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Ph.D. Dissertation of International Studies

**Dynamics of South Koreans'
Perceptions on China:
Interactions among Regime, Region and Political Ideology**

역동적인 한국인의 대중인식
-정권, 지역 및 정치적 이념의 상호작용-

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**Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
International Studies**

Xingxing WANG

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-Interactions among Regime, Region and Political Ideology-

Thesis advisor: Ki Soo EUN

Submitting a Ph.D. dissertation

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Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

Xingxing WANG

Confirming the doctoral thesis written by Xingxing WANG

August 2018

Chair _____ (Seal)

Vice Chair _____ (Seal)

Examiner _____ (Seal)

Examiner _____ (Seal)

Examiner _____ (Seal)

Abstract

Dynamics of South Korean Perceptions on China: Interactions among Regime, Region, and Political Ideology

This paper has empirically studied how the South Koreans' perceptions on China change according to regime, region, and political ideology. It endeavored to capture the dynamic changes of the perception on China that emerge when the regime, which is an exogenous variable, interacted with region and political ideology, which are endogenous variables. In addition, it attempted to prove that the Koreans' perception on China can be influenced greatly by the attitudes and positions of China over inter-Korean relations as well as the above-stated variables by analyzing the effects of the Cheonan ship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents in 2010 on perception on China. In spite of the increase of interchange between South Korea and China after the diplomatic relations between Korea and China, conflicting perceptions of opportunities and threats repeatedly appeared between South Korea and China, and this study made an effort to emphasize once again that it is an important task to study 'perception' in discussing the diplomacy towards China for the development of South Korea-China relations.

As research methodology, it set the target of the perception on China as 'the general public,' and set the research period as the past decade from the political period of Roh Moo-hyun to that of Park Geun-hye's. It uses the data from 'Unification Perception Survey (2007~2016)' which consist of survey questionnaires related to coherent perception on China surveyed for 10 years conducted by the Institute for Unification and Peace at Seoul National University. Through multinomial logit analysis methodology, it analyzes Koreans' perception on China objectively. It compares the effects of regime, region, and political ideology that are set as the important variables in Koreans' perception on Korea, and analyzes their interactions. Moreover, it scrutinizes the period effect of the effects of Cheonan ship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents in 2010 on Koreans' perception on China.

As a result of the study, Koreans' perception on China showed a different aspect by the interactions between regime, which is the exogenous variable, and region and political ideology, which are endogenous variables. Also, it was observed that the significant events affecting South Korea-China relations have a great impact on Koreans' perception on China.

First, it was examined that the stereotypes 'conservative regime – China is a threat' and 'progressive regime – China is a friend' are not always accurate. Koreans' perceptions on China are dynamic due to the changes in policies toward China and the Korea-China relations that change according to the change of regime. Koreans' perception on China showed differing trends between the Lee Myung-bak's political period and that of Park Geun-hye's before the deployment of THAAD, even though the two regimes are both conservative. This can be interpreted as depending on what policies each regime implement on China, and it can also be explained that the regime has an important influence on general public's perception on China. Koreans perceive China as a competition, negation, and cooperation target in turn, and this is a combination of complex elements such as changes in the international environment, China's rise, inter-Korean relations, changes in domestic regime and policies, etc.

Furthermore, region and political ideology, which are endogenous variables in perception on China, appear to interact with regimes that are exogenous variable. There is a difference in Koreans' perception on China according to region and political ideology. Compared to the people in the Yeongnam area, the people in Honam area were confirmed to perceive China more favorably. Looking at ideological differences, the progressive group perceived China more favorably than the conservative group, but the regression analysis revealed that these differences were not statistically significant. It was confirmed that the influence of regime is more influential than political ideology in Koreans' perception on China. Also, it was appeared that the regime interacts with region and political ideology. In particular, the people in Youngnam region and the conservative group did not maintain consistency in perception on China but were able to change dynamically according to the regime. They are influenced by the policy direction and changes of South Korea-China relations of their supporting regimes of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, which have a tendency for conservatism, and the perception on China also changes at that time according to the codes. Furthermore, in perception on China, there is no interaction between the regime and political ideology, and the progressive group in Honam and conservative group in Youngnam had little difference in the perception on China. The difference of the perception on China based on region and political ideology can be attributed to the imbalance of development in South Korea due to historical, political, and economic factors, as well as the root of ideological formation such as "pro-US, anti-North" and "anti-US, pro-North." Likewise, it is deduced that the perception on China changes according to the policies of the

party and government that one supports as well as the situation of the South Korea-China relationship.

Lastly, it was confirmed that period effect is observed in South Koreans' perception on China and it does not only due to regime, region, and political ideology, but also when major events incur related to North Korea issues, such as the Cheonan Ship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incident. The period effect was found to affect the perception on China for most of South Koreans regardless of the differences of region or political ideology. The reason why the two incidents affected the perception on China is due to the difference in the North Korea policy that the two countries took. South Koreans expected that China would take a neutral stance when these incidents occurred, but China took a different approach to South Korea than their expectation, which made South Koreans change their existing perception on China.

Taken together, regime, region, and political ideology interact with each other and influence Koreans' perception on China. Koreans' perception on China is not consistently coherent, and it can be seen that it depends on the different government's policies on China and the bilateral relations. In addition, by confirming that China's attitude toward the Cheonan ship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents in 2010 had a great impact on the Koreans' perception on China in this period, the events and incidents related to North Korea and China's position on them in particular have shown that they have an enormous impact on the South Koreans' perception on China beyond the regime, region, and political ideology analyzed above. This phenomenon shows that South Korea-China relations have not yet established a stable cooperative relationship, that Koreans do not have a firm trust on China, and that there is a great uncertainty in South Koreans' perception on China.

Keywords: Perception on China, South Korean, Regime, Region, Political ideology, Period effect

Student number: 2007-30705

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Chapter 1 Introduction

I Raising the Question

After its reform and opening, China has achieved outstanding improvements in various areas including economics, politics, military, science, and others over the last 40 years. In particular, its GDP grew at an annual average rate of 9% over 30 years, which is unprecedentedly high both in speed and quantity. Moreover, China's total GDP in 2010 surpassed that of Japan's, resulting in ranking the world's second largest economy (after the United States of America). With this rapid economic and military growth, as well as stable structure and numerous human resources, China is being considered as a potential superpower. Indubitably, in many areas including today's economic, social, environmental, political and other fields, China still has many obstacles to overcome. Especially in terms of the United Nations (UN) and global influence, China is still far behind the US and Soviet influence. Nonetheless, the developmental pace and the sustained development of various fields indicate the possibility of China becoming the second superpower of the 21st century. As a developing country with the fastest economic development, China plays an important role in several international affairs, especially that of the military, economic, and political areas of the Korean Peninsula.

China and the Korean Peninsula have maintained their relationship for almost all historical periods, which account for over 4,000 years. Recently, Korea and China prolonged to develop affiliations after their official normalization on August 24, 1992, and the economic, cultural, and personal exchanges also increased rapidly with the frequent visits of high-ranking officials from both countries. A month later from the establishment of diplomatic relations, in September 27, 1992, Korean President at that time, Roh Tae-woo led a large-scale visit to China. The two parties declared a "Korea-China Joint Statement," and signed the "Korea-China Trade Agreement," the "Korea-China Investment Protection Agreement," the "Korea-China Economic, Trade, Technology Union Committee Agreement," and the "Korea-China Science and Technology Agreement." In December 1997, former President Kim Dae-jung visited China, and elevated the bilateral relationship to that of the "cooperating partners toward the 21st century." This led to a constant advancement to "comprehensive collaborating partnership towards the 21st century" in 2003, and "Korea-China

comprehensive collaborating partnership" in May, 2008, by the former President Lee Myung-bak. However, after hitting its peak, the relationship deteriorated under the Park Geun-hye administration's decision to deploy the THAAD missiles despite China's strong dislike (Kim Heung-kyu, 2016). Afterwards, President Moon Jae-in and his administration came to power, and his efforts to discuss and have talks regarding the THAAD issues between Korea and China have dissolved the rigidity and led back the relationship to that of forthcoming. The two countries have maintained a dynamic relationship between such developments and declines.




Figure-1 South Korea-China Trade and Trade Balance (1992-2016)

Source: "25 Years of Korea-China Diplomatic Normalization", Sungkyunkwan University Press: p22

Since the establishment of Korea-China diplomatic relations, the two countries have achieved remarkable achievements in each field, and the development of the economic sector has been most prominent. As of the end of 2016, bilateral trade accounted up to \$211.4 billion, which was 33 times the \$6.37 billion that was totaled at the time of normalization See <Figure-1>. Industrial structure has advanced and the Korea-China economic relationship has been reinforced in its competitive nature than that of the complementary, and trade volume has slightly decreased due to political issues such as the THAAD issue; however, China is still Korea's biggest exporter and at the same time the largest investment and import destination, and conversely, Korea is China's third trading partner and the fourth investor. Especially for Korea, Korea-China trade volume has been larger than that of Korea-Japan and

Korea-US together, so it is difficult to deny the significance of China's role in Korea's continuous economic growth. Then, would this expansion of economic and cultural exchanges as well as the deepening of mutual interdependence make Korean citizens feel more congenial and cooperative, too?




Figure-2 South Korean's cooperative perceptions for foreign countries (Unit: %)

According to the results of the "Korean Unification Perception Survey" conducted for 10 years since 2007, it is depicted that Koreans' perceptions and attitudes towards neighboring countries have changed according to changes in the international environment, inter-Korean relations, and the foreign policy of the Korean government. As shown in <Figure-2> and <Figure-3>¹, Koreans are showing a sustained positive attitude toward the US with the highest cooperation and lowest hostility, due to the long-term alliance and accumulated confidence. South Koreans' thoughts on the North is more complicated – they are brothers of the same ethnic group, the subject of ultimate reunification, and yet the South's biggest military threat (Lee Nae-young, 2015). Korea is relatively more indifferent about Japan than the US and North Korea because of their history of 40 years of slavery, as well as historical, territorial disputes that continue to this day. However, Korea's consciousness on cooperation with China is on the third in line behind the US and Japan, but on the other hand recorded hostility almost to that against North Korea in certain periods. It should be duly noted that

¹ 'Korean Unification Perception Survey' was conducted from 2007 to 2016 with the question "How would you define the given nations?" The respondents were asked to select one category from 'Ally,' 'Competitor,' 'Subject to Caution,' and 'Hostile' between the five countries including the US, China, Japan, North Korea, and Russia.

Korea's perception on China is very volatile. This is contradicting to the close correlation of economic growth and mutual reliance between the two countries. Then, why do Koreans view China as such? Do all Koreans share the same view on China? What factors influence Koreans' perceptions of China?




Figure-3 South Koreans' Threat Perception for Foreign Countries (Unit: %)

Korea is China's most important neighboring country and partner country, and the Koreans' perception for China can represent the neighboring countries' perception and coincide with the universal view for China as the new soaring G2. Thus, the Koreans' perception for China reflects other nations' as well. Also, due to its geological importance, the Korean peninsula has been a stage for fierce conflict among neighboring powers among history, so the Korean perception can be an indicator for China's international influence. On Korea's side, analyzing the aspects and causes of various factors on the perception for China in different angles holds significance that they can newly understand the public's perception on foreign countries.

Therefore, this paper will thoroughly analyze how the Koreans' perception on China contradicts their close interactions and establish the basis for a solid development of their relationship.

II Research Background

"The relationship between countries depends on the friendship between the peoples, and the friendship between the peoples depends on the way of the heart (国之交在于民相亲，民相亲

在于心相通)." National consciousness is a product of the combination of complex, various elements such as history, culture, politics, and economy. The mutual trust between the two nations is an important basis for bilateral relations in entering the bipartite orbit, and this should be achieved through genuine cooperation and continuous exchange in the fields of politics, economy, and culture.

Generally, the political position of the government and the consensus of the people are interdependent. The policy tendency of the state is manifested through various aspects such as media opinion, economic operation, diplomatic relations, other., and it is reflected in the public mentality through which it forms the psychological perception on the people. In addition, national sentiment is a kind of social collective consciousness, which becomes an important concern of national policy, and it is an important reference for determining national policies. In democratic countries that guarantee freedom of opinion, such as South Korea, whether progressive or conservative, groups must regard public opinion as important, and pay more attention to the changes of the popular will.

It has been 26 years since Korea and China have formally normalized, and through "full cooperation partnership" in 2003, they have formed "strategic cooperation partnership" in 2008, and are continuing to strengthen cooperation in various fields. However, apart from the proliferation of exchanges and the development of relations between the two countries, mutual recognition has repeatedly developed and declined, and this is preventing the development of genuine bilateral relations. Therefore, the development of bilateral relations depends on the unremitting change of people's perception along with the foreign policy of both governments.

Overall, the change in perception on China by the Koreans can be divided into several stages as follows. The mutual disconnection and confrontation between Korea and China before normalization in 1992 is called the "Disconnection period," while the decade between 1992 to 2003 can be termed the "Honeymoon period," through which both Korea and China smoothly exchanged diplomatic relations with each other in politics, economics, and culture. The relations between the two countries gradually cooled down as the "Tension period" prolonged from 2008 to 2009, when the "Northeast Project" and the "Goguryeo" historical issue caused Korean people to distrust and held in check against China. The period between 2009 and 2016 was called "Transition and Regulation," in which the financial crisis occurred with the rise of China, and Korea-China trade continued to tighten. However, in 2010, the

"Cheonan ship sinking" and "Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident" issues broke out, and the Koreans again felt deep disbelief of the attitudes and positions of the Chinese people on the Korean peninsula issues related to China. The year 2013 was the beginning of power for both former President Park Geun-hye and General Secretary Xi Jinping, and the two governments worked together to improve bilateral relations to have the brightest time after normalization. However, their relationship dramatically came to a downfall due to the THAAD deployment issues, and the hatred that the Chinese public had on Korea was at its peak. Consequently, many bilateral exchanges including those of trade, culture, and education were all restricted, and the relationship had dramatically entered the coldest period in history. In the early days of President Moon Jae-in's power in office, efforts were made to restore the damaged Korea-China relations, and there are indications of thawing. In the context of the development of these bilateral relations, the Korean people's perception on China is rather complex, and the ups and downs can be seen as severe.

The above-mentioned Korean perception on China is a result of complex action of various factors, which can be comprehended in several aspects as follows. First, Korean people's perception on China is influenced by the changes in the global situation created by the oppression of various countries surrounding Northeast Asia. Second, as the change in the target country, China has influenced the Koreans' perception on China through its 40 years of reform and opening. Third, as the change in the Korean political and policy, it can affect the perception on the US and China according to the government political and policies from the 'balanced diplomacy' policy of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun to the 'pro-American alliance,' Lee Myung-bak's conservative policy. Fourth, external events such as the Cheonan incident can also be an influence. Fifth, the diversity in Korea also affects the perception on China. In other words, South Korea has a relatively high economic development, a large number of inhabitants, and a very different political ideology and historical background in Honam and Youngnam, both of which are characterized by regionalism compared to other regions. Sixth, Korea is a democratic nation, and its tendencies toward the US and North Korea are different according to the political ideology of conservative, progressive, and middle-level politicians, distinguishing from 'pro-America vs. self-reliance,' and 'pro-North vs. anti-North.' Finally, there may be differences in perceptions due to the differences in age, occupation, education, and social positions. For example, according to a large number of surveys from pre-Korea-China normalization, the white-collar class with a high level of

education and income was relatively favorable to China, and the elderly over 60 years of age had a high tendency toward conservatism with an inclination towards pro-America.²

Taken together, these factors all seem to form the perception on Koreans to China. If so, what elements are specifically related to the Korean perception towards China? Also, what is the difference between the perceptions themselves that the Koreans have towards China? This paper focuses on these issues to discuss the Koreans' perceptions towards China and the differences.

III Research Question and Importance

1. Purpose of Research and Research Question

This paper examines the dynamics of Koreans' perception on China and the interaction among different independent variables which are considered to be influential factors. In particular, it makes an endeavor to analyze the cause of North Korea's perception on China and identifies the difference of perception between political, region, political ideology, and the factors regarding North Korea that have been identified as important elements in the previous section. Ultimately, it characterizes the perception on China by the Koreans, and further tries to understand the Koreans' apprehension of China.

For this purpose, this paper tries to answer the following three questions that have not yet been researched, based on the results of previous studies.

First, does Koreans' perception differ according to different political periods? This is analyzed through the following two points: 1) What do Koreans perceive China as? 2) What are the perceptions that Koreans have on China in the last decade from Roh Moo-hyun's political period to that of Lee Myung-bak's and Park, Geun-hye's?

Second, how do region and political ideologies affect Koreans' perceptions on China? This is studied through the following four questions: 1) What pattern does Koreans' perception on China have on region? Specifically, how are the perceptions on China different in Honam and Youngnam regions? 2) What pattern does Koreans' perception on China have on political ideology? Specifically, what kind of aspects and characteristics do the conservative, moderate

²"Survey on the National Awareness of Transition Period" conducted in 1987, 1988, 1989 by the Institute of Social Science, Seoul National University, Seoul National University Publisher, p297-316.

and progressive groups perceive about China according to their political ideologies? 3) Does regime influence the differences of perception on China by regime and political ideology?

Third, what pattern does Koreans' perception on China have when major events around North Korea issues incur that have an impact on Korea-China relations? How does the external factor of North Korea affect the perception on Koreans versus China, and if so, how much influence do they have? This is studied through the following four questions: 1) Is the North Korean factor a significant variable that influences Korean perception towards China? 2) How do Koreans perceive China's position on North Korea? 3) When North Korea-related issues occur that affect the Korea-China relations, does the Korean perception on China appear to have a 'period effect'?

When these three questions are put together, the main purpose of this paper is to study the core elements that affect the Koreans' perception on China, including 'regime,' 'region,' 'political ideologies,' and 'North Korean factors,' scrutinizing their interaction on dynamics of Koreans' perception on China and analyzing what the causes are.

2. Importance of Research

It is necessary to understand the perception on the Koreans on China accurately, to organize the development of Korea-China relations, to study the internal factors such as regional and political ideology elements, as well as external factors such as North Korean issues, all through which can be of crucial data in grasping the characteristics of Koreans, as well as analyzing and predicting the future directions of Korea-China relations and political tendency of Koreans towards China. Moreover, it can be said that China has realistic significance because it can help to establish the overall diplomatic strategy by adjusting the difference of the present situation between Korea and China and China's issues of the Korean Peninsula.

Then, why is it necessary to study the perception on the Koreans? The reason for choosing Koreans as the subject of research is that Korea has a complex geographical situation as a neighboring country compared to other countries, and it has much interest in China as the country who is heavily influenced by China, and furthermore, due to some historical problems, perception on China differs and varies highly. The Korea-China relationship has existed for a long time, and there prevailed the experience of cultural communication and fierce war in their history. Moreover, they are economically interdependent, but there are differences or conflicts in ideology. While intergovernmental relations have been steadily rising, the public sentiment has sometimes deteriorated. As China's rise and the level of influence elevate,

China is increasingly influencing Korea and other neighboring countries, but from a geopolitical point of view, the Korean Peninsula is the main axis of the great powers of China, the United States, and Russia, and the public consciousness is reflected on the effects of China's influence and foreign policies like a mirror. As China's geographical neighbor, South Korea shares commonality and representation regarding the perception on China's rise, along with other neighboring countries. In order to grasp the external perception on China's rise, there needs a direct and systematic investigation and research on the Korean people.

Second, why should Korea be studied in the perspective of region and political ideology? In order to adjust to the public expectations, the characteristics and internal differences of the country should be analyzed in depth. China is a large country with 1.4 billion people, 9.6 million square kilometers in size, and 56 ethnicities that live together. The population is comparatively huge, the region is wide, the languages are diverse, and the level of economic development, system, and ideologies are different according to each region and nation. For example, Pekingese and Shanghai people have superiority and exclusiveness, and Beijing and Shanghai tend to ignore each other. The people of Guangzhou have different consciousness and characteristics, such as the feelings of Gentiles to non-Guangdong people and the inclusion of foreigners to the people of Shenzhen. South Korea is a middle-class country with a population of 51 million, but its population and area are not as high as China, but as a comparatively successful democratic country, it has different experiences and consciousness in history, politics and economy in Seoul, Gyeonggi Province, Honam and Youngnam regions. Especially, people in Honam and Youngnam regions have ideological differences, and the stereotypes and prejudices between the generations are different from each other based on the imbalance of development historically, politically, economically, etc. In Korea, the ROK-US alliance and the US-China strategic rivalry have different views on the foreign policy of the country in accordance with the political ideology of progress and conservatism.

Furthermore, the diplomatic ideology of Korea is traditionally based on the confrontation between 'Korea-US alliance vs. self-reliance,' 'anti-North Korea vs. pro-North Korea.' After its establishment, Republic of Korea underwent continuous cold war, hostile competition between the two Koreas, and the formation of ideology in foreign policy influenced by the perception and attitudes towards North Korea and the US through Korea-US alliance and authoritarian political. From the political's point of view, the comparatively progressive-inclined governments of Kim, Dae-jung and Roh, Moo-hyun were opposed to the

comparatively conservative-inclined governments of Lee, Myung-bak and Park, Geun-hye in terms of policy, and comparing with Honam region, Youngnam region has comparatively more conservative ideals. Therefore, regionalism and ideology can be analyzed in the study on the perception on China and foreign policy preference.

Third, why should the North Korean factors be studied? The North Korean problem has always been the key external factor that restricts the development of South Korea-China relations. During the 26 years since the establishment of diplomatic normalization between South Korea and China in 1992, two countries have established close relations. Also, bilateral trade is worth more than 200 billion dollars, the economy is interdependent, and the two countries are still very sensitive to the influence of external factors, such as North Korea and US related issues, even though there are frequent summits. In particular, the North Korean nuclear issue in various issues such as China's participation in the Korean War, confrontation of the Cold War ideology, consideration of North Korea during diplomatic normalization, North Korea's nuclear tensions after the diplomatic normalization, Cheonan ship sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling incident issues, THAAD deployment issue, as well as North Korean defectors issue were all external factors that influenced the development of South Korea-China relations, reflecting the structural dilemma of two countries' relationship. (Kim, Heung-kyu, 2011). Although the present situation of the Korean peninsula has entered into a serious transition due to the peace atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula through the present inter-Korean summits, the Korean Peninsula is still in power fail state. Therefore, Korea still has to continue to receive China's influence in the process of national diplomacy, security, and inter-Korean unification, and there are expectations and concerns about China's policies and attitudes towards the Korean Peninsula (Park, Gun-il, 2015). In terms of China's attitude toward North Korea and its handling of problems will have a direct impact on Koreans' perceptions of China (Jeong, Ji-yong, 2015). By studying the perception on Koreans on China through external variables such as the North Korean issues, we can gain wisdom to deeply understand the context of bilateral development, examine the foreign policy of both countries, and solve the problems of the two countries.

The main difference from previous researches of the suggested topic to this study is that this research will try to understand the perception through internal factors through a new perspective including but not limited to region, political ideology, and differences, based on the previous researches of Koreans' perception on China hinged on the historical background

of the development of Korea-China relationship. In other words, this study combines the in-depth analysis of Korea and the history of development of Korea-China relationship. Furthermore, it adds external variables to it, considering them as a whole, and conducts research through statistical methods to analyze their interaction, through which the analysis is further increased.

The perception on Koreans is like a mirror, reflecting the development of bilateral relations. Understanding the Koreans' perceptions and opinions, as well as listening to their voices can be a catalyst for narrowing realizational gap between the people in two countries and promoting the development of bilateral relations, and so this study can be regarded as having realistic significance and value.

IV Composition of Paper

The core agenda and purpose of this paper is to study the Koreans' perceptions on China and the influence and interactions among factors that have an impact. In other words, it examines the differences and causes of the Koreans' perception on China, which is a combination of endogenous variables such as region, political ideology, and exogenous variables such as regime or political period and North Korea factor. For this purpose, this paper synthesizes and summarizes the process of change in the development of Koreans' perception on China for the past 10 years, and using the independent variables including issues of regional, political ideology, and North Korea, the paper explores the implications, differences, and practical motives of these perceptions. Especially, by focusing on the policy change of the government and the development of the Korea-China relationship, this research analyzes and construes the Koreans' perception on China, and it makes an endeavor to become the recommendations regarding the development of friendly relations between the public for both countries, as well as the establishment of foreign policies for each country.

For this purpose, this paper is divided into the following seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory part; Chapter 2 includes literature review and theoretical framework of previous researches on the perceptions on China; Chapter 3 is research methodology, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyzes the interaction of internal and external factors of Koreans' perception on China during Roh, Moo-hyun · Lee, Myung-bak · Park, Geun-hye political period through the primary data of 'Korean Unification Perception Survey' by the Unification Peace Research

Institute, Seoul National University. With this course of nature, the basic structure of this paper is as follows.

Chapter 1 introduces the reasons and significance of the selection of the research topic, the research questions and the purpose of research, and explains the composition of the paper.

In Chapter 2, the theoretical framework of the paper is created by reviewing existing literature related to the topic. In other words, the current status of suggested topics is compiled and reviewed related to the perceptions on China that the Koreans and other countries during the last decades, in regards to the question "How do you see the rise of China?" To this end, theoretical framework for studying Korean perceptions on China in terms of both endogenous and exogenous variables is established, and a theoretical basis for the development of the thesis is also identified.

Chapter 3 explains the concept definition and means for measurement of perceptions on China as research methodology, and introduces the general characteristics of research subjects, research methodology, and data.

Chapter 4 discusses Koreans' perceptions on China during the last decade from Roh's political period to Park's political period separately, focusing on the influence of 'regime' and analyze the difference and causes of the Koreans' perception on China based on the dynamic trend of international environment such as the rise of China, governmental policies, bilateral relations and issues between South Korea and China.

In developing the context, the perception on the Koreans on China during the time of three governments, Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye on the axis of time is analyzed, and furthermore, crucial events that affected the Korea-China relationship and Koreans' perception on China are each categorized into different axis. Furthermore, this study examines the differences and perceptions of Koreans of China in a multidisciplinary, omnidirectional, and comprehensive ways in order to draw what kind of results and differences were delineated for public perceptions by regime.

Chapter 5 discusses the influence of region and political ideology as well as the interactions among regime and these two factors on Koreans' perception on China. In Korea, structural factors related to political, economic, and social differences between Honam and Youngnam regions that exist due to regionalism have an influence on people's perception. Also, according to the political ideology between that of the conservative and progressive, Koreans have clear contrasting perceptions especially in the US and North Korea issues. Chapter 5

takes a further step from the analysis of difference in perceptions of China by political conducted in Chapter 4, and examines Koreans' perception on China in Roh Moo-hyun political period, Lee Myung-bak political period, and Park Geun-hye political period in more detail. In particular, it considers regional and political tendencies, which are the important factors that cause different aspects among Koreans in relation to foreign relations and politics.

Chapter 6 examines what the pattern of South Korenas' perception is on China when big events occur related to North Korea. Specifically, this chapter will examine whether there exists a period effect in Cheonan ship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident. Important issues regarding South Korea's diplomacy are linked to inter-Korean issues, and the development of South Korea-China relations is also affected by inter-Korean relations. This chapter examines the perception on the attitude and position of Koreans on North Korea based on the framework established in Chapter 2, analyzing whether there is a period effect in the perception on North Korea with China, as well as find out what kind of reasons there exists.

Chapter 7 includes conclusion, and it takes a comprehensive analysis of perceptions and differences formed through a combination of the endogenous variables of 'region' and 'political ideology' affecting the Koreans' perception on China and the exogenous variables of 'regime.' Moreover, by analyzing the period effect of 2010 Cheonan ship / Yeonpyeong Island incident in the perception on China, it tried to prove that Koreans' perception on China can change not only from the variables stated above but also from the impact of China's attitude and stance on North Korea issues. Based on the above-mentioned variables affecting the perception on the people and the difference of perceptions among the people, the paper derives the perceptions of South Koreans' on China. In addition, the systematic and continuous research on perception also emphasizes that it is a very important task to narrow the psychological distance between the two countries and to lead the good relationship between Korea and China, on the basis that the strategic choice of policy leaders and policy intervention can play a significant role in the improvement of perception, the fact that demographic characteristics due to regional and political ideologies have formed different perceptions among individuals, and that there are structural problems such as North Korean issues in the relationship between Korea and China.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

South Korea's "perception on China" as a way of looking at China in a rapidly changing international situation along with the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States is a very important issue in South Korea-China relations and South Korea's diplomacy with China. Especially, judging the "China Threat" and "China Opportunity" which determine the direction of Korea's China policy is based on the difference of perception on China. However, existing research on Korea's diplomacy with China has been focused on history, diplomatic relations, and case analysis, and there have not been many studies on 'perception' (Lee Hee-ok, 2009). In this study, 'political', 'region', 'political ideology', and 'North Korea factor' are classified as independent variables, and they are classified into three categories of cooperation target, competitor target, and negation target. Based on the methods and theories of previous researches, the following analyzes the perception on the general public through data of Unification Perception Survey,' and study the characteristics of each variable in their perception on China. This study attempts to overcome the limitations of existing theories and try to establish a new framework of analysis in the study of 'Korean's perception on China,' which was not easily approached due to the difficulties of objective verification in Chinese studies.

I Existing Researches on Perceptions on China

1. Existing research on perception

Perception is a field of philosophy and has been receiving the attention of many scholars from ancient times. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are the well-known scholars involved in the study of perception, and the medieval cognitive research has developed in connection with religious philosophies such as Saint Augustine, Scholasticism, and St. Thomas Aquinas. In addition to the development of science, Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes developed cognitive research through the fusion of cognition and science, and later, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume used the theory of empiricism as a cognitive theory, while Arno, Spinoza, Leibniz developed the epistemology of rationalism. Kant then developed a new perspective on critical philosophy, space and time theory, a priori comprehensive judgment and critical observation, and then developed into various fields such as neo-liberalism, neo-positivism, and

Neo-Scholasticism. A representative book that comprehensively summarizes the history and flow of this epistemology is the "History of Epistemology" of Sophia Robigi (2005).

In Korea, research related to perception is linked to various fields such as education, science, philosophy, and social literature, and various studies are being conducted from basic research to applied research. As a study of basic research on perception itself, Hong Byung-seon (2006), in his "Controversy of Contemporary Epistemology," examined the main issues of modern epistemology, such as external theory, internal theory, foundational theory, and introduced theories, through which he emphasized that there are various problems in these theories. Hwang, Seol-jung in "Epistemology" (2009), tries to understand the world and ourselves through philosophical questions about how to believe the knowledge of the world, how to recognize the outside world, and whether to be free from skepticism through the skeptical view, through which the value of epistemology once again proved its worth. Lee Byung-deok, in "Contemporary Epistemology" (2013), gives insight into various models related to epistemology such as justification of perception, matching theory, credibility theory, induction problem, a priori knowledge, naturalism epistemology and de-naturalism epistemology, and provides a unique solution to these problems.

In terms of international study, Matthias Steup (2008), in "Contemporary Debates in Epistemology," discusses theories and studies of various theories, such as knowledge and justification, epistemology, intellectual knowledge, legitimacy, other., and compared and analyzed the inquiry achievements made by contemporary epistemologists through practical arguments. In Buddhism and Christianity, there are many studies analyzing the epistemology from a religious point of view. In "Buddhist Epistemology," S.R.Bhatt and Anu Mehrotra (2013) studied 'how human beings can know,' 'what is knowing,' other., and systematically analyzed and organized the key notions of Buddhist epistemology including the enlightenment such as perception, reasoning, stabbing, fancy, argument, object of argument, argument as essence, argument as result, and argument as non-perception. In a study of epistemology related to Christianity, James Porter Moreland (2008) defended and justified the truth and worldview of Christianity in the field of philosophy and problems in the "Epistemology: Philosophical Basis of Christian Worldview," and have fused argument and theory with the truth of the Christian worldview. Previous studies on these kinds of perception provide the definition of the perception and the theoretical basis of this paper.

2. Existing research on Chinese perception on China

The study of Chinese scholar researches on the perception on China to the world is relatively abundant, and there exists possibility of utilizing existing researches for reference for the theory and methodology of this study, including research on how different countries such as Korea, the US, North Korea, Russia, India, Australia, Europe and Myanmar perceive China.

First, Liu Aming(2009) studied how the US perceives China in "China's Rise: Perception and Response of the United States." In his thesis, he argues that depending on China's rise, the US's perception on China is so complex that it needs to cooperate with China in the fields of diplomacy, trade and security, but at the same time is worried that China's rise is a challenge to its status and interest. Piao Dongxun and Liang Meihua(2017), in their "North Korea's Perception on China and Its Influencing Factors: Analysis on Media Related to China from North Korea's 'Labor News'", analyzed the perception on China through the coverage on China in 'Labor News,' through which they found that the coverage on China in the paper sharply decreased as the strategic divisions between the two countries deepened in July 2014, and China's image changed from a 'country of friendship' to a country 'that pursues profits and pursues the US.' In addition to the nuclear issue, North Korea and China also differed greatly in their perception on socialist fundamental ideals and external perception. In addition, the historical burden created during the Cold War period also revealed that North Korea had an effect on its perception on China.

Xuzhong(2012) studied how Russia perceived China in "Understanding the image of the Chinese people in the last 10 years: according to the empirical analysis by the survey in Russia." This study analyzed the characteristics of the Russian people's perception on China through the survey data. In addition, it investigated the psychological causes in detail.

Tang Lu(2010) studied India's perception on China in his "India's mainstream media coverage and public awareness of China", which distinguishes the differences in the impact on public opinion of the government and the media, emphasizing the importance of non-governmental media. In particular, the Indian government maintained a relatively favorable position on the issue with China, but there was a massive hostility in India's nongovernmental strategy. This was due to the fact that the people who commented on the media were analysts of non-governmental strategy. It is significant that the nongovernmental

strategic elites as civil servants discussed the formation process and influence of public opinion.

Zhai Huixia(2012), through "A Study on the Perceptions of Australians on China: Based on the Empirical Study of the Australian and Global Year Survey Report 2007-2012" recognizes the fact that there are bilateral relations, ideological differences, and the media coverage of the Australian media on factors affect the perception on China by the Australian people, and suggests the development of tailor-made public diplomacy in order to increase the liking of China.

As a researcher that examined the perception on China in Europe, Zhang Jian(2007) "European Union's Change in Perceptions of China and Policy Coordination" studied the European countries' perception on China according to the rise of China. In other words, he emphasized that perception on China began to show a tendency to become friendly, not seeing China as a developing country, but as a potential threat competitor. Also, he emphasized that there was a propensity towards pro-US, as some started to give a similar voice as the US in order to 'prevent' the rise of China. As a neighboring country of China, Myanmar was studied by Song Qingrun(2013), who examined Myanmar's perception on China through the analysis of "Myanmar's perception on China in its present day." Myanmar has always been suspicious and vigilant about China as a superpower. Myanmar often banned Chinese culture, magazines, other. when there was a strong sense of bounds about China.

There are also a number of excellent papers that analyzed the Koreans' perception on China by Chinese scholars. Dong Xiangrong (2011) studied the image of China through the important media and middle school textbooks of Korea by combining quantitative research and qualitative research in the "Image of China in the heart of Koreans." In "China Seen Through a Korean Expert: Focusing on Korea-China Relations," Dong, Lee and Wang (2012) limited the survey subjects to Korean experts, and studied how the scholastic elite groups perceive China. Due to the fact that they were scholastically elites, there was an advantage that it was possible to analyze specifically the core problems that they wanted by distinguishing between interests and conflicts in Korea-China relations. "The Chinese Pavilion of Koreans Seen from History Textbooks: Focusing on the Collision of Korea and China" by Dong and Lee(2014) analyzed how perception on China is formed in the perspective of history. In particular, they emphasized that the relationship between the two countries cannot develop due to the fact that the Korean aristocracy has been criticizing the

socialism since the modern times, emphasizing the advocacy of the continental officer, or forming the image of the supremacy of China in textbooks.

