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Master's Thesis of International Studies

**A Study on Zainichi Taiwanese's
National Identity:**

Focusing on the Name Rectification Movement

재일대만인의 내셔널 아이덴티티에 관한 연구:
정명운동을 중심으로

August 2018

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

International Area Studies Major

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National Identity:
Focusing on the Name Rectification Movement**

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


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Abstract

A Study on Zainichi Taiwanese's National Identity:

Focusing on the Name Rectification Movement

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The aim of this thesis is to find out the reasons behind the revival of Taiwanese national identity consciousness among Zainichi Taiwanese and the upgrading of their movement influence. Historically their national identity is believed to have been shifting due to the great effect that they received from the international structure change. But in recent years the Taiwanese national identity is gradually becoming a main stream among Zainichi Taiwanese, and the relevant movements have also been upgraded from a civic level to a governmental level with influence on Japanese govern policies, with the Name Rectification Movement as one typical example. By taking a whole look of this movement's process and making a deep analyzation, we find out that the shared pursuit of Taiwanese national identity and democracy between Zainichi Taiwanese and local Taiwanese are acting as two factors for the revival of Taiwanese national identity consciousness. To put this potential trend into a real influential phenomenon, we believe that: 1. the participation of Taiwan government and the intervention from Japanese Right-Wing forces are acting as two pushing power; 2. Japanese government's plan on preventing illegal alien residents and the following releasing of new system provided a good enough time point for Zainichi Taiwanese to upgrade their

movement influence

Keyword: Zainichi Taiwanese, national identity, Name Rectification Movement, Taiwanization, Democratization, Japanese Right-Wing Force

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Abbreviation and Explanation

CPC	Communist Party of China
DPP	Democratic Progress Party
GHQ	General Headquarters
IOC	International Olympic Committee
KMT	Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)
Lee Friend's in Japan	Friends of Lee-Tenghui in Japan (日本李登輝之友會)
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
UN	United Nations
PFP	People First Party (亲民党)
PRC	People's Republic of China
Promotion Community	2020 Tokyo Olympics Taiwan Name Rectification Promotion Community (2020 東京五輪「台灣正名」推進協議会)
ROC	Republic of China
TAJ	Taiwanese Association in Japan (在日台灣同鄉會)
WTC	World Taiwanese Congress
WUFI	World United Formosans for Independence (台灣獨立建國聯盟)

I. Introduction

1. Research Subject and Purpose

When talking about the national identity of Asian area, Taiwan is no doubt one of the best research samples. Due to its special geographic location, its citizens have been standing at the forefront of national identity shift and manipulated by the change of world structure and history, and thus, a great number of related studies have been made in the past years with key words such as “Taiwanese”, “Taiwanization” etc. But one thing needs to be mentioned here is that, in most of the existing researches, the study subject “Taiwanese” generally means the local people who are living inside the Taiwan Island. Therefore, the national identity of Taiwanese who are living (even were born) overseas becomes a blind point for this field of study.

Except China, Taiwan has the most and closest connections with Japan through history, with both good ones and bad ones. This also results in the formation of Taiwanese living in Japan, who is officially called as “Zainichi Taiwanese” in Japanese legal terms (He, 2015). After years of living in Japan, Zainichi Taiwanese has already grown up to a remarkable group with the population of 54,358 in total,

among which the ones who hold the family permit visa status¹accounts for more than fifty percent (Official Statistics of Japan, 2017). Along with the national identity movements which are more frequent with bigger scale in recent years, this group of people is attracting more and more attention from the public. Indeed, they are special enough to be more studied by scholars. On the one hand, they do have both similarities and differences with local Taiwanese, and their national identity issue not only contains the factors of Taiwan, People’s Republic of China (PRC hereafter) and Republic of China (ROC hereafter), but also adds the element of Japan, a country that once colonized Taiwan, had war with PRC and ROC, and now occasionally shows an ambiguous attitude towards the pro-Taiwan independence movements. On the other hand, their national identity is even more ambiguous and uncertain compared to that of local Taiwanese, with more possibilities to be affected and fewer leading determinants such as dominant culture. But it’s a pity that their uniqueness doesn’t bring them enough attention from the academic realm. Except being overlooked by scholars who focus on Taiwanese national identity, they are also overshadowed by the group of “Zainichi Korean” in the national identity research which focuses on foreign residents in Japan. These Zainichi Taiwanese are therefore comparatively margined in both research fields.

¹ Including the following five status of residence: Special Permanent Resident, Permanent Resident, Spouse or Child of Japanese National, Spouse or Child of Permanent Resident, Long Term Resident. For more information: Immigration Bureau of JAPAN
<http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/english/tetuduki/kanri/qaq5.html>

