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Master’s Thesis

Different effects of the aftermath of democratization on the Civil Society and Middle Classes in the Philippines and South Korea

필리핀과 한국의 시민 사회와 중산층에 대한 민주화 여파의 효과

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Different effects of the aftermath of democratization on the Civil Society and Middle Classes in the Philippines and South Korea

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ABSTRACT

Different effects of the aftermath of democratization on the Civil Society and Middle Classes in the Philippines and South Korea

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This thesis examines the different effects of the aftermath of democratization on the Civil Society and Middle Classes in the Philippines and South Korea – the two countries in Asia that democratized at almost the same time in the late 1980s – 1986 and 1987 respectively. It mainly focuses on the two particular cases of CODE-NGO and CCEJ. This thesis suggests that despite the continuing rise in the number of civil society and middle classes in both cases one can clearly see that their societal influences as well as governmental leverages are highly affected by the way the leader in the government situate them in their respective administration’s goals and agendas. The time periods selected in this thesis were divided in to four time frame based on the specific administration periods from 1988 to 2008. Period 1 was from 1988-1993 or Corazon Aquino and Roh Tae Woo administrations. Period 2 was from 1993-1998 or the administrations of Fidel Ramos and Kim Young Sam. Period 3 was from 1998-2003 or the Joseph Estrada and Kim Dae Jung administrations. Lastly, Period 4 was from 2003-2008 or the Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Roh Moo Hyun administration. After analyzing the empirical evidences, this thesis suggests that despite the increase in civil society and middle classes in both cases, Philippine case still exhibits a relatively positive result compared to South Korea case.

Keywords : Philippines, South Korea, Democratization, Civil Society, Middle Class

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

I.1 Background of the study

Discussing about the history and aftermath of democratization in the Philippines and South Korea have been one of the topics of interest of the scholars and academicians in the past decades. This discourse on democracy and democratization per se is a matter of importance not just to the academic field but also to the political arena from the past, the present, and the future especially because there are a number of challenges that arises in relations to it since its global introduction and expansion. As Tom Ginsburg argued studying the democratization cases in Asia teaches us a lot about the various salient debates with regards to the contemporary literature on democratization (2008: 2). Furthermore, Waylen argued that the beginning of the third wave of democratization paved way for the formation and adaptation of democratic rule thus leading to the re-emergence of interest that centers on the discourse of democracy and democratization (1994: 330).

Moreover, even in the continuous worldwide expansion of democratic ideals and principles it can be argued that giving a concrete definition to the term democracy is still remaining somewhat equivocal even to the scholars. This is exacerbated by the fact that different scholars sometimes have different interpretations on how democracy and democratization should be define. Ansell and Samuels supported this
argument when they argued that as a concept democracy is intrinsically contestable idea and measuring it is naturally challenging (2014: 98).

Meanwhile, in his *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* Samuel Huntington mentioned that – as a form of government – the idea of democracy dates back from the Greek philosophers. Meanwhile, contemporary usage of the concept originates during the end of the eighteenth century – the period wherein Western society experience revolutionary upheavals. Additionally, he further argued that by the half of the twentieth century the debates concerning the conceptualization of democracy revolves in three general approaches. As a form of government, Huntington describes democracy based on the government’s authority sources, government’s served purposes, and procedures for constituting government (1991: 5-6).

Moreover, besides the problem of coming to consensus of what democracy mean Gerardo L. Munck points out that even the approach of qualifying what democracy actually mean is also a dilemma which then provide the basis for the difficulty encountered in pinpointing the particular topic matter. Furthermore, he stressed that additional effort is required to elucidate what actually define the tenets of democracy as most scholars tends to separate the concepts and quality of democracy, thereby misleadingly implying that the two have different referents (2016: 2).

On the other hand, the continuing rise and expansion of civil society as well as the middle classes in the Philippines and South Korea after the two republics
undergone democratization is also a crucial discourse in the field of social sciences particularly in the East and South East Asian region. As Gordon White argued taking into consideration the explicit multi-faceted connection between the two concepts – civil society and democratization – (1995: 56) this discussion is a matter of interest for it address a number of issues related not just to the overall way the society will work but also how the democracy of the country will continue. Moreover, as Blakeley argued given that a number of literature in democratization tackles about the significance of the civil society resurrection because its revival lays the ground through which the consequent political shift occur (1998: 178) it is just rational to interpret these topics in one encompassing scholarly discourse. As Pietrzyk-Reeves argued the concept of civil society can be considered as an analytical key to understand the dynamics of the social complexity concerning the public sphere. The clear division between these two important actors – civil society and state – offers an important key in the analysis of the social and the political complexity (2015: 48).

Unsurprisingly, just like the problem of addressing the enigma of the concept of democracy, scholars are also entangle in giving a concrete definition to the term ‘civil society’. In his *Democracy after Democratization: The Korean Experience*, Choi Jang Jip argued that not just there exist a difficulty in defining the term civil society but also there exist a problem of approaching the subject matter analytically. A dilemma exacerbated by the fact that there is also a great deal of variant opinions of how civil society should be define among scholars (2005: 247). Furthermore, this argument is supported by Blakeley when she argued that as a concept civil society can be differently understood by different people at different period. The so-called
‘chameleon-like’ characteristic of this concept rooted based on the variety of factors such as its long history that dates back from the time of Hobbes and Locke to the time of Marx and Gramsci (1998: 179). Likewise, White argued that although the notion of civil society has an extensive, distinguished conceptualization in the Western political theory it still have a very ambiguous history (1994: 375) thus making the utilization of the concept in the modern usage quite difficult. This argument is further supported by Georgina Blakeley when she argued that because of the great number of apparent contradictions and variant conceptualization existing in the literature focusing on civil society is it just expectable that there may also be an idea that civil societies are different at different period and in different situations (1998: 178).

Additionally, as Frank Schwartz argued in his “What is Civil Society?” quoting John Keane, the term civil society fundamentally speaking does not have any single nor infinite fixed form. Thus, it is not surprising that the very context of civil society is disputed and this problem worsened with time (2003: 23).

Also as Gordon White argued in his Civil society, democratization and development (I): Clearing the analytical ground, alongside democracy and the market, civil society is considered as one of the so-called pillar of the development panaceas that began during the 1980s and prospered in the 1990s. Gordon further mentioned that civil society – the third factor in the extensive response against 1960s and 1970s developmental states – can be taken as the market’s social complement in the economic aspect and democracy’s political counterpart in the political sense. Therefore, it is a significant complementary actor in the so-called dichotomy between the state and the market (1994: 375).
As such, given the complexity of the terminology, this research will not deal deeper on how to properly define what civil society is but rather this research will adopt an already existing definitions given by some scholars. For instance, Choi define civil society as that entity existing between the individual and the state primarily characterized by its voluntary associations. Furthermore, he argued that if we assume that civil society is a voluntary intermediary arena between the state and the individual then it can be divided into three major components namely: the interest groups, the non-governmental organizations and network, and lastly the movement. The first component are mainly composed on associations established to uphold and advance the particular interest of a specific homogenous groups, popular examples of such are the physicians’ association, pharmacists’ associations, or any voluntary associations. On the other hand, the second component are those non-governmental organizations and networks that basically cannot be grouped under the first category. This component primarily engage on matters that concerns people’s philosophy and values as well as their consciousness both in educational and social sphere. Groups such as the media, religious organizations, educational and youth-related social organizations largely comprised this category. Meanwhile, unlike the first two components, the third classification – movements – are usually seen as having a low level of institutionalization, unclear scope of organization, and shorter continuity. Nonetheless, movement refers to the collective action of the masses and believe to have an organizational bodies tasked to mobilize the masses in order to achieve a specific value and goal particularly those related to the pursuance of public good (2005: 248). This conceptualization is somewhat coinciding with Schwartz argument
that civil society is essentially the sphere situated in between the individual and the state by which the social actors neither pursue the achievement of any benefits from the market nor does it pursue the achievement of power from the state (2003: 23).

Consequently, Hagen Koo aptly observed the connection between civil society and middle classes. According to Koo, civil society literature designates a very distinguished function to the middle classes in developing and sustaining civil society. He went further by emphasizing the importance of middle classes to civil society’s growth. Historically, as Koo argued, the growth of the market economy as well as the middle classes brought with it the advancement of an active civic organizations as well as the public sphere that state does not have immediate control. For Koo, unlike other social classes it is the middle classes who are naturally characterized as the one who hold the specific interests, dispositions, and cultural qualities – like moderation, open-mindedness, liberalism as well as communicative skills – required in order to sustain a feasible civil society. Additionally, as history have witnessed, in a number of societies it is this particular class that have acted a central role in materializing and protecting democracy against its potential dangers (in Charles K. Armstrong, 2007: 73).

In this research the author will discussed the particular cases of the Philippines and South Korea, the two countries in Asia that democratized at almost the same time in the late 1980s – 1986 for the case of the Philippines and 1987 for the South Korean case. The successful transition from authoritarian state to democratic state of these two countries as well as the seen trend of continuous
increasing growth of civil societies and middle classes may perhaps signifies a lot of lessons to both countries and other nations in the region. Moreover, the two countries analyzed in this research – Philippines and South Korea – are selected for two particular and important reasons. First, both countries democratized at almost the same time in the late 1980s which imply that there exist a vast array of literature that seeks to compare the situations that happened in both countries. Second, since both countries clearly show variations not just in the economic development but as well as in its political development the author argue that perhaps these observed variations between the two countries can be utilized to answer the research questions posited below.

With Proclamation No. 1081, the whole Philippines was placed under Martial Law which lasted from September 23, 1972 until January 17, 1981. During that time, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos strictly restricted the basic rights of the people particularly the right to make public assembly as well as the formation of civil society and Non-Government Organizations advocacy groups. Moreover, despite the government rigid and strong stance about this restriction, underground Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) mushroomed during Martial Law era and they were able to form strong alliances with the vulnerable communities specifically the poor. With that, civil society influence and participation is one of the crucial point for discussion in the democratization process of the Philippines. CSOs activism was heralded as one of the contributing factors for the successful non-violent 1986 People Power Revolution (popularly known in the Philippines as EDSA Revolution). EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of the Philippine dictator Marcos and brought to power
Corazon Aquino, a power shift that signals that the formal political democracy was then re-established in the country. Striking to point in this 1986 People Power Revolution is the active participation played by different religious, political, and military groups.

