Here Hegel’s idea is explicit that the spirit knows only itself, so that the content of its knowledge is never imposed from the outside. According to Derrida’s recapitulation, “to know is to appropriate oneself, to produce or reproduce the known” (GL 21/29). To put it another way, it is only the spirit that can know the spirit, and in this sense, Derrida formulates, “Geist repeats itself” (GL 29/22). Nevertheless, self-repetition of the spirit has little to do with some logical or formal tautology, nor with reflective structure of our subjective knowledge, although the terminology
employed for determining the spirit might remind us of some self-conscious structure. Rather, what concerns circularity, or self-repetition of the spirit in Derrida’s terminology, as Derrida emphatically characterizes, is the liberty for itself of the spirit. Derrida goes on to clarify the point that for Hegel the liberty of the spirit is clearly distinct from the being in itself of a natural thing, meaning that the liberty consists in the active self-constitution of the spirit by negating all that limits itself. And therein Derrida further sees the necessity of the phenomenal experience of that liberty, since otherwise the spirit would remain only a concept without becoming actual. What is needed is therefore “becoming-alive, the matter’s becoming life” (GL 32/25) under the form of self-sensation in animality. So it is not difficult to recognize that the nature-spirit framework in which Derrida reads the problems of Hegel’s system, when it comes to nature here in particular, has little to do with nature of a natural being in a general sense, nor with various issues dealt with in the philosophy of nature. Rather, nature that Derrida brings into question refers to the naturalness of the spirit. That is, the spirit is nature in the sense that nature is where the spirit finds itself externalized as the other of itself. This nature should be said to be the nature of the spirit as far as it is also where the spirit begins to become itself. By extension, it is worth noting that Derrida identifies the very domain of the nature-spirit to the anthropological sphere, putting emphasis on the particularity of Hegel’s concept of human desire, wherein also constitutes the thematic association between liberty for itself of the spirit and the family: “man passes from feeling [sensation] to conceiving only by suppressing the pressure, what the animal, according to Hegel, could not do. Ideality, as thought of the universal, is born and then bears the mark of a suppression of the pressure: the violent interruption between pressure and satisfaction, between the animal moment and the
spiritual moment of the life, death in the natural life, natural death as the spirit’s life. The family is announced” (GL 33/25).

Derrida’s idea would be that once the main problem of Hegel’s system of paradoxical circularity is formulated in terms of the repetition of the spirit, we are led to the theme of the family. In other words, the spirit repeating itself means that this repetition occurs in the family. If so, the question arises as to what the family means here, in which manner and in what sense, more precisely, Derrida associates the question of the Hegelian spirit to the problem of the family. In this regard, it should first made clear that the family at issue here does not concern only the economic community unit constituted by marriage and raising children that we just determined as concerning the anthropological sphere, and of which Hegel provides a theory in the economic-political context in the *Philosophy of Right*. The family as well as the relation of the spirit-family as well that Derrida wants to cipher out through his reading of Hegel’s early texts is concerned with the problem of the ontological copula, or copulation in Derridian terms. And, we will see that ontologically problematizing the issue of Hegel’s system in this way, Derrida finally characterizes Hegel’s system as *speculative onto-theology*. Meaning that first, what we can read from the Hegelian spirit is an ontology deeply rooted in Christianity, and secondly, Hegel ultimately sees the truth of this onto-theology consisting in its sublation into philosophy—speculative philosophy. So, we will first follow in more detail, Derrida’s problematization that we just sketched, and then return to reflect on the asserted relation between the spirit and the family.

To begin with, we will dwell on Derrida’s remarks on the metaphor of the seed given in *Reason in History*. While Hegel originally used the
metaphor to complement his account on the particularity of the human spirit, that is, the mediating of thought, Derrida takes this metaphor to articulate three different leaps constituting Hegel’s system: the quantitative leap of plants and animals, the qualitative leap of human spirit, and the dialectical leap of infinite spirit. First, the qualitative leap concerns the life of a plant, in which a seed is the starting point and the end result at the same time. In this identity, Hegel also sees their discordance that a seed, being the starting point of a plant, is the ending result of the other plant. For Hegel, this discordance however shows the impotency of the life of a plant (*die Ohnmacht des Lebens*), and so, the growth of plants and animals cannot be regarded as anything but quantitative. What is meant thereby is that the latent form in a seed is separated from its development and result. In contrast, the formation of a human individual, Hegel argues, consists in the following ontological ought: “man must make himself what he should be; he must first acquire everything for himself” (GL 36/28). So Derrida, next, goes on to deal with Hegel’s explanation of the formation of a human individual. What gets highlighted is that for Hegel, the formation of a human individual is fundamentally the cultural process termed as *Bildung*. For Derrida, the formation can then be regarded as the auto-production, in a sense that a human individual constitutes itself through such symbolic formation. To put it another way, “the human individual is its own proper product, its own son, the son of its works” (GL 37/29). In comparison to the first case, the division (*Entzweiung*) is also essential to the human individual, as far as the human individual is determined by its self-knowing; but the starting point and the end result form the life of one individual, and together they are completely involved in the life of one individual. Additionally, an important point Derrida underlines is that auto-production of a human individual is made
through the negative relation to nature, so that this second case creates the negative relation to the first above. It means that cultural formation of a human individual is made by “the inhibiting negation of natural self-mobility” (GL 37/29). From this Derrida articulates the qualitative leap, indicating the very inhibiting negation of the nature in the auto-production of a human individual. As a third point, the dialectical leap concerns the passage, or sublation of the finite, human spirit into the infinite spirit, the absolute. The related issue here is then to clear up the relationship between the finite spirit and the infinite spirit, what the passage or sublation would mean:

But of this self-production, as the inhibiting negation of natural self-mobility, the human individual, the particular, finite individual, as such, is only an example. And the (human) father/son relation is only a (finite) example of the infinite father/son relation, of the relation of infinite spirit freely relation to itself as to its own rebound [ressaut], its own resource. Just as there was a leap [saut] into negativity, between the negativity of the natural [plant, animal] Entzweiung and that of the spiritual or human Entzweiung, between the relief in nature and the relief of nature in the finite spirit, so there is a dialectical leap that is the absolute rebound of the result, between the Aufhebung of the finite spirit and that of the infinite spirit. Just as—so: the analogy or the proportion depends on what the finite is at the passage to the infinite. (GL 37/29)

The first noticeable point in the citation above is that Derrida explicitly brings the problem of the absolute into the center of his reconstruction of the problem of Hegel’s system. But what is more suggestive in this regard is that Derrida deals with the Hegelian concept of the cultural formation (Bildung)
in terms of a father-son filial relation. We will later see in more detail that Derrida converges the problem of Hegel’s system as a whole into the framework of a filial relation; including not only the cultural formation of finite human beings but fundamentally the relations between the finite human spirit and the infinite spirit. First we need to examine how Derrida drags the whole problem to an idea of filial relation, and for this, particular attention should be paid to his interpretation of Hegel’s terminology of the ‘example’. As it is explicit in the citation above, Hegel gives an account of the relation between the finite spirit and the absolute by establishing the former as the example of the latter. Asserting that the terminology is not merely rhetoric, then, Derrida goes on to examine the other paragraph where Hegel uses the term the example in a more implicative way. To look at only a part of the cited paragraph here:

The most sublime [raised, elevated, relieved, eminent: das erhabenste Beispiel] is to be found in the nature of God himself; strictly speaking (eigentlich), this is not a genuine example in the sense of one casual instance among others (ein Beispiel (bei-her-spiel)), but rather the universal, truth itself, of which everything else is an example (Bei-spiel). (GL 38/30)22

By definition, the term the example implies the relation between the higher order universal and its instances. But what Hegel wants to affirm is that the

22 For the original text of Hegel, see: Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, in: (ed.) Johannes Hoffmeister, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte vol.1, Hambourg: Felix Meiner, 1955, p.58
most sublime form of the universal-instances relation is found in God, on the basis that God is the universal of which everything else is an instance. In this respect, Derrida maintains that the term obviously concerns the ontological issue: the positing of the finite being elevated to the infinite. So, Derrida implicates his own interpretation of this term into his comments on Hegel’s texts, according to which the term implies the ontological hierarchy between the finite being and the infinite being: if the finite beings, as example, relevant to the particular cases substitutable for each other under the general rule, the infinite being is unclassifiable, non-substitutable. Hegel’s ontological argument using the term the example would then be that the positing of the finite beings is only possible by being elevated to the infinite being. Then, following this interpretation, Derrida poses a further question of whether it would not be possible for the infinite to become an example of its own self. The question actually touches on the core of Hegel’s thesis on infinity—which will also express his fundamental intuition in regards to the relation between the absolute or the infinite spirit and the finite human spirit—according to which the infinite should involve the finite as its moment. Otherwise, Hegel argues, it cannot be infinite but only limited, as opposed to finite. So, if the infinite’s possibility of becoming the finite should be preserved in this way, the question arises then as to in what sense more precisely it is preserved. In this respect, we observe that Derrida comments on the cited passage above in which Hegel determines God as the most sublime case of the ‘example’ and identifies this God precisely as the Christian God, opposing it to the Jewish God.\textsuperscript{23} Derrida pays special

