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Self-interested Reporting by Mainstream Media:
A Study of How Broadcast News Covered Media Policy
(방송의 자사이기주의 보도: 미디어 정책 보도를 중심으로)

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Abstract

This study examined the role of self-interest among mainstream media in reporting related to media policies. Ideally, the press is objective and impartial. However, this is not always the case, and the most damage could result when the press practices biased reporting regarding public policies that could significantly affect society. This study addresses this phenomenon in the Korean press, specifically focusing on broadcast news reporting where objectivity and impartiality are especially required.

To that end, the study examined how rival broadcast companies in Korea reported on media policies that were closely related to their self-interest. Major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels, Korea’s major rival media groups, were selected for examination. News reports on the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, and re-approval of general programming channels were selected for analysis. These media policies are closely related to the interests of both terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels. Furthermore, the policies have the potential to show biased reporting given that terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels have distinctly different interests in regards to the two policies. Therefore, it can be reasonably expected that news reporting of terrestrial broadcasters and general programming
channels differs on the policies.

Additionally, the study explored how stations belonging to the two broadcasting groups reported on the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) for the period when they covered the debates around the *gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters*, and *re-approval of general programming channels*. The study hypothesized that there would be less criticism of the KCC, the government regulatory agency that governs the adoption and implementation of media policies related to terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels, by a media company that supported the adoption of media policies in line with its self-interests.

Finally, the study looked at the quality index for both terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels. The quality index measured which broadcast companies aired more factually-based news reports despite the potential for biased reporting derived from mainstream media’s self-interest. If a news report was more factually based, the score was closer to +1, and if a news report was less factually based, the score was closer to −1. Means to calculate the quality index were created in the study.

The study results were significant in two ways. First, most of the hypotheses regarding self-interested reporting were supported, which means that self-interested news reporting practices do exist in Korea. Specifically, the results showed that media firms reacted sensitively to
media related policies and were likely to practice biased reporting that fit their self-interests. Second, the result showed that a public terrestrial broadcaster (KBS) demonstrated a higher quality index than a general programming channel (TV Chosun), which means that a public broadcasting company was more likely to practice factual news reporting than a private broadcasting company, which has more concern about economic profits. However, this study has limitations in that it only confirmed the existence of mainstream media’s self-interested reporting in Korean journalism rather than systematically explaining how related factors interacted and influenced the generation of biased news. In other words, it focused more on the final news product than the processes that led to that product.

keywords: Self-interested Reporting, Media Policy, Gross-cap Regulation of Advertising Time, Re-approval of General Programming Channels, Korea Communications Commission(KCC), Terrestrial Broadcasters

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1-1. Research background & research purpose

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of self-interest among mainstream media in reporting related to media policies, specifically focusing on broadcast news reporting on the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters and re-approval of general programming channels.

People watch news to better understand the world they live in. News provides the public with essential information about what is happening in the society. Therefore, the press is required to report news in an objective and impartial manner. Objectivity and impartiality are considered to be the key elements for legitimate journalism. Objectivity in journalism concerns fair and unbiased fulfilling of the interests of all interested parties(Schudson, 1978). Objectivity can be assessed through coverage patterns of news(Schudson, 1978). Objectivity is also regarded as a professional standard or strategy that classifies ‘opinion’ and ‘information’(Schiller, 1981; Schudson, 2001). However, as Lichtenberg(1991) pointed out, objectivity in the press does not mean that there is only one solution to a problem. 'Objectivity in the press’ means that the press should implement the ideal regulative principle that the press can unbiasedly report on
matters (Lee, 2004). Then, what is impartiality in the press? It is difficult for the press to meet the standard that would satisfy every interested party in the conflict. Nonetheless, it is important for the press to view the event in the most neutral and balanced manner. Balance in news reporting means that every interested party is fairly interviewed and reported in the news. Impartiality means various opinions are reported on matters with conflicts of interest. It is important not to be fixated upon one point of view in order to be impartial (Youn, 2013).

But in reality, the press can not always be considered as objective and impartial. It is more fitting to say that the press has bias or inclination when reporting, and political and ideological inclination in the press has always drawn attention. In a sense, certain political or ideological inclination in the press is considered as the press’ inherent function. The problem arises, however, when a media firm expresses its “inclination” in a way that is favorable to its own interest or when the firms try to sway the public opinion to further their agendas. It can be reasonably argued that airing news reports intentionally tailored toward a media firm's self-interest can not only be considered to be unfair and unobjective, but also could interfere with the public interest,

1) Lim (1993) simplifies all the different perceptions of fairness by defining it as just “impartial.” The BBC editorial guideline also defines fairness as not giving special treatment to any party in the interest but treating every party equally (The BBC Editorial Guideline, Section 4. Impartiality).
for it provides the public with biased information and skewed perspectives. News reporting tailored toward media corporate self-interest causes the diminution or distortion of coverage. For instance, when an event is directly connected to the profits of a media firm, such phenomenon could occur. When media firms report on the matters related to their owners, they frequently report in a way that is favorable to the owners. Media firms also show a tendency to deny or downsize the events when the owners or workers of the firms are involved in societal or political scandal. Furthermore, media firms

2) One such favorable reporting took place when Joongang Ilbo and the TBC tried to cover up and protect their mother firm, Samsung, when the Samsung saccharine smuggling incident occurred in the mid-1960s. In September 1966, Samsung was accused of smuggling an ingredient for saccharin, which was illegal at that time, to use at its fertilizer plants. This escalated into a major social problem and caused the public to become leery of the Park regime’s commitment to eradicate corruption (Kim, 1997). This incident is a typical example of self-interested news reporting.

3) An example of such a reporting practice is demonstrated through the Chosun Ilbo’s handling of the 'Jang Jayeon Scandal'. Jang Jayeon, a South Korean actress, was found hanged at her home on March 7th, 2009. Her death caused a national scandal when it emerged that she had been sexually and physically abused by a number of prominent entertainment executives during her career, and that the abuse had contributed to her depression. When the involvement of Bang Sanghoon, the CEO of the Chosun Ilbo, in the scandal was brought up, the Chosun Ilbo downright denied the suspicion and filed a suit against politicians and the representatives of the Internet news firms, who cast a doubt on Bang (Media Today, 2015. 5. 22). The Chosun Ilbo lost on the first trial but did not lodge an appeal. In 1999, Joongang Ilbo was dubbed by public as “Bodyguard Press” when its CEO, Hong Seokhyun, was reported to the police for his charge for Bokang Tax Evasion and 40 plus reporters from the Joongang Ilbo lined up in front of the police station, shouting
tend to refrain from attacking the stakeholders of their sister companies or affiliates, while attacking their rivals in a blunt manner.  

Out of all the media, broadcasting is the one to watch out the most for news reporting behavior tailored toward media corporate self-interest. Even though the media environment is rapidly changing in today’s society, broadcasting news continues to function (considering its exposure range and influential dimension) as the most important means for the public to comprehend what is happening in society(Kim & Lee, 2008; Jung, 2009). Therefore, broadcast news, compared to news in other medium, is demanded by law and ethical guidelines to stick to the strictest fairness criteria. That is to say, broadcast news is innately obliged to practice fairness by reporting on matters as objectively and impartially as possible(Yoon, 2007).

There is a great deal of social interest in and concern for the fairness of broadcast news. However, recently there has been a lot of disputes over whether a TV news is fair or not. In 2008 during the candelight vigil, a social conflict broke out around whether TV

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4) For instance, if Joongang Ilbo reports an incident that is unfavorable to the Chosun Ilbo, the ChosunIlbo makes a counterattack against Joongang Ilbo. However, knowing this, rival companies sometimes refrain from attacking each other(to protect itself). In this case, rival companies show behavior that they mutually not report anything bad about each other.
programs, including <PD Notebook>, which featured on the candlelight vigil incident, violated the broadcast fairness standard or not (Lee, 2008). Referring to this kind of phenomena, Inkyu Park (2007) argued that the Korean public broadcasting was far from carrying out its social role that is to promote ‘fairness.’ Minwoong Lee (2005) claimed that the spread of advocacy journalism, which only unilaterally advocates certain views instead of verifying and reviewing various views, was the main cause for such a phenomenon in Korean society.

Although there have been many fairness controversies related to broadcast news reporting, biased news reporting tailored toward self-interest of a broadcasting firm is one of the most problematic issues related to broadcast fairness. To be more clear, 'biased news reporting tailored toward 'a media firm's self-interest'(hereinafter 'self-interested reporting')' refers to the behavior of reporting biased news for the purpose of promoting the interest of a media firm or its owner/stakeholder. Such examples include: Not reporting an

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5) MBC became the subject of legal action. On 12 August 2008, the Korea Communications Standards Commission called for MBC to apologize to the public over misrepresentations made in the PD notebook program. MBC apologized through a two-minute broadcast, saying, "We would like to offer a sincere apology to our viewers (over the report)." MBC conceded that six translation errors had been made and that downer cattle had been mistakenly identified as suffering from the mad cow disease (BSE).
incident/issue that is unfavorable to the owner or the CEO of their own firm, promoting their firm's programs, or social contribution, and continuously reporting news that is only favorable to their own firms, etc. For instance, recently the KBS featured on the news that its TV program <Special Live Program for Separated Family Reunion> - which helps people find out and reunite with long separated family members - was designated as a World Cultural Heritage by UNESCO. The problem was that the KBS featured the fact in the main news segment multiple times. Another instance was that in June 2013, KBS aired news that KBS would be hosting a show during President Park’s visit to Beijing in the main news segment. The TV Reporters’ Alliance(2014) commented that “KBS put this news, which is not of the main news element, in the main news segment. It is an example of self-interested reporting.” On the other hand, when it comes to reporting on a rival press, broadcast firms often show a behavior of 'criticism for the sake of criticism.' In August 2015, <Media Inside>, a media criticism program of the KBS, harshly criticized general programming channels for their lowbred programs under the title of “Panels in general programming channels with bombarding rough words.” Particularly, it extensively criticized general programming channels for their "gonzo" journalism, making a referral to the amateur and inappropriate statements made by the panels(Newsfinder, 2015. 8. 31.). However, <Media Inside> chose to have an interviewee from the
Citizens' Coalition for Democratic Media, a representative civic group of the progressive camp, to denounce the perspectives of the panelists who were critical of certain behaviors of the people from the progressive camp, even though the words that the panelists used for criticism were actually far from being rough or lowbred (Newsfinder, 2015. 8. 31.). This instance shows that the KBS simply chose to criticize its rivals for the purpose of denouncing, rather than to legitimately criticize them for journalistic purposes. This case is another example of a news reporting for promoting corporate self-interest in which a media company intentionally reports negatively on its rivals.

1-2. Self-interested reporting and broadcast news coverage on media policies

The most problematic type of self-interested reporting is when media firms show such behavior in dealing with public issues. If the press reports biased news on the public issue where the public interest is at stake, the consequence can be even more serious. Media policies are such public issues. Since media policy gravely affects the media industry, including media firms' interests, media firms are tempted to report on certain issues in a way that could benefit themselves. For instance, newspapers and broadcasters which had different interests in relation to the revision of the cross media ownership rule in the
'Broadcasting Act', attempted to influence the revision process during the years of 2008~2009(Mediaus, 2009. 2. 17.). Broadcasting companies’ lopsided coverage on the raise of the TV license fee was also the subject of controversy. The Korea Communications Standards Commission(KCSC) made a decision of 'suggestion of opinion' for KBS' unfair coverage of the issue. The reputation of the KBS as a public broadcaster, which is required to be more impartial than any other private broadcasters, was tarnished by this incident. As a result, the incident dealt a blow to the viewers' trust in KBS(Media Today, 2014. 7. 14.). major terrestrial broadcasters(KBS, MBC, SBS) were also criticized for their reporting behaviors that put their self-interests before the public interest in relation to the issue of 700Mhz spectrum allocation. The criticism dealt mostly with the fact that the three companies extracted comments from politicians or seminars that were favorable to their own interests, and only used those extracts when covering the news(Chosun Ilbo, 2014. 11. 13.). Besides this, their dealing with other media policy issues, including the issue of deregulation of broadcast advertising for the purpose of promoting their interests have been the subject of controversy.

Self-interested reporting behavior is further heightened with the

6) One of the key issues in the reform measure was the planned lifting of a ban on cross-ownership in the media industry. Democrats had fiercely resisted the changes, claiming that they could give conglomerates and newspapers undue influence over network television stations. (http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2901743).
recently intensifying competition among the TV channels as a result of the launch of general programming channels affiliated with the influential conservative newspapers in the broadcasting turf in 2011. General programming channels have displayed clash of interests with existing terrestrial broadcasters over many issues. Through their news reports focused on their self-interests, terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels attempted to influence the policy making process in the direction that would be beneficial to themselves.