Moreover, since the restoration of democracy in the Philippines, coupled not just with a very promising legal environment but also with the influx of Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds, the period from 1986 until 1992 or the President Corazon Aquino administration witnessed the blooming or flourishing of the number of CSOs. According to the report published by ADB, CSOs swift growth from years 1986 to 1992 can be ascribed also to the Aquino government’s initiative to systematize the contribution or involvement in the development planning both in national and regional spectrum of the civil society. Moreover, although there exist a dilemma of giving a concrete figure of CSOs present in the country primarily due to the fact that not only that many of the existing civil society groups in the Philippines are unregistered but also due to the absence of a single official and updated database of those government-agency registered CSOs, previous studies claimed that the country with the largest array of NGOs per capita in Asia is still the Philippines. For this, many accepts the argument that it is in the Philippines where civil society contributed a lot in the democratization process (2013: 2).

Meanwhile, in South Korea year 1987 was the year wherein the country experienced the political transition to democracy. This so-called democratization was the aftermath of the large scale student-led democracy movements and later on
amalgamated with the democratization movement participation of the large number of white-collar workers as well as the other spectrum of the society with the end goal to overthrown the authoritarian and military rule. The success in the restoration of democracy in the country is in fact usually seen as a good indication that indeed civil society’s development and flourishing in this period as a crucial turning point in South Korea’s modern history (Koo, n.d.). Additionally, Sun Hyuk Kim argued in his *The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society* that just like the cases that occurred in some countries in the Eastern Europe and Africa, for South Korean case as well groups like the civil society are the ones who instigated and controlled the entirety of democratization process in the country through the formation of alliance party concentrated on pre-democracy movements which culminated in the pressuring to reciprocate the demands of the people by the authoritarian regime (2000: 5).

Choi Jang Jip argued that in Korea, it was in 1980s when the idea of civil society appeared. 1980s, for Choi, is the so termed period of the democratization movement in Korea. During this democratization movement period, South Korea witnessed the rampant circulation both in the academic sphere and social movement arena of the idea of civil society. This thus imply that the concept of civil society and the struggles of the Korean democratization movement have in fact a very close relationship. Choi further argued that after the notion of civil society started to be adopted in Korea it was viewed as the representation of the observed hostile strain and antipathy between the two actors, the so-called Korea’s highly institutionalize authoritarian government and the egalitarian Korean civil society. In that sense, in
Korea civil society can be understood as the groups which go against vis-à-vis the state. Additionally, Choi argued that it was also in this period when Korea saw the attempt to describe democracy movement not just as a movements for civil rights but also as a voice of those group of people who vocally or explicitly go against the authoritarian state. Consequently, Korean civil society was viewed as the social pillar of the Korean democratization movement against the state. Therefore, in Korean context civil society meant the general public’s venue to put forward their accepted public interests opposite the authoritarian state (2005: 249). Thus, after the ultimate overthrown of the authoritarian rule in 1987, South Korea – just like the Philippines – experienced and witnessed the continuing growth of civil society.

In this research, first the author will try to seek the similarities and differences between the Philippines and South Korea cases so as to justify why these two countries should be studied in the first place. Second, the author will put specific emphasis or focus on the growth of civil society and middle classes after democratization and see how these growth in the number of civil society and middle classes as well as its increasing governmental leverages can actually help promotes the continuity of the democratic society in both the Philippines and South Korea.
I.2 Research Questions of the study

The background of this paper has covered mostly the direct relationship between democratization, civil society, and the middle classes. In that matter, this research will try to address the following questions:

- How does the different effect of the aftermath of democratization on Civil Societies and Middle Classes in the Philippines and South Korea promotes the continuity of democracy?
- How does the number of civil society and middle class changes after democratization?
- How does these observed changes in the number of civil society and middle class affect the democracy in the Philippines and South Korea?
- What are the extent of influences of these groups in the Philippines and South Korea politics?

I.3 Objective of the study

This research aims to give an alternative explanation to better understand the different effects of the aftermath of democratization on the Civil Society and Middle Classes in the Philippines and South Korea. By utilizing the specific cases of CODE-NGO and CCEJ, in this thesis the author tries to prove that despite the observed diversities between the two cases both in the economic and political development before and after democratization we can still see that the different effects of the aftermath of democratization on the civil society and middle classes
indeed helps in the advancement and continuity of democracy in the Philippines and South Korea.

I.4 Scope and Limitations of the study

This research will only tackle about the different effects of the aftermath of democratization on civil society and middle classes in the Philippines and South Korea from years 1988 until 2008. 1988 was chosen as the starting point of the research primarily because Philippines democratized on 1986 while Korea democratized on 1987. On the other hand, the author chooses 2008 as the end of the scope of the research primarily because of the assumption that the 2008 Global Financial Crisis might actually affected how the government responded in the leverages forwarded both by the civil society and middle classes.

I.5 Significance of the study

Through this qualitative comparative study, we can better understand how the different effects of the aftermath of democratization on Civil Society and Middle Classes in the Philippines and South Korea can actually promotes the continuity of democracy in both cases. By identifying the different effects of democratization to civil society and middle classes in both cases, the author wishes that this research findings contributes in the further improvement and promotion of a more active and engaging civil society-middle class-state relationship. Furthermore, another
significance of this research is its uniqueness in terms of the choice of civil society group that it studied. As a pioneer study that compares Philippines and South Korea’s respectively biggest coalition of civil society organizations, the author of this thesis aims to emphasize that the result of this particular research can in fact be a guide to both the public and the government to better understand how their exerted influences towards one another may actually results in the advancement and continuity of democracy in both countries.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURES

The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss in-depth the array of existing literatures primarily tackling about the relationship of democratization, civil society, and middle classes. The first part will explain about the tenets and definition of the four most important terminologies in this research the democracy, democratization, civil society, and the middle class. Second part of the chapter will mainly focus on reviewing the existing literatures that seek to draw connections between the four concepts.

II.1 Democracy, Democratization, Civil Society, and Middle Classes

2.1.1 Defining Democracy

“Government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

-- U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, excerpt from Gettysburg Address (November 19, 1863)

For the past three decades, the world witnessed an important breakthrough. Since 1987, a vast number of developing countries made transition from authoritarianism to democracy. As expected, the exercise of democratic politics,
institution building, and civil society activities were enhanced soon after democratic constitutions were introduced in those countries that undergone transition (Bae and Kim, 2013: 260). In the years 1974 to 2005 alone, Sørensen argued that forty countries undergone democratization. This democratic transitions began in South Europe, followed by countries in the Latin and Central America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and countries from former Soviet Union. For Asia, transition from authoritarian regime to democratic regime started as early as 1970s. Thus, this recent surge towards democracy indeed provides us the evidence that in a relatively short span of time democracy progress in a large scale (2008: 36).

Moreover, as democracy is generally viewed as a positive concept it is not a surprised that a number of 1980s publications shed light of how to undergone democratization process particularly on ways democracy can be realized and sustained. Waylen argued that scholars such as Diamond, Linz, and Lipset were seen as putting focus on the different prerequisites required for democratic transition to happen by utilizing and examining a large number of cases that focuses on different variables such as but not limited to political leadership and political institutions. Whereas, writers like O'Donnell and Schmitter put emphasis on the characteristic of the democratization process more specifically the actions done by the political actors (1994: 330).

Meanwhile, the most important task of this section is to discuss the concept of democracy. In layman’s term, democracy as a form of government is usually define as a government rule by the people (emphasis added). Taking into account that the
term comes from the combination of two Greek words *demos* which mean ‘people’ and *kratos* which mean ‘rule,’ however, one should not be misled by the complex issues surrounding this very “innocent straightforward” conception of democracy as Georg Sørensen termed it (1998: 3). Sørensen argument was back by Philip Green’s argument when he argued that in the very moment we say that democracy means rule of the people it implies that not only we entered the definitional problem of the term itself but also we are plunged in the practical morass of it (1993: 2). However, despite this very long history of democracy, it can be argued that the concept until the present times still remain as an ambiguous puzzling terminology both in the scholarly world and in the political world. It is a paradox because even though these scholars are talking about the same concept sometimes it is really rare to see a consensus among them. Sørensen argued that for several centuries not just how this form of government must be organized but also even the necessary means and prerequisites it entails are heavily contested (1998: 3). Green also supported this argument when he argued that democracy is not just a highly debatable concept but also an expectedly ambiguous idea. He further argued that for the fact that democracy is a very ambiguous and multifaceted concept it is anticipated that there exist a little possibility to eliminate such kind of ambiguity in addressing the subject matter for this characteristic seems to be naturally part of it (1993: 2). Thus, as Charles Tilly argued, with which the author agree, it is essentially necessary to put forward a clear-cut definition to the term democracy (2007: 7) because by doing so such resulting ambiguities in understanding the other concepts directly and indirectly related to it can also be addressed. However, the author does not suggests that by just giving a concrete
definition of the concept of democracy everything will be resolve. Given its complexity and ambiguity, defining democracy according to Green is by essence evolved as a political project to be addressed ultimately through the means at least of a voting booth (1993: 2).

Furthermore, as Samuel Huntington and Georg Sørensen argued, in order to fully understand the very concept of democracy one should traced back to the earliest contributions regarding democracy discourse from the ancient Greece. It should be noted that the knowledge of the most significant discussions concerning the definition of democracy as well as the long list pertaining to the ‘core features’ (emphasis added) of it relevant to the contemporary world and of course the comprehension on how the quality of democracy is affected by conditions in the economic, social, and cultural aspects should also be taken into consideration when one wishes to fully understand how democracy evolved and developed over time (Huntington, 1991: 5; Sørensen, 1998: 3).