\textsuperscript{23} The rest of the citation is as following: “It is true that the older religions also referred to God as Spirit; but this was no more than a name which could not as yet contribute [grasp: gefasst] anything towards explaining the nature of spirit. In the Jewish religion
attention to the point that Hegel sees the true nature of the spirit expressed in the Christian God: “in Christianity, however, God is revealed (offenbart) as Spirit. In the first place, he is the Father, power (Macht), abstract universal (abstrakt Allgemeines), which is still veiled, enveloped (eingehüllt) within itself. Secondly, he is an object for himself, an other than himself, a dividing himself in two (ein sich Entzwiendes), the Son (der Sohn)” (GL 38-39/30-31). This provides Derrida with the interpretative ground for making sense of Hegel’s concept of the spirit from the presented idea of the Christian God. And from Derrida’s perspective, what Hegel sees in the Christian God is the God knowing itself by dividing itself into his own son, by becoming itself its own other and so the object for itself. In a word, “God knows and recognizes himself in his son” (GL 39/31). So Derrida argues that Hegel’s concept of the spirit refers to the Holy family constituting with God and his son, the Christ. In line with this, Derrida interprets the Holy Spirit as the familiarity, meaning the medium through which “the (infinite) exemplar gives itself and makes the (finite) exemplar return to it” (GL 31/39). What determines the Holy Spirit would be then no other than the filiation itself, the making of the filial relation. So, Derrida finally draws the definition of the spirit as the filiation itself as following: “the spirit is neither the father nor the son, but filiation, the relation of father to son, of son to father, of father to father through the mediation of the son, of son to son through the mediation of the father” (GL 39/31).

In this way, the point that Derrida wants to demonstrate through his comments on Hegel’s theological earlier writings is that Hegel develops the ontological question therein, which covers all of the essential elements of the too, the spirit was at first represented (vorgestellt) only in general terms.” (GL 38/30)
mature system. Inversely, it means then that it is the ontological question through which we can appropriately intertwine the early and later texts of Hegel. Derrida formulates the question as following: “it is the question of the Wesen(essence) and of the copula is as a question, the relation or name of father-to-son” (GL, 66/56). In other words, for Derrida, what Hegel showed through his treatment of the Christian Holy Family is a thought on the copula, namely the ontological link:

The Father is the Son, the Son is the Father; and the Wesen, the essential energy of this copulation, its unity, the Wesenheit of the first and the second, is the essence of the Christian Last Supper Scene. The spirit of Christianity is rather the revelation of the essentiality of the essence that permits in general copulation in the is, saying is. Unification, conciliation (Vereinigung), and being (Sein) have the same sense, are equivalent in their signification (gleichbedeutend). And in every proposition (Satz), the binding, agglutinating, ligamentary position of the copula (Bindewort) is conciliates the subject and the predicate, laces one around the other, entwines one around the other, to form one single being (Sein). The Sein is constituted, reconstituted starting from its primordial division (Urteil) by letting itself be thought in a Bindwort. (GL 67/56)

As we have previously seen, Derrida comments on the nature of the spirit—that Hegel draws from his reflection of Christianity—as consisting in the filiation itself. And then, as we see in the citation above, Derrida articulates more precisely this problem of the Christian filiation as the identity of the father and of the son in the trinity. With this, Derrida clarifies the point that the problem of the Christian trinity, when it comes to the Hegelian spirit at
least, is the ontological problem of the copula *is*. In this regard, for Derrida, it is important to understand the point that the copula, as far as it is involved in the trinity and thereby in the Hegelian ontology of the spirit, cannot be regarded merely as a grammatical, functional constituent. Instead, Derrida maintains that the *is* should be considered ‘the essential energy of the copulation’, namely, of generating a link itself: and so, making the divided parts one, unifying them. Accordingly for Hegel, it is improbable that a being would be restricted to the sole sphere of conceptual determination, but it fundamentally signifies the energy of unification. And this is the way that it is as being, wherein Derrida sees the essentiality of essence. By extension, as Derrida points out, Hegel does not think that judgment could be dealt with only at the level of formal logic; what judgment is rather concerned with would be the reconstruction of the being as oneness from the primordial division, as Derrida formulates it. In short, for Hegel, being refers to the energy of the construction of being as being from the primordial division, through generating a link, that is, unifying the divided parts—the subjectivity of the Hegelian being. Concerning this ontological problematization, particular attention should be paid to the point that Derrida does not get out of the Christian framework, but rather the Hegelian being, the energy of the copulation, refers to the very Christian filiation in Derrida’s view. So this interpretation recognizes the Hegelian ontology as referring to Christianity, instead of extending consideration of the ontology that is deeply rooted in Christianity to a comprehensive reflection of Hegel’s ontology in general. So it can be said that this interpretation obviously concerns the Christian origin of Hegelian spirit. Nevertheless, it should not simply be said that it has critical intention against such a theological origin, but it seems to better to take it more neutrally: as an ontological interpretation. Certainly, it seems
unlikely fair to treat Hegel’s ontology without taking into account *Science of Logic*, where Hegel actually develops his thesis on the being. But this would not depreciate Derrida’s ontological interpretation above, as far as it explicitly catches the particularity of the Hegelian spirit or of the Hegelian being: the subjectivity of self-constituting such a power.

Then, the onto-theological reading of the Hegelian spirit does not seem to go against what we normally admit of the Hegelian system in some critical way: its Christian origin and subjectivity. But the most distinct feature of Derrida’s reading lies in his identification of the ontological linkage and the familial filiation. Thus, the issue is neither revealing the theological origin of the concept of the spirit, nor to give an analogical interpretation of it on the basis of the metaphor employed by Hegel himself. More precisely, what Derrida wants to argue is the overlapping of ontological, or onto-theological linkage and of the unification in actual human family—of the Holy family and the human family. Wherein precisely he sees the key to the Hegelian system. And the key issue that Derrida wants to bring into the center of all of the set of problems therewith can be appropriately illuminated from the perspective of the speculative sublation of onto-theology, which thematically has to do with sublation of the absolute religion into philosophy in Hegel’s system. So we will examine in more detail how Derrida, using his conceptualization of the overlapping of two families above, leads onto-theological problematization of Hegel’s system to a new step in his reading, concerning the final sublation in Hegel’s system. To begin with, what Derrida gains from Hegel’s earlier theological writings, as we have seen above, is the ontology that has its root in Christian filiation: or, in his own term, “thus is opened and determined the space in which the ontological (the possibility of Wesen, Sein, Urteilen) no longer lets itself be
unglued or decapitated from the family” (GL 67/56). But, in order to make clarify what the family means here, we will need to examine Hegel’s concept of the love and Derrida’s interpretation of it as well. First, Hegel determines Christianity as the religion of love in his early theological writings in comparison with Judaism, which is in its turn determined as the religion of command and duty. In other words, for Hegel, the ontological identity between the infinite and the finite—between God and human—becomes possible with Christianity whereas in the case of Judaism, God and humans creates a the lord-slave relation. In this sense, love means no more than the ontological filiation that we have seen so far. On the other hand, love is presented as the unifying factor of the family in the Philosophy of Right. In particular, Hegel takes love to be a kind of feeling and on this basis argues that the family is the most natural form of the ethical life or of the spirit (PhR § 158). In the same passage (PhR § 158 Addition), the love is also determined as ‘the consciousness of my unity with another’ and from this Hegel goes on to argue ‘the most immense contradiction’ of love. To put it another way, if love means that “I know myself as the unity of myself with another and of another with myself”, the contradiction consists in that I should renounce my independent existence to gain my self-consciousness. Regarding Hegelian love, Derrida takes two approaches: the first is substitution of Christianity for Judaism, which is the thesis of young Hegel in his earlier theological writings; and then, the passage from morality to the ethical life in the Philosophy of Right. First, paying special attention to infidelity prohibition, Derrida explains that if Jewish commandment prohibits only the infidel act without touching the desire of infidelity, Christianity prohibits both (GL 43/35). But it should be said more precisely that the prohibition in the latter has nothing to do with a commandment
imposed from outside but it is only the internal prohibition; since what Christ teaches is that the duty of chastity is accompanied by love of the partner. Thus, substitution of Christianity for Judaism means ‘the interiorization of the interdict, the interiorization of the objective law’ (GL 44/35) in Derrida’s terminology. The interiorization of the interdict should be mediated, however, by the love of God and so Derrida goes on to argue the infinity of Christian love. In short, the interdict or the limit would become infinite when it is interiorized, so that “no longer is one limited to loving a finite being, but one loves a finite being as infinite” (GL 44/35). From Derrida’s perspective, the infinity of love or what Hegel takes being love is the unification without alterity; or, if one claims on Hegel’s behalf that there is certainly the alterity, Derrida will firmly maintain that the other of love cannot be but the infinite. In short, for Hegel, love means linkage between the finite and the infinite and in this sense the reconciliation of their opposition. Such is, in Derrida’s view, the Hegelian concept of love presented in his theological writings. Additionally, it is the archetype of Hegelian love, the human love Hegel thinks of more precisely, of which the fundamental meaning and structure should be preserved in the family’s love of the *Philosophy of the Right*: it would thus be meaningless, in Derrida’s view, to dwell on the family’s love in the *Philosophy of the Right* without taking into consideration love as the filiation between the finite and the infinite. But the most important point that Hegel argues, as Derrida rightly underlines, is that such a relation between the finite and the infinite could be thought of for the first time with coming of Christianity, whereas it has never been possible with Judaism. To be more precise, what Judaism could not think of is the relation between the finite and infinite as “the commensurablity or the passage between two [of them], the presence of the immeasurable in the determinate” (GL 99/85).
On the other hand, Derrida pays attention to the duplicity in Hegel’s understanding of Christianity, in that Hegel sees in the death of Jesus Christ, the destiny of Christianity to repeat the split; that Christianity surpasses and also repeats the split in Judaism. Nevertheless, Derrida does not interpret the duplicity as meaning that Hegel actually had an inconsistent understanding of Christianity. Rather, from his perspective, the duplicity pretypifies the conceptual core of what Hegel later calls the absolute religion: the split or the opposition in the very divine—“the representative nature of the presence of the divine that holds itself before consciousness” (GL 107/92) in Derrida’s terminology. For Derrida, the Hegelian conceptualization of the historical religion called Christianity as the absolute religion should not be simply regarded as a philosophical interpretation. For Hegel considers the absolute religion the representative form of philosophical truth, meaning that the truth of the absolute religion is philosophy, that sublation of the absolute religion is philosophical truth. In this way, the question as to what could be the proper philosophical truth is brought into the center of the problem in Hegel’s system with the problem of the relation between the absolute religion and philosophy. But it does not seem to be easy to make sense of the relation—the formal transformation of the truth that is presented already in the absolute religion; since it would be hardly possible, or even absurd, to extract the purely philosophical elements from the whole system Hegel develops, which is however supposed to develop through its becoming other, nature or spirit, naturally including religion. But the difficulty, from Derrida’s perspective, fundamentally lies in what we have previously dealt with in terms of the paradox of the philosophical beginning. In this occasion, Derrida refers to what Hegel discusses concerning the need of philosophy in his *Differenzschrift*. The paradox can be then formulated as following: we do not
have philosophy in its proper meaning yet, but philosophy makes its start in its own self without depending on some external elements. As it is well known, based on his own historical perspective on philosophy, Hegel asserts that the nature of philosophical knowledge lies in the synthesis. And the proper duty of philosophy consists in presenting the synthesis of all sorts of modern dualistic divisions. What Derrida understands from this Hegelian demand for philosophy is, however, a particular philosophical situation, which is unstable, floating:

Philosophy’s need is not yet philosophy. There is not yet of philosophy (il y a un pas encore de la philosophie). Philosophy—already—is announced in it. (GL 110/95)

Obviously, the Hegel’s idea that we need philosophy implies that we do not have philosophy in its proper meaning yet. But, from Derrida’s perspective, it connotes that philosophy, nevertheless, is announced in its non-proper form. And this non-proper form is nothing but the absolute religion for Derrida. It means then that Hegel would have seen the resolution of the system problem—the paradox of philosophical starting point—in the absolute religion. On this basis, a key feature of Derrida’s interpretation is that he sees these problems, which would stand at the zenith of the system problem, are deeply involved in the family problem. In other words, both sublation of the absolute religion to philosophy and the constitution of the system of philosophical truth are developed in the framework of the family problem. But the most significant argument is that one should consider the problem of the human family once sublation of the absolute religion to
philosophy becomes an issue, instead of limiting the family problem to the onto-theological filiation in the Holy Family. In this regard, paying particular attention to a short passage in Hegel’s article on the *Natural law*, Derrida asserts that the whole project of Hegel’s system lies in constituting the *speculative science of the Sittlichkeit*; the science of *Sittlichkeit*, which has the family as its first moment, and gives an account of it from the ontological perspective in terms of love. Then, the speculative science of *Sittlichkeit*, Derrida points out, is far from empiricism and formalism, which take the family only as an example for their account of the communal life of human beings and count only raising children and sharing of wealth for roles of conjugal relation without being capable of thinking of unification by love. Thus, from Derrida’s perspective, love, which we have previously determined as the infinite relation to the infinite other according to Derrida’s reading, is the first theoretical core on which the speculative science of *Sittlichkeit* could be founded. By extension, Derrida sees the second core of this science in the very theme of death, representing the negative aspects such as division, separation, and dissolution, of which we will not deal with in detail here. From this comes Derrida’s interpretive strategy that the theme of the passage from religion to philosophy or of sublation of the absolute religion to the absolute knowing should be considered with the theme of sublation of the family within *Sittlichkeit* (GL 108/93-94). Then, we can reconstruct the process of Derrida’s problematization of Hegel’s system problem in *Glas* in terms of the speculative sublation of onto-theology as following. The first issue was to reconstruct from Hegel’s earlier theological writings what would be Hegelian onto-theology. The second issue is then to make clear what sublation means by examining how Hegel explains sublation of the family within his theory of *Sittlichkeit*. And finally, what
speculative sublation of onto-theology would be, will be presented by considering sublation supposed to take place in the absolute religion.
6. Derrida’s Interpretation of Hegel’s Theory of Three Potencies of Consciousness

On these bases, we will examine how Derrida deals with the 1803/04 manuscript of Hegel—specifically, what which role does his reading of this manuscript have for his treatment of Hegel’s system problem? Prior to directly accessing the question, it will be helpful to sketch Derrida’s reading process of Hegel in *Glas*. First, Derrida explores Hegel’s earlier theological writing with great effort to articulate Hegelian onto-theology. The main analyzed texts are: the *Destiny and Spirit of the Christianity*, the *Reason in History*, the *Life of Jesus*, and also including later text such as the *Lecture of the World History*. At this point, Derrida moves on to deal with the 1803/04 manuscript in detail, weaving it together with the part on the genus-process (*Gattungsprozeß*) in the *Encyclopedia*. On this basis, Derrida develops his interpretation of chapter six of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in which Hegel launches his doctrine of the spirit by making an interpretation of the role and significance that Antigone has for the Greek *Sittlichkeit*. Following this, Derrida deals with the section about absolute religion in the *Phenomenology*, of which the particularity lies in its location: just before the absolute knowing. And then, the last pages of *Glas* are devoted to natural religion in the *Phenomenology* and related various considerations in the *Lecture of the Philosophy of Religion*. Thus, we can say that the 1803/04 manuscript takes the mediating role between earlier theological writings and the *Phenomenology* in Derrida’s reading of Hegel in *Glas*. And then, by examining how Derrida reads the 1803/04 manuscript, we can see how Derrida thematically connects what he articulates as the Hegelian onto-
theology on the one hand and what he determines as the project of the speculative theory of *Sittlichkei* on the other—the connection between the Saint-Family and the human family. With the previously mentioned problems kept in mind, we will follow Derrida’s reading of this manuscript step by step. That the following points will explicitly show the direction to which we will lead this study. First, Derrida deals with the last part of the philosophy of nature in the *Encyclopedia* on the genus-process in detail. This reading of the genus-process is significant because it is on the basis of the very problems he articulates from this reading that Derrida deals with the philosophy of spirit of 1803/04. Besides, Derrida pays great attention to the passage from the second potency to the third in this manuscript, upon which we will reflect on our own reading of the genus-process and on the problems articulated through Derrida’s reading of it as well.

To begin with, as Derrida indicates, Hegel considers the disease and death keys to passage from nature to spirit: “the disease of animal is the becoming of the spirit” (JS I 179). In this regard, pointing out the fact that the same is asserted in the *Encyclopedia*, Derrida interprets the assertion as completing the teleology based on internal purposiveness, which originated from Aristotle’s philosophy of nature and metaphysics and was reestablished in the modern period with Kantian internal teleology (GL 125/109). We can support this interpretation based on the evidence that the spirit—which is supposed to be generated by the death of individuals, at least in the last part of the philosophy of nature—refers to the biological universal called the genus and is thus concerned with the life of an organism. Additionally, the genus-process can be properly regarded as a teleological explanation, since it implicitly inherits the concept of the internal purposiveness of an organism—the concept of an organism having itself as the purpose and so constitutes
and maintains its organic life. The internal purpose, however, has nothing to do with conscious intention, as Derrida explicitly points out, but rather refers to an effective biological reality which cannot be grasped other than as a whole, as the universal. By extension, Derrida refers to the genus-process in *Encyclopedia* to stress the point that Hegel’s genus-process contains the evolutionary idea of the struggle between species; not only natural death due to disease, but also the violent death caused by struggle between species is considered necessary for the whole genus-process according to Hegel. In this way, Derrida first deals with the genus-process in *Encyclopedia* before making sense of the main theme of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04, namely, the passage from nature to spirit—the consciousness as the place where the externalized spirit as nature returns back into itself. As we have seen, Hegel’s mention in this philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 that the passage from nature to spirit consists in disease and death of organisms provides

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24 We can make sense of the Hegelian teleological concept of organism from the Kantian concept of internal purposiveness. For Kant, the existence and life of an organic being cannot be explained by the mechanical causal relation but by the teleological idea that organic beings exist only as a purpose, meaning that an organism is simultaneously the cause and the result of itself (KU B280-281, B284-285). In the last part of *Science of Logic*, Hegel highly appreciates the Kantian teleology (WL 438-444/737-739). According to Hegel, Kant’s greatest service to philosophy consists in the distinction between external purposiveness and internal purposiveness, since the very notion of internal purposiveness opens up the concept of life and idea, which makes it possible to grasp effective reality as a whole in the most proper way. In spite of all of this, Hegel criticizes Kant for restricting the internal purposiveness only to a subjective maxim, for depriving of objectivity and reality. So, Hegel agrees with the Kantian idea that the life of an organic being should be grasped together with the concept of internal purposiveness, but he will argue that internal purposiveness constitutes objective existence, effective being or reality of organisms—but, precisely, as process: the whole process through which the universal called the genus is generated and maintained and organisms also individuated.
Derrida with sufficient reason to go to the genus-process in the *Encyclopedia*. However, as we will see, the most elaborate interpretation in the genus-process given by Derrida is sex-relation (das *Geschlechtverhältnis*) rather than disease and death. Then we need to first revisit how Hegel himself presents the genus process in *Encyclopedia*. We will also examine in detail how Hegel understands sex-relation from the perspective of the genus-process.