Why is self-interested reporting not acceptable in journalism then? It is because news reporting used as a means to produce a certain outcome can be considered the so-called 'activism' (Brewer, 2015). When news reporting is used as a means to promote a specific purpose, it is not journalism anymore but just a tool to achieve a desired outcome. Viewers/readers lose trust in such reporting and eventually the press itself (Lee & Choi, 2005). If this happens, the press cannot function as a guide for social reality and the democratic deliberation is hindered, thus resulting in society ending up in abnormal conditions. Particularly, self-interested reporting on media policies is not desirable, because media policy is very important in terms of forming social interactions, public opinions, and important national policies that could become the groundwork of democratic decisions. The influence of media policy has on society makes it one

7) Brewer said, “journalists should not have a desired outcome - that’s activism.”
of the important public policy.

Existing discussions on fairness in broadcasting have been mostly about the problems related to political control on broadcasting. However, as considered so far, the problem of biased news reporting tailored toward broadcasters' self-interest is another serious and important issue in Korean journalism (Yoon, 2007; Yoo, 2009). Reasonable regulations on self-interested reporting are necessary to deal with the side effects of it. However, there is a dearth of studies that deal with this issue, and most of them simply describe how the behavior of self-interested reporting prevails in the broadcasting sphere rather than analyze why such behaviors take place and how they can be confronted. An analytical approach on this phenomenon will allow us to deal with the problem more systematically.

In this context, this study aims to investigate news reporting behaviors of broadcasting companies on media policies, which are closely related to the companies' corporate interests.

To that end, the study first examines the general factors that influence media content. Then it narrows its focus on the role of media firms' self-interest (media corporate self-interest) as one influencing factor that could cause biased news report, particularly in relation to media policy issues. The study then goes over the details of news reporting behaviors caused by media corporate self-interest. It then investigates how different groups of broadcasting organizations
deal with media policy issues, on which each group has different interests, in their news reports. For the investigation, the study compares self-interested reporting behaviors of major terrestrial broadcasters (SBS, MBC, KBS) and general programming channels (TV Chosun, MBN, Channel A, JTBC), given that the two groups have conflicting views about certain media policy issues. The study chose the following two topics as media policy issues for analysis in that these two are the representative media policies on which the interests of major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels clearly conflict: (a) the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, and (b) re-approval of general programming channels. Based on the potential co-relation between media corporate self-interest and biased news reporting on media policies, the study suggests an analytical model specification and research hypotheses.

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8) major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels show distinctively different interests on several matters.
Chapter 2. Literature Review

This chapter first considers general influential factors that could have effect on media content, and then moves on to the specifics on the role of media corporate self-interest as one of the factors. As one of the theoretical perspectives for the review, the chapter considers Shoemaker & Reese (1996)’ explanation about organizational effect on media content particularly in that media corporate self-interest can be categorized as an 'organizational level' of influence. Since there is a dearth of existing researches on media corporate self-interest and news reporting, related researches on how media ownership affects media content will also be examined. After reviewing general discussion of the influence of media corporate self-interest on media content, the chapter will focus the discussion on how media corporate self-interest affects news reporting particularly on media policy issues.

2-1. Factors influencing media content

In this section, I will consider the factors that influence media content. But before examining the factors, it is necessary to understand journalism.

Journalism is for building community and democracy. Increasingly more people today are empowered by a free flow of information and directly involved in influencing their governments and creating new
rules for their political, social, and economic lives (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001). People believe that journalists should work in the public interest. Although technology changes the means of how news is delivered, there already exists a clear philosophy of how journalism should function “The primary purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be free and self-governing” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001). As Tom Brokaw, a former NBC anchormen, commented, “the news media should serve as a watchdog and offer a voice to the forgotten” (Brokaw, 1999, interview by William Damon, Howard Gardner, and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi).

With so many things happening in the society, journalists not only should decide what the public should know, but also help audiences make order out of what they know. According to Kovach & Rosenstiel (2001), the first task of a new journalist is to verify what information is reliable and then order the information so people can grasp them efficiently. Before, in some parts of the world, the limitations to the pursuit of the truth took forms of government-censoring. However, in the 21st century in which the information flows and the technology evolves very quickly, the new limitation takes in the form of commercialism. We call it 'market driven journalism'. Material incentives create business and free market economy and the media is affected by commercialism.

But if you ask what the ideal journalism should be, journalism’s
first obligation must be an approximation to the truth. When asked what values they consider paramount, 100 percent of journalists interviewed for a survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and the Committee of Concerned Journalists (CCJ) answered “getting the facts right” (CCJ and the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 1999). However, what is the “truth?” Everyone has certain biases and different perceptions; truth can vary with different lenses and perspectives. This is why journalists view truth as more of a process than an end itself. Patty Calhoun, the editor of the alternative weekly paper Westword said, “You can certainly pursue accuracy and fairness and the truth, and that pursuit continues” (Calhoun, at CCJ Chicago forum, 6 November, 1997.) In journalism, the desire that information be truthful is elemental. The “journalistic truth” is merely more than just being accurate. According to Kovach & Rosenstiel (2001), the first principle of journalism, its disinterested pursuit of truth, “is ultimately what sets it apart from all other forms of communications.” In his book News Values, journalist Jack Fuller, explains that journalists should get the facts straight and make sense of the facts (Fuller, 230). To sum up, journalistic truth is a process, a continuing journey toward understanding. Truthfulness can be tested by subordinate concepts such as fairness and balance. A lot of researches on media impartiality consider it as unbiased and balanced (not partial to one side) behavior. Gump (2002) stated to practice media
fairness, a reporter should exclude his personal perspective and report on every related party’s views equally (Youn, 2015). In a similar context, McQuail (1992) views media fairness as balance in the choice and use of sources that is both quantitatively and qualitatively well-balanced. Thus, ideally the press should report on matters impartially on both quantitative and qualitative level.

However, there are many factors that harm journalism’s path towards ideal impartial journalism. These factors should be identified to accurately diagnose the cause of the unfair, biased news in broadcasting.

*Figure 1* Model of a Hierarchy of Influences on Media Content

Source: Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 141
<Figure 1> shows Shoemaker & Reese (1996)’ model of a hierarchy of influences on media content. From the greatest range to the smallest level are ideological level, extra-media level, organization level, media routine level, and finally the smallest, individual level. Shoemaker & Reese (1996) clarify their model by citing the organizational structure of newspapers (see figure 2). Through the structure, they explain how company system affects its content.

*Figure 2* Newspaper’s Organizational Structure

Source: Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 191
The tendency of the owner of an organization, ownership structure (public or private), the governance within an organization and many other factors directly and indirectly influence the final determination of content. Bagdikian (1987) found out, using 'Mother Jones' case, that media's organizational characteristics have a considerable amount of effect on content decisions. To be more specific, media struggle not to lose their advertisers; thus, even if an individual reporter strives to report on things in the most “idealistic” manner, if it goes against a certain goal/interest of the company, then it is very difficult for that work to be published. Even though media is prone to criticism for such acts, it is a common phenomenon in the press to pursue and choose news that can be profitable. In other words, for most organizations the primary goal is economic, to make a profit. Shoemaker & Reese (1996) state that such a phenomenon, when a reporter’s autonomy is inhibited by the company, happens more frequently when the company is having a hard time acquiring its advertising resources (in which it depends most on for the earnings). Media sociologists, such as Herbert Gans and Leon Sigal, typically view economic considerations as constraints on news work and, thus, as indirect influences on editorial decisions (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). A case of KTVY-TV demonstrates such a phenomenon. When the number of workers and earnings of the KTVY-TV dropped, the media company chose to reutilize articles, which were already written, with
more pictures than before, rather than trying to recruit more capable reporters for a better coverage of news. Even after the improvement of the company’s financial structure, the decline of the quality of news continued because the company continuously tried to cut down on the expenditure of news making and maximize the profit (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The governance within an organization also affects on the media’s content decisions. It is a likely scenario that if a governance within an organization has a lot of power and cares more about other things than “realizing a true journalism,” then the final content of the media is expressed differently (i.e., inapproximately to the truth). In other words, figures within an organization are not sometimes really strong at resisting outside pressure. Gitlin (1980), too, points out that even a so called “media elites” violate from time to time the standard of journalism. Gans (1979) also states that the influence of the chief editor or the executives on the content making is excessive. The ownership and policy of the company also have an influence on content decisions. In the end, in order to better understand why media content is the way it is, comprehension of the organization’s policy or strategy through its inside dynamics is a must. On the surface, the most influential factor would be the head of the company who decides the company’s policies, but from an organizational perspective, the

9) The content in media differ depending on ownership, the goal and policies of the company. However, in every media, the final say belongs to the owner (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The owner of the media “fundamentally
pursuit of economic profit that is directly related to survival of company, also plays a huge role in determining media content.

While Shoemaker & Reese (1996)’ reviews of the hierarchical model are confined to media ownership and governance, McManus (1994) explains further using the concept “market-driven journalism.” McManus shows how news reporters breach the objectivity of journalism for market-oriented interest. Back to Shoemaker & Reese (1996), they assert that company’s profit-driven operation and management have more influence on determination of which contents are in the news and which are not, rather than an individual news reporter. Therefore, a company’s guidelines/goals can frequently collide with an individual reporter’s journalistic morals (Barkin, 2003). For instance, when a news company targets certain customers, it can provide news that fit their tastes. The reason why the reporting style of general programming channels and major terrestrial broadcasters differ can be understood in such aspects. In the end, it is only possible to achieve ideal journalism only when the press itself strives for truth and objectivity. In this aspect, although press should represent all the parties in controversial issues, in reality, it just does not so due to several factors influencing the content (Attaway-Fink, 2005).

determines the values and the direction of management” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2001/2003, p. 95). In other words, a reporter or producer determines “the style of journalism” (Harcup, 2009, p.18) but the media owner and the governance have the most influence on forming the frame of news (Breed, 1955).
The same goes for coverage on government’s media policies. The reason lies in a very competitive market system. It is essential for a media firm that a media policy unfolds in a direction that is favorable/profitable to its own interests, for that is directly related to its survival. McManus’ commercial news production model is suitable in explaining why general programming channels show a certain types of reporting behaviors on the issues that are in conflict with their own interests. Both researches of Shoemaker & Reese(1996) and McManus(2004) show that news organizations can commercialize even its ideology for economic gains. In this aspect, even though KBS, SBS, and MBC are all major terrestrial broadcasters, KBS shows a reporting tendency that is a little bit different from that of the other two. For terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels, there exist not only a goal for profit-making but also a political goal to expand their influence in Korean society. In this aspect, McManus’ market-driven journalism and Shoemaker & Reese’(1996) research suggest that it is necessary to examine content decision factors including uneconomic factors like social influence.

Going further, media content is also influenced by occupational routine of mass media workers(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Karl Mannheim, a German sociologist, states that people are social creatures and take part in a certain pattern of actions(that they themselves have not created). Consequently, people speak their group’s
language and think their group’s thought. Thus, as an individual of a group, people have formed a certain reaction/thought pattern for a certain situation (Mannheim, 1936/1964 cited in Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). This certain pattern of thought and action is called “routine.” And this routine functions as a kind of guideline or limitation for media workers. Shoemaker & Reese (1996) gives an example of a gate-keeper to explain about routine. A book publisher must choose one title out of many, a TV channel programmer must choose which TV program to put in prime-time, a newspaper editor must choose which event to put in the front page. And these choices affect the media content that the public see.

Here, we must ask a question. Are these choices merely made by certain individuals? Shoemaker & Reese (1996) explains that in many situations, it is not so. For instance, there is a certain routine that news reporters use when they collect information, when they write articles, and when editors choose which articles to put in the paper. This routine is called selecting value of news (and this is one of many routines in the media industry). Traditionally, the factors that the press consider when they are selecting value of news are already decided. This routine predicts what news will be enjoyed and be considered important by reviewers, and function as a guideline for a gate-keeper to choose which article to put in the paper.10) The routine for news

10) “Production routines embody assumptions about audiences... the audience is part of a routinized way of life....When it comes to thinking about the
value includes the importance of an event, interest, controversy, unusualness, timeliness, and proximity (Stephens, 1980). There are many routines other than those about news values like one that is used for dealing with international disputes, one for interviewing experts, and one for gate-keeping, etc. And these routines ultimately affect media content by functioning as a kind of guideline and limitation for media workers. As discussed so far, many factors can be considered as the elements that can influence the news content. Then, more specifically, what is the role of media corporate self-interest in journalism?

2-2. The role of media firms' self-interest in journalism

1) Self-interested reporting by mainstream media

In the previous section, a number of factors that affect media content were considered. There are many different factors, such as politics, markets, professional routines, governance within an organization, disposition of a media owner, etc., that affect media content and mar fairness in news reporting. This section will be devoted to one of the most problematic factors that have an influence on media content: media corporate self-interest. In reality, news kind of news most relevant to the audience, newsmen exercise their news judgement rather than going out and seeking specific information about the composition, wants or tastes of those who are being addressed" (Schlesinger, 1978, pp. 115-116).
reporting biased with corporate self-interest is common in the press and is increasing in broadcasting news (see Figure 3).

<Figure 3> Self-interested Reporting by Korea's major newspapers

(2014. 8. 1~2015. 7. 31)

Source: Media Today, 2015.8.11.