While the study on the national identity issue of Zainichi Taiwanese still needs much more development, the relevant movements in real life have made substantial progress in recent years. Along with the revival and upsurge of Taiwanese national identity consciousness among Zainichi Taiwanese, their practical power to seek for their own national identity also increased a lot. With more specific goals, these movements are heading towards a higher level, with stronger influence in both social aspect and political aspect. The Name Rectification Movement is a typical example. Seeing from its participants and coverage area, this movement was first started by Zainichi Taiwanese in Japan, and later expanded to Taiwan, with more than 150,000 local Taiwanese participating during the peak periods. In Japan, Zainichi Taiwanese require to rectify the names of nationality on a series of alien certificates and join in international events in the name of Taiwan. These movements fully reflect the growing Taiwanese national identity consciousness among Zainichi Taiwanese, and have made the biggest achievement after years of efforts by successfully affected the decision of Japanese government. Going further still, they also try to unite the most power to achieve their goals by joining in the movements inside Taiwan. The Name Rectification movement now is still going on in both places, with more Zainichi Taiwanese joining and fighting for more rights

regarding their national identity. So in the time scope, the Name Rectification Movement can serve as both an evidence for the upsurge of Taiwanese national identity among Zainichi Taiwanese and the bases for the forecast of their future national identity tendency. To wrap up, the Name Rectification Movement can be regarded as the best starting point for the research of the national identity issue of Zainichi Taiwanese from the perspectives of organizer and participant, achievement so far, and time duration. This is exactly the value that this movement brings to this research.

2. Previous Studies

National identity is not a new topic in sociology, while the national identity of Taiwanese is much less a new one. To provide readers with both basic theoretical and practical understanding, we will give a brief review of national identity theory and the existing studies on Taiwanese national identity in the next section. In addition, as our research is a diaspora study due to our study subject Zainichi Taiwanese, the theory of long distance nationalism can also provide us with some basic ideas of our research topic, and therefore will also be briefly reviewed in the next section.

2-1. Theories on National Identity

In the long history of human development, the phrase “national identity” was mentioned again and again with the change of world structure, such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the reunification between the East and West Germany. In modern times, with the tide of globalization, national identity once again becomes a hot topic because of the gradually blurring boundaries between countries and the increasing regional cooperation. But this concept was first arising from the emergence of nation around the world. Basing on the concept of “identity”, which directly points to the questions to people such as “Who we are” and “Where we are”, “national identity” further specify the above question to the nation scope. As for the exact meaning of “nation”, Anderson’s view, which defines nation as “an imagined political community---imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 1983) has gained widespread acceptance by world scholars. While Anderson focused on the definition of “nation” itself, Smith shifted ground to equate “nation” with “national identity” when he was giving his definitions (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2015). In his book <National Identity> back in 1991, he defined “nation” as: “a named human population sharing a historic

territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991). The elements listed in his definition such as territory, memory, culture, legal right and duty and economy are also regarded as fundamental features of national identity, which conceptually “blend two sets of dimensions: the one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and geological, in varying proportions in particular cases” (Smith, 1991).

In real life, “a sense of national identity sutures people into the national community and gives them meaning and purpose beyond what they themselves can generate” (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2015). People “define and locate themselves in the world through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture” (Smith, 1991). Sociologists don’t have big differences on their views of national identity’s function. But when talking about the base of this specific process, scholars’ views start to divide into two camps: the “primordialism” vs “modernism”. Under Dahbour’s description, the primordialist views national identity as something which is based on “pre-existing or primordial, kinship ties, sentiment, common histories, or geographic”, while the modernist views national identity as something that comes from the “modern nation”---- that is, “constituted out of cultural

attitudes, social aspirations, or political beliefs developed in response to the emergence of societies after the industrial and democratic revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (Dahbour, 1996). Similar differentiation can also be found under different names by scholars. For example, Anthony Smith named these two types of national identity view as “Eastern Model”---the one with shared history, culture and tradition etc. as components and “Western Model”---the one with legal-political community and member equality etc. as components. Hans Kohn elaborated his view from the perspective of time, that is, “eastern nationalism was backward-looking and mystical, basing itself on an exclusive, quasi-tribal understanding of nationality”; whereas western model was rational and liberal in character, looking forward to a future in which all should enjoy the rights of man (Kohn, 1944).

Though the existing theories on national identity are made under different names, we are still able to roughly classify them into two categories: the one school that believes national identity is something inborn and cannot be changed, and the other school that believes national identity is something that is formed and under construction by the influence of external factors as time goes by. Each of these thoughts stands on an extreme of national identity formation base, and thus they are

destined to be imperfect. The biggest flaw of the “primordialism” view is that, its base such as ethnicity, culture and custom are not rigorous enough to be a criterion for national identity difference. For one thing, these factors are mostly constructed in the very early time and later followed by people rather than the real inborn characteristics such as blood type and gene. For another, facts prove that people who own different primordial factors are still able to share same national identity. Examples are easy to be picked up in real world, especially in multi-national countries like China and immigration countries like the U.S. Thus merely setting these elements as base for national identity is dubious to some extent. As for the “modernism” view, its limitation comes from its complete denial to the influence of elements like culture and ethnic in the construction of national identity. Until now, there is not even one nation that forms its national identity only on territory, law and politics. Still take the U.S. as an example. Even in such a multi-cultural country, the government also needs to keep publicizing its social value of “freedom” to foster the sense of belonging and its citizens’ American national identity. Thus, facing with the problems of both schools of thought, it’s important to find the accurate point between the two sides when analyzing national identity issue of a specific group of people in real life.

