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외교학석사학위논문

**China's Charm Offensive Strategies in Africa
and Its Political Influence:**
**Evidence from UN Human Rights Voting by African Countries,
1992-2014**

2016년 8월

서울대학교대학원
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이 논문을 외교학석사학위논문으로 제출함

2016년 8월

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이규원의 석사학위논문을 인준함

2016년 7월

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether economic dependence on China affected African countries' vote choices on one of China's most serious foreign policy concerns: UN country-specific human rights (hereafter UNHR) resolutions. The previous research showed that African countries trading more with China are more likely align with China in opposing UNHR resolutions. On the contrary, I find that African countries' support for UNHR resolutions has increased since 2002, despite the fact that bilateral trade with China and Chinese aid have continuously increased.

To explain this empirical puzzle, I argue that the diffusion of human rights norm could explain diminishing influence of China's charm offensive on African countries' UN human rights voting. Growing emphasis on a interventionist approach towards human rights agenda in the early 2000s has led to the increase in normative pressures to support UNHR resolutions.

This paper conducts both case studies and statistical analyses to support the argument. Case study on South Africa is conducted to illustrate how norm diffusion significantly influence UN voting pattern of countries who have forged close political and economic ties with China. During the period 2000-2014, South Africa's stance has changed from opposing UNHR resolutions to being neutral. This change was attributable to normative criticisms on South Africa's voting records. South Africa was more constrained by the criticisms as they revealed the inconsistency between South Africa's voting pattern and its previous commitment to emerging human rights norm such as participating in the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Human Rights Council (HRC).

For statistical analyses, this dissertation utilizes the variation in the membership of the ICC and HRC among African countries as an empirical

leverage. Two mechanisms could explain the effect of ICC and HRC membership on UNHR voting. First, members of these two organizations previously signalled their commitment to emerging human rights norms and hence would face the cost of losing its legitimacy within the international community when not supporting UNHR resolutions. Second, regardless of perceiving the cost of their commitment, these countries are more likely to support UNHR based on their affinity towards emerging human rights norm.

Considering the aforementioned mechanisms of norm diffusion, this paper suggests two hypotheses. First, ICC and HRC members would more readily vote in favour of UNHR resolutions during the period 2002-2012. Second, during the period 1992-2002, the effect of ICC and HRC membership would not be effective whereas Chinese trade would. This paper uses time series cross sectional data covering 46 African countries for the period 1992-2012 and find empirical evidence to support two hypotheses.

My dissertation aims to overcome two limitations of the existing research on political influence of China's charm offensive. For one, my dissertation demonstrates that normative and institutional factors can also influence China's charm offensive strategy, whereas the previous literature focused solely on the effect of economic and military factors. African countries' voting behavior in terms of UNHR resolutions shows that normative concern often overrides material payoffs in international politics. Second, this paper sheds light on dynamic relationship between China and African countries which has received relatively little attention compared to Sino-Asian relations.

Keyword: Sino-African relations, China's charm offensive, UN human rights voting, economic interdependence, norm diffusion

Student Number: 2013-22889

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I . Introduction

1. China's Charm Offensive and Human Rights in Africa

Since the late 1950s, China has actively sought to forge closer economic ties with African countries. China has prioritized its diplomatic relationships with Africa based on its long ideational longing to build “solidarity among the Third World countries”¹⁾ and to strengthen its positions as a major power within international politics. Recently, China’s engagement in Africa became more aggressive than before, dubbed as “charm offensive”; China overtook the US as Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009²⁾ and pledged to give 60 billion dollars aid to assist Africa’s development.³⁾ China also organized a multilateral forum with African countries, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which has held two summits (2006 and 2015) and six ministerial conferences so far.

As Sino-African relationship deepened, scholars of international relations started to ponder whether China’s “charm offensive” can change regional political orders in Africa, which has been dominated by western powers.⁴⁾ In case of Sino-African trade, the room for Chinese political

1) Yun Sun, “China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Competition and Diplomacy”, *Brookings Institutions*, April 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/04/china-africa-us-competition-diplomacy-sun>

2) Luke Patey and Zhang Chun, “China, trade, aid and Africa”, *Financial Times*, March 11, 2014, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e05c6154-a90b-11e3-9b71-00144feab7de.html#axzz4225onHOF> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

3) Norimitsu Onishi, “Pledges 60 Billion to Aid Africa’s Development”, *New York Times*, Dec 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/world/africa/china-pledges-60-billion-to-aid-africas-development.html?_r=0 (Accessed April 19, 2016).

4) Denis M. Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 44, Issue. 3 (2006). pp.

power is large because there exists asymmetrical power relationship: for many African countries China is one of top trading countries, whereas China trade heavily with many countries outside Africa. If we turn our attention to investment and bilateral aid from China to Africa, the room for political power is even larger. Unlike trade, bilateral aid and investment creates a highly visible asymmetric relationship between the donor and the recipient. China's investment in infrastructure development in Africa, mostly delivered by various Chinese lending agencies, is increasing rapidly. The head of Eximbank announced in 2013 that China will provide 1 trillion USD by 2025 in the form of direct investments, soft loans and commercial loans. As the official clearly stated, "Africa for the next 20 years will be the single-most important business destination for many Chinese mega corporations."⁵)

In particular, the growing Chinese influence among African countries generates a grave concern regarding human rights-related issues. This is because economic assistance from China is seen to weaken the strife against human rights violations led by international organizations and western countries. For example, China's investment and aid to Zimbabwe has been criticized to give a breathing space to the Mugabe regime, which has been isolated by international aid agencies and western countries for its human rights violations. In return, Mugabe repeatedly expressed appreciation for China's economic support and adopted Chinese yuan as a legal currency in

459-479; Ali Zafar, "The Growing Relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade, and Aid Links," *World Bank Research Observer*, Vol. 22, Issue. 1 (2007), pp. 103-130; Ian Taylor, "Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights," *African Affairs*, Vol. 107 (2008), pp. 63-87; Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, "New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 35 (2008), pp. 23-42.

5) "China to provide Africa with US\$1tr financing" *South China Morning Post*, November 18, 2013.

2015.⁶⁾

There is no doubt that China would not shy away from turning her economic power into political influence regarding human rights agenda. She would do so especially in terms of voting on country-specific human rights (hereafter UNHR) resolutions in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). China thinks that UNHR resolutions intervene too much in domestic issues of individual states and thus endeavors to defeat these resolutions. Since the early 1990s, China has consistently defended non-interference policies and demanded that human rights issues be considered as internal affairs of states.⁷⁾ In the UNGA sessions, delegates of China has adamantly asserted that each country has a right to choose its own social system, including human rights.⁸⁾ Recent statement of Chinese Foreign Ministry clearly claims that China has a “consistent position of opposing country specific resolutions on human rights ... the Chinese delegation has always held that countries should seek to resolve their differences in the field of human rights.”⁹⁾ Not

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- 6) China Daily, “Zimbabwe praises China's technology transfer,” May 10, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-05/10/content_15258768.htm (Accessed April 19, 2016); The Guardian, “Zimbabwe to make Chinese yuan legal currency after Beijing cancels debts” December 22, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/zimbabwe-to-make-chinese-yuan-legal-currency-after-beijing-cancels-debts> (Accessed April 19, 2016); The Guardian, “Robert Mugabe greets China's Xi Jinping as 'true and dear friend' of Zimbabwe” December 2, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/02/robert-mugabe-greets-chinas-xi-jinping-as-true-and-dear-friend-of-zimbabwe> (Accessed April 19, 2016).
 - 7) Ann Kent, China, *the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
 - 8) Foreign Ministry PRC, “Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan at the 54th Session of the UN General Assembly,” 2000, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18058.shtml (Accessed April 19, 2016).
 - 9) Foreign Ministry PRC, “Statement by Ms. Zhang Dan, Counselor of the Chinese Delegation, at the 3rd Committee of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on Explanation of Vote before the Vote on Draft Resolution L.25 (Situation of Human Rights in DPRK)”, November 19 2009, www.china-un.org (Accessed April 19, 2016),

surprisingly, vote records in the UNGA show that China has consistently voted against or abstained from UNHR resolutions (See Appendix 1).

China's interest in defeating UNHR resolutions is understandable when we consider that China has been occasionally subjected to a condemnatory resolution on the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) or its sub-Commissions in 1990-2004.¹⁰⁾ To defeat the introduction of the resolutions targeting herself, China has strived to mobilize support from developing countries, especially African countries, in the commission.¹¹⁾ It seems that to minimize the possibility of UNHR resolutions targeting China being passed, not only does China vote no to other UNHR resolutions in general but also persuades other developing countries to vote against these resolutions. Recent studies find that African and Latin American countries trading more with China are more likely align with China in opposing country-specific human rights resolutions in the UNGA.¹²⁾ Accordingly, in order to gain support for non-interventionist principles towards human rights, China is utilizing its economic power to persuade others vote against UNHR resolutions in general.

Thus, voting on UNHR resolutions provides a rare opportunity to see whether China can transform her charm offensive into political influences on African countries as western observers worry.

quoted in Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 358.

10) Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States, "US won't rap China on human rights," 18 March 2005, www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgrq/t188036.htm (Accessed April 19, 2016).

11) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-375.

12) Rosemary Foot, *Rights Beyond Borders: the Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 178, 194.


2. Research Question

Discussions in the previous section indicate that Chinese economic power exerts considerable political influence on African countries' positions in human rights diplomacy. However, recent phenomenon contrasts this existing argument. When extending the time frame to the period 1992-2014, the political influence of Chinese economic ties with African countries, measured by voting similarity between African countries and China on UNHR resolutions, started to wane around 2002. Figure I-1 shows that African countries start to support UNHR resolutions despite the fact that the amount of trade with China and Chinese aid has ever more increased after 2002.

This declining effect of Chinese charm offensive in African region is intriguing given that Sino-African relations are amicable compared to those of East Asian and Latin American regions. Unlike Sino-East Asian relations, Sino-African relations are not fraught with historical animosities or territorial conflicts which would diminish the effect of Chinese charm offensive strategies. Nor are Sino-African ties are strongly influenced by US military influences that exert a significant impact on Latin American countries. In this regard, if Chinese charm offensive strategies do not work well in African region that provides most hospitable environment to China's soft power diplomacy, Chinese charm offensive strategies may not be able to yield its intended results as Western observers conjecture.

This recent trend in African region presents an interesting research question that should be scrutinized. Yet the previous literature has not examined this phenomenon in question. My dissertation therefore tries to answer an empirical puzzle of **why have China's economic incentives lost its political influence in Africa regarding human rights diplomacy**. Answering this research question would not only enhance our understanding on political

influence of emerging Chinese economic power but also shed light on future implications of China's economic rise.



<Figure I -1> Economic Dependence and Voting Similarity with China, 1992-2014: *Note.* Chinese trade saliency and Chinese aid measured as the amount of bilateral trade and aid as a share of recipients' Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Voting similarity with China is measured based on Flores-Macias and Kreps (2013). *Source.* Based on UNGA Voting Data from Voeten, "Data Analyses of Voting in the UN General Assembly," in Bob Reinalda (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of International Organization* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), pp. 54-66. Trade data from COW International Trade, IMF Direction of Trade and World Bank Development Indicators. Chinese aid data from Austin M. Strange, Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks and Michael J. Tierney, "Tracking Underreported Financial Flows: China's Development Finance and the Aid-Conflict Nexus Visited," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (forthcoming). pp. 1-29.