There are also a number of studies analyzing China's perception through the media. "Change of image of China as seen from the perspective of Korean media" by Qi Xiaofeng and Ahn In-hwan (2017) analyzed the process of image change of China until 2017 after the diplomatic relations. The main contents of the report are as follows: First, the process of change of perception is divided into 5 stages, and the image of China after the diplomatic relations between China and Korea is damaged, and they suggested a countermeasure for this. In addition, the "Image of China in the Korean media: the case of the Chosun Ilbo" by Xu Yulan (2016) and the "Analysis of the image of the Chinese nation in the Korean media report and related countermeasure: Case of Asian Games in Guangzhou, China in Korean Mainstream Medai" of Wei Lijiao (2013) and the "Analysis of the Chinese news reports and emotional characteristics of the Chosun Ilbo" by Lu Jinsong (2011) organized and analyzed the changing process of the image of China from South Korea-China normalization to current period in the perspective of the South Korean media. As a study examines what independent variables are without controlling other independent variables, there are studies including Wang Xiaoling (2009) "What factors affect the Korean people's position on the Central American relationship?" and "Influential factors on mutual perception between Korean and Chinese citizens."

Overall, Chinese scholars conducted a large-scale Chinese awareness study through various perspectives such as historical viewpoint, control of survey group, mass media and newspaper report synthesis, history textbooks, literature review, and surveys. All these studies are characterized by the representation of public opinion in one field. However, in Korea where the freedom of the press is relatively high, one field is difficult to represent all, and opinions are different according to the region, generation, and political party. Moreover, opinions are different from press to press, and evaluation of history is different for each textbook. Therefore, it is considered that there are insufficient researches in terms of the characteristics and causes of the Koreans' perception on China. This paper tries to solve this through comprehensive analysis of various independent variables.

3. Existing research on Koreans' perception on China

It has not been so long since the issue of 'perception' in Korea-China relations or Korea's diplomacy with China has begun to attract attention. A study on modern and contemporary Chinese perceptions includes "Between Chinese and China: Koreans' Perception on China through Commentary on Perception of China's Relations of the Media in the 1950s~1970s" by Jung Moon-sang (2012). In his paper, he noted that the Cold War system led by China's anti-American aid (named "the Korean War" in Korea) and the subsequent cold war system led by the US and Soviet union formed an important background for Korea's perception on China. Since then, the Koreans' on China has begun to gain attention in Korea-China relations, as the rapid change in China's perception on China as an issue of Northeast Process in 2004 has started.

Early research on Koreans' perception on China has received attention in relation to the change of the ROK-US alliance. Jung Jae-ho (2012) asked whether the "rise of China" would affect the ROK-US alliance, and analyzed the changes in the perception on the US and the perception on China in terms of social dimension, mass media dimension and elite dimension. In addition, in the "South Korea Between Eagle and Dragon", he explained that from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Korean general public's attention was paid to the fierce rise on perception on China, and further explained the Koreans' perception on China in the perspective of perceptual ambivalence situated in between the US and China. Jung Jae-ho points out that Koreans' perception on China as a friendship and their preference for China are very high despite the fact that China's true intentions remain unclear, in the sense that there exists a 'perceptual ambivalence.' South Korea, which is tied to the framework of the ROK-US alliance, is constrained by the autonomy of strategic choice in a structure where 'the rise of China' is identified with threats. In addition, as a result of the elites' perception on China which is more negative than that of the general public, he emphasized the changing perception regarding the problem solving ability and the willingness to the North Korean problem as well as the 'unsympathetic and non-cultural' appearance of China, attitude toward North Korean human rights problems, and Chinese diplomats' arrogance. In his paper, Jung emphasizes that China is in a position of increasingly strategic importance to Korea and at the same time, the United States is in a position to maintain friendly and mutually beneficial relations for the purpose of economic, strategic and unification of Two Koreas. However, if the disparities in national power between the two countries are gradually diminishing in real terms and cognitive aspects, ultimately, if the situation of a typical "power transition" or a

"clash of civilizations," it would become increasingly difficult to establish a friendly relationship with everyone at the same time.

With the rapid rise of China since the 2000s, the growing awareness of pro-China by Koreans expanded, and the dynamism of the perception on friendship toward China since the Northeast in 2004 increased the interest in 'change in perception on China.' As a result, the perception factor that has not been paid attention in the study of Korea and China came to be treated as one of the main research areas of Korea-China relations. Especially, the study on the Koreans' perception on China has emerged from the Northeast Project. Lee Hee-ok (2010) explains that the perception on the emergence of China as a neighboring country can be different from the view of 'the rise of China' in international politics. The recent conflict over Goguryeo history emphasizes that it is a case of reminding us how easily symbiotic relations can be shaken sharply. On the other hand, in the early 2000s, the study of the spread of anti-Americanism in South Korea, focusing on the growing awareness of friendly relations with China, also focuses on the "alternative Chinese-ism" that is emerging along with the proliferation of anti-Americanism among Koreans. In addition, attention has been paid to the tension between the facts and the interpretations resulting from the process of 'politicization of the historical problems', and the excessive generalizations that do not distinguish between the realities of China and the reality.

Jung Jae-ho (2011) summarized the historical context of the change of South Korean-Chinese favorability in the last 20 years in "China's Rise and Future of the Korean Peninsula". Especially, from 1992 to 2012, he collected the results of perceptions on China and the US by the research institutes, and introduced the changes of perception, of which the attention was paid to the trend of change in perception. Throughout, he explained that the change in perception on China had a certain impact on the change of foreign policy toward China.

Jeong Jong-ho (2012) conducted a case-oriented study in "Ethnoscapes, Mediascapes, and Ideoscapes: Socio-Cultural Relations between South Korea and China," and marked that the remarkable development of the relationship between South Korea and China increased the possibility of conflict and collision simultaneously in many areas. Especially, the socio-cultural interaction between the two countries created new identity, image, thought, and discourse, through which he emphasized that this led to the increase of conflicts and disputes. In particular, based on Appadurai's review of transnational interactions in the process of

globalization, he analyzed the socio-cultural relations between Korea and China in accordance with the focus on national, media, and ideology. He noted that the Goguryeo historical dispute that began in 2004 and the sinking of Cheonan in 2010 were important events that heightened Koreans' negative perception on China.

Cheong, Young-Rok (2010) studied the Koreans' perception on the rapid growth of the Chinese economy in the perspective of economics. He acknowledged that China has several problems economically. For example, its democratization is not mature; there exist severe income gaps between farming, coastal, inland, and strata. Moreover, energy efficiency is also reduced. Further, since China conducts the great nation with a single ideology, it certainly has limitations in spreading economic ideas. However, considering the pace and size of China's development, the possibility of surpassing the US is high, and so he sees that South Korea should take the strategy of getting a lift in, rather than competing against China.

Lee Jung-nam, in his "Koreans' Perception on China and Implication Regarding Korea-China Relations" (2009), revealed that according to the rise of China, Koreans come to have a positive attitude toward the economic development of China, and at the same time have a great deal of concern because the increase of China's military capability results in the changing balance between Korea's neighboring superpowers and affect the peaceful unification of the Peninsula. In "How far has the Korea-China relationship come in 1992-2012? Performance and Prospects," Min Gwi-sik (2012) analyzed each factor that affects Koreans' perception on China, including economic, social, cultural, and historical factors. The positive factors influencing the perception were the reform and openness of China, economic growth, gender equality, excellence in cultural history, and common anti-Japanese sentiment. Passive elements were dictatorship, lack of credit, low public opinion, imputed problems regarding South Korea-China traditional cultures, and the Northeast Project. Yang Seung-hyun (2016) carried out an analysis through media coverage and book review related to THAAD deployment issue on "Chosun Ilbo" and "Korean National Newspaper" in 2016 through his "Analysis on THAAD Deployment in South Korea and East Asian Public Opinion Trends: Focusing on newspaper reports in South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong." Jung, Jae-ho emphasized that the current South Korea views China as a concern in the economic and security fields despite the ever-increasing interaction with China in "South Korean Views of South Korea-China Relations: Evolving Perceptions and Upcoming Challenges." In other words, he mentioned that such concerns have become greater

by the distortions and disillusionments of the history of Korea and China caused by Cheonan ship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling Incident, and the exchange between the two countries will be further expanded but will also face conflicts in 7 areas, including trade and commercial conflicts, historical conflicts, collision of values and standards, North Korea's nuclear weapons, and the ROK-US alliance.

The results of the research on the perception on other aspects have provided new perspectives and materials to this research. For example, Cho, Young Nam (2010) studied the possibility of collision between Korea and China in the area of norms, standards, and values in "Norms, Standards and Values as Sources of Conflict between South Korea and China," and saw that in the process of China rising and Korea striving to heighten its status, these kinds of conflicts will deepen in the future.

Taken together, there have been various accomplishments, ranging from the field of history to the study of various fields of reality. Some of the papers that examined perception on China from the perspective of the rise of China were analyzed mainly from the viewpoint of realism or liberalism, and many studies have been conducted in three aspects, namely rise of economic impact, rise of military influence, and rise of diplomatic culture and soft power. There exists many research conducted in qualitative research methods, but there were only a few conducted in quantitative research methods. As a result, there have been a number of studies focusing on the issue of 'mutual perception' which is regarded as the most negative area in the relationship between South Korea and China in past decades; however, it can be seen that the in-depth analysis of the external factors such as the North Korean factors influencing the China-Japan relations and the differences in the perception on China by the political ideology has not been reached yet. Therefore, this paper tries to complement the deficiencies by combining the endogenous variables and the exogenous variables.

4. Existing research on subject and contents of perception on China

4-1 Subject of perception on China

Since perception focuses mainly on 'individuals' when making foreign policy decisions, it can be said that individual perceptions have close links with foreign policy actions. The subjects of perception are largely divided into leaders, policy elites, expert groups (scholars, journalists, other.), and the general public. It can be a meaningful research in analyzing the autocrats' perception in the study of perception and diplomatic policy decision, when the

autocrat's foreign policy decision authority is high. Presidents are an absolute actor that influences the national agenda and the most important actor to focus national attention on a given issue. He or she can also substantially affect media and parliamentary interest in foreign policy issues. In the case of the leadership system such as that of China's, the analysis of the world view and foreign policy of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping is a representative example. In Korea, there have been some studies analyzing the president's philosophy and foreign policy, but there is a limit to the study because there is absolutely no objective data to analyze the Presidents' perception.

Second, it is analyzing the perception of policy elite groups. It is related to bureaucratic groups and staff groups that directly influence foreign policy decisions, which is the group that is most analyzed as the subject of perception in the correlation analysis between foreign policy decisions and perceptions. In many studies, the perception of policy elites is not as wide as changes in public perception, but rather is consistent and persistent. However, in the case of Korea, there is a limit to the perception and analysis research due to the lack of objective data and open data. However, it is possible to grasp indirect information on the contents of discussions of the policy elite group through the statements of the stubborn elite and the media reports.

Third, it is analyzing the perception of 'expert group' and 'influence group'. Scholars, experts, and journalists are not only able to exert various influences on foreign policy decisions, but also have a significant influence on public opinion. They also link policy elites with public perception, as well as expert knowledge and information, through which they can not only affect public perception but also manipulate the state of perception through various channels such as thesis and media reports. The opinion survey of the expert group is an important subject for the cognitive analysis because it is relatively easy to access the amount of data and the data compared to the cognitive survey of the leader or the policy elite group. It is possible to analyze aspects of perception through various papers, press releases, and public lectures. Although there are no studies on Korea's perception on China by analyzing scholarly papers comprehensively, but there are some studies that focus on China's perceptions in the media reports.

The fourth group is the mass public. With the development of various political societies such as democratization, the public perception is becoming more important. Today, diplomatic issues are much more influenced by informal and irrational aspects, including

selective information, prejudice, attitudes, and public opinion, rather than formal aspects. The perception of the general public is sometimes expressed as 'public opinion', and it can be seen that the democratic government changes policy when public opinion changes. In addition, in relation to public opinion, not only does public opinion influence policy, but also the relationship between policy and public opinion. Of course, this public perception is not always reflected in the perception on policy elites directly or indirectly participating in policy decisions. However, it is very common for public perception to follow the 'flag (the direction of the leader or policy maker)'. For example, in 2013, President Park set China as the first foreign country for her to visit China after she took power, and thus the perception on Chinese friendship toward Korea changed in one day. Although there are some data on foreign policy and diplomatic relations in China, there is still little research on the regional and ideological aspects.

In the previous studies on Korea's changing perceptions on China, the subject that is most recognized as the main subject of perception is the perception on the general public. This paper tries to analyze the rapid change of Korea's perception on China by region, political, and ideology, among which the key analyst is 'the general public'. This is because it is the area where the analysis of the total amount of objective statistical data is possible. This study presents the results of the 'perception survey' for the general public as a key basis for raising questions about the perception and difference of Koreans to China. In other words, it analyzes the perception and characteristics of Koreans toward China, focusing on the general public as 'the subject of perception' in analyzing the Koreans' perception on China.

4-2 Contents of perception on China

The empirical studies on the perception on China reveal that the perception on China is diversified. In particular, the international community has a tendency to view China's rise as a simultaneous view of opportunities and crises. (Hirshberg, 1993, Broomfield, 2003; Ko Sung-bin, 2006; Lee Sang-won, 2005). In the results of the survey conducted by Korea-US and China jointly conducted by the US-ROK research institutes concerned, they saw that the expectations and concerns about China coexist, while the US and Chinese people regard their mutual international role as a zero-sum relationship. And in the case of Koreans, a person with a friendly perception toward the United States could have a friendly perception on China, or a pro-US or pro-China, or oppositely anti-US or anti-China (Lee Nae-young, Jung Han-wool, 2007). In addition, there have also been studies showing that the perception of the

international community on the rise of China may be subject to subjective evaluation and preference (Kim Heung-gyu, 2009). In other words, in addition to the ability and willingness of China to recognize the emergence of China as a threat or cooperation, it is also important to recognize the other country. The empirical evidence that China's influence is greater than what it wants is more likely to perceive China's rise as negative, so that the perception on China's rise is influenced by subjective assessment of China's influence and preference (Suh Jin-young, Kang Soo-jung, 2008).

In a study that analyzed the perception on China by using social survey data, it shows that the Koreans' perception on China is influenced not only by Korea-China relations but also by the perceptions and emotions of the United States and North Korea (Lee Sang-shin, Jang Hee-kyung, 2011). At the same time, in a study of Koreans' perception on China, especially the rise of China as an Asian leader, Koreans' perceptions are divided into rational and emotional, while rational judgments tend to fully recognize China. In addition, it was found that there is a certain tendency depending on demographic characteristics such as age, sex, education, and income level (Kang So-yeon, Seo Un-seok, 2012).

II Existing Research on 'Decision Factors of Perception'

'Perception' is the constitution of reality for the country where the policy decision is made and its partner (Richard K. Herrmann, 1985). Perception is formed in information processing and 'mutual exchange' of 'reality'. It has different meanings depending on how the individual interprets and refracts the diplomatic reality encountered in everyday life and what actually happened. For example, 'threat perception' is a crucial parameter between action and counter-action in the crisis of international relations. In other words, if the threat is not recognized, no matter how objective the evidence exists, the mobilization of resources for defense does not occur and the threat can be perceived even if the opponent does not act maliciously. In Korea's perception on China as well, the same reality of 'the rise of China' is sometimes actively involved in the objective reality, but at some point, it can be seen that threat perception does not work. In the end, Koreans' perception on China is also formed in inter-Korean exchanges, the facts about China, and the issue of how Koreans interpret and understand 'issues or events' in bilateral relations. Perception is influenced by "psychological orientation" (Dean G. Pruitt, 1965), which is derived from distrust, past experience, contingency planning, and personal concern.

The study of perception on other countries is a study of 'psychological aspects' of diplomatic relations and foreign policy. The impact of psychological and cultural factors on international relations and foreign policy decisions cannot be overemphasized (Glen Fisher, 1997). There is a lot of existing research on the perception on the other country as an important subject of diplomacy. The study mainly analyzes the influence of policy makers' misunderstanding on diplomatic relations and disputes; there are studies that analyze the impact of public perception on diplomatic relations and foreign policy decisions. In other words, most of the analysis focus on the causal relationship of 'foreign relations and foreign policy decisions' as dependent variables and 'perception' as the independent variable.

1. Research on regime and perception

Generally, public perception or notion plays a very important role in regime's foreign policies.³ Robert Jervis (1976) emphasized that in the "Perception and Misperception in International Politics", the empirical findings of some significant decision-making processes in domestic relations play an equally important role in the decision-making process. In particular, he divided the perspectives as worldview, normative belief, and causal belief in his "Perspective and policy of domestic politics: belief, institution and political change," and asserted that they act in the following ways and affect the internal determining process. First, viewpoints help distinguish the benefits and serve as road signs. Second, when there is competition for various interests, the viewpoint serves as concentration and glue, and helps to form a cooperative federation. Third, the viewpoint can be converted into the system, and the effect of durability can be demonstrated. A similar study is Judith Goldstei's "Ideology and Foreign Policy", which emphasized that ideas and beliefs provide guidelines for actors to make goals and means clearer. Especially when there is no possible policy choice, the idea was often considered to be an important determinant of government policy. He pointed out that organizational culture, bureaucratic pressure, social culture, and institutional factors have important constraints on individual perceptions, while recognizing that perceptual and social factors are combined. It has been found that there is a mutual relationship between perception and international relations by applying to the problems that are transferred to the national level.

³ Regime is identified with a broad meaning in this thesis, such as the government's policy, political period and or government.

As a result of this government policy and the perception on China, there is a case in which general public's preference for foreign policy and public support play a very important role in Korea-US FTA promotion (Park, Young-hwan, 2014). However, some scholars have pointed out that domestic public opinion is a key determinant of government policy, and that international system factors, presidential personal factors, and domestic policy-making structure are more important than domestic public opinion (Yang Sul, 2017). In other words, Park Geun-hye's government that had the highest cooperative perception on China made a choice to implement the THAAD deployment policy, which is an opposite direction to the cooperative perception on China. As a result, it is seen that the government's policy and the perception on China are mutually independent and can be dependent variables; however, there has been no research on which factors are more important than others or how independent and dependent variables change according to what other factors, other. Therefore, in this paper carries out a more in-depth study on the mutual relations based on the data of the each of the government's policy toward China and survey data from the politicals of Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye.

2. Research on regionalism and perception

Korea developed at a rapid pace after liberation and experienced different history, politics, and pace of development in different regions, but with different political tendencies and regionalism. In addition, regionalism became stronger due to the Confucian culture and the "petition" culture in Korea, and the western area (Honam) is geographically easier to trade with China than the eastern area, which may result in a difference in perception. In addition, it is very meaningful to study the perception on China by distinguishing the regions because there is no existing research on the perception on China according to classifications of regions.

There are no studies on the perception on China according to regionalism. However, in the 2000s, based on the survey of voters' consciousness during the election process, there exists studies on the influence of regional awareness and regionalism as well as cognition. It analyzed whether the variable 'region' in the actual elections affects voters' voting decision process. Particularly, these tendency studies use the data obtained from the questionnaires such as voter consciousness survey and opinion survey, election results and aggregate data. Based on these data, we can see what variables were important in the election, how much the

explanatory power of the variables of the region is, and how the voting behaviors of the regional states appeared in the elections.

The recent regional studies show that the voting behavior of the provincial governments after the democratization is still valid (Yoon Kwang-il 2013: 2012; Kim Sung-soo 2013; Lee Gab-yoon, Park Chung-suk 2011, other.), in which the voting process is deteriorating and becoming a substitute for existing regional cleavages (Lee Nae-young, Jung Han-wool 2013; Kang Won-taek 2010:2003; Choi Joon-young, Cho Jin-man 2005, other.) (Jung Sang-ho 2016). Yoon Kwang-il (2012), in his analysis based on the 19th National Assembly election voter survey in 2012, shows that regionalism has an important influence on voting behavior, and that regionalism affects the preference of political parties and politicians in an indirect way. In another study (Cho Jin-man, 2013) based on the 18th Presidential Election Voter Survey in 2012, he claimed that it is hard to say that cleavages have replaced the regional cleavages yet, and that the results show that there are signs of change in regionalism and that political parties play an important role in the continuation of regional voting behavior. On the other hand, Kang Won-taek (2003) pointed out that, in the 16th presidential election in 2002, localism was emphasized and generational and ideological factors were greatly emphasized during the election process. The results of the election revealed that the concentration of votes in the region was the same as in the past, but the ideological propensity of voters and their perception on support for North Korea influenced voting decisions. As a result, the 2002 presidential election showed "the possibility of de-alignment from past party support patterns", which means "the realignment of party support by other factors such as ideology has now begun" (2003, 254). Choi Jong-young and Cho Jin-man (2005), who analyzed the 17th National Assembly election in 2004, also showed that ideological and household variables were important factors, while regional cleavages decreased significantly. The influence of these variables increased compared to previous elections; as a result, it is argued that homogeneity in the region is shaking.⁴

⁴In another study (2010) analyzing the results of the 17th presidential election in 2007, Kang Won-taek argues that regionalism is changing in a different form from that of the previous. In particular, this process distinguishes between the area of origin and the area of residence of voters, which means that regionalism is not based on emotional and emotional factors as before, but is transformed into conflict based on substantive policy interests. Lim Sung-hak (2011) also shows that the importance of regionalism is decreasing due to the influences of generations and ideologies on voting behavior. In addition, Lee Nae-young and Jung Han-wool (2013) also argue that generational effects replace regional cleavages. In addition, they claim that regional cleavage and generation

The previous studies on regionalism and perception that are discussed above have the following characteristics. First, the research on regionalism and perception on Korea has mainly studied the public perception related to voting in the political election process in Korea. Second, almost all the researches were analyzed. The survey of voters was usually a questionnaire on political consciousness and political knowledge conducted before and after the election. Lastly, previous studies have shown different perceptions according to the regionalism of Youngnam and Honam, so most of the studies have analyzed the differences of political support and political consciousness among the Youngnam and Honam regions. In other words, it sees a wide range of large areas such as Youngnam area and Honam area as one target. In this way, the question of whether Koreans can have a very different position in relation to a particular political issue in different regions can be questioned that their perception on China may also vary greatly from region to region. In addition, regionalism and Chinese perception based on the study of regional voting, especially in the election, can also be observed. This paper will examine the perception on China as a region moderated on the Youngnam and Honam regions by adopting the perspectives of these existing studies.

3. Research on political ideology and perception

Apart from regionalism, the political ideology represented by progressivism and conservatism may affect the perception on the other country. Particularly in Korea, progressivism and conservatism are closely related to security, and they can be a key factor influencing the perception on the United States and China in the security situation on the Korean peninsula under the North Korean factor and the US strategic rivalry (Cha Jung-mi, 2012).

The existing research on the ideological propensity of Koreans is summarized as follows. First, conservatism and progressivism are not the confrontation of ideals that pursue the true right and the essence of the left. It is a confrontation between conservative and progressive forces rather than ideological confrontation (Kang Won-taek, 2010). Second, the boundary of ideological conflict is divided into political factors rather than those of the economic. Third, the low income class in Korea is not progressive but rather conservative, and the white color layer is progressive. This is largely due to the induction of support from low-income brackets

cleavage constitute a dual cleavage structure that constitutes the two core axes (Sung Kyung-ryoong 2015) has also been raised (Jung Sang-ho 2016).

by inducing profits in past authoritarianism. The trend of low-income group still pursuing pragmatism is still the same. Fourth, the difference of ideology by generations reflects age effect and generation effect. The relatively progressive tendency of the so-called 386 generation⁵ shows this. Fifth, the people of moderate tendency move to the alternative position through the learning period, and the progressive forces are greatly expanded. This can be attributed to the failure of alternatives or alternatives to conservative forces. Likewise, the absence of alternatives to the progressive forces in Korea has resulted in the emergence of the Lee Myung-bak administration and the Newlight (Lee, Hyun-chool 2005, 324-325).

In addition, it can be seen that there are variables such as gender, age, income, education level as demographic characteristics that can influence the awareness according to ideological tendency in the existing research. First, the aging effect and the generation effect, which can affect the political tendency, can be discussed separately. In terms of policy attitudes, age effects tend to be more conservative as voters get older. Generation effects share a unique political and social attitude among voters who share specific experiences over time. Second, the 'class betrayal phenomenon', in which the low-income class and the blue-collar class show a conservative tendency as a characteristic of Korean politics, was pointed out (Kang, Won-Taek 1998; 2003). Third, according to the ability to organize information, high-educated voters are more likely to have a consistent preference for different policies than non-voters (Barton and Parsons, 1977).

In addition to studying the characteristics of political ideology, political ideology is also linked to subjects of foreign policy. The subject of ideology⁶ such as the relationship between

⁵It refers to the generation born in the 1960s when the 4.19 generation and 6.3 generation, who were called the first generation of the Korean student movement, attended college, and who lived in college in the 1980s. The term "386" comes from the 386 computers that emerged in the mid-1990s, a concept that came into being in the 1990s when these generations began to appear on the political and social fronts. However, '386' numbers have their meanings. '3' refers to the 30s at the time of the 1990s, '8' refers to the students who attended college in the 1980s, and '6' refers to those who were born in the 1960s. That is, the 386 generation was born in the 1960s, went to college in the 1980s, and was in its 30s in the 1990s. It is narrowly limited to the student movement that led to the student movement and democratization struggle in the 1980s. In this case, there is a conceptual limit in that there is a tendency to exclude students who have entered university after the declaration of June 29, 1987, and that even if they are the same, they must go to college. Therefore, it is widely believed that people born in the 1960s should be seen as the 386 generations, whether they went to college or not, or whether they were involved in the student movement or not.

⁶ The political ideology 'conservative-progressive' terms that are usually divided into two classifications can also be observed in 4 different dimensions. First, in the economic dimension, the political tendency is divided into left and the right. Second, in social point of view, conservatism and progressivism are distinguished into libertarianism

ideology and foreign policy, the role of ideology, has been attracting attention as an important study subject of political science and many research results have been published to examine the influence of ideology, whether statistical analysis or historical narrative analysis. Ideologies distinguish between coherence and contrast as a system of beliefs that bind each other together. Ideology is, in a broad sense, a system of thinking that rationalizes itself, whether individuals or the whole society (Knight 2006, 619). The ideology has attracted attention as a factor affecting the perception and attitude of diplomacy and state relations. However, there is a cracking view on whether ideology and diplomacy perceptions have a meaningful influence.

In addition, many studies analyzing the relationship between ideology, foreign policy, and Chinese attitudes suggest that factionalism and ideology do not significantly affect public attitudes toward foreign policy, especially China (Page & Marshal 2006; Page & Tao 2010. Restated from Gries 2014). The survey results of the polling agency also argue that the difference between the Republican and the Democratic parties did not indicate a significant degree of foreign policy issues (Gries 2014, 318). However, there are a number of studies that argue that ideological differences are important factors in diplomatic awareness and foreign policy preference (Lee Sang-shin 2014; Namkoong Gon 2003; Javaid, Naz, Watoo & Rashid 2006; Nincic 2010; Hunt 2009). Horwitz and Peffley (1990) explain that in the analysis of national image change of the general public, the change of national image is influenced by partisan and ideological identity. Murray and Cowden (1999) argued that ideology-based foreign policy beliefs and positive images play a key role in the Cold War as well as in the post-Cold War era. Berinsky (2007) argues that public support for the war reflects a paradoxical crack in analyzing public opinion on the war. Ideology is like a shortcut to learning information, so individuals generally apply ideological political tendencies to determine the priorities of foreign policy. In other words, if ideological and sectarian leaders reveal their perception on diplomatic issues, then the same ideological group and sectarian powers recognize diplomatic issues as defined by their leaders (Mirilovic & Kim 2017, 180).

The role of ideology in China's perceptions and diplomatic attitudes along with the rise of China is attracting attention (Mirilovic & Kim 2017; Gries 2014; Gries, Crowson & Cai 2012). It analyzes the changes and perceptions of Chinese perception by including ideology as a

and authoritarianism. Third, it can be divided into post-material and material value in the dimensions of post-materials, and fourth, it can be summarized as the rejection, abolition, maintenance, and survival or subsist in the level of security and foreign policy.

major independent variable. Rosenau (1988) argues that conservatives and Republican supporters among US policymakers are stouter than liberals or Democrats. Thrall (2007) argues that conservatives tend to feel more of China's military threat than liberals, and Gries and Crowson (2010) also claim that conservatives tend to view China as a threat. On the other hand, Mirilovic and Kim (2017) argue that conservatives tend to favor more engagement policies for emerging economies because of economic benefits.

There are various discussions on the question of whether the role of ideology on foreign policy and the role of ideology on foreign policy have a meaningful influence and what kind of ideological tendency perceive what perception or foreign policy tendency. Especially, Korea is in a situation where the North and South Korea are divided while maintaining the ideological cleavage of the Cold War era. Therefore, studies analyzing the correlation between domestic ideological cleavages and foreign policy have very important academic and policy values. In this regard, there is little research on the relationship between ideology and foreign policy or diplomatic attitudes in Korea (Lee, Sang-shin, 2014; Lee Nae-young, Jung Han-wool 2005; Park Hyun-sook, Namkoong Gon 2003; Kim Tae-hyun, Namkoong Gon, Yang Yoo-seok 2003). In particular, there is little research on the role of ideology on the perception on China or the problem of foreign policy toward China. The relationship between ideology and perception on China has been intermittently presented in the results of questionnaires on foreign policy preference by public opinion research institutes, but it is hard to find in systematic and analytical studies. In this regard, it is necessary to deeply analyze the perception on the Chinese by the political ideology, focusing on progressivism, moderation and conservatism⁷.

4. Research on period effect and perception

⁷This paper focuses on progressivism and conservatism mainly in terms of international politics or security. While progressive camps emphasize the importance of international peace and international cooperation, conservatives tend to place more emphasis on military power and national interests (Budge et al. 2001: 21-24). In Korea, this appears to be a conflict over anti-communist ideologies such as the attitude toward North Korea, the attitude toward alliance with the United States, and the National Security Law. The differences in political positions surrounding the sunshine policy promoted during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments were fueled by violent ideological conflicts because the security issues represented by North Korea policies reflect the differences in fundamental values beyond merely the preferences of policy alternatives. The conservative position in the Korean society is that the anti-communist ideology needs to be maintained as a whole, such as hardline stance toward North Korea, reinforcement of the US-ROK Alliance, and maintenance of the National Security Law, while progressivism state that they should be abolished or fundamentally changed.

Period effect means that the occurrence of a major social event or impact affects all groups, thus changing the overall choice and direction.⁸ Time, age, and cohort form three axes of temporary change. In particular, sociological studies have been conducted in various fields.

Miguel and Mikolaj (2014) argue that the political participation of the Catholic Church under the dictatorship of Spain and Poland in the "Religiosity and politics in Spain and Poland: A period effect analysis." The authors used data from the 1991-2008 General Survey of Poland and the Survey conducted by the Moderate for Sociological Studies in Spain (CIS) in 1975-1995. The results confirmed that the political intervention of the Catholic Church affected different countries' subsequent religious practices differently. As a result, the secularization of Spain in the political transition in the late 1970s was extreme, while the secularization of Poland in the 1990s had little change.

In the "Cohort, Life Cycle and Left-Right Identification in South Korea: Analysis of World Values Survey 1990-2010," Huh Seok-jae (2014), through a long-term analysis, examined the effect of the generation effect on ideology. Although research shows that people tend to be conservative according to aging (age effect), the generation of relatively conservative and progressive generations may be formed due to the historical experience of generation-formation (generation effect) and ideological formation (period effect), and that due to the interdependence of these three, one is derived automatically through the other two. The authors used the proprietary APC model to see how each effect affected. In particular, from 1990 to 2010, the analysis of the Korean data on Korea's global values survey revealed that there was no generation effect, and it was revealed that age-related changes and the period effect at that time played a major role in determining subjective ideology.

This study used the implicit estimator method proposed by Yang, Fu and Land (2004) to estimate the school dropout rate in "Age-Period-Cohort Effects Analysis on School Dropout Rates" by classifying into grade (age), generation (cohort), period effect, other., and reinterpreted the implications of each effect. In particular, attention was paid to the period effects of the policies that the government had pursued in relation to the suspension of study, and confirmed that some government policies did not have a significant effect on the decrease in the school dropout rate.

⁸ Changes in the Societal Attribution and Upward Movement Consciousness in Korean Society: Focusing on Age, Period and Cohort Effect, Korean Society of Sociology, Vol. 50, No. 5 (2016), pp. 247-284.

Lee Wang-won et al. (1986), in their "Dynamics of Subjective Classification and Upward Mobility Consciousness in Korea: Time Trends and Age-Period-Cohort Effects" analyzed the change in perceptions of inequality and internal dynamics after the Korean economic crisis by observing the changes in hierarchical attribution and upward mobility with independent variables of age, period, and cohort. As a result of analysis, the distribution pattern of hierarchical attribution and upward consciousness tended to be very different, and it was found that they were highly heterogeneous according to age, period and cohort. Especially, it was found that the age effect had a strong influence on the perception on upward movement in the middle and upper generations, and it was confirmed that the period effect had a predetermined effect.

Kim Moonjo et al. (2012) in "The consciousness of upward movement of Koreans: focusing on the age, period, and cohort effect" in the period from 1999 to 2015 for 15 years after the IMF crisis, analyzed the change of consciousness of upward movement among generations of generations of Koreans. According to the Age-Period-Cohort Detrended model, the temporal variation of upward mobility was divided into three effects: age, period, and cohort. It is confirmed that the effect of the upward movement within the household is very low. Instead, higher consciousness of upward movement among generations was confirmed. This proved that the economic events of the IMF had a major impact on the likelihood of individual upward movement within the household, but did not have a significant impact on the longer-term perspective of upward migration among generations. The period effect emphasizes the fact that economic conditions and socio-political events that have had an impact on all members of society during the period are the source.

In previous studies, the period effect can be understood as the effect of economic situation, or socio-political crisis, on people's consciousness. In particular, the impact of the IMF crisis on Korean society has been found to have a negative effect on various dimensions such as politics, culture, and consciousness (Kim Moon-jo, 2008, Shin, Kwang-young, 2013). In the Korean society, the negative perception on North Koreans has been unstable and continuously fluctuating due to the impact of North Korea's nuclear weapons development and armed provocations under the situation of inter-Korean division. If so, is it possible that the period effect will occur according to these socially important events and that the perception on China will also be affected? In order to analyze this, it is necessary to summarize important events of Korea-China relations.

In Korea, after the period of opening the door to the hostile relationship with China during the Cold War in the 1970s and pursuing diplomatic relations, it achieved industrialization and democratization in the 1980s and normalized diplomatic relations with China. The following looks at what kind of perceptions have changed through major events by period.

In the pre-normalization period (1968-1987), there were Nixon Doctrine in 1967, President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, declaration of Park Chung-hee's 6.23 declaration in 1973, and the Asian Games in 1986 (participation of China). In the diplomatic approach to China or Korea-China normalization (1988-1997), there were 88 Olympics in 1988 (participation of China), the establishment of a Korea-China trade representative office in the post-Cold War period in 1991, concurrent enrollment of the United Nations in 1991, and diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992. During the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun government eras (1998-2007), it included the rise of the US "China threat" in 1992, the garlic dispute in 2000, anti-American candlelight demonstrations in 2002, Kimchi wave in 2005, and between 2004 and 2006, there was the Northeast Project issue. During the Lee Myung-bak administration period (2008-2012), there were the 2008 global financial crisis, the G2 competition and conflict system rise, the 2008 Korea-US alliance controversy, the 2008 Olympic torch clash, the second nuclear test in 2009, territorial dispute between China and Japan as well as resource threats to South Korea in 2010, the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong events in 2010, the Chinese fishing boat seizure case in 2012, and the North Korean defector problem. At the same time, history culture and territorial sovereignty disputes persisted, and there were issues such as the Northeast Process issue, Arirang, Myoiji conflict, and the Great Wall extension problem. In the period of the Park Geun-hye government (2012-2016), there were visits to China as the first country to visit after inauguration, the participation in the heat parade ceremony, and THAAD deployment from 2016 to 2017. When we look at Korea's early perception on China in 1992 during the diplomatic relations between Korea and China, we can see that it was influenced by President Park Chung-hee's declaration of the Korean peninsula in 1973 after the 6.23 declaration until the declaration of Nordpolitik.