2-2 The National Identity of Taiwanese

To a political body which has different ethnic groups and culture coexisting, while at the same time has an unclear scope of territorial sovereignty, the question of its people's national identity is definitely an explosive topic (Jiang, 1998). Taiwan is indeed a typical political body of this kind, making itself and its citizens a perfect sample for the research of national identity issue. "Taiwanese people's national identity is considerable complicated by the twists and turns of Taiwan history" (Yang Z. , 2016). Under the direct and indirect influence of external power factors, their national identity has always been on a shifting process, which in return generates a large amount of relative research articles. Generally, most of these studies are based on survey data, with two major approaches employed: The first "relies on the measurement of respondents' positions on the unification/independence spectrum; another approach is to assess Taiwan residents' national identity through their self-identification as being Taiwanese or Chinese or both" (Wang & Liu, 2004). Conclusion that is drawn from these studies are kind of similar, indicating that Taiwan now is on a process changing from the once culture oriented national identity to current political system oriented one. These two dimensions, in technical terms the "primordial" and "modern" ones are shown to be complementary, bringing Taiwanese a characteristic of dual-national identity

(Chen R. , 2012).

In the primordial dimension, the local Taiwanese can be ethnically “divided into three groups: the Aborigines whose ancestors lived in Taiwan long before the Chinese migrated into Taiwan in the thirteenth century; Benshengren (Taiwan natives including both the Holo and Hakka peoples) whose ancestors migrated to Taiwan from China before the mid- to late-1940s; and Waishengren (the Mainlanders) who or whose parents or grandparents fled from mainland China to Taiwan after the mid- to late-1940s” (Yang Z. , 2016). Chinese origin accounts for a large proportion in the whole Taiwan society. Later during the govern by Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT hereafter), the Chinese national identity which came from Chinese origin was further strengthened to all the local Taiwanese by the implementation of Sinicization policy in extensive institutions such as schools and media, aiming at infusing the Chinese ethnic origin consciousness and continue the history of Chinese ethos in the aspects from politics to everyday life (Chen R. , 2012). Chinese national identity therefore started to dominate Taiwanese awareness since then. In a 2016 survey about national identity from the perspective of ethnic, when asked the question: “From the perspective of blood and culture, whom do you think you are?”, still “the majority of Taiwanese

people do not reject their Chinese ethno-cultural identity but reject the notion of a separate and distinctive Taiwanese ethno-cultural identity as promoted by some Democratic Progressive Party (DPP hereafter) politicians” (Yang Z. , 2016). Taiwanese are also proud of their good keeping of traditional Chinese culture in the form of places of interest.

But the above is only one side of current Taiwanese’s national identity awareness, and this once dominant Chinese national identity is increasingly being challenged by the rapid democratization process since 1990s and the emergence of new ethnic identity. A great portion of Taiwanese nowadays only admit their culture origin of the big “Chinese Nation (Zhong Hua Min Zu) but refused to recognize themselves as “Chinese”, neither as citizen of Republic of China (ROC hereafter) nor People’s Republic of China (PRC hereafter). Meanwhile, a new ethnic national identity “New Taiwanese” (新台湾人), which was advertised and popularized in the 1998 Taipei mayoral election by the then president Lee Tenghui (李登辉) and election candidate Ma Yingjeou (马英九), is gaining acceptance by more and more Taiwanese. As expressed by Lee, “as long as those who identify with Taiwan and sympathize with Taiwan, who are willing to strive and struggle for Taiwan, it is they who are New Taiwanese...At the same time, those who cherish nationalist


feelings, uphold Chinese culture and do not forget the ideals of China's unification, they are Chinese" (Lee, 1999). This vague but attractive ethnic concept is inclusive enough to unite the Taiwanese who once have differences on their national identity as a new group. According to a survey made by Gallup in 1998, 46.7% of Taiwanese identify themselves as "New Taiwanese" (Zhang W. , 1999).

As for the sovereignty, though there is a split of opinions inside Taiwanese themselves, still the majorities of them support for the total independence (de jure independence) or at least maintains current de facto independence. The difference in political system----socialism in PRC and capitalism in Taiwan, and in the policymaking system---- authoritarianism in PRC and democracy in Taiwan, plays a major role in the pro-Taiwanese independence tendency. As a result the "One Country, Two Systems" unification formula which was put forward by Beijing government is not accepted either. In the latest "Taiwanese Attitude Trend Survey" made by Global Views Research (see Figure 1), the percentage of people who support for "total independence", "Maintain Current Status first then decide" and "Forever maintain current status" account for more than 76%, much higher than the 14.8% for supporting integration. While among the 76%, maintaining current status (combining the two choices together) accounts for more than 64%. This ambiguous

but with strong pro-Taiwan independence tendency attitude can also be revealed by other surveys. Take the “Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution” made by Election Study Center National Chengchi University (See Figure 2) for example. The percentage of people who clearly identify themselves as Chinese show a decrease from year 1992, while the percentage of people who regard themselves as Taiwanese sharply increased from 43.3% in 1997, and reached its climax in 2014 as 66.6%. The number of people who identify both is relatively smaller, but still accounts for 37.3% in 2017.


Seeing from the data showed in the above surveys, we can see that the change of Taiwanese’s national identity is an ongoing process. The Chinese ethnic origin still has its effect, while at the same time the implementation of democracy system and the rise of democratic consciousness are making stronger effect on the construction of Taiwanese national identity. Neither of the “primordial” and “modern” elements has totally dominated the whole formation. The dual-identity therefore is the most distinctive feature of Taiwanese national identity.

