The Encounter of the Self and the World
— A Study of Schleiermacher’s Unified I —

Kim, Hi-Heon Ph.D *

I. Introduction

The issue of this paper is to discuss Schleiermacher’s distinctive

* Hanshin Univ.
understanding of the self, the unified self which is different from the one-sided grasp of idealists. To do this, first, I will point out Schleiermacher’s criticism of Kant and Fichte and his suggestion of the idea of the self as individuality. Next, I will discuss Schleiermacher’s philosophical presuppositions—the relationship between the organic and the intellectual functions in thinking; the idea of the unity of thinking and being in objective thinking. Finally, I will figure out Schleiermacher’s unified understanding of the self that keeps in its system dynamics toward creative unity.

1. Schleiermacher’s Criticisms of Kant’s and Fichte’s Ideas of the Self

First of all, Schleiermacher receives a Kantian legacy in the sense that he seeks the transcendental ground of knowledge. For Kant, human beings are the thoroughly active place in the world where two incommensurable realms—the realm of what is (nature) and that of what ought to be (morality)—meet together. But how could the two realms interact? Can the one be located in an unbroken causal relation to the other? This question expresses a central problem of Kant’s philosophy. He tries to show that the two realms must be compatible because they are products of human thought. His philosophical attempt to account for the conditions of knowledge, therefore, leads him “to regard human beings as belonging to two worlds, the phenomenal and the noumenal, or the world of sense and the intelligible world.”¹ And Kant postulates *a priori* knowledge in the noumenal world as a presupposed

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transcendental ground of knowledge. Such an endeavor to set up a universal ground of knowledge is inherited in Schleiermacher.

Schleiermacher, however, rejects Kant’s noumenal world. For Schleiermacher, “Kant’s division of human experience into two worlds” is unacceptable. In Schleiermacher’s criticism, the central problem in Kant’s thoughts is that the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds are separate and stand parallel. Accordingly, Schleiermacher “attempts to account for our experience by regarding us as beings wholly immersed in one world, the world of time and space.” He believes that Kant overlooks the fact that human beings are the self who is an inextricable part of the world. He, therefore, seeks to correct this oversight, “believing that the failure to recognize, acknowledge, and understand the relationship of our being to our thinking result[s] in the inability to ascertain the actual way in which we are aware of thinking’s link to the world.”

For Schleiermacher, Kant’s division of human experience into two different worlds inevitably entails the gap in which there is an absence of the necessary link between the noumenal and empirical self. In other words, Kant tries to make his theory of self consciousness the foundation of the proof of the objective validity of the pure concepts of understanding, but he fails to demonstrate how pure self consciousness leads to knowledge of the self as an empirical being or to knowledge of the objective empirical world. For Schleiermacher, self consciousness is an “ongoing unity” in that all representations must conform to the conditions entailed in the self’s constant unity as the identical consciousness. He

2) Ibid., 37.
3) Ibid.
believes that Kant fails to ascertain the structure of unity in which antithetical perspectives unite. In fact, Kant fails to distinguish the self’s awareness of this unity of thinking from the self’s actual act of combining disparate elements of thinking. Schleiermacher seeks to demonstrate the nature of the act of the self in his Dialectic. Basically the same, yet more subtle, criticisms could be applied to Fichte’s delineation of the self.

Fichte establishes the post-Kantian task of philosophy in traversing of the gap between the noumenal and empirical self. According to Fichte, “Kant successfully analyzed the fact of knowledge but Kant left the ground of knowledge unexplained.” He believes that Kant does not actually lose the empirical self but simply could not see it because his theory is inadequate for the task. He, therefore, tries to explain how to see the link between the pure self and the empirical self and how to justify knowledge “by conceiving of the being of the self as its basis” with the notion of the “subject centered self.” The self is the one that “originally and unconditionally posits its own existence.” Here, Fichte seeks to establish the primacy of the subjectivity so that the condition of the world could be intelligible rather than remaining a mere chaos of causally linked events. Fichte tries to solve the Kant’s problem

5) Ibid., 37.
7) Ibid., 83.
of the gap with the concept of human subjectivity, which is the condition of all being and the cause of all becoming.

