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Russian Language Status in the post-Soviet Space
Between Identity and Interest

탈 소비에트 국가들에서의 러시아어 위상:
정체성 및 국가이익 인식의 영향

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background of the Study and Problem Statement

Two decades have passed since the Soviet Union’s dissolution, when Russia and the other fourteen republics became independent states. Despite the fact that all former Soviet republics once shared a strong common identity as a unified nation, the dissolution that followed prompted a radical diversion of political, economic and foreign policy trajectories among the republics. Nevertheless, the Soviet power’s historical reign in all fifteen republics still left a trace. The various sorts of cultural and material Soviet legacies remained in all former Soviet republics, affecting their whole process of nation-state building and foreign policy orientation.

One of those significant Soviet legacies was the Russian language. Having once united all Soviet republics and shaped the identity of every Soviet man, Russian language played an important role in all spheres of life. It was the main means of intercommunication among Soviet republics, the chief language of science, progress, culture, as well as the very symbol of great Soviet power, Revolution, Lenin, communism and peace. Moreover, Russian language was an integral part of the overall national Soviet
policy, claimed to be perceived by the non-Russian Soviet citizens not as a foreign language but as “the second mother tongue.” Indeed, Russian language proved to be an influential tool of the Soviet socialization and integration that, on the one hand, was a crucial element for the spiritual solidarity of more than 140 diverse nationalities in the USSR; and that, on the other hand, was a powerful instrument of individual choice for better career opportunities.

According to the 1989 Soviet census data, there were as many as 184 million Russian-speaking people in the former USSR. However, after the Soviet dissolution, the Russian language study dropped sharply in all former republics as soon as it ceased being mandatory. Since then, the process of de-Russification in the post-Soviet region became an expression and the symbol of the Soviet disintegration itself, challenged both locally and globally.

### How Is It Important Today?

“The pen (language) creates a symbol for a new community frontiers and new interests which are defined and defended by the thrust of the sword. All humans associate their first language with their most intimate social group—family and peer. Other languages are consequently associated with these other, more distant domains beyond kinship and neighborhood. Strategies are needed,
however, in order that language variations might serve a consciously articulated political goal requiring the mobilization of significant numbers of people. If the linguistic symbols are legitimized or accepted by significant numbers of people, a powerful weapon is available for political elites demanding economic and power benefits for the new ethnicity or nationality in whose name they claim to speak.”¹

In effect, the first particular expression of the shifting balance between Moscow and the periphery was the enactments of local language laws in 1988-89, right prior to the Soviet disintegration, which designated the titular languages as official in the Soviet republics.²

After the disintegration, most national leaders in the former republics started to implement policies to guarantee and protect national, political, economic, and cultural dominance in their homelands. The formal nationalism was evident in the new republics’ constitutions, citizenship laws, as well as in voting rights even in republics where the actual Russian-speaking population comprised almost half of the entire population.

Yet one of the most noticeable expressions of such nationalism was the language legislation: after Soviet disintegration, the languages of the titular

nations rose to the status of official state languages, whereas Russian varied extremely in its status from one republic to another. As a former metropolitan language, Russian became a highly politicized issue, directly involved in defining symbolic contours of the new states and foreign policy orientation. Thus language laws, a pivotal point in national and interstate relations, significantly escalated the problem of 70 million Russian-speaking people living outside their own territory, 26 million of which were Russian diaspora. The steadily declining trend of Russian language in the former republics and its undetermined status in many of them was nothing but a certain political message to Russia, a clear expression of the republics’ official foreign policy orientation.

Despite the obvious political divorce of the former republics with Russia, some eventually decided to remain in the Russian-speaking realm, demonstrating their active support for the language and their intentions to keep close relations with Russia; while others relegated Russian to the foreign language status, expressing their political distance from the former metropole. In fact, Russian language issue in the post-Soviet region still remains a remarkable topic on domestic and foreign policy agendas, often mentioned on presidential elections and, for some republics, becoming one of the trump cards in economic and security bargains with Russia.
Current Language-Related Issues

For instance, in 2009 the president of the Republic of Tajikistan suggested abolishing Russian as a language of “interethnic communication,” arguing for the need of language policy alteration to bolster Tajikistan’s sovereignty. Russian politicians angrily responded to this initiative, claiming that any effort to abandon Russian language’s official status would provoke punitive economic measures by Moscow. Indeed, this is not the first Russian language-related precedent in the Republic. In March 2007, President Rahmon dropped the Slavic “-ov” from his surname and ordered that all Tajik newborns do the same. Many political analysts suppose that the president’s manipulation of Russian language is nothing but leverage aimed at increasing


4 The president of Tajikistan has changed his family name from RahmonOV to Rahmon. Surnames ending in -ov, -ev, -in are short forms of possessive adjectives; the ones ending in -sky are full forms. Russian surnames usually end in -ov (-ova for female), -ev (-eva), or -in (-ina). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, -off was a common transliteration of -ov when spelling Russian surnames in foreign languages such as French (e.g., the Smirnoff brand). Some surnames in those languages have been russified since the 19th century and remain as such; e.g., the surname of Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev has a Russian "-yev" suffix, which literally means "of Nazar-bay" (where "bay" is a Turkic native noble rank - compare Turkish "bey", Uzbek "beg", and Kyrghyz "bek"). This surname russification practice is not common, varying greatly by country.

financial assistance from Moscow.\textsuperscript{6}

In the same fashion, other former Soviet nations followed. The leader of Turkmenistan prohibited studying Russian in schools and refused to recognize diplomas issued in Russian universities in the Republic. Meanwhile in Ukraine, in December of 2007, the Constitutional Court under former president Viktor Yushchenko ordered that movies in Russian and other foreign languages be dubbed in Ukrainian prior to screening in the nation’s movie theaters, in spite of objections from the country’s large Russian-speaking population in the eastern regions.\textsuperscript{7}

As to the more recent language-related issues in the post-Soviet region, the most notorious are the language referendums in Ukraine and Latvia. In early July 2012, the Ukrainian Parliament, unexpectedly adopted a bill which grants Russian the status of a regional language, approving its usage in courts, schools and other government institutions in the republic’s Russian-speaking southern and eastern regions. This motion heightened the division between those who support Ukraine’s independent post-Soviet national identity and those who seek to maintain close ties with Russia, a split that has been haunting the country since the Pro-Western Orange Revolution in 2004. Indeed, the current Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych’s election in 2010 was like a death knell to Ukraine’s pro-democratic Orange Revolution, which

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\textsuperscript{6} Parshin, August 25, 2009.

\textsuperscript{7} Krainova, July 24, 2009.
attempted to stage the final break with the country’s Soviet past. The bill, initiated by the ruling Party, led to street protests across the country and scandals in parliament; the opponents of the bill even called it a “crime against the Ukrainian tongue,” warning that it could result in splitting the country. In addition, since the language bill came three months prior to Ukraine’s holding parliamentary elections, where the ruling party struggled to stay a majority, analysts believe that Yanukovych’s party of Regions had pushed through the bill purposely as a pre-electoral move to appease his voter base.

The status of Russian language in Ukraine is also an issue of delicate political interest in Moscow; hence the elevation of Russian could be, as analysts suggest, a signal that President Yanukovych may be looking east for support, although his ties with Kremlin have been strained. Finally, as political analysts assume, the stormy debate over the language issue was likely to cloud the discussion over the price Kiev should pay for Russian gas. It is also


another obstacle for one of Yanukovych’s foreign policy priorities – to integrate with Europe’s mainstream.11

Yet Ukraine is not the only former Soviet republic to wrestle with the language issue. This year, voters in Latvia rejected a referendum that would have designated Russian as a state language. In February 2012, Latvia held a national referendum on whether to accept Russian as the republic’s second official language, uncovering ethnic and political tensions that have remained for more than 20 years after the Soviet dissolution.12 Latvian voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposal to adopt Russian as the second official language, showing a negative 75 percent vote as evidence of the Republic’s formal break with the Soviet past and with the language of the former “occupiers,” as President of Latvia called it.13

In turn, Moscow, where officials grieve for the decline of Russian language in


13 Harry Smith, “Russia critical of Latvia language vote,” Aljazeera, February 19, 2012
the former Soviet territories, quite admired the attempts to change the Russian status in Latvia, explaining the high turnout as evidence of the fact that the concerns of Russian-speakers would have to be heard. Moscow has repeatedly blamed the Baltic republics for discriminating against Russian-speaking population in their regions.

What Is Russian Language for the Russian Federation?

Russian is the official language of Russian Federation. It also holds official status in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova (Gagauzia), Romania (a number of municipalities in Tulcea County and Constanta County), Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Moreover, Russian is also an official language of UN, UNESCO, WHO, International Civil Aviation Organization, CIS, Eurasian Economic Community, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, and International Organization for Standardization. The most spoken among Slavic languages, it is also the most geographically widespread language of Eurasia;

14 Herszenhorn, February 19, 2012.

the largest native language in Europe, with 144 million native speakers in
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; and a secondary language for 114 million people
in the world.\textsuperscript{16} Russian is the eighth most spoken language in the world by
number of native speakers and the fourth by the total number of speakers.
From Russia’s political view, the preservation and expansion of the Russian
language in the post-Soviet region is a significant force that strengthens
Russia’s prestige as one of the world’s educational and cultural centers\textsuperscript{17};
moreover, the promotion of Russian language is an effective way to protect
Russia’s geopolitical interests outside its own territory. And while the Soviet
Empire no longer exists, Russian language still plays an important role in
almost all of the CIS countries; indeed, often the imperial language maintains
its high status even after decolonization. Thus, from a political perspective,
Russian language appears as a way of holding the “Russian world” together.\textsuperscript{18}
In this context, Russian language becomes of vital importance to the country
and to the imagined Russian empire, boasting such imperial features as great
(“velikiy”) and powerful (“moguchiy”). Thus, by using the concept of the
“Russian World,” the country’s foreign policy aims at reintegrating the

\textsuperscript{16} Александр Арефьев, «Падение статуса русского языка на постсоветском
\textsuperscript{17} “Мир русского мира,” panel session report, Russian World Foundation,
23, 2011)
\textsuperscript{18} Oleksii Polegkyi, “Changes in Russian Foreign Policy Discourse and Concept of “Russian
World”,” Pecob’s papers series, No.16 (2011), p.17
www.pecob.eu (accessed March 6, 2012)
Russian nation and including former countrymen in its sphere of influence. Russia feels its “holy duty” to ensure the security of Russian citizens, ethnic Russians and even Russian-speakers in its “near-abroad” region. In this light, Russian language appears not only as a way of sustaining and preserving Russia’s unity but also as a tool to maintain and strengthen Russia’s influence in the former Soviet territory.¹⁹

This study explores the current Russian language status in the former Soviet republics.

It asks why do the former Soviet republics vary so drastically in relation to the Russian language status in their homelands? What are the major factors in supporting and granting Russian language high official status?

1.2. Literature Review

Although the literature on post-Soviet republics is vast, much of it does not address questions identified here. Most of existing research on Russian language topic in the post-Soviet republics consists mostly of case studies on sociolinguistic, educational changes and problems of multilingualism. (e.g. Smagulova, 2008; Orusbaev, 2008; Nagzibekova, 2008; Giger and Sloboda, 2008; Bilaniuk 2005; Ciscel, 2007;)

These works offered nuanced and detailed sociolinguistic pictures of a given republic but without the centripetal effort usually displayed by political scientists. Their attention is more concentrated on the outcomes of the Soviet language and nationalities policy – namely, multilingualism scrutinized through historical and social contexts.

Among the foundational works in this area are many accounts of ethnicity, nationalism and the role of Russian diaspora in the former republics. The most notable studies were conducted by political scientists Laitin (1998) and Kolsto (1995, 2002) who have documented the change of linguistic regimes and have attempted to show the close relation between nationalism, Russian diaspora and national identity shift in the post-Soviet space. For example, Laitin assumes that language is a critical and perhaps the single most important marker of identity. What is fresh here is the alternatives that Russian speakers in the former republics face with regard to language.\(^{20}\) Kolsto in his work also is more focused on Russian diaspora, minority rights and on political changes they would bring to the post-Soviet republics. Undeniably, these studies on post-Soviet republics’ identities lay out the theoretical and methodological foundations for the future study of the area.

While these studies implicitly assume that national identity and Russian-speaking population in the former republics play a significant role in their

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nation-state building process, as well as national relations with Russia, both of these works investigate problems of national identity and nationalism-related issues largely from the perspective of Russian diaspora, where Russian language by default serves as a mere identity marker. Nevertheless, a few works have conducted a comparative analysis of the Russian language status and policy in the post-Soviet area. For example, Kreindler’s study, *A second missed opportunity: Russian in retreat as a global language*, includes a discussion of Russian language in the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods, as well as of linguistic situation in the ex-republics shortly after the Soviet dissolution, with special emphasis on the role of language grievances in promoting national self-assertiveness and the causes of the early 90’s anti-Russian backlash in the republics. Kreindler’s discussion on this topic is supported by historical illustrations rooted in Soviet Russian language policies from Lenin’s to Gorbachev’s rule. Kreindler’s main focus lies on the Russian language retreat as a global language soon after the Soviet dissolution. The main point of this study is that “both the Leninist policy of linguistic generosity and its opposite, post-Stalinist drive to make Russian the instrument of integration of the Soviet people, are chiefly to blame for the rapid retreat of Russian; ...thanks to the initial Leninist policy, most of the national languages were well prepared to become state languages; ... most union and autonomous
republic languages were prepared to take over from Russian in the political, economic, and cultural domains of human endeavor.”21

In fact, this study is supported by especial scrutiny of the Soviet language policy; however it has several weak points. First, this study was conducted in the early 90s right after the Soviet dissolution and thus cannot reflect the current Russian language situation in the former republics; second, this comparative study is rather a prologue to the issue based mostly on historical facts.

Another comparative study, Russian as a lingua franca by Pavlenko, also provides an introduction to the subject of Russian language status in the post-Soviet republics. This research consists of historiographies and sociolinguistic analyses of language policies of the Russian empire and the USSR on the one hand, and an examination of the changing status of Russian in the post-Soviet states on the other.

Pavlenko’s approach to the derussification in the post-Soviet republics is based on two clusters of factors. The first cluster involves historic, sociopolitical, and socioeconomic factors; while the second cluster considers the interplay between demographic factors and linguistic competence and attitudes of the local population, including the level of russification reached by the time of the

collapse of the USSR.  

In her recent study *Multilingualism in post-Soviet countries: language revival, language removal, and sociolinguistic theory*, Pavlenko also conducts a comparative analysis of language shift outcomes and of challenges faced by fourteen states in implementing new language laws. Pavlenko highlights historic, demographic, linguistic and sociopolitical factors that shaped distinct language shift outcomes in geographically close countries groups of Eastern European, Transcaucasus and Central Asia.

In this study Pavlenko goes further and claims that there are now three clusters of factors affecting language planning outcomes, in the case of regional lingua franca. The first cluster involves ethnic and linguistic make-up of the country’s population and the patterns of settlement. The second cluster involves linguistic and ideological factors that shape attitudes towards particular languages. The third and the most important cluster involves regional and global forces – including transnational cash, migration, education, and communication flows – that mediate language maintenance, shift, and use in late modernity.  

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http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=530424&jid=APL&volumeId=26&issueId=1&aid=530420 (accessed November 2, 2011)  
Both of these researches situate the post-Soviet language management in a geopolitical and historical context supported by reliable data and facts. However, they provide only a general background of Russian language developments in the ex-republics, designating only historic, demographic, linguistic and, to a certain extent, sociopolitical factors that shape distinct language shift outcomes in geographically close former Soviet republics, leaving other significant factors, such as republics’ economic and security relations with Russia, beyond the scope of the studies.

Another recent informative work on the current Russian language status and policy in the post-Soviet states is by “Nasledie Evrazii” foundation.24 This analytical project summarizes Russian language legislation, Russian language popularity and public demand for the Russian language study in all former fourteen Soviet republics. This study abounds with various unique public surveys and data on the attitude toward Russian language status and policy, as well as the motivations behind the Russian language study demand by population in each republic. However, since Russian language policy, particularly its status, is inseparably involved in a republic’s not only domestic but also international affairs, to rely on public surveys and information of individual attitude toward language and its status only does not

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comprehensively answer the questions of interstate relations.

The existing scholarship on the post-Soviet politics and Russian language in particular is useful as a source of reliable data and hypotheses; however, it does not tell which hypotheses are valid or superior. One has little if any trustworthy information on the main reasons for the former republics’ choosing a particular status for the Russian language in their homelands. Instead of simply replicating the existing research on the matter, this study proposes to expand the notion of language beyond the conventional study of sociolinguistics, and to observe it from different angles. This study aims to generalize the major commonalities of the former republics in most important aspects of political, economic and security relations with Russia, thereby providing for better comprehension of the integral political processes affecting Russian language status in the post-Soviet space.

With regards to the Russian language status, this cross-national comparative research covers factors other than merely historic, demographic, linguistic or geographic; it intends to draw the whole picture of the Russian language status issue by including and combining symbolic, historic, political, economic, and security factors.
1.3. Research Design

1.3.1. Approach and Hypotheses

Language is, first of all, an essential tool of communication. Furthermore, it is one of the symbols of a nation, the ethnicity marker; it serves as the unifying banner over common values and self-identity. Hence, a state’s official language becomes a special form of political identification; indeed, language’s prowess in political matters becomes an indispensable tool in state affairs.

Besides, the power of language extends beyond symbolic or political value and into economic field as well. In its broadest definition, the economy also influences, directly or otherwise, various language processes, maintaining a language and generating various strategies in its adaptation, as well as using language to link an individual to the society.

Bourdieu’s standpoint on the value of language includes the economic aspect where, a treasure in itself, language never stands in solitude; instead, it partakes in a much broader, social context.

In fact, language has become a vulnerable issue in many parts of the world today. This is especially true for the post-Soviet region, where after almost

seventy years of Soviet reign and its policy of Russification, the former republics are now able to guarantee national, political, economic, and cultural dominance of their native languages.

What makes the phenomenon stand out today is that Russian language issue is still of crucial importance for both domestic and foreign policy agendas in the post-Soviet region.

In the post-Soviet context, the conventional explanations of the Russian language issue, such as those from cultural and demographic perspectives, are only partially successful in explaining variations in the former republics’ choice for the Russian language status.

In *cultural* terms, defined by *religion, language family, and proficiency* in Russian, the fourteen former Soviet republics (as seen in Table 1.1), while somewhat similar, vary in their status for the Russian language.

Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Language family</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Russian population</th>
<th>Russian Language proficiency (fluency, adults)</th>
<th>Russian language status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Indo-European</td>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Turkic</td>
<td>Islam (Shi’a)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Kartvelian</td>
<td>Georgian Orthodox</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Belarus | East Slavic | Russian Orthodox | 11% | 78% | State
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Moldova | Romance | Romanian Orthodox | 6% | 51% | Interethnic
Ukraine | East Slavic | Russian Orthodox | 17% | 70% | Interethnic
Kazakhstan | Turkic | Islam (Sunni) | 30% | 67% | State
Kyrgyzstan | Turkic | Islam (Sunni) | 12.5% | 38% | State
Tajikistan | Iranian | Islam (Sunni) | 1% | 35% | Interethnic
Turkmenistan | Turkic | Islam (Sunni) | 2% | N/A | Undetermined
Uzbekistan | Turkic | Islam (Sunni) | 5% | N/A | Undetermined
Estonia | Finno-Ugrian | Lutheranism | 26% | 39% | Foreign
Latvia | Baltic | Lutheranism | 30% | 59% | Foreign
Lithuania | Baltic | Roman Catholic | 5% | 24% | Undetermined

(continued)

Source: Language Family/Religion- based on data from White, Stephen, Alex Pravda, Zvi Gitelman (eds.), 1994, p.243
Russian population/Russian Language Proficiency/Russian Language Status- elaborated on the basis of data from Eurasia Heritage Foundation and Eurasian Monitor, 2008.

