



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

Master's Thesis of International Studies

**The Significance of
Non-Government Aid Channels
Based on an Online Survey about Foreign Aid
in South Korea**

**비정부 원조 경로의 중요성
한국의 해외 원조에 대한 온라인 설문조사를
기반으로**

August 2017

**Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
International Area Studies Major**

Jiye Kim

Abstract

This paper conducts an online survey about foreign aid in South Korea, and analyses the results of a public survey developed for the purposes of this research. This study offers a unique insight into opinions of South Korean people on the role of government in providing foreign aid, which is an area in this field of study that has thus far been unaddressed by previous studies. Existing literature shows that public mistrust towards their own government or the public's lack of knowledge about foreign aid has been known to influence the government into choosing more non-government or multilateral channels of aid provision. However, the results drawn from this study on the South Korean public contradicts this premise.

The survey results show that although the majority of the respondents are in favour of providing foreign aid and have decent knowledge about foreign aid, although they prefer foreign aid to be provided via non-government channels like NGO/NPOs or international organisations rather than through its government. The survey has shown this is mainly because of their mistrust towards the government and its lack of transparency.

The pilot study making a comparison with the case of Australia shows that Australian public opinion about foreign aid is aligned with its governments' actual policies in key areas unlike South Korea. Whether this alignment is due to government's efforts to collect Australian public opinion requires further investigation. Nevertheless, the results also help to explain how the South Korean government need to opt for 'non-government channels' of foreign aid provision owing to the credibility problems it is experiencing with its own voters.

Keywords : Foreign Aid, South Korea, Online Survey, Transparency, Public Policy, Non-government aid channels

Student Number : 2015-25163

Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction	1
1.1 Study background	
1.2 Purpose of this research	
Chapter 2. Literature Reviews	5
2.1 Why public opinion	
2.2 Why South Korea	
2.3 Previous studies about public opinion on foreign aid in South Korea	
2.4 Research questions	
2.5 Hypotheses	
Chapter 3. Analytical Framework	18
3.1 Scope	
3.2 Methodology & data sources	
3.3 Sample Population Characteristics	
3.4 Survey questions	
3.5 Appendices	
Chapter 4. Main Analysis	24
4.1 Key findings	
4.2 Background knowledge about development assistance and foreign aid	
4.3 Levels and Areas of support for foreign aid	
4.4 Preference over its foreign aid channels	
4.5 Knowledge about foreign aid and its budget	
4.6 Preference over its foreign aid budget	
4.7 Implications	
4.8 Limitations and scope	
Chapter 5. Pilot Study Comparing with the Case of Australia	59
5.1 Why Australia	
5.2 Results comparison	
5.3 Implications	
Chapter 6. Concluding Remarks	76
Bibliography.....	79
Abstract in Korean.....	82
Appendices	83

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Study Background

When the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were announced at the UN summit meeting on 25th September 2015 and the member countries started promoting and adopting these new goals in their development agendas, donor countries including traditional Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development - Development Assistant Committee (OECD DAC) countries as well as emerging donors like China, Turkey and India continued to expand their involvement in foreign aid and development cooperation initiatives. Foreign aid has now become an integral part of today's interdependent and interconnected international society, and despite varied motivations and points of interest, most developed countries partake in its provision.

In this climate, policy makers and aid practitioners have hotly discussed numerous topics including recipient ownership, aid effectiveness, aid for trade and good governance. Nonetheless, conversation is still sparse in relation to public opinion on foreign aid, which is an important facet scholars and policy makers ought not to neglect when designing aid projects and programmes. This is largely because public opinion on foreign aid is closely related to domestic politics and policy making and with so-called conventionally renowned 'principle-agent problems', which will be discussed in Chapter 2.1.

This study conducts an online survey about foreign aid in South Korea with the aim to hear the voice of the South Korean public. It must be noted that due to limited human and financial resources, the online survey was unable to be administered to a sample population large or diverse enough to be representative of the entire South Korean public. Nevertheless, other studies held in Korea on foreign aid with more or less comparable sample sizes, (i.e. Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)'s 2009 survey on the public's opinion with five hundred people surveyed) were able to draw out meaningful results and implications. Therefore, the survey conducted for this paper which finds clear patterns and tendencies within its responses should be considered a success in finding noteworthy results that have meaningful real-world applicability. Therefore, the word 'public' used in this paper will imply not the entire South Korean public but a selected portion of the sample population who participated in the online survey.

This study focusing on South Korea's public opinion on foreign aid is significant for two reasons. Firstly, this research is 'timely' because South Korea has been undergoing tremendous political crises since October last year, when the presidential scandal over corruption and bribery instigated nationwide protests and impeachment of the former president Park Geun-hye.^① While distrust towards the government and political leaders is stronger than any other period in the country's history, the new Moon Jae-in administration came in as of 11 May 2017 should reflect the Korean

^① Paula Hancocks & Euan McKirdy, 10 March 2017, "South Korea: Court upholds President Park Geun-hye's Impeachment; Protests Erupt", *CNN*, <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/09/asia/south-korea-park-geun-hye-impeachment-upheld/> (Accessed 15 March 2017)

public's strong desire for transparency and justice in their policies. The political atmosphere in South Korea today highlights the importance of listening to the public when designing foreign aid policy, not only because they pay taxes, but also because South Korean public these days are desperate for the realization of democracy and justice. It should become a priority for the new government and especially for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, who are in charge of foreign aid decision makings in South Korea.

This research is also original because there are very few reputable studies focusing on public opinion on foreign aid by scholars or research institutions in South Korea and even the existing studies tend to show biases and limitations in their research methodologies and survey frameworks which may have led to deflected outcomes. Studies on South Korea's public opinion on foreign aid have also been very superficial, without going into the details of why the public think so and what should be done from there on. Furthermore, there are still no comparative studies conducted in this field on South Korea, which makes this research more distinctive and significant as the study comprises of a pilot study comparing the public opinion on foreign aid in Australia. The study can also be a valuable addition to the general research on public opinion on foreign aid by applying this comparative methodology.

1.2. Purpose of Research

The purpose of this research is to examine one foreign policy issue – South

Korea's foreign aid policy, and how there are issues in the public perception towards foreign aid provision that need to be revised and updated in its policy designing. To be specific, it aims to show that South Korea's foreign aid should be directed more through non-governmental channels rather than through government or bilateral channels, such as direct, nation-to-nation aid provision. The paper will also redesign and revise the conventional model of public opinion surveys about foreign aid, with the intent to draw out more updated and objective results. Lastly, the study aims to compare South Korea's public opinion on foreign aid with that of Australia, another donor country with a similarly sized economy and foreign aid provision in the Asia-Pacific region, which will give better insight into where South Korea stands on foreign aid.

In doing so, this paper comprises of six chapters. After the introduction, Chapter 2 reviews a range of existing literature discussing the importance of 'public opinion' in foreign aid policy designs. Then, additional background information on South Korea's aid provision history will be studied, followed by what needs to be done in developing the studies on public opinion on foreign aid in South Korea and why. Chapter 3 introduces the analytical framework, methodologies and data resources used in this study. This chapter will also introduce the survey questions designed for this research. Chapter 4 deals with the empirical analysis, key findings of the research, the interpretations of the results and its implications. The chapter is going to investigate the South Korean public's opinion on foreign aid and examine how the government should react towards these opinions. Then, Chapter 5 introduces a pilot study

comparing similar studies conducted in Australia, whereby studies on public opinion on foreign aid are relatively well-developed. It will combine summaries of the Australian survey results on foreign aid support and the implications for South Korea in this research field. The last chapter provides concluding remarks, limitations of this study and the scope for future studies.

Chapter 2. Previous Studies

2.1. Why Public Opinion?

Discussions on public opinion and general foreign policy have a long history dating back to the 1950s. Gabriel Almond in his 1950 publication studied public opinion towards foreign policies and general public policies in the United States.^② Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion*^③ and *Essays in the Public Philosophy*^④ also explore the general relationship between public opinion and public policy and how general public opinions are formulated. Philip E. Converse explained how the mass public influences decision making procedures and how they have “systemic differences” with the relative elites in their perceptions, attitudes and behavioural

^② Strausz-Hupé, 1950, ‘The American People and Foreign Policy by Gabriel A. Almond’, *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 757-760

^③ Walter Lippmann, 1922, *Public Opinion*, (Harcourt: Brace)

^④ Walter Lippmann, 1955, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, USA and London, UK)

patterns.^⑤

Despite a number of in-depth publications on public opinion and their relationship with general public policies, the literature on ‘foreign aid’ and public opinion is much sparser compared to those on public opinion and foreign policy in general or in relations to particular policy fields like immigration and trade.^⑥ The lack of research in this field can be attributed to two major misperceptions widely held by scholars and policy makers. First is that the public holds no opinions on foreign aid and that even when they do they tend to be wrong. Secondly, foreign aid authorities often think that public opinion about foreign aid is irrelevant to the actual policy making process.^⑦

Nevertheless, public opinion on foreign aid does matter and is directly related to aid effectiveness because of ‘principle-agent problems (PAP)’ a fundamental concept in development assistance discussions. While PAP can be classified into two-stage delegation processes, one within a donor country and one that involves a developing recipient country, the former domestic PAP between domestic taxpayers (principle) and the government (agent) mechanism virtually brings about the issues of ‘public opinion on foreign aid’ and makes ‘public opinion’ a factor that cannot be ignored. This is because transparent foreign aid policy making procedures can avoid the problems of the “principles” having very little information about how their tax money is spent on aid and the associated benefits.^⑧ Thus, public opinion needs to be reflected in foreign

^⑤ Philip E. Converse, 1964, ‘The nature of belief systems in mass public’, *Critical Review*, 18:1-3, p.65

^⑥ Helen Milner & Dustin Tingley, 2013, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay’, *International Interactions*, 39:3, p.390

^⑦ Milner & Tingley, 2013, p.390

^⑧ Helen Milner, 2005, ‘Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principle-Agent Problems’,

aid policy designing as the taxpayers have the right to know to what use their tax is put.

This is not a simple process and if the public holds no opinion, or wrong or irrelevant opinions on foreign aid, the relationships between these principles and agents, and their authority to provide development aid to another developing country becomes more complicated. According to Helen Milner, a profound researcher in the field of public opinion and foreign aid, such lack of knowledge by the public on foreign aid leads governments to choose multilateral rather than bilateral type of aid, so that they can hand over the burden of decision making on the amount of development assistance they give to non-government, non-profit or international organisations.[Ⓔ] Moreover, Milner's research also shows that the public's mistrust towards their own government also causes the domestic governments to choose more multilateral channels when providing foreign aid.[Ⓕ] This is because when taxpayers have a pessimistic perception of the value of aid, they would not want their tax to be allocated to the foreign aid budget. In order to prove that their aid spending is justified – beneficial towards recipient countries - untrustworthy governments can choose to give aid through a multilateral agency which is known to be more credible in their aid delivery.

Whether or not publics have knowledge about foreign aid, it can be seen that public opinion is a crucial factor in designing foreign aid policy, as it can even determine types of aid governments can choose to deliver. It is also true that, despite its

Research Gate, vol.5, p.35

Ⓔ Milner, 2005, p.35

Ⓕ Milner, 2005, p.36

importance, public opinion on foreign aid is something practically beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. In addition, Mark Otter's criticism of democratic governments not paying sufficient attention to public opinion particularly in 'elite policy areas' like foreign aid needs to be considered.^⑩ He argued that despite some efforts of public opinion surveys conducted in first-world donor countries, such survey results and support/opposition for aid are not necessarily reflected in the actual budgetary expenditure on foreign aid.^⑪ In other words, the merit of conducting research on public opinion on foreign aid notwithstanding, a question still remains as to whether governments are reflecting the results of these studies.

This is why there needs to be more studies on public opinion on foreign aid and governments need to hear these opinions in their foreign aid policy making. This study aims to contribute to this effort.

2.2. Why South Korea?

Before investigating whether South Korea's foreign aid allocations are aligned with the opinions of the public, it is necessary to understand the history of South Korea's foreign aid allocation/disbursement patterns as a donor and its major characteristics including the types of aid and the ODA/GNI ratio.

South Korea's donor history dates back to 1963 when it participated in a training

^⑩ Mark Otter, 2003, 'Domestic public support for foreign aid: does it matter?', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 24, no. 1, p. 115

^⑪ Otter, 2003, p.115

session suggested by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).^③ Development assistance initiatives by South Korea started as early as 1977 when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea (MOFAT) started providing technical cooperation to some developing countries.^④ Nevertheless, South Korea only started to actively function as a donor country when the Economic Development and Cooperation Fund (EDCF) in the Korea Export Import Bank (Exim bank) was established by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance in 1987 and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was created in 1991 to handle concessional loans and grant aid.^⑤

According to the statistical data provided by OECD Database, by 2009, prior to its entry into OECD DAC, South Korea's total Official Development Assistance (ODA) including concessional loans and grants increased to USD 816.0 million from USD 264.7 million in 2001 as shown in Table 1. Out of the total ODA amount in 2009, bilateral type of aid took up more than 66.1% while multilateral aid only took up 28.8%. Furthermore, out of the bilateral aid disbursed by South Korea, the grant element of South Korea's aid disbursement comprised 68.1% while loans took up 39.7% in 2009. This grant ratio is comparatively low amongst DAC member countries whose average grant ratio is 87.5%.¹⁶ Such characteristics of relatively high portion of concessional loans can be attributed to the widely-held perception that loans will

^③ Eun Mee Kim & Jinhwan Oh, 2012, 'Determinants of Foreign Aid: The Case of South Korea', *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 12, p.252

^④ Hong-Min Chun, Elijah N. Munyi & Heejin Lee, 2010, 'South Korea as an Emerging Donor: Challenges and Changes on its Entering OECD/DAC', *Journal of International Development*, 22, p.790

^⑤ Kim & Oh, 2012, p.252

¹⁶ Chun, Munyi & Lee, 2010, p.793

provide greater fiscal prudence than grants, as well as its historical experience of leveraging using concessional loans.¹⁷

In addition, as can be seen from Table 1, ODA/GNI ratio of South Korea continued to remain below 0.1% from 2001-2009, which is far below the UN aid spending target of 0.7% of ODA/GNI. The country's ODA/GNI ratio is ranked the lowest out of all thirty OECD DAC member countries.

