Postwar Compilations on the History of Governing by the Japanese Ruling Elites of Colonial Korea: The Case of Yūhō Kyōkai

LEE Hyoung-sik*

Abstract | Postwar Japanese society sought to erase the memories of the nation’s colonial past after its defeat in the Asia-Pacific War. As colonial legacies lingered, however, including the problem of Korean residents in Japan and the outbreak of the Korean War, the so-called “Korea problem” (Chosen mondai) emerged to the fore of Japanese society. It was against this backdrop that the former ruling elites of the colonial era organized into Yūhō Kyōkai (Friendly Nation Association) with the support of repatriated Japanese corporations and Korea-related firms. As the Fatherland Defense Corps of the League of Koreans in Japan (Choryŏn) sought to expand their influence after the outbreak of the Korean War, Japanese newspapers and magazines became fierce political battlegrounds on the issues of Korean residents and Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. Right-leaning newspapers and magazines began to publish malicious reports on Koreans in Japan, outwardly expressing their contempt and discrimination against them. In response, the leftist literary circles, composed of Korean residents, members of the New Japanese Literary Society, some conscientious Japanese and progressive intellectuals, and journalists began to criticize this approach to the problem. With this overall shift away from prewar militarism towards a “cultural” and “pacifist” Japan, the former officials of the Government General of Korea, who kept a relatively low profile under the US occupation’s censorship in postwar Japanese society, began to challenge the “collective memory” of oppression and exploitation constructed by the “colonized.” Instead, they disseminated their own memory of development and progress brought to Korea during colonial rule. With the support of Japan’s economic circles, including the Japan-Korean Economic Association, Yūhō Kyōkai established historical archives on the colonial era (Yūhō Collection, Historical Records on the Rule over Korea, Yūhō Series, etc.) in order to “historicize” the collective memories of “colonizers.” For the former officials of the Government General of Korea, the final agreement reached in 1965 for Korea-Japan normalization acted as a “seal” or a settlement of the issues surrounding Japan’s responsibilities for colonizing Korea. With this occasion and Japan’s rapid economic growth at the time, these “collective memories” of former colonial officials came to evolve into “public memories,” significantly influencing Japan’s postwar conception of the colonial era.

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Introduction

In postwar Japanese society, the problems of the nation’s colonial past remained buried in oblivion. Yet, the Japanese repatriates who returned home at the end of the war and Koreans remaining in Japan (Zainichi Koreans) who directly experienced the colonial period brought the issues to the fore. The Japanese repatriates, however, were not well received by Japanese society, as they were criticized from both ends of the political spectrum. The left condemned them as the “major culprits of aggression,” while the right treated them as a “nuisance” to Japan’s already-strained job market and tight food supply (Yi Yeon-Sik 2012).

Responding to such denunciations, the former ruling elites of colonial Korea, including the returned Japanese officials of the Government General of Korea (hereafter GGK), organized into Yūhō Kyōkai (Friendly Nation Association) in 1952, in order to collect, organize, and publish relevant materials on their colonial rule. In the form of archives (Yūhō Collection [Yūhō Bunko]) and professional historiography (Historical Survey of Japanese Overseas Activities, Yūhō series, audio records, etc.), they sought to visualize and disseminate their collective memories of the colonial past to Japanese society in the postwar era.

The studies on the experiences and memories of the former officials of the GGK are invaluable in understanding Japan’s relations with East Asian countries, as well as Japan’s overall perception of East Asia in the postwar era, which are critical in bridging the historical gap between Korea and Japan. Yet, given the diversity of the Japanese repatriates, varying by occupation, age, gender, and geographic location, it is difficult to generalize their experiences and memories. Nonetheless, if we consider that individual memories are also social constructs, memories are both the outcome and the foundation of the

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1. In this paper, “ruling elites of colonial Korea” refers to Japanese officials of the GGK, Bank of Korea, Industrial Bank of Korea (Shokusan Ginkō), Oriental Development Company, Keijō Daily News (Keijō nippō) Keijō Imperial University, who were involved in the colonial rule of Korea.
2. On collective memory, refer to Olick (2011).
3. Kajimura’s (1992) work pioneered the question of “how the discriminative preconceptions forged in the prewar era transcended and reproduced over time.”
group’s identity (Halbwachs 1992). On the grounds that a diverse array of “collective memories” coexisted in postwar Japanese society, and that these memories gradually converged into forming Japan’s “official memory” of its colonial rule, this article focuses on the Yūhō Kyōkai. This group provides an empirical lens through which to understand Japanese ruling elites’ perceptions and memories of the colonial era.

Despite the merits of the research, the number of studies addressing the activities and colonial consciousness of Japanese ruling elites remains small. Chŏng Pyŏng-uk (2005), for instance, focused on the Central Japanese-Korean Association (Chūō Nit-Kan Kyōkai) in analyzing the Korea-Japan Talks. Rho Ki Young (2006) studied the Assimilation Association (Dōwa Kyōkai) and Central Japanese-Korean Association, which were organized by Japanese repatriates from colonial Korea. Apart from the above literature, the work by Miyata Setsuko (2000) only provides a brief overview of the Yūhō Kyōkai. The main limitations of these studies are that they restrict their scope of research to a basic overview of the Yūhō Kyōkai—particularly its membership—in the context of Korea-Japan normalization talks. They do not address the foundational questions of why the Yūhō Kyōkai was established in the first place, how their members and financial structures were organized, or what specific activities the association actually did.

To fill in such gaps in the literature, this article sets up the following research agenda. First, it explores how and in what context Japanese ruling elites of the colonial era established the Yūhō Kyōkai. Second, the personnel and financial structure of the organization will be examined. Lastly, this article delves into why these past ruling elites sought to compile their history of ruling colonial Korea and how these compilations were prepared and published in the historical context of postwar Japanese society.

The materials analyzed in this research include newspapers from the time, magazines, memoirs, the audio record collection at Gakushūin University, and Yūhō Kyōkai’s internal documents and bulletins (Yūhō Monthly, Yūhō Kyōkai Newsletter), as well as the personal documents of the association’s executive members (Kimiijima Ichirō-Related Documents),4 which remain underutilized in

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4. Kimijima Ichirō (1887-1975) was born in 1887 in Tochigi Prefecture and attended the First High School (Ikkō). Upon his graduation from Tokyo Imperial University in 1912, Kimijima joined Bank of Japan. Starting from the Osaka branch office, Kimijima worked his way up a series of key posts in the Bank of Japan, including Okayama branch manager, Moji branch manager, treasurer, and director of Document Management (inaugurated in 1936), until his retirement in 1940. After his retirement, Kimijima served as vice president of the Bank of Korea, as well as chairman of the Central Korea Association from 1940 to 1945. In the postwar years, he served as chairman of the Central Japanese-Korean Association, Japan-Korea Fraternal Association, and Yūhō Kyōkai. When
other research. *The Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents (Kimijiam Ichirō kankei bunsho)*⁵ are especially key primary materials in this research to vividly restore the internal affairs of Ŷūhō Kyōkai and the voices of Japanese ruling elites of the colonial era, which remained largely inaccessible and unstudied to this date.

The Founding of Ŷūhō Kyōkai

1. Background

Why was Ŷūhō Kyōkai established? This question remains unanswered since its founding in October 1952. Another untouched area of study is the close correlation between the founding of Ŷūhō Kyōkai and the issues at the time surrounding Korean residents in Japan. To illustrate how these issues of Korean residents formed the background of the incipient phase of Ŷūhō Kyōkai, this section will analyze *The Guidelines on the Establishment of Ŷūhō Kyōkai (Zaidanhōjin Ŷūhō Kyōkai setsuritsu yōkō, n.d.)*.⁶

The nationwide association of Korean residents in Japan, officially named the League of Koreans in Japan (*Chae-Ilbŏn Chŏsŏnin Yŏnmaeng*, hereafter *Choryŏn*), was founded in October 1945. As the representative group of Koreans liberated from Japan’s colonial rule, *Choryŏn* took over the buildings and financial assets of the GGK branch offices and Bank of Korea in Japan when Korea was finally liberated in 1945. *Choryŏn* also secured enormous amounts of money from Koreans in exchange for mediating their return to Korea and receiving deposits and bonds left by these repatriates. They also accrued funds by withdrawing unpaid wages and compensation for Koreans conscripted during the colonial era from the Japanese government and corporations. Based on these abundant financial resources, *Choryŏn* rapidly expanded their scope of influence by providing support for repatriating Koreans, offering humanitarian relief to Koreans living in flood-stricken regions, supporting Korean residents in the black market, and undertaking education and cultural programs that sought to improve the lives of these Korean residents (O Kyu-sang 2009; Mizuno and Mun Kyŏng-su 2015).

