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Explaining
the 2010 North Korean Shelling
of Yeonpyeong Island

2010 년 북한의 연평도 포격 분석

2014 년 2 월

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Abstract

The Yeonpyeong Incident was an artillery engagement between the North Korean military and South Korean forces stationed on Yeonpyeong Island. After the dispute, North Korea claimed that the strike was in reaction to South Korea firing artillery shells into its territorial waters. However, this paper demonstrates through a careful content analysis of North Korean news that despite North Korea’s claim that this action was in self-defense, this attack was both premeditated and strategically planned. This paper argues that the Yeonpyeong Island incident is related to the Kim regime’s fight for legitimacy, resulting from the insecurity that the North Korean regime faced after Kim Jung Il’s severe stroke in 2008 and Kim Jung Un’s uncertain succession. This attack was the result of an active North Korean campaign to boost the legitimacy of the Kim regime to ensure Kim Jung Il’s legacy could be passed on to his son, Kim Jung Un. This paper concludes that the Yeonpeyong Island incident was not merely a reaction to the expansion of annual ROK-US military exercises in 2010, but was used in North Korean propaganda to boost domestic perception of regime legitimacy. Ultimately, North Korea chose to use violence and carried out its threat against the ROK in a calculated manner to ensure the successful succession of Kim Jung Un.

Keyword: North Korea; South Korea; Yeonpyeong Island; Military Provocation; North Korean Succession

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I. Introduction: The Yeonpyeong Island Shelling

1. November 23rd 2010: The Incident

The Yeonpyeong Incident was an artillery engagement between the North Korean military and South Korean forces stationed on Yeonpyeong Island. Preceding this skirmish, North Korean forces sent a memo at 8:20 a.m. inquiring as to the purpose of the South Korean “Hoguk” exercise. An annual practice since 1988, Hoguk exercises are considered routine. Following this initial inquiry, North Korean forces issued a warning stating that North Korea would not tolerate South Korea firing into its territorial waters. However, South Korea ignored this warning and began its scheduled artillery exercise by firing rounds southwest of Yeonpyeong Island. The impact range (see Figure 1 and Map 1) had been announced in an internationally accepted publication, Notices to Airmen.¹ A skirmish ensued approximately four hours later, after North Korean forces used deadly force. After two rounds of back-and-forth artillery exchange, North Korean forces had fired an estimated 170 artillery shells and rockets at the island, killing four and injuring 19 South Koreans. In response, South Korean forces retaliated by shelling North Korean gun positions. After the incident, North Korea claimed that the strike was in reaction to South Korean artillery shells landing in North Korea’s territorial waters.

According to the South Korea newspapers, the initial artillery exercise, which began in the morning of November 23, 2010, was a routine artillery exercise that occurred every month and was actually separate from the Hoguk exercises occurring in the West Sea on the same day. In comparing Figures 1 and 2 it can be determined that coordinates for the designated air zone around Yeonpyeong Island for “Surface to Surface high angle firing,” which is also known as an artillery fire, has remained identical since the year 2006, providing evidence that similar “Surface to Surface high angle firing” artillery exercises occur monthly. Sources within the USFK have confirmed that live-fire artillery exercises are a

part of standard operation military procedures for maintenance of artillery equipment and should be performed regularly. Evidence indicates that the same kind of artillery exercises that occurred on the morning of November 23rd were routine in nature and had been occurring periodically without extracting such a violent response from the KPA.  

A careful examination of maps marking the scheduled impact range in Figure 1 and Map 1 below raises doubt as to the validity of North Korea’s claims. Figure 1 is a list of the coordinates of the restricted air zone, designated by the ROK military. These coordinates identify the location of "surface to surface high angle firing," which is also known as an artillery fire. These coordinates mark what is called the “RK R134 Yeonpyongdo (Yeongpyeong Island) restricted air zone." The restricted zone designated as “RK R134” in Map 1 below provides a visualization of where exactly artillery exercises were being conducted from Yeonpyeong Island. As shown by the barring and location of “RK R134” in Figure 1, the general direction of the artillery exercise fire from Yeonpyeong Island was indeed from the southwest. This is consistent with the direction of fire that was reported by the South Korean forces. One should note, however, that around 25 percent of the designated area appears to be more westward than southwestward. Considering the contour of the North Korean map, firing into the more westward portion of this zone could have been determined to be relatively close to DPRK territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identification, name and lateral limits</th>
<th>Upper limit</th>
<th>Remarks (time of activity, type of restriction, nature of hazard, risk of interception)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RK R134 YEONPYONGDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>373840N 1244500E - 374200N 1244500E-</td>
<td>5 000</td>
<td>Surface to surface high angle firing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>374200N 1245000E - 373730N 1250130E-</td>
<td>GND</td>
<td>by NOTAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>373400N 1251400E - 374000N 1253200E-</td>
<td></td>
<td>ROK Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>374100N 1253900E - 373720N 1253900E-</td>
<td></td>
<td>VMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>373945N 1252400E - 372800N 1252400E-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>372600N 1250400E - 373218N 1244800E-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the beginning</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: ROK Restricted Air Zone Warning (2010)
To better comprehend both the Yeonpyeong Island Incident and the proceedings leading up to the incident it is best to visualize the events sequentially, as a linear progression. The following is a breakdown of the Yeonpyeong Island Incident:

July 15, 2010: Impact area for monthly Yeonpyeong Island artillery exercise rounds designated

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3 See Appendix A: Map of ROK Prohibited, Restricted and Danger Areas- Index Chart
The impact area for the ROK Artillery rounds from the Yeonpyeong Island’s monthly artillery exercises was announced in internationally accepted Notices to Airmen.4 (see Figure 1 & Map 1)

November 16, 2010: Hoguk Military Exercise Announcement

- ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that it would conduct the Hoguk Military exercises from November 22 – 30 and that the US would not participate. The increased scale of the exercise was also announced at this time.5
- DPRK denounced the Hoguk Exercises as preparation for US invasion.6

November 18, 2010: USFK - Marines not to participate in Hoguk Exercises

- United States Forces Korea confirmed that “The U.S. Marine and Navy participation in the annual ROK-U.S. amphibious training exercise had to be postponed due to scheduling conflicts.” 7

November 22, 2010: DPRK Denounces the Hoguk Exercises8

The Rodong Shinmun denounced the Hoguk military exercises as a provocative “criminal act of aggression.”
  - No mention of the size, scale or threat level of the 2010 Hoguk exercise.

November 23, 2010: The Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island

- **08:20 Hours** - DPRK sent a telegram warning the ROK that it would not sit idly if the ROK fired into DPRK territorial waters during the scheduled military exercises.⁹
  - The ROK Ministry of National Defense dismissed the DPRK warning. The planned ROK artillery exercise was a monthly ROK marine exercise conducted on Yeonpyeong Island and unrelated to the Hoguk Military Exercise being conducted in the West Sea.¹⁰

- **10:15 Hours** - ROK military on Yeonpyeong Island began live firing exercises using Vulcan Cannons at a range of about 2~3 kilometers in the southwest direction (the opposite direction of the DPRK main land).¹¹
  - No signs of North Korean response.

- **11:00 Hours** - ROK Military began live fire exercises with 105 millimeter howitzers at a range of 13 kilometers. Followed by K9 howitzers at a range of 40 kilometers.¹²

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• **11:30 Hours** – Movements of an ammunition vehicle reported on the North Korean coast.\(^\text{13}\)

• **14:30 Hours** - The DPRK’s 60\(^{th}\) Air Regiment at Pukchang-ni Air Base, in Pyeongan-namdo, launched a flight of five MiG-23ML flogger g-fighters. Korean People’s Navy (KPN) coastal defense missile units went on alert and a number of patrol vessels began sorties from their bases on the West Sea.\(^\text{14}\)

• **14:34 Hours** - DPRK commenced fire on Yeonpyeong Island.\(^\text{15}\) According to Joseph Bermudez, the southern 122 mm MRL battery located 1.2 km south of Kaun-gol conducted the initial surprise “time-on-target” artillery attack. However, it is possible that the 76.2 mm coastal defense batteries at Kaemori and on Mu-do also participated in the initial attack.\(^\text{16}\)

• **14:35 Hours** – ROK Military called for the Crisis Management Committee.\(^\text{17}\)

• **14:47 Hours** – ROK K9 Howitzers attempted to return fire with 50 rounds, only aiming at Mu-do, a preordained target. Once the AN/TPQ-37 Fire Finder counter-battery radar was repaired the ROK K9 battery was finally able to identify the 122 mm MRL battery south of Kaun-gol and return fire with 30 rounds.\(^\text{18}\)

• **14:50 Hours** - ROK Air Force (ROKAF) launched four F-15K and four KF-16 fighter aircrafts.\(^\text{19}\) The ROKAF Fighters were given authorization by the

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\(^\text{13}\) ibid. p. 291.
President Lee to attack KPA artillery positions if they were to commence a third artillery barrage.\textsuperscript{20}

- \textbf{14:55 Hours} – Firing stopped for 15 minutes.
- \textbf{15:10 Hours} – Firing Continued.
- \textbf{15:41 Hours} – Firing Stopped. No third barrage occurred...

2. Research Question

\textbf{Research Question:} Why did North Korea premeditate an attack on Yeonpyeong Island on November 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2010?

North Korea has a reputation for being a rogue state, but is paradoxically recognized by many North Korea watchers as a rational actor in international relations. North Korea’s seemingly unpredictable use of force is a key part of this enigma. By providing a nuanced analysis of North Korea’s motives for shelling Yeonpyeong Island, this paper aims to alleviate some of this uncertainty, a crucial task for managing possible future conflicts between North and South Korea. This paper contributes to the academic study of North Korean provocations, and additionally aims to provide policy makers with information necessary to make decisions on issues related to North Korea. Although this is a fairly recent case, sufficient data is available to draw preliminary conclusions.

Compared to other military clashes between North and South Korea, the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling on November 23, 2010 was a clear and widely publicized case of North Korea’s use of conventional military force against South Korean land territory, causing two civilian casualties. Many scholars, journalists and politicians have investigated why North Korea shelled Yeongpyeong Island; however, current research has failed to systematically analyze all possible motivations for North Korea’s military actions. I believe that there is great value in posing this question once again. This paper begins by stressing that the validity of the North Korean claim that this was a ‘defensive’ act must be tested and disproven before trying to speculate as to alternative premeditated motives. This paper aims

to discredit this North Korean claim, and then further discuss possible explanations of North Korea’s motives.

### 3. Methodology

This paper is a single-case explorative and historical analysis of the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling. This paper analyzes the incident and the context of the events occurring before and after the incident using both qualitative and quantitative analytical methods. As a single case study, this paper offers a ‘thick’ and holistic description of the events in relation to the incident; therefore, this study attempts to explain not only the behavior of the DPRK during the event, but also the timing and context of the process through both content and frequency analysis.\(^{21}\) Although there are both advantages and disadvantages to a single case study design, the Yeongpyeong Island Shelling requires a scientific ‘autopsy’ to both gain an understanding of the incident itself and to contribute to literature on North Korean provocations as a whole.

The application of a single-case study is necessary to study the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling for two reasons. One of the strongest arguments for a single-case study is the lack of existing comprehensive historical research on the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling. The previous literature on the Yeonpeyong Island Shelling lacks in-depth, analytical academic research. As such, understanding North Korean military provocations remains evasive. Therefore an in-depth breakdown and analysis of this event alone would add configurative and ideographical value towards subsequent theory building on similar classes of events. The second reason, as noted by George and Bennet, is that a heuristic case study, which attempts to unearth another variable for understanding North Korean provocations, is best served by focusing on a single case, rather than multiple cases.\(^{22}\) Despite the fact that the Korean War ended with an armistice, military provocations have been


quite regular. A thorough understanding of these events is absolutely necessary to improve deterrence methods.

This master’s thesis is not intended to solve motivations behind all North Korean military provocations. Instead it should be looked upon as an ‘thick’ single case study that will serve as what George and Bennett define as a future “building block” that will eventually function to fill an important space in the development of the overall typological theory of North Korean military provocations. The scope of this study is limited to one case, but it addresses this important problem in descriptive detail to capture the reason(s) behind this massive and shocking event. Single case studies have two strengths: (1) tests performed with single case studies are often strong, because the predictions tested are quite unique; (2) inferring and testing explanations that define how the independent causes the dependent variable. Asking “why” is a difficult research question, but a single case study allows the hypotheses to be complex enough to answer why things happened. My hypotheses reflect this more complex methodological undertaking.

4. Chapter Outline

The day after the Yeonpyeong Island incident, North Korea justified its actions on November 23rd by stating that the DPRK does not make “empty talk.” This DPRK published statement implies that the North Koreans made a threat to the ROK, which the ROK intentionally and/or inadvertently ignored. Therefore, it is important to investigate North Korea’s strategic use of threats and violence. The Yeonpyeong Island incident is related to the Kim regime’s fight for legitimacy that resulted from the insecurity that the North Korean regime faced after Kim Jung Il’s severe stroke in 2008 and the uncertainties in relation to Kim Jung Un’s succession process. The North Korean regime conducted an active campaign to boost the legitimacy of the Kim regime to ensure Kim Jung Il’s legacy could be passed on to


his son, Kim Jung Un. This study finds that North Korea appropriated the incident to alleviate its insecurity related to succession, which began in 2008, and to necessarily speed up the succession process.

Chapter three argues that before discussing possible premeditated motives behind the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island one must first test the North Korean claim that the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2013 was a defensive reaction to the 2010 Hoguk military exercise. After comparing the scale, location, transparency and DPRK reaction to the 2010 Hoguk exercise with prior Hoguk exercises, this paper concludes that the 2010 Hoguk exercise was conducted in a more threatening manner, when compared to previous years. North Korea’s relative decrease in its usual reaction to military exercise announcements — especially given the larger scale of the 2010 Hoguk exercise — is suspicious. Chapter three argues that significant inconsistencies exist in North Korea’s behavior, with regards to the Hoguk military exercise, casting doubt on North Korea’s claim. In addition to these, this paper argues that signs of preparation by the Korean Peoples Army leading up to the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island on November 23, 2010 provides further evidence that North Korea’s actions were premeditated.

Both chapter four and chapter five use content and frequency analyses of KCNA articles to understand North Korea’s behavior both before and after the 2010 incident. Chapter four of this paper provides both a content and frequency analysis of all 2010 North Korean threats accessible in North Korean news. This analysis confirms that North Korea’s suspicious silence was not isolated to the 2010 Hoguk exercise. In fact, it was a change in behavior beginning with threats that North Korea published and reiterated throughout the months of July and August. 2010 was an eventful year in terms of the volatile relations between South and North Korea. North Korea reached extremely high levels of agitation following the ROK’s strong response to the Cheonan Incident.

During this period of heightened North Korean agitation in 2010, North Korea drew a rhetorical line with the July ROK-US combined East Sea exercises, for both domestic and international audiences. North Korea promised physical retaliation if the exercises were conducted as scheduled. However, the ROK and US ignored
these articles as empty threats. After these clear threats were ignored, North Korea’s rhetoric abruptly decreased to a few promises per month of imminent retaliation. North Korea had previously protested for the halt of every ROK military exercises since the public May 20th announcement that the DPRK was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan. Yet, in August, the DPRK appears to have finally felt its resolve when it was publicly challenged by the ROK, ultimately leading to a change in North Korean behavior.

The Yeonpyeong Island Shelling was a way to restore the unique setting of inter-Korean conflict, which has always been a key requirement for the Kim family regime’s legitimacy. Chapter five presents a frequency analysis of North Korea’s Rodong Shinmun, pointing to a high frequency in the reporting of the incident, which was sustained over a long period of time. For a two-year period, the North Korean regime continued to use this manufactured crisis for domestic propaganda, and the KCNA kept the incident alive. North Korea was therefore able to extract a long-term domestic benefit by keeping this story alive to boost regime legitimacy and ensure a successful succession process from Kim Jung Il to Kim Jong Un.
II. Research Framework

1. Classification of Events: North Korean Overt Military Actions

The Yeonpyeong Island Shelling is a recent event that may be best analyzed using an in-depth, single-case study design. According to Ken Gause, North Korean violent actions can be classified as either “covert” or “overt” actions. Overt military actions can be tied to internal regime considerations, but they can also appear to be driven by external stimuli. As these actions are overt, they can be used as a signal. Overt actions can highlight perceived wrongdoings and North Korean dissatisfaction with the status quo, or they can be used to gain internal public support. Covert provocations are more closely connected to internal regime considerations, because they are designed so as to avoid responsibility. A covert action can deter the risk of escalation, but it dilutes the ability of the actor to use the action as a public signal for propaganda. This risk of escalation is always apparent in overt actions; therefore, the public benefit must be worth the possibility of retaliation. The Yeonpyeong Island Shelling was conducted publicly and carried the risk of escalation; therefore, it may be best classified as an overt military action. Its high-level of escalation risk would then imply a worthy benefit.

North Korea has a record of “overt” actions with South Korea along the Northern Limit Line (NLL).26 The NLL is located in the West Sea and has historically been a hot spot for South-North Korean military clashes. The most frequent and violent of these incidents have occurred in the relatively confined waters surrounding Paengnyeong, Taechong, Socheong, Yeonpyeong and U Island.27 There are many explanations for these re-occurring incidents, but the unresolved dispute over the NLL, which North Korea claims was illegally drawn, is a continuous problem.

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Other overt military clashes related to the NLL include: the first battle of Yeonpyeong (1999), the second battle of Yeonpyeong (2002), a North Korea vessel crossing the NLL in 2004, the battle of Taecheong (2009), and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (2010). However, in comparison to these other incidents, the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling was a direct act of aggression against South Korean territory. This event displayed an unusually significant North Korean disregard for escalation, making it stand out from other overt clashes in the West Sea. The significant risk of escalation implies that in order for this to be a defensive response it would have to have been the result of a large stimulus. Therefore, it is important to first analyze possible stimuli to see if this incident was indeed reactive in nature.

2. The Threat of Inter-Korean Escalation:

Paul Stares, in his paper “On Escalation in Korea,” discusses the significance of the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling. He defined the shelling as troubling in three significant ways. First, the timing of the Yeonpyeong Island incident was

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significantly close to the sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010, and North Korea’s revelation of its new nuclear enrichment facilities. Second, for the first time since the Korean War, this was a conventional military action that targeted areas inhabited by civilians. Finally, this incident provoked a predominantly pacifist and/or indifferent South Korean public to erupt with a desire for military retaliation. The volatile nature of this specific incident thus came to define four critical variables related to escalation on the Korean peninsula. According to Stares, the potential for escalation depends on who is involved, where the interaction takes place, the type of interaction, and why the overt provocation initiated. An overt provocation that either intentionally or accidentally engages US forces or citizens carries a higher risk of escalation, just as an overt provocation that occurs beyond the disputed NLL or DMZ would entail a higher risk of escalation. There exists a combined effect on the probability of escalation between the scale, intensity and nature of military interactions and the perceived operational status of both sides’ offensive capabilities at the time of the incident. The final variable affecting the probability of escalation is the motivation behind the provocation, particularly whether it happens to be more than merely a territorial dispute. In the end, both sides must be careful and fear the momentum of action.

According to Robert Kaplan, Seoul cannot deny the amount of damage North Korea’s conventional weapons could cause to Seoul within a matter of hours. With North Korea’s 13,000 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers, capable of launching more than 300,000 projectiles per hour onto Seoul, an attack would be detrimental to South Korea. Seoul is the second largest metropolitan area in the world. Seoul’s metropolitan area houses almost half of South Korea’s population

and serves as the South’s economic center of prosperity. North Korea’s strategy would likely consist of using shock and awe to renegotiate a peace treaty. However, North Korean military escalation is ultimately no match against the sophisticated abilities of the combined efforts of the US-ROK military alliance. Despite the destruction that would occur in the ROK, according to Robert Kaplan, any North Korean strategy is doomed to fail.\textsuperscript{33} The US-ROK military alliance makes a constant effort to be transparent in its maintenance of its strong military deterrent. North Korea should be relatively aware of the direct consequences of an escalation to war. As Seong-ho Sheen states: “It is a well known fact that a full scale war will be the very end of the North Korean regime,” which is the last thing that the Kim regime could logically want.\textsuperscript{34}

South Korea cannot be certain as to the rationality of North Korea’s cost benefit analysis when it comes to an escalation to war. This prevents South Korea from ever allowing North Korea to ever have the opportunity to show its willingness and/or unwillingness to go to war. Going to war would likely lead to high costs for South Korea, however it would result in the destruction of North Korea, an even higher cost for the North Korean regime. Therefore, a rational North Korea would be averse to allowing a challenge to escalate to war. An irrational North Korea would be willing to escalate a challenge to a destructive war at any cost. As long as South Korea continues to play this game in a perfectly rational way, equilibrium will continue and South Korea will remain unwilling to test North Korea’s rationality. The slight uncertainty in North Korea’s rationality or willingness to go to war forces South Korea to continuously be responsible for rationally avoiding escalation. Thus, if one assumes that North Korea is in fact a rational actor, in this sense, North Korea is using South Korea’s rationality to treat the risk of war as if it were not a cost in order to achieve asymmetric bargaining.


\textsuperscript{34} Seong-ho Sheen, “The Beginning of the Endgame?: Attack on Yongpyong Island and North Korea’s Survival,” Seoul National University, 2011.
leverage. Historically, South Korea has yet to successfully call North Korea’s challenges as a bluff, and North Korea’s rationality remains an uncertain variable.