Table 1. Korea's net ODA Distribution (2001-2009)¹⁸

ODA assistance per year (million USD)

Categories	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Total ODA	264.7	278.8	365.9	423.3	752.3	455.3	696.1	802.3	816.0
I. Bilateral	174.5	206.8	245.2	330.8	463.3	376.1	490.5	539.2	581.1
	65.9%	74.2%	67.0%	78.1%	61.6%	82.6%	70.5%	67.2%	71.2%
I.I. Grant	53.0	66.7	145.5	212.1	318.0	259.0	358.3	368.7	367.0
I.2.Loans	118.6	140.1	99.7	118.7	145.3	117.1	132.2	170.6	214.1
II.Multilateral	93.1	72.0	120.7	82.6	289.0	79.2	205.6	263.1	234.9
	35.1%	25.8%	33.0%	19.5%	38.4%	17.4%	29.5%	32.8%	28.8%
ODA/GNI	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.1

Source: OECD Stats, EDCF Statistical Database, Korea Eximbank

Since 2010, after South Korea's official entry into OECD-DAC, the country's total net ODA distribution has continued to increase as shown in Table 2. By 2015,

¹⁷ Chun, Munyi & Lee, 2010, p.794

¹⁸ Economic Development Cooperation Fund, 'Annual Report', <https://www.edcfkorea.go.kr/site/program/board/basicboard/list?boardtypeid=306&phototype=list&menuid=005003003> , (Accessed on 3 January 2017)

South Korea's total net ODA distribution has reached USD 1915.4 million, in which bilateral aid and multilateral aid took up 79.9% and 20.1% respectively. This indicates that the portion of bilateral type of aid has increased as opposed to the decreased multilateral type of aid ratio. Meanwhile, the percentage of grant continues to remain only around two thirds of the total bilateral aid in 2015.

It is also noticeable that despite the slight increase in the country's ODA/GNI ratio, the ratio has not yet reached 0.15%.

Table 2. Korea's net ODA Distribution (2010-2015)¹⁹

ODA assistance per year (million USD)

Categories	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total ODA	1173.8	1324.6	1597.5	1755.3	1856.7	1915.4
I.Bilateral	900.6	989.6	1183.2	1309.5	1395.8	1531.1
	76.7%	74.7%	74.1%	74.6%	75.2%	80.0%
I.I.Grant	573.9	575.0	714.9	809.0	883.7	968.8
I.2.Loans	326.7	414.6	468.3	500.5	512.1	562.4
II.Multilateral	273.2	335.0	414.3	445.8	460.9	384.3
	23.3%	25.3%	25.9%	25.4%	24.8%	20.0%
ODA/GNI	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.14

Source: OECD Stats, EDCF Statistical Database, Korea Eximbank

South Korea's aid determinants have been more influenced by external forces like national economic and political interests and its relationships with other donor

¹⁹ ODA Korea, 'Overview', http://odakorea.go.kr/ODAPage_2012/T02/L03_S01_01.jsp, (Accessed on 3 January 2017)

countries. After going through a dramatic economic growth which has been made exemplary, and earning the moniker, the 'East Asian Miracle', South Korea has now been playing a role as a donor country for more than 40 years. South Korea's motivations in giving aid and its procedures have therefore been naturally influenced by this rapid development experience in many aspects. According to Eun Mee Kim and Jinhwan Oh's research on South Korea's aid determinants, South Korea tends to provide more aid to upper-income developing countries with higher reliability in terms of debt repayment, which reflects its motivation to pursue its own economic interests when providing foreign aid.²⁰ This argument is substantiated by Kang, Lee and Park's study which also states that South Korea has a tendency of considering its economic relations to the recipients as a priority factor when allocating its aid.²¹ The study also claims that such pattern of aid determinants resembles Japan's aid practices of 1980s.²²

Meanwhile, Kye Woo Lee in his regression studies of KOICA's aid determinants details how KOICA during 2004-2008 had a very narrow focus only on infant mortality in relation to recipient needs, which also did not align with its government's national interests – as KOICA's aid is only responsive to Korea's Foreign Direct Investment to its recipient countries.²³ Such disorganisation in KOICA's aid determinants is another problem in Korea's aid provision and more effective strategies for aid allocation must be developed. Additionally, with regards to South Korea's aid

²⁰ Kim & Oh, 2012, p.268

²¹ Sung Jin Kang, Hongshik Lee & Bokyeong Park, 2011, 'Does Korea Follow Japan in Foreign Aid? Relationships between Aid and Foreign Investment', *Japan and the World Economy*, 23, p.19

²² Kang, Lee & Park, 2011, p.26

²³ Kye Woo Lee, 2012, 'Do Emerging Donors Allocate Aid as DAC Members Do? The Case of Korea in the Millennium Era', *Journal of International Development*, 24, p.986

distribution mechanisms and determinants, Ian Watson also criticized that South Korea's state-led initiatives for foreign aid provision were ineffective and need to be re-examined.²⁴

2.3. Previous studies about public opinion on foreign aid in South Korea

Although section 2.1 explained the importance of public opinion on foreign aid, South Korea's foreign aid implementation process, especially their type of aid shows that South Korean government is neither reflecting nor attempting to understand the opinions of the public. In other words, there have been very few studies regarding public opinion on foreign aid in South Korea throughout its entire aid history. This is partially because of its foreign aid history background of being a recipient country as recently as until 1995, when South Korea largely received concessional loans through government-to-government bilateral aid, especially through the help of the United States.²⁵ This can be seen from the fact that US assisted an average of 69 per cent of imports to South Korea from 1952 to 1962.²⁶

Out of the very few studies conducted regarding public opinions on foreign aid in

²⁴ Iain Watson, 2011, 'Global Korea: Foreign Aid and National Interests in an Age of Globalization', *Contemporary Politics*, 17:1, p.66

²⁵ 임형백, 2014, '한국 공적개발원조(ODA)의 전개와 과제', *한국정책연구*, 14(1), p.73

²⁶ US Agency for International Development, 'South Korea: From Aid Recipient to Donor', http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/115197/kimnamhee/Korea%20case%20study%2020110615%20corrected%2020111027%20TU_%20-%2050th.pdf, (Accessed 20 December 2016)

Korea, Korea Institute for Economic Policy (KIEP)'s 2013 research on public opinions on ODA is one of the most comprehensive study, with a survey to which one thousand people responded. Another research conducted by the World Research in 2016 is the most recent public opinion survey about foreign aid, again with one thousand people surveyed.²⁷ Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)'s 2009 survey on the public's opinion came third with five hundred people surveyed. Nevertheless, several limitations could be found even within these studies and certain wordings induced misleading outcomes and hindered the objectivity of the survey.

Firstly, the questions for data classification asked by KIEP in 2013, World Research in 2016 and KOICA in 2009 only queried respondents' occupations, income levels and education levels. It omitted an important question on the respondents' political stance, which other countries' similar studies commonly found correlated with opinions on foreign aid.²⁸²⁹

Secondly, several questions have assumed that public support for foreign aid is largely determined by the income levels of the people, although this is not necessarily true. There could be many other factors like political stances, government efficiency and national economic and political circumstances and so on. For examples, one of the options in KOICA's 2009 survey that respondents could choose to indicate why they

²⁷ 월드리서치, 09.2016, '2016년도 ODA 국민 인식 조사 결과 보고서', (주)월드리서치

²⁸ 전승훈 & 김소원, 2009, '개발원조에 대한 대국민 여론조사 및 정부의 국제개발협력 정책의 방향연구', *국제개발협력*, 5, p.51

²⁹ 권율, 이주영, 유애라 & 이규현, 2014, '2013 ODA에 대한 국민인식 조사', *대외경제정책연구원* (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy), p.205

would oppose foreign aid provision was due to domestic ‘economic’ problems instead of broader domestic economic, social and political problems.³⁰ The question did not consider other factors in a more comprehensive manner as it could have done, that might potentially affect the public’s foreign aid support but only perceived ‘economic problems’ as a potential variable. KIEP’s 2013 survey had a similar limitation, only giving the respondents the option: ‘because South Korea is not rich enough to provide foreign aid’.³¹

Thirdly, other studies, including European and US studies of public opinion on foreign aid found ‘trust in government’ and ‘role of government’ to be necessary variables for aid opinion³², although all of the KIEP, World Research and KOICA’s survey, as well as all other previous studies in Korea never questioned the public’s opinions and attitude towards its government.

Overall, it could be seen that previous studies on South Korea’s public opinion on foreign aid has been very superficial and misleading, often omitting important questions and asking many that are too broad and generic. This has led to the identification of a need for a more detailed and objective model of survey questionnaire, and this study aims to facilitate its development.

³⁰ 전승훈 & 김소원, 2009, p.53

³¹ 권율, 이주영, 유애라 & 이규현, 2014, p.202

³² Polly J. Diven & John Constantelos, 2009, ‘Explaining generosity: a comparison of US and European public opinion on foreign aid’, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 7:2, p.122

2.4. Research Questions

Previous studies explored above show that South Korea lacks studies in the field of foreign aid public opinion, and that South Korean government is not making sufficient effort to understand and reflect the opinions of the public. Filling this gap is the purpose of this research.

This study asks three questions. First, what are the current opinions of the South Korean public on foreign aid? Secondly, what are the reasons for the results? Lastly, what are the implications for the South Korean government? In addition, as a pilot case study, this research also aims to make comparisons with the case of Australia which continuously makes efforts to understand public opinion on foreign aid and aid communities' opinions and whose ODA amount is similar to South Korea amongst OECD DAC members. This additional comparative study will provide a better insight into where South Korea's foreign aid policy stands today, and suggest a guideline on how the government should move forward.

2.5. Hypotheses

Firstly, in terms of the public's knowledge about foreign aid and its budget, I hypothesize that the majority of South Korean's perception of their knowledge on foreign aid to be poor. I predict that the majority will not know about the foreign aid

budget amount of South Korea either.

Secondly, in terms of support for foreign aid, I hypothesize that the South Korean public will show negative opinions on foreign aid because of its mistrust towards the government, with the most salient reasons including the government's inefficiency and lack of credibility. To be specific, I predict that the majority of the South Korean public will oppose foreign aid provision. They will also be opposed to the idea of increasing the government's foreign aid budget, and the majority of the public will prefer aid delivery through multilateral channels rather than bilateral means. With regards to which region South Korea should prioritise as the recipient of its aid, I predict that the public will perceive Africa as the most important recipient continent, because of media promotion and aid advertisement largely focusing on African countries in South Korea.

Despite such mistrust towards the government, the South Korean government is continuously focusing on bilateral and multi-bi aid. In both cases the usage of aid is determined and allocated solely by the South Korean government. Such pattern of aid mechanism may need to be changed due to strong negative opinions of the public, by channelling more aid towards non-government channels or multilateral forms or by enhancing the efforts to understand and implement the opinions of the public.

Thirdly, I hypothesize that people supporting foreign aid, supporting an increase in the aid budget or seeking alternative non-government aid mechanisms will tend to show more 'progressive' political stances. This is because I assume that conservative Korean public generally tends to avoid change and prioritizes self-interest rather than cooperation and assistance. The progressive elements of the public will generally think

that changes need to be made in many parts of South Korean domestic and foreign policies including foreign aid policies.

Overall, South Korea's ODA could satisfy its tax-payers through a more transparent implementation or by directing ODAs to Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), international organisations or other multilateral forms of aid provision, where the public voice can be heard better. Moreover, lack of knowledge by the public about foreign aid will give additional credits to non-government type of aid more than bilateral government aid.

In addition, in the pilot study in Chapter 5, I predict that Australia's public support for foreign aid is relatively high compared to that of South Korea, although the public expenditure on this area is unsustainable. Moreover, knowledge about foreign aid and its budget in Australia would also be relatively high compared to that of South Korea. This is because Australia has thus far exhibited a positive trend where the government and other Australian research institutes have continuously conducted aid surveys for the Australian public and tried to apply the results in their policy makings.

Chapter 3. Analytical Framework

3.1. Scope

The scope of the paper is focused on analysing the headline (population) levels of

public support for and knowledge of aid necessary for developing aid policy designs. The survey is designed to target all Korean citizens at any literate age group, with a variety of occupational, political and religious backgrounds in South Korea. However, as mentioned in section 1.1, the sample population of the online survey conducted is not large enough to be considered representative of the entire South Korean public. Therefore, the word ‘public’ used in this paper will imply not the entire South Korean public but a selected portion of the sample population who participated in the online survey.

A comparative pilot study will utilize a country case of Australia. This is because the economic circumstances as well as the amount of net ODA disbursement to least developing countries in Australia is similar to that of South Korea.

3.2. Methodology & Data Sources

Firstly, in order to devise an objective survey questions and collect accurate and unbiased information, this paper incorporates research methodologies of professional research institutes including KIEP, World Research and KOICA. It also refers to the three institutions’ survey questionnaire design methods – KIEP’s 2013 public opinion on foreign aid survey and those conducted by World Research in 2016 and KOICA in 2009 which had similar designs –, although this paper is modified to overcome their limitations, selectively utilizing their survey questions and adding important questions of its own. In summation, the modified survey questionnaire utilized for this research

is simplified overall with the addition of necessary, complementary questions.

The sample size for the survey conducted is approximately 300 respondents. Initially the targeted sample size was 500 respondents, but achieving this was unviable due to limitations in financial, technological and human resources required to administer the survey to a large number of people. Having 300 respondents still provides a significant and sufficient representation of the larger population they are intended to reflect.

The survey questionnaire was designed online by using Google forms. Therefore, the survey conducted is entirely web-based, although administering this survey was done by personally asking each individual respondent, and through Social Network Services (SNS) including Facebook, Instagram and KakaoTalk. No phone-based survey was conducted due the lack of accessibility.

The survey results drawn out using the above methods are then analysed based on the hypotheses deduced from the literature reviews of the previous studies. It analyses the surveyed support for aid in South Korea, and provides guidelines for future policy making as well as developing for further research in this area.

Furthermore, the research also utilizes a comparative methodology. As a pilot study it compares and contrasts the public opinion on foreign aid in Australia and South Korea, their survey questionnaire methodologies and their research status. The reason why this paper chooses a comparative study in a chapter is to analyse where South Korean public stands compared with another OECD-DAC country.