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⁵ *The Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents* are stored in the Faculty of Law Center for Modern Japanese Legal and Political Documents, the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics.

⁶ It is an unpublished document stored at the Ŷūhō Collection. The author and the year of creation are unknown.
However, *Choryŏn*’s rapid expansion was soon interrupted by 1947 when the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (hereafter GHQ) shifted its occupation policy. Unlike the initial treatment of Korean residents in Japan as “liberated Koreans” from Japan’s colonial rule, the new policy placed these Korean residents under the jurisdiction of the Japanese government and made their schools follow the guidelines of the Japanese Ministry of Education. Further departing from the prewar period, the GHQ and Japanese government disfranchised the Korean residents and enacted an alien registration system. They also began repressing *Choryŏn*’s “national education” programs by closing down Korean schools in Japan. In response, *Choryŏn* implemented an aggressive protest movement against such suppression, as shown in the case of *Choryŏn*’s Hanshin Education Struggle.

Designating *Choryŏn* as a violent group, the GHQ and Japanese government (under the directives of the GHQ) disbanded *Choryŏn* in September 1949 and confiscated all their assets. Twenty-eight executive members of *Choryŏn* and the Democratic League of Korean Youth in Japan (*Zainichi Chōsen Minshu Seinen Dōmei*) were also removed from public offices. *Choryŏn*’s youth academies and high schools, located across Japan to foster the younger generations’ activities, were forcefully closed down after October 1949 (Chŏng Yong-hwan 2013, 277-78). With the ostensible reason for arresting criminals of robbery and theft, the police also raided eighty-one *Zainichi* villages in Japan around the Kantō region. As *Choryŏn*’s financial provisions had been foundational to the lives of Korean residents in Japan, this suppression of *Choryŏn* quickly deteriorated their living standard. The confrontation between *Choryŏn* and the GHQ was exacerbated as the *Choryŏn* activists further responded with counter activities, such as protesting against the residence tax, providing relief for Koreans in Japan, implementing campaigns against registering in the Japanese educational system, advocating Korean schools and their national education, and demanding the release of imprisoned Koreans. Highlighting the collisions between GHQ and Korean residents in Japan, Japan’s mainstream media often expressed concern, urging restraint and self-reflection from Korean residents (“Shasetsu: zaityū Chōsenjin,” 1949; “Chōsenjin ni nozomu,” 1949; “Shasetsu: chian ni taisuru,” 1950).

The Japanese government, while suppressing *Choryŏn*’s human rights advocacy and democratization movements, dissolved *Choryŏn* on November 10, 1949 and declared in the cabinet that the confiscated assets from *Choryŏn* would

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7. The public offices here include not just the positions in the government, but also the executive positions in the private sector, associations, and labor unions.
be used for the welfare of Korean residents in Japan. On January 4, 1950, Attorney General Ōhashi Takeo announced that “a considerable amount of resources [withdrawn from Choryŏn] will be allocated immediately to be spent on the education and welfare of Korean residents in Japan” (Suzuki 1968, 74).

Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was the momentum to make the “Korea problem” the top issue in Japan. As economic analyst Koyama Setsuo (1950a, 1950b) described, the Korean War was “welcome rain” to the persistent “drought” in Japan’s industry at the time. The Korean War propelled an economic boom in Japan—namely the “Korea boom” or Korean War special procurements—as Japan became the major supplier of military materials to the UN forces, primarily composed of the US Army.

The Korean residents in Japan affiliated with Choryŏn regarded the Korean War as US imperialist aggression against the Korean Peninsula and illegally organized their own Fatherland Defense Committee and Defense Corps to impede the production and transportation of Japan’s military goods and instigate strikes among the laborers in the munitions factories (Pak Kyŏng-sik 1989, 32). Many were arrested in November 1950 in the Kobe region, when Choryŏn came into direct conflict with the police forces during their protests against the residence tax and the removal of Choryŏn members from public offices, and their efforts to improve the lives of Korean residents. As similar confrontations escalated in other areas, right-wing news outlets, such as the Yomiuri Newspaper and Jiji Newspaper, referred to these incidents as “riots.” This raised suspicions on the connections between the riots and the Japanese Communist Party, thereby urging countermeasures by the Japanese government (“Kōbe ni sengo,” 1950; “Shasetsu: Kansai no Chōsenjin,” 1950; “Shasetsu: Higashi Nihon,” 1950; “Shasetsu: zenryō na Chōsenjin,” 1950). At a press conference on December 28, 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida announced that heavy punishments would be imposed on Korean residents for acts of aggression against public order. The chief cabinet secretary also stated that firm actions would be taken to reflect the law and that the government was also deliberating various measures, including deportation.

Under the circumstances, in June 1951, former GGK director of the Bureau of Industry (Shokusankyokuchō) and Vice President of the Assimilation Association Hozumi Shinrokurō stated in the “Statement of Purpose of Yūhō

8. Despite some differences in the tone of the articles, the era’s influential news outlets in Japan, including Asahi Newspaper, Mainichi Newspaper, and Tokyo Newspaper, expressed concern over “the riots involving Korean residents in Japan.”

9. Hozumi Shinrokurō was born in 1889, the fourth son of Hozumi Nobushige, in the faculty of law at Tokyo Imperial University. After graduating from the Department of Law, majoring in
Kyōkai” that “the Korean issues are most important and grave in Japan.” In his presumption, “most of the Korean residents in Japan are potential advocates of communism.” He argued that “their uprising in Japan would be inevitable, should the communist forces intrude into Japan from the north” (Zaidanhojin Yūhō Kyōkai setsuritsu yōkō, n.d.). In this way, he expressed his concern over the possibility of a communized Korean Peninsula and therefore an urgent need for comprehensive measures on the Korea problem.

As illustrated, the emerging problems of Korean residents in Japan and the outbreak of the Korean War brought the “Korea problem” to the fore of postwar Japanese society. In this backdrop, the former ruling elites of the colonial era realized the need to establish Yūhō Kyōkai to deal with the problem.

2. Preparations

Initially, these repatriated GGK officials sought to compile their thirty-six year histories of governing via the Old Friends’ Club (Kyūyū Kurabu, formerly Central Korea Association). However, as the budget shortage made the attempt unrealistic, Hozumi Shinrokurō, in the autumn of 1950, began to plan for the founding of an institution, the Korea Research Institute (Chōsen Kenkyūjo). This institution would research, analyze, and disseminate their findings on Korean issues with the members of the Assimilation Association, Suzuki Takeo (former professor at Keijō Imperial University), Funada Kyōji (former professor of Keijō Imperial University), Odaka Tomoo (former professor of Keijō Imperial University), and many others.

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10. The Central Korea Association was founded in 1926 in Tokyo by the former high-level officials of the GGK. On prewar Central Korea Association, refer to Lee Hyoung-sik (2007).

11. The Assimilation Association was established in July 1947 among Japanese repatriates from colonial Korea. It brought together the Korea Business Council (established in November 1945 to compensate overseas businesses and assets), the Old Friends’ Club (formerly Central Korea Association, established in February 1946), and the Relief Society of Compatriots Repatriated from Korea (established in March 1946). In November 1952, shifting away from the association’s initial focus as a group for Japanese repatriates, the association changed its name to the Central Japanese-Korean Association. Many executive members of Yūhō Kyōkai, such as Hozumi and Shibuya, also served as executives to the Assimilation Association.
University), Kubota Yutaka (former CEO of Korea Power), Shibuya Reiji (former chief of Investigation Division of Bank of Korea), Zenshō Eisuke (former non-regular staff member of the GGK) and others (Lee Hyoung-sik 2011, 264; Zaidanhōjin Yūhō Kyōkai setsuritsu yōkō, n.d.). At the outset, this Korea Research Institute planned to be a subsidiary organization to the Assimilation Association, which was composed of Japanese repatriates. It would have support from the Immigration Bureau, national police, Ministry of Justice, and other government agencies and ministries, and accrue a sum of two-million yen from major banks and corporations (Shibuya Reji’s Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, November 29, 1950, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents).

It was around this time—at the end of 1950—when the Ministry of Justice delivered their intention, via Shibuya Reiji,12 to the former Japanese ruling elites of colonial Korea that the government was willing to allocate fifteen million out of 160 million yen confiscated from Choryŏn to launch welfare programs for Korean residents in Japan. Initially, these colonial ruling elites debated among themselves whether or not to accept the offered amount, and the majority of the voices opposed settling on the offer.