3. Overview of South-North Korean Relations from 2006-2010

A stark reversal in South Korean policy towards North Korea occurred in 2008 as the conservative Grand National Party took office under the Lee Myung-bak administration. The preceding Roh Moo-hyun administration, which began in February 2003 and ended in February 2008, had continued the Democratic Party’s position and the legacy of the Kim Dae-jun presidency. The Roh Moo-hyun administration implemented a prolongation of the pro-engagement ‘Sunshine Policy,’ which had begun in 1998 under the Kim Dae-jun presidency. Despite high initial hopes, the Roh Moo-hyun presidency encountered strong opposition from the conservative Grand National Party and the conservative media. The South Korean public had once favored the ROK Democratic party’s platform of a mutual thaw in inter-Korea relations by way of pro-engagement polices with North Korea. However, despite the fact that engagement and unconditional aid continued to flow North, North Korea’s reciprocation did not come as quickly as the South Korean public had expected or could tolerate.

Almost 10 years of unconditional engagement with the North created some significant progress in cooperation, including the currently active Kaeseong Industrial Complex, but the long-term benefits ultimately proved to be no match for the volatile nature of South Korean domestic politics. The conservative party ultimately was able to utilize the growing public dissatisfaction with the cost and stagnation in the ‘thaw’ process to create strongly rooted support, ultimately regaining control of the South Korean government. Therefore, the year 2008, when Lee Myung-bak took office, marks a year of a reversal in inter-Korea relations

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35 Asymmetrical Bargaining Leverage: Negotiation leverage that has been achieved by unconventional means of violence or threat. Asymmetrical bargaining leverage is a useful tool for those who cannot achieve their desired goals by way of force because, of their relatively weak status compared to their adversary.

towards a more adversarial position towards North Korea and the end to both Kim Dae-jun’s legacy and the ‘Sunshine Policy.’

This renewed hardliner stance came at a bad time for the Kim regime. Kim Jung Il was faced with the task of maintaining regime legitimacy despite his deteriorating health. The Kim family was faced with the difficult task of grooming a young and inexperienced successor, Kim Jong Un, in just a fraction of the time Kim Il Sung had spent prepping Kim Jun Il to come into power uncontested. Around the world, most governments base their legitimacy on providing basic human needs, economic prosperity, and political civil liberties. Despite the fact that the Kim regime has failed in these important areas, the regime has been able to extract legitimacy in other ways. The Kim regime has anchored its regime legitimacy in a cult of personality centered on the legend of Kim Il Sung and the North Korean homegrown brand of ideology, known as *Juche*. Ultimately, the source of legitimacy is the public, and it is hard to imagine that the Kim regime, which bases its legitimacy on something other than providing for the basic human rights and needs of its people, could last indefinitely. Kim Jung Un’s succession was going to bring the Kim family yet another generation further from Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality. Without both bolstering the foundation of Kim’s legitimacy, the system of control was in danger of collapse.

1) Overview of the Inter-Korea Relations under the Roh Moo-hyun Presidency

President Roh was for the most part supportive of the United States. He deployed troops to Iraq in support of the U.S.-led military campaign and initiated negotiations with the United States for a free trade agreement. However, Roh’s continued support of engagement with North Korea often conflicted with the Bush administration’s neoconservative approach towards North Korea. Despite President Roh’s support for the majority of the US’s demands in regards to more global issues, the two administrations were relatively divergent in nature until the Bush

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administration was willing to recognize the validity in engagement with North Korea.\textsuperscript{38} Progress on the North Korean nuclear issue was eventually seen in 2007, with the Six-Party Talks joint statement.\textsuperscript{39} However, this progress was ultimately reversed because of the US government’s clumsy decision-making process, which stalled the decision to remove North Korea from the list of known terrorist states.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{Number of Annual Cross-border Travelers: 1998 - 2007}
\end{figure}

In terms of inter-Korea relations, the Roh administration is well known for its pro-engagement stance towards North Korea, and Roh’s presidency marked record growth in the scale of interaction between the two Koreas. The increase in inter-Korea relations began during the Kim Dae-Jung presidency, which was continued and expanded by president Roh Moo-hyun. Significant increases were observed in terms of inter-Korea cross-border travel, annual cross border trade, annual aid provided to North Korea, and inter-Korean talks. During the duration of the ‘Sunshine Policy’ the total annual number of sanctioned cross-border travelers between South and North Korea increased from 3,317 people in 1998 to 159,214 people in 2007. This increasing trend number in cross-border travelers can be seen


in the graph above, titled “Number of Annual Cross-border Travelers: 1998-2007.”

This level of South – North interaction had never before been observed since the peninsula had been divided by war.

As can be seen in the graph above, titled “Amount of Trade Between South and North Korea: 1998-2007,” the total number of annual trade between the two Koreas tripled during the Kim Dae-jun administration, and the Roh administration was able to nearly triple inter-Korea annual trade again by the end of its term. The larger half of the trade was maintained in favor of North Korea. However, by 2008 both in-bound and outbound inter-Korea trade to and from South Korea had not just reached nearly equal levels, but actually favored South Korea by $44 million USD.

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In terms of humanitarian projects, the amount of government and private assistance, grants, and food loans had also increased during the Roh administration. This trend can be observed in the graph above titled “South Korean Assistance to North Korea: 1998-2007.”

The trend was for the most part increasing, and the year 2007, Roh’s last full year in office, met a record high of 4,397 hundred million KRW, ten times the level of monetary assistance the South was providing North Korea in the first year of the ‘Sunshine Policy.’ A dip in assistance can be seen in 2006, likely due to the repercussions of North Korea’s October 3rd test of its first nuclear device. However, the overall trend was an expansion in the direct assistance being provided to North Korea by South Korea.

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Active engagement was a pillar of the Roh administration’s dealings with North Korea. This can be observed in the graph above titled “Number of Annual Inter-Korea Talks 2005-2010” which indicates sustained high levels of inter-Korean talks that reached a record level of 55 annual talks in the year 2007.\(^\text{45}\) However, immediately following this peak the number of inter-Korean talks fell dramatically, a result of the anti-engagement policies of the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration. The Lee administration allowed a mere 15 inter-Korean talks to occur between the years 2008 and 2010.

One additional legacy President Roh aimed to leave behind was finding a peaceful resolution to prevent further conflict between the South and North in the West Sea. In 1973, Pyongyang declared that “the five islands are in the territorial waters controlled by the KPA, and everyone must receive permission to travel to and from the islands in advance.”\(^\text{46}\) North Korea defends its 12 nautical miles of territorial waters in accordance to the International Law of the Sea. But this territory overlaps with South Korea’s territorial waters; not to mention both Koreas continue to claim sovereignty over the entire peninsula. North Korea is actively...

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seeking the means to reduce the South’s military presence in this area by increasing the South’s cost of maintaining the NLL. The West Sea has been a source of military volatility on the Korean peninsula, and President Roh used the October 2007 inter-Korea summit to put in motion discussions regarding building more inter-Korea military trust, including a plan for “designating a joint fishing area to prevent accidental clashes in the West Sea, the turning of this area into a peace zone, and the issue of military guarantee measures for various cooperation projects.” Because of Seoul’s proximity to the NNL, this was a particularly controversial issue in terms of South Korea’s national security. Hardliners viewed these movements as ceding territory and as a signal of an exploitable Southern weakness. When the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration took office in February of 2008, President Lee made it clear that his administration would almost entirely dismiss Roh’s October summit agreement.

2) Overview of the Inter-Korea Relations under the Lee Myung-bak Presidency

Lee Myung-bak won the 2007 South Korean presidential elections by fairly large margins. The South Korean public was concerned with domestic economic issues and disillusioned with the short-term cost of the ‘Sunshine Policy.’ After ten years of waiting, the conservatives had finally returned to power, and they were prepared to reverse the previous pro-engagement policies and promote a much more hardline stance in dealings with North Korea. A stark quantitative change was observed in terms of inter-Korea cross-border travel, annual cross-border trade, annual aid provided to North Korea, and inter-Korean talks.

As can be seen in the graph above titled “Number of Annual Cross-border Travelers: 2005-2010” 2008 marks the beginning of a significant decrease in the number of cross-border travelers between South and North Korea. Once the Lee Myung-bak administration took office, relations between South and North Korea immediately began to reverse. According to Oberdorfer’s book, *The Two Koreas* (2013), “Lee’s administration brought South Korean policy toward the North back a quarter century, to the era of Chun Doo Hwan, when there was virtually no contact between the two Koreas and the rhetoric within the South was often harsh and ugly.”

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A similar trend of a declining scale of inter-Korea relations beginning in 2008 is observable in the graph above titled “Amount of Trade Between South and North Korea: 2005-2010.” By 2010 the annual level of trade between South and North Korea had dropped by $61 million USD, below the level of trade the Roh administration had achieved in 2005, completely negating all of the progress in inter-Korea trade that the Roh administration had achieved.

[Fig 8: Amount of Trade Between South and North Korea: 2005-2010]

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This same decline in the scale of engagement and inter-Korea relations can be seen in the graph titled “South Korean Assistance to North Korea: 2005-2010.” This graph indicates a stark drop in the amount of assistance provided by both the South Korean government and private South Korean donors. The Roh administration’s level of assistance to North Korea fluctuated in 2006, likely because of North Korea’s first nuclear test, but eventually reached record levels in 2007.

Ultimately the return of the ROK’s hardline stance, which was brought on by the Lee Myung-bak government, brought back a chill in inter-Korea relations, and the Lee administration very seldom engaged in any talks with the North between the years 2008 and 2010. Between the years 2005 and 2007, a total of 112 inter-Korean talks occurred between South and North Korea under the Roh administration. In great contrast, the Lee government only conducted a total of 15 inter-Korean talks between the years of 2008 and 2010. Engagement quickly trickled to a halt in terms of inter-Korea cross-border travel, annual cross border

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trade, annual aid provided to North Korea, and inter Korean talks. South Korea turned its back on the North, ultimately leaving a vacuum in North Korea’s outside source of income and food assistance and causing North Korea to rely even further on Chinese assistance.

3) Overview of Kim Jung Un’s Succession Process

During President Bush’s second term, beginning in November of 2006 after Republicans lost majorities in both the House and Senate during the US midterm elections, the Bush administration began to show signs of willingness to engage with North Korea, and the Six-Party Talks were finally able to make some traction. There was some progress in 2007, with the July shutdown of the Yongbyon North Korean nuclear reactor, a new Six-Party Talk joint-statement and implementation agreement on October 3rd, and President Roh’s inter-Korean summit. However, most of this progress was quickly reversed the following year.

Washington ultimately proved too slow to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and showed negligible official support for the 2007 Philharmonic visit. The almost immediate reversal in South Korea’s North Korea policies, which occurred in 2008 as a result of the presidential election in 2007, reversed most agreements that had been made during president Roh’s rushed inter-Korea summit during his last months in office.

On August 11, 2008 the US informed North Korea that it would not be removed from the list of states supporting terrorism. Very soon after, on August 15th, Kim Jung Il made his last publicized visit before suffering a severe stroke. French doctors were urgently sent to North Korea to manage Kim Jung Il’s critical condition, but Kim’s life-or-death situation remained a highly guarded secret. According to Dr. Francois-Xavier Roux, a French brain specialist who had treated

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Kim Jung Il before and was a member of the team of doctors that had been sent to treat Kim after his stroke, Kim was “in intensive care, in a coma, in a bad way… He was in a life-threatening situation.” Roux also noted that during the extent of Kim’s recovery process Kim Jong Un, Kim’s eventual successor, often visited Kim Jung II. The Kim family and key individuals in Kim Jong Il’s elite Guard Command did their best to keep the situation hidden from the world and especially the people of North Korea; however, it was impossible with Kim’s absence from the September 9th celebration of the DPRK’s sixtieth National Day, which indicated something was seriously wrong. In early October of 2008 it was reported, without photographic evidence, that Kim Jong II had attended a university soccer game, and a few weeks later, the North Korean media displayed pictures of Kim supposedly visiting a North Korean military unit. However, South Korean analysts have suggested that the photos that were produced were likely taken earlier in the year. Eventually, genuine photos appeared in November of him attending an army soccer match, but Kim continued to appear disturbingly frail throughout the early half of 2009. Ultimately, the 2008 stroke took a significant toll on Kim Jung Il’s life, and it took Kim almost three years to recover more fully.

Despite the need for a recovery period, the experience ultimately sprung Kim Jung II into action, suggesting what appeared to most North Korea watchers as rushed preparations for succession. Despite his health concerns, Kim made well over 300 public appearances, including four international trips between the time of his stroke in 2008 and his death in 2011.

Likely on the same day as Kim Jung Il’s stroke, on August 14, 2008, the disablement process of the Yongbyon reactor had been stopped. This was announced publicly on August 26, and in September it was announced that the DPRK planned on reversing the disabling measures it had initially taken at


Relations between Washington and Pyongyang had again deteriorated, and whatever progress that had been made in 2007 quickly vanished. The US attempted to quickly bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks in October, but it appeared that Kim Jung Il’s poor health conditions throughout the end of October had paralyzed the decision making ability of the regime. Ultimately, the Bush administration ran out of time due to a new US presidential election.

By the time President Obama came to office in January 2009, the succession process already had a significant influence on North Korea’s strategy with Washington, and North Korea was not interested in “even the appearance of compromise” with the United States. Despite Obama’s inaugural speech: “We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist,” North Korea instead clenched its fists notably harder within Obama’s first month in office. On April 5, 2009 North Korea conducted a three-stage rocket launch, which the North Korean media reported as a successful launch of a satellite into orbit, despite the fact that the rocket had failed during its third stage booster. Weeks later, on April 14, one day after the UN Security Council issued a statement condemning the rocket launch as a missile test, North Korea announced that it would be restarting its Yongbyon reactor. North Korea then responded with its second nuclear test on May 25, but this explosion was large enough to convince the world that North Korea had indeed advanced its nuclear ability enough to make a working nuclear weapon. Ultimately, both South Korea and the United States decided to respond with a new strategy deemed by the US as ‘strategic patience.’

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64 "North Korea says it has started reprocessing spent fuel rods". Nexis: BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political; Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 25 April 2009.


Korea nor the United States were willing to provide any further concession to
North Korea, marking the end to any further unilateral and unconditional aid to the
DPRK.

The South Korean hardliners that had come into power in 2008 appeared to be
of the impression that with Kim Jung Il in decline, the rushed succession process
would then prove to be more than the North Korean security apparatus could
handle. The new hardline policy from the Lee administration was in some ways
meant to not only demonstrate the strength of the ROK to the North, but also to
squeeze North Korea to the brink of collapse.67

In November of 2009, North Korea attempted to revalue its currency, likely to
regain control of the markets. Kim Jong Un is suspected of initiating this reform in
order to resuscitate the formal state economy.68 Every citizen in the DPRK was
allowed seven days to exchange a maximum 100,000 North Korean Won.69
However, this act produced a widespread negative response and was viewed by the
public as a move to confiscate their savings. Ultimately, the regime was forced to
react, raising the limit to 150,000 North Korean Won in cash and 300,000 North
Korean Won in bank savings. Considering the timing of this move in regards to
the timing of the succession process, Kim Jung Il may have been attempting to
promote better economic conditions for 2010, when he planned to place Kim Jung
Un in public view for the first time. The currency reevaluation ultimately did go
into effect, displaying to the middle-class, which was slowly rising from North
Korea’s backstreet markets, that the Kim regime was still in power. However,
backlash from this reevaluation required a scapegoat; therefore, Pak Nam-ki, the
chief of the KWP’s finance department, was purged and executed in March of
2010.70

Kim Jong Un was unveiled publicly as Kim Jung Il’s successor on the 27th of
September 2010.71 However, mass preparations to position the soon to be young

69 Ho, Jung Kwon (November 30, 2009). North Korea Replaces Currency. Daily NK.
70 "North Korea Executes Official for Currency Reform, Yonhap Says". Bloomberg. March 17,
2010.
71 "Kim Jong Il issues order on promoting military ranks". KCNA 27 September 2010.
leader had begun years before. There is no doubt that preparation for the succession of Kim Jong Un had to be sped up after Kim Jong Il’s severe stroke in 2008. Normally, transitions such as these present risks to authoritarian regimes, and to be done right, the process cannot be rushed. However, Kim Jong Il’s failing health left him no choice but to accelerate the process.

Internally, the official announcement that Kim Jong Un was to be the next successor was silently passed down through the KWP’s leadership on January 8, 2009, which is believed to be Kim Jong Un’s 26th birthday. Then in January and February of 2009, mass meetings were conducted between the KPA, the State Security Ministry, the People’s Security Ministry, the KWP Central Committee, and other organizations at which members signed an oath of allegiance to Kim Jong Un. In the spring of 2009, the constitution was amended to elevate Kim Jong Il’s status and to expand the powers of the National Defense Commission “to better manage state affairs in the event that he could no longer rule.” The attempted satellite launch in April and the second nuclear test in May occurred just before the DPRK constitution was amended. North Korean diplomats abroad were told that Kim Jong Un had been responsible for giving the order to conduct the second nuclear test. The timing of these actions was an attempt to “rally nationalistic emotions” similar to the August 1998 launch just days before the constitution was amended to formalize Kim Jong Il’s succession.

In the name of increasing labor outputs, Kim Jong Un was also given credit for initiating a 150 day mass mobilization ‘speed battle’ in April 2009. In September Kim Jong Un was publicly unveiled as Kim Jong Il’s successor and the KWP convened the party conference, one of the largest meetings held since the 1980’s in which Kim Jong Un was elected to the Central Committee and made vice chairman.

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77 정성장, 현대북정치, op. cit., p. 153.
of the Central Military Commission. 78 From then on Kim Jong Un began to regularly accompany his father during his usual onsite guidance visits, and over the next year publicly accompanied Kim Jung Il for 100 out of the 152 on-site visits that he conducted. 79 However, the official measures to transfer power to Kim Jong Un were not complete until the fourth party conference, on April 11, 2012, elected him the first secretary of the KWP after Kim Jung Il’s death. It was “decided to hold Kim Jung Il in high esteem as eternal general secretary of the KWP.” 80 Two days later Kim Jong Un was elected as the first chairman of the NDC, and it was “decided to hold leader Kim Jung-il in high esteem as eternal chairman of the NDC.” 81

Transitions often present risks to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, and with Kim Jung Il’s health suddenly becoming a variable in the Kim regime’s ability to control and stabilize, completing the process of Kim Jong Un’s succession was of the upmost importance. During a succession, boosting regime legitimacy is crucial to ensure that the system will peacefully accept the chosen successor. However, between 2008 and 2011 time was scarce, and with Kim Jong Un’s age and lack of military experience, Kim Jung Il likely felt a dire sense of insecurity in terms of his regime’s future and the Kim legacy.

4. Hypotheses

Much speculation exists as to the possible motivations for the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2010. These possible motivations...
explanations are discussed briefly in the following chapter’s literature review. This paper aims to explore the North Korean claim that the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was in reaction to the 2010 Hoguk exercise. After this explanation has been confirmed to be either true or defunct, scholars can then confidently explore other premeditated motivations. This paper aims to explore the narrative and context of the events both leading up to and following the incident. Hypothesis 1 focuses on the immediate external variable, and Hypothesis 2 considers internal regime motivations as explanations for the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island.

1) Hypothesis 1

- The North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island was a premeditated retaliation stimulated by the expansion of the 2010 ‘Hoguk’ military exercise.

According to the linear progression of events outlined in chapter one, the 2010 Hoguk exercises were publicly announced on November 16th. First, it is necessary to see whether the announcement indicated that the 2010 exercise would be of a larger scale or more threatening than that of previous years. Then, if the North Korean narrative were true, one would expect to see preparation by North Korea for these threatening exercises beginning after this date. To test this hypothesis, I additionally searched for signs of preparation for the attack before the details of the exercises were announced. However, signs of preparation before the scale of the Hoguk exercise was announcement would serve to discredit the North Korean claim that the shelling was a defensive action. In addition, this section attempts to explore whether there were any inconsistencies in the scale and threat of the 2010 exercises performed on the 23rd of November. It is worth mentioning that military exercises can be perceived as troop buildup in preparation for invasion; but, in the case of North and South Korean relations this is unlikely given that these same military exercise were conducted in previous year without incident. By comparing the exercises conducted in 2010 with those of previous years one would expect one of the following three conclusions: 1) the exercises in November 2010 were more threatening than previous years, 2) the exercises in November 2010 were consistent
with those of previous years, or, 3) the exercises in November 2010 were less threatening than in previous years. Only a significantly more threatening military exercise would warrant such a violent response against South Korea as a defensive action. Possible sources of ROK military exercise inconsistencies that would be worthy of such a significant North Korean response include:

- Duration / timing and transparency
- An increased number of troops involved (steady or drastic)
- Types of equipment used for invasion (more threatening)
- Location (affecting more sensitive areas)
- North Korean warnings/protests

If this hypothesis is true, the South conducted military exercises in a manner that was significantly more threatening and violated North Korean territory. Therefore the following important questions need to be answered. How were the exercises conducted in 2010? Was this routine compared to previous years? Did South Korea and the US perceive the North Korean warning to be more assertive?

The key indicator is whether South Korea committed any acts that were inconsistent with previous years, which may have triggered a North Korean territorial defensive response. If the same usual precautions were taken to avoid provoking a North Korean response, and a response has not occurred because of these exercises in the past, then it is not likely that North Korea would suddenly feel a larger threat worthy of a preemptive strike. If every factor of these exercises is consistent with previous years, then there is little support for North Korea’s claim. If North Korea’s response is the only thing out of the ordinary or if North Korea began preparation for the attack even before the scale of the exercise was announced, then Hypothesis 1 is invalid.
2) Hypothesis 2:

- The North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island was a premeditated act designed to boost North Korea’s regime legitimacy to ensure the success of Kim Jung Un’s urgent succession process.