In general, genus is a biological unit for categorizing animals and plants. It is thus relevant to universal, abstract concepts which embrace various individuals. In this regard, paying special attention to the development of zoology and comparative anatomy during his time, Hegel appreciates that these empirical sciences are concerned with *fundamental classifications* and *essential* determinations of animals (EN §368). However, the genus, for Hegel, should be concretely considered as what exists, as a certain effective reality, instead of being merely understood as an abstract category for classification. In this context, Hegel presents the idea that the genus is the universal which *particularizes itself* (EN §386): it exists namely as species. To be more precise, for Hegel, the genus can only be understood as the process of its own particularization into species. So, the main issue of the genus-process is to give an account of the existence of species in terms of the process of its generation and its durable subsistence—termed as the genus process. The genus-process can in this way be regarded as the Hegelian account for the particular existence of the biological universal—genus or species. But the more significant point is that Hegel describes it from the perspective of the life of an individual organism. Thus, the genus-process includes the following themes: struggles between individuals from different species, mating, breeding, disease and death. More precisely, Hegel
explains the genus-process with the following sub-processes: (1) the struggle between species in the evolutionary context: the process in which individuals recognize themselves as the member of a certain species and make a hostile relation to the individuals from other species; (2) sex-relation: the process in which an individual engages in intercourse with another individual, which has a different sex from the former and produces another individual belonging to the same species; (3) disease and death: the natural death of individuals, without which the genus cannot maintain its subsistence. And then, Hegel argues throughout the whole description of the genus-process for the emergence of the spirit: “in this genus-process, the merely natural being only perishes, for, as such, it does not transcend the natural” (EN §367).

Hegel defines the sex-relation as a symmetrical relationship between two sexually different individuals through which they interchange self-sensation and so exist in the other. Through the sex-relationship, a singular individual “continues itself in its other and in this other feels its own self”, and thus the sex-relationship is ‘the self-sensation which exists’ and ‘the life in the self-sensation’ (EN §369). Hegel further defines sex-relation as ‘the substantial connection of genus’, stating that “the Idea of nature is actual in the male and the female couple” (EN §369 Addition). In this case, sex-relation is directly identified with the genus-process itself, namely, with the process of bringing the genus into existence.25 By extension, for Hegel, the

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25 What draws our attention is the wordplay given by Hegel, that is, the identification of the copulation (Begattung) with the genus-process (Gattungsprozeß): the sex-relationship understood as sexual intercourse (Begattung) with the process of realization or actualization of genus. Here the German prefix ‘-be’ performs the function of verbalization of noun, Gattung. Thus, the Begattung means the operation which aims at Gattung or has Gattung as its result.
initiator of sex-relation is a need or the feeling of defect—the defect of the universal. According to Hegel, the singular individual exists only as a singular being before having a sex-relation, even though as the substantial foundation of genus, it has immanently in themselves the universal, the genus. In this sense, the starter is the formal discordance of ontological categories constituting organic beings—between the universal and the singular. So the Hegelian concept of sex-relation can be made sense of in terms of the biological concept of species: species is the sets of organisms that are capable of producing other individuals which are the same to them and maintain the existence of species through reproduction.

On the other hand, from the perspective of genus or species, Hegel considers sex-relation in terms of asexual unity of species: “on the contrary, both are organisms and belongs to the genus, so that they exist only as one species (ein Geschlecht). Their union is the disappearance of the sexes into which the simple genus has developed” (EN §369 Addition) (My emphasis). Actually, the German noun Geschlecht bears two different meanings: sex on the one hand and species on the other. The ein Geschlecht then, simultaneously means ‘a sex’—the disappearance of the biological sexual difference—and ‘one species’. 26 On this basis, we can interpret the term ein

26 For that reason, the expression ‘one species/one sex’ seems to be the second-best translation for the German term ein Geschlecht. The English translator A.V.Miller translate it in English as ‘one species’ while J.Derrida as ‘un seul Geschlecht (sexes ou genre)’. Miller’s translation seems to well convey the meaning of ‘one species’ but the meaning of annulation of sexual difference is excluded therewith. On the other hand, Derrida’s translation reveals the double connotation of the term in question as it is, by remaining the German term Geschlecht. His French translation in parenthesis makes clear the point that this word has to do with the sexual issue but his selection of the French term ‘genre’ does not seem to perfectly fit to the term Geschlecht because the latter is related here rather to ‘species’, the particularized existence of genus/genre.
*Geschlecht* as the asexual unity coming into being through sex-relation, called species. We also observe that Hegel defines genus as an ‘asexual and fecund universal’ (EN §370 Addition). However, what the asexuality or the disappearance of sexual difference means still remains ambiguous, and actually this seems to be problematic. In this regard, the following point is clear that the asexuality is not only a predicate describing an attribute of the universal—genus or species. More significantly, for Hegel, the asexuality also means the annulment of the sexes, the disappearance of the individuals involved in the sex-relationship: the death of singular individuals. In fact, genus-process, understood in terms of successive repetition of birth and death of individuals, includes the death of individuals as its necessary moment. This point is applicable to Hegel’s conception of the genus-process. But the important point is this: that when Hegel speaks about the death of individuals, the individuals dying through the genus-process are considered as sexually differentiated individuals, either as male or female. Thus we can say that all individuals involved in the genus-process are those that exist only as male or female. And thus for Hegel, the singularity of the individual involved in the genus-process, has the biological sexual difference as its fundamental determination.

With regards to the sexual difference presented in the Hegelian explanation of the genus-process, we should say that it has little to do with the distinct determinacy of masculinity and femininity—neither anatomically nor culturally. On the contrary, the sexual difference in the genus-process is concerned with the natural fact that every organism, as far as it is involved in the genus-process, only exists either as male or female. In so far as Hegel considers the existence mode of natural organisms in terms of the singularity, we can say that the biological sexuality is the core moment of the singularity
of an organism. To put it another way, there cannot be singularity without sexuality for Hegel; what biological sexuality—that a singular organism exists either as male or female—implies is no more than the ontological discordance between the singularity and the universality. By extension, we can regard this discordance as the most fundamental determination of the life of an organism, namely, of the mortal being in general.

The word for copulation or coupling, for this general play of the copula, is *Begattung*, the operation of the genus (*Gattung*), the generic and generative operation. Just as what is rightly translated by sexual relationship (*Geschlechtverhältnis*) also designates the relationship of genus, species, or race (family, lineage) or the sex relationship as the feminine or masculine gender (*Geschlecht*) (*le rapport du sexe comme genre (Geschlecht) féminin ou masculine*). (GL 126/110)

For Derrida, the whole genus-process of Hegel can be constructed with copulation (*Begattung*) at the center. In other words, the genus-process indicates no other than copulation. In this context, Derrida interprets that copulation is the operation of the genus: it is the operation made by the genus, which is immanent to organisms, and the operation generating genus as the result as well. In line with this, Derrida also interprets the sexual relation (*Geschlechtverhältnis*) as the relation of the genus, determining it as the relation of the sex, which is directly identified with genus itself (*Geschlecht*) once again. In this way, the genus-process, copulation, and sexual relation are sequentially regarded as equal by Derrida. Then, the question arises as to how Derrida understands the term Geschlecht; since it appears that the term
Geschlecht stands at the center of this interpretation, the determination of this term given by Derrida—‘le sexe comme genre féminin ou masculin’—seems to be ambiguous. To begin with, through the following consideration of the Hegelian concept of sexual difference, Derrida gives an interpretation of Hegel’s claim that individuals “exist only as ein Geschlecht”. First, Derrida dwells on the idea of the difference of sex, which probably means that every organism exists as either male or female. For Derrida, the difference of sex should be regarded as the essential factor that introduces the contradiction into the whole genus process. And the contradiction, as we have previously seen, consists in that an organism, even though it has the universal in itself in the sense that it is relevant to the substantial foundation of genus, is a singular being that exists only as either male or female. On the other hand, Derrida argues that what characterizes the difference of sex—the sex of each organism involved in the genus-process—is its universality, meaning that, when each relates to the other, each represents one of the natural sex. According to Derrida’s view, the copulation Hegel describes is not the relation of a singular being to the other singular being, but it is considered at the universal level as copulation between two sexes. In line with this, Derrida implicitly gives his interpretation that universality of the genus actually means bisexuality. Copulation would then mean no more than the effective realization of the bisexuality each organism has in itself through the relation to the other organism. In short, for Derrida, ein Geschlecht means that an organism exists only as one sex, but it also means that an organism is already a universal or generic being in the sense that it contains sexual universality or unity, probably understood as bisexuality, for it to effectively realize itself as a genus. According to this interpretation, then, we can make sense of the Hegelian concept of sexual difference in terms of the
synthesis of these two aspects, namely, the difference of sex and generic universality of an organism. This is relevant to the discordance between singularity and universality we have previously examined. On this basis, Derrida argues that copulation is no more than the process of producing the sexual difference while eliminating it at the same time. The argumentation is very convincing, so that Derrida states, “Copulation relieves the difference: Aufhebung is very precisely the relation of copulation and the sexual difference. The relief in general cannot be understood without sexual copulation, nor sexual copulation in general without the relief” (GL 127/111).