3.3. Sample Population Characteristics

The characteristics of the 281 people who participated the online survey are listed in the table below. They are grouped by their age, occupations and political stances. Previous studies have analysed the sample, categorizing them by gender, educational levels and income levels. In order to fill the gap in our understanding of the public's perception towards foreign policy this survey instead focused on the following three characteristics that have thus far been relatively unexplored.

Table 3. The characteristics of the surveyed population

Categorization		Number of People	Population Ratio (%)
By Age	10-20s	131	47%
	30s	40	14%
	40s	59	21%
	50s	47	17%
	60s+	4	1%
By Occupation	Managers	12	4%
	Professionals and related workers	36	13%
	Administration officers	75	27%
	Service Workers	10	4%
	Sales Workers	23	8%
	Craft and Related Trade Workers	4	1%
	Elementary Workers	8	3%

	Housewife	25	9%
	Students	81	29%
	Armed Forces	1	0%
	Unemployed/Retired	6	2%
By Political Stances	Conservative	45	16%
	Neutral	102	37%
	Progressive	134	47%

3.4. Survey Questions

The survey aims to ask two big questions regarding foreign aid. First is related to the levels of public support for foreign aid and its budget and the second part is related to the public's knowledge about aid and its budget which is necessary for development aid policy designing.

The former part of the survey is integrated into section 3 of the survey questionnaire and enquires about people's preferences on foreign aid policies including whether they are for/against foreign aid provision and why, to which countries South Korea should provide aid, how much aid should South Korea provide, through which organisations should aid be provided and why. The latter part is divided into two different sections of which section 1 asks general knowledge about foreign aid and section 2 asks the public's knowledge about South Korean foreign aid budget. Section 4 of the survey will include questions necessary for data classification of the sample population.

3.5. Appendices

This paper has two appendices attached. The first appendix includes the full wording of all 20 survey questions conducted for this research. Because the survey is aimed at Korean citizens and the majority of Korean citizens are more comfortable with Korean rather than English, the survey questions have been formed in Korean.

The second appendix summarises KIEP and World Research survey questionnaires upon which this paper's survey questions were built. The original survey questionnaire conducted by KOICA 2009 is not available and therefore could not be included in the appendix. The second appendix includes KIEP and World Research's survey questions this paper referred to when designing its own survey questionnaire. It also includes KIEP and World Research's survey questions that this paper avoided to utilise because of their limitations and necessity of modification. Some categories have been collapsed to make comparisons clearer.

Lastly, another appendix includes different survey questions conducted in Australia regarding the country's public support for foreign aid. It will provide an insight into how frequently and thoroughly foreign aid public opinion research is being conducted in another OECD donor country like Australia.

Chapter 4. Main Analysis

4.1. Key Findings

This research analyses surveyed support for aid in South Korea and provide a guideline for South Korea's future foreign aid policy makings and the development of further research. Through the research this paper finds that South Korea's aid allocation should be channelled more through non-government or multilateral mechanisms rather than through bilateral and government to government channels. The research is also designed to inform priming effects of public opinion polling on aid and its necessity.

Levels of support for and knowledge about aid vary across groups within South Korea. Main findings of this research are described below.

- Unlike the hypothesis, South Korean public's knowledge about aid is relatively good, as majority of the population have basic knowledge about South Korea's provision and around half of the population are aware of South Korea's foreign aid provision and its approximate budget.
- Vast majority of South Koreans approve of foreign aid provision to poor countries who need development assistance, although only around half of the population believe that aid should be provided primarily on humanitarian

grounds.


- Moreover, when it comes to the foreign aid budget, majority of the population favour either sustaining or reducing the current aid budget, despite the fact the South Korean government and OECD-DAC expect an increase in the foreign aid budget.
- The results show that higher percentage of the people in the progressive spectrum of the political stance tend to support an increase in the foreign aid budget. This correlation may become more verifiable if the sample size were larger.
- The results also show however that the correlation between people's political stances and their preferred aid channels are not significant. People from all political spectrums show stronger preference for non-government and multilateral channels of foreign aid provision.
- Existing evidence suggests that South Korean people generally support foreign aid provision, although majority of them favour channels other than the government, like NGO/NPOs or international organisations, mainly due to mistrust towards the government operations and its lack of transparency.
- Further research is needed in this area particularly in terms of its scope because the sample size collected is only around 300 people. This is less than the three-other major researches conducted in South Korea as discussed above as well as the Australian surveys discussed in Chapter 5 which had respondents ranging from 500 to 1000.

4.2. Background Knowledge about Development Assistance and Foreign Aid

General background knowledge about the public have been analysed before asking them detailed questions about foreign aid policies in South Korea and their opinions. First of all, in order to test basic knowledge in this field, the paper enquired about whether or not respondents have been to poor countries that need development assistance. This is because first-hand experience in such countries can enhance the knowledge of their political, social and economic climate. Out of the 281 people surveyed, around 33 per cent (93 people) have been to poor countries that need development assistance. Around two thirds of the respondents have not had such experience. (See Chart 1)

Nevertheless, the percentage of respondents who have visited countries that require development assistance is higher than expected. This indicates substantial likelihood that around one third of those surveyed have some degree of understanding about these poor countries.

Chart 1. Have you been to any poorer countries around the world where development assistance is needed?




There is another question in the survey which asks whether South Korea is an advanced country. This question is designed to collect information on people's perception of South Korea. This question has been included because their perception on whether South Korea is an advanced country may affect their support for foreign aid provision and what they perceive to be the appropriate size of the aid budget. Interestingly, despite the fact that South Korea has become a member of OECD in 2010 and its GDP is ranked 14th in the world as of 2017,³³ more than half of the respondents do not perceive South Korea as an advanced country as shown in Chart 2. This is seemingly because of the recent political scandal that happened in South Korea where the former president Park Geun-hye's corruption and bribery with her confidante Choi Sun Sil brought about a huge shock to all Koreans citizens and the

³³ Statistics Times, List of Countries by Projected GDP, <http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp.php>, (Accessed on 17 January 2017)


country.

Chart 2. Do you think South Korea is an advanced country?



Lastly, another question asks the respondents' general knowledge about South Korea's provision of foreign aid to developing countries. As shown in Chart 3, 13 per cent (36 people) of those surveyed claimed to know about South Korea's aid provision very well, and 42 per cent (118 people) claimed they have some knowledge about it. 33 per cent (93 people) of the people said they heard about it but do not have much knowledge, and the rest, taking up 12%, responded that they do not know. Overall, majority of the respondents seemed to have at least a basic understanding of South Korea's foreign aid provision to developing countries.

Chart 3. Did you know that the South Korean government is providing foreign aid to developing countries?




4.3. Levels and areas of support for foreign aid

Levels of support for aid vary across groups within South Korea. Out of the 281 people surveyed, around 94 per cent (264 people) showed their approval of South Korea's aid provision to poorer countries around the world. As shown in Chart 4, out of these 94%, 31% of the respondents (86 people) said they 'strongly agree' with the government's aid provision and 63% of the people (178 people) chose 'slightly agree' and showed their tentative support for aid. In the meantime, only 6% of the surveyed population said they either 'strongly disagree' or 'slightly disagree' with the government's aid support to developing countries. The survey reveals that out of these 17 people who oppose the provision of aid, 6 people showed their partial disagreement and 1 person showed his/her strong disagreement towards aid provision. The results

run counter to the hypothesis stated above, which predicted the public to be opposed to the government's aid provision. It can be seen that the majority of the Korean public has a positive attitude towards aid provision regardless of the size of the aid budget and its mechanisms. (See Chart 4)

Chart 4. Do you generally agree or disagree with South Korea's aid provision to poorer countries around the world?




The survey also investigates the reasons why people are either approving of or opposed to South Korea's aid provision. Chart 5 firstly shows the reasons why people approve of South Korea's aid provision to poorer countries around the world. The chart draws data from the question, 'If you agree, why do you approve of South Korea's aid provision to poorer countries around the world?' which allowed respondents to select multiple options. The top reason was because 'South Korea also received foreign aid in the past' with 84 people as shown in Chart 5. Respondents evidently felt they have a

kind of moral obligation or a need for repay the generosity of the donor countries that provided assistance for South Korea in the past. The second biggest reason for supporting aid came from altruistic motivations as 75 people chose ‘for the betterment of recipient countries’. Such motivations likely to be derived from frequent media promotions for aid in South Korea.

The third most popular option was ‘for international stability and peaceful coexistence’ with 54 people, followed by the 4th and 5th reasons which are ‘for South Korea’s international recognition’ and ‘overseas investment opportunities for South Korean companies’. These two options were selected by 27 and 24 respondents respectively.

Chart 5. If you agree, why do you approve of South Korea’s aid provision to poorer countries around the world?




The survey also enquired why people would oppose South Korea’s aid provision

to poorer countries around the world, again allowing multiple selections. As shown in Chart 6, out of 17 people who either strongly opposed or slightly opposed South Korea's aid provision, 16 people chose 'domestic issues are more important'. This reason by far outnumbered the other reasons and showed that the majority of objectors prioritize domestic problems over international ones. Meanwhile, in descending order, the respondents who chose 'mistrust towards the government and its inefficiency', 'aid being ineffective for recipient countries', 'South Korea not being rich enough for providing aid' and 'aid being unhelpful for national interests' as their reasons comprised less than 25% of the respondents opposed to providing aid.

The results show that overall South Korean people are generally supportive of providing aid to developing countries, many of them for ethical reasons. Those who are against aid provision tend to prioritize domestic problems and are oriented more towards national or internal matters rather than international problems.

Chart 6. If you disagree, why do you oppose South Korea's aid provision to poorer countries around the world?




A question was posed to gauge the public opinion on what constitutes an appropriate motivation for providing aid. Respondents of the survey were asked whether South Korea's aid should be provided primarily on humanitarian grounds or for commercial and political interests. The responses were interesting. It was deemed important to have a question in the survey that was designed specifically to collect information on the public's motives for providing aid, be it humanitarian or self-interest because the motivation for aid determines not only the countries to which aid is allocated, but also aid sectors, aid types and the quality of benefits from recipient countries.

As can be seen from Chart 7, around 56 per cent of the respondents (156 people) were either strongly in favour or in favour of providing aid for humanitarian purposes. On the other hand, 44 per cent of the respondents (125 people) were either strongly in favour or in favour of providing foreign aid for national commercial or political interests. The difference between humanitarian and commercial or political motivations was only 12 per cent. While supporters of aid provision comprised 94 per cent of all respondents to the survey as shown in Chart 4, the response to this question demonstrates that there is a significant divide in what motivates public support for foreign aid. Evidently, not everyone supporting foreign aid provision has altruistic motives.

To be specific, among those who were in support of humanitarian motivations, 17% argued that foreign aid should be provided for 'strongly humanitarian' purposes,

while 39% of the respondents responded that foreign aid should be provided for humanitarian purposes to a certain extent. Meanwhile, out of the 44% of the respondents who choose commercial and political interests, 41% called for commercial and political motivations to a certain extent, and 3% of the people indicated that foreign aid provision should be ‘strongly for national commercial and political interests’.

Chart 7. Do you think South Korean government aid should be given primarily on humanitarian grounds, or do you think South Korea's commercial and political interests should play a significant part?



Another question was designed to comprehend the public's foreign aid target preferences. With regards to six major recipient regions for aid provided by South Korea that include Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe and former Soviet Union, Middle East and Oceania, around 93 per cent of the people found Asia as either a 'very

important (47%)’ or ‘fairly important (46%)’ region, while 92 per cent of the people also found Africa as either a ‘very important (41%)’ or ‘fairly important (51%)’ region. Respondents indicated that these two regions prioritized the most as aid recipients as shown in the survey results shown in Chart 8.

In the meantime, Latin America came third in terms of its importance as a recipient region. Around 69 per cent of the respondents (196 people) believe Latin America is either a ‘very important (11%)’ or ‘fairly important (58%)’ region. A significant number (22%) of the respondents however also considered Latin America as a ‘fairly unimportant’ region.

Middle East was identified as the fourth important recipient region according to the survey, as 58 per cent (163 people) thought Middle East is either ‘very important (13%)’ or ‘fairly important (45%)’ while 39% of the respondents believed the Middle East is ‘fairly unimportant (29%)’ or ‘unimportant (10%)’. The order of importance of the other regions as recipients of South Korea’s aid are then followed by ‘Oceania’ and ‘Europe and former Soviet Union’ with 43% and 41% of the survey participants finding the region either very important or fairly important respectively, and 55% and 51% of the surveyed considering the region either fairly unimportant or unimportant.

Interestingly, these results are aligned with South Korea’s actual ODA net disbursement by regions, as top two recipient regions of South Korea’s aid are Asia and Africa, which are followed by Latin America, Middle East, Oceania, and Europe and former Soviet Union in descending order of the ODA amount according to the 2015 statistics from the OECD. See Chart 9 for further information.

Chart 8. In your opinion, how important is it that South Korea gives aid to the following regions?





Chart 9. Regional Aid Share of Bilateral ODA (2008-2015)³⁴



³⁴ ODA Korea, 'Regional Aid Share of Bilateral ODA (2008-2015)', https://www.odakorea.go.kr/ODAPage_2012/T02/L03_S01_01.jsp, (Accessed on 7 March 2017)

4.4. Preference over its foreign aid channels

This research paper makes a valuable contribution to the academic field by studying an area which has so far been unaddressed by previous studies on public opinion on foreign aid in South Korea. The survey asks the respondents to identify the organisation through which foreign aid should be provided in order to ensure the efficiency with which aid is provided to developing countries. No other foreign aid surveys in Korea have asked this although aid implementation agencies have the authority of deciding the amount of aid, means for aid, aid target, aid sectors and has a critical role in determining aid effectiveness and benefits. This question may have been omitted because they did not consider the problems caused by donor governments (agents) previously.

The survey results show that out of 281 survey respondents, 37 per cent (104 people) have chosen the 'government' as the most efficient aid delivery agency. The remaining 62 per cent (176 people) have chosen non-government agencies for effective aid provision, out of which 36 per cent (102 people) has chosen 'international organisations', while 26 per cent (74 people) has chosen 'non-government organisations (NGOs) or non-profit organisations (NPOs)'. (See Chart 10)

Chart 10. In your opinion, which organisation is the most efficient in providing foreign aid to developing countries?