As Tilly argued, there are four main types of democracy definition usually adopted by observers of democracy and democratization the: constitutional, substantive, procedural, and process-oriented. On constitutional approach the focus is on those legislations a particular government enacts in relation to political activities. This approach is highly advantageous if one is interested in making a large historical comparison particularly those concerning the constitutional forms relative visibility. On the other hand, the substantive approach emphasizes more on the life and politic situations or conditions a particular regime upholds. Likewise, those who promotes a
procedural approach tends to focus on a relatively narrower sense of defining the concept. The main focus is on whether or not a regime under study can be considered or does it qualifies as a democratic regime or not based primarily on governmental practices the particular regime adopts. Observers of this approach center overwhelmingly on elections. Thus, as Tilly argued despite the convenience of adopting the procedural definitions of democracy one will find that this approach applies only in an exceptionally narrower understanding of the involved political processes. Lastly, the process-oriented definition to democracy differs significantly from the three other approaches basically because it recognizes a number of pre-condition processes that must be constantly observed for a certain scenario to be considered democratic. As Robert Dahl argued, quoted by Tilly, there are five process-oriented criteria for democracy namely the: effective participation, quality of voting, enlightened understanding, agenda control, and adult inclusion (2007: 7-9).

Nonetheless, answering the existing issues concerning democracy, unfortunately, cannot be pursued in this research primarily because doing so will require a lot of theoretical background of the theories concerning the contemporary society. Also, since doing so is beyond the scope of this research the author in that matter will not offer a new conceptualization of democracy instead for convenience and consistency to the existing literature related to democracy the author will adopt the two particular types of definition of democracy, one narrow and one comprehensive. For David Held, as quoted by Green, democracy is basically the liberal and Marxist traditions collective understandings. Democracy for Held means a political system wherein:
“Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy the framework to negate the rights of others.”

On the other hand, Tilly argued that democracy is a regime wherein there exist a broad, fair, secured, and mandatory consultation between the political relations of the state and its respective citizens (Green, 1993: 10; Tilly, 2007: 13-14). This conception is supported by the contemporary social scientist Seymour Martin Lipset who rephrased Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of democracy. For Lipset, as quoted by Green, democracy as a government mean “a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among candidates for political office” (1993: 6).

As can be observed in the two type of definitions of democracy the author chooses to adopt, the idea of democracy for the case of Schumpeter and Lipset indeed is somewhat a narrow conceptualization of democracy, whereas, that of Held and Tilly is on the opposite end of the spectrum for they give a more comprehensive notion of democracy.
2.1.2 Defining Democratization

Tilly argued that democratization has clearly arrived in waves since the 1850s (2007: 43). Wave of democratization is what Huntington usually define as the movement from a non-democratic form of government to a democratic type of regime observed or happened at a specific time and typically comprises a political system that failed to achieve full democracy but either reach full liberalization or incomplete democratization. Huntington’s book “The Third Wave” provides a very extensive account on how this democratization waves actually occur in different time periods. In his book, he argued that both Philippines and South Korea fall into the same category, both cases experienced “second short wave of democratization” (Huntington’s argued that the second wave of democratization different countries experienced arbitrarily occurred around 1943-1962.) But around the period of 1958-1972, both countries actually experienced Huntington’s so-called “second wave reverse” then eventually undergone another phase of democratization or the so-called “third wave of democratization” (1993: 15). Thus, in that reference we can say that democratization as Cannon and Hume argued is definitely a non-linear course (2012: 1040) but rather democratization as an ideology means the aggregated transition towards the goal of achieving wider, fairer, more secured, and more mutually binding discussion between the state and the citizens (Tilly, 2007: 14).

Just as the term democracy is surrounded by issues and conceptual ambiguities so as democratization. Different scholars have different views on how democratization should actually be defined. The dilemma does not stop there because
even what factors and tenets should be included for a process to be considered as democratization is also a matter of contentions. Democratization, in layman’s term for instance, simply mean the process of introducing democratic system or democratic principles. However, unlike this very simplistic conceptualization of what democratization is, for social or political analyst democratization does not just simply mean the movement from authoritarian rule towards a more democratic rule but rather it is a more complex process of regime change. For instance, Sørensen defines democratization as shift of the form of rules towards a more democratic type of regime. He then provides three concrete phases of democratization namely: the fall of the non-democratic regime; the establishment of the pillars of democratic order; and eventually the democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation or the third phase is basically characterized by the more developed new democracy as well as the acceptance of the practices associated with democracy until it become a customary tenet of the country’s political culture (2008: 194).

On the other hand, according to Edward Friedman the politics of democratization is indeed a global human phenomenon. For Friedman, democratization refers to the process wherein the regimes accept the movement towards the direction of democracy. Moreover, he further argued that whatever the form of the original political breakthrough, in a democratic transition (democratization) the regime make effort to stay away from the old system it had and to commit the regime in the direction of a consolidated democracy primarily by arriving into consensus with the related groups of actors. Hence, we can say that a regime movement towards democracy generally relies on consolidation. Friedman
arguments are supported by Donald Share and Alfred Stepan. For Share, there are basically four types of transitions that rely on whether the process is either protracted or compacted, also on whether the authoritarian regime accepts to undergo change or transition. Whereas, Stepan provides ‘eight paths of democratic transition’ which were based on a different categorization of the sources of democratizing forces or the key catalyst of change (1994: 1, 126, 143-144).

For consistency, the researcher will adopt the conceptualization of democratization proposed by Sørensen primarily because he gave a more detailed explanation of what phases democratization process have and basically because the definition he gave is easier to understand for those people with limited knowledge about the complex politics of democratization.

### 2.1.3 Defining Civil Society

Citizens’ role is pivotal in bringing democracy in the country, however, paradoxically once the democratic structures are already established citizens’ role is somehow marginalized. Pietrzyk-Reeves argued that legislators and political scientists alike shows great concern and focus on the significance of the advancement and flourishing of civil societies for effective democratic performance (2015: 47). Having said that, it is undeniable that as state and civil society continue to work along with each other whether in a positive or negative terms we can see that the boundaries between state and civil is blurring (Cannon and Hume, 2012: 1040). This is true given that the “states may act a significant or pivotal part in influencing the civil society
and reciprocally civil society influencing the state; and therefore these two actors – state and civil society – may intersect in varying degrees” (White, 1994: 381). The observed blurring boundaries of the two actors in some way also have an impact on democratization. Civil society such as popular movements according to Waylen act a pivotal role in the process towards democracy (1994: 328). This argument is supported by Pietrzyk-Reeves when she argued that – as a concept – civil society per se is considered to be one of the public’s key topic of discussion and of course the final objective in the democratic transformation (2015: 47).

Meanwhile, as scholars usually link the importance and significant roles of civil society in the achievement (perhaps even maintenance) of democracy, it is deem crucial that we should first define what civil society is and what composes it.

Civil society concept which dates back to Alexis de Tocqueville, unsurprisingly, faces the same equivocality and complexity just like the first two concepts discussed in this chapter – the democracy and democratization. This multifaceted and ambiguous characteristic is unavoidable given that civil society as a concept by default is a nebulous word (Richardson, 2007: 165). As this concept experience similar enigma, the author of this research will first offer a literature review that primarily tackles about the tenets and unique characteristics of a civil society. Pietrzyk-Reeves argued that civil society as an ideology is often define as the public sphere -- aside from the market – situated at the middle of the state and the family, that people may possibly take part of in order to realize their specific individual goals and objectives so long as they do not infringe any law the state
guaranteed (2015: 48). Her argument is supported by White. For White, civil society as a concept is often used loosely to mean either as a society or that entity contradicting the state. To put it in a more concrete manner, civil society is the intermediary sphere between the state and the society’s basic units – namely the household and market. They are basically the social organizations or associations that seeks to create an intermediary role to connect the basic actors of the society to the state. This conceptualization is then supported by Jean-François Bayart when he links civil society as the antagonistic relationship between society and the state primarily restricting the idea to social groups that represents a society that have a confrontational relationship with the state. Therefore, for White civil society basically mean the intermediary organizational realm situated in between the state and the family and primarily comprised of groups voluntarily organized by the society’s member with the goal of safeguarding or widening the group’s private interests. They are also uniquely characterized as a group detached and distinct from the realm of state and practices autonomy or independence from the state’s control (1994: 377, 379).

Whereas, for Arato and Cohen civil society is an array of social groups they termed as ‘associations’ indifferent and traversing different classes such as those organizations like the neighborhood groups, associations offering mutual aid, or those locally established groups intended to extend collective service to the community and the like. Moreover, they argued that civil society basically is that sphere where social experimentation can be performed in order to developed new types of life and solidarity as well as the advancement of the cooperation and work social relations
Additionally, for Arato and Cohen the civil society concept is not just a mere slogan concept but it is more than that. They argued that if this concept is properly reconstructed, it can address numerous theoretical and practical enigma experienced by contemporary analysis and social actors (1988:40).

Consistent with the other existing literatures, the author argued that civil society then is that entity positioned in between (if not directly) face-to-face groups on one side and out-right state organizations on the other end. To put it in a more political and theoretical realm, Mary Kaldor adopted Hegel’s civil society conceptualization and fundamentally define it as the transitional realm situated in between the family and the state. Civil society, therefore, mean the mediating force in between society (family or public) and the state (2003: 584). Kaldor’s argument is parallel with the argument of Frank Schwartz and Susan Pharr. In their book entitled *The State of Civil Society in Japan*, Schwartz and Pharr defined civil society as that domain situated in between the family and the state by which social actors’ forwarded goal is not the pursuance of neither profit in the market nor the achievement of power from the state (2003: 23). In this study the author will adopt the definition of civil society forwarded by Schwartz and Pharr for the author believes the definition they gave is more applicable to the case studies that will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 6.

Moreover, in this study the author chosen to use the term Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) instead of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) although the focus civil society are both NGOs, as they have indicated in their respective websites. The researcher wants to point out that because the terminology NGO is not
only a contested jargon but argued by many scholars as an entity that belongs under the much broader category of CSO thus adopting the term CSO is a more appropriate term to use. Also, whenever the term NGOs appears in this research it should be understand to mean interchangeably with the term CSOs. This study adopts in particular the definition of CSOs put forward by the 2007–2008 Advisory Group on CSOs and Aid Effectiveness which is now adopted by the OECD-DAC. CSOs accordingly are:

“All non-market and non-state organizations outside of the family in which people organize themselves to pursue shared interests in the public domain. Examples include community-based organizations and village associations, environmental groups, women’s rights groups, farmers’ associations, faith-based organizations, labour unions, cooperatives, professional associations, chambers of commerce, independent research institutes and the not-for-profit media.”
2.1.4 Defining Middle Class

The uncontestable developments in the economic and political sphere in the past decades both in the South East Asian and the surrounding regions warrant a re-examination of the specific and pivotal part played by the middle classes in these regions. Perhaps, it can be argued that if there is a particular group that benefitted tremendously with this economic growth and deepening globalization it is none other than the middle classes.