According to Fichte, “intellectual intuition” is the foundation of knowledge. He believes that “the ground of all knowing is the being of a subject that posits itself unconditionally as being self posited.”\(^9\) Then, there seems to be a dichotomy between self positing subject and self posited object in the self. Fichte, however, argues that the division of the self in subject and object clarifies nothing because the self of the original act of representing is neither subject nor object alone, but the union of both. This original act as \textit{a priori} act is in an “undivided moment” of the self.\(^10\) Fichte postulates the \textit{a priori} act as the ground of self consciousness and calls it “the absolute self activity of the self” or “intellectual intuition.” The intellectual intuition is the awareness of the precondition to consciousness. On the basis of the intellectual intuition, we realize that all distinctions, which are posited by ourselves as distinct from ourselves, are in fact self determinations of ourselves. In other words, the concept is a determination of the self, and the ground of all determined concepts is the intellectual intuition. Actually, with the idea of intellectual intuition, Fichte tries “to discover a single, indubitable, universal and necessary principle from which all philosophic truth could be deduced.”\(^11\)

Schleiermacher finds in Fichte’s ideas a contradiction and tries to solve the problem with the idea of the self as individuality. For

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\(^10\) Thandeka, \textit{The Embodied Self}, 51.

Fichte, both receptivity and activity of the self are based on the idea of intellectual intuition alone. Simply speaking, according to Fichte, I know something because I do it, not because I experience it from others. The actual difference between the activity of intellect and the receptivity in experience is disregarded because of the postulate of the idea of intellectual intuition. So, knowing I and known not I are not differentiated in Fichte’s thought. This is the Fichte’s dilemma in Schleiermacher’s eyes: “The self is both presupposition and result of itself so that it lays formal contradiction.” Schleiermacher responds to this problem “by positing an element that is prior to the self positing itself.” The element is the lived self, which Klemm in his essay refer to “individuality of the self,” which is “neither a universal subjectivity nor a particular personality as such, but a unique mediating of the two.”

Schleiermacher seeks to construct a unified idea of the self in order to overcome Fichte’s one sided theory of the “subject centered self.” Schleiermacher, on the one hand, shares with Fichte the Kantian inspired goal of a philosophically demonstrated ground of all knowledge situated in the unity of the self. It is the modern idea of the self as subjectivity: “the self itself as positing and being posited.” Schleiermacher, on the other hand, accuses Fichte of not making enough of the self in that Fichte’s presupposition of “the subject centered self” leaves the gap between thinking and its object unresolved. Fichte’s method, according to Schleiermacher, at

13) Ibid., 84.
14) Ibid.
best, determines a pure act of doing, but no being of the self. Fichte’s account, therefore, lacks explanation of nature, the world, and the physical aspect of human experience. The missing idea in Fichte is the characteristics of “the receptivity of the self in the act of connecting universal and particular elements,” namely, the idea that “the self does not posit itself but is posited by another.”¹⁵) Overemphasizing on intellection, Fichte spurns the use of exterior nature as a means of helping to determine human nature. He, therefore, could not reconcile the two philosophical systems—idealism and realism. There is no room for Fichte’s ideas to determine how speculation and empiricism are united and form knowledge. In the *Dialectic,* Schleiermacher seeks to demonstrate the common ground of these two systems.