Table 4 classifies these results by categorizing them by the respondents' 1) political stances; and 2) age. The results suggest that a slightly higher percentage (43.2%) of politically conservative respondents prefer aid to be delivered through the government. Only 36.3% of the respondents who have identified themselves as politically 'neutral', and 36% of the progressively minded respondents have opted for the government to function as the primary aid delivery channel.

Across all political spectrums however more than 50% of the people chose either NGO/NPOs or international organisations as the primary mechanism through which foreign should be delivered. This is likely due to the high level of mistrust towards the current regime, in relation to its operational capacity and perceived lack of transparency.

This suggests that while the public's political affiliation is no doubt a major

element in its preference on aid delivery mechanisms, the severe lack of support for the government evidenced by this survey's data may have been influenced by some outliers. The Park Geun Hye administration has received widespread criticism across the entire political spectrum, not for any ideologically charged behaviour, but for apparently defying 'common sense.' This is concurrent with the findings of the survey which has shown respondents of all political orientations refusing to identify the government as the primary deliverer of foreign aid.

Secondly in relation to age, the results show that younger people prefer non-governmental aid channels such as NGO/NPOs and international organisations to the government. 29.8% of the respondents aged 10-20 chose the government, while 39.7% chose international organisations and the remaining 30.5% chose NGO/NPOs as the primary aid delivery channel. Interestingly, an equal number of respondents in their 30s (15 people, 37.5%) supported international organisations and the government as the primary aid delivery organization. The remaining 25% chose NGO/NPOs. Respondents in their 40s showed slightly stronger support for the government, with 39% choosing this option. 33.9% selected international organisations and the remaining 27.1% selected NGO/NPOs. Respondents aged 50 and over however, showed the strongest support for the government delivering foreign aid, with 54% choosing this option. 30% said that international organisations should deliver aid, while only 16% selected NGO/NPOs.

A point of note is that among the different age groups, respondents aged 10-20 showed the least support for aid provision through the government, and those aged 50

and over showed the greatest level of support for its government as their aid delivery channel. In addition, in all age groups except age over 50, non-government and multilateral channels like NGO/NPOs and international organisations combined had more number of people than those who chose government as their preferred aid delivery channel.


Table 4. In your opinion, which organisation is the most efficient in providing foreign aid to developing countries? (By Classification)

		Government	NGO/NPOs	International Organisations
By Political Stance	Conservative	19	11	14
		43.2%	25.0%	31.8%
	Neutral	37	28	37
		36.27%	27.45%	36.27%
	Progressive	48	35	51
		36.09%	26.31%	38.06%
By Age	10-20s	39	40	52
		29.77%	30.53%	39.69%
	30s	15	10	15
		37.50%	25.00%	37.50%
	40s	23	16	20
		38.98%	27.11%	33.89%
	50s+	27	8	15
		54.00%	16.00%	30.00%
Perceiving South Korea	Yes	41	41	41
		33.3%	33.3%	33.3%

as an advanced country	No	63 40.1%	33 21.0%	61 38.9%
------------------------------	----	-------------	-------------	-------------

Reasons why the respondents have chosen the government, NGO/NPOs and international organisations respectively are discussed below. Respondents could choose more than one reasons for their answers. Firstly, looking at the reasons for choosing the government as the most efficient aid delivery agency, Chart 11 shows that the biggest reason is ‘for national interests and security’. ‘Mistrust towards NGO/NPOs or international organisations’ came the second, followed by ‘lack of professionalism by NGO/NPOs or international organisations’. These options were available for 104 respondents who chose ‘the government’ as the most efficient aid delivery agency and allowed multiple options to be selected.

Chart 11. Why do you believe that the government is the most efficient aid delivery channel?



On the other hand, out of 102 people who chose international organisations as the most efficient aid delivery agency, the strongest reason for their choice was ‘mistrust towards the government operation and its lack of transparency’, which accounted for more than double the number of the other options chosen by the respondents (see Chart 12). ‘The government’s lack of professionalism in aid delivery’ and ‘the government’s lack of understanding about recipient countries’ came the second with 35 responses. The rest of the answers were ‘mistrust towards NGO/NPOs’ operation and their lack of transparency’ with 23 responses, ‘NGO/NPOs’ lack of professionalism in aid delivery’ with 17 responses and ‘NGO/NPOs’ lack of understanding about recipient countries’ with 14 responses. The remaining three reasons for choosing international organisations as the most effective aid delivery agency were ‘de-politicisation’, ‘independence from the government’ and ‘for national interests and security’. Overall, proponents of aid delivery through international organisations are mostly mistrustful of the government, and to a lesser extent of the NGO/NPOs, both in their credibility and capability to deliver aid in a fair and effective manner.


Chart 12. Why do you believe that international organisations are the most efficient aid delivery channels?



People who chose NGO/NPOs as the most efficient aid delivery agency accounted for 26 per cent (74 people). Again, the majority of these people chose ‘mistrust towards the government operation and its lack of transparency’ as the strongest reason for choosing NGO/NPOs with 45 responses. The second and third strongest reasons were ‘the government’s lack of professionalism in aid delivery’ and ‘the government’s lack of understanding about recipient countries’ with 35 and 25 responses respectively. Very few people chose international organisations’ transparency problem, organisational mistrust, lack of professionalism or lack of understanding about recipient countries as their reasons for choosing NGO/NPOs as shown in Chart 13. Other responses expressed concern about ‘government’s diplomatic conflicts over different aid diplomacy’ and ‘difficulty of coordination between governments’ as their reasons for choosing NGO/NPOs. Overall, both groups who chose NGO/NPOs or

international organisations have mistrust towards governments' operation and their lack of transparency, and they are shown in the survey results.

Chart 13. Why do you believe that NGO/NPOs are the most efficient aid delivery channels?




4.5. Knowledge about foreign aid and its budget

In order to investigate knowledge about foreign aid and its budget, the survey has asked questions on the participants' self-perceived level of knowledge about aid, their actual knowledge about foreign aid and their perception towards it. The survey results indicate that South Koreans are knowledgeable about aid, both in their self-perceived and actual terms.

When people were asked about the approximate amount of foreign aid budget in

terms of overall percentage, 47% of the people were able to correctly answer that the foreign aid budget takes up less than 1% (See Chart 14) of the entire federal government budget. The foreign aid budget in South Korea only takes up around 0.57% of the entire budget³⁵, but the respondents have not yet been made aware of this at this point in the survey. The remaining 53% believed that the foreign aid budget is more than the actual amount. Therefore, it has been identified that although many people are aware that South Korea is providing aid to developing countries, when it comes to the size of the foreign aid budget size, a majority do not understand the actual amount.

Chart 14. As far as you know, how much of the government budget is spent on foreign aid?




Despite the fact that the majority of the respondents generally supported

³⁵ Ministry of Strategy and Finance Republic of Korea, '2017 South Korean Government Budget', <http://www.budget.go.kr/index.do>, (Accessed on 17 March 2017)

providing foreign aid to developing countries, the majority were not in favour of increasing the foreign aid budget before being told its actual figure with considering it to be ‘about the right amount’ and 11% indicating it is ‘too much’. 15% of the people claimed they ‘do not know’ about the budget size and did not have any opinion. Nevertheless, applying the results of the survey to the larger population of South Korea, approximately one third of the population favours an increase in the foreign aid budget which is a non-negligible number to say the least.

Chart 15. Do you think South Korea spends too much or too little on foreign aid?



When the sample population is classified into political stances, ages, and whether they perceive South Korea as an advanced country, the results are interesting. Table 5 shows the survey participants’ preferences in relation to the foreign aid budget size, sorted according to their political orientation, age and their perception whether or not South Korea is an advanced country.

When the respondents were unaware of the actual size of the foreign aid budget, the survey results did not display a correlation with the respondents' political stance that was significant enough to display a massive skew in favour of a particular orientation. 35.6% of the conservative participants indicated it is too small, 42.2% responded it is just right, 13.3% said it is too much, and the remaining 8.9% indicated they do not know. Therefore, while a large number of respondents thought the budget should increase or is sufficient, and those who thought it should decrease was firmly in the minority, there was no single opinion that held a vast majority.

Respondents with neutral political preferences followed the same pattern, with 33.3% saying the current budget is too small, 37.3% saying it is just right, and those who answered 'too much' or 'do not know' both taking up 13.7% respectively. The progressives had the greatest amount of support among themselves for an increase in the budget albeit by a minute margin, with 40.3% saying the current budget is too small, 32.8% saying it is just right, 17.2% saying they do not know, and only 8.2% saying it is too much.

While the results show a general propensity for the South Korean public to think the budget could increase or is sufficient, no single option held the majority across all political preference groups. Furthermore, it must be considered that a non-negligible number of survey participants confessed to their ignorance of the actual budget size and did not register an opinion.

Similar to the lack of a strong correlation between the respondents' political orientation and their preference in relation to the budget size, there is no significant

skew towards a particular response under the age group category, especially because many respondents chose ‘don’t know’. However, the data clearly shows that the respondents in their 40s were most inclined to perceive the current aid budget to be ‘too small’. The highest percentage of the people in their 50s or more perceived the current aid budget to be ‘too much’.

On the question of whether or not South Korea is an advanced country, a higher percentage of the people who believe South Korea is not an advanced country tended to believe that the current aid budget is too large, although many of the respondents indicated their ignorance about the current foreign aid budget amount.

Overall, due to the lack of sufficient data, the implication is not that significant. Nevertheless, many people have answered the question without foreknowledge and the opinions have not changed much even when the information was given. (This will be further explained in Chapter 4.6). This shows that many of the South Korean respondents possess basic knowledge on foreign aid budget. Their perception towards the foreign aid budget by classification (with the information given) will also be analysed in Chapter 4.6.

Table 5. Do you think South Korea spends too much or too little on foreign aid?

		Too small	Just Right	Too much	Don't Know	Other
By Political Stance	Conservative	16 35.6%	19 42.2%	6 13.3%	4 8.9%	0
	Neutral	34	38	14	14	2


		33.3%	37.3%	13.7%	13.7%	2.0%
	Progressive	54	44	11	23	2
		40.3%	32.8%	8.2%	17.2%	1.5%
By Age	10-20s	41	61	10	21	1
		30.6%	45.5%	7.5%	15.7%	1%
	30s	14	13	3	7	0
		37.8%	35.1%	8.1%	18.9%	
	40s	23	13	10	10	3
		39.0%	22.0%	16.9%	16.9%	5%
	50s+	26	14	26	3	0
		37.7%	20.3%	37.7%	4.3%	
Perceiving South Korea as an Advanced Country	Yes	52	47	6	17	1
		42.3%	38.2%	4.9%	13.8%	0.8%
	No	52	54	25	24	3
		32.9%	34.2%	15.8%	15.2%	1.9%

4.6. Preference over its foreign aid budget

Following the above question, the survey participants were told the actual amount of the foreign aid budget as of 2015 (USD 1915.4 million dollars). In spite of this new information, the survey found that the participants' preferences in relation to the aid budget has more or less remained consistent, except for a shift among those who chose 'don't know' and 'other' in the previous question (Chart 16). According to Chart 16, 37% of the people were still in favour of an increase in the foreign aid budget which is the same rate as when they were asked without knowing the actual budget. Meanwhile,

those who perceive the level of the government's expenditure on foreign aid to be 'appropriate' has increased from 36% to 45%. The number of people who think foreign aid budget should be 'decreased' has also increased from 11% to 18%. Overall, the majority of the respondents either want the South Korean foreign aid budget to remain as it is or decrease, unlike the government's plans to increase the foreign aid budget.

Chart 16. The South Korean government allocated KRW2,141,200,000,000 for foreign aid budget as of 2015. This is equivalent to KRW 42,000 per capita a year. What do you think of this current aid budget amount?



When looking into the above results by different categories (See Table 6), the characteristics are more evident than in Table 5 when the budget size information was not given. While the majority of the population favoured either sustaining or reducing the current aid budget, some other trends were noticeable when dividing the population into categories.

In relation to the respondents' political stances, it could be seen that a higher percentage of the people in the progressive spectrum of the political stance tended to support an increase in the foreign aid budget. This is because 44% of the politically progressive respondents tended to find the current foreign aid budget 'too small', while only 37% of the politically conservative respondents answered as such. The results suggest that this correlation may become more verifiable if the sample size were larger.

Secondly, in relation to the respondents' ages, it could be seen that a highest percentage of people in the age of 40s tended to find the foreign aid budget size too small, with 44.9% of the respondents in their 40s answering as such. In the meantime, the highest percentage of the people in their 30s found the budget to be too much as around 27.8% of the respondents in their 30s responded so.

Lastly, when looking at the results by their perception of whether South Korea is an advanced country, it could be seen that those who think South Korea is not an advanced country had a higher percentage of people who think foreign aid budget is too much (22.2%) – compared to the other group where only 12.2% thought it is too much. Similarly, out of the group perceiving South Korea as not an advanced country, 34.8% of the people thought the South Korean foreign aid budget is too small, while 40.7% of the other group thought it is too small.

Table 6. The South Korean government allocated KRW2,141,200,000,000 for foreign aid budget as of 2015. This is equivalent to KRW 42,000 per capita a year. What do you think of this current aid budget amount? (By Classification)


		Too small	Just Right	Too much
By Political Stance	Conservative	17	22	6
		37.8%	48.9%	13.3%
	Neutral	34	46	21
		33.7%	45.5%	20.8%
	Progressive	59	58	17
		44.0%	43.3%	12.7%
By Age	10-20s	49	67	18
		36.6%	50%	13.4%
	30s	13	13	10
		36.1%	36.1%	27.8%
	40s	22	26	11
		44.9%	44.1%	18.6%
	50s+	21	19	11
		41.2%	37.3%	21.6%
Perceiving South Korea as an Advanced Country	Yes	50	58	15
		40.7%	47.2%	12.2%
	No	55	68	35
		34.8%	43.0%	22.2%

In addition, those who indicated that foreign aid budget should either be increased or decreased were asked as to what their preferred amount of the foreign aid budget would be. As shown in Chart 17, out of 155 people who said that aid budget should be increased or decreased, 26% of them said the budget should be less than KRW30,000 per capita. 11% of the respondents called for the budget to be in the region of KRW30,000-42,000 per capita, which is a slight decrease from the actual 2015 foreign aid budget. Meanwhile, 26% of the people indicated that the budget should be slightly

increased from KRW42,000 to 50,000 per head, and 31% of the people thought it should be increased to KRW50,000-100,000 per capita. There were also 6% of the respondents who thought the foreign aid budget should be over KRW100,000.