<Figure 3> shows the result of a research by Media Today about the self-interested reporting behavior in the main stream newspapers about terrestrial broadcasters and the Internet portal services. According to it, from August 1st of 2014 to 31st of July 2015, Donga Ilbo had 104 self-interested reporting items, while Chosun Ilbo had 80 of such items, Maeil Kyungjae had 53, and Joongang Ilbo had 32. From this, we can tell that the behavior of self-interested reporting is prevalent in the Korean press.

Let us consider how self-interested reporting by a news media
driven at the organizational level affects media content. What is self-interested reporting, then? According to a Korean dictionary, self-interested reporting refers to "news reporting behaviors that only account for the interests of one’s own company and not considering general society’s benefit." That is to say, self-interested reporting is a biased reporting that is in accordance with private interest of the media company and the owner. In this sense, this study defines self-interested reporting as "the news reporting behavior that is organized to pursue a goal and interest of a media company set by the highest management group and the CEO." Media's self-interested reporting is more of an outcome of an organizational influence on media content rather than of an individual level of influence, because such behavior is relative to the interest or goal of a company that are specifically set by the highest authority group and the owner. In order to learn about the mechanism in which self-interested reporting takes place, I will look into the mechanism of organizational control over media content.

The whole press acts in a systematic coherent manner towards profits and goals set by the highest organizational authority and owner. A leader of an organization carries out and makes policies for the benefit of an organization(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Thus, here an organization functions as a gatekeeper(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). A press organization is composed of a hierarchical levels of bureaucracy consisting a reporter, an editor, an editor-in-chief, the management, etc.,
and at each level exits a gatekeeper. For instance, a reporter’s article is monitored by an editor, an editor by an editor-in-chief, an editor-in-chief by the management. Therefore, even if the working class (such as a reporter) writes an article from the perspective of a “professional,” if a higher level says no, the article cannot reach the public. For example, a press organization suggests its reporters not to be politically active to maintain fairness (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). However, the same does not go for those in the highest bureaucratic level like business owner. This is because the owner of a press firm has created a certain organizational goal that surpasses any kind of influence from an individual reporter or an editor.

Shoemaker & Reese (1996)’ discourse on organizational influence on media content is mostly related to a company’s economic profit, especially related to advertising earnings. This is particularly true in the U.S. media market where there exists almost no regulation on the press organizations and the press organizations are primarily run by the market principle. Therefore, there is not much private interest relationship related to government’s public policy in the U.S., especially related to the press organizations. Bagdikian (1983) states that in the U.S. press market, the economic factors is the most influential and because of that, public is robbed of chances to understand the “real world.” Although the economic factor is the most influential in the U.S., the researches acknowledge media ownership as very
influential as well. Most researches related to media ownership in the U.S. criticize influential media owners who control the press’ ideological tendency and reporting (McChesney, 1999).

Shoemaker & Reese (1996) argue that a press organization imposes its policies on its individual journalists through unspoken and subtle pressure, which will have them conform to the company's rules. If one of the rules require its journalists not to write a news article, which is critical of or unfavorable to its owner, and one of the journalists do not like the rule, then he/she can quit the company anytime and the company can replace him/her with other person. Those who follow the rules are rewarded with a promotion or wage raise. According to Turnstall (1971), the policies of the most companies are traditional and relatively fixed. The journalists learn such unwritten rules through experience and observation of what kind of news the company reports. The news articles that better serve the company's goal (more precisely, a goal that is related to the owner's interest) can be aired or published, whereas the news articles, which do not serve the company's goal, are cut out by the editor. Therefore, in order to get recognition, journalists have to write news articles that better fit the company's goal through self-censorship. Ultimately, the owner owns the power at the organizational level, and create and enforce the company's rules that are relevant to his/her own interests. Therefore, news reporting for a media firm's self-interest is influenced by the company's system of
recruiting, promotion, reward and self-censorship, which journalists practice when writing a news article in order to comply with the company's rules.

Then how does the goal at the organizational level of domestic media companies appear to influence content? Many scholars point out that domestic media companies tend not to get out of the control at the organizational level. Sanghyun Kang(2014. 11. 8.) argues that "MBC(Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation)'s organizational culture in the past was cultivated through pride and self-esteem." According to him, production autonomy was recognized and MBC's broadcasting culture was created in such an environment, but now, external pressure and internal conflicts co-exist(Medius, 2014. 11. 8.) His diagnosis is that organizational control has been intensified since the launch of a conservative regime as a result of the change in internal organizational governance. Soejung Kim(2013. 7. 23.) calls for strenuous internal efforts, saying that people outside the MBC can take supportive actions only if resisting voices come out from within the MBC. This means that organizational control needs to be shattered first. The evaluation for general programming channels is the same. There are arguments that fairness of general programming channels have seriously been undermined with the influence of the owners of conservative newspapers. Many liberal scholars,¹¹) who view general programming

¹¹) For example, Sanghyun Kang(2011) considers the birth of general programming channel as a tragedy that would destroy democracy in
channels as tools for strengthening conservative ideologies, interpret the birth of general programming channels as a phenomenon in which the press colludes with capital and get quasi-empowered. These liberal scholars see that the Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo, and Donga Ilbo, the three powers in the Korean newspaper market who entered the broadcasting market, are impairing broadcast fairness with sensationalism and partiality. These scholars do not specify on how the owners of the three news papers control their affiliated general programming channels at the organizational level. However, considering the characteristic of a private newspaper, which puts top priority on profit maximization, they assume that the fairness of a general programming channel as a broadcaster is vulnerable to damages by the mother company's economic interest and ideological tendency.

Then how does self-interested reporting appear at the organizational level in the Korean press? Let us take a concrete case. In general, media corporate self-interest works at the organizational level when the reported content is directly linked to the interest of the press(i.e., the status of the media, the owner's interest). Such behaviour includes: i) they cover favorable issues to their own company prominently, while

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Korean society. Namsuk Kim(2012) declares his support for the Unified Progressive Party and expresses his concern that there is no press with a midway stance. Seojung Kim(2012) also criticizes that general programming channel indulge in impartial reporting practices, abandoning the principle of fairness. Jinbong Choi(2014) claims that general programming channel should be kicked out of the market and a parliamentary investigation and hearings need to be conducted in relation to the Channels.
covering unfavorable issues to their company inconspicuously or not covering at all; ii) they cover favorable issues to a rival company inconspicuously or do not cover at all, while covering unfavorable issues to the rival company prominently, iii) when a rival company covers offensive content about their company, they also do the same against the rival company. It is a kind of gate-keeping practice that a press organization hardly ever covers news report that criticizes its owner. It is a longstanding practice for a press organization that it does not provide unfavorable news coverage of its owner.

As one such example, Joongang Ilbo opened the top 10 list of privately owned houses with highest posted prices to the public on April 29, 2012 under the title of "Houses over 10 billion one appear in Seoul." Then it reported that the house of Mr. Sanghoon Bang, the owner of the Chosun Ilbo, located in Heukseok-Dong, Dongjak-Gu, turned out to be the most expensive house, the posted price of which went up 50.5% from last year. However, Chosun Ilbo, unlike Joongang Ilbo, did not cover the news. That is, while the news paper companies, the owner of which is not Mr. Bang, covered the news that could be burdensome to Mr. Bang, Chosun Ilbo did not mention it at all.
On the contrary, Chosun Ilbo on May 5, 2012 reported that the Presidential Security Service(PSS) exchanged the house in Samchung-dong that Mr. Seokhyun Hong, Chairman of Joongang Ilbo, was awarded at a public auction in 2009, with a state land belonging to the Joongang Ilbo as well. It can be said that the two daily newspapers showed self-interested reporting practices by not covering the news that is not beneficial to the newspapers' owner. Self-interested reporting practices include detailed explanatory reporting about the suspicion over the company's owner. Joongang Ilbo reported on the suspicion in detail on May 5, 2012 that Chairman Hong exchanged...
lands with the Blue House two days after the fact was reported in other newspapers. Joongang Ilbo explained in the social news page that the exchange of the land belonging to the Presidential Security Service with the Samchungjang in Samchung-Dong owned by Chairman of Joongang Ilbo was an equivalence exchange under the State Property Act. It also commented that the reason why Chairman Hong exchanged his land was that the Presidential Security Service raised an issue in relation to presidential escort service (Noh, 2012).

<Figure 5> News Article: “The Blue House Exchanges a State Land Belonging to the Presidential Security Service with a Hanok in Samchung-dong Owned by Chairman Hong”

Source: Chosun Ilbo, 2012. 5. 5.
As seen so far, the press organizations show two types of responses in regards to a suspicion or criticism over the company's owner: i) do not cover the story, or ii) actively explain about the suspicion. It is because the owner has a substantial influence over the process of news gate-keeping. Other types of self-interested reporting can work advantageously for the company. Such reporting includes: representing the company's position unilaterally, presenting the company's unilateral position in the form of a news report, using news report for the publicity of the company's program; publicizing the company's events or the activities of the major shareholders or management (Broadcasting Journalist Association, 2012). For example, media corporate self-interest can appear in relation to the advertiser by not criticizing the advertiser. This is because the press organization pursues profits (Broadcasting Journalist Association, 2014). Thus private broadcasters in particular, advertising makes up the majority of whose revenue, are never free from the influence of the advertiser. The more dependent on the advertising revenue a media company is, the harder it criticizes the advertiser. Therefore, media companies are eager to raise the ratings and increase advertising revenue by making up exciting and interesting content which can gain good viewership.

Media companies also make diverse efforts to maintain their relationship with the advertiser positively. One such effort is to restrain

12) In the case of KBS, a public broadcaster, 60% of the revenue comes from advertising and 40% of the revenue comes from the license fee.
itself from overly criticizing the advertiser. It is very important to secure advertising revenue without stepping on the toes of the advertiser. Swisher & Reese (1992) in the U. S. compared the coverage of the lobbying of the tobacco industry between the tobacco region (where tobacco is grown) and the non-tobacco region (where tobacco is not grown). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced in 1990 that passive cigarette smoking causes 3,800 lung cancer deaths each year. The EPA organized a panel of 16 experts for the review of the draft report related to the announcement. One of the experts was Dr. David Burns, who had conducted research on the harms of passive smoking for a long time. However, Dr. Burns was removed from the panel, because the Tobacco Institute, the U.S. tobacco industry's public relations arm, protested that Dr. Burns' involvement in the review of the EPA's report was not fair. What was intriguing about this incident was that the newspapers in the tobacco region and those in the non-tobacco region reported differently from each other about the reason for the exclusion of Dr. Burns from the panel. In the tobacco region, only two of the five headlines attributed the exclusion of Dr. Burns from the panel to tobacco industry lobbying. By comparison, in the non-tobacco region, six out of eight headlines attributed the removal of Dr. Burns from the panel to the result of the tobacco industry lobbying. Furthermore, the headlines of the newspapers in the non-tobacco region showed a more unfavorable
attitude toward the tobacco industry (Swisher & Reese, 1992). In conclusion, the newspapers in the tobacco growing region, which had larger influence from the tobacco advertisers, tended not to criticize the tobacco industry, while the newspapers in the non-tobacco region, which had lesser influence from the tobacco advertisers, tended to criticize the tobacco industry.

*Table 1* Headlines for the Associated Press story on David Burns showing regional differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers Inside Tobacco Region</th>
<th>Removal from EPA Cigarette Panel Linked to Tobacco Lobby</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scientist Opposed by Bliley is Taken Off Smoking Panel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tobacco Lobbyists, Lawmaker Get Scientist Off EPA Panel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tobacco Backers Get Scientist Taken Off Panel on Second-Hand Smoke</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tobacco Lobbyists Triumph: “Anti-Smoking” Expert Removed from Panel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newspapers Outside Tobacco Region</td>
<td>Passive Smoking Expert Forced Out</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tobacco Industry Changes EPA Panel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tobacco Industry Lights a Fire under Scientist, EPA Dumps Analyst from Panel Studying Passive Smoking</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tobacco Industry’s Lobbying Gets Scientist Removed from EPA Panel</td>
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<td>Lobbying Removes Scientist from Smoking Panel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Panelist Removed after Lobbying by Tobacco Industry</td>
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<td>EPA Drops Smoking Expert</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tobacco Lobby Ousts Scientist</td>
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Source: Swisher & Reese, 1992, p. 995

This study is a good example suggesting that the bigger portion of a media company's revenue an advertiser takes, the more self-interested reporting practices the company shows in relation to the advertiser's interests. There has been a criticism in Korea as well that the
newspapers do not criticize big advertisers, which means we can rarely see critical news articles about the companies that take the top of the list of advertising revenue. According to the industry estimates, the Samsung Group takes much more than 10% of the newspaper advertising revenue, while it takes only about 5% of the advertising space (Media Today, 2010. 2. 3.). When the Samsung Group stopped newspaper advertisement after the slush fund scandal in 2009, all newspapers started to defend the Samsung Group. The Hankyeorae, in which the Samsung Group fully stopped advertisement, was the only newspaper that carried a critical news article about the special pardon for Samsung Gourps' Chairman Lee. We can see a similar phenomenon related to apartment advertisements. The newspapers do not raise a voice of criticism about the real estate bubble, because apartment advertisements take a big portion of newspapers' revenue. There is a study that most of the newspapers represent the position of the management in relation to the strikes of the Hyundai Motor and Kia Motor mainly due to advertising revenue (Media Today, 2010. 2. 3). It is the reality of the media companies that they can not easily criticize the advertisers who take a big portion of their revenue. This aspect is the main cause of slanted reporting biased with media corporate self-interest.
2) Self-interested reporting on media policy issues