The ruling elites’ main points of contention were: (1) The complicated nature of the funds limited efficient usage of these resources to fulfill their goals; (2) The assigned amount would be insufficient to provide the necessary welfare to 600,000 Korean residents in Japan; (3) Successful welfare programs for Korean residents in Japan remained unprecedented since the GGK period.

Those who agreed to the proposed sum argued that: (1) the Korea problem is becoming an internationally significant issue that can no longer be neglected; (2) the establishment of a more comprehensive state apparatus is becoming indispensable to govern these Korean residents; and (3) this opportunity would bring knowledgeable experts on Korean resident issues and their “unique characteristics” to the process.

Understanding the gravity of this offer, the repatriated ruling elites of colonial Korea deliberated the matter with the key figures of the Assimilation Association, such as President Tanaka Takeo, Advisor Maruyama Tsurukichi (former director of the Police Affairs Bureau at the GGK), and Ikeda Kiyoshi (also a former director of the Police Affairs Bureau at the GGK) (Yūhō geppō 1951). As a result, they agreed that a request for a large sum of government

12. Shibuya was born in 1877 in Hokkaido. Graduating from Waseda University in 1905, he was invited to join the Korean government as an advisor in 1907. Shibuya remained in his post after Japan’s annexation of Korea and worked as head of financial affairs in North Hamgyŏng Province. After retirement in 1916, he assumed a series of high-level posts in the Bank of Korea as well as in the Korea Trade Association.
subsidies should be made and that the Assimilation Association should fully cooperate in the founding of a new organization, the Korea Research Institute, to deal with Korean resident problems. With numerous follow-up deliberations with relevant experts, they finally came to the decisions that 1) the newly establishing organization should attend to the original goals—to research and analyze the problems surrounding Korean residents in Japan; and 2) they should accept the proposed budget from the Ministry of Justice and use the funds to provide welfare programs for Korean residents. To perform these two tasks, they also reached a consensus to found the institution with a new name, **Yūhō Kyōkai**, rather than the previously posed Korea Research Institute. In the end, however, Hozumi declined to accept the proposed funds from the Ministry of Justice on the grounds that it was not desirable to run Korea-related programs with such confiscated assets from **Choryŏn**. Instead, he decided to establish an independent institution that specialized in collecting, studying, and disseminating materials on the past colonial rule of Korea (**Yūhō Collection Recording**, February 23, 1964). In other words, with Hozumi’s refusal to accept **Choryŏn**’s assets, the welfare related issues for Korean residents in Japan became secondary to the priorities of the newly established **Yūhō Kyōkai**.

Contrary to Hozumi’s claims, the evidence reveals that the Assimilation Association did not fully agree with his approach to set up an independent institution outside of the Assimilation Association: “Setting up an independent institution may be justifiable if the purpose is to pursue a purely academic approach on Korean issues, like the Academic Association of Koreanology in Japan (**Chōsen Gakkai**). However, as the listed aim of (establishing) **Yūhō Kyōkai** is to solve and study the era of colonial Korea and Korean resident problems in Japan, (without founding a separate association), these programs can be (consistently) implemented as part of the Assimilation Association” (Hozumi 1952).

In response, Hozumi argued that it would be inappropriate for the Assimilation Association to act as the sole institution to deal with all Korean issues, and that a separate organization would be indispensable for research on the era of colonial Korea and mediating Korea-Japan talks. His main argument was that the Assimilation Association had negative reputation to address colonial issues, for it was composed of too many former officials of the GGK (**Yūhō Collection Recording**, February 23, 1964). There were also issues

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13. The confiscated assets from **Choryŏn** by the Japanese Ministry of Justice were relocated to general accounting after April 1953, instead of the initial intention to spend it on Zainichi Korean’s welfare programs.
surrounding President Tanaka’s use of the Assimilation Association funds.\footnote{President Tanaka was found to have used the funds of the Assimilation Association (about thirty-million yen) to run for the House of Councilors election in 1953 (Tasaka 1986).} Henceforth, \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai} was in charge of collecting, researching, and compiling data on their past rule over colonial Korea. The Central Japanese-Korean Association, succeeding the Assimilation Association, managed “Korea-Japan relations, cultural exchange, and economic partnership” as normalization talks began between Korea and Japan, alleviating the association’s initial stigma as an organization of Japanese repatriates from Korea. Regardless, these two organizations were occasionally at odds with each other.\footnote{Although Miyata Setsuko (2000) stated in her work that \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai} closely collaborated with the Central Japanese-Korean Association, they seemed to disagree at times. Director of the Assimilation Association Harada Dairoku, for instance, opposed the founding of \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai} and thereby refused to let their members’ names to be used in the process. He also collected utility fees from \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai}, which used the same offices as the Assimilation Association (Kōtaki Motoi’s Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, March 21, 1973, \textit{Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents}).}

At the end of January 1951, in consultation with the Ministry of Justice, \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai} obtained approval from the GHQ via the Ministry of Justice to establish regulations for “donations.” In April of the same year, Hozumi codified the institutional structure of \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai} and submitted a proposal entitled \textit{The Guidelines on the Establishment of Yūhō Kyōkai} to the government. This proposal founded the Institute for South Korean Studies (\textit{Kankoku Chōsa Kenkyūjo}), Japan-Korea Discussion Meeting (\textit{Nit-Kan Konwakai}), Korea Cooperation Committee (\textit{Tai-Kankoku Kyōryoku Inkkai}), and Committee for Health and Welfare of Korean Residents in Japan (\textit{Zainichi Kankokujin Kōsei Fukushi Inkkai}) under the jurisdiction of the \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai}. With the finalization of the plan in June, Hozumi aimed to raise about two-million yen in funds, utilizing Shibuya’s connections as former section chief of the Bank of Korea and chairman of the Korea Trade Association.

Founding members of \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai} included Hozumi, Ogata Taketora, Ikeda Kiyoshi, Hayashi Shigeki, Kubota Yutaka, Shibuya, and others. Serving as cabinet secretary, Ogata delivered information on the internal affairs of \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai} to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and lobbied for his support. From December 1951, serious fundraising, nationwide discussions, and committee meetings on Korean issues commenced. On December 6, for instance, committee meetings were held at the Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The participants included founding members of \textit{Yūhō Kyōkai}, including Hozumi, Shibuya, Kondō Ken’ichi, and Ogata, as well as Fukuoka Governor Sugimoto Katsuji, Fukuoka Mayor Konishi Haruo, President of
Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce and Industry Yamawaki Masatsugu, and other influential figures in Fukuoka’s political and economic circles. As a result, they raised a total of 640,000 yen, mainly from companies returning to Kyushu from Korea. According to Shibuya’s letter to the former vice president of the Bank of Korea Kimijima Ichirō, sent on June 6, 1952, the process of founding Yūhō Kyōkai was as follows:

To establish Yūhō Kyōkai, I have been accompanying Mr. Hozumi since last year, arranging several meetings in various places with the help of Fukuoka Mayor Konishi. Many people have responded quite positively to our initiatives. In February and during these three occasions, we were able to raise around 600,000 yen. Also, during a meeting of twenty Korea-related Japanese repatriates, held in late May in Osaka, we achieved much more than we expected. I am planning to go back to Osaka on the ninth to finalize the discussions and return to Tokyo on the fifteenth. Following [the discussions on the founding of the association] last year, we plan to hold an inaugural meeting after fundraising one-million yen or more, getting permission to establish the foundation in Tokyo, and seriously beginning our activities. Through Matsumoto Kenjirō, Mr. Hozumi and I are seeking contributions from the five largest conglomerates, namely Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Furukawa, Sumitomo, and Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship (Hokkaidō Tankō Kisen). When we finish establishing the association, we would also like to ask for your help. As I mentioned earlier, since Mr. Hozumi is not good with communications, we sought to invite Mr. Shibusawa Keizō [for the presidency]. Yet, as Mr. Shibusawa continues to refuse, we decided to endorse Shimomura Hiroshi on the recommendation by Ogata Taketora. Mr. Shimomura has already consented. Furthermore, we are planning to consolidate Yūhō Kyōkai and the Assimilation Association later. (Shibuya Reiji’s Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, June 6, 1952, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents)

Four things can be inferred from this letter. First, Fukuoka Mayor Konishi Haruo played a central role as an active supporter to the founding of Yūhō Kyōkai. Second, they sought to raise funds from the five major conglomerates, including Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship,16 which were closely involved in colonial Korea with the help of Matsumoto Kenjirō who served as president of Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) at the time. Third, they endorsed Shimomura Hiroshi as the first president of the association, which Shimomura had already accepted. Fourth, they planned to consolidate the Assimilation Association and Yūhō Kyōkai in the foreseeable time. Shibuya’s idea to consolidate the two groups is especially noteworthy, as it reveals his differences from Hozumi, who wanted independent operation for Yūhō Kyōkai.