For example, the state or interethnic language status for the Russian language might have either a Slavic republic with Orthodox Christianity as its state religion, or a Turkic republic with Islam. Conversely, foreign or undetermined status for the Russian language might have a republic with any of the widely-represented post-Soviet region language family or religion.

As to Russian language proficiency, republics with similar percentage of fluency in Russian might have diametrically opposite legal status for the Russian language. For instance, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Estonia constitute almost the same rate of Russian language fluency among adults, yet they vary significantly in their status for Russian language: Kyrgyzstan has Russian as the state language, Tajikistan as interethnic, and Estonia as foreign.
Demographic factor, defined by the size of Russian population in the former Soviet republics, is perhaps the most sound among the abovementioned factors that might have the potential effect on the Russian language status in republics. For example, republics with the smallest size for Russian population, in most cases, have an undetermined status for Russian language.

However, in some cases, there is a contradiction between the relation of percentage of Russian population and the status for Russian language in republics. For instance, among the republics, Latvia and Kazakhstan both have the largest Russian population, yet the former assigns foreign status to Russian language, while the latter endows Russian with state language status. Similarly, Moldova and Tajikistan – while showing similarities in the percentage of Russian population with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Lithuania and Uzbekistan, where Russian language has undetermined status – give Russian language the interethnic status.

For this reason, the abovementioned factors alone are insufficient for comprehensive analyses and explanations for the republics’ Russian language status choices. Another explanatory variables of national identity, economic and security interests can make a significant contribution to a better understanding of the ex-Soviet republics’ Russian language policy behavior and its outcomes.
Since Russia is a legal successor of the Soviet Union, it is now the representative of Russian language; and at the interstate level, Russian language is associated primarily with Russian state rather than with Russian people. Therefore, the custodianship of foreign relations with Russia would also determine Russian language status in republics.

The prevailing theory of the nations’ motives behind their conduct in international affairs is that of the Realist school: while some scholars debate over the differences in specific factors, mainstream scholarly analyses of the forces shaping international behavior generally agree that the state is a rational actor.28 According to Hans Morgenthau, the root of political realism is the concept of self-interest, which infuses rational order into politics and thus makes political theory understandable. Moreover, Realism rejects the notion that morality has a role in politics, instead placing the highest importance on the self-interest of nation states, rather than the moral laws that govern the universe.29

Yet, given the Realist theory’s prevalence in the academia, scholars often overlook the ideological aspects of foreign policy; in fact, the study of international relations often overlooks the ideological bond that may drive an entire population to support certain external policies, no matter their

unproductiveness or social harm.\textsuperscript{30}

Constructivism, on the other hand, argues for the increasing number of socially constructed rules as guidance for individuals, groups and states: with accumulating empirical evidence largely in the form of descriptive narratives, constructivism supports the proposition that shared norms, authored by actors themselves, both constrain and enable them to act.\textsuperscript{31} Constructivists strive to provide evidence of how political actors acquire their identities, which generating actors’ material and non-material interests. Whereas realists argue that state interests are fixed and timeless, constructivists argue for changing actor identities, including those viewed as reified actors. Lead by Alexander Wendt, constructivists contend that states can have different identities and, correspondingly, varying interests.

National identity, as Ilya Prizel claims, by definition, projects a nation’s relationship to the “other,” stemming from the interaction between at least two distinct groups. In fact, national identity has a strong dialectical tie with a state’s conduct of foreign policy and its relations with neighboring states.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, the emotional aspect of national identity – which helps to define the parameters of a nation’s interests at home and abroad – orchestrates a society’s perception of its environment and acts as a driving force behind the formation

\textsuperscript{31} Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
\textsuperscript{32} Prizel, 1998, p.8.
of a state’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{33}

Furthermore, national identity primary links not only an individual to the society but also the latter to the world. Foreign policy, in its protection and security of national identity, gives the political elite the opportunity for mass mobilization and political cohesion; consequently, the majority of countries often rely on national identity to articulate their foreign policies which they then use as groundwork for their legitimacy.\textsuperscript{34}

Customarily, both economic and security interests of a state are primarily associated with material rather than non-material aspects; however, the exclusion of national identity, particularly of the former Soviet republics’, leads to an incomplete picture of the foreign relations’ outcomes.

This study proposes to develop a combination of national identity and interest factors as the substantial explanatory foundation responsible for the language policy outcomes.

By focusing on the former Soviet republics, this study seeks to demonstrate how a state’s choice for the Russian language status can be motivated and affected by its national identity, as well as economic and security interests. This study does not intend to suggest that other factors, such as demographic and linguistic considerations, are insignificant in understanding former republics’ policy for Russian language. Rather, it seeks to point out the

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p.14  
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p.19
limitations of conventional approaches and to illustrate other explanatory opportunities for bringing together material and non-material variables into international relations.

Since former Soviet republics all have the necessary prerequisites for fruitful comparisons – numerous similarities as well as significant differences – a model of combined historical, economic and security analysis will help to understand the impacts on the present choices for Russian language status in the post-Soviet space. In order to generalize the major commonalities among Russian language policy choices and to find the crucial factors affecting official status of Russian language among the former Soviet republics, this study, tracing the issue within the 1991-2012 timeframe, will present the comparative cross-national approach.

This study hypothesizes that national identity as well as economic and security interests are the most considerable explanatory factors for the Russian language status choices in the post-Soviet republics.

**Hypothesis 1**

The stronger the national identity of a republic, the more negative effect it would have on the Russian language policy in general, and on the status of the language in particular.

**Hypothesis 2**

The higher the economic interest and the tighter the economic institutional
binding a republic has with Russia, the more likely is Russian language to have a high official status in that republic.

**Hypothesis 3**

The higher a republic’s security interest in cooperation with Russia and the tighter its security institutional binding with Russia, the more likely is Russian language to have high official status in that republic.

**1.3.2. Operationalization**

National identity impacts on the policy-making can be operationalized in a number of ways. This study proposes that for the post-imperial states, the former Soviet republics, the factor that is essential for capturing the level of development of their national identities is their historical experience with national independence. Those states that had enjoyed such an experience for a comparatively long time (before being incorporated into the empire) have a somewhat better opportunity for developing and maintaining their non-imperial identity during the colonial rule.35

In terms of national identity, the fourteen republics can be divided into three

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diverse groups: the *strong*, well-developed national identity group, represented by republics with the longest experience with the national independence, among the former republics; the *weak* national identity group, represented by republics with no experience with the national independence before being incorporated into the Soviet Union; and the group of relatively strong national identity, represented by republics that fall somewhere between those two extremes, with rather short-lived and *fragmented* experience with national independence before being integrated into the Soviet Union.

Figure 1.1

National Identity Groups

![Diagram of National Identity Groups]

*Note: A- strong national identity group; B- weak national identity group; C- relatively strong national identity group*

The *economic interest* is defined here as one of the facets of foreign relations between former republics and Russia.

It captures four aspects of republics’ economic cooperation with Russia:
conventional trade, energy trade, migratory remittances from Russia and participation in regional economic organization (EurAsEC) lead by Russia. These four are considered in this study as the most prominent dimensions shaping the economic relations between former republics and Russia. They serve as the major connecting ground for republics and Russia in the economic field.

The measurement of this factor will help reveal the existence, or absence thereof, of the republics’ economic dependency on Russia, and therefore correlate it with the attitude toward Russia in general and Russian language status in particular.

*The high economic interest* here is designated as: 1) a republic’s *high trade* dependence on Russia; 2) high dependence on Russia’s *energy imports*; 2) the *high migratory labor* dependence on the Russian labor recipient market; 3) the *institutional bindings* with Russia under the main regional economic organization orchestrated by Russia (*the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc)*).

The *security interest* is defined here as another facet of the foreign relations between former republics and Russia.

It captivates two aspects of military cooperation with Russia: institutional binding under the main regional security organization (*the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)*)) lead by Russia and Russian military contingent
in the republics.

The measurement of this factor will provide a base for republics’ security dependency assessment on Russia; will serve as the reflection of republics’ attitude toward Russia in general, and consequently will affect the attitude toward Russian language in republics.

*The high security interest* here is defined as the high level of a republic’s security cooperation with Russia as seen in: 1) the existence of Russian military bases in a country; 2) the membership in the main regional security organization lead by Russia (*the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)*).

The term *high official Russian language status* is used frequently throughout the study.

For the purposes of the study, *high official status* of Russian language is defined as the legally recognized status of a state and/or interethnic language in a republic; whereas *low official status* of Russian language is defined as the legally undetermined status and/or legally recognized status of the foreign language in a republic.

Currently, Russian language differs significantly in its status among all fourteen republics. In terms of *legal status*, all ex-republics can be divided into *four groups*: the group of republics with Russian as the *state* language, the group of republics with Russian as the *interethnic* language, the group of
republics having Russian language with *undetermined* status, and the group of republics with Russian as a *foreign* language.

Figure 1.2

**Russian language status groups**

The forecited definitions and typology are intended to facilitate an empirical study of such connections by providing a framework for the research analysis.

**1.3.3. Data Analysis and Chapter Outline**

In order to measure both Russian language policy outputs and factors which
determine it, this study is based on primary and secondary sources. Russian language status has been investigated through the republics’ Constitutions, Language Acts and other related legislations. The national identity assessment was based on historical works of Soviet, Western and Asian scholars and on public surveys carried out by “Fond Nasledie Evrasii” as well. The economic calculations were based on the trade statistical data from UN Comtrade, Russian Federal Customs Service, Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Eurostat, Central Statistics Bureau of Latvia, Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, and Statistics Bureau of Estonia; energy trade calculations were based on the energy statistics from Trade Statistics for International Business Development; and calculations on migrant remittances were based on data from Ministry of Economic Development of Russian Federation, Bank of Russia, and Statistical Bureau of EurAsEC’s members. Security interest was traced through the sources from Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, US Department of State, CSTO (official governmental websites), and secondary sources from the post-Soviet and Western analytical works. The study is divided into six major chapters. Chapter 1 begins with a background introduction to the problem and develops the analysis model of
this study. Its purpose is to introduce the analytical tools of the study; to define the criteria for generalization; to present selected status groups for the Russian language; and to highlight some analytical challenges and means to address them.

The first part of chapter 2 historically illustrates the russification policy in the republics during the Soviet period; while the second part of chapter 2 analyzes the post-Soviet situation with Russian language legislation, as well as the public opinion on this matter.

Chapter 3 aims to test the first hypothesis related to national identity and to conduct main generalizations within each language status group. Chapter 4 deals with the economic aspect of republics’ relations with Russia, testing the second hypothesis, particularly focusing on trade, energy, migrant remittances and institutional binding. Chapter 5 analyses the republics’ security relations with Russia, assessing the third hypothesis: it focuses on security institutional binding and Russian military contingent in the republics. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and discusses explanatory and theoretical implications of the study.
2. Russian Language Policy

2.1. Soviet Language Policy

After the Revolution in 1917, Bolsheviks inherited from the tsarist epoch a politically, culturally, and linguistically complicated country, with over 100 million people speaking more than 150 different languages. With the threat of the Russian Empire’s potential disintegration into a host of smaller entities, a certain preventive measure became a high priority on the new government’s agenda. Furthermore, the spread of the Communist doctrine among different nationalities within the borders of the former Russian Empire was one of the primary goals of the new Soviet regime. Diverse strategies applied to consolidate Bolshevik power in the newly born Soviet state lay a solid foundation for the Communist society; the language policy strategy that Soviet authorities adopted in dealing with non-Russian nationalities was one of the most significant. The new regime recognized the crucial role of language in national affairs, hence making significant steps in guiding the development of non-Russian languages in compliance with the overall aim of the Communist party.

Before the Great Russian Revolution, Russian Empire was still mostly an illiterate nation. The literacy rate for the general population in 1897 was about
28.4%, the lowest of any European state at that time; moreover, the literacy rate of Central Asian nationalities was even lower: among the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks, the rates were 1%, 0.6%, 3.9%, 0.7%, and 1.9%, respectively. This phenomenon was unacceptable for the new regime due to several reasons. Literacy was the most significant and desirable ground for the Communist ideology to take root. Thus, a major motivation in the Soviet campaign for eradicating illiteracy had a strong political undertone: “Mass illiteracy hindered the building of socialism. It was of vital importance for the success of the cultural revolution that illiteracy should be eradicated.” With passionate fervor, inspired by the idea that literacy was essential for the Communist utopia, Bolsheviks thus began their crusade for literacy.

**Lenin’s Language Policy (1917-1930s)**

Lenin’s generous linguistic policy, which also served as foundation for his nationality policy, set the essential parameters for future implementations throughout the Soviet era. Lenin’s program called for the absolute equality of all languages and included a specific restriction against making Russian a

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37 Ibid.
38 Kriendler, 1993, p. 258.
mandatory language in schools. Lenin also promoted a vast campaign for the “development of languages and literatures of the formerly repressed nationalities,” and for promotion of literature in their mother language. Russian was not even mentioned in Lenin’s language program since it mainly emphasized non-Russian languages. In fact, under Lenin’s rule, it was Latin rather than Cyrillic alphabet that became associated with “the victory of October on the whole earth.”

Under Lenin, central authorities were promoting true linguistic pluralism in both culture and education. As Kreindler suggests, Lenin’s policy was indeed an expression of strength rather than weakness – a sign that Lenin was confident of his Marxist message, the true priority behind its linguistic form. Lenin also recognized the value of the mother tongue in providing rapid access to the target population and hence to implementing literacy, a process which he viewed as a prerequisite for politics.

Furthermore, even as the policy of developing and promoting national culture yielded overall support from the national intelligentsia, there were also many cases where no such intelligentsia existed – or where, trampled under strong Russian influences, it chose to ignore its indigenous culture. In such cases, the metropolis patiently proceeded to train the native cultural elite, or to push the assimilated intelligentsia back into its indigenous folds.

39 Ibid., p. 259.
The goal of the first phase of the Soviet linguistic program was to set up the “larger” languages for functioning in most major areas, and to guarantee survival to most of these languages up to the present.\textsuperscript{40}

**Stalin’s language policy (1930-1950s)**

While nationality policy under Stalin maintained its roots in Leninist theory, most of the language construction work came into realization under Stalin. It was under his rule that the *korenizatsia* (nativization) program, along with generous support of all languages, started to plummet. Russian language was most remarkably brought back by the Decree of March 1938 which, in spite of Lenin’s initiative, made Russian compulsory in all Soviet Union schools. At about the same time, Russian was also graphically taken back by switching the alphabets of all Soviet nationalities’ languages from Latin script into Cyrillic. This implementation was the second or, in some cases, third or even fourth alphabet change in the Soviet Union within just a single generation, excused by the idea that alphabet change made learning Russian easier.

On the other hand, due to this policy, almost universal literacy was achieved instead in various mother languages rather than in Russian, during the 1930s.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., pp.259-60.
When Stalin succeeded Lenin, he abandoned the latter’s caution against the dangers of chauvinism, instead enacting his own ethnic and linguistic policies. At first, however, Stalin strongly opposed any special privileges for Russian language in particular, coining the term “national in form, socialist in content.” At the dawn of his rule, language body planning increased with the greatest number of non-Russian languages. By 1934, textbooks were published in 104 different languages, compared to 25 only ten years earlier. In the 1938-1939 school years more than 70 languages functioned as mediums of instruction, each Soviet republic’s trying to provide education in the mother tongue for each of its own minorities.

However, Stalin’s later policies (post-1938 and to some extent even the policies of 1930) were a big step backwards from the earlier achievements of the time of nativization. The policy of “korenizatsiia” was curtailed, thus initiating estrangement from local languages. By Stalin’s Decree of March 1938, Russian became an obligatory subject in all Soviet schools, the language of “high culture” and, more importantly, the “language of socialism,” Russian words and terms flooding the non-Russian languages. Indeed, Stalin’s policy was rather a symbolic expression of Russian language’s greatness. Instead of republics’ self-determination, Stalin employed rather a

43 Ibid., p.235.
44 Ibid., p.245.
coldblooded policy of assimilation/Russification, favoring the latter because of its ability to control the tensions between nation-building and multi-ethnicity.\(^{44}\) Moreover, emphasizing cultural autonomy in the non-Russian regions and republics as rather conservative in nature, Stalin thus hindered economic and social development of the Union.\(^{45}\) The solution he proposed was for the underdeveloped nations to strive for “higher,” more developed cultures. Stalin felt that Russian language must act as a “Big Brother” in dealing with the other national groups in the Union. Nevertheless, total eradication of minority languages proved impossible even during Stalin’s rule. His leadership was strong enough to tolerate some measures of linguistic development, paired with a strong and certainly new impulsion in favor of the Russian language. Later, without this impulsion and the eradication of national elites, it would have been much harder for Khrushchev to pursue his language policy.

**Khrushchev’s language policy (1950s-1985)**

It was during Khrushchev’s tenure that Leninist theory was de facto abandoned and the Soviet language policy was veered radically to the new angle, openly favored the Russian language.

The Soviet Union was declared as having “solved its nationality problem” and

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\(^{44}\) Ibid., p.238.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., p.244.
as a country achieved “an unprecedented unity of peoples”, with the Russian as its “language of interethnic communication”. All this was soon to be articulated in the new formula of Soviet nationality policy, “The Soviet People: A New Historical Community” with the Russian language as one of its fundamental “core”.\textsuperscript{46}

For the first time it became allowable to designate some languages as the “useless” and even call into question the very need for other languages besides Russian in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{47}

The pivoting movement for the Russian language were the Education Reform Laws of 1958-59, which repealed Stalin’s 1938 decree that had made Russian a compulsory subject in all Soviet schools. Nonetheless, while renewing the juridical equality of languages on paper, the laws rejected the indisputable right to an education in one’s mother tongue, a right that in fact, was strongly emphasized in Leninist nationality policy and in all previous Soviet legislations and party documents.\textsuperscript{48}

Now, however, parents were “free” to choose the desirable language of instruction and even to decide whether their children were to study their own national language. The mother tongue was now simply compacted into of “this or that language of choice” category. Besides, the so called “free choice”

\textsuperscript{46} Kriendler, 1993, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
provision gave rise to opposition in several republics, and until repealed by republican language laws in the late 1980s it was the major target of the national protest movements.\footnote{Ibid., p.262.}

To some extent, Khrushchev gave Russians and non-Russians free hand in examining their national histories. "Non-Russians were also given a slightly more open forum for expressing their views. Nevertheless, in his later years, Khrushchev became threatened by the non-Russians and took away some of these freedoms." \footnote{Bychkov Green, 1997, p.248.}

Khrushchev argued that the Russian people should be respected and their "great achievements" should be recognized with gratefulness. While admitting that the non-Russian Republics flourished, he strongly emphasized that it was only possible under the umbrella of the Soviet culture and with the direct assistance of the Russian people.