Following this interpretation, Derrida goes on the search for Hegel’s own explanation for the sexual difference, which is presented in the addition to paragraph 369 of the Encyclopedia. In the addition, Hegel introduces the account of the formation of different sexes given by the anatomist of the time and adds his philosophical interpretation, which is, according to Derrida, the most traditional and follows the Aristotelian idea. The anatomist theory explains that the male and female originally shares the same type of sex and the sexuality is determined by which part is dominant: if the active part is dominant, the organism becomes male and female if it is passive. Hegel appreciates this theory, stating that the complete understanding of the conversion between two sexes is attained by anatomy, and adds a further interpretation:

Just as in the male, the uterus is reduced to a mere gland, so, on the other hand, the male testicle remains enclosed in the ovary in the female, does not emerge into opposition, does not develop on its
own account into active brain; and the clitoris is inactive feeling in
general. In the male, on the other hand, we have instead active
feeling, the swelling heart, the effusion of blood into the corpora
cavernosa and the meshes of the sponges tissue of the urethra. […]
In this way, the reception by the uterus, as a simple retention, is, in
the male, split into the productive brain and the external heart.
Through this difference, therefore, the male is the active principle,
and the female is the receptive, because she remains in her
undevolved unity. (EN §369 Addition)

So, Hegel estimates that sexual difference explained in terms of the
formation of different sexes by anatomists does not concern the difference as
opposition, and that we cannot develop an account of the active brain in this
framework. What the theory explains is, thus, only the difference of feelings
between male and female: the male has active feelings whereas the female
has only inactive feelings. Hegel’s idea is, then, that if we can rightly explain
the sexual difference with the difference activity and passivity as the
anatomist theory suggests, the difference of activity and of passivity should
be regarded precisely as the difference between the separation of active
feelings and active brain and the indifference or the undevolved unity. The
former is of male and the latter is of female. Thus, according to Hegel’s
interpretation, femininity consists in remaining in the original undevolved,
undivided unity, while masculinity consists in the active division. If so, the
sexual difference no longer concerns the symmetrical difference that was
supposed to arise depending on the dominant part by the anatomists. On the
contrary, the sexual difference is asymmetrical; it is the difference between
the undifferentiated state and of the divided state—the difference between
indifference and division or opposition. This point gives Derrida the reason
for interpreting the Hegelian sexual difference as the difference between difference and non-difference: “Male and female are not opposed as two different, two terms of the opposition, but as indifference and difference (opposition, division). The sexual difference is the difference between indifference and difference” (GL 128/112). By extension, Derrida maintains that the Hegelian sexual difference is based on hierarchical understanding stretching back to Aristotle: the female does not have what the male has, and the male activity is superior to the female passivity as far as the male is what is differentiated and developed, whereas the female remains as it is. So, what the Hegelian concept of the sexual difference represents is the hierarchical opposition between activity and passivity, between material and form, etc. More significantly, Derrida characterizes the Hegelian system as a whole with the hierarchical concept of the sexual difference: “The Aufhebung, the central concept of the sexual relation, articulates the most traditional phallocentrism with the Hegelian onto-theo-teleo-logy” (GL 130/113). That is, the Hegelian system fundamentally stands on the basis of the hierarchical dualism, giving primacy to all of the essential factors of the system such as productivity, differentiation, opposition, and logos by characterizing them as active. In some sense, however, the Hegelian system can be also regarded as standing on feminism, according to Derrida. For Hegel understands the female as the original undifferentiated unity, which means, in Derrida’s view, that the female is closer to the origin than the male and, thus, the male is secondary to the female: “The phallocentric hierarchy is a feminism; dialectically feminism, making man the subject of woman, submits itself to Feminism and Truth, both capitalized” (GL 130/113).

At this point, we will follow Derrida’s reconstruction of Hegel’s theory of the three potencies of consciousness in the philosophy of spirit of
1803-04, especially in terms of the desire. First of all, Derrida clarifies the indispensable relation of the theoretical consciousness and of the practical consciousness—first potency, memory/language, and second potency, labor/instrument. According to him, theoretical consciousness cannot constitute its durable existence, nor posit itself, in so far as language, the first existing mode of consciousness, is invisible, sonorous, and evanescent. To put it another way, Derrida argues that the theoretical consciousness is in the inorganic state and it is, thus, no more than dead consciousness; it is just theoretical, its singularity is only internal, and its liberty is merely subjective. Thus, Derrida puts emphasis on the point that the theoretical consciousness can be posited only as the practical consciousness. So, the passage from theoretical to practical consciousness is then relevant to the passage from the only theoretical consciousness, which is not distinguishable from inorganic, or dead thing. In this context, Derrida importantly deals with the Hegelian concept of the desire in the second potency. Derrida highlights that this desire refers to the relation of the living being, namely, what is capable of making relations with the other. Furthermore, Derrida sees the particularity of the Hegelian concept of desire in that it includes the inhibition of desire as the essential moment of desire itself: desire should preserve its object to consume, to destroy, in order for that it can still desire. In Derrida’s view, this structure of desire is applicable both to human desire and animal desire. It is equally possible to animal beings to inhibit their desires. The difference between human desire and animal desire, then, consists in whether the desire and its inhibition take place at the same time or with a time lag. Thus, Derrida states, in the case of animal beings, “consum(mat)ion and inhibition are dissociated in the way that they consum(at)e, then do not consume, destroy, then do not destroy, etc., the inhibition ‘inhabits the consum(mat)ing’
consumption’ and ‘forms part of the present of the consum(mat)ing’ (GL 138/121). Finally, Derrida affirms that this peculiar structure of human desire, the inhibition in the desire should be thought of as the sublating itself. From this perspective, Hegelian sublation has little to do with some determined thing, or with a formal structure applicable to every moment. But it should be understood in its ‘self-relief in its presence’, whereby the human history is constituted: “so the Aufhebung relieves itself in present desire. Human desire: relief of the relief, relieving presence of the relief, [...] The Aufhebung is not some determinate thing, or a formal structure whose undifferentiated generality applies itself to every moment. The Aufhebung is history, the becoming of its own proper presentation, of its own proper differentiating determination [...]” (GL 138/121). So, Derrida’s idea is that the relation of the theoretical consciousness and of the practical consciousness can be made sense of in terms of human desire. To put it another way, that theoretical consciousness can be posited only as practical consciousness means no other than that the consciousness actually posits itself, brings itself into existence only as human desire. Then, the human desire of Hegel, for Derrida, exactly means the same as praxis, or to create a practical relation, to labor—of which animal beings are not capable. Thus, to labor is to inhibit desire, to oppose to itself with destroying objects; it is impossible for human desire to be satisfied. Then, Derrida points out that the instrument is relevant to tradition, meaning that the labor products of human desire cannot be something that would be merely consum(at)ed, simply destroyed, but it is the retained ideality resisting to such natural disappearance—the existing universality.

In Derrida’s view, the most difficult issue in the whole theory of consciousness of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 lies in the passage from the second potency to the third potency: in what sense does Hegel
affirm that marriage is the relief of the instrument? Derrida explains, first of all, the necessity and significance of this passage. According to him, the instrument is in fact the external constraint of the consciousness: its ideality is heterogeneous to laboring consciousness, so that the inhibition of desire is imposed from the outside instead of coming from the inside of consciousness. Thus, Derrida quotes a passage from the philosophy of nature of 1803-04:

The freedom of consciousness relieves this need, and inhibits the annihilating in enjoyment, through consciousness itself (*durch sich selbst*); that makes the two sexes into consciousness for one another, into beings and subsists for one another ... in such a way that in the being-for-self-of the other, each in itself. (GL 141/123)