Overall, Korea's perception on China in the 26 years after the establishment of diplomatic ties between Korea and China was largely attributed to the "formation of expectation, rise (1992-1997), rapid friendship period (1998-2003), the structural deterioration period (2008-2012) (Cha Jung-mi, 2012) and the adjustment period of perception (2012-2016). This trend is contrary to the economic and human relations between the two countries, which

showed a steady upward trend for the last 20 years (Yang Pyung-sup, 2015). From the opening diplomacy of the communist country in the 1970s to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992, and throughout the diplomatic period of 26 years, Korea's perception on China has undergone major changes, and it is still in a 'transitional' phase (Lim Dae-geum 2013).

In the case of the above-mentioned events that affect Korea-China relations and public awareness in Korea, there are cases such as 'Northeast Project' and 'Kimchi Wave' which are the problems between Korea and China. However, there also exist the 'normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and China,' 'Six-Party Talks', and so on. Among them, the Kimchi Wave is a temporary phenomenon that affects the perception on China to the Korean people, but the North Korean problem is the ongoing event and the biggest external factor influencing the Korea-China relationship. In this way, important issues in Korean diplomacy are mostly related to the division of the Korean peninsula, and the development of Korea-China relations is also influenced by inter-Korean relations. In other words, if inter-Korean relations are stable, Korea-China relations can develop, but if the inter-Korean relations are crushed, Korea will depend on the United States, and the ROK-US alliance will be strengthened and criticism against China will increase. Therefore, Koreans' perception on China can be influenced by the North Korea issue, and when such an event happens, it can have a period effect on Koreans' perception on China according to how they interpret and understand the events. The period effect here does not refer to an effect that occurs in the perception on China whenever big or small events occur, but refers to something that concurs a big change in the whole public's perception on China regardless of the differences in regions, ideology, or demography that affect a large effect in the Korea-China relationship.

As pointed out above, factors affecting the perception on China are influenced not only by regional, political ideological factors but also external factors such as political. If an external event had an impact on the perception of the people of Korea, it could be said that this external factor has a period effect. Therefore, in order to investigate whether the North Korean factor has a period effect on the perception of China, it must first summarize the big events affecting the Korea-China relationship, analyze whether the North Korean factors have a period effect in these big events, and see how Koreans have changed their perception on China and North Korea. In other words, it is necessary to study whether there is a common denominator in the change of the Korean people's perception on North Korea and China, and

how the Koreans' perception on China is affected according to China's position on North Korea. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the period effect of the Korean people's perception on China through the external variables of North Korea Moderateing on the major events that affect the Korea-China relationship.

5. Hypotheses

Through previous researches on perceptions and its influencing factors, this research tries to capture the dynamic changing aspect of the perception on China that is shown through an interaction between regime, which is an exogenous variable, and region and political ideology, which are endogenous variables. This paper presents several hypotheses as follows.

The different policies of each political affect the relations between countries as well as the perception on the citizens toward other countries. In recent years from 2007 to 2016, Korea's political changed from that of progressive to conservative, and according to the changed policy in the process, the bilateral relationship between Korea and China have deeply influenced the Koreans' perception on China by the dynamic process of intimacy and wistfulness.

Hypothesis 1: Koreans demonstrate different patterns of perception on China according to different political periods.

The unique feelings and supporting ideologies and perceptions by different regions are formed over an extensive period of time. In some regions in Korea, they have experienced different political, economic and social developments for a long time. Consequently, some regions have distinct characteristics, and according to them, there exists conflicting patterns, especially in Honam and Youngnam regions.

Hypothesis 2: Koreans' perception on China differs depending on the region, mainly in Honam and Youngnam.

Korea's ideology on diplomacy and security is basically conflicted with two values between 'Korea-US alliance vs. anti-America' and 'anticommunism vs. pro-North.' Cold war and hostile rivalry between South and North Korea that have lingered after the establishment of Republic of Korea, as well as the perceptions and attitudes toward 'North Korea' and 'the United States' in the history of the ROK-US alliance and authoritarian political are the main factors that form the diplomatic and security ideology of Korea.

Hypothesis 3: Koreans differ in the perception on China according to the different political ideologies of progressivism, moderate, and conservatism.

The development of the two countries Korea and China is affected not only by the bilateral relations, but also by the relations between the US and North Korea as well as North Korea and China. The North Korean issue is the largest external factor influencing the development of Korea-China relations (Dong Xiangrong, 2016), and China's attitude toward North Korea has been of great interest to Koreans. Especially, when the North Korean issue occurred on the Korean peninsula, how China dealt with the problem had a great influence on the Koreans' perception toward China.

Hypothesis 4: There is a period effect on Koreans' perception on China in the event of an important North Korean issue related to Korea-China relations.

III Perception on China and Differences –Alternative Analysis

Framework

Social perception is the way in which an individual understands and thinks about others and makes inferences about others or objects through social information of the surrounding environment. In other words, social perception is the process of inferring and judging the psychological state, motivation of action, and intentions, and the factors influencing such perception are endogenous variables and exogenous variables.

Endogenous variable is the variable that is included in econometrics to determine its movement or its value within the model. The endogenous variables are determined depending on the exogenous variables that are determined outside of the model. In other words, if the exogenous variable changes, the endogenous variable also changes. In this sense, we can see the exogenous variables as inputs to the model and the endogenous variables as outputs from the model. For a model, the distinction of which variables are exogenous or endogenous is not uniformly determined, but varies according to the nature of the model. However, in general, endogenous variables are often economic variables such as price, wage, interest rate, national income, consumption and investment.⁹

Exogenous variable is a variable that is determined outside the economic system when an economic model can be represented by a system of simultaneous equations. It is an economic

⁹ <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=1129730&cid=40942&categoryId=31819>

variable determined by various natural, technological, social, political or institutional forces. An exogenous variable is used to describe the endogenous variable (內生變數) whose movement or value is determined within the model. For example, under the economic system of the general equilibrium theory, the price is an endogenous variable and the content and quantity of the resource at that time is exogenous. In a model, which variables are exogenous or endogenous are not predetermined, and the distinction depends on the nature of each model

Exogenous variables include conditional variables and policy variables. In a model that explains the economy of a country, variables such as temperature and rainfall, are also variables considered to be exogenous. On the other hand, variables related to the policy management of the national economy, such as the fiscal expenditure or the fair interest rate, are policy variables. In the case of the model explaining the global economy, the economic trends of foreign countries, which were thought to be exogenous in a country's economic model, also turn into endogenous variables.

The above-mentioned endogenous and exogenous variables are not only widely used in the field of economics but also analyzed in many domestic and international cognitive researches. Therefore, factors affecting Koreans' perception on China can also be divided into endogenous variables and exogenous variables. The endogenous variable is the subject of the perception with the characteristics of the individual, and the gender, the history, the region, the political ideology, the level of education and the income level are caused by the internal difference of the perception subject. Exogenous variables come from the external environment, and there are various foreign policies that are executed after each political. These elements of "regime" belong to exogenous variables because they are not inherent elements of the people. In the same logic, the relationship between Korea and China has been influenced by the North Korean problem. When a series of important events related to North Korea arise and the China adopts an attitude towards the two Koreas, various perceptions are shown to South Koreans, and the external factors such as these important events are not characteristic of individual citizens. Therefore, it belongs to exogenous variables.

This paper sets the "South Koreans' perception on China" as dependent variable, and sets 'regime,' 'region and political ideology,' as independent variables in order to study the Koreans' perception on China and its characteristics. Furthermore, by analyzing the period effect of not only the above-stated variables but also the China's attitude and stance on inter-Korean issues, it makes efforts to prove that the latter can also have a great impact on

Koreans' perception on China. In particular, it sets regional and political ideologies as endogenous variables and regime as exogenous variables, and through these two perspectives, an analysis framework is established for Koreans' perception on China, and with this background, a comprehensive study is developed. A concrete image is shown in <Figure-4>.




Figure-4 South Koreans' Perception of China and Its Characteristics: Alternative Framework

Chapter 3 Research Methodology

I Objectives and Scope of Research

The subject of the paper is the South Koreans' perception on China. During the decade from 2007 to 2016 of the three governments, Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, the Korean regime, region, political ideology, and North Korean factors can be identified. This research scrutinizes what kind of influences these variables had on Koreans' perception on China, and what kind of differences exist by each variable, combining them as a whole and exploring their interactions as well as finding out the causes and explaining their implications.

There are several considerations in the selection of the 'research subject' in the study of the 'differences of Koreans' perception on China by variable.' First, it is a question of 'the subject of recognition' as to who to define 'China's perception' as 'Koreans' perception on China.' In other words, it is a question of who to set as the representative subject of recognition in examining the 'Koreans' perception on China.' Second, it is about the contents of 'perception,' specifically when the degree of perception on each variable is different for each variable regarding 'perception on other country,' or the sensitiveness of the change due to an event is different, through what means can the change be shown? In other words, it is the problem of 'source of understanding perception' and what kind of data can exhibit the change of perception.

First, the 'subject of perception' distinguishes 'perception on the state' as a single actor, 'absolute leader' such as the President, 'policy decision elite,' 'influential elite,' 'general public,' can be divided in order to conduct analysis¹⁰ In democratic countries, the general public's perception can have a decisive influence on the perception on policy decision-making groups,

¹⁰ The approach that sees 'nation' as the subject of perception is regarded as reflecting the 'national perception' of the speeches of senior leaders, government documents, editorials and articles of institutional media. The approach that sees 'leader' as the subject of recognition analyzes the perception and beliefs of senior leaders themselves. The approach that regards 'minority elites involved in foreign policy making' as the subject of recognition is the subject of analysis of the perception on high ranking officials toward other countries. The approach in seeing 'influential elites' such as opinion groups and experts who can influence foreign policy makers, is analyzed by various groups such as scholars, businessmen, and diplomats. The perception on 'the general public' is the most influential factor in government policy decision in the democratic countries, and it focuses on the public perception and foreign policy attitude toward other countries.

and on the contrary, policy-making groups can influence the public's perception. In terms of measuring the Koreans' perception on China and the differences of perceptions, the most objective and accessible material in measuring is the public opinion survey that studied the perception and preference of the general public. Also, generally when evaluating Koreans' perceptions whether or not they have become 'better,' 'worse,' other., the grounds in which the evaluation is conducted are the survey results of the public perception, and it can also be analyzed through total, objective statistical data. Furthermore, since the democratization of Korea, the influence and importance of 'the general public' on foreign policies have increased day by day, and the information gap between policy makers and the general public has sharply decreased. This has resulted in the 'foreign policy' not being localized among small number of elites, and public awareness, as the perception on the general public, is an important factor influencing diplomatic relations and foreign policy decisions. Therefore, this paper focuses on the perception on the 'general public,' and uses secondary literature such as research papers based on survey results and public opinion polls of the major public opinion agencies and the media, as well as the opinion polls as the data for analysis.

Second, 'sources of understanding perception' including the means to grasp the contents of 'perception' as well as the data through which it can be understood can be classified into statistical survey (opinion survey, questionnaire interviews' other.), 'statements by policy makers,' 'academic literature,' 'media reports,' other. 'Korean Unification Perception Survey' is a systematic survey designed to understand the contents of perceptions by conducting survey questionnaires as well as the survey target of the same size, and the iterative and regular analysis the survey results help understand the contents and trends of the abstract 'perception' data. This paper first analyzes these statistical data and uses other resources such as policy makers' remarks, media reports, and academic papers for a complementation of inferring the contents of 'perception.'

Third, it is a problem regarding 'Perceptions on China,' specifically in questioning what kind of variables should be used as target for analysis. This paper chooses the independent variables that affect the change of perception towards China as the 'regime' (based on the government's policy and Korea-China relations in different political periods), the 'regional and political ideology,' and analyzes the relationship between changes and differences of perceptions toward China for each of the four different independent variables. In other words,

the main analysis targets are the three regimes of Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, regional and political ideologies, and North Korean factors.

II Conceptualization and Measurement of Perception on China

Perception is a psychological concept, a process of acquiring knowledge through psychological activities such as concept, intuition, judgment, or imagination, or the process of handling information with personal reasons. The concept of perception is one through which one can understand how people know and recognize information, and the beliefs and attitudes of the perception subject recognize this part of the system. The process of forming perception involves all things from the combination of perceptions and memory problems to information processing, language, and cognition (Robert Jervis, 1976). Under this theoretical definition, the "Koreans' perception on China" in this paper covers the general concept and intuition, judgment detection, appreciation, and interest on China. From the viewpoint of international politics, the perception on China can be distinguished if they can be friends, on the same side or different side, or if they are friends or threats. These kinds of perceptions are different from national image, and images are a general term of belief, attitude, and perception. So, it can be said that the range is wider in that its scope is more than merely perception but something that includes politics, economics, military, diplomacy, society, culture, geography, and history. In a comprehensive review of previous studies on 'awareness of China,' these studies have commonly researched "What is China today for Koreans, after China has emerged as a G2?" Furthermore, for the past 40 years, the survey data on Koreans' perception on China may have some differences in perceptual angle depending on the contents of the questionnaires, but it is largely a preference survey that can comprehend the change of friendly perceptions toward China (question that asks which one prefers between the US or China, other.) or cognitive research (If perception on China has changed negatively or positively, other.). In particular, the "Korean Social Survey" and "Unification Perception Survey" grasp the degree of favorability in perception on China, and they are very meaningful and important data in the sense that it studied the Koreans' perception on China through continuous observation of the changes in the perception for over a decade on the international background compared with other countries.

In setting the Koreans' perception on China as the dependent variable, the degree of perception can be classified into 'favorable vs. hostile,' 'opportunity vs. threat,' 'friendliness vs.

antipathy,' and so on. In addition, according to the media survey in the recent decade, it is important to recognize China as a target of cooperation, competition target, border target, hostile target.' Here, the perception on cooperating objects as a target includes the sense of goodwill, preference, friendliness, and opportunity recognition. The target of competition is a moderate perception that targets opportunities and threats, nervousness, antipathy, threat recognition, and hostile awareness.

These perceptions that Korea have toward China have greatly changed before and after the cold war. During the cold war period, Korea and China regarded each other as enemies because of ideological differences; however, nowadays there are many changes in consciousness. Therefore, this paper sets the 'boundary target' and 'hostile target' of 'Korean Unification Perception Survey" as 'negative object.' In other words, this paper applies 'negative object' to the question "What is China for Koreans?" for "boundary object" and "hostile object."

In addition, in the case of North Korea, Koreans regard China as a socialist country that has close ties with North Korea, a country that supports not only economic and political sectors but also gives passive responses to North Korea's armed protests and provocations with a solidarity responsibility. Furthermore, in the past ten or so years of Korean surveys, Koreans were most afraid of China's military intervention in the event of a Chinese intervention on the Korean Peninsula. In the Korean War, there was a history of China helping North Korea, and even though the situation on the Korean Peninsula changed a great deal, South Koreans are still afraid that the Chinese military intervention will not bring about the national desire for unification. Also, in the event of military friction or clashes on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea is anxious and unreliable about China, as the US will surely help South Korea as an ally, while China is uncertain and bordered by North Korea. In order to further clarify the above-mentioned, the research asks two questions: "Is China responsible for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations?" and "Which side will China take in the event of a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula? Through these two questions, it confirms the period effect for Koreans' perception on China.

Put together, this paper classifies the "perception on China" as 'cooperation target,' 'competition target,' and 'negative target,' and further examines how these differences develop according to 'regime,' 'region,' and 'political ideology.' Moreover, in terms of the exogenous variables of the North Korean problem, which is something that the Koreans are most

interested in about China, the study examines what kind of differences exist in the Koreans' perception on China by group through the two questions regarding 'recognition of the Korean position and attitude toward China in the event of a military conflict between the two Koreas' and 'Koreans' perception on whether or not China is responsible when the inter-Korean relations deteriorate.

III Research Methodology

1. Research Methodology

This paper mainly uses the method of quantitative research in analyzing the difference of public perception.

First, the national perception analysis of China uses sociological quantitative research methodology. The text is based on the statistical analysis and multinomial logic analysis through the STATA program using the "Korean Unification Perception Survey" conducted by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies Seoul National University from 2007 to 2016. Furthermore, endogenous variables such as regional and political ideals are analyzed in order to deeply analyze the public perceptions and differences, and study the characteristics and reasons for the Koreans' perceptions on China.

Next, in terms of theoretical analysis, the through sociological research, it explores the changes of people's perceptions in all directions and diverse ways on the basis of perception and influencing factors, as well as national perceptions and international relations theory, and derive internal and external factors influencing the perception on China.

In addition, in terms of reality taken in historical background, literature review, comparative analysis, and case analysis are conducted. First, it focuses on Korean and Chinese literature related to the history of Korea-China relations, North-China relations, inter-Korean relations, as well as major events related to Korea-China relations. In analyzing publications, newspapers, and statistical data related to the perception on the Korean domestic public, the paper maintains an objective position by focusing on government data when studying government policies. Second, it analyzes the difference and characteristics of perception among Koreans through regional, political ideology, gender and age, gender level, and income level. Third, it tries to identify the cause of the influence by analyzing and inducing the major events affecting the people's perception on China.

2. Research Data

This study analyzed the data moderated on primary data using that of the 'Korean Unification Perception Survey' conducted from 2007 to 2016 based on primary data. Since 2007, the Institute for Unification and Peace Research at Seoul National University has been analyzing the trends of how people are changing their perceptions, attitudes, and directions year after year. Through this, one can confirm the Korean peoples' perception on the flexible reality. In response to the changes in domestic and international circumstances related to the unification issue, items related to the current issue were newly established and accumulated through regular surveys every year. In order to analyze the changes in perceptions and attitudes toward unification and North Korea, consistent progress was made. It also maintains the basic framework without major changes, adding or changing only a few questions on a small number of issues. The contents of the survey on unification consciousness are divided into five categories. Specifically, the views on unification of North and South Korea, the perceptions and attitudes toward North Korea, the evaluation of North Korea policy, the attitudes toward North Korean defectors, and the relationship with neighboring countries are included. In addition to the five areas on which these surveys are based, the Unification Perception Survey examines the demographic characteristics of the respondents as a trait variable. Basic trait variables include gender, age, education, occupation, income level, residential area, marital status, religion, and political orientation.

The survey group is similar every year, which includes a combination of both males and females aged between 19 to 74 that reside in 16 cities nationwide (Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Gwangju, Ulsan, Gyeonggi Province, Gangwon Province, Chungcheongnambuk Province, North Jeolla Province, North Gyeongsang Province, Jeju), on the basis of 2016. The number of valid samples is 12,000, and the sample error is $\pm 2.8\%$ at 95% confidence level. The sampling was performed using multi-staged stratified sampling. The questionnaires were created by the Gallup Research Institute of Korea and used a one-to-one interview method using a structured questionnaire. The original data were processed by editing, coding, and punching, using statistical package for the SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Science) 21.0 version program. The original data of the Unification Perception Survey is provided with the questionnaire and codebook through the Korean Social Science Resource Moderate.

These survey data are cumulative data for 10 years from 2007 to 2016, and the cumulative total number of targets is 11,860. Through similar questions every year, the survey is

conducted for 10 consecutive years, and it is very useful for studying the changes and perceptions of Koreans over the past decade. However, this study has two limitations due to the fact that the survey subject changes every year, and the data itself has limited characteristics. First, some of the data used in this paper starts from 2007, so the Roh Moo-hyun political is included for only one year. Regards to this issue, first, the data of the Koreans' perception on China during the Roh, Moo-hyun political was analyzed through the one-year data, and the polls conducted by other public opinion polls were supplemented for the lack of data. In order to maintain the objectivity of the results, the paper analyzed the data of 2007 during the Roh, Moo-hyun period, focusing on the technical analysis. It did not conduct a multinomial logit analysis but a multinomial analysis for the Roh's period. Instead, a multinomial logit analysis was performed for the politicals of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye in order to study the Koreans' perception on China. In addition, there is a lack of data for 2017 when the deterioration of South Korea and China's relationship happened after the decision to deploy THAAD. In this research, it only includes the data from 2012 to 2016 during Park's political period, which only shows the peak of good atmosphere of two countries and friendly perceptions. The second limitation is that although the survey was conducted on the same scale every year, it was not conducted through the same respondents for 10 years.

3. General Characteristics of the Survey Subjects

Since the first survey conducted in 2007, the Unification Perception Survey surveyed a total of 11,860 people for 10 years, and the general characteristics of survey subjects are classified by gender, age, education, income level, and political ideology. In this study, some of these general characteristics are re-classified to fit the study. In gender, the basic contents of men and women were similar, so the study did not separate them again. Age was divided into five age groups: 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s. Of these, the age group for the 20s account for more than half of the total population, and the other age groups basically account for 15 to 20% each. For the level of education, three groups are classified: middle school graduates or lower, high school graduates, and university graduates. Among them, the proportion of high school graduates are close to 40%. For the income level, it is divided into 4 groups: monthly income of 2 million KRW, 2~3 million KRW, 3~4 million KRW, and over 4 million KRW, and among them, about 40% of the total were in the group that has over 4 million KRW of monthly income, and 3~4 million KRW next. Regionally, it has been classified into three groups:

Honam, Youngnam, and others. Among them, the proportion of other regions is about 60%, Honam is about 12%, and Youngnam is about 28%. In terms of political ideology, it is classified into 3 groups, including conservative, moderate and progressive. Among them, the proportion for moderate is the most common with 50%, and conservative and progressive has fairly low rates. Table-1 shows the above content.

Table-1 Unification Perception Survey (2007~2016) General Characteristics of Respondent

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Sex	Male	592	583	597	600	600	608	592	603	610
		(50.60)	(49.70)	(50.29)	(50.29)	(51.28)	(50.84)	(49.87)	(50.71)	(50.83)
Age Group	Female	578	590	590	593	570	588	595	586	590
		(49.40)	(50.30)	(49.71)	(49.71)	(48.72)	(49.16)	(50.13)	(49.29)	(49.17)
Level of education	20s	295	257	299	302	252	253	246	247	225
		(25.21)	(21.91)	(25.19)	(25.31)	(21.54)	(21.15)	(20.72)	(20.77)	(18.75)
Level of income	30s	304	299	310	312	283	281	272	263	237
		(25.98)	(25.49)	(26.12)	(26.15)	(24.19)	(23.49)	(22.91)	(22.12)	(19.75)
Region	40s	297	336	303	301	302	307	304	297	275
		(25.38)	(28.64)	(25.53)	(25.23)	(25.81)	(25.67)	(25.61)	(24.98)	(22.92)
Political ideology	50s	191	203	189	192	249	261	267	274	253
		(16.32)	(17.31)	(15.92)	(16.09)	(21.28)	(21.82)	(22.49)	(23.04)	(21.08)
Honam	60s+	83	78	86	86	84	94	98	108	210
		(7.09)	(6.65)	(7.25)	(7.21)	(7.18)	(7.86)	(8.26)	(9.08)	(17.50)
Youngnam	Middle	150	140	129	103	108	105	114	92	129
		(12.82)	(11.94)	(10.87)	(8.63)	(9.23)	(8.78)	(9.60)	(7.74)	(10.75)
Other	High	498	551	488	460	504	554	575	513	491
		(42.56)	(46.97)	(41.11)	(38.56)	(43.08)	(46.32)	(48.44)	(43.15)	(40.92)
Progressive	College+	522	482	570	630	558	537	498	584	580
		(44.62)	(41.09)	(48.02)	(52.81)	(47.69)	(44.90)	(41.95)	(49.12)	(48.33)
Moderate	<200	275	233	222	202	202	149	148	106	127
		(23.50)	(19.86)	(18.70)	(16.93)	(17.26)	(12.46)	(12.47)	(8.92)	(10.58)
Conservative	200-300	364	390	350	315	283	311	265	232	214
		(31.11)	(33.25)	(29.49)	(26.40)	(24.19)	(26.00)	(22.33)	(19.51)	(17.83)
Honam	300-400	291	331	350	330	377	372	376	391	371
		(24.87)	(28.22)	(29.49)	(27.66)	(32.22)	(31.10)	(31.68)	(32.88)	(30.92)
Youngnam	400+	240	219	265	346	308	364	398	460	488
		(20.51)	(18.67)	(22.33)	(29.00)	(26.32)	(30.43)	(33.53)	(38.69)	(40.67)
Other	Honam	131	136	130	128	125	127	127	176	178
		(11.20)	(11.59)	(10.95)	(10.73)	(10.68)	(10.62)	(10.70)	(14.80)	(14.83)
Other	Youngnam	319	325	324	323	310	310	311	326	326
		(27.26)	(27.71)	(27.30)	(27.07)	(26.50)	(25.92)	(26.20)	(27.42)	(27.17)
Moderate	Other	720	712	733	742	735	759	749	687	696
		(61.54)	(60.70)	(61.75)	(62.20)	(62.82)	(63.46)	(63.10)	(57.78)	(58.00)
Progressive	Progressive	299	283	294	395	285	292	291	351	291
		(25.56)	(24.12)	(24.77)	(33.11)	(27.78)	(27.34)	(24.52)	(27.34)	(24.25)
Conservative	Moderate	555	558	574	538	564	589	591	573	597
		(47.44)	(47.57)	(48.36)	(45.10)	(48.21)	(49.25)	(49.79)	(48.19)	(49.75)
Conservative	Conservative	316	332	319	260	281	258	305	291	312
		(27.01)	(28.30)	(26.87)	(21.73)	(24.01)	(23.05)	(25.69)	(24.47)	(26.00)

Chapter 4 Perceptions on China According to Regime

The South Korea-China relationship over the past 60 years since the establishment of the Republic of Korea can be divided into the following five stages. The first stage is the 'hostility period' between 1948 and 1979, the second stage is the 'early improvement of relationship period' between 1979 to 1987, the third stage is the 'take-off period' from 1988 to 1990, the fourth stage is the 'relationship normalization period,' and the fifth stage is the 'maturity period' from 1993 up to now (Jeong, Jae-ho, 2011). Since the South Korea-China diplomatic normalization, the two countries have achieved remarkable outcomes in politics, economics, and cultural areas. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that during the 26 years of diplomatic relations, the two countries have developed a quantitative and qualitative relationship with each other. In 1992, the Roh Tae-woo government and the Jiang Zemin government established friendly cooperative relations, and in 1998, the Kim Dae-jung political period and Jiang Zemin government established a cooperative partnership. At that time, the relationship between the two countries operated for the first time in the framework of 'companions.' In 2003, the Roh Moo-hyun government and the Hu Jintao government, both starting from the two countries, expanded the existing partnership to a full-fledged cooperation partnership. In 2008, the Lee Myung-bak administration and the Hu Jintao government established strategic partnership. In 2013, the Park Geun-hye administration and the Xi Jinping government increased cooperation partnership. Especially, with the emergence of China, bilateral relations have been increasingly influential not only in South Korea but also in the whole Korean Peninsula and East Asia. In particular, China has been actively promoting economic construction moderated on China through the strategy of 'One Belt, One Road with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and is actively seeking to build a Chinese order with global power through 'New Great Power Relations'. Through such changes in the status of China, the perceptions that South Korea have towards China also have gradually changed. When analyzing the changing trend of the Koreans' perception of China based on the results of the survey on the perceptions conducted by the media and research institutes in South Korea over the past 20 years, the changes can be classified into three stages: first, 'formative period of the perceptions for expectations' during the early years of diplomatic normalization, 'cracking period or sudden change period' during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun

periods, and 'worsening period' during the Lee Myung-bak administration. The Koreans' perception of China differs from political period to political period. Then, is the 'regime' a significant variable for Koreans' perception of China? Through what kind of target are the Koreans perceiving China as? Specifically, what is the pattern of Koreans' perception of China according to each of the governments? What kind of differences exist in the perception of China by each group, and what are the causes for the different perceptions?

With this awareness of the problem, this chapter aims to analyze the Koreans' perception on China over the past decade by each political period, and it has the purpose of studying the differences and changes by each political period. The composition of this chapter is as follows. It first looks at the perception of Koreans' perception on China by year. Next, it scrutinizes the perceptions in the period of Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye respectively. Lastly, it examines the changes of Koreans' perception toward China and the causes of change in each political period.

I Trends and Changes of Koreans' Perceptions on China

Considering the deepening of economic interdependence between South Korea and China, the expansion of China's influence on inter-Korean relations, and the role of China in the future of unification, there have been dynamic changes that have occurred in Korea's perception of China, and there could still be many changes yet to be made. The establishment of South Korea-China diplomatic normalization in 1992 certainly played a major role in the changing perception of Koreans' view on China; however, the perception toward China has a lot of liquidity unlike the perception toward the US. This is due to the fact that the image of the nation is shaped by the US-ROK alliance, while China has many variables such as the rise of national power, the change of status as an emerging power, and the rapid change of Korea-China relations (Lee Nae-young, 2015). In addition, it should also be noted that the perception toward China has been formed together with the Koreans' sentiments toward the North (Lee, Jeong-nam, 2012). According to the 'Korean Unification Perception Survey', Koreans' perception toward China is different from that of the US and Japan.¹¹ When we

¹¹From the perspective of international politics, major countries around the Korean peninsula, such as China, the United States, Japan, and Russia, have had significant influence from the past on the Korean Peninsula. According to the "Korean Unification Perception Survey" in 2016, in the case of the United States, most Koreans perceive the United States as a cooperation target. The high response rate to the US reflects the perception of North Korea's threat to subsequent military provocations, and it can be concluded that the stance and efforts of the South Korean

observe the Koreans' perception on China over the past decade, multiple perceptions including those of cooperation, competition, and negativity have co-existed, rather than a certain perception of China overruling. Among them, perception of competition is the highest; negativity is next; the last is the perception of cooperation. The reasons why such fluid and diverse perceptions were formed include factors such as the rise of China, domestic government policies, development of South Korea-China relations, and problems related to the core interests of the two countries, such as Goguryeo historical dispute.

When observing the South Koreans' perceptions on China in more detail, the development of both South Korea-China relations started from economic cooperation after the diplomatic normalization, and so it can be said that the early perception on China were formed by economic factors as a whole. The perceptions in the pre-1997 period, represented by the so-called China Opportunity Theory, were formed due to the expansion of Koreans' perception on China with the rise of China that has been recognized by Koreans as an expansion of market and investment opportunities due to the rapid development of South Korea-China economic cooperation. However, since the financial crisis in 1997, the abstract Chinese Opportunity Theory that took advantage of the rapid growth has gradually shifted to Chinese Border Theory (Han, Seok-hee, 2003). With the changes in the international economic environment, sense of crisis about China's rise as a strong competitor of the Korean economy, and the increasing dependence on the Chinese economy and anxiety about the future of the Chinese economy were all intermixed. This showed the tendency for South Korea to perceive China's economic development as a challenge.

For example, at the end of 2016, the trade volume between Korea and China was \$211.4 billion, which was a 33-fold increase from the \$6.37 billion it had during the time of normalization. China is Korea's largest exporter now, as well as the biggest investor and

government on this issue have formed a consensus among the general public. Comparing the survey of the Lee Myung-bak government period with that of the Park Geun-hye government period, the perception became even clearer. Overall, the Koreans' image of the US is comparatively positive and does not change a lot. This shows that the perception that the United States is a traditional ally of South Korea, of which friendship and partnership is embedded among people's perception. For Japan, South Koreans perceived Japan as a target of competition and boundary rather than a target of cooperation. Japan shares many values with Korea in that it has allied with the US based on democracy and market economy in East Asia. However, the negative views of the people on the history of the two countries and the military cooperation between South Korea and Japan still exist in Korean society, and these factors continue to affect the people's feelings toward Japan. Finally, Koreans have an image of competition and boundaries mainly about Russia. Although Korea does not have a key interest in Russia in the military security arena, Russia is recognized as a country that can still have a significant impact on the Korean peninsula issue.

importer, and Korea is China's third trading partner and the fourth largest investor. In particular, from the perspective of South Korea, since the trade volume with China¹² is larger than that of the trade volume sum between Korea and China, it can be said that the continued development of the Korean economy is highly related to the rise of China and the South Korea-China trade and investment. This close economic relationship between South Korea and China, as shown in <Table-2>, was reflected in the general public's perception on cooperation with China.

Table-2 South Korea-China Trade Statistics

Category	Korea Statistics (billion \$)				China Statistics (billion \$)				Trade Increase Rate (%)		Trade Balance (%)	
	Trade	Public Exports	Mass Imports	Trade Balance	Trade	Public Exports	Imports (Korea)	Trade Balance	Korea Stats	China Stats	Korea Stats	China Stats
1992	64	27	37	-11	50	24	26	-2	43.6	54.9	-16.8	-4.3
1995	166	92	74	18	170	67	103	-36	41.9	44.9	10.6	-21.2
2000	313	185	128	57	345	113	232	-119	38.6	37.8	18.1	-34.5
2005	1,006	619	386	233	1,119	351	768	-417	26.7	24.3	23.1	-37.3
2010	1,884	1,168	716	453	2,071	688	1,383	-696	33.7	32.6	24	-33.6
2011	2,206	1,342	864	478	2,456	829	1,627	-798	17.1	18.6	21.6	-32.5
2012	2,151	1,343	808	535	2,564	877	1,687	-811	-2.5	4.4	24.9	-31.6
2013	2,289	1,459	831	628	2,742	912	1,831	-919	6.4	7	27.4	-33.5
2014	2,354	1,453	901	552	2,904	1,003	1,901	-898	2.8	5.9	23.5	-30.9
2015	2,274	1,371	903	469	2,758	1,014	1,743	-732	-3.4	-5.1	20.6	-26.4
2016	2,114	1,244	870	375	2,546	957	1,588	-631	-7	-7.7	17.7	-25

Source: Korea International Trade Association (KOTIS)

In addition to the mutual development of the two countries, South Korea and China have been facing a new turning point in bilateral trade and investment cooperation. In the past, if China had been a 'goose that laid golden eggs' to the Korean economy and Korean companies, there was a concern that the Chinese economy would become a crisis for the Korean economy and Korean companies as the economy grew. This proves that Korea's trade surplus with

¹² The size of trade between Korea and China remained at an annual average growth rate of 16.7% over the past 25 years from \$ 6.4 billion in 1992 to \$ 211.4 billion in 2016. Korea-China trade surpassed \$ 10 billion in 1994, \$ 100 billion in 2005, more than \$ 200 billion in 2011, and expanded to \$ 235.4 billion in 2014 (\$ 295.5 billion in China). However, it retreated to the level of 2012, with \$ 227.4 billion in 2015 and \$ 211.4 billion in 2016. The status of the partner in the trade between the two countries also changed. China had become the largest trading partner since 1992 in Korea's fifth largest trading partner country in 1992. In 1992, China, from Korea's 5th largest trading partner, beat Japan in 2002 and the United States in 2004, becoming the largest trading partner in the world. In exports, from being the 6th largest trading partner in 1992, beat Japan in 2001, the US in 2003, becoming the largest exporting partner in the world. In terms of imports, it ranked as the fifth largest importer in 1992, beat the United States in 2004, and Japan in 2007, becoming the largest importing partner in the world. South Korea, from being China's 7th largest trading partner in 1992, is maintaining the 4th largest trading partner since 1996. In the Chinese import market, China ranked the sixth largest import market in 1992, and beat the United States in 2002, Taiwan in 2005 and Japan in 2013. Korea's position in exports to China has remained the fourth largest export market since the 5th place in the export market in 1992 and beyond Germany in 1995.