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16. Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship was a representative coal mining company in the Hokkaido region, where a large number of mobilized Koreans were placed to work in coal production.
Given their disparate views, Shibuya and Hozumi did not always communicate well with each other when promoting Shimomura as the first president of Yūhō Kyōkai.

Meanwhile, Hozumi and Shibuya also consulted with Kimijima, who had influential connections in political and economic circles (Kimijima Ichirō’s Diary, June 28, 1952, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents). They were able to receive 300,000 yen from the Bank of Japan and 30,000 yen each from the Asahi Newspaper and Mainichi Newspaper. Yet, given Japan’s recession at the time and growing antipathy towards Korean residents in Japan, the contributed amount fell far below the expected amount. After holding the inaugural meeting on August 30, Hozumi and Shibuya stopped by Tokyo on September 19 to apply for permission to be established in Tokyo at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the help of Cabinet Secretary Ogata, they received final approval on October 4.

As illustrated in the case of former Bank of Korea vice president Kimijima, former Bank of Korea section chief Shibuya, and former Bank of Korea branch manager in Dalian Konishi, the process of tracing Yūhō Kyōkai’s incipient phase reveals how connections to former Bank of Korea personnel played a critical role in its establishment. The question arises as to why former executives of the Bank of Korea became involved in the founding of Yūhō Kyōkai. According to Shibuya’s letter to Kimijima, sent on November 29, 1950, Kimijima proposed a plan to use the six-billion yen located in the Bank of Korea to found the Special Bank for Japan’s Annexation of Korea and aid the economic recovery of Korea after the war (Shibuya Reiji’s Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, November 19, 1950, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents). As Shibuya largely concurred with Kimijima’s idea, “reentry into the Korean market” seems to have been their underlying goal.

3. Executive Members and Finance

Table 1 provides the list of executives of Yūhō Kyōkai from its founding to 1970. While Shibuya strongly endorsed Shimomura as president of Yūhō Kyōkai since the very early stages of the process, Shimomura declined. Instead of Shimomura, Hozumi became the first president. As stated above, when Hozumi passed away in 1970, Kimijima Ichirō and Mizuta Naomasa succeeded as the next president and chairman of Yūhō Kyōkai, respectively. Except for Ogata Taketora, the early executive members of Yūhō Kyōkai were former directors of GGK (Hayashi Shigeki, Kōtaki Motoi, Hagihara Hikozō), former professors of Keijō Imperial University (Suzuki Takeo, Suematsu Yasukazu), former executive personnel at the Bank of Korea (Konishi Haruo, Shibuya Reiji), editors of Keijō Daily News
Table 1. The List of Executive Members of Yūhō Kyōkai (Since Its Founding to Year 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Prewar Occupation</th>
<th>Postwar Occupation</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of Directors</td>
<td>Hozumi Shinrokurō</td>
<td>Director of Industry Bureau</td>
<td>Vice President of Central Japanese-Korean Association, House of Councilors</td>
<td>Died in 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mizuta Naomasa</td>
<td>Director of Finance Bureau</td>
<td>Managing Director of Tokyo Bankers Association</td>
<td>President in 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Hayashi Shigeki</td>
<td>Director of Academic Affairs Bureau</td>
<td>Director of Central Japanese-Korean Association</td>
<td>Died in 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kondō Ken'ichi</td>
<td>Editor of Keijō Daily News</td>
<td>Representative Director of Head Office, Daihatsu, Inc.</td>
<td>Died in 2003</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ogata Taketora</td>
<td>Chief Cabinet Director for Information</td>
<td>Chief Cabinet Secretary</td>
<td>Died in 1956</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shibuya Reiji</td>
<td>Investigation Manager of Bank of Korea, Chairman of Korea Trade Association</td>
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<td>Died in 1961</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kubota Yutaka</td>
<td>CEO of Korea Power</td>
<td>CEO of Nihon Kōei Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>Died in 1986</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Zenshō Eisuke</td>
<td>GGK Commissioner</td>
<td>Professor at Shōwa Women's University, Tenri University</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Konishi Haruo</td>
<td>Director of Dalian Branch of Bank of Korea</td>
<td>Mayor of Fukuoka</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Suzuki Takeo</td>
<td>Professor at Keijō Imperial University</td>
<td>Professor at Musashi University</td>
<td>Died in 1975</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shiraiishi Muneshiro</td>
<td>Executive Director of Korea Nitrogen Fertilizer</td>
<td>Director of Central Japanese-Korean Association</td>
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<td>Kōtaki Motoi</td>
<td>Director of Korea Industrial Bank</td>
<td>Judge, Supreme Court of Japan</td>
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<td>Suematsu Yasukazu</td>
<td>Professor at Keijō Imperial University</td>
<td>Professor at Gakushūin University</td>
<td>Died in 1992</td>
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<td>Hagihara Hikozō</td>
<td>Governor of South Hamgyŏng Province, Vice-minister of Treasury</td>
<td>Associate Director of Central Japanese-Korean Association</td>
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<td>Died in 1972</td>
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<td>Kimijima</td>
<td>Ichirō</td>
<td>Vice President of Bank of Korea</td>
<td>Director in 1954, President in 1970, Died in 1975</td>
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<td>Kudō</td>
<td>Sanjirō</td>
<td>Managing Director of Korea Trade Association</td>
<td>Died in 1970</td>
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<td>Kanda</td>
<td>Keizaburō</td>
<td>Mitsubishi Corporation</td>
<td>President of Taisei Fisheries Co., Ltd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takahara</td>
<td>Takeo</td>
<td>Director of Chūgai Manufacture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Watanabe</td>
<td>Toyohiko</td>
<td>Director of Education Affairs Bureau</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Died in 1970</td>
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<td>Musha</td>
<td>Renzō</td>
<td>President of Keijō Electric</td>
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<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Ken</td>
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<td>Supervisors</td>
<td>Furuichi</td>
<td>Keijō, Kwanghwamun</td>
<td>Keiō Electric Corporation, Director of Central Japanese- Korean Association</td>
<td>Died in 1963</td>
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<td>Shōzō</td>
<td>Kageyama</td>
<td>Tōka Industry, Senior Managing Director of Korea Trade Association</td>
<td>President of Asahi Broadcasting Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shūjirō</td>
<td>Sakurazawa</td>
<td>Director of Bank of Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shigemasa</td>
<td>Okumura</td>
<td>Treasurer of Finance Bureau</td>
<td>President of Nikken Kagaku Co., Ltd.</td>
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(Kondō Ken’ichi), and others Japanese repatriates who were directly or indirectly involved in colonial rule over Korea.

The directors of Yūhō Kyōkai, especially former officials of the GGK, were mostly “bureaucrats with lifetime careers in Korea” (haenuki kanryō). They were mostly appointed to their positions in Korea in the 1910s, and when they completed their terms, many of them were reemployed by corporations related to the GGK.17 As the majority of directors were over sixty, new members were recruited among those involved in colonial Korea to fill in the vacancies when the senior members passed away. Shibuya was practically in charge of running the association since its establishment. Cabinet Secretary Ogata and Fukuoka Mayor Konishi joined the association upon Shibuya’s invitation.18 In this regard, it can be said that colonial officials and the bureaucratic orientation of Yūhō Kyōkai were not markedly present in its early phase. However, when Shibuya passed away in 1961, former directors of the GGK began to run the association: Hayashi Higeki (former director of the Academic Affairs Bureau) took over the position in 1961. Then Hagihara Hikozō (former governor of South Hamgyŏng Province) succeeded after Hayashi died in 1964. When Hagihara passed away in 1967, Kōtaki Motoi (former director of Industry Bureau) took on the position. The former editor of Keijō Daily News Kondō Ken’ichi was in charge of editing the association’s publications.