3. Argument and Method

This dissertation aims to explain the puzzle of diminishing political influence of China in Africa. This paper suggest this empirical question cannot be solved by the arguments made by the existing literature on political influence of strong states' economic incentives. Instead, my dissertation argues that the rapid diffusion of international human rights norm, which challenges the traditional concept of sovereignty and non-intervention principles, is responsible for the change in African countries' voting on UNHR resolutions. A series of events such as the institutionalization of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Human Rights Council (HRC) in the UN, which happened during the period of China's charm offensive in Africa, created a tipping point in human rights norm diffusion around the early 2000s. Growing emphasis on interventionist approaches towards human rights issues led to the increase in normative pressures to support UNHR resolutions as well. **As a result of this normative pressures, more and more African countries began to vote for UNHR resolutions in spite of increasing economic assistance from China.**

This paper employs both qualitative and quantitative methods to support my argument. First, to discuss the effect of norm diffusion on UN voting pattern of African countries, I utilize various sources ranging from news articles, academic journals and statements from the UN and member states. I conduct case study on South Africa to illustrate how norm diffusion significantly influence UN voting pattern of countries who have forged close political and economic ties with China. During the period 2000-2014, South Africa's stance has changed from opposing UNHR resolutions to neutral despite that maintaining cooperative relationship with China was strategically important to South Africa and constitutes its core national interests. This

change was attributable to normative criticisms on South Africa's voting behavior on UNHR resolutions. South Africa was more constrained by the criticisms as they revealed the inconsistency between South Africa's voting pattern and its previous commitment to emerging human rights norm such as participating in the ICC and HRC.

For statistical analyses, this paper uses time-series cross-national data set covering 46 African countries over 21 years (1992-2012). Detailed information of the variables used in this dissertation will be introduced in the following chapters. To substantiate my argument that normative pressures within the international society overwhelm China's soft power diplomacy in terms of African countries' voting on UNHR resolutions, I utilize the variation in the membership of the ICC and HRC in African countries as an empirical leverage.

Two mechanisms of norm diffusions could explain the effect of ICC and HRC membership on UNHR voting. First, participation in these two organizations signals countries' commitment to support interventionist approaches to resolve domestic human rights problems of states. As a result of their commitment, ICC and HRC members receive more pressure from domestic and external audience to act in accordance with the committed norm. Because the content of UNHR resolutions represents the very same norms supported by the ICC and HRC, member states face the cost of losing its legitimacy within the international community when not supporting UNHR resolutions. In this regard, when normative pressures on UNHR resolutions voting began to increase the early 2000s, countries with ICC and HRC membership would more readily vote in favour of UNHR resolutions.

Second, affinity towards emerging human rights norm could also play its role on UNHR voting. It is also possible that some ICC and HRC would support UNHR resolutions because they believe in moral righteousness of emerging human rights norm. Therefore, as an extension of

showing their support for emerging human rights norm rather than a concern for the cost of their commitment, ICC and HRC members would vote in favour of UNHR resolutions.

Considering the aforementioned mechanisms of norm diffusion, this paper suggests two hypotheses. First, holding all other things constant, ICC and HRC members would more readily vote in favour of UNHR resolutions. Second, during the period 1992-2002, the effect of ICC and HRC membership would not be significant whereas Chinese trade would.

II. Economic Dependence and Political Influence: Literature Review

Recent discussions on the relationship between emerging Chinese economic power and its political influence on developing countries have their roots on classical debates about foreign policy consequences of strong states. Scholars in international political economy have long scrutinized how trade relationship with a strong country compel its counterpart small countries to follow foreign policy objectives of the strong state.¹³⁾ Hirschman argued that trade disparities create opportunity costs (income loss and adjustment costs) in economic relationships which induces both trade partners to adjust their foreign policies and forge cooperative diplomatic ties.¹⁴⁾ Keohane and Nye reinforced Hirschman's argument and suggested that asymmetrical trade interdependence between a strong country and small country becomes a source of political power for the strong country.¹⁵⁾ Recent theories on

13) Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1945); Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade" *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 317-347; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Independence*, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Longman, 1977); Kal Holsti, "A New International Politics? Diplomacy in Complex Interdependence," *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1978), pp. 513-530; Richard Rosecrane, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York, NY: Simple Books, 1986); Harrison R. Wagner, "Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, Issue. 3 (1988), pp. 461-483; Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner, "Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of National Interests," *Security Studies*, Vol. 9, Issue. 5, pp. 119-156; Jonathan Kirshner, "The Consequence of China's Economic Rise," "The Consequences of China's Economic Rise" in Ross, R. S. & Feng, Z. (Eds.), *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 238-259.

14) Hirschman, 1945.

15) Keohane and Nye, 1977.

asymmetrical trade dependence focus on the role of domestic constituencies and argue that deepening bilateral trade relationship gives more power to constituencies who advocate favorable diplomatic relations between two countries.¹⁶⁾

This classical argument now extends to question on whether increasing Chinese trade and aid induce developing countries in general to support Chinese foreign policies. There are now burgeoning studies on this research question.¹⁷⁾ First, there are researchers who claim that countries receiving more Chinese aid and trade tend to take foreign policy stance that is favorable to China. Flores-Macías and Kreps measure countries' alignment with Chinese foreign policies based on UNHR resolutions and suggest that during the period 1992-2006 increase in bilateral trade with China led developing countries to vote against UNHR resolutions and support Chinese position on these resolutions.¹⁸⁾ Strüver uses overall UNGA vote records and find some evidence that not only aid dependence from China but also regime similarity, diplomatic ties and shared international governmental organizations (IGOs) memberships with China could influence developing countries' alignment with Chinese foreign policies.¹⁹⁾

Other studies take nuanced stance, suggesting that political effect of

16) Abdelal and Kirshner, 2000, pp. 119-156; Kirshner, 2008, pp. 238-359.

17) Gustavo A. Flores-Macías and Sarah E. Kreps, "The Foreign Policy Consequences of Trade: China's Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992-2006," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 75, Issue. 2 (2013), pp. 357-371; David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Scott L. Kastner, "Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China's International Trade," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (2014), pp. 1-28, <http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/12/26/0022002714560345.abstract> (Accessed April 19, 2016); Georg Strüver, "What Friends are Made of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with China," *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2014), pp. 1-22, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fpa.12050/abstract> (Accessed April 19, 2016)

18) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371.

19) Strüver, 2014, pp. 1-21.

Chinese economic power depends on the issue areas and specific types of economic incentives. Shambaugh argues that although the projection of Chinese economic power has increased globally over the past three decades, China's global presence falls short of being a major power and hence China should be referred as a 'partial power.' Although China endeavors to build her soft power, her efforts are often limited due to domestic political constraints and lack of coherent contribution to global governance.²⁰⁾ Kastner finds that among different types of trade dependence indicator, import dependence on China is more likely to generate compliance from developing countries on foreign policy issues. Moreover, countries trading more with China would easily follow China on economic issues but not on political issues such as independence of Taiwan and Tibet.²¹⁾

While the aforementioned research derives implications of China's soft power diplomacy on developing countries across different regions, other studies focus on regional implications of China's rise and examine variations across countries' behavior in the region. First, there are studies that focus on how East Asian countries respond to the rise of China's economic power.²²⁾ Since East Asian region is geographically proximate to China and

20) Shambaugh, 2013.

21) Goh, 2014, pp. 825-848.

22) Robert Ross, "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia," *Security Studies*, Vol. 15, Issue. 3 (2006), pp. 119-156; David M. Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Minds* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008); Evan Medeiros, Keith Crane, Eric Heginbotham, Norman Levin, Julia Lowell, Angel Rabasa, and Somi Seong, *Pacific Currents: The Responses of US Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise* (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2008); Young Nam Cho and Jae Ho Chung, "China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 48, Issue. 3 (2008), pp. 453-472; Jae Ho Chung, "East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations" *Pacific Affairs*. Vol. 82, Issue. 4 (2009), pp. 657-675; Evelyn Goh, "The Modes of China's Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 54, Issue. 5 (2014), pp. 825-848; Pascal Abb and Goerg Strüver,

has enduring historical memories, East Asian countries' reaction to deepening economic relationship with China has been diverse across time and policy issues. Cho and Chung argue that soft power strategies, based on the Chinese developmental model, foreign policies with emphasis on 'peaceful rise' and Chinese civilization, has been a major stake for China in the post-Cold War era and these strategies have significantly contributed to the positive image of China among Asian countries.²³⁾ Medeiros et al. attempt case studies and find that Japanese business elites, wanting to maintain heightened trade relationships with Chinese counterparts, pushed their government to take more pro-Chinese stance on foreign policy issues.²⁴⁾ Abb and Strüver examine Sino-Southeast Asian relations during the period 1972-2010 and suggest that Southeast Asian countries' support for Chinese foreign policies in the UNGA depends on the cooperative bilateral regional relationships and trade dependence on China. Their findings imply that the Cold War era and alliance with the US had negative effect on countries' support for Chinese positions in global affairs.²⁵⁾

On the other hand, some researchers doubt that Chinese trade and aid could exert significant influence on East Asian countries. These studies frequently point out that the effect of China's charm offensive would not hold when states feel threatened by China's military rise. Accordingly, states could be wary of China's military capabilities and resist political pressure made by China based on growing volume of trade and aid. For instance, Ross examines the case of East Asian countries and conclude that increasing

"Regional Linkages and Global Policy Alignment: The Case of China-Southeast Asia Relations," *GIGA Working Paper* (2015), Vol. 268, pp. 1-31; Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, "Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia," *Security Studies*, Vol. 24, Issue. 4 (2015), pp. 696-727.

23) Cho and Chung, 2008, pp. 453-472.

24) Medeiros et al., 2008.

25) Abb and Strüver, 2015, pp. 1-31.

Chinese trade does not induce states to support Chinese foreign policies in this region.²⁶⁾ Because of their historical relationship with China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan feel threatened by growing Chinese military capabilities and would balance against rather than accommodate China. In line with this argument, Goh suggests that even though China's economic resources have increased in Southeast Asian region, its influence on these countries is not always significant.²⁷⁾ Accordingly, they would be willing to cooperate for economic regionalism that is mutually beneficial. In case of maritime disputes, however, China fails to make Southeast Asian states to act in accordance with Chinese policies: these countries have a considerable interests in securing territories in South China Sea and would not give up their national interests. Recently heightened tensions between Southeast Asian countries and China has led them to be more wary of Chinese intention.

Studies focusing on China's rise in East Asian region also examines what factors contribute for variations in secondary states' response to China's growing power. Notably, Chung analyzes countries' behavior towards China during the period 2004-2007 based on bandwagoning-balancing spectrum and suggest that their different attitudes are mostly influenced by alliance with the US.²⁸⁾ Lim and Cooper further argue that East Asian countries who are US military allies or have territorial conflicts with China are more likely to balance against China.²⁹⁾

To study implications of China's charm offensive strategies, researchers also focus on cases in African region where China has put a considerable effort to build cooperative diplomatic ties with developing countries.³⁰⁾

26) Ross, 2006, pp. 119-156.

27) Goh, 2014, pp. 825-848.

28) Chung, 2009, pp. pp. 657-675.

29) Lim and Cooper, 2015, pp. 696-727.

30) Ian Taylor, "China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa" *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, Issue. 5 (2006), pp. 937-959; Tull, 2006, pp. 459-479; Taylor, 2008, pp. 63-87; Mohan and

Tull points out that China's increased involvement in African region is against the idea of international marginalization of African countries and growing China's interest in the region reflects her foreign policy strategy based on multi-polarity and non-intervention policies.³¹⁾ Taylor argues that China's charm offensive strategies in Africa also concerns increasing domestic demand for oil and long-term goal of positioning herself as a major player in the international oil market.³²⁾

Despite growing volume of research on Sino-African relations, however, current studies fall short of demonstrating concrete and detailed stories of Chinese impact on African countries. In this regard, Mohan and Power argue that Sino-African relations are contextual and complex, which suggest a need for detailed case studies and reveal dynamic relationship between individual African countries and China.³³⁾ The recent work of Brautigam conducts field works and numerous interviews in China and Africa, and challenge the notion that China's engagement in Africa is motivate by short-term economic and strategic interests. Instead, she argues that China is actually interested in promoting the lesson she learned from her own development process and considers about how to build mutually

Power, 2008, pp. 23-42; Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange and Michael J. Tierney, "Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa," *AidData* (2015), pp. 1-32, http://aiddata.org/sites/default/files/wps15_apples_and_dragon_fruits.pdf (Accessed April 19, 2016); Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Roland Hodler, Bradley C. Parks, Paul A. Raschky and Michael J. Tierney, "Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China's Foreign Assistance," *Center on Economic Policy Research* (2015), pp. 1-52, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B4w0pBeo3NLZazJqNFijTjZ1Tmk2d3Q1d3RIZ1hOanViV0IV/view?pref=2&pli=1> (Accessed, April 19, 2016).