In sum, Schleiermacher does not desert the modern philosophical conception of the subject, but he situates the actuality of the subject in its temporal spatial status, neither in *a priori* ground of the noumenal self nor in the transcendental postulate of universal subjectivity. In self consciousness, according to Schleiermacher, “there are only two elements: the one expresses the existence of the subject for itself, the other its co-existence with an Other.”¹⁶) There is no dualism of spontaneity and receptivity in Schleiermacher’s conception of the relationship between the self and the world. “The total self consciousness... is one of *reciprocity* between the subject and the corresponding Other.”¹⁷) This reciprocal and unified understanding of the self is the Schleiermacher’s unique contribution

¹⁵) Ibid., 85.
¹⁷) Ibid., 14.
to overcome post-Kantian problematic ideas of the self.\footnote{Andrew Bowie, introduction to \textit{Hermeneutics and Criticism}, by Friedrich Schleiermacher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), x.}

\section*{II. A Discussion on Schleiermacher’s Philosophical Presuppositions}

In this section, I will discuss some fundamental ideas that constitute Schleiermacher’s distinctive conception of the self. The accounts in this section are composed of two main issues: the co-determinate relationship of the organic and intellectual functions of thinking; the unity of thinking and being in objective thinking. These two components comprise the formulation of the structure of the unified self which Schleiermacher presupposes as the transcendental ground of all thinking and of all being.

\subsection*{1. The Relationship between the Organic and the Intellectual Functions in Thinking}

Schleiermacher divides the nature of an act of thinking into two ways in which it functions. “Every instance of thinking arises from two elements, a formal element and a material element.”\footnote{Friedrich Schleiermacher, \textit{Dialectic} (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), 19.} The material element of an act of thinking is “comprised of a certain organic function,” while the formal element is “the reception of the material element in a form.”\footnote{Ibid. See the footnote 30 which shows Twesten’s elaboration.} More specifically speaking, the
organic function is that which craves to know and thus opens sense organs to be able to be filled with “things that are so called matters of understanding.”21) These matters, “the thinking matter” [Denkstoff], which are exterior to our reason, characterize our mental life primarily to be receptive. Our thinking, according to Schleiermacher, is “organically affected” by the matters.22) Without this organic function, a pure formal thinking does not occur and becomes vacuous. Importantly and peculiarly, in Schleiermacher’s ideas, “every instance of thinking rests on an organic function.”23) On the other hand, the formal function, called “intellectual function in thinking,” determines the thinking matter (sensible data) so that something can be known. This function is the active agent which combines manifold data into unity. In their correlation, one function of an instance of thinking without the other gives not a complete act of thinking on the way to knowledge. In relation, “every formal element can embrace the entire realm of organic functions, and vice versa.”24)

The organic function, in the process of forming knowledge, shifts the activity of reason from the mere will to conceptualize to the actual construction of a concept. Schleiermacher says that “[a]bsolute knowing can become real only in its uniting with the organic element.”25) Through the organic function, the world impacts our sense organs, and the impact results in “organic affections,” differently called “the first affection.”26) The organic

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21) Ibid., 20.
22) Thandeka, The Embodied Self, 64.
23) Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 19.
24) Ibid., 21.
25) Ibid.
affections, as the original condition of consciousness, are the internal expression of a particular capacity of our mental life to be engaged by what is external to it. On the other hand, reason as the receiving agent for the activity of the organic function constitutes the interior ground of consciousness. Now, Schleiermacher brings about a “co-determinate relation between reason and sensing.” 27) In the interaction of reason and sensing, a determinate place is established in consciousness for external being. He refers to this determinate place in consciousness as concept.

For Schleiermacher, a concept is reason’s activity of positing a location in consciousness for a particular group of organic affections. In the concept formation, reason and organic functions have different roles. A concept is not merely innate to reason, but “hovering between what is general and what is particular.” 28) Here, the particular is that which is purely given in being but which does not purely resolve into thought, and the universal is what is completely given in thought but which cannot be purely shown in being. This hovering concept hence denotes the presupposed correlation of the determinate activity of reason with the indeterminate activity of organic function. For Schleiermacher, our knowing consists in an oscillation between the organic and the intellectual function, neither of which can be purely present as itself.

And then, what’s the transcendental ground for making the oscillation possible? In Schleiermacher’s terminology, the transition [der übergang] allures for the unifying ground. “[I]f human thinking

27) Ibid.
is an alteration between thinking and willing,” says Schleiermacher, then “the transition or ‘übergang’ between thinking and willing in the self reveals something about the being of the one thinking and also presents us with an analogy of the transcendent ground.”