Discussion on the media fairness has been mainly focused on the impartiality over socially controversial issues. Scholarly researches on media fairness show some characteristics as follows. The first characteristic of media fairness study is its analysis of the sub-elements of the concept of fairness. Scholars interpret 'fairness' as a concept that consists of appropriateness, balance, objectivity, neutrality (Golding, 1983; Lim, 1993; McQuail, 1986; Rosengrin, 1980). The second characteristic is the discussion of for whom the so-called fairness function. Progressive scholars point out that fairness for a public broadcaster is to take side with the socially disadvantaged and air their position (Kang, 2004). They argue that such attitudes correspond with social justice and the spirit of the times. However, Yoo (2015) refutes the argument, saying that a public broadcaster should not ignore a minority view and position to be fair, but it does not necessarily mean that a public broadcaster must take side with the minority view and provide biased broadcasting (Youn, 2013; Lee, 2014). As mentioned earlier, existing studies on media fairness have focused on theoretical concepts or the issue of institutional governance. There has been a serious dearth of fairness study that addresses media corporate self-interest at the organizational level based on the interests of the owner or advertiser. Existing studies on media fairness have focused on
political variables and overlooked the economic aspect of a press organization and its owner. According to <2012 News consumer perception survey> conducted by the Korea Press Foundation, 79.5% of the respondents took media corporate self-interest as the first reason for the decrease of fairness and credibility of news reporting (Journalist Association of Korea, 2015. 1. 14.). This is why proper regulation over self-interested reporting is necessary in order to enhance fairness of the press. The problem here is that proper regulation over media’s self-interested reporting seems somewhat abstractive. Therefore this study focuses on how media corporate self-interest plays role in reporting news on broadcasting policy related issues. As mentioned earlier, media policy is regarded very crucial and influential to media business. By examining the role of media corporate self-interest, this paper will figure out how news about policy related issues has been formed.

What should be noted about the cases considered above is that as with the newspapers, which are assumed to be under the strong control of the owner, the broadcasters as well take a completely egoistic attitude when covering media policies that are related to their interests. There appears not much difference between public broadcasters and private ones in terms of self-interested reporting practices.13)

13) Besides the cases discussed in the earlier section, other such example is as follows: A KBS news report on March 23, 2015 bluntly emphasized the necessity of the raise of the license fee and the adoption of the
Particularly, more expanded, watered-down, or omitted reporting are spotted in relation to media policy issues, which are more closely intertwined with the interests of broadcasting companies. Broadcasting firms tend to display self-interested reporting practices much more, when a policy can directly affect the competitive relationship among them. This tendency will be strengthened, as public regulation over broadcasting in general becomes increasingly relaxed and competition in the broadcasting industry becomes increasingly intensified, as a result of the changes in the media environment. A favorable media policy is an essential element for the success in media business. Even if a media company is highly competitive in the market, it cannot help but face limits to growth when government media policies are in conflict with its business interests. This is one of the main reasons why broadcasting firms show self-interested reporting practices over media policies, which are closely related to their business interests. With their biased news reports tailored toward their corporate self-interest, they attempt to exert their influences on public discussions of certain media policies in order to survive or flourish as a corporation in the market.\textsuperscript{14} As discussed earlier, biased self-interested reporting,

\textsuperscript{14} Recently, Donga Ilbo published a boxed article under the headline of "KBS that covets even mid-program ads" (Dongailbo, 2015. 4. 27.). It harshly criticized the KBS that it revealed its regret over the failure of the passage of a legislation that would permit the terrestrial broadcasters to carry mid-program ads when delivering the news about the adoption of
particularly related to media policies, could seriously harm broadcast fairness, which is an essential element for maintaining a democratic society.

This is why systematic research on self-interested reporting by broadcasting firms is needed. However, there is a serious dearth of analytical scholarly research on this issue. The existing studies on broadcasters' self interested reporting display several characteristics. Most notably, they simply describe how terrestrial broadcasters pursue their interests utilizing their own news sections. One of the studies (Moon, 2012) described the cases of broadcasters' self interested reporting practices and other one (Broadcasting Journalist Association, 2014) suggested a list of check points for the prevention of self interested reporting by broadcasting firms. However, they cannot be considered as systematic research on media’s self-interested reporting in that they simply described problematic practices of self-interested reporting or suggested check points to prevent such practices without offering any theoretical explanations for the phenomena or exploring them using any systematic research method.

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the gross cap regulation of advertising time, even though it promises to reduce the amount of advertising for the public as a public broadcaster.
Chapter 3. Research Model and Hypotheses

3-1. Research Model

This section explains about the research model. The details of the context and background of the two media policies chosen for the study (the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters and re-approval of general programming channels) are described below.

<Figure 6> Research Model

The research model above is designed to explain how media corporate self-interest affect biased news reporting. This model explains what this study is about and how research hypotheses are deducted for analysis.

The first square of the model is about the factors generating a
media firm's self-interest. There are several factors, such as organizational and economic factors, which generate corporate self-interest. Here, the independent variable is media corporate self-interest and the dependent variable is biased reporting. The study assumes that a media firm’s self-interest should affect its news report, resulting in biased reporting, that is, self-interested reporting. The study also assumes that self-interested reporting related to media policies appears in two different aspects: i) if the concerned policy is favorable to a media firm's interest, it will reports positively on the policy; ii) if the concerned policy is favorable to a rival firm's interest and unfavorable to the media firm's interest, it will negatively report on the policy. In the same context, the study assumes that both major terrestrial TV broadcasters and general programming channels are likely to report biased news in line with their self-interest. This is expected to be particularly so when the media policies covered in the news report are related to their economic profitability.

More concretely speaking, the study assumes that media firms are likely to report less news if the news hinders their profitability. The policy of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters allows terrestrial TV broadcasters to allocate advertising time more efficiently than they used to do, therefore could increase their profitability. However, the policy may work unfavorably to general programming channels, because the broadcast advertising market
is limited and they need to fiercely compete with terrestrial broadcasters to obtain advertising. This implies that advantageous policy to terrestrial TV broadcasters can be disadvantageous to general programming channels.

The study hypothesizes that terrestrial TV broadcasters used more news sources/interviewees who support the gross cap regulation of advertising time than general programming channels did. In the same sense, terrestrial broadcasters are believed to use more chroma-keys or longer comments of the side that support the gross cap regulation of advertising time than general programming channels did. By the same logic, it is assumed in this study that general programming channels were more likely to use more news sources/interviewees who support re-approval of their channels than terrestrial broadcasters did. General programming channels are also believed to use more chroma-keys or longer comments of the side that support re-approval of their channels than terrestrial TV broadcasters did.

Furthermore, this study infers that terrestrial TV broadcasters are likely to report less amount of news that criticize the KCC than general programming channels did, during the period when they covered the debates around the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters. In other words, during the period, terrestrial broadcasters are believed to use less amount of comments/sources/chroma-keys that criticize the KCC than general
programming channels did. In the same sense, it is assumed that the length of broadcasters' comments that criticize the KCC is likely to be shorter than those of general programming channels. By the same logic, this study infers that general programming channels are likely to report less amount of news that criticize the KCC than terrestrial broadcasters did during the period when they covered the debates around re-approval of general programming channels. General programming channels are also believed to use less amount of comments/sources/chroma-keys that criticize the KCC than terrestrial TV broadcasters did during the period. It is also believed that general programming channels used shorter comments on average that criticize the KCC during the period than terrestrial broadcasters did.

This study seeks to develop quality index of biased report. The quality index measures which broadcast companies aired more factually-based news reports despite the potential for biased reporting derived from corporate self-interest. If a news report was more factually based, it earned a higher quality index score than a less factually-based news report. From a common sense perspective, the study assumes that a public terrestrial broadcaster is likely to score a higher quality index than that of a general programming channel, which has more concern about economic profitability. Based on the assumed relationship between variables considered so far, the following hypotheses are generated.
3-2. Analyzing Cases

To test the hypotheses, news reports by terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels on the following two media policies will be analyzed: i) the *gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters*, and ii) *re-approval of general programming channels*. These two representative media policies on which the interests of major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels clearly conflict.

As mentioned earlier, there is a dearth of analytical studies that deal with the issue of broadcast firms' self-interested reporting. Most of the existing researches simply describe how the broadcasters pursue their interests utilizing their own news sections, and how the news reporting aiming to promote corporate self-interest prevails in the broadcasting sphere. These researches do not really explore the mechanism in which self-interested reporting occurs. Taking an analytical approach on the phenomenon, this study seeks to investigate the mechanism in which self-interested news reporting takes place in broadcasting arena, particularly concerning media policy issues. More specifically, the study will investigate how two rival groups of broadcasting organizations deal with media policy issues, on which each group has different interests, in their news reports. For the investigation, the study will compare self-interested reporting behavior of the major terrestrial broadcasters (SBS, MBC, KBS) and general
programming channels (TV Chosun, MBN, Channel A, JTBC), given that the two groups have conflicting interests in regards to certain media policy issues. This study assumes that the two groups of broadcasting firms will report on these policies differently from each other in line with their self-interest. Furthermore, since the two of the major newspapers (the Chosun Ilbo and Joongang Ilbo) are under the same ownership with the two of general programming channels (JTBC and TV Chosun) respectively, the two newspapers’ reporting behavior will also be included for the analysis.

1) The gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters (GCRAT)

The gross cap regulation of advertising time is a regulation that limits the total allowance of broadcast advertising time while allowing a broadcasting company to freely determine the method to put advertising, such as allocation time, numbers, and advertising types. Since the government only limits the total allowance of advertising time, a broadcasting company has benefit of having flexibility to allocate more advertising in a prime-time (for example, putting multiple advertising through mid-show). This regulation, which had been allowed only for pay-TV channels, began to be applied to terrestrial broadcasters

15) Major terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels show distinctively different interests on several matters.
with the amendment of the Enforcement Ordinance of the Broadcasting Act in April, 2015. With the adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, terrestrial broadcasting companies can determine the method of allocating advertising more flexibly than before as long as the time don’t exceed the total allowance level. With this regulation being adopted, terrestrial broadcasters can have much more latitude in allocating advertising in the prime time segments (and possibly more commercial gains).\(^{16}\) Throughout the period during which public debates around the adoption of the policy took place, terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels showed contrasting reactions to the regulation proposal in line with their expected business interests related to the policy.

\(^{16}\) However, advertising revenue boosting effect for terrestrial broadcasters through this regulation are limited, since mid-program advertising is yet allowed to terrestrial broadcasters.
Reasons Against the Policy
- Deepening the gap between the have and the have-nots
- Negatively affecting media diversity
- Tarnishing the role of public broadcasting

Reasons For the Policy
- Affordable revenue for quality content production
- Global trend (relaxed regulation)

[Table 2] Reasons for opposing/supporting GCRAT

Hypothesis 1] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to report news that supports the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters than general programming channels do.

[1-1] Terrestrial broadcasters are likely to air more comments supporting the gross cap regulation of advertising time than general programming channels do.

[1-2] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to use sources that support the gross cap regulation of advertising time than general programming channels do.

[1-3] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to use interviewees/panels who support the gross cap regulation of advertising time than general programming channels do.

[1-4] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to use chroma-keys that support the gross cap regulation of advertising time than general programming channels do.

[1-5] Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to report on average longer comments of the side that supports the gross cap
regulation of advertising time than general programming channels do.

2) Re-approval of general programming channels (RAGPC)

General programming channels have to acquire re-approval by the government every three years. The government institution in charge of this process is the Korea Communications Commission (KCC). The Broadcasting Appraisal committee within the KCC determines on whether to re-approve a general programming channel in accordance with the following standards: broadcasting evaluation 350 points; public accountability of broadcasting (public responsibility, fairness, feasibility of the fulfillment of the public interest, protection of viewers' rights) 230 points; the appropriateness of planning, programming, and production plans of broadcasting programs 160 points; financial and technical capability 80 points; the appropriateness of institutional and human management plans 60 points; Funding plans for the development of broadcasting and their execution 30 points; contribution to the development of local society, validity for local social cultural needs 20 points; compliance with the requirements for broadcasters at the time of approval 70 points, the number of correction orders and the number of non-compliance with correction orders. The total points are 1000 and general programming channels have to receive over 650 points in
order to get re-approval by the KCC. During the last re-approval period in March 2014, all of the channels met up to the requirement (JTBC 727.01; TV Chosun 684.73; Channel A 684.66; MBN 690). Re-approval of general programming channels is not quite much directly related to the interest of terrestrial broadcasters. Realistically, the re-approval system is not so much about cancelling the channels' license but more about making them motivated to keep their promise they made at the launch of the channels. In other words, the KCC uses the “re-approval system” as a means to keep the channels in check.¹⁷)

Although re-approval of general programming channels do not actually have significant effect on major terrestrial broadcasters’ business interests, it may be assumed that terrestrial broadcasters still do not view it positively. Since general programming channels are considered “rivals” to major terrestrial broadcasters, this study hypothesizes that major terrestrial broadcasters, at least, do not encourage re-approval of general programming channels, even though it is unrealistic for general programming channels to ever be kicked out of the broadcasting market.