Derrida’s idea is that Hegel thinks of the internal and liberal inhibition of desire to be made through sexual relation; because sexual relation is characterized by inhibition or relief of pleasure within enjoyment—to relieve pleasure in order not to destroy the other and so destroy itself, to limit in order to keep, and deny in order to enjoy (GL 141/123). But Derrida also makes clear the point that Hegel himself thinks of internal and liberal inhibition of desire in terms of love and marriage. The point becomes clearer, as Derrida points out, when we refer to Hegel that marriage differs from concubinage in that the latter mainly concerns the satisfaction of natural drive (PhR §163 Addition). In this way, in Derrida’s reading, the whole problem of the consciousness theory of 1803/04 converges into the themes of love and marriage. And it is with this that Derrida begins his treatment of the human family problem in Hegel’s system.
As we have previously seen elsewhere, Derrida characterizes the Hegelian theory of Sittlichkeit as a speculative one, meaning that Hegel establishes his theory on the basis of the positive principle of unity and of the negative principle of dissolution—which are relevant to love and death respectively—instead of depending on empirical or formalistic factors. This point would clarify the reason of why Derrida pays special attention to Hegel’s theory of consciousness of 1803-04. Derrida might think that this theory is more useful to clarify what the speculativeness of the Hegelian concept of Sittlichkeit and of the family is like. So, we will inquire into how Derrida explains the speculativeness in question from his reading of the family potency in Hegel’s theory of consciousness of 1803-04. First, Derrida sees that the family potency stands on the condition of the sublatedness of sexual difference: “love and marriage belong to the element of the freedom of consciousness and suppose the Aufhebung of the sexual difference” (GL, 149/131). This claim refers to the Hegelian idea we just examined that love implies inhibition of the natural drive. But, the more significant point Derrida has in mind is that Hegel does not include any empirical account of sexual difference in his consideration of love and marriage. In order to clarify this point, Derrida examines the Kantian explanations of sexual difference and the superiority of monogamy given in his Anthropology which depend on some empirical and cultural factors. Kant addresses the question as to the particularity of the female—the female’s cultural superiority in spite of the male’s physical superiority in Kant’s terminology—in terms of a fight between husband and wife, for example. It is the harem that Kant takes into consideration in order to claim the cultural superiority of monogamy. In contrast, Hegel never deals with the difference of sexes in marriage, according to Derrida, “as if the spouses were the same
sex, were both bisexual or asexual” (GL 143/125). What comes into question in Derrida’s view, however, is not the fact that Hegel does not explain how the female and the male are different from each other in marriage. To more precisely articulate Derrida’s idea, Hegel establishes his theory of marriage and family in terms of sublation of the sexual difference: the death of parents in their child—what would be relevant to the death of individuals in the genus-process. This is the second point that Derrida draws from the family potency in order to clarify the speculativeness of Hegel’s theory of Sittlichkeit. So, Derrida states, “The specualtive dialectics of marriage must be thought: the being-one (Einssein) of the spouses, the consciousness of one in that of the other, such is the medium, the middle of exchange. The sexual opposition is relieved there. [...] That is the child. [...] That is education” (GL 150/131-132).

The relieving education interiorizes the father. Death being a relief, the parents, far from losing or disseminating themselves without return, “contemplate in the child’s becoming their own relief.” They guard in that becoming their own disappearance, reg(u)ard their child as their own death. And in reg(u)arding that disappearance, that death, they retard it, appropriate it; they maintain in the monumental presence of their seed—in the name—the living sign that they are dead, not that they are dead, but that dead they are, which is another thing, Ideality is death, to be sure, but to be dead—this is the whole question of dissemination—is that to be dead or to be dead? (GL 151/133)

We have previously interpreted Hegel’s thesis of the education of a child—the becoming of consciousness in family through the death of
parents—as meaning that for Hegel, consciousness refers to a singular being coming into being through cultural formation. In other words, the Hegelian concept of consciousness is not merely limited to some mental state or cognitive functions such as perception, memory, or thought; nor does it simply concerns a laboring human being; it refers rather to a cultural subject who inherits, generates, and conveys the tradition. In this sense, we can say that older generation does not merely disappear with their death, but remain in newer generation, through their death. Such is the meaning of death of parents Hegel thinks of. But Derrida does not stop at this point. In his view, a death of parents cannot simply be interpreted as presenting the idea that a human being is a cultural being. For what this concept includes is in fact the combination of two issues: that they are dead and that dead they are. That is, the parents are dead but exist—exist as dead beings in their child. So, pointing out the difference of these issues is too subtle to grasp.

If the two different ideas intertwined in the concept of the death of parents can be discerned in this way—the death of beings and the being or presence of dead beings, what is more problematic for Derrida is likely the second. For beings or presence of dead beings is obviously paradoxical. So, Derrida concludes that death of parents signifies the negation of death: the being of that no longer is. To put it another way, the death that is present cannot be the death in its proper sense, but an idealized, weakened concept of death. For Derrida, it is the very idealized, weakened death that characterizes the Hegelian thesis in general: “Such is the Hegelian thesis: philosophy, death’s positing, its pose (Telle est la thèse hegelienne: la philosophie, la pose de la mort)” (GL 152/133). By extension, Derrida extends his reflection of the meaning of death in family to the speculation on the familiarity of Hegelian sublation. First, Derrida determines sublation as
‘the concept of economy in general in speculative dialectics’ (GL 152/133), meaning that sublation is fundamentally familial. The term economy can be understood in terms of the traditional metaphysical concept of *oikeios*. For Derrida, *oikeios* represents traditional familial logic: possession and reappropriation. This is the very ground on which Hegelian sublation works. From this, Derrida draws the fundamental formulation for characterizing Hegelian sublation: “the Aufhebung, the economic law of absolute reappropriation of the absolute loss, is a family concept” (GL 152/133). On this base Derrida features this economic concept of sublation as ‘an onto-economic concept’ (GL 152/134), meaning that the Hegelian concept of formation—which Derrida equalizes with the metaphysical concept of *eidos*—is equally penetrated by familial logic. Thus education and cultural formation is relevant to the metaphysical formation of material and the child is the relief of absolute loss to Hegel. Additionally, Derrida argues that his onto-economic concept of sublation also features the Hegelian concept of the spirit: “it is the guarding of the proper, of property, propriety, of one’s own [*la garde du propre*]; this guarding retains, keeps back, inhibits, consigns the absolute loss or consum(mat)es it only in order better to reg(u)ard it returning to (it)self, [...]. Spirit is the other name of this repetition” (GL 152/134).

In this way, Derrida gives to the family potency a special meaning by reading the fundamental structure and feature of Hegelian dialectic from it: *the reappropriation of absolute loss*. On the other hand, Derrida also argues that this conclusion, covering the ontological, metaphysical issue, has great implication for the Hegelian concept of consciousness in general. So, in Derrida’s view, the Hegelian consciousness is the result of the familial process—the family considered from the onto-economic perspective, not in
the empirical-anthropological context. This then implies that we cannot properly understand the Hegelian concept of consciousness without referring to the family potency presented in this manuscript. For this reason, Derrida argues that overlooking or misunderstanding of this familial aspect would lead us to the wrong conception of Hegelian concept of consciousness; it has little to do with pure ego, nor with Husserlian transcendental consciousness for example. In like manner, the ‘experience of consciousness’ of the Phenomenology of Spirit cannot be properly understood without dwelling on this familial onto-economy found in the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. The question then arises what the familial process constituting the consciousness is like. In this regard, Derrida answers that it consists in the elimination of empirical singularity. It is in this context precisely that Derrida earnestly considers the struggle for recognition Hegel includes in the family potency. Concerning the recognition struggle, the following two points should be pointed out. The first is a basic determination of the recognition concept we can find in a consistent way in spite of the difference of its concrete explanations given by Hegel: consciousness—or self-consciousness—can be consciousness only if it is for another consciousness. Specifically, it is only by returning into itself from its other-being does the consciousness come into being. On the other hand, Hegel considers recognition a violent process; recognition has little to do with some cognitive, verbal activity, but takes place as the effective invasion of the other’s possession. Concerning this concept of recognition struggle, Derrida dwells on the point that Hegel does not consider the violent process in terms of some arbitrary decision of consciousness, but rather articulates the contradiction of natural things to explain it: the contradiction that a thing, the universal reality, opened to everyone, is nevertheless appropriated by a certain consciousness. Therefore,
we should say that recognition for possession of natural things is not sufficient, not appropriate for the elimination of the empirical singularity of consciousness. As Derrida suggests, recognition that results by such a struggle is no more than retribution of properties, reappropriation of the proper, which is thus the reappropriation of the singularity based on natural things. In this context, we should also say that, for Hegel, it is not simply by violating what is proper to the other, and by achieving recognition by this other of its possession of what was previously proper to this other, that the consciousness as the self-relating consciousness—not the empirically singular being—comes into being. So Derrida sees the necessity for Hegel to think of recognition struggle to the death: the struggle around the proper body and life, not around the possession of natural things. To put it another way, the only way of resolving the contradiction of natural things is to eliminate the singularity itself—not to reappropriate the proper, the singularity—which signifies the death of consciousness.