China is rapidly declining recently. This is because South Korea's role as a provider of intermediary products is weakening as the linkages between South Korean industries and Chinese industries are weakening in new growth industries such as "China's manufacturing 2025"¹³ and other industries. In the perspective of South Korea and China being complementary partners, they have been complementary competitors. The perception of Koreans' high competition for China is related to the rise of China's economic power and the change of South Korea-China economic relations due to the rise of China. In other words, at the beginning of bilateral relations between South Korea and China, China has established mutual win-win relations based on economic complementarity by laying the cornerstone of reform and opening policy through South Korea-China economic cooperation. However, due to the rise of economic power following the rise of China, South Korea-China economic relations are now more competitive than complementary ones. Furthermore, South Korea's trade surplus with China and the surplus ratio are decreasing, and the threatening negative perceptions are being reflected in the public's perception on China, as well.

¹³'China Manufacturing 2025' refers to the industrial upgrading strategy announced by the State Council (國務院) on May 8, 2015 with the aim of revitalizing manufacturing. It is the next generation industry in which China's ten key industry development projects were first announced by Premier Li Keqiang in 2015, with emphasis being given to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. The top 10 strategic industries include information technology (IT), aerospace, marine engineering, shipping, rail transportation, new energy, robots, power plants, biomedicine, agricultural machinery and new materials. This strategy has been made to achieve qualitative growth by fostering the manufacturing base, technological innovation that lowers the reliance of advanced facilities and core technologies, and green growth that promotes energy efficiency. By 2020, it aims to increase the localization rate of key parts and materials to 40%, achieve the localization rate of 70% in order to join the ranks of global manufacturing powerhouses by 2025, raise China to the middle of the manufacturing industry by 2035, and by 2049, make itself as the market-leading country. The Chinese government provides various subsidies and benefits.




Figure-5 Trend of South Koreans' perception to China

In addition to the economic aspects delineated above, Koreans' perception on the threat in military security differs from that of other countries. India and the Philippines, which are neighboring countries of China, are very concerned about the strengthening of China's military power and therefore feel a strong threat to China. On the other side, while South Koreans are one of the most directly exposed to China's military threat in terms of geopolitics, their negative perception on China's military power is not relatively strong (Lee Dong-ryul, 2006). For example, according to a 2005 survey conducted after the Goguryeo historical dispute had bulged, Koreans still voted their most threatening countries as North Korea (46%), Japan (28%), the US (17%), and China (7%) as last. Despite the rise of core interests between the two countries, South Koreans still did not recognize China as a threat to themselves.

It can be said that the cooperation, competition, or negativity perceptions that Koreans have on China are due to a combination of factors such as those of historical and realistic in addition to economical. It has only been 26 years since the South Korea-China diplomatic normalization; however, the bilateral relationship in the Koreans' perception on China are based on a much longer period including the ancient history. The awareness of China's tributary system and the participation of China in the Korean War caused the division in the Korean Peninsula are rooted in the South Koreans' perception on China. Also, there is a difference in ideology due to the dissimilarity between the two countries' political systems.¹⁴

¹⁴First, Korea recognizes that China is a socialist country whose ideology and system are different from Korea. Korea is a liberal democracy with liberty, democracy, human rights, rule of law, and market economy as its core

Therefore, the basis of South Korea's understanding of China is the collective memory that has accumulated in the process of exchanging with China in the past, and this remnant perception can be superimposed on the current specific events.

From the Roh Moo-hyun government to the Park Geun-hye government in the past decade, there have been series of incidents that worsened the South Korea-China relationship and negatively affected the Koreans' perception on China. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, there were issues such as the Kimchi Wave in 2005, the Northeast Project and Goguryeo Historical Dispute from 2004 to 2006. During the Lee Myung-bak administration, there was a controversy over the Korea-US alliance in 2008, the collision of Olympic torch in 2008, North Korean nuclear test 2nd experiment in 2009, Cheonan ship sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incident in 2010, the 2012 maritime police murder case of the Chinese ship, North Korean defectors' problem, etc. During the Park Geun-hye government, there was the THAAD deployment issue from 2016 to 2017. These events are important factors that formed a negative impact on the Koreans' perception on China. For example, between 2004 and 2006, the negative perceptions on China have increased significantly due to the Chinese Northeast Project and the Goguryeo Historical Dispute between South Korea and China. In other words, anti-China sentiment has spread because of the rise of the "Northeast Project" in China, and the perception on China is an abstract and negative collective memory for Koreans. The negative perception on Chinese nationalism accumulated in the experiences of Chinese and South Korean exchanges caused economic rivalry and crisis awareness as the rise based on China's economic growth became a reality (Lee Dong-ryul, 2006). Therefore, the combination of these complex factors has led to an increase in perceived threats or negative perceptions on China.

Koreans' perception on China is related to exogenous variables such as North Korean factors as well as those related to the relationship between South Korea and China. During the 26 years since diplomatic normalization, North Korea and its nuclear issues are the core issues that overwhelm both the political and diplomatic relations of the two countries (Lee Hee-ok, 2017), and the North Korean factors that have a direct impact on the bilateral relations include three factors, including North Korea-China relations, unification of the

ideals, while China does not. Therefore, there is a wall of 'value' that cannot be surpassed in the middle and the middle. For this reason, Korea can interact and cooperate with China, but it cannot be fundamentally the same. On the other hand, the United States recognizes that it can become a genuine 'friend' and 'ally' because it is a liberal democracy that shares this value.

Korean Peninsula, and the North Korean nuclear issues. Immediately after diplomatic normalization, Korea expected and demanded substantial development of bilateral relations, but on the other hand, China continued its tug of maintaining the 'bloody' peculiarity of North Korea-China relations. Although the meaning of the traditional 'blood alliance' relationship has certainly greatly diminished, the effect of the North Korean nuclear issue on the bilateral relations has been expanding as time goes by. In particular, the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue has been chronic in China.¹⁵ China's influence on North Korea clearly exists, and it is difficult to deny China's role in seeking the North Korean nuclear program. For example, in a survey that asked the Koreans' perceptions on 'major events in bilateral relations between Korea and China in 2013,' 37% saw 'the North Korean nuclear issue' as the most important issue of the South Korea-China relationship, and 21% chose 'the unification of North and South is the most important issue between South Korea-China relations,' and 'economic cooperation,' 'regional and international cooperation,' and 'social culture and human exchange' were chosen by 20%, 9%, and 8%, respectively. Looking at the results, more than half of South Koreans view the 'North Korean issue' as the most important issue of South Korea's diplomacy and security, and China plays a very important role in the crisis intervention and conflict resolution, through which it can be inferred that South Korea finds it necessary for it to receive strong support from China.




Figure-6 South Korean's perception on big issues between China and South Korea

¹⁵ In response to EAI's public opinion poll conducted in 2004, 37.2% answered that "China's role is very important" in the question "How much do you expect to see the role of countries in view of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue?", the response rate is 55.7%.

Fortunately, although the increase in negative perceptions on China due to the North Korean factors is diminishing with the reciprocal development of the South Korea-China relationship, the sudden change of Cheonan is still affecting the perception on the Koreans. For example, in the case of Yeonpyeong Island incident, respondents (91.9%) were dissatisfied with the Chinese government's attitude (Very dissatisfied 57.2%, somewhat dissatisfied 34.7%).¹⁶ Moreover, 58.2% of South Koreans argue that even if there are economic problems in the middle of South Korea-China relations, they should strongly protest against China. There showed a so-called "collateral damage" that criticized China at the same time as being hostile to North Korea. Expectations and threats to North Korea's close relations with North Korea respond to China's attitude and position on North Korean factors. Therefore, South Koreans' perception on China as cooperative or negative appears according to China's North Korea policy.

Table-3 Koreans' Perception on China by Year (Unit: %/year)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Cooperative	225 (19.2)	279 (23.7)	248 (20.8)	234 (19.6)	241 (20.6)	268 (22.4)	341 (28.7)	403 (33.8)	408 (34.0)	359 (30.0)
Competitive	541 (46.2)	450 (38.36)	498 (41.95)	539 (45.18)	472 (40.34)	443 (37.04)	518 (43.64)	411 (34.57)	475 (39.58)	470 (39.33)
Negative	404 (34.53)	444 (37.85)	441 (37.15)	420 (35.21)	457 (39.06)	485 (40.55)	328 (27.63)	375 (31.54)	317 (26.42)	366 (30.63)
Total	1170 100	1173 100	1187 100	1193 100	1170 100	1196 100	1187 100	1189 100	1200 100	1195 100

According to Korean Unification Perception Survey by year, the rate at which the Koreans perceived China as competitor was 46.24% during the Roh Moo-hyun period, which is the highest among the three governments. Since the advent of the Lee Myung-bak comparatively conservative government moderated on the US-ROK alliance in 2008, the percentage of China's negative perceptions has increased, reaching 40.55%, and at the end of the term in 2012, it reached its peak at 40.55% within 10 years. In particular, the relations between the two countries deteriorated due to differences in the positions of the two countries regarding the North Korean armed provocations, including the sinking of the Cheonan ship sinking and Yeonpeyong Island Shelling incident since 2010, and the negative perception on Koreans by China has increased. However, at the beginning of the presidency of the conservative Park political period in 2012, the perception on cooperation with China has greatly increased, and

¹⁶ Source: Asan Policy Research Institute, "Emergency Survey Report on Yeonpyeong Island Shelling Incident", 2010.10.

the percentage of Koreans who recognized China as a cooperative target reached 33.89% in 2014.

According to the results of the survey, the perception that Koreans have toward China has a fixed pattern until 2011. However, since 2012, perception as a cooperative object has continuously risen, and the perception as the negative target has generally declined. First, it can be inferred that the proliferation of positive image in China is not unrelated to the economic interdependence and the human interchange after 2012 with Xi Jinping administration, as well as the efforts of Park Geun-hye to intensify South Korea-China relations. Economically, South Korea is China's third largest trading partner, and China is South Korea's largest trading partner and second investment destination. Human exchange increased from about 590,000 in 1995 to about 10.35 million in 2015. In addition, South Korea's participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: AIIB) (March, 2015), President Park Geun-hye's attendance to 70th anniversary of World War II military parade (September, 2015), the announcement of Korea-China Free Trade Agreement: FTA (December, 2015), others. showed the tranquil atmosphere of cooperation between South Korea and China. However, due to the conflict over THAAD issue at the end of the Park Geun-hye government, the perception on China did not maintain the initial cooperative atmosphere, and the perception on cooperation decreased while the perception on negativity increased once again.

Next, the perception on cooperation at the end of the Park Geun-hye period decreased (34.0% in 2014, 33.9% in 2015, 30.0% in 2016), economic cooperation increased (24.2% in 2015, 27.6% in 2016), and these perceptions are regarded to be reflected in the disappointment towards China's actions in terms of North Korean nuclear issues. In fact, the response rate of "The responsibility of China in deterioration of inter-Korean relations is high" increased from 51.2% in 2015 to 56.6% in 2016. It is inferred that the reason why cooperation recognition in China is not being expanded among the South Koreans is related to structural factors. In other words, it means that there is not enough trust bases between the two countries in solving the North Korean nuclear issue and unification problem, compared with the external growth and development of the economic, cultural, and human sectors of the South Korea-China relationship. Actually, China, while it regards North Korea as important for political security, it regards its relationship with South Korea more important in economic terms, which is related to China's strategy to expand its core interests on the Korean Peninsula issue. It is true

that South Korea and China have developed a multifaceted relationship through 'Full Cooperative Partnership' in 2003 and 'Strategic Cooperative Partnership' in 2008, but it is necessary to diversify and strengthen bilateral relations.¹⁷

The above table shows that the perception on the Koreans over the last decade is different for each political period. The next section scrutinizes the perception on China by each political period more closely.

II Perception on China by Regime

1. General characteristics of respondents

Regarding the characteristics of the respondents by political period, the proportion of men and women is similar in terms of gender. In terms of age, the numbers are similar for the age groups 20s, 30s, and 40s, but the number for the age group 60s is relatively smaller. For the level of education, most subjects are high school graduates or college graduates, and the number of people who have not graduated from middle school is low. In terms of income levels, the number of people with the monthly income between 2~4 million KRW during Roh Moo-hyun government and Lee Myung-bak government is relatively high, and during the Park Geun-hye government, more people are in the income level that accounts to over 4 million KRW. In terms of geographical distribution, the population of Youngnam is about one third of the population surveyed, which is bigger than that of the population surveyed in Honam region. In terms of political tendencies, the proportion of people with political Moderate is the highest, which accounts to about half the population surveyed. The number of people with political Moderate is the highest, and it occupies about 40%, others accounting to about 20% each. The analysis of the data accumulated during Roh Moo-hyun political period is small in terms of the number of people surveyed. This research will utilize different data in order to analyze the trend and flow of perception on China during the whole period of Roh Moo-hyun political period, and will be suggested later (see <Table-4>).

¹⁷ South Korea's position in the North Korean nuclear issue is not only to persuade China to participate in the sanctions against North Korea and encourage active cooperation, but also to seek a fundamental understanding of the unification that Korea intends. Korea considers that it is very important to promote trust and cooperation in matters of diplomatic security such as the North Korea issue.

Table-4 General characteristics of the respondents by political period

	Government	Roh	Lee	Park	Total
Sex	Male	596 (50.47)	3,001 (50.46)	2,417 (50.58)	6,014 (50.51)
	Female	585 (49.53)	2,946 (49.54)	2,362 (49.42)	5,893 (49.49)
Age group	20s	297 (25.15)	1,372 (23.07)	923 (19.31)	2,592 (21.77)
	30s	309 (26.16)	1,492 (25.09)	1,009 (21.11)	2,810 (23.60)
Level of education	40s	300 (25.4)	1,555 (26.15)	1,155 (24.17)	3,010 (25.28)
	50s	192 (16.26)	1,099 (18.48)	1,056 (22.10)	2,347 (19.71)
Level of income	60s+	83 (7.03)	429 (7.21)	636 (13.31)	1,148 (9.64)
	Middle	150 (12.70)	587 (9.87)	471 (9.86)	1,208 (10.15)
Region	High	500 (42.34)	2,571 (43.23)	2,167 (45.34)	5,238 (43.99)
	College+	531 (44.96)	2,789 (46.90)	2,141 (44.80)	5,461 (45.86)
Political ideology	<200	277 (23.45)	1,010 (16.98)	528 (11.05)	1,815 (15.24)
	200-300	367 (31.08)	1,657 (27.86)	921 (19.27)	2,945 (24.73)
Total	300-400	293 (24.81)	1,770 (29.76)	1,498 (31.35)	3,561 (29.91)
	400+	244 (20.66)	1,510 (25.39)	1,832 (38.33)	3,586 (30.12)
Youngham	Honam	131 (11.20)	646 (10.91)	657 (13.77)	1434 (12.09)
	Youngnam	319 (27.26)	1592 (26.90)	1289 (27.02)	3200 (26.98)
Conservative	others	720 (61.54)	3681 (62.19)	2825 (59.21)	7226 (60.93)
	Progressive	299 (25.56)	1624 (27.44)	1216 (25.49)	3139 (26.47)
Moderate	Moderate	555 (47.44)	2823 (47.69)	2368 (49.63)	5746 (48.45)
	Conservative	316 (27.01)	1472 (24.87)	1187 (24.88)	2975 (25.08)
Total		1,181	5,947	4,779	11,907
		100	100	100	100

2. Perception on China in each political period

<Table-5 > shows the crossover analysis of differences in Koreans' perception on China by each political period. The perceptions were different for each political period, which was statistically significant. .

Table-5 Crossover analysis of the perception on China by specific political period in general characteristics of respondents

	Cooperative	Competitive	Negative	Total
Roh	225 (19.23)	541 (46.24)	404 (34.53)	1170 100
	1270 (21.46)	2402 (40.58)	2247 (37.96)	5919 100
Lee	1511 (31.67)	1874 (39.28)	1386 (29.05)	4771 100
	3006 (25.35)	4817 (40.62)	4037 (34.04)	11860 100
Total				Pearson $\chi^2 = 200.83^{***}$

According to the "Korean Unification Perception Survey" by political period, the perception on China was stronger at 46.24% in the Roh Moo-hyun period, despite the conflict between South Korea and China over the Goguryeo historical dispute. The data in "Korean Unification Perception Survey" is limited to the data of 2007, and when adding the results of Koreans' perceptive level of closeness toward China conducted by Korea General Social Survey (KGSS), the level has declined from 2005 to 2006 and slightly increased in 2007 during the 2003~2007 Roh Moo-hyun political period, as <Figure-7> shows.¹⁸




Figure-7 South Korean's perception to China by political period

¹⁸The results of the unification survey between 2007 and 2012 and the Korean social survey were similar. When we analyze the intimacy of neighboring countries by country preference, we can confirm the change of perception about China and Japan. From 2007 to 2012, familiarity with neighboring countries showed a fixed pattern in the order of the United States, North Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. However, for the first time in 2013, the preferences of China and Japan have changed, and in 2014 China was the second, North Korea the third, and Japan the fourth. That is, China's intimacy, which was the fourth favorite in 2007-2012, became the second most intimate country in 2014 and 2015, and Japan, which maintained its third preference for the same period, became the fourth country since 2013. The closeness to China was 4.2% in 2010, the lowest since the 2007 survey, but has since increased to 10.3% in 2014.

At the time of Lee Myung-bak's political period, the general public's perception on China changed gradually from high level of cooperative in the early stage to negative, and the negative perception increased from 34.53% to 37.95%. In the period of Park Geun-hye political period, the percentage of people who perceive China as a cooperative target increased from 21.46% to 31.67%, while the negative perception decreased from 37.96% to 29.05%.




Figure-8 Korean's intimacy to China in Roh's political period¹⁹ (Unit: %/year)

Source: "Korean General Social Survey" (2003~2007), Sungkyunkwan University

As shown in <Figure-8>, Koreans' perception on China differs by each political period. These aspects are complex, reflecting the variables such as internal changes in China, governmental policies and bilateral relations between two countries. To this end, the perception on Koreans' toward China will be examined in specifics by each political period, and review whether the regime is a significant variable for Koreans' perception on China.

2-1 Perception on China during the Roh Moo-hyun's political period

The first half of the Roh Moo-hyun administration can be classified as a 'sharp increase in pro-China perception' and a 'sharp decline in pro-China perception.' The important factors that have had a great influence on China's perceptions during this period include the rise of China,

¹⁹ The question is to select one of the five countries: the United States, North Korea, China, Japan, and Russia, in the question "Do you feel closest to the United States, Japan, North Korea, China or Russia?"

the political and security interests of Korea and China in the North Korean issue, and the Goguryeo Historical Dispute.

The perception that rapidly became friendly after the launch of the Roh Moo-hyun political period in 2003 can be said that it is based on the changed perception from China's economic growth and strengthening of Korean Peninsula. In the early days of Roh Moo-hyun political period, the perception on pro-China was born in the awareness of the 'post-America self-reliance' represented by anti-America movement during the democratization period and the spread of anti-America candlelight demonstrations in 2002. China's political and economic upsurge and the declining relative influence of the US raised the awareness of opportunities for China in the perception that China's influence is greater than that of the US in terms of the North Korean nuclear issue, the inter-Korean relations, and the economic situation. It is recognized that China's rise is more perceived as an opportunity to be actively utilized and adapted than a threat. As perception on China in regards to South Korea's economic development model due to 1997 financial crisis has changed, China's steady economic development and rising international status bring a change in the perception on national power between South Korea and China. In other words, China recognizes its neighboring country South Korea as a 'small nation,' while Korea recognizes its neighboring country China as a 'powerful nation.' China's GDP in 2003 was \$1.372 trillion, ranking seventh in the world, rising to the world's fourth largest economy with \$2.27 trillion in 2005, reaching \$3.25 trillion in 2007 See< Table-6>. In response to which country would formulate strong economic power in the near future in the Korea's Public Opinion Survey, 54.4% chose China, 39.3% chose the US, and 6.14 chose Japan.²⁰. Furthermore, 61% of Koreans predicted that China's economy would be as large as the US; 49% of Koreans perceived China's development as a threat; 42% saw it as a slight threat; 8% saw barely as a threat.

²⁰ Source: Korea Daily, Korea-Japan National Consciousness Survey (2006.8)

Table-6 Korea-China Economic Trade Status during Roh Moo-hyun Political period (2003~2007) (Unit: million \$, %)

Year	Export			Import			Trade Balance	
	Total	China	Weight	Total	China	Weight	Total	Weight
2003	193,817	35,110	18.1	178,827	21,909	12.3	14,991	13,201
	(19.3)	(47.8)		(17.6)	(25.9)			
2004	253,845	49,763	19.6	224,463	29,585	13.2	29,382	20,193
	(31.0)	(41.7)		(25.5)	(35.0)			
2005	284,418	61,915	21.8	261,238	38,648	14.8	23,180	23,267
	(12.0)	(24.4)		(16.4)	(30.7)			
2006	325,465	69,459	21.3	309,383	48,557	15.7	16,082	20,902
	(14.4)	(12.2)		(18.4)	(25.6)			
2007	371,489	81,985	22.1	356,846	63,028	17.7	14,643	18,957
	(14.1)	(18.0)		(15.3)	(29.8)			

Source: Korea International Trade Association (KOTIS)

In the case of Roh Moo-hyun political period, the amount of trade between South Korea and China has increased rapidly. In 2007, South Korea's exports to China accounted for 22.1% of total exports. In 2006, South Korea-China trade reached \$ 134.3 billion, as the first trading partner. In addition, South Korea's trade surplus continued to increase in South Korea-China trade, which is consistent with the expectation that China's economic rise will help South Korea's economic development. On the contrary, there were concerns and threats about the asymmetry of power between Korea and China due to the excessive dependence on China and the influence of Chinese economic power. In particular, the 'Kimchi Wave'²¹in 2005 was a major example of a turning point in South Korea's diplomacy toward China as a trade dispute between two countries. In 2006, 32.9% of Koreans perceived a positive impact on the economic impact of China's economic growth, while 41.7% perceived it as a negative impact. In other words, according to the economic rise of China, South Koreans perceived China as an opportunity and a threat, and this perception was expressed as cooperation, competition, and negative perception.

If the emergence of 'China as a Threat Theory' in terms of borderline and concern along with the sudden formation of 'pro-China flow' in line with the continuous rise of China in the

²¹ Since Korea's agricultural products are more expensive than China, Korean contractors have built many kimchi factories in China and produced kimchi that matches Korean standards and taste and exported them to the Korean market. Kimchi imported from China increased from 393 tons in 2001 to 28,000 tons in 2003 and to 72000 tons in 2004. On September 26, 2005, the major media in Korea reported that the lead content of Chinese kimchi exceeded the standard, and then three kinds of parasite eggs were detected, raising the fear of Korean kimchi. The Korea Food and Drug Administration immediately banned and recalled imported Chinese kimchi. At the same time, the Chinese side also detected parasitic eggs from 10 kinds of kimchi, kochujang, roasted meat sauce, and so on in Korea. In the future negotiations between the two governments, the Kimchi wave was resolved.

period of Roh Moo-hyun and the change of Koreans' perception on foreign countries, such cleavage in the perception on China suddenly changes to unfavorable status with the 'Northeast Project' issue in 2004 as a turning point, and eventually changes in the domestic flow that used to be evaluated as 'anti-US, pro-China.' In response to the issue of the Northeast Project in 2004, the perception on China as friendship plummeted, and after the results of the Northeast Project in 2006 were published, Jilin promised to register Baekdusan Mountain as a UNESCO heritage. In addition, these issues are linked to 'Chinese hegemony', and the interpretation of China's overall diplomatic activities is interpreted in the framework of Chinese hegemony'. This perception is coupled with the Western threat of China, which leads to a rapid reversal of pro-China flow and a further expansion of the "anti-war sentiment" of South Koreans. Also, in 2004, North Korea's defection of North Korean refugees would be regarded as a country that did not respect human rights and violated the expectations of repatriation. In this period, important events that affected the relations between South Korea and China in the historical, political, and economic fields played a negative role in the recognition of South Koreans to China.

On the other hand, the Roh Moo-hyun administration adopts the 'peace prosperity policy' that inherits the 'sunshine policy' of the Kim Dae-jung government, Under the condition that the North Korean nuclear issue should not be solved by force even under any circumstances, the Government of the Republic of Korea will actively promote dialogue between the parties for peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. The continuation of the North Korean embracing policy is consistent with China's understanding of the stabilization of the situation around the Korean peninsula and the stability of the North Korean regime. There are no conflicts between the two countries over North Korea policy. In the political and military arena, South Korea's perception on China as a "strong partner" from the "hostile country" to security cooperation, which was the subject of security threats in the Cold War era, will be recognized. Especially, as the traditional friendship between the North Korea and the North Korea has been restored, the communication between South Korea and China has become closer to each other, and especially since the beginning of the six-party talks with China as a presidency in 2003, the importance of South Koreans to China has increased steadily. In 2004, 48.3% of South Koreans considered China to be the most important in

terms of diplomatic security in the survey on the importance of Koreans to neighboring countries, which was higher than those who chose the US (38.1%).²²

In light of the above, there acknowledged the economic disparity during the Roh Moo-hyun political period, the relatively stable economic growth of China, and the strengthening of its political and diplomatic influence. In addition, as South Korea's expectation and reliance on China, which has a close friendly relationship with North Korea, has risen in the context of the South Korean government's willingness to worsen the North Korean nuclear issue and improve inter-Korean relations, China's influence on the Korean peninsula in both economic and security aspects, and so it can be said that it was gradually strengthened. However, a series of events such as the Kimchi wave, the North Korean defectors issue, the Northeast Project and the Goguryeo historical dispute at this time also increased the negative perception on China.

2-2. Perception on China during the Lee Myung-bak political period

Since the Lee Myung-bak administration's inauguration in 2008, the perception on South Korea-China relations and the perception on China have become worse in 2004 and 2006. China's perception on China in this period has been increasingly negative due to issues such as the Northeast Project. In the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008, the negative perception increased with non-cooperative attitudes and frequent conflicts between Korean and Chinese netizens due to nationalism.

With the decline of the economic and political status of the United States since the global economic crisis in 2008, the "rise of China" attracted new attention. In other words, the recognition that the world order is being reorganized by the two powerful powers of the G2 system was emerging. China had emerged as the second largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan in 2010, with a steady annual growth rate of around 10.0% per annum since its reform and opening in 1978. As of the end of 2011, the world's second largest economy (GDP \$6.9884 trillion dollars), the world's second largest trade volume (\$3.6421 trillion), the world's second largest foreign investment attraction (FDI \$1.5 trillion), and the world's first economic country with the largest foreign currency (\$3.2017 trillion) (See<Table-7>). The world was now in the process of realizing that China will soon be the world's number one

²² Dong-A Ilbo, Foreign Perception Survey, May 2004

country. In the next 20 years, China was expected to become the world's No. 1 economic powerhouse (Cheong, Young-Rok, 2010).

Table-7 Status of South Korea-China Economic Relations during the Lee Myung-bak Political period
(Unit: million \$, %)

Year	Export			Import			Trade Balance	
	Total	China	Weight	Total	China	Weight	Total	China
2007	371,489	81,985	22.1	356,846	63,028	17.7	14,643	18,957
	(14.1)	(18.0)		(15.3)	(29.8)			
2008	422,007	91,389	21.7	435,275	76,930	17.7	-13,268	14,459
	(13.6)	(11.5)		(22.0)	(22.1)			
2009	363,534	86,703	23.9	323,085	54,246	16.8	40,449	32,457
	(-13.9)	(-5.1)		(-25.8)	(-29.5)			
2010	466,384	116,838	25.1	425,212	71,574	16.8	41,172	45,264
	(28.3)	(34.8)		(31.6)	(31.9)			
2011	556,514	134,205	24.1	524,375	86,426	16.5	32,139	47,779
	(19.3)	(14.9)		(23.3)	(20.8)			

Source: Korea Trade International Association (KOTIS)

In 2012, the 20th year of diplomatic relations, the economic indicators of both countries showed very close bilateral relations. As of 2011, China was South Korea's biggest trading partner and export destination country, the largest trade surplus, and the largest investment destination. Korea was also the fourth largest trading partner of China, the second largest importing country, and the fourth largest exporting country. Koreans generally perceived this positively on the economic rise of China in the context of continuously increasing trade volume between South Korea and China, trade surplus, and huge market of China. Of course, the excessive dependence of the Korean economy on China could pose a serious threat to China's economy, and there were concerns and boundaries over the Korean economy's deepening dependence on China. In addition, China's absolute influence on the Korean economy was threatening not only in the economic realm but also in its ability to leverage the influence of other areas at any time (Yoo Sang-cheol, 2016). In other words, while the perception that close economic interdependence between Korea and China plays an important role in Korea's economic growth has become commonplace, it has been recognized that the excessive dependence of China on the economy is always a threat to economic, as well as the perception on threats that could act as a threat economically, security-wise, and politically.

As such, during the Lee Myung-bak administration, China's economic rise was largely recognized as 'opportunism' rather than 'threat target'. However, in terms of diplomatic security between Korea and China, the dissonance between the two countries over the North Korean problem had become greater than during the Roh Moo-hyun political period, which

has raised the public's negative perception on China. In February 2008, the regime was replaced by the Lee Myung-bak administration, which promoted differentiated foreign policy and North Korea policies from the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. In the 17th presidential election in 2007, the birth of the Lee Myung-bak government, which stood for "Strengthening the ROK - US alliance" and "Denuclearization and openness, 3,000", represented the new perception on the people in China under the changed foreign policy trends. If the perception on the threat to see the rise of China during the Roh Moo-hyun period was a bilateral relationship based on China's "threat" or "opportunity," then the characteristics of China's recognition of the time of the Lee Myung-bak administration can be said that it is the domination of structural awareness perception. From the standpoint of Korea, it is best to harmonize the South Korea-US alliance and the South Korea-China partnership relations that have been announced in the stability of international affairs. However, the biggest threat is that the harmonization and coexistence of these bilateral relations may become difficult due to the conflict between China and the US. In particular, since the crisis in 2008, South Korea had become more aware of the threat as a "subjugated nation" between the two major powers in Central and South America. The rising conflict and conflict between the two countries in the United States and China has raised the awareness of the crisis that South Korea can be forced to "choose something hard to choose".

Also, during the Lee Myung-bak administration's disagreement with North and South Korea over the North Korean issue, the 'disappointment' and 'recognition of expectations' declined and the 'perception on the threat' rose. From the beginning of the Korea-China diplomatic normalization, the key to the recognition of China's expectations was the expectation that improvement in inter-Korean relations and, ultimately, "unification of the Korean Peninsula" would be an important basis for improving relations with China. However, the question of the effectiveness of the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue is questionable, as China recognizes that North Korea is not playing its role as much as expected. In the case of Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incident, China's advocacy toward North Korea was also an opportunity to "frustrate" Koreans' perception on China's security awareness. In addition, in spite of the persistent provocations of North Korea, China maintained its sustained support to North Korea in order to maintain a stable environment for economic development. In South Korea, the perception on North Korea's economic dependency and North Korean encroachment has risen in South Korea. From the standpoint of South Koreans,

the recognition of the fact that it will help improve inter-Korean relations is a negative recognition of the "provocation of North Korea" and the threat of North Korea's intensification of dependence on China, and negative perceptions have emerged that could be a hindrance to the unification of the peninsula.

In addition to economic and political security, events such as the Cheonan sinking, the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incident, the torch bearing in 2008, and the killing of seafarers in 2012 were major events that negatively affected Koreans' perception on China. The cultural clash that has worsened the perception on China as the most representative of Koreans since the Lee Myung-bak government was launched in 2008 is the torch clash that took place ahead of the Beijing Olympics in April 2008. At the time, as the human rights groups of Korea and the Chinese protesters physically clashed at that time, the Koreans' emotions and conflicts between the two countries spread, and the negative public perception on Chinese nationalism and anti-human rights was heightened. In addition, prior to the first summit in May 2008, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (DPRK) spoke about the "ROK-US Alliance". In addition, in the economic zone in 2012, there were incidents such as the collision of Chinese fishing vessels and the killing of Korean maritime seas, and this series of serious events had a negative impact on Koreans' perception on China.

2-3 Perception on China during the Park Geun-hye political period

During the political period of Park Geun-hye (Feb. 2013 ~ Mar. 2017), South Korea-China relations have expanded rapidly so that bilateral relations were almost unprecedented. The trade volume between the two countries at the end of 2016 was \$ 211.4 billion, a 33-fold increase from the \$ 6.37 billion at the time of negotiations. The number of exchanges between the two countries increased by 80 times (from 13.0 million to 10.42 million), and the number of flights between the two countries reached 1,100. Korea was the third largest trading partner and investment country in China, and China was South Korea's No. 1 trading partner. As the Korea-China FTA was officially announced on December 20, 2015, the tariff cuts for the commodity sector were made in 2016 and the momentum of new cooperation was sought. At the same time, the phenomenon of a decline in the size of trade between South Korea and China, a decline in Korea's export dependence on China, a decline in Korea's share in the Chinese import market, an increase in China's share in the Korean import market, appear. Changes in the contents of bilateral relations had also occurred in accordance with the

economic relations between Korea and China. The difference between Korea and China has increased by 8 times, and the exchange and cooperation have increased asymmetrically, which had gradually changed from a complementary relationship to a competitive economic system. China has continuously changed its economic policies to improve its quality and economic structure, and the development of China's industrial competitiveness and the protection of domestic enterprises had been implemented. As a result of the rise of labor costs in China, South Korean companies have continued to leave China (Shin Jung-seung, 2017). Compared to the Roh and Lee administration periods, the expansion of economic asymmetry between the two nations in the era of Park Geun-hye led to the coexistence, competition, and threatening perception on China.

In addition, the policy of Park Geun-hye's government was to strengthen the ROK-US alliance in a large framework based on the recognition of its identity as a middle country and to develop a strategic partnership between South Korea and China. This was because the Roh Moo-hyun government had become self-reliant as a Northeast Asian balancer and had worsened the ROK-US alliance by deploying diplomacy across the United States. This pursuit of harmony was one step further from the Roh Moo-hyun administration's "balancer" diplomacy, which moderated on the ROK-US alliance, and its core is the simultaneous development of ROK-US relations and South Korea-China relations, which was a balanced diplomacy devised (Lee Hee-ok, 2016). After establishing the "Strategic Cooperation Partnership", which is the highest level of relations with China in the past years, during President Lee Myung-bak in 2008, China enhanced this in the period of President Park.

By the end of 2015, South Korea and China showed an unprecedented tightening and rapid progress. President Park declared that she would raise the South Korea-China relationship to a strategic cooperation partnership in the presidential election pledge, and immediately after the election, China was the first to send a special envoy to. Since then, the meeting has been actively promoted, including the discussion with North Korea and the conclusion of the Korea-China FTA. In particular, seven summit talks were held in 2015, and President Park showed off the honeymoon of bilateral relations both at home and abroad, including attending the 70th anniversary of World War II military parade in China. Thus, the relationship between South Korea and China during the Park Geun-hye government period (Feb.2013 ~ Mar.2017) has been unprecedented in the end of 2015 and positively influenced South Koreans' perception on China.

However, since the end of 2015, the relations between the two countries have deteriorated rapidly due to the THAAD deployment issue. In the wake of the THAAD deployment issue, the relationship between South Korea and China showed weak roots compared to its appearance. The conflict between China's strategies for the Korean peninsula surrounded the North Korean nuclear issue and Korea's security interests. China put more emphasis on denuclearization than on the collapse of North Korean regime. Therefore, China was in a position to prefer dialogue rather than sanctions to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. China insisted on holding the Six-Party Talks with the emphasis on the purpose of sanctions in the dialogue on the North Korean nuclear issue. Further, it insisted on the US-ROK military drills, the temporary suspension of North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the concluding of a peace treaty. However, the Korean government has maintained the need for dialogue on the North Korean nuclear issue, but decided to focus on sanctions and decided to deploy the US forces in the THAAD.