Life is a series of antithetical transition from thinking to willing and back again. Both thinking and willing are inextricably bound up with oppositions between the intellectual and the organic poles. Here, thinking means a description of consciousness from the organic perspective, while willing expresses the intellectual’s perspective. “Our being as the unity of thinking and willing is the übergang.” According to Schleiermacher, the transition between two functions is itself the limit or boundary between the having ceased of one and the not yet having begun of the other. The limit or boundary of this transition is called “null point” [Nullpunkt] or “indifference” [Indifferenz]. The null point at transition as the foundation for all consciousness is “the point of an immediate relation of the self to itself as the original unity of opposites.” The transition is the openness and the belonging together of both functions. Now, we are ready to discuss Schleiermacher’s Gefühl.

Gefühl is the transition point within and between each moment of experiences. Gefühl, as subjective, immediate self consciousness, refers to the identity of the self from one instance of experience to the next. Schleiermacher uses the term to point out the experience of our nature. Gefühl expresses the crucial aspect of life, “abiding

30) Ibid.
31) Ibid.
in self (*Insichbleiben*),” not “passing beyond self (*Aussichheraustreten.*)”32) According to Schleiermacher, *Gefühl* can never be taken up into reflexive thoughts because it is in us as the identity of contrasts between intellectual and organic functions in thinking. *Gefühl* is merely expressed as the null point of thinking in objective consciousness; however, it is “never disappearing entirely” through all phases of the temporal stream.33) According to Schleiermacher, therefore, *Gefühl* overcomes the subject-object dichotomy on which thinking and knowing are structured. In *Gefühl*, the absolute unity of the ideal and the real, merely presupposed in thinking and willing, is actually accomplished. *Gefühl* both embraces and cancels the antithesis between thinking and willing.

For Schleiermacher, the self of immediate self-consciousness is distinct from the self of the reflected self-consciousness. The latter self is the identity of the subject in different moments. Such identity rests upon the gathering together of various moments and then identifies that which they have in common. This is indirect, mediated consciousness. Immediate self consciousness, on the contrary, is the consciousness in *transition* so that it is null consciousness of the self. *Gefühl* as immediate self consciousness is not an objective fact of consciousness; rather it is that which makes objective facts of consciousness possible. The distinction of the immediate self consciousness from the reflected self consciousness characterizes Schleiermacher’s outstanding grasp of the self. It indicates a big difference of Schleiermacher from idealists. According to Fichte, the positing of self consciousness includes

“the positing of the actual ‘difference of elements’ by the I as they occur in the relation of reflection.” For Schleiermacher, the positing of self-consciousness is “a pre-reflexive inner-awareness that is ‘ichlos’ in the sense that it is not in the first place pronominally articulated.” 34) In Schleiermacher’s ideas, therefore, Gefühl represents “a thoroughly immanent third element” in us, “which is itself co-posited in the play of alteration between opposites as the middle, in which the transformation of each happens.” 35) “Gefühl... comes to stand ‘only in the subject’ but is ‘not effected by the subject’.” 36) For Schleiermacher, Gefühl is that which arises at the point where nature and mind meet.

Schleiermacher employs the term Anschauung to signify the perspective of objective consciousness with regard to the indifferent point between the organic and the intellectual functions, while Gefühl denotes the subjective perspective of this transition. Gefühl refers to the immediate awareness of our nature, that is, that which posits as distinct from what is posited. Anschauung, in contrast, refers to “immediate and individual representations of the world.” 37) The two terms are identical in a sense that they both denote the same indifferent point between the organic and the intellectual functions in thinking. Their difference is in the perspective from which the indifferent point is expressed. Gefühl is the positive expression of the identity of our beings. Anschauung is the awareness of this point of indifference of the two functions from

34) Manfred Frank, Das individuelle Allgemeine: Textstrukturierung und interpretation nach Schleiermacher (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 95, 97, quoted in Klemm’s essay, 94.
35) Ibid.
36) Ibid.
37) Frank, “A Look at Schleiermacher’s Dialectic,” 36.
the standpoint of objective consciousness. *Gefühl* is the awareness of this point of indifference by subjective consciousness. Again, we could discuss them in this way. There are two events: The one is “the shift or change in thinking from one function to the other.” The other is “the way in which self consciousness is authenticated or is felt as the organic agency of the world.”\(^{38}\) The first event is the state of *Anschauung* while the second is that of *Gefühl*.

Schleiermacher’s term *Anschauung* shows very different aspects from that of idealists. As we saw the distinctiveness of Schleiermacher’s *Gefühl* in the previous paragraph, his version of *Anschauung* also has an insight to overcome the split of Fichte’s intellectual intuition. Fichte’s attempt, which tries to solve the problem of the split between receptivity (intuition) and the spontaneity of the intellect by the notion of the prior activity of the self, entails another split of the self into knowing I and known not I. Schleiermacher responds to this problem here by suggesting that “it is only by an acceptance of an inherent link of ourselves to a world which transcends both our cognitive and practical activity that we can really comprehend our place in the universe.”\(^{39}\) *Anschauung*, for Schleiermacher, is objective consciousness without an object, that is, object less awareness, which consists of the organic and the intellectual functions of thinking at their point of indifference. In sum, the transcendental ground of both *Gefühl* and *Anschauung* pertains to the nature of the relationship of the organic and intellectual functions to each other.

The doctrine of individual self consciousness stands at the center of Schleiermacher’s system which is based on the principle derived

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from the process of life. Schleiermacher discovers that the situation of immediate self-consciousness is the primordial situation for all human activity. This situation expresses the immediate givenness of something to the receptive self. In this case, the something given is the “inner-worldly situation” of the receptive self.⁴⁰ There is real interaction and the inner and the outer dimension in human individuality. Through the interaction, the universal is acquired. Therefore, “the universal conditions of becoming or acting do not articulate an overall universality without any specific determined traits.”⁴¹ Human life and history really depends on “the physical process” and its “organic productivity.” The key idea of Schleiermacher’s understanding of the self is that “feeling and the immediacy of self-consciousness are the constitutive, primordial, and insurmountable situation of human existence.”⁴²

In sum, Schleiermacher’s examination of the role of the organic and the intellectual functions in thinking plays a crucial role in his philosophy. Especially, his Dialectic rests upon the analysis of the role of the two functions in thinking. These two functions express the spontaneity and receptivity of sense experience and reason in thinking. They pertain to the organic affections and the intellect (reason) in the process of concept formation. Both are co-determinate agencies which constitute objective thought. Schleiermacher argues that the structure of thinking is based on the way in which these two functions relate to and mutually interact with each other. His analysis of the role of the organic and the intellectual functions in

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⁴⁰ Eilert Herms, “Process and God in Whitehead and Schleiermacher” (Manuscript, 2003), 8.
⁴¹ Ibid., 9.
⁴² Ibid., 14.
thinking provides him with the structural elements for his argument for a presupposed transcendental ground of Gefühl and Anschauung. The relationship of the organic and the intellectual functions is a fundamental ground of knowledge.

2. The Idea of the Unity of Thinking and Being in Objective Thinking

Schleiermacher thinks of the integrity of human experience as a unity of thinking and being. He says that all our activities are based on our unstated presupposition that thinking and being correspond. “In every instance of thinking,” says he, “what is thought is a knowing, what is known is a being.”43) Without the presupposition of this structure of unity of thinking and being in objective thinking, no knowledge is possible. Kant could not adequately explain this presupposition or our conviction concerning this theory of coherence because of the gap in his theory of the self. Schleiermacher tries to identify the presupposition and the source of human conviction. To do this, he transforms the Kantian gap between pure and empirical knowledge into the source of the conviction within human beings. The conviction is that we are the whole, not fractured, self, and that the world is aligned with our inner process of knowing.

According to Schleiermacher, the self is the original source of both identity and difference. Our first certain knowledge is the opposition of the self and others. This is our first experience of difference and dissonance. Our first experience of continuity is that of the moments and functions of the self. The very possibility of

43) Schleiermacher, Dialectic, 16.
thinking is an account of this primal experience of identity and difference by the self. For Schleiermacher, therefore, the unity of our world is not guaranteed by the presupposition that there is one single mode of processing through the single mode of causality. Rather, he argues the given fact within our world that there are various modes of causality working together in continual passages. “What guarantees the unity of our world and the different modes of processing the overarching continuum within it is the openness of all these different modes of processing to being mutually conditioned by the working of all the rest.” 44) Surely, there is no single mode of absolute processing. “No mode of process within this world given to and inhabited by us is the unique ground for the existence of other modes; no one produces and guarantees harmonious openness of all different modes of process.” 45)

In *Dialectic*, Schleiermacher says that all thinking is a combination of either concepts or judgments. 46) Schleiermacher, by exploring the two forms of objective thinking (concept and judgment), tries to reveal the rules of procedure for each actual act of thinking here. *Concept* is the comprehensive grasp of manifold aspects of organic affections while *judgment* is the expression of the dominance of the intellectual function in objective thinking. 47) Judgment brings clarification or definition to the antecedent concept. It untangles the chaotic manifold aspects through a series of propositions. Judgment begins with the determination given to the intellectual function by the organic affections. Judgment thereby is

45) Ibid.
47) Ibid., 26.
a posteriori thinking because it originally depends on the organic affections and presupposes something already given. Concept, on the contrary, is a priori because it originates with the impulse of the desire to know. Concept and judgment become the source of determinability in each other. The limit of the beginning of the concept, therefore, is the limit of realization of all possible judgments.

For Schleiermacher, unity presupposes a constant relationship with diversity. Otherwise, the absolute unity of being is only an empty thought. It can be a full or adequate thought only if it arises from diversity. Where there is a unity of being, one must presuppose that this unity has emerged from the diversity of being. Diversity, on the other hand, demonstrates the connectiveness of being through which unity emerges. Thinking present for being is the production of determinate form by means of which being can be discerned. This thinking has two forms: concept and judgment. The unity of concepts presupposes a separation of being. The plurality of judgments presupposes a universal connection of being. In sum, at the real ground of thinking, there is a fundamental presupposition that the totality of the beginning of concept and the totality of things are identical. This presupposition refers to the totality of actual thinking. This totality is the unity of all being and all thinking as one.
III. Schleiermacher’s Unified I: The Encounter of the Self and the World

Schleiermacher tries to delineate a transcendental standpoint that allows to see and to feel the unity of thinking and being hidden by the gap between the noumenal and the empirical self. The underlying principle of Schleiermacher’s system is derived from the self-world polarity. The self is open to what is outside it in the following three ways: First, the self remains within itself and is receptive in relation to the world. Secondly, the self goes outside of itself and is active in relation to the world. Thirdly, the self both remains within itself and goes outside of itself in a reciprocal relation between passivity and activity. In the dynamic interaction between the self and the world, we see so many creative oscillations of dipolar elements toward unity: oscillation between the organic and intellectual functions towards a proper thinking, oscillation between self and the world in the organic function, oscillation between unity and diversity in the intellectual function, and so on. All these oscillations maintain a tension of spontaneity and receptivity to acquire a creative unity.

Schleiermacher rejects dualistic ideas and presents creative ideas in dynamic dipolarities. Here, I use the term “dynamic” to mean ongoing movements toward creative unity; I use “dipolarities” to go against one-sided extremities. In his idea of the self, Schleiermacher

48) Klemm, 85.
49) Ibid.
argues “the individuality of the self” which uniquely mediates both universal subjectivity and particular personality. The dipolar tensions between the universal and the particular and between the ideal and the real always exist in Schleiermacher’s idea of the self. These tensions undergird the vitality and balance of various dipolar pairs. First of all, we could see a fundamental dipolarity of the organic and the intellectual functions in thinking. The organic function is the human capacity for sensibility while the intellectual function is the human activity of reason. To become true knowing, the ideal and the real aspects of thinking come together.\textsuperscript{50} The first step toward knowing is “proper thinking” that takes place in the interaction of the two functions. The one function without the other cannot be yet a thinking. The creative oscillation between the organic and the intellectual functions guarantees proper thinking and thereby knowing.

The organic and the intellectual functions themselves have each own dipolar system. The organic function oscillates between the self and the world whereas the intellectual function oscillates between ideal unity and real diversity. The organic function represents “the agreement between thinking and being” and thus involves “the proper relating of subject and object.”\textsuperscript{51} In the oscillation of the self and the world in the organic function, the self reflects the subject pole of human experience (internal consciousness). The world represents the objective pole of human experience (external


\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 184.
In the oscillation between ideal unity and real diversity in intellectual function, unity reflects the agreement between thought and its object; diversity represents real “matter” of thinking. The oscillation of these two categories—unity and diversity—in intellectual function makes possible the activity of reason.

Like the organic and the intellectual functions in thinking, concept and judgment in objective thinking are correlative and mutually interdependent in producing more clarified meanings. They also have each own dipolar system. Concept is “hovering” between the general and the particular, between the higher and the lower, and in other words between power (Kraft) and manifestation or phenomenon (Erscheinung). Judgment oscillates between subject and predicate to express being as dynamic.

For Schleiermacher, all these creative oscillations of dipolar systems are based on two transcendental grounds—God and the world. Schleiermacher defines the totality of being as our idea of the world and the unity of being as the idea of God. God is the unity with the exclusion of all contrasts while the world is the totality with the inclusion of all contrasts. Accordingly, the terms, God and the world, represent the two components of Schleiermacher’s transcendental formula for all objective thinking. God, as the unity of being, is that to which concepts ultimately refer in thinking. The world, as the totality of being, is that to which all judgments ultimately refer in thinking. The unity of being (God) presupposes that this unity exists in relation to the diversity of being (the world), vice versa. The two ideas are thus correlative. According to Schleiermacher, all adequate formulae for the transcendental

52) Ibid.
53) Ibid., 186, and Dialectic, 23.
ground must entail the two ideas—God and the world. God and the world are not identical. Each refers to a differently conceived determining ground of consciousness. These two, however, cannot be totally separated from each other because they are only two values for the same claim. 54)

IV. Conclusion

In a nutshell, Schleiermacher discovers a way to affirm the presence of the unified self, a self through the life process of which there are actual encounters between the self and the world. This unified self is wholly immersed into the world so that it affirms interconnection rather than separation. To construct the idea of the self, Schleiermacher argues the transcendental ground of knowing and being. He maintains thoroughgoing vitality in his dipolar structure, and hence he can figure out an integral self in ongoing movements toward creative unity without falling into one-sided extremities. Schleiermacher’s unified self is not only to overcome inadequate understandings of his contemporaries but also to suggest a great answer to the postmodern predicament in which there remains exceeding deconstruction of the self. This is the great teaching of Schleiermacher!

54) Schleiermacher, *Dialectic*, xxiii
Bibliography


ABSTRACT

The Encounter of the Self and the World

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Kim, Hi-Heon

This paper is to study Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher’s understanding of the self that criticizes the subjectivist bias of Kant’s and Fichte’s idealism and constructs a unified idea based on the real encounter of the self with the world. For Schleiermacher, the self is neither a thinking subject, which has an a priori ground of the noumenal self, nor a pure being, which postulates the universal subjectivity in thinking. Rather, it is always and completely moving in a self creative process of continual reciprocity between the subject and the corresponding world. To discover the legacy of Schleiermacher’s idea in this paper aims not only to overcome the modern subjectivity, which maximizes the spontaneity of the self in thinking and being without its receptivity from the world, but also to redirect the postmodern deconstruction of the self itself, which maximizes the diversity without the unity of the self.

Keywords: Subjectivity, Gefühl, Consciousness, Subjectivist fallacy, Schleiermacher