31) Tull, 2006, pp. 459-479.

32) Taylor, 2006, pp. 937-959.

33) Mohan and Power, 2008, pp. 23-42

beneficial relationship in Africa.³⁴⁾

Recently, there have been attempts to quantitatively examine the effect of Chinese aid and trade on foreign policy positions of African countries. Based on their media-based source of Chinese aid data, Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney find that during the period 2000-2013 the amount of Chinese ODA allocated to African countries are associated with recipients' UN voting alignment with China and their position vis-a-vis One-China policy. On the other hand, distribution of less concessional official aid was associated with economic consideration.³⁵⁾ Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, Parks, Raschky and Tierney further argue that Chinese aid is more likely to be allocated to the birth region of African political leaders.³⁶⁾ Their finding implies that Chinese aid can be utilized in a way desired by African elites and thus African countries who receive more official aid from China are more likely to comply with Chinese foreign policies to receive more aid. These studies also indicate that increasing bilateral trade with China influences positions of developing states in terms of broader foreign issues such as overall UNGA vote with China.³⁷⁾

There are also studies on how China's rise would influence foreign policies of Latin American region.³⁸⁾ These studies question whether China's

34) Brautigam, 2009.

35) Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney, 2015, pp. 1-32.

36) Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, Parks, Raschky and Tierney, 2015, pp. 1-52.

37) Kastner, 2014, pp. 1-28.

38) Gonzalo Sebastián Paz, "China, United Nations and Hegemonic Challenge in Latin American: An Overview and Some Lessons from Previous Instances of Hegemonic Challenge in the Region" *China Quarterly*, Vol. 209 (2012), pp. 18-34; Rhys Jenkins and Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, "Fear for Manufacturing? China and the Future of Industry in Brazil and Latin America," *China Quarterly*, Vol. 209 (2012), pp. 59-81; Julia C. Strauss, "Framing and Claiming: Contemporary Globalization and Going Out in China's Rhetoric towards Latin America," *China Quarterly*, Vol. 209 (2012), pp. 134-156; Hongying Wang, "The Missing Link in Sino-Latin American Relations," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 24, Issue. 95 (2015), pp. 922-942.

rise would challenge US dominancy or domestic industries in the region. They also question how people and governments in Latin America perceive China's growing share in global market. Because of being a region relatively less important to China, compared to East Asian and African regions there are not many studies on China's charm offensive strategies in Latin American region.

In sum, the existing research on the relationship between Chinese economic power and foreign policy convergence reaches different conclusions depending on countries and issue areas in observation. Their findings imply that various factors should be taken into account when examining dynamic relationship between China and secondary states across the regions.

Nonetheless, current studies on foreign policy consequences of Chinese economic power face two limitations. First, they primarily focus on material aspects of international politics such as aid money or material capabilities. The existing research emphasizes economic incentives that strong states can give to developing countries or military capabilities that could arouse threat perceptions among secondary states. This perspective neglects other important aspects of international politics, such as shared norm or role of multilateral institutions that came to play a decisive role in the post-Cold war era. These normative and institutional factors could also alter behavior of states within the international community. These factors would be especially important when discussing the impact of China's charm offensive strategies on human rights diplomacy in Africa. Yet until now studies addressing human rights issues in Sino-Africa relations did not question how diffusion of international human rights norm in the post-Cold War era could constrain the effect of Chinese trade and aid on foreign policies of African countries.

The second limitation of the previous literature is that much of the attention is paid to East Asian region compared to African and Latin American countries. In case of Sino-African relations, there are limitations in

data accessibility and this constrained researchers to examine in detail the effect of China's charm offensive strategies in the region.

My dissertation aims to overcome the aforementioned limitations of the existing research on political influence of China's charm offensive. For one, my dissertation demonstrates that normative and institutional factors can also influence China's charm offensive strategy, whereas the previous literature focused solely on the effect of economic and military factors. Second, by focusing on the impact of Chinese trade and aid on human rights issues in Africa which has not been sufficiently researched, this paper intends to show in detail dynamics of Sino-African relations.

III. Norm Diffusion and Limits of China's Charm Offensive

1. International Human Rights Norm Diffusion

To account for decreasing leverage of China's economic ties in Africa, this paper considers normative aspects of international politics that play a more dominant role in the post-Cold War era: the diffusion of international human rights norms that bind states' behavior. According to the constructivist IR approach, international relations are not solely shaped by power and interests. What is equally important is shared normative understandings among states.³⁹⁾ In this sense, states could conform to international norms without explicit interests or material gains. Recent studies analyze how diffusion of norm –such as human rights, international election monitoring, women's rights and accountability norm for individual leaders- occur and change behavior of states.⁴⁰⁾ The literature further points out how non-state

39) Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security Norms and Identity in World Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 2, Issue. 1 (2001), pp. 65-90; Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom, "Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45, Issue. 1 (2001), pp. 27-57.

40) Judith Kelley, "Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring," *International Organization*, Vol. 62, Issue. 2 (2008), pp. 221-255; Jay Goodliffe and Darren Hawkins, "A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining International Criminal Court Negotiations," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 71, Issue. 3 (2009), pp. 977-997; Sarah S. Bush, "International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures," *International Organization*, Vol. 65 (2011), pp. 103-137; Suan D. Hyde, "Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and

actors such as non-governmental organization (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) could serve to socialize states to comply with international norms.⁴¹⁾

The sudden change in African countries' UN voting behavior reflects the diffusion of international human rights norms that challenges the traditional concept of sovereignty and non-intervention principles. The process of this norm diffusion can be divided into three phases: norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internationalization. Table III-1 summarizes characteristics of each stage. First, in norm emergence stage, norm entrepreneurs, mainly non-state actors within international organizations, drive the development of new norms and persuade others to accept the new norm. At the tipping point, sufficient number of states accept new norms to redefine the appropriate behavior within the international community. Following tipping point comes the stage of norm cascades during which

International Norm Diffusion,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2011), pp. 356-369; Jay Goodliffe, Christine Horne and Daniel L. Neilson, “Dependence Networks and the International Criminal Court,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56 (2012), pp. 131-147; Hun Joon Kim and Jason C. Sharman, “Accounts and Accountability: Corruption, Human Rights, and Individual Accountability Norms,” *International Organization*, Vol. 68, Issue. 2 (2014), pp. 417-448.

- 41) Martha Finnemore, “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy,” *International Organization*, Vol. 47, Issue. 4 (1993), pp. 565-597; Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43 (1999), pp. 83-114; Alexandru Grigorescu, “European Institutions and Unsuccessful Norm Transmission: The Case of Transparency,” *International Politics*, Vol. 39 (2002), pp. 457-489; Brian Greenhill, “The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 54 (2010), pp. 127-145; Daniela Donno, “Who is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms,” *International Organization*, Vol. 64, Issue. 4 (2010), pp. 593-625.

norm-complying states, non-governmental actors, and multilateral institutions compel other states to endorse emerging human rights norms.⁴²⁾ In this stage, socialization mechanism such as diplomatic praising or condemnation from norm-complying states or multilateral institutions is used in order to bring about norm conformity.⁴³⁾ Lastly, during norm internalization, norms are so widely spreaded that states are taken for granted and everyone acts according to the norm.

In case of international norm of interventionist principles on human right issues, the period of the 1990s can be referred as norm emergence stage. The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the international political landscape and has allowed the UN to actively pursue an indivisible and universal approach towards human rights.⁴⁴⁾ Under the phrase "human rights for all", there emerged an idea that collective actions are required to resolve human rights abuses of individual states. Accordingly, UN should not only prioritize human rights as its goals but also seek measure to effectively protect human rights over the world. The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was also discussed. During this period, however, discussions were not linked to active measures to induce states to respect interventionist approaches towards human rights agenda.

42) Finnemore and Skkink, 1998, pp. 887-917.

43) In the words of Waltz, socialization occurs in the form of praising norm compliers, ridiculing the deviation and emulating heroes. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (McGraw-Hill, 1979).

44) Jean-Philippe Thérien and Philippe Joly, "All Human Rights for All: The United Nations and Human Rights in the Post-Cod War Era," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 36, Issue. 2 (2014), pp. 373-396.

<Table III-1> **Stages of Norm Diffusion:** *Source.* Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Skkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, Issue. 4 (1998), pp. 898.

	<i>Stage 1</i> Norm Emergence	<i>Stage 2</i> Norm Cascade	<i>Stage 3</i> Internalization
Actors	Norm entrepreneurs with organization platforms	States, international organizations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
Motives	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
Dominant mechanisms	Persuasion	Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration	Habit, institutionalization

The diffusion of new international human rights norms met its momentum in the early 2000s. During this period a critical mass of state and non-state actors adopted the emerging human rights norm and pressured other states to conform to the new norm. This critical moment can be referred as "tipping point" and the following stage of norm diffusion as "norm cascades". This norm cascade has been undergoing since the year 2001 and norm internalization is yet to be realized.⁴⁵⁾

The period around the early 2000s served as the tipping point at

45) Finnemore and Skkink, 1998, pp. 887-917.

which pressures to abide by new international human rights norm increased. After the 9/11 attacks, the UN actively pushed for new human rights initiatives that could eliminate root causes of terrorism and this meant that domestic human rights problems of individual states would be more actively discussed within the UN.⁴⁶⁾ EU countries without hesitation embraced the new norm since exporting values of democracy and human rights has been their foreign policy concern for some years.⁴⁷⁾ In Africa, the notion of collective responsibility to human rights was already starting to develop as countries began to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and People's Right in the late 1990s and adopted the Constitutive Act in 2000 to found African Union (AU).⁴⁸⁾


The process of these growing acceptance of new norm was clearly visible within the international community. In December 2002, Optional Protocol to the UN Convention Against Torture (OP-CAT), which unprecedentedly takes preventive measures towards human rights abuses of states by allowing outside experts to visit the place of detention, was adopted with 127 countries voting in favour of, 4 countries against and 42 countries abstaining. Moreover, during the period 2000-2002, the ratification

46) See, United Nations, *Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism*, U.N.GA 57th Session., Item 162, Provisional Agenda, at 2, UN Doc. A/57/273-S/2002/875 (2002).

47) European Commission, "The Stabilization and Association Process and CARDS Assistance 2002 to 2006" (2006), http://www.seerecon.org/region/documents/ec/ec_sap_cards_2000-2006.pdf (Accessed April 19, 2016).

48) The Constitutive Act states the right of African countries to intervene in domestic affairs of other member states and this interventionist policy distinguishes the AU from the previous regional organization, Organization of African Unity (OAU). Bience Gawanas, "The African Union: Concepts and Implementation Mechanisms Relating to Human Rights," in A. Bosl and J. Diescho (eds.), *Human Rights in Africa* (Windhoek: Macmillan Education Namibia, 2009), pp. 135-163.

rate of the ICC surged: more or less 60 countries ratified the ICC treaty and this indicates that tipping point and norm cascades stage for new international human rights norm occurred during that period (Figure III-1). Establishing the ICC in the late 1990s was a milestone decision in which states for the first time allowed the enforceable international institution to have a right to sanction domestic human rights abuses of states.⁴⁹⁾



<Figure III-1> Cumulative Numbers of ICC Ratifiers, 1998-2014: Source. ICC website, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (Accessed April 19, 2016).

49) Darren Hawkins, “Explaining Constly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48 (2004), pp. 779-804; Nichole Deitelhoff, “The Discursive Process of Legalization: Charting Islands of Persuasion in the ICC Case,” *International Organization*, Vol. 63, Issue. 1 (2009), pp. 33-65.

