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국제학석사학위논문

**The Korea-U.S. Relations in the 1980s:
Asymmetry between Security and Trade during the
Reagan-Chun Era**

1980년대 한미관계:

레이건-전두환 정부 간 안보·통상관계의 불균형을 중심으로

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尹智暎

Master's Thesis

**The Korea-U.S. Relations in the 1980s:
Asymmetry between Security and Trade during the
Reagan-Chun Era**

A thesis by

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Graduate Program in International Cooperation
For the Degree of Master of International Studies

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Seoul, Republic of Korea**

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ABSTRACT

Established studies reviewing on Korea-U.S. relation in the 1980s have mainly examined Gwangju Uprising and the issue of the responsibility for the U.S. intervention focusing on security and diplomatic relations between the two nations. The relations between the two governments representing the 1980s were assessed as rather 'amicable' based on the strengthened security ties. However, studies focusing on trade relations between the two governments view the 1980s as the era of intensified tensions. Thus, by examining declassified documents published by the U.S. government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, the paper re-verifies the asymmetric nature of the relations; strengthened security alliance and intensified trade conflicts between the two nations. In addition, as Trump administration proclaims protectionism glorifying the Reagan era, reviewing the systematic differences between the past and current Korea-U.S. relations would be a meaningful work. Through this, the paper reviews the relations more comprehensively hoping to contribute to understand not only the current situations Korea is facing but also the future challenges it would encounter with the U.S.

Keywords: *Korea-U.S. Relations in the 1980s, Reagan, Chun Doo-Hwan, Asymmetry between Security and Trade, U.S. Policy towards Korea in the 1980s, GATT Beef Case*

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ABSTRACT IN KOREAN

REFERENCES

I. INTRODUCTION

Through the years, the Korea-U.S. (hereinafter; KOR-U.S.) relations have experienced dynamic changes as international and domestic situations vary. Entirely dependent on the U.S., Korea was a recipient country and one of the least-developed countries in the world until 1950s. According to Han (1980), the U.S. was a protector and a provider in the 1950. After the Korean War, the country was divided and had nothing left in its hands. In 1960s, however, since Korea started to achieve marvelous economic development, the well-known ‘Miracle of the Han River’, the relations between the Korea and the U.S. also has started to develop in a more compound way not limited to erstwhile ‘Donor-Recipient’ or ‘Protector – Client’ relations.

Park (2006) analyzed the relations during 1960s as ‘Core-Periphery’ based on the ‘Dependency theory’¹. The U.S., the core state, deeply engaged in Korea’s affairs with its economic and military power represented as loan and operational command authority. In 1970s, with the efforts of Korea to achieve its

¹Dependency theory explains the development of emerging countries dichotomizing the world into ‘Core States’ and ‘Peripheral States’. Simply put, ‘Peripheral States’ are dependent on ‘Core States’ both economically and politically. ‘Core States’ exploit the ‘Peripheral States’ for their development so the gap between ‘Core’ and ‘Periphery’ becomes wider. For more details, See below.

Halperin, Sandra. 2013. “Dependency Theory.” Accessed June 11. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/development-theory#ref1181038>

‘self-reliance’, the KOR-U.S. relations became more complex and complicated. Though limited, Korea attempted to make a room for itself in the process of its own policy making and the U.S. recognized that it could no longer apply the erstwhile approach towards Korea.

However, the fact that Korea is still divided with North Korean threat hanging in the air while the U.S. has taken the wartime control represents the continuity among the dynamics the two nations had. Particularly, with the recent election of President Trump, the issue of USFK (U.S. Armed Forces in Korea, hereinafter USFK) and the trade balance of two nations have been re-explored. These events indicate the present relation between the two countries is an extension of the past, however developed.

President Trump’s ‘America first’ and his remarks on the trade deficit t found their causes in the Korea’s ‘unfair trade’ treatments. This reminded many scholars of 1980s when President Reagan proclaimed ‘Let’s make America great again’ while strengthening trade pressures towards foreign nations. 1980s were not only the era of the ‘New Cold War’ but also the era of economic recession for the U.S. Security tensions had built up having the fall of the Soviet Union ahead while the U.S. suffered from stagnation and growing trade deficit. Elected as the President of the U.S., Reagan had two main statements; ‘Peace through strength’ based on expansion of the military power and

‘Reaganomics’ based on extensive tax cuts and deregulations.

The U.S.’s emphasis on a stronger security alliance was welcomed in Korea. The U.S.’s pursuit of withdrawal of the USFK during the Carter administration was a challenge for Korea. However, as Reagan pronounced the Soviet as the ‘Evil Empire’, he reassured the U.S.’s security interests in the region and as a result, security ties between the U.S. and Korea were also reinforced. Therefore, under the Chun regime, yet another military regime approved by the U.S. despite the retreat of democracy in the peninsula, Korea and the U.S. had quite amicable relations overall compared to the previous relations the two nations had.

In 1981, immediately after his inauguration, President Chun of Korea was officially invited to visit Washington and the memorandum written by Richard Allen, the former national security advisor in Reagan administration stressed that the meeting with Chun would give ‘a powerful signal to all of Asia’ and represent that the U.S. were ‘cognizant of the vital interests of the Free World in Asia’. Thus, the U.S. reassured Korea that it would not withdraw the U.S. Troops in the region laboring its intention to support Korea both militarily and economically.

Nevertheless, the trade between the two nations put an entirely different complexion on KOR-U.S. relations during the Reagan-Chun era. With the U.S.

economic recession during the 1980s along with its growing trade deficit, the U.S. blamed foreigners for its hardships. Especially, as Korea started to record trade surplus with the U.S. in 1982, the trade conflicts between the two nations were mounted. Although the U.S. showed rather docile attitude towards Korea in regard of trade making concessions on Korea's economic situation compared to its severe pressures on Japan, as Korea's performance of trade improved in the 80s, the Reagan administration raised its level of trade pressure towards Korea.

In 1983, when 'KOR-U.S. Commission on Trade' was held in Washington, the U.S. asked Korea deeper and broader market liberalization while imposing international responsibility on Korea's economic development. To the U.S., Korea was no longer a poor nation in need of aids and donation but rather an 'advanced developing country' along with Brazil, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Especially, as the economic situation in the U.S. showed gloomy outlook, the U.S. had internal pressure from the congress to downsize the benefits the U.S. offered to developing countries such as Generalized System of Preferences (hereinafter; GSP).

Though the Reagan administration supported the Chun regime politically, particularly in pursuit of security alliance, the alliance was not as amicable in the perspective of economy. From the U.S.'s point of view, Korea was no longer

in need of concession but it still was on the unfair ground utilizing its status as a developing country. The U.S.'s complaint against Korea on its beef import restrictions to GATT in 1988 is a decisive manifestation of the U.S.'s trade pressure. Despite the amicable political relations or strengthened security ties between the two countries, the U.S.'s trade pressure was at its peak. As the trade conflicts grew, the significance of the economy in the KOR-U.S. relations was also expanded. This signify the unique feature, the contrasting and asymmetric nature, of the KOR-U.S. relations during the Reagan-Chun era; separation of security and economic ties between the two nations and the transition of a significance in the U.S. policy towards Korea.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Majority of the established studies addressing on the KOR-U.S relationships or the U.S policy towards Korea in the Reagan-Chun era focused on the Gwangju Uprising and the issue of the responsibility for the U.S intervention. It is an orthodox that the U.S supported the military intervention to suppress the Gwangju Uprising, which in result represented the U.S support for the Chun regime. To many Koreans, such acts were outraging. The U.S had continuously

argued for the development of democracy in Korea. However, the intervention helped to establish another military regime in Korea which was far from democratic government and many scholars studying the 1980s agree that the intervention became the root of the Korea's anti-Americanism (Katsiaficas 2006; Park 2006; Chung 2010; Park 2011).