For general programming channels, the evaluation period for

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¹⁷) The KCC ordered TV Chosun and Channel A to improve their “biased” reporting and for JTBC to improve its financial management. The KCC also demanded TV Chosun and Channel A for “diverse and harmonious TV programs” (to cut back on news program allocation ratio) (KCC press release, 2015. 6. 4.).
re-approval is very important and they are known to react very sensitively to any point deduction. For instance, recently the KCC pushed ahead with doubling the penalty for TV programs deemed unfit for broadcasting, and general programming channels reacted very seriously to that. General programming channels opposed such a plan, stating that “general programming channels can fail to reach the standard 650 points just because of one or two points. It is very unfair to double the penalty and if the government pushes ahead with this plan, general programming channels will only come up with TV programs that they think are in line with the government’s preference. This is not democracy”(DongA.com, 2015. 10. 26.).

Theories explaining the varying relationship between media firms and the regulators, such as the KCC, are rare. Nonetheless, a mechanism that is similar to 'revolving-door hypothesis' can be used to expect a plausible relationship between media firms and regulators. The 'revolving door' refers to the phenomenon between regulators and the industries that "industry...hires people out of government positions to gain personal access to government officials, seek favorable legislation/regulation and government contracts in exchange for high-paying employment offers..."18) The revolving-door hypothesis' assumes that government officials try to have positive relationship with

the firms, where their future jobs may be available. The logic can be applied to the relationship between the media firms and the government regulator, such as the KCC. Especially during the period when media firms apply for re-approval from the KCC, it may be assumed that they are likely to air less news reports which criticize the KCC in order not to offend the policy decision makers in it.

In sum, media policies directly/indirectly affect press organizations' reporting behavior. The gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters is favorable policy for major terrestrial broadcasters, while definitely not so for general programming channels. In this case, the study assumes that the two groups of broadcasters behave differently. First, if a media policy is favorable to one's own company, the company comments on it positively and reports on it regularly so as to make public opinion favorable to them. Second, if a media policy is not favorable to one's own company (but favorable to the rival company) the company will criticize the policy or not report on it at all. In other words, media firms are likely to try to set an “agenda” depending on the nature of a policy, by avoiding conflicts with regulators such as the KCC, especially when there is interest based on relationship with the regulators.
Hypothesis 2] General programming channels are more likely to report news that supports re-approval of general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do.

[2-1] The reporters/anchors/MCs of general programming channels are more likely to make more comments supporting re-approval of general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do.

[2-2] General programming channels are more likely to use sources that support re-approval of general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do.

[2-3] General programming channels are more likely to use interviewees/panels who support re-approval of general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do.

[2-4] General programming channels are more likely to use chroma-keys that support re-approval of general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do.

[2-5] General programming channels are more likely to report on average longer comments of the side that supports re-approval of general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do.

Moreover, this study will examine whether broadcasters display self-interested reporting behavior regarding the KCC when there is an interest at stake (e.g., whether KBS behaves 'nicer' to the KCC during
the debating period for the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters)

[Hypothesis 3] Terrestrial broadcasters are less likely to report news that criticizes the KCC during the period when the debates around the adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters took place.

[3-1] KBS’ reporters/anchors/MCs are likely to make less comments criticizing the KCC than TV Chosun does during the period when the debates around the adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters took place.

[3-2] KBS is less likely to use sources that criticize the KCC than TV Chosun does during the period when the debates around the adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters took place.

[3-3] KBS is less likely to use interviewees/panels who criticize the KCC than TV Chosun does during the period when the debates around the adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters took place.

[3-4] KBS is less likely to use chroma-keys that criticize the KCC than TV Chosun does during the period when the debates around
the adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters took place.

[3-5] KBS is likely to report on average shorter on comments of the side that criticizes KCC than TV Chosun does during the period when the debates around the adoption of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters took place.

[Hypothesis 4] General programming channels are less likely to report news that criticizes the KCC during an appraisal period for re-approval of general programming channels.

[4-1] TV Chosun’s reporters/anchors/MCs are likely to make less comments criticizing the KCC than KBS does during an appraisal period for re-approval of general programming channels.

[4-2] TV Chosun is less likely to use sources that criticize the KCC than KBS does during an appraisal period for re-approval of general programming channels.

[4-3] TV Chosun is less likely to use interviewees/panels that criticize the KCC than KBS does during an appraisal period for re-approval of general programming channels.

[4-4] TV Chosun is less likely to use chroma-keys that criticize the KCC than KBS does during an appraisal period for re-approval of general programming channels.
[4-5] TV Chosun is likely to report on average shorter on comments of the side that criticizes KCC than TV Chosun does during an appraisal period for re-approval of general programming channels.

Last but not least, the study will review the quality of “biased reporting” using biased index created in this study.

[Hypothesis 5] A terrestrial broadcaster is more likely to get higher scores on the “quality index” than a general programming channel does.

[5-1] KBS is more likely to get higher scores on the “quality index” than a general programming channel (JTBC) does.

In short, the hypotheses in this study were created to examine whether a broadcast news report is a news biased with corporate self-interest(self-interested news report) by assessing both quantitative indicators (e.g., the length of comments, the number of comments, sources, chroma-keys and interviewees/panels) and qualitative indicators (e.g., more factually-based news reports, less-factually-based news reports). The study expects that through an examination of biased news reporting with both quantitative and qualitative indicators, it will better figure out the relationship between media corporate self-interest and
self-interested reporting behavior, particularly related to media policy issues.
Chapter 4. Research Method

This chapter offers explanations about the subjects of analysis and the sampling Tables. Then, the chapter considers the coding method used to check the hypotheses.

4-1. Subjects of analysis

This study examines how terrestrial TV broadcasters, general programming channels and newspapers to which general programming channels are affiliated report news related to two media policies: the *gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters* and *re-approval of general programming channels*. News items, which dealt with the two media policies between one year before and four months after the announcement of a relevant policy, were reviewed.\(^{19}\)

In this vein, i) in regards to the *gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters*, the subjects for analysis include relevant news reports by three terrestrial broadcasters(KBS, MBC, SBS), four general programming channels(TV Chosun, JTBC, MBN, Channel A) and two newspapers(Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo) between

\(^{19}\) The period for the selection of news items seem somewhat arbitrary. However, this study assumes that the selected periods for news items allow us to assess the attitudinal change of media firms in regards to a regulator or regulatory policy.
one year before and four months after the KCC's decision on the adoption of the regulation (2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14). (ii) In regards to re-approval of general programming channels, the subjects of analysis include relevant news reports by three terrestrial broadcasters (KBS, MBC, SBS), four general programming channels (TV Chosun, JTBC, MBN, Channel A) and two newspapers (Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo) between one year before and four months after the KCC's evaluation of general programming channels for re-approval (2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13). The news items were collected from the homepage of the broadcasters and newspapers.20)

This study also reviews reporting behavior of a media firm related to the KCC when debates around a certain policy at which the media firm's interest at stake, took place. The study assumes that a media firm is likely to demonstrate different reporting behaviors when there is an interest at stake and there is not. For instance, the study hypothesizes terrestrial TV broadcasters are not likely to report news that criticizes the KCC during the period when debates around the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters took place. Hereinafter, 'GCRAT period' refers to the period when debates around the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters took place.

broadcasters took place. *RAGPC period* refers to the period when debates around re-approval of general programming channels took place. For relevant investigation, the study chose 10 controversial policy issues related to the KCC for both above mentioned periods (2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13; 2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14) respectively.

<Table 3> The 10 controversial policy issues related to the KCC

| During the period of debates around the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters  
[**GCRAT Period**]  
(2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14) | 1. Right to be forgotten  
2. 700Mhz  
3. Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act  
4. Creative economy  
5. Personal information protection  
6. Mobile phone subsidies  
7. KBS license fee  
8. Uber  
9. Crisis of the Korean wave content  
10. KBS hearings |
|---|---|
| During the period of debates around re-approval of general programming channels  
[**RAGPC Period**]  
(2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13) | 1. Disaster broadcasting  
2. Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act  
3. Hacking  
4. Reply comments by the National Intelligence Service  
5. Personal Information Protection  
6. Digital free universal service  
7. KBS license fee  
8. UHD TV  
9. Retaking-off of the Korean wave  
10. KCC chairman confirmation hearings |
For data collection, the coders searched news reports, which were related to each of the 10 controversial policy issues and aired/published during the 'GCRAT period' (2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14) and RAGPC period (2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13) respectively, using various relevant key words. The reason for choosing 10 issues for analysis was because there were too many news reports about the KCC for the both periods, and it was almost impossible and inefficient to review all of them. For the same reason, the study examined the reporting behavior of KBS (as a terrestrial broadcaster), TV Chosun (as a general programming channel) and Chosun Ilbo (as a sister newspaper company to TV Chosun). 21)

21) Conventionally, it is not really necessary to review the three terrestrial broadcasters and the four general programming channels. KBS, a public broadcaster, depends 60% of its revenues on advertising. The dependency of both MBC and SBS on advertising is much higher than that of KBS, which receives the license fee. General programming channels depend 100% of its revenues on advertising. In this respect, it must be fair to choose KBS as a terrestrial broadcaster for analysis in that KBS and a general programming channel are likely show much different behaviors from each other. TV Chosun was chosen for analysis, out of the four general programming channels, on the ground that it can be considered a major general programming channel relatively highly focusing on news reporting. Chosun Ilbo was selected for analysis mainly in that it is one of the Korea's major newspapers and a sister company to TV Chosun).
Table 4: The number of news items related to GCRAT (2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrestrial Broadcasters (39)</th>
<th>General Programming Channels (22)</th>
<th>Newspapers (63)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SBS (12)</td>
<td>TV Chosun (10)</td>
<td>Chosun Ilbo (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBC (16)</td>
<td>Channel A (3)</td>
<td>Joongang Ilbo (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS (11)</td>
<td>MBN (8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTBC (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: The number of news items related to RAGPC (2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrestrial Broadcasters (14)</th>
<th>General Programming Channels (7)</th>
<th>Newspapers (20)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SBS (2)</td>
<td>TV Chosun (1)</td>
<td>Chosun Ilbo (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBC (5)</td>
<td>Channel A (3)</td>
<td>Joongang Ilbo (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS (7)</td>
<td>MBN (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTBC (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<Table 6> The number of news items related to the KCC during the GCRAT period (2014. 7. 14.~2015. 11. 14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>KBS (77)</th>
<th>TV Chosun (40)</th>
<th>Chosun Ilbo (343)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right to be Forgotten</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700 Mhz</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative economy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal information protection</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile phones subsidies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS license fee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uber</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis of the Korean wave content</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS hearings</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<Table 7> The number of news items related to the KCC during the RAGPC period (2013. 3. 31.~2014. 7. 13)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>KBS (54)</th>
<th>TV Chosun (34)</th>
<th>Chosun Ilbo (281)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disaster broadcast</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Device Distribution Improvement Act</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacking</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reply comments by the National Intelligence Service</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal information protection</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital free universal service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS license fee</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHD TV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-taking off the Korean wave</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCC chairman confirmation hearings</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4-2. Coding

This study analyzes news bias in two dimensions. First, it looks at how much biased the news reports of terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels/newspapers are by looking at various quantitative indicators. For instance, the number of supporters/dissenters for/against an issue, the average length of the comments by both sides is counted, along with the number of chroma-keys used in the news
reports. Through looking at the balance of characters used in the news reports and other quantitative indicators, this study seeks to verify the first group of hypotheses. Second, the study analyzes the quality of bias of the news reports of terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels/newspapers. While the first dimension of analysis(quantitative analysis) concerns how the two broadcasting groups(terrestrial broadcasters & general programming channels) differ in their inclination (in terms of whether they oppose or support the concerned issue), the second dimension of analysis(qualitative analysis) concerns which of the two broadcasting groups display a better quality in their news reporting. Throughout the second part of analysis, this study acknowledges that news reports by both broadcasting groups are biased. However, even though they are biased, there may be a difference in the quality of their biased news reporting. In other words, even if a news report is favoring one side, if those comments in the news report is factually-based, the news report can be considered better in quality than the news report depending on less factually-based comments. The latter could be considered just an activism with lower reliability and persuasiveness. To compare the quality of biased news reports of terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels/newspapers, the study uses the “quality index” which is specifically created in this study. Through the quality index, Hypotheses 2 will be verified.
1) Quantitative bias

To quantitatively assess the degree of bias in a news report, this study divides the characters in a news report into three groups. First group is for anchors/reporters. Second group is for news sources. Third group is for interviewees/panels. 22) For the first group(anchors/reporters), the study examines how much personal opinion of the anchormen/reporters/correspondents was included in the news report(percentage out of the total news length). The coders determine if that personal opinion is for/against the issue (it wouldn’t be neutral because then it would not be much of a personal opinion; it would be either side of the two). Moreover, the study looks at what kind of inclination indicators the first group used for his/her personal opinion. According to Yoon(2007), a news presenter suggests his/her opinion in a various ways. These ways include: 1) using personal opinion, 2) using embellished language, 3) using a historical example, 4) using specific facial expressions, 5) proposing a moral value, 6) speaking not a fact but a subjective opinion.