As Bychkov Green admits, it seems that Khrushchev associated the "non-Russians" with the "oppressed", designating Russian as a special group of people. "Russian" and "Soviet" were referred to definitely different notions, and it seems that Khrushchev had identified the Soviet Union as a precisely Russian entity.\footnote{Ibid., p.249.}

Since it is difficult to change someone’s ethnic identity, especially when the
best available tools of change are mostly rhetoric about the brotherhood of the Soviet peoples, the Soviet linguists and ethnographers insisted that changing a person’s language was a requirement for the any change in ethnic identity. And keeping this in mind, Khrushchev targeted language policy as the best option for the countering rising nationalism and ethnic uprisings which threatened the economic unity of the USSR.  

Khrushchev’s language policies can be seen to fulfill the goal of promoting the Russian language. He was able to defeat much of the protests to his policies, and oblige them in all of the Soviet republics. Finally, since he was the first leader to break away from the “national in form, socialist in content” formula, and since Brezhnev and other leaders (at least until Gorbachev, and perhaps even him to some extent) continued Khrushchev’s ideas, it is possible to say that not only were his policies successful, but his theories had taken hold intellectually.

Brezhnev’s and His Successors’ Language Policies

In spite of the options, the post Khrushchev leaders tended toward the attempt of total Russification of the non-Russians. The Khrushchev’s successors-

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52 Ibid., p.256.  
53 Ibid., p.257
Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, continued most of Khrushchev’s language policies.

The campaign for the Russian language was set in motion as it became clear that Khrushchev’s courageous attempt to revitalize communist ideology had fizzled and that at the same time the demographic balance was speedily shifting against the Great Russians. As in the last decades of the tsarist regime, the central authorities took hold on the Russian language as the remaining “cement” of the Union.

Russian was now perceived as an overall Soviet treasure which played an crucial role in the development of all nationalities and was becoming “a component part of their culture,” which under socialism had achieved such a height that republic’s languages alone no longer sufficed to meet people’s needs.54

Rather than merely declaring Russian the official state language of the Soviet Union, which all citizens were oblige to learn, Soviet spokesmen claimed that although Russian was the language of interethnic communication, it has no privileges and was only “the first among equals”.55

The most idealistic policy for the post-Khrushchev leaders was arguably:

[allowing] slow progress toward stable, asymmetric bilingualism, with non-Russian increasingly learning Russian but not abandoning their original

54 Kriendler, 1993, p. 263.
55 Ibid., p.264.
languages...[Therefore] if the Soviet Union, by making good on its claim that Russian and the other republic languages are symbiotic rather than antithetical, can show that neither fear is warranted, it may provide a unique model for reconciling complete linguistic unity with a high degree of linguistic diversity.\textsuperscript{56}

Indeed, the Communist leadership was very slow to comprehend the significance of the nationality question and in particular of its linguistic aspect. At the 27\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress in 1986, the nationality problem was still announced as “being solved,” and the language “free choice” was once again reconfirmed.\textsuperscript{57}

Gorbachev's, the last Soviet leader’s position, was that the nationality question had been technically solved, and that the Soviet republics had “formed a community based on brotherhood and cooperation, respect and mutual assistance.”\textsuperscript{58} In January 1989, Gorbachev rejected the idea of “sliianie” (merging) and decided the path of rather ethno-cultural and linguistic liberalization.\textsuperscript{59}

Yet, by that time Russian had already achieved its dominant and leading position in the Soviet Union, the State’s dissolution and the de-Russification

\textsuperscript{56} Bychkov Green, 1997, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{57} Kriendler, 1993, p. 264.
\textsuperscript{58} Bychkov Green, 1997, p. 262.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
policies were on their way to begin.\textsuperscript{60}

\section*{2.2. Post-Soviet Language Policy}

In the first years of Gorbachev's \textit{perestroika}, Russian language remained under the spotlight.\textsuperscript{61} The 19\textsuperscript{th} Communist Party Conference in June 1988, as well as the special Plenum on the problem of nationality in September 1989, still echoed the old slogans about the importance of Russian and the "democratic" principle of free choice in language. Yet by the time the 28\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress met in the summer of 1990, its pronouncements on the language question had become altogether irrelevant.\textsuperscript{62}

In fact, the first concrete manifestation of the shifting balance between the center and the periphery was the passage of local language laws in 1988-89, which designated titular tongues as official state languages. As an afterthought, in April 1990 the center also passed a language law, for the first and last time making Russian the official language of the Soviet Union,\textsuperscript{63} yet by 1989-90, the republics, as well as smaller national units, were declaring national sovereignty, followed by declarations of independence in 1991.\textsuperscript{64} From this

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p.162. \\
\textsuperscript{61} Kriendler, 1993, p. 265. \\
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p.266. \\
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
point in all former “People’s Democracies” the study of Russian language dropped precipitously as soon as it ceased being mandatory. Although Russian had for a long time acted as the natural choice for the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, by 1992 the priority shifted toward the national languages of each of the former republics. Consequently, the de-Russification and the dominance shift in the direction of titular languages became key goals of the post-Soviet language policy and planning.

In language legislations of the former republics, one can observe a certain trend in favor of Russian language, although each has its own ambiguities. There are four aspects to the post-Soviet status of Russian language in the former republics.

First of all, most language legislations of the former republics place the status of Russian language, as well as the legal protection base of its usage and development, as uncertain. Of all the republics, the clearest and the most consistent position on the legal status of Russian language is Belarus, which de jure acknowledges Russian as an official state language. Similarly, in the legislation of Kyrgyz Republic, which also legally acknowledges Russian as an official state language, there also exist some legal guarantees for the nationalities of Kyrgyz Republic. Kazakhstan also recognizes Russian as official language which can be used on par with Kazakh language in state

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65 Ibid., p.268.
66 Pavlenko, 2006, p. 83.
federal institutions and local government bodies.

Secondly, however, such former republics as Uzbekistan – which, driven by the legislation momentum of the Soviet period during the 90s, did grant Russian the status of an “interethnic language” – currently have dropped such normative-legal regulations.

Thirdly, the legal status of Russian language in the post-Soviet region is more a reflection of the republics’ sentiment toward Russia and its politics, rather than of Russian people in their homelands. In particular, the most questionable situation with Russian language policy appears in the Baltic States and the Central Caucasus: currently, these countries prefer to leave the Russian language status issue open.

And fourthly, even in such republics that have already granted legal status to Russian language, the interpretation of respective legislative regulations often possesses a quite contradictory and ambiguous character.67

In general, as presented in table 2.1, the Russian language status of the fourteen former Soviet republics can be classified into four status groups: state, interethnic, foreign, and undetermined.

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Table 2.1

Russian Language Status and Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Russian Language Status</th>
<th>Legal Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Armenia</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Language Act 1993, Frame Treaty for Protection of Minorities 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Georgia</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>Frame Treaty for Protection of Minorities 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Latvia</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Language Act 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Lithuania</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Belarus</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Constitution 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Moldova</td>
<td>Interethic</td>
<td>Language Act 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Kazakhstan</td>
<td>State/official</td>
<td>Constitution 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Tajikistan</td>
<td>Interethnic</td>
<td>Constitution 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To observe Russian language popularity among the republics, it is convenient to differentiate them into three groups: high, low, and moderate popularity.

The group with *high Russian language popularity* includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; the group with *low Russian popularity* includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania, and Tajikistan. The remaining republics belong to the moderate group, where *good Russian proficiency* conflicts with a limited environment in Russian communication.

As for the *changing attitude toward Russian language studies*, it is also
possible to divide the countries into three groups. The first group is generally complacent with Russian language status and its position in their republics’ education system: it includes Belarus, where Russian maintains high official state status and where most academic instruction is in Russian; Azerbaijan and Lithuania, which consider improving Russian language studies at schools as rather unnecessary; and Kazakhstan, where more than half of the population sees no need to change the current status of Russian language study, although almost a third of the entire population supports increasing Russian language education.

Similarly, the second group has relatively polarized opinions regarding Russian language study. In Estonia, Moldova, Lithuania, Georgia, and Ukraine, 35-43% of the entire population is quite satisfied with the current position of Russian language at schools, whereas the other half stands in favor of increasing Russian language study.

On the other hand, the third group includes republics where there is general dissatisfaction with the current Russian language situation, as well as the necessity to increase Russian language education; these include Armenia and Tajikistan. According to the republics’ official data, only a bare minimum number of pupils are instructed in Russian; one can also subsume Kyrgyzstan to this group, although the situation with Russian language there is much less dire. There, the demand for the increase of Russian language education is
much less (61%) than in Armenia (84%) and Tajikistan (89%). This is generally due to the fact that Kyrgyzstan has a higher proportion of pupils instructed in Russian.

As to Russia's probable support for Russian language in the former republics, the survey did reveal the following results: Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan yielded more positive results in support of Russia’s likely provision for Russian language, totaling 89%, 84%, and 69%, respectively; while Georgia displayed the more negative sentiment on the issue, with 35% for, and 45% against Russian “interference.” Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is indifferent.

Among the Baltic States, the general attitude toward Russia’s probable support of Russian language study is more or less positive; however, a significant part of the population considers Russian support as “interference with the republic’s domestic policy.” Such is the case particularly with Estonia (35%), Latvia (29%) and Lithuania (26%).

On the other hand, in terms of requirement for learning Russian or increasing its study, the former has only moderate association with the level of Russian proficiency in a republic. For instance, in Belarus and Estonia the level of requirement for Russian language study is the same, although the level of Russian proficiency is different: while it is high in the former, it is twice as low in the latter. In Central Asia, however, the relation between Russian
proficiency and the intension to learn it is quite the opposite. The highest requirement for Russian study is in Tajikistan (67%), and the lowest is in Kazakhstan (19%), with Kyrgyzstan (37%) somewhere in the middle. And accordingly, as survey results show, Tajikistan has the highest support for increasing Russian language study at schools. This fact shows that people of Tajikistan are rather unsatisfied with the existing language circumstances as well as with the lack of opportunity to learn Russian in their homeland. Similarly, in Armenia, the requirement for the study of Russian is very high – something that distinguishes it from Georgia and Azerbaijan, where the average level of Russian proficiency is significantly low, with adults’ showing no interest in learning Russian. Close to this group of countries are the Baltic States, where there is no interest in learning Russian in their homelands. Particularly, the lowest level of requirement for the Russian language study is seen in Lithuania where the level of Russian proficiency also is one of the lowest.

In Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine the requirement for increasing the level of Russian proficiency is relatively poor, although in Moldova (by contrast to Belarus and Ukraine where the level of Russian proficiency is much lower), the requirement for the study of Russian is slightly higher. In other words, almost half of the former Soviet republics is relatively satisfied with the existing low level of Russian proficiency and believes there is no need for
One must note, however, that the highest level of communicative function (mostly for the purpose of communicating with Russian citizens) is in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Ukraine, and Estonia. In other republics, such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, and Tajikistan, this function, due to a steady decrease in the Russian-speaking sphere, is relatively unrepresented.

As for the motivation behind the Russian language requirement, nearly half of the ex-republics’ entire population believes that “it is important to know Russian because it could become useful in life.” In addition, adults consider Russian as important due to the following reasons: first, the language’s function as communicational means within the republic; second, its function as an interethnic/interstate language outside a republic; third, its function as a tool for professional/academic knowledge; and fourth, its function as means of Russian enculturation.68

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3. National Identity Factor

The Soviet Union disintegration was an unprecedented chance for the ex-Soviet republics to establish or in some cases to “restore” their national statehood.

Soon after the declaration of independence all fourteen former republics faced the vital task of becoming viable actors in the international arena, by establishing necessary economic, security and cultural links through rational foreign policy and nation-state definition.

Yet not all newly independent states had sufficient pre-Soviet historical experience with nationhood, and hardly had a clear notion of the “national idea”.

A polity’s national identity is very much a result of history-beliefs and perceptions’ interpretation that constitutes society’s “collective memory”. The “collective memory” can be a basis for the redefinition of the “national idea” and with it, the main parameters of a national interest.69

Though, all nations to some extent have a national identity, it can be varied greatly in intensity and origin. The sense of self-national identity may be derived from common language, religion, culture, myth of common ancestry,

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geographic location, collective memory and etc.\textsuperscript{70} Moreover, because national identity serves not only as the major link between individual and society, but also between society and the outside world, the concept of national identity plays a decisive role for all countries in shaping national foreign policy, which in turn rely on foreign policy as a foundation of their legitimacy.\textsuperscript{71}

As A. Tsygankov proposed in his article, a way for the post-imperial states in which national identity can be operationalized is their historical experience with national independence, which is the essential factor for capturing the degree of national identity’s development.

Therefore, the states that had experienced independence before being integrated into the Soviet empire have a better opportunity to sustain, and developing their non-imperial, non-Soviet identity during their imperial period and after.\textsuperscript{72}

With regard to experience with national independence, the fourteen former Soviet republics can be divided into three diverse groups: 1) republics with relatively strong, well-developed political identities (the Baltic republics) 2) republics with relatively weak sense of national identity, with accordingly similarities in having no and/ or insufficient experience of independent statehood before being incorporated into Soviet Union (Belarus, Moldova, Moldovan, Udmurt, Tatarstan, Ingushetia, Ossetia)

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., p.16.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., p.19.
\textsuperscript{72} Tsygankov, 2000, p. 108.
\end{footnotesize}
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) 3) republics with rather short-lived and fragmented experience of historical experience of independent statehood (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). 73

**Baltic Republics**

The Baltic area's strategic location and the fact that historically it has been more economically highly developed than most of the Russian empire have helped cultivate a proud nationalistic identity, yet have caused the Soviet Union to covet it as a particularly essential possession. The durable economic strength of the region has reinforced the idea of Baltic superiority.

Following World War I, the Baltic states gained independence from Russia exhausted by war and revolution. Perhaps sensing the uncertain nature of their newly found independence, leaders of the Baltic states scrambled to consolidate power within their immature governments and to develop a strong sense of national identity among their fellow countrymen as well as world

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leaders. They also strove to create an effective army, and began fielding diplomats in effort to strengthen ties with the world community.

Between 1922 and 1925 the three Baltic states joined Poland and Finland in a Baltic League for the purpose of protection against the outside aggression, particularly from the Germany and Soviet Union. Nonetheless, within a few years the League dissolved due to disagreement over military and political contingency plans, as well as a perception of weakened danger resulting from the Soviet’s promises of the non-aggression.

However, the post-World War I era of a proud nationalism ended unexpectedly after August 23, 1939, when the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression treaty between Germany and Soviet Union, gave Germany free access to Poland in exchange for uncontested Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. Citing the Baltic states need for the Soviet protection from Germany, Soviet military contingent took over military bases in all three republics by October 1939. Though the Kremlin certainly demonstrated no intention of allowing the republics autonomy, it could be argued that Soviet acknowledgement of each state as a discrete political subordinate was rather implicit recognition of the right of each to exist as an individual entity. Such acknowledgement also amounted to an assumption that effective submission
of Baltic entities with well-developed national identities required granting as a minimum a degree of autonomy.74

The Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were the most recent of the Soviet acquirements, taken by the Russian Red Army as it advanced against Hitler in the ending phases of World War II. As such, the Baltic states were rather less integrated into the Soviet system than those republics that had been brought under Soviet reign after the 1917 Revolution or in the 1920s. In their struggle for independence, the Baltic states benefited from at least a formal disposition by the outside world to support their cause, since the inclusion of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union was not officially recognized by many countries including United States.75


In fact, a mere two decades of experience with national independence may seem brief in a larger historical context, yet it provided for three Baltic states the international recognition of their sovereignty, and it gave a legitimate stamp to the culmination of centuries of growing nationalism. Moreover, it was enough time to create their internal political and legal systems, and for an entire Baltic generation to pass from birth into adulthood as free citizens.76

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**Transcaucasian Republics**

Historically, Russian expansion encountered fierce and prolonged armed opposition in the Caucasus. Moscow had for many years been well aware of the difficulty of bringing the Caucasus under its control. The people of the region, as the Russians soon realized, were the most troublesome of all peoples to Russify and capture. There was only one efficient way of Russifying the Caucasus- to colonize the region. The several failed attempts were made in the mid-nineteenth century to settle Russians in the region. However, during the first decade of the twentieth century, several thousand of Russian people were living in different areas of the Caucasus region.

Despite the partial success in settling Russians in the Caucasus area, the Soviet revolutionaries wrestled with opposition that was known as the Basmachi rebellion. In fact, they caused problems for the Soviet regime until 1922.\footnote{Nozar Alaolmolki, Life after the Soviet Union: the Newly Independent Republics of Transcaucasus and Central Asia (State University of New York Press, Albany, 2001), p.20.}

In the disordered period after World War I and the Bolshevik revolution, the Caucasus nations of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia discarded the Soviet rule as illegitimate and set up on their own; the result was the formation of the Republic of the Trans-Caucasia. However, this union lasted only five weeks during the spring of 1918, at which time the individual nations began to pursue independence. Following the brief periods of Turkish, German, and British occupations during and after World War I, the Caucasus region was finally seized by the Soviet army in 1921.\footnote{Ibid., p.21.}

**Azerbaijan**

At the dissolution of the Russian Empire in 1917, an independent republic of Azerbaijan was proclaimed in Ganja on May 28, 1918 following an unsuccessful attempt to establish a federal Transcaucasian Republic with Armenia and Georgia. In fact, this was the first Democratic Republic established in Islamic World.
Azerbaijan was proclaimed a secular republic, yet British administration initially having not acknowledging the Republic implicitly did cooperate with it. By mid-1919 the situation in Azerbaijan had relatively stabilized, and British forces left the Republic in August 1919.

On the other hand, by early 1920, the Soviet forces, victorious in Russian Civil War, started to pose a great threat to the newborn republic, which also engaged in a military conflict with Armenia over the territory of Karabakh. Azerbaijan de facto received recognition of the independent nation by the Allies in January 1920 at the Versailles Paris Peace Conference.

Supported by Azeri dissidents in the Republican government, the Russian Red Army occupied Azerbaijan on April 28, 1920. In reality, the Azerbaijan did not surrender its brief independence of 1918–20 swiftly or effortlessly. As many as 20,000 died opposing what was practically a Russian re-conquest.79

Nevertheless, the establishment of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic was made easier by the fact that there was some popular support for Bolshevik ideology in Azerbaijan, in particular among the industrial workers in Baku.80

Moreover, before 1920 year was over, the same fate had befallen Armenia, and, in March 1921, Georgia as well.

Soviets ruled Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as a federation until 1936, when they were made the Soviet republics.\(^{81}\)

**Armenia**

While the Russian army showed success in gaining most of *Ottoman Armenia* during World War I, their gains were lost with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. At the time, controlled by Russia territories of Eastern Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan challenged to tie together in the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. However, this federation could not last long, and as the result, Eastern Armenia became the independent entity, the Democratic Republic of Armenia on 28 May 1918.

The Republic of Armenia’s short-live national independence was burden by war, territorial disputes, and mass influx of refugees from Ottoman Armenia.

The Turkish invasion and occupation of 1918 left Armenia in ruins. By 1919, the republic was overwhelmed by almost 300,000 refugees aggrieved at failures of the East Armenian leadership; they poured in daily from the North

\(^{81}\) Alaolmolki, 2001, p. 21.
Caucasus and Azerbaijan.