In particular, Katsiaficas (2006) argued that the main concerns of the U.S. during the time were almost solely focused on its economic interests; securing the U.S. investments in Korea and liberalization of the Korean economy. By examining the U.S. embassy documents along with memoirs of then-U.S. Ambassador Gleysteen and Commanding General Wickham, Katsiaficas stated that the U.S. had believed the Chun's regime could stabilize the country with its military leadership so that it would bring more stabilized business environment for the U.S. For the U.S., the Chun regime was a useful instrument or a measure to execute the economic policy as it like and Chun, who was approved by the U.S. as a result, faithfully fulfilled the demand of the U.S. According to Katsiaficas, the fact that import liberalization and deregulation of foreign investments were greatly implemented in the 1980s was the embodiment of the outcome of the Gwangju Uprising. These fulfillments left Korea with massive foreign debts and after a decade, Korea suffered through Asian Financial Crisis - so called 1997 IMF crisis.

Unlike Katsiaficas who insisted the U.S. decision for supporting the Gwangju Uprising had derived mainly from its economic interests, other scholars such as Chang (2013) and Park (2011) looked the KOR-U.S. relationship in 1980s in the perspective of the U.S.'s security interests. Chang claimed that though the U.S. had had stated that the final goals for Korea were democratic prosperity and peaceful re-unification it eventually chose political stability over democratic government bearing risks of North Korea invasion. For the conservative Reagan administration, stability of the Korean peninsula was necessary for its maintenance and increases of the influence in the region. Thus, Chang argued, the human right issues or the development of democracy were not discussed officially and publicly between the two nations. Reagan provided the approval with the commitment and the support of the U.S. in the area of security and economy while Korea humored them with what could be sensitive such as treatment issue of Kim Dae-Jung. The coordination of the two governments in such way in the 1980s demonstrated the alliance the two were having; not a 'value-alliance' but a 'security-alliance', according to Chang.

Park, though his analysis on the U.S.'s chief concerns or motivation for the intervention is in line with Chang's, he concluded that the U.S. was more in the middle ground between 'active coordination' and 'potential approval' by focusing on the international variances. With the Iran Hostage Crisis and the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Carter administration's attention to security both in and out the allied nations was at its full-swing. Especially, the U.S. didn't want Korea to have another crisis as that of Iran and it needed Korea to be secured so that the U.S could strengthen its military power in the Indian Ocean in case there had been any armed conflict with the Soviet Union. This also meant the U.S. was in need of cooperation from its allies. Chun government made full use of these circumstances by stimulating anxiety of the U.S. Therefore, during the Gwangju Uprising the U.S. who wanted stable Korea actively intervened requiring prudent military operation but not saying no to the military intervention itself.

In these attempts to examine what made the U.S. intervene and support the establishment of the Chun regime, Chung (2010) and Park (2006) took a step forward and pointed out the fact that there was also 'Korea variance' at play. Chung argued that the established studies on the Gwangju Uprising underscored the responsibility of the U.S. stressing that the advent of the New Cold War became the decisive factor for the rise of the new military regime or the U.S. pursuit of the national interests as an imperial hegemon. According to then-U.S Ambassador Gleysteen and Commanding General Wickham, Korea was suffering from the internal factors such as passivity of its people, lack of leadership and social division. They insisted that the U.S.'s impact on Korea

was limited and these domestic factors were more crucial and Chung agreed on the fact that no matter how deeply involved the U.S. was, it was limited external factor so Korea held a position of the primary responsibility to political changes developed in Korea. Though his arguments are pointing out the significance of the internal or domestic influences, it seems to be an outreach to conclude this in reliance of Gleysteen and Wickham's memoirs. The documents released in the U.S. between 1979 and 1980 showed fairly negative view towards the Korean. Particularly, it is noteworthy that Gleysteen referred to Korean as a "society of garlic and pepper eating combatants" while calling the opposition forces "a handful of Christian extremist dissidents". (Park, 2006) Thus, the acknowledgement of the Korea factor is a notable achievement while it seems to set a foot on the dubious ground.

Park pinpointed this bias expressed by then-U.S. government and the U.S embassy in Korea. He acknowledged that there might be 'Orientalism' lain underneath their perspectives of Korea, the nation of 'un-chosen' people unlike the westerners. However, he argued Korean politicians certainly were liable for what happened in 1980. Whenever there was a critical condition in the country, Korean politicians were dependent on the U.S. putting personal gains before a good cause. Especially, the opposition party and the pro-democracy demonstrators who were so suppressed that they believed only the U.S. could

overthrow the military regime, mistakenly and irresponsibly followed the U.S. However this eventually became one of the main factors that made U.S. endorse another military regime which were seemingly more stable.

In addition to the studies focused on diplomatic relations the two nations had, Lee's paper navigated trade relations between the two countries. He argued that the U.S. trade policy had shown a shift since the WWII as the U.S.'s global economic power had changed. Until 1960s, the U.S. was an ardent seeker of 'free trade' and pursued worldwide trade liberalization. However, through the 1970s, as its global economic power dwindled, protectionism gained ascendancy over its free-trade policy. In 1980s, with the economic recession the U.S.'s export-protectionism was much strengthened and Korea was no exception. (Lee, 2000)

As the Gwangju uprising marked the start of another military regime in Korea with the support of the U.S., the significance it has in the KOR-U.S. relations is appreciable. The aforementioned papers and the documents of the time are also valuable data to examine the U.S. policy towards Korea in the transition period. Chung and Park's studies are particularly meaningful as they provided a Korea side of the story among the established researches mainly emphasizing the U.S.'s role and interests during the Gwangju Uprising.

However, as most of them mainly examined the Gwangju Uprising, the

KOR-U.S. relationship through the 1980s has not much been the subject despite its values and impacts on the future relationship between the two nations. In addition, most of the established studies focused on the diplomatic relations between the two countries leaving the trade relations untouched. Studies on the trade relations were discussed in the commerce area which is concentrated more on international trade disputes or process and limitations of the dispute settlement system such as GATT or WTO separately. Thus, in spite of the asymmetric nature between the diplomatic and economic relations, there is a dearth of studies navigating the general features of the two governments in the 1980s which can provide the overall and comprehensive perspectives of the development of the relations between the two nations.

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS

3.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As aforementioned, the KOR-U.S. relations in the 1980s were assessed as rather ‘smooth’, ‘amicable’ (Chung, 2010), and even as ‘enjoying honeymoon’ (Chang and Kim, 2013). However, in terms of the trade relations, 1980s were the era when trade conflicts between the two nations dramatically increased.

The GATT dispute case; Korea – Restrictions on Imports of Beef in 1988 is the primary case which well-represents the tensions between the two nations.

In 1985, Korean government restricted beef imports due to the collapse of a domestic cow price. For the next three years, beef imports in Korea were stopped all together and there was no commercial beef imported to Korea until 1988. Again, the USTR initiated an investigation on this issue under the Section 301, but this time the U.S. also brought this case to GATT. It was the first international dispute case Korea had. Korea argued that the quantitative restriction was justified under the GATT exception rule; XVIII:B which allowed developing countries suffering from poor Balance of Payment to rightfully restrict imports while the U.S. argued that due to Korea's development, Korea was no longer justified to have a such concessional term. Unfortunately for Korea, GATT accepted the U.S.'s arguments and Korea was graduated from the GATT XVIII:B, losing legal protections to import liberalization.