Figure 1: Taiwanese Attitude Trend Survey



Source: Global Views Research, 2018

Figure 2: Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution



Source: Election Study Center National Chengchi University, 2018

2-3 Theory of Long Distance Nationalism

First proposed by Benedict Anderson in 1998, the term ‘long distance nationalism’ represented another national identity theory which is based on the idea of ‘imagined community’. In Anderson’s description for long distance nationalism which is generally accepted by the academic realm, he analyzed it as a politics that ‘no longer depends on territorial location in a home country’ (Şenay, 2013). “Long distance nationalism here is understood as a particular aspect of diasporic identity” (Ziemer, 2010), an “ideology of a migrant group that does not politically orientate itself to the state in which it is located, but to the country of its origin” (Sam, 2003). Further developed by Schiller and Fouron, they believed that “long distance nationalism is a claim to membership in a political community that stretches beyond the territorial borders of a homeland. It generates an emotional attachment that is strong enough to compel people to political action that ranges from displaying a home country flag to deciding to ‘return’ to fight and die in a land they may never have seen” (Schiller, Fouron, & Albuero, 2002). Thus the long-distance nationalism here can be “on the one hand elite driven and thus part of the public realm of everyday life, while on the other hand can be part of private sphere of life such as individuals’ friendship or intimacy choices” (Ziemer, 2010).

Though this concept hasn't been proposed until 1990s, long distance nationalism is in fact not a new phenomenon in human history. It has already "become observable as early as the sixteenth century, and then became a mass phenomenon in the late nineteenth century with the trans-Atlantic migration of European peoples who took with them a national identity" (Sam, 2003). Printing and transportation are believed to be the two preconditions for the establishment of imagined community by Anderson, a situation where "people rarely pays taxes in the country in which he does his politics; he is not answerable to its judicial system; he probably does not cast even an absentee ballot in its elections because he is a citizen in a different place; he need not fear prison, torture or death, nor need his immediate family. But, well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer information circuits, all of which can have incalculable consequences in the zones of their ultimate destination" (Anderson, Exodus, 1994). This situation in turn becomes a booster for the development of long distance nationalism.

As the "commonsense assumption in much literature on long-distance nationalism indicate, distance from home in time and space coupled with marginalization within host countries can lead to nostalgia and reification of homelands"

(Thiranagama, 2014). “Diasporas in this situation therefore need ‘imagined resources’ to create and maintain a sense of collective identity, making the homeland and diaspora are tightly intertwined” (Ziemer, 2010) Driven by this motivation, “practitioners of ‘politics without responsibility’ are easily manipulated by homeland political actors” (Sasson, Shain, Hecht, Wright, & Saxe, 2014). This is also the reason why Anderson believes that “long distance nationalism acts as an unaccountable and naive extension of identity politics that is cynically exploited by homeland politicians” (Anderson, 1998). Moreover, “as it is generally removed from the compromises of day-to-day political activity, long distance nationalism can cherish the purity of its political principles from afar, and thus tends to be more virulent than that which is found in the country of origin” (Sam, 2003). Therefore “actors are believed to be more radical than ‘natives’ when they engage in ‘homeland politics’” (Daniele). But this idea is currently challenged by the view that, “diaspora plays varied roles in conflict, and different groups and individuals within the same diaspora may have different approaches, organizations, interests and objectives within the same conflict. In short, diaspora may occasionally play the role of ‘peace-makers’ as well as ‘peace-wreckers’” (Sasson, Shain, Hecht, Wright, & Saxe, 2014).

3. Research Question

The research subject in this study is the national identity of Zainichi Taiwanese, and currently there's a lack of integrated studies on this topic. This is also the reason why we try to refer to existing literatures on relevant sub-topics such as national identity and Taiwanese national identity as we briefly summarized above.

In one aspect, the modernism view of national identity theory conforms to the ever changing character of Zainichi Taiwanese's national identity, therefore supports to the fact that their national identity is more determined by the outside factors rather than inborn ones. Scholars have pointed out that factor such as territory and political system can affect the formation and shift of national identity. But this only gives a general direction for the research on Zainichi Taiwanese's national identity at a theoretical level. Moreover, though theory of long distance nationalism provides some basic explanations for the rationality of Zainichi Taiwanese' participation in the national identity movement in both Taiwan and Japan, it still fails to connect specific situation and conditions that help to convert the tendency of consciousness to reality. While in another aspect, we turn to the studies on Taiwanese national identity to find more practical supporting views beyond theoretical explanations. But except for the origin similarities that Zainichi Taiwanese have with local Taiwanese, the different historical experience and living

environment have brought them more differences. Factors that have affected the formation of local Taiwanese' national identity may only play part of their roles in the long time formation of Zainichi Taiwanese' role, with more other elements may need to be added. In addition, Taiwanese national identity has actually existed in Zainichi Taiwanese community for a long time. But it's only in recent years that the national identity movements made a big progress and achieved substantial results. This not only reflect the tendency of their national identity to some extent, but also show that there are factors that pushing these movements forward and accelerating the tendency. To wrap up, the existing relevant studies can do help to the research on Zainichi Taiwanese' national identity, but just partly from the theoretical and practical aspects, and therefore, this thesis will try to find the reasons behind by answering the following research question:

Why did the upsurge of Taiwanese national identity among Zainichi Taiwanese appear only in recent years but not earlier? Also, as a minority group living in a foreign country, how did they make the achievements beyond their own abilities?