Additionally, a number of scholars accept the consensus that it is undeniable that middle classes act as both a market players and as political actors. This dual role played by the middle classes unsurprisingly give them a leverage to influence the country’s economic growth and development. Capuno (2016) citing Banerjee and Duflo (2008) and Birdsall (2010) argued that in the market, middle classes comprised the groups of both the consumers, the investors and the entrepreneurs. Arguably, a burgeoning or flourishing middle class is a pivotal sign of the country’s path towards poverty mitigation and thus a good indicator of the economic growth quality of a specific nation. On the other hand, through the middle classes political choices and activities, they in turn can exert leverage on what government institutions should be adopted, what regimes and policies should be observed, and even the economic trajectory of the country (Ibid, 467). However, contrary to these positive roles played by middle classes both in the economic and political sphere, it can be argued that scholars, indeed, also agree to the dilemma that giving concrete definition to the term middle class is a hard task. According to an ADB Special Report (2010), in contrast
to poverty which can be given an absolute definition based on a person daily caloric intake, for the case of the middle class there is an absence of a standard criteria to define what it actually mean (Ibid: 5). As expected, just like the cases of the above terminologies, defining the term middle class is a difficult mission for the simple reason that different scholars have different ways and uses different criteria in order to define this term. Moreover, upon thorough and closer scrutiny of a number of works addressing what middle class is, it is evident that middle classes are actually defined differently by scholars depending on what purpose and objective of their respective study is.

According to Pew Research Center, an American-based think tank, middle class are those adults with annual salary that falls either on the two-thirds or double of the median income bracket of the country. On the other hand, Easterly (2001) defined middle classes as those group that belongs to the second to fourth quintile of the per capita consumption distribution of the country. In contrast, Birdsall (2000) considered middle class as those particular households who possessed an income that ranges from 75 to 125 percent of the country’s per capita income. As can be stipulated from the above examples, we can argue that the aforementioned definitions given by different authors above are basically according to a relative sense of what middle class mean as all definitional thresholds were given after considering the household income distribution alone.

Meanwhile, another way to define middle class population are based on the assumption that it should be in reference to the absolute poverty lines so as to arrive
to an absolute definition of middle class. For instance, Martin Ravallion (2009), former World Bank’s Research Group head, distinguished the middle class from those on the developing world from those middle class in the Western World. Accordingly, Ravallion characterize developing world middle class by utilizing the poverty lines median value for 70 national poverty lines as the lower bound middle class or what he approximates as $2 per person per day. Consequently, the US poverty line or those consuming $13 per day as the upper bound (ADB, 2010: 5).

Parallel to one of the objectives of this research that is to estimate and determine the size of the middle classes across the Philippines and South Korea over the considered specific period after democratization, from 1988-2008, the researcher generally considered middle class, first, based on absolute approach. Middle classes based on this approach mean, according to the Asian Development Bank’s Special Report published in 2010, are those members of the society with daily per capita consumption expenditures that ranges from $2–$20 in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)$. Second, middle class as considered in this research basically mean those people that falls between the peasantry and the nobility group. Consequently, middle classes in this research, as sociologists have typically defined, are represented based on their educational achievement and occupational status in a white-collar job. (Ibid: 5) Therefore, whenever the term middle class appears in the study it loosely refers to those professionals, white-collar workers, and college educated members of the society who basically resides in major urban areas (Capuno, 2016: 470).
II.2 Review of Related Literatures

The multifaceted nature and connection of the aforementioned terminologies, as expected offer a complicated academic discourse. Accordingly, the author argues that these complex connections between democracy, democratization, civil society, and middle classes is an indubitable discourse that needs a re-examination. In this section, the author will shed light to the arguments posited by different scholars who specifically and rationally draw the direct connections between democracy, civil society, and middle classes.

2.2.1 Democracy, Democratization, the Civil Society, and the Middle class

Pietrzyk-Reeves argued that although the connotation between civil society and democracy is really different, the two concepts in fact is overlapping (2015: 50). Her argument thus make sense following White’s argument that civil society conceptualization is a major issue to be considered in any democratization discussion. White’s argument is primarily based on the fact that he sees civil society as an entity that can put forward key issues with relation to the pivotal role played by societal forces whether in defining, controlling, and legitimating the power of the state (1994: 382). Consequently, Cheng and Kim argued that transition to democracy can be considered as an encompassing process between two contesting actors, the so called ‘power holders’ (in this case the state) and the ‘power holder challengers’ (in this case the civil society) (1994: 125). Thus, the blurring boundary and complex relationship
advanced by both the state and civil society offers a crucial thesis that perhaps it is (partly) because of civil society that democracy was achieved in the Philippines and South Korea. Moreover, the thesis emphasizing the importance of civil society as a pivotal catalyst of democratization as White (1995: 57) argued is evident in Ernest Gellner’s work. Pietrzyk-Reeves citing Gellner sees civil society as a ‘natural’ expression of human freedom. Historically speaking, the existence of civil society was in fact a prerequisite for the achievement of a fully-working democracy in some Western nations namely the Great Britain, France, and the United States. Whereas, unlike the cases of the previously mentioned countries, nineteenth century Russia, Italy, and interwar Germany witnessed a vast range of associations and social forces but it does not translate to the fact that a prolonged democracy follows (2015: 49). White argued that it is the weakness of the states that serves as a catalyst to lay the ground for the societal impetus that eventually leads the path into democratization (Ibid: 57).

Accordingly, for the case of Korea, Bae and Kim (2013) posit that depending on the activities of subnational actors and civil society that strengthening of democratic (local) government will occur (Ibid: 261). Their argument thus indeed supports the idea that there is a connection between democracy and civil society. Interestingly, Choi (2005) also argued that it was in 1980s – the era of Korean democratization movement – when Korea concurrently witnessed the appearance of the term of civil society both in the academic and in social realm, thereby suggesting that the concept of civil society and the pursued struggles of the Korean democratization movement have in fact a very direct relationship. Therefore, for
Korea case, we can argue that the notion of civil society gained its conceptualization as a public domain constructed by highly dynamic Korean citizens to challenge the government (*Ibid*: 249-250).

Meanwhile, another appropriate case study for this discourse is the Philippines. Philippines, accordingly, is the country which houses the vast array of NGOs per capita in Asia and thus explicitly shows the connection of civil society and democracy. Furthermore, compared to the case of South Korea, Philippine NGOs on the other hand acquired nationwide significance particularly towards the end of the martial law regime when they were seen as an actor that can fill those functions the government failed to achieve. Consequently, due to this positive image portrayed by NGOs they became the ultimate recipients of international funding. Thus we can argue that Philippine NGOs strive to preserve independence was then simultaneously assisted by both the negative stimulus, and therefore hindered by oppression as a consequence of the actions done by the Marcos regime. Apparently, it is evident that during this martial law regime, Ferdinand Marcos general approach certainly excludes and discourages the involvement of any genuine NGOs in the government administration.

On the other hand, existing literatures argue that in several instances the middle class is viewed to be a major key player in the process of democratization. Since Aristotelian period, intellectuals have deeply examined the role taken by the middle classes in the achievement of political change. Middle class is either seen as a *carrier class* towards the achievement of the political modernization or as a rational
coalitional actor for democratic transition. Moreover, extending this Aristotelian conceptualization that shed direct connection between the middle class with democracy, Glassman (1995), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) posit that democratization will be possible when there is a presence of a strong and vast number of middle class. This is true given that it is the middle class that shows lesser acceptance and favor of any radical policies the government is trying to impose unlike the poor. Thus, when this situation is at hand, it then follows that the rich will not take any action to repress nor counter the democracy once they saw that democracy is technically well-handle by the interest of the agents of the middle class. Taking that into account, then Capuno is right when he argued that economic growth alone is not enough in order to achieve democracy but rather the presence and active participation of the middle class is also critical in the discussion of democracy. Furthermore, Capuno citing the work done by Loayza, Rigolini and Llorente (2012) clearly exemplifies and presents that democratic institutional reforms can be made possible with middle classes crucial participation (Capuno: 2016: 467).

Consequently, even in the political landscape, the role played by middle classes in achieving democracy is viewed positively. In fact in the recent two decades, the political world witnessed the spectrum of middle class participation in some salient events. Taken for instance the cases of middle classes intervention to achieve democracy in different South East Asian Nations. These cases give a clear evidence that indeed these two discourses – democracy and middle classes – are inseparable to each other. In the Philippines, for instance, another milestone was achieve in 2001. Middle classes were seen as one of the most crucial key actors in the street rallies in
Metro Manila that happened in early 2001 that ended in the ouster of the then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada or most commonly known as President Erap. Similarly, in Thailand, middle classes in the capital city of Bangkok partake in parallel rallies in 2006 which in the end led to the removal from the office of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a popularly elected leader in Thailand. Apparently, analogous situation occurred in 2013 during the administration of Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister. Although Yingluck was popularly elected as Prime Minister in 2011, her administration was challenged on 2013 by the massive anti-government protests which concluded in Yingluck removal from her office the following year due to corruption charges by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, another noteworthy example of the middle class intervention in the South East Asian region can be seen in the post-Suharto Indonesia. The rampant corruption cases in the government prevails thereby agitating groups such as the middle classes and even the poor population, this situation then led the dissatisfied members of the society to elect a new President in 2014 under the persona of Joko Widodo (Capuno, 2016: 468).

Just like in the Philippine case, South Korea’s public discourse mainly tackles about the significance of middle class as a political potential. However, it fail to foresee the constraints to middle classes’ participation in the government decision-making specifically due to the effects of the economic prosperity, prosperity that serves also a factor to hinder or inhibit middle classes from seeing itself as the state political protagonist. The uncontestable three decades of successful economic development brought with it the eventual swift rise in the number of white-collar
workers, managers, and engineers that essentially comprised the middle classes (Villegas and Yang, 2013: 349).