The new government administration can refer to the data in these results when making a decision on its foreign aid budget in its next planning stage. Overall, the survey results indicate that almost half of the sample population is satisfied with the current aid budget. Nevertheless, when they were asked to provide a numerical figure as to exactly how big the aid budget should be, those who did not have much knowledge about the foreign aid mostly inclined towards either decreasing or maintaining the current aid budget.

Chart 17. If you have responded that the foreign aid budget should be increased or decreased, what do you think is the appropriate size for the budget? (calculated per capita/year)



4.7. Implications

One major difference between this research and other few studies on public opinion about foreign aid in South Korea is that previous studies have never questioned the role of the government in foreign aid provision. Previous surveys have never problematized the fact that out of South Korea's total ODA distribution, bilateral aid delivered government to government takes up 79.9%, of which only two thirds of them are provided as 'grants'. The survey used for this study has included many questions that allow the public to express their opinions towards the government. Chapter 4.4 deals with the respondents' preference on the South Korean foreign aid channels and analyses how the respondents perceived the foreign aid delivery channels and their reasons. For example, the survey included a question that allows people to choose a mechanism through which foreign aid should be provided. If they chose a channel other than the South Korean government, asking the reasons why also allowed the respondents to express their opinions about the government. Moreover, questions allowing multiple-selections asking why the respondents would be against foreign aid provision also included 'mistrust towards the government's aid implementation' as an option.

As such, the survey provides a series of questions that allows South Koreans to express their opinions about the government's role in foreign aid provision. The results are noteworthy. The majority of the respondents, regardless of their political stance, age or occupation, preferred South Korea's foreign aid provision to be done through

‘non-government’ mechanisms like NGOs, NPOs or international organisations, mainly because of their ‘mistrust towards the government’s operation and their lack of transparency’. As an exception, people in their 50s or more showed stronger support for a ‘government’ channel of foreign aid provision, but even this age group showed around 46% of preference towards non-governmental foreign aid channels like NGOs, NPOs or international organisations. Overall, it could be seen that there is a strong need for the government to alter the channel of foreign aid provision from bilateral, government-to-government aid channels to non-governmental ones including multilateral aid channels, based on the opinions of the surveyed respondents.

Literature reviews conducted in Chapter 2 explained that when the public has distrust towards its government’s foreign aid policies, foreign aid provision should instead be channelled through multilateral mechanisms in order to enhance transparency and to reflect the opinions of the public in relation to its foreign aid policies. South Korea’s recent political circumstances which has involved the incidents surrounding the now former president Park Geun-hye and her eventual impeachment have led to a call for, most vocally than ever, greater political transparency and open communication with the public, further highlighting the importance of such a transition. It is true that South Korea’s bilateral aid amount is significantly large compared to the other OECD countries. Moreover, it has been found that the majority of the surveyed South Koreans do not favour the government’s engagement in foreign aid provision. Under these circumstances, more multilateral (and non-governmental) rather than bilateral aid should be provided.

Furthermore, the level of knowledge about foreign aid and the budget size by the public are also fairly significant, contradicting the hypothesis. The hypothesis above assumed that the South Korean public's knowledge in this policy area will be very shallow. The hypothesis turned out to be false as more than half of the population knew about the fact that South Korea is providing foreign aid to developing countries, and almost half of the population could at least approximate the foreign aid budget amount. However, this may be because the surveyed population is mostly concentrated in the capital region of South Korea in which educational levels are high and vocationally are skilled professionals. If the sample population was larger and conducted nation-wide within South Korea, there may be more variations to the educational levels and occupational backgrounds, which would inevitably influence the survey outcomes.

While previous studies have emphasized that governments facing a credibility problem should re-allocate their aid budget toward multilateral agencies, the public's lack of knowledge about aid is also another factor that supports the notion of channelling foreign aid through multilateral mechanisms. This is because the public in donor countries generally rely upon restricted information provided by their governments and the feedback link between the tax they paid and how they translate into benefits for the aid recipients is not very clear. This may lead the public opinion about foreign aid to become more negative, and aid practitioners are going to channel more aid through multilateral agencies to reassure taxpayers, or the public. South Korea's knowledge about foreign aid is respectable, yet there is a serious lack of the government's credibility in their perception. If further research with a more expansive

population sample is conducted and knowledge about foreign aid turns out to be lower, the importance of channelling more aid through multilateral mechanisms becomes much stronger.

Another interesting point to note is that when it comes to the size of foreign aid budget, South Korean public generally do not wish for the foreign aid budget to increase. This is because only one third of the surveyed population indicated that the current aid budget should increase, whether or not they were aware of the current South Korean foreign aid budget amount. In this case, the need to channel more aid to multilateral organisations would imply shifting bilateral aid budgets to multilateral aid, instead of a wholesale increase in the multilateral aid budget.

Lastly, unlike the hypothesis stated in Chapter 2, the correlation between the public's political stances and their support for non-governmental aid mechanisms is not significant. Regardless of the political stances, it can be seen that people in all political spectrums prefer foreign aid provision through non-government, multilateral channels like NGOs, NPOs and international organisations. The problem of the government's lack of credibility and transparency was not a matter of political ideologies but a matter of common sense.

Meanwhile, there is some correlation between the people's political stances and their foreign aid budget size preference. This is because the results show that more progressive people tend to favour the foreign aid budget to increase than what the conservative-minded respondents indicated. It seems like the political stance has more influence on the amount of the foreign aid budget, rather than the mechanisms through

which foreign aid is provided.

4.8. Limitations and Scope

The first and most significant limitation of this survey is the sample size of 300 respondents. Should there have been more resources available, a more ideal sample size would have been at least 500, and up to 1000 respondents. This would have enhanced the capacity of the survey to represent the larger Korean population, and allow the results to be compared on much more equal terms with those generated by the KOICA, World Research and KIEP studies.

The second limitation was in the methodologies of the survey, which was administered only through the internet. Having a variety of means including phone surveys and face-to-face surveys would have enabled more potential respondents to be reached. This would in turn have allowed for more variety in the types of respondents, such as in their age, education, locale and vocation, further enhancing the reflective qualities of the study.

The wording and framing of the questions may also have had limitations. While they were formed with the simplest and the most objective language possible, some respondents may have interpreted them in ways that were not intended. Having further guidance or a team with which to collaboratively formulate the questions may have helped to minimize this risk and enhance the quality of the research.

Including a question to gauge the public's preference in relation to loans and

grants as types of aid was initially considered but ultimately omitted. This was to make the survey questionnaires easier for the public to undertake, because not all public are aware of the difference between loans and grants of the ODA. Nevertheless, such omission instead led to an omission of another important analysis. Future studies on this area may include this option using simple and understandable wordings and explanations as collecting this information can establish additional scope of understandings of the public opinion about foreign aid.

Finally, the survey could have benefitted from including questions that allows links to be drawn between the respondents' income levels and their preference in relation to aid size, type and mechanism. While the survey already includes questions that collected information on the respondents' political stances, occupations and age and how this influences their aid preferences, an aid giver's financial status could also be a significant factor. In spite of such potential benefit, questions relating to respondents' income levels were ultimately not included in order to respect their privacy.

Chapter 5. A Pilot Study – A Comparison with the Case of Australia

5.1. Why Australia

This study adds a pilot study comparing South Korea's public opinions about foreign aid with the case of Australia. The paper chooses to compare with the Australian case for two major reasons. First is that there has been regular and a diverse range of surveys conducted in the field of public opinion about foreign aid in Australia, which can be a good model for South Korea's foreign aid policy making. Second is because of some important similarities Australia and South Korea share the OECD-DAC member countries that are important for the comparison, including the size of the distribution of net ODA, household disposable income, inflation rate and GDP.

Firstly, Australia has conducted many studies on public opinions on foreign aid. For examples, Development Policy Centre has conducted a comprehensive research on public opinions about foreign aid from 2011 to 2015, compiling many different surveys conducted in Australia.³⁶ Lowy institute in Australia also conducts polls enquiring Australians' opinion on foreign aid policies the most recent one on 2016.³⁷ Galaxy Research commissioned by the Campaign for Australian Aid also conducted similar survey in 2015, while Essential Media Communications and Social Research Centre (SRC) at the Australian National University also conduct their surveys on similar topics. These efforts have started very early from 1989 when Jonathan Kelly published 'Australian Attitudes to Overseas Aid'.³⁸

Unlike these variety of research institutes actively enquiring opinions of their

³⁶ Camilla Burkot & Terence Wood, 2015, 'Australian public opinion about foreign aid, 2011-2015', *Development Policy Centre*, 40, pp.1-40


³⁷ Lowy Institute, 'Public Opinion', <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/public-opinion>, (Accessed on 10 February 2017)

³⁸ Jonathan Kelly, 1989, 'Australian Attitudes to Overseas Aid', *Australian Government Printing Office*, pp.1-102

public in Australia, researches conducted in South Korea on the same topic are very few and sporadic. KIEP's research on public opinion on foreign aid in 2013 and World Research's 2016 research as well as KOICA's 2009 survey on the same topic are few representative studies conducted in this field, and these researches have not been conducted annually nor comprehensively. Such different research backgrounds on public opinion on foreign aid provide a ground for South Korea to learn from the Australia's research efforts in this field. Considering this, Australia can be a good model for South Korea in terms of its research in this field.

In the meantime, out of OECD-DAC member countries, Australia and South Korea's distribution of net ODA to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in 2015 ranked around the same. Chart 18 shows that Australia and South Korea's distribution of net ODA as of 2015 is ranked top 10 and top 12 out of the OECD-DAC member countries respectively. Australia provides slightly more aid with USD 678.75 million while South Korea is providing USD 580.13 million. This similar scale of ODA distribution is an indication that South Korea and Australia's public opinions on foreign aid can be comparable.

Chart 18. Distribution of Net ODA 2015 (Least Developed Countries, USD million)³⁹




Another comparable reason is because of their inflation rate measured by consumer price index. For the past two years, Australia and South Korea's inflation rate has been measured with differences between less than 1%. (See Chart 19) Compared to other OECD-DAC countries whose inflation rate differ up to around 6% from South Korea (e.g. Turkey's inflation rate as of 2015 Quarter 1 is 7.47%)⁴⁰, the inflation rates between Australia and South Korea is very similar which adds another similarity between the two countries economic circumstances.

³⁹ OECD Data, 'Distribution of Net ODA', <https://data.oecd.org/oda/distribution-of-net-oda.htm>, (Accessed on 23 March 2017)

⁴⁰ OECD Data, 'Inflation CPI', <https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm>, (Accessed on 23 March 2017)

Chart 19. Inflation measured by consumer price index (CPI) 2015-2017⁴¹




The people's living standards for both countries is another good indicator to see whether the two countries are comparable for public opinions on foreign aid, because taxpayers (principles)' perception towards foreign aid should be compared for those with similar economic standards. As Chart 20 shows, household disposable income for Australia and South Korea has been experiencing similar rate of growth for the past 12 years, which makes the two countries suitable for comparison.

Likewise, Australia and South Korea's similar economic circumstances as well as their ODA distribution status make the two countries comparable for this pilot study comparing public opinions on foreign aid in the two countries.

⁴¹ OECD Data, 'Inflation CPI', <https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm>, (Accessed on 23 March 2017)

Chart 20. Household Disposable Income (Net, Annual Growth Rate (%), 2005-2015)⁴²



5.2. Results Comparison

The results used for comparison have been cited from ‘Australian public opinion about foreign aid, 2011-2015’ by Camilla Burkot and Terence Wood, which comprises possibly all the surveys conducted in Australia with regards to ‘public opinion about foreign aid’ since 2011. This is because the data sources include results of six reputable commercial survey companies, including Essential Media Communications (EMC), Galaxy Research, the Social Research Centre at the Australian National University, Development Policy Centre, I-view and Newspoll both conducted by the Lowy Institute Poll.⁴³


⁴² OECD Data, ‘Household Disposable Income’, <https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-disposable-income.htm>, (Accessed on 23 March 2017)

⁴³ Burkot & Wood, 2015, p.2

5.2.1. Level of support for foreign aid and its budget in Australia and South Korea

Observing these results, there are many differences between Australian and South Korean public opinions about foreign aid. Firstly, both countries seem to show general approval of foreign aid provision to developing countries. This is because 75% of the Australian population either strongly approved (36%) or approved (39%) of foreign aid as shown in Chart 21. Comparing to 94% of either strong approval (31%) or approval (63%) of support for foreign aid in South Korea, this is relatively low especially those who ‘approve of foreign aid provision to certain extent’. Overall, in terms of ‘general level of support for foreign aid’, South Korean people are more favourable in providing aid to poorer countries.


Chart 21. Level of Support for Foreign Aid in Australia (2014)⁴⁴



⁴⁴ Burkot & Wood, 2015, p.26

When it comes to ‘level of support for the foreign aid volume’, both South Korean and Australian population show more negative results compared to their high rates of ‘general support for foreign aid’. According to Chart 22 measuring level of support for foreign aid volume in Australia conducted by The EMC in 2015, 44% of the Australians perceive that Australia spends too much on foreign aid. Only 16% of the people find the country spends too little on foreign aid, 21% of them find the amount appropriate and 19% of the population claim to not know about the Australian foreign aid budget amount.

Chart 22. Level of Support for Foreign Aid Volume in Australia (2015)⁴⁵



As discussed in Chapter 4, South Korean preference over foreign aid budget

⁴⁵ Burkot & Wood, 2015, p.24

amount is shown to be different. Majority of South Korean population find the current foreign aid budget either ‘appropriate’ or ‘too much’, as these two population takes up 63% in South Korea; this is similar to the case of Australia in which 65% of the population find the foreign aid budget amount to be appropriate or too much. Nevertheless, out of these population, 45% of the South Korean population find the amount ‘appropriate’ instead of ‘too much’. The case is opposite in Australia as 44% of the population find the foreign aid budget amount ‘too much’ and only 21% of the population consider the foreign aid volume at the time ‘appropriate’.