Then, the question to be asked is whether the two countries really had 'smooth' relations. Did the two countries really have 'smooth' relations as they proclaimed to the public? And if they indeed had such a friendly relations, why the U.S and Korea underwent such growing tensions regarding trade issues? What made the U.S. actively pursue its economic interests with Korea? Finally,

what implications can be drawn from this asymmetry to the current KOR-U.S. relations that are claimed to be in line with 1980s?

3.2 METHODS

To answer these questions, this study focused on the specific relations between Reagan administration and the Chun regime in order to assess the KOR-U.S. in the 1980s. It is because not only the two administration were the main actors leading the 1980s, but also they show stark asymmetry of the alliance between security and trade.

Therefore, the period of analysis is from the 1981 - the establishment of the two governments; the Chun Regime of Korea and the Reagan administration in the U.S., - to 1988 GATT case on Korea's restrictions on imports of beef. Since there have been numerous established studies on the Gwangju Uprising, this paper has not included the event despite its significance on the relations of the two administrations. Secondly, not only the GATT beef case was a first international lawsuit Korea experienced, it was also a crucial case indicating heightened tension on trade between the two nations. As a result of the U.S.'s complaint against Korea on its import restrictions of beef, Korea was ruled to graduate from its Balance of Payment protection from the GATT and entered into more level playing field for the first time in the modern history. Therefore,

it would be meaningful to review the process.

This paper examines the relations between the two administrations through the unclassified documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea during the Chun regime and the documents from the U.S. governments related to the Reagan administration. In addition, the paper reviewed the newspapers published at the time and data on the economy of the U.S. and Korea. There are still many unrevealed government documents, so when they are published later, it will contribute to the field of study to have more concrete and complete picture of the time.

3.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Based on the de-classified documents and papers, this paper attempts to provide the more comprehensive perspective of KOR-U.S. relations in the 80s; the Reagan-Chun era while finding implications meaningful for the current time.

By examining the asymmetric development in the 1980s, the study re-verifies the arguments of the established studies that the U.S. had vital security interests in the Asia and the two governments – Chun and Reagan Administration - had a smooth diplomatic relations based on strengthened security alliances while the trade pressures were growing on the other side.

It has its significance on today's KOR-U.S. relations as Trump, the current president of the U.S., has been ventilating his hard protectionist view accusing its trade partners including Korea of its vast trade deficit.

With the analysis of the 1980s, the paper implies that though the current president of the U.S. claims to bring back the glory of the Reagan era insisting similar slogans and policies, there also exist systematic differences in today's KOR-U.S. relations. With these implications, this paper hopes to contribute to understand not only the current situations Korea is facing but also the future challenges it would encounter with the U.S.

IV. THE BEGINNING OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS

4.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENTS

On December 12, 1979, about two months after the death of the President Park Chung-Hee, then-military man Chun Doo Hwan staged a military coup and came into power. On May 18, 1980, the Gwangju Uprising occurred with the people demanding retreat of the new military group and the establishment of democratic government. Chun took the lead on bloody suppression and four months later, he became the 11th president of Korea through indirect election

system. Korea faced yet another military regime just six months after the fall of Park regime. In March, 1981, again with the indirect election system, Chun became the 12th president of Korea. In his inauguration speech, Chun emphasized national unity to ensure people's safety through 'raging waves of the 1980s' (Maeil Kyungje, 1981) Around the same time, in 1980, Reagan won the election and became the president of the United States in January 1981, with a campaign stating "Let's make the America great again." He claimed 'the strong America', economically affluent and militarily powerful.

4.2 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT BEFORE THE 1980s

1970s were known as the era of 'détente', the easing of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet. In 1972, U.S. and China had reconciliation and the U.S. wanted to reduce the USFK showing less will to intervene in the Peninsula. The same year, South Korea and North Korea announced the 7.4 North-South Joint Statement proclaiming three grand principles for re-unification. In 1976, President Carter, a former president before Reagan, was elected. His basis for the U.S. diplomacy had two distinctive features; diplomacy of morality and human rights. Under his emphasis on the human rights, he pursued withdrawal of nuclear weapons and the U.S. army in South Korea while postponing the production of new armaments. President Carter especially made an issue of

Korea's inferior human rights status. His pacifism achieved the desired outcome as he maintained a hospitable relation with China along with Mao's death and succeeded in having Israel and Egypt where wars had been continued for decades, reconcile in 1978.

However in 1979, when the U.S. allowed Pahlavi to enter the U.S. soil after the fall of his regime, it infuriated Iran people. They occupied the U.S. embassy and took 58 Americans hostages. Carter failed to rescue them. At the end of 1979, to make the matters worse, the Soviet invaded Afghanistan. It meant that Carter's moral diplomacy was too naïve to stand the harsh reality of Cold War. In 1979, Carter's job approval rating fell to 28%, which was cut more than half compared to 1977's 75%. During his final years, Carter's job approval only remained at around 30% (Gallup).

4.3 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS BEFORE THE 1980s

In addition, during the Carter administration, the U.S.'s economic status became far more deteriorated. With two oil shocks in the 70s, the first one in 1973 and the second one in 1978, the global economy was hit hard with galloping oil prices. Advanced economy's overall GDP growth rate fell from 4.0% in 1978 to 2.9% in 1979. Average inflation rate recorded 10.3% while emerging market recorded 32.0% inflation on average. The U.S. and Korea

were no exception. The U.S. Inflation rate which recorded 5.7% in 1976 constantly surged to 13.5% in 1980. Annual GDP growth was also in a bad condition falling from 5.4% in 1976 to -0.2% in 1980. (Table 1) The U.S. was having a perplexing stagnation.

<Table 1> Inflation and GDP Growth of the U.S. (1976~1980)

Year	Inflation	GDP Growth
1976	5.7	5.4
1977	6.5	4.6
1978	7.6	5.6
1979	11.3	3.2
1980	13.5	-0.2

(annual, %)
(Source: World Bank)

In the second quarter of 1980, GDP even fell to -7.9% showing the worst decline since the Great Depression.

Korea also suffered from a sharp increase in prices along with a fall of GDP growth rate. From 1976 to 1980, the inflation rate of Korea kept double digit and in 1980, it rocketed to unprecedented rate of 28.7%. In contrast to the skyrocketed inflation rate, GDP growth continued to fall. In 1980, it even recorded negative growth. (Table 2)

<Table 2>Inflation and GDP Growth of Korea (1976~1980)

Year	Inflation	GDP Growth
1976	15.3	13.5
1977	10.2	11.8
1978	14.5	10.3
1979	18.3	8.4
1980	28.7	-1.9

(Source: World Bank)

During those years, trade balance between the U.S. and Korea showed ups and downs. Although from 1976, Korea's trade balance with the U.S. turned to surplus until it was overturned again in 1979. Furthermore, the surplus amount was still remained at weak level. (Table 3)

Under these circumstances, Reagan's emphasis on 'strong America' through strengthening military power and 'Reaganomics' which mainly included the followings; 1) Extensive tax cut plan leading to growing savings and investments followed by more output and jobs, 2) Tightened balance-sheets through reduced budget, 3) Control of inflation through restrained money supply, and 4) Deregulation for business liberalization, was greatly welcomed by then-citizens of the U.S. Reagan believed the causes of the problem lied in the 'big government'. Therefore, in order to reduce the size of the government, he implemented polices to reduce the fiscal budget except for the defense.