Additionally, Villegas and Yang argued that since the start of the mid-1980s, middle classes are portrayed by the mass media as a vital social force that will eventually bring back democracy to Korea. In fact, intellectuals and journalists both in the liberal and conservative bloc saw this class as a potential moderator between the capitalists and the poor to bring forth a phenomenon that will culminate in Korea’s steady reform in the politics and shift towards liberal democracy. However, contrary to the normative discourse forwarded by both the intellectuals and the journalists in relation to the middle class many still argued that in South Korea this particular economic class generally still remained the politically indolent and nearly invisible (Ibid: 350). Nonetheless, the worsening scenario in the Korea towards the end of the 1980s, eventually ignited the middle classes to participate in the democratic movement together with the more vocal and active students.

In sum, the argument push forward by Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al. can be considered as true given that democratization indeed advance forward if middle class is seen as a the pivotal actor in any political alliances (in Villegas and Yang, 2013: 360).
CHAPTER III

ANALYTICAL AND

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As a comparative research dealing primarily on the cases of Philippines and South Korea, the researcher aim to find if there are any diversities or differences soon after the two countries undergone democratization process. In particular this research will talk about the different effects of the aftermath of democratization on the Civil Society and Middle Classes in the Philippines and South Korea. The research will study the growth of middle classes and civil society as well its expanding influence and increasing governmental leverage after democratization from years 1988 until 2008. The researcher will shed light on how these phenomenon correlates on the way the democratic regime will prosper in these two nations.

This research theoretical framework relies heavily on the work of Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave*. In his book Huntington provide different factors that might have contributed to the achievement of democracy in the Philippines and South Korea. Factors such as *declining legitimacy and the performance dilemma, economic development and economic crises, religious changes, new policies of external actors, demonstration effects or snowballing* were some of the factors considered to explain how democratization happened in the Philippines and South Korea case. Drawing from these specific factors mentioned by Huntington, the author argued that civil
society as well as middle classes played a key role for democratization to be achieved and for democracy to prosper and continue until the present time. The religious changes proposed by Huntington clearly proves that civil society in the name of church actually contributed massively in the democratization process both in the Philippines and South Korea. However, other civil society also were in existence that helped paved way for the persistence of democracy in both countries. Moreover, this research analytical framework draw its inspiration from Esther Duflo’s *Empowerment-Development Nexus*. However, the author will need to realign the concept so as to accommodate and for the framework to be compatible with the argument being address in this research. Therefore, **Civil Society and Middle Classes – Democracy Nexus** analytical framework will be adopted in this research (as seen in Figure 3.1)

![Civil Society and Middle Classes – Democracy Nexus](image)

**Figure 3.1 Civil Society and Middle Classes– Democracy Nexus**

The researcher argue that as the influence and governmental leverage of middle classes and civil society increases the more the government became democratic. Hence, the assurance that democracy will prevail in the society.
Additionally, as the country continues to become more democratic the middle classes and civil society’s influence in turn will be positively affected. Thus, middle classes and civil society influence and governmental lobbying power will increase.

As can be seen from the case study of Philippines and South Korea, as societal and political citizen’s role, hereinto referred as the civil society role, increases before democratization occurred, and as the number of middle classes expands in relation to the former the government was left without any other resort but to sway the government towards democratic regime. Once the democratization was achieve, the middle classes and civil society’s influence and governmental lobbying further increases with the goal of preventing the return to the authoritarian regime. Thus the researcher argued that the Civil Society and Middle Classes – Democracy Nexus proposed above is indeed applicable for the specific cases of Philippines and South Korea. In chapter 5, the author will further elaborate on how the democratization factors push forward by Huntington and the Civil Society and Middle Classes – Democracy Nexus the author suggested actually worked side by side to ensure that democratic regime both for Philippines and South Korea case will not perish and will continue to prevail. Through this analytical and theoretical framework, the author aims to address the research questions posited in Chapter 1.
CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

This research employs a qualitative comparative analysis to analyze the difference effects of the aftermath of democratization on civil society and middle classes in the Philippines and South Korea. Additionally, the author also studies the pattern of similarities in middle classes and civil society governmental lobbying or leverage from years 1988 to 2008. The researcher relies primarily on extensive literatures which includes published data of related Civil Society Organizations, books, journal articles, academic papers, international organizations publications as well as local government publications. The Civil Society Organizations’ publications are used to examine the scope and range of civil societies influence in both cases, whereas the other literatures and sources are used to provide strong foundation to support the argument of the author.

The materials published by CODE-NGO and CCEJ online were utilized by the researcher to find whether governmental influences exerted by the civil society were effective (accepted) or ineffective (rejected) by the government. By relying heavily on these published materials the researcher hopes to find the trend in the way middle classes, civil society, and the government of Philippines and South Korea interacted after democratization was established in the country. The researcher argued that the different effects of the aftermath of democratization on the civil society and middle classes in both cases give light on how despite differences we can still
observed similarities in the end. Observing the different increasing influence (governmental leverage) of both the middle classes and civil society after the democratization period is one of the pivotal reasons why pattern of social development as well as the continuation of democracy in both countries are similar.

The author argued that the differences and similarities that can be observed from this civil society and middle classes influence is helpful to better understand how the Philippines and South Korea case after democratization differs or became similar. The way how the government of both country interacts, responses, and listens to the civil society’s and middle classes’ suggestions and influences in some way explains how the democracy will be protected and maintained in the Philippines and South Korea.
CHAPTER V

DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS:

PHILIPPINES CASE

The following case study below underlines the reality that there is nothing automatic about transition away from authoritarian regime and towards a more democratic regime. In the succeeding sections, the author of this research will talk about the long sequence of events in which different actors in the society – the state, civil society, and middle classes occupy the center of the political stage in order to achieve their specific goals and aspirations. The first case will be from one of the most dynamic South East Asian country, the Philippines.

V.1 Civil Society in the Philippines

Wurfel argued that Philippines is the country that houses the largest array of Non-Governmental Organizations per capita in Asia and thus if these organizations had ever taken an active role in the democratization process it should be in this country (2014: 215). Additionally, according to an ADB report, in fact Philippines is home to the numerous key international NGOs and network organizations headed of course by Filipinos. Given the vast array of CSOs present and working in the Philippines, it is not surprising that the country’s CSOs are globally viewed as some of world’s most dynamic and advanced civil society (2013: 2).
Moreover, according to another ADB report published in 2007, the foundation for civil society in the Philippines are the two particular Filipino concepts of *pakikipagkapwa* (directly translated in English as the holistic interaction with others) and the concept of *kapwa* (or the shared inner self). Whereas, scholars argued that maybe it is the Catholic missionaries who introduced the so-called Western notion of *kawanggawa* (or charity) to the country. Hence, with that we can argue that civil society, in fact, have been present in the Philippines even before the country experience democratization in 1986.

Historical records proved that civil societies, indeed, are actually in existence even during the Spanish and American colonization era although they take somewhat different forms. For instance, during the Spanish era it is the Roman Catholic Church together with other religious sects who pioneered and instituted the country’s first welfare organizations. Although recipients and beneficiaries of those welfare programs are basically reserved for local elites, it is without doubt that these welfare organizations provide services to people though in a very limited sense. On the other hand, Filipinos witness that the restrictions between state provision of public goods, religious charity, and even the private Non-Profit Organizations were delineated during the colonial government of America. Thus, the colonial government was portrayed to be generally welcoming and sympathetic to civil society. Good example of which is the Philippine corporation law of 1906, a law that unequivocally acknowledged NGOs and thus allowing NGO operations to be subsidized by the government (ADB, 2007: 2).
Meanwhile, with Proclamation No. 1081, the whole Philippines was placed under Martial Law which lasted from September 23, 1972 until January 17, 1981. During that time, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos strictly restricted the basic rights of the people particularly the right to make public assembly as well as the formation of civil society and Non-Government Organizations advocacy groups, a scenario parallel to what President Marcos envisioned as the ‘new society’. However, in contrast to the scenarios civil societies experienced during the martial law period, the setting was relatively quite different once democracy was restored to the Philippines on February 25, 1986. When President Corazon Aquino took office, the public saw a more promising environment for the expansion of civil society. In fact, a number of law encouraging civil society’s expansion or growth were enacted soon President Aquino took office. Some of these legislations are the Republic Act No. 6938 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines of 1990 and the Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act of 1992.

Additionally, primarily due to the very promising legal situation during the Aquino administration backed by the inflow of Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds to the country, it was natural of course to expect that the number of CSOs mushroomed during 1986 until 1992 or the President Corazon Aquino administration. Moreover, CSOs swift growth from years 1986 to 1992 can be ascribed also to the Aquino government’s initiative to systematize the contribution or involvement in the development planning both in national and regional spectrum of the civil society (ADB, 2007: 2).
In addition, with the resurgence of the civil society during the President Corazon Aquino’s administration various types of CSOs also began to emerge one after another. To date there are many types of CSOs in the Philippines, nonetheless, Cooperatives, Development NGOs, and People’s Organizations (POs) are just some of the most important types of CSOs in the country. These CSOs primarily engage themselves to a very wide range of societal activities that cover almost every aspect of Filipino’s lives, some of their key roles are related to: (1) education, training, and human resource development; (2) community development; (3) enterprise development and employment generation; (4) health and nutrition; (5) law, advocacy, and politics; and (6) sustainable development (ADB, 2013:2).

Moreover, with the continuous increase and expansion of CSOs in the Philippines soon after the country undergone the democratization, scholars argued that CSOs strength depends heavily in their membership scale, in their far-reaching cooperation and alliances with like-minded groups as well as with various complimentary sectors or organization, in their knowledge and expertise they have acquired as a result of long term engagement in doing development works, in their devotion as well as the resourcefulness of CSO heads and personnel, and lastly in their versatility as most of CSOs are relatively small in size (Ibid: 8).
V.2 Civil Society in the Philippines after democratization (1988-2008)

Since the Philippines return back to democracy through the success of the 1986 People Power Revolution, civil society experienced a relatively more openness in influencing the government. However, despite this observed openness by the government towards the civil society it is also undeniable that CSOs democratic space are either been extended or limited depending basically on the preferences of whoever owns the political supremacy. Due to the differing inclinations both by the elected and appointed leaders and bureaucrats, CSOs place in the government relies heavily on the general political conditions of the country or on the relationship they established with the incumbent political leaders, among others (Ibid: 2).