In fact, Sovietization of the republic turned out to be “as a measure of the last resort by the defeated, discouraged, and disintegrating *Dashnak* government of independent Armenia,” which resigned its power on December 2, 1920. By December 4, the Soviet forces entered the Armenian capital and the short-lived Armenian republic collapsed. For Armenians it was better to have Russians back and to give up their independence than to be massacred by the Turks.\(^\text{82}\)

**Georgia**

The Russian October Revolution of 1917 submerged Russia into a bloody civil war during which several remote Russian territories declared independence. Georgia was one of them; moreover, the Russian revolution did strengthen the struggle between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in Georgia. In May 1918, Georgia declared its independence under the protection of Germany; and its independence was recognized by the major European powers. In fact, Georgia turned for support to Germany in order to prevent opportunistic assault by the Turks.\(^\text{83}\)

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Nevertheless, in 1921 the Bolsheviks army invaded Georgia and suppressed the Mensheviks.

The fall down of the first Georgian republic and its incorporation into the Soviet Union led to the establishment of what is usually termed the ‘Second Georgian Republic’, that is, Soviet Georgia. Georgia was from the time of its establishment, and further remained somewhat outward republic within the Soviet Union.84

From 1922 until 1936, Georgia was part of a united Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (TSFSR) within the Soviet Union. In 1936 the federated republic was divided into Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, which remained separate Soviet socialist republics of the Soviet Union until the end of 1991.85

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85 “Georgia: World War I and Independence,” Library of Congress, 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ge0020) (accessed September 2, 2012)
East European Republics

Moldova

Moldova is unique among the Soviet Union republics in that it has Romania across the border, a counterpart of the same ethnic group and with which the republic was historically united. Moldova’s geopolitical location guaranteed that over centuries its lands were governed by various conquerors, including the Ottomans, the Russian Empire, Romania and the Soviet Union. And as a result, Moldova had never existed as an independent political unit prior to 1991; except for a few months in 1918-and even then, only within right bank of Bessarabia. 86

In 1793, the eastern territories were incorporated into the Russian Empire. Following a brief period of autonomy after the Russian revolution, in 1922 the left-bank territories were also incorporated into the Soviet Union. In fact, this area enjoyed close links to Moscow, with only negligible interruption, until 1991.

In 1812, the lands to the west of the river, known as Bessarabia, were seized by Russia. While the area remained part of the Russian Empire for over

hundred years, after 1918 Bessarabia was reintegrated with Romania and remained under its rule for the next twenty years.

The eastern lands of Moldova occupied a particularly essential position within the USSR. In October 1924, the All-Ukrainian Executive Committee of the Communist Party created the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) on the left bank of the Dniester river, which then formed the boundary between Romania and the Soviet Union. Later, the existence of the MASSR supported an ethno-political justification for the further spreading of the Soviet influence into Romanian-governed territory of Bessarabia.87

Since World War II, Moscow attempted to justify its rule in Moldova, claiming that Moldavians as the ethnic group differ from the Romanian people. And as the result, in summer 1940, like the Baltic states, Bessarabia was occupied by the Soviet Union forces as part of the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between USSR and Germany. However, Moldova’s case differs from the Baltic states; while the integration of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the USSR was in fact, never recognized by the majority of Western countries, the international community did recognize Moldova’s forced annexation when Romania conceded Moldavian territory to the Soviets.88

87 Ibid., p.59.
88 Daria Fane, “Moldova: breaking loose from Moscow,” in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (ed.), Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Ukraine

The Ukrainian as well as Belarusian ethnic groups are traced at least as far in time as other East Slavs.

With the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires in 1917-18, followed by the Russian civil war, various powers vied for territory in Ukraine. By the early 1920s, the territories that constitute modern Ukraine were divided between Romania, Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.\(^89\)

The collapse of the Russian empire in 1917 caught the Ukrainian elite, along with the rest of the world, unprepared. Nevertheless, between 1917 and 1918, several separate Ukrainian republics proclaimed independence, the anarchist Free Territory, the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and plentiful Bolshevik revolutionary committees.

Soon after the Bolsheviks seized control in immense, troubled Russia in November 1917 and moved towards negotiating peace with the Central Powers, the former Russian state of Ukraine declares its total independence.

However, the leaders of independent Ukraine were unable to address or resolve effectively the severe social issues of the day. Ukrainian governments

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1993), pp.121-23.
\(^89\) Melvin, 1995, p. 82.
lacked both the internal mechanism and external conditions to claim legitimacy. And as a result, Ukrainian’s efforts to end their status as a “submerged nation” failed. The collapse of both the Galician and the Dnieper Ukrainian states, coupled with the very different Ukrainian policies pursued by the Polish Second Republic and Soviet Russia, divided the Ukrainian population more than ever.

After more than six years of continuous war across their territory, Ukrainians found themselves divided not only between two empires, as was the case before 1914, but between radically different ideologies and very different concepts of statehood. These divisions undetermined any concerted drive on the part of the Ukrainians to determine their own destiny as a nation. As brief as Ukraine’s experiment with independence was, however, the politicization of the Ukrainian national identity had become reality that could no longer be ignored.90

The defeat of the Central Powers and the signing of the armistice in November 1918 forced Germany and Austria to withdraw from Ukraine. At the same time, with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, an independent West Ukrainian republic was proclaimed in the Galician city of Lviv. The two Ukrainian states proclaimed their union in early 1919, but their independence

was short-lived, as they immediately found themselves in a three-way struggle against troops from both Poland and Russia. The Ukrainian government briefly allied themselves with Poland, but could not withstand the Soviet assault. In 1922, Ukraine became one of the original constituent republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.); it would not regain its independence until the U.S.S.R.’s collapse in 1991.\(^1\)

In fact, national conscious Ukrainian intellectuals began to emerge at the universities of Kiev and Kharkiv in the mid-19\(^{th}\) century, but the tsarist autocracy, which considered Ukrainian –speakers to be Russians, suppressed Ukrainian cultural and educational activities, especially between 1863 and 1905. However, in **western region**, ruled by Austria-Hungary from the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the late 18\(^{th}\) century to 1918-nationally conscious Ukrainian intellectuals took advantage of the relative freedom allowed by the Habsburgs to lay the political, cultural, social and economic foundations of Ukrainian nationhood.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\) History, “January 26, 1918: Ukraine declares its Independence,”


By contrast in the eastern region, where only for brief periods during the 19th and 20th centuries did nationally conscious Ukrainians have the opportunity to cultivate an identity distinct from the Russians, Ukrainians are more likely to consider themselves part of an all-Russian nation, composed of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Ukrainian nationalists call this identity “Little Russianism”; they argue that it denies Ukrainians are a “separate Slavic people with its own culture, language and traditions distinct from those of other Slavic nations”.  

In fact, the Bolshevik rule brought an important change in the relationship between Soviet Russia and Belarus and Ukraine. For the first time, the view that Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians constituted a single people was officially repudiated in Moscow and three separate Slavic republics were established.  

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94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 Melvin, 1995, p. 83.
Belarus

After an initial period of independent feudal consolidation, Belarusian lands were incorporated into first, Kingdom of Lithuania, then Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and later in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, then the Russian Empire, and finally the Soviet Union. Only 1991 after declaring itself free from the Soviet Union, Belarus became independent state. Therefore, Belarus had long experienced the rule of neighboring powers, and had not had state of their own for almost whole history.

Although a Belarusian Democratic Republic emerged in 1918, it lacked the social base to withstand pressures from Poland and Soviet Russia, which divided Belarus between them in the 1921 Treaty of Riga.\textsuperscript{97}

A brief period of formal independence, ended by the Polish invasion in the following year, raised many questions about the maturation of the nationhood at this time; on the one hand, the existence of a Belorussian government would seem to have owed much to the political convulsions haunting neighboring states and to the presence of German forces in the region when independence was proclaimed; on the other hand, the movement for the national

\textsuperscript{97} Burant, 1995, pp. 1132-33.
independence lacked a mass popular support, since both indigenous nobility and bourgeoisie were massively non-Belarusians.

During the interwar period, the Belarusian territories were divided between Poland and the Soviet Russia under the Treaty of Riga in 1921, which placed some territory of Belarus and 3.5 million of its under Polish sovereignty.\textsuperscript{98}

However, under the Soviet regime Belarusian national and cultural development flourished in the 1920s, yet this brief period was insufficient to permit a Belarusian national identity to take root and grow among the peasantry.\textsuperscript{99} In fact, before had been incorporated into the Soviet Union, the Belorussian national movement was markedly less developed than its neighbor Ukraine. Furthermore, Belarusians were much less numerous than Ukrainians and lived compactly only in five provinces. Belarusians labored solely on the land and, when educated, tended to deny their Belorussian ethnicity and become integrated into the Polish or Russian cultures.\textsuperscript{100}

In addition, Belarus did not have its very boundaries and legitimate ethno-


territory, even capital Minsk was established only in the Soviet period. And only after Belarus had been incorporated into the Soviet Union, Belarusians for the first time in their history were united on their legitimate territory, which was one of the essential preconditions for the formation of national awareness.¹⁰¹

**Central Asian Republics**

What best distinguishes the birth of the Central Asian states from that of any other sovereign country is the incredible weakness of pro-independence movements throughout the region. In fact, both the elites and the masses were reluctant to leave the imperial union to which their homelands belonged. The chance to build independent statehood came suddenly and unexpectedly to the Soviet republics, where this experience did not exist before. It was especially relevant to the five Central Asian republics. They were faced with huge task of creating new states institutions and building legitimacy after the Soviet Union’s collapsing authority. The Soviet legacy both assisted and obscured the task of building new state where it did not previously exist. The Central Asian republics had been the most Soviet of all in more ways that one. In fact, their elites never challenged Moscow's authority and the

¹⁰¹ Tsygankov, 2000, p. 111-12.
populations loyally followed the leadership's directives.\textsuperscript{102}

These groups, however, were all strikingly different from the mass-supported national independence movements that were emerging in the three Baltic republics and in Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. While the authority of the Communist party was collapsing elsewhere, the organization continued to thrive in most of the Central Asian republics.\textsuperscript{103}

Due to the lack of both popular or/and elite support for independence, the Central Asian states were the last to declare independence.\textsuperscript{104}

Indeed, the Central Asian republics were rather resent, Soviet creation. The boundaries between them were drawn by Soviet state authorities, often with clearly political purposes. The Soviet authorities wanted to establish quasi nation-states in Central Asia with the intention of to destroy the alliances to such rising ideologies as Pan-Turkism and the Islamic fellowship.\textsuperscript{105}

The people of Central Asia were less developed nations among others in the Soviet Russia. They had little consciousness of “nationality” at the time of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 4.
\end{flushleft}
revolution. Central Asian people distinguished themselves according to clans and tribal roots as well as by cultural and linguistic dissimilarities. The major distinction among Central Asian peoples was two principal lifestyles – nomadism (Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen) and sedentarism (Uzbeks, and Tajiks).

Both zones were rather politically fragmented, and temporary centralization which they experienced occasionally was brought by conquerors from the outside: Persians and Arabs from the south, eastern Turks and Mongols from the east, and finally Russians and Chinese. The Central Asian land in its history had in fact long suffered from continuously invasion and occupation by the neighboring imperial powers.

During the Soviet rule, the setting up of large industries went along with large-scale migration of the Slavic population, mostly Russians, to other union republics. The result was a remarkable change in the ethnic composition of the republics, and in some republics the titular nationality was outnumbered by the “new comers”.

Large scale migration, the foundation of uniform institutions, standardization of education system and rigorous indoctrination helped to growth of some

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elements of the supra-ethnic Soviet culture with its common shared values and beliefs, which had significant influence on the geo-cultural identity of the Central Asia.

To sum up the major findings from the historical background of the republics’ experience with national independence before the Soviet Union integration, one may conclude the following.

The fading of central authority after the overthrow of the Russian tsar and the rapid worsening of economic conditions created a chance for nationalist movements throughout the Empire to assert claims for political leadership and the independence of "their" people. In the long run, those claims would be materialized only in three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Elsewhere, political independence, attained as a result of the implosion of Russian-based government and in several cases with the backing or support of other external powers, was more short-lived.109

The Baltic states, prior to being incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940, enjoyed a quarter-century of independent statehood. This fact allowed them to preserve a sense of national identity even during the Soviet period, which they, unlike other Soviet republics, perceived rather as a period of occupation.

The history of national independence among Ukraine and the three Transcaucasian republics, while only a brief and short-lived experience, was enough to develop and maintain a set of historical myths glorifying the notion of national independence and national identity.

Belarus, Moldova and the five Central Asian republics, on the contrary, as more recent Soviet creation, accordingly had weak consciousness of “nationality” before Soviet incorporation.

According to a public survey conducted by the Eurasian Monitor Organization the post-Soviet republics in their perception of the Soviet period can be also divided into three groups: the positive, the mixed/ambivalent, and the negative perception of the Soviet period. The survey results revealed the visible correlation between the experience of national independence and the perception of the Soviet past. As shown in Table 3.1, the more developed a republic’s political identity prior to Soviet incorporation, the more negative is its perception of the Soviet period after the disintegration. Accordingly, the less experience a republic has had of prior independent statehood, the more positive is its perception of the Soviet period. This correlation is particularly evident in Central Asian and Baltic republics.
Table 3.1

Experience of Independent Statehood and Perception of the Soviet Period

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>well-developed political identity</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>negative perception of the Soviet period</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>mixed perception of the Soviet period</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>no experience of independent statehood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
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</table>

(continued)

### Table 3.2

**National Identity and Perception of the Soviet Period**  
(by Russian language status groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>National Identity</th>
<th>Perception of the Soviet past</th>
<th>Russian population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State/Official Status for the Russian Language</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mixed/Positive</td>
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<th>Countries</th>
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<th>Perception of the Soviet past</th>
<th>Russian population (%)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Interethnic Status for the Russian Language</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Relatively Strong</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>6</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>National Identity</th>
<th>Perception of the Soviet past</th>
<th>Russian population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undetermined Status for the Russian Language</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Relatively Strong</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaian</td>
<td>Relatively Strong</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Relatively Strong</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To summarize the data shown in Table 3.2, below are the following conclusions.

**STATE/OFFICIAL-3.** The unifying trait of this group of countries is *weak* national identity: lacking any sufficient experience with national independence, these countries had never existed as sovereign states. As for the Soviet period, these three republics unanimously perceive it as positive; moreover, they are satisfied with the current high status of Russian language in their homelands. In addition, an average percentage for the Russian population in the group estimates 18%, with the largest Russian population in Kazakhstan (30%) and the smallest in Belarus (11%).

**INTERETHNIC-3.** This group of countries – with the exception of Ukraine which has already had a rather fragmented experience with national independence – is characterized by mostly *weak* national identity. In terms of perception of the Soviet period, the majority of republics are rather *mixed or*

### Foreign Status for the Russian Language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>National Identity</th>
<th>Perception of the Soviet past</th>
<th>Russian population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Based on data from the Eurasia Heritage Foundation (2008) and the Eurasian Monitor Organization (2009)
ambivalent – with the exception of Tajikistan, which perceived the Soviet period in its land positively. Moreover, opinions regarding satisfaction with the current Russian language (interethnic) status in these respective states are rather polarized. The average size of Russian population among the relevant republics amounts to 8%, the biggest in Ukraine (17%) and smallest in Tajikistan (1%).

UNDETERMINED-6. With the exception of two states (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), the majority of republics in this group has a relatively strong national identity, with a rather short-lived experience of statehood. In terms of perception of the Soviet period, except for Uzbekistan, the majority of republics split equally between mixed and negative. Besides, the overwhelming sentiment in these countries is that they are rather satisfied with current low status of Russian language (exception Armenia). The average percentage of Russian population estimates 3%, the largest in Lithuania (5%) and Uzbekistan (5%), and the smallest in Armenia (0.5%).

FOREIGN-2. This group of countries represents the strongest national identity among post-Soviet states and hence the most negative attitude toward Soviet period in history. Furthermore, the two Baltic States have the highest average percentage of Russian population (28%), yet are unanimously relatively satisfied with current foreign status of Russian language on their territory.
4. Economic Factor

4.1. Institutional binding(CIS and EurAsEC)

The collapse of the Soviet Union initiated a set of disintegration and integration processes in the area it formerly occupied. Originally established as an ‘instrument of civilized divorce’, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been used for new integration attempts since the early 1990s. Later further sub-regional groups replaced the CIS in this function.110 The absolute majority of the post-Soviet integration projects are formed by Russian centric structures with similar functions, underlying ideas and strategies, but different membership: the CIS itself, the Russia-Belarus Union State and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC).111

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December 1991. In the adopted Declaration the participants of the CIS declared their interaction on the basis of sovereign equality.112

At present the official members are- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,

111 Ibid., p. 402.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The unofficial member states are Turkmenistan which has a status of unofficial associate member and Ukraine which de facto participating, but officially not a member. Georgia is used to be an official member, but withdrew in August 2008. The three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the beginning chose not to join the CIS.

The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC, or the Community) is an International economic organization created to effectively further economic the process undertaken by the Parties to form a Customs Union and Common Economic Space, as well as for the realization of other goals and objectives related to enhanced integration in the economic and humanitarian fields.

The Treaty on the Establishment of EurAsEC was signed on 10 October 2000 in Astana and came into force on 30 May 2001, after ratification by all the member states.

Five states have been members of the Eurasian Economic Community from the formation - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. On 25 January 2006 a protocol was signed on Uzbekistan's accession to the organization. In October 2008 Uzbekistan suspended to participate in the work of EurAsEC bodies. Ukraine and Moldova have had the status of EurAsEC observer since May 2002, and Armenia since January 2003.\(^\text{113}\)

\(^{113}\) Eurasian Economic Community, Integration Committee Secretariat of the Eurasian
In 2003 EurAsEC was granted observer status in the UN General Assembly. The organization covers currently 94 percent of the CIS territory, with over 200 million population and a cumulative GGD equaling 88% of that of the CIS. The trade turnover is reported to have increased three times between 2002 and 2007, exceeding $90 Billion.

The statutory aims include the development of a free-trade regime, coordinated reorganization of the respective economies, creation of a common energy and transport market, common payment system; harmonization of national legislations and social and humanitarian cooperation.114

On August 16 2002 the heads of state decided to establish a Customs Union (CU) within the EurAsEC framework with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia as the initial members. The expansion of the organization was foreseen from the start. The CU was called into being to establishing Single Customs Territory on which free movement of goods is provided for goods that either originate in one of the member states or are imported from the third countries and released into free circulation on the CU territory.115 This is a major success for Russia, binding two of the stronger post-Soviet economies into a Moscow-centred economic zone.

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115 Eurasian Economic Community, http://www.evrazes.com/
Indeed, EurAsEC’s concentration on this three-state Customs Union is one of the reasons for Tashkent’s decision to suspend its membership, as it considers the other members were ignored, in spite of EurAsEC claims that it expects them to join at a later date. The narrow focus on three countries is an expression of Moscow’s new pragmatic attitude to multilateralism, whereby it is unwilling to bankroll cooperative mechanisms without receiving something substantive for doing so. This blurring of the lines between Russia’s bilateral and multilateral strategy in EurAsEC emphasizes the strong influence Russia wields within the organization.\[116\]

During these years, its member countries have created a framework for implementing initiatives in various areas of cooperation based on pragmatism, coordination of approaches, and an orientation towards efficient use of the member countries’ economic potentials, which add up to a most impressive total even by strict international standards.