<Table 3> Korea's Trade Balance with the U.S. (1976~1980)

Year	Trade Volume	Trade Balance
1976	4,455,480	529,666
1977	5,566,087	671,209
1978	7,101,295	1,015,395
1979	8,976,510	-228,652
1980	9,496,873	-283,623

(\$1,000)

(Source: Korea International Trade Association, KITA)

All the more, as he pronounced 'peace through strength', the defense budget was increased despite the expanded government deficit. Reagan's effort to reinforce security alliance with the allies unlike his predecessor was a welcome change to Korea.

V. STRENGTHENED SECURITY TIES

5.1 CHUN'S VISIT TO THE U.S. IN 1981

Under these circumstances, the two newly elected presidents each had their own goals with the other. According to Chang and Kim, the two governments held their own leverage to satisfy each other's needs. (Chang and Kim, 2013) Chun needed the U.S. 'to bolster his political legitimacy' (Wampler, 2010)

while Reagan intended to announce the U.S.'s revitalized interests on Asia by reinforcing its security alliances in the region. Though Chun was elected as the president of Korea, the journey to the Blue House was filled with military coup and bloody suppression of the Gwangju Uprising. Later it was revealed that the U.S. further tried to use this invitation as leverage to spare Kim Dae Jung. Both sides could gain what they hoped for through Chun's visit to Washington. Washington officially invited Chun for the new beginning of the KOR-U.S. relations. Chun welcomed the invitation, and Kim was released.

In January 1981, Chun visited the U.S. and Korean presses gave prominent coverage on the visit. *Kyunghang Shinmun*, one of the major Korean newspapers, praised this visit arguing that Reagan's invitation to Chun right after his inauguration both symbolically and substantially meant the new era had arrived between the two countries. (Kyunghang, 1981) Another paper, *Maeil Kyungje Shinmun* stressed the security alliance between Korea and the U.S. reporting that Regan and Chun would have a summit discussing international affairs, in particular focused on Korean peninsula and Asia in pursuit of seeking for measures to strengthen security and economic cooperation. (Maeil Kyungje, 1981) A number of commentaries published in the papers revealed likewise acclamations. Via Chun's visit to the U.S., Korea and the U.S. finally could overcome rather 'uncomfortable' status with each

other and ‘fortunately’ Reagan administration recognized that security on Korean peninsula was a pivot to balance of power in the Asia. Korea felt assured that the U.S. would not leave it behind but would vigorously put all efforts to secure Korea against the communist threats. (Kyunghang, Maeil Kyungje, 1981)

These were grounded assumptions. The two unclassified documents of 1981, a ‘*Memorandum for the president*’ written by Richard Allen (1981), the former National Security Advisor in Reagan Administration, and a paper published by the Department of State well represent the U.S.’s intention to revitalize its security alliance through Chun’s visit.

Allen argued that Reagan’s meeting with Chun was ‘an important milestone in American relations with the Republic of Korea’ pinpointing that Chun was seeking the approval from the U.S. to legitimize his presidency. In addition, Allen pointed out ‘under Chun’s lead, the ROK is now spending six percent of its GNP on defense, a figure unmatched by any of our major allies’. Chun’s such efforts on security was a stout pillar to Reagan administration. Allen further wrote the guiding points which Reagan should mind before his meeting with Chun as follows: 1) USFK would remain as it was without any reduction, 2) the U.S. would put as much efforts as possible to support Korea to overcome its economic hardships, 3) the U.S. would not access to North Korea unilaterally,

and 4) the KOR-U.S. relations had personal significance to Reagan.

The other paper released from the Department of State preparing Reagan's meeting with Chun prepared by Alexander Haig, then-Secretary of State, had following five main topics the U.S. tried to address with Chun. (Table 4)

<Table 4> THE ISSUES ON THE OFFICIAL VISIT OF CHUN

The Issues	
1	Normalization of Relations and Korean Political Development
2	The Security Commitment and Troop Withdrawals
3	Support for Korean Security Efforts
4	North-South Korea
5	Economic-Commercial Issues

(Source: National Security Archive)

Haig perceived that Chun would want to secure the stay of the U.S. Troops in the peninsula while have the U.S. endorse him so that he could consolidate his status as a newly elected president as Allen pointed out. Furthermore, in the document, Haig represented Chun's number one objective as 'the normalization of KOR-U.S. relations after a period of prolonged strain'. This was the same for Reagan. Restoration of the relations between the two countries which rather had a rough journey during Carter and Park administration meant restored security alliance. By meeting with Chun, the U.S. can show the rest of the world that it

would not neglect its security duties in the Pacific region deterring the communist Soviet and North Korea.

In regard of USFK, the U.S. showed a determined attitude on their military presence in the region. During the 1970s, North Korea had built up its military forces as Carter proclaimed moral diplomacy. This resulted in the military imbalance between the South and the North. Haig argued that Korea had an ambitious intention to enhance its military power against the communist threats by launching a defense industry development program and purchasing military armaments such as F-16 aircraft. Haig stressed that Korea was making an effort despite its economic recession in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Thus, if Korea had reassured its willingness to continue such efforts in spite of its recession, naturally they would have gotten the support from the U.S., according to the Secretary Haig. The document also mentioned that the U.S. was appreciated for Kim's release and ready to 'resume a full range of consultation in order to improve the KOR-U.S. cooperation'.

Furthermore, the U.S. also recognized Korea's economic development and its market value for the U.S. Haig stated that Korea, the 12th largest trading partner of the U.S., was not only a significant agricultural market but also a major consumer for nuclear power plants. Trade balance with Korea at the time was still slightly in favor of the U.S. as Korea had trade deficit in 1979 and

1980.²Especially, The U.S. showed sympathy with Korea's economy stating that the U.S. acknowledged that the year was a 'particularly crucial for Korea's economy' and it's their 'intention to be as helpful as possible in promoting expanded economic ties'.

Having understood Korea's difficult economic situation in 1980, the U.S. was also once again appreciated Korea's efforts on defense budget. Under 'Contingency Talking Points', Haig wrote that the U.S recognized Korea's substantial burden on defense budget and proclaimed that they would 'not ask Korea to do more under present economic circumstances'. Also, the U.S. represented its strong will to support Korea by accelerating renewal of Korea's weapons and helping Korea to purchase appropriate armaments from the U.S.

5.2 THE U.S. SECURITY POLICIES TOWARDS KOREA IN 1983

The tone for reinforced security ties between Korea and the U.S. was not dissolved afterwards. In 1983 documents revealed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea under the subject '*The U.S.'s security policies towards Korea*', U.S's stance on security of Asia still remained firm. The documents include the speech titled '*Pacific Ties are Rising*' given by Shultz, then-Secretary of State, at the 36th anniversary dinner of the World Affairs Council of North California.

²See again the <table 3>. As aforementioned in <Table 3>, in 1979 and 1980, Korea was having trade deficit with the U.S.

Secretary Shultz who visited Northeast Asia at the time stressed again the significance of the region to the U.S. He emphasized the geopolitical and strategic importance of the region while recognizing Soviets' growing military power as well as that of North Korea.

...The Soviets have their largest fleet in that ocean, backed by modern, long-range bombers. Soviets' land forces in the region have also grown during that time from 20 to more than 50 divisions. Most ominously of all, some 100 intermediate range SS-20 missiles, each equipped with three warheads, threaten Asia...