Despite the dramatic development of the South Korea-China relationship, which had been emphasized by the two governments of South Korea and China, since the deployment of the THAAD, the anti-Semitic feelings of South Koreans had deepened. In particular, from the standpoint of South Korea, China's retaliatory measures aimed at South Korean enterprises, travel industry, and culture against the THAAD issue were more adverse in their perception. In addition, during the THAAD reprisals, there was an expansion of words such as "let's reduce our reliance on China and diversity our markets into India and Southeast Asia," "now that there are no more Chinese tourists, it's quiet," and "let's find our own way without China," as well as public opinion on hatred towards China. Asan Policy Research Institute's survey of foreign public awareness of the THAAD deployment in March 2017 showed a remarkable decrease in Chinese favorability (0 points: no favorability ~ 10 points: very favorable). China's strong retaliatory measures against the THAAD deployment have led to a slight decline in Chinese favorability, but dropped more than one point in two months. Favorability in China, which was 4.31 points in January 2017, dropped to 3.21 points in March. On September 3, 2015, it was in stark contrast to when Park Geun-hye, the only US ally leader, attended the 70th anniversary of World War II military parade in China and demonstrated a strong relationship. What is even more remarkable is that the favorability of China is lower than that of Japan (3.33). Koreans have a very low likelihood of Japan because of the comfort women agreement and the issue of the Sonyeosang (Statue of Peace). The drop

in favorable sentiment in China is remarkable compared to the favorable feeling in Japan, which was a slight decline during the same period. This shows how seriously the public (internal) sentiment in South Korea has deteriorated due to the THAAD deployment on the Korean peninsula.

3. Differences of perception on China by political period

The above has discussed the Koreans' perception on China by each three political periods including that of Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. We analyzed the perceptions of South Koreans on China in the context of the rise of China during the three political periods, the change of government and the foreign policy to China and North Korea, various events that could affect the relations between Korea and China.²³ In sum, Koreans' perception on China is complicated by cooperative, competitive, or threatening negative perceptions during each political period, which is also reflected in flexible South Korea-China relations. Regarding the exogenous variables of the regime, we will revise the exogenous variables by using the data of the "Korean Unification Perception Survey" to examine if there is a meaningful difference in the perception on South Koreans toward China.

²³The relationship between nations does not just depend on the recognition of both economic and military power. In the process of forming the cognition and emotion of each other, the norms and the elements of values work together at the same time. In particular, the "New Great Diplomacy" emphasized by China recently emphasized the development of "soft power". It is an important criterion to determine the extent to which norms and values can be maintained in each of the areas of human rights (such as defectors), democracy, development model, anti-corruption, environmental protection, climate change, nonproliferation, (Jeong, Jae-ho, 2014).

Table-8 Multinomial logit analysis results of perception on China during Lee Myung-bak political period and Park Geun-hye political period

Variable	base: Competition Target		
	Model1		Model2
	Cooperation Target vs. Competition Target	Negation Target vs. Competition Target	
Park's regime (Reference: Lee's regime)	0.43***	-0.25***	
	0.05	0.06	
Region(Reference: Honam)	Youngnam 0.09	-0.29*** 0.08	
	Other -0.29*** 0.08	0.08 0.74	
	Moderate -0.06 0.06	-0.07 0.06	
	Conservative 0.09 0.07	0.16 0.06	
Sex	Female 0.01* 0.05	0.05 0.05	
Age	0.05 0.02	-0.01 0.02	
Level of Education	0.3*** 0.05	-0.05 -0.04	
Level of Income	0.11*** 0.03	0.09*** 0.02	
Cons	-1.46	-1.46	
Log Likelihood	-11320.71	-11320.71	
X²	368.94***	368.94***	
Pseudo R²	0.016	0.016	
N	10665	10665	

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

<Table-8> is the Multinomial logit analysis of the perception on the Chinese by the political period. In the case of the Roh Moo-hyun survey, only the data for 2007 are included. It was assumed that the data for this year represents the Roh Moo-hyun period and the number of subjects too small, so the data of Roh's period was not included in multi-nominal logit analysis. In the multinomial analysis, the criterion category set in Model 1 is the case of China as a competition target. As a result of the analysis, it is found statistically significant differences between the political periods on the perception on China. The results of the two regression analyses of the two governments of Lee and Park ²⁴ showed that Koreans' perception on China in favor of Park Geun-hye during the Lee Myung-bak administration changed more favorably. Specifically, it can be seen that Koreans perceive China as a target of cooperation as opposed to competition, as compared to the Lee Myung-bak administration. In addition, it can be seen that the perception on Park Geun-hye as a competitive object rather than a negative object is more pertinent to the government. For more specific comparison, we

²⁴ Unification Perception Survey did not include in the regression analysis since the survey was started in 2007 and the number of subjects in the Roh Moo-hyun period was small.

changed the criteria category from the competition target to the negative target in the model 2, and the result of the multinomial analysis showed that Koreans perceived China as the cooperation target compared to the negative target.

In terms of control variables of gender, age, level of education and income, and regional and political orientation, the differences in perceptions of South Koreans on China were statistically significant depending on the region, gender, level of education and income. Specifically, When the criterion category is a competitive target, the higher the level of education and income, the more China is recognized as a cooperative target than a competitive target. Comparing with males, females are more inclined to consider China as a cooperative target rather than a competitive target, which means females have a comparatively friendly perception on China. When the criterion group is changed to a negative target, the higher the level of education, the more China is recognized as a competitor to the negative target. The reason for perceiving China as a relatively friendly object according to educational level and income level is that the two groups are more objective in their understanding of China because they have more means of acquiring information about China than other groups. Also, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the white-collar class with a high level of education and income has a progressive tendency and the perception on China is relatively favorable.

III Summary

This chapter examined the Koreans' perception on China over the past decade, and these perceptions and changes are mainly attributed to factors such as changes in the strength of the two countries mainly due to the rise of China, popular policies in Korea,²⁵ North Korea related issues, and specific events. As a result of the study, it is clear that there exists different perceptions of Koreans on China in each political period. The reason was analyzed from the

²⁵The international community is determined by the power relations between the great powers, and China, the emerging power, challenges the current international order of the United States. As historical experience tells us, it is inevitable that China will rise and clash with the United States. In particular, South Korea, a strategic hub for powerful countries such as the United States and China, is likely to be in the midst of rivalry and confrontation between Central America and the United States. Therefore, the rise of China is not only a threat to international order, but also a threat to Korea. In line with this idea, securing Korean security from emerging China should be the top priority of Chinese policy. Economic exchanges and cooperation are important, but there is nothing more important than Korea's security. I think it is necessary to guard against the increase of China's military strength following the rise of China and prepare for it.

complex factors such as the dynamics of international environment, the rise of China, the inter-Korean relations, changes of Korean regime and China's policies towards North Korea.

It also came to the conclusion that the stereotypes of 'conservative political period - threatening China' and 'progressive government – friendly China' were proven false. As a result of the rise of China and the many complex factors, South Koreans were not all friendly to China, and China was recognized as a competitive, negative, and cooperative target. This basic recognition rank almost did not change, but Koreans' perception on China was inconsistent and irregular due to the continual change of South Korean's foreign policy and South Korea-China relations following the change of regime. In particular, compared to the Lee Myung-bak political period, "Allying with US. and harmonizing with China", the Park's administration's more favorable policy toward China until the deployment of the THAAD, which affected the public's perception on China that was more favorable at the beginning and middle of Park Geun-hye's administration than that of the Lee Myung-bak's. However, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the two nations had a great influence on the deterioration of Korea and China, and in the early days of President Lee Myung-bak, the consciousness of cooperation with China was very strong. Compared to the Lee Myung-bak political period, when Park Geun-hye took power, Koreans' perception on China was deteriorated as a result of the THAAD deployment, but can be said that it ameliorated overall.

Finally, the concept 'unstabilization' means that Koreans' perception on China is not fixed for a certain period of time shows that the Koreans' perception on China is still forming, and that the relationship between Korea and China has not been established yet. The Roh Moo-hyun government promoted 'Peace and Prosperity Policy' which succeeded Kim Dae-jung's 'Sunshine Policy' after the ruling and promoted 'Balanced Diplomacy' and 'Engagement Policy toward North Korea' in foreign relations. Although there were conflicts between Korea and China over the Korean-Chinese relations as well as the Goguryeo incident, the Koreans' perception on China as a whole was relatively favorable. After the Lee Myung-bak administration, the ROK-US alliance, the ROK-US alliance, had changed its perception on China to negative compared to that of the Roh Moo-hyun political period. However, during the period of Park Geun-hye, the Korea-China relationship was at its peak after their diplomatic normalization 25 years ago. However, due to the THAAD issue, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated again, and the favorable perception among the people had also fallen.

The views of the Korean academic community on the future development of Korea-China relations do not necessarily coincide, but the mainstream view is basically the following. First, China's importance to Korea is growing, and this trend will continue. Second, the rise of China will lead to unpredictable uncertainties in Korea (Jung Jae-ho, 2014). The Korean perception on the US has some differences according to the governments including the Roh Moo-hyun period, but the importance of the ROK-US alliance and the accumulation of decades-long friendly feelings toward Korea in the United States has led to a series of endogenous and exogenous variables and maintained a high level of friendship. However, Koreans' perception on China did not show a fixed pattern, but was influenced by changes in the international environment, changes in government and policies, changes in perceptions easily occurred, and undue relief. Compared with this strong sense of friendship toward the United States, the informal perception on China has many suspicions and uncertainties in regards to Koreans' feelings toward China, and despite the continuous upward relations between the two countries, it shows that the mental distance is still far away and that the relationship between Korea and China needs to be further strengthened.

Chapter 5 Perception on China by Region and Political Ideology

The difference between regionalism and political ideology is a very significant variable in analyzing the political perception on Koreans. The concept of regionalism actually signifies the state of mind that an individual possesses. In other words, it means the mental state of cognizing the importance of having the regional relationship with oneself when making a political choice. Here, regionalism and cognition, especially in social psychology theories, have been the subject of difference in the perceptions of Honam and Youngnam. It is argued that regionalism has risen due to regional sentiments, preferences, social distances, other. (Kim Yong-cheol•Cho Young-ho 2015; Yoon Kwang-il 2013: 2012; Lee Nam-young 1998, et al.). In addition to regional factors, South Korea's diplomatic ideology has traditionally been lined between the cleavages of 'ROK-US Alliance vs. self-reliance' and 'anti-Communism vs. pro-North Korea.' Looking at the Cold War that has continued after the establishment of the country, hostile rivalry between the two Koreas, as well as the history of the ROK-US alliance and authoritarian regime, the perception and attitude toward North Korea and the United States were a major factor in shaping Korea's foreign policy ideology.

It has already been confirmed in many previous studies that there is a difference in perceptions about the emotions and political issues of Koreans according to regional and political ideologies. Structural factors related to political, economic, and social inequality between Honam and Youngnam affected regionalism, which caused differences between the two regions. In addition, it can be divided into the recognition of the US and the recognition of North Korea as conservative or progressive. There is a clear political ideological difference in political ideological difference in perceiving North Korea. On the other hand, there is no significant difference in political ideology in the perception on Japan (Cha, Jeong-mi, 2012). Then, do Korean region and political ideology affect the perception on China? How does the political period relate to local and political ideals as well as the perception on China? This chapter has set the following questions to understand the perception on China based on region and political ideology.

First, does Koreans' perception on China differ from one region to another? Are there differences in perceptions on China in Honam and Youngnam? Second, does Koreans' perception on China differ according to political ideology? In other words, what differences

exist in perceptions on China between progressive, conservative, and center groups? Third, does political period affect regional and ideological differences in perception on China? Specifically, is there a difference in the perception on China in regional and political ideological sense by the political periods of Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye?

The following hypotheses are set based on the above research questions.

Hypothesis 1) Perception on China in Honam area is friendlier than that in Youngnam area.

Hypothesis 2) Progressive group has a friendlier perception on China than does conservative group.

Hypothesis 3) Regional differences and ideological differences in perception on China vary depending on the regime.

Hypothesis 4) The progressives in Honam and the conservatives in Youngnam have the greatest difference in perception on China.

This chapter focuses on analyzing the perceptions and differences regarding China according to region and political ideology of Koreans. Taking a further step from analyzing the differences between the perceptions on China by political period, it intends to analyze in more detail the perceptions on China during the political periods of Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye. In particular, by considering the regional and political tendencies which are the main factors causing different aspects among the Koreans in relation to foreign relations and politics, as well as by exploring the influence of difference of regional and political tendency on the difference of public perception by each regime, the following will analyze the difference by regime more deeply. In other words, it is aimed to clarify whether the ideological and regional factors influence the public perception on the public, and if so, what influence it has and if the influence is continuous. To this end, this chapter is composed as follows. First, it will examine Koreans' perception on China and differences according to the regional factors. Second, it will examine the Koreans' perception on China and differences based on political ideology. Third, after examining whether the region and ideological tendencies are interacted and are affecting Koreans' perception on China, it will analyze the characteristics of region and political ideology factors in Koreans' perception on China in the précis.

I Theoretical Discussion on Region and Political Ideology

1. Regionalism and Perception in Korea

The concept of regionalism actually indicates the state of mind that an individual possesses. In other words, it means the mental state of cognizing the importance of having a relationship between oneself and his or her region when making a political choice. The tendency to place emphasis on local inclusions encompasses several types of psychology: (1) loving his or her home region, (2) propensity to support people from their hometowns, (3) the tendency to support the group that has a strong relationship with his or her hometown and that of the group's, (4) tendency to abhor or hostile people from a particular region, (5) a tendency to place more emphasis on problems at the regional level rather than at the national level, (6) emotional judgment rather than logic and rationality (Lee Nam-young 1998, p. 20). Regionalism is intermingled with regional cleavages, regional sentiments, regional conflicts, and regional hegemony, which suggests that regionalism is expressed not only by voting behavior in Korean society. At one time, the most serious conflicts in Korean society were regional conflicts, and in particular, conflicts and differences of sentiments between people in Youngnam and Honam were deeply rooted not only in the central government but also in the daily lives of individuals.

Political studies of regionalism that have been conducted since the 2000s often analyzed whether the variable 'region' influenced voters' voting process rather than examining the origins and causes of regionalism. Particularly, the studies of this tendency utilize the data obtained through questionnaires such as voter perception survey or poll survey, election results and aggregate data. Based on these data, research questions are formed, such as what variables were important in the election, how much the explanatory power of the variables of the region is, how the voting behaviors of the regional states appeared in the elections, etc. The recent regionalism studies can be categorized as follows: the position that the voting behavior of the regionalism after democratization is still valid (Yoon Kwang-il 2003: 2012; Kim Sung-soo 2013; Lee Gab-yoon·Park Jung-seok 2001, etc.) and the other position that the voting behavior of regionalism is gradually weakening and that the new cleavage and conflict structure is replacing the existing regional cleavage (Lee Nae-young·Jung Han-wook 2013; Kang Won-taek 2010: 2003; Choi Joon-young·Cho Jin-man 2005, etc.) (Jung Sang-ho, 2016) (Jung Jin-wook, 2017).

The above has examined the origins and changes in the formation of regionalism in Korea, and regionalism is a very important endogenous variable affecting Koreans' perception on China. Here, Honam province (湖南地方) is a regional term for Korea, which refers to Gwangju, Jeollanam-do and Jeollabuk-do. Broadly, Jeju Special Self-governing Province is included in Honam region. It is located in the southwestern part of the Korean peninsula, and forms the southern part of the Korean peninsula along with Honam and Youngnam provinces. And Youngnam province (嶺南地方) is a regional classification term for South Korea located in Southeast Asia. It corresponds to the areas of Gyeongsangbuk-do, Gyeongsangnam-do, Busan, Daegu, and Ulsan metropolitan cities. As mentioned before, there are conflicting perceptions between Honam and Youngnam because of the imbalance of historical, political, and economic development in Honam and Youngnam regions. Therefore, it is paid attention to the local people having different perceptions on supporting political parties, national policy issues, perceptions on the US and China, etc. For example, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun government received much support from the Honam region, while Lee Myung-bak, the Park Geun-hye's political period received more support from the Youngnam region. In addition, the Honam area is considered as a comparatively progressive area, and the Youngnam area is considered as a comparatively conservative area. In foreign policy, Honam is more pro-North Korea than Youngnam and Youngnam has a stronger perception on pro-US and anti-North than does Honam.

2. Political Ideology and the Perception in Korea

To understand today's Koreans' perception on China correctly, it is necessary to accurately understand the characteristics, contents and changes of Koreans' formation in foreign perception. Koreans' perception on foreign countries is largely divided into four types in the liberation period: the 'pro-US, anti-Soviet dependence from foreign power type' of the right, the 'pro-Soviet, anti-US dependence on foreign power' of the left, 'pro-US, pro-Soviet combined dependence on both domestic and foreign power' and 'rejection of foreign power, autonomous nationalist type' of the center (Um Sang-yoon, 2008). They exposed fierce competition and conflict around the issue of provisional government. In the end, the external recognition of the left and right won the real politics, which resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula.

These three types have repeated fierce confrontation, dissension, and conflict over the control of the leadership of the state. For the past 50 years, from the time of Rhee Syng-man to the time of Kim Young-sam, 'pro-US, anti-Soviet dependence type' dominated the leadership of the country, when in the meanwhile, 'pro-US, pro-Soviet combined independence on both domestic and foreign power' as well as 'rejection of foreign power, autonomous nationalist type' showed their aspects of challenging. For the first time in history after independence, 'pro-US, pro-Soviet combined dependence on both domestic and foreign power' in Kim Dae-jung's political period and 'rejection of foreign power, autonomous nationalist type' in Roh Moo-hyun's political period for the first time after establishment of country showed their aspects of challenging. With the emergence of the Lee Myung-bak's political period in 2008, the 'pro-US, anti-Soviet dependence from foreign power type' commenced again. It is remarkable that Park Chung-hee and Roh Tae-woo governments, who were faithful to 'pro-US and foreign-dependent foreign dependence', chose 'pro-US, pro-Soviet combined independence on both domestic and foreign power' in the early 1970s and early 1990s, respectively.

Koreans' perception on foreign countries showed the patterns of 'pro-US, anti-Soviet dependence type' or 'pro-US, anti-North.' From the Rhee Syng-man's political period to the Kim Young-sam political period. However, in Kim Dae-jung's political period, they showed 'pro-US, pro-Soviet combined independence on both domestic and foreign power' or 'pro-US, pro-North,' and during the Roh Moo-hyun period, 'rejection of foreign power, autonomous nationalist type' or 'pro-North, anti-US.' From the late Roh Moo-hyun political period, the two sides have been divided into two groups: 'pro-US, anti-North' and 'pro-US, pro-North and pro-North, anti-US.' These perceptions on foreign powers have undergone considerable change. In the Cold War, 'anti-communism and anti-North' prevailed, but during the post-Cold War, especially after the Kim Dae-jung era, there showed a tendency to weaken anti-communism and anti-North Korean consciousness. The consciousness of 'pro-US' among the Koreans has been firmly established, but the consciousness to resist the US policy toward Korea has been intermittently expressed. Especially, after the 'death of the girl student' in 2002, anti-US consciousness showed a tendency to be rooted in some Korean societies. On the other hand, since the 1970s, the issue of security has become a relatively large part of the national security problem, and the post-Cold War world tide has also accelerated. The changes in the internal and external perceptions were caused by the changes in the domestic and

international environment, especially before and after the war, globalization, changes in the US policy, economic development and democratization in Korea, and improved inter-Korean relations. In addition, it can be said that there were few cases of the generation change, especially the '386 generation' who did not experience the devastation of the 6.25 war and the political stage of the 'generation after the democratization' (Um Sang Yoon, 2008). Despite the fact that the post-Cold War political period has passed, Koreans' perception on foreign countries is inevitable in the divisional reality, and has yet to be completely removed from the Cold War and dichotomy thinking.

The Koreans' perception on China is in the confrontation of ideology centered on the left and right in this historical context. As described above, Korea's diplomatic ideology is traditionally based on the cleavages of 'ROK-US Alliance,' 'anti-communism vs. pro-North.' In the history of Cold War, hostile rivalry between South and North Korea and the history of the ROK-US alliance and authoritarian regime, the perception and attitude toward 'North Korea' and 'America' were the main factors forming Korea's foreign policy ideology. Under such foreign perception, how to look at the rise of China in particular and how to cope with it is a key issue of Korean diplomacy today and is becoming a serious diplomatic task. However, the question of how to look at and respond to China is a topic that is still controversial, and there exists no consensus view.

The region and political ideology described above are closely related to the independent variables that influence Koreans' perceptions. In other words, the two provinces of Honam and Youngnam are historically different from each other's ideological tendencies in progressivism and conservatism due to the imbalance of development, and therefore, the two regions and two political ideological groups can have different perceptions depending on the policies that their supporting political parties implement. For example, it can be inferred that progressive groups in Honam region that has a tendency of progressivism and conservative groups in Youngnam region that has a tendency of conservatism may show a large gap in the perceptions on the US and the North. If then, the following will look at how the perception on China differs according to region and political ideology.

II Perception on China according to Region and Political Ideology

1. General Characteristics of Survey Respondents

According to the general characteristics of the respondents surveyed by region, there are many young people in the age of Roh Moo Hyun political period, and the number of people in their 50s and 60s is relatively small. The level of education is mainly high school and college, and the income level is mainly in the range of 2~3 million KRW, the population of Youngnam is about 1/3 of the total, and the number of Honam is relatively small. In the aspect of political ideology, moderate group takes up half of the whole, and there is comparatively small number of conservative and progressive groups. During the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye political periods, the general characteristics of the survey respondents are similar to that of the Roh Moo-hyun period, while the income level of Lee Myung-bak is relatively high at 3~4 million KRW, and there are comparatively more groups who have income levels of more than 4 million KRW during Park Geun-hye political period. (See <Table-9>)

Table-9 General Characteristics of Survey Respondents by Region and Political Ideology during the Political Periods of Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye

		Roh's period		Lee's period		Park's period	
		Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Sex	Male	592	50.6	2,988	50.48	2,412	50.56
	Female	578	49.4	2,931	49.52	2,359	49.44
Age group	20s	295	25.21	1,363	23.03	923	19.35
	30s	304	25.98	1,485	25.09	1,007	21.11
Level of education	40s	297	25.38	1,549	26.17	1,149	24.08
	50s	191	16.32	1,094	18.48	1,056	22.13
Level of income	60s+	83	7.09	428	7.23	636	13.33
	Middle	150	12.82	585	9.88	471	9.87
Region	High	498	42.56	2,557	43.2	2,163	45.34
	College+	522	44.62	2,777	46.92	2,137	44.79
Political ideology	<200	275	23.5	1,008	17.03	528	11.07
	200-300	364	31.11	1,649	27.86	920	19.28
Total	300-400	291	24.87	1,760	29.73	1,493	31.29
	400+	240	20.51	1,502	25.38	1,830	38.36
Region	Honam	131	11.2	646	10.91	657	13.77
	Youngnam	319	27.26	1,592	26.9	1,289	27.02
Political ideology	Other	720	61.54	3,681	62.19	2,825	59.21
	Progressive	299	25.56	1,624	27.44	1,216	25.49
Total	Moderate	555	47.44	2,823	47.69	2,368	49.63
	Conservative	316	27.01	1,472	24.87	1,187	24.88

2. Koreans' perception on China according to region

<Figure-9> shows Koreans' perception on China over the past decade. Overall, Honam region recognizes China more favorably than Youngnam and other regions. Specifically, the

proportion of cooperation in Honam is 30.7%, which is higher than that of 20.9% in Youngnam, while the negative perception on Honam is 33.8%, which is slightly lower than that of Youngnam in 34.7%. Compared to other regions, Honam has a higher perception on cooperation on China and a lower perception on negativity.




Figure-9 Koreans' perception on China according to region

<Table-10> is a cross-sectional analysis of differences of perception on China by region. Differences in perceptions on China by region were statistically significant.

Table-10 Cross-sectional analysis of perception on China by region

	Cooperative	Competitive	Negative	Total
Honam	440	510	484	1,434
	30.7	35.6	33.8	100
	14.6	11	12	12.1
Youngnam	670	1,488	1,042	3,200
	20.9	46.5	32.6	100
	22.3	30.9	25.8	27
Other	1,896	2,819	2,511	7,226
	26.3	39.0	34.7	100
	63.1	58.5	62.2	60.9
Total	3,006	4,817	4,037	11,860
	25	41	34	100
	100	100	100	100

Pearson chi² = 86.9***

3. Koreans' Perception on China according to political ideology

<Figure-10> is Koreans' perception on China according to political ideology over the past decade. The progressive group has a slightly more favorable perception on China than the conservative group. Specifically, the progressive group has 26.4% of cooperation perception on China, which is slightly higher than that of the conservative group which is 25.1%, while the negative perception on progressive group is 33.6%, which is slightly lower than that of conservative group which is 36.8%.




Figure-10 Koreans' perception on China according to political ideology

<Table-11> is a cross-sectional analysis of perception on China according to political ideology. Differences in perceptions on China by region were statistically significant.

Table-11 Cross-sectional analysis of perception on China according to political ideology

	Cooperative	Competitive	Negative	Total
Progressive	828	1,256	1055	3,139
	26.4	40.0	33.6	100
	27.5	26.1	26.1	26.5
	1,432	2,428	1,886	5,746
Moderate	24.9	42.3	32.8	100
	47.6	50.4	46.7	48.4
	746	1,133	1,096	2,975
	25.1	38.1	36.8	100
Conservative	24.8	23.5	2.1	25.1
	3,006	4,817	4,037	11,860
	25.3	40.6	34.1	100
	100	100	100	100
Pearson chi ² =20.1				Pr = 000***

<Table-12> is a multinomial logit analysis of Koreans' perception on China according to region and political ideology. The reference set out in the analysis is the case where China is perceived as a competition target. As a result, regional differences in the perception on China were statistically significant, and differences in political ideology were not statistically significant. Specifically, people in Youngnam and other regions perceived China as a competition target than negation target compared to people in Honam area. The differences of Koreans' perception on China according to control variable year, education level, and income level were statistically significant. When setting the reference as a competition target, the higher the education level and the higher the income level, the more favorable the perception on China is. Compared to 2007, perception on China is more favorable in 2008 and between 2012 and 2016. Moreover, the differences of perception on China according to political ideology did not show statistically significant results.

Table-12 Multinomial logit analysis of Koreans' perception on China according to region and political ideology

Variable	Model 1 base: Competition Target			Model 2 base: Competition Target			Model 3 base: Competition Target		
	Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.	Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.	Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.	Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.	
	-0.62 *** 0.08 -0.26 *** 0.72	-0.33 *** 0.08 -0.1 0.05	-0.62 *** 0.08 -0.27 *** 0.73	-0.33 *** 0.08 -0.1 0.05	-0.81 *** 0.15 -0.29 0.13	-0.51 *** 0.14 -0.13 0.12			
Region (Reference: Honam)	Youngnam				-0.07	-0.07	-0.17	-0.14	
		0.08	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.15	0.14	
	Other	-0.26 *** 0.72	-0.1 0.05	-0.27 *** 0.73	-0.1 0.05	-0.29 0.13	-0.13 0.12		
Political Orientation (Reference: Progressive)	Moderate				-0.07	-0.07	-0.17	-0.14	
					0.05	0.05	0.15	0.14	
	Conservative				0.18	0.18	0.37	0.43	
					0.06	0.06	0.18	0.18	
Interaction effect (Reference: Honam&Prog ressive)	Youngnam& Moderate						0.26	0.22	
	Youngnam& Conservative						0.19	0.17	
	Moderate& Other						0.23	0.26	
	Conservative &Other						0.22	0.21	
							0.06	0.02	
							0.16	0.16	
							-0.01	0.1	
							0.2	0.19	
Sex	Female	0.01 0.04	0.41 0.04	0.01 0.04	0.05 0.04	0.01 0.04	0.01 0.04	0.04 0.04	
		0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	
Age		0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	
		0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	0.00 0.00	
Education level		0.24 *** 0.05	-0.08 0.04	0.23 *** 0.04	-0.07 0.04	0.23 *** 0.04	-0.07 0.04	-0.07 0.04	
		0.10 *** 0.02	0.08 ** 0.02	0.10 *** 0.02	0.07 ** 0.02	0.10 *** 0.02	0.07 *** 0.02	0.07 *** 0.02	
Income level		0.10 *** 0.40 ***	0.08 ** 0.28 **	0.10 *** 0.40 ***	0.07 ** 0.28 **	0.10 *** 0.40 ***	0.07 *** 0.27 **	0.07 *** 0.27 **	
		0.11 0.11	0.09 0.09	0.11 0.11	0.09 0.09	0.11 0.11	0.09 0.09	0.09 0.09	
		0.16 0.11	0.03 0.09	0.16 0.11	0.17 0.09	0.15 0.11	0.16 0.09	0.16 0.09	
		-0.01 0.11	0.04 0.09	0.03 0.11	0.04 0.09	-0.01 0.11	0.03 0.09	0.03 0.09	
		0.11 0.16	0.09 0.25 **	0.11 0.16	0.09 0.26 **	0.11 0.16	0.09 0.25 **	0.09 0.25 **	
		0.11 0.11	0.09 0.09	0.11 0.11	0.09 0.09	0.11 0.11	0.09 0.09	0.09 0.09	
		0.32 ** 0.11	0.37 *** 0.09	0.32 ** 0.11	0.37 *** 0.09	0.31 ** 0.11	0.36 *** 0.09	0.36 *** 0.09	
		0.41 *** 0.11	-0.19 * 0.11	0.41 *** 0.11	-0.19 0.09	0.4 *** 0.1	-0.18 0.09		
		0.11 0.77 ***	0.1 0.17	0.1 0.77 ***	0.1 0.17	0.1 0.76 ***	0.1 0.17		
		0.1 0.63 ***	0.1 -0.14	0.1 0.63 ***	0.1 -0.13	0.1 0.63 ***	0.1 -0.13		
Year (Reference: Year2007)	2013	0.11 0.11	0.1 0.1	0.1 0.1	0.09 0.1	0.1 0.1	0.1 0.09	0.09 0.09	
	2014	0.1 0.77 ***	0.1 0.17	0.1 0.77 ***	0.1 0.17	0 0.76 ***	0 0.17		
	2015	0.1 0.63 ***	0.1 -0.14	0.1 0.63 ***	0.1 -0.13	0.1 0.63 ***	0.1 -0.13		
Cons Log Likelihood	2016	0.53 *** 0.1	0.01 0.1	0.54 *** 0.1	0.02 0.1	0.53 *** 0.1	0.02 0.09	0.02 0.09	
		11,860 11,860		11,860 11,860		11,860 11,860		11,860 11,860	
X ²		421.39	421.39	443.7	443.7	449.15	449.15		
Pseudo R ²		0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01		
N		11,860	11,860	11,860	11,860	11,860	11,860		

***<.001. **<.01. *<.05.

When observing the Koreans' perception on China according to region and political ideology as a whole, there exist differences in Koreans' perceptions on China according to region and political ideology. In regards to China, Honam people perceive China more favorably than do Youngnam people to the point that it is statistically significant.

Conservative group perceives China slightly more favorable than does progressive group, but there exists no disparity to the point that it is statistically significant. It can be seen that the influence of the region is greater than that of the political ideology in perception on China.

If then, why does Honam recognize China more favorably? This can be interpreted as a Party Identification in accordance with the favorability and support of the local party, the nature of the local people and the supporting party, the external recognition of the local people, and the foreign policy of the supporting party.

Since the democratization of Korea in 1987, the difference in party support has been distinct from the 13th presidential election until now (Choi Jang-jib, 1996). When comparing the Honam and Youngnam regions, the Honam region has a relatively progressive ideological tendency, and the Youngnam region has a relatively conservative tendency. The Honam residents have supported more progressive political parties, and the Youngnam residents tend to support conservative political parties, as can be seen in the presidential election. For example, in the 17th presidential election held in 2008, the conservative GNP candidate Lee Myung-bak received 62% of votes in the Youngnam area and 8.9% in the province of Honam, while the candidate of the Unified Democratic Party Jung Dong-young 10.2% in Youngnam and 79.5% in Honam area. Making a decision to support a political party is strongly influenced by the liking of local people (Lee Gap-yoon, 2014). In other words, whether one supports the Grand National Party or the Democratic Party depends on whether one likes the people of Youngnam and Honam. Thus, the strong regional support of Korea is not often found in other democracies. This phenomenon is extremely exceptional in countries where race, language, and culture are homogeneous, especially in South Korea. The most frequent cause of the differences in political parties supported by the region was the uneven development in the regions that occurred during the industrialization process. (Kim Man-heum, 1987). From the Third Republic to the Fifth Republic, the political elites from Youngnam came to have power and distributed economic resources unequally among the regions, and thus led to the development of Youngnam region and alienation of Honam region. These socioeconomic cleavages between the two regions are expressed in local supportive parties (Lee Gap-yoon, 2014). Due to the imbalance of regional development, the Honam area tends to be more progressive than Youngnam, and it tends to be more challenging than the Youngnam area, which is a privileged area. The most representative example that Honam region challenges to achieve power is Gwangju Democratization Movement, through which

areas of Gwangju (光州) and Jeonnam (全南) demanded the realization of democracy in May 1980.

The perceptions on China by the residents in Honam and Youngnam are closely related to the party they support and the policies of those parties. While conservative ideological proponents support conservative parties or issues, support for progressive political parties and issues is prominent in local people with such ideological tendencies. Among these theoretical grounds, representative research achievement is a sense of unity of the party. Party identification is a variable that best explains the preference of voters who do not think in accordance with systematic ideological tendencies. Party identification works as a "long-term partisan commitments that lead to attitudes to political objects" (Campbell et al. 1960, 135), and can determine political preference according to the position that the voters' supporting party expresses. In other words, the Honam region has supported a progressive political party with a sense of unity, and according to the popular attitude of the party, the preference for public policy and the attitude toward China can be changed according to the party policy supported by the party. The Democratic Party (now Democratic Party of Korea), which represents Korea's progressive tendency, has taken a relatively friendly attitude toward China compared to the conservative party centered on the "Korea-US Alliance". For example, on September 28, 2010, the Diaoyudao / Senkaku territorial dispute was declared that "We should do balanced diplomacy on the path of friendly cooperation, not tense relations with China".²⁶ The inhabitants of Honam are inferred to be friendly toward China in accordance with the favorable public policy that their party supports.

To summarize the above, it is assumed that the regional differences of Koreans' perception on China are derived from the differences in ideology. The progressive group tends to have anti-Americanism and pro-North Korea characteristics compared to conservatives. And it is shown with the favorable perception on pro-North and anti-China. On the other hand, historically, the Youngnam region has supported conservative regimes. The characteristic of conservatism is the tendency of pro-US & anti-North, and it is inferred that anti-North and anti-China appear in combination of perceptions. This can be interpreted as the root of the formation of ideology in the region. The conservative group began its history as Korea was liberated from Japan. In other words, the forces cooperating with Japan made a 'Democratic Party of Korea' in cooperation with Rhee Syng-man to maintain vested rights, while Rhee

²⁶ <http://m.munhwa.com/mnews/view.html?no=2010092801070823236002>

retained their vested rights as president and suppressed Kim Koo and others' advance. Youngnam region was the basis of these past vested interests. However, both Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in were originally from Youngnam, but ideologically they wanted to break the long-term power of vested power and make a new politics as progress. Therefore, even more important of the region and ideology is not the person but the ideological tendency.