Of all the organizational structures established in the post-Soviet space, the EurAsEC has been able in the ten years of its existence to accomplish its designated tasks, setting the direction for the integration of former Soviet Union (FSU) countries over the long term and achieving a four-fold increase

\[116\] Stephen Aris, “Russia’s Approach to Multilateral Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Space: CSTO, EurAsEC and SCO,” Russian Analytical Digest, No.76 (2010), pp.3-4
in trade between its members.\textsuperscript{117}

Today there are several proto-integration groupings operating in the post-Soviet space: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Community (\textbf{EurAsEC}), Common Economic Space (CES), Russia-Belarus Union State, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), Community of Democratic Choice (CDC), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). At the same time, a number of post-Soviet states are already members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The real picture of involvement of the post-Soviet economies in regional integration groupings orchestrating by Russia is shown in Table 4.1.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Armenia & + & observer \\
Azerbaijan & + & \\
Belarus & + & + \\
Georgia & + & \\
Kazakhstan & + & + \\
Kyrgyzstan & + & + \\
Moldova & observer & observer \\
Tajikistan & + & + \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{CIS and EurAsEC membership}
\end{table}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>unofficial associate member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)

**Source:** based on data from the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States; the Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States; the Eurasian Center for Legal Analysis, Information and Investment Support; the Eurasian Economic Community.

**STATE/OFFICIAL-3.** In terms of Russian language status groups, one may observe that the group of the *official state* status has the absolute participation in the two main pro-Russian economic organizations, such as CIS and EurAsEc.

**INTERETHNIC-3.** *Interethnic* status group countries are still show the will to belong to these organizations, but mostly as observers.

**FOREIGN-2.** As to *foreign* status group of countries, they have never been intended to join any organizations centered by Russia.

**UNDETERMINED-6.** And *undetermined* status group of countries are can be seen as stuck somewhere in the middle between the two extreme poles.
4.2. Dynamics of Mutual Trade

Current economic interaction in the post-Soviet space is almost entirely confined to trade. All countries have similar economic characteristics: labor surplus, capital shortage (except Russia and Kazakhstan) and low technological level of production (except, to a certain extent, Russia).\footnote{Stanislav Zhukov and Oksana Reznikova, “Economic Interaction in the post-Soviet Space,” CA&CC Press, AB Publishing House \url{http://www.ca-c.org/c-g/2006/journal_eng/c-g-1/11.zhukoven.shtml} (accessed September 17, 2011)}

The generally accepted indicator of the significance of regional trade flows is the share of intra-regional exports and imports in the given region’s total exports (and imports) flows. Table 4.2 shows the movement of this indicator in 2009-2011.

Table 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imports from Russia (value in) from the total Imports (%)</th>
<th>TOTAL Average (annual) (%)</th>
<th>Exports to Russia (value in) from the total Exports (%)</th>
<th>TOTAL Average (annual) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>22.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>54.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>31.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The share of intra-regional trade in the total exports flows varies widely: from 16.03% for Armenia to 34.57% for Belarus.

\footnote{89
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Average annual (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>23.21</td>
<td>20.62</td>
<td>20.38</td>
<td>21.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>8.73</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>7.81</td>
<td>7.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>47.01</td>
<td>45.90</td>
<td>44.49</td>
<td>45.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>5.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>9.89</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>9.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>22.02</td>
<td>24.61</td>
<td>25.16</td>
<td>23.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>13.53</td>
<td>12.61</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>13.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>25.53</td>
<td>31.76</td>
<td>32.42</td>
<td>29.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>17.38</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>30.71</td>
<td>28.48</td>
<td>27.47</td>
<td>28.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>22.63</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>18.51</td>
<td>21.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>13.79</td>
<td>12.55</td>
<td>9.83</td>
<td>12.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>18.89</td>
<td>25.65</td>
<td>27.53</td>
<td>24.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>18.35</td>
<td>19.55</td>
<td>17.46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: calculations based on data from the International Trade Centre, Trade Statistics for International Business Development

Table 4.3

Total Trade Turnover with Russia from Total Turnover with World (%)

Source: calculations based on data from the International Trade Centre, Trade Statistics for International Business Development
### Table 4.4

#### Percentage of Total Turnover with Russia by Russian language status groups (2009-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Official</th>
<th>Interethnic</th>
<th>Undetermined</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45.80%</td>
<td>29.90%</td>
<td>21.40%</td>
<td>9.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.89%</td>
<td>21.12%</td>
<td>7.81%</td>
<td>13.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>17.46%</td>
<td>5.09%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.93%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.06%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.02%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average (%) for the group</strong></td>
<td><strong>33%</strong></td>
<td><strong>23%</strong></td>
<td><strong>16%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** calculations based on data from the International Trade Centre, Trade Statistics for International Business Development

### Table 4.5

#### Russia's ranking among major trade partners (by Russian language status groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Official</th>
<th>Interethnic</th>
<th>Undetermined</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** based on data from the European Commission, Eurostat (2010); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia; the Central Statistics Bureau of Latvia; Department of Statistics to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania; International Magazine “The Baltic Course” International Magazine “Made in Lithuania”

**Note:** The highest rank is -1; the lowest rank is -7.
The data presented in Tables 4.3-4.5 suggest the following conclusions:

**STATE/OFFICIAL-3.** Trade with Russia for this group of countries has a big significance. From 2009 to 2011 the average percentage of *exports* to Russia amounted to 34.57% for Belarus, 15.83% for Kyrgyzstan and 23.4% for Kazakhstan. The average share of *imports* from Russia for the same period estimated 54.60% for Belarus, 34.60% for Kyrgyzstan and approximately 23.4% for Kazakhstan. The *average trade turnover percentage* with Russia estimated 45.80% for Belarus, placing Russia to the 1st ranking among major trade partners, 28.89% for Kyrgyzstan with Russia’s 2nd rank among major trade partners and 23.4% for Kazakhstan, having Russia as the major trade partner in the 3rd place. The average percentage of the trade turnover with Russia of the respective group of countries -is estimated 33%.

**INTERETHNIC-3.** The economic cooperation with Russia for this group of countries is also play an important role. The average percentage of *exports* to Russia from the total exports for the period of 2009-2011, is estimated 25.50% for Ukraine, 17.53% for Tajikistan and 25.57% for Republic of Moldova. The average percentage of republics’ *imports* from the total amount of imports reached 33.63% for Ukraine, 22.17% for Tajikistan and 14.17% for Moldova. The *average trade turnover percentage* with Russia has estimated 29.90% for Ukraine with Russia’s 1st position among the major trade partners, 21.12% for Tajikistan having Russia in the 1st place and 17.46% for Moldova placing
Russia in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place among the main trade partners. The average percentage of the trade turnover with Russia for the all countries of the respective group is estimated 23%.

**UNDETERMINED-6.** The mutual trade with Russia has a less significant role for this group of countries, but still has constituted a visible proportion of the total trade turnover. The average percentage of exports to Russia from the total exports has amounted 16.03\% for Armenia, 4.40\% for Azerbaijan, 1.80\% for Georgia, 15.3\% for Lithuania, 3.23\% for Turkmenistan and 25.17\% for Uzbekistan. The average percentage of imports from Russia from the total imports has amounted 22.73\% for Armenia, 17.27\% for Azerbaijan, 6.03\% for Georgia, 31.83\% for Lithuania, 18.03\% for Turkmenistan and 23.37\% for Uzbekistan. The average percentage of trade turnover with Russia for the period from 2009 to 2011 has made up 21.40\% for Armenia with Russia’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} place among the key trade partners, 5.09\% for Georgia ranking trade priority with Russia as the 7\textsuperscript{th} place, 7.81\% for Azerbaijan having Russia in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} place, 23.93\% for Lithuania with Russia’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} place among major trade partners, 12.06\% for Turkmenistan having Russia in the 4\textsuperscript{th} place and 24.03\% for Uzbekistan with the Russia’s 1\textsuperscript{st} place in the country’s trade priority. The average percentage of the trade turnover with Russia of the respective group of countries -is estimated 16\%.

**FOREIGN-2.** The trade relations between this group of countries and Russia
can be characterized as positive, having increased quite rapidly in recent years. The average percentage of exports to Russia from the total for the past several years amounted 10% for Latvia and 15.13% for Lithuania. The average percentage of imports from Russia from the total amount of imports estimated 9.80% for Latvia and 10.70% for Estonia. The average percentage of trade turnover with Russia for the period from 2009 to 2011 composed 9.90% for Latvia, positioned Russia in the 3rd place among the major trade partners and 13.21% for Estonia having Russia similarly in the 3rd place. The average percentage of the trade turnover with Russia for this group is constituted up to 12%.

4.3. Energy Trade

After 1991, the Russian government managed the prices of oil and gas exports to the other fourteen newly independent states of Eurasia and thus continued to subsidize their energy consumption. Indeed, Eurasian markets for oil and gas were highly fragmented, with prices lowest within Russia and highest in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the three Baltic republics that refused to join the CIS.119

The Soviet Union was endowed with enormous oil and gas reserves, which Soviet planners used to promote industrialization, regional integration, and state building. While the consistent republics of the Soviet Union and east European satellite states were allocated oil and gas by planners at effective prices far below those of the world market, energy exports fetched much higher prices. As a result, oil and gas dominated Soviet export earnings, reaching as high as 75 percent of the total. Thus, for nearly forty years, Soviet oil and gas export authorities operated in two entirely different markets— the world market and a separate market consisting of countries with centrally planned economies. The implicit energy subsides in Soviet planning were crucial for the process of industrialization. Gas was particularly, and eventually became the single most important resource in the regional economy. Moreover, after the Soviet Union disintegrated in December 1991, it was precisely gas— and the miles of pipelines that transported it— that continued to tie the new states’ economies together. Oil, in contrast, was not as important for industrial firms, nor was its supply as technically difficult to cut off as a result of arrears.120

Now, after twenty years since the Soviet dissolution, energy still constitutes a large proportion of the total trade turnover with Russia. Almost all of the CIS countries are dependent in different degree on some combination of Russian

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120 Ibid., pp.104-5.
and Central Asian energy supply. They face common issues of cost, reliability of supplies, and Russian efforts to control downstream infrastructure such as pipelines, refineries, and domestic distribution networks.¹²¹

One of the objectives Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet republics, including by raising the price these countries pay for natural gas to world market prices.¹²² These actions may be seen as paralleling the reduction of subsidies and the unpaid energy debts of countries in the region as leverage to try to secure key energy infrastructure in those countries.¹²³

**Ukraine**

Although it possesses modest oil and natural gas reserves of its own, Ukraine is dependent upon Russia for most of its oil and natural gas, both from Russia’s own oil and natural gas fields and from Russian-controlled pipelines from Ukraine’s suppliers in Central Asia, especially gas from Turkmenistan.¹²⁴ In 2008, Russian *crude oil* imports accounted for 93.59%, *petroleum* for 40, 59% of Ukraine’s oil consumption. Also, Russian natural gas imports have a

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¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Woehrel, 2009, p. 7
tendency to grow. While in 2009, natural gas imports from Russia amounted to 55.12%, in 2010 it raised up to 99.21%.\textsuperscript{125}

Ukraine has one of the most energy-intensive economies in the world, partly due to the strength and steel and chemical sectors relying on under-priced energy inputs. It produces substantial volumes of natural gas and small volumes of oil and strongly relies on hydrocarbon imports from Russia or through Russian territory. At the same time it is a major transit corridor for Russian gas (and to lesser extent also oil) sales to Europe (with shares of around 80% and above 15%, respectively). Ukraine is a large net importer of energy resources, particularly of natural gas. It is the 5th largest natural gas consumer in Europe and despite substantial domestic production (slightly below Kazakhstani levels in 2006), it is a major importer of natural gas, currently from Turkmenistan and Russia. Oil plays a limited role in energy balances, with a share of under 15%. Seventy-five percent of this is imported, mainly from Russia. The refining sector has been privatized, with strong participation of Russian companies. Several refineries are currently being modernized to improve product quality. Ukraine has large power generating capacity – with a large role of nuclear energy (almost double domestic demand) and exports electricity to Russia and EU countries.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{125} Trade Statistics for International Business Development http://www.trademap.org
\textsuperscript{126} “The economic aspects of the energy sector in CIS countries, Economic and Financial Affairs,” CASE (Centre for Social and Economic Research), Economic Papers 327, (June
In total, the average percentage of Russian energy imports consisted of the three types of oil and gas altogether for the period from 2008 to 2010, estimated 85.26% for crude oil, 29.05% for petroleum and 5.39% for natural gas. The average annual percentage of the three types of energy (crude oil, petroleum and natural gas) in total estimates 55.72%, placing Ukraine in the 2nd place among the republics in terms of dependency on Russian energy imports.

Ukraine’s vulnerability to Russian pressure has been mitigated by the fact that the main oil and natural gas pipelines to Central and Western Europe transit its territory. According to a 2006 report of the International Energy Agency, 84% of Russia’s natural gas exports and 14% of Russian oil exports pass through Ukraine. \(^{128}\)

**Belarus**

Belarus’s unreformed and largely Soviet-style economy is heavily dependent on cheap Russian natural gas and oil. The Russian oil and gas giant company Gazprom long supplied Belarus with energy at Russian domestic prices. After

\(^{127}\) Calculations are based on data from Trade Statistics for International Business Development http://www.trademap.org

the recent several disputes with Russia over the prices, subside reduction and oil supplies, Belarus and Russia ended the crisis by agreeing that Belarus would raise its export duty on crude and refined products to Western Europe to match that imposed by Russia. Russia would then exempt Belarus from most of the new Russian oil export duty. More significantly, Belarus agreed to hand over to Russia 70% of the proceeds that it receives from its exports of refined oil products to the Western market. This figure was increased to 85% in 2009. Therefore, Belarus continues to pay for gas far below that charged to Ukraine.\textsuperscript{129}

Belarus does not produce any substantial amounts of hydrocarbons and is strongly reliant on imports, primarily from Russia. At the same time it is an important transit country for Russian gas and oil sales to Europe (with around 20% and 30% shares, respectively). The oil sector plays an important role in the Belarusian economy and the country’s two large refineries (one state-owned, the other with the participation of a Russian investor) produce substantial volumes of oil products, which account for up to 40% of total exports to non-CIS countries. Oil refining was particularly profitable (and brought substantial tax revenues to the Belarus budget) until end-2006 as Belarusian companies were importing Russian crude without Russian export

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., pp.13-4.
duties and were then able to sell oil products at European prices.

For the period of 2008-2010, the average annual percentage of Russian imports of the whole Belarus energy consumption estimated 94.33% for crude oil, 83.91% for petroleum and 99.98% for natural gas. Thus, it is possible to say that Belarus has one of the highest levels of dependency on Russian energy imports, which constitutes 95.44% of average annual percentage of the three types of energy (crude oil, petroleum and natural gas) in total.

Moldova

Moldova is entirely dependent upon Russia for its energy resources, and also as a market for the wine and agricultural products that are its main exports. In 2006, Russia has pressured Moldova on the issue of energy supplies. The Russian government-controlled firm Gazprom cut off natural gas supplies to Moldova, after Moldova rejected Gazprom’s demand for a doubling of the price Moldova pays for natural gas. But eventually, Gazprom restored supplies in exchange for a price increase. Moldova also agreed to give Gazprom, already the majority shareholder. As the result of the agreement, Gazprom now holds 63.4% of MoldovaGas’s shares and has control of Moldova’s domestic

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gas infrastructure.\textsuperscript{131}  
Moldova is one of the smallest energy markets in Europe and of the CIS countries. It has practically no domestic hydrocarbon resources and relies heavily on imported gas, petroleum products, coal and half of the domestic electricity demand. Moldova is also a transit corridor for Russian gas exports to Turkey and the Balkans. Gas imported from Russia plays the most important role in the energy balance. The most important Moldovan power plant is located in the break-away Transnistria province. Due to difficult relations with Transnistria and to the deterioration of generating capacities in the country, Moldova imports substantial amounts of electricity from Ukraine, Russia and Romania.\textsuperscript{132}

The main item of the Russian energy imports for Moldova has been the \textit{natural gas}, which comprised to 93.66\% in 2008 and 60.10\% in 2010 from the \textit{total gas consumption} of the country. As for the ranking of Russian imports dependence, Moldova can be placed in 3\textsuperscript{rd} place, with the 24.60\% of the \textit{average annual percentage of the three types of Russian energy imports} (crude oil, petroleum and natural gas) in total.

\textsuperscript{131} Woehrel, 2009, p. 10-1.  
\textsuperscript{132} CASE (Centre for Social and Economic Research), 2008, p. 18.
**Baltic Republics**

The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have about 90% of their oil coming from Russia, and 100% of their natural gas. They faced Soviet energy supply cutoffs in the early 1990s, as they were trying to achieve independence and shortly thereafter. They pay world prices for their energy supplies. In the past few years, the main concern in the Baltic states has been Russian efforts to increase control over the energy infrastructure in their countries. *Gazprom* has a large equity stake in domestic natural gas companies of each of the three Baltic countries.\(^{133}\)

Russia has been the most important source of energy imports for *Lithuania*. Lithuania is specifically strongly dependent on crude oil and natural gas come from Russia. For the period from 2008-2010, the *average annual percentage* of crude oil made up 98.66%, petroleum 43.23% and natural gas 97.30%, which comprised altogether 95.43% of the average annual percentage of country’s total energy imports.

In *Estonia* and *Latvia*, Russia was basically a source of natural gas supply and relatively small part of exports went to that market. Russia has been created 42.30% of the average annual percentage of *Latvia’s* energy imports.

(from 2008-2010) including 10.47% of petroleum and 97.26% of natural gas. Among Estonian energy imports, similarly with Latvia, the dominant item was natural gas, comprising average annual percentage of 96.21% (of the period 2008-2010) and 41.40% of the average annual percentage of all 3 types of energy commodities (crude oil, petroleum, and natural gas). As for the level of dependence on Russian energy imports, Lithuania can be ranked as a country of the highest 1st group, whereas Latvia and Estonia can be placed among the 2nd group of countries.

**Georgia**

Georgia began to follow a clearly pro-Western orientation after the “Rose Revolution” of November 2003, which swept out of power political forces with close ties to Russia. Georgian-Russian deteriorated in the wake of the Rose Revolution. Russia has many ways to pressure Georgia, including supporting the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and disrupting economic ties between Georgia and Russia, including in the energy sphere.

However, Georgia’s geographical position neighboring energy-rich Azerbaijan has allowed it to counter Russian pressure more effectively than other countries. Georgia is a transit state for a pipeline completed in mid-2006
carrying of Azerbaijani oil to the Turkish port of Ceychan (The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceychan pipeline). Another pipeline completed in early 2007 initially carries of Azerbaijani natural gas to Georgia and Turkey, lessening their dependence on Russia as a supplier. The August 2008 Russian military assault on Georgia resulted in temporary interruptions of some oil and gas pipeline shipments, but these were soon resumed. Gazprom also continues to supply Georgia with natural gas.\textsuperscript{134}

Georgia has no mineral energy resources but has substantial hydropower potential. Fuel supply largely depends on imports, mainly from Russia and Azerbaijan. Political relations with Russia deteriorated recently, complicating the energy situation in the country. With the opening of the BTC and Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum pipelines, the country has become an increasingly important transit corridor for Caspian Sea region oil and gas. Georgia imports all gas and petroleum products consumed locally. Gas import prices have increased substantially since 2006 and prompted Georgia to switch from Russian to the then cheaper Azerbaijani gas.\textsuperscript{135}

Since the 2008, the Russian energy imports decreased significantly. For the period of 2008-2010, the average annual percentage of Russian imports from all energy imports, amounted to only 8.80\% (consisted of crude oil, petroleum, and natural gas) which was the lowest imports index among the post-Soviet

\textsuperscript{134} Woehrel, 2009, p.12.
\textsuperscript{135} CASE (Centre for Social and Economic Research), 2008, pp. 15-6.
countries for that period. Georgia can be placed in the lowest 4\textsuperscript{th} group of countries regarding dependence on Russian oil and gas imports.