...The North Koreans, who spend twenty percent of their GNP on their armed forces, threaten their southern neighbors with an armed force of over 700,000. One of the largest armies in the world. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea³,1983)

His remarks on Korea's fulfillment of productive conversation with the U.S. showed how well the relations were established between the two countries during the time. In the speech, Secretary Shultz reassured the U.S.'s security responsibilities and its intention to fulfill those duties in the region, 'particularly to the frontline states of Korea'. He belabored the firm alliance arrangements among the allies saying that without the U.S., Soviet would threaten the

³ The citation is based on the unclassified documents published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea; hereinafter, MOFA Korea. The year represents the year it was written, not the registered year. You can find the registered number of the documents in the Reference section.

region's development with its military forces. He said, "Security in this sense is – and will remain – indivisible."

In addition, in March 1983, Robert Sennewald, both the Commander in Chief UN and Combined Forces Command, delivered a statement to the House Armed Services Committee emphasizing the threat of North Korea while showing satisfaction with the robust KOR-U.S. alliance. Sennewald, as the Commander in Chief was fully recognized the realistic threat North Korea posed to the Peninsula. He stated that the military power of North Korea already exceeded the required level and it was fully capable of various combats.

Sennewald also bared his trust with Korea's security efforts. To him, Korea was "a staunch ally" who "so willingly shoulders its share of the burden of maintaining peace" like nobody else that he knew of. Korea was spending 6% of its GNP on defense budget, and this fact was enough to impress the Commander. Since every nation in the region shared the sea lanes, having this area under the U.S.'s control was essential to deter the outside threats. Sennewald again strongly insisted the geopolitical and strategic importance of Korea underscoring the responsibility of the U.S., also as an ally.

...Conversely, complete control of the peninsula by and adversary would pose an unacceptable threat to our regional allies and provide a formidable location from with to protect their power throughout the area...

...We also have a clear obligation to stand by our off-stated commitment to assist in the preservation of freedom of the people of South Korea. This firm commitment forms the basis of our continuing fine relationship and our mutual efforts to preserve the peace on the peninsula. (MOFA Korea, 1983)

Deputy Secretary of State, Armitage shared these recognitions. He added weight on security surrounding the Korean peninsula mentioning that the defense of freedom and independence in the peninsula was a cornerstone of the U.S.'s security policies on Asia. In case of another war broken between South Korea and the North, Japan would be threatened, the balance between China and Soviet would be distorted, and naturally it would all come down to the U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-China relations. Thus, he argued that deterrence on North Korea invasion to the South would have much more significance not limited to Korea's defense. This argument went same for the Soviet threat on the peninsula.

Korean government's report on the acts of Washington to the U.S. congress regarding the security issues indicated that the U.S. was taking a strong action against the Soviet Union after it had realized the Soviet's increased military power during the 1970s which was decisively represented with the Iran Crisis and the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S worried further invasion including the peninsula so Reagan administration's defense budget, despite its

efforts to establish the ‘small government’, was not reduced as aforementioned.

On March 23rd, 1983 Reagan sent a letter to Chun demonstrating his commitment to vigorously review new defense technologies despite domestic concerns on spread of weapons. He also released a statement to the nation addressing his willingness to invest to a new armament which ‘could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached the U.S’s soil or that of its allies’. This raised criticisms within the U.S. congress. The House, and both the Democrats and the Republicans were skeptical and expressed their concerns especially with the expanded budget. Nevertheless, the two governments continued to have their smooth journey together as Chun agreed entirely with Reagan’s remarks on maintaining strength to deter invasion on his reply to Reagan.

VI. EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND GROWING PRESSURES

It is noteworthy that on the same speech addressed by the Secretary Shultz, economic ties in the region were frequently mentioned. Arguing the direct interests which the U.S. had in the region, Shultz raised two facts forming the

basis of those interests; 1) The growing volume of the U.S. trade with Asia and
2) The security alliance which was represented by the past three wars the U.S.
had in the Pacific. Interestingly, in his remarks 'trade' came before 'security'.

More specifically, Shultz paid his attention to Japan.

...Decisions on trade and free markets in Asian lands influence the actions of legislators in Washington, and governments worldwide. The world is watching Japan in particular to see if its markets will be more open to competition from abroad. (MOFA Korea, 1983)

...East Asian and Pacific nations, and most importantly Japan have acknowledged their responsibilities for strengthening GATT and maintaining an open international trading system, as they see with growing clarity the threat of protectionism around the world. (MOFA Korea, 1983)

Korea was also mentioned relatively briefly, while Shultz expressed uneasiness towards protective trade policies of Korea.

Even smaller Asian countries, such as Korea, see that they must consider modification of their own protectionist policies... (MOFA Korea, 1983)

In order to understand the background of his comments on trade relations with Asia, the economic situation of the U.S. in the early 80s should be addressed.

6.1 THE U.S. ECONOMY AND THE KOR-U.S. TRADE BALANCE IN THE EARLY 80S

Though Reagan ambitiously and strong-mindedly implemented the new economic policies known as ‘Reaganomics’, the situation in the early 1980s had a bumpy ride. Though he succeeded to relatively stabilize the inflation rate compared to those of 1979 and 1980, the rest of the economic indicators did not show much improvements. In 1982, as the U.S. annual GDP growth collapsed again to -1.9%, a worse record than that of 1980, the U.S. economy experienced the second big recession in only two years. Unemployment rate marked 9.7% in 1982 and again 9.6% in 1983, which was the highest since the Great Depression. (Table 5)

**<Table 5>Inflation, GDP Growth, and Unemployment rate of the U.S.
(1981~1985)**

Year	Inflation	GDP Growth	Unemployment
1981	10.3	2.6	7.6
1982	6.2	-1.9	9.7
1983	3.2	4.6	9.6
1984	4.3	7.3	7.5
1985	3.6	4.2	7.2

(Source: World Bank, Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S. Government)

To make matters worse, the U.S.’s overall trade balance was also not it a great

shape. From 1981 to 1985, the current account balance of the U.S. continuously deteriorated. This trend maintained until 1987 and during the time trade deficit of the U.S. showed record high increasing more than 30 times. (Table 6)

<Table 6>Current Account Balance of the U.S. (BoP, % of GDP)

Year	Balance of Payment	(current US\$, %) % of GDP
1981	4.8 billions	0.2
1982	-11.6 billions	-0.3
1983	-44.2 billions	-1.2
1984	-99.0 billions	-2.5
1985	-124.5 billions	-2.9

(Source: World Bank)

Naturally, the trade partners especially those who had trade surplus with the U.S. became the target. Reagan's emphasis on 'free trade' or 'freer trade' during 1980s was well represented by then-U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker's remark: "Reagan has granted more import relief to U.S. industry than any of his predecessors in more than half a century."

As it is represented with the Secretary Shultz's speech mentioned above, Japan became the first target in the region. From 1980, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan surged dramatically and in the early 1980s, trade deficit with Japan took more than a third of the total amounts; increased from 33.8% in 1980 to

36.5% in 1985.⁴Reagan administration weighed on Japan in particular with its automotive manufacturing market which eventually resulted in Japan's agreement on Voluntary Export Restraints. Japanese automakers could only export 1.68 million cars to the U.S. due to this.

At the time, Korea's trade started to vitalize. Recovered from its brief period of trade deficit with the U.S. from 1979 to 1981, Korea's trade balance with the U.S. overturned to positive in 1982. In 1983, trade balance jumped more than 10 times compared to the previous year. (Table 7) During the 80s, even when the Korea's total trade balance marked negative, the trade balance of Korea with the U.S. steadily remained at positive.