The Philippines 1987 Constitution, a constitution that was crafted as an aftermath of the successful and peaceful non-violent People Power Revolution of the 1986, explicitly acknowledges the involvement and the liberation as well as the pivotal role portrayed by CSOs. Provisions related to CSOs are clearly stated at 1987 Constitution’s Article II, Section 23; Article XIII, Section 15; and Article XIII, Section 16. Aside from this, a number of legislations also accepts and encourages CSOs participation together with the recognition of the vital and key contributions CSOs provided in the pursuance of development. Some of the most essential law related to CSOs promotion and participation are the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act of 1997 (Ibid: 3-4).
Meanwhile, Silliman and Noble argued that the number, variance, and Philippine NGOs political importance offers a unique occasion to examine citizen’s activism in the country. Accordingly, they argued that NGO in the Philippines advances a wide spectrum of interests that basically and essentially encompasses the interest of the marginalized groups such as the farmers, urban poor, women, and indigenous peoples. Moreover, in order to address an inclusive and comprehensive arrays of demands from the interest groups particular civil society represents, NGOs are left without choice but to establish national and regional coalitions to ensure that they can be able to influence the government on specific issues concerning land reform, environment, and human rights as well as to bargain from external donors some development assistance. Consequently, aside from this role, NGOs in the Philippines also provide a vast array of services that ranges from offering services in the legal field, training as well as financial assistance those groups directly engaged in helping people at the community level. Therefore, Philippine NGOs, compared to other NGOs elsewhere in South East Asia, not only expedites citizen’s political involvement but also exert effort to redress society’s inequalities (1998: 3).

Paradoxically, despite the clear role CSOs played in the country in the social, political, and economic arena, scholars still view it so difficult to put a definite account on how many CSOs are existing in the country. This difficulty in accounting the definite tally of Philippine CSOs is partly due to the fact that many CSOs in the country are unregistered. Fundamentally speaking, in the Philippines CSOs have the freedom whether they will or will not register in the government offices handling matters related to CSOs. To put it simply, there is no legal mandate that requires
CSOs to register with the Philippine government agencies that handles CSOs matters and thus most People’s Organizations as well as other small organizations do not bother to do so. Another reason about this difficulty addressing the concrete number of CSOs existing in the country is due to the fact that despite the efforts made by government to reach out to CSOs, to date there is an absence of a comprehensive official and updated government database for all those civil society who voluntarily registered in the related government agencies. Furthermore, this phenomenon is aggravated by the fact that even those previous literatures that attempt to take into account the number of civil society groups in the country utilized varying definitions and incorporate or omits various kinds of CSOs unintentionally. Nonetheless, this is not surprising given that diversity within the NGO universe mean that of course there will also be disagreement among academics and policy makers as to what is meant by the label NGO (Ibid: 5). For instance, after reviewing a number of data sources, Cariño suggests that the range of registered or accredited CSOs in the Philippines in 1997 were in between 249,000 and 497,000 (2002: 84). However, data presented by CODE-NGO does not matched with it. For instance, CODE-NGO estimated that in 2008, there were around 179,000 CSOs in the Philippines. These number primarily comprises of 89000 NSCs, 70000 cooperatives, 5000 homeowners’ associations and 15000 trade unions and employee associations (Clarke, 2013: 234). Silliman and Noble argued that while John Clarke uses the label all inclusively, the Philippine government agency National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) on the other hand restricts the term NGO to only those private groups and voluntary non-profit organizations dedicated for the achievement of socio-economic development
and those groups primarily instituted for the deliverance of service. Furthermore, Silliman and Noble additionally mentioned that David Korten, notes that the concept of NGO embraces a vast collection of organizations. NGO, accordingly, basically comprises ‘voluntary organizations, public service contractors, people's organizations, and governmental non-governmental organizations’ (1998: 5-6).

Furthermore, it should be noted that among other things political engagement and involvement is seriously taken by Filipino CSOs compared to other CSOs elsewhere. CSOs in the Philippines, for instance, take pivotal and critical roles in order to regain Filipino independence from more than three centuries of Spanish rule and the three decades of American rule. Moreover, CSOs influence can also be seen at its finest when they played great roles in order to topple down the Marcos government as well as in putting an end to the corrupt Estrada administration. Even in contemporary times, CSOs strong influence, political influence for this matter, can also be observed on how presidential election will turn out. Data proves that all the Presidents who won the presidential race since the country restored democracy in 1986 were all backed by CSOs. During the 1992 Presidential election, Fidel V. Ramos, the president who served the government in 1992 to 1998, eventually took the presidency only by a slim margin after his tight rival the then-Agrarian Reform Secretary and very prominent senator the late Miriam Defensor-Santiago lose the presidential race. Soon after Ramos won the election, he subsequently aimed to widen his support base that covers a wide array of sectors in the society including of course the CSOs. To show that his sincerity in his political agenda, President Ramos
developed the Social Reform Agenda so as to incorporate CSOs in the processes concerning the national policy development.

President Ramos was succeeded by another CSO-backed political leader in the name of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the vice-president during Ramos administration. Expectedly, to reciprocate the strong support he received from the CSOs, some of these CSO leaders were actually appointed to Cabinet positions. However, not long after President Estrada took office many CSOs who used to support him eventually soon became disenchanted primarily because the President’s name was linked to numerous problems, including cronyism, corruption, inept governance, poor economic performance, and press freedom limitations. Same scenario happened in 2001 when strong civil society put in to power Estrada’s then Vice President Gloria Macapagal after the former was ousted from his Presidential post through the Second People’s Power Revolution (Second EDSA Revolution). However, years after President Arroyo took office, Government–CSO relations soured when news regarding the 2004 electoral fraud emerge in 2005. The bad situation was exacerbated when Arroyo’s administration raised concerns after her sudden February 2006 State of Emergency declaration despite the strong opposition to her administration. This situation was seen as a threat to Filipino’s civil liberties.
V.3 Middle Classes in the Philippines before and after democratization

Decided through the means of income or occupation, middle class is perceived as socioeconomic stratum in the society. Furthermore, Villegas and Yang (2013) argued that presence of robust middle class is a prerequisite for successful achievement of democratic transition (336). In public discourse, the middle class as for the Philippine case, is closely linked to revolutionary action particularly at the time of the first and second People Power Revolution that happened in 1986 and 2001 in Manila respectively (337). However, the important question is how did this middle class came out as being one of the critical or pivotal actors that will eventually bring democracy in the Philippines?

Scholars argued that a very specific contingent event that occurred prior to democratization in 1986 served as a catalyst for the sudden re-emergence of middle classes in the political arena. The author used the term re-emergence because, historically speaking, middle classes were already in existence in the Philippines but this group were not particularly active in the political sphere. The tragic death of Ninoy Aquino – Marcos considered strongest critic and political rival – on August 21, 1983 as he was on his way to go out the plane is said to be one of the catalyst for the regaining of democracy three years after. The so-called assassination of the son of a popular landed political family in the name of Ninoy Aquino are deemed to be a wakeup call for the public to take their disagreement to the Marcos regime. Aquino’s assassination ignited the public most particularly the white-collar workers who
protested in the street in a surprising number. Aquino’s death although surrounded by so many mystery was viewed by many scholars as a phenomenal event to finally bring back the discourse of democracy in the country. During this time, the newly created active white-collar demonstrators made sure that they visibly express themselves in the society as an important opposition group against Marcos dictatorship. Not just they conducted boycotts and protest jogs but also they held marches and masses to celebrate Aquino’s death (Villegas and Yang, 2013: 347-348).

Additionally, critical junctures that occurred alongside the February 1986 EDSA Revolution served as the backdrop for the formation of the narrative of the new middle class in the Philippines. It should be noted that in the Philippines, definition of middle class is assume to be composed of even those people from the Church as well as the oligarchic families. This then clearly shows that the social class was reorganized and readjusted in order to accommodate political moderation and piety to the Catholic Church. With that, it is not surprising to witness that the religious groups and wealthy elites were able to successfully portray themselves together with their avid supporters that they are part of the so-termed middle class in the Philippines (Ibid: 355-356).
V.4 Civil Society and Middle Classes after democratization: The case of CODE-NGO

In essence, as Silliman and Noble argued, the NGO community in the Philippine is ‘large, highly organized, and politically prominent.’ Their growth signifies a major shift in the way civil society and the state form and prolong their relationship. (1998: 13).

Accordingly, Philippines is aptly viewed as one of those countries greatly mentioned on any literature and works that aims to discuss democratization and democratic form of governance. First, Philippines’ 1986 People Power revolution is popularly acclaimed as a good example of citizen-initiated nonviolent means to overthrow authoritarianism of President Marcos from the Malacañang Palace and finally culminated in the termination of his highly repressive and corrupt governance. Second, literatures on democratic transitions or democratization frequently heralded Philippines as the first country in Asia who manage to successfully restored democracy in a peaceful means under the leadership of a popular women named Corazon Aquino, the wife of the late Ninoy Aquino and Philippines first female President (Ibid: 280).

Parallel to this, the middle classes just like the civil society took critical part in the achievement of the Philippines two most recent historic event related to democratization: first, the 1986 toppling down of Marcos dictatorship and second, the 2001 Estrada ouster from his Presidential post. Middle classes in the Philippines, in that sense, were able to took leadership role in a number of organizations and social
movements primarily because they have the appropriate unique skills and training, polished sense of modernity, and of course because of the occurrence of political opportunities favorable to them (Rivera, 2011: 19).

In this section, the author will discuss the first case study of this research that is the CODE-NGO, considered as Philippines’ largest coalition of development NGOs. Through this case study the author argue that from the years 1988-2008, the period after the Philippines undergone democratization, there are a number of salient events that ensure the increasing governmental leverage and influence of both the civil society and the middle classes. Although there have been a substantial increase or decrease in the number of civil society and middle classes in the country (primarily due to the differences in the way certain conceptualization is being define by scholars) it is without doubt that Philippine case foster a very promising and positive case study. Through this specific case we can clearly see the trend that as the government reach democratization is it natural that civil society and middle class will also flourish.

In the early years following the establishment of democracy in the Philippines we witnessed that the Civil Society and middle classes were able to strongly influenced the decision-making policy of the Aquino government. Thus, they are considered to be a highly influential actors in the political sphere alongside the state.