22) As qualitative inclination indicators for a news report, this study attempts to table out the balance of characters used in the news. Won & Yun(2015) stated that for a fair journalism, a news report must include various sources and interviewees/panels to provide diverse perspectives for the viewers. Lee & Kim(2008) also stated that for a news report to be impartial, inclusion of diverse perspectives, opinions, and statements is necessary. In order to achieve this, one ways is using different sources(Entman, 1985).
23) Speaking not a fact but a subjective opinion.
quoting someone else. Thus, the study consulted with Yoon's research for reference and used these standards to look at what kind of inclination indicators the news presenter used.

<Table 8> The types of opinion intervention by news anchors/reporters

| Using personal opinion (when a news anchor/reporter comments based on his/her personal views or experiences) |
| Using embellished language |
| Using historical examples |
| Using specific facial expressions |
| Proposing a moral value (when a news anchor/reporter suggests his/her opinion on the direction of a policy) |
| Quoting someone else |

Then, the study looks at how many sources the news used for each respective issue’s supporter or and dissenter. For instance, for one KBS news item related to the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, two supporters were used as news sources while zero dissenters were used as news sources (implying KBS’ bias on the issue). The study also reviewed how many interviewees/panels/commentators were used in the news for both sides (supporting and dissenting). Not only that, the coders left a note on who the interviewees and panels were (ex. a professor, a KCC staff member, etc.)

The use of chroma-key was also examined to look for quantitative bias of the news. The coders reviewed whether a chroma key was
used or not. If a chroma key was used, the coders left a comment on what the chroma key referred to, whether the chroma-key was relevant to the issue, and whether it was favorable or unfavorable to the issue. Finally, the coders quantified the total length of comments of the consenting side and dissenting side (in seconds). In verifying hypotheses, average length of the comments of both consenting and dissenting sides were used.

2) Quality index 24)

To assess the quality of a biased news report, this study uses the following index.

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24) For qualitative bias, this study examines the bias of comments. Garsten(2008) stated that rhetorics do not always have to rational because a ‘good message’ sometimes appeals to emotion, even biased remarks can help achieve democratic deliberation. However, considering the fact that factitious rhetoric, such as appealing to emotion and bias, has significant effect in election campaigning, it is not desirable to reveal bias for public policies that require fairness(Collins, 2004; Dellavigna & Kaplan, 2006; Morris, 2005).
<Table 9> Quality Index

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Real reportage (account of what happened approximated to the incident)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Facts + Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Facts + Reflection of each side’s position in a balanced way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Facts + Support for the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters/re-approval of general programming channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Facts + Objecting to the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters/re-approval of general programming channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Facts + Support for the KCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Fact + Objection to the KCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Balanced attitude without factual report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Support for the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters/re-approval of general programming channels without factual report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Objection to the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters/re-approval of general programming channels without factual report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Support for the KCC without factual report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Objection to the KCC without factual report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Other remarks with/without factual report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1, 2, 3, 8, 13 = 0 : non-biased reporting → neutral/null
4, 5, 6, 7 = +1 : more factually-based biased reporting → high quality biased reporting
9, 10, 11, 12 = -1 : less factually-based biased reporting → low quality biased reporting

To measure the quality of bias, the coders watch the news clips and write the corresponding numbers for the news report. For each news report, the numbers can be multiple because each news report is
composed of multiple comments and those comments can differ (one comment can be 2, the other can be 4, and so on).

Then the study looks specifically into whether the news items have elements of 4, 5, 6, and 7, thus scored '+1', which refers to 'high quality bias', or 9, 10, 11, and 12, thus scored '-1', which refers to 'low quality bias'. To assess the level of bias quality for a news report as a whole, each score with '+1' value (which is 4, 5, 6, and 7) will be multiplied by the length of respective comment and added together. Then, the score is divided by the whole score ('high quality comment score x length of the comment' + 'low quality comment score x length of the comment'). Then, the final score will come out between '-1' and '+1'. If the final score is closer to '+1', it means that the news report was more factually-based biased report as a whole, which could be interpreted as a high quality biased report; Meanwhile, if the final score is closer to −1, it means that the news report was less factually-based biased report as a whole, which can be interpreted as a low quality biased report. The elements of 1, 2, 3, 8, and 13 indicate neutral dispositions, which would not be meaningful for this study.

\[
\text{Quality Score} = \frac{\text{comments built on facts}}{\text{total comments}}
\]
3) **Inter-coder reliability**

Two coders participated in the coding work for this study. They each reviewed 30 identical news items in the pilot test. The inter-coder reliability was verified to be more than 95% and thus was deemed to be fit for the research. The coders coded news items based on the coding book and coding guide book provided for them by the study.
Chapter 5. Findings

5-1. Outcome for the 'gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters (GCRAT)' (2014. 7. 14 ~ 2015. 11. 14)

In this section, both descriptive results and hypothesis verification results for Hypothesis 1 (Terrestrial broadcasters are more likely to report news that supports the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters (GCRAT) than general programming channels do) will be provided.

Descriptive Results

<Table 10> The order of news items related to GCRAT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beginning</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial Broadcasters</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Programming Channels</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, the order of news items arranged within a news program were looked at. The order is categorized into three levels depending in which time segment the news item appeared. If it appeared in the
beginning segment (the 30% time segment from the start of the program) of the whole news program, then it was categorized into the 'beginning'. If it appeared in the middle segment (the middle 30-70% time segment), then categorized into the 'middle'. if it appeared in the ending segment (the 30% time segment toward the end of the program), then categorized into the 'end'. Table 10 shows that 20 of the terrestrial broadcast news items were put in the beginning segment, while 16 were in the middle segment. Only 3 were put in the ending segment. Compared to that, 15 of general programming channel news items were put in the ending segment, while only 2 and 5 were put in the beginning and middle segments respectively. This can be interpreted that terrestrial broadcasters put more importance in reporting about the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters in that most of the news items related to the regulation were put in the beginning or middle segments.

The news items were collected from the three terrestrial TV broadcasters (KBS, SBS, MBC), four general programming channels (TV Chosun, Channel A, MBN, JTBC), and two newspapers (Joongang Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo). The average length of the news items from the three terrestrial broadcasters was 105 seconds; 100 seconds for those from the four general programming channels, and 1,059 words for those from the two newspapers. The average proportions of subjective comments in the news report are as described below in the Table.
Among the three terrestrial broadcasters, MBC had the highest subjective comment rate, which can be interpreted as 'opinion intervention rate', and among the four general programming channels, MBN had the highest subjective comment rate. Joongang Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo showed relatively high subjective comment rates, which were 20% and 15% respectively. The types of news reporter’s opinion intervention also varied between terrestrial TV broadcasters and general programming channels. For the terrestrial TV broadcasters, mostly quoting or embellished comments or statistics were used. For general programming channels, there were a lot of quoting, historical examples,
and specific facial expressions.

<Table 11> demonstrates that terrestrial TV broadcasters and general programming channels, along with newspapers, show very different reporting behaviors from another: terrestrial broadcasters used a lot more sources that favor the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, while general programming channels and newspapers were the opposite. <Table 11> also indicates that terrestrial broadcasters featured longer on the comments that supported the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, while general programming channels did the opposite.

Both terrestrial TV broadcasters and general programming channels used chroma-keys most of the time; terrestrial broadcasters used chroma-keys that favored the policy, while general programming channels did the opposite.
**Hypothesis Test Results**

<Table 12> Results for Hypothesis 1-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reporter/Anchor/MC Comments on GCRAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial Broadcasters</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Programming Channels</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05

Hypothesis 1-1 is supported(*p<0.05, \(x^2=19.411\)). As shown in <Table 12>, terrestrial TV broadcasters made 22 comments (by reporters/anchors/MCs) supporting the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters. On the other hand, general programming channels did not make any comments that supported the regulation. The difference between the two broadcasting corporation groups is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.
<Table 13> Results for Hypothesis 1-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Supporting Sources for GCRAT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St.dv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial Broadcasters</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Programming Channels</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05

Hypothesis 1-2 is supported (p<0.05, t=2.874, df=59, st.dv=1.47). As shown in <Table 13>, the number of supporting sources for the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters used by terrestrial TV broadcasters (mean=1.79) is bigger than that of general programming channels (mean=.31). The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

<Table 14> Results for Hypothesis 1-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Supporting Interviewees/Panels for GCRAT</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St.dv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial Broadcasters</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Programming Channels</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05
Hypothesis 1-3 is supported\((p<0.05, \ t=4.56, \ df=59, \ st.dv=.18)\). As shown in <Table 14>, the number of supporting interviewees/panels for GCRAT (mean=1.30) used by the terrestrial TV broadcasters is bigger than that (mean=.31) of general programming channel. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of 0.05.

<Table 15> Results for Hypothesis 1-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chroma-keys Supporting GCRAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial Broadcasters</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Programming Channels</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\*p<0.05

Hypothesis 1-4 is supported\((p<0.05, \ x^2=36.552)\). As shown in <Table 15> above, terrestrial TV broadcasters used 33 chroma-keys supporting the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters. The number of chroma-keys that do not support the regulation is 6. On the other hand, general programming channels are reported to use one chroma-key supporting the regulation. On the other hand, the number of chroma-keys that do not support the regulation is 21. The difference between terrestrial TV broadcasters and general
programming channels is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

<Table 16> Results for Hypothesis 1-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Avg Comment Length of Supporting Side on GCRAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial Broadcasters</td>
<td>19.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Programming Channels</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05

Hypothesis 1-5 is supported (p<0.05, t=11.48, df=49, st.dv=16.61). As shown in <Table 16>, the average length of comments supporting GCRAT (mean=19.21) used by terrestrial TV broadcasters is longer than that of general programming channels (mean=2.59). The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of 0.05.

To sum up, all of the hypothesis 1 were supported. This means that in every way the study measured self-interested reporting behavior (by the number of reporter’s comments, the number of sources, interviewees/panels, and chroma-keys, and average length of comments), both terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels showed
such behaviors. Terrestrial broadcasters were proved to report more news that supports the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters than general programming channels did (which implies that general programming channels also shows self-interested reporting behavior in that they were more critical of the regulation that terrestrial broadcasters support.

5-2. Outcome for 're-approval of general programming channels(RAGPC)' (2013. 3. 31~2014. 7. 13)

In this section, both descriptive results and hypothesis verification results for the hypothesis 2 (General programming channels are more likely to report news that supports re-approval of general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do) are summarized. General programming channels are more likely to show self-interested reporting behavior related to re-approval of general programming channels than terrestrial broadcasters do.
Descriptive Results

<Table 17> The order of news items related to RAGPC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beginning</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial Broadcasters</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Programming Channels</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, the order of news items arranged within a news program were looked at. The order is categorized into three levels depending in which time segment the news item appeared. If it appeared in the beginning segment (the 30% time segment from the start of the program) of the whole program, then it was categorized into the 'beginning'. If it appeared in the middle segment (the middle 30-70% time segment), then categorized into the 'middle'. If it appeared in the ending segment (the 30% time segment toward the end of the program), then categorized into the 'end'.

<Table 17> shows that most of the news items from general programming channels are put in the beginning and middle segment, while most of those from terrestrial broadcasters are put in the end. It can be inferred that general programming channels put more importance in reporting about re-approval of general programming channels in that most of the news items were put in the beginning or in the middle.
The news items were collected from the three terrestrial TV broadcasters (KBS, SBS, MBC), four general programming channels (TV Chosun, Channel A, MBN, JTBC), and 2 newspapers (Joongang Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo). The average length of the news items from the three terrestrial TV broadcasters was 175 seconds; 52 seconds for those from the four general programming channels; 1,118 words for those from the two newspapers.

The average proportions of subjective comments in the news report are as described below in the <Table 18>. Among the three terrestrial TV broadcasters, MBC had the highest subjective comment rate, which can be also interpreted as 'opinion intervention rate', and among the four general programming channels, MBN had the highest subjective comment rate. Joongang Ilbo showed 20% of subjective comment rate and Chosun Ilbo showed 25% of subjective comment rate.
The types of news reporters' opinion intervention also varied between terrestrial TV broadcasters and general programming channels. For terrestrial TV broadcasters, mostly quoting or statistics were used. For general programming channels, there were a lot of use of facial expressions, embellished remarks, and also statistics. The Table above shows the average number of news sources (including interviewees and panels) used for/against re-approval of general programming channels.