<Table 7>Korea's Trade Balance with the U.S. from 1981 to 1985

Year	Trade Volume	Trade balance
1981	11,611,060	-489,338
1982	12,074,455	162,833
1983	14,402,281	1,853,419
1984	17,354,271	3,603,321
1985	17,243,422	4,264,778

(\$1,000)

(Source: Korea International Trade Association)

Until 1970s, the U.S's trade policy towards Korea was rather docile. The

⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

issues involved were nothing more than the bilateral quota on textile under GATT's Multi-Fiber Arrangement, Voluntary Export Restraints on color TV, anti-dumping on the bicycle tube, and shoes – especially the rubber kind. However, as the U.S. saw the growing trade deficit with Korea, it started to swing its trade policy direction. (Lee, 2000) And its pressures on trade towards Korea were compartmentalized with its strong assurance on security alliance between the two.

6.2 GROWING PRESSURES

6.2.1 1983 KOR-U.S. TRADE COMMITTEE'S MEETING

In April, 1983 the 3rd KOR-U.S trade committee's meeting was held in Washington. The committee was established in 1981 as an affiliated organization of KOR-U.S. Economic Council. (Donga Ilbo, 1981) In the meeting, Korean government addressed the issue of import restrictions the U.S. had imposed towards Korea arguing that the U.S.'s trade actions such as double regulations of anti-dumping and countervailing measures had been injuring the trade development between Korea and the U.S. Details included easement of Korea's import restrictions on Scotchman Industry Machine Tools, Glassware,

Textiles such as carpets, Almonds, Citrus Fruit and Orange Juice, and Computer along with tariff reduction on Soy bean, Maize for Industrial Use, Lumber, Services and the issue of the U.S. Steel market raised by the U.S. Korea raised the U.S.'s anti-dumping investigation on polyester, elimination of the U.S. quota on textile, reclassification on the tariff nomenclature in regard of machine threshed tobacco, GSP, plus expressed Korean government's concern over the spread of protectionism within the U.S. congress. (Table 8)

Above these legislations, the Senate passed the legislation supporting the U.S.'s agriculture export.

Another main topic discussed in the meeting was the U.S.'s amendment regarding GSP, the system imposing non-tariff or even lower tariff than that of the Most Favored Nation to developing countries so the poorer nations could promote their export and manufacturing. As Korea had achieved record economic development and with the U.S.'s economic recession, ahead of the GSP planning for the 1980s, there had been voices insisting that the advanced developing countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore should be excluded from the list. (Maeil Economy, 1979)

The U.S. made it a rule to exclude the main seven beneficiaries such as Korea and Taiwan in the second-term of the GSP which would be operated after 1985. Even if they were included, the U.S. intended to apply a 'Graduation

Policy' which would reduce the benefits taken by the advanced developing countries while expand the benefits for the least developing countries.

<Table 8> Pending Protectionist Legislations in the U.S. Congress

Title	Proposer	Contents
The Reciprocal Trade Act of 1983: HR. 1571	Sam Gibbons (House, Dem., Florida)	Import quota, Tariff modification, reclassification on the tariff nomenclature etc.
Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act of 1982: S144	John C Danforth (Senate, Rep., Missouri)+ 30	Reciprocity on Service and Investment sector (Strengthening of Section 301), Limitation on the President's right on tariff reductions on high-tech goods
Fair Practices in Automotive Products Act: HR 1234	R. Ottinger (House, Dem.)	Foreign car exporters should annually expand its cost on American components
Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: S414	John Heinz (Senate, Rep., Penn)	Supporting the U.S.'s international competitiveness
Export Adm'n Act Amendments of 1983: S397	John Heinz (Senate, Rep., Penn)	The U.S. export promotion along with strengthening controls of Washington

(Source: 1983 Doc. On Trade Committee's Meeting)

Naturally Korea argued that GSP was still necessary for its economy. Though Korea was the second largest beneficiary following Taiwan, among the object

items Korea's utilization rate was 36.3%, most of them accounted only for less than 5% of the U.S. market. In the meantime, Korea stressed its efforts to liberalize the economy despite the difficulties with Korea's poor Balance of Payment and heavy burden on the defense budget which accounted for more than 6% of its GNP. Korean government whose liberalization rate had been reached 76.7%, planned to uplift the rate by 80% with its recovery of domestic economy so that it could meet the level of the advanced markets. In addition, Korea indicated its poor BoP status continued from 1979 to 1982. (Table 9)

<Table 9>Current Account Balance of Korea (BoP, % of GDP)

Year	Balance of Payment	(current US\$, %)
		% of GDP
1979	-4.2 billions	-6.0
1980	-6.8 billions	-10.1
1981	-6.4 billions	-8.4
1982	-5.6 billions	-6.8

(Source: World Bank, 1983 Doc. On Trade Committee's Meeting)

While the meeting is in progress, *Donga Ilbo*, the Korean newspaper, reported that with the approval made by Reagan before the meeting, the U.S. decided to reduce the GSP object items expressing concerns on the resulting impact. (Donga Ilbo, 1983)

To the U.S., with its achievement of economic development, Korea should

open its markets more broadly and more fully under the principle of 'Reciprocity'. Nevertheless, the U.S.'s stance on strong security alliance with Korea remained firmly according to a joint statement issued on Reagan's visit to Korea later in 1983.

In November 1983, Reagan officially visited Korea and the two president again reassured their amicable relations based on their security cooperation. The joint statement by the two presidents was filled with how great the alliance was. The Korean government assessed the statement showed outstanding achievements on KOR-U.S. relations in perspective of quality and solidity compared to that of 1981. Especially the plane KAL's crash with the Soviet attack happened in September killing more than 200 people aboard contributed to raise their awareness. (Donga Ilbo, 1983)

6.2.2 1984 KOR-U.S. COMMERCE MINISTERS' MEETINGS

In March 1984, concerning KOR-U.S. Commerce Ministers' meetings, the requests from the U.S. became more specified and enlarged. (Table 10)

<Table 10> THE REQUESTS MADE BY THE U.S.

Contents

1	In case of Korea's import liberalization, try special consideration on including larger amounts of American products
2	The U.S. companies' majority participation on large scale business in Korea (cf. Construction of Seoul Metro, Pohang 2 nd Steel Corp., Nuclear power plant reactor no.11 and 12, Purchase of KAL aircrafts, etc.)
3	Investment environment reform for the U.S. industries
4	Condition reform for Foreign banks' branch in Korea
5	Approval of issuing Certificate of Deposit(CD) in terms of bank cooperation
6	Approval of rediscounting on discounted Export Finance, Commercial Notes
7	Market open for high-tech commodities
8	Market open for Service sector
9	The U.S.'s sharing the half of the marine transportation on adopted coal
10	Extensive import liberalization on agricultural sector (cf. Almonds)
11	Internationalization of Industrial property
12	Market open for foreign tobacco
13	Market open for the U.S. insurance business such as life and indemnity

(Source: 1984 Doc. KOR-U.S. Commerce Ministers' Meetings)

The U.S. asked Korea to import larger amounts of goods and reform which would provide more hospitable environment for the U.S. companies, specifically. The requests also contained opening up service sectors including financial services such as banking and insurance which could be a huge investment.

The U.S. also revealed its interests in investing Korea's public infrastructure such as construction of Seoul Metro, Pohang 2nd steel corp., nuclear power plant reactor no.11 and 12, purchase of KAL aircrafts.

In the discussion regarding multilateral system including MTN codes and 'New Round', the U.S. argued Korea's 'greater responsibility' as a leading developing nation. Such remarks from the U.S. along with its will to exclude Korea from GSP beneficiary imply that Korea was becoming less suitable nation for the U.S.'s concession.