As this article found, the naming of Yūhō Kyōkai involved a political consideration to avoid using the term Chosŏn or Korea. While the original plan was to secure about ten- to twenty- million yen annually from the government and act as a consulting, research, and analysis group to government offices, including the cabinet and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the circumstances of the time made the plan difficult. A closer look into Director Kōtaki’s report to Kimijima provides a succinct portrayal of the situation. While the material is quite lengthy, the following is a direct quotation from the report, which is a valuable primary source to examine the internal affairs of Yūhō Kyōkai:

With Hozumi’s initiative and active support from Shibuya and Kondō, the Yūhō Kyōkai was founded around 1950. In 1952 and 1953, a formal approval to establish Yūhō Kyōkai was granted from the government with the help of Ogata Taketora. For financial resources, Hozumi, Shibuya, and Kondō sought to raise

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18. As his “respected friend” Shibuya asked for support, Ogata gladly accepted the request to become one of the founding members of Yūhō Kyōkai. Kohishi, the former director of the Dalian branch of the Bank of Korea, was also invited by Shibuya to join Yūhō Kyōkai (Yūhō geppō, 1952). Shibuya attended Waseda University with Ogata, and worked with Konishi at the Bank of Korea.
about one-million yen from the Osaka and Fukuoka regions. Running the association on this initial lump sum, with no other new sources of funds or profits, the financial structure of the association gradually deteriorated, making accounting for the association very difficult for Shibuya, who struggled with the issues until he passed away in his sickbed. When Hayashi Shigeki took over the accounting, he was quite nitpicky, as it was the only job he had at the time. Hayashi hardly brought any new funds to the association, and Hozumi rarely came to the association, due to his heart disease. When Hayashi passed away, Hagihara succeeded in the position and took charge of the accounting. While there has been no regular balancing of the association’s finances, Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested them to submit annual reports on the association’s activities. Although Kudō [Sanjirō] spent months to write up the balance sheet, he could not finish, and gave up on the task. Kishi roughly arranged what Kudō had worked on and reported to the board of directors. He has been in charge of the accounting ever since. As Hagihara pressed for my support around 1965, I [Kōtaki] consulted with Uehara Kōgorō [chairman of Keidanren] for fund raising, and naturally I came to sign off the balance sheet. (Kōtaki Motoi’s Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, March 21, 1973, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents)

Inferable from this letter are that (1) Yūhō Kyōkai’s initial endowment continued to decline, as there were no new sources of funds; (2) the accounting of the association was poorly managed; (3) from 1965 and onwards, Chairman of Keidanren Uehara Kōgorō helped out in raising funds for the association.

**Yūhō Kyōkai’s Compilations on the History of Governing Colonial Korea**

1. The Historical Background

Japanese repatriates from colonial Korea were not welcomed in either Korean or Japanese society. Koreans criticized them as the main culprits of Japan’s imperialist aggression against Korea, while Japanese society simultaneously blamed them for the atrocities committed against Koreans during the colonial era (Hozumi 1973). Japanese politicians also condemned the GGK as “the main source of Japanese militarism,” which ruled over colonial Korea at its own will. To further contextualize the situation, it is necessary to understand the atmosphere of postwar Japanese society. The condemnation of Japanese repatriates stemmed from the emerging discourses on Japan’s shift away from prewar militarism towards a “cultural” and “pacifist” nation. As the postwar Japanese intellectuals converged on the notion of a “cultural nation” and gained influence in political circles, they began to inquire into the responsibilities and
problems of war and colonial domination over Korea.\textsuperscript{19}

As aforementioned, the outbreak of the Korean War raised problems regarding the Korean residents in Japan, which, in turn, exposed the issues of Japan’s colonization of Korea. The armed confrontations between Korean residents in Japan and GHQ became ever more frequent as the Fatherland Defense Corps of \textit{Choryŏn} expanded their influence. In particular, “Bloody May Day” (May), the Suita Incident (June), and the Osu Incident (July) in 1952 highlighted the apex of the clash between GHQ and Korean residents. The Suita Incident occurred on June 24-25, 1952, exactly two years after the outbreak of Korean War. Protesters against the war and the transportation of armed goods clashed with Japanese police forces in Osaka. Every mainstream media outlet reported on the incident. They discussed the problems of Korean residents in Japan and argued that some of the “communist” Koreans instigated other Korean residents to join their riot. In 1952, the Japanese media was full of articles and reports about the issue of Korean residents in Japan, addressing the root causes of the problem, public assistance, and forced deportation issues, which largely converged onto the question of Japan’s colonial past and their domination of Korea. On this backdrop, Japanese newspapers and magazines turned into a fierce battleground between the left and right.

The newspapers and magazines of the right persistently published malicious reports on Korean residents in Japan, outwardly expressing contempt and discrimination against them. For example, the \textit{Jiji Newspaper} (March 24, 1951) argued that “as Korean residential areas are frequently becoming prone to crime, they are placing civilians in danger and are being used by the underground forces of the Communist Party. This is equivalent to keeping a ticking time bomb or enemy within Japanese society.” Therefore, “if possible, all remaining Korean residents should be deported back home.” Similarly, the \textit{Yomiuri Newspaper} (June 27, 1952), discussing the Bloody May Day and Suita incidents, stated that “it is very regrettable that riots, arson, murder, and wounding are repeated on memorial days. Since we cannot ignore these actions, we need to come up with effective and appropriate measures quickly.” A series of malicious and provocative articles followed in the \textit{Yomiuri Newspaper}, such as “Communist Terrorist Group Infiltrating Japan: The 30,000 Korean Residents” (March 30, 1952), “The Identity of the Fatherland Defense Corps of North Korea Revealed: The 30,000 Special Forces of Blood” (July 16, 1952), and “800,000 North Korean Forces Infiltrating Japan, Organizing under Japanese Communist Party” (July

\textsuperscript{19} On postwar discourses on the “cultural” and “pacifist” nation, refer to Akazawa (1995); Asano (2004); Jo Gwan Ja (2012).
17, 1952). On August 7, 1952, an article entitled “Taxpayers’ Money Spent on Communist Koreans” criticized government spending on Korean residents’ living expenses, arguing that the payment was too big and that the funds were backfiring by protecting the “Communist Koreans,” providing funds for their activities. Nakamura Torata of the Japan Reform Party spoke in the plenary session of the House of Representatives on June 30, 1952. He stated, “Korean residents violating the laws of Japan and creating disorder in Japanese society must be deported,” resembling the arguments and hostility against Korean residents found in right wing views on the internet today. Although the tone and degree of statements varied, Asahi Newspaper and Mainichi Newspaper also frequently criticized and expressed concern over the riots instigated by North Korea affiliated Korean residents (“Seizei bōryoku,” 1952; “Shasetsu: Zainichi Chōsenjin,” 1952).

Given the situation, the left’s literary circles, composed of Korean residents, members of the New Japanese Literary Society (Shin Nihon Bungakukai), some conscientious Japanese who had relations with Korea, and progressive intellectuals and journalists, began to criticize Japan’s approach to the Korean resident problem, as well as Japan’s colonial past. For instance, the members of the New Japanese Literary Society published Democratic Korea (Minshu Chōsen), first issued in 1946 by Zainichi Korean writers like Kim Dal-soo and Huh Nam-ki. They contributed numerous articles questioning Japan’s colonial past in the journal’s special issue for the March First Independence Movement (March/April 1947) (Ko Yŏng-ran 2013). Tsuboi Shigeji—publisher of New Japanese Literature (Shin Nihon Bungaku) and poet—published his poem “15.50 Yen” in New Japanese Literature in April 1948, recollecting his personal experiences and observations of the Korean massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake. Tsuboi’s questioning of the Korean massacre in the poem predated later research that focused on the Great Kantō Earthquake. Many Korean residents,

21. Other columns urged that a one-shot policy to solve the Zainichi Korean problems would be difficult, and therefore suggested a comprehensive plan for life support and protection for Zainichi Koreans (“Chōsenjin no mondai,” 1952).
22. Tsuboi Shigeji (1897-1975) was born in Kagawa Prefecture. When he left Waseda University, he joined the literary circle and was appointed as the central committee member of Japan Proletarian Literary Alliance (Nihon Puoretaria Bungei Renmei). In the postwar years, Tsuboi played an active role as a member of Japanese Communist Party, as well as the leader of the New Japanese Literary Society and Japanese Poet Society.
23. On the fortieth anniversary of the Great Kantō Earthquake in 1963, protest movements occurred across Japan, including protests against Korea-Japan normalization. Numerous
intellectuals, and left wing politicians began to refer to the massacre, as they found the incident similar to the growing unilateral and malicious condemnation of Korean residents in Japan (Suzuki 1952; “Chōsenjin gyakusatus”, 1952). In his later publication in the Tokyo Newspaper, Tsuboi severely criticized the GGK for banning the use of Korean language during the colonial era.

When novelist Yasutaka Tokuzō wrote “Literature of National Anguish” in the Tokyo Newspaper on March 24-25, 1952, he introduced the works by Kim Sa-ryang, Chang Hyŏk-ju, Aoki Hiroshi [Hong Chong-u], Kim Dal-soo, and others as representative Korean writers, portraying the struggles of Koreans under Japan’s colonial rule. The questioning of Japan’s colonial domination in these works predated the cluster of studies on the colonial era (imperialism) which began to proliferate in the 1970s.