**Armenia**

Armenia and Russia have close political and military ties, in large due to Armenia’s desire for support in its struggle with Azerbaijan over the dispute territories of Nagorno-Karabakh region. However, in early 2006, Russia informed Armenia that it would sharply increase the price it would have to pay for gas. In May 2006, Armenia agreed to relinquish various energy assets to Russian firms as partial payment for this price increase.\textsuperscript{136}

It is almost fully dependent on imported energy products – gas from Russia through Georgia and smaller volumes from Iran (also controlled by Gazprom), oil and oil products from Georgia, Iran and Russia and nuclear fuel from Russia. Over 70\% of electricity demand in Armenia is satisfied through nuclear and thermal (gas) generation, which relies entirely on inputs imported from Russia. Russian investors (especially Interenergo, a subsidiary of RAO UES, and Gazprom) play a key role in the Armenian energy sector. Conflict with Azerbaijan and difficult relations with Turkey, combined with a lack of own energy resources, the relatively weak development of hydropower and the

prospects of a closing down of the only nuclear power plant, all leading to very high level of dependency on Russian supplies, are a major weakness in the Armenian energy sector. 137

The Russian share in Armenia’s energy imports has been estimated 51.10% of the average annual percentage (consisted of crude oil, petroleum, and natural gas) of the period from 2008-2010. The major energy item for Armenia was natural gas, which amounted to 98.15% in 2008, with the 90.84% of the average annual percentage of the total natural gas imports of the country. Armenia can be categorized as 2nd group of countries in terms of dependence on Russian energy.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is undergoing a major oil boom, with output more than doubling between 2004 and 2007 and net exports more than tripling in the same period. This made Azerbaijan the largest contributor to total non-OPEC output growth during 2006-2007. The large majority of exports are conducted via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, bypassing Russia and the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. Azerbaijani gas is currently reaching Georgia and Turkey. The energy sector dominates the economy and played the key role in the

recent economic boom (with GDP growth averaging at around 17% annually since 1999 and exceeding 30% in 2006 and 2007). Oil accounts for well over 80% of Azeri exports. Large hydrocarbon reserves and access to westward oil and gas pipelines independent of Russia are the key strengths of the energy sector. Weaknesses include the physical obsolescence of electricity and gas transmission networks and limited domestic reform progress.\textsuperscript{138} Russia’s share in Azerbaijan’s energy imports has been created \textit{average annual percentage} of 14.61\%, (for the period of 2008-2010) mostly represented by petroleum. Thus, Azerbaijan can be ranked as the lowest 4\textsuperscript{th} group of countries in terms of dependence on Russian energy imports.

\textbf{Central Asian Republics}

\textbf{Kazakhstan}

Kazakhstan has the Caspian Sea region’s largest recoverable crude oil reserves and is the largest oil producer in the region. It is also an important producer of gas, coal and uranium. Helped by large FDI inflows, the oil extraction sector has been experiencing a boom over the recent decade, strongly contributing to the robust growth of the whole economy. In view of the expected significant growth in oil and gas exports, the government is making efforts to develop and

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., p.14.
diversify export routes that still run mainly through Russia. Oil is shipped primarily through the CPC pipeline to Novorossiysk, and northwards to the Russian pipeline system, with smaller quantities also reaching China and Iran. One of the key strengths of the domestic energy sector is its massive oil and gas reserves and proximity to China. Underdeveloped export pipeline infrastructure and dependence on Russia weaken the position of the country.\textsuperscript{139} Russia’s share in Kazakhstan’s energy imports made up 86.75\% (composed by crude oil, petroleum, and natural gas for the period of 2008-2010) of the average annual percentage. Kazakhstan occupied the place among the highest 1\textsuperscript{st} group of countries with regards to dependence on Russian energy imports.

\textbf{Kyrgyzstan}

In view of its very low levels of domestic production Kyrgyzstan relies on imports of gas (mainly from Uzbekistan) and oil and oil products (from Russia and Kazakhstan). The country has significant hydropower generation potential, which is currently utilised only to a limited degree. Hydropower accounts for around 90\% of generated electricity and allows for exports to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia and China. Kyrgyzstan is an important element of the water-energy inter-relations in Central Asia, where the Kyrgyz Republic (as

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., pp.16-7.
well as Tajikistan) would prefer to release water for electricity production in winter and accumulate it in summer, while neighbouring downstream countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) need water for irrigation in spring and summer. Hydropower generation potential is an important asset of the country.  

For the period of 2008-2010, Russia’s share in Kyrgyzstan’s energy imports has been created 41.90% of the average annual percentage (consisted of 3 types of energy commodities- crude oil, petroleum, and natural gas). The dominant item of the energy imports were crude oil, estimating 98.68% in 2008 and 100% in 2010 of the total crude oil imports of the country. In terms of dependence on Russian oil and gas, Kyrgyzstan can be ranked as 2\textsuperscript{nd} group of countries.

**Tajikistan**

The most important element of the energy sector in Tajikistan is the hydropower stations producing virtually all electricity generated in the country. From the perspective of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan is the key partner, also because Tajikistan imports all its natural

\footnote{Ibid., pp.17-8.}
gas from there. All petroleum products are also imported. For the period of 2008-2010, Russia’s *average annual share* in country’s energy imports has been amounted to 92.91% for petroleum and 54.83% for natural gas, comprising in total 84.41% of the average annual percentage of energy imports (petroleum and natural gas). In terms of energy dependence on Russia, Tajikistan can be categorized to the highest 1st group of countries.

**Turkmenistan**

Turkmenistan probably has the Caspian Sea region’s largest gas reserves and is the largest gas producer and exporter in the region. Years of economic and political self-isolation, hardly any economic reforms in the country and lack of access to export gas pipelines other than towards Russia have severely limited development of the energy sector (and the country as a whole). Ninety percent of exports are directed to Russia and then via non-transparent deals with intermediaries partly controlled by Gazprom are mostly sold on to Ukraine. Oil production potential is significantly lower and may allow some exports to regional markets, but does not matter much in total CIS exports. In Turkmenistan’s energy trade Russia does not occupy the leading role. Russian share in Turkmenistan’s energy imports and exports has been rather

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141 Ibid., p.20.
142 Ibid., pp.20-1.
modest. For the period of 2008-2010, the average annual percentage of Russian imports estimated 10.19% in total, and mostly covered by petroleum. Therefore, Turkmenistan can be categorized as the lowest 4th group of countries in terms of energy dependence on Russian imports.

**Uzbekistan**

Uzbekistan has large gas reserves and for the last few years its gas output has been at levels similar to Turkmenistan, although exports have been much lower. Large domestic gas consumption and very high losses due to a deteriorated pipeline network do not currently allow any more significant increase in exports. Apart from gradually increasing exports to Russia, Uzbekistan has been supplying Kazakhstan, as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan is a net importer of oil, with output stagnant or declining for the last few years. Gas is a key input in electricity production. Substantial gas reserves, uranium deposits and substantial power generation capacity are the key asset of the country’s energy sector.\(^{143}\)

In terms of dependence on Russian energy imports, Uzbekistan can be ranked as the country of the 3rd group, with the Russian energy imports estimating 19.89% (mostly comprised by petroleum, 2008-2010) of the average annual

\(^{143}\) Ibid., pp.22-3.
percentage of the total energy-related imports of the country. Summarizing the data shown in Tables 4.6 - 4.8, one may conclude that the *oil and gas imports* from Russia play a far from negligible role for most post-Soviet states.

**STATE/OFFICIAL-3.** This group of countries has a higher dependency on Russia in terms of energy imports, *Belarus* in particular. The average annual percentage of Russian oil and gas imports amounts to 95.44%. *Kazakhstan*, despite being an oil and gas producer, also depends on Russian energy imports. Average annual percentage of Russian oil and gas from the total energy imports estimates 86.75% (based on data for 2008 and 2009; no such data is available for imports from Russia in 2010). For *Kyrgyzstan*, the average annual percentage of Russian imports estimates 41.90%.

**INTERETHNIC-3.** Average annual percentage of Russian *imports* from a country’s total energy imports constitutes 84.41% for *Tajikistan*, 55.72% for *Ukraine*, and 24.60% for the Republic of *Moldova*.

**UNDETERMINED-6.** This group of countries consists largely of major oil and gas producers and transit countries among post-Soviet states (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). For these respective countries, the average annual percentage of Russian energy imports estimates 14.61% for *Azerbaijan*, 8.80% for *Georgia*, 19.89% for *Uzbekistan*, and 10.19% for
Turkmenistan. For non-producer countries, the average annual percentage of Russian imports estimates 51.10% for Armenia and 95.43% for Lithuania.

FOREIGN-2. For the two Baltic States, the dependency on Russian energy imports is quite similar. The annual percentage of Russian imports out of the total energy imports constitutes 41.40% for Estonia and 42.30% for Latvia.

Table 4.6

Dependency Ranking on Russian Energy Imports
(by Russian language status groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/Official</th>
<th>Interethnic</th>
<th>Undetermined</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Groups of Oil and Gas Dependency (average annual Russian imports, total for 3 types of oil and gas): I - the highest (Belarus, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan); II (Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Armenia, Estonia); III (Uzbekistan, Moldova); IV (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan) - the lowest
Table 4.7

Energy Imports from Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Crude oil (average annual %)</th>
<th>Petroleum (average annual %)</th>
<th>Natural gas (average annual %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>15.92</td>
<td>90.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>14.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>29.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>94.33</td>
<td>83.91</td>
<td>99.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>85.26</td>
<td>29.05</td>
<td>52.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>66.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>76.06*</td>
<td>64.47*</td>
<td>15.80*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>98.59</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>92.91</td>
<td>54.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>10.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>19.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>34.18</td>
<td>96.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>10.47</td>
<td>97.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>98.66</td>
<td>43.23</td>
<td>97.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculations are based on statistics from the International Trade Centre, Trade Statistics for International Business Development

Note: Calculations on average annual percentage of energy imports from Russia are based on data for the period of 2008, 2009, 2010.
* - calculations for Kazakhstan are based on data for the period of 2008, 2009.

Table 4.8

Oil and Gas Total Trade Turnover with Russia (crude oil, petroleum, natural gas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EXPORTS (by 3 sorts of energy) average %</th>
<th>EXPORTS average annual (%)</th>
<th>IMPORTS (by 3 sorts of energy) average %</th>
<th>IMPORTS average annual (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008  2009  2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>2008  2009  2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>2.22  1.77 N/A</td>
<td>1.99*</td>
<td>87.78  85.71 N/A</td>
<td>86.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>0.0275005</td>
<td>40.09</td>
<td>6.62  79.00 N/A</td>
<td>41.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.99  4.64 8.94</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>38.52  45.43 42.94</td>
<td>42.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.18  0.30 0.27</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>95.28  96.15 94.85</td>
<td>95.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>36.58 24.26 12.95</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.00  83.53 98.70</td>
<td>84.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>71.00 83.53 98.70</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.15  4.83 10.60</td>
<td>10.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0.01  0.10 0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.15  4.83 10.60</td>
<td>10.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>27.40</td>
<td>36.62</td>
<td>50.87</td>
<td>38.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>46.10</td>
<td>59.02</td>
<td>48.19</td>
<td>51.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>14.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td>11.08</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)

**Source:** Calculations are based on statistics from the International Trade Centre, Trade Statistics for International Business Development

**Note:** Calculations on average annual percentage of energy exports+imports from Russia are based on data for the period from 2008-2010.

*- calculations for Kazakhstan are based on data for the period of 2008, 2009.

### 4.4. Migrant Remittances

Russia and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan are the main “centers of attraction” for migrants from the former Soviet republics. It is also evident that labor migrants come from such donor countries as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova and Ukraine.¹⁴⁴

The past two or three years have seen a noticeable increase in labor migration from Uzbekistan; however, with statistical information on that country scantily available, the existing estimates are likely to be seriously understated, failing to reflect the actual scale of labor migration from Uzbekistan.

Table 4.9 presents rough estimates of the macroeconomic significance of migrant workers’ remittances for some labor-surplus countries of Central Asia

¹⁴⁴ Zhukov and Reznikova, “Economic Interaction in the post-Soviet Space.”
and the Caucasus. Several points deserve special attention. First, migration involves sizeable contingents of the economically active population in countries with modest local economic opportunities, along with labor surplus. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, labor migrants constitute up to a third of the economically active population; while in Azerbaijan and Georgia, up to two-fifths. Second, about 70-85% of all labor migrants are oriented toward Russia. Third, migrant remittances are a major macroeconomic factor for labor-exporting countries: in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the total migrant remittances – including official bank transfers, cash and goods – make up at least 10-15% of the Gross Domestic Product; in Georgia and Azerbaijan, the number amounts to 20%.145

Until the financial crisis in 2008, Russian economy provided work to about 12 million people from CIS countries, with most labor’s coming from Azerbaijan, and with the largest proportion from Tajikistan and Moldova. This gave Russia considerable soft power over its neighbors, although when Moscow attempted to convert it to hard power against Georgia – by forbidding direct money transfers at the time of the 2006 crisis – the results were minimal.146

Yet despite economic ups and downs in the newly independent states, many

145 Ibid.
146 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence,” The Washington quarterly, 32:4, (October 2009), p.15.
still depend on migratory remittances, varying from country to country in degree of dependence. Since Russia is geopolitically located close to the CIS countries, remaining extremely desirable for the labor migrants, significant number of people put their faith in Russia. According to The Bank of Russia, as well as EurAsEC’s statistical data on migratory remittance dependency over a period from 2007-2008, it is possible that in 2008 Russian Federation remained a major klondike for labor migrants and a major migratory partner for most CIS countries. According to The Bank of Russia’s data sources, during the 12 months in 2008, 12.6 billion USD were transferred individually (residents and non-residents) from Russian Federation to the CIS. Compared with 9.7 billion USD in 2007, this index increased by 29.9%. The most significant contribution into CIS member states’ economy was through the remittances transferred from Russia by labor migrants from Tajikistan, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and, to a lesser extent, from Armenia and Uzbekistan. Additionally, one should note that this tendency also reflects the results of a survey conducted by the Eurasia Heritage Foundation on willingness to immigrate to Russia among the former Soviet republics, as seen in Table 4.11. According to survey results, the countries with the strongest desire to immigrate to Russia are Tajikistan (29%), Moldova (27%), Kyrgyzstan (25%), and Armenia (20%). The next in line are Uzbekistan (16%), Azerbaijan (12%), Belarus (12%), and Kazakhstan (11%), all only moderately interested in living
in Russia. By contrast, Georgia and the Baltic republics showed no interest or willingness to immigrate to the Russian Federation. One should note that, according to results, the general level of Russian language proficiency has essentially no effect on the intention to immigrate to Russia. ¹⁴⁷

**STATE/OFFICIAL-3.** Migrant remittances from Russia are likely of no importance to this group of countries, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan. The average annual percentage of remittances transferred by Kyrgyz migrants from Russia constitutes 21.68% of the country’s GDP; while the total average percentage of migrant remittances from Russia for the group estimates 7%.

**INTERETHNIC-3.** This group of countries (with the exception for Ukraine) has the highest dependence on Russian migrant remittances, which comprise (average annual) 46.90% as share of GDP for Tajikistan, 20.85% for Moldova, and 1.10% for Ukraine. The total average percentage of migrant remittances from Russia for the group estimates 23%, the highest percentage of dependence among all four groups.

**UNDETERMINED-6.** This group, on the other hand, while certainly interested in remittances from Russia, does so with less intensity. The highest interest in migrant remittances within the group is from Armenia and

Uzbekistan, with the average annual percentage at 11.05% and 9.58%, respectively.

FOREIGN-2. Since GDP per capita of Baltic States is higher than GDP per capita of Russia, the former’s economy is independent of migrant remittances from the latter.

Table 4.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant Remittances from Russia as a Share of GDP (%)</th>
<th>Average annual %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>7.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: elaborated on the basis of statistics data from Ministry of Economic Development of Russian Federation; the Bank of Russia; the Statistical Bureau of EurAsEC’s members
Table 4.10

Dependency Ranking on Migrant Remittances from Russia (by Russian language status groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State/Official</th>
<th>Interethnic</th>
<th>Undetermined</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrant Remittances</strong></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>average percentage for the group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Willingness to immigrate to Russia</strong></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>average percentage for the group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Remittances- elaborated on the basis of statistics data from Ministry of Economic Development of Russian Federation; the Bank of Russia; the Statistical Bureau of EurAsEC’s members
Opinion polling- data from the Eurasia Heritage Foundation; the Eurasian Monitor Organization (2008)
Note: I-(Tajikistan) - the highest; II-(Kyrgyzstan, Moldova); III-(Armenia, Uzbekistan); IV-(Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Georgia); V-(Kazakhstan, Belarus, Turkmenistan) - the lowest

Table 4.11

Survey results on “Willingness to Immigrate To Russia”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Would like to immigrate to Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

120
**Source:** The Eurasia Heritage Foundation; the Eurasian Monitor Organization (2008)

Table 4.12

**Economic Factors in Total**

(by Russian language status groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Institutional Binding</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Oil/gas (imports)</th>
<th>Migrant Remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State/Official</td>
<td>H*</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>L*</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** H- Relatively high; H*- high; L- relatively low; L*- low
5. Security Factor

5.1. Institutional binding (CSTO)

The countries on Russia’s borders, its fellow successor states to the Soviet Union, are unquestionably important to Russia. The countries of the CIS are seen as the top priority of Russian foreign policy, citing economic and security goals.

Clearly, Russian policy in the region has not been universally effective. Belarus, Tajikistan, and Armenia have extremely close ties to Russia and follow its lead on many issues, but other neighbors have taken pains to assert their independence since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The tensions that have resulted were manifested prominently in the Russo-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008. The three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) have joined the European Union and NATO. Other countries walk their own lines, acquiescing and agreeing with Moscow in some areas while parting ways in others.\textsuperscript{148}

In the aftermath of the unsuccessful Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit, held in Moscow in June 2006, several regional organizations moved to take-over some of the CIS’s responsibilities. These include the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which is responsible for economic integration; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  

The CSTO is made up of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and until 2012, Uzbekistan (suspended and then withdrew in 2012). It focuses on traditional military cooperation, particularly the development of a common counter-terrorism force, military training exercises, the sale of military equipment and as a hub for the coordination on defence policies. The CSTO has developed against the background of Ukrainian and Georgian interest in joining NATO, which NATO itself has encouraged.

The Collective Security Treaty (CST) was established in 1992 shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The initial aim was to preserve a united security space involving all the former Soviet states and to prevent, as far as possible,

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the total disintegration of what had been the Soviet military complex. In 2002 the bulk of the original signatory states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) transformed the Collective Security Treaty in to the Collective Treaty Organization (CSTO).151

Moscow has successfully managed to keep what it considers strategic areas of cooperation within CSTO and EurAsEC. This mixed approach has enabled Russia to reassert its place as the leader of multilateralism in parts of the post-Soviet space.