The efforts to strengthen the institutionalization of R2P also increased during this period. Responding to the call from the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to strengthen the international effort to build up ‘humanitarian intervention in 1999 and 2000, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was founded to develop a broader international support for institutional frameworks of humanitarian intervention.⁵⁰⁾ The result of the Commission was a document *Responsibility to Protect* in 2001 and the report all the more intended to legitimize new interventionist norms. In addition, the UN established the HRC in 2006 in order to replace the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) that was criticized as ineffective. The newly founded HRC actively sought to promote human rights of member states by releasing Universal Periodic Review that keeps track of each country's human rights compliance and UN voting records.

As more and more countries adopted the emerging interventionist principles regarding human rights issues, voting in favour of UNHR resolutions, which address human rights abuses of individual states to be resolved within the international community, was also recognized as an important signal that countries abide by the new norm. As a result, there has been an increasing use of praising and condemnation to socialize states to take pro-human rights stance in UN voting. Notably, "naming and shaming" by the UN, member states and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) became prevalent. Notable example comes from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that are most renowned INGOs in human rights issues. During the 60th UNGA session in 2005, Amnesty International urged member states to take appropriate action to solve human rights situation in any country. Moreover, it expressed its deep concern about potential “no-action motions” in the Third Committee of the

50) ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

UNGA which would impede discussions on human rights situations in Iran, Myanmar, North Korea and Sudan.⁵¹⁾ Human Rights Watch, another INGO recently released voting records within the Human Rights Council (HRC) on its *VotesCount* website. This allows a closer public monitoring of member states whose voting pattern fails to comply with the international human rights standard.

Other INGOs also participate in pressuring countries to vote against UNHR resolutions. 25 NGOs sent letters to UNGA members to vote in favour of the resolution criticizing human rights abuses in Iran.⁵²⁾ The UN Watch, a non-governmental organization whose mandate is to monitor activities of the UN, has been active in addressing the list of countries who voted against country-specific human rights resolutions. The notable example is South Africa who has been criticized by the UN watch report that it does not support UN human rights agenda as promised and this incident received a considerable attention from the press.⁵³⁾ Other NGOs such as UN Watch and International Service for Human Rights also tracks voting records of individual countries on UNHR resolutions.⁵⁴⁾ Recently, UN Watch condemned countries such as Russia, China, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Ecuador for their contradictory behaviors of supporting UNHR resolutions targeting Israel while rejecting any other UNHR resolutions.⁵⁵⁾

51) Human Rights House Network, "Six Nations Revolt Against UN Censure," November 23, 2005, <http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/509.html> (Accessed June 12, 2016).

52) Outright Action International, "25 NGOs Urge UN Third Committee to Pass Iran Human Rights Resolution," 2013, <https://www.outrightinternational.org/content/25-ngos-urge-un-third-committee-pass-iran-human-rights-resolution> (Accessed June 16, 2016).

53) UN Watch, "South Africa at the UN: Your Freedom and Mine," 2007a, <http://www.unwatch.org/south-africa-opposes-un-human-rights-resolutions/> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

54) ISHR, "Analysis of Voting on Country-Specific Resolutions," Nov 29, 2011, <http://www.ishr.ch/news/third-committee-update-analysis-voting-country-specific-resolutions> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

In Africa, normative pressures to support interventionist approaches towards human rights issues also increased around the early 2000s as African countries' involvement in international human rights framework deepened during this period. Their participation in the international human rights regime reinforced as African countries realized that non-interference policies adopted by Organization of African Union fuelled civil wars and human rights abuses in the region.⁵⁶⁾ First, Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) regional offices began to be established. OHCHR constitutes an important pillar of human rights framework within the UN. OHCHR is primarily responsible for helping governments to implement human rights standards on the ground and provide them with expertise and technical assistance. It also aims to add a human rights perspective to every UN programs and collaborate with other UN and International organizations such as International Labour Organization, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Criminal Court, specialized criminal tribunals and the World Bank in their efforts to promote and protect human rights.

As Table III-2 shows, the timing of the establishment of OHCHR regional office in Africa is around the early 2000s. OHCHR regional office in Central African, East Africa and Southern Africa was founded during this period and this demonstrates that African countries' involvement in

55) UN Watch, "Hypocrisy at the UN: dictatorships reject county-specific resolutions, then adopt 22 country-specific resolutions on Israel," December 3, 2012 <http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2012/12/03/hypocrisy-at-the-un-dictatorships-reject-county-specific-resolutions-then-adopt-21-country-specific-resolutions-on-israel/> (Accessed June 16, 2016).

56) The Citizen, "Non-Interference Enables Human Rights Violations: AU," November 6, 2015, <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Non-interference-enables-human-rights-violations-AU/-/1840340/2945734/-/7u5sa6z/-/index.html> (Accessed June 16, 2016).

international human rights institutions deepened. OHCHR regional office also aims to improve governance of African countries and make them abide by international human rights treaties.


In terms of ICC, Africa was ardent supporters of establishing ICC. Along with efforts of African states, some 90 African organizations participated in NGO coalitions and strongly pushed for early establishment of independent and effective ICC.⁵⁷⁾ As shown in figure III-1, during the period 1999-2001 10 countries ratified the treaty, whereas in the year 2002 11 countries did. This pattern of ICC ratification in Africa resembles the overall pattern shown in figure III-1. As a result, African countries constitute the largest number of ICC members to this date and the substantial number of ICC judges have been Africans. In addition, African countries are also a part of regional members of HRC.

African countries have also been active participant in UN peace keeping missions. After the period of the mid 1990s during which multiple UN peacekeeping missions in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia, African countries' contribution to UN peace keeping missions began to increase in 2000 (Figure III-2). The timing overlaps with the call from the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to strengthen efforts to institutionalize R2P. The increased UN peace keeping contribution from African countries also reflects the surge in the number of UN peace keeping missions in African region such as Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Syria.

57) Phakiso Mochochoko, "Africa and the International Criminal Court", in E Ankumah and EKwakwa (eds), *African perspectives on international criminal justice* (Ghana: Africa Legal Aid, 2005), pp. 248.

<Table III-2> **OHCHR Regional Office in Africa:** *Source.* OHCHR website, <http://www.uhchr.org> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

Region	Date	Countries
Central Africa	2001	Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe
East Africa	2002	Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania
Southern Africa	1998	Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe
West Africa	2008	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo



<Figure III-2> African Countries' Contribution to UN Peace Keeping Mission, 1990-2014: *Note.* The data is collected on monthly basis, starting from November 1990. Contribution is measured as the total number of troops, police and observers. *Source.* International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*, www.providingforpeacekeeping.org (Accessed April 19, 2016).

2. Norm Diffusion in Africa: Case Study of South Africa

This section presents case study of African countries and examines how diffusion of human rights norm pressured African states to change their voting decisions on UNHR resolutions in the 2000s. Since we cannot cover all African countries, we analyze one country who have forged close economic and diplomatic ties with China: South Africa. South Africa is known to have sided with China on opposing UNHR resolutions and as

well as country-specific mandates in HRC. Moreover, South Africa is one of the top trading partners with China in African region. In this regard, the case of South Africa would reveal how normative pressures induce African states to support UNHR resolutions despite the existence of material payoffs that could be obtained by opposing UNHR resolutions.

<Table III-3> Statistics of South Africa. *Figure based on the year 2004.

	South Africa
Trade with China (US mil dollars)*	7867.29 (rank 1 st)
Regime	Democracy
ICC Member	since 2000
HRC Member	2006-2010, 2014-2016
UN Peacekeeping	since 1999


Since the establishment of diplomatic relations on January 1998, South Africa and China has forged close bilateral political and economic ties. Recognizing strategic importance of its largest trading and investment partner in Africa, China established ‘strategic partnership featuring equality, mutually benefit and common development’ (平等友好, 共同發展的戰略伙伴關係, *pingdeng youhao, gongtong fazhen de zhanlüe huoban guanxi*) with South Africa in 2004.⁵⁸⁾ It was the first time that China sought strategic partnership with

58) China pursues strategic partnerships with countries which are more flexible than military alliances yet are mutually beneficial. See, Vidya Nadkarni, *Strategic Partnership in Asia: Balancing without Alliances* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

African countries. In 2010, Sino-South African relations were elevated to ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ (全面戰略伙伴關係, *quanmian zhanlüe huoban guanxi*).⁵⁹⁾ Again, South African became the first African country to establish such a close diplomatic link with China. To this date only Algeria and South Africa are labelled as comprehensive strategic partner of China. Deepening Sino-South Africa relations are confirmed as leaders of South Africa and China also frequently visit each other and confirms their enduring diplomatic relationship.

Figure III-3 shows the trend of South Africa’s voting on UNHR resolutions and economic dependence with China. The volume of bilateral trade volume with China has been increasing and dramatically surged in the 2010s. On the other hand, South Africa’s voting similarity with China on UNHR resolutions has been slow decreasing since the early 2000s. In the 2010s, voting similarity scores are around 0.5 which implies that South Africa’s preferred to remain neutral on UNHR resolutions. The shift in South Africa’s voting decision comes at a surprise given that Sino-South African relations has been deepening since the early 2000s.

59) Compared to the previous type of strategic partnership, this type includes an additional term ‘comprehensive’ (全面, *quanmian*) which implies that the scope of Sino-South African relations is widening. See, 葉自成, 李紅杰, 『中國大外交: 摺衝樽俎60年』 (北京: 當代世界出版社, 2009), pp. 252-253.



<Figure III-3> South Africa’s Economic Dependence and Voting Similarity with China, 1992-2014. *Note.* Chinese trade salience and Chinese aid measured as the amount of bilateral trade and aid as a share of recipients’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Voting similarity with China is measured based on Flores-Macías and Kreps (2013). *Source.* Based on Voeten, 2013, pp. 54-66. Trade data from COW International Trade, IMF Direction of Trade and World Bank Development Indicators.

South Africa’s positions on UNHR resolutions can be divided into several phases. The first phase took place in the 1990s. In 1994, South Africa was readmitted to the UN following transition from the system of apartheid to democracy. Under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, promotion of human rights seems to have become guiding principles of South Africa’s foreign policies. South Africa welcomed advisory and technical assistance from the UN and Center Human Rights at Geneva.⁶⁰ The delegate of South

Africa also declared in the UNGA that its country was acceding to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other major international human rights instruments.⁶¹⁾ During this period South Africa also actively sought to improve domestic human rights practices. In 1996, South African government adopted a new constitution that guarantee fundamental human rights, democratic values and social justice. The Parliament enacted the Promotion of National Unity Act and established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. As a consequence South Africa's voting with similarity with China on UNHR resolutions was low during this period.

Notwithstanding the initial position on human rights issues in the UN, drastic turn in South Africa's human rights diplomacy occurred in the 2000s. The official rhetoric of South Africa on human rights foreign policy has changed little during this period, as in 2004 Department of Foreign Affairs listed promotion of human rights and democracy as top foreign policy goals.⁶²⁾ South Africa even acceded to the ICC in 2000, began to participate in UN peacekeeping missions in 1999 and became a member of the HRC during the period 2006-2010. Nonetheless, actual practices of South African government were undermining principles of promoting international human rights. South Africa acquiesced extensive human rights abuses of neighboring state Zimbabwe.

The pattern of UN voting in figure III-2 shows that during the period 2001-2005 voting similarity scores with China are above 0.5. This signifies that South Africa support China's positions on UNHR resolutions. Its support for China in terms of human rights issues is reflected on its

60) United Nations, Third Committee, "Summary Record of the 34th Meeting," December 8, 1994, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.34, pp. 13.

61) United Nations, Third Committee, "Summary Record of the 36th Meeting," November 13, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/51/SR.36, p. 7

62) South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs, *Strategic Plan, 2003-2005*, March 2004, pp. 14. www.dfa.gov.za (Accessed June 14, 2016).

statement in the UNGA. In 2000, South Africa did vote in favour of UNHR resolutions targeting Sudan yet cautioned against adopting any unilateral coercive measure which were “likely to create obstacles to trade relations among States and impede the effective realization of human rights.” On behalf of Non-Alignment Group and China, the South African delegate also supported the resolution concerning human rights questions which proposes alternative approaches for the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedom.⁶³⁾ In 2004, when discussing UNHR resolutions targeting Zimbabwe South Africa took a stronger stance and insisted on behalf of the African Group that the UN should not target only human rights abuses of developing states and that intransigent nature of UNHR resolutions would not be productive.⁶⁴⁾ This statement took place after the fourteenth ministerial conference for the Non-Aligned Group was held in South Africa.