To test this hypothesis, indicators of regime insecurity must first be identified. This paper identifies Kim Jung Il’s stroke in 2008 and uncertainties related to Kim Jun Un’s succession process as the main sources of North Korean insecurity from 2008-2010. In this paper, I explore the sources and background of the Kim regime’s legitimacy. Considering the insecurities and uncertainties related to both Kim Jong Il’s failing health and unresolved succession issues from 2008-2010, it is likely that the Kim regime exploited North Korea’s declining relationship with South Korea to boost regime legitimacy. This would have been a necessary step to ensure a successful transfer of power between Kim Jung Il and Kim Jong Un.

In the events leading up to the 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, one would expect to see indicators suggesting that the North Korean regime was conducting an active campaign to ensure a successful succession from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jung Un, including crackdowns and purges. In addition, if Hypothesis 2 were true, indicators that the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was then used as a tool to boost regime legitimacy, such as appropriating the event as a propaganda tool for a long period of time, would be expected.
III. Literature Review

1. Literature on the Yeonpyeong Island Incident
The previous literature on the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling lacks in-depth, analytical academic research. To date, the most detailed narratives on the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling include Kim Jong-de’s (김정대) book *War of the West Sea* (서해전쟁 2013) and Joseph Bermudez’s article, “The Yonpyeong-do Incident (2011).” Kim Jong-de provides an objective narrative of the events leading up to the attack and the ROK’s response, while Bermudez provides a careful, detailed analysis of the North Korean military action, pointing to the complex coordination that was required for the attack. Bermudez cites the high-level of complexity and coordination involved in the initial North Korean strike as a sign that the strikes were premeditated. However, one must first disprove a simpler explanation: that North Korea’s complex coordination in the shelling was the product of well-prepared artillery units.

1) Exploring North Korean Premeditation
According to Bermudez, there are multiple signals indicating that the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling was a premeditated act. Joseph Bermudez’s article concludes with four convincing examples that the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was both premeditated and well prepared. After viewing this list, one may begin to speculate that a lot of planning went into this specific event. Nevertheless, legal definitions of premeditation of the preparation of arms or other instruments required may be useful indicators, but cannot alone serve as absolute proof. The following outline breaks down Bermudez’s four examples.

- The DPRK movements before the initial attack were well coordinated:

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The DPRK’s 60th Air Regiment at Pukchang-ni Air Base, in Pyeongan-namdo, launched a flight of five MiG-23ML flogger g-fighters.

Four minutes before the initial barrage of the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) coastal defense, missile units went on alert and a number of patrol vessels began sorties from their bases on the West Sea.

All indicate a high level of inter-service coordination, which would likely require the knowledge, or permission of the National Defense Commission.

- The initial barrage was well coordinated and conducted in sophisticated manner:
  - The DPRK Artillery units used “time-on-target” tactics. Time on target tactics require sophisticated coordination and is ideal for an ambush. The artillery rounds of the initial strike were coordinated to land simultaneously so that they would inflict the most damage by not allowing the targets time to take shelter.
  - “Time-on-target” tactics were practiced during the DPRK’s January and August 2010 artillery exercises.
    - January DPRK artillery exercises were announced as a routine firing exercise on January 26th and then conducted on January 27th. The public forewarning showed signs of North Korean restraint.

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86 Ibid. p. 6.
The August DPRK artillery exercises came on August 9\textsuperscript{th}, without any previous warning.\textsuperscript{90} This outburst of fire came right at the tail end of the ROK’s second West Sea anti-sub drill since the May 20\textsuperscript{th} announcement of the findings of the Cheonan joint investigation team.\textsuperscript{91}

- “Since the ROK Marine artillery was a known and observable quantity, it is probable that the KPA timed its attack, in part, to catch the K-9s outside of their hardened positions.”\textsuperscript{92}
- The KPA laid “new buried communications cable from the Kaemori UGF north to what appears to be a small communications center 700 m northwest of Sanji-gol.” The trench is easily visible from satellite imagery and was apparently done with a high priority since the line was dug with little concern for existing terrain or infrastructure.\textsuperscript{93}

After viewing Bermudez’s outline it is easy to conceive that there was a lot of coordination involved in the planning and implementation of this attack. The coastal North Korean Forces were already scrambled and on high alert. Hard-line communications were installed well in advance of the attack to avoid any eavesdropping by the ROK or the Unites States military intelligence forces. The August 9\textsuperscript{th} DPRK artillery exercises by the same North Korean artillery units involved in the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling were reportedly conducted as time-on-target exercises in preparation for the actual attack, which came later in November. Finally, the attack was conducted in ambush-style against an observably limited quantity of ROK Marine artillery units when they were outside of their hardened


\textsuperscript{93} Ibid. p. 6.
firing positions. In order for these ROK artillery units to conduct their monthly live-fire exercises safely in a southwestward direction away from the North Korean mainland, these units had to leave their designated hardened firing positions. The response time of an observably reduced number of ROK Marine artillery units defending Yeonpyeong Island was significantly greater than average, because the units could not return fire until they had returned to their hardened firing positions. The specific moment chosen to implement this attack — precisely at a time when the ROK forces could not respond to DPRK artillery fire on Yeonpyeong Island — raises significant doubt that North Korea was responding defensively to the ROK Hoguk exercise.

2. Existing Literature on North Korean Motivations for the Shelling:

The existing literature on North Korean motivations for the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island overwhelmingly assumes that this was a premeditated act and that the shelling was not a reaction to a South Korean stimulus. This paper argues that these explanations are severely weakened by the underlying contradiction of an untested and plausible North Korean claim that North Korea attacked Yeonpyeong Island because it felt threatened on November 23, 2010. This alternative explanation calls into question these speculations as to North Korea’s motives. The conflicting claims as to how and why this dispute started requires further investigation. Without a full investigation into North Korean claims, all alternative claims lack sufficient evidence to demonstrate that this was a premeditated attack.

The following chapter explores the claim that the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling was in response to a South Korean stimulus. In the existing literature there are multiple explanations to date as to why North Korea decided to shell Yeonpyeong Island. The following sub-sections discuss briefly four possible explanations within the existing literature as to why North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island.
1) Succession:

The first explanation identifies succession within the North Korean regime as the key variable related to the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. Ken Gause speculates that North Korea began pursuing a trend of increasingly provocative behavior in the year 2010 “because of dynamics related to the ongoing succession and the need to build up the credentials of the heir apparent, Kim Jong-un.” The speed of the Kim Jong-il’s failing health and the process of a succession within the North Korean regime led to a “dramatic increase in the level of violence associated with North Korean provocations, with the sinking of Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.” Gause then concludes that the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island was both premeditated and intended to secure a smooth power transfer from Kim Jong II to Kim Jong Un. It is undeniable that such a provocation could be used to aide the internal process of succession. Hypothesis 2 in this paper builds from and tests Gause’s speculation, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 of this paper.

2) Desperation:

The second explanation within the existing literature posits that the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island is a sign that the North Korean regime was weak at the time and acted out of desperation. Attributing the attack to a more a dangerous North Korean risk-acceptance that was spawned out of desperation, Victor Cha argues that North Korea attacked Yeonpyeong Island out of weakness. This explanation reflects a common Korean proverb in which even a rat will choose to fight when it is cornered and has no hope. Victor Cha sites Prospect Theory as the reason for North Korea to rationally contemplate such a desperate action. According to Prospect Theory, as an actor’s situation worsens and hope dissipates, the tendency

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96 Ibid. p. 3.

for that actor to be risk-acceptant increases, and as an actor’s situation improves it tends to be more risk-averse.\textsuperscript{98} As a theory, this is a simple and sound concept; but, this paper argues that this theory fails to explain the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. North Korea’s situation is far from ideal, but for North Korea, the year 2010 showed signs of improvement.

According to Cha’s theory, North Korea would have been more risk-averse. This attack was not used to extract peace negotiations, with the expectation of aid, and a rational actor would not have been expected such an outcome from the hardliner ROK government of 2010. In fact, after the attack, North Korea did not seek concessions, indicating that its motive was not related to a state of weakness at all. The improvements seen in the North Korean position during 2010 makes it unlikely that the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was rashly decided upon from a state of desperation.

3) Seeking Independence from China:

A third explanation posits that North Korea attacked Yeonpyeong Island to extract concessions from Washington and Seoul. Andrei Lankov argues that North Korea manufactured this crisis “largely because they do not want to be too dependent on China which now is the nearly sole provider of aid.”\textsuperscript{99} Lankov explains that after losing patience with both the United States and South Korea’s strategic patience and general refusal to provide concessions for free, North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island. Lankov defines the year 2010 as a relatively good year for North Korea in terms of food strength, military funding, and the revelation of their new uranium enrichment program. Therefore, he argues, the desire to extract concessions from other parties came from a North Korean discomfort with being too dependent on China’s support. Although North Korea is uncomfortable relying heavily on China economically, trade with China has become more and more


commercialized, making it more costly for the Chinese government to extract leverage over North Korea. Commercialization has made it more costly to extract leverage since it would be damaging to Chinese domestic economic interests.

Lankov asserts that this incident was manufactured to grab the attention of both the United States and South Korea, ultimately aiming to make the policy of strategic patience less feasible as a diplomatic strategy. He asserts that “North Korean strategists chose to hit the weakest spots” of both Washington and Seoul. The November revelation of the highly enriched uranium program to the team of visiting American scientists, he explains, was meant to gain the attention of Washington. Meanwhile, Lankov identifies vulnerability within the South Korean economy as being related to this incident:

“[South Korea’s] efficient but out-ward-oriented economy depends on the whim of the international markets. Incidents like [the] Yeonpyeong Island shelling are likely to scare markets, which damages the economy, and voters are likely to eventually blame the government for this damage. The South Korean voters are remarkably indifferent to North Korea, but they are not going to be happy about economic troubles, so a government must know how to keep North Korean regime reasonable or face problems during the elections.”

Ultimately, he concludes, this incident was about convincing both Washington and Seoul never to ignore North Korea. However, North Korea rationally would not have expected the hardliners ruling the ROK at the time to be willing to pay for peace. It is worth noting that the concept of aid and concessions became very unpopular among the South Korean public during the Noh administration, and the conservative Lee administration was against the concept of softening its stance vis-à-vis the North. In fact, contrary to Lankov’s conjecture, the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling had the opposite affect, causing an unusually fiery public outcry calling


for retaliation in the South. This made the possibility of negotiations less likely than ever before to occur.

4) A New Assertiveness:
   Yoon Young-kwan’s article, “China’s North Korean Pivot.” Yoon asserts that China’s decision to provide generous economic aid in October 2009, despite North Korea’s second nuclear test, set a precedent for Chinese indifference towards North Korean behavior. He writes, “Immediately after the North’s second nuclear test in 2009, Chinese officials undertook a review of their country’s North Korea policy and decided to separate the nuclear issue from the overall bilateral relationship.” This led to a deepening economic relationship between the two countries; however, the North Korean leadership appeared to have interpreted “China’s policy as a sign of unwillingness to pressure the North on nuclear matters.” Yoon’s concept of China’s indifference to North Korean behavior and China’s willingness to continue to support North Korea after its bold 2009 nuclear test inspired this paper to explore the possibility of a new North Korean assertiveness, which may have arisen from this indifference. Ultimately, “China’s North Korea policy has entered a new stage” as a result of North Korea’s continued provocative behavior, and China has been willing to criticize North Korean behavior and the nuclear issue.

   Building from Yoon’s concept, Hypothesis 2 in this paper argues that the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling was the result of North Korea’s need to boost regime legitimacy, which produced a North Korean assertiveness. China’s economic channels of support are no longer one-sided, but have developed into the regime’s lifeline and are far too intricate to be cut. Ultimately, the hardened commercialized trade channels between North Korea and China have provided the state with more economic security; but this is only one of many factors contributing to North Korean stability.


103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.
3. Scholarly Contribution:

It is clear that many scholars have chosen to touch on the significance of the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling. However, as this is a recent case, the academic community still lacks in-depth analysis into the context of what actually happened on November 23, 2010. Scholarly exploration of North Korean motives underlying this incident has not moved beyond mere speculation. Because this event is recent, data is not as abundant as other cases. Nevertheless, this is a persistent challenge when dealing with anything pertaining to North Korea, and, the importance and value of an in-depth analysis of this case outweigh these shortcomings.

Moreover, I argue that enough information is available in first and secondary open source materials on previous Hoguk military exercises and the events leading up to the incident to proceed with this case study. Using modern electronic newspaper databases, enough time has passed for me to conduct a thorough frequency analysis using multiple newspapers. This paper utilizes multiple quantitative and qualitative content analyses of South Korean, North Korean and international newspapers as its data sources. This paper then asserts that an innovative combination of these sources, when combined with existing literature, makes a “building block” that will ultimately add to the understanding of North Korean military provocations, and, will hopefully help policy makers in managing stability on the Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{105}

As Andrei Lankov observes, this attack struck South Korea in an area of weakness. South Korea’s outward-oriented economy depends on the stability of the peninsula and “incidents like Yeonpyeong Island shelling are likely to scare markets, which damages the economy.”\textsuperscript{106} Therefore, grasping a better of understanding of the reasons and motivations behind this attack will greatly benefit not only the academic community, but also bring those in charge of maintaining the stability of the Northeast Asia region one step closer to understanding North Korea’s often destabilizing behaviour.


\textsuperscript{106} Ibid. p. 76-79.
IV. Descriptive Analysis of the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island Shelling

1. The Context of the Incident

This section aims to better understand the ‘key’ events of 2010 and how North Korea responded to those events in order to reconstruct the context of the Yeonpyeong Island incident. In this section, I evaluate the threat level of the 2010 Hoguk exercise and compare it to previous Hoguk exercise threat levels. Part of this process includes evaluating whether or not there were signs of North Korean premeditation. The source of North Korea’s decision to attack Yeonpyeong Island had to come from some event and/or a series of events that occurred in the time period leading up to November. Therefore, this chapter marks North Korea’s 2010 agitation levels as the main events leading up the Yeongpyong Island Shelling.

North Korea is well known for promulgating wordy complaints and protests against the ROK and the United States through its government-controlled media outlets. Essentially, the Rodon-Sinmun (Rodong Newspaper) and KCNA are the mouthpieces of the Kim family regime and one of the only legitimate peepholes the outside world has to peer inside the mysterious North Korean ‘black box.’ This section sequentially covers the events leading up to the November 23 incident as the contextual backbone for categorizing and analyzing the 2010 DPRK KCNA articles. This analysis focuses on both the frequency and content of all 2010 DPRK articles that either threatened, warned, or denounced the ROK for its behavior related to military exercises and/or the ROK’s reaction to the Cheonan Incident.

1) The Major Events of 2010:

The year 2010 was by no means uneventful for South-North Korean relations. This paper classifies the year 2010 as having thirty-three significant events in South-North Korean relations, including two North Korean live-fire artillery exercises, twenty-eight ROK related military exercises that caught the attention of the DPRK media, the sinking of the PCC Cheonan, the joint investigation team finding North Korea guilty of the sinking of the PCC Cheonan, and, finally the Yeonpyeong Island incident. To better understand the sequence of these events
leading up to the Yeonpyeong Island incident and the relationship of each event individually to the Yeonpyeong Island incident, it is useful to visualize the progression of events using a time line. The following is a breakdown of all of the major military exercises of 2010 in which North Korea publicly offered threats, warnings and/or denunciations:

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**2010 ROK, US, ROK/US AND DPRK MILITARY EXERCISES**

**ROK:** 27 MILITARY EXERCISES (6 BEFORE THE CHEONAN ANNOUNCEMENT, 21 AFTER)

**DPRK:** 2 ARTILLERY EXERCISES (1 BEFORE THE CHEONAN ANNOUNCEMENT, 1 AFTER)

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**January**
- January 27: DPRK conduct preannounced “time on target” artillery exercises in the West Sea.

**February**

**March**
- March 2-3: ROK air maneuvers.
- March 8-18: Key Resolve and Foal Eagle Exercises.

**April**
- April 15: ROK-US combined live firing exercise in Kyonggi Province.

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107 See Appendix E, titled “2010 ROK, US, ROK/US MILITARY EXERCISES.”


• ROK West coast field mobile exercise in the areas of Inchon and Puphyong.¹¹²
• May 13, 14, and 19: ROK military exercises in the Hwacheon.¹¹³

*May 20th joint investigation announcement that a DPRK torpedo sank the Cheonan. *

• May 24- June 1: ROK conducted field mobile exercises in Kangwon province.¹¹⁴
• May 27: ROK West Sea anti-sub drill in response to Cheonan incident.¹¹⁵

June
• June 1: ROK finished field mobile exercises in Kangwon province.¹¹⁶
• June 9-11: ROK military ground cooperation exercises in Chunchon and Hwachon.¹¹⁷
• June 14-18: ROK East Sea anti-sub drill in response to Cheonan Incident.¹¹⁸
• June 15-16: ROK staged large-scale land exercises in the areas of Koyang and Phaju, Kyonggi Provinces.¹¹⁹
• June 21-22: ROK tank and artillery live fire exercises.¹²⁰

July

- July 1 - August 1: RIMPAC combined (including the ROK) military exercises in Hawaii.\(^{121}\)
- July 25-28: ROK-US East Sea combined maritime and air exercise “Invincible Spirit.”\(^{122}\)

August

- August 1: US finish RIMPAC combined (including the ROK) military exercises in Hawaii.\(^{123}\)
- August 5-9: ROK West Sea anti-sub drills in response to the Cheonan.\(^{124}\)
- August 9: DPRK conducts unannounced “time on target” artillery exercises in the West Sea.
- August 16-26: ROK-US combined Ulji Freedom Guardian computerized command-and-control military exercises.\(^{125}\)
- August 30-31: ROK tank exercise in parts of Seoul and Kyeongi-do.\(^{126}\)

September

- September 5-9: ROK combined naval exercise in the West Sea.\(^{127}\)


- September 13-17: 2010 Hwarang Exercises in South Kyongsang Province.128
- September 14: ROK-US combined landing exercise at Wolmi Island, near Incheon.129
- September 16-18: ROK air force exercises.130
- September 27-October 1: ROK-US combined anti-sub exercises in the West Sea.131
- September 28: ROK-US combined air maneuvers.132

**October**

- October 1: ROK-US finish combined anti-sub exercises in the West Sea.133
- October 13-14: ROK ‘hosts’ the October 13-14 Busan PSI drill in response to Cheonan Incident.134
- October 15-22: ROK-US 8-day air defense exercise.135
- ROK-US CANCEL end of October combined anti-sub exercises that were to take place in the West Sea due to the November G-20 summit.136
November

- November 1-5: 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2010 ROK Hwarang Exercises.\(^{137}\)
- November 22-30: 2010 Hoguk Exercises.\(^{138}\)

The following represents the total number of 2010 KCNA articles denouncing the ROK for raising tensions in relation to military exercises and the Cheonan Incident. (The appendix titled “2010 Events and North Korea Reactions” should be referenced for more details.)

- 470 KCNA articles total from January 1 until November 23, 2010\(^ {139}\)
  - 106 of the 470 articles include ‘threats/warnings’
    - 38 against ROK military exercises
    - 38 against the findings of the Cheonan
    - 30 against both
  - 364 articles without ‘Threats / Warnings’
    - 138 against ROK military exercises
    - 178 against the findings of the Cheonan
    - 48 against both

Throughout the year 2010, up until the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, North Korea used the KCNA website to publish a stunning 470 articles denouncing the


\(^{139}\) See chart in Appendix F, titled “2010 Events and North Korea Reactions”
ROK for raising tensions on the Korean peninsula. Of those 470 articles, 106 issued direct threats/warnings against the ROK and/or the United States, demanding that they change their behavior. It would be expected that with the level of violence observed during the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island that the number of threats/warnings related to the 2010 Hoguk exercises would account for a large proportion of these 106 threats/warnings; but, North Korea only provided two public denunciations specifically mentioning the Hoguk exercises and did not include any specific threats or warnings. The only DPRK threat/warning in relation to the 2010 Hoguk exercise came at 0820, just hours before the incident. This threat/warning was not a public denunciation. Instead, it was a relatively private telegram, warning the ROK that it would not sit idly if the ROK were to fire into DPRK territorial waters during the scheduled military exercises.\(^{140}\) North Korea did not exert a proportional amount of effort into denouncing the 2010 Hoguk exercise; but it is possible that North Korea believed that it had already delivered a significant number of threats/warnings earlier in the year. It is plausible that at the time of the 2010 Hoguk exercises North Korea believed that the ROK had decided to ignore its threat or believed its threats were empty.

North Korea would have then been left with the decision of either revealing weakness by backing down or displaying strength in order to deter the ROK from ignoring its threats in the future. Exploring this scenario requires a break down of data denouncing the ROK in 2010, which were mined from the 2010 KCNA website. In the graph “North Korean 2010 Agitation Level Jan 1-Nov 23” (see below) a narrative of the events leading up to the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling is apparent. March is the first month in which North Korean agitation can be observed. March began with the large-scale ROK-US combined military exercises, known as Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, and ended with the March 26\(^{th}\) sinking of the Cheonan.\(^{141}\) The significant level of North Korean agitation in March was followed by a lull in activity for the entire month of April. Earlier in March, North


Korea was quick to announce two ROK plane crashes and an ROK helicopter crash, which had occurred during aerial maneuvers in early March. But, North Korea suspiciously failed to mention the March 26th sinking of the Cheonan until almost a month after the incident on April 17th.  