4. Research Methodology

Zainichi Taiwanese is a special community with a more vagrant history. In years of

living as a minority group in Japan, Zainichi Taiwanese has been suffering from unfair treatment due to their ambiguous legal status. The general trend of their national identity was also affected by the change of the world, aiming to seek for the most favorable situation for themselves. This custom has a great influence on the formation of their national identity, also brings more possibilities for the current upsurge of Taiwanese national identity among them. Thus a historical method will be used in this research to briefly comb the birth of this group of people and the shift of national identity that they have experienced.

Moreover, in current wave of Taiwanese national identity upsurge, the Name Rectification Movement can be seen as a land mark, also an important component in the whole process. By making use of internet, organizers called together Zainichi Taiwanese who shares the same national identity with them to join relevant activities in the form of parade, signing etc. These events and the inner thoughts were reported and further publicized by their own websites and magazines, thus able to reach more people and absorb more Zainichi Taiwanese and Japanese to stand in the same line. Materials such as activity posters, recorded videos and articles which were written by participants clearly show these Zainichi Taiwanese' recommendations and therefore become the most valuable first-hand resources for

this research. The background information of main organizers also provides important clues for us to find out the reasons hidden in this upsurge. So all these vital information above will be utilized as basis for analyzing the current trend of Zainichi Taiwanese national identity. Moreover, more detailed points of this movement will be distilled from a mixture of news reports and articles on newspapers, SNS media etc.

Based on the conception above, this study is organized as follows: the introduction section will provide readers with notable information on the necessity and starting point of this study. Literature review on relevant theories will also be made to provide readers with basic understanding of this research. We will briefly comb the process of how the community of Zainichi Taiwanese came into being and what they've suffered in the legal status aspect and their changing national identity in chapter 2, aiming to give a historical background of this study and put forward the most suitable definition for the research subject. In Chapter 3, the Name Rectification Movement in Japan will be described in detail. Relevant data such as slogans, speeches, public reactions will be used here to make an authentic representation of this movement and reveal the connection between it and Zainichi Taiwanese' demand on their national identity issue. We will discuss in depth about

the reasons behind the upsurge of Taiwanese national identity among Zainichi Taiwanese and put forward our points of view on explaining the great development they've made in recent years in chapter 4. Finally, we will conclude with a summary of our findings along with the possible points which can be further developed.

II. Zainichi Taiwanese as the Orphan of Asia

1. Birth of Zainichi Taiwanese

Literally, “Zainichi” means “In Japan”, and therefore “Zainichi Taiwanese” can be understood as Taiwanese people who are living in Japan. But this is a very general description, and there's a lack of detailed description about this special group of people in both Taiwan and Japan government laws and document. For example, in the latest 2016 Statistical Yearbook of the Overseas Community Affairs Council made by ROC government, the “overseas Taiwanese” (海外台灣僑民) is defined as “the emigrants who removed from Taiwan (Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu) and their descendants” (ROC, 2016) with no more description. Similarly, the definition for Zainichi Taiwanese can be extended from “overseas Taiwanese” as “the emigrants who removed from to Japan and their descendants” under ROC

government description. But Zainichi Taiwanese is in fact a group of people with much more complicated differences in their coming time, origin and even current nationality status.

The formation process of Zainichi Taiwanese can be generally divided into pre-war period and post-war period by the WWII. During the colonial period which started from 1895, local Taiwanese were brought to Japan and settled there since then. When Japan surrendered at the end of WWII in 1945, it was expected that 80% of the registered 15,906 Zainichi Taiwanese would return to Taiwan. But according to the survey made in July 1948, there were still 14,064 Zainichi Taiwanese chose to stay in Japan (Huang, 2008). These people received their new nationality as citizen of ROC and joined the original Zainichi Chinese community which was mainly composed by mainlanders, accounting for more than half of the whole community population. These “new comers” have their origins in Taiwan and living experiences in Japan, thus formed the original Zainichi Taiwanese. Along with their descendants, they make the narrow definition of Zainichi Taiwanese. While in the post-war period, there was another wave of immigration that came from Taiwan to Japan. In 1949, the Chinese Civil War ended by the establishment of PRC by the Communist and the retreat of Nationalist troops and ROC refugees to Taiwan.

Some of these people later went to Japan for settlement, and generally they are also viewed as Zainichi Taiwanese, though owing different origins as from Taiwan or mainland. In the following tens of years, a series of historical events such as the 2.28 Incident by KMT, the Culture Revolution by Communist Party of China (CPC hereafter) and the Tiananmen Square Protest in PRC greatly affected people in Taiwan to come in and out of Japan. These people who went to Japan from Taiwan regardless of their origin, plus the Taiwanese who stayed in Japan since the colonial period along with their descendants, formed the broad definition of Zainichi Taiwanese.

Thus among the widest scope of Zainichi Taiwanese, there are inconsistencies of coming time and origin of these people. What's more, their current nationality is another inconsistent point, as some of them still own ROC nationality, whilst some of them have already naturalized to Japanese nationality. To wrap up, Zainichi Taiwanese in this sense have to neither be Taiwan origin nor have settled in Japan since colonial period. They are also free from the limitation of nationality under this scope. So where should we set the line as the criteria to define Zainichi Taiwanese?