The Russian Federation’s approach to multilateral cooperation with former Soviet states has changed markedly in the last decade. During the 1990s, Russia promoted the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), seeking to position Moscow as the centre of the post-Soviet space. However, during the 1990s a number of member-states became disillusioned with the CIS. Eventually, even Russia came to consider the CIS as an ineffective mechanism for its aims, viewing a number of CIS states as actively disrupting the organization as a response to Russia’s dominance. On coming to power, Putin identified the “near abroad” as a key priority. This trend was intensified during the 2000s, as relations with Europe, the US and certain former Soviet states deteriorated, creasing its influence in the “near abroad”, which includes

developing multilateral cooperation in a number of smaller regional organizations with those states most inclined to cooperate with Russia. In this way, Moscow considers that if it is bankrolling these organizations, it will be ensured of a high degree of influence over them.  

5.2. Security Policies and Military Bases

Baltic Republics


Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia acceded to NATO on March 29, 2004.

After the Baltic States had been recognized as full-fledged members of the international community and later on became members of NATO and the EU,
they started selecting partners for cooperation following the principle of who would best serve their foreign, security and defense policy goals.\footnote{Tromer E., “Baltic perspectives on the European security and Defence policy” in Molis, 2009, p. 39.}

This step provoked a sharply negative response from Russia. The appearance of NATO’s Baltic air base appearance provoked serious concern from Russia, because it meant that the fly-in time for combat aircraft to major Russian cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg shrank to between 5 and 30 min. \footnote{Voinikov, 2012.}

However, the Baltic States were too weak economically to equip their national armed forces for international peacekeeping operations. Nordic and some other Western states were keen to make donations to the Baltic militaries thus not only relegating burden or contributing to the improvement of the security situation in the region, but also getting rid of the outdated armament.\footnote{Molis, 2009, p. 34.}

Besides, the Baltic States’ accession to NATO has not significantly changed the existing balance of forces in Europe. Especially since NATO’s military involvement in the Baltic States has so far failed to create an armed force capable of damaging Russia’s defenses. The EU and NATO membership of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia implies, in effect, these states’ partial waiver of their national sovereignty, including on defense issues. In discussing a variety of different aspects of their cooperation with Russia, the Baltic States are not
free to act as full-fledged negotiators: they lack the authority. In this context, emphasis on cooperation over security issues shifts to the Russia-NATO and Russia-EU levels.\textsuperscript{158}

Indeed, the Western support to the Baltic states was in line with the then approach, which sought to involve the “newly independent” states in Euro-Atlantic integration. However, there was one factor preventing Westerners from providing direct military assistance to the Baltic States: Moscow’s reluctance. Therefore it was decided to provide assistance not to the National Armed Forces, but to the regional joint forces, officially designated for peacekeeping. The first attempt do so was channeling of military assistance through the BALTBAT project.\textsuperscript{159}

Undeniably, military cooperation among the Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the early 90s allowed the Baltic States to demonstrate their ability to act in the international environment and to attract foreign donations. At the same time this cooperation prevented Moscow from spreading its military influence in the Baltic region.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{158} Voinikov, 2012.
\textsuperscript{159} Molis, 2009, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., p. 38.
East European Republics

Belarus

One of the first indications of a close relationship between Russia and Belarus in the military field came with the bilateral agreement from 1992. Three years later, in January 1995 an agreement was signed between the defence ministries of the two countries granting Russia usage of further military installations. Officially, both republics were given the right to use installations on the territory of the other. In practice, this has meant Russian access to Belarusian facilities.\footnote{Kaare Dahl Martinsen, “The Russian-Belarusian Union and the Near Abroad,” Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, (June 2002), p. 7. \texttt{http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/martinsen.pdf} (accessed April 19, 2011)}

Russian military constructions in Belarus include the enlarging the early-warning missile attack radar in Baranivichi, and the low-frequency radio station used for submarine tracking in Vileyka. The Baranivichi radar is a replacement for the one located in Skrunda in Latvia. Russia tried to negotiate a lease agreement with the Latvian authorities after independence had been restored in 1991. This was refused and the radar was dismantled. Without Skrunda, Russia was left with a considerable gap in the country’s ballistic missile early-warning radar network. Enlarging the one already built in
Baranivichi solved this.\textsuperscript{162}

In January 1995, a treaty transferring Vileyka and Baranivichi to the Russian military for 25 years was signed. According to the text, Russia disposess of them free of charge. A month later, in February 1995 an agreement for cooperation between the border troops for the protection of the borders of Belarus was signed. The agreement only applied to Belarus’ borders with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. The Belarusian leader, Lukashenka presented the agreement as the ultimate security guarantee for Belarus against a military attack from the West.\textsuperscript{163}

\textbf{Ukraine}

In 1993, the Ukrainian government adopted a policy of “Neutrality, Non-Nuclear and Non-Block Status”. This was primarily intended as an instrument against any attempts from Moscow to include the Ukraine in a new security alliance either inside or outside the framework of CIS, let alone inclusion in the Russian-Belarusian Union project. The nonblack status did not prevent the Ukraine from engaging in an increasingly closer cooperation with other CIS countries apprehensive about Moscow’s role.\textsuperscript{164}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., pp.25-6.
\end{flushleft}
The government has stated that it intends to pursue European integration, while also improving relations with Russia and strengthening its strategic partnership with the United States. Ukraine's relations with the EU have been guided by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) since 1998. At the December 2009 EU-Ukraine Summit then pro-Western President Yushchenko reiterated his desire to conclude an association agreement with the EU, but the negotiations that began in 2008 are still ongoing.\textsuperscript{165}

Since the election of the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine has pursued improved relations with Russia. Ukraine's relations with Russia have recently focused on several bilateral issues including energy security, natural gas prices, and issues related to the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.\textsuperscript{166} In 2010, both Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Ukrainian counterpart, Viktor Yanukovych, announced a new agreement concerning the extension of the lease on Russia’s Black Sea naval base in the Ukrainian port city of Sevastopol, one of Russia’s most important military installations. The agreement aims to extend the 1997 lease accord on the Russian base in Sevastopol, set to expire in 2017, for twenty five more years, until 2042, with the possibility of further extension by another five years.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{165} Global Security, US Department of State, \url{http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/forrel.htm} (accessed February 27, 2012)
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{167} Philippe Conde and Vasco Martins, “Russia’s Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol beyond 2017.”
Moldova

Moldova has accepted all relevant arms control obligations of the former Soviet Union. On October 30, 1992, Moldova ratified the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which establishes comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional military equipment and provides for the destruction of weapons in excess of those limits. Moldova joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Partnership for Peace on March 16, 1994. Due to Moldova's constitutional neutrality, it is not a participant in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS - a group of 12 former Soviet republics) Collective Security Agreement.

Moldova's Parliament approved the country's membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States and a CIS charter on economic union in April 1994. In 1995, the country became the first former Soviet republic admitted to the Council of Europe. In addition to its membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace, Moldova also belongs to the United Nations, the OSCE, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

In 1998, Moldova contributed to the founding of GUAM, a regional cooperative agreement made up of Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan, in

Diploweb, May 23, 2010
addition to Moldova. Although the agreement initially included a declaration of mutual defense, Moldova has since declared its disinterest in participating in any GUAM-based mutual defense initiative. Moldova has been involved in information exchange, trade and transportation, border control, and energy projects issues within this regional agreement. In 2006, the organization's members voted to change the name to the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - GUAM.\textsuperscript{168}

In 2005, the Republic of Moldova adopted a political decision to recommence on a new level its relations with the North-Atlantic Alliance. Moldova objected to the reference to Transdniester as a separate state. Ever since it broke away from Moldova in 1992, Moldovan politicians have pressed Russia to support a reintegration of Transdniester by withdrawing its military support. Although some progress towards the reintegration of the region with Moldova was made in the course of the 1990s, the strong Russian military presence came to be regarded not only as an obstacle, but also as a source of instability. In fact, in a public statement made by the Russian ambassador to Moldova in April 2001, previous pledges to withdraw had suddenly been rescinded. Russia, it was stated, wanted to keep its troops in the region.

\textsuperscript{168}Global Security, US Department of State
indefinitely in order to protect munitions there.\textsuperscript{169} 

Today, Russian military presence manifests itself in the form of the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) and “peacekeeping forces”. The "peacekeeping" forces presently active on the territory of the Republic of Moldova were established there on 27th July 1992 on the decision of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which had been set up in order to ensure the practical realization of the “Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation on the principles of a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova”, signed in Moscow on 21 July 1992.\textsuperscript{170}

Transcaucasian Republics

Armenia

Relations with Russia are vital for the proper existence of the republic. Russia has a closer relationship with Armenia than with any other country in the South Caucasus. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia's national security

\textsuperscript{169} Martinsen, 2002, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{170} Mihai Gribincea, “Russian troops in Transnistria: a threat to the security of the Republic of Moldova,” Moldova.org, December, 2006  
continued to depend heavily on the Russian military. The officer corps of the new national army created in 1992 included many Armenian former officers of the Soviet army, and Russian institutes trained new Armenian officers. Two Russian divisions were transferred to Armenian control, but another division remained under full Russian control on Armenian soil. Armenia's location between two larger states, Russia and Turkey, has long forced it to orient its policies to favor one or the other. Until the late Soviet period, Armenia generally favored its coreligionist Orthodox neighbor and depended on the Russian or Soviet state for its national security.

After independence was officially proclaimed in 1991, Armenia's membership in the new CIS became a national security issue because it seemingly prolonged Russian occupation. The prevailing view in the early 1990s, however, was that isolation from reliable alliances was the greater threat.  

Russia played the key role in the cessation of the military phase of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Russia, to a large extent, is a guarantor of security for Armenia surrounded by enemies. A recently signed agreement on the extension of stay for 102-nd Russian military base till 2044 provides a direct

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171 Global security, US Department of State
confirmation thereto. Russia was directly involved in the establishment of Armenia-Turkey dialogue finalized by the signing of Zurich protocols.

Today Armenia is one of the closest allies and partners of Russia in the post-Soviet space. It is a member of CIS, CSTO, it joint the resolution on the creation of Collective Rapid Deployment Forces adopted soon after the August war (2008)¹⁷³ by the CSTO summit in Moscow. It’s an outpost of Russian presence in Transcaucasus, with a high value for Russian policy in the region.¹⁷⁴

Armenia also cooperates with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program which it joined in 1994. Armenia is a member of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Neighborhood Program of the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO's Partnership for Peace, the Organization of the Black Sea Economic

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¹⁷³ The 2008 South Ossetia War or Russo-Georgian War (also known in Russia as the Five-Day War) was an armed conflict in August 2008 between Georgia on one side, and Russia and the separatist governments of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other.


Cooperation organization (BSEC) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.\textsuperscript{175}

\textbf{Azerbaijan}

Azerbaijan, like the other former Soviet states in the Caucasus, serves as a territorial buffer for Russia from the south. It also borders the Caspian and has significant energy resources. Azerbaijan is an important part of a southern corridor that could undermine Russia’s importance in the areas of trade and energy.\textsuperscript{176} Therefore a stable and strong Azerbaijan is very important for Russia. In the opposite case the Russian Caucasus might be faced with unpleasant destructive influence. That is why one of the most important elements of bilateral relations is the cooperation of law enforcement agencies engaged in civil security (cross-border cooperation, antiterrorist activities, suppression of drug trafficking and illegal migration) as well as strategic cooperation in the CIS regional ballistic missile defense (ABM) and air defense (PVO). Rocket and strategic interaction is little-known area of cooperation of the CIS countries in ballistic missile defense (ABM) and air defense (PVO) spheres. The Russian radar system “Daryal” deployed in Azerbaijan tracks rocket launches in the areas of the Middle East and Central

\textsuperscript{175} Global security, US Department of State

\textsuperscript{176} “The next of stage of Russia’s resurgence: the Caucasus states,” Eurasianet, February, 2012
Asia. Russian presence in “Daryal” depends on the settlement of the ABM issue. Azerbaijan has acquired several 3PK C-300 air defense missile systems from Russia and got an opportunity to strengthen its defense potential. Now it can complement the overall structure of the CIS PVO with the high-tech segment of defense in the central and southern regions of the Caspian Sea.¹⁷⁷

Azerbaijan is not part of Russia's alliance system, but it is also not part of NATO (though it has a bilateral security partnership with NATO member Turkey).¹⁷⁸ Azerbaijan's main military-strategic partner is Turkey. Educating military personnel in the pan-Turkic spirit is considered highly important. The relations with Turkey which was the first to support Azerbaijan's position from the first days are of great importance for Azerbaijan.¹⁷⁹

However, Russia dominates the negotiation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow's political


¹⁷⁸ Eurasianet, 2012.

¹⁷⁹ Chernyavsky, 2012.
ties in Azerbaijan are limited compared to Armenia, but it does have strong connections to the political and security elites in Nagorno-Karabakh.180

**Georgia**

Georgia's location, situated between the Black Sea, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, gives it strategic importance far beyond its size. It is developing as the gateway from the Black Sea to the Caucasus and the larger Caspian region, but also serves as a buffer between Russia and Turkey. Georgia has a long and close relationship with Russia, but it is reaching out to its other neighbors and looking to the West in search of alternatives and opportunities. It signed a partnership and cooperation agreement with the European Union, participates in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and encourages foreign investment.181

Russia occupies the breakaway Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with about 3,500 troops stationed in each area.

Georgia remains committed to NATO and EU membership and has stayed outside of Russia's alliance system.182 Georgia actively cooperates with the Baltic countries on a broad range of issues. Sharing the experience of the

180 Eurasianet, 2012.
Baltic States in European and Euro-Atlantic integration is important for Georgia. Support from these countries to Georgia on its path to NATO and EU integration is important.

Turkey is Georgia’s leading partner in the region. Turkey supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and its efforts to develop stable political, economic, and security institutions. Turkey is Georgia’s largest trade and economic partner.

Georgia continues to deepen its strategic partnership with the US, a fact reflected in the US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership signed in January 2009. By focusing on the implementing of concrete decisions by working groups, this document advances the development of mutual relations in defense and security; economy, trade, and energy, democracy; and intercultural exchanges.\(^{183}\)

Central Asian Republics

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is Russia's closest military and political ally in the Central Asian region. It was, in 1992, the first CIS country with which Russia concluded a

\(^{183}\) Global security, US Department of State
"friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" treaty. This treaty envisages the creation of a joint military and strategic space, joint use of military bases, firing ranges and other military facilities in the event of a threat to Russia or Kazakhstan. Another fundamental bilateral document is the declaration of "eternal friendship and alliance for the 21st century" of 6 July 1998. In addition to these documents, the mutual security of the two countries is assured in a wide range of subjects in the "military cooperation" treaty of 28 March 1994 and more than 60 bilateral documents and agreements signed since then.\textsuperscript{184}

A key instance of military cooperation was the signing in January 2004 by the ministers of defence of Russia and Kazakhstan of an agreement on joint planning for the employment of military force in the interests of preserving the national security of both countries. In 2007 Moscow and Astana were discussing the construction of a joint automated operational planning system for air forces, air defence forces and ground troops.\textsuperscript{185}

The most important former Soviet military facilities in Russia’s "near-abroad" are on the territory of Kazakhstan, and they continue to be of great importance to Russia’s defence capabilities today. There are bilateral agreements enabling Russia to rent seven of these important facilities in Kazakhstan for its own use

\textsuperscript{184} Vladimir Paramonov and Oleg Stolpovski, “Russia and Central Asia: Bilateral Cooperation in the Defence Sector,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Central Asian Series, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, (May 2008), p.1

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p.2

The 2004-2005 set up the legal basis for formalising the cooperation between Moscow and Astana in joint space research and exploitation, and in the development of the associated high technology. A joint Russian-Kazakh project was initiated for the construction of the "Baiterek" rocket centre at the "Baikonur" cosmodrome.\textsuperscript{187}

\textbf{Kyrgyzstan}

For Kyrgyzstan Russia has a strategic importance. It is one of the possible

\textsuperscript{186} Paramonov and Stolpovski, 2008, p.3
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., p.5
guarantors or safety (e.g. in the frame of CSTO and SOC).\textsuperscript{188}

The legal basis for cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan is based on
more than 120 treaties and agreements covering various aspects of bilateral
cooperation. Cooperation in the defence area is based on the "friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance" treaty signed on 10 June 1992, the
"cooperation in the defence sector" treaty dated 5 July 1993, the agreement
"on cooperation in defence equipment supply" dated 25 August 1999 and the
"security cooperation" agreement dated 5 December 2002. At the beginning of
2007 more than 40 documents were signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in
the defence and security areas.

In recent years there have been regular joint training activities involving anti-
terrorist forces of both countries. Russian specialists also assist Kyrgyzstan's
military personnel to organise the control of their air defence systems to
maintain them at a high alert state.\textsuperscript{189}

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia took on the
responsibility for helping Kyrgyzstan to protect its borders with China and
setting up a national border troops service. As well as protecting the more than
1000 km long border with China, the Russian border troops also exercised

\begin{flushleft}
188 Andrei Kazantsev, “Relations between the independent Kirgizia and Russia: present and
future,” Russian Council, January 26, 2012


\end{flushleft}
border protection duties at the "Manas" International Airport in the capital city of Kyrgyzstan.\textsuperscript{190}

For Russia Kirgizia is first of all of military and strategic interest. Russian military base is located in Kirgiz town of Kant. US and NATO military base in Bishkek airport “Manas” is also important for Russia in view of a strategic competition in the region.\textsuperscript{191}

In total, Russia leases five major military facilities in Kyrgyzstan (\textit{999th "Kant" Air Base}; \textit{954th Anti-submarine Weapon Trials Establishment "Koi-Sary"} of the Russian Navy; \textit{338th Communications Centre} of the Russian Navy; \textit{1st Automatic Seismic Station} and \textit{17th Radio-seismic Laboratory} of the seismographic service of the Russian Ministry of Defence).

\textbf{Uzbekistan}

The legal basis for relations between Russia and Uzbekistan is expressed in more than 200 treaties and agreements covering various aspects of cooperation. Defence cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan is based primarily on the "friendship and cooperation" treaty of 30 May 1992, the agreement on the

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., p.7.

\textsuperscript{191} Andrei Kazantsev, “Relations between the independent Kirgizia and Russia: present and future, Russian Council, January 26, 2012
"principles of mutual logistic support for the armed forces" of 2 March 1994, the treaty on the "further intensification of cooperation in the military equipment and defence spheres" of 11 December 1999, the "strategic partnership" treaty of 16 June 2004 and the treaty on "alliance relationships" of 14 November 2005.

Moscow and Tashkent agreed to cooperate actively in modernizing and reorganizing the armed forces of Uzbekistan, re-equipping them with modern weapons, training Uzbek officers in Russia and taking joint measures in respect of combat training.

There are no military facilities in Uzbekistan that the Russian Ministry of Defence is leasing. The "strategic partnership" treaty, however, did envisage the joint establishment of a military air base for use by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Article 8 of that treaty, in the interests of security, maintaining peace and stability and to counter external aggression, provided for Russia and Uzbekistan to offer each other the right when necessary to use military facilities on their territory, subject to separate agreements.192

In the first few years following the independence of Uzbekistan, the relations between Russia and Uzbekistan were fairly active and were based on partnership. Uzbekistan signed a number of parallel agreements on military cooperation with the CIS countries and with some foreign countries. In 1999,

Uzbekistan decided not to continue to take part in the CIS "collective security" system. When Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia there were positive moves in the bilateral relations between the two countries, including military cooperation. Against a background of increasing disillusionment with US policy in Afghanistan and in Central Asia as a whole, Uzbekistan aligned itself with Russia in 2005. Indeed, in May 2005 when the Andijan tragedy of firing into protesters led the West to harshly criticize Uzbekistan for its "indiscriminate use of force" against terrorists, Tashkent responded by reducing its seemingly pro-Western foreign policy and (re)entering the CSTO in 2006. However, Uzbekistan has constantly refrained from participation in the military dimension of this alliance and has supported only non-military cooperation.