The climax of North Korea’s public outcries of agitation, without question, came during the month of June. June was a month filled with North Korean rhetoric, because it immediately followed the joint investigation team’s conclusion, announced on May 20th, that it was a North Korean torpedo that had struck the Cheonan, killing 46 South Korean Sailors. In the aftermath of the joint investigation team’s announcement, the ROK, often with the help of the US, responded by participating in twenty-one different military exercises, drills and maneuvers over the course of 187 days, stimulating 404 of the 470 total negative North Korean articles, including 89 articles involving threats/warnings within a six-month period.

**Figure 10: North Korean 2010 Agitation Level Jan 1-Nov 23**

![](chart)

However, there appears to be an inconsistency with the relationship between North Korea’s rhetoric and its use of violence. If the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island were truly defensive, as North Korea continues to claim, one would expect

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144 See Appendix F title “2010 ROK, US, ROK/US MILITARY EXERCISES”
to see an increase in the number of threats/warnings before an act of violence. However, in the months leading up to violent November 23<sup>rd</sup> incident, the number of threatening articles and the number of article’s denouncing the ROK’s actions and responses to the Cheonan incident continued to decrease, and the total number of negative articles for the month of November is lower than any other month since May. Following the climax of North Korea’s discontent in June, the number of articles denouncing the ROK’s military activities and/or its responses to the Cheonan, both with and without threats, began to steadily decrease. If it were not for the knowledge of the November Yeonpyeong Island Shelling, it would have been tempting to conclude from the “North Korean 2010 Agitation Level Jan 1-Nov 23” graph that tensions on the peninsula were decreasing. In reality, they were at a high enough level to warrant a premeditated attack by North Korea. Therefore, it is necessary to look for other indicators or sources of tension.

2) Exploring North Korean Reactions to the ROK’s Response to the Cheonan Incident:

There are 187 days between the May 20<sup>th</sup> announcement by the joint investigation team and the November 23<sup>rd</sup> Yeonpyeong Island Shelling. Within those 187 days, the ROK conducted and/or participated in twenty-one different military exercise, drills and maneuvers. After conducting a content analysis of the KCNA website’s 2010 past articles section, it can be confirmed that North Korea publicly both acknowledged and denounced each of these twenty-one exercises as ROK preparations and/or acts of war. If one takes into account the duration of each of the twenty-one military exercises, the ROK was involved in military exercises for 113 of the 187 days, or around 60 percent of the time between the May 20<sup>th</sup> announcement by the joint investigation team and the November 23<sup>rd</sup> incident. Given the heightened military presence during this period, it is important to look closely at the details of these specific exercises and the DPRK threats corresponding with them to see whether there were possible stimuli for agitation, tension and discontent.
Because of the unresolved controversies between North and South Korea over the legality of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the most sensitive location to conduct a military exercise in the Korean peninsula region is most certainly the West Sea near the five islands.\textsuperscript{145} The ROK conducted one West Sea exercise in May, one in August, three in September and one more in November. The 2010 Hoguk exercise were the last of the West Sea exercises, but they were interrupted on the second day of the nine-day exercise by the violent Yeonpyeong Island Shelling. Considering the ongoing territorial dispute in the West Sea over the NLL, the DPRK would consider any type of ROK military movements in the vicinity of the West Sea sensitive and suspicious. Therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct the number of North Korean negative responses corresponding to each exercise, with respect to each individual geographical location. Only then can the relationship between North Korea’s agitation levels and the potential sensitivities of each ROK military exercise be properly observed.

Table 2: ROK May 20- Nov 23 Military Exercises \textsuperscript{146}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location:</th>
<th>West Sea</th>
<th>East Sea</th>
<th>Korean Peninsula</th>
<th>(Other) Hawai\textsuperscript{i}, Busan</th>
<th>Not Specified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration of Exercise (days)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Exercises</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the chart above, “ROK May 20 - Nov 23 Military Exercises 1,” one can see the geographical distribution of the 113 days during which the ROK was involved in military exercises for the last half of 2010. The majority of days spent performing military exercises were on the Korean peninsula. However, three times

\textsuperscript{146} This graph was created using the data on threats/warning, which can be seen in Appendix F. The time line for military exercises can be seen in Appendix E.
as many separate military exercises, for twice as many days, were conducted in the West Sea compared to the number of exercises conducted in the East Sea. The Hoguk military exercise was one of these West Sea exercises. Therefore, given the distribution of the number of North Korean protests against these exercises, one would expect to see more articles denouncing the exercises located in more sensitive areas. This was not the case, however, as one can see in the chart below, titled “DPRK Agitation Relative to ROK Exercises 1,” which was created using content analysis from the KCNA website.

After mining all KCNA articles in relation to ROK military exercises, I recorded the number of times each military exercise involving the ROK was mentioned in a negative manner throughout 2010. The following chart reflects the date and location of the ROK exercise the number of times the DPRK directly mentioned each exercise in a Rodong-Sinmun article on the KCNA website.

Table 3: DPRK Agitation Relative to ROK Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROK Exercise Date (Duration)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of DPRK Threats/Warning/Denunciations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 22</td>
<td>East Sea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 2 – Mar. 3 (2 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 8 – Mar. 18 (11 days)</td>
<td>West Sea</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 15-16 (2 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10 – May 14 (5 days)</td>
<td>West coast</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13, 14 &amp; 19 (3 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 24 – Jun. 1 (9 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>West Sea</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 9 – Jun. 11 (3 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 14 – Jun. 18 (5 days)</td>
<td>East Sea</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 15 – Jun. 16 (2 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 21 – Jun. 22 (2 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 1 – Aug. 1 (32 days)</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>DPRK Protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 25 – Jul. 28 (4 days)</td>
<td>East Sea</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 5 – Aug. 9 (5 days)</td>
<td>West Sea</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 16 – Aug. 26 (11 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 30 – Aug. 31 (2 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5 – Sept. 9 (6 days)</td>
<td>West Sea</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 13 – Sept. 17 (5 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 14</td>
<td>West Sea</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 16 – Sept. 18 (3 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 27 - Oct. 1 (5 days)</td>
<td>West Sea</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 28</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 13 – Oct. 14 (2 days)</td>
<td>Busan</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 15 – Oct. 22 (8 day)</td>
<td>(Not Specified)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Oct (CANCEL)</td>
<td>West Sea</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1 – Nov. 5 (5 days)</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 22 – Nov. 30 (9 days)</td>
<td>West Sea</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Exercise Not Specified</td>
<td>(Not Specified)</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen above, not all ROK military exercises in the West Sea received a lot of attention from the North Korean press. The May 10 - 14 ROK military exercises, the May 27th ROK military exercises, the September 5 – 9 ROK military exercises, and the September 14th ROK-US combined military exercises were all conducted in the West Sea, but only received an average of 4.25 DPRK protests per exercise. In contrast, the KCNA protested the March 8 – 18 Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises sixty-one times, the July East Sea anti-sub drill forty-six times, the August Ulji Freedom Guardian exercise on the Korean Peninsula thirty-nine times, and the October PSI drill near Busan twenty-two times. In the year 2010, the top four ROK-related military exercises that were contested by the DPRK were all conducted in four different geographic locations. This raises doubt regarding the significance of the geographical proximity of the Hoguk exercise to North Korea and its 2010 military response.
3) Exploring the 2010 DPRK Threats/Warnings by Content: May - August

Now that the relationship between the location of the military exercises conducted between the May 20th announcement and the November 23rd Yeonpyeong Island incident have been investigated, the next step is to explore how these exercises correlate with the content of North Korea’s reactions over time. The line graph below titled “ROK Military Exercises vs. DPRK Threats Jan 1-Nov 23, 2010” provides a visualization of the number of DPRK threats issued per month versus the number of days the ROK spent per month involved in military exercises. The darker line graph only focuses on the more serious articles, which included threats and/or warnings against ROK actions.

At first glance, three significant points on the graph are evident. In May the two lines begin to diverge, and for the first time the number of threats and/or warnings issued by the DPRK was significantly higher than the number of days the ROK

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147 This graph was created using the data on threats/warning, which can be seen in Appendix F, and the time line for military exercises can be seen in Appendix E. It is important to note that the July 1- August 1 RIMPAC exercise was excluded since it was conducted in Hawaii. The ROK military did participate in the 2010 RIMPAC exercise and the DPRK denounced the ROK’s participation in four separate articles. However, the 32-day Hawaii exercise was removed from this graph in order to focus on purely ROK military exercises, which posed a more direct threat to the DPRK geographically. “US and S. Korean Forces Accused of Staging War Exercises.” KCNA, 12 July 2010. Web. 23 Aug. 2014. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201007/news12/20100712-09ee.html.
was spending conducting exercises. The next significant point on the graph is August, where there was a significant drop in the number of DPRK threats and/or warnings. For the first time since April, the number of DPRK threats and/or warnings fell below the number of days the ROK was spending involved in military exercises per month. The final significant point on the graph is of course the last data point. The divergence between these final points in time represents a snapshot of North Korea’s aggressive behavior vis-à-vis the ROK’s possible provocation(s) on the day of the November 23rd artillery incident.

Up until the month of May, the number of DPRK threats and/or warnings appear to correspond with the number of days the ROK spent involved in military exercises. In May, the number of threats and/or warnings issued by the DPRK’s KCNA website began to surpass the number of days the ROK spent conducting exercises, indicating a heightened period of North Korean agitation. Out of the twenty threats that the DPRK delivered in May, eighteen occurred in the short ten-day span between May 20th and May 31st, directly after the May 20th announcement of the findings from the joint investigation team. Therefore, the May 20th announcement served as the initial catalyst for the significant increase in DPRK threats and/or warnings and the first divergence of the two line graphs.

The next significant point on the graph is August. It is here that a crossover appears and the number of threats and/or warnings issued per month is once again significantly lower than the number of days in August that the ROK spent involved in a military exercise. Up until May, the ROK military calendar corresponded with North Korea’s level of agitation; however, as the ROK’s response gained momentum and as the Lee administration began to develop and implement the ROK’s hard response to the Cheonan Incident, a steady increase in ROK military exercise activity began. The United States was distracted with the large-scale combined RIMPAC exercises in Hawaii up until August. These large scale combined exercises involved the ROK, Australia, Chile, UK, Japan, Canada, Peru and other participating countries with the purpose of improving maritime offensive defensive combat, protecting sea lines of communications, providing training in
guided missile and torpedo launching, and conducting a maritime interdiction air assault and naval firing exercise.\textsuperscript{148}

The ROK conducted six different exercises on its own as an initial response to the Cheonan Incident. However, the thirty-two day RIMPAC exercises likely limited the initial capacity for the ROK-US militaries’ ‘combined’ allied response to just the four-day July 25 – 28 East Sea “Invincible Spirit” exercises. These exercises were originally scheduled to occur on June 4\textsuperscript{149}, but due to practical difficulties related to the mountainous logistics required to conduct a combined exercise, the US delayed the exercises until the end of July. Also, the location of the “Invincible Spirit” exercises was eventually moved from the West Sea to the East Sea due to Chinese protests in mid-July.\textsuperscript{149} The “Invincible Spirit” exercises only involved 8,000 military personnel; but, notably, it also included a US nuclear aircraft carrier, 20 warships, and over 200 aircrafts, such as the new F-22 raptors.\textsuperscript{150} North Korea paid close attention to the movements of this aircraft carrier, which was scheduled to participate in the 2010 Hoguk exercise. However, in October the US canceled all future involvement of US aircraft carries in any remaining 2010 Korea combined military exercises.\textsuperscript{151}

The next combined ROK-US response was the August 16 - 27 Ulji Freedom Guardian (UFG) combined exercises, which were ‘enhanced’ to a much larger scale. The UFG exercises were mostly limited to computerized command-and-control military exercises, requiring little troop movement; but, they did involve


30,000 US soldiers stationed in Korea, 56,000 ROK troops, and an additional 3,000 US troops based in the US. Moreover, the ROK conducted seven-days worth of additional exercises, divided over two separate occasions. This resulted in 20 days of ROK-involved exercises for the 31 days in August (65 percent). Compared to other months, August has the highest percentage value of days in a month that the ROK spent involved in exercises for the year 2010. However, August did not warrant the largest number of threats and/or warning from the DPRK. In fact, the time period between July and August shows the beginning of a decline in the number of DPRK threats and/or warnings vis-à-vis the ROK. This decline requires further investigation, considering that the average number of days that the ROK spent involved in military exercises was greater than 15 days per month (50 percent) from August to November in 2010. Before August the ROK averaged a mere six days per month (~18 percent) involved in military exercises in Korea. This was not a docile time period for either of the Koreas.

4) Exploring the Declining 2010 DPRK Threats/Warnings by Content: August – November

The heightened events surrounding the decline in DPRK threats and/or warnings vis-à-vis the ROK between 2010 August and November suggest that this decline did not indicate that the situation between the two Koreas was beginning to calm down. One must then consider the reason(s) motivating North Korea’s departure from using threats and/or warnings in favor of silence and action. Exploring the content of the DPRK July and August threats and/or warnings in greater detail is necessary to better understand this change in North Korea’s behavior. Specifically, it is important to determine whether the ROK failed to acknowledge an ‘ultimatum’ of any kind.153

The chart below titled “DPRK Total July-Nov 2010 Anti-ROK Art. 1” shows a breakdown of the basic types of DPRK threats and/or warnings and denunciations.

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/08/16/71/0301000000AEN20100816006700315F.HTML.

153 See Appendix G for a detailed timeline of all North Korean threats that were published in KCNA articles between July 2010 and November 23, the day of the Yeonpyeong incident.
that were published between July 2010 and November 23, 2010. Over this five-month period, there is a declining trend in both the number of DPRK threats and/or warning and the number of denunciations. In addition, 161 of the 246 anti-ROK articles (65 percent) were denouncing the ROK, US, and ROK-US military exercises. Forty-three of those 161 articles involved threats and/or warnings.

Table 4: DPRK Total July-Nov 2010 Anti-ROK Art.

Consistent with the previous graph, titled “ROK Military Exercises vs. DPRK Threats Jan 1-Nov 23, 2010,” August represents a turning point in North Korean reactions to ROK-involved military exercises. Although the number of days that the ROK spent involved in military exercises was relatively constant, with an average of 14 days per month, the DPRK became increasingly silent in its public protests, suggesting a change in the regime’s perception that it could influence South Korean behavior with mere threats. By the November 23rd Yeonpyeong Island Shelling, the number of anti-ROK articles had reduced from an average of 74 articles in July and August by 65 percent to a mere 26 articles in November. There was an additional shift by the beginning of August in the content of the articles. The majority of the threats, warnings, and/or denouncements began to

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**Table 4: DPRK Total July-Nov 2010 Anti-ROK Art.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Threat / No threat</th>
<th>Reaction- No threat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Ch</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August-10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September-10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November-10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Reference Appendix F for complete chart) This chart provides a break down of all anti-ROK articles in relation to the 2010 military exercise and the Cheonan incident published using the KCNA website by the DPRK. Each number in the chart represents the number of articles each month that qualified as a threat/warning or a denunciation without a threat relating to articles in relation to the 2010 military exercise and the Cheonan Incident.
focus less on protesting the ROK’s reaction to the Cheonan Incident and more on proclaiming that ROK military exercises were a provocation.

Analyzing the content of North Korea’s threats makes it possible to reconstruct a narrative of its demands. On July 16th North Korea issued a serious threat. North Korea was agitated that ROK-US combined anti-sub naval exercises, which had been delayed from the previous month, were still scheduled to take place at the end of July in the East Sea. The location had been changed from the West to the less sensitive East Sea, but the DPRK was especially attentive to the involvement of the USS George Washington, the US 97,000-ton nuclear powered aircraft carrier. On July 16th, the DPRK publicly warned the ROK-US not to proceed with the exercises:

“The army and people of the DPRK will never remain an onlooker to the projected provocative war maneuvers of the enemies. Should the group of traitors finally stage the above-said maneuvers together with the U.S., the army and people of the DPRK will consider them as a grave infringement upon its dignity and sovereignty and strongly react to them.”

The day before the July 25 - 28 exercises began, North Korea chose to confirm both this threat and its determination to act upon it. On July 24th and 25th North Korea publicized the following threats, outlined below under the title “2010 July 24 – 25 DPRK Anti-ROK Threats/Warnings.”

2010 July 24 – 25 DPRK Anti-ROK Threats/Warnings

July 24 (Threat, DPRK denounces upcoming ROK-US combined East Sea anti-sub military exercises in response to the Cheonan, the upcoming combined UFG exercises, upcoming West Sea joint anti-sub exercises, and other coming September drills.)

- “The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces will keenly realize what high price they will have to pay for their reckless military

provocation rendering the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the worst phase under the pretext of the ‘Cheonan’ case.”

July 24 (Threat, DPRK denounces upcoming ROK-US combined military exercises, which are in response to the Cheonan.)

- “The U.S. provocations amount to trespassing on the off-limits fixed by the DPRK and it, therefore, feels no need to remain bounded to the off-limits drawn by the U.S.”
- “It is the mode of the DPRK’s counteraction to react to sword brandishing in kind.”
- “The DPRK will bolster its nuclear deterrent in a more diversified manner and take strong physical measures as it had already clarified, now that the U.S. opted for military provocations, sanctions and pressure, defying the demand of the international community including the UN Security Council.”

July 24 (Threat, DPRK denounces upcoming July 25-28 ROK/US East Sea combined anti-sub military exercises that are in response to the Cheonan.)

- “There is no doubt that the enemies’ escalated military stand-off with the DPRK would compel the latter to reinforce its retaliatory measures to safeguard the supreme interests of the country and the nation.”
- “It is the steadfast mode of counteraction of the DPRK to return fire for fire. It never makes an empty talk.”

July 25 (Threat, DPRK denounces ongoing July 25-28 ROK-US combined East Sea anti-sub military exercises (which are in response to the Cheonan), the upcoming August 18-26 combined UFG exercises, upcoming West Sea combined anti-sub exercises, and all other drills to come in September.)

- “The army and people of the DPRK will take strong retaliatory measures with dignity by dint of their powerful nuclear deterrent, as a spokesman for

the DPRK National Defense Commission had declared in his statement, in
order to cope with the nuclear war exercises kicked off by the U.S.
imperialists and the south Korean puppet warmongers.”

- “They will start Korean-style sacred war for retaliation any time they
deeem it necessary. The DPRK has never made an empty talk.”

July 25 (Warning, DPRK denounces the results of the Cheonan investigation and
the upcoming ROK-US joint military exercises, which are in response to the
Cheonan.)

- “Lee Myung Bak is getting frantic in staging war exercises against the
DPRK while turning aside from the inter-Korean joint investigation, far
from making an apology for the case which failed to get recognition even
on the international arena, the statement said, declaring that it is the
unanimous will of the Korean nation to punish the Lee Myung Bak
dictatorial regime.”

The rhetorical line that North Korea drew was inevitably crossed with the onset
of the July 25 - 28 ROK-US “Invincible Spirit” combined anti-submarine exercises,
involving the USS George Washington, which were preformed as scheduled in the
East Sea. Once the ROK-US combined exercises began, the wording of the
North Korean threats and/or warnings began to newly describe retaliation as if it
were imminent, and the articles read less and less as attempts to modify the
behavior of the ROK government or military.

In the year 2010, up until July 24th, most North Korean threats and/or warnings
were not definitive and avoided drawing ‘lines in the sand.’ However, on July 24th,
after delivering three separate articles of threats in one day, the DPRK published an
article for the first time in 2010 warning that the DPRK “never makes empty

talk.” This same phrase was repeated again the next day after the DPRK published two more threats and/or warnings in an article titled “Will to Take Retaliatory Measures against Warmongers Declared.” The types of retaliatory measures were never defined, and at first glance, this appears to be a simple phrase. However, North Korea’s first article published after the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling used the same expression the day directly following the incident. In this November 24th article, North Korea declared that “the army of the DPRK took such a self-defensive measure as making a prompt powerful strike at the artillery positions from which the enemy fired the shells as it does not make an empty talk” as its first public explanation of its use of violence against the ROK. The first time the DPRK used the terminology “empty talk” was in conjunction with its July 24th reiteration of its July 16th threat against the ROK, should it choose to stage the July 25 – 28 ROK-US “Invincible Spirit” combined East Sea exercises.

After the “Invincible Spirit” combined exercises, the DPRK threats became more definitive, cursing the ROK for “defying our repeated warnings.” As can be seen below, the two threatening articles published on July 27th were uniquely clear and harsh.

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**2010 July 27th DPRK Anti-ROK Threats/Warnings**

July 27 (Threat, DPRK denounces ongoing ROK-US combined anti-sub exercises in response to the Cheonan and the upcoming combined UFG exercises.)

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“The army and people of the DPRK will decisively react to the enemies’ ‘demonstration of deterrent’ with more powerful and horrible deterrence built up by dint of Songun as already clarified.”

“It is the spirit and mettle of the DPRK to react to "force" in kind and foil sanctions in kind.”

July 27 (Threat, DPRK denounces ongoing July 25-28 ROK-US combined anti-sub exercises in response to the Cheonan and the upcoming UFG exercises.)

“The U.S. and the South Korean puppet group will keenly realize before long what a dear price they will have to pay for their reckless military provocations.”