Similarly, looking at the rate of support for foreign aid budget increase, only 16% of the Australian population show their support for foreign aid volume increase, while more than half of this South Korean population rate claim that foreign aid budget should increase. Many Australian (19% of the population) also claim their ignorance towards foreign aid volume. Obviously, more Australian population prefer foreign aid volume to be reduced – favouring aid budget cut than the case of South Korea.

5.2.2. Knowledge about foreign aid and its budget size in Australia and South Korea


Researches conducted in Australia state that Australians’ knowledge about the size of Australian foreign aid is clearly limited.⁴⁶ This is based on different survey results conducted in Australia. In Chart 23, the results of Australian knowledge about foreign aid budget size is investigated by the EMC in 2015 shows that almost half of the

⁴⁶ Burkot & Wood, 2015, p.8

Australian population (43%) claim that they do not know about the foreign aid budget size. 13% of the population believe it is less than 1%, 14% of them believe it around 2%, 10% of the population understands the budget size as around 5% and 9% of the population believe that the aid budget would be more than 5%. Only 11% of the surveyed Australians claim that the budget size would be around 1%, which is the correct amount. At the time of the survey, foreign aid budget took up 1.3% of the federal budget in Australia.

These results are similar with other surveys conducted in Australia including Campaign for Australian Aid in 2015 and EMC in 2011.

Chart 23. Knowledge about foreign aid budget size in Australia (2015)⁴⁷



South Korean case is somewhat different. South Korean foreign aid budget is

⁴⁷ Burkot & Wood, 2015, p.24

around 0.57% of the entire government budget, and almost half of the surveyed population (47%) believed that South Korean aid budget would be less than 1%, which is a correct answer (See Chart 14). Amongst other incorrect answers by the South Korean public, 'less than 2%' came second with 22% of the population, followed by 'less than 3%' (21%), 'around 5%' (6%) and 'more than 5%' (4%). The results show that even many of those who answered incorrectly had an understanding of the budget that was not very far from the truth. Considering the fact that only 11% of the Australian population have correct understanding about foreign aid budget size, South Korean people tend to possess high degree of knowledge about foreign aid budget.

5.2.3. Share of respondents who think it is important to give aid to specific regions in Australia and South Korea


Important recipient countries for Australia and South Korea should inevitably different due to their geographic circumstances. Although both South Korea and Australia are located within the broad Asia-Pacific region, their surrounding countries who need development assistance are different. According to a survey result provided by the EMC in 2015, level of importance for aid provision is highest in 'Pacific island countries' in Australia, followed by Papua-New Guinea (PNG), Southeast Asian countries, African countries, Indonesia and then Middle East countries. (Chart 24).

The result is very different from the case of South Korea where the most preferred recipient countries/region by South Koreans are first of all Asia and then African countries. The surveyed South Koreans then choose Latin America, Middle East,

Oceania and Europe and former Soviet Union in order of importance.

The difference of respondents' preferred countries/regions for foreign aid provision is natural because of the two countries' geographic locations as well as their strategic importance differences. In both cases, the people's perception towards the importance of recipients by regions were aligned with the actual government foreign aid disbursement amount by regions. This indicates that both South Korea and Australia have been successful in directly and indirectly promoting countries/regions in need of foreign aid provision to their publics.

Chart 24. Share of respondents who think it is important to give aid to specific recipients (2015)⁴⁸




5.2.4. Preferred motives for giving foreign aid in Australia and South Korea

Preferred motivations for foreign aid by the publics in South Korea and Australia

⁴⁸ Burkot & Wood, 2015, p.5

are also different. In Australia, according to a poll conducted by the Social Research Centre at the Australian National University in 2014 (See Chart 25), around 75% of the population favour foreign aid provision grounded in humanitarian motives, of which 42% of them strongly favour and 33% favour humanitarian motives. Only 13% of the population is shown to either strongly favour (4%) or favour (9%) commercial or political motivations for foreign aid provision. Although Australians favour foreign aid budget cuts and they do not have much knowledge about aid, their beliefs about foreign aid are strongly grounded for ‘altruistic’ purposes.

Chart 25. Preferred motives for giving foreign aid (2014)⁴⁹



The results are again quite different from South Korea. As discussed in Chapter 4 (Chart 7), only 56% of the population either favour or strongly favour humanitarian

⁴⁹ Burkot & Wood, 2015, p.5

motives for foreign aid, while around 44% of the population alternatively favour commercial or political motives for foreign aid provision. Despite the fact that South Koreans have better knowledge about foreign aid and more people tend to generally support foreign aid provision, many South Korean apparently believe that South Korea's aid disbursement should be for national interests including the country's political or commercial interests.

5.2.5. People's preferred aid channels in Australia and South Korea

No survey questions are asked with regards to the channels through which foreign aid should be provided in Australia. No survey questions as to the people's opinions about the role of government in foreign aid provision are asked in Australia.

5.3. Implications

It can be seen that the Australian public generally possess more negative opinions about foreign aid provision compared to South Korea. Nevertheless, when looking at the two governments' actual aid policies, Australian government's aid policies are more aligned with their public opinions about foreign aid.

This can be seen in two major areas of the Australian aid policies. First aspect is the foreign aid budget size. As shown above, majority of the Australian public tend to have stronger preference over 'foreign aid budget cut' than the South Korean public. Such opinions of the public actually meet the expectations of the Australian

government, who was undergoing the government deficit at the time of the surveys conducted.⁵⁰ The Australian government announced the aid cuts of AUD 224 million or 7.4% of the Australian aid program for its 2016/2017 federal budget.⁵¹ According to Jonathan Pryke, a research fellow at the Lowy Institute, this cut is leading the trend of Australian aid program to the least generous in its donor history.⁵² However, what is important to note is that, although the trend is depressing from the perspective of the recipient countries, majority of the Australians' opinions on foreign aid budget size are actually aligned with this government aid policies – taxpayers' wants are satisfied by the government.


Another aspect is the recipient countries/regions of importance perceived by the Australian public. As described above the government's actual aid disbursement by countries/regions are aligned with the Australians' preferred countries/regions of importance for foreign aid provision. This can be seen in Figure 1 showing where Australia provides aid by how much. PNG rated the first in terms of its importance (\$558.3 million) followed by Indonesia (\$365.7 million). South East Asian countries including Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines are then followed, and other Melanesian countries including Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu and other pacific islands also indicate a relative high importance as recipient countries/regions.

⁵⁰ Burkot & Woods, 2015, p.20

⁵¹ Lowy Institute, 'Australian Foreign Aid', <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/australian-foreign-aid>, (Accessed on 25 March 2017)

⁵² Lowy Institute, 'Australian Foreign Aid', <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/australian-foreign-aid>, (Accessed on 25 March 2017)

Figure 1. Australian ODA by partner country and region for 2016-17⁵³



Although there are no specific survey questions conducted with regards to the channels through which foreign aid should be provided in Australia, two major elements of the Australian aid programs - including where to provide and how much to provide – are aligned with the opinions of the Australian public. Whether the government is reflecting the public’s opinions about foreign aid, or whether the public supports the government’s decision makings cannot be identified from this research. However, what is important is that the two parties – domestic principle and agent (the taxpayers and the government) share similar opinions in major aspects of the foreign aid policies.

South Korean case is somewhat different. Despite the fact that South Korean

⁵³ Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 3 May 2016, ‘2016-17 Australian Aid Budget Summary’, <http://dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/2016-17-australian-aid-budget-summary.aspx>, (Accessed on 30 March 2017)

public has more positive opinions about the foreign aid, when it comes to the foreign aid budget size, the government's actual policies and the South Korean public's opinions about it are different. As shown above, majority of the South Korean respondents either favour the foreign aid budget to be steady or to decrease. Nevertheless, South Korea continues to increase its foreign aid budget little by little, in order to meet the target of 0.2% ODA/GNI ratio by the year 2020.⁵⁴ This clearly indicates that South Korean foreign policy makings have not considered or tried to hear the opinions of its public who is paying taxes for the foreign aid provision.

Moreover, it has been shown that the South Korea public do not generally prefer the foreign aid budget to be provided via its government. The biggest reason is shown to be their mistrust towards the government and its lack of transparency. These South Korean rather prefer the foreign aid provision through multilateral agencies like NGO/NPOs or international organisations in search of these problems of the government. Nevertheless, the truth is that South Korea is continuing to increase its bilateral aid amount, even after their entry to the OECD-DAC member. (See Table 2) Comparing with the case of Australia whose public opinions are aligned with the government's actual policy makings, it becomes more appealing for the South Korean government to choose 'multilateralism' strategy who face credibility problems with their own voters.

⁵⁴ ODA Korea, 'Overview', http://odakorea.go.kr/ODAPage_2012/T02/L03_S01_01.jsp, (Accessed on 3 January 2017)

Chapter 6. Concluding Remarks

This research analysed an online survey conducted about foreign aid in South Korea and their reasoning behind. The research also drew out some implications for the South Korean government with regards to its foreign aid policies. The survey results are noteworthy. Most importantly, when it comes to aid provision channels, it could be seen that South Korean people generally favour channels other than the government, like NGO/NPOs or international organisations, mainly due to mistrust towards the government operations and its lack of transparency. The results also show however that the correlation between people's political stances and their preferred aid channels are not significant. People from all political spectrums show stronger preference for non-government channels of foreign aid provision. In addition, respondents aged 10-20 showed the least support for aid provision through the government, and those aged 50 and over showed the greatest level of support for its government as their aid delivery channel.

Previous literature suggests that when the public has distrust towards its government's foreign aid policies, foreign aid provision should instead be channelled through non-government mechanisms in order to enhance transparency and to reflect the opinions of the public in relation to its foreign aid policies. Considering South Korean public opinion survey results on foreign aid discussed above, more non-government or multilateral rather than bilateral aid should be provided by re-allocating

its bilateral aid budget toward NGO/NPOs or other multilateral agencies. In addition, the publics' lack of knowledge about aid is also another factor that supports the notion of channelling foreign aid through multilateral mechanisms. If further research with a more expansive population sample is conducted and knowledge about foreign aid turns out to be lower, the importance of channelling more aid through non-governmental mechanisms becomes much stronger.

The results also showed that vast majority of South Koreans approve of foreign aid provision to poor countries who need development assistance, although only around half of the population believe that aid should be provided primarily on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, when it comes to the foreign aid budget, majority of the population favour either sustaining or reducing the current aid budget, despite the fact the South Korean government and OECD-DAC expect an increase in the foreign aid budget. It has been identified that higher percentage of the people in the progressive spectrum of the political stance tend to support an increase in the foreign aid budget, although this correlation may become more verifiable if the sample size were larger. Overall, only one third of the surveyed population indicated that the current aid budget should increase, whether or not they were aware of the current South Korean foreign aid budget amount. In this case, the need to channel more aid to multilateral organisations would imply shifting bilateral aid budgets to multilateral aid, instead of a wholesale increase in the multilateral aid budget. With regards to the knowledge about foreign aid, it was identified that South Korean public's knowledge about aid is relatively good, as majority of the population have basic knowledge about

South Korea's provision and around half of the population are aware of South Korea's foreign aid provision and its approximate budget, contradicting the hypothesis.

The pilot study comparing the case with Australia also provide important implications for South Korean foreign aid policy makings. This is because Australian government's aid policies are more aligned with their public opinions about foreign aid. Firstly, it could be identified that majority of the Australian public tend to have stronger preference over 'foreign aid budget cut' than the South Korean public. Such opinions of the public actually meet the expectations of the Australian government, who is implementing continuous budget cut on foreign aid at the time of the survey until now – taxpayers' wants are satisfied by the government. Secondly, the government's actual aid disbursement by countries/regions are aligned with the Australians' preferred countries/regions of importance for foreign aid provision. Australia continuously conduct surveys on public opinion on foreign aid at regular basis. And this is shown to appear in the government's actual foreign aid policy makings. Such efforts of listening to the public is something South Korea should learn from the case of Australia.

Bibliography

- Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 3 May 2016, '2016-17 Australian Aid Budget Summary', <http://dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/2016-17-australian-aid-budget-summary.aspx>, (Accessed on 30 March 2017)
- Burkot, Camilla, & Wood, Terence, 2015, 'Australian public opinion about foreign aid, 2011-2015', *Development Policy Centre*, 40, pp.1-40
- Chun, Hong-Min, Munyi, Elijah N., & Lee, Heejin, 2010, 'South Korea as an Emerging Donor: Challenges and Changes on its Entering OECD/DAC', *Journal of International Development*, 22, pp.788-802
- Converse, Philip E., 1964, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Public', *Critical Review*, 18:1-3, pp.1-74
- Diven, Polly J. & Constantelos, John, 2009, 'Explaining generosity: a comparison of US and European public opinion on foreign aid', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 7:2, pp.118-132
- Economic Development Cooperation Fund, 'Annual Report', <https://www.edcfkorea.go.kr/site/program/board/basicboard/list?boardtypeid=306&phototype=list&menuid=005003003>, (Accessed on 3 January 2017)
- Hancocks, Paula, & McKirdy, Euan, 10 March 2017, 'South Korea: Court upholds President Park Geun-hye's Impeachment; Protests Erupt', *CNN*, <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/09/asia/south-korea-park-guen-hye-impeachment-upheld/> (Accessed 15 March 2017)
- Kang, Sung Jin, Lee, Hongshik, & Park, Bokyeong, 2011, 'Does Korea Follow Japan in Foreign Aid? Relationships between Aid and Foreign Investment', *Japan and the World Economy*, 23, pp.19-27
- Kelly, Jonathan, 1989, 'Australian Attitudes to Overseas Aid', *Australian Government Printing Office*, pp.1-102