Unlike the result related for the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, distinct reporting behaviors between the two groups were not displayed so apparently regarding re-approval of
general programming channels. General programming channels used chroma-key that favored re-approval of general programming channels, while terrestrial TV broadcasters did not use chroma-key. To sum up, the study finally measured the total length of comments from both opposing and consenting sides. <Table 18> above shows a pattern of distinct reporting behaviors between terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channel. For general programming channels and newspapers, the comment length of supporters for the policy was relatively long compared to that of opponents against the policy. For terrestrial TV broadcasters, the comments from supporters of the policy were rarely featured in the news reports

**Hypothesis Test Results**

<Table 19> Results for Hypothesis 2-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reporter/Anchor/MC Comment on RAGPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial Broadcasters</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Programming Channels</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p > 0.05
Hypothesis 2-1 is not supported (p>0.05, \(x^2=0.875\)). As shown in <Table 19>, the number of reporter/anchor/MC comments (by terrestrial TV broadcasters) supporting re-approval of general programming channels is 5, whereas the number of reporter/anchor/MC comments (by general programming channels) supporting re-approval of general programming channel is 4. The difference between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Supporting Sources for RAGPC</th>
<th>Terrestrial Broadcasters</th>
<th>General Programming Channels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St.dv</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St.error</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*\(p>0.05\)

Hypothesis 2-2 is not supported (p>0.05, \(t=-.84, \, df=19, \, st.dv=.42\)). As shown in <Table 20>, the number of supporting sources for re-approval of general programming channels (mean=.42) used by terrestrial TV broadcasters is a little bit less than that of general programming channels (mean=.85). The difference between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of 0.05.
Hypothesis 2-3 is not supported (p>0.05, t=-.71, df=19, st.dv=-.21). As shown in <Table 21>, the number of supporting interviewees/panels for re-approval of general programming channels used by terrestrial TV broadcasters (mean=.21) is a little bit less than that of general programming channels (mean=.42). The difference between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of 0.05.

Hypothesis 2-4 is not supported (p>0.05, x^2=2.1). As shown above, terrestrial TV broadcasters used 0 chroma-key supporting re-approval of
general programming channels. Likewise general programming channels use only 1 chroma-key that supports re-approval of general programming channels. In other words, both terrestrial TV broadcasters and general programming channels rarely use chroma-keys to support re-approval of general programmin channels. The difference between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

*Table 23* Results for Hypothesis 2-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Avg Comment Length of Supporting Side for RAGPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial Broadcasters</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Programming Channels</td>
<td>6.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p>0.05

Hypothesis 2-5 is not supported (*p>0.05, t=-1.8, df=19, st.dv=-5.23*). As shown in *Table 23*, the average comment length of supporting side for re-approval of general programming channels used by the terrestrial TV broadcasters (mean=1.28) is a little bit less than that of general programming channels (mean=6.52). T-value (-1.8) for both types of firms is the same. The difference between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of 0.05.
To sum up, hypothesis 2 is not supported. This means that for the issue of re-approval of general programming channels, both types of broadcasting firms did not show self-interested reporting behavior. Unlike the issue of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, they reported more “neutrally” on the issue of re-approval of general programming channel. Moreover, there were a lot less news items on this issue. this means that they were relatively quiet around this issue.

5-3. Outcome for the KCC (Reporting on KCC)

In this section, the results for Hypothesis 3 will be offered. Both terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels are likely to show self-interested reporting behavior when there is an interest at stake. Moreover, the results on the two time periods (GCRAT period and RAGPC period) will be reviewed.

1) For the GCRAT period (2014. 7. 14. ~ 2015. 11. 14):
**Hypothesis Test Results**

<Table 24> Results for Hypothesis 3-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reporter/Anchor/MC Comments on KCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criticizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05

Hypothesis 3-1 is supported (p<0.05, \( \chi^2=38.14 \)). As shown in <Table 24>, KBS aired only 3 comments (by reporter/anchor/MC) criticizing the KCC during the review period of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters. On the other hand, TV Chosun aired 21 comments which criticized the KCC during that period. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

<Table 25> Results for Hypothesis 3-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Criticizing Sources against KCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05
Hypothesis 3-2 is supported($p>0.05$, $t=-3.9$, $df=115$, $st.dv=-.48$). The average number of criticizing sources against the KCC used by KBS is .09. On the other hand, the number of such sources used by TV Chosun is .57. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

<Table 26> Results for Hypothesis 3-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Criticizing Interviewees/Panels against KCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05

Hypothesis 3-3 is supported($p<0.05$, $t=-3.42$, $df=115$, $st.dv=.12$). As shown in <Table 26>, the average number of criticizing interviewees/panels against the KCC used by KBS is .015, during the review period of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters. On the other hand, the number of those used by TV Chosun is .60. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.
**Table 27** Results for Hypothesis 3-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chroma-keys Criticizing KCC</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criticizing</td>
<td>Not Criticizing</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p>0.05

Hypothesis 3-4 is not supported (p>0.05, x²=2.965). As shown in <Table 27>, KBS used 2 chroma-keys criticizing the KCC. On the other hand, TV Chosun aired 0 chroma-key which criticizes the KCC during the GCRAT period. The difference between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

**Table 28** Results for Hypothesis 3-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Avg Comment Length of Criticizing Side on KCC</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>St.dv</td>
<td>St.error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>-1.85</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05

Hypothesis 3-5 is supported. The average comment length of criticizing side against the KCC (by KBS) is .59, on the other hand, that of TV Chosun is 2.45. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.
<Table 29> Summary for Hypothesis 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supported</th>
<th>Not Supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-5</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To sum up, for Hypothesis 3, all of the sub-hypotheses except 3-4 was supported. This means that KBS criticized the KCC less than TV Chosun did during the period of the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters in terms of the number of reporters’ comments, used panels and interviewees, and the length of criticizing comments, etc. but not in terms of using chroma-key. Thus, although hypothesis 3-4 was not supported, it can be concluded that there exists self-interested reporting behavior regarding the KCC.

2) For the RAGPC period (2013. 3. 31~2014. 7. 13)

Hypothesis Test Results

<Table 30> Results for Hypothesis 4-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reporter/Anchor/MC Comment on KCC</th>
<th>Criticizing</th>
<th>Not Criticizing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05
Hypothesis 4-1 is supported ($p<0.05$, $x^2=6.312$). As shown in <Table 30>, KBS aired 9 comments of criticizing the KCC, during the review period of re-approval of general programming channels. On the other hand, TV Chosun aired 0 comment which criticizes the KCC during that period. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

<Table 31> Results for Hypothesis 4-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Criticizing Sources against KCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p>0.05

Hypothesis 4-2 is not supported ($p>0.05$, $t=1.52$, df=86, st.dv=.1). As shown in <Table 31>, the average number of criticizing sources against the KCC used by KBS is .16, during the review period of re-approval of general programming channels. On the other hand, those used by TV Chosun is 0.05 The difference between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.
<Table 32> Results for Hypothesis 4-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Criticizing Interviewees/Panels against KCC</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St.dv</th>
<th>St.error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p>0.05

Hypothesis 4-3 is supported(p<0.05, t=2.32, df=86, st.dv=.16). As shown in <Table 32>, the average number of criticizing interviewees/panels against the KCC used by KBS is .22, during the review period of re-approval of general programming channels. On the other hand, those used by TV Chosun is 0.05 during that period. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

<Table 33> Results for Hypothesis 4-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chroma-keys Criticizing KCC</th>
<th>Criticizing</th>
<th>Not Criticizing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05

Hypothesis 4-4 is supported(p<0.05, \( \chi^2=3.902 \)). As shown in <Table
KBS aired 9 chroma-keys criticizing the KCC, during the review period of re-approval of general programming channels. On the other hand, TV Chosun aired 1 chroma-key that criticizes the KCC during that period. The difference between them is statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

<Table 34> Results for Hypothesis 4-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Avg Comment Length of Criticizing Side against KCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p>0.05

Hypothesis 4-5 is not supported (p>0.05, t=1.57, df=86, st.dv=.54). As shown in <Table 34>, the average comment length of criticizing side against the KCC used by KBS is 1.01, during the review period of re-approval of general programming channel. On the other hand, those used by TV Chosun is 0.47 during that period. The difference between them is not statistically meaningful at the probability level of .05.

<Table 35> Summary for Hypothesis 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supported</th>
<th>Not Supported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-1, 4-3, 4-4</td>
<td>4-2, 4-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For Hypothesis 4, sub-hypotheses 4-1, 4-3, 4-4 were supported, while sub-hypotheses 4-2, 4-5 were not. This means that TV Chosun criticized the KCC less than KBS did in the review period of re-approval of general programming channels in some aspects but not in other aspects. For instance, the number of sources used for criticizing the KCC and the average length of comments criticizing the KCC showed no difference between KBS and TV Chosun. However, TV Chosun and KBS showed self-interest reporting behavior in terms of the number of reporters' comments, used interviewees/panels, and the use of chroma-keys.

5-4. Outcome for Quality Index

In this section, results for Hypothesis 5(KBS is more likely to have higher score on the “quality index” than TV Chosun is) are offered.

Descriptive Results

<Table 36> Quality index score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting</th>
<th>Fact 0/4,5,6,7/+1</th>
<th>Fact x/9,10,11,12/-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>44(KBS)/11(TV Chosun)</td>
<td>4(KBS)/9(TV Chosun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing</td>
<td>12(KBS)/14(TV Chosun)</td>
<td>1(KBS)/9(TV Chosun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56(KBS)/25(TV Chosun)</td>
<td>5(KBS)/18(TV Chosun)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is easy to tell which one between KBS and TV Chosun has a higher quality score in its biased reporting simply by looking at <Table 36>. For the score +1 area (which indicates higher quality) KBS has 56, while TV Chosun has less than half of KBS with 25. For the score -1 area (which indicates lower quality), TV Chosun(18) has more than triple the number of KBS(5). To compare the average scores of KBS and TV Chosun by using t-test, each of the score was then multiplied by the length of comments and divided by the total length of the comments.

<Table 37> Results for Hypothesis 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quality Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Chosun</td>
<td>-.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05

Since the quality scores' difference is significant (p<0.05, t=6.25, st.dv=.49), Hypothesis 5 is supported. <Table 37> shows that quality score for KBS is .39. On the other hand, quality score for TV Chosun is -.1. In conclusion, KBS has higher quality index score than TV Chosun, meaning that although their reporting may be both biased, KBS’ news reports are more factually-based, thus “higher” in quality. The result has turned out as expected in that KBS is a public
broadcaster, the majority of whose revenues comes from the license fee, whereas TV Chosun is a private broadcaster which has more concerns about economic profits.
Chapter 6. Discussion

This study investigated how media firms' self-interest affects their news reporting behavior, particularly focusing on broadcast news reporting on media policies. Biased news reporting tailored toward media corporate self-interest, which can be increasingly more observed in broadcasting, is a serious problem that hinders fair journalism in Korea. This phenomenon needs to be taken particularly serious when broadcasters practice biased reporting regarding public policies that could significantly affect society.

This study addressed this problem by examining the role of broadcasters' self-interest in reporting biased news on two media policies, which were closely related to their self-interest. Major terrestrial broadcasters (KBS, MBC, SBS) and general programming channels (TV Chosun, Channel A, MBN, JTBC), Korea’s major rival broadcasting groups, were selected for examination. News reports on two major broadcasting policies were selected for analysis. The two broadcasting policies are i) the *gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters* and ii) *re-approval of general programming channels*. These two policies were specifically chosen for the study, because they have the potential to show biased reporting given that terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels have distinctly different interests in regards to the two policies. Therefore, it
can be reasonably expected that news reporting of terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels differs on the policies. The *gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters* is considered to have significant advantages for major terrestrial TV broadcasters who are competing with general programming channels in the increasingly competitive broadcast advertising market. It was expected that with the adoption of the regulation, the terrestrial TV broadcasters would be in much better shape in terms of advertising revenue,\(^{25}\) while general programming channels could get stuck in a situation where their advertising revenue would not increase or even get shrunken. This is why this study assumed that terrestrial broadcasters will show biased reporting behaviors that would encourage the adoption of the regulation. All of the hypotheses proposed regarding this regulation were supported. Terrestrial broadcasters were proved to report more news that supports the regulation than general programming channels did. This could imply that general programming channels also showed self-interested reporting behavior in that they were more critical of the gross advertisement cap regulation that terrestrial broadcasters support.

25) After a prolonged debate on the pros and cons of the regulation, *‘the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters’* was finally adopted in April 2015. However, mid-program advertising is still not allowed for the terrestrial TV broadcasters.
general programming channels was not supported. There were a lot less news items on this issue. The reason why Hypothesis 2 was not supported may not be due to fair journalism in broadcasting news but because of the lack of news report items on the issue. Terrestrial broadcasters kept relatively low profile on this matter. This was probably because the issue was not considered as important and influential for them as the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters.