Notably, on August 3rd the DPRK’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) command vowed to counter the ROK’s August 5 - 9 West Sea anti-sub drill with “physical retaliation.” The article was so black and white in its intention that the title was even named “KPA Command Vows to Counter S. Korean Drill by Physical Retaliation.” This same threat from the KPA command was reiterated again on August 6th. In this threatening article against the ROK, the DPRK stated, “The Command of Forces of the Korean People's Army in the western sector of the front clarified its resolute stance that it would react with strong physical retaliation to the anti-submarine drill to be staged by the group of traitors in the West Sea of Korea from Aug. 5.” Again, this threat did not question whether the ROK was going to follow through with the exercises, nor did it try to modify ROK behavior. It was essentially a clear statement that the KPA vowed to take physical retaliation against the ROK as punishment for ignoring its demands. It is important to note that these statements were occurring three months before the scale of the 2010 Hoguk exercise was to be announced, making it difficult to argue that an expansion


169 Ibid.

of the Hoguk exercises in 2010 may have caused North Korea to shell Yeonpyeong Island.

In the end, the ROK did carry out its five-day August anti-submarine drill in the West Sea.\(^{171}\) As a result, on August 5\(^{\text{th}}\) the KCNA scolded the ROK for “defying the DPRK’s notification of its resolute stan[ce] that it would counter the exercises with powerful physical counterstrike,” naming the ROK action as a “challenge” to their warnings.\(^{172}\) The day immediately following this article, on August 6\(^{\text{th}}\), a DPRK article quoting the commander of the KPA’s western forward sector “clarified its resolute stan[ce] that it would react with strong physical retaliation to the anti-submarine drill to be staged by the group of traitors in the West Sea of Korea from Aug. 5.” At this point, it still appears that the ROK was on the verge of seeing a strong physical retaliation from the KPA forces stationed in the southwest.

Indeed, on August 9\(^{\text{th}}\) at the end of ROK West Sea drills, the KPA fired 130 artillery rounds into the west, near the NLL.\(^{173}\) This could have been considered the KPA’s “strong physical retaliation” to the ROK anti-submarine drill, but, if it had been, North Korea would have certainly seized the opportunity and displayed it as a valiant stand against the ROK’s exercises and publicized this as retaliation and the people’s victory. On August 3\(^{\text{rd}}\) the DPRK alluded to upcoming firing exercises, warning that the “waters close to the five islets in the West Sea of Korea” should be cleared of all civilian ships and fishing boats. However, these 130 artillery rounds were never recorded by the DPRK in its newspapers, nor were they publicized as a signal of regime strength against the ROK. This is contrary to North Korea’s previous behavior after performing similar West Sea artillery exercises in January. With these August 9\(^{\text{th}}\) live-fire drills, this specific KPA action was not only kept quiet within the DPRK; the DPRK also continued its rhetoric of an


imminent physical retaliation and did not end at what the South Korean media had misinterpreted as the DPRK’s response to the ROK West Sea drills.

Perhaps, what the ROK media defined as a “North Korean provocation” was not a provocation at all, and North Korea’s silence was due to the fact that it was neither intended as a message nor as retaliation. Instead, it was just practice for the real strike. This supports Joseph Bermudez’s evidence that the August 9th artillery exercise was a chance for the KPA to iron out the difficulties of using “time-on-target” tactics in a surprise artillery strike. The timing and coordination required to efficiently conduct real life “time-on-target” tactics in the field is close to impossible to achieve without practice. The fact that the DPRK refrained from brandishing this artillery live fire drill as retaliation adds to the evidence that the August 9th KPA drill was in fact a dry run to ensure that the west coast KPA artillery batteries were proficient in coordinating the rounds of their initial strike. This would allow them to land simultaneously and inflict the greatest amount of damage, since those at the target locations would not have time to take shelter. Therefore, in line with Bermudez, I argue that this provocation was in fact preparation for the violent attack on Yeonpyeong Island and that this qualifies as evidence of North Korean preparation for an attack several months before the intention, scale, duration, or location of the 2010 Hoguk exercises had even been announced.

On August 15th, the day before the ROK-US 12-day Ulji Freedom Guardian combined exercises began, the DPRK boasted that they had reached their limit and again declared that an imminent attack was coming. The August 15th threat stated “now that the reckless war maneuvers targeted against the DPRK have reached their limit, the army and people of the DPRK will deal a merciless counterblow to

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the U.S. imperialists and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors as it had already resolved and declared at home and abroad.\footnote{177} On August 18\textsuperscript{th} this threat was then reiterated in the statement “the army and people of the DPRK will never remain an on-looker to the warmongers’ military provocation and war moves but deal unpredictable severe blows at the enemy strongholds any moment and from any place as they had already clarified.”\footnote{178} At this point it would be hard to imagine that the DPRK need for definitive retaliation was going to be satisfied by simply launching artillery rounds into the West Sea. These articles were being observed not only by the outside world; they also served as one of the sole sources of media to the people of the DPRK. Rhetorical lines were drawn in July, and action was promised throughout the month of August.

In September and October the number of DPRK articles with threats and/or warnings severely dropped to just 4–5 anti-ROK threats and/or warning per month. However, even though the frequency of the threats and/or warnings had decreased, the severity and graveness of the content of the articles remained the same, almost as if the DPRK grew tired of repeating itself. On September 30\textsuperscript{th}, the DPRK again ordered the ROK to stop its involvement in military exercises, and stated, “If the south side fails to immediately stop the provocations being perpetrated by it against the DPRK on the ground and in the sea, it will not be able to evade the responsibility for the ensuing disastrous consequences.”\footnote{179} This same message was reiterated again, a month later on October 29\textsuperscript{th} in a DPRK article warning that “the army of the DPRK will counter the South side's reckless provocative act of openly shunning the implementation of the inviolable bilateral agreement with a merciless physical retaliation.”\footnote{180} This final threat in October set the tone of ROK-DPRK relations during the month of November 2010. North Korea was still promising


physical retaliation, and the ROK was still crossing the fewer and fewer lines the DPRK was willing to publicly draw.

On October 24th, two days before the final DPRK threat was reiterated on October 29th, the ROK and US announced the cancelation of what was meant to be another large-scale combined West Sea military exercise, which had been originally planned to occur at the end of the month. The ROK-US forces decided to cancel the combined exercise, and the US announced that no more Korea exercises in 2010 would involve a US nuclear powered aircraft carrier, which had participated in previous combined exercises. This could be viewed as a gesture that the ROK and US aimed to alleviate tensions so that Seoul could host the 2010 G-20 summit in November. The cancelation of this large-scale military exercise could have easily been skewed as a ROK-US concession in the DPRK media, but again there was silence. Combined with the DPRK’s missed opportunity to play up the KPA August 9th live-fire artillery exercise, this is the second opportunity in which the KCNA could have chosen to de-escalate the situation and spin events as inspired victories. Instead, the DPRK denied this opportunity and chose to reiterate the threat of an impending “merciless physical retaliation.”

In the aforementioned graph, “ROK Military Exercises vs. DPRK Threats Jan 1-Nov 23, 2010,” November was defined as the final significant point in the year of 2010, because it was the month containing the greatest divergence between the number of times the DPRK threatened and/or warned the ROK and the number of days the ROK spent involved in military exercises. The August to November section of the graph projects the development of a North Korean silence relative to the number of days the ROK spent involved in military exercises. In November, the ROK planned to spend fifteen out of the thirty days in November involved in military exercises, but the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling interrupted their plan on the


182 Ibid.

seventh day of scheduled November exercises. Leading up to the November 2010 Hoguk exercises, North Korea reacted with a mere twenty-six articles denouncing the ROK, including the following three warnings:

**2010 November 1st – 23rd DPRK Anti-ROK Threats/Warnings**

November 1 ([Warning](#), DPRK denounced recent anti-DPRK maneuvers in relation to the findings on Cheonan as a farce.)\(^{184}\)

- “The DPRK has put forward various reasonable proposals for [diffusing] the tension between the north and the south and improving the inter-Korean relations and made every sincere effort to put them into practice.”
- “However, the South Korean authorities are working hard to harm the DPRK, persistently pursuing confrontation, and this is driving the situation into more uncontrollable catastrophe.”

November 2 ([Warning](#), DPRK denounces Cheonan findings as a farce.)\(^{185}\)

- “The U.S. and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors will never be able to escape the sledge-hammer blow of the times and history for their fabrication of the hideous charade unprecedented in the history of the Korean nation.”

November 17 ([Warning](#), DPRK denounces Cheonan findings as a farce.)\(^{186}\)

- “The South Korean authorities would be well advised to ponder over the fact that their reckless action against dialogue with the north is as foolish as lifting an axe to drop it on their own foot.”

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These warnings did not include conditional threats, but instead multiple statements implying that the ROK government was bringing what was coming upon itself, like dropping an “axe on their own foot.”

2. Analyzing and Comparing Past Hoguk Military Exercises:

On November 23rd 2010, a communiqué by the Korean People’s Army Supreme Command classified the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island as a reaction to South Korean provocative behavior. North Korea has officially framed this confrontation as a reaction to the Hoguk military exercise. Historically, the South Korean military exercises date back to 1988, and, until 2010 they had been conducted consistently without such violence. According to North Korea, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was in response to blatant South Korean military provocations conducted during these exercises. The claim that the 2010 Hoguk exercises were threatening enough to warrant such a response is worth an investigation. North Korea has made threats over military exercises before, but on this occasion it took action.

The shelling of Yeonpyeong Island cannot be considered lawful under the granted right of self-defense. A reaction that is defensive in nature does not have to qualify as legal self-defense, but a defensive reaction cannot be premeditated. According to the 1856 Law Dictionary definition, which was later adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States, the legal definition of premeditation is the following:

PREMEDITATION: [189]

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A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. By John Bouvier. Published 1856.
1. A design formed to commit a crime or to do some other thing before it is done.

2. Premeditation differs essentially from will, which constitutes the crime, because it supposes besides an actual will, a deliberation and a continued persistence, which indicate more perversity. The preparation of arms or other instruments required for the execution of the crime, are indications of premeditation, but are not absolute proof of it, as these preparations may have been intended for other purposes, and then suddenly changed to the performance of the criminal act. Murder by poisoning must of necessity be done with premeditation. See Aforethought; Murder.

For the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island to have been a defensive reaction and not a premeditated act, one would thus have to prove that there was a stimulus worthy of causing such a violent reaction from the DPRK. According to the above definition, signs of preparation of arms or other instruments required could be indicators of premeditation, but cannot serve as absolute proof.

This section analyzes the structure of Hoguk military exercises occurring in the years 2010, 2009 and 2008, measuring the scale, location, transparency and DPRK reaction to all three of these exercises (see Table 2 below). Table 2 attempts to cover all categories as mentioned above to measure the relative threat level of the 2010 Hoguk military exercise. First, the 2010 Hoguk military exercise was held in the more controversial West Sea, while the 2009 and 2008 Hoguk exercises were held in the less controversial East Sea. Table 2 further shows that the 2010 Hoguk exercises were at a larger overall scale compared to both the 2009 and 2008 Hoguk military exercises. Troop numbers alone for the 2010 Hoguk military exercise were 21 times greater than the 2009 Hoguk military exercise and seven times greater than the 2008 Hoguk military exercise. The 2010 exercise had 37 times more landing vehicles than 2009 and eight times more than in 2008. In terms of the number of helicopters, the 2010 exercise had about three times more than both the 2009 and 2008 Hoguk exercises. In light of the previously defined
categories, the 2010 Hoguk military exercise appears to have been conducted at a larger scale, which the North Korean regime was likely to have perceived as more threatening than years past. Such a threatening increase in scale may have been perceived as preparation for an invasion.

Table 5: 2010, 2009, 2008 Hoguk Exercise Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>ROK Units</th>
<th>US Units</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>70,000 Troops 600 Tracked Vehicles 90 Helicopters 500 Aircraft</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>West Sea of Korea</td>
<td>US Marine and US Navy participation was postponed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USS George Washington Nuclear Powered Aircraft carrier participation canceled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DPRK denounced the Hoguk Exercises as preparation for US invasion (Nov 16).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DPRK protested the US military exercise as a provocation to cause a new Korean war (Oct 27).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DPRK protested the previous use of the nuclear powered USS George Washington (Oct 27).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DPRK protested that the US should stop conducting aggressive military exercises (Oct 31).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,600 Troops 16 Landing Vehicles 27 Helicopters 36 Armored Assault Landing Vehicls (KAAV) 6 Tanks 176 other vehicles/ equipment</td>
<td>600 Marines 2 Landing Ships 29 CH-53E Helicopters</td>
<td>East Coast of Korea</td>
<td>DPRK defined the Hoguk exercise as a threat to the peninsula created by the US (Nov 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Announcements</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>DPRK protested the US-ROK reckless war moves (Oct 30).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occurrence</td>
<td>October 29</td>
<td>DPRK protested against the South Korean Warmongers and US-ROK military exercises as moves to scare the DPRK (Nov 1: 2 Articles).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Start</td>
<td>October 29</td>
<td>DPRK protested US-ROK Hoguk exercise (Nov 3: 3 Articles).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finish</td>
<td>November 8</td>
<td>DPRK protested Hoguk exercise (Nov 4: 1 Article).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10 days)</td>
<td>DPRK protested ROK Hoguk exercise (Nov 6: 1 Article).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DPRK protested Hoguk exercise (Nov 7: 1 Article).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DPRK protested Hoguk exercise (Nov 8: 1 Article).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Yet, there are several significant inconsistencies with an argument claiming that the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was a defensive reaction. Specifically, inconsistencies related to the transparency of scale, location, and intention of the exercises are worth discussing. The level of transparency was not only maintained, but, when compared to the previous exercises the 2010 Hoguk exercise was additionally announced with a weeks advanced notice (as opposed to just days before the beginning of the exercise). Transparency in the purpose, location and intention of the 2010 Hoguk exercises, therefore, improved greatly compared to the 2009 and 2008 exercises. The second inconsistency is the absence of US troops in the 2010 Hoguk military exercise. The mass increase in scale was in terms of ROK forces only, while US participation was significantly reduced and almost removed. Not only was the scale of US forces involved reduced greatly, but this reduction also was announced transparently via public broadcast. The final inconsistency is the most significant of all. If the 2010 Hoguk exercise was both significantly larger in scale and threat and significantly more transparent, then why was the 2010

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190 See Appendix D

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Hoguk military exercise ignored for nearly a week and only protested on two occasions, once on the day of the announcement and once on the 22nd of November?

The 2008 Hoguk military exercise was around two to three times the scale of the 2009 Hoguk military exercise; therefore, one would expect to see an increase in the scale of protest. Yet, the 2008 Hoguk exercise received two to three times as many articles protesting the exercise. The 2009 Hoguk military exercise (the smallest of the three) warranted three scathing Rodong Shinmun articles without violence erupting, and the 2008 Hoguk military exercise warranted eleven scathing Rodong Shinmun articles without violence. The 2010 Hoguk military exercise, on the other hand, only warranted two Rodong Shinmun articles, one of which came with less that 24 hours notice before the beginning of the exercise. If the DPRK really felt threatened by the transparency of the coming exercise, then why did it squander a weeklong opportunity to protest? What did it know that it was not telling the public?

In conclusion, the 2010 Hoguk military exercise was significantly more threatening than both of the previous year’s Hoguk military exercises. Despite the fact that the 2010 exercise was significantly more threatening in the scale of ROK forces and was conducted in a more sensitive location than in both 2009 and 2008, the presence of US soldiers was significantly reduced and the level of transparency of proposed US and ROK forces’ actions was greatly increased. It is plausible to believe that the 2010 Hoguk military exercise could have been perceived as a larger stimulus, but the fact that the DPRK failed to react in a timely and symmetrical manner, as measured by their protest to the 2008 and 2009 exercises, raises suspicion as to their innocence. North Korea is never silent on such issues and is usually quick to comment immediately on any ROK military movements. If the regime’s intention had truly been to avoid confrontation, then there would have been a more boisterous reaction beginning with the initial announcement of the 2010 Hoguk exercise on the 16th of November. North Korea’s apparent calculated silence parallels that of a hunter’s silence in observing a snare. These inconsistencies in North Korea’s reaction to the significantly larger, yet, significantly more transparent 2010 Hoguk exercise, combined with Bermudez’s observed preparation, leave this paper to conclude that sufficient signs of
premeditation do exist. Therefore, further analysis of North Korea’s possible motives is warranted.

The largest inconsistency is apparent in North Korea’s failure to react symmetrically towards the larger scale of the 2010 Hoguk exercise. This silence primed the domestic North Korean audience for a manageable and purposeful shock. If North Korea had chosen to strike at the climax of its threat delivery in July, when its domestic agitation was manufactured to be at its highest levels in 2010, the resulting fear and expectation of imminent war would have been impossible to back out of.

North Korea used the relative silence to cool down the domestic feelings of imminent crisis for three specific reasons. The silence made the incident more unexpected and prepared the public to believe that the act was righteous and an act of self-defense. With the level of fear and hysteria in the news reduced, the act could then be perceived as an act of strength rather than an act of fear or desperation. It removed the possibility that the domestic audience would perceive that North Korea had been cornered into a position of weakness. Finally, the silence reduced the level of public agitation enough so that the regime could strike the ROK without the immediate public expectation of an all-out re-initiation of the Korean War. The premeditated silence effectively bought the regime time to manufacture a lasting positive impression of the Kim regime without having to reduce a public outcry for war. The act could then be portrayed by KCNA as a moment of gallantry and strength, not only legitimizing the artillery strike, but also the Kim regime itself.

Despite the evidence that the scale of the 2010 Hoguk exercise increased significantly, the evidence of inconsistencies in North Korea’s response combined with evidence of North Korea’s preparation for an attack several months before the intention, scale, duration, or location of the 2010 Hoguk exercises had even been announced makes the North Korean claim that the attack was merely in response to a South Korean ‘provocation’ highly unlikely. Therefore there is not sufficient support for hypothesis 1. In Chapter 5, hypothesis 2, positing that ensuring the successful succession of Kim Jung Un by boosting regime legitimacy was a key motivation for this attack, will be explored in further detail.
V. Succession and Boosting Regime Legitimacy

1. Foundations of Regime Legitimacy and How it Affected Kim Jung Un’s Succession

According to Park Han S. (1998) the basis of regime legitimacy for North Korea is not based on the satisfaction of basic human need, economic prosperity, or human rights defined as civil rights. Instead the foundation of the Kim regime’s legitimacy is drawn from and anchored in the ideology of Juche (national self-reliance), as opposed to economic prosperity or political freedom.\(^\text{191}\)

Transition periods are always difficult periods for authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. So, for the Kim regime, which does not base its legitimacy on the public satisfaction of basic human needs and economic prosperity, the need to reinforce alternative sources of legitimacy is absolutely critical during the process of succession. Kim Jung Il’s health quickly deteriorated after suffering a severe stroke in 2008, and he was forced to face the realities of boosting his regime’s legitimacy to secure his son’s legacy as the next leader of the DPRK. In 2008, the North Korean government was far from capable of providing prosperity for its people. Kim Jung Il was unable to supply his son with more conventional forms of legitimacy to create a smooth transition of power, and so, he had to construct regime legitimacy for Kim Jung Un’s succession. This is a return to what Rudiger Frank has deemed North Korean ‘socialist neo-conservatism.’\(^\text{192}\)

This chapter then argues that the Yeonpyeong Island attack was a premeditated attack that provided a necessary platform to boost regime legitimacy and to justify a return to an anti-foreign doctrine, particularly an anti-South-Korea doctrine. This continued perception of a hostile environment provides the unique and crucial context required for the Kim regime to warrant its own position of power, despite its failure to meet the basic needs of its people.


1) Foundations of Kim Regime Legitimacy

Regime legitimacy for the DPRK has long been anchored in the ideology of *Juche*, instead of economic prosperity or political freedom. According to Park Han S., “The ideology of *Juche* with nationalism and self-reliance has worked as a salient basis of regime legitimacy in the unique context of the inter-Korea confrontation.” 193 Multiple factors have contributed to the creation of such a doctrine, but the unique context of the inter-Korea confrontation provides reason for the regime to utilize *Juche* as a means by which to circumvent the common rule that human needs and rights must be satisfied for a regime to claim legitimacy. The perpetuation of this unique form of regime legitimacy is continued by the very existence of an imminent threat from a U.S.-backed South Korea, which poses a direct challenge that must constantly be discredited in favor of Korean nationalism, a socialist economy, a closed system, self-reliance, and spiritual determinism. 194

Praised as the liberator who fought for independence from Japanese colonial oppression, Kim Il Sung exploited the resulting anti-Japanese sentiment to suggest that all foreign powers are essentially imperialistic in nature. The existence of South Korea as an ever-present enemy that Pyongyang has had to defend itself against has played a key role in the construction of the Kim regime’s legitimacy as the righteous antithesis of South Korea. South Korea’s economic success was rooted in its system of “capitalism, ideological pragmatism, dependence on alliances for defense, reliance on the world market for economic developments, and social openness” with the international community in contrast to the Kim regime’s *Juche* ideology, which defies capitalism, pragmatism, foreign dependence and an open system of communication. 195

Instead, the Kim regime sought legitimacy through its teachings of self-reliance, by promoting a North Korean brand ethnocentric nationalism, economic self-subsistence, self-defense and a closed or contained social system that protects

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194 ibid, p. 230.