In limited relevant studies, scholars mostly stand between the narrow and broad definition of Zainichi Taiwanese. For example, Okano mentioned that the immigrants who came from Taiwan both before and after 1945 are called as “Zainichi Taiwanese” in Japan (Okano, 2018). To include as many as possible of the targets that fit for the research motivation, in this study we will lay aside the coming time and current nationality, and only focus on their origin and current living place (Japan) as boundaries for the definition of Zainichi Taiwanese. In addition, to exclude the Taiwanese who just temporarily stay in Japan, in this study we will only include the Taiwanese who have the tendency or already de facto long residence by distinguishing their status of residence, that is, the ones who hold the family permit visa status which includes the following five status of residence: Special Permanent Resident, Permanent Resident, Spouse or Child of Japanese National, Spouse or Child of Permanent Resident, Long Term Resident. In conclusion, Zainichi Taiwanese in this study will be defined as: The Taiwan origin people who are currently living in Japan with status of residence without activity limitation (including Special Permanent Resident, Permanent Resident, Spouse or Child of Japanese National, Spouse or Child of Permanent Resident, Long Term Resident.), regardless of their coming time to Japan and their current nationality.

As for the name of these people, it has actually changed lots of time in the past periods. For example, during GHQ period they were mostly called as “Sangokujin” (第三國人) or “Liberated people” (解放人民). While in the official diplomatic documents made by Japanese government, they were called as “Yuan Tai Wan Ren” (元台灣人) or “ROC Citizen”(中華民國人). While in this, we will stick to use “Zainichi Taiwanese” as their name to make a more precise elaboration of their historical contexture (He, 2015).

2. The Orphan of Asia

2-1 The Once Ambiguous Legal Status

Before 1945, Zainichi Taiwanese were holding Japanese nationality due to Japan’s colonization. But this peaceful state was broke by the surrender of Japan in WWII. The year 1945 therefore became the starting point for Zainichi Taiwanese’ suffering from their ambiguous legal status. Just after the end of WWII, the ROC government unilaterally declared the restoration of ROC nationality of Zainichi Taiwanese. But this declaration was not recognized by the Japanese government and Zainichi Taiwanese were still regarded as citizens under Japan’s jurisdiction. Zainichi Taiwanese became the one sandwiched between the two hostile camps.

The Shibuya Incident happened in 1946 pushed the compromise solution of Zainichi Taiwanese' nationality issue. In February 1947, the General Headquarters (GHQ hereafter) approved ROC government's proposal to record Zainichi Taiwanese as Formosan-Chinese and enjoy equal treatment as citizens for WWII victor countries. While at the same time, GHQ also admitted Japanese government's proposal to recognize Zainichi Taiwanese as victor country citizen only after signing the Treaty of Peace with Japan (日本国との平和条約). It was until 1952 when the Treaty of Peace with Japan became effective and Japanese government declared the Law 125「外国人登録法(がいこくじんとうろくほう)」 (Law on Alien Registration) and Law 126「外務省関係諸命令の措置に関する法律」 (Law on the Implementation of Acts Issued by Ministry of Foreign Affairs) did Zainichi Taiwanese formally divorce from Japanese nationality and became foreigners living in Japan. But under Law 126, Zainichi Taiwanese' residency right was not guaranteed by any relevant legal provisions on duration according to the Law 126 Paragraph 6 of Article 2, which notes that “those can stay without having the status of residence determined by the Immigration Control Order for a while until being determined by law” (Hatano, Kurasima, Tanaka, Sigemi, & Iwasaki, 2001).

In 1965, more than 60% of Koreans living in Japan who once shared the same legal status with Zainichi Taiwanese were given the visa status of Kyoutei-eiju-sha (協定永住者) under “the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea” (Han, 2017). Zainichi Taiwanese were again expelled from the target group who were qualified to receive stable residency status. It was not until 1982 when the visa status of “Permanent Resident” was given to Zainichi Taiwanese under the “ special case permanent residence permission (特例永住)” of Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law. Though this visa status is different from the Kyoutei-eiju-sha in the aspects of contents, licensing requirements and application period, it can still be understood that the legal status problem of Zainichi Taiwanese has been solved after 30 years of suffering.

2-2 Lived as Chinese under Unfair Treatment

A by-product brought by their unclear legal status was the unfair treatment compared to original Zainichi mainlanders. As the special group of people who were experiencing a transformation of legal status, Zainichi Taiwanese should be able to receive the same treatment as citizens of victor country. But in reality this was not the case for them. Different from Zainichi mainlanders, who were

automatically categorized to victor country citizens, Zainichi Taiwanese were only “treated as liberated people under the condition that the military safety permits, and they can still be treated as citizen from enemy country if necessary” according to the regulation 「日本占領及び管理のための連合国最高司令官に対する降伏後における初期の基本的指令」 (Basic Instructions on the Occupation and Management in the Early Era of Surrender after WWII by GHQ) issued on November 11th 1945 (Yang Z. , 2012). Also unlike Zainichi mainlanders, they were not eligible to get the basic foods that were distributed by United Nations (UN hereafter) according to the regulations of 「連合国人及び中立国人、無国籍. 人に対して食糧の特別配給制度」 (Special Food Rations for Foreign Nationals 特配), as they were categorized as 無国籍者(stateless persons) (Huang, 2008). In this situation, Zainichi Taiwanese had no choice but to apply for the Overseas Chinese Registration Certificate issued by ROC government to be qualified for receiving distributed foods. They also set their first step to become Chinese in this way, though was partly forced by the unfavorable condition. Zainichi Taiwanese didn't officially become Chinese until the signing of Treaty of Peace with Japan by the Japanese government. They also temporarily finished their legal status transformation by joining the original overseas Chinese community in Japan as “new comer”. But the fusion was not immediately achieved. On contrary,

the unfair treatment under same nationality brought them more confusion on their country belonging.