Moreover, the Aquino Government was seen as highly supportive and open to the Civil Society as well as the middle classes then without much surprise the number of these groups eventually flourish exponentially. In December 1991 to show
Aquino’s commitment towards its promise to incorporate the civil society in her administration, Covenant on Philippine Development and the Code of Conduct for Development NGOs were ratified by the Congress following the First National Congress conducted by CODE-NGO. Hence, we can argue that from years 1988-1993, Philippine civil society and middle class falls more towards the right-side of the spectrum as shown in Figure 5.1.

![Figure 5.1: Philippines as a more democratic country (1988-1993)](image)

Meanwhile, from 1993-1998 Philippines can still be argued as part of the more democratic spectrum ahead of South Korea. During this period, civil society and middle classes influence arguably was strong and impactful. During the years 1992-1998, the case study NGO was in fact act as one of the major stakeholders in the preparation of the Philippine Medium-Term Development Plan (MTPDP). By the end of 1998 as well, CODE-NGO were able to successfully established together with the government the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC), a CSO-governed and managed body, that certifies CSOs based on good governance standards.
while at the same time maintaining the status of having tax exemption (See Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: Philippines as a more democratic country (1993-1998)

Moreover, period 1998-2003 is one of the most crucial part of the case study. During this phase, in particular in 2001, the salient role of civil society and middle class was again tested. With the eventual ouster of the then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Philippine democracy indeed is still working (as shown in Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3: Philippines as a more democratic country (1998-2003)
However, contrary to the previous years, 2003-2008 seems to not produce a quite impactful and positive scenario. Although CODE-NGO tried to levy to the Arroyo’s government the leverage was to no avail because the Executive Order 671, an order designating a government agency to certify and accredit charitable organizations as donee institutions, was enacted (as shown in Figure 5.4).

![Figure 5.4: Philippines as a lesser democratic country (2003-2008)](image-url)
CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS:

SOUTH KOREA CASE

Parallel to the previous chapter, this chapter will tackle about the case of Korean civil society and middle classes after the country undergone democratization in 1987. Primarily in this chapter, the author will try to analyze how the expansion and growth of South Korea’s civil society and middle class affects and shapes the politics of democratic consolidation in the country.

VI.1 Civil Society in South Korea

Richardson argued that the growth of civil society in South Korea, in many ways, reflects economic growth in the country. In the past years, South Korea citizens witnessed that CSOs in Korea were actively engaged in the public discourse on a wide range of issues (2007: 166).

Moreover, he further argued that although scholars are still debating about the exact geneses of Korea’s civil society, it is without any question that these systematized groups actually flourished from 1987. In fact, some scholars argued that even though it was in a very nascent form during the Joseon dynasty, civil societies, indeed were already existing in Korea. Whereas, for others its existence in the Korean society came in a much later years perhaps it came when Korea was under Japanese annexation or perhaps in the postwar period (Ibid: 166).
Additionally, Kim and Hwang argued that civil society in Korea takes various forms, some of the most popular and most important categories of Korean civil societies are: NPOs (*beyoungri danche*), NGOs (*mingan danche*), CSOs (*simin danche*), Civic Movement Organizations (*simin woondong danche*), Public Interest Corporations (*gongick bubin*), and the Nonprofit Civil Organizations (*beyoungri mingan danche*). However, it should be remembered that in Korea although there exist a different civil society categorization those terms are fundamentally and vaguely defined thus making it obvious that they are utilized interchangeably in Korea without the careful thinking of what unique and distinct differences it actually have (2002: 4-8).

On the other hand, according to Richardson, 1987 Korea mirrors the time wherein nationwide demonstrations are occurring left and right, which culminates in the eventual toppling down of the authoritarian Chun Doo-hwan regime. It is the year that marks the milestone era in the Korean history in which a democratic elections were held and in the end assisted the country during its entrance to the new era of participatory politics. Moreover, just like the Philippine case, period after Chun’s capitulation signals that Korea will then witnessed a sudden flourishing not just in number but also in the types of civic groups and voluntary organizations. Some of the groups that blossom after Chun defeat according to Professor Hagen Koo were the: Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, the League of anti-pollution movements, feminist groups, teachers’ associations for educational reform, journalists’ associations for press freedom, citizens’ watch groups for fair elections, citizen
groups to fight political corruption or to fight regionalism, pressure groups for ensuring responsive state agencies, among others (2007: 166-167).

Moreover, it is worthy to note that CSOs in Korea utilize a variety of tactics in order for their messages to be heard and eventually materialized into law. These vast array of techniques technically speaking involves direct communication with government officials, participation in think thank conferences, campaigns in media, and street-level demonstrations. Nevertheless, CSOs efforts success ultimately relies on the kind of political environment in which those CSOs effort are undertaken (Richardson, 2007: 170). Additionally, it should be remembered that even though CSO presence is widely seen in the Korean society there is no doubt that there still a clear limits as to what they can achieve as a group in the current South Korean political system. It can be argued that CSOs effectiveness relies not only on the support they acquired from citizens as well as the closed elite ties they established but also their effectiveness depends principally on various structural elements that influence how elite will compromise and give their opinion to a particular problem. Fundamentally, when there exist a strong consensus among the elites naturally and as expected those groups who push forward different policies will experience difficulties. In contrast, if the elite consensus is weak, CSOs have a more favorable environment to initiate change (Ibid: 171)

Moreover, it should be remembered that even before 1980s a vibrant and dynamic civil society was already in existence. In fact, despite the failed Second Republic, Korean people continued their quest for democracy. Cheng and Kim
quoting Jin Woo Jeon argued that throughout the 1960s and 1970s, consistent student demonstrations against the authoritarian regime of Park Chung Hee leads to the annual shutting down for at least a month of university campuses. This scenario continued in the 1980s, however, it can be noticed that during this period student-led demonstrations not just become better organized but it also become more violent than ever. Moreover, as the violence and frequency of violence increased as the suppression by the Chun regime intensified, it produce a ‘vicious cycle of opposition and suppression’ (1994: 134)

However, changes in student-led demonstrations happened following the October 28-31, 1986 Konguk University incident. The Konguk university incident serves as a wake-up call for the student activists not just to reconsider their violent strategy towards the achievement of democracy but also the incidence exemplified the brutality and severity of police suppression. Moreover, Korean public both criticizes the brutality police exercises towards the protesters as well as the violent nature student protesters exhibits. Public dismay particularly that from Catholic Church leader Cardinal Stephen Kim and Ham Sok-Hun, two of Korea’s prominent opposition leaders, paved way for the student to think that their effectiveness in the political sphere highly depends on the level of support they can acquire from reform-minded middle class exemplified by the opposition leaders (Cheng and Kim, 1994: 134).

Another event that triggers civil society to prosper prior to the 1987 democratization was the sudden death – due to torture killing of the police – of Park
Jong Chul, a linguistic major student activist from Seoul National University in January 1987. Park’s unfortunately death leads to the spread of criticism against police torture that naturally encouraged the New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP) and forty-seven dissident religious and human rights groups to join the students in their national peace rally on March 3, 1987. The public and the opposition party united in criticism of and opposition to the authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, despite widespread opposition, on April 13, 1987, President Chun announced a moratorium on constitutional debates and sought to postpone presidential elections until his term expired in February 1988. This led to massive demonstrations in a number of cities. The police reported demonstrations in twenty cities whereas the news reports claimed that there were more than 300,000 people that demonstrated. The anti-regime confrontation between the different civil society and the Chun government kept escalating until June 29, 1987 when Roh made a breathtaking concession to the opposition (Ibid: 134-135).

The June 29, 1987 announcement by Roh Tae Woo of the ‘Democratic Reform’ makes the democratic breakthrough in South Korea. This democratic reform measures encompassed a fair and direct presidential election and the release of political prisoners. Critical for this June 29, 1987 democratic breakthrough was the preceding political liberalization which allowed the partial freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom to form political parties, which thus enables the general public to learn the opposition forces and demands. Political liberalization made it easier for the opposition both to mobilize the citizenry and to bargain with the regime with the main goal to split soft-liners from hard-liners (Ibid: 133, 135).
Moreover, it can be argued that different factors and scenarios contributed for the successful transition of Korea from authoritarian regime to democracy. The timely 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the media participation to strengthen democratization movement by covering human rights related issues, and the televised broadcasting of the successful overthrown of the Marcos regime in the Philippines were some of the factors that contributed in bringing renewed hope and vitality to the democratization movement in Korea. These occurrences paved way for challengers to gain extra opportunities for a democratic transition through the means of political entrepreneurship (Ibid: 135-136).

VI.2 Civil Society in South Korea after democratization
(1988-2008)

Professor Hagen Koo argued that ever since the democratic transition in 1987, civil society language is extensively used in South Korea. The country’s recent democratization is frequently viewed as a result of civil society resurrection (Koo, n.d.).

Richardson, on the other hand, argued that a rapid scrutiny of the different groups of civil society which came to existence during this period clearly can be characterized as liberal, if not part of the leftist group. This phenomenon should not be surprising given that traditionally, people’s so-called ‘liberal’ interests which includes but not limited to press freedom, environmental protection, and women’s
rights were exactly those interests which either had been overlooked or repressed during the authoritarian period in the Korean history. Therefore, political sphere liberalization naturally will paved way for the liberalization of civil society. It should be noted, that ‘the nature and composition’ of the new civic organizations in Korea mirrored the country’s degree of dissatisfaction as the course of economic development is simultaneously occurring. It is without contentions that the economic growth led by the state made drastic transformation to the country, however, alongside this economic growth is the fact that it had also obstructed the aspirations both in the political and social sphere of the vast members of the society. Therefore, in the 1990s, several civic groups made efforts to compensate for those years they experience neglect (2007: 167).

Meanwhile, there have been a number of books released in the past decades discussing the process and implications of democratization in the Republic of Korea. Samuel S. Kim in his *Korea’s Democratization*, for example, acclaimed that South Korea is considered as a magnificent example of democracy in East Asia. Korea according to him is among those countries with exhibits an outstanding and prominent third-wave democracy (Kim, 2003a: 3). However, despite this very positive view and noteworthy achievement of the Republic of Korea in the past three decades regarding the successful transition to democracy (democratization), we cannot deny the fact that democracy in Korea is still far from complete democratic transition and during the past decades, Korean politics experience a lot of prominent changes. As Kim Sun Hyuk pointed out compared to the past decades political contestation in South Korea has become much fairer. Fairer in a sense, that opposition party candidates were able
to get great chances of winning a seat in the government, a good example is the triumph of Kim Dae Jung, which was viewed by many as a longtime opposition leader in the country. Kim Dae Jung victory thus proved, that Korean politics already reach the momentum wherein not just the ruling party dominates the political arena but even those who were vocally opposing the government. Moreover, Kim argued that Korea’s civil liberties have been substantially expanded in the past years. Kim noted that given the heightened equality in political rivalry, civil liberties expansion, and civilian control of the military augmentation, South Korea has achieved successfully its transition from authoritarian regime towards a democratic regime and thus now become one of the prominent promising democracies in Asia if not in the region (2000: 1-2).