Among the Japanese who were directly or indirectly involved with Korea—those with friends and relatives (“Korea networks”)—also began to criticize Japan’s colonial rule. Korean history researcher (Koryŏ and Chosŏn Dynasties), Hatada Takashi,24 for instance, was born in Masan, Kyŏngnam Province of Korea, and published a book entitled The History of Korea in 1951 with Japan’s renowned publisher, Iwanami Shoten. In the introduction, Hatada argued that Japan’s prewar studies on Korean history had been influenced by Japan’s regional strategy and expressed sympathy to Koreans suffering from the Korean War. Hatada’s work was one of the first publications to compile Korean history from ancient to modern times. With the publication of the English version of the book, Hatada’s work became widely read. It should be noted that the work remained limited in that Hatada shared a similar prewar conceptual framework for Korea—setting the discussion within the topics of ancient Japan’s rule over Korea, and the assumption that Korea was culturally inferior.25 Regardless of this limitation, Hatada’s work criticized Japan’s colonization of Korea. Moreover, on July 18-19, 1952, via a column in the Tokyo Newspaper entitled “Korean Residents in Japan and Japanese’s Self-Reflection: Why They Left Their Motherland?,” Hatada appealed for a fundamental self-retrospection by the Japanese. Highlighting how many Korean residents first came to Japan as forced laborers during the colonial era to work in Japan’s businesses and war-related industries,

Hatada argued against deporting Korean residents. During a discussion with Koreans and Japanese intellectuals, Hatada further mentioned that “none of the Japanese repatriates are commenting on the past. Although if they did speak out, they would probably argue that what they did was also beneficial to Korea, it is important to admit the atrocities committed by the Japanese. Aggressors should not be at peace without acknowledging their past” (“Zainichi Chōsenjin no zadankai,” 1952, 10-11). According to Hatada (1983, 287), the former officials of the GGK strongly reacted against Hatada’s publication of *The History of Korea*, claiming that Hatada’s negative representations of the GGK were ill-founded. They also condemned Hatada’s column for “criticizing Japan’s good deeds to Korea” (“Zainichi Chōsenjin no zadankai,” 1952, 10-11).

Lawyer Fuse Tatsuji was involved in various cases defending Korean independence activists during the colonial era. In the postwar years, Fuse defended *Zainichi* Korean activists involved in the Education Struggle, 1950 Chōren (Choryŏn) Hall Incident, 1948 North Korean Flag Incident, and others, working as the advisor to the Liberty Law Group he organized. During a roundtable discussion organized by *Central Review* (Chūō kōron), Fuse argued that if the Japanese understood why *Zainichi* Koreans were brought to Japan in the first place and how they were treated, Japan would not be able to criticize their behavior. Empathizing with their fear of forced deportation and living under oppression, he urged the creation of policies to liberate these people (Ōya et al. 1952, 83). The renowned journalist Ōya Sōichi, Chinese literary scholar Okuno Shintarō, writer Nishino Tatsukichi, and others were also present during this roundtable.

*Asahi Newspaper* journalist Mura Tsuneo (former director of *Keijō Daily News*, Pyŏngyang branch) wrote in *Women’s Review* (Fujin kōron) addressing the historical background of how *Zainichi* Koreans came to Japan. Pointing out how the negative perception of Korean residents at the time was influenced by Japanese repatriates who were seeking to regain their assets left in Korea, Mura urged for a critical reflection of Japan’s past. Furthermore, Mura criticized the fact that the discussion of Korean problems was mostly led by former officials of the GGK, who lacked any understanding of *Zainichi* Koreans’ national sentiments, possessing an outdated nineteenth-century ideology of imperialistic Japan (Mura 1952, 128; Ōya et al. 1952, 83-84).

Hosokawa Karoku (1952, 20), scholar of colonial policies and member of

26. Yamanouchi Ichirō from the University of Tokyo and Matsuo Takashi from Waseda University were also present during the discussions.

27. On the relations between Fuse Tatsuji and *Zainichi* Koreans in the postwar years, refer to Yi Hyŏng-rang (2010); Kawaguchi (2012); Mori (2014).
House of Councilors in the postwar years, denounced Japan's lack of repentance on its past imperialism and atrocities committed against Koreans during the colonial era. He especially criticized Japan's conservative party for oppressing the Zainichi Koreans and the socialist party for remaining silent.

The Assimilation Association's newsletter at the time, titled Assimilation (Dōwa), introduced Korea-related articles published in mainstream newspapers and magazines. This reveals how the former officials of the GGK remained alert to the growing criticisms of their past colonial rule in the Japanese media and intellectual circles. Former editor-in-chief of the Keijō Daily News Nakayasu Yosaku (1952), for instance, called the Japanese criticism of their own colonial past and former Japanese ruling elites as “mentally abused.” He also argued that these intellectuals were merely pandering to the populist discussions on Koreans in the media.

However, as Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, which described Koreans as slaves to Japan under colonial rule, the social atmosphere of Japan evaded discussions that sought to justify the nation’s colonial past. Japan's signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, return to international society, and engagement in Korea-Japan normalization talks reinforced this postwar tendency. The Yūhō Kyōkai strongly opposed this scenario and organized to compile their history of Japan's colonial past.

The Guidelines on the Establishment of Yūhō Kyōkai stated that the existing discourse treated Zainichi Koreans’ “terrorist acts” as merely “reactionary” to oppression in postwar Japanese society. Without questioning the foundational causes of their acts, The Guidelines further stated that Zainichi Koreans were only being allowed to seek Japan’s apology, without any self-reflection themselves (Zaidan hôjin Yūhō Kyōkai setsuritsu yōkō, n.d.). The Yūhō Kyōkai also criticized how Rhee Syngman's anti-Japanese policies were stirring up Zainichi Koreans' anti-Japanese sentiments and contempt for the Japanese colonial era, an argument with which some of the populist Japanese media outlets began to sympathize. These guidelines were explicit in revealing Yūhō Kyōkai’s strong distrust in the Japanese media.

Most of these discussions in the media are based not on facts, but on conclusions deducted from prejudices. Therefore, distortions, exaggerations, and neglect have become prevalent in the media to the level of propaganda, having an immeasurably harmful impact on the people. If left as such, it is plainly clear that the Japanese people will lose their pride and confidence in their country, implant a false conception of Japan in the world, especially to the people of East Asia, and thereby cause a detrimental impact on foreign relations, especially with Korean
nationals in the region. (Yūhō Kyōkai-shi)\textsuperscript{28} (emphasis added)

In other words, the main purpose of Yūhō Kyōkai was to compile the history of Japan’s colonial rule in order to “fix” the media’s “oppressive” and “exploitative” portrayal of the GGK during the colonial era and collect, research, analyze, and disseminate their own findings on their past and Korea’s problems. Keeping a low profile under the censorship of the GHQ and the postwar ideological landscape of Japanese society, the former GGK officials sought to counteract the “collective memory” of oppression and exploitation of the “colonized,” and instead substitute the “colonizers’ collective memory” of development and progress in Japanese society.

2. Compiling the History of Governance

Due to financial difficulties after the founding of Yūhō Kyōkai, their publications were not very active. As part of their work on the Korea problem, Yūhō Kyōkai printed 3,000 copies of The New Reader on Korea (Shin chōsen dokuhon) in August 1953 and distributed or donated them to relevant government offices, schools, libraries, and community leaders in Japan. First published to scrutinize Korea-Japan historical relations and the national characteristics of the Koreans, The New Reader on Korea described Koreans and their history in terms of feudalism, backwardness, toadyism, reactiveness, identity, exclusivity, and ephemerality. Such portrayals indicated that the prewar Japanese ruling elites’ distorted and contemptuous views of Korea persisted.\textsuperscript{29}

When Korea-Japan normalization talks came to a halt with “Kubota’s statement” in October 1953, former GGK officials resented the attitude of Korean delegates and urged fundamental countermeasures to deal with the Korea problem and their colonial past. Considering the Rhee Syngman regime’s anti-Japanese sentiment, these former officials were pessimistic about the prospect of signing a normalization treaty with Korea at the time, and instead waited for a turning point in Korea, such as regime change. Hozumi believed that “nothing can change if we only talk amongst ourselves and do not speak out. Yet, if we blindly believe in the rightness of our actions and fight, we will

\textsuperscript{28} It is an unpublished document stored at the Yūhō Collection. The author and the year of creation are unknown.