195 ibid, p. 228.
citizens from the influence of foreign imperialist powers. The Juche ideology makes “concerted efforts in instilling into the masses a belief which defies material prosperity as the symbol of success,” and that human dignity “has little to do with economic material or material life. In opposition to capitalism, Juche teaches that prosperity and material abundance is a trap in which human dignity can be lost.\textsuperscript{196}

Even at the height of the food shortage that occurred in 1997, the regime was pragmatic in terms of accepting food aid, but ultimately refused to give in to foreign pressures to open up to the world, “thus avoiding the danger of exposing the people to ‘unhealthy’ external stimuli.”\textsuperscript{197}

Park Han S. thus prescribes two ways for the Kim regime to maintain its legitimacy. First, the regime must preserve the unique setting of domestic and external environments, including the perpetuation of political education, the belief in the cult of personality, the control of information at all levels of society and the presence of external hostility. Second, the long-term deprivation of basic needs and rights cannot be prolonged indefinitely. These basic needs must be met in order for the ‘unique setting’ of the domestic and external environments to be preserved to a satisfactory extent.\textsuperscript{198}

2) North Korea’s Return to Socialist Neo-conservatism

According to Rudiger Frank (2012), tension on the Korea peninsula is only partially related to the type of government in Seoul. Rather, regime insecurity plays a key role in whether or not the Kim regime emphasizes strength and/or a hardline concerning both the economy and foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{199}

Frank performed several frequency analyses using North Korean media to point out quantitative trends between North Korea’s domestic attitudes and its foreign policy. For example, the frequency with which the North Korean media


\textsuperscript{197} ibid, p. 228.

\textsuperscript{198} ibid, p. 34.

used the terms ‘socialism’ and ‘juche’ declined between the years 1997 and 1998 and again after the year 2000, but began to increase again in 2005. This phenomenon can be observed in the graph below titled “Use of Key Ideological Terms in KCNA Article, 1997-2010.”

Figure 12

Frank argues that beginning in 2008, when Kim Jung Il’s health began to deteriorate and caused a crisis of insecurity for the Kim regime, the spirit of reform in North Korea was replaced by intensified neo-conservative values aimed at framing South Korea as a threat to the regime.

Beginning in 2008, the North Korea media began to target South Korea and the frequency with which the words ‘puppet’ and ‘traitor’ were used drastically increased and was the dominant language used to describe the ROK. This pattern can be observed in the graph below titled “Frequency of KCNA Articles with Typical Pejorative Terms Used for South Korea, 1997-2010.”

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North Korean rhetoric had returned to levels of negativity towards South Korea similar to the time period before Kim Dea-jung and his ‘Sunshine Policy.’ This trend may appear at first glance to be a trend of displeasure with the conservative Lee administration; but, Kim Jung Il’s deteriorating health and the pressure of managing a hastened succession provides context to support the possibility that North Korea was in fact publicly exploiting the recent 2008 downturn in inter-Korea relations to boost regime legitimacy. Consistent with Park Han S.’s position discussed in the previous section, “the unique context of the inter-Korea confrontation” is one of the main reasons the Kim regime is able to maintain its legitimacy without providing satisfaction in terms of basic human needs and economic prosperity.202

The foundation of the regime’s legitimacy relies constantly on xenophobia, Korean nationalism and an anti-foreign doctrine to educate its populace as why integration with the rest of the world would ultimately lead to subjectification and must be avoided at any cost. With this return to negativity towards South Korea, anti-Japanese sentiment again was mined and exploited beginning in 2008. This

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rise in North Korea’s anti-Japanese rhetoric can be seen in the graph below titled “Frequency of KCNA articles with the term anti-Japan(ese), 1997-2010.”

The guerilla fight against the Japanese during the Japanese colonial period has always served as one of Kim Il Sung’s main sources of legitimacy and has been passed down through the Kim family by way of the preservation of anti-Japanese sentiment. According to Frank, considering North Korea’s duel crisis occurring from 2008 to 2010, “It seems understandable that these key issues for legitimacy are being promoted.”

Ultimately an increase in the frequency of KCNA articles mentioning the words “traitor” and “puppet” in reference to the ROK or with the term “anti-Japan(ese)” during the years 2008 and 2010 can be explained by two factors. North Korea has a tendency to report more on its enemies than its allies, and therefore this frequency increase was due to a deterioration of inter-Korean relations and DPRK-Japan relations. Another explanation is that the source of this increase is in North Korean domestic politics. Considering the likely insecurities and uncertainties related to both Kim Jong Il’s health and the unresolved succession issues during 2008-2010, it is highly likely that North Korea exploited

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declining inter-Korean relations to boost its legitimacy, which would have been necessary for the regime to stay in power for the remainder of Kim Jung Il’s life and into Kim Jong Un’s rise to power. This is all connected to the Yeonpyeong Island shelling.

2. Consolidating Power
The following section covers purges by the North Korean government dating from 1976 to September 2011. Events occurring in North Korea are never transparent, but it is clear that purges play a large role in the maintenance of the DPRK state’s central control system and authoritarian regime. Purges were and have been heavily used in Kim Il Sung’s ruthless rise to power, the construction of the cult of personality built around the Kim family, and in the alignment for succession from Kim Jong Il to his son, Kim Jong Un.

North Korea first emerged under the leadership of Kim Il Sung as a totalitarian state. Like most totalitarian leaders, Kim Il Sung was a revolutionary and was intensely committed to building a new order using an all-encompassing ideology. Totalitarian states do not tolerate pluralism or opposition and regularly and systematically purge those individuals who may pose as an obstacle to its revolutionary aims. Kim Il Sung’s history of purges began with his initial rise to power. Kim Il Sung was an outsider because of his experiences abroad as a guerrilla fighter. Kimilsungists used his experience fighting the Japanese to label opposition factions as Japanese “collaborators” to tactically purge domestic rivals. 205 “The Kim Il-song regime was merely following the basic patterns established by Stalin in the 1930s and pursued after 1945 by various Easter European Communist elites. Those who lost the battle for power in Communist states of this era general found their national as well as their class loyalty impugned.” 206

According to Oberdofer, “Kim Il-sung systematically purged his political opponents, creating a highly centralized system that accorded him unlimited power

and generated a formidable cult of personality.” Kim Il-sung consolidated his power in the 1950’s using purges to remove all domestic challengers and to make room for the Communist Party’s monopoly of politics under a totalitarian model. By liquidating any opposing factionalism, he was able to create a streamlined elite of likeminded revolutionaries. It removed those who had dared to disagree and provided a structure of loyalty laced with the fear of being labeled an enemy of the state (i.e. an enemy of Kim Il Sung). Kim Il Sung “followed the totalitarian model’s expectation for a permanent purge,” and he used these purges as a way to prevent diverging views from ever advancing or undermining North Korea’s system of centralized control. Kim’s control of the state was based upon the important role of the party, ideology, continual purges and a command economy. His son Kim Jong Il followed in his footsteps when it came to his succession.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: PURGES DURING KIM JONG IL’s SUCCESION PROCESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


210 Asia Times “Recalled to life in Pyongyang,” Andrei Lankov, April 15, 2011 http.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987-1988</td>
<td>Military Officers</td>
<td>Mass Purge</td>
<td>Purge of military officers occurred for unknown reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>600 Military</td>
<td>Mass Purge</td>
<td>Mass purge of six hundred officers in the wake of an alleged coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995, Fall</td>
<td>KPA Sixth Corps</td>
<td>Mass Purge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>So Kwan-hi</td>
<td>Party Secretary of Agricultural Affairs</td>
<td>Public Execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Top Intelligence Leaders</td>
<td>Mass Purge</td>
<td>Purge of top intelligence leaders following the introduction of military first politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Yong-ryong</td>
<td>Deputy head of State Security Department</td>
<td>Executed (Mass Purge)</td>
<td>Executed on trump-up charges after voicing opposition to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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211 Asia Times “Recalled to life in Pyongyang,” Andrei Lankov, April 15, 2011 http.
214 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p 374.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kwon Hui-gyong</td>
<td>Former ambassador to the USSR and the director of the Party’s Central Committee on External Information Collection Department</td>
<td>Exiled (Mass Purge)</td>
<td>One of the leaders purged for disagreeing with military first politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jang Song-taek</td>
<td>1st Vice-Director of the Guidance Division</td>
<td>Purged but re-appointed as the First Vice Director of the Guidance Department in 2006</td>
<td>Reportedly purged after he tried to build up a military faction to put his own son in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jang’s Relatives and aides</td>
<td>Mass Purge</td>
<td>~80 top officials and their family members were reportedly sent to North Korea’s Gulag in the largest purge in a decade; The exact fate of other family members unclear as of early 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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217 ibid. p 92.
218 ibid. p 94.
| **Jang Song-u**  
(Jang’s Eldest Brother) | KPA vice marshal and commanded the Third Army Corps which surrounds the city of Pyongyang | Purge  
*(Victim of Jang’s Mass Purge)*[^221] |
| **Jang Song-yop**  
(Jang’s Second-eldest Brother) | Vice Director of the Kim Il-sung Higher Party School | Purge  
*(Victim of Jang’s Mass Purge)* |
| **Jang Song-gil**  
(Jang’s Younger Brother) | Lt. General and tank commander | Purge  
*(Victim of Jang’s Mass Purge)* |
| **Jang Song-ho**  
(Jang’s Youngest Brother) | Political Vice President of the Mangyongdae Revolutionary School | Purge  
*(Victim of Jang’s Mass Purge)* |
| **Kim Chul**  
Former President of Jangsaeng Trading Company | Arrested and died during the preliminary trial | Executed, charged for illegal sales of iron to South Korea[^225] |
| **Multiple Businessmen** | Multiple Executions  
*(Mass Purge)* | Charged for food price manipulation, Lee Hongchun as well as five branch |

[^221]: ibid.
[^222]: ibid.
[^223]: ibid.
[^224]: ibid.
[^225]: North Korea Today No. 419 September 7, 2011
store directors in Chungjin, North Hamgyong Province were executed.; Other executions not open to the public happened throughout the nation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lee Hong-chun</td>
<td>Sales director of Chungjin Branch, Namgang Trade Company</td>
<td>Executed (Mass Businessman Purge)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1973 we saw Kim Jong-il’s introduction into the political scene and from then on the system was carefully groomed for his succession. Purges have played a central role in the Kim Regime’s consolidation of power, which can be seen in the chart above. In order to secure Kim Jong Il’s succession, purges began as early as 1976. Preparations for succession intensified in the 1980’s as he became the supreme leader in waiting at the Sixth Party Congress, but his succession was not met without opposition. Therefore, father and son together had to clear the way for his rise to power. The security apparatus was strengthened by Kim Jong Il and was used as means to purge all those who opposed his succession. “Kim Jong-il demonstrated an early willingness to use not only targeted purges but also arbitrary repression to assert his power even when his specific goals were not clearly formed.”

In Kim Jong Il’s rise there were certainly aggressive movements to establish his dominance. Kim Jong Il’s regime was considered a post-totalitarian era for North Korea, but he still held a firm grip on his authoritarian method of rule. Kim Jong Il, like his father, maintained a strong security apparatus; but he utilized a balance of

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226 ibid.
227 ibid.
both rewards and purges/punishments to repel possible divergent ideas. In the 1990s, Kim Jong Il purged military and intelligence leaders to make way for military-first politics. In many ways, he followed in his father’s footsteps to maintain his power. The people of North Korea lack any form of civil society and continually must face purges and widespread repression. The post-totalitarian institutional state retains its roots in totalitarianism by continuing to use “arbitrary terror and regular purges to instill fear and anxiety in elites and masses alike.”

The legitimacy of Kim Jong Il’s succession was secured using over 20 years of purges. However, Kim Jung Un did not have the luxury of time to do whatever was necessary to solidify his rule. Kim Jung Un’s succession required a faster way to boost regime legitimacy, enough to absorb any underlying uncertainties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Fate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010 March</td>
<td>Lim Bong-yool</td>
<td>Senior Military Official</td>
<td>Executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 March</td>
<td>Pak Nam-gi</td>
<td>Director of the Workers Party’s Planning and Finance Department</td>
<td>Executed over the currency reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 July</td>
<td>38 Family and Relatives of Pak Nam-gi</td>
<td>Mass Purge: the wake of Pak Nam-gi’s currency reform</td>
<td>Most known to have died after being transferred to labor detention centers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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232 ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Title/Role</th>
<th>Execution/Replacement Reason</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>Kim Yong-sam</td>
<td>Minister of Railways</td>
<td>Executed on espionage charges</td>
<td>Chosun Ilbo, “2 Senior N.Korean Apparatchiks Executed,” April 4, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>Mun Il-bong</td>
<td>Finance Minister</td>
<td>Executed over botched 2009 currency reform</td>
<td>Asia Times “Recalled to life in Pyongyang,” Andrei Lankov, April 15, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MD15Dg01.html">http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MD15Dg01.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>Hong Sok-hyong (Age 73)</td>
<td>North Korean regime’s chief economic planner</td>
<td>Disappeared</td>
<td>North Korea Today No. 422 September 28, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea Today No. 422 September 28, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Executive Action</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011, ~Sept</td>
<td>90% of Ministry of Foreign Trade officials</td>
<td>Mass Purge</td>
<td>Vice Min. and Councilor &amp; ~90% of officials in the MOFTT are being replaced; 7 officials at the general manager level were dismissed.²⁴⁰</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ri Ryong-nam, Minister of Foreign Trade</td>
<td>Purged (Mass Purge)</td>
<td>Made an example by the Central Party for negligence of duty.²⁴¹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANYONE: government officials, politicians, military officials, &amp; civilians under scrutiny; Investigation targeted anyone, therefore the number of people found to have engaged in illegal activities was</td>
<td>Cell phones, brokers for illicit border crossing, ROK errand runners, &amp; drug dealers (Mass Purge)</td>
<td>Crack down aimed at unauthorized communication with overseas; targeting unregistered phones, officials no longer take bribes, no exceptions.²⁴²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁴¹ ibid.
As Kim Jong Il’s health faded in late 2008, North Korea was forced to either ramp-up the process of succession or face the possibility of instability. Kim Jong Un’s succession followed an aggressive establishment of dominance that was similar to his father. As can be seen above, Kim Jong Un’s political beginnings correlate with the purges and crackdowns on dissent seen during his initial succession process. According to the Chosonilbo, "Kim Jong-un implemented ‘a reign of terror using military and public security agencies…’ and conducted an all out purge of ‘senior officials who pose a hurdle to his succession.’" Kim Jong Un initiated a hardline crackdown on "anti-socialist" trends, such as the possession of South Korean music and TV series contraband. Kim Jung Un also began to become more deeply involved in the organizational and personnel matters of the State Security Department and the Ministry of Public Security. As Kim Jong Un became a more prominent public figure, public executions, in comparison to 2009, tripled in 2010 to about 60. Simultaneously the regime began a massive hunt for potential defectors and created a special mobile force armed with riot gear to manage any hint of a popular uprising. It appears that purges then continued to be a widely used method for Kim Jong Un to consolidate and legitimate power, strengthen the cult of personality, and maintain the regime’s centralized control. However, despite the purges related to Kim Jung Un’s succession and the striking increase in public executions, this was not enough to make up for his lack of time, a vital resource. Kim Jung Un’s succession required more active methods for boosting his regime’s legitimacy.

2010 displayed not only an increase in North Korean political purges and public executions, but also an extreme drop in the number of North Korea defectors recorded by the ROK Ministry of Unification. As seen below in the figure titled “figure 2-1 (MOU),” the record number of defections in the year 2009 was part of a steady increase since 2005, indicating a possible increase in public dissatisfaction.

with the regime. However, in 2010 the number of defections steadily declined, indicating an influential event during that time. This is of course the year of the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling. In the three years following the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the number of annual defections decreased by 51 percent, at a much steeper rate than it had risen organically. Regardless of whether this was a consequence of a crackdown or because the situation in North Korea improved for its people, this is an indicator that an active campaign to consolidate power and legitimacy was initiated in 2010.

In 2010 there were indeed active North Korean campaigns to tighten the control over the population. According to the US State Department’s 2010 Human Rights Report on the DPRK, North Korea began the year 2010 with a 50-day-long crackdown on defections in January. The regime at that time had been consolidating its control over its population. This type of crackdown can be viewed as the regime’s attempt to regain its footing in its domestic environment by conducting an active campaign against defections to the ROK.

The graph below titled “Figure 2-1 (MOU)” is a good representation of the results of this campaign, which was likely related to the 2010 succession process. Before 2010, the North Korea regime, in terms of its domestic control over its population, was weak enough to cause problems related to succession. The rate of North Korean defectors serves as one indicator of the Kim regime’s ability to control the population, and thus is related to legitimacy in North Korea, as outlined in previous chapters. A high rate of defection indicates a high level of public dissatisfaction, and it also represents the regime’s inability to combat defection. Since 2005, the number of defectors arriving in the ROK (not accounting for the number of defectors crossing the Chinese boarder) was steadily rising until it reached its peak in 2009 at nearly 3,000 North Korean defectors entering the ROK per year. The high rate of defection in 2009 indicates that the North Korean regime’s control over the population was relatively weak until 2010. However, as can be seen in the aforementioned graph, the year 2010 was a turning point. With record levels of defection in 2009, the beginning of Kim Jung Un’s succession process, the North Korean regime likely had no other choice but to use force to
turn the tides in its favor, leading to crackdowns on defection at the beginning of 2010.

The crackdowns in January were followed by a decree by the Ministry of Public Security, stating that the crime of defection would be treated as treason and could be punished by execution. These are all indicators of an active campaign to combat possible political instability to improve domestic acceptance of the transition of power to come. The regime, therefore, appropriated the threat of violence to improve its domestic control, making its regime legitimacy incontestable.

![Figure 15](image)

**Figure 15**

Ultimately, the evidence indicates that the Kim regime managed to improve its control over the population during the year 2010. Over the following two years the number of people fleeing North Korea dropped at an uncannily steep rate. Somehow the Kim regime had boosted its control over its population in 2010, likely utilizing its state security apparatus. However, using the state security apparatus as a tool to force the population to accept its authority was only a short-term solution and cannot be the only answer to the North Korean regime’s need to

boost its legitimacy. The regime must have boosted its legitimacy in other aspects to justify the succession.

3. Yeonpyeong Island as a Propaganda Tool

The month of November was dominated by two prominent public events, which were manufactured by the North Korean regime to boost its legitimacy. According to Andrei Lankov, the “new and shiny uranium enrichment facility” presented to the visiting American scientists in November 2010 demonstrated that the North Korean military was far from being at a deficit.\(^{246}\) Instead, November was designated as the chosen month in 2010 to re-define South Korea as an actual outside threat, to demonstrate North Korean military prowess, and ultimately, to boost the North Korean regime’s legitimacy.

The purpose of strengthening military prowess is two-fold. Military strength can serve as an effective deterrent to outside threats, and, it can also increase domestic security by contributing to public perceptions that the state can defend its people and territory. The latter effect, however, requires first a public perception of danger, or, what Park defines as the unique context of inter-Korean conflict.\(^{247}\)

In chapter four, I placed the tension between South and North Korea along a timeline including all of the key events in 2010, which revealed an overall and relatively high tension level for the majority of the year. With all 470 public DPRK protests and warnings of imminent war on the peninsula, it is easy to imagine that the North Korean public’s perception of danger in 2010 was high. It would be hard to ignore the exhaustive nature of all of North Korea’s threats and denunciations combined with the stories of ROK and US military exercises, ‘gearing up for war.’ However, despite all of the public threats and denunciations, the DPRK was unable to successfully change the behavior of the ROK and prevent any of the planned exercises from happening. The only exercise that was canceled in 2010 was the


ROK-US combined exercise, which was canceled in late October due to the G-20 summit.\(^{248}\) This cancelation could have been championed by the DPRK as the ROK-US forces finally taking a step back, since the DPRK had begun its endless campaign of threats against the exercises as preparations for a preemptive strike, but this was not the ‘physical retaliation’ the KPA had promised.

Hypothesis 2 posits that North Korea’s KPA used the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling as a political tool to boost its regime legitimacy to ensure a smooth transition for Kim Jung Un’s succession. The Yeonpyeong Island Incident was designed to boost both the DPRK public’s perception of South Korea as a threat and to boost the Kim regime’s legitimacy to a level high enough to absorb the uncertainties pertaining to a power transition period.

In this section, I present a content frequency analysis of the Rodong Shinmun coverage related to the shelling for two years after the incident. The Rodong Shinmun is known as the mouthpiece of the North Korean government; therefore it is an excellent data source to represent the North Korean government. As such, the following frequency analysis of how the KCNA reported the incident for the following two years reveals whether North Korea used the manufactured crisis to promote its own government status. In this frequency analysis, I defined an article concerning the Yeonpeyong Island Shelling as an article that either mentioned the incident in the title of the article, or as an article that discussed the incident for more than a single paragraph. Therefore each article that was counted covered the incident in both a prominent and substantial manner.

It can be concluded that if the Rodong Shinmun conducted an unusually sustained and frequent account per month of the incident that it was an indication that the incident was a propaganda tool. Combined with evidence that the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island was premeditated, such a trend would indicate that North Korea created this overt event for political gain.

In the initial weeks following the incident, the Rodong Shinmun reported an average of one article per day. However, by the end of the year the attack actually

quieted down as an international issue. North Korea continued to report on the incident as if it had been the victim of a perverse provocation, asserting that it had righteously shown both the United States and South Korea that it should not interfere with it.

As can be seen in the graph below titled “North Korea’s Reporting of the YP-do Incident (2010 - 2012),” from November 23, 2010 to November 23, 2012 North Korea reported on the incident in 172 separate articles, and in the year 2011 alone North Korea published 105 articles concerning its version of the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling. As can be observed using the graph below, the Rodong Shinmun maintained a high average number of articles throughout the entire year of 2011, and it was not until 2012 that this high average began to noticeably decline. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Rodong Shinmun throughout the entire year of 2011 intentionally maintained tension related to the crisis. A year after the incident, North Korea mentioned the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling a mere 10 articles fewer than it had at the time of the actual incident in 2010.