South Africa’s deviant behavior in human rights diplomacy was also observed in HRC and Security Council. During the creation of HRC. As one of HRC members, South Africa. In 2007, South Africa, China and Russia was the only members of the 15 Security Council members to oppose a resolution criticizing human rights situations in Myanmar. In HRC, South Africa deliberately obstructed progress of international human rights norm by opposing country-specific mandates and putting considerable efforts to weaken Universal Periodic Review.⁶⁵⁾

This shift in South Africa’s behavior indicates that during this period South Africa’s foreign policy was mostly driven by the relationship with

63) United Nations, 54th U.N.GA Session, February 7, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/54/SR.55, pp. 5-6.

64) United Nations, 59th U.N.Ga Session, November 30, 2004, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/59/SR.54, pp. 2.

65) Eduard Jordaan, “South Africa and the United Nations Human Rights Council,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 36, Issue. 1 (2014), pp. 93-34.

other African countries and China. During this period South Africa's national interests lie in securing cooperative relationship with developing countries and BRICs. Especially regarding China, presidents of South Africa visits China to affirm stable Sino-South African relations.⁶⁶⁾

Yet South Africa's human rights policy within the UN underwent another change in the late 2000s. During this period, increase in the number of naming and shaming on South Africa's UN voting pattern led South Africa to adjust its stance on human rights issues in the UN. The criticism towards South Africa within the international community surged in the year 2007 and 2008. In 2007, UN Watch criticized South Africa for refusing to support UNHR resolutions within the Human Rights Council. Public opinion of South Africa went wild as numerous domestic media outlets reported the statement made by the UN Watch.⁶⁷⁾ The Economist reported that during its two years as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, South Africa aligned with authoritarian states to defeat every country-specific human rights resolutions.⁶⁸⁾ The criticism towards South Africa was harsher because South Africa did not respect its role in defending international human rights institutions despite of the fact that South Africa was involved in them and promised to fulfill its duties as responsible state actors.

Figure III-3 shows that in 2006-2008 when naming and shaming on South Africa became active, South Africa's voting pattern on UNHR resolutions fluctuate. In 2007, although South Africa statement still concern that UNHR resolutions should be discussed in a non-political and

66) "South Africa's Foreign Policy: Human Rights? What's That?" *The Economist*, October 14, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/node/17259138> (Accessed June 14, 2016).

67) UN Watch, "South Africa's Vote Against Human Rights," November 19, 2007b, <http://www.unwatch.org/south-africas-un-votes-against-human-rights/> (Accessed June 18, 2016).

68) "The See-No-Evil Foreign Policy," *The Economist* (November 13, 2008), <http://www.economist.com> (Accessed June 18, 2016).

non-selective manner,⁶⁹⁾ South Africa on the average remained neutral on UNHR resolutions. The voting decision in 2007 is especially notable given the fact that voting took place right after South Africa defended its position on human rights diplomacy against UN Watch statement. This strongly suggests that public criticism towards South Africa have pressured the government to withdraw their explicit opposition against UNHR resolutions.

With new president Jacob Zuma running office in 2009, South Africa's stance on UNHR resolutions turned neutral during the period 2009-2014. This shift in South Africa's behavior is less likely a result of the president's personality as President Zuma declared that his foreign policy priorities are in continuities with those of the previous government. Rather, the change seems to result from an increase in pressures on South Africa to abide by human rights norm it committed upon. Right after Zuma became a president in 2009, renowned INGO Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the President Zuma and urged him to make human rights issues a central pillar of South Africa's foreign policy.⁷⁰⁾

Recognizing the heightened expectation, the Zuma government seemed to be determined to put human rights to the center of its foreign policy. Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperations, affirmed in 2009 that South Africa "intend to more robustly flex our muscles on human rights issues so that we can never be accused of betraying the ideals on which our democracy was founded."⁷¹⁾ Moreover,

69) United Nations, "Summary Record of the 49th Meeting," December 14, 2007, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/62/SR.49, pp. 10.

70) Human Rights Watch, "Letter to President-Elect Zuma on South Africa's Foreign Policy" (May 9, 2009) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/08/letter-president-elect-zuma-south-africas-foreign-policy> (Accessed June 19, 2016).

71) "Reply to the budget vote by Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, to the National Assembly," *South African Government Information* (June 18, 2009), <http://www.anc.org.za/caucus/show.php?ID=1115> (Accessed June 22, 2016).

its voting similarity score with China on UNHR resolutions in 2009 was even below 0.5 in 2009, indicating that South Africa expressed general support for the resolutions.

Critics often point out that in reality South Africa's foreign policy in terms of human rights issues has not changed much during Zuma administration. Notwithstanding the initial expectation, President Zuma put little effort to put human rights issues to the forefront of South Africa's foreign policy. South African government refused to issue Dalai Lama a visa when he was invited to attend a meeting of Nobel peace laureates in South Africa. It also permitted the visit of Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, despite the fact that he was indicted by the ICC for driving genocide in Darfur. Nonetheless, there are signs that South Africa's policies are constrained by normative criticisms. For instance, South Africa supported the decision of AU Assembly in 2009 which declared that AU would not help the ICC arresting Bashir. Nonetheless, South Africa was aware that its action would tarnish its international reputation as an ICC member. As a consequence, the South African Department of African Affairs issued a statement declaring that they would respect its constitutional values and obligations under the Rome Statute and would arrest Bashir if he visits South Africa.⁷²⁾ In addition, in terms of UNHR voting, South Africa decided to remain neutral on the issue. During Zuma administration South Africa abstained on UNHR voting despite the fact that it still sides with authoritarian states such as Cuba and voices concern for politicization of UNHR resolutions.⁷³⁾

72) "South Africa legally rebuts AU resolutions on arresting Bashir," *the Sudan Tribune* (August 3, 2009) <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article31996> (Accessed June 22, 2016).

73) United Nations, "Summary record of the 46th meeting," (January 14, 2015) U.N. Doc. A/C.3/69/SR.46, pp. 10.

In sum, the case of South Africa demonstrates how norm diffusion significantly influenced UN voting pattern of countries who have forged close political and economic ties with China. South Africa was more constrained by normative criticisms as they revealed the inconsistency between South Africa's voting pattern and its previous commitment to emerging human rights norm such as participating in the ICC and HRC.

3. Theoretical Hypotheses

This section lays out theoretical hypotheses to support the argument in this paper. To examine the impact of normative pressures on UN voting since the early 2000s, we examine how countries with varying degrees of commitment to the emerging human rights norm responded to growing normative pressures on UNHR voting. In recent years, countries have explicitly signalled their commitment to the new human rights norm by participating in two international organizations: ICC and HRC. Given the unique nature of the ICC with enforcement mechanism, becoming a member of the ICC demonstrates countries' commitment to bear sovereignty cost and support interventionist approaches to resolve domestic human rights problems of states.⁷⁴ Participating in the HRC also indicates that member states would be responsible for actively addressing domestic human rights abuses of states and discuss country-specific mandates within its sessions.

Two mechanisms of norm diffusions could explain the effect of ICC and HRC membership on UNHR voting. First, there is perceived cost of following the previously made commitment to human rights norm. ICC and HRC members' commitment is not a mere cheap talk as they are more pressured from domestic and external audience to consistently act in accordance with the norm they agreed upon. For instance, ahead of the ordinary session of the AU, INGOs in Africa jointly sent a letter to Foreign Ministers participating in the session to strengthen cooperation with the ICC and uphold their mandates and obligations made to the ICC.⁷⁵ Voting records of HRC members are consistently checked by INGOs and criticized

74) Hawkins, 2004, pp. 779-804; Deitelhoff, 2009, pp. 33-65.

75) Human Rights, "Letter to Foreign Ministers of African States Parties to the ICC" (January 26, 2012) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/26/letter-foreign-ministers-african-states-par> (Accessed June 19, 2016).

if they are against country-specific mandates. The aforementioned case of South Africa also demonstrates that ICC and HRC member states could be named and shamed when their act is not seen to be complying with the committed norm.

ICC and HRC members hence face considerable cost of losing its legitimacy within the international community when failing to act in accordance with emerging human rights norm. Their situation is analogous to doctors in a medical association who “are more likely to follow the norms of the association because membership in it exerts pressures to at least appear that they are complying with the standards of conduct in the profession.”⁷⁶⁾ There are signs that member states do care about consistent act in accordance with their committed norm. For instance, when the US pressured countries to sign Nonsurrender Agreements that prevent them from surrendering Americans to the ICC, many states refused to do because they were concerned about domestic audience cost of violating their commitment to the ICC.⁷⁷⁾

Considering that the content of UNHR resolutions also represents the very same norm of interventionist approaches towards human rights, it is likely that when normative pressures to vote in favour of UNHR resolutions increased the early 2000s, ICC and HRC member would more readily support UNHR resolutions to avoid legitimacy cost.

Second, besides the aforementioned mechanism of norm diffusion, another mechanism may have played a role in the association between UNHR voting and ICC and HRC membership: affinity towards emerging

76) Christine Min Wotipka and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Global Human Rights and States Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965-2001,” *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 23, Issue. 4 (2008), pp. 736.

77) Judith Kelley, “Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, Issue. 3 (2007), pp. 573-589.

human rights norm. It is also possible that some ICC and HRC would support UNHR resolutions because they believe in moral righteousness of emerging human rights norm. In case of ratifying the ICC, empirical research and anecdotes suggest that ratifying the ICC could be interpreted as countries' willingness to support interventionist approaches to resolve domestic human rights problems of states.⁷⁸⁾ Therefore, as an extension of showing their support for emerging human rights norm rather than a concern for the cost of their commitment, ICC and HRC members would vote in favour of UNHR resolutions.

This paper does not sought to separately test these two mechanisms of norm diffusion since either of these mechanisms could explain the impact of norm diffusion on African countries' UNHR voting. Moreover, either of the two mechanisms could be explained by ICC and HRC membership. Hence there is no need to disentangle the aforementioned two mechanisms of norm diffusion.


Hypothesis 1 Since the early 2000s, countries with ICC and HRC membership are more likely to not vote in accordance with China on UNHR resolutions than countries without membership.

The effect of norm diffusion on African countries' UN human rights voting could be primarily examined from the average voting pattern of early ratifiers and non-ratifiers of the ICC treaty.⁷⁹⁾ Figure III-4 shows that before

78) Kelley, 2007, pp. 573-589; Simmons and Danner, 2010, pp. 225-256.

79) African countries who have ratified the Rome Statute between the year 1999 and 2000 are classified as early ratifiers. These countries are Senegal, Ghana, Mali, Lesotho, Botswana, Sierra Leone, Gabon and South Africa. On the other hand, a group of non-ratifiers consists of Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Sudan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe.

the early 2000s, when normative pressures on UNHR resolutions voting were absent or minimal, the gap between voting similarity scores of early ratifiers and non ratifiers was smaller and at times converging. On the other hand, when there were increasing normative pressures to support UNHR resolutions after the early 2000s, ICC members start to more readily voted in favour of UNHR resolutions. Compared to non-ICC members, the speed of their voting in favour of UNHR resolutions is much faster and the gap of voting similarity with China between members and non-ICC members gets wider. This suggests that there have been normative pressures on UNHR voting beginning in the early 2000s.



<Figure III-4> ICC and Non-ICC Members' Voting Similarity with China on UNHR Resolutions, 1992-2014: *Source.* Based on United Nations General Assembly Voting Data from Voeten, 2013, pp. 54-66.