- Kim, Eun Mee & Oh, Jinhwan, 2012, 'Determinants of Foreign Aid: The Case of South Korea', *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 12, pp.251-273
- Lee, Kye Woo, 2012, 'Do Emerging Donors Allocate Aid as DAC Members Do? The Case of Korea in the Millennium Era', *Journal of International Development*, 24, pp.977-988
- Lippmann, Walter, 1922, *Public Opinion*, (Harcourt: Brace)
- Lippmann, Walter, 1955, *Essays in the Public Philosophy*, (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, USA and London, UK)
- Lowy Institute, 'Australian Foreign Aid', <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/australian-foreign-aid>, (Accessed on 25 March 2017)
- Lowy Institute, 'Public Opinion', <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/public-opinion>, (Accessed on 10 February 2017)
- Milner, Helen, 2005, 'Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principle-Agent Problems', *Research Gate*, vol.5, pp.1-48
- Milner, Helen & Tingley, Dustin, 2013, 'Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay', *International Interactions*, 39:3, pp.389-401
- Ministry of Strategy and Finance Republic of Korea, '2017 South Korean Government Budget', <http://www.budget.go.kr/index.do>, (Accessed on 17 March 2017)
- ODA Korea, 'Overview', http://odakorea.go.kr/ODAPage_2012/T02/L03_S01_01.jsp, (Accessed on 3 January 2017)
- ODA Korea, 'Regional Aid Share of Bilateral ODA (2008-2015)', https://www.odakorea.go.kr/ODAPage_2012/T02/L03_S01_01.jsp, (Accessed on 7 March 2017)
- OECD Data, 'Distribution of Net ODA', <https://data.oecd.org/oda/distribution-of->

- [net-oda.htm](#), (Accessed on 23 March 2017)
- OECD Data, ‘Household Disposable Income’,
<https://data.oecd.org/hha/household-disposable-income.htm>, (Accessed on 23 March 2017)
 - OECD Data, ‘Inflation CPI’, <https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm>,
(Accessed on 23 March 2017)
 - Otter, Mark, 2003, ‘Domestic public support for foreign aid: does it matter?’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 24, No 1, pp 115–125
 - Statistics Times, ‘List of Countries by Projected GDP’,
<http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp.php>, (Accessed on 17 January 2017)
 - Strausz-Hupé, Robert, 1950, ‘The American People and Foreign Policy by Gabriel A. Almond’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp.757-760.
 - Watson, Iain, 2011, ‘Global Korea: Foreign Aid and National Interests in an Age of Globalization’, *Contemporary Politics*, 17:1, pp.53-69
 - 권율, 이주영, 유애라 & 이규현, 2014, ‘2013 ODA에 대한 국민인식 조사’,
대외경제정책연구원 (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy), pp.1-230
 - 임형백, 2014, ‘한국 공적개발원조(ODA)의 전개와 과제’, *한국정책연구*, 14(1), pp.73-102
 - 월드리서치, 09.2016, ‘2016년도 ODA 국민 인식 조사 결과 보고서’,
(주)월드리서치, pp.1-185
 - 전승훈 & 김소원, 2009, ‘개발원조에 대한 대국민 여론조사 및 정부의 국제개발협력 정책의 방향연구’, *국제개발협력*, 5, 50-64

Abstract in Korean (국문초록)

이 논문은 한국의 해외원조에 대한 국민인식 온라인 설문조사를 기반으로 진행한 연구로, 온라인 설문조사와 그 결과를 논문의 목적에 따라 분석한다. 특히 이 논문은 원조 제공에 관한 정부의 역할에 대한 한국인들의 견해 분석이라는 고유한 시사점을 제공하며, 이는 같은 분야의 기존연구에서 이전에 충분히 검토되지 않은 관점이다. 이론상으로, 대중의 자기 정부에 대한 불신 또는 대중의 해외원조에 대한 지식 부족은 정부로 하여금 비정부 또는 다자적 원조경로를 선택하도록 한다. 그러나 한국의 사례는 이 이론과 모순된 현상을 제시한다.

온라인 설문조사 결과 과반수 이상의 한국인 응답자는 해외원조 제공에 찬성하며 해외원조에 대한 기본적인 지식을 가지고 있지만, 해외원조 경로에 있어서는 정부보다 비정부/비영리 기관 또는 국제기구를 선호하는 것으로 나타났다. 설문조사는 이러한 현상의 가장 주된 이유가 대중의 ‘정부에 대한 불신과 불투명성’인 것으로 나타났다.

이 논문의 동기가 된 선행 연구인 호주의 해외원조에 대한 국민인식 조사 사례와의 비교는 호주의 해외원조 정책이 한국의 사례와 다르게 호주의 원조에 대한 국민인식에 부합하는 것으로 드러났다. 이같은 정치적 지지가 정부의 국민인식 수렴의 결과에 따른 것인지의 여부는 추가적 연구가 필요하지만, 이같은 호주의 사례 역시 국민들에게 낮은 신뢰도를 받고 있는 한국 정부가 ‘비정부 원조 경로’를 선택해야하는 이유를 설명하는데 도움을 준다.

Appendices

Appendix I. Online survey questionnaire conducted for this research paper

한국의 해외원조에 대한 국민인식 온라인 설문조사
1. 대외원조에 대한 기초인식
1-1. 그 동안 원조를 받을 정도로 가난한 나라에 직접 방문해 본 적이 있습니까? 있다 / 없다
1-2. 우리나라가 선진국이라고 생각합니까? 예 / 아니오
1-3. 현재 한국 정부가 개발도상국에 대한 대외원조를 공여하고 있다는 사실을 알고 계십니까? 매우 잘 알고 있다 / 어느정도 알고 있다 / 들어본 적 있으나 잘 모른다 / 전혀 모른다
1-4. 한국은 개발도상국에 대해 다양한 원조를 제공하고 있습니다. 한국이 이들 개발도상국에 원조를 하는 이유는 다음 중 무엇이라고 생각하십니까?(복수선택 가능) 개발도상국의 경제·사회 발전을 위해 개발도상국의 지원 요청에 대해 돕기 위해 한국의 상품수출 확대 등 자국의 이익 추구 국제적 평화와 안정유지 국제사회의 일원으로서의 도의적 책임과 의무 개발도상국의 민주화와 법치 실현 개발도상국과의 정치적 동맹 강화 기타
2. 대외원조 예산 규모에 대한 인식
2-1. 정부 예산의 몇 퍼센트가 대외원조에 쓰인다고 생각하십니까? 1% 미만 / 2% 미만 / 3% 미만 / 약 5% / 5% 초과
2-2. 한국 정부가 개발원조에 지정하는 예산액이 어떻다고 생각하십니까? 개발원조에 너무 많은 예산을 쓴다.

<p>개발원조에 너무 적은 예산을 쓴다.</p> <p>개발원조에 딱 적당히 쓴다.</p> <p>모름</p> <p>기타</p>
<p>2-3. 정부는 2015년 기준 대외원조로 2조 1412억원을 집행 하였습니다. 이는 국민 1인당 연간 약 4만2천원에 해당하는 금액입니다. 현재 원조예산규모에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까?</p> <p>확대해야 한다 / 축소해야 한다 / 적절하다</p>
<p>2-4. 2-3에서 확대나 축소를 해야한다고 응답한 경우, 개발도상국에 대한 개발원조를 위한 예산 규모는 국민 1인당 기준 연간 어느 정도가 적당하다고 생각하십니까?</p> <p>3만원 미만</p> <p>3만원 이상 4만2천원 미만</p> <p>4만2천원 이상 5만원 미만</p> <p>5만원 이상 10만원 미만</p> <p>10만원 이상</p>
<p>3. 대외원조 정책 선호도</p>
<p>3-1. 한국 정부가 개발도상국에 대외원조를 제공하는데 대해 찬성하십니까, 혹은 반대하십니까?</p> <p>적극 찬성한다 (3-2 문항으로)</p> <p>찬성하는 편이다 (3-2 문항으로)</p> <p>반대하는 편이다 (3-3 문항으로)</p> <p>적극 반대한다 (3-3 문항으로)</p>
<p>3-2. (3-1 에서 적극 찬성 / 찬성하는 편인 응답자만) 대외원조 제공에 찬성하는 가장 큰 이유는 무엇입니까?</p> <p>인도적인 차원에서 개도국 국가들의 삶의 질 향상을 위해</p> <p>과거에 우리나라도 외국의 원조 혜택을 입었기 때문에</p> <p>우리나라의 국제적 이미지나 위상을 제고할 수 있기 때문에</p> <p>국제사회의 안정과 평화적 공존에 기여하기 때문에</p>

<p>한국 기업의 해외진출을 지원할 수 있는 수단이기 때문에</p> <p>기타</p>																																										
<p>3-3. (3-1 에서 반대하는 편 / 적극 반대인 응답자만) 대외원조 제공에 반대하는 가장 큰 이유는 무엇입니까?</p> <p>정부 행정능력/운영방식에 대한 불신 때문에</p> <p>국내문제 해결이 더 중요하기 때문에</p> <p>원조가 우리나라의 국익에 별로 도움이 되지 않기 때문에</p> <p>우리나라는 아직 원조를 제공할 만큼 부유하지 않기 때문에</p> <p>원조가 개발도상국의 빈곤문제 해결에 도움이 되지 않기 때문에</p> <p>기타</p>																																										
<p>3-4. 한국이 아래의 지역들에 원조를 주는 것이 얼마나 중요하다고 생각합니까?</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; text-align: center;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 15%;"></th> <th style="width: 15%;">매우 중요함</th> <th style="width: 15%;">적당히 중요함</th> <th style="width: 15%;">별로 중요치 않음</th> <th style="width: 15%;">전혀 중요치 않음</th> <th style="width: 15%;">모르겠음</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>아시아</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>아프리카</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>남미</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>유럽 및 구소련</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>중동</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>오세아니아</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		매우 중요함	적당히 중요함	별로 중요치 않음	전혀 중요치 않음	모르겠음	아시아						아프리카						남미						유럽 및 구소련						중동						오세아니아					
	매우 중요함	적당히 중요함	별로 중요치 않음	전혀 중요치 않음	모르겠음																																					
아시아																																										
아프리카																																										
남미																																										
유럽 및 구소련																																										
중동																																										
오세아니아																																										
<p>3-5. 개발도상국에 대외원조를 공여하는 방식에 있어 어느 기관을 통해 제공하는 게 가장 효율적이라고 생각합니까?</p> <p>정부 / 비영리.민간단체 / 국제기구 / 기타</p>																																										
<p>3-6. (3-5 에서 정부를 택한 경우) 그 이유가 무엇입니까? (복수선택 가능)</p> <p>비영리/민간단체 또는 국제기구의 운영방식에 대한 불신 및 투명성 부족</p> <p>비영리/민간단체 또는 국제기구의 전문성 부족</p> <p>비영리/민간단체 또는 국제기구의 수원국에 대한 현지 사정 이해 부족</p> <p>국가적 이익과 안보를 위해</p> <p>기타</p>																																										

<p>3-7. (3-5 에서 비영리/민간단체를 택한 경우) 그 이유가 무엇입니까? (복수선택 가능)</p> <p>정부 운영방식에 대한 불신 및 투명성 부족</p> <p>정부의 원조 지원 체제 전문성 부족</p> <p>정부의 수원국에 대한 현지 사정 이해 부족</p> <p>국제기구 운영방식에 대한 불신 및 투명성 부족</p> <p>국제기구의 원조 지원 체제 전문성 부족</p> <p>국제기구의 수원국에 대한 현지 사정 이해 부족</p> <p>기타</p>
<p>3-8. (3-5 에서 국제기구를 택한 경우) 그 이유가 무엇입니까? (복수선택 가능)</p> <p>정부 운영방식에 대한 불신 및 투명성 부족</p> <p>정부의 원조 지원 체제 전문성 부족</p> <p>정부의 수원국에 대한 현지 사정 이해 부족</p> <p>비영리/민간 단체에 대한 불신 및 투명성 부족</p> <p>비영리/민간 단체의 지원 체제 전문성 부족</p> <p>비영리/민간 단체의 수원국에 대한 현지 사정 이해 부족</p> <p>기타</p>
<p>3-9. 귀하는 한국의 대외원조가 인도주의적 기반을 가지고 지원되어야 한다고 생각합니까, 혹은 국가의 정치적/경제적 이익을 위한 수단으로 제공되어야 한다고 생각합니까?</p> <p>철저히 인도주의적인 목적</p> <p>어느정도 인도주의적인 목적</p> <p>어느정도 원조국의 정치적/경제적 이익을 위한 목적</p> <p>철저히 원조국의 정치적/경제적 이익을 위한 목적</p> <p>기타</p>
<p>4. 자료 분류용 질문</p>
<p>4-1. 실례지만, 귀하의 연령대는 어떻게 되십니까?</p> <p>10-20대 / 30대 / 40대 / 50대 / 60대 이상</p>

4-2. 귀하의 현재 직업은 무엇입니까?

4-3. 귀하의 정치 성향이 대략적으로 어떠하다고 생각하십니까?

보수적 - 1 / 진보적 - 10									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Appendix II. Summaries of the KIEP, World Research and KOICA survey questionnaire – Referenced and Modification Required

Referenced Questions

World Research 2016

문1-1) 다른 나라의 원조를 받을 정도로 가난한 나라에 방문해 본 적이 있습니까?
1. 있다 2. 없다
문2) 현재 우리나라가 선진국이라고 생각하십니까?
1. 예 2. 아니오
문3) 현재 우리 정부가 저개발국에 대외원조(ODA)를 제공하고 있다는 사실을 알고 계십니까?
1. 매우 잘 알고 있다 2. 어느 정도 알고 있다
3. 들어본 적은 있으나 잘 모른다 4. 전혀 모른다
문8) 국제사회가 저개발국의 빈곤층을 돕는 것이 얼마나 중요하다고 생각하십니까?
1. 매우 중요하다 2. 중요한 편이다 3. 별로 중요하지 않다 4. 전혀 중요하지 않다
문11) 우리 정부는 저개발국에 다양한 원조를 제공하고 있습니다. 우리가 이들 나라에 원조를 하는 가장 큰 이유는 무엇이라고 생각하십니까? 2가지만 골라 주십시오.
1. 저개발국의 경제·사회 발전을 위해
2. 저개발국의 지원 요청에 응하기 위해
3. 우리 상품의 수출촉진 등 우리 이익을 위해
4. 국제적 평화와 안정유지를 위해
5. 국제사회 일원으로서의 도의적 책임 때문에

<p>6. 저개발국의 민주화와 정치발전을 위해</p> <p>7. 저개발국과의 외교관계 강화를 위해</p> <p>8. 기타 (이민억제, 테러방지 등)</p>
<p>문15) 귀하께서는 우리나라의 대외원조 규모에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까?</p> <p>1. 적절하다(현재 수준 유지)</p> <p>2. 적으므로 확대해야 한다</p> <p>3. 많으므로 축소해야 한다</p>

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 2013

<p>문1) 그 동안 원조를 받을 정도로 가난한 나라에 직접 방문해 본 적이 있습니까?</p> <p>1. 있다 2. 없다</p>
<p>문2) 우리나라가 현재 선진국이라고 생각하십니까?</p> <p>1. 예 2. 아니오</p>
<p>문7) 국제사회가 개발도상국의 빈곤층을 돕는 것이 얼마나 중요하다고 생각하십니까?</p> <p>1. 매우 중요하다 2. 어느 정도 중요하다 3. 별로 중요하지 않다 4. 전혀 중요하지 않다</p>
<p>문14) 한국 정부가 개발도상국에 대외원조를 제공하는데 대해 찬성하십니까, 혹은 반대하십니까?</p> <p>1. 적극 찬성한다 2. 찬성하는 편이다 3. 반대하는 편이다 4. 적극 반대한다</p>
<p>문15) 정부는 2012년 대외원조로 1조 7,462억원을 집행 하였습니다. 이는 국민 1인당 연간 약 3만 5,000원에 해당하는 금액입니다. 현재 원조예산규모에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까?</p> <p>1. 확대해야 한다 2. 축소해야 한다 3. 적절하다</p>

Questions the author found limited and required modification – i.e. Focused on the role of government in foreign aid provision without questioning the public opinions about it

World Research 2016

<p>문 16) 우리 정부가 저개발국에 제공하는 원조가 저개발국의 경제발전과 빈곤퇴치에 실질적인 도움이 된다고 생각하십니까?</p> <p>1. 매우 그렇다. 2. 그런 편이다 3. 그렇지 않은 편이다 4. 전혀 그렇지 않다</p>
--

문 16-1) 우리나라의 대외원조가 도움을 주지 못한다고 생각한다면, 가장 큰 이유는 무엇이라고 생각하십니까?