This high reporting frequency was not unique to the year 2011 and actually continued into the year 2012. It is easily observable that the DPRK continued to publish articles covering the Yeonpyeong Island Incident at a high average frequency per month. The actual reporting decreased compared to 2011, but the total number of articles published concerning the Yeonpyeong Island Incident in the year 2012 was still almost a month’s worth of material.
In conclusion, the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling was not only premeditated; it was a crisis manufactured to boost regime legitimacy by bolstering the unique context of inter-Korean conflict, supporting Hypothesis 2. For the two years following the incident, the North Korean media and mouthpiece of the regime kept this crisis alive by publishing articles covering the incident at an observably high frequency. After the incident, the DPRK continued to use this incident as a way to enhance its own regime’s legitimacy and to provide Kim Jung Un a successful succession.
VI. Conclusions

In conclusion, contrary to North Korean rhetoric, the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island Incident was not a case of self-defense. It was in fact a premeditated act that required a significant amount of prior preparation, planning, and calculated short-term cost versus long-term benefit analysis. Evidence points to the conclusion that the decision to use violence against the ROK was made in late July 2010, that both the location of the retaliation was chosen and preparation for the artillery attack began in August, and that in the remaining months leading up to November 23rd North Korea’s overall rhetorical campaign to influence the ROK military exercise schedule was reduced until all of the conditions were perfect for catching the ROK military off guard. This well-planned ambush manufactured a crisis that came at the short-term risk of immediate ROK retaliation. However, the DPRK is adept at avoiding responsibility for de-escalation.

Sufficient evidence was presented to cast doubt on the North Korean claim that its actions that day were purely for the sake of self defense. The evidence pointing towards premeditation began with the two ‘time-on-target’ artillery exercises that were conducted in both January and August.249 ‘Time-on-target’ artillery firing is a tactical operation requiring both perfect and proficient coordination between multiple artillery batteries and is a tactical skill that can only be honed with practice.250 The January 27th DPRK artillery exercise was announced the day before, with a DPRK warning that provided sufficient time for all boats and aircrafts to avoid being caught in the designated area.251 This initial announcement displayed a practical concern for the overall tension between the South and the North on the peninsula. The August artillery exercise came with similar forewarning on the 3rd of August, six days before the August 9th DPRK artillery

live-fire drill. However, the DPRK showed less concern for the tension on the peninsula, and never again mentioned the 130 rounds it fired into the West Sea as being just an exercise, as it had previously stated in January. At first glance, this appeared to be a warning in-and-of-itself, given that it was conducted at the tail end of the ROK’s second West Sea exercise since May. But a key question remained: why would the DPRK choose to remain silent after taking such bold action?

There was a particular inconsistency, which deserved deeper exploration. Despite an increase in transparency for the 2010 Hoguk exercise, North Korea had remained particularly quiet, and only presented two public protests before unleashing its attack upon Yeonpyeong Island. The comparison in this paper of the 2010 Hoguk exercise to previous Hoguk exercises provided evidence that this silence was unique to the 2010 Hoguk exercise. This silence concerning ROK military exercises was a phenomenon unique to 2010, with an origin dating back to August. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to explore what could explain North Korea’s deadly and sudden silence in an otherwise contentious and eventful year.

Both North and South Korea were involved in a game of conflict during the final six months of 2010. North Korea’s agitation levels were brought to a climax immediately following the joint investigation team’s announcement in late May that North Korea had sunk the PCC Cheonan with a torpedo. After protesting the ROK’s reactive displays of strength, North Korea drew a rhetorical line in mid-July, stating that it would not tolerate the ROK-US combined military exercises and threatened physical retaliation. The ROK ignored North Korea’s threat, and then a noticeable change was observable in the nature of North Korea’s protests of the ROK-involved military exercises. In August, North Korea repeatedly warned of an imminent physical retaliation by the KPA. However, the DPRK no longer exerted a long-winded effort to reiterate this warning to the ROK. After August, North Korea became relatively silent in its objections, periodically reminding the public that retaliation was on its way and that the ROK did not expect it. This is evidence that the decision to attack Yeonpyeong Island was made in August or even July, months before Hoguk exercises were even announced. In addition, the

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253 See Appendix G for more details concerning North Korea threats in the last six months of 2010.
unannounced artillery exercise North Korea conducted on August 9th, 2010 is evidence of preparation occurring before the November 16th Hoguk announcement.

On the morning of November 23rd, just hours before the violent incident occurred, North Korea issued its final threat, warning that it would not tolerate ROK artillery firing into what the DPRK considers to be its territorial waters. The DPRK chose to attack Yeonpyeong Island while the ROK artillery units responsible for defending the island were away from their positions, conducting scheduled artillery exercises. North Korea’s wise timing ultimately caught the ROK off-guard and prevented the ROK artillery units from providing an immediate and effective response. The next day, North Korea reiterated that the KPA does not make empty talk, referring to the threats that the DPRK had been publishing since mid-July.

2010 was a year marked by higher levels of ROK-US military exercise activity, which was designed to be a show of force in light of the Cheonan Incident, which happened in March 2010. This heightened activity likely contributed to North Korea’s level of agitation, but then again, it must be remembered that the source of this expansion of ROK-US military activity was North Korea’s covert provocation against the Cheonan. Despite the vocal barrages of rhetoric against ROK-US military exercises, it is still difficult to discern which ROK-US military exercises the DPRK actually believed to be a threat to its national security.

The reality is that the ROK and US military forces conduct an uncountable number of military exercises at various scales every year in and around the Korean peninsula. Most exercises are too insignificant in scale to even make the news. The exact number of exercises conducted each year is information that has been deemed classified by the United States Department of Defense; however, it is important for the public to understand that despite the large number of exercises conducted annually, many of these exercises are merely computerized, and involve little if any actual military troop movement. The scale of these exercises does vary depending on the circumstances each year. However, it is important to remember that each military exercise is not met with consistent North Korean reactions.

North Korea can choose to portray each exercise as a military threat, but it is difficult to distinguish whether North Korea does indeed feel threatened or if North Korea has ulterior motives behind its fiery public stances.

Despite the fact that the ROK was persistent in the number of days it spent conducting military exercises from August to November, the DPRK purposely chose to be relatively silent in the months before the North Korean attack. This silence primed and set-up the domestic North Korean audience for a manageable and purposeful shock. If North Korea had chosen to strike at the climax of its threat delivery in July, when its domestic agitation was manufactured to be at its highest levels in 2010, the resulting fear and expectation of imminent war would have been impossible to back out of. North Korea used the silence to cool down the domestic feeling of eminent crisis for three specifics reasons. First, the silence made the incident less expected and prepared the public to believe that the act was righteous and an act of self-defense. With the level of fear and hysteria in the news reduced, the act could then be perceived as an act of strength rather than an act of fear or desperation. Second, it removed the possibility of a domestic perception that North Korea had been cornered into a position of weakness. Finally, the silence reduced the level of public agitation so that the regime could strike the ROK without the immediate public expectation of an all-out re-start of the Korean War. The premeditated silence effectively bought the regime time to manufacture a lasting positive impression of the Kim regime without having to reduce a public outcry for war. The act could then be portrayed by KCNA as a moment of gallantry and strength, thus boosting the Kim regime’s legitimacy.

Kim Jung Il’s failing health, which began with his stroke in 2008, put North Korea in a position of regime insecurity. This feeling of insecurity was then the catalyst for further regime insecurities and uncertainties related to Kim Jung Un’s succession; therefore the Lee administration’s renewed hardliner stance came at a bad time for the Kim regime. Kim Jung Il was facing the task of boosting regime legitimacy for the succession of his son, even though his health had quickly deteriorated, leaving the Kim family with many difficulties in grooming a young and inexperienced Kim Jung Un as the successor. Kim Jung Il knew that his days
were numbered and that he only had a fraction of the time Kim II Sung had spent prepping him for his succession.

Transition periods are always difficult periods for authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The Kim regime has not in the past based its legitimacy upon the public satisfaction of basic human needs and economic prosperity. Instead, the foundation of the Kim regime’s legitimacy is drawn from and anchored in the ideology of *Juche*, as opposed to economic prosperity or political freedom. According to Park Han S., *Juche* has worked as the salient basis of North Korean regime legitimacy, because of the unique context of the inter-Korea confrontation. The need to reinforce this legitimacy is absolutely critical during the process of succession.

When Kim Jung Il’s health quickly deteriorated after suffering a severe stroke in 2008, Kim was forced to face the realities of boosting his regime’s legitimacy to secure his son’s legacy as the next leader of the DPRK. In 2008, the North Korean government was far from being capable of providing prosperity for its people, and, therefore unable to supply his son with more conventional forms of legitimacy to create a smooth transition of power. Instead Kim Jung Il had to look elsewhere to construct regime legitimacy for Kim Jung Un’s succession. Kim was forced to the revitalize the unique setting of domestic and external environments, especially the presence of external hostility. This paper then argues that the Yeonpyeong Island Incident was a premeditated attack that provided a platform to boost the regimes’ legitimacy based on an anti-foreign, and especially anti-South Korean, doctrine. The Yeonpyeong Island Shelling was not only premeditated; it was a crisis manufactured by the Kim regime to artificially boost its regime legitimacy by reviving the unique and necessary context of inter-Korean conflict, supporting Hypothesis 2.

This was a crucial part of the active succession process from Kim Jung Il to Kim Jung Un. North Korea used rhetoric of its use of force to ultimately boost its regime’s legitimacy, appropriating the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island for political propaganda. This use of violence escalated the fear of invasion and framed the Kim regime and the KPA as a noble protector of its people. The manufactured crisis was ultimately utilized as a propaganda tool by KCNA for the two years following the incident, and even today the main outlet of North Korean media
continues to publish articles concerning the event at a frequency that is two to three times greater than that of a South Korean left-wing newspaper. In the end, North Korea chose to use violence and carry out its threat against the ROK in a calculated manner, and then extracted a long-term benefit of two years worth of propaganda, which was used to promote its regime’s legitimacy throughout the process of Kim Jung Un’s succession.
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Appendix

Appendix A: Map of ROK Prohibited, Restricted and Danger Areas - Index Chart

Change: Establishment of RK R138 and R139.
Appendix B: 2010 Hoguk Military Exercise Announcement

'10 호국훈련

- 전구급 합동훈련인 호국훈련이 오는 11월 22일(월)부터 30일(화)까지 육·해·공군 및 해병대, 합동부대가 참가한 가운데 전국 일원에서 실시된다.

- 호국훈련은 매년 10월과 11월 사이에 연례적으로 실시하는 합동훈련으로 금년에는 경기도 여주·이천 및 남한강 일대에서 육군의 군단쌍방훈련과 서해상에서 함대기동훈련을, 그리고 공군의 연합배대군 훈련과 서해안에서 연합상륙훈련 등을 실시할 예정이다.

- 한편 호국훈련은 '96년에 팀스피리트 훈련을 대체하여 군단급 기동훈련 위주로 시행해 왔으나, '08년부터는 육·해·공군 상호간 합동전력 지원과 합동성 증진에 주안을 두고 합동훈련 개념으로 실시해 오고 있다. //
Appendix C: 2009 Hoguk Military Exercise Announcement

보도자료

News Release

일련번호: 2009-056

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사진: 없음
2009. 10. 27(화) 출 1쪽입니다.
담당자: 육군 대령 윤문섭 · 대령 김용후 전화 02)748-2810

'09 호국훈련 실시

- 합참 통제 하 지 해 공 합동전투행동능력 배양-

○ 합참은 '09 호국훈련을 오는 10. 29일부터 11. 6일 까지 육 해 공군 해병대가 참가한 가운데, 각 군 상호간 합동전력 지원과 합동성 증진에 주안을 두고 실시한다.

○ 이를 위해 육군은 전투지휘훈련 (BCTP)을 겸한 아뢰기동훈련과 중소시설 방호훈련을, 해군은 해상방어훈련과 항만방호훈련, 공군은 방공훈련 및 지해상 근접지원훈련 등을 실시한다.

○ 한편, 호국훈련은 매년 10월말 ~ 11월초에 연례적으로 실시하는 지 해 공 합동훈련으로 작전시간 합동전력 지원 및 운용절차를 숙달하고, 주요 국면별 재작전요소의 합동성·동일성·통합성을 제고하여 통합전투수행 능력을 향상시키는데 목적이 있다.
보도자료
News Release

합동참모본부
2008. 10. 29(수)
담당부서 : 작전본부
합동연습훈련과 (748-3510)

사진 : 없음
www.jcs.go.kr
총 2쪽입니다.

'08 호국훈련 실시

- 합참 통제 하 지 해 공 합동작전 수행능력 숙달훈련 -

○ 합참 통제하에 실시하는 '08 호국훈련이 오는 10. 30일부터 11. 8일 까지 육 해 공 황해해병대가 참가한 가운데, 각 군 상호간 합동전력 지원과 합동성 증진에 주안을 두고 시행 된다.

○ 호국훈련은 매년 10월말 ~ 11월 초에 연례적으로 시행하는 지 해 공 합동훈련으로서, 여주 이천 일대에서는 육군이 전투지휘훈련 (BCTP)을 겸한 야외기동훈련, 해상에서는 함대기동훈련, 공중에서는 공격편대군훈련, 포항 지역에서 는 예년 수준의 한 미 연합상륙훈련 등을 실시한다.
동해안 일대에서 대규모 사단급 상륙훈련 실시

- 미 해병대 전력 포함, 대형 상륙함, 헬기 등 입체적 상륙전력 과시
- 상륙작전을 통한 육해공 전력의 합동성, 통합성, 동시성 발휘
- 21세기 공지기동 해병대로 발전위한 필수 전략요소와 과제도출

○ 해병대는 미 해병 제31 원정기동부대 (31 MEU : Marines Expeditionary Unit)와 함께 사단급 규모의 연합상륙훈련을 11월 2일부터 8일까지 7일간 실시한다.

○ 경북 포항 일대의 해상과 내륙지역에서 실시되는 이번 훈련은 독도함을 포함한 함정 척 기동 공격헬기 등 항공기 여대(KAAV) 상륙돌격장갑차 여대 해병대 사단 및 상륙지원단 병력 8,000여명이 참가한 가운데 대규모로 실시될 예정이다.

○ 상륙군이 해안에 상륙하는 결정적 행동이 실시되는 6일(목), 먼저 항모 및 항공화력 지원 등 어건조성작전이 시행되고, 이에 해상에 전개되어 있던 한미 해병대 병력으로 구성된 상륙군은 해상돌격을 통해 목표해안에 상륙함과 동시에, 내륙지역으로 헬기(AH-1S, CH-47, UH-1H, UH-60)를 이용한 공중돌격을 강행, 목표지역을 신속히 탈취하고 해안두보를 확보한 후 지상부대와의 연결작전을 실시 할 예정이다.
또한 이 해병대의 제31완정부대 병력 약 2,000여명이 상륙점 (LOP)과 CH-46을 이용하여 공중과 해상으로 상륙하여 적진의 측 후방을 탐색하고 해안무도를 확보한 후 LSF와 LST 등 상륙함을 이용하여 전차 등 장비의 후속상륙을 실시할 계획이다.


특히, 이번 훈련을 통해 해병대는 CMCC(연합해병 구성군 사령부 : Combined Marine Component Command)의 지휘 통제능력을 향상시키고, 고효의 합동성과 통합성, 동시성이 요구 되는 상륙훈련을 통해 각 작전사령 부대와의 간밀한 협조방안을 수립할 계획이다.

작년에 이어 두 번째로 사단급 상륙훈련에 참가한 독도함은 상륙작전을 위한 병력과 장비 수송을 기본으로 하는 대형 상륙수송함으로서 입무를 수행하면서, 동시에 상륙군과 상륙 기동부대의 지휘부가 위치하여 상륙작전을 지휘하는 상륙기함의 기능도 수행하게 된다.
또한 훈련장가 부대의 전투근무지휘소를 전담하는 해병대 상륙
지원단이 허치에서 전투근무지원단을 실제 운용하고, 상륙군에
대한 전투근무지원이 이뤄지는 전 과정과 절차를 훈련장으로써
전장 상황에서의 작전지속능력을 향상시키려는 계획이다.

'06년 최초로 사단급 상륙훈련을 실시한 이후 한국 해병대는
매년 사단급 상륙훈련을 실시해 오면서 사단급 상륙훈련에
필요한 필수전력 소요와 개선과제를 도출, 순차적으로 능력을
구비하기는 어려운 계기를 마련해 국방전략의 큰 것 속에서
해병대가 수행하고 있는 상륙작전의 효율성을 향상하고 21
세기 군사기동부대로 발전하기 위한 기틀을 마련할 예정이다.

-------------------영어역어 설명-------------------
RAAV : Korea Amphibious Assault Vehicle (한국형 상륙돌격차)
MEU : Marines Expeditionary Unit (해병 원정 기동단)
CMCC : Combined Marine Component Command (연합해병 구성군 사령부)
CATF : Commander, Amphibious Task Force (상륙 후방부대 사령관)
CLF : Commander, Landing Force (상륙군 사령관)
RLT : Regiment Landing Team (연대급 상륙단)
BLT : Battalion Landing Team (대대급 상륙단)
LPH : Landing Platform Helicopter Ship (대형 상륙함)
CSSA : Combat Service Support Ama (전투 근무지원 지역)
BSA : Beach Support Ama (해안 지원지역)
Appendix E:

2010 ROK, US, ROK/US MILITARY EXERCISES

**February**
- February 22: ROK Small scale naval maneuver in the East Sea
  - Basic naval maneuvers, anti-submarine maneuvers, anti-ship and anti-aircraft firing

**March**
- March 2-3: ROK air maneuvers
  - Maneuvers resulted in two plane crashes and a helicopter crash
- March 8-18: Key Resolve and Foal Eagle ROK/US combined exercise
  - Announced February 17th
  - To involve around 18,000 US troops
  - Smaller than 2009’s exercises which involved 25,000 U.S. troops

**April**
- April 15: ROK/US combined live firing exercise in Kyonggi Province

**May**
- May 10-14: ROK field mobile exercise in the areas of Inchon and Puphyong
  - Announced May 8th
- May 13, 14, and 19: ROK military exercises to happen in the Hwacheon
  - Announcement May 12
- May 24- June 1: ROK conducted field mobile exercises in Kangwon province
- May 27: ROK launched West Sea anti-sub drill in response to Cheonan Incident
  - 1-day exercise including: 9x ROK warships, 1x 3000-ton ROK destroyer and 3x ROK patrol ships
  - Exercise included the testing anti-sub bombs and naval guns in the West Sea

**June**
- June 9-11: ROK military ground cooperation exercises in Chunchon and Hwachon
  - Announced June 8
  - Exercises entail “large-scale search, reconnaissance, blockade operations and operating a mobile task force”
- June 14-18: ROK East Sea anti-sub drill in response to Cheonan Incident
  - Announced June 13
- June 15-16: ROK to stage large-scale land exercises in the areas of Koyang and Phaju, Kyonggi Provinces
Announced June 14
To practice coping with "infiltration" and "provocation"

- June 21-22: ROK tank and artillery live fire exercises

**July**

- July 1 - August 1: US RIMPAC Joint military exercises in Hawaii
  - US RIMPAC exercise involves ROK forces
- July 25-28: ROK/US East Sea combined maritime and air exercise "Invincible Spirit"
  - Announced July 20
    - Original announcement was June 3 but it was delayed one June 4 to the month of July
  - Location was originally West Sea, but changed to East Sea over Chinese objections on participation by the USS George Washington
  - “To ‘highlight alliance resolve to face any threat North Korea may pose’"
  - 97,000-ton nuclear aircraft carrier USS George Washington, 20 ships and more than 200 aircraft, (including four F-22 Raptors)
  - 8,000 military personnel total
  - “The F-22, capable of striking the North's nuclear reactor site of Yongbyon within some 30 minutes after takeoff, to fly on training missions in and around Korea for the first time”

**August**

- August 1: US finish RIMPAC combined military exercises in Hawaii
- August 5-9: ROK West Sea anti-sub drills in response to the Cheonan
  - Announced July 30
  - 4,500 ROK troops, 29 warships, and 50 fighter aircraft
- August 16-26: ROK/US combined Ulji Freedom Guardian computerized command-and-control military exercises
  - Announced June 28
  - Exercise is mostly computerized and involves few troop movements
  - 30,000 US soldiers in Korea, 56,000 ROK troops and 3,000 US troops based in the US
- August 30-31: ROK tank exercise in parts of Seoul and Kyeongi-do

**September**

- September 5-9: ROK combined naval exercise in the West Sea
  - Announced August 31
- September 13-17: 2010 Hwarang Exercises in South Kyongsang Province
  - 2010 Hwarang Exercises involve 10,000 ROK troops and police
To "establish a joint defense posture and bolster up the forces for conducting operations in rear areas"

- September 14: ROK/US combined landing exercise at Wolmi Island, near Incheon
- September 16-18: ROK Air Force exercises
  - Exercise included various types aircraft including the F-15K
- September 27-October 1: ROK/US combined anti-sub exercises in the West Sea
  - Announced September 16
  - 1,700 troops
  - 10 ships, including two U.S. guided-missile destroyers, the USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald, and two submarines
- September 28: ROK/US combined air maneuvers
  - Helicopters, such as the UH-60, AH-64 and AH-1S, practiced airlifting artillery pieces from Jungiphyong to Chungju