6.3 MANIFESTATION OF TRADE CONFLICTS

GATT BEEF CASE

The trade pressure that the U.S. had imposed to Korea peaked when the U.S. filed a complaint against Korea to the GATT in 1988 claiming that Korean government's restriction on the importation of beef was a violation to the GATT. This was the first case Korea got sued under the GATT dispute settlement system and due to Korea's lost in this very first case, Korea became no longer protected by the GATT exception rule which was imposed on developing countries having 'Balance of Payment' issues; GATT Article XVIII:B. According to Ahn (2003), this was 'a legal completion of import liberalization

in Korea.’ Despite its significance on trade relationship between the U.S. and Korea, the case has chiefly been in the interests of trade law areas studying on international dispute settlements.

Korea started its importation of beef in 1976. With a rise in the income, meat consumption surged leading the price of beef to soar as well. The price of beef in 1979 was 1,500KRW per 600g, a 36% rise compared to that of last year. Cow price which recorded 51.3% increase (YoY) was not an exception. *Kyunghang* reported that the government had believed importation was essential in order to stabilize the inflation pointing out the 10% increase in the price of beef leads to 0.31% rise in the inflation. (Kyunghang, 1976) At the time Korea was under the GATT Article XVIII:B; the exception clause for developing countries having the Balance of Payment (hereinafter, BOP) issues. Under GATT Article XVIII:B which states Government Assistance to Economic Development⁵, a member country may exceptionally restrict imports in order to safeguard its BOP.

⁵ GATT Article XVIII states as follows: (highlighted by the author)

***4.(a) Consequently, a contracting party, the economy of which can only support low standards of living* and is in the early stages of development,* shall be free to deviate temporarily from the provisions of the other Articles of this Agreement, as provided in Sections A, B and C of this Article.**

Section B

9. In order to safeguard its external financial position and to ensure a level of reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development, **a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article may, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 10 to 12, control the general level of its imports by restricting the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported;...**

Under this exception rule, Korea was conceded by GATT for a 20% tariff implementation in 1979. During the early 1980s, the cow price seemed to be got out of hands. The government, in order to control the beef price, implemented various policies such as more supply through importation, price liberalization and diversification of imports in the market so it could lead to increased competitiveness. However, when the price of a cow started to drop in the late 1983, *Donga Ilbo*, argued that imprudent importation had exacerbated the collapse of the market. A price of a calf was in more serious condition. For example, in Chungcheong Province, the calf price marked only 740,000 KRW, the half of the price of the previous year. The calf price in Jeolla Province plummeted likewise, from 1.2 million KRW in 1983 to 650,000KRW. (*Donga Ilbo*, 1984)

This was a major problem. At the time, a cow was not only a commodity but a property. It was not rare to see local farmers selling their cows to put their children into college or get them married. ‘Selling a cow’ meant the one had to spend a fortune. A plunge of the price of a cow implied the value of one’s fortune had been seriously deducted. Farmers were dejected and made an outcry that importation of beef was the main culprit of what happened. The Chun government immediately carried out a measure to restrain the drop. On October 16th, the number of release of imported beef a day was limited to 400 (*Maeil*

Kyungje, 1984). 6 days later, it was again restrained to 100 a day decreased by 89% in a month. The Department of Agriculture of Korea also announced that the government would purchase live cattle and dressed carcass without limitation. The government prioritized a female cow, over 6-year-old weighing more than 350kg for a purchase. (Kyunghang, 1984)

Despite the government's efforts, the price of cow kept falling until the mid of 1980s and farmers started to sell off their cows and calves expecting no rise in the future. Korean press continuously criticized the government policy and its decision to import beef. (Maeil Kyungje, 1984) Eventually, the Korean government restricted the importation of commercial beef and then in May 1985, it restricted the importation of high-quality beef which were provided to hotel and stopped the beef importation all together. (Ahn, 2003)

In 1988, the U.S. along with Australia and New Zealand filed a complaint to GATT arguing that such quantitative restrictions of Korea were a violation to GATT rules.

The U.S. mainly argued that since Korea's external current account registered surplus between 1986 and 1987 while its external debt had been substantially reduced, Korea did not need to be protected by the Article XVIII:B.

The IMF...reported that: "The external current account registered surpluses of \$5 billion in 1986 (5 per cent of GNP) and \$10 billion (8 per cent of GNP) in 1987.

Export volume rose by an average of 25 per cent annually, mainly due to increased competitiveness brought about by a large real effective depreciation of the won between 1985 and mid-1986 and by the emergence of new exports".⁶

Korea counter-argued insisting that in 1967 when it acceded to the GATT, Korea was justified to be applied the Article XVIII:B and it had been maintained so since then. To Korea, its quantitative restrictions under the BOP issue were necessary measures since its economic status was still at a weak level.

the restrictions which it currently maintained, including its restrictions on beef imports were indeed necessary to secure an adequate level of reserves...Korea's huge foreign debt, though declining, still posed a serious threat to Korea's balance of payments.⁷

... Korea's current account surpluses on its balance-of-payments position should not be overestimated. Korea's current account had only been in surplus since 1986....mainly due to the decline in oil prices.⁸

As to the U.S.'s claim for Korea's inconsistency over the application of the Article XVIII:B, Korea stated that the restrictions were consistent with the

⁶ See page 22, argument number 84 from REPUBLIC OF KOREA - RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF BEEF - COMPLAINT BY THE UNITED STATES, *Report of the Panel adopted on 7 November 1989 (L/6503 - 36S/268)*. The United States quoted from the IMF report sourced from IMF, Korea - Recent Economic Developments (SM/88/101), 4 May 1988, page 2.

⁷*Ibid.* See page 22, argument number 82.

⁸*Ibid.* See page 22, argument number 83.

Article, but it were only strengthened due to its ‘unprecedented situation’ introducing an evidence that ‘many small farmers were going bankrupt or incurred very heavy losses’⁹.

Despite the Korea’s vigorous defense, the GATT panels made rulings stating Korea was no longer under the protection of the Article XVIII:B. As a result, Korea lost its first international lawsuit and it came with a price; a graduation of GATT BoP provisions along with overall liberalization of import market.

7. CONCLUSION

7.1 ANALYSIS

The unclassified documents released in the U.S. and Korea well represents the amicable security and diplomatic relations between the two governments in the 1980s as claimed through many established studies. In particular, the U.S. documents prepared by then-National Security Advisor Richard Allen and then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig in 1981 for the Chun’s visit to the U.S., fully denote their reiterated emphasis on how important to defend the Korean peninsula from the communist threats both strategically and geopolitically.

⁹*Ibid.* See page 22, argument number 93-94.

They in one accord, argued that through Chun's visit to the U.S., Reagan could represent the U.S.'s revitalized interests and its willingness to fulfill its security duties in Asia against Soviet and North Korea.

This tone went on in 1983 document republished by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea titled "The U.S.'s security policies towards Korea". Not only then-Secretary of State Shultz comprehensively acknowledged the Soviet and North Korea's threats on the peninsula, Commander in Chief Sennewald indicated Korea as "a staunch ally". Then-deputy Secretary Armitage stated the significance of Korea towards the U.S.'s arguing that in case of another invasion to Korea, it would have a direct impact on the U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-China relations. Later in 1983, Reagan wrote a letter to Chun underscoring his determination to invest in new technologies and armaments despite the opposition within the congress.