1. 저개발국의 관리능력이 부족해서
2. 우리나라의 원조규모가 작아서
3. 우리나라 원조집행기관의 전문성이 부족해서
4. 우리나라 원조집행기관들 사이의 협력이 부족해서
5. 저개발국의 현지사정을 충분히 고려하지 않아서
6. 원조집행의 투명성이 부족해서
7. 기타

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 2013

문16) 정부는 앞으로 우리나라의 대외원조 규모를 지속적으로 확대해 나갈 것을 국제사회에 약속했습니다. 향후 대외원조 규모를 확대하는 정책에 대해 어떻게 생각하십니까?

1. 국제사회에 약속한 규모보다 더욱 확대해야 한다
2. 국제사회에 약속한 수준을 지켜야 한다
3. 국제사회에 약속했다라도 원조 규모를 확대하지 말아야 한다
4. 현재 경제상황을 고려하여 원조규모는 축소되어야 한다

문17-1) 우리나라의 대외원조가 도움을 주지 못한다고 생각 한다면, 가장 큰 이유는 다음 중 무엇이라고 생각하 십니까? 하나만 골라 주십시오.

1. 개발도상국의 자조노력 부족
2. 개발도상국의 취약한 관리능력
3. 우리나라의 원조규모가 작아서
4. 우리나라 원조기관의 전문성 부족
5. 다수의 원조시행기관 간 조화 미흡
6. 개발도상국의 현지사정 고려 불충분
7. 대외원조 투명성 부족

8. 기타
<p>문 21) 현재 정부의 대외원조정책 중에서 가장 시급한 개선 과제는 무엇이라고 판단하시는지 2가지만 골라주십시오.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 사전조사의 강화 2. 원조사업 후 철저한 사후관리 3. 원조사업에 대한 모니터링 강화 4. 원조정책의 투명성 강화 5. 원조 관련 전문가 육성 6. 민간원조기관의 참여 확대 7. 원조관련 교육 및 홍보 강화 8. 원조 전담기관 설립 9. 현장 중심 원조사업 추진 10. 기타

Appendix III. Summaries of the Australian survey questionnaire

2015

[Essential Media Communications – 2 June 2015](#)

As far as you know, about how much of the Federal budget is spent on foreign aid?					
	Total	By political preference			
		Vote Labor	Vote Lib/Nat	Vote Greens	Vote Other
Less than 1%	13%	14%	10%	31%	17%
About 1%	11%	12%	12%	12%	8%
About 2%	14%	14%	18%	8%	9%
About 5%	10%	10%	11%	11%	14%
More than 5%	9%	11%	8%	7%	16%
Don't know	43%	39%	41%	32%	35%

And do you think Australia spends too much or too little on foreign aid?								
	Overall	By political preference			By knowledge about aid			
		Vote Labor	Vote Lib/Nat	Vote Greens	Spend 1% or less	Spend about 2%	Spend 5% or more	Don't know
Spends too much	44%	45%	50%	12%	26%	45%	66%	43%
Spends too little	16%	22%	7%	46%	39%	16%	9%	7%
Spends about the right amount	21%	17%	30%	13%	26%	31%	20%	14%
Don't know	19%	16%	13%	29%	9%	9%	4%	36%

In your opinion, how important is it that Australia gives foreign aid to the following countries and regions?						
	Total very/somewhat important	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important	Don't know
Pacific island countries	66%	24%	42%	14%	10%	10%
PNG	65%	24%	41%	14%	11%	10%
South East Asia countries	50%	13%	37%	23%	16%	12%
African countries	50%	13%	37%	20%	19%	11%
Indonesia	39%	10%	29%	24%	27%	11%
Middle east countries	26%	6%	20%	27%	35%	12%

[Newspoll \(for the Lowy Institute\) – 22–24 May 2015](#)

Thinking now about the Federal Budget. In last week's Federal Budget, the Government reduced the amount of overseas aid to developing countries — from about five billion dollars a year, or one point two per cent of the budget, to around four billion dollars, or nought point nine per cent of the budget. Are you personally in favour or against this reduction in the budget to Australia's overseas aid?

<i>Strongly in favour</i>	31%
<i>Somewhat in favour</i>	22%
<i>Somewhat against</i>	16%
<i>Strongly against</i>	19%
<i>Neither/don't know/no view</i>	13%

[I-view \(for the Lowy Institute\) – 20 February–8 March 2015](#)

Thinking now about the aid the Australian Government provides to developing countries. Currently the government provides approximately five billion dollars in aid to developing countries, or around 1.2 (one point two) per cent of the Budget. Do you think this is too much, about the right amount, or not enough?

<i>Too much</i>	36%
<i>About the right amount</i>	41%
<i>Not enough</i>	21%
<i>Don't know/no view</i>	2%

Essential Media Communications (for [Development Policy Centre](#)) – 6–9 March 2015

Every year about 1.2% of Australian federal government spending is spent on foreign aid to poor countries. Recently the government announced that it plans to cut foreign aid by nearly 20% starting in July. They have justified this as a means of preventing government debt rising. Which of the following options would you prefer (each involves equivalent amounts of money)?

<i>That aid not be cut and government debt levels increase by a small additional amount next year (approximately 0.4%) as a result of this.</i>	10%
<i>That aid not be cut and taxes be raised by a small amount (approximately 0.3%) to produce the same reduction in government debt sought from the aid cut.</i>	10%
<i>That aid not be cut and other government expenditure be cut by a small amount (approximately 0.2%) to produce the same reduction in government debt sought from the aid cut.</i>	23%
<i>That aid be cut by 20% as the government is currently planning.</i>	57%

Galaxy Research (commissioned by the [Campaign for Australian Aid](#)) – 10–12 February 2015

To the best of your knowledge, what amount do you think is spent on Australian aid?	
<i>\$1 billion</i>	7%
<i>\$3 billion</i>	12%
<i>\$5 billion</i>	12%
<i>\$6 billion</i>	5%
<i>\$8 billion</i>	6%
<i>\$10 billion</i>	9%
<i>\$12 billion</i>	6%
<i>Don't know</i>	43%

Australia is the 14th wealthiest country per capita in the world. Do you think it is fair that, as part of the mid-year economic and financial outlook (MYEFO), the Government announced a third successive cut to Australian Aid bringing our aid program to its lowest level as a proportion of our gross national income in history?

<i>Yes</i>	36%
<i>No</i>	40%
<i>Don't know</i>	24%

This year and for the next two years, Australia has pledged to give a fixed sum of \$4 billion in aid, equivalent to 0.29% of Gross National Income. Considering the United Kingdom gives 0.7% of its Gross National Income as aid, do you think Australian Aid should be increased, decreased or maintained at the same level?

<i>Significantly increased</i>	7%
<i>Increased</i>	26%
<i>Maintained at the same level</i>	38%
<i>Reduced</i>	13%
<i>Significantly reduced</i>	7%
<i>Don't know</i>	9%

2014

[Social Research Centre \(SRC\) \(for the ANUpoll\) – 12–25 May 2014](#)

Do you generally approve or disapprove of the Australian Government providing aid to poorer countries around the world?

<i>Strongly approve</i>	36%
<i>Approve</i>	39%
<i>Disapprove</i>	12%
<i>Strongly disapprove</i>	8%
<i>Don't know</i>	5%

Do you think Australian government aid should be given primarily on humanitarian grounds, or do you think Australia's commercial and political interests should play a significant part?

<i>Strongly favours humanitarian</i>	42%
<i>Favours humanitarian</i>	33%
<i>Favours commercial, political</i>	9%
<i>Strongly favours commercial, political</i>	4%
<i>Don't know</i>	13%

Essential Media Communications – 20 May 2014

Do you support or oppose the following decisions that were made in the latest Federal Budget, announced on Tuesday 13th May:		
Foreign aid-related decisions:		
1. Foreign aid frozen at current levels for two years, helping save \$7.6 billion over five years		
Strongly support	28%	
Support	36%	
Neither support nor oppose	18%	
Oppose	6%	
Strongly oppose	7%	
Don't know	5%	
2. International commitment to spend 0.5 per cent of gross national income on foreign aid abandoned		
Strongly support	15%	
Support	29%	
Neither support nor oppose	27%	
Oppose	10%	
Strongly oppose	10%	
Don't know	8%	
Other decisions:		
Eligibility for the age pension to rise to 70 by 2035		
Support	17%	
Oppose	61%	
Deregulation of university fees (meaning universities can set their own tuition fees)		
Support	17%	
Oppose	58%	
Cut public funding for university courses by 20%		
Support	18%	
Oppose	49%	
General patients to pay \$5 more and concessional patients 80 cents more for prescription drugs		
Support	23%	
Oppose	58%	
A \$120M cut to the ABC's budget		
Support	27%	
Oppose	41%	
\$7 Medicare co-payment for all visits to the GP, with this money to be used to fund a Medical Research Future Fund		
Support	29%	
Oppose	50%	
Cut 16,500 full-time jobs from the public service in the next 3 years		
Support	31%	
Oppose	43%	
A six-month waiting period for those under-30 before they can access the dole (Newstart)		
Support	39%	
Oppose	41%	
Tightening eligibility criteria for disability support pensioners for those under 35		
Support	41%	
Oppose	33%	
Make those under 25 apply for Youth Allowance, instead of Newstart (Youth Allowance is around \$100 less per fortnight)		
Support	44%	
Oppose	32%	
University graduates to repay HELP debt once they earn \$50,638 (reduced from \$53,345)		
Support	53%	
Oppose	23%	

[Essential Media Communications – 5 March 2014](#)

Do you think the Government should raise taxes or cut spending to reduce the national debt or should they do neither?

<i>Raise taxes</i>	6%
<i>Reduce spending</i>	47%
<i>Both</i>	19%
<i>Neither</i>	20%
<i>Don't know</i>	8%

If "Reduce spending" or "both" –
In which of the following areas should the Government reduce spending?

<i>Foreign aid</i>	79%
<i>The arts</i>	70%
<i>Private schools</i>	65%
<i>Subsidies for business</i>	61%
<i>Welfare support</i>	44%
<i>Support for manufacturing industries</i>	43%
<i>Defence</i>	38%
<i>The environment</i>	36%
<i>Border security</i>	23%
<i>Universities</i>	23%
<i>Public transport</i>	15%
<i>Roads</i>	12%
<i>Pensions</i>	12%
<i>Public schools</i>	9%
<i>Health and hospitals</i>	8%

2013

[Essential Media Communications – 13 Aug 2013](#)

Do you think the Government should raise taxes or cut spending to reduce the national debt or should they do neither?

<i>Raise taxes</i>	13%
<i>Reduce spending</i>	55%
<i>Neither</i>	20%
<i>Don't know</i>	12%

If "Reduce spending" - In which of the following areas should the Government reduce spending?	
<i>Foreign aid</i>	76%
<i>The arts</i>	70%
<i>Private schools</i>	59%
<i>Subsidies for business</i>	59%
<i>Welfare support</i>	43%
<i>Support for manufacturing industries</i>	36%
<i>Defence</i>	34%
<i>The environment</i>	32%
<i>Border security</i>	18%
<i>Universities</i>	18%
<i>Public transport</i>	14%
<i>Roads</i>	12%
<i>Pensions</i>	9%
<i>Public schools</i>	9%
<i>Health and hospitals</i>	5%

2011

[Essential Media Communications – 11 July 2011](#)

As far as you know, about how much of the Federal budget is spent on foreign aid?				
	<i>Total</i>	<i>By political preference</i>		
		<i>Vote Labor</i>	<i>Vote Lib/Nat</i>	<i>Vote Greens</i>
<i>Less than 1%</i>	7%	8%	6%	15%
<i>About 1%</i>	8%	10%	8%	14%
<i>About 2%</i>	17%	23%	17%	12%
<i>About 5%</i>	11%	8%	15%	10%
<i>More than 5%</i>	16%	16%	15%	7%
<i>Don't know</i>	41%	35%	38%	42%

And do you think Australia spends too much or too little on foreign aid?								
	<i>Overall</i>	<i>By political preference</i>			<i>By knowledge about aid</i>			
		<i>Vote Labor</i>	<i>Vote Lib/Nat</i>	<i>Vote Greens</i>	<i>Spend 1% or less</i>	<i>Spend about 2%</i>	<i>Spend 5% or more</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
<i>Spends too much</i>	42%	34%	52%	25%	25%	28%	66%	40%
<i>Spends too little</i>	16%	20%	11%	37%	36%	25%	7%	9%
<i>Spends about the right amount</i>	21%	27%	21%	21%	30%	39%	19%	13%
<i>Don't know</i>	21%	20%	15%	16%	9%	8%	8%	39%