\textsuperscript{29} Additionally, conservative polemicist Nagoshi Futaranoosuke described The New Reader on Korea as “a good book that is respectful of Japan’s position,” when introducing the book to Japanese students visiting Korea (Nagoshi Futaranoosuke’s Letter to Kishi Ken, September 11, 1967, Yūhō Collection).
only fool ourselves by showing them our flaws first, which will backfire on us.” On these grounds, Hozumi sought to compile documents and data on their colonial past while waiting for the right time when their past deeds could be “fairly” evaluated (Hozumi Shinrokurō’s Letter to Kōtaki Motoi, June 25, 1965, Kōtaki 1972). As illustrated below, Hozumi’s ideas were materialized into the plans to compile the history of Korea’s industrial development and establish an archive of documents on Korea in 1954.

First, Suzuki Takeo, Funada Kyōji, and other former faculty of Keijō Imperial University participated in compiling the history of Korea’s industrial development. The purpose was to illuminate how Japan’s rule had been critical in Korea’s remarkable leap in industrial development (Tanaka and Hozumi 1954). Put differently, they sought to refute the emerging thesis that all colonial domination is aggressive and exploitative. At the same time, Yūhō Kyōkai prepared to publish an “accurate history” of Japan’s colonial rule (beginning with industrial development). As a joint project with the Central Japanese-Korean Association, Yūhō Kyōkai planned to reorganize the association’s Yamagata Collection and Hashi Collection, compile data on their colonial rule, and publish and reinterpret valuable relevant materials. Under the title of “Data Collection and Compilation Plan of Colonial Rule over Korea,” Yūhō Kyōkai launched its initiative to begin the joint program, with costs totaling seventy-two-million yen. In March 1955, they began the first phase of the plan—fundraising. Director Kimijima, inaugurated in October 1954 with the help of director Hayashi Shigeki, sought to raise funds from the Bank of Japan, Japan’s First Bank, Tokyo Bankers Association (Tokyo Ginkō Kyōkai), Fuji Bank, Sanwa Bank, Yamaichi Securities, and others. However, as “there were still no responses from the government,” fundraising remained as a major challenge to Yūhō Kyōkai. According to the 1954 proposal to launch the history compilation project on Korea’s industrial

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*Source: Yūhō Kyōkai-shi (n.d.). Amount below 10,000 were rounded up.
Table 3. Main Publications by *Yūhō Kyōkai*

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<td>New Reader on Korea</td>
<td>Kondō Ken'ichi</td>
<td>1953</td>
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<td>References on the History of Korea’s Development in Fiscal and Monetary Systems</td>
<td>Kondō Ken'ichi</td>
<td>1956</td>
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<td>Annexation and Protection of Korea</td>
<td>Kondō Ken'ichi</td>
<td>1956</td>
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<td>Records on the Government General of Korea at the End of the War</td>
<td>Yamana Mikio</td>
<td>1956</td>
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<td>Collection of Important Documents on Korean Electricity</td>
<td>Kishi Ken and Kondō Ken'ichi</td>
<td>1958</td>
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<td>Overview of Korea’s Public Works</td>
<td>Shinba Kōhei</td>
<td>1959</td>
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<td>Collection of Contemporary Research on the Modern History of Korea (1)</td>
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<td>1959</td>
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<td>History of Korean Agriculture: Policy</td>
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<td>1959</td>
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<td>History of Korean Land Improvement Projects</td>
<td>Furushō Itsuo</td>
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<td>Korea and Taiwan during the Pacific War</td>
<td>Kondō Ken'ichi</td>
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<td>List of Literature and Documents Related to Korea</td>
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<td>Analysis on Governing Korea and Its End through Fiscal and Financial Policy</td>
<td>Mizuta Naomasa and Tsuchiya Takao</td>
<td>1962</td>
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<td>Korea during the Pacific War (1)</td>
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<td>Korea Manse Incident (March First Independence Movement) (3)</td>
<td>Kondō Ken'ichi</td>
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development, the donations accrued at Yūhō Kyōkai increased from 350,000 yen to 1.5 million yen. Nevertheless, as aforementioned, even the annual reports for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were cursorily prepared, as Yūhō Kyōkai paid little attention to accounting at the time. Fiscal reports became available only by 1959, and funds began to increase after 1962 (see table 2).

The main purpose for founding the archive of documents on Korea was for Yūhō Kyōkai to actively respond to the growing “historicization” tendency of Japanese interpretation of the nation’s colonial past, and pursue a more realistic and justifiable—according to their views—conception of Korea. They sought to collect and categorize both old and new literature, documents, and data on Korea and provide the materials to researchers.

Table 3 is the list of Yūhō Kyōkai’s publications from its founding to 1964. These Yūhō publications enabled Hozumi to enact his plan to compile a history of Korea’s industrial development. In 1955, Yūhō Kyōkai planned to publish The History of Korea’s Fiscal and Financial Development with Suzuki Takeo, drawing upon the experiences of former GGK officials. The References on the History of Korea’s Development in Fiscal and Monetary Systems, listed in table 3, was published in preparation for this project. The publication of this material had been financed by over ten banks, including the Bank of Japan, Japan’s First Bank, Fuji Bank, Sanwa Bank, and others (“Yūhō Kyōkai no jigyō ni tsuite” [On Yūhō Kyōkai’s Businesses], attached to Shibuya Reiji’s Letter to Kimijima Ichirō, March 19, 1957, Yūhō Collection). The third publication listed in table 3, Annexation and Protection of Korea, was distributed to Japanese government offices, libraries, and other general archives. As Yūhō Kyōkai viewed the material as an “essential reference” to understand the Korea problem, the main purpose of this publication was to refute the Korean position during the Korea-Japan normalization talks that the annexation of Korea was illegal. Yūhō’s publications until 1964 were mostly duplications of former documents of the GGK and rarely included direct records or descriptions of the GGK officials’ actual experiences.

3. The Publication of the Yūhō Series

The publications of Yūhō Kyōkai proliferated in 1965 as Korea and Japan normalized relations. When Forty Years of Manchuria Development was published in 1964, the members of Yūhō Kyōkai decided on the need to publish The History of Ruling Taiwan and The History of the Government General of Korea. However, Yūhō Kyōkai decided to postpone their original plan to publish their History of the Government General of Korea for another 100 years. Finding it more urgent to actually collect and organize the vast amount of empirical
data, *Yūhō Kyōkai* began instead to focus on publishing the *Yūhō* Series, which compiled voice and written recordings of the people directly and indirectly involved in Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. When Korea and Japan finally normalized relations, *Yūhō Kyōkai* sought to use the momentum to discuss prospective projects for the association and search for new funds to run these programs. Kimijima, for instance, went to a party hosted by the president of the Bank of Japan on April 1, 1966, and submitted *Yūhō Kyōkai*-related documents, asking for donations from President Usami Makoto and Vice President Sasaki Tadashi (*Kimijima Ichirō’s Diary, April 1, 1966, Kimijima Ichirō-Related Documents*). *Yūhō Kyōkai* sought to increase their funds with their personnel connections in the Bank of Japan and throughout economic and political spheres across Japan.

After *Yūhō Kyōkai* received a subsidy of one-million yen from the government in March 1968, President of Japan-Korea Economic Association Uehara Kōgorō (president of *Keidanren*), Vice President Andō Toyoroku, and other Korea related Japanese corporations formed a support organization for the *Yūhō Kyōkai* in July of that year. The Japan-Korea Economic Association had been founded by President of Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry Adachi Tadashi, Vice President of *Keidanren* Uemura, and *Zainichi* Korean businessmen Sŏ Kap-ho and Yu Kang-u in December 1960 to facilitate the normalization of Korea-Japan relations and economic exchanges.

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30. According to Hozumi’s report in July 1968, the *Yūhō Kyōkai* accumulated a total of 4.31 million yen since April 1967 from the following sources: Kajima Corporation (300,000 yen), Nishimatsu Construction (300,000 yen), Sumitomo Real Estate (200,000 yen), Bank of Korea Tokyo Branch (10,000 yen), Shimizu Corporation (100,000 yen), Tokyo Bankers Association with sixteen banks in total (1.5 million yen), Yasushi Electric (50,000 yen), Yawata Steel (100,000 yen), Nihon Kōei (100,000 yen), Japan Airlines (50,000 yen), cabinet secretary (one-million yen), TEPCO (200,000 yen), and Fuji Steel Corporation (100,000 yen).

31. Uehara visited Korea in 1962 as the head of the economic mission and agreed with Park Chung-hee to collaborate on his regime’s First Five-Year Economic Development Plan. As Uehara became president of the Japan-Korea Economic Association, he also came to serve as the bridge between the Japanese and Korean economic circles (*Uehara Kōgorō Denkishitsu 1979, 320-21)*.