Furthermore, Kim Sun Hyuk argued that unlike what happened in some cases in the Southern Europe and Latin America, what happened in Korea in 1987 was not really a “pacted” transition or the so-called democratic transition revolves around and formed elite calculations and interactions. But rather, Korean democratization is essentially characterized by the presence of a protracted and intense conflict between two strong forces – the civil society and the state (Kim, 2003b; 81).

Additionally, since the 1987 democratization, Korea experienced a tremendous increase in the number of its CSOs. For instance, The 2006 Comprehensive Survey of South Korean Non-Government Organizations accounts that the number of Korean NGOs after democratization climb sharply from 1,235 in 1999 to 3,937 in 2002, and increased much higher to 5,556 in 2005. As can be seen
from the figures mentioned, only in the span of three years the number of NGOs from 1999-2002 and for 2002-2005 drastically improved by more than three times. This only proves that citizen’s role and public participation in the Korean society are getting more and more vital and noticeable.

VI.3 Middle Classes in South Korea before and after democratization

Just like the case of the Philippines, Villegas and Yang argued that public discussion concerning middle classes in the early phase of the 1980s clearly shows that middle classes see their political potential. However, the positive effect the economic growth give to these groups in fact limits the middle class to seeing themselves as state political protagonist. The so-called miracle of the Han River or the compacted successful economic growth in the country give way for the swift rise in the middle classes which basically comprised of white-collar workers, managers, and engineers. Meanwhile, since the start of the mid-1980s, middle classes are portrayed by the mass media as a vital social force that will eventually bring back democracy to Korea. In fact, intellectuals and journalists both in the liberal and conservative bloc saw this class as a potential moderator between the capitalists and the poor to bring forth a phenomenon that will culminate in Korea’s steady reform in the politics and shift towards liberal democracy. However, contrary to the normative discourse forwarded by both the intellectuals and the journalists in relation to the
middle class many still argued that in South Korea this particular economic class generally still remained the politically indolent and nearly invisible (2013: 350).

Additionally, according to a survey conducted in the early 1987 concerning the middle class, we can see that middle class was highly praised. In fact the survey shows that Korean middle class in the urban area are educated liberal social force that shows interest in politics as well in other social problems, and with a very high voters rates. However, the same survey also demonstrated that this urban middle class actually did not take part in political parties nor in other political organizations which is considered to be a form of citizen’s legitimate and moderate forms of participation (Villegas and Yang, 2013: 350).

However, contrary to this a contingent event in 1987 turn the once before passive middle classes to an active part of the nation. The tragic death of the Seoul national University student, Park Jong Cheol ignited and mobilized the middle class to take a more pro-active part in the Korean political arena. Regime opening coupled with the brutal death of Park hastened what actually took three years in the Philippines. These events paved way for the realization that middle class active political participation in fact can lead to the development of its symbolic democratic capabilities. Although, South Korean public discourse did not anticipate that middle class can actually be one of the catalyst for change it is undeniable that Korean middle class are capable collective political actor (2013: 351, 353-354).
VI.4 Civil Society and Middle Classes in South Korea after democratization: The case of CCEJ

Kim argued that the witnessed Korea’s democratic transition in the 1980s was primarily mass-driven. It was principally the civil society, or that realm or sphere of organized social public life basically characterized as voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, and autonomous from the influences of the state that significantly facilitated, if not directly caused various phases of democratization in Korea. In particular, analysts have emphasized that civil society groups such as the student groups, labor unions, and religious organizations were some of those groups that had staged intense pro-democracy struggles since the early 1970s. The aforementioned social groups were united under the leadership of several national umbrella organizations that necessitates them to mobilize and organize a democratic alliance that challenge the authoritarian regime in 1987 (Kim, 2000: 4-5). Hence, it can be argued that it is without doubt that civil society groups have, indeed, affected and shaped the discourse of democratic consolidation in Korea (Ibid: 105).

On the other hand, Figure 6.1 shows that just like Philippines, South Korea witnessed a more democratic-style country soon after the Republic achieved democracy. Moreover, for the case of South Korea, CCEJ’s establishment proved to be a very promising event for the group were able to push forward some salient policies like the introduction of financial real name system as well as the chaebol reform on separation of ownership and management although the latter did not fully materialized.
Meanwhile, with a number of salient moves CCEJ managed to push forward from years 1988-1993, the researcher argued that South Korea is a more democratic country. Some of the most important actions CCEJ managed to advance are the following: South-North reconciliation cooperation started; Urgent Implementation of Local Autonomy; Call for the Protection of Human Rights of Foreign Workers in 1994; Information disclosure law that urges adoption of administrative procedure law; Call for Fair Trade System Improvement in 1996; Urgent prosecution and reform of political fund system in 1997 and Call for implementation of comprehensive taxation of financial income in 1998.

Figure 6.2: South Korea as a more democratic country (1993-1998)
Additionally, for years 1998 to 2003 it can be noted that compared to Philippines, South Korea were less democratic. It should be remembered that in 2001, Philippines experienced another milestone for the observance of democracy which was the ouster of the then President Estrada. CCEJ managed to advance a lot of programs, however, those programs were less noticeable compared to the case of the Philippines.

![Figure 6.3: South Korea as a more democratic country (1998-2003)](image)

Moreover, years 2003 to 2008 South Korea shows a more democratic government compared with that of the Philippines. During this period, CCEJ were able to assert a more powerful governmental leverage relative to that of the Philippines.

![Figure 6.4: South Korea as a more democratic country (2003-2008)](image)
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

An active civil society is normally regarded as an important prerequisite for the achievement of democracy. Concurrently, international donors seeking to promote democratization in developing countries often encourage the growth of Non-Governmental Organizations and other Civil Society Organizations (Forman, 2006; Cole, Eppert, & Kinzelbach, 2008).

On the other hand, scholars agree that both cases illustrated in Chapter 5 and 6 shows a very the positive role of the middle classes during the democratization process particularly in the eventual overthrown of Ferdinand Marcos and Chun Doo Hwan in 1986 and in 1987 respectively. Additionally, middle classes as presented in the previous chapters are indeed a major player in the democratization process that occurred in the Philippines and South Korea just like the civil society. Therefore, as Villegas and Young argued, middle class is then democracy’s long-awaited saviors (2013: 340).

As presented in Chapter 5 and 6, the Philippines and South Korea experiences, therefore strengthens the observation that NGOs as well as middle classes played a substantial role in consolidating and maintaining democracy. Furthermore, it can be argued that despite the fact that the Philippines and South Korea exhibits a very different democratization trajectories, nonetheless, as shown in Chapter 5 and 6 both cases shared noteworthy similarities after democratization. In both cases a popular
mass uprising against the dictator, backed by the vibrant and strong civil societies and middle classes, culminated in a nonviolent transition towards a period of democracy. However, shortly after the two countries undergone democratization, both cases legislated bold and even detrimental reforms that tends to hinder the democratic space where civil society and middle class can freely work on.

Arguably, the economic and political developments that have swift Korea and Philippines in the past decades proved to be a crucial factors that determine the course of actions adopted by the two key agents considered in this research – the civil society and the middle classes. As mentioned above, this economic development in some ways hinders initially the political participation of the middle classes given that their involvement might perhaps jeopardize their economic status.

Moreover, the future and the continuation of the democratic state and society is indeed highly reliant on the continuation of support civil society and middle classes show. The increasing trend of civil society and middle classes in both republics is a positive sign that democratic principles and government will continue in the next few years. However, it should be taken into account that different challenges faces civil society in the recent years, challenges such as difficulty in fund acquisition from local and foreign donors as well as the continuous government rejection of their suggestions. Also government exerts major influence on how civil society can materialized its objectives. As shown in the previous chapters, civil societies are facing either an expanded or restricted democratic arena depending on how leaders of the government situated them in their political agenda. Nonetheless, the different
effect of the aftermath of democratization on both the middle classes and civil societies in the Philippines and South Korea proved to promote the continuity of democracy thus proving the researcher’s argument.
CHAPTER VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

This study only focused on the two specific CSOs in the Philippines and South Korea, the CODE-NGO and CCEJ. However, there are other major CSOs and NGOs that are really influential and powerful in both countries. The future researchers can consider studying those other civil societies to know some other possible trends.

Moreover, the recent changes in the political situation of both countries requires a re-examination of whether or not civil society and middle classes influences still have a valid ground. Issues such as human rights violations and civil society involvement or discourse that discusses the civil society participation that focuses on specific issues can also be a good starting point to ponder on in the future researches.

Due to time constraints and language barriers experienced by the author, those academic works that were highly difficult to be reviewed in the research were intentionally not considered. It will be the task of the future research to offer a more comprehensive and detailed research with regards to other issue-based Civil Society Organizations that were not included in the research.

Furthermore, given the recent changes in the political, social, and economic situation in both the Philippines and South Korea case, it should also be the task of the future researchers to deal with the recent salient phenomenon in both cases. The
recent political turmoil that occurred in South Korea can also be a good case study to work on in the future. Likewise, the experience Philippine politics undergone in the past year can also be a great case study research for the students in the future. The observed transition from a traditional political leader towards a more non-conventional political leader in the Philippines greatly implies how civil society and middle class influence and leverage actually works in the country. Also, given the most recent declaration of Martial Law in the Southern area of the country can also be a good case study to consider by those student who wished to understand the relations of civil society and middle classes influence and relationship towards the Philippine government.
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Notes:

All data for CCEJ was derived from their respective website available at http://ccej.or.kr/

All data for CODE-NGO was derived from their respective website available at http://code-ngo.org/publications/
국문 초록
필리핀과 한국의 시민 사회와 중산층에 대한 민주화 여파의 효과

마리아 리넷 칼안타
국제지역학
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