In this paper, participation in UN peacekeeping is not considered as countries' commitment to the new human rights norm. Although the ICC and UN peacekeeping are known to share the broad notion of collective actions towards domestic problems of individual states,⁸⁰⁾ states primarily concern security and military issues when participating in UN peacekeeping missions. In this sense, participants in UN peacekeeping missions are less likely to be seen as committed to emerging human rights norm and would face less legitimacy cost when voting against UNHR resolutions.

To further check the role of normative pressures in diminishing the political influence of China's economic ties, it is possible to conjecture that prior to the early 2000s during which normative pressures on UNHR voting was nearly absent, the effect of international human rights regime membership would not have been significant. On the other hand, material incentives from China would significant influenced African countries' voting decision on UNHR voting. Since HRC did not exist prior to the early 2000s, the effect of ICC membership is solely tested.

Hypothesis 2 Prior to the early 2000s, the effect of ICC membership would not have been significant. On the other hand, the influence of Chinese material incentives on human rights voting would have been significant.

Alternative hypotheses are also proposed in order to account for another factors that led the change in African countries' voting behavior on UNHR resolutions. First, the effect of US aid on African countries' UN

80) Eric Neumayer, "A New Moral Hazard? Military Intervention, Peacekeeping and Ratification of the International Criminal Court," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 46, Issue. 5 (2009), pp. 659-670; Beth A. Simmons and Allison Danner, "Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court," *International Organization*, Vol. 64 (2010), pp. 225-256.

vote decision are taken into account. The US also emphasizes the importance of voting records of UNHR resolutions. Since the end of the Cold War, the US State Department has annually addressed UNHR resolutions to be vital to America's national interests. Starting from the early 1980s, the US State Department annually released the document "Voting Practices in the United Nations" and listed UN resolutions that are considered to be important to the US. The Department of State makes it clear that "a country's behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to its bilateral relationship with the United States, a point the Secretary of State regularly makes in letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors."⁸¹ During the period 1992-2014, the State department listed most of UNHR resolutions to be "important" issues and voted in favor of all but one of these resolutions (See Appendix 1).

It is therefore reasonable to argue that the US uses its aid to induce countries to follow America's position on UNGA resolutions that are considered to be "important" to the US. There are a few empirical studies that corroborate this argument. Wang examines the period between 1980s and 1990s and argues that the US aid induces countries to follow America's position on issues in the UN that are regarded as "important" to the US.⁸² Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele examine sub-categories of the US aid and suggest that general budget support and untied grant strongly generate foreign policy compliance of secondary states.⁸³ Flore-Macias and Kreps also find that the US aid induces developing states to not vote in line with


81) Quoted in Thomas B. Anderson, Thomas Harr and Finn Tarp, "On US Politics and IMF Lending," *European Economic Review*, Vol. 50, Issue. 7 (2006), pp. 1843-1862.

82) T.Y. Wang, "US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: An Analysis of Important Issues," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43 (1999), pp. 199-210.

83) Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele, "Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Vote? A Disaggregated Analysis," *Public Choice*, Vol. 136 (2008), pp. 139-164.

China on UNHR resolutions.⁸⁴⁾ In this regard, the following hypothesis can be derived:

Hypothesis 3 Countries receiving more aid from the US are more likely to not vote in line with China on UNHR resolutions.



<Figure III-5> Aid Money to Africa from the US and China, 1992-2014:

Note. US and Chinese aid measured as a share of recipient countries' GDP. *Source.* US aid data from USAID data. Chinese aid data from Strange et al., forthcoming, pp. 1-29.

84) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371.

Preliminary examination shown in Figure III-5 does not support the alternative hypothesis. Figure shows that from the early 2000s, average flow of the US aid fluctuates and does not increase dramatically to induce African countries to vote against Chinese stance on UNHR resolutions. On the other hand, the amount of Chinese aid increases during the period. While Figure III-5 shows that US aid does not increase dramatically to change UN voting pattern in Africa, the figure is based on aggregate data and hence it would be too early to conclude that aid money from the US had no impact on UN voting decision of African countries.

Second, African countries' domestic conditions could affect their voting decision on UNHR resolutions. Democracies and countries with good human rights records are more likely to support interventionist principles towards human rights issues to punish autocracies and human rights offenders.⁸⁵⁾ In addition, the incidence of civil wars could also matter in voting decision on UNHR resolutions. Countries undergoing civil wars could oppose UNHR resolutions because of the fear that their domestic affairs could be interfered. On the other hand, these states might support UNHR resolutions in order to resolve their domestic problems. Considering the potential impact of these domestic conditions on UNHR voting, following hypotheses are proposed:

Hypothesis 4a Democracies are less likely to not vote in line with China on UNHR resolutions.

Hypothesis 4b Human Rights Offenders are more likely to vote in line with China on UNHR resolutions.

Hypothesis 4c Countries experiencing civil wars are more likely to vote in line with China on UNHR resolutions.

85) Kelley, 2007, pp. 577.

Lastly, the influence of threat perceptions towards China on UNHR resolutions is taken into account. As discussed in the previous section of literature review, the case of East and Southeast Asia illustrates that increase in China's military capabilities or historical animosity could lead secondary states in the region to balance against China instead of accommodate Chinese foreign policies.⁸⁶⁾

However, the argument that China's military rise is responsible for the change in African countries' UN voting pattern is implausible given that China does not have any military power or interest in African region. Sino-African relations have no historical legacies and are not fraught with suspicion and hostilities that characterize Sino-Asian relations. Nor is their relationship aggravated by maritime territorial disputes as in Southeast Asian region. Only recently did China began to increase its military involvement in African region in order to help to resolve growing insecurities in the region and this by no means implies that China is becoming a threatening figure to African countries.⁸⁷⁾ In this sense, by examining African region "we can better isolate foreign policy consequences of trade than other studies."⁸⁸⁾ In this sense, this alternative hypothesis does not hold in case of Sino-African relations and hence would not be examined in statistical analyses.

86) Ross, 2006, pp. 119-156; Lim and Cooper, 2015, pp. 696-727.

87) Ayush Midha, "Shifting Tides in Sino-African Relations," *Harvard Political Review*, Feb 8, 2016, <http://harvardpolitics.com/world/shifting-tides-sino-african-relations-case-south-sudan/> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

88) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 360.

IV. Empirical Analyses

1. Model, Data, and Method

To examine the relationship between African countries' economic interdependence on China and their foreign policy convergence with China, this paper uses time-series and cross sectional data (TSCS). The unit of analyses is dyad-year of 46 African countries for the period 1992-2012. Research design is more fully discussed below.

To assess both African countries' stance on human rights issues and their alignment with Chinese foreign policy, this paper uses the yearly average voting on UN country-specific human rights resolution between the period 1992-2002. The previous section outlined that China has consistently defended non-interventionist approaches to human rights issues. The voting record of China reveals that China consistently opposed UNHR resolutions (Appendix 1). In this sense, voting divergence from China can be interpreted as a willingness to respect an active and interventionist principles towards human rights agenda. This paper follows the same coding rule of Flores-Macías and Kreps, and Thacker.⁸⁹⁾ The variable takes the value of 1 when states agrees with China, 0 if disagrees with China and 0.5 if one state abstained but the other voted in favour or against human rights resolutions. This variable is log transformed in order to facilitate interpretation in percentage terms.

African countries' ICC and HRC membership is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 on the year countries ratified the ICC treaty or are a member of the ICC in that given year, otherwise 0.

89) Flores-Macias and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371; Strom Thacker, "The High Politics of IMF Lending," *World Politics*, Vol. 52, Issue. 1 (1999), pp. 38-75.

For other explanatory variables, this paper utilizes the same variables used in the analysis of Flores-Macías and Kreps: Chinese trade salience, US trade salience, US aid and national capabilities.⁹⁰⁾ Chinese and US trade salience are measured as total amount of bilateral trade with China or US divided by recipients' GDP in that given year. Bilateral trade data come from the Correlates of War (COW) International Trade data, v.3.0, 1870-2009⁹¹⁾ and GDP data from World Bank World Development Indicators.⁹²⁾ Because COW International Trade data are only available for the period until 2009, the amount of bilateral trade during 2010-2012 is estimated according to the methodology specified by Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins.⁹³⁾ US aid is measured by the amount of US economic aid commitment divided by recipients' GDP. US aid data come from USAID *Foreign Aid Explorer* dataset which specifies aid money given to recipient government by the US government.⁹⁴⁾

We also measure variables for regime type and human rights records of African countries. The variable regime type is a revised polity VI score ranging from -10 to 10. The value of -10 indicates autocracies and 10 democracies.⁹⁵⁾ Human rights variable is based on Political Terror Scale (PTS), which is the average rating of Amnesty International and US State

90) Flores-Macias and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371.

91) Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, *Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook*, v.3.0. (2012), <http://correlatesofwar.org> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

92) World Bank website, <http://data.worldbank.org/> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

93) Katherine Barbieri, Omar Keshk and Brian Pollins, "Trading Data: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding Rule," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 26, Issue. 5 (2009), pp. 471-491. I first collect trade data based on importers' report based on IMF *Direction of Trade* (DOT) data since countries are more likely to monitor thoroughly on goods that come into their country rather than leaving it. When trade data is missing, we imputed data from exporters' report.

94) USAID website, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

95) Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers, *Polity VI Dataset*, v.4.0. (2008), <http://www.systemicpeace.org/> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

Department's reports on human rights.⁹⁶⁾ The PTS score of 1 indicates that citizens receive no repression from their government while the score 5 means that there is severe repression from the state. Civil war variable is based on UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4 and takes the value of 1 when the country is undergoing a civil war that resulted in 1000 battle deaths in that given year and otherwise 0.⁹⁷⁾ Lastly, national capability variable is log transformation of Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), which takes into account demographic, industrial and military capabilities that “reflect the breadth and depth of the resources that a nation could bring to bear in instances of conflict.”⁹⁸⁾ The CINC score measures a ratio of one's material power out of world's total material power and is based on the COW National Material Capabilities Dataset v.4.0. CINC score is available only for the period until 2007 and hence for the rest of the period we impute the value in 2007 considering that countries' ranking of CINC score rarely changes over time.

Since Flores-Macías and Kreps (2013) did not measure the effect of Chinese aid on UN voting, this paper additionally includes predictors which measure the amount of Chinese aid money. In case of Chinese aid, it is difficult to estimate the amount since China does not report their development assistance activities to the international reporting regime. This limitation could be overcome by using a novel dataset obtained with open-source methodology for the period 2000-2012.⁹⁹⁾ This new media-based methodology follows several steps to ensure reliable data collection. In the

96) Mark Gibney, Linda Cornett, and Reed Wood, Political Terror Scale, 1976-2015 (2015), <http://www.politicalterroryscale.org> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

97) Thérèse Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2015,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 52, Issue. 4 (2015), pp. 536-550.

98) *Correlates of War: National Material Capabilities Data Documentation* (2005). v.3.0., pp. 3.

99) Strange et al., forthcoming, pp. 1-29.

first stage researchers collect individual-level project information from various sources. This stage involves four steps. First, researchers find Chinese project information from a search engine *Factiva* which draws 31,000 sources from 200 countries. Second, based on the obtained project information researchers navigate aid and debt information management system of recipient/borrower government. Third, they extract information from development finance institution websites such as Chinese embassy and Economic and Commercial Counselor's Office (ECCO). Lastly, researchers identify aid project information from academic articles found in Google Scholar. In the following second stage researchers assess and enhance their obtained data. In this stage researchers constantly repeat the previous steps and refine and recode their project description.¹⁰⁰⁾

This media-based data is not without its own limitations. Researchers using this data point out that media-based information cannot perfectly substitute for “complete and accurate statistical data from official sources.”¹⁰¹⁾ Nonetheless, it is by far the most systematic, transparent and multi-level source data that tracks the flow of Chinese aid to individual African countries given that there is no disaggregate data on Chinese aid to this date. Moreover, the advantage of this media-based data is that researchers follow the entire life cycle of individual aid projects and code them according to their status of pledge/commitment or suspended/completed which enables us to categorize Chinese aid in detail and better understand

100) Researchers aim to track under-reported Chinese aid data by documenting aid projects from various sources such as search engines, official records of recipient/donor governments and academic articles. For more detailed information on methodology of data collection, visit AidData website, <http://china.aiddata.org/> (Accessed April 19, 2016).

101) Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher and Vijaya Ramachandran, “China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection,” *Center for Global Development Working Papers* (April, 2003), pp. 3.

its effect.¹⁰²⁾

Among different categories of Chinese aid, this paper primarily uses the broadest one labelled as "Official Assistance" that combines the amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF) and Vague Types.¹⁰³⁾ This is because a considerable amount of Chinese aid is classified as Vague Types that cannot be categorized into either ODA or OOF. Moreover, researchers using this data finds that this broad category of Chinese official aid exerts a significant political influence on African states.¹⁰⁴⁾ Since the substantial number of Chinese aid projects lacks respective financial values, as Chinese aid variable this paper uses the number of Chinese aid projects divided by recipient countries' GDP in that given year.

The estimation method for models in this paper is OLS regression. All models include country fixed effects to control for country-specific unobserved factors. I do not control time trend in our model since results of panel-specific, augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejected the null hypothesis that our panel data is non-stationary. All trade and aid related variables are log transformed to better estimate our linear models and make our results robust

102) Besides studies on the political consequences of Chinese trade, recent research on Chinese political economy began to employ media-based collection to support their arguments and find interesting results. See also, Steven Liao and Daniel McDowell, "No Reservation: International Order and Demand for the Renminbi as a Reserve Currency," *International Studies Quarterly* (2016), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv020> (Accessed April 19 2016).

103) ODA refers to official aid that is (a) provided by official agencies, (b) has its objectives on economic development and welfare of developing countries and (c) is concessional and includes grant element of at least 25 percent. On the other hand, OOF refers to official aid that does not meet the aforementioned standard of ODA either because (a) it does not have development purpose or (b) has grant element less than 25 percent.

104) Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney, 2015, pp. 1-32; Dreher, Fuchs, Hodler, Parks, Raschky and Tierney, 2015, pp. 1-52.

to outliers.

This paper estimates statistical models on the period 2002-2012 considering that the normative pressures on UNHR voting began to increase in the early 2000s. Especially, the trend of African countries' voting similarity with China on UNHR resolutions shows the year 2002 as an important turning point in the diffusion of ICC treaties. However, our findings remain unchanged when we used different turning points such as 2000 or 2001. Moreover, the effect of ICC and HRC membership on UNHR voting increases as I estimate the latter period of time. This implies that normative pressures on UNHR voting did not increase suddenly at certain period of time but rather increased slowly in the early 2000s. Data after the year 2012 is excluded from statistical analysis as Chinese aid projects variable is only available for the period 2000-2012. However, when estimating the effect of ICC and HRC membership during the period 2002-2014 after excluding Chinese aid projects variable the effect remains significant.

2. Results

Table 1 and 2 shows the result of our analyses. Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. A star indicates the existence of statistical significance at the 95 percent level.

The first and second hypothesis is evaluated in Table VI-1. First, the negative and statistically significant coefficient of ICC and HRC Membership for the 2002-2012 period indicates that ICC members were more likely to support UNHR resolutions when controlling for other factors that affect vote decisions in UNHR resolutions. The effect of ICC membership (coef =

-0.154) is more significant than that of the HRC membership (coef = -0.055). This would be so because the HRC membership lasts only for three years and normative pressures on members could be limited. On the other hand, the ICC offers a permanent platform for member states to convene conferences and exchange their thoughts.

On the other hand, during the period 1992-2002 the effect of ICC membership does not pressure African countries to support UNHR resolutions. Rather, the effect of ICC membership seems to be associated with opposing UNHR resolutions. This should be interpreted that ICC membership was not a mediating mechanism of norm diffusion during the period 1992-2001 when normative pressures on UNHR voting was scant.

Hypothesis 3 regarding the effect of the US aid does not hold in the result of statistical analyses. During the period 2002-2012, the effect of US aid is insignificant. The results imply that the shift in the amount of bilateral aid could not have been a decisive factor for the shift in African countries' voting pattern on country-specific human rights resolutions in the UNGA. In addition, US trade salience does not seem to induce states to support UNHR resolutions. According to the model in table VI-1, the increase in US trade salience is even associated with the increase in voting similarity with China. This result could mean that once the normative pressures on UNHR voting increased, economic incentives from the US became less important to African countries' voting on UNHR resolutions.

Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c is also evaluated. African countries' human rights records are not significantly associated with UNHR voting. On the other hand, democracies were more likely to vote in line with China on UNHR resolutions. Occurrence of civil wars is not associated with supporting UNHR resolutions. Overall results indicate that particular domestic conditions of African states such as democracy could also influence their voting decision. Nonetheless, the models demonstrates that even after

controlling for domestic conditions the impact of international norm pressures was profound on African countries.

The results also demonstrates different effects of Chinese trade and aid on UN human rights voting. During the period 2002-2012, Chinese trade salience induces African countries to not vote in alignment with China on UNHR resolutions. This contrasts the finding of Flores-Macías and Kreps according to which Chinese trade salience exerts a significant influence on African countries' voting similarity with China.¹⁰⁵⁾ Because bilateral trade has only a persuasive influence but not coercive power based on rewards and punishment, the effect of Chinese trade seems to become negative when norm diffusion came to play an important role in African countries' UN voting decision. On the other hand, the effect of Chinese aid remains significant for non-ICC members during the period 2002-2012, which demonstrates that Chinese aid can be yield stronger political influence than Chinese trade.

105) Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, pp. 357-371.

<Table VI-1> The Effect of the ICC Membership on UN Voting Similarity with China, 1992-2012: Ln() indicates that variables are log transformed.

	<i>Dependent Variable</i> : Voting Similarity with China (0 to 1)	
	1992-2002	2002-2012
	(1)	(2)
ICC Membership	0.086* (0.023)	-0.157* (0.046)
HRC Membership		-0.054* (0.020)
Ln(Chinese Trade Saliency)	0.044* (0.019)	-0.121* (0.019)
Ln(Chinese Aid Projects)		0.121 (0.064)
Ln(US Aid)	-0.054 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.020)
Ln(US Trade Saliency)	0.020 (0.019)	0.039* (0.020)
Regime	0.01 (0.004)	-0.020* (0.007)
Human Rights	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.014)
Civil War	-0.022 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.045)
National Capability	0.209* (0.061)	-0.020 (0.145)
Observations	411	479
R ²	0.175	0.369
Adjusted R ²	0.152	0.325
F Statistic	9.490*	24.688*

V. Conclusion

This study brought diffusion of international human rights norm into the discussion of foreign policy consequences of increasing China's charm offensive. This paper suggests that in order to account for the diminishing effect of China's soft power diplomacy on UN human rights voting, we should go beyond traditional theories based on economic incentives and military capabilities. By examining UNHR voting pattern of countries with ICC and HRC membership, we observe the process of norm diffusion and the impact of normative pressures on UNHR voting. During the period 2002-2012, ICC and HRC members would more readily vote in favor of UNHR resolutions than non-ICC members. On the other hand, during 1992-2002 the effect of ICC membership was not effective whereas Chinese trade was.

The argument of this paper is not without limitations. First and foremost, because my dissertation only examines African cases it is questionable whether the effect of norm diffusion could also account for UN human rights voting of developing countries in other region. Bearing in mind the specific regional implication of my argument, we also need to consider whether ICC and HRC membership represents countries' commitment to abide by emerging new international norm in other regional context.

Second, besides two mechanisms of norm diffusion –commitment problems and affinity towards norm- outlined in this paper, there might be other paths in which norm diffusion can induce African countries to not vote in line with China on UNHR resolutions. Perhaps these alternative mechanisms could be sought from examining cases of other African countries that are not covered in this dissertation.

Nonetheless, this paper attempts to complement the previous literature on foreign policy consequences of China's charm offensive strategies in two ways. First, in discussing secondary states' response to increasing Chinese trade and aid, my argument suggests that we need to consider other factors that now plays a decisive role in international relations after the Cold War: increasing importance of normative factors and role of multilateral institutions. When these elements are counted for, the political leverage of emerging powers' economic ties could be less significant. My argument hence differ from the existing research has primarily highlighted material factors such as trade and military capabilities. African countries' voting behavior in terms of UNHR resolutions shows that normative concern often overrides material payoffs in international politics. Moreover, this paper focused on the impact of China's charm offensive strategies on African countries that has received relatively scant attention compared to Sino-Asian relations.

For future research agenda, this paper suggests to look for the effect of China's charm offensive strategy in other areas of foreign policy issues such as maritime territorial disputes or one China policy. Examining out whether there is a turning point and why the change occurred would lead us to find meaningful implications of increasing China's soft power diplomacy. In addition, further inquiring how China deals with diminishing effect of its charm offensive would enhance out understanding of dynamic process of China's soft power diplomacy.

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Appendix

<Appendix 1> UNHR Resolutions, China and US vote, and Target Country, 1992-2014

No.	Date	Resolution	China vote	US vote	Target country
1	1992/12/06	A/RES/47/139	Against	In favour*	Cuba
2	1992/12/06	A/RES/47/142	Against	In favour*	Sudan
3	1992/12/06	A/RES/47/145	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
4	1992/12/06	A/RES/47/146	Against	In favour*	Iran
5	1993/12/02	A/RES/48/142	Against	In favour*	Cuba
6	1993/12/02	A/RES/48/144	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
7	1993/12/02	A/RES/48/145	Against	In favour*	Iran
8	1993/12/02	A/RES/48/147	Against	In favour*	Sudan
9	1994/12/06	A/RES/49/196	Abstention	In favour*	Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia
10	1994/12/06	A/RES/49/198	Against	In favour*	Sudan

11	1994/12/06	A/RES/49/ 200	Against	In favour*	Cuba
12	1994/12/06	A/RES/49/ 202	Against	In favour*	Iran
13	1994/12/06	A/RES/49/ 203	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
14	1994/12/06	A/RES/49/ 204	Abstention	In favour	Kosovo
15	1995/12/06	A/RES/50/ 188	Against	In favour*	Iran
16	1995/12/06	A/RES/50/ 190	Abstention	In favour	Kosovo
17	1995/12/06	A/RES/50/ 191	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
18	1995/12/06	A/RES/50/ 193	Abstention	In favour	Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia
19	1995/12/06	A/RES/50/ 197	Against	In favour*	Sudan
20	1995/12/06	A/RES/50/ 198	Against	In favour*	Cuba
21	1995/12/06	A/RES/50/ 199	Against	In favour*	Nigeria
22	1996/12/05	A/RES/51/ 106	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
23	1996/12/05	A/RES/51/ 107	Against	In favour*	Iran
24	1996/12/05	A/RES/51/ 109	Against	In favour	Nigeria
25	1996/12/05	A/RES/51/ 111	Abstention	In favour	Kosovo

26	1996/12/05	A/RES/51/ 112	Against	In favour*	Sudan
27	1996/12/05	A/RES/51/ 113	Against	In favour*	Cuba
28	1996/12/05	A/RES/51/ 116	Abstention	In favour*	Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia
29	1997/12/06	A/RES/52/ 139	Abstention	In favour	Kosovo
30	1997/12/06	A/RES/52/ 140	Against	In favour*	Sudan
31	1997/12/06	A/RES/52/ 141	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
32	1997/12/06	A/RES/52/ 142	Against	In favour*	Iran
33	1997/12/06	A/RES/52/ 143	Against	In favour*	Cuba
34	1997/12/06	A/RES/52/ 144	Against	In favour	Nigeria
35	1997/12/06	A/RES/52/ 147	Abstention	In favour*	Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia
36	1998/12/04	A/RES/53/ 157	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
37	1998/12/04	A/RES/53/ 158	Against	In favour*	Iran
38	1998/12/04	A/RES/53/ 163	Abstention	In favour*	Bosnia, Herzegovina,