Meanwhile, the conservative forces have continued to use the hostile frame of the North and South to maintain their vested interests. Also, in Youngnam area, investment was made according to the long-term power of the conservative group, and factories and export complexes are built much more than Honam area. On the other hand, Honam area has fallen behind in the priority of economic development and has become conscious of damage, and has some aggressive tendency than other regions. After the Kim Dae-jung regime, the development of the Honam region was attracted to the attention, and the need for the exogenous factor of China to invest in new investment would lead to a favorable perception on China. Especially, in the "Saemangeum Construction Project", which is a large-scale investment, it is a representative example of building a Korea-China Industrial Complex and attracting investment from China. Therefore, in terms of economy, Honam region has a structural condition that is more favorable to China than Youngnam region.

The reason for the differences in perceptions on China by region and political ideology are explained in the context of the history of the origin and formation of progress and conservatism. In addition to regional and political ideologies, there may be differences among generations in external recognition. In the past, it could be shown through the combination of anti-North socialism and anti-China according to region and political ideology; however, the combination perception in regards to anti-communism and anti-North, anti-China among the young people can be weak. Of course, China is still a socialist state with North Korea, but the relationship between China and North Korea has continued to evolve unlike the Cold War, and China itself is rapidly developing. Therefore, when the elderly view the past China, the perception on anti-North and anti-socialism can be combined with anti-China, while the united perception on anti-North and anti-socialism can be weak for the present young people. It is inferred that perception on China will be combined with more complicated causes considering the political, economic, and cultural aspects of the Chinese society. And it means that Honam and progressive group, which is said to be friendly to public recognition, has a relatively friendly perception compared to Youngnam and conservative groups. In other words,

it is not proven to be true that the Honam region or the progressive group is friendly to China or the Youngnam region or the conservative groups have a negative perception on China.

III Interaction of Regime, Region, and Political Ideology in South Koreans' Perception on China

1. Perception on China by region according to regime

1-1. Koreans' Perception on China by Region during Roh Moo-hyun Political Period

In the Roh Moo Hyun period, the general public's perception on China is basically in the order of competitive, negative, and cooperative. According to the region, perception on China shows the following differences. See <Figure-11 >.

First, Honam recognizes China more favorably than Youngnam and other regions. Specifically, Honam has a higher percentage of viewers who see China as a cooperative target than other regions (26.72%), while 23.66% perceive it as a negative target, much lower than that of Youngnam (36.05%) and other regions (35.83%). Honam also recognizes China as the most favorable in the two other government periods.

This is due to the fact that the support base for the Roh Moo-hyun government, which is a progressive government, is Honam. Looking at the ratio of approval votes for Roh, Gyeongnam province won 29.86%, Gyeongbuk won 21.65%, and Daegu won 18.68%, followed by Jeonnam 93.39%, Gwangju 95.18%, Jeonbuk 91.59%, and Seoul 51.30%. There is a big difference of ratio of approval votes between Youngnam and Honam, and Roh government in particular has gained a lot of votes in Honam region. The Honam region was favorable to the Roh Moo-hyun policy, and the government's attitude towards China was also reflected in the public's perception. The Roh Moo-hyun government had a friendly perception on China during the Roh Moo-hyun's political period, and the government's perception was reflected on the general public's perception, as well. Here, the friendly perception on China during the Roh government period is said to be resulting from the interlink between the maximization of economic interests through economic cooperation relationship after the Korea-China diplomatic normalization as well as the maximization of positive perception. It is inferred that Roh Moo-hyun's political period's Chinese policy and favorable relations

between the two countries have more influence on the public perception on Honam area as the support base of the Roh's political period.

Second, as a whole, Koreans are more likely to perceive China as competitive, especially in the Honam region. Even when observing the Honam region as a whole, the competitive perception on China in the Honam region is perceived to be the highest. During the Roh Moo-hyun government, China began to realize that it was emerging economically and someday it would become the world's largest economy over the United States. It is inferred that, at that time, Korea perceived China with two perceptions of both opportunistic and of threat, and at an economic level, it has a strong perception on China.




Figure-11 Perception on China by Region during Roh Moo-hyun Political Period

The differences in perceptions of China during Roh Moo-hyun regime period appear to have a significant through cross analysis. See <Table-13>

Table-13 Cross Analysis of Perception on China by Region during Roh Moo-hyun Regime Period

	Cooperative	Competitive	Negative	Total
	35	65	31	131
Honam	26.72	49.62	23.66	100
	15.56	12.01	7.67	11.2
	67	137	115	319
Youngnam	21	42.95	36.05	100
	29.78	25.32	28.47	27.26
	123	339	258	720
Other	17.08	47.08	35.83	100
	54.67	62.66	63.86	61.54
	225	541	404	1170
Total	19.23	46.24	34.53	100
	100	100	100	100
Pearson chi ² = 12.2951				Pr = 0.015*

1-2. Perception on China by Region during Lee Myung-bak Political Period

The perception on China by the general public during the Lee Myung-bak's political period is as follows. See <Figure-12>.

First, Youngnam has the highest negative perception on China, which is in contrast to Honam's view of China as the most favorable. Specifically, Honam recognizes China as a cooperative target of 27.4% which is far higher than 15.95% of Youngnam. Youngnam has a higher perception on China as a competitive target than other regions which is similar to perception on China during the political period of Roh Moo-hyun's. This is inferred that the base of Lee Myung-bak's regime is Youngnam, while the Youngnam region is originally responding to the policies of the regime while there are differences in regional perceptions. In the 17th presidential election, when each candidate receives a vote by region, the concentration of votes is prominent in Youngnam and Honam. Lee Myung-bak has 72.58% of the votes in his homeland, Gyeongbuk, and 69.37% in the neighboring province of Daegu. Also, the rate of votes in Busan / Ulsan / Gyeongnam area, which is in Youngnam area, is well over 50%. On the other hand, Chung Dong-young's case shows a high concentration of votes in Honam who received 81.60% support in Chonbuk area, 79.75% in Gwangju area, and 78.65% in Chonnam area. Lee Myung-bak, who was from Youngnam, received high support from Daegu / Gyeongbuk ($\beta=.118$) and native people from Busan / Ulsan / Gyeongnam ($\beta=.107$). On the contrary, it has rather high opposition support from Gwangju / Cholla indigenous people ($\beta=-.265$). This tendency reflects the region's exclusive competition of native people. Native people in other areas do not show support or opposition to Lee Myung-bak. In particular, the cohesiveness of votes in the Seoul area, where Lee Myung-bak is politically acclaimed in the market, has hardly appeared. (Lee, Nam-young, 2008). The election turnout of Lee Myung-bak's political period was highly supported by the Youngnam region. Youngnam area is relatively conservative than Honam and responds to public policies of the Lee Myung-bak government, which is centered on the alliance between Korea and the US, so that there is a difference in the perception on China.




Figure-12 Perception on China by Region during Lee Myung-bak Political Period

Second, the negative perception on China is similar in Lee Myung-bak's period. Compared to Roh Moo-hyun period, the rate of negative perception on China in Honam area increased from 26.66% to 37.46%, the rate of negative perception on China in Youngnam area increased from 35.83% to 37.95%. This change is caused by the deterioration of the Korea-US relationship due to the Korea-US alliance policy at the time of Lee Myung-bak's political period.

Table-14 Cross Analysis in Perception on China by Region during Lee Myung-bak's Political Period

	Cooperative	Competitive	Negative	Total
Honam	177	227	242	646
	27.4	35.14	37.46	100
	13.94	9.45	10.77	10.91
Youngnam	254	730	608	1592
	15.95	45.85	38.19	100
	20	30.39	27.06	26.9
Other	839	1445	1397	3681
	22.79	39.26	37.95	100
	66.06	60.16	62.17	62.19
Total	1270	2402	2247	5919
	21.46	40.58	37.96	100
	100	100	100	100

Pearson chi² = 53.4 Pr = 0.000***

As shown in <Table-14>, the difference in Koreans' perception on China by region during the Lee Myung-bak's political period described above was statistically significant.

Table-15 Multinomial Logit Analysis on the Perception on China by Region and Political Ideology –

Lee Myung-bak Political Period

Variable		Model1 base: Competition Target		Model2 base: Competition Target		Model3 base: Competition Target	
		Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.	Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.	Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.
Region (Reference: Honam)	Youngnam	-0.799*** (0.125)	(0.260)	-0.802*** (0.125)	(0.281)* (0.108)	-1.197*** (0.234)	(0.568)** (0.197)
	Other	-0.347** (0.111)	(0.111)* (0.1)	-0.348** (0.111)	(0.123) (0.101)	-0.422* (0.192)	(0.317) (0.176)
Political Ideology (Reference: Progressive)	Moderate			-0.095 (0.084)	(0.135) (0.072)	-0.258 (0.228)	(0.336) (0.209)
	Conservative			0.010 (0.101)	0.153 (0.084)	-0.254 (0.297)	(0.388) (0.275)
Interaction (Reference:H onam&Progre ssive)	Moderate& Other					0.091 (0.249)	0.210 (0.228)
	Conservative &Other					0.182 (0.321)	0.522 (0.294)
	Youngna& Moderate					0.513 (0.295)	0.273 (0.251)
	Youngnam& Conservative					0.616 (0.363)	0.740 (0.313)
	Female	0.037 (0.071)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.041 (0.071)	-0.004 (0.06)	0.045 (0.071)	0.003 (0.06)
Age group		0.004* (0.003)	0 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Level of Education		0.273*** (0.068)	-0.107 (0.056)	0.27*** (0.069)	-0.108 (0.057)	0.274*** (0.069)	-0.106 (0.057)
Level of Income		0.112** (0.036)	0.059 (0.03)	0.112** (0.036)	0.059 (0.03)	0.112* (0.036)	0.059 (0.03)
Year	2009	-0.254* (0.11)	-0.105 (0.094)	-0.254* (0.11)	-0.104 (0.094)	-0.26* (0.11)	-0.107 (0.094)
	2010	-0.426*** (0.111)	-0.234* (0.094)	-0.428*** (0.111)	-0.229* (0.094)	-0.43*** (0.111)	-0.229* (0.094)
	2011	-0.252* (0.111)	-0.023 (0.094)	-0.251* (0.111)	-0.015 (0.094)	-0.254* (0.111)	-0.018 (0.094)
	2012	-0.092 (0.11)	0.09 (0.095)	-0.089 (0.11)	0.101 (0.095)	-0.097 (0.111)	0.094 (0.095)
	Cons	-1.146	0.226	-1.079	0.312	-0.960	0.509
Log Likelihood		-6230.499	-6230.499	-6222.296	-6222.296	-6217.269	-6217.269
X²		133.770***	133.770***	150.170***	150.170***	160.230***	160.230***
Pseudo R²		0.011	0.011	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.013
N		5919.000	5919.000	5919.000	5919.000	5919.000	5919.000

***p<.001. **p<.01. *p<.05.

<Table-15> shows the results of the multinomial logit analysis on the perception on China by region and political ideology during the Lee Myung-bak political period. The criteria set out in the analysis is the case of China as a competitor. As a result, regional differences in perception on China are statistically significant. Regression analysis of the perception on China during Lee government period revealed that Honam perceived China more favorably than Youngnam and other regions, while Youngnam showed stronger competition and negative perception. Specifically, it can be seen that as the region is more Youngnam compared to Honam, the perception on China is more towards competitive than

cooperative. Compared with Honam, Youngnam perceives China as a competition target rather than a negation target. Compared to Honam, other regions see China as a competition target rather than a cooperation target. The basic criteria, when it is set as negation target,²⁷ Youngnam recognizes China as a negation target rather than cooperation target compared to Honam, and compared to Jeonnam, other regions perceive China as a negation target rather than a cooperation target.

Control variables including sex, age, education level, income level, and year showed that the difference in Koreans' perception on China was statistically significant. Setting the basic criteria as competition target, the higher the age, the higher the education level, and the higher the income level, the perception on China is more towards being cordial. Koreans' perception on China in 2009, 2010, and 2011 during the Lee Myung-bak's political period was found to have changed very negatively.

To summarize the perception on China by region during Lee Myung-bak's political period, there shows differences in perceptions according to region. At the same time, according to the policies and attitudes the government has taken toward China, it has been confirmed that the general public's perception on China has changed. First, Honam recognizes China more favorably than other regions. Second, it is confirmed that Youngnam region has strong competitive and negative perception on China. Third, the perception on China is different according to the region, and at the same time, the policies of the ROK-US alliance in the Lee Myung-bak's political period caused deterioration of Korea-China relations, affecting the general public's perception on China. The perception on China has changed in a negative direction in each region, compared to Roh Moo-hyun's political period.

1-3. Koreans' Perception on China by Region during Park Geun-hye's Political Period

This section seeks to study the Koreans' perception on China during the Park Geun-hye's political period. See <Figure-13>.

First, in the emergence of Park Geun-hye's political period, the public attitude towards China in the three regions has changed to being amicable. Specifically, during this period, cooperative perception towards China increased and negative perception decreased than that of Lee Myung-bak's political period. This survey does not include the data for 2017 of Park Geun-hye's political period because it uses data from the past 10 years until July 2016. In the

²⁷ The basic criterion was not shown in the table when it was set as negation perception.

early days of Park Geun-hye government, Korea-China relations were at its best state since the normalization. In September of 2016, after the announcement of the THAAD establishment, the strong opposition from China and the "law that bans Korean culture in China" was enforced, all of which changed the period to the worst time of the year. If the data of perception on China until the end of 2017 is added, it is expected that perception on China could be more unfavorable than other political periods. However, it is also meaningful when compared with perception on China during the time of good relations between Korea and China before the THAAD deployment in 2016 and the perception on China during Lee Myung-bak's political period. It is because Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye are in the same conservative regime, and their policies differ according to the political period. Specifically, during the Lee Myung-bak's political period, the Korean-Chinese alliance is centered on setting distance from China, and from Park Geun-hye's early political period, "allying with the US & harmonizing with China" policy was implemented, through which the good Korea-China relations were emphasized. As a result, the relationship between Korea and China recovered and perception on China was favorable at the beginning of the Park Geun-hye's political period. Even in the same conservative regime, it has been confirmed that perception on China depends on the public policy and the relationship between the two countries and this change in public perception is also reflected in the region.




Figure-13 Perception on China by Region during Park Geun-hye's Political Period

Honam region has the strongest tendency to recognize China favorably and the Youngnam region has the strongest perception on China as a competitive target. These results are the same as those of political periods of Roh Moo-hyun's and Lee Myung-bak's. Specifically, the proportion of people in the Honam region that recognize China as a cooperative target is 34.7%, the highest in Youngnam and other regions. On the other hand, Youngnam has a rate of 48.18% perceiving China as a competitor, which is higher than other

regions and the highest in the regime period. This shows that the Honam region is more progressive than the Youngnam region and the perception on China is more favorable.

Specifically, it is noteworthy that the negative perception on China in the Youngnam region declined by as much as 14% from 38.19% to 24.75%, compared to other regions. This is because President Park is based in Youngnam²⁸ and supported by Youngnam people, and general people's perceptions move according to the government's policy. In the 18th presidential election in 2012, the GNP candidate Park Geun-hye won the elections in Youngnam, Chungcheong, Gangwon, Gyeonggi, Incheon and Jeju except for Seoul and Honam areas. In addition, Park Geun-hye is leaned too much towards Youngnam, and there is even the word 'Youngnam Republic.' 73% of the high-ranking personnel including the President were those from the Youngnam region in March 2015. The heads of the five major agencies including prosecutors, police, the National Tax Service, the Audit Office, and the Fair Trade Commission were all from Youngnam region. In particular, among the 168 high-ranking officials of the five major power agencies (the prosecutors are above the level of the inspectors), 71 people (42.3%) were from the Youngnam region. Followed by 32 in the metropolitan area (19%), 30 in the Honam area (17.9%), 28 in Chungcheong province (16.7%), 5 in Gangwon Province (3%) and 2 in Jeju Island (1.2%).²⁹ In the election of Park Geun-hye, the local voting system was much more supportive in the Youngnam region and many people from Youngnam during the term were employed. People in the Youngnam area were more dynamic in accordance with the friendly policies toward China during the early days of the Park's political period.

As shown in <Table-16>, the differences in Koreans' perception on China by region during the Park Geun-hye's political period were statistically significant.

The criterion category set in the multinomial logit analysis in <Table-17> is perception on China as a competition target. As a result, regional differences in perception on China are statistically significant. Specifically, the Honam region showed a more favorable perception on China than the Youngnam region, while the Youngnam region showed stronger competitive perceptions. More specifically, Youngnam compared to Honam recognized China

²⁸https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EB%B0%95%EA%B7%BC%ED%98%9C_%EC%A0%95%EB%B6%80

more as a competition target compared to cooperation target. Compared to Honam, Youngnam recognizes China as a competition target compared to negation target. This confirms that perception on China in the Youngnam area has changed more favorably in the period of Park Geun-hye compared with the results of the analysis of the regional polynomial of public perception on China during the Lee Myung-bak's period.

Table-16 Cross-sectional analysis of perception on China by region during Park Geun-hye's political period

	Cooperative	Competitive	Negative	Total
Honam	228	218	211	657
	34.7	33.18	32.12	100
	15.09	11.63	15.22	13.77
	349	621	319	1289
Youngnam	27.08	48.18	24.75	100
	23.1	33.14	23.02	27.02
	934	1035	856	2825
Other	33.06	36.64	30.3	100
	61.81	55.23	61.76	59.21
	1511	1874	1386	4771
Total	31.67	39.28	29.05	100
	100	100	100	100
Pearson chi ² = 61.3096 Pr = 0.000***				

Control variables including gender, age, education level, income level, and year showed that the difference in Korean public perception was statistically significant. When the basic category is set to competition, the higher the age, the higher the education level, and the higher the income level, the more favorable the perception on China. It can be seen that the general public in the time of Park Geun-hye's government perceived China favorably in 2014 and 2015.

Table-17 Multinomial Logit Regression Analysis of Koreans' Perception on China by Region and Political Ideology during Park Geun-hye's Political Period

Variable	Model 1 base: Competition Target		Model 2 base: Competition Target		Model 3 base: Competition Target	
	Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.	Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.	Cooperation Target Coef.	Negation Target Coef.
	(0.117)	(0.12)	(0.117)	(0.12)	(0.225)	(0.24)
Region (Reference: Honam)	Youngnam	-0.608 *** (-0.608 ***)	-0.649 *** (-0.649 ***)	-0.620 *** (-0.620 ***)	-0.663 *** (-0.663 ***)	-0.685 ** (-0.685 **)
	Other	-0.170 (0.107)	-0.183 (0.109)	-0.175 (0.107)	-0.188 (0.109)	-0.133 (0.197)
Political Orientation (Reference: Progressive)	Moderate		0.034 (0.085)	0.092 (0.088)	-0.006 (0.223)	0.095 (0.229)
	Conservative		0.251 * (0.102)	0.297 ** (0.105)	0.356 (0.267)	0.386 (0.275)
Interaction effect (Reference: Honam & Progressive)	Moderate& Other				-0.013 (0.248)	-0.144 (0.255)
	Conservative &Other				-0.150 (0.297)	-0.149 (0.305)
	Youngnam& Moderate				0.154 (0.281)	0.346 (0.293)
	Youngnam& Conservative				-0.057 (0.328)	0.056 (0.343)
Sex	Female	-0.034 (0.071)	0.102 (0.072)	-0.03 (0.071)	0.105 (0.073)	-0.032 (0.071)
Age		0.007 * (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	0.006 (0.003)	-0.008 * (0.003)	0.006 (0.003)
					0.006 (0.003)	-0.008 * (0.003)
Education level		0.207 ** (0.071)	-0.086 (0.072)	0.216 ** (0.071)	-0.073 (0.072)	0.214 ** (0.071)
					0.214 ** (0.071)	-0.077 (0.072)
Income level		0.086 * (0.038)	0.081 * (0.039)	0.086 * (0.038)	0.082 * (0.039)	0.085 * (0.038)
					0.085 * (0.038)	0.08 * (0.039)
Year	2014	0.369 *** (0.1)	0.367 *** (0.101)	0.373 *** (0.1)	0.371 *** (0.102)	0.372 *** (0.1)
	2015	0.221 * (0.099)	0.063 (0.103)	0.225 * (0.099)	0.067 (0.103)	0.225 * (0.099)
	2016	0.123 (0.1)	0.214 * (0.101)	0.135 (0.1)	0.227 * (0.101)	0.133 (0.101)
Cons		-1.172	-0.001	-1.195	-0.073	-1.191
Log Likelihood		-5138.135	-5138.135	-5132.510	-5132.510	-5129.335
X²		127.370 ***	127.370 ***	138.620 ***	138.620 ***	144.980 ***
Pseudo R²		0.012	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.014
N		4771.000	4771.000	4771.000	4771.000	4771.000

*** p<.001. ** p<.01. * p<.05.

1-4. Interaction of regime and region in terms of perception on China

As seen above, there is a regional difference in perception on China. Honam has a relatively friendlier perception on China as compared to Youngnam. At the same time, regional differences exist, but the regime does not maintain a fixed pattern, especially in the

Youngnam region, which is more dynamic in perception on China, depending on the regime. See <Figure-14>.




Figure-14 Interaction of political period and region in terms of perception on China

There are two things that have received the most attention here. First, under the influence of the political period, negative perceptions became similar regardless of region during Lee Myung-bak's political period. This is reflected in the policies of the ROK-US alliance during the Lee Myung-bak's political period and the deterioration of bilateral relations between Korea and China. The influence of the political period influences regional differences in perception on China due to the deterioration of relations between the two countries due to Lee Myung-bak's government's alliance with the ROK - US alliance and the pressure on North Korea, the conflict regarding policies toward the North, and the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island issues.

In Honam and other regions compared to Youngnam, the ratio of friendly cooperation is showing an increasing trend during the political periods of Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. This reflects the public perception on China reflecting the policies and

the Korea-China relationship of each period. However, unlike Honam and other regions, the Youngnam region shows a very special trend. In Lee Myung-bak's political period, cooperation perception in the Youngnam region is much smaller than in other regions. In the Park Geun-hye's period, Youngnam region has much less negative perception and even lower negation perception than Honam. As mentioned above, the Youngnam region is the base of support of the Lee Myung-bak and the Park Geun-hye governments, and the Youngnam region is relatively conservative and ideologically strong in anti-communism and pro-US tendencies. Anti-North and anti-China are the same context as anti-communism, and it is inferred that anti-communism and anti-North perceptions are combined.

More specifically, unlike the policy of establishing a "Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula" during the Roh Moo-hyun government's foreign affairs and security policy, Lee Myung-bak's government changed into the center of the ROK-US alliance, and conflicts have worsened bilateral relations. As can be seen from various statistical surveys in Korea, in fact, Korean's perception on China shortly after 2010 is the most negative. According to Dong-A Ilbo, "A Survey of People's Perception on Korea, China and Japan", reported on January 6, 2012 in the 4th year of the Lee Myung-bak government's evaluation of the Korea-China relationship, the question "Korea-China relationship is going smoothly" had results of negative with 57%, which was 26% higher than positive perception (31%), which is 20% lower than the positive response (51%) in the 2005 survey.

Park's government is based in Youngnam³⁰ and supported by Youngnam people, and the perception of ordinary people moves according to the government's policy. Since the establishment of the Park Geun-hye government, it has taken a much more favorable policy and attitude toward China in the early days. We will have a favorable attitude toward China, such as the 2013 summit meeting between Korea and China and the attendance of the Tiananmen formal military inspection. Positive evaluation of the general people's summit between Korea and China will also increase Koreans' popular intimacy (from 5.8% in 2012 to 7.3% See the Unification Perception Survey in 2016), the relationship between Korea and China has improved much better than Lee's political period. Then, China joined the United Nations resolution on sanctions against North Korea and tried to take an active role in the crisis of the Korean Peninsula, expanding economic exchanges with China and declaring a new relationship between the US and China, all of which seemed to have had a positive effect.

³⁰https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EB%B0%95%EA%B7%BC%ED%98%9C_%EC%A0%95%EB%B6%80

Therefore, the area from which Park Geun-hye came from is Youngnam, and the Youngnam area as a support base has changed more favorably toward China than the Lee Myung-bak's political period, centering on the ROK-US alliance.

The two regional characteristics are that the region, especially Youngnam, has dynamic relations with the political period in terms of perception on China, but it is also that there is an interaction with the political period which is also influenced by the region.

2. Koreans' Perception on China by political ideology according to regime

2-1. Koreans' perception on China by political ideology during Roh Moo-hyun's political period

According to the political ideology of Roh Moo-hyun's political period, there is a difference between the general public's perceptions on China. Overall, the most prevalent perception on China is that of competition, followed by and cooperation.




Figure-15 Perception on China by Political Ideology during Roh Moo-hyun Political Period

First, conservative-minded people perceive China as unfriendly compared to people with other political ideologies. In concrete terms, only 17.41% of the conservative-minded people perceive China as a cooperation target, and 37.03% of those who perceive China as a negation target are the highest. Second, people with moderate tendencies tend to view China as a competition target. Those who are moderately inclined are 49.19% of those who perceive China as a competition target, which is close to half. Third, progressive people are highly aware of China. 22.74% of progressive people think that they should cooperate with China compared to other political ideologies. According to the political ideology of Roh Moo-hyun

government described above, the difference of the general public's perception on China is not statistically significant. See <Table-18>.

Table-18 Cross Analysis of perception on China by Political Ideology during Roh Moo-hyun's Political Period

	Cooperative	Competitive	Negative	Total
Progressive	68	124	107	299
	22.74	41.47	35.79	100
	30.22	22.92	26.49	25.56
Moderate	102	273	180	555
	18.38	49.19	32.43	100
	45.33	50.46	44.55	47.44
Conservative	55	144	117	316
	17.41	45.57	37.03	100
	24.44	26.62	28.96	27.01
Total	225	541	404	1170
	19.23	46.24	34.53	100
	100	100	100	100
		Pearson chi ² = 6.63	Pr = 0.157	

As seen above, the difference of perception on China according to political ideology at the time of Roh Moo-hyun's political period reflects the policy of this political period and Korea-China relations. The Roh Moo-hyun's political period was the period of 'anti-US, autonomous nationalism' of the 'radical' 386 generation who led the democracy movement of the 1980s. President Roh Moo-hyun himself has also led the democratization movement at the time. The Roh Moo-hyun's political period has promoted the succession and development of the Sunshine Policy by advocating "Peace and Prosperity Policy". However, in terms of external recognition, there is a clear difference between the two. In other words, the Sunshine Policy is based on 'pro-US, pro-Soviet combined-dependence on both domestic and foreign power' or 'pro-US, pro-North,' while Peace and Prosperity Policy is based on 'rejection of foreign power, autonomous nationalist type' or 'pro-North, anti-US.' Both had succeeded in recognizing the external recognition of the middle wave of the liberation period, but the 'type' of foreign recognition that each succeeded was different. Nonetheless, the vast majority of Koreans perceive that the 'Peace and Prosperity Policy' is similar to the 'Sunshine Policy'.

Moreover, Roh Moo-hyun's political period actively promoted the establishment and operation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the promotion of inter-Korean human exchange and cooperation, the expansion of tourism in Mt. Geumgang, the expansion of inter-Korean economic cooperation, the second inter-Korean summit talks, all through which tried to relieve tension in the Korean peninsula. However, the conservative forces were not able to overcome the difficulties of inducing changes in the North Korea's regime, including the 'Sunshine Policy' and 'Peace and Prosperity Policy', the subordination of the North Korean

policy to foreign policy and security, the leftist Korean society, and strongly criticized North Korea's condemnation of human rights abuses, its low tax bases on North Korea, and its excessive support to North Korea. In this way, the public perception on China in the political society had been driven by the 'pro-North, anti-US' exercising the leadership of the government, and the 'pro-US, anti-North'. In the Roh Moo-hyun era, the 'pro-US, anti-North', which link the voices of the 'rejection of foreign power, autonomous nationalist type' of the middle phase of the liberation period, dominated the leadership of the government. In this domestic situation, the solidarity between China and North Korea shows the combination of the perceptions on the North and China. It is also the first time that the Korean people have experienced the heightened awareness of the anti-North Korean people since the post-Cold War era, as the fact of the Northeast China process was known at this time. Also, the conclusion of the Korea-US FTA in 2007 was the time for Koreans to have new expectations and concerns about the globalization of the market economy (Um Sang-yoon, 2008). Moreover, due to the rise of China, Koreans have a lot of negative views on cooperation and competition in perception on China, and especially, middle-class people, who make up the majority of the people, have a strong perception of competition on China.

2-2. Koreans' Perception on China by Political Ideology during Lee Myung-bak's Political Period

This section seeks to examine the perception on China in accordance with the political ideology of the general public during the Lee Myung-bak's political period. See <Figure-16>.

First of all, according to each political ideology, people's perception on China changed unfavorably compared to the Roh's political period. In the period of Lee Myung-bak's political period, negative perceptions of conservative, moderate and progressive people toward China increased from 37.33% to 42.36%, from 32.43% to 35.95%, and from 35.79% to 37.56% respectively.




Figure-16 Perception on China by Political Ideology during Lee Myung-bak's Political Period

Second, there is a clear change in people's perception on China, especially in people with conservative tendencies. Only 37.03% of the Roh Moo-hyun government perceives China as a negative target, but those who perceive China as a negative target during the Lee Myung-bak's political period increased by almost 5%. This is due to the close relationship between the Lee government and the conservative government.

Third, progressive people have more cooperation perception on China than other people with other ideological tendencies. Progressive people perceive that 22.97% of those who have other political ideologies should cooperate with China, and are similar to the Roh Moo-hyun's political period.

Fourth, people with political center tendency have the highest competition perception on China than those with other ideological tendencies, which is similar to the Roh Moo-hyun's political period.

Table-19 Cross Analysis of Perception on China by Political Ideology during Lee Myung-bak's Political Period

	Cooperative	Competitive	Negative	Total
Progressive	373	641	610	1624
	22.97	39.47	37.56	100
	29.37	26.69	27.15	27.44
Moderate	604	1204	1015	2823
	21.4	42.65	35.95	100
	47.56	50.12	45.17	47.69
Conservative	293	557	622	1472
	19.9	37.84	42.26	100
	23.07	23.19	27.68	24.87
Total	1270	2402	2247	5919
	21.46	40.58	37.96	100
	100	100	100	100
Pearson chi ² = 19.80		Pr = 0.001***		

The differences in the perception on China by political ideology during the Lee Myung Bak's political period were statistically significant. See <Table-19>

As seen above, in the political period of Lee Myung-bak's, the unfriendly perception on China based on ideology can be understood through the policy of the Korean conservative government at this time. The emergence of the Lee Myung-bak's political period in 2008 means resurrection and dominance of the political leadership of 'pro-US, anti-North' or 'pro-US, anti-Soviet combined dependence on both domestic and foreign power'. The Lee Myung-bak's 'pro-US, anti-North' regime pushed North Korea to give up its nuclear program and change its regime through pressure on North Korea. Ultimately, this is the pursuit of the annihilation of the Kim Jong-il regime and the unilateral absorption unification of Korea. Such perception is reflected in real politics as embodied in the restoration and strengthening of the ROK-US alliance and the '3000 concept of denuclearization and openness'.

Lee Myung-bak government's 'pro-US, anti-North' policy inheres the implication to face the strong challenge of the power from domestic progressive groups that pursues 'pro-US, pro-North' and 'pro-North, anti-US.' Moreover, not only has the 10-year rule of progressive power of democratization changed Koreans' external perception on the foreign; it has also greatly expanded the role and influence of progressive political and civic groups. Therefore, it is anticipated that the Lee Myung-bak's political period, based on 'pro-US and anti-North Korea', will face intense competition with the conservative forces and conservative forces surrounding the diplomacy and North Korea policy. The 'beef surge' in the first half of 2008 showed a bit of this foresight. Perception on China by ideology at the time of Lee Myung-bak's political period also appears in this historical context. Particularly, in March 2010, the sinking of Cheonan ship and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in September caused a great grievance on Koreans' perception on China. This is a contradiction shown in the North Korea policy of both Korea and China, but when viewed in Korea, the conservative forces take control of the regime and the perception on China is changed.

2-3. Koreans' Perception on China by Political Ideology during Park Geun-hye's Political Period

This section seeks to examine the perception on China by political ideology during Park Geun-hye's political period. See <Figure-17>.

First, it can be seen that the perception on China in the political period of Park Geun-hye's government has changed toward the overall favorable direction. While the

proportion of conservative, moderate and progressive people perceiving China as a cooperative target is increasing, the rate of perceiving China as a negative target is greatly reduced. In addition, the percentage of all political ideological groups regarding China as a cooperation target is beyond the view that it is a negative object, and it is confirmed that the favorable perception on the people by China during the early and mid-period of the government.




Figure-17 Perception on China by Political Ideology during Park Geun-hye's Political Period

Second, it is proven significant that the conservative tendencies of people change greatly in favor of China. Specifically, the conservative tendency to perceive China as a cooperation target during the period of Park Geun-hye government increased by 24% from 19.9% to 33.53% in Lee Myung-bak's political period, while the ratio of perceiving China negatively decreased from 42.6% to 30.8%. This is a change of attitude toward China more than those of other political ideas. Conservative proponents, compared to progressive proponents, tend to perceive China more as a cooperation target. This is in contrast to the highest proportion of progressive people in the times of Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak government regarding China as a cooperation target. At the time of Park Geun-hye's political period, 33.53% of conservative-minded people perceived China as a cooperation target, which is the highest percentage of people who perceive China as a cooperation target in three periods. The conservative group does not necessarily recognize China as negation target, and it is inferred that the government's policy has a greater impact on perception on China. The Park Geun-hye government is based on conservatism, and perception on China on these people seems to be more influenced by government policies.

Third, the negative perceptions of progressive people on China are the lowest. The perception on China among the people with political center tendency is in the midst of conservative and progressive people.

The difference of the general public's perception on China according to the political ideology during Park Geun-hye's political period described above is not statistically significant. See <Table-20>.

Table-20 Cross Analysis of Perception on China by Political Ideology during Park Geun-hye's Political Period

	Cooperative	Competitive	Negative	Total
Progressive	387	491	338	1216
	31.83	40.38	27.8	100
	25.61	26.2	24.39	25.49
Moderate	726	951	691	2368
	30.66	40.16	29.18	100
	48.05	50.75	49.86	49.63
Conservative	398	432	357	1187
	33.53	36.39	30.08	100
	26.34	23.05	25.76	24.88
Total	1511	1874	1386	4771
	31.67	39.28	29.05	100
	100	100	100	100
Pearson chi ² = 6.53 Pr = 0.163				

According to the result of the multinomial logit analysis of the political ideology by the region during the Park Geun-hye's political period, the criteria set here are cases where China is recognized as a competition target. As a result of the analysis, differences in political ideology about the perception on China were statistically significant. According to the results of the public perception regression analysis by the political ideology during Park Geun-hye's political period, the conservative tendency shows that there are cooperative and negative perceptions on China and two opposing perspectives strongly exist. Specifically, the more conservative the person is than the progressive person, the more China recognizes as a cooperation target than the competition target. Also, the more conservative the person is than the progressive person, the more China recognizes as a negation object than the competition target. It is because the conservatives are the foundation of support for Park's government, and rather than maintaining a relatively negative perception on China and changing the fundamental attitude on the perception on China, the friendly policies toward China that the Park government implemented before the decision to deploy THAAD, through which it rather promotes a rather positive perception on China.

2-4. Interaction of regime and political ideology in perception on China

As seen above, there is a difference according to political ideology in perception on China. Progressivism over the past decade tends to be more favorable to perception on China than the conservatism. At the same time, regional differences exist, but it is influenced by political period, and it does not maintain a fixed pattern. In particular, conservative group is more dynamic in perception on China depending on political period. See <Figure-18>.




Figure-18 Interaction of Political Period and Political Ideology in Perception on China

It is worth noting here that the perception on China for the progressivism is comparatively friendlier than that of the conservatism if observed by political period, but it is not always the case.