**October**

- October 1: ROK/US finish combined anti-sub exercises in the West Sea
- October 13-14: ROK ‘hosts’ the October 13-14 Busan PSI drill in response to Cheonan Incident
  - “Fourteen countries, including the United States, Japan and Australia, are taking part in the two-day exercise under a U.S.-led initiative, code-named "Eastern Endeavor 10”
  - “10 ships from South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, including a 9,000-ton U.S. guided missile destroyer, USS Lassen, and two 4,500-ton Korean KDX-II destroyers
  - Australia sent P-3C maritime patrol planes and anti-submarine helicopters
- October 15-22: ROK-US 8 day air defense exercise
  - Announced October 14
  - Exercise involved “50 fighter jets, including F-15Ks and KF-16s from South Korea as well as F-16 Fighting Falcons and KC-135 Strato tankers from the U.S.”
- ROK-US CANCEL End of October combined anti-sub exercises that were to take place in the West Sea due to the November G-20 summit
  - No more exercises in 2010 involving a US aircraft carrier

**November**

- November 1-5: 2nd 2010 ROK Hwarang Exercises
  - Announced October 28
- November 22-30: 2010 ROK Hoguk Exercises
  - Announced November 16
  - West Sea exercises to include 70,000 ROK troops
Originally planned as a combined exercise, but the US troop’s participation was canceled
Appendix F:

2010 Events and North Korea Reactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Threat / Warnings</th>
<th>Reaction - No threat</th>
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<td>Ch</td>
<td>Both</td>
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<td>1/26/2010(DPRK Prepares for firing drill in West Sea)</td>
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<td>1/27/2010(DPRK conduct live firing drill in the West Sea)</td>
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| Threat / No threat    | 12    | 41   |
| March Total           | 12    | 41   | 53   |

Threat / No threat
## 2010 Events and North Korea Reactions

### April-10

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<td>13</td>
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### ME: Number of articles in relation to ROK, US, ROK/US Military exercises or Drills
### CH: Number of articles in relation to the Cheonan Incident
### Both: Number of articles related to both ME and CH

- **5/8/2010:** (ROK announcement of May 10-11 ROK West Sea military exercises)
- **5/10/2010:** (May 10-11 ROK West Sea military exercises)
- **5/12/2010:** (ROK announcement of ROK military exercises to happen in the Hwacheon on May 13, 14 and 19)
- **5/20/2010:** (Joint Investigation team announces the findings that a DPRK torpedo sunk the PCC Cheonan)
- **5/24/2010:** (ROK announcement of field mobile exercises in Kangwon-do May 21 - June 1)
- **5/25/2010:** (ROK/US announce future joint military exercises in response to the Cheonan incident)
- **5/27/2010:** (ROK launches West Sea 1-day anti-sub drill in response to Cheonan incident)
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### 2010 Events and North Korea Reactions

**ME:** Number of articles in relation to ROK, US, ROK/US Military exercises or Drills  
**Ch:** Number of articles in relation to the Cheonan Incident  
**Both:** Number of articles related to both ME and CH

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7/16/2010 (ROK announces the July ROK/US joint anti-submarine exercise location to be changed to East Sea and ROK/US announce upcoming August West Sea combined drill)

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7/19/2010 (ROK announces large-scale ROK/US joint maritime and air exercise to occur from July 25 to 28)

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7/21/2010 (US nuclear aircraft carrier lands in the Busan)

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7/25/2010 (Start of the July 25-28 East Sea anti-sub ROK/US joint exercises)

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7/30/2010 (ROK announces that it will conduct West Sea anti-sub drills from August 5-9)

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## 2010 Events and North Korea Reactions

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8/1/2010 (ROK begins August 5-9 West Sea anti-sub drills)

8/2/2010 (ROK fishing boat was intercepted the Korean People's Army on their routine maritime guard duty in the East Sea)

8/3/2010 (ROK/US announce September 5-9 West Sea joint naval exercises)

8/5/2010 (ROK begins August 5-9 West Sea anti-sub drills)

8/6/2010 (ROK announces that an ROK fishing boat was intercepted the Korean People's Army on their routine maritime guard duty on August 8 in the East Sea)

8/8/2010 (ROK fishing boat was intercepted the Korean People's Army on their routine maritime guard duty in the East Sea)

8/10/2010 (ROK/US announce September 5-9 West Sea joint naval exercises)

8/12/2010 (ROK fishing boat was intercepted the Korean People's Army on their routine maritime guard duty in the East Sea)

8/14/2010 (ROK fishing boat was intercepted the Korean People's Army on their routine maritime guard duty in the East Sea)

8/16/2010 (ROK begins 11 day computerized command-and-control Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military exercises until August 26)

8/18/2010 (ROK/US announce another round of ROK/US joint military exercises to be held in September in the West Sea)

8/20/2010 (ROK announcement and beginning of August 30-31 tank exercise located in parts of Seosu and Kyongsan-do)

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### 2010 Events and North Korea Reactions

**ME:** Number of articles in relation to ROK, US, ROK/US Military exercises or Drills  
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**November Total:** 23

**Total (Jan - Nov):** 470
Appendix G:

2010 July – November 23rd DPRK Anti-ROK Threat/Warning Timeline

July 2 (Threat, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings as a farce)
- “The Lee group should not run amuck, clearly understanding that its extreme confrontation racket is a self-suicidal act of accelerating their shameful end.”

July 5 (Warning, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings, and denounces the ROK hosting the PSI exercises in Busan in October)
- “The Lee Myung Bak group of traitors will be held wholly accountable for all the ensuing disastrous consequences”

July 10 (Threat, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings as a farce)
- “If the hostile forces persist in such provocations as demonstration of forces and sanctions in contravention of the presidential statement which calls for "avoiding conflicts and averting escalation" on the Korean Peninsula, they will neither be able to escape the DPRK's strong physical retaliation nor will be able to evade the responsibility for the resultant escalation of the conflict.”

July 15 (Warning, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings as a farce)
- “The U.S. would be well advised to drop its anachronistic Cold War-minded way of thinking.”

July 16 (Threat, DPRK denounced all recent and upcoming ROK-US military exercises occurring in response to the Cheonan incident)
- “The army and people of the DPRK will never remain an onlooker to the projected provocative war maneuvers of the enemies. Should the group of traitors finally stage the above-said maneuvers together with the U.S., the army and people of the DPRK will consider them as a grave infringement upon its dignity and sovereignty and strongly react to them.”

July 19 (EVENT/REACTION: Warning, DPRK denounced ROK announcement that it is to stage large-scale combined ROK-US military exercises in July)
- “The south Korean authorities should immediately cancel their plan for join naval exercises, pondering over the catastrophic consequences that the exercises may bring to the situation of the Korean Peninsula and its vicinities.”
July 20 (Warning, DPRK denounced two ROK-US combined military exercises to be staged in late July and early August in the East and West Seas and along the DMZ)

- “The warmongers would be well advised to behave themselves, bearing deep in mind the consequences to be entailed by the above-said war moves, urges the commentary.”

July 21 (Warning, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings as a farce)

- “The conservative group had better draw a lesson from all what it has done so far over the warship case and bear deep in mind that it can never find a way out of the present dilemma in escalating the confrontation between the north and the south.”

July 24 (Threat, DPRK denounced upcoming ROK-US combined East Sea anti-sub military exercises in response to the Cheonan, the upcoming combined UFG exercises, upcoming West Sea joint anti-sub exercises, and other coming September drills)

- “The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet forces will keenly realize what high price they will have to pay for their reckless military provocation rendering the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the worst phase under the pretext of the ‘Cheonan’ case.”

July 24 (Threat, DPRK denounced upcoming ROK-US combined military exercises, which were in response to the Cheonan)

- “The U.S. provocations amount to trespassing on the off-limits fixed by the DPRK and it, therefore, feels no need to remain bounded to the off-limits drawn by the U.S.”
- “It is the mode of the DPRK's counteraction to react to sword brandishing in kind.”
- “The DPRK will bolster its nuclear deterrent in a more diversified manner and take strong physical measures as it had already clarified, now that the U.S. opted for military provocations, sanctions and pressure, defying the demand of the international community including the UN Security Council.”

July 24 (Threat, DPRK denounced upcoming July 25-28 ROK-US East Sea combined anti-sub military exercises that are in response to the Cheonan)

- “There is no doubt that the enemies' escalated military stand-off with the DPRK would compel the latter to reinforce its retaliatory measures to safeguard the supreme interests of the country and the nation.”
- “It is the steadfast mode of counteraction of the DPRK to return fire for fire. It never makes an empty talk.”
July 25 (Threat, DPRK denounced ongoing July 25-28 ROK-US combined East Sea anti-sub military exercises, which were in response to the Cheonan, the upcoming August 18-26 combined UFG exercises, upcoming West Sea combined anti-sub exercises, and all other drills to come in September)

- “The army and people of the DPRK will take strong retaliatory measures with dignity by dint of their powerful nuclear deterrent, as a spokesman for the DPRK National Defense Commission had declared in his statement, in order to cope with the nuclear war exercises kicked off by the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet warmongers.”
- “They will start Korean-style sacred war for retaliation any time they deem it necessary. The DPRK has never made an empty talk.”

July 25 (Warning, DPRK denounced the results of the Cheonan investigation and the upcoming ROK-US joint military exercises, which were in response to the Cheonan)

- “Lee Myung Bak is getting frantic in staging war exercises against the DPRK while turning aside from the inter-Korean joint investigation, far from making an apology for the case which failed to get recognition even on the international arena, the statement said, declaring that it is the unanimous will of the Korean nation to punish the Lee Myung Bak dictatorial regime.”

July 26 (Threat, DPRK denounced ongoing July 25-28 ROK-US East Sea combined anti-sub military exercises, which were in response to the Cheonan and the upcoming UFG exercises)

- “They will have to pay a dear price if they persist in the criminal act of harassing peace and security on the peninsula, defying our repeated warnings and turning a deaf ear to the domestic and foreign demand for the settlement of outstanding issues of the peninsula in a peaceful way through direct talks and negotiations.”

July 27 (Threat, DPRK denounced ongoing ROK-US combined anti-sub exercises in response to the Cheonan and the upcoming combined UFG exercises)

- “The army and people of the DPRK will decisively react to the enemies' ‘demonstration of deterrent’ with more powerful and horrible deterrence built up by dint of Songun as already clarified.”
- “It is the spirit and mettle of the DPRK to react to "force" in kind and foil sanctions in kind.”

July 27 (Threat, DPRK denounced ongoing July 25-28 ROK-US combined anti-sub exercises in response to the Cheonan and the upcoming UFG exercises)

- “The U.S. and the South Korean puppet group will keenly realize before long what a dear price they will have to pay for their reckless military provocations.”
July 28 (Warning, DPRK denounced all large-scale ROK-US combined military exercises)

- “Large-scale joint military exercises and arms buildup, being ceaselessly conducted in South Korea, are the most realistic danger. The reckless anti-DPRK joint military exercises and arms buildup in South Korea, which pose military threat to the fellow countrymen and bring the danger of a war, should be discontinued unconditionally.”

July 28 (Warning, DPRK denounced ongoing July 25-28 ROK-US East Sea combined anti-sub exercises that are in response to the Cheonan)

- “The hostile forces would be well advised to behave themselves, cogitating about the serious consequences to be entailed by the above-said moves.”

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**August 2010**

August 1 (Warning, DPRK denounced ROK-US combined anti-sub East Sea military exercises, which were in response to the Cheonan and the upcoming combined UFG exercises)

- “The U.S. and the south Korean bellicose forces should be mindful of this warning and no longer resort to the adventurous military blackmail trick.”

August 3 (Threat, KPA Command Vowed to Counter ROK West Sea anti-sub drill by physical retaliation)

- “As regards the expected DPRK’s counteraction for self-defense, the command warns in advance all the civilian ships including fishing boats not to enter the theatre of naval firing fixed by the group of traitors in the waters close to the five islets in the West Sea of Korea.”

- “It is the unshakable will and steadfast resolution of the army and people of the DPRK to return fire for fire.”

August 5 (Threat, DPRK denounced the August 5-9 ROK West Sea anti-sub drill)

- “They will immediately send the warmongers bent on provocations against the DPRK and their war equipment to the bottom of the sea should they show even the slightest sign of attack.”

August 5 (Threat, DPRK denounced August 5-9 ROK West Sea anti-sub drill)

- “What should not be overlooked is that the group is challenging the DPRK while calling for "staging the exercises", defying the DPRK's notification of its resolute stand that it would counter the exercises with powerful physical counterstrike.”

August 6 (Threat, DPRK denounced the August 5-9 ROK West Sea anti-sub drill)
The statement recalled that the Command of Forces of the Korean People's Army in the western sector of the front clarified its resolute stand that it would react with strong physical retaliation to the anti-submarine drill to be staged by the group of traitors in the West Sea of Korea from Aug. 5.

August 7 (REACTION: Threat, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings as a farce and the August 5-9 ROK West Sea anti-sub drill)
- “The group is fated to suffer destruction in face of the unimaginably powerful strike to be made by the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK if it keeps going reckless, misjudging the will of the DPRK.”

August 9 (EVENT: DPRK fired 130 rounds of artillery into the West Sea)

August 10 (Threat, DPRK denounced last month’s large-scale joint military exercises and the ROK’s West Sea anti-sub drill)
- “Now that the puppet bellicose forces conduct the war gambling one after another after making the provocation of an anti-DPRK war an established fact, the DPRK will clearly show to those buoyed by war fever what a real war is like any time it deems necessary through a war of retaliation of its own style based on its nuclear deterrent.”

August 15 (Threat, DPRK denounced the ROK/US August 16-25 combined UFG military exercise)
- “Now that the reckless war maneuvers targeted against the DPRK have reached the limit, the army and people of the DPRK will deal a merciless counterblow to the U.S. imperialists and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors as it had already resolved and declared at home and abroad.”

August 16 (Threat, DPRK denounced the Cheonan findings as a farce and the start of the ROK-US UFG combined military exercises)
- “The U.S. and the south Korean puppet forces will face the serious consequences to be entailed by their reckless military provocations driving the situation on the peninsula to the worst phase under the pretext of "Cheonan" case.
- “The U.S. and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors should clearly understand the army of the DPRK highly alerted with iron will and firm stand never says empty words.”

August 17 (Threat, DPRK denounced the ROK-US UFG combined military exercises)
• “The puppet group had better halt its provocative play with fire, mindful that it can never go scot-free while escalating the tensions and the moves to ignite a war of aggression against the DPRK by toeing foreign forces’ line.”

August 17 (Threat, DPRK denounced the ROK-US UFG combined military exercises)

• “The army and people of the DPRK will not remain an onlooker to the U.S. imperialists staging three-dimensional attack operations in the seas, etc. with huge armed forces involved and thereby gravely threatening its sovereignty.”

August 17 (Threat, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings as a farce and the ROK-US UFG combined military exercises)

• “If the group of traitors rushes headlong into confrontation to the last, the DPRK will resolutely react to it.”

August 18 (Threat, DPRK denounced the ROK-US UFG military exercises)

• DPRK also denounced the July ROK-US East Sea combined anti-sub exercises

• “The U.S. and the south Korean authorities should understand that there is a critical point in the tension, too, and should not calculate they can evade the blame for the explosive situation.”

August 18 (Threat, DPRK denounced the ROK-US UFG combined military exercises)

• DPRK also denounced the July ROK-US East Sea combined anti-sub exercises

• “The DPRK will clearly teach the warmongers that the DPRK-targeted war maneuvers will get them nowhere and bring only self-destruction.

• “The army and people of the DPRK will never remain an on-looker to the warmongers' military provocation and war moves but deal unpredictable severe blows at the enemy strongholds any moment and from any place as they had already clarified.”

August 25 (Threat, DPRK denounced the ROK-US UFG combined military exercises)

• “It is the independent right of a sovereign state to defend oneself. The warmongers at home and abroad had better stop at once their reckless war racket, not misjudging the mental power and strength of the army and people of the DPRK.”

August 27 (Threat, DPRK denounced the ROK-US UFG combined military exercises)
“Through the confrontation between systems and moves for a war the puppet group of traitors will get nothing but a miserable end, and the DPRK will prove this in its eyes.”

September 2010

September 14 (EVENT/REACTION: Warning, DPRK denounced ROK announcement of ROK-US combined landing exercise at Wolmi Island, near Incheon)
- “The group would be well advised to halt such acts of treachery as sycophancy towards the U.S. and the escalation of confrontation with fellow countrymen, bearing in mind that the army and people of the DPRK are closely watching its behavior.”

September 14 (Warning, DPRK denounced upcoming ROK-US combined anti-sub exercises)
- “It is the steadfast stand and revolutionary principle of the DPRK to respond to good faith in kind and counter force with force.”

September 18 (Threat, DPRK denounced all August ROK anti-DPRK military exercises)
- “Should the south Korean authorities persist in the confrontation with the north and moves for a war of aggression against it, swimming against the trend of the times, the DPRK will resolutely counter them, warns the commentary.”

September 21 (Threat, DPRK denounced upcoming ROK-US combined military exercises involving a US nuclear aircraft carrier)
- “The army and people of the DPRK can never remain an onlooker to the fact that the U.S. imperialists are posing a serious threat to its sovereignty while mobilizing huge armed forces to conduct a three-dimensional attack operation.”

September 30 (Threat, DPRK denounced all recent ROK-US anti-DPRK military exercises and denounced the findings on the Cheonon Incident as a farce)
- “If the south side fails to immediately stop the provocations being perpetrated by it against the DPRK on the ground and in the sea, it will not be able to evade the responsibility for the ensuing disastrous consequences, it warned.”

October 2010
October 4 (Threat, DPRK denounced recent ROK-US combined exercises in the and the findings of the Cheonan as a farce)
- “The south Korean authorities will not be able to escape a stern punishment by history if they escalate the tension and hamstring the efforts to improve the inter-Korean relations, swimming against the trend of the times.”

October 15 (Warning, DPRK denounced ROK military maneuvers)
- “The DPRK warns once again that its army will choose its mode of counteraction depending on the attitude of the south side. The south Korean puppet forces should clearly understand that there is no limit to this mode of counteraction.”

October 17 (Threat, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings as a farce)
- “The DPRK will resolutely cope with the conservative group if it persists in the moves for confrontation between the north and the south and a war of aggression against the north, quite contrary to the trend of the times.”

October 24 (EVENT: ROK-US decided to cancel the late October combined anti-sub exercises that were to take place in the West Sea due to the November G-20 summit)
- No more exercises in 2010 involving a US aircraft carrier
- Source also claimed “it is realistically difficult for South Korea and the U.S. to hold another large-scale naval exercise in the wake of their anti-submarine training from Sept. 27-Oct.1” in the West Sea.

October 29 (Threat, DPRK denounced all anti-DPRK military exercises in the name of the Cheonan Incident)
- “The army of the DPRK will counter the South side's reckless provocative act of openly shunning the implementation of the inviolable bilateral agreement with a merciless physical retaliation.”

November 2010

November 1 (Warning, DPRK denounced recent anti-DPRK maneuvers in relation to the findings on Cheonan as a farce)
- “The DPRK has put forward various reasonable proposals for defusing the tension between the north and the south and improving the inter-Korean relations and made every sincere effort to put them into practice.”
“However, the South Korean authorities are working hard to harm the DPRK, persistently pursuing confrontation, and this is driving the situation into more uncontrollable catastrophe.”

November 2 (Warning, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings as a farce)
- “The U.S. and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors will never be able to escape the sledge-hammer blow of the times and history for their fabrication of the hideous charade unprecedented in the history of the Korean nation.”

November 17 (Warning, DPRK denounced Cheonan findings as a farce)
- “The south Korean authorities would be well advised to ponder over the fact that their reckless action against dialogue with the north is as foolish as lifting an axe to drop it on their own foot.”

November 24 (EVENT: DPRK offered first response to Yeonpyeong Island Shelling)
- “The army of the DPRK warned several times that if even a single shell of the enemy is fired inside the territorial waters of the DPRK, it will take a prompt retaliatory strike in connection with the live shell firing drill they planned to stage from Yonpyeong Islet while conducting the ill-famed war maneuvers for a war of aggression against the DPRK codenamed Hoguk.”
- “The army of the DPRK took such a self-defensive measure as making a prompt powerful strike at the artillery positions from which the enemy fired the shells as it does not make an empty talk.”
국문초록

연평도 포격사건은 북한과 연평도 주민 사이에 벌어진 포격 교전을 말한다. 이번 사건 이후 북한은 한국군의 작전 영역에 대한 대표 발사에 대한 정당성을 주장했다. 그러나 이 는 북한이 한국에 대한 역할을 분명히 하는 북한의 정당성의 증거로 보고 연평도 사건은 이미 준비되었으며 전략적으로 계획된 것이었다고 밝혔다. 이연평도 사건이 정체된 전쟁의 정체 여기성은 한국의 노력을 인한 것으로 보았다. 2008년 북한의 능동적 및 적극적인 방어침략

정체 한강 전쟁에서 나타난 북한의 발사위를 보인 것이다. 연평도 사건은 북한이 한국의 정책에 대한 정당성을 확보하기 위한 적극적인 활동이며, 이를 통해 김정은에게 정권을 인정받고 있다. 이연평도사건이 먼저

2010년의 합의문결과에 대한 반영에 그치는 것이 아니며, 정책의 정체성을 국내외에 확신의 일시적인 막바지

로 징란당해 사용되었다는 것을 보였다. 그와 같이 북한은 한국의 정책에 따라 적극적으로 한국을 이행함으로써

김정은의 정체성을 공고하였다.

주요어: 북한, 남한, 연평도, 군사도발, 북한 정책
학번: 2011-24263