To recapitulate, that the Hegelian consciousness is constituted through the familial process first means that elimination of its empirical singularity is presupposed for its constitution. And then the conclusion Derrida draws from the reflection of the recognition struggle in the family—the struggle for possession—would be that, for Hegel, the elimination occurs through the struggle to death. Then it seems that what elimination of the singularity means needs further explanation in regards to the struggle to death. So referring to the death issue again, Derrida devotes the last part of his interpretation of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 in dealing with the peculiar contradiction to Hegelian recognition through the other’s death. In short, the contradiction lies in that the consciousness risks its life when it aims for the death of the other. This is because to eliminate the other’s being
and singularity, within the logic of recognition, directly implies the elimination of the foundation of my being and singularity. Due to this inherent contradiction then, we should conclude that Hegelian recognition cannot in fact be realized. However, as Derrida points out, Hegel affirms sublation of this contradiction and elevation of the consciousness to the universal —to the consciousness as totality, which is, the people-spirit or even the absolute spirit. Or, the singularity of the consciousness is effective only when it relates itself to the universal, the spirit. So, Derrida states, “once relieved, the singular totality becomes universal totality, absolute spirit. It still exists as singular totality—‘family,’ ‘possession,’ ‘enjoyment’—but relates to itself only in an ideal mode and ‘proves itself as self-sacrifice.’ By this sacrifice, it sees itself, gets itself recognized in another consciousness, the people’s. It is ‘saved’ at the same time as lost as singularity” (GL 160/141).
Conclusion

Taking notice of the particularity of the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 that Hegel presented it as a theory of consciousness, this paper aimed to make sense of Hegel’s concept of consciousness as well as the set of related problems and to follow his theory of three potencies of consciousness in detail. First of all, dealing with Hegel’s definition of consciousness as the middle—the unity of what is conscious and that of which it is conscious, of the active and the passive, that is, the unity generating such an opposing relation, it attempted to point out that Hegel opposed an epistemological, or psychological approach to consciousness. Rather, Hegel’s proposition was to consider consciousness at an ontological level according to what we examined; in the sense that consciousness is what actually exists, and more precisely that its existence is concerned with the very movement of the spirit, of returning from its externalization into nature to itself as true spirit. Then, through the following study on fragment 15 and Hegel’s theory of three potencies of consciousness, this paper drew the conclusion that consciousness was an anthropological theme for Hegel, referring to a human being who lives the world. In this regard, we saw that Hegel arrived at conceptualizing consciousness as an absolute singularity by developing his ideas on the first and second potencies of consciousness. To recapitulate, beginning with the problem of the elevation of consciousness out of sensation, Hegel argued throughout the first potency that the singularity of consciousness cannot be like animal self-sensation but rather consists in its negativity, meaning that the absolute singularity of consciousness consists in practically negating what it faces. This point was better clarified when Hegel
specified through the second potency the condition for consciousness to be able to effectively create a relation by conceptualizing the way it does in terms of the practically negative activity of consciousness. While the point became clear that Hegel’s anthropological understanding of consciousness overweighs practical rather than theoretical, or epistemic aspects of conscious activity in this way, we could also figure out, with the study on the third potency, that Hegel thematized the social, cultural, and even historical formation of individuals with the term of consciousness. This provided us the reason for defining Hegelian consciousness as a subject who lives the cultural and historical world by inheriting and transmitting tradition, following its practical determination as an agent living this world by desiring and laboring. Finally, we examined Hegel’s argumentation for the passage to the people-spirit through the ideas of recognition struggle to death.

In order to deal with Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04, the second part of this paper first attempted to overall outline the problem of Hegel’s system. Especially its circularity seemed to be the crux of the matter, of which we also tried to clarify how Derrida continuously and repetitively articulated it on various aspects; and in which context it finally converged into the problem of ‘not-yet-of-already’ in the absolute religion for Derrida. The second part of this paper was devoted to discerning Derrida’s two approaches in regards to the Hegelian system: the onto-theology in the Saint-Family and the speculative theory of Sittlichkeit or of the human family. First, we saw that, elucidating the Christian origin of the Hegelian concept of the spirit, Derrida gave a suggestive interpretation of Hegel’s ontological thought; according to which it was no more than ontological filiation. In this regard, we paid attention to the point that Derrida considered the Hegelian spirit above all as the dynamic, active power of
producing the ontological filiation. Meanwhile, we could also comprehend the ethical connotation of this ontological interpretation of Derrida; specifically, through the Derridian argumentation that the relation between an infinite being and a finite being by love, constituting the ontological filiation, could be applied to all relations of a finite being to another. Next, the second approach of Derrida to the Hegelian system seemed to be appropriately articulated through his interpretation of Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit*. More precisely, Derrida thought of Hegel’s project of completing the system as the movement of the spirit as being crystalized through the plan of the speculative theory of *Sittlichkeit*. In this regard, we saw that Derrida clarified the location of *Sittlichkeit* within the system’s architectonic; where the externalized spirit as nature returns into itself to be the spirit for itself. Then the second step of Derrida’s dealing with Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit* was reconstructed in this paper as the elucidation of its speculative character—by emphatically interpreting how the concepts of love and death, as the principles of unification and of sublation respectively, grounds it. By discerning Derrida’s two approaches to Hegel’s system in this way, we could finally make sense of why Derrida pointed out the family as the core concept around which all circularity problems of Hegel’s system revolve—as the entrance to the system as well as the system itself. That is, in Derrida’s view, the family was the theme that involved the ontological filiation found in Hegel’s interpretation of Christian trinity; and which, as the principles of love and death, also grounded Hegelian speculative theory of *Sittlichkeit*. The final section of this paper concentrated on Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of consciousness in his philosophy of spirit of 1803-04. First of all, a detailed study of the genus-process in the *Encyclopedia* seemed to be indispensable in dealing with the Derridian interpretation, because Hegel’s
conceptualizing of sex-relation as well as sexual difference appeared to be the key issue. So clarifying the point that the passage from the second to the third potency was highly significant for Derrida to interpret Hegel’s theory of the three potencies of consciousness, we examined how Derrida problematized it in terms of hierarchical dualism which had dominated western metaphysical thoughts since Aristotle. Through this examination we found that this problematization provided Derrida with the basis for arguing for the speculative character of Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit*. That is, in Derrida’s view, Hegel’s *Sittlichkeit* was established on the sublation of the sexual difference; in the sense that Hegel considered love in marriage as the ontological principle of unification while dismissing the problem of sexual desire, and that the death of parents, of the male-female couple having a child, was considered essential for the *Sittlichkeit*. The final point we reflected on was that from his whole interpretation of Hegel’s theory of the three potencies, Derrida drew a general formulation for grasping Hegel’s dialectical sublation, that is, the reappropriation of absolute loss.

On the other hand, we observe that Hegel’s concept of consciousness has been mainly dealt with from, among Hegel scholars, the perspective of the methodology of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In this regard, the question has been frequently raised: how does the concept of consciousness presented in the introduction of the *Phenomenology*—what has its measure in itself for comparing its object to its knowledge of the latter—justify the methodology of the *Phenomenology* while enabling Hegel to develop his critique of knowledge under the sub-title ‘the science of the experience of consciousness’? Meanwhile, Hegel’s philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 has

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27 See: K. R. Westphal, “Hegel’s Phenomenological Method and Analysis of
been significantly considered within the framework of the development of Hegel’s project of the system and his idea of the spirit. And recently it has also received serious attention due to the concept of recognition developed therein.\(^{28}\) In this respect, this paper hopefully presented a comprehensive survey on Hegel’s concept of consciousness through examining the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 while articulating its particularity and the related problems in his system therewith. Obviously the Hegelian consciousness does not seem to be concerned with the set of problems that we generally address with the term consciousness, such as perception, personal-identity, awareness of an object, or true knowledge of an object, for example. Then, the particularity of the Hegelian concept of consciousness probably can be made sense of from the perspective of anthropology—the anthropology constructed in a speculative manner in the sense that it considers the existence of a human being in terms of the movement of the spirit while opposing an empirical, psychological understanding of it. In this respect, Derrida’s interpretation is worth noting in that he ciphers out this speculative character of Hegel’s understanding of a human being. Certainly implicit in this interpretation is the critique that Hegel’s system still stays within the framework of traditional western metaphysics, of which we could not deal with in this paper.