Thus, the KOR-U.S. relations on the security matters examined by the unclassified documents re-verified the main arguments given by the established studies on the KOR-U.S. relations in the 1980s; unprecedented amicability.

Unlike the smooth diplomatic relations based on the strengthened security ties, trade relations between the two nations were not as smooth as what they had diplomatically. From the early 1980s, the U.S. suffered from its economic recession and growing trade deficits, started to put pressures on its trade

partners. Especially, as Korea's trade with the U.S. turned to surplus in earnest from 1983, the U.S.'s trade policies towards Korea were also turned its direction.

The growing pressures were well represented in the unclassified documents including one mentioned above. In the speech addressed Shultz, references on the U.S.'s trade with Asia came into existence even prior to comments on security ties. Shultz argued that Asian countries such as Japan and Korea were aware of their responsibility to bash their protectionist trade policies.

The documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea on the KOR-U.S. Trade Committee's meeting in 1983 revealed that the tensions between the two nations had started to grow. The U.S. showed its dissatisfaction on Korea's import restrictions on 10 items including Glassware, Textiles, and Services. Korea, on the other hand, expressed its concerns over the spread of protectionism within the U.S. congress and the on-going anti-dumping investigations. GSP was also a hot potato between the two nations as Korea had achieved record economic development. According the U.S., The U.S. maintained that Korea should be eliminated from the beneficiary list since Korea was no longer a poor nation in need of aids.

In the KOR-U.S. Commerce Ministers' Meeting in 1984, the requests from the U.S. became more direct and specific. The U.S. asked Korea to import

larger amounts of goods made in the U.S. In addition, it also showed direct interests in investing Korea's public infrastructure.

These documents show stark transition in the U.S.'s policy towards Korea; separation of security and economy. During the post-war era, economic or trade relations between the two countries were in fact hardly existed. It was more of a mean rather than a goal itself. The U.S. provided economic aids to Korea in order to protect Korea from the communist threats while promoting the U.S.'s value and its prestige (Lee, 2015). However, during the 1980s, economic policies became more and more separated from security policies. The trade pressure from the Reagan administration was increased despite the strengthened security alliance between the two governments.

As the economic relations were isolated from the security relations, emphasis on economic relations was intensified. The official speeches and documents delivered by the officials from the Reagan administration acclaimed for their well-established security alliance but also showed frequent remarks on economic and trade issues stressing 'reciprocity' and Korea's responsibility as an 'advanced developing country'. Sometimes, the economic relations were mentioned even before the security relations.

By isolating the economic policies from the security policies, the U.S. could attain both of its purposes; solidification of the U.S.'s security interests in the

region and pursuit of its economic interests by putting pressures on trade. This was synchronized with the Chun's intention to be perceived as a legitimate president of Korea. As Katsiaficas (2006) pointed out, during the Chun regime, Korea carried through various market liberalization policies. In 1983, for example, the revised 'Foreign Capital Inducement Law' opened the door and eased barriers for foreign capital and investments. (Kyunghang, 1983) In addition, due to the loss on GATT beef case in 1989, Korea graduated its 'protected status' unexpectedly and rushed in to 'even playground' where no concessions were applied. The impellent enforcement contributed to Korea's suffering in 1997, the Asia Financial Crisis as well as intensification of Korea's anti-Americanism.

7.2 IMPLICATIONS

Newly elected as the president of the U.S. in 2017, president Trump was reminiscent of the 1980s to many. He proclaimed 'America First' and 'Buy American, Hire American' leading protectionism and populism around the globe. Both administrations implemented or tried to implement massive tax reforms which include deregulation and simplification of tax codes. But above all things, they attributed the U.S's economic recession to its growing trade deficits blaming foreigners and represented strong protectionist views on trade.

Even the representative slogans from the two administrations were alike: ‘Let’s make American Great Again’ and ‘America First’. Both directly emphasized the interests of the U.S.

When closely reviewed, however, the two administrations have systemic differences from each other. First, unlike Trump administration which manifestly applies protectionism, Reagan administration showed ambivalent attitude. Outside, Reagan administration emphasized the importance of free trade and market liberalization but within, protectionism proliferated. Thus, if Trump’s protectionism is more focused on building a wall, Reagan’s protectionism was about easing the barriers of the opponents urging broader and deeper market liberalization.

Second is the establishment of the multi, rule-based system. The 1980s were the era of GATT and though the system was in pursuit of multilateralism, it was not an official international organization so its effectiveness and enforcement power were limited. Inversely, this means the aftermath and the impacts of the U.S.’s strengthened unilateral protectionism also had ‘limited’ shocks. Compared to today, the U.S.’s unilateralism was in the predictable range. However, since the Uruguay Round and the establishment of WTO, the world has accustomed to the multi-lateral, rule-based system led by the U.S. For more than a decade, the U.S. was the central axis of this multi-lateral system along

with other western advanced economies. As a result, when president Trump was elected, the world was already in shock with this ‘unexpectedness’. Martin Wolf (2017), the chief economist of Financial Times, expressed his concerns over ‘the collapse of global cooperation’ in his article titled ‘*Risks remain amid global recovery*’. He particularly argued that the spread of protectionism was posing the gravest risk in today’s world economy for it destroys the established rule-based world system.

As economic interdependence has increased more than ever between countries and multi-lateral system under WTO has been established, Trump administration’s current protectionism policies which have represented nostalgia for the 1980s would have bigger impacts and shocks to the rest of the world including Korea. Especially, since tensions between Japan and the U.S. were at peak in the 1980s, Korea had relatively restrained consequences in the shadow of Japan which were bashed from the U.S. with a numerous restrictions such as Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and the Plaza Accord of 1985.

Thus, the next challenge for Korea would be how to exploit the established rule-based system and multilateralism against the current protectionism and nationalism. In addition, it is important for Korea not to judge the current U.S. policies based on the seemingly similar factors. In this regard, though this paper is limited to re-verify the asymmetry of the KOR-U.S. relation in the 1980s

focusing on Reagan-Chun administrations by examining the past records, it would be a meaningful job to review the similarity and variations of the KOR-U.S. relations comparing the 1980s and the present in depth.

국 문 초 록

1980년대 한미관계를 다룬 기존의 연구들은 광주혁명과 미국의 개입에 초점을 맞추어 한미관계를 조명해왔으며, 이 과정에서 한미 안보 및 외교 관계에 대한 연구가 집중적으로 이루어져왔다. 80년대를 대표하는 미국의 레이건 정부와 한국의 전두환 정부는 과거 한미관계에 비해 상대적으로 매우 우호적인 관계를 맺은 것으로 평가된다. 그러나 한미통상관계를 다룬 연구들을 살펴보면 동 시기는 레이건 정부의 보호무역주의가 심화되며 한미 간 통상 긴장이 고조되는 시기임을 알 수 있다. 따라서 본 논문은 기밀 해제된 레이건 시기 미국 정부의 문건과 전두환 시기 한국 외교부 문서를 바탕으로 80년대 두 정부가 안보 동맹의 강화와 통상 갈등의 심화라는 불균형적 관계를 맺고 있었음을 재 입증한다. 이를 통해 80년대 한미관계를 보다 통합적인 시각에서 재조명하고 최근 미 트럼프 정부의 보호무역주의 및 자국우선주의 기조가 강화되며 트럼프 행정부와 레이건 행정부 정책의 유사성이 대두되는 가운데 현대 한미관계에 미치는 함의를 도출하고자 하였다.

주요어: 1980년대 한미관계, 레이건, 전두환, 안보와 통상의 불균형, 1980년대 미국의 대한정책, 소고기 분쟁

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