3. The Changing National Identity

Being vexed by the blurry legal status and raw deal in the name of Chinese, Zainichi Taiwanese was living under a strong feeling of insecurity. The famous historian Dai Guohui (戴国輝, 1931-2001) used the word “境界人” (Margined people) to describe the anguish that Zainichi Taiwanese were suffering from. Trying to ensure themselves to be in the best situation they could achieve, Zainichi Taiwanese became very sensitive to world change outside Japan, and showed a tendency to shift their national identity basing on the benefits. When local Taiwanese’ resentment to ROC reached its peak because of the 2.28 Incident, the CPC has already started to won an advantage over KMT in the Chinese Civil War, and even established the PRC later in 1949. This new country gave Zainichi Taiwanese a new choice for their national identity, and more of them, especially the ones with left-wings were willing to support for the new established PRC. They participated in political activities under the name of PRC citizen and published articles in magazines to support. For example, the chief editor for <Chinese Public

Comment> (《中国公论》), a magazine which was issued by the Overseas Chinese in Japan Federation, was originally a Taiwanese. He published the article <The New China is Misunderstood> in magazine <Democratic Korea> to defend for the revolution led by CPC (He, 2015). What happened in the following years even made a bigger influence on Zainichi Taiwanese' national identity choice. In 1971, the PRC was recognized as the only country that represents China in UN and the representatives of ROC were expelled. In 1972, the PRC signed the <Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China> with the U.S. and normalized the diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Later in September in same year, the then Japanese government declared that they “recognizes that government of PRC as the only legal government of China” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1972) and break the diplomatic relationship with ROC. More Zainichi Taiwanese started to view PRC as a country with bright future and had a tendency to set their national identity as citizen of PRC. There was a wave of Zainichi Taiwanese who went to PRC with enthusiasm to make a contribution for the construction of the state. But the later Great Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen Square Protest were like wet blankets threw on them. Many of them were suppressed by the PRC government and therefore retrieved their national identity as PRC citizen.

On the other side of Taiwan Strait, the whole Taiwan was under a gloomy atmosphere during the White Terror Period from 1949 to 1991. Under the governing of KMT, public opinions were strictly controlled and any idea that shows an opposition tendency to the lead of KMT was regarded as an action of betray. Celebrities and intellectuals chose to stay far away from politics to protect themselves from being wronged, and the whole journalism and newspaper industries were in a depressed state with no relevant comment published. But this was not the case for Zainichi Taiwanese. Their location determined that they were free from the control of expression by ROC government. It was possible for them to publicly express different arguments on the future of Taiwan in political activities. For example, there was an anniversary for the 2.28 Incident held in Tokyo by the left-leaning Zainichi Taiwanese group on Feb. 28th 1950, an activity that would be impossible to happen in the White Terror Taiwan. Some of the Zainichi Taiwanese even started their lecturers and wrote books focusing on the discussion about Taiwan, PRC and ROC. These people observed the White Terror in a different way by their different historical experience. What they have experienced from this special time period was the precious of speech freedom and the terror of ROC government. Their national identity as citizen of ROC was

depressed in this way.

In conclusion, the shift of Zainichi Taiwanese's national identity has been a process filled with expectation and frustration. Their choices on national identity were initially forced by the international situation. But as time goes by, Zainichi Taiwanese started to have their own thoughts, leading to a division of national identity choice among this group of people, with some pro-ROC, some pro-PRC and some belong to neither side. But one thing can't be denied is that, with more Zainichi Taiwanese being unsatisfied with both PRC and ROC sides, the once latent Taiwanese national identity is gaining more acceptance by them. The consciousness of "we" as Taiwanese is being strengthened in an accelerating speed.

III. Name Rectification Movement in Japan

By combing the history above, it's easy to find out that to some extent, Zainichi Taiwanese are a group of people who have been standing in an embarrassed situation in the globe. They have their connections with both Japan and China (either ROC or PRC), while at the same time they belong to neither if seeing from the rights they own. This situation definitely has an effect on Zainichi Taiwanese'

personal feeling of which country they really belong to. As we mentioned in chapter1, to conduct the study on Zainichi Taiwanese' national identity, the Name Rectification Movement in Japan can be the best example. Thus in this section, we will make a detailed overview of this movement in Japan.

1. Initiation Preparation

The Name Rectification Movement was lunched by Zainichi Taiwanese represented by Lin Jianliang (林建良) with the Pan-Green Coalition of ROC government members later joined. It initially started in Japan and then transferred its ideology to Taiwan, leading to a series of sub-movements in both areas. As the country where the Name Rectification Movement originated, Japan undoubtedly has provided a unique enough platform for the movement. On the one hand, Japan gives Zainichi Taiwanese an environment where they live as a minority group meanwhile experienced different historical process compared to local Taiwanese, thus being more sensitive to the change of outside situation. On the other hand, their geographic location determines that this movement is displayed to the local Japanese from the beginning, and therefore the public were possible to join and feel this movement in person instead of through media. They can choose to join in this

activity or not, get a deep understanding of Zainichi Taiwanese' demands, and may even form their own position on this issue. In this way the Name Rectification Movement in Japan has both Zainichi Taiwanese and local Japanese as movement participants, equipping the activities and appeals with bigger influence, which even had an impact on the official decision of Japanese government during its climax.

As the organizer of the movement, Lin played a big role in the initial preparation period of the movement, especially in Japan. Born in Taiwan in 1958, Lin first arrived in Japan in the 1980s as an international student. During the years living in Japan, Lin was shocked by both Japanese people's misunderstanding on Taiwanese' nationality and Zainichi Taiwanese' compromising on this issue, and therefore started his career on the struggle for Zainichi Taiwanese's recognized nationality on a series of certificates along with other proper rights which are considered should be owned by Zainichi Taiwanese. Over the past years, Lin has been holding several senior positions in pro-Taiwan independence groups such as Taiwanese Association in Japan (在日台灣同鄉會, TAJ hereafter) and World United Formosans for Independence (台灣獨立建國聯盟, WUFI hereafter) etc. Organizing and promoting the Name Rectification Movement has been one of Lin's main tasks through the years. More preparations were made with bigger scale of participants.

On Jun 11th 2001 when Lin was still serving as the president of TAJ, he led the official establishment of “Name Rectification Group” (正名運動小組) with 10 other members of TAJ in Japan², aiming at attracting people and government attention on Taiwanese nationality issues. The later facts proved that this group received warm reception from people and united more of them to join in the Name Rectification Movement. More preparations were made in Taiwan, echoing and pushing the movement in Japan. In July 2001, another group “511 Name Rectification Movement Coalition” (511 正名運動聯盟) was established in Taiwan with Wang Kanghou (王康厚) and Wang Xianji (王獻極) as key characters, focusing on the mass promotion of this movement. On March 16th 2002, the three-day “The 2nd World Taiwanese Congress” (WTC hereafter) was hold in Taipei with the theme of “Rectifying Taiwan’s Name, Drawing up State Constitution” (臺灣正名, 國家制憲), directly challenged the ideology of pro-integration hold by some ROC government members. During the congress, Lin elaborated the necessity to rectify the name of Taiwan by his experience that, when he was taking Japanese politicians to ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the officials said “the

² List of signatures: Lin Jianliang (林建良, President of TAJ), Zhangdu Xinhui (張杜信惠, Routine director of TAJ), Lian Genteng(連根藤, Routine director of TAJ, head of 台生報負責人)、Weng Shumin(翁述民, Routine director of TAJ, doctor), Li Mengzhe (李孟哲, Director of TAJ, priest of The United Church of Christ in Japan Tokyo Taiwan Church), Chen Mingxing(陳明星, Director of TAJ, priest of Taiwan Christ Church Kawagoe Church), Gao Huiyang (高輝陽, director of TAJ, professor of Osaka International University), Zhang Guoxing(張國興, director of TAJ, professor of Kurume University), Zeng Lingyi(曾齡儀, Director of TAJ, student of Tokyo University), Xue Gefang (薛格芳, director of TAJ, student of Mejiro University), Guo Shilin(郭士麟, director of TAJ, student of Hosei University)

Sino-Japanese diplomacy is the cornerstone for Southeast Asia's peace and stability", thus causing the Japanese guests mistakenly think that they were in Beijing instead of Taiwan (Chen Y. , 2002). In the later dinner banquet on that day, the then president of the ROC Chen Shuibian (陳水扁) also pointed out that it is necessary to keep the priority of Taiwan and regard it as the most important consideration (Shao, 2006). The proposal of adding "Taiwan" instead of "Issued in Taiwan" on Taiwan passport was again put forwarded in this congress, and was approved by the ROC government in next year. This modification is regarded as the prelude for the subsequent series of modifications and provided encouragement for the struggle. The Name Rectification Movement was officially started by the great parade which was organized by "511 Name Rectification Movement Coalition" on May 11th 2002 just one day before the Mother's Day, meaning that Taiwan is the only mother of Taiwanese people. The year 2002 is also viewed as the year of enlightenment for the whole Name Rectification Movement.

2. What to Rectify

As the name of the movement shows, its most important goal is to rectify the name of Taiwan and its people in international arena, especially in Japan, thus to clarify

the political situation of Taiwan and change the nationality of Zainichi Taiwanese from a vague one to a legal, formal one.

But the saying of “right name” is quite subjective. So what are the criteria of a “right name” and what specific changes do the advocators expect in mind?

Simply put, Zainichi Taiwanese are wishing to confirm the total independence status of Taiwan and make their own nationality as Taiwanese being formally recognized by Japanese government. The specific appeal can be found in the recommendations proposed by Lin Jianliang in the 1st WTC from March 16th to 18th 2001 as: Strive for changing the registered nationality of Zainichi Taiwanese from “China” to “Taiwan” to Japanese government (Lin, 2003). Another appeal was proposed in recent years with the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games drawing near, that is: Taiwan joins in the Olympics in the name of Taiwan instead of Chinese Taipei. These two recommendations set the main direction of the following sub-movements in Japan. Though taking longer struggling time and have been meeting more resistance compared to the simple rectification actions in Taiwan, some of the appeals still have already realized by the unremitting efforts of Zainichi Taiwanese. The specific movement activities in Japan will be discussed in more detail in below.

3. Standing Point for the Rectification

Being part of the whole movement, the Name Rectification Movement in Japan shares the same motivation with the movement in Taiwan. In 2002, the “511 Name Rectification Movement Coalition” released a