32. The founding members of the association include: Uehara Kōgorō, Andō Toyoroku (president, Onoda Cement Co., Ltd.), Egashira Yutaka (Chisso Corporation), Kajima Morinosuke (Kajima Corporation), Kubota Yutaka (chairman, Nihon Kōei Co., Ltd.), Dokō Toshio (president, Tokyo Shibaura Electric Co., Ltd.), Nakajima Masaki (president, Mitsubishi Steel Corporation), Nakayasu Shūichi (president, Ube Industries, Ltd.), Nagano Shigeo (president, Fuji Steel Corporation), Hasegawa Jūsaburō (president, Daichi Bank Ltd.), Fujii Ryōgo (vice president, Yahata Steel Corporation), Hoshino Kiyoji (chairman of Real Estate Bank), Matsuo Shizuma (president, Nihon Airport Co., Ltd.), Matsuyama Mosuke (chairman, Sapporo Beer Co., Ltd.), Miyazaki Kagayaki (president, Asahi Chemical Industry Co., Ltd.), and Yoshikawa Seiichi (president, Shimizu Corporation).

To provide information on Korea to its members, the Japan-Korea Economic Association published regular periodicals, such as the News Bulletin and Monthly Reports. While Keidanren asked for more practical research on the situation in Korea for Japanese businesses to evaluate their prospects for re-entry into the Korean market, Yūhō Kyōkai prioritized publishing materials on their past colonial rule. They planned to receive a 50,000-yen donation from each prominent businessman. In specific, the Yūhō Kyōkai raised funds from the Tokyo Bankers Association with the help of Mizuta, as well as from the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan via Uehara's connections. Inferable from these donations by the private sector is that many Japanese businesses supported Yūhō Kyōkai's publications, mainly to create a favorable environment for them to re-enter the Korean market. Their business incentives converged around Yūhō Kyōkai's goal of replacing the "exploitative and repressive" portrayal of Japan's colonial past with a more benign emphasis on the "development and progress" that Japanese rule brought to Korea.

When Hozumi passed away in May 1970, Mizuta was endorsed as the next president of Yūhō Kyōkai. However, Mizuta declined, and the board promoted Kimijima as the head of directors and Mizuta as vice-head of directors. Yet, as Mizuta continued to decline the endorsements, the board finally settled on Kimijima as the next president and Mizuta as chairman of Yūhō Kyōkai. This process involved revising the original memorandum of the association and enlarging the total number of directors and members. The inauguration of Kimijima and Mizuta, who had influential connections in Japan's business circles, allowed Yūhō Kyōkai to increase their funds significantly and run their programs more stably than before. In 1971, a second support association was formed to raise funds of up to eighteen-million yen for the next three years. According to a letter sent to their founding members in June 1973, Yūhō Kyōkai emphasized "how Japan's postwar publishing and media circles are becoming predominated by leftists who consistently portray Japan's colonial past as oppressive and exploitative of Korea. Since we cannot ignore a situation in which incorrect history is being taught, Yūhō Kyōkai was founded to pass down history in its entirety through firsthand materials and recordings of the experiences of individuals involved in both the private and public sectors during Japan's rule of Korea." From 1971 to 1973, Yūhō Kyōkai accrued a total of 19.25 million yen, far exceeding the original amount proposed. When Kimijima passed away in 1975, Yūhō Kyōkai's fundraising efforts became dormant. However, once Mizuta replaced Kimijima as the next president, the fundraising began to pick up again.

Starting from 1966, thirty titles of the "Research on Historical Records of
Modern Korea: Yūhō Series” were published. While the Yūhō publications until 1964 were mostly duplicates of the original documents from the GGK, the publications after 1966 were distinguishable by the direct records of former officials’ testimonies on governing Korea. This Yūhō Series was distributed to universities and public libraries in Japan and abroad to refute the growing criticism of their colonial rule among Japanese intellectual, media, and cultural circles.

Specifically, the first and second titles of the Yūhō Series (“Research on Korea’s Land” and “Korean Rice and Japan’s Food Shortage Problem”) were published to refute Hatada Takashi’s criticisms of the GGK’s Land Inquiry Project and Rice Crop Production Enhancement Plan. The third title (“Korean Language Education in Korea under Japan’s Colonial Rule”) was intended to refute Tsuboi Shigeji’s critique of the GGK’s Korean language ban. As the former officials considered Korea-Japan normalization as the final “seal” or settlement to the problem of Japan’s responsibility of colonizing Korea, they no longer suppressed their views of their past. Yūhō Kyōkai began to directly challenge the perception of renowned scholars. On a television program in October 1966, Inoki Masamichi, professor of law at Kyoto University, and Prime Minister Satō Eisaku mentioned how the GGK banned Korean language education and oppressed Koreans during the colonial era. Yūhō Kyōkai responded by sending them their Yūhō Series (Kawase Osamu’s Letter to Kōtaki Motoi, October 3, 1966, Yūhō Collection). When Yanaihara Isaku—philosopher and eldest son of Yanaihara Tadao—published an article in the Japanese Economic Newspaper (Nihon keizai shinbun) on March 16, 1967, mentioning compiling a Korean dictionary, Hozumi sent the following letter to Yanaihara:

Your discussion of a “Korean dictionary” in the column you published in the corner of “Tomorrow’s Issue” in the Japanese Economic Newspaper on March 16, 1967, greatly lacks understanding of the issue. It is regrettable to see such an influential figure like yourself write such a column in the media. Although Japan’s colonial rule over Korea was, at times, excessive during the Second World War (which has to be considered in the context of Japan’s political situation), the main purpose of the GGK was always to develop Korea’s culture and economy to the level of Japan. … There was no ban of the use of Korean nor enforced use of Japanese. … Please read the attached “Korean Language Education in Korea under Japan’s Colonial Rule,” and I hope you can change your perception.

(Hozumi Shinrokurō’s Letter to Yanaihara Isaku, March 20, 1967, Yūhō Collection) (emphasis added)

As Hozumi pointed out, a Korean dictionary was already published by the GGK in the 1920s. However, although he knew that Japan banned the use of
Korean and enforced Japanese during the Japanization policy period, these statements reveal Hozumi's efforts to conceal facts that were disadvantageous to them. As illustrated, the Yūhō Series was devised to “fix” the conception of Japanese intellectuals who were largely “ignorant” on Japan's colonial past.

Conclusion

This article examined the background and the process of establishment of Yūhō Kyōkai, and its compilation projects on the history on Japan's colonial rule over Korea from the point of view of former GGK officials.

Postwar Japanese society sought to erase the memories of the nation’s colonial past after their defeat in the war. However, as the colonial problem of Korean residents in Japan lingered, along with the outbreak of the Korean War, the so-called “Korea problem” emerged as an important issue in Japanese society. It was against this backdrop that the past ruling elites of the colonial era organized into Yūhō Kyōkai with the support of repatriated Japanese corporations and Korea-related firms.

As the Fatherland Defense Forces of Choryŏn sought to expand their influence after the outbreak of the Korean War, Japanese newspapers and magazines became a fierce battleground between the left and right on the problem of Korean residents and Japan's colonial rule over Korea. The newspapers and magazines of the right consistently spread malicious reports on Koreans in Japan and outwardly expressed their contempt and discrimination against them. In response, the left literary circles composed of Korean residents, members of the New Japanese Literary Society, some conscientious Japanese who had relations with Korea, and progressive intellectuals and journalists began to criticize Japan's approach to Korean resident problems in Japan, as well as Japan's colonial past. The former officials of the GGK who had been keeping a low profile under the GHQ's censorship and postwar Japanese society, which sought to shift from prewar militarism towards a “cultural” and “pacifist” Japan, began to challenge the “collective memory” of oppression and exploitation of the “colonized.” Instead, they disseminated the “colonizers’ collective memory” of development and progress in Japanese society. With the support of Japan's economic circles, including the Japan-Korea Economic Association, which sought to regain their market in Korea, the Yūhō Kyōkai established historical archives on the colonial era (Yūhō Collection, Historical Records on the Rule over Korea, Yūhō Series, etc.). These were efforts to historicize the collective memories of colonizers. Among the former GGK officials, the 1965 Korea-Japan
normalization agreement was a final settlement on the issues surrounding Japan’s responsibilities for colonizing Korea. With this occasion and Japan’s rapid economic growth at the time, these collective memories of former colonial officials evolved into public memories, significantly influencing Japan’s postwar conception of the colonial era.

• Translated by JO Bee Yun

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