This study also explored how the two broadcasting groups reported on the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) for the period when they covered the debates around the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters, and re-approval of general programming channels. The study hypothesized that there would be less criticism of the KCC, the government regulatory agency that governs the adoption and implementation of media policies related to terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels, by a media company that supported the adoption of media policies in line with its self-interests. Interestingly, self-interested reporting behavior was also detected when both terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels mentioned about the KCC. For instance, KBS was less critical of the KCC during the period when the gross cap regulation of advertising time for terrestrial broadcasters was being discussed. TV Chosun was less critical of the KCC during the period that re-approval
of general programming channels was being discussed. This result implies that media firms' practice of self-interested reporting could aim to affect not only the issues the news report is covering but also the institution that has control power over the issues.

Furthermore, the study looked at the quality index for both terrestrial broadcasters and general programming channels. The quality index measured which broadcast companies aired more factually-based news reports despite the potential for biased reporting derived from mainstream media’s self-interest. If a news report was more factually based, the score was closer to +1, and if a news report was less factually based, the score was closer to −1. Means to calculate the quality index were created in the study. One of the interesting findings regarding quality index is that although both KBS and TV Chosun were biased in their reporting, KBS’ quality in biased reporting was much higher than that of TV Chosun. That is, KBS, a pubic broadcaster with 60% of its revenue coming from the TV license fee, voices out its argument more on a factual basis than a general programming channel does.

The results of this study are significant in two ways. First, most of the hypotheses regarding self-interested reporting were supported, which means that self-interested news reporting practices do exist in Korea. Specifically, the results showed that media firms reacted sensitively to media related policies and were likely to practice biased reporting that
fit their self-interests. Second, the result showed that a public terrestrial broadcaster demonstrated a higher quality index than a general programming channel, which means that a public broadcasting company was more likely to practice factual news reporting than a private broadcasting company, which has more concern about economic profits. However, this study has limitations in that it only confirmed the existence of mainstream media’s self-interested reporting in Korean journalism rather than systematically explaining how related factors interacted and influenced the generation of biased news. In other words, it focused more on the final news product than the processes that led to that product.

This study is meaningful in that it investigated the influence of mainstream media’s self-interest on news reporting in Korean journalism. There has been a dearth of studies on this phenomenon. Future studies on the influence of media firms’ self-interest on news reporting should go into more depth, covering a wider range of controversial public issues. Eventually, these studies could generate societal agreement about effective and realistic guidelines to curb self-interested new reporting in Korean journalism.
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Appendix A: 
Code Book for the Gross Cap Regulation of Advertising Time for Terrestrial Broadcasters

A. ID

V1. 아이템 ID

( )

V2. 어느 방송사의 프로그램인가?

1) KBS 2) MBC 3) SBS 4) TV조선 5) MBN 6) 채널A 7) JTBC

( )

V3. 방송 날짜

월/날짜/요일/년도

요일: 1)일 2)월 3)화 4)수 5)목 6)금 7)토

( )

V4. 기사 순서 (*이거는 연구자가 체크함-코더들은 leave it blank)

1)처음 2)중간 3)끝

( )

V5. 기사 길이

( 초)
B. 정량적 편향성: 등장인물의 균형성

V1. (진행자·앵커·기자)

전체 뉴스보도 대비 각각 몇 % 수준에서 본인의 주관적 논평을 결들였나? 논평은 주제에 대해 찬성하였가? 반대하였는가?

(          %)

V2. 진행자·앵커·기자 발언의 편향성 유형은 주로 어떤 것이었나? (중복 가능)

1) 주관적 감정 2)윤색적 꾸밈말 3)역사적 사례 등 4)얼굴 표정 5)윤리적 가치 6) 인용 7) 기타

(          )

V3. 광고총량제 옹호 측 취재원의 수?

(          )

V4. 광고총량제 비판 측 취재원의 수?

(          )

V5. 광고총량제 옹호 측 인터뷰이·출연자의 수?

(          ) (누구였는지 memo: 예) 대학교수/정치인/논객 etc)

V6. 광고총량제 비판 측 인터뷰이·출연자의 수?

(          ) (누구였는지 memo: 예) 대학교수/정치인/논객 etc)

V7. 크로마키 처리 여부 및 내용

1) 광고총량제 반대 진영의 주장 요지가 크로마키로 처리
2) 광고총량제 찬성 진영의 주장 요지가 크로마키로 처리
3) 어느 일방의 주장 요지라고 판단하기 어렵다
4) 크로마키 처리 없음

V8. 광고총량제 옹호 측 진영의 평균 발언길이는?
(분 초)

V9. 광고총량제 비판 측 진영의 평균 발언길이는?
(분 초)

C. 정성적 편향성: 발언의 편향성

1) 사건(발생) 과정에 대한 사실보도
2) 사실+분석
3) 사실+양측 입장을 균형 있게 반영
4) 사실+광고총량제 지지
5) 사실+광고총량제 반대
6) 사실+방송통신위원회 지지
7) 사실+방송통신위원회 반대
8) 사실 없는 균형적 발언
9) 사실 없는 광고총량제 지지
10) 사실 없는 광고총량제 반대
11) 사실 없는 방송통신위원회 지지
12) 사실 없는 방송통신위원회 반대
13) 사실 또는 사실 없는 기타 발언

(중복 입력 가능: )
Appendix B:  
Code Guide Book for the Gross Cap Regulation of Advertising Time for Terrestrial Broadcasters

A. ID

V1. 코딩 순서대로 번호를 준다. 뉴스 프로그램에서 '뉴스거리' 한 폭지 개념과 대등한 수준에서 추출한다.

V2. 어느 방송사의 TV 뉴스 프로그램인지 그 이름을 찾아 그 번호를 기입한다.

V3. (03)월 (12)일 (6)급요일처럼 두 간, 두 간, 한 간씩 기입한다.

V4. 코드들은 leave blank. 연구자가 작성할 것임.

①처음: 전체 기사 중 제일 먼저 나와 있는 30%.
②중간: 전체 기사 중 중간에 있는 40%.
③끝: 전체 기사 중 가장 나중에 있는 30%.

V5. 기사 길이

아이템의 길이를 초 단위로 재서 기입한다. 앵커멘트 부분도 포함시킨다.

B. 정량적 편향성: 등장인물의 균형성

V1. 진행자·앵커·기자의 정의: 프로그램을 이끄는 사람/프로그램의 진행을 주도하는 사람. 기사를 취재하는 사람(진행자·앵커·기자를 하나로 묶어서 본다).

전체 뉴스보도 대비 몇% 수준에서 주관적 논평(사실이 확인되지 않은 개인의 의
견)이 있었나 쓴다. 예) 20%

V2. 중복 입력 가능

①주관적 감정: 사실이 확인되지 않은 개인의 주관적 감정을 표현할 때
②윤색적 훈들말: 사실을 과장하거나 미화함을 비유적으로 이르는 말을 사용할 때
③역사적 사례 등: 역사적 사례 등을 대면서 개인의 의견을 표현할 때
④얼굴 표정: 제 3자가 놀 때 얼굴표정이 사안에 대하여 분명히 지지하거나 반대할 때 (예: 광고총량제에 대한 얘기를 하는데 얼굴을 막 짜그러거나 비웃음의 표정)
⑤윤리적 가치: 윤리적 가치를 이유로 대며 개인의 주관적 의견을 표현할 때
⑥인용: 다른 사람의 말을 인용하며 자신의 주관적 의견을 표현할 때
⑦기타: 발언의 편향성 유형을 코더가 직접 적는다.

V3. 취재원의 정의: 10초 내외의 짧은 발언을 하는 외부 인물. 예) 행인/뉴스소스.
취재원의 수를 적는다

V4. 취재원의 수를 적는다

V5. 인터뷰이·출연자의 정의: 뉴스 스튜디오에 참석해 진행자의 인터뷰에 응하거나 (인터뷰이) 내지 상호간에 대담 내지 토론을 전개하는 인물들(출연자, 흔히 '논객'으로 지칭)을 묶어서 지칭한다.

인터뷰이·출연자의 수를 적는다. 그리고 그게 누구였는지도 적는다. 예: 대학교수/정치인/lobbyist 등

V6. 인터뷰이·출연자의 수를 적는다. 그리고 그게 누구였는지는도 적는다. 예: 대학교수/정치인/lobbyist 등

V7. 크로마키의 정의: 텔레비전 방송의 화면 합성 기술(자막같은)
반대/찬성 진행의 주장 요지가 크로마키로 처리 되어있는지 확인한다. 판단하기 어려울 때는 3번. 크로마키 처리가 없을 때는 4번을 적는다.
그리고 코더는 크로마키의 내용이 무엇이었는지 적는다.
V8. 옹호 측 진영(진행자·앵커·기자, 취재원, 인터뷰어·출연자 다 합쳐서 옹호 발언을 한 사람들)의 평균 발언길이를 구한다.

V9. 반대 측 진영(진행자·앵커·기자, 취재원, 인터뷰어·출연자 다 합쳐서 옹호 발언을 한 사람들)의 평균 발언길이를 구한다.

C. 정성적 편향성: 발언의 편향성

1. 사건(발생) 과정에 대한 사실보도: 이 사실이 구체적으로 무엇이었는지 쓴다/어떤 내용이었는지 간단히 적는다.
2. 사실26)분석: 분석의 내용도 간단하게 memo한다.
3. 사실+양축 입장을 균형있게 반영
4. 사실+광고총량제 지지: 지지자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
5. 사실+광고총량제 반대: 반대자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
6. 사실+방송통신위원회 지지: 지지자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
7. 사실+방송통신위원회 반대: 반대자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
8. 사실 없는27) 균형적 발언
9. 사실 없는 광고총량제 지지: 지지자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
10. 사실 없는 광고총량제 반대: 반대자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
11. 사실 없는 방송통신위원회 지지: 지지자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
12. 사실 없는 방송통신위원회 반대: 반대자의 발언이 무엇이었는지 간단히 적는다.
13. 사실 또는 사실 없는 기타 발언

1, 2, 3, 8=중립
4, 6, 9, 11=지지
5, 7, 10, 12=반대
13=null

*중복 입력 가능하다.

26) fact가 뒷받침 되어 있는.
27) fact가 아닌 개인의 의견이 뒷받침 되어 있는.
국문초록

방송의 자사이기주의 보도:
미디어 정책 보도를 중심으로

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본 연구는 한국의 방송 뉴스가 자사의 이해와 관련된 정책에 대해 어떻게 보도하는지 살펴보았다. 방송뉴스가 공정하고 불편부담해야 함에도 불구하고, 한국의 방송뉴스 보도는 자사이기주의에 의해 편파적인 성향을 보이고 있다고 알려졌기 때문이다. 이러한 가정을 검증하기 위해 구체적으로 본 논문에서는 지상파방송에 유리하고 종합편성채널(종편)에 불리한 ‘지상파 광고총량제’ 및 ‘종편재승인 정책’에 대해 지상파TV와 종편이 어떻게 차별적으로 보도하는지를 조사하였다. 그 결과, 지상파TV는 광고총량제에 대해 우호적으로 보도하였고, 종편은 이에 대해 다소 부정적인 보도를 한 것으로 드러났다. 지상파광고총량제는 지상파TV의 경영수지 개선에 긍정적인 반면, 경쟁사인 종편TV에는 부정적인 측면이 많기 때문이다. 구체적으로도 지상파 광고총량제 정책에 대해 지상파TV는 앵커의 논조방향, 취재원 수, 패널/인터넷이 수, 크로마키 사용 정도 등에서 종편과 유의미한 차이를 보이고 있었다. 반면 종편재승인 정책에 대해서는 지상파TV나 종편 모두 의미 있는 차이를 보이지 않는 않았다. 종편재승인 정책이 자사 이해와 직접적인 연관성이 없고 인허가 정책에 대한 보도가 해당 정책의 설정에 크게 영향을 미치지 않기 때문에
판단된다. 한 가지 흥미로운 사실은, 지상파TV와 종편이 이해가 엇갈리는 방송정책이 수립되는 지점 전후에 방송규제기구인 방송통신위원회(KCC)에 대해 비판하는 보도를 지양하는 추세를 보이고 있다는 점이다. 사실을 기초로 한 자사이기주의식 보도를 보이는지, 아니면 자기주장에 기초한 단순한 자사이기주의식 보도인지를 가늠하는 자사이기주의의 보도의 질적 성향도 검토하였다. 그 결과, 지상파TV가 이윤추구 중심의 종편에 비해 사실에 기초한 자사이기주의식 보도가 많은 것으로 드러났다. 이 논문의 의의는 양적, 질적 차원에서 자사의 이해와 밀접한 정책 이슈에 대해 지상파TV와 종편이 자사이기주의에 입각한 보도를 하고 있음을 입증하고 있다는 점이다. 자사이기주의식 방송뉴스 보도에 대한 사회적 대응이 필요한 시점이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 본 연구가 자사이기주의가 구체적으로 어떠한 맥락에서 발생하는지 체계적으로 기술하고 있기는 하나, 자사이기주의가 어떠한 요인들에 의해 유도되는지에 대한 설명적 분석은 적었다. 이에 대한 후속연구가 필요하다.

주요어: 자사이기주의 보도, 광고총량제, 종편재승인, 방송통신위원회, 지상파 방송, 종합편성채널
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