In reality, Uzbekistan in its foreign policy, is trying to maneuver among the interests of Russia, China and the USA. To illustrate, Tashkent refused to take part in creating the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF) in the framework of CSTO. It occurred when there was a thaw in relations with the USA: the sanctions imposed on Uzbekistan in connection with the events in Andijan were lifted. It is worth recalling that in 2003, when Uzbekistan found itself in

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193 Ibid., p.7.
194 The Andijan massacre occurred when Uzbek Interior Ministry and National Security Service (SNB) troops fired into a crowd of protesters in Andijan, Uzbekistan on 13 May 2005
international isolation, it signed an alliance treaty with Russia.

Nevertheless, today the Republic is reluctant to participate in the integration processes in the post-Soviet space (passivity in the CIS framework organizations, that is, unsuccessful experience of participation in the Eurasian Economic Community (suspended in 2008) and CSTO (withdrew in 2012)).

**Tajikistan**

From the moment when Tajikistan acquired its independence, Russia has played an active role in protecting its borders while building up its own national border protection force. The costs of maintaining this force and protecting the border were borne almost entirely by the Russian federal budget. The Russian border troops played a significant role in containing the civil conflict in Tajikistan (1992-1996).

The legal basis for cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan is expressed in more than 150 treaties and agreements covering various aspects of cooperation, including cooperation in the defence sector. Two of the main ones are the "cooperation in the defence sector" treaty of 25 May 1993 and the "cooperation between allies in the 21st century" treaty of 16 April 1999.

In 1993, in accordance with a decision by the CIS heads of state, the CIS

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Collective Peacekeeping Forces were established in Tajikistan, based on the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division. In this way Russia provided a kind of guarantee for peace in Tajikistan against the threat of escalation of tension in the country and the whole region, in view of the on-going military and political instability in neighboring Afghanistan. When the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces were disbanded in 2000, Moscow and Dushanbe agreed that a Russian force based on the 201st Division and some logistics units would remain in the country.\textsuperscript{197}

At the present time, Tajikistan is a member of CSTO and there is treaty agreement for a substantial Russian contingent to be stationed in Tajikistan. Under the deals signed by Russia and Tajikistan on October 2012, Moscow will keep its massive military base in the Central Asian country until 2042 for free.\textsuperscript{198} This contingent comprises more than ten military units and detachments from various branches of the armed forces (4th Military Base, formerly 201st Division; 670th Air Group and 303rd Independent Helicopter Squadron; 1109th Independent Electro-optical Unit of the "Okno" Space Surveillance system (Object 7680)).\textsuperscript{199}

In fact, the new base deal signed with Tajikistan reinforces Moscow’s political and military control over a large segment of Central Asia, forcing the U.S. out

\textsuperscript{197} Paramonov and Stolpovski, 2008, p.9.
\textsuperscript{199} Paramonov and Stolpovski, 2008, pp.10-2.
of a key part of Russia’s “near abroad,” and shielding Russia from a potentially unstable Afghanistan.

The new agreements signed with Moscow also offer significant political and security advantages to Tajikistan. The country, which experienced a deadly civil war in 1990s, is not immune from a potential spillover of violence and Islamic radicalism from post-2014 Afghanistan. In this sense, Dushanbe shares Moscow’s interest in ensuring that security dynamics in Afghanistan have no impact on other post-Soviet republics. Besides, the government in Dushanbe understands that the presence of a Russian military base in the country safeguards Tajikistan from potential aggression by Uzbekistan, which fiercely opposes Dushanbe’s hydropower development schemes. Hence, there appears to be a good amount of truth in President Putin’s claim that the continued deployment of Russian troops is a guarantee of stability in Tajikistan and the broader region.\textsuperscript{200}

\textbf{Turkmenistan}

Turkmenistan is located in the strategically important region for Russia: it borders on Iran, Afghanistan and post-Soviet Central Asia on land, and has a

\textsuperscript{200} Alexander Sodiqov, 2012.
Cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan in defence matters has so far been of a different character to the cooperation between Russia and the other countries of Central Asia, due to the special place which Ashgabat has occupied since Turkmenistan acquired its independence. Turkmenistan is the only country in the post-Soviet space which does not belong to any military or military-political alliance.

In the first years of independence the leadership of Turkmenistan tried to show maximum loyalty to Russia as successor of the Federal Centre in the military-strategic sphere. In the early 1990s Russia played a key role in ensuring security of the southernmost republic of the former USSR. Turkmenistan—due to the priority of bilateral relations—did not sign the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, but in the early 1990s it actively cooperated with Russia in the military and border protection spheres.

On 31 July 1992, Russia and Turkmenistan signed a treaty on “joint measures to create the armed forces of Turkmenistan”, by which Moscow guaranteed the security of Turkmenistan. Under the treaty, the numerous units of the air force and air defence forces of the former Soviet armed forces, as well as the border

202 Paramonov and Stolpovski, 2008, p.15.
troops, remained under Russian jurisdiction, but the other land forces of the former Turkestan Military District - four motor rifle divisions - were to be handed over to the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defence in the course of the next ten years. During this transitional period Moscow would provide Ashgabat with assistance in the form of military equipment and would pay compensation for stationing Russian troops in the country.

In 1994, however, after relations between Moscow and Ashgabat cooled, the joint command was disbanded. In 1999 the Turkmenistan leadership also reviewed the border cooperation question and asked for Russian border troops to be withdrawn. Turkmenistan then virtually ceased to have any defence cooperation with Russia until the middle of 2006. To support its armed forces, Turkmenistan cooperated closely with Ukraine, Georgia, and especially Turkey.204

On the international arena this policy was maintained by the official neutral status and non-membership in all post-Soviet organizations. Turkmenistan always abstained from joining the post-Soviet organizations, both sponsored by Russia (Organization of the Collective Security Treaty, the Euro-Asian Economic Cooperation) and “the alternative ones” (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) and insisted on the bilateral format of relations. By the end of President Niyazov’s lifetime this policy finally

204 Paramonov and Stolpovski, 2008, p.16.
transformed into isolationism and in 2005 led to the withdrawal of Turkmenistan from the CIS membership (while retaining the observer status). Nevertheless, when Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov came to power in Turkmenistan in 2007, Ashgabat began to show signs of a willingness to revive cooperation with Russia, at least in the defence equipment sector. The attendance by the president of Turkmenistan at the 7th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in 2007, is an indirect indication of some willingness by Ashgabat to participate in some regional projects.

The data presented in Table 5.1 suggests the following conclusions.

**STATE/OFFICIAL-3.** For these countries, since Russia is their main military-strategic partner, participation in CSTO is almost indispensable; indeed, all three republics are the original signatory states of the organization. Naturally, it follows that all these republics have a vast Russian military contingent on their territory.

**INTERETHNIC-3.** This group of countries is characterized by a largely high security interest in cooperation with Russia; the only exception may be

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206 Paramonov and Stolpovski, 2008, p.16.
Moldova, drawn more to the West in terms of military cooperation. Ukraine, on the other hand, has been trying to orient itself west, yet only with varied success, currently balancing between the two extreme poles and still allowing the Russian Black Sea Fleet to be based on Ukrainian territory. Meanwhile, of all the aforementioned countries, Tajikistan has the highest interest in strategic military partnership with Russia, since it both participates in CSTO and has Russian military troops.

UNDETERMINED-6. The security interests of this particular group vary the most, with the highest level of interest in cooperation with Russia displayed by Armenia, and with the lowest by Lithuania, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and, to some degree, Uzbekistan. In case of Azerbaijan, although Turkey is its main military-strategic partner, the country still reserves a Russian base on its territory. Therefore one may conclude that this group, with the exception of Armenia, mostly has a rather low interest in security cooperation with Russia.

FOREIGN-2. Among all the former Soviet states, this group of countries displays the most negative attitude toward Russia in general, as well as toward Russian security and military support – for these countries still perceive Russia as an aggressor. Hence they have always kept themselves as part of West/Europe (both Estonia and Latvia are members of European Union and
North-Atlantic Treaty Organization), avoiding Russia and everything orchestrated by it on institutional level.

Table 5.1

CSTO Membership and Russian Military Bases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSTO</th>
<th>Russian Military Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>+ +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>+ +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>+ +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>+ +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>+ +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Withdraw 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lukin (2007); Aris, (2010)
Table 5.2

Factors in Total
(by Russian language status groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Economic Interest</th>
<th>Security Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State/Official</td>
<td>W*</td>
<td>H*</td>
<td>H*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>S*</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: W-relatively weak; W*- weak; S-relatively strong; S*- strong; H-relatively high; H*- high; L-relatively low; L*-low
6. Conclusion

The main purpose of this comparative study is to suggest an additional national identity, economic and security interest hypotheses for analyzing the Russian language status choice in the post-Soviet space.

The cross-national analysis confirms the first hypothesis on the impact of national identity on the Russian language status in most instances.

Historical experience with national independence is the crucial factor for capturing the degree of national identity’s development. National identity, defined by experience with national independence before Soviet incorporation, certainly brought influence on the former republics’ nation-state building processes and the foreign policy’s trajectories in the post-Soviet time.

Moreover, the pre-Soviet national independence experience was an influential custodianship of the strength of the republics’ national identities; undeniably, it could not but have visible effect on republics’ relations with Russia in general, and the Russian language status choices in particular.

With regard to experience with national independence among the ex-Soviet republics, there are three diverse groups. The first group, the republics with no experience with pre-Soviet national independence and, therefore, with a somewhat weak national identity, in most cases has rather high status for the Russian language. Belarus, Moldova and the three Central Asian republics
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) have the Russian legal language status in their lands ranging from interethnic to state. The exceptions in the group are two other Central Asian republics (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan): there, the status for Russian language is undetermined.

The second group, the republics with substantial experience with national independence before the Soviet Union inclusion and, accordingly, with strong national identity, in most cases have low legal status for Russian language. The Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) give Russian language the status ranging from undetermined to foreign.

The third group consists of republics with rather short-lived or fragmented experience of pre-Soviet national independence, yet enough for the development of relatively strong national identity. These republics have predominantly low legal status for Russian language in their homelands. Three Transcaucasian republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have Russian language status legally undetermined. The exception for the group is Ukraine, which has Russian as interethnic.

Regarding the pre-Soviet national experience, another finding is worth mentioning. It is revealed that the stronger national identity, the more negative perception of the Soviet period republic has. That is the case of Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: having the strongest national identity among the former Soviet republics, they have also the most negative
perception of the Soviet period in their republics. Conversely, republics with rather weak national identity have largely positive perception of the Soviet past.

The most highly dependent on Russia in terms of economic cooperation, confirmed in all four aspects, comprising economic interest designated here (namely EurAsEC membership, trade turnover with Russia, Russian energy imports and migrant remittances from Russia), are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Both of these two republics’ entire economies are dependent on cooperation with Russia. They are both participants in regional Russia’s leading organizations, CIS and EurAsEC; and almost entirely dependent on Russian trade and energy imports. What distinguishes them from the other republics is the fact that the economies of both are heavily dependent on migrant remittances from Russia.

The other group of republics has no less dependency on economic cooperation with Russia than the previous group. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Armenia all have high interest in economic cooperation with Russia. All four are dependent on Russian trade and energy imports, whereas Moldova and Armenia are also interested in migrant remittances from Russia. Moreover, both participate in EurAsEC, although less visibly than the other republics, having only statuses of observers.

The other five republics – Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
– are also interested in economic cooperation with Russia, but mostly in trade and energy sectors.

Most of these are not tied to Russia under EurAsEC, for the exception of Ukraine and Uzbekistan: Ukraine has observer status and Uzbekistan, being in and out of the organization, has eventually suspended its membership in 2008. The last three republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan have the least dependency on Russia in the economic field among the former republics. While sharing somewhat moderately with Russia in conventional and energy trade, they show no interest in economic institutional binding with Russia in the region.

To correlate all these findings with the second hypothesis on the impact of economic interest on Russian language status choice, one may conclude the following: while nearly all former republics are interested in economic cooperation with Russia to various extents, the republics with high status for Russian language appear to be interested the most. From the interethnic to the state status group of republics, all are heavily dependent on cooperation with Russia. Only two republics, Ukraine and Moldova, while interested in conventional and energy trade share with Russia, are the exceptions to the interest in economic institutional binding with Russia under the EurAsE: they both have status of EurAsEC observers, thus participating rather nominally.

The groups of republics with fairly low Russian language status in general
vary the most in terms of economic interest. However, the group of republics with foreign status for Russian language has more well-defined patterns of economic relations with Russia; both of republics (Estonia and Latvia), while heavily dependent on Russian energy imports, avoid any economic cooperation with Russia on the institutional level. Meanwhile, the group of republics with undetermined status for Russian language is the most heterogeneous with regard to economic cooperation with Russia. In terms of trade and energy interest in Russian imports, these six republics nominally can be divided into two different camps – the one that exhibits interest and the one that does not. Armenia, Uzbekistan and Lithuania are quite interested in Russian trade and energy, whereas Armenia can be ranked as the first among them. As to economic institutional binding under EurAsEC, currently only Armenia has the status of observer, with Uzbekistan’s suspending its membership and Lithuania’s never even considering such a possibility. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan are perhaps the least interested among the republics in tight cooperation with Russia in the economic field. Moreover, what unites them with the Baltic republics is the non-participation in EurAsEC. The highest in terms of interest of security cooperation with Russia, designated here as cooperation under Russia’s leading organization CSTO and existence of Russian military contingent in a republic, are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia. For them, Russia is a strategic partner
and one of the possible guarantors of safety or national security in the region.

In contrast with the first grouping, three Baltic republics along with Moldova, Turkmenistan and Georgia show little if no interest in cooperation with Russia in security ground in the region. In terms of military cooperation, most of them are primarily oriented toward the West, with the exception of Turkmenistan which pursues mostly isolationist security policy, belonging to none of the military or military-political alliances.

As to Moldova and Georgia, they both have unresolved diplomatic conflicts with Russia. Russian military troops remain on the territory of internationally unrecognized republic of Transnistria, the secessionist entity of Moldova, even against the will of the Moldavian government. In the same manner, Russia has its military contingent in the internationally unrecognized republic of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the breakaway provinces of Georgia. In fact, Russia did officially recognize Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia as the independent states, currently providing them with military support and assistance.

The rest of the three republics, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, are positioned somewhere between the two abovementioned ‘extreme groups’. They all have points of contact with Russia in the security field; however, they vary in nature. Thus, Ukraine and Azerbaijan are not members of CSTO, and Uzbekistan, being in and out of organization, eventually has decided to
withdraw in 2012. Besides, Uzbekistan has no Russian military contingent within its borders, whereas Ukraine and Azerbaijan have Russian military elements in their lands. Currently, Ukraine and Uzbekistan have been trying to orient themselves West, yet only with inconsistent success; while Azerbaijan is primarily oriented toward its main military-strategic partner, Turkey.

To correlate all these findings with the third hypothesis on the impact of security interest on the Russian language status choice, one may conclude the following.

The republics with high status for Russian language were found to cooperate most tightly with Russia in the security field. The republics of interethnic and state status groups are actively participating in CSTO and have Russian military contingent in their lands. However, the probable exceptions for the interethnic status group are Ukraine and Moldova: they both do not cooperate with Russia under the CSTO, while having Russian military troops on their soil. In case of Moldova, however, Russian military contingent in the secessionist entity of Transnistria is stationed against Moldova’s will.

The republics with low status for Russian language predominantly display no will nor interest in cooperating with Russia in the security domain. And while the republics with Russian status as a foreign language show more consistency on this matter, the republics with undetermined Russian language status have some irregularities. Armenia, Azerbaijan and to some degree Uzbekistan
deviate from the major trend of this group: Armenia, having Russian troops in its land and membership in CSTO, shows very high interest in military cooperation with Russia; Azerbaijan, while not a CSTO participant, has Russian military presence in its land; Uzbekistan, being in and out of CSTO and other regional organizations under Russia’s leadership, has probably the most inconsistent behavior in terms of security cooperation.

In short, the three hypotheses of this study found their confirmation in the majority of instances in the Russian language status groups.

In terms of national identity, the republics with strongest national identity in the post-Soviet space have the lowest status of foreign language for Russian. In terms of economic interest, the republics with high economic interest in cooperation with Russia and tight economic institutional binding with Russia have high status of interethnic and/or state for Russian language; while other republics with low Russian language status also have to some extent economic interest in cooperation with Russia, such interest does not include cooperation on the institutional level.

In terms of security interest, the republics with high security interest in interaction with Russia have a high, interethnic and/or state status for Russian language.

Therefore, the cross-national comparative analysis suggests that it is precisely the combination of weak national identity and high interest in economic and
security cooperation with Russia that has an obvious positive impact on relations with Russia in general, and Russian language status choice in particular.

The study however, faces several limitations. First, while assessing three aspects of impact on the Russian language status choice, it aims at neither revealing the causality between national identity and interest, nor systematically analyzing the mechanism of decision-making itself. Instead, it offers major generalizations of probable factors affecting the language policy outcomes. Secondly, the analysis is limited to the republics’ relations with Russia. To address also the impact of relations with other global powers is beyond the scope of this study.

From a theoretical point of view, the study implies that not only culture remains an important motivation in a state’s language policy decision making, but a pragmatic interest as well.

For this reason, this study proposes a way to combine Realism and Social Constructivism in an effort to synthesize various methods and opinions from different theories instead of positioning one as superior to another. While on the one hand, Realism in itself focuses mostly on the context of choice, characterized by material interests, Social Constructivism, on the other hand, accentuates the impact of ideas, neglecting the impact of power relations; this study stresses the importance of both in defining a state’s national interests, as
well as their methodology in determining a particular policy outcomes.

Furthermore, this study suggests that applying combined analytical approaches based on ideological and material factors can help increase the explanatory power for foreign relations and their policy outcomes in the post-Soviet space.
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Appendix

The List of Abbreviations

ABM (The Anti-Ballistic Missile)
BALTBAT (The Tri-national Peacekeeping Unit of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania)
BSEC (The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation)
BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan)
CRRF (The Collective Rapid Reaction Force)
CIA (The Central Intelligence Agency)
CIS (The Commonwealth of Independent States)
CES (The Common Economic Space)
CDC (The Community of Democratic Choice)
CSTO (The Collective Security Treaty Organization)
ECO (The Economic Cooperation Organization)
EU (The European Union)
EurAsEC (The Eurasian Economic Community)
FSU (The Former Soviet Union)
FPA (The Foreign Policy Analysis)
FDI (The Foreign Direct Investment)
GUAM (The Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova))
GAZPROM (The largest extractor of natural gas in the world and the largest Russian company)
INTERENERGO (The International Electricity Company)
IMF (The International Monetary Fund)
NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
NK (Nagorno-Karabakh)
OPEC (The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)
OGRF (The Operational Group of Russian Forces)
OSCE (The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)
OSCE (The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe)
PVO (The Russian Air Defence Forces)
PCA (The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement)
RAO UES (The Russian Electric Power Holding Company)
SCO (The Shanghai Cooperation Organization)
UN (The United Nations)
USSR (The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics)
WTO (The World Trade Organization)
WHO (The World Health Organization)