Influenced by political period, conservatism has a more dynamic perception on China. In the three periods, the progressive and moderate groups are gradually increasing their cooperative perception, but the conservatism is much larger in the period of Park Geun-hye government and the cooperation perception is higher than the progressivism. In addition, conservatives have more negative perceptions than progress in the three periods, but they have the highest reduction in negative perceptions during the period of Park Geun-hye government. Pay is influenced by the regime and public awareness is more dynamic. This means that political ideology is influential, but in particular has a correlation with the regime. Also, the conservatism is the support base of the Park Geun-hye's period and reflects the favorable policies of the early government of Park Geun-hye and the good relationship between the two countries.

The cooperative and negative perceptions of the conservative group at the time of Park Geun-hye's political period were statistically significant at the same time. This is also a political influence, but in particular, it has a correlation with the government. It was the most favorable period since Korea-China relations seen through the pro-China policy of Park Geun-hye in the first half of the year, the first visit to China after the inauguration, visit to Tiananmen for the participation of a formal military inspection, etc. It is because the conservatives are the foundation of support for Park's government, and rather than maintaining a relatively negative perception on China and changing the fundamental attitude on the perception on China, the friendly policies toward China that the Park government implemented before the decision to deploy THAAD, through which it rather promotes a rather positive perception on China.

IV Précis

To summarize the results of this study, there is a difference in the perception on China among Koreans according to region and political ideologies. When looking at region, Honam has a more friendly perception on China than does Youngnam region, and it is most dynamic according to the political period. Progressivism has a relatively favorable perception of perception on China rather than conservatism, but it does not keep this pattern constant. There are regional and political influences on perception on China, but there is a correlation with the political period. In the Youngnam and conservative groups, the perception on China is influenced by the political period and dynamic phenomenon appears due to the policy of the

Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye's governments which are the self-supporting conservative governments and the dynamic change of the Korea-China relationship. In other words, according to the region and political ideology, perception on China is not maintained consistently, but rather dynamic in accordance with the regime that it supports, the public policy expressed by the regime, and the beliefs of its own. Also, the progressivism of Honam and the conservatism of Youngnam are not statistically significant in perception on China. It can be seen that the difference in the perception on China in Korea is more influential than the political ideology of the individual.

1. Causes of difference in public perception based on region and political ideology

The cause of the difference in perception on China according to the region and political ideology can be found in the historical, political and economic imbalance of regional origins and formation, and in the formation of political ideologies that represent Korea's progressivism and conservatism. As noted in previous studies, the Honam region has a progressive ideology compared to the Youngnam region. In particular, Honam has undergone the Gwangju Democratization Movement and is different from the conservative tendency of the Youngnam region. According to the Dong-A Ilbo survey in 2002, Jeju residents showed the most progressive tendency. In the case of members of the parliament, Honam was the most progressive, while the members of the parliament from the Gyeongbuk province showed the most conservative tendency. In terms of political ideology, Honam is the most progressive (2.57%), followed by Chungcheong (2.47), Gangwon, Jeju (2.44), Gyeongnam (2.44), the capital (2.39), North (2.32). Regional differences in perception on China are related to political ideological differences. As a result of these advances and conservatives, Koreans' perception of China and its differences according to political ideologies reflects the ideological difference between Korea and China, the North Korean government's attitude toward North Korea based on the divided system of South and North Korea and the alliance formed during the Cold War. One of the most crucial variables that divide conservatism and progressive ideology in Korean society is the difference of view on anti-communism ideology. According to the political ideology of Koreans, the difference of perception on China has been strongly influenced by ideology since the beginning of North Korea in the context of history. The initial process of Korean ideology in the perception on China was interacted with

the 'anti-communism (anti-North) vs. engagement with North Korea (pro-North)', which is a traditional diplomatic ideological cleavage reinforced by the history of the Korean War and the division of the North and the South. The disagreement and conflict over the past history issue of the Korean War was an important factor in strengthening the ideological role of Koreans in perception on China after the Korea-China diplomatic normalization in 1992 (Cha Jung-mi, 2016). The confrontation between Korea and China over the Korean War, whether China's anti-US aid war was a legitimate war that prevented China's invasion or a war that caused Korea's division, has become an important part of the ideological rift.

Domestic controversy over China's response to the North Korean nuclear crisis for more than 20 years since the outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 is another important reason for strengthening the ideology of perception on China. China's negative attitudes toward the North Korean nuclear issue and the provocation of North Korea's armed forces have been steadily strengthening criticism and antipathy toward domestic conservatives. On this basis, the domestic crackdown on the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea policy acted as a prism for China's policy toward North Korea. Afterwards, China's protection of the North or passive attitude toward the North seen in the events of the 2nd North Korea nuclear test, the Cheonan ship's sinking in 2010, or in Yeonpyeong Island incident, had a detrimental effect on the Koreans' perception on China. The fact that the progressivism has a friendlier perception on China than does conservatism is because there exists 'embracing policy toward North Korea' and 'independence diplomacy,' which is different from 'anti-communism' and 'US-ROK alliance.' (Cha Jeong-mi, 2016). As such, progressivism and conservatism tend to perceive China as a friendly target and negation target respectively, based on such perceptions.

As seen above, the progressive class in Korea is basically characterized by the anti-US and pro-North. They regard China as a socialist country like North Korea and show a cooperation perception on China. On the other hand, the conservative party is basically a "pro-US, anti-North" group with a vested power. The conservative group has a negative perception of anti-North and semi-communist socialist countries that are viewed in the same context.

2. The cause of the interaction of political period, region, and political ideology in perception on China

There is also regional and political influence in perception on China, but the existence of interaction with the regime is due to the government's policy of public policy and the dynamic changes in the relationship between Korea and China. Here, the dynamic feature of the region and political ideology, especially in the perception on China in the Youngnam region and the conservative group, is that the concept of 'Party Identification' can explain the change of perception on China according to the political party. Rahn (1993) and Lodi and Hamill (1986) maintain that voters are forming stereotypes of policy directions from political parties through long-term memory, and eventually, the evaluations for arguments for and against regarding policy are classified according to one's likes and dislikes of the political party, and the political party acts for the extradition of the position of the policy (Zaller 1992; Shafer and Claggett 1995; Carmines and Stimson 1989). Berinsky (2007) analyzed the public opinion, and argues that public support for the government's policies reflects the cleavage of party relations. As ideology is the shortcut to acquiring information, individuals generally apply ideological orientations in determining the priorities of foreign policy. If an ideological eparchy leader reveals his / her perception of diplomatic issues, the same ideological group and sectarian forces recognize diplomatic issues as prescribed by their leaders (Mirilovic & Kim 2017, 180). Therefore, it can be said that the party identification will have an important influence on the formation of perception on China because the supporters of the regime will be in harmony with the direction and the world view of the policy promoted by the political party supported by the party under the influence of the party identification. The Honam and progressive groups were the supporters of the Roh Moo-hyun government, while the Youngnam and conservative groups were party supporters of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye governments. In the Roh Moo-hyun political period, the friendly perception on China is higher among the progressive groups than in conservative groups in the background of 'Peace Prosperity Policy' and 'anti-US, pro-China'. During the Lee Myung-bak's political period, the Korea-China relations was overall worsened as a result of the 'ROK-US alliance' policy, and especially in the Youngnam area and conservative groups, the negation perception worsened further. During the Park Geun-hye's political period, most of the political periods' perception on China changed to a favorable direction according to the Korea-China positive relations after the policy of 'allying with the US and harmonizing with China' before the

decision to deploy THAAD. The friendly perception on China amongst Youngnam region and the conservative groups changed further. The dynamic perception on China amongst Youngnam region and the conservative group are the result of interaction of policy toward China that the government implements, region, and political ideology.

Chapter 6 Period effect of Perception on China related to North Korea issues

The Korean perception on China has been strongly influenced by the North Korean issues since the establishment of the country. Soon after its founding of the country, Korea underwent the Korean War, and the South Koreans' perception on China formed hostility as China participated in the war since they consider that China has the responsibility in the division of the two Koreas. Since then, however, South Korea has sought to "improve the inter-Korean relations and unify the Korean peninsula" through China, moderated on Park Chung-hee's "Access Diplomacy towards China" and Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae-woo's

'Nordpolitik.' In other words, it was to improve relations with China, to create favorable environment for "unification of the Korean Peninsula" and to gain important cooperation in communication with North Korea. However, this perception on security interests has gradually undergone a process of change over time, and negative security factors of some North and South Korea have become important factors to enhance the negative tendency of China's perception. After the diplomatic normalization between South Korea and China in 1992, the North Korean issue including the North Korean nuclear issue has acted as a major axis of cooperation and conflict between the two countries and plays a decisive role in forming the two countries.

After the inauguration of Kim Dae-jung in 1997, the pro-North Korean position on North Korea has been strengthened, and the perception on China was greatly affected. In particular, the engagement policies of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun government basically agreed on maintaining the North Korean system, the peaceful settlement between the two Koreas, and the stability and peaceful orientation of the Korean peninsula. Based on this, the two countries have maintained close cooperation in the North Korean nuclear policy more than ever through the Six-party talks and bilateral negotiations between South Korea and China. In particular, during the first nuclear test of North Korea in 2006, President Roh Moo-hyun did not stop the dialogue with North Korea and expressed opposition to North Korea's nuclear test, even though there were many negative comments about North Korea in South Korea. China also took the opposite stance on North Korea's nuclear test; however, North Korea's first nuclear test did not affect China's negative perception.

On the other hand, the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye governments tried to improve relations through dialogue and cooperation with North Korea like Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun political periods in the early stages and to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and the foundation of unification. However, according to the Cheonan Ship Sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents and continuous nuclear tests, it transitioned to a pressure policy toward North Korea, and a cleavage formed between the two countries moderated on the North Korean issue. In particular, in relation to the Cheonan incident in March 2010 and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, South Korea decided that China was ambivalent about the cause of North Korea, and thus the strategic distrust of the Korean government toward China expanded (Lee Hee-ok, 2017: p12~14). However, after Park Geun-hye took power, China expressed its opposition to North Korea's nuclear test development in accordance with North Korea's continued development of its nuclear and missile technologies. In addition to favoring sanctions against the North in the Security Council, China announced that it will aggressively intervene in its own sanctions. As a result, Korea came to form a very high level of friendly perception on China before the occurrence of the THAAD issue.

In sum, the two countries' bilateral ties are common in solving problems through dialogue and cooperation. However, in the past, it was difficult to draw a dialogue through "dialogue" and "exchange." If there was a difference in favorability to China, there was a consensus among the Chinese and the Chinese that they would lead the dialogue through "pressure" after the Park Geun-hye's political period. In analyzing this, it can be said that the perception on China by the Koreans is influenced not only by the domestic diplomatic tendency of North Korea, which is symbolized by the traditional diplomatic tendency of anti-North Korea, through which it can be said that it is affected much by the reaction.

Then, "what pattern does Koreans' perception on China have when major events around North Korea issues incur that have an impact on Korea-China relations?" During the past decade, the biggest issues that affected the Korea-China relationship surrounding the North Korean issue were the Cheonan incident of March, 2010, and Yeonpyeong Island bombardment incident in September, 2010. Accordingly, this chapter sets the hypothesis as the following. The sinking of Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents show a period effect in the Koreans' perception on China.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, the following focuses on the major events that affect South Korea-China relations and look for events whether they have had a period effect on Korea's perception on China. Second, surrounding the North Korea issue³¹, it examines the attitudes, stance, and perceptions that South Koreans have on China and the period effect that changes the perception on China, focusing on important events such as the sinking of Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling Incidents. Third, it seeks to scrutinize the in-depth causes of the effects of the South Koreans' perception on China in regards to the North Korea problem.

I South Koreans' Perception on China related to North Korea issues

The bilateral relations between Korea and China have developed from 'good friendship cooperation relationship' to 'strategic cooperation partnership relationship' after the diplomatic normalization. However, regardless of this development, South Korea and China still have many limitations. These factors include not only the elements of history, territorial disputes, the elements of the United States, but also the elements of North Korea, which are particularly important. Therefore, the issue of history in the middle of the Korean Peninsula, the territorial problem, and the United States element are attracting much attention from scholars, and the North Korean problem is also receiving great attention in the development of South Korea-China relations. Among them, South Korea's interest in the development of two countries' relationship is the attitude of China to North Korea. Whenever North Korea conducts a military provocation, China has mainly come to North Korea and does not seek active cooperation with Korea (Zhang Yi, 2010). In South Korea's view, it is difficult to understand China's consistent support for North Korea despite the North Korean threat. Inter-Korean relations and North Korea's policies are the most important state agenda of South Korea's politics, academia, public opinion and people. According to South Korea's interpretation of the strategic cooperation partnership between South Korea and China, the relationship between the two countries will strengthen cooperation between the two countries'

³¹ The North Korean issue covers important events related to North Korea such as the North Korean nuclear issue, the unification of the Korean peninsula, and the issue of North Korean defectors. In this paper, the issues affecting North Korea's national interests and Korea-China relations, focusing on security perspective, refer to the sinking of the Cheonan, the Yeonpyeong incident, and the THAAD issue.

diplomacy and security area through expansion of the economic zone as well as cooperation in bilateral cooperation between the two countries and the international community.

Even after the end of the Cold War, North Korea's military threat was still the biggest threat to South Korea, so security in North Korea's regional security cooperation became an indispensable agenda. Historically, the triangular relationship among two Koreas and China began in 1992 with the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China. Before that, North Korea and China were in the socialist camp, South Korea was in the capitalist camp, and after the Cold War, the confrontation between the two camps collapsed, but China and North Korea continued to maintain a friendly traditional clan relationship. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992, this situation has made the three provinces as regional triangular national highways. The following explains such phenomenon in the historical context.

First, there existed friendship between China and North Korea, as well as a hostile relationship between the two countries toward South Korea during the Korean War. Due to historical reasons and geopolitical factors, they formed a traditional friendly relationship after the Korean War. For a long time, not only did they maintain the same socialist system, but also formed a "blood-tied" special relationship. China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea formed a military alliance and formed a confrontation with Korea, the US, and Japan, which are in the US alliance system. In 1961, China and North Korea signed a "Treaty of Mutual Assistance for Friendship and Cooperation between the DPRK and China," which signaled the formal start of the bilateral friendship alliance. During the Cold War period, there was a sharp conflict between the two camps in politics in addition to occasional culture and sports exchanges. The most violent confrontation since the founding of China in the middle of the Korean War was the participation of China in the Korean War, and at the end, the war ended with the signing of the "Armistice Agreement". Since then, tension between the North and the South has persisted.

The second is the formation of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China. Following the Cold War, as the international and regional situation changes, the two countries recognize the importance of bilateral relations and become closer and closer to each other. During the Roh Tae-woo government; South Korea actively promoted diplomacy toward the socialist nation through the 'Nordpolitik.' Improving relations with China was to improve the international environment in order to actively reflect the global situation after the Cold War,

to expand diplomatic targets around the world, and to establish new inter-Korean relations on the Korean peninsula. Based on the ROK-US alliance, they sought to endorse the Cold War system in Northeast Asia by allowing South Korea and North Korea to recognize each other on the Korean peninsula in a larger country, mitigate tensions on the Korean Peninsula, improve inter - Korean relations, China's reform and openness and its close ties with the North have called for North Korea to open up to the outside world and realize its strategic vision of "Nordpolitik." South Korea's positive relationship with China also had another purpose of restricting North Korea's dangerous behavior. South Korea predicted that China would become a moderate position in inter-Korean relations if relations with North Korea's traditional ally, China. The diplomatic relations between South Korea and China practically affected the relations between the two Koreas and made the sense of solidarity between the two countries worse. The total amount of trade in North Korea decreased greatly from \$900 million in 1993 to \$414 million in 1998.

The third is the formation of South Korea-China strategic partnership. South Korea-China relations have achieved a very rapid relationship development since the establishment of diplomatic relations. Generally speaking, the degree of China's external relations closely develops into 'cooperation ',' partnership',' friendship treaty' and 'traditional friendly relationship'. However, South Korea-China relations have developed into a strategic partnership, which is a very high level of partnership and full-fledged cooperation partnership, in a friendly relationship. The change of government every five years in South Korea and China is an important political base for stable and healthy South Korea-China development. Korea interprets the strategic cooperation partnership as developing from economic cooperation to diplomacy and security, and further developing into cooperation between Northeast Asia and the world in the scope of both countries.

The construction of South Korea-China strategic cooperation partnership is the result of comprehensive selection of various factors in both countries. 'Strategic cooperation' is a standard for the more mature development direction of the South Korea-China's future, but if the two countries do not trust each other, cannot cooperate in the whole, and are not able to actively participate (求同存异), the 'complete cooperation partner relation' that was formed as a formality will be meaningless and will not last long.

What South Korea should consider is the friendship between China and North Korea in the triangular relationship between South Korea, North Korea, and China. However, through the

improvement of relations with China, South Korea wants to be in an equal position with North Korea, which is a "romantic triangle" in triangular relations. The development of bilateral relations can reduce North Korea's threats or even isolate North Korea because there is always a conflict between the two countries and there is a clear strategic goal of regional stability in the middle. However, it is not easy to achieve South Korea's strategic interests in the South Korea-China relationship because the presence of friendly relations between the two countries and the strategic cooperation partnership are also affected by North Korea. When the inter-Korean relations are good, the development of the South Korea-China partnership is relatively smooth, but when the inter-Korean relations are strained, the elements of North Korea have a great influence on the development of the South Korea-China relationship. As a result, the North Korean issue is an important factor influencing the development of the South Korea-China relationship, and the Koreans' perception on China also changes with the change of the bilateral relations by the elements of North Korea. In that regard, the North Korea issue is to be verified as the period effect as the influences on South Korea-China relations and Koreans' perception on China in the next section.

II Period Effect of Perception on China in Relation to North Korea

1. Period effect

Period effect means that the occurrence of a major social event or impact affects all groups, thus changing the overall choice and direction³². Time, age, and cohort form three axes of temporary change. There are various studies in the natural science and social science research about the period effect. The period effect is the source of the economic situation or social and political events that have influenced all the members of the society during that period. Studies related to the effects of the previous period have studied the effects on people's consciousness through economic situation or socio-political crisis. In particular, the impact of the IMF foreign exchange crisis on South Korean society has been negatively influenced by various factors such as politics, culture, and consciousness (Kim Moon-jo, 2008, Shin, Kwang-young, 2013). In the South Korean society, the perception on North Korea has been fluctuating steadily due to the impact of North Korea's nuclear weapons development and armed provocations. North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches, which could affect the entire

³² Changes in the Societal Attribution and Upward Movement Consciousness in Korean Society: Focusing on Age, Period and Cohort Effect, Korean Society of Sociology, Vol. 50, No. 5 (2016), pp. 247-284.

Korean society, can have a period effect on Korean society. In fact, public opinion polls show that when North Korea tests nuclear weapons and launches missiles, the perception on Koreans in North Korea was shocked during a certain period of time, and there was a time when threat recognition became stronger and then recovered again.³³

Then, in order to see what factors generate the period effect, the following seeks to look at the major events that can cause a period effect on the Korean perception on China after the Kim Dae-jung's political period in the order of time. During Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun political periods (1998-2007), there were the rise of the "China threat" in the US since the late 1990s, the 'Garlic dispute' in 2000, anti-American candlelight demonstrations in 2002, Kimchi wave in 2005, 'Northeast Project' issue between 2004 and 2006, others. During the Lee Myung-bak administration period (2008-2012), there are the 2008 global financial crisis, the G2 competition and conflict system rise, the 2008 Korea-US alliance controversy, the 2008 Olympic torch clash, the second nuclear test in 2009, Resource threats to South Korea, the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents in 2010, the Chinese fishing boat seizure case in 2012, and the North Korean defector problem. At the same time, history culture and territorial sovereignty disputes persisted, and there were issues such as the Northeast Process issue, Arirang, Myoji conflict, and the Great Wall extension problem. There is a problem of THAAD placement from 2016 to 2017 in the Park Geun-hye government period (2012-2016).

There are many events such as 'Northeast Project' and 'Kimchi Wave' which are the problems between South Korea and China in the above-mentioned cases that have affected the South Korea-China relations and Koreans' perception on China. However, there are also external factors related to North Korea and the United States, such as the 'US-China normalization of diplomatic relation,' 'Cheonan Ship Sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents,' 'Six-party talks,' others. In terms of Korea's national income, 'Kimchi wave' is only a temporary incident and does not cause much damage to the national interests of the country. However, since the North Korean problem is directly related to survival, it has the greatest impact on Koreans and the greatest influence on Korea-China relations.

Therefore, Koreans' perception on China can be influenced by the North Korea issue, and whenever these events happen, the effect their perception on China can be seen depending on how Koreans interpret and understand the events. The characteristic of period effect of recognition is that it is greatly affected at a certain time and therefore change the perception of

³³ "Unification Perception Survey" 2016, "Koreans' Perception on China"

the whole people. However, after a certain period of time, it is restored. Every time a large or small event that affects the above-mentioned Korean-Chinese relations occurs, it may not be all the period effect. In a certain period of time, the period effect can be seen only when a serious event occurs that causes the change of public perception of the people regardless of the difference of individual people such as region and ideology.

2. Period effect of perception on China related to North Korea issues

The controversy in South Korea over China's response to the North Korean nuclear crisis for 20 years after the outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 is one of the important factors in perception on China. From the standpoint of South Korea, the issue of North and South Korea is not only the responsibility of North Korea, but also China's, as a socialist country with close ties to North Korea. Also, in addition to supporting economic and political fields such as North Korea, China responds negatively or encases North Korea; China seems to be responsible for solidarity. In South Korea, there is such "China accountability" in North Korea problem, especially in conservatives of pro-US and anti-North Korea.

The 'China Responsibility Theory' that South Korea feels in the North Korea issue reflects the expectations of how much China will do to South Korea in terms of support and positive impact. Since the diplomatic normalization between South Korea and China, South Korea has been constantly debating whether or not China is pro-North Korea. In 1992, along with South Korea-China diplomatic relations, China's attitude toward North Korea was the most anticipated part of China in the perspective of South Korea. South Korea is trying to achieve unification led by North and South in the issue of unification of the two Koreas and it shows resentment against the excessive interference of the neighboring powers, but it is hard to escape from the influence of the neighboring countries' security situation on the Korean Peninsula. China's cooperation in both the security and the unified aspects of the Korean Peninsula is necessary. Generally, when Korea and China do not have a big disagreement about North Korea, or when China can help South Korea, the Chinese position and the expectation of Koreans are matched, so the Koreans' perception on China changes more favorably. However, if they are not matched, perception turns negative. In the Korean poll of the past decade, the most fearful of intervention on the Korean peninsula was the Chinese

military intervention in the event of military friction or conflict.³⁴ In the Korean War, there was a history of China helping North Korea, and even though the situation on the Korean peninsula changed a great deal, Koreans are still afraid that the Chinese military intervention will not bring about the national desire for unification.³⁵ Also, in the event of military friction or clashes on the Korean peninsula, South Korea is anxious and lack full reliability about China, as the US will surely help South Korea as an ally, while China is too uncertain and bordered by North Korea.

In order to further clarify the above, the following two questions are asked in order to verify the period effect of Koreans' perception on China in relation to North Korea factor: "Is China responsible for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations?" and "Which side will China take in the event of a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula?"

2-1. The deterioration of inter-Korean relations and China's accountability

Looking back at the inter-Korean relations, after the second inter-Korean summit, inter-Korean relations have worsened rather than improved. From the standpoint of South Korea, North Korea continued to develop asymmetric weapons through continuous nuclear testing and missile launches, as well as launching large and small military provocations such as the Cheonan Ship Sinking and the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents, the GOP burial mound burial, And continued provocation to deteriorate inter-Korean relations, such as steadily attempting terrorism. In response, South Korea worked with the United Nations to 'sanction North Korea' and gradually increased its intensity as the provocation level of North Korea increased. As a result, inter-Korean government talks that symbolize the improvement of inter-Korean relations since 2008, inter-Korean economic exchanges, humanitarian aid to North Korea and reunions of separated families have been severed or severely shaken.

The responsibility for the worsening of inter-Korean relations is also diverse: "North Korea's responsibility theory," which claims responsibility for North Korea, and "China's responsibility theory," which states that North Korea is continuing to provoke because of lukewarm cooperation on sanctions against North Korea. Continued development of

³⁴ "Public Opinion Survey on Foreign Awareness" conducted by EAI.CCGA in 2008, "Unification Awareness Survey" from 2007 to 2016, "Public Perception Survey" conducted by the Joongang Ilbo from 1999 to 2010.

³⁵The Korean people's security concerns with China are well represented in the issue of North - South unification. According to the Asan Research Institute's National Cognition Survey in 2012, 68.1% of the respondents said that China would not want inter-Korean unification because most Koreans think that China regards North Korea as a buffer. This recognition hinders strengthening cooperation between Korea and China.

asymmetric weapons includes "South Korea and the US responsibility theory," which is based on hostile policies between South Korea and the United States. Among them, 'China's responsibility theory' is a major issue in South Korea when the policy direction of the South Korea and China is not consistent in regards to the series of provocations by the North.

Comparing the responsibility of each country for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations in the result of the "Unification Perception Survey" of the past decade,³⁶ Koreans have regarded North Korea's responsibility as the overwhelming responsibility for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations.³⁷ China's responsibility for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations is shown in <Figure-19>. The response that the responsibility of China is 'highly' in the deterioration of inter-Korean relations is 10%-25%; 35%-45% for 'some,' '25%-40%' for 'middle,' and '5%-7%' for 'little,' and '1%-2%' for 'rarely.' Compared to changes in responsibility for North Korea, South Korea, and the United States by year,³⁸ the change in perception on China shows a relatively constant change. This proves that the relationship between South Korea and China is easier to change than with other countries because of the interests or disadvantages of Korea depending on the situation, and it also proves that there is a lack of mutual trust.

³⁶ The questions and analysis methods used in the analysis are as follows. The annual "Unification Perception Survey" conducted by the Institute for Unification and Peace at the Seoul National University asked questions such as "How much do you think each country is responsible for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations" from 2009, that asks the respondents to answer between 'highly,' 'some,' 'middle,' 'little,' and 'rarely' for each of the five countries including North Korea, Korea, the US, China, and Japan.

³⁷ According to the results of the 2016 survey, 45.6% of the respondents said that China's responsibilities were "some" when the inter-Korean relations deteriorated, and 34.8%, 37.3%, and 33.2% respectively for the US, North Korea, and Korea.

³⁸ See Unification Perception Survey, 2006.




Figure-19 Korean's perception on China's responsibility in case of the deterioration of Two Koreas

Particularly, in 2011, 26.67% of respondents answered "highly" on China's responsibilities in the case of deteriorating inter-Korean relations. This was due to the fact that in 2010, when the "sinking of the Cheonan ship" and the "Yeonpyeong Island Shelling" incidents happened. It is believed that the China's attitude and stance in answering and dealing with such events are influential factors in South Koreans in regarding China as the significant country in charge in the deterioration of inter-Korean relations.

Table-21 ANOVA analysis of differences in perception on "China's responsibility" by year

Classification	Average	Standard deviation	F	Scheffe
2009(a)	61.71	22.67		
2010(b)	67.60	23.04		
2011(c)	71.06	22.97	36.12***	a<b<c, d
2012(d)	68.83	22.64		

<Table-21> shows the ANOVA analysis of the differences in perception on "China's responsibility" for the deterioration of inter-Korean relation by year. The analysis results are statistically different in 2010, 2011, and 2012 compared to 2009. Specifically, according to the year, the average value for 2011 is higher than the average for 2009 and 2010, and the average value for 2012 is again lowered. In 2011, it was confirmed that the period effect of the recognition of China's responsibility was deteriorated when the inter-Korean relations deteriorated. It is inferred that this is due to the recognition of China by the Cheonan sinking incident in March 2010 and the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling Incidents in September 2010. Moreover, the "Unification Perception Survey" is held every year in July. The average value that is heightened in 2010 as well as the average value that is at its peak in 2011 are reflected on the public perception before the survey.

2-2. Perception on China's "defending" North Korea

North Korea has been continuing its nuclear test and armed demonstrations for the last 20 years, which has been a major threat to Koreans. Since the Korean peninsula has long been a hub for major powers such as China and the United States, Koreans have paid attention to the positions, attitudes and influence of the Great Powers on North Korea's security threats, which may affect Korea's national interests and the flow of the entire Korean peninsula. Historically, the tragedy of the history that caused the division of the peninsula by the military intervention of the US, Soviets, and China during the Korean War was still left in the hearts of Koreans (Dong Xiangrong, 2012). After the division, Korea has been affected by the security threats from North Korea and the interests of the neighboring countries such as the Six Party Talks in the process of national development. South Korea has China as its neighbor; China has an unimpeachable influence on the North Korean nuclear issue and the unification of the two Koreas. It has a history of enemies participating in the Korean War in the past. Moreover, China and North Korea have a special relationship and a 'blood-tied' alliance. If the Korean peninsula once again has a military conflict, China's attitude and position will become even more important. China can help either North Korea or South Korea, and it can also express its medium position. Or it could decide in pursuit of benefit for its own country not for either side. The position and attitude of China on this issue of the Korean peninsula is very important for Koreans, and the important events directly linked to the national interest are reflected in the Koreans' perception on China.




Figure-20 Koreans' perception on China in case of military clash between Two Koreas
(Unit: %/year)

As can be seen in <Figure-20>, for the past decade, most Koreans still think that China is

biased towards North Korea in comparison to South Korea.³⁹ Specifically, when the Korean War broke out, there was the largest number of Koreans who thought China would help North Korea, the next was moderate, and only a few people thought China would help South Korea. The trends and peculiarities that may be of interest in this survey are that there was a big change in the Koreans' perception on China around 2011. Before 2009, more than half of South Koreans thought that when a military conflict broke out between the two Koreas, China would be dependent on the interests of the two sides. However, after 2011, the number of Koreans who thought that China would decide on which side to take their own interests in the case of an inter-Korean conflict declined sharply from 56.4% in 2007 to 31.11% in 2011. However, the perception that it would decide on its own profits after 2011 had increased again. Conversely, in the case of North-South military clashes, since 2007, most Koreans have increased their chances of helping North Korea, and this ratio is the highest in 2011, beyond the perception that China will decide on its own interests in 2010. Since 2011, the percentage of Koreans saying that China will help North Korea has declined somewhat, but still has not recovered to its pre-2011 level. What should be noted is that Koreans have made a reversal in 2009 in the survey, 'China will decide on its own interests' or 'will help North Korea', peaking in 2011, and in the last two years, the ratio in regards to the two opinions remain almost the same. In sum, Koreans think that China will actively intervene in a military conflict between South and North Korea, and Koreans have a strong sense that China will cover North Korea. This is because the choice of China in the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong cases in 2010 did not meet the expectations of Koreans in China, such as giving support to Korea or make joint sanctions against North Korea.

<Table-22> is a cross analysis of the perception on "China will help North Korea when in war." The result of analysis showed statistical significance.

³⁹ The questions and analysis methods used in the analysis are as follows. The annual Unification Consciousness Survey conducted from 2006 by the Institute for Unification and Peace at the Seoul National University asked questions such as "How do you expect your attitude toward the following countries during the war," and answer between 'will help Korea,' 'will help North Korea,' 'will decide on the interest of its own country,' and it will stay 'moderate.' According to a 2016 survey, Koreans' perception on China has improved significantly, but only 7% of the surveyed people thought that China would support Korea when the Korean peninsula war broke out. Nearly 90% thought that the US would help Korea in the outbreak of a war. In other words, most Koreans in the North Korea issue are more trusting in the United States than in China.

Table-22 Cross Analysis of Perception on "China will help North Korea when in war"

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
No	728 (61.3)	530 (44.4)	436 (36.2)	499 (41.7)	2,193 (46.2)
Yes	458 (38.7)	663 (55.57)	734 (62.7)	697 (58.3)	2,553 (53.8)
Total	1,187 100	1,193 100	1,117 100	1,196 100	4,746 1000
Pearson chi2(3)=158.017 Pr=0.000					

3. 'Period effect' of Koreans' perception on China related to North Korea issues

The negative perception on South Koreans that China is responsible for deteriorating inter-Korean relations is caused by the external acquisition of North Korea. As can be seen in <Figure-21>, before 2011, Koreans increasingly recognized that China would help North Korea in an inter-Korean military conflict, and the perception that China is responsible for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations also rose to the highest level in 2011. After 2011, these two perceptions were lowered. Since around 2010, there has been a change in Korean perceptions on China, as South Koreans have been biased towards North Korea in the South-North military conflict of the sinking of the Cheonan and the Yeonpyeong Island bombing.




Figure-21 'Period effect' of Koreans' perception on China on North Korea issues

<Figure-20> and <Figure-21> show that Koreans had a very large period effect on China's perception during 2010 and 2011.⁴⁰ In other words, Koreans' perception on China has

⁴⁰ During the political periods of Roh Moo Hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye, there are several serious events that have affected the relationship between Korea and China or have created a period effect. During

changed greatly around 2011, and after 2011, this perception has begun to recover. This is because the Yeonpyeong Island bombing occurred in November of the same year after the sinking of the Cheonan in the western part of the Korean peninsula in March 2010. In 2010, Koreans' perception on China was negative, and in 2011, this perception was reflected in the survey results.

4. Regression Analysis of Period Effect in Perception on China

<Table-23> is a regression analysis of period effect which shows the set criteria in 2009. As a result of the analysis, the year-to-year differences in perception on China are statistically significant. In 2010, 2011 and 2012, the percentage of respondents who said that the deterioration of inter-Korean relations was the responsibility of China was higher than in 2009. In 2011, the percentage of respondents reached a peak, but then dropped again in 2012.

In terms of gender, age, education level, income level, and regional and political orientation, the difference in the perceptions on Koreans to China was statistically significant according to the level of education and politics. Specifically, the middle-class people are more aware of the responsibility of China in 2010, 2011 and 2012 than in 2009 when the inter-Korean relations deteriorate. The higher the level of education, the higher the perception that China is responsible for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations. Control variables including gender, age, income level, and locality did not show statistically significant differences among Koreans' perceptions on China.

the Roh Moo-hyun period, the events of 'Northeast Project' and 'Goguryeo History' were the first to have a great negative impact on the Korean perception of China after the Korea-China diplomatic relations. The extent and scope of the influence was very deep and extensive, But it is also worth studying as an event. In addition, in the case of the sinking of the Cheonan during the Lee Myung-bak era and the incident of the Yeonpyeong Island bombing, China's attitude and attitude toward disposition caused a great dissatisfaction with the Koreans, which seems to have created a period effect on the perception of the Korean people. In this study, the time limit was limited to the last 10 years, and since the data of the research on 'Unification Perception Survey' was referenced from 2007 to 2016, the same analysis was conducted on the Goguryeo history disputes from 2004 to 2006 during the Roh Moo-hyun period I cannot. However, in the sinking of the Cheonan during the Lee Myung-bak era and the bombardment of the Yeonpyeong Island, we can conduct in-depth studies to see if the Chinese influence on the North Korea issue is due to the period effect of perception on China.

Table-23 Simple regression analysis of "China's responsibility for deterioration of inter-Korean relations"

	Variable	Coef.
Year (Reference: 2009)	2010	5.64 *** (0.93)
	2011	9.16 *** (0.94)
	2012	6.85 *** (0.94)
Sex (Reference: Male)	Female	-1.01 (0.67)
Age		0.61 (0.03)
Level of Education		1.34 * (0.64)
Level of Income		0.66 (0.34)
Region (Reference: Honam)	Youngnam	-2.28 (1.20)
	Other	-1.20 (1.10)
Political Orientation (Reference: Progressive)	Conservative	-2.55 (2.04)
	Moderate	-4.54 * (2.00)
Cons		62.27
N		4746

* $p<0.5$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

<Table-24> shows the result of binary logit analysis that "China will help North Korea when in war". The criterion set in the analysis is 2009. The results of the analysis show that the yearly difference is statistically significant for "China will help in war". The results of the perception on China regression analysis for 2010, 2011 and 2012 reveal that 2010, 2011 and 2012 are "more likely to help North Korea during the Cold War than 2009." Moreover, even when other variables are controlled, according to the year, China has a high effect on the recognition period of 'defending' North Korea. Specifically, the proportion of China's perception on the 'defending' in 2010 appears to be lower than in 2009, and this rate is higher in 2011 than in 2010, but falls again in 2012. Here, the effect of the public perception is also inferred as the result of the 2010 Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents.