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국문 초록

해겔의 의식 및 자기의식 개념과 관련하여 기존의 연구들은 주로 『정신현상학』의 자기의식을 해명하는 데 집중했다. 주지하되, 희수변증법에 대한 코제브의 해석은 20세기 초중반가 유럽의 매티스트들에게 미친 영향이나 (Kojève 1947) 장 발의 불행한 의식 해석이 포스트-실존주의자들에게 미친 영향은 자세히 (Wahl 1929). 최근 미국 해겔 연구자들 사이에서도 해겔 자기의식 개념이 집중적으로 다루어진 바 있는데, 그 중에서도 특히 『정신현상학』의 자기의식을 제조명함으로써 비형이상학적 해겔을 옹호하려는 피핀의 시도가 유명하다(Pippin 1989). 이에 비해 해겔의 '의식' 개념은 그 자체로 주제화된 적은 거의 거의 없고, 주제가 되는 경우는 주로 『정신현상학』의 의식 장에서 (감성적 확신, 지각, 지성) 해겔이 대상 인식과 관련해 어떤 인식론적 입장을 드러내는지를 탐구하거나 (Westphal 2009) 아니면 『정신현상학』의 서론에 나타난 의식 개념이 어떻게 '의식의 경험의 학'이라는 『정신현상학』의 서술 방법론을 정당화하는지를 살펴보기(Schlösser) 위한 것이었다. 그러나 해겔의 의식 개념은 그 자체로, 특히 해겔 정신철학 및 체계 구성의 관점에서 중요하게 다루어질 필요가 있다. 무엇보다도 주목할 사실은 『철학대계』에서 해겔이 의식을 주관정신의 두 번째 하위 범주로 구성하면서, 여기에 『정신현상학』의 전반부 세 장, 곧 의식, 자기의식, 이성을 포함시켰다는 점이다. 따라서 『철학대계』의 구성에 따라서는, 의식이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식 casi도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 의식 개념이 자기의식까지도 포함하는 포괄적 개념이라 해야 할 것이다. 1803-04년 정신철학은 해겔이 1803-04년 겨울 학기에 '사변철학의 체계'
라든 제목으로 준비했던 강의록의 제 3부를 가리킨다. 이 정신철학은 예나 시절 헤겔의 체계 기획을 추적하는 데 중요한 문헌으로 평가되는데, 그것은 이 정신철학을 논리학 및 형이상학, 자연철학, 정신철학의 3부로 구성함으로써 후기『철학대계』에서와 마찬가지의 체계 구상을 드러내고 있기 때문이다. 더불어 이 정신철학에서 헤겔이 체계는 무엇보다도 정신의 체계이어야 한다는 테제를 내세우고 이를 통해 셀링 동일성 철학의 영향으로부터 벗어나 체계 구성과 관련하여 독자적 노선을 개척하고 있다는 점을 고려하면, 헤겔이 자신의 철학적 여정 전체를 통틀어 끌어내리 다듬고 발전시켰던 정신 및 정신의 체계에 대한 사유의 원형적 형태를 보여주고 있다는 점에서 이 문헌이 갖는 의미는 각별하다. 그러나 본 논문은 1803-04년 정신철학을 정신 체계의 발전사라는 문맥에서 조망하는 대신 ‘헤겔의 의식론’이라는 관점에서 재구성해보고자 한다. 이러한 해석적 관점은 이 정신철학의 내용 구성을 통해, 즉 이 정신철학에서 헤겔이 먼저 의식 개념 정의를 (의식은 정신의 개념) 앞세우고 그에 이어 의식을 구성하는 계기들에 대한 구체적 이론을 (의식의 3 포텐츠: 기억과 언어, 노동과 도구, 가족과 소유) 개진한다는 점을 통해 정당화될 수 있다. 이렇게 1803-04년 정신철학을 헤겔의 의식론이라는 관점에서 재구성함으로써 우리는 기존의 지배적 해석 경향, 즉 체계, 정신, 및 절대자와 같은 형이상학적 주제들을 중심으로 한 해석을 넘어 의식 내지, 아예 좀더 상세히 다루겠지만 실천적이고 역사적 존재로서의 인간이라는 좀 더 구체적이고 실제적인 주제 중심으로 헤겔 정신철학을 읽어내고, 이를 토대로 의식이 어떤 의미에서 어떤 헤겔의 체계 및 정신철학 전체와 관련해 중요한지 잘할 수 있을 것이다.

간략히 요약하자면 1803-04년 정신철학을 헤겔 의식론의 관점에서 재구성하면서 본 논문은 무엇보다도 헤겔 의식 개념의 특징이 그 존재론적 의식 정의에 있다고 본다. 요컨대 헤겔은 의식을 의식하는 것과 의식되는 것의 통일로 정의하고, 이 의식은 의식하는 것과 의식되는 것, 능동적인 것과 수동적인 것. 의식적 대립관계를 이루는 그 대립항들 중 어느 하나가 아니라 이 대립관계 전체를 산출하는 매개적 전체라고 주장하는데, 이때 이 의식은 그러한 외부 대상 인식과 같은 그 인식론적 기능으로는 이해될 수는 없고, 그 자기 매개 운동을 통해 자기 존재를 산출하는 어떤 것으로 이해되어야 한다는 것이
다. 이러한 존재론적 의식 이해를 토대로, 본 논문은 또 여기 정신철학에서 제시되는 의식의 3 포텐츠론을 의식의 존재 및 행위를 이루는 서로 다른 세 계기들에 대한 설명으로 재구성한다. 특히 이 세 계기들은 단지 의식의 존재 및 행위를 이룰 수 있는 이러한 우연한 요소들의 단순 결합이 아니라 그 개념적 논리적 필연성에 따라 좀 더 완전한 의식 규정을 도출해가는 일련의 연속적 과정으로 이해되어야 한다는 것이 본 논문이 취한 재구성의 관점이다. 1803-04년 정신철학에 대한 우의 재구성적 독해를 통해 본 논문은 마지막으로 여기 제시된 의식론은 인간학으로 규정될 수 있다고 주장한다. 요컨대 여기 정신철학에서 의식 개념을 통해 헤겔이 이론화하는 것은 결국 말을 하고 노동을 하며 가족 단위의 경제 생활을 영위하고 문화적 전통을 전수하는 인간 존재자다. 덧붙이자면 헤겔의 의식 개념을 통해 이론화하는 이 인간 존재자는 그 절대적 개별성의 말을 통해 외재화된 자기로 성립한다는 점에서, 감각 내지 자기-느낌 수준에서 그 개별성이 성립하는 동물 유기체와 구별된다. 헤겔에 따르면 또 인간 존재자가 산출하는 보편자, 곧 문화와 전통은 그 이념적 성격 때문에 자연 유기체들이 유직 과정을 통해 산출하는 보편자, 곧 생물학적 유와도 다르다. 이런 관점에서 본 논문은 1803-04년 강의록 자연철학 마지막 단편을 다루면서, 여기 나타난 유기체 이해가 정신철학의 의식론과 어떤 연속적 관계에 있는지, 또 헤겔은 여기서 동물 유기체와 인간 유기체의 차이를 어떻게 설명하는지 해명한다.

다른 한편, 헤겔의 의식론을 인간학으로 규정할 수 있다는 주장이 정당하다면, 헤겔의 의식 개념이 인간 존재자를 가리킨다는 점 외에도, 헤겔 인간학의 고유한 방법론적 특성을 개념적으로 규정하는 일이 필요하다. 왜냐하면 헤겔의 의식론 내지 인간학은 그 대상 규정의 측면에서나 방법론 측면에서나 모두 일반적 의미에서의 인간학 (내지 인간학) 즉 다양한 인간 생활 현상에 대한 경험적이고 문화적 탐구 일반에 환원될 수 없기 때문이다. 이 점과 관련해 본 논문은 몇몇 연구자들의 (데라다 1974, 부르조아 2000) 관점대로 헤겔의 인간학을 ‘사변적’ 인간학으로 규정하는 것이 타당하다리는 관점을 취한다. 이때 ‘사변적’이라는 것은 일차적으로는 이 인간학이 그 다루는 대상이 경험적 현상도 아니며, 그 방법론 역시 경험적으로 정당화될 수 있는 것이 아니라는

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점의 의미하지만, 그 근본적 의미는 무엇보다도 정신철학의 문맥에서, 특히 헤겔에게 의식이 정신 운동의 메개자요. 달지자라며 어떤 의미에서 그려진지 해명함으로써 밝혀져야 할 것이다. 본고는 이 지점에서 데리다가『조종』에서 보여준 1803-04년 정신철학 해석이 헤겔 의식론 및 인간학의 사변성을 탁월하게 개념화, 문제화했다고 보고, 본 논문의 2부에서 데리다의 1803-04년 정신철학 해석을 상세히 다루어 보고자 했다.『조종』의 주요 주제는 사실 ‘헤겔의 체계’로, 그 전반부의 초점은 헤겔 정신 개념의 기독교적 내지 존재-신학적 기원을 밝히고 이 정신의 체계를 특히 인류성의 첫 계기인 가족 개념 중심으로 재구성하는 데 있다. 그리고 데리다가 이렇게 전반적 수준에서 헤겔의 체계 문제를 재구성하고자 할 때, 1803-04년 정신철학은 특별히 중요한 의미를 갖는데, 그것은 데리다가 바로 이 텍스트 독해를 통해 우리 두 측면의 문제를 연결하고, 그림으로써 또 ‘절대적 상실의 재전유’라는 개념으로 헤겔 체계 전체에 대한 성격 규정을 시도하기 때문이다. 따라서 본 논문의 2부에서는 우선 (1)『정신현상학』,『논리학』,『철학대계』를 중심으로 헤겔의 체계의 문제점들을, 특히 시작과 끝에 순환성 내지 체계로의 도입과 체계 전체의 동일성이라는 문제를 중심으로 개괄하고, (2) 데리다가『조종』전반부에서 헤겔의 체계 문제를 어떻게 정신의 존재-신론과 (Saint Family) 사변적 인류성론(인간가족) 중심으로 재구성하는지를 정리한 후, (3) 이 재구성을 위해 데리다가 어떻게 헤겔의 1803-04년 의식론을 해석하는지를 살펴보고자 한다. 본 논문에서 시도한 독해에 의하면 헤겔 인간학의 사변성에 대한 데리다는 해명에는 1803-04년 정신철학에 나타난 의식론의 세 번째 가족 포텐츠로부터『법철학』에서의 가족론으로의 확장이 필연적이다. 본 논문은 또 그중에서도 특히 데리다가 헤겔의 사랑과 죽음 개념을 그 가족론 전체를 따르는 개념적 핵으로 재시하고 또 헤겔식 변증법적 이행의 탁월한 사례로 해석하고 있다는 점에 주목해, 이 해석을 자세히 분석함으로써 헤겔식 인간학의 사변성에 대한 좀 더 구체적 이해를 도모하고자 한다.
주제어: 헤겔의 1803-04년 정신철학, 의식, 인륜성, 가족, 체계. 데리다의 헤겔 해석
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