					Croatia and Yugoslavia
39	1998/12/04	A/RES/53/164	Abstention	In favour*	Kosovo
40	1999/12/06	A/RES/54/177	Against	In favour*	Iran
41	1999/12/06	A/RES/54/178	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
42	1999/12/06	A/RES/54/179	Against	In favour	Congo
43	1999/12/06	A/RES/54/182	Against	In favour	Sudan
44	1999/12/06	A/RES/54/183	Abstention	In favour*	Kosovo
45	1999/12/06	A/RES/54/184	Abstention	In favour*	Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia
46	2000/12/03	A/RES/55/114	Against	In favour*	Iran
47	2000/12/03	A/RES/55/115	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
48	2000/12/03	A/RES/55/116	Against	In favour	Sudan
49	2000/12/03	A/RES/55/117	Abstention	In favour	Democratic Republic of the Congo
50	2001/12/05	A/RES/56/171	Against	In favour*	Iran
51	2001/12/05	A/RES/56/173	Abstention	In favour*	Democratic Republic of Congo

52	2001/12/05	A/RES/56/ 174	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
53	2001/12/05	A/RES/56/ 175	Against	Abstention	Sudan
54	2002/12/05	A/RES/57/ 230	Against	In favour*	Sudan
55	2002/12/05	A/RES/57/ 232	Abstention	In favour*	Iraq
56	2002/12/05	A/RES/57/ 233	Abstention	In favour*	Democratic Republic of Congo
57	2003/12/22	A/RES/58/ 196	Abstention	In favour*	Democratic Republic of Congo
58	2003/12/22	A/RES/58/ 195	Against	In favour*	Iran
59	2003/12/22	A/RES/58/ 194	Against	In favour*	Turkmenistan
60	2004/12/20	A/RES/59/ 207	Abstention	In favour	Democratic Republic of Congo
61	2004/12/20	A/RES/59/ 206	Against	In favour	Turkmenistan
62	2004/12/20	A/RES/59/ 205	Against	In favour*	Iran
63	2005/12/16	A/RES/60/ 174	Against	In favour	Uzbekistan
64	2005/12/16	A/RES/60/ 173	Against	In favour	Democratic People's Republic of Korea

65	2005/12/16	A/RES/60/ 172	Against	In favour	Turkmenistan
66	2005/12/16	A/RES/60/ 171	Against	In favour*	Iran
67	2006/12/19	A/RES/61/ 176	Against	In favour*	Iran
68	2006/12/19	A/RES/61/ 175	Against	In favour*	Belarus
69	2006/12/19	A/RES/61/ 174	Against	In favour*	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
70	2007/12/18	A/RES/62/ 169	Against	In favour	Belarus
71	2007/12/18	A/RES/62/ 167	Against	In favour*	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
72	2007/12/18	A/RES/62/ 168	Against	In favour*	Iran
73	2007/12/22	A/RES/62/ 222	Against	In favour*	Myanmar
74	2008/12/18	A/RES/63/ 190	Against	In favour*	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
75	2008/12/18	A/RES/63/ 191	Against	In favour*	Iran
76	2008/12/24	A/RES/63/ 245	Against	In favour*	Myanmar
77	2009/12/18	A/RES/64/	Against	In favour*	Democratic

		175			People's Republic of Korea
78	2009/12/18	A/RES/64/176	Against	In favour*	Iran
79	2009/12/24	A/RES/64/238	Against	In favour*	Myanmar
80	2010/12/21	A/RES/65/225	Against	In favour*	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
81	2010/12/21	A/RES/65/226	Against	In favour*	Iran
82	2011/12/19	A/RES/66/174	Against	In favour*	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
83	2011/12/19	A/RES/66/175	Against	In favour*	Iran
84	2011/12/19	A/RES/66/176	Abstention	In favour*	Syria
85	2011/12/24	A/RES/66/230	Against	In favour*	Myanmar
86	2012/12/20	A/RES/67/182	Against	In favour*	Iran
87	2012/12/20	A/RES/67/183	Against	In favour*	Syria
88	2013/12/18	A/RES/68/182	Against	In favour*	Syria
89	2013/12/18	A/RES/68/184	Against	In favour*	Iran

90	2014/12/18	A/RES/69/ 188	Against	In favour*	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
91	2014/12/18	A/RES/69/ 189	Against	In favour*	Syria
92	2014/12/18	A/RES/69/ 190	Against	In favour*	Iran

<Appendix 2> Descriptive Statistics

	2002-2012		
	Full	ICC	Non-ICC
UN Voting Similarity with China	0.444 (0.180)	0.394 (0.168)	0.514 (0.175)
ICC Membership	0.577 (0.494)	-	-
HRC Membership	0.189 (0.392)	0.222 (0.416)	0.141 (0.349)
Ln(Chinese Trade Salience)	1.748 (0.928)	1.833 (0.973)	1.624 (0.847)
Ln(Chinese Aid Projects)	0.078 (0.132)	0.086 (0.143)	0.067 (0.114)
Ln(US Aid)	0.567 (0.561)	0.669 (0.591)	0.420 (0.480)
Ln(US Trade Salience)	1.555 (0.922)	1.566 (0.958)	1.530 (0.871)
Regime	1.545 (5.109)	3.954 (4.303)	-1.778 (4.193)
Human Rights	2.971 (0.912)	2.791 (0.907)	3.204 (0.866)
Civil War	0.027 (0.162)	0.006 (0.080)	0.056 (0.231)
National Capability	-7.469 (1.362)	-7.682 (1.314)	-7.177 (1.375)

<Appendix 3> List of African Countries in Statistical Analyses

ICC Members	Non-ICC members
Benin (11)	Algeria (11)
Botswana (11)	Angola (11)
Burkina Faso (9)	Burkina Faso (2)
Burundi (9)	Burundi (2)
Central African Republic (11)	Cameroon (11)
Chad (6)	Chad (5)
Comoros (7)	Comoros (4)
Congo (9)	Congo (2)
Democratic Republic of Congo (11)	Egypt (11)
Djibouti (11)	Equatorial Guinea (11)
Gabon (11)	Guinea (1)
Gambia (11)	Guinea-Bissau (11)
Ghana (11)	Ivory Coast (11)
Guinea (10)	Kenya (3)
Kenya (8)	Liberia (2)
Lesotho (11)	Libya (11)
Liberia (9)	Madagascar (6)
Madagascar (5)	Mauritania (11)
Malawi (11)	Mozambique (11)
Mali (11)	Rwanda (11)
Mauritius (11)	Somalia (1)
Namibia (11)	Sudan (11)
Niger (11)	Swaziland (11)
Nigeria (11)	Togo (11)
Senegal (11)	Tunisia (9)
Sierra Leone (11)	Zimbabwe (11)
South Africa (11)	

Tanzania (11)	
Tunisia (2)	
Uganda (11)	
Zambia (11)	

Note. Figures in parentheses denote the number of years in observation.

국문 초록

본 논문은 증가하는 대중 무역과 원조로 대변되는 중국의 매력공세 (Charm Offensive) 전략이 중국이 가장 중요하게 생각하는 외교 사안인 인권 외교에 어떤 영향을 미쳤는지를 중국-아프리카 관계에서 탐구한다. 증가하는 대중 무역과 원조에도 불구하고 아프리카 국가들은 2000년대 초반 이후부터 유엔에서 진행되는 특정 국가에 대한 인권결의안투표에서 중국의 바람과는 달리 점차 찬성표의 비중을 늘리기 시작했다. 이러한 추세는 아프리카에서 중국이 공세적으로 전개한 매력공세 전략에 비추어 볼 때 중요한 퍼즐이라고 볼 수 있다. 본 논문의 핵심질문은 대중 무역과 중국 원조의 증가에도 불구하고 왜 중국의 영향력이 아프리카 국가들에 대한 인권외교에서 감소하고 있는가이다.

본 논문은 2000년대 이후 아프리카 지역에서 중국의 매력공세 전략의 효과가 점차 약해지는 원인을 국제 인권 규범의 확산의 결과로 본다. 국내 인권 문제에 대한 적극적 개입을 강조하는 인권규범이 전 세계적으로 빠르게 확산되는 과정에서 유엔인권 결의안을 지지하라는 국제적 차원의 규범적 압력 역시 증가하였다.

본 논문은 위의 주장을 뒷받침하기 위해 사례 연구와 통계 모형을 활용한다. 우선, 규범 확산이 아프리카 국가들의 유엔 결의안 투표에 미친 영향을 살펴보기 위해 남아프리카 공화국의 사례를 본다. 남아프리카 공화국은 중국과 긴밀한 정치적, 외교적 관계를 맺기 위해 노력해왔으며 그 결과 유엔인권 결의안 투표에서 중국과 같은 입장을 취해왔다. 그러나 2000년대 중반 이후 남아프리카 공화국의 투표 행위는 대내외적인 비판에 직면하게 되었다. 또한 남아프리카 공화국의 투표 행위는 남아프리카 공화국이 여러 국제 인권 제도에 참여한 과거 행위와 모순된다는 사실로 더 큰 비판을 받게 된다. 그 결과 남아프리카 공화국은 2000년대 중반 이후 유엔인권 결의안 투표에서 중립을 유지하게 된다.

본 논문은 국제형사재판소(International Criminal Court)와 유엔인권

이사회 (Human Rights Council) 회원국 여부를 기준으로 국가들의 새로운 인권 규범에 대한 구속 여부를 측정한다. 위 두 기구들의 가입 여부를 바탕으로 두 가지 경로의 규범 확산 과정을 제시할 수 있다. 첫째, 국제형사재판소와 유엔인권이사회에 가입한 국가들은 새로운 인권 규범에 동의한다는 신호를 이전에 보냈기 때문에 유엔 인권 결의안에 반대할 경우 국제 사회 내에서의 정당성의 훼손될 수 있는 위험 부담이 높다. 또한 이들은 굳이 위험 부담을 고려하지 않더라도 규범의 도덕적 기반을 지지하는 차원의 연장선상으로 유엔인권 결의안에 찬성표를 던질 수 있다.

이러한 가정을 바탕으로 본 논문은 다음과 같은 두 가지 가설을 제시한다. 첫째, 다른 조건을 통제하면, 2002-2012년 시기에 유엔 인권결의안 지지에 대한 규범적 압박이 증가하였을 때 국제형사재판소와 유엔인권이사회 회원국들은 비회원국들보다 유엔인권 결의안을 유엔인권 결의안을 지지할 가능성이 더 높다. 둘째, 1992-2002년 시기에 유엔인권 투표에 대한 인권 국제제도 가입의 영향력은 유의미하지 않은 반면에 대중 무역의 영향력의 유의미하다. 본 연구의 주장을 뒷받침하기 위해서 1992-2012년 시기 46개 아프리카 국가들의 유엔인권 결의안 투표결과를 분석한 결과, 위 가설에 대한 경험적 증거를 확인할 수 있었다.

본 연구의 결과는 다음과 같은 두 가지 함의를 제시한다. 첫째, 기존 연구들이 경제적 유인 혹은 군사적 역량이라는 물질적 요인에만 한정하여 중국의 매력공세 전략의 효과를 분석한 반면, 본 논문은 대중 무역과 원조의 정치적 영향력이 규범적-제도적 요인과 상호작용하고 있음을 보여주었다. 유엔인권 결의안에 대한 아프리카 국가들의 투표 행위는 국제정치에서 규범적 고려가 종종 물질적 유인을 뛰어넘을 수 있음을 보여준다. 둘째, 본 논문의 결과는 중국-아프리카 관계의 역동적인 상호 작용과 변화를 보여줌으로써, 중국-아시아 관계보다 연구보다 관심이 덜했던 중국-아프리카 관계를 연구하고, 향후 중국과 아프리카 국가들 간의 관계가 어떻게 전개될 수 있을지에 대한 함의를 제시한다.

주요어 : 중국-아프리카 관계, 중국 매력공세 전략, 유엔 인권 투표, 대중
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학번 : 2013-22889