Table-24 Binary logit analysis "China will help North Korea when in war"

Variable		Coef.	OR
Year (Reference: 2009)	2010	0.70 *** (0.08)	2.02*** 0.17
	2011	0.98 *** (0.86)	2.65*** 0.23
	2012	0.76 *** (0.84)	2.14*** 0.18
Sex (Reference: Male)	Female	-0.16 * (0.06)	0.85** 0.05
Year		0.01 * (0.00)	1.01** 0.00
Level of Education		-0.24 *** (0.06)	0.78*** 0.05
Level of Income		0.14 *** (0.03)	1.15*** 0.04
Region (Reference: Honam)	Youngnam	0.35 ** (0.11)	1.41*** 0.15
	Other	0.35 *** (0.10)	1.42*** 0.14
	Moderate	0.01 (0.18)	1.01 0.18
Political Orientation	Conservative	0.27 (0.19)	1.31 0.25
Cons		-0.96	0.35
Log Likelihood		-3145.29	-3145.29
X²		262.99	261.44
Pseudo R²		0.04	0.04
N		4746	4746

*p<0.5, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Regarding the gender, age, education level, income level, regional and political tendency of control variables, the difference of Korean people's perception on China was statistically significant depending on sex, age, education level, income level and region. Specifically, it can be seen that the period effect on the perception that China will help North Korea as one is more male, the lower the education level, the higher the level of income, and more towards the Youngnam and other regions. In terms of demographic characteristics, it is assumed that the participation of men in society is higher than that of women. According to the age group, more than 30 generations are anti-communist educated generations, especially those in their 70s or older who have experienced the Korean War. According to the results of Public Perception Survey in Youngnam area during the Lee Myung-bak period in Chapter 5, the region has a stronger perception on competition than the Honam region in perception on China. This area is a relatively conservative area and ideologically tends to be pro-American, anti-North and anti-communist. Anti-North and anti-communism perceptions on the

elderly⁴¹ and young people are relatively high and public perception is combined with anti-communism and anti-north perception. As a result, the effect of the perception on China is higher than that of the other groups. In addition, there is a relationship between high educational attainment and low level of personal information in terms of educational level, so that the higher the academic level, the more means to obtain information, and the greater the intelligence and objectivity that can be judged as the more information is obtained. On the contrary, in the case of low-educated people, the perception on China shows an emotional tendency, and the perception on China is less than other groups. Also, in the survey on the favorability of Koreans to China before and after the Korea-China diplomatic normalization,⁴² low-educated people's perception on China decreased gradually. There is a relatively low level of information available to understand China, a relatively low likelihood of favoritism toward China, a tendency to conservative political tendencies, and a tendency toward anti-North Korea. Therefore, when the events affecting the South Korea-China relationship occur in the North Korea problem, the less educated group has a larger effect of public perception than the other groups.

III Causes of Period Effect of the Perception on China

The above has mentioned the period effect that occurs in the perception on China in the North Korea issue, and this period effect raised in the Koreans' perception on China because China's handling of Cheonan Ship Sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents fell short of Koreans' expectations, a phenomenon that also occurs in the structural problems between the two countries.

1. Transition of Perception on China due to North Korean related issues

⁴¹ It has been confirmed in several surveys that the group of elderly people over 60 has a significant effect on the public perception. For example, in a survey conducted by the Korean people in August, 2016, 60 or more groups showed more favorable attitude toward China than other groups in terms of measures such as China's retaliation against the Korean economy after the THAAD deployment decision. On the other hand, when the Korea-China relationship was favorable, the 60s group had the highest liking. This is because the group of 50 ~ 60 generations of Park Geun-hye were the main supporters of the political period, the political ideology was conservative, and the oldest group was the most favorable to China in the period, and that the perception of China is not fundamentally changed.

⁴² "Public Perception Survey in the Transition Period "(1988-1991) and 王晓玲 , "韩国人眼中的中国形象," others.

After the Cheonan Ship Sinking incident in March 2010, South Korea increased its overall military posture, and South Korea gradually depicted the back of the incident as North Korea, and the inter-Korean relations deteriorated sharply. As South-North relations fell into this stalemate, South Korea took strong measures against North Korea, moderated on ROK-US cooperation. However, China considered the stability of the Korean peninsula as a peaceful policy, and took a cautious attitude to the case and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a moderate position after a month. On May 4, the South Korean government announced a series of sanctions against North Korea on May 4, and at the same time, South Korea's military training and various exercises, of which the plan was submitted to the United Nations. The United States and Japan each issued their names and sanctions. North Korea insisted that it was innocent and looked at the threat of these neighboring countries as a war phase. With regard to these tense situations, China called for calm and self-control through bilateral and multilateral talks. In the post-Cold War strategic economic dialogue, the Six-Party Talks, the South Korea-China Summit, the Korea-China-Japan Summit, and the Sino-Japanese Summit, China continued to seek diplomatic solutions to the problems and resume the Six Party Talks, not agreeing to any violent means and trying to solve the problem with peaceful means. However, as a result of the survey, China was not always positive and not negative, which was disappointing to Koreans because it did not meet their expectations. At the same time, South Korea passed sanctions against North Korea at the United Nations. However, China has shown the convenience of North Korea, and Russia has objected to it. On July 9, the United Nations issued a non-binding "Ambassador's Statement." The Cheonan incident was not clearly defined by any country; efforts to pressure North Korea through the United Nations have not been successful.

On November 23, 2010, shortly after the Cheonan incident, North Korea carried out a massive bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in South Korea on the grounds that it was provoking the Korean people. Four Koreans died and a large number of people were injured. South Korea immediately counterattacked and warned through the ROK-US alliance, which further heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula. After the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo visited China, but the attitude toward the Yeonpyeong Island incident gave a Korean impression that China was defying North Korea. As Korea's expectations for China plummeted and after the diving, the Korean-Chinese relationship became colder as well, and the Korean perception on China also fell sharply.

South Korea felt that China could not escape responsibility whenever North Korea's inter-Korean relations deteriorated, and that South Korea, in the face of military friction or conflict, thought that China would take over North Korea. Although there is a difference between the perception on China in regards to its defending of North Korea and the perception on Chinese in the same issue, there is a 'period effect' on the perception on China by Koreans⁴³ as mentioned earlier, which is different from the policy position of North Korea.

In the process of solving the Cheonan problem mentioned above, there was a serious conflict and confrontation between South Korea and China. There are some differences in the perception on China among the Koreans in the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong cases. Some people think that the main reason for the conflict between South Korea and China is in China. This paper will refer to them as 'Advocates for China's Responsibility.' Another reason lies on the Koreans themselves who should reflect on themselves, and this paper hereinafter refers to them as 'Advocates for Korea's Responsibility.'

Advocates for China's Responsibility point out that China does not regard Korea as a strategic partner and that the Korean government did not officially recognize the findings of the Cheonan as a result of such a process. Also, in this process, China had vetoed the fact-finding statement by Ryu Woo-ik, Korean Ambassador to China at the time. President Lee Myung-bak visited Shanghai on April 30, 2010 for two days. China did not mention a word in President Lee's visit, but three days later commented on Kim Jong Il's visit, many Koreans feel sorry for Kim Jong Il's visit. The Chinese government also issued hardline editorials and a series of reports on the Hangzhou Times, all of which stood on the North Korean side and did not care about Koreans. According to one analysis, in the 241 papers from March 26 to September 3, 2010, 80% of the South Korean media in the report related to 'Cheonan' were negative to China. In the survey, more than 39% of netizens claimed to press

⁴³The results of the research conducted by the ARI and EAI in 2011 showed that there was a difference in the judgment of the Chinese by Koreans and the judgment made by the Chinese themselves when there was a military conflict or friction between the two Koreas. In response, 69.2% of Koreans responded that China would support North Korea if there was a military conflict with North Korea. These results show that most people believe that China will support North Korea for its own national interests. The perception of Koreans is very different from the opinion of Chinese researchers. In fact, 2.0% of Chinese respondents said they would support South Korea and 29.4% said they would support North Korea. The reason for the difference in the percentage of people (39.8%) that China will choose to support North Korea is because Koreans are not only suspicious of China but also believe that China will actually support North Korea regardless of their opinions.

South Korea. The Chinese chief has criticized China's attitude in the settlement of the Cheonan incident as not a great attitude. In the case of Cheonan and Yeonpyeong, China did not break relations with North Korea and insisted that the Six-Party Talks be held, and the Chinese leadership considered it to be too indecent and excessive.

The Korean delegation believes that Korea lacks understanding about China, and that the Chinese stereotypes of the 20th century and the solution strategy of the United States have created conflicts between Korea and China. Therefore, before criticizing China's diplomacy, he argues that Korea should reflect on whether there was any problem in public diplomacy. The greatest failure of Korea's diplomacy with China is to evaluate China with the viewpoint of early diplomatic relations in 1992 and to obscure China. In the case of North Korea, such as the Six-Party Talks, Korea thought that if South Korea persuaded it, China would align with Korea. The Lee Myung-bak administration claimed the previous six-party talks and tried to gain the leadership of the North Korean nuclear issue through the 'Non-Nuclear, Open, 3000' strategy and Grand Bargain. In addition to ignoring the close relationship between Korea and China, there is no reason for China to offer a strategic dialogue between Korea and the US on the sudden change of North Korea.

Prior to the Cheonan incident, Lee Myung-bak chose to focus on strengthening the alliance, believing that only the United States could move China. In other words, the US unilateral foreign policy of the Lee Myung-bak government caused Korea's failure to diplomacy with China. The internal cause theory thinks that the ROK - US alliance has partial responsibility for the conflict between Korea and China, but there is a problem with the way of strengthening the alliance than the ROK - US alliance itself. Because the Lee administration focused on the development of common values such as market economy and liberal democracy in the course of strengthening the ROK-US alliance, China regarded it as actively participating in the US check against China.

Therefore, the Advocates for Korea's Responsibility argue that China should transform the way of thinking about Korea as a great nation. As a North Korean ally, it is hard for China to strongly deny North Korea on the Korean side, just as the US is helping in the Korean version, like the two issues stated above. Therefore, it cannot be said that China claims to violate international norms. Since national interests always precede international norms, South Korea always demands that China be morally responsible for the big country, and it speaks of credit, but it only undermines South Korea-China relations. In addition, the Lee Myung-bak

government rejected the Chinese-related personnel established by the former government and placed the defenders of Lee Myung-bak's government policy on the frontline of Chinese diplomacy. Before and after the Cheonan incident, the Lee Myung-bak administration continued to find diplomats who have deep understanding of China but failed, and so opened up a period of desire for Chinese diplomacy.

Some people interpret the deterioration of relations between the two countries from the perspective of Korea-China relations. This view emphasizes that after the diplomatic relations, the bilateral relationship between Korea and China is only quantitative and ignores substantive structural relations. In the absence of mutual trust, strengthening the ROK-US alliance and policy coordination in North Korea after Lee Myung-bak's government stimulated China's distrust of Korea's strategic alliance with the Korean peninsula, leading to difficulties in communicating strategically. In this situation, South Korea did not let China catch up with the Cheonan incident, so the relations between the two countries got worse and the perception on China fell as low as it could. After the Cheonan incident, China's hardline stance on military exercises was not aimed at South Korea, but it was not enough for China to increase awareness in the international community after the global financial crisis. From this point of view, it can be said that Korea did not grasp the structural changes of the emerging China and Northeast Asia states at that time. This perspective is consistent with the assertion of the Advocates for Korea's Responsibility. Therefore, it seems that the Cheonan incident became a turning point in the development of Korea-China relations. In addition, considering that the Korean people's perception on China in 2011 has a period effect, it is clear that China's accountability is more dominant and there is a basic consensus on the recognition of China in South Korea.

2. South Korea and China's strategic distrust on North Korea issue

Both events were those that broke out between the two Koreas, but they sparked Chinese interests and influenced Koreans' perception on China. On the other hand, Koreans' perception on China showed that the perception on China was not fixed but fluctuating according to some big events⁴⁴.

⁴⁴Koreans' opinion polls showed that Americans were more favorable and cooperative than China. Although there is a contradiction between anti-American sentiment and the ROK-US alliance in Korea, the Koreans' perception on the US continue to build trust in the ROK-US alliance even though some negative events have occurred.

As can be seen above, whether or not China has a cooperative relationship with South Korea in solving the North Korean problem is an important variable for Koreans' decision on China. The mutual cooperation in the North Korea problem depends on the unity of the North Korean policy based on the national interest and the national interest of the two countries. In the perspective of China, the best development process of the Korean peninsula is that through Six Party Talks, North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons and get protected with security, and that the South Korea-US-Japan trilateral relations are normalized and the armistice system on the Peninsula becomes that of the peaceful. Moreover, China aspires for the current South Korea-China strategic partnership relationship develops into that of the future-oriented, and that North Korea plans for the development of economic and people's livelihood through economic reform and escape from its current isolated situation. Through this, the Peninsula will achieve an independent unification, and after the unification, it will form a long-term friendly, cooperative relationship with China, and the US Armed Forces in Korea would lessen in time, resulting in a complete withdrawal (Yang Xiyu, 2017). In contrast to the Chinese government's consistency with regard to the North Korean problem⁴⁵, South Korea's progress in the process of replacing the conservative government and the South's attitude toward North Korea clearly differed. . First of all, the Roh administration's North Korea policy in the case of North Korea was largely consistent with China's policy toward North Korea, the Korean Peninsula and its strategic understanding. In the Roh Moo-hyun government period, the "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" was introduced, succeeding Kim Dae-jung government's "Sunshine Policy." The Roh Moo-hyun administration also pointed out that it would actively promote dialogue between the parties to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, under the condition that the North Korean nuclear issue should not be resolved under any circumstances. The continuation of the North Korean engagement policy is consistent with China's understanding of the stabilization of the situation around the Korean peninsula and the stability of the North Korean political. This is a time when mutual cooperation rather than confrontation or conflict between Korea and China over (Cha Jung-mi, 2012). As a result, Korea's balanced diplomacy and engagement policy

⁴⁵After the Cold War, China's basic position and policy on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear issue involved ending the Cold War, developing the economy, maintaining peace, sustaining the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through peaceful means of communication, supporting the independent unification between the two Koreas.

toward North Korea during the Roh Moo - hyun government was in a favorable period for Korea's recognition of China.

However, during the Lee Myung-bak administration, the conservative political period allied with the US and strengthened the alliance and insisted on a hardline policy against North Korea based on various provocations of North Korea. Basically, the direction of pursuing denuclearization and peace and stability was the same in China, and the Koreans' perception on China has also turned negative. Inter-Korean talks interrupted inter-Korean military conflicts and local military conflicts. As the events of the sinking of the Cheonan and the Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, inter-Korean relations have not progressed to the atmosphere of reconciliation and cooperation over time, and military conflicts have frequently occurred. On this basis, the domestic crackdown on the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea policy acted as a prism to view China's North Korea policy. From the standpoint of South Korea in the case of the Cheonan ship and the Yeonpyeong Island bombing in 2010, China's defensive or passive attitude toward North Korea of China's perception on China, especially in the conservative group.

However, this situation is in a new phase due to the emergence of the conservative Park Geun-hye's political period, the radical development of North Korea's nuclear and missile technology, and its role as China's great power. With the development of North Korea's radical nuclear and missile technology, the Korean Peninsula is becoming more and tenser, and the interest and influence of the US has gradually increased. Also, with the rise of China's international status, China could not even prospect North Korea's nuclear and missile development. According to this comprehensive situation, China also participated in strong sanctions against North Korea in the Security Council, and after the declaration of the THAAD deployment in South Korea, China began to implement pressure on North Korea in the unprecedented event. Like so, whenever the Korean political system changes, and there occurs frictions on the cooperation relationship according to the basis of the North Korean policy. Accordingly, Koreans' perception on China can be different depending on bilateral relations and government policies.

IV Summary

This chapter analyzed the characteristics of Koreans' perception on China over the issue of North Korea, moderating on the North Korean factor influencing the Korean perception on

China focusing on the time horizon, and the following results were obtained. In regards to the two core problems related to North Korea issue – 'China's stance in case of inter-Korean war' and 'China's responsibility in the deterioration of inter-Korean relations' - it showed that the disposition of the perception on China corresponded with each other. In other words, in the case of military conflict between the two Koreas, China would take North Korea's side, and at the same time, China is seen as an important cause of deteriorating inter-Korean relations.

The results of this study show that the two characteristics that influence Koreans' perception on China when a series of North Korea issues affecting Korea-China relations arise are based on different understanding of the two countries, and deteriorate or strengthen the bilateral relations by handling the North Korea issue in different attitudes and methods. In other words, it is that this close and distant relationship between nations is naturally reflected in the Korean people's perception on China.

The differences in attitude and position of the two countries are major factors that can deepen the strategic distrust between South Korea and China. The effect of the Koreans' perception on China in regards to North Korea issue in 2011 was based on the difference in policies, and China's measures against North Korea was not met by Korea's expectations. This can be confirmed through the correlation between Lee Myung-bak government's blockade policy on North Korea and deteriorating relations between South Korea and China. In other words, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated during the Lee Myung-bak administration's period, rather than the direct conflicts between the two countries. Kim The inclusive policy towards North Korea during the political periods of Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun tended to coverage mainly on the maintenance of the North Korean political, the peaceful settlement between the two Koreas, and on the stability and peaceful orientation of the Korean peninsula. Based on this, the two countries have maintained close cooperation in the North Korean nuclear policy more than ever through the Six Party Talks and bilateral negotiations between Korea and China. On the other hand, the Lee Myung-bak political period transitioned to the North Korea's pressure, and led to a rift between the two countries regarding North Korea and its nuclear issues. In particular, with regard to the sinking of Cheonan in March 2010 and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents in November, the Korean government's intrinsic strategic distrust of China has expanded. In the aftermath, the Chinese government also turned to the pressure policy toward North Korea, but the THAAD deployment issue led to a decline in the favorability of China. In conclusion, it can be said

that Koreans' perception on China is closely related to the North Korean factors influencing Korea-China relations as well as Koreans' policies on China.

South Koreans have a complex psychological state about North Korea, and because North Korea is a subject to be unified and also like a brother or a hand⁴⁶, South Korea wishes that China takes a fair and objective view of North Korea and that there is at least a balance between South Korea and North Korea. Of course, China, by considering China's national interest in terms of the Korean peninsula policy and in terms of the basic principles of handling the Korea-China relational problem, deliberate the special relationship between China and North Korea. However, no matter what China's belief in the North Korea issues such as the sinking of Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, the results were far below the expectations of Koreans, and this disappointment increased the awareness and distrust of China as a threat, and the awareness of the threat to North Korea was transferred to the perception on China, resulting in the so-called 'period effect.'

The Koreans' perception on China is not stable, and if a series of serious events occur, there will be a great change in the people's perception on China. This is because the South Korea-China relationship has not yet established a stable cooperative relationship, and there is great uncertainty in perception. In response to the sinking of the Cheonan and the attack on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea strengthened its military alliance with the United States, but China, viewed from the standpoint of South Korea, intentionally refused to acknowledge that the incident was a North Korean act, as opposed to South Korea who handled the issue by strengthening the military alliance relationship with the US. In the end, China became aware that South Korea was "a country that cooperated with the United States to control China for

⁴⁶In response to the question "What target is North Korea to us?" in the <Unification Perception Survey> conducted in 2016, the answers were divided into four categories of 'target to cooperate with' (cooperation target), 'target for us to help' (support target) 'target to compete with us' (competition target), 'target to be watched by us' or 'hostile target that threatens our safety' (negative target). The Koreans' perception on North Korea was highest in terms of cooperation, unlike in the perception on China (competition target> negative target> cooperation target), followed by negative target, support target, and competition target. For Koreans, North Korea is an enemy on the one hand, but on the other hand it is the subject for unification and dialogue. In other words, North Korea is an enemy but a brother at the same time. This is because the hostile perception of North Korea is based on a realist position and the image of a brother is tied to a nationalist standpoint. The results of various polls reflect this duality (Kim Tae-hyun, 2007, 92-98). And since not everyone has a consistent ideological attitude, the people's perception on North Korea also has both an enemy and a sense of brotherhood. The more the conservative tendency has the hostile perception, the more the progressive tendency is, and the more the perception of the compatriot seems to be stronger.

military purposes," and South Korea realized that China was "an ally of North Korea and a hostile country to military security." In particular, the military provocation of North Korea has been a decisive factor in bringing out the criticism that it is difficult to treat each other as 'strategic cooperation partnership' in both Korea and China.

In addition, Korea's perception on China on North Korea reflects the structural contradiction between Korea and China. In other words, there is not enough trust base between the two countries in solving the North Korean nuclear issue and unification problem, compared with the external growth and development of the economic, cultural and human fields of Korea-China relations. Koreans think that China regards North Korea as an important issue in political and security affairs and economic relations as important to Korea, which is related to China's strategy to expand its core interests on the Korean peninsula issue (Lee Hee-ok, 2011). It is true that South Korea and China have developed a multifaceted relationship through 'Full Cooperation Partnership' (2003) and 'Strategic Cooperation Partnership' (2008), but it is necessary to diversify and strengthen bilateral relations. Koreans want China to cooperate with South Korea in keeping with the direction of unification in the Korean peninsula issue, to curb North Korean military threats and to cooperate more in Korea. In this respect, it is very important to promote mutual trust and cooperation regarding North Korea issues. At the same time, in order to elevate Koreans' sense of reliability and favorable impression on China, both Korea and China should wisely demonstrate their mutual position and resolve the North Korea issues.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

This paper conducted an empirical study on how Koreans' perception on China changes according to regime, region, and political ideology, by utilizing objective data. It tried to grasp the dynamic changing phenomenon of Koreans' perception on China that show with an interaction between the regime, which is an exogenous variable, and region and political ideology, which are endogenous variables. Furthermore, by analyzing the period effect of the Cheonan Ship Sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents in 2010 that affect Koreans' perception on China, it tried to prove that the perception can be influenced by China's attitude and stance over inter-Korean relations.

For research methodology, it set 'general public' as the object of the perception on China, and the research period is the past decade from Roh Moo-hyun's political period to Park Geun-hye's political period. It uses 'Unification Perception Survey (2007~2016)' composed of survey questionnaires related to perception on China. Through multinomial logit analysis, it analyzes Koreans' perception on China objectively. As important variables in Koreans' perception on China, regime, region, and political ideology are compared in their influence, and their interactions are analyzed. Also, it observes the period effect of the influence of Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents on Koreans' perception on China.

As a result, Koreans' perception on China showed different phenomenon from the interaction of regime and region and political ideology. Also, it was revealed that major events that affect South Korea-China relations have a big impact on the Koreans' perceptions on China.

First, it was proved that the stereotypes 'conservative regime – China is a threat' and 'progressive regime – China is a friend' were not always the case. Koreans' perception on China is dynamic from the change of South Korea-China relations as well as the changing policies on China that different regime takes. Koreans' perceptions on China were different between the political period of Lee Myung-bak's and that of Park Geun-hye's before the THAAD deployment, although the two regimes were both conservative. It was observed that South Koreans' perception on China were friendly during Park Geun-hye's political period. This is due to the difference of policies that each government implements on China, and it can be interpreted that regime greatly influences the public's perception on China. Koreans

perceive China as a competition target first, then negation target, and cooperation target as last, and this is the result of complex factors such as changes in the international environment, rise of China, inter-Korean relations, and changes in domestic regime and policies.

In addition, region, which is an exogenous variable, as well as regime and political ideology, which are endogenous variables, appear to interact in the perception on China. There exists a difference in Koreans' perception on China according to region and political ideology. Compared to the people in Youngnam area, people in Honam area were confirmed to perceive China more favorably. Looking at ideological differences, progressive groups perceived China more favorably than the conservative group did, but the difference was not statistically significant in the regression analysis results. It was confirmed that the influence of regime was greater than that of political ideology in Koreans' perception on China. Also, in the perception on China, regime was shown to have an impact by an interaction with political ideology. Youngnam area and conservative group especially did not maintain consistency in the perception on China, and they have been changing dynamically according to different regimes. These are influenced by the policy direction and changes of South Korea-China relations of their supporting regimes of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, which have a tendency for conservatism, and the perception on China also changes at that time according to the codes. Furthermore, it does not show from the interaction between regime and political ideology, and the progressive group of Honam and the conservative group of Youngnam did not show much difference in the perception on China. The cause for this difference of perception on China according to region and political ideology can be found in the roots of imbalance of development in the Korean region as well as ideology formation of "pro-US, anti-North" and "anti-US, pro-North." Also, it is presumed that the perception on China changes according to the policies on China that the supporting political party or government implement and the South Korea-China relationship situation.

Lastly, it was verified that period effect is observed in Koreans' perception on China when serious events related to North Korea such as Cheonan Ship Sincking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents arise, in addition to regime, region, and political ideology factors. The period effect is shown to have an effect on most of the Koreans' perception on China regardless of the differences of region or political ideology. The reason why these two incidents had an effect on the Koreans' perception on China lies on the difference of the two countries' policies that they take on the North Korea. When such events occur, South Koreans

expect that China would at least take a neutral stance between the two Koreas instead of take North Korea's side, which causes to be a factor to change the Korean government and Koreans' existing perception on China.

Synthetically, regime, region, and political ideology interact with each other and influence the Koreans' perception on China. Koreans' perception on China is not consistent, and it is observed that that it is controlled by the regime change, with each's policies toward China and the South Korea-China relationship. Moreover, by confirming that China's attitude toward Cheonan Ship Sinking and Yeonpyeong Island Shelling incidents in 2010 had greatly impacted the Koreans' perception on China during the period, it is discerned that China's attitude toward North Korea issues and conflicts have a great influence on the public perception on China beyond the regime, region, and political ideology factors analyzed above.

Koreans' perception on China is largely changed when there is a change of regime and policies toward China and the South Korea-China relationship are altered accordingly and when there occurs a series of major events. These phenomena prove that relations between the two countries have not yet established a stable cooperative relationship, and that there is a great uncertainty in the perception on China due to lack of trust. Various factors along with the interest in the issue of mutual recognition should be researched further, which has an important impact on South Korea-China relations, so that the emerging China is not a threat or hostile object but a partner to cooperate with. In particular, today, as a peaceful atmosphere on the Korean peninsula has been established, strengthening the foundation of bilateral cooperation by building confidence and friendship based on in-depth analysis on mutual recognition is necessary to reduce the distance between the two countries and create a more harmonious bilateral relationship.

This research is very useful and meaningful in studying the difference and change of Koreans' perception on China, as it observed the same survey yield of Koreans' perception on China with 'Unification Perception Survey' for a decade. However, the study has some limitations the data itself has limited characteristics. First of all, the data used in this study were surveyed on the same scale every year, but were not surveyed through the same subjects for 10 years. Secondly, some of the data used in the research started from 2007, so it only contains 1 year of data for Roh Moo-hyun's political period. Also, because it used data of period up to 2016, it does not have the data of 2017 at the end of Park Geun-hye's regime. On this, the study analyzed the data of Roh Moo-hyun's political period for one year based on the

assumption of perception on China. Therefore, in order to maintain the objectivity of the results, it centrally analyzed the technical analysis of the data in 2007 during Roh Moo-hyun's period. Also, as the number of data is small for Roh Moo-hyun's period, the study did not perform a multinomial logit analysis on Koreans' perception on China according to regime, region and political ideology, and only conducted a multinomial logit analysis for the data during Lee Myung-bak's and Park Geun-hye's political periods. Furthermore, the research includes data only from 2012 to 2016 for Park Geun-hye's political period, when the South Korea-China relations were most favorable from the early period up to the mid-term of the regime and does not contain data during the period when South Korea-China relations rapidly deteriorated after the Park's decision to deploy THAAD in 2017. There exist such limitations of data, and there is a necessity for an overall pattern of the perception on China by adding the data of 2017 during Park Geun-hye's political period. In addition, further research is required on the relationship between various variables affecting Koreans' perception on China and their interactions, other than the variables of regime, region, and political ideology.

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국문요약

역동적인 한국인의 대중인식: 정권, 지역 및 정치적 이념의 상호작용

왕성성

서울대학교

국제대학원

국제학 전공

본 논문은 한국인의 대중국 인식이 정권, 지역, 정치적 이념에 따라 어떻게 변하는지를 객관적 자료를 활용하여 실증적으로 분석하였다. 외생변수인 정권과 내생변수인 지역 및 정치적 이념이 서로 상호작용하면서 나타나는 대중인식의 그 역동적인 변화 양상을 포착하고자 하였다. 더불어, 2010년도에 발생했던 천안함 폭침 및 연평도 포격 사건이 대중인식에 미치는 시기효과를 분석함으로써, 한국인의 대중인식이 위와 같은 변수들 외에도 남북관계를 둘러싼 중국의 태도와 입장에 중대하게 영향을 받아 변할 수 있음을 증명하고자 하였다. 특히 한중 수교 이후 양국 간 지속적인 교류의 증가에도 불구하고, 한국과 중국 사이에는 기회와 위협이라는 서로 상반된 인식이 반복적으로 나타났는 바, 한중관계 발전을 위한 대중국 외교를 논의함에 있어 이와 같은 ‘인식’을 연구하는 것은 매우 중요한 과제임을 본 연구에서 다시 한 번 강조하고자 하였다.

연구 방법으로 대중국 인식의 대상을 ‘일반대중’으로 설정하고, 연구 시기는 노무현 정권 시기부터 박근혜 정권 시기까지 최근 십년으로 한다. 서울대학교 통일평화연구원에서 실시한 십년 동안 연속적으로 조사한 일관된 대중국 인식과 관련설문조사문항으로 구성된 ‘통일의식조사(2007년~2016년)’ 자료를 활용한다. 다행로 짓회귀분석 방법을 통해 한국인의 대중 인식을 객관적으로 분석한다. 한국인의 대중인식에 중요한 변인으로써 본 연구에서 설정한 정권, 지역, 정치적 이념의 영향을 비교하고 이를 간의 상호작용을 분석한다. 또한, 2010년도에

일어난 천안함 폭침 및 연평도 포격 사건이 한국인의 대중인식에 미친 영향의 시기효과를 분석한다.

연구 결과, 한국인들의 대중 인식은 외생변수인 정권과 내생변수인 지역 및 정치적이념이 상호작용하여 다른 양상을 나타내는 것으로 드러났다. 또한, 한중관계에 영향을 미치는 중대한 사건은 한국인들의 대중인식에 매우 큰 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다.

우선, ‘보수 정권-중국은 위협적’, ‘진보 정권-중국은 우호적’이라는 고정관념은 항상 옳지 않은 것으로 나타났다. 정권의 교체에 따라 변하는 대중정책과 한중관계의 변화에 의해 한국인의 대중국 인식은 역동적이다. 같은 보수 정권이지만 이명박 정권 시기와 박근혜 정권의 사드배치 이전 시기 동안 한국인들의 대중인식은 다르게 나타났는데, 이명박 정부에 비해 박근혜 정부 아래 한국인들의 대중인식은 더욱 우호적인 것으로 나타났다. 이는 각 정권이 중국에 대해 어떤 정책을 펼치느냐에 따라 다르게 나타난 것으로, 정권이 일반 국민들의 대중인식에 중요한 영향을 미친다고 해석할 수 있다. 한국인은 중국을 경쟁적 대상, 부정적 대상 그 다음에 협력적 대상의 순으로 인식했는데, 이는 국제환경의 변화, 중국의 부상, 남북관계 형세, 국내 정권과 정책의 변화 등 복잡한 여러 요소가 복합적으로 작용한 결과이다.

또한 대중인식에 있어 내생변수인 지역과 정치적 이념은 외생변수인 정권과 상호작용해서 나타난다. 지역 및 정치이념에 따라 한국인의 대중인식에는 차이가 존재한다. 영남 지역 사람에 비해 호남 지역 사람들은 중국을 더욱 우호적으로 인식하고 있음을 확인했다. 이념적 차이를 살펴보면, 진보 집단은 보수 집단에 비해 중국을 조금 더 우호적으로 인식했지만, 회귀분석 결과 이러한 차이는 통계적으로 유의미하지 않은 것으로 드러났다. 한국인의 대중 인식에 있어 정치적 이념보다 지역의 영향력이 더 크다는 것을 확인하였다. 그리고 대중인식에 있어 정권은 지역 및 정치적 이념과 상호작용하여 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 특히 영남 지역 및 보수 집단은 대중 인식에 있어 일관성을 유지하지 않고 정권에 따라 역동적으로 변해왔음을 알 수 있었다. 이들은 본인이 지지하는 보수 경향이 있는 정권인 이명박 및 박근혜 정권의 정책방향 및 한중관계의 변화에 영향을 받아 대중인식도 그 때 그때 그 코드에 맞춰 바뀌는 것이다. 또한,

대중국 인식에 있어 지역 및 이념에 따라 상호작용을 해서 나타나지 않고 호남의 진보 집단 및 영남의 보수 집단은 대중인식에 있어 크게 차이가 없다. 이런 지역 및 정치이념에 따른 대중 인식의 차이는 역사적, 정치적, 경제적 등으로 한국 지역 발전의 불균형 및 “친미, 반북” 그리고 “반미, 친북”이라는 이념형성의 근원에서 원인을 찾을 수 있다. 그리고 자기가 지지하는 정당 및 정권이 펼치는 대중정책 및 한중관계의 정세에 따라 중국에 대한 인식이 변화하는 것으로 추론된다.

마지막으로, 한국인의 대중 인식에 있어 정권, 지역 및 정치적 이념 외에도 천안함 폭침 및 연평도 포격 사건과 같은 북한문제와 관련된 중대한 사건이 터질 때 한국인의 대중인식에 시기효과가 발생하는 것으로 확인되었다. 이러한 시기효과는 지역 및 정치적 이념의 차이에 상관없이 대부분의 한국인들의 대중 인식에 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 천안함 폭침 및 연평도 포격 사건이 한국인의 대중인식에 영향을 미친 이유는 바로 한중 양국이 취하는 대북 정책의 상이성에 의한 것이다. 이 사건들이 발생했을 때 한국인들은 중국이 중립적인 입장을 취해줄 것이라고 기대했지만, 중국은 이러한 기대와는 다른 대북조치를 취함으로써, 한국 정부 및 한국인들에게 중국에 대한 기준의 인식을 크게 변화시키는 요인으로 작동한 것이다.

종합적으로 볼 때, 정권, 지역 및 정치적 이념은 서로 상호작용하며 한국인의 대중 인식의 영향을 미친다. 한국인의 대중국 인식은 일관적으로 지속적이지 못하고 정권 교체에 따라 각 정권의 대중 정책 및 양국 관계에 의해 좌우될 가능성을 알 수 있다. 또한, 2010년도에 있었던 천안함 폭침 및 연평도 폭격 사건 때 중국이 취한 태도는 이 시기 한국인의 대중인식에 매우 큰 영향을 미쳤다는 것을 확인함으로써, 특히 북한과 관련된 사건, 사고들과 이에 관한 중국의 입장은 위에서 분석한 정권, 지역, 정치적 이념을 넘어서 한국 국민들의 대중인식에 막대한 영향력을 가지고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 이러한 양상은 한중관계가 아직 안정적인 협력관계를 구축하지 못하고, 한국인의 중국을 신뢰하지 못하며, 대중국 인식에 큰 불확실성이 있다는 것을 보여준다.

키워드: 대중 인식, 한국인, 정권, 지역 및 정치적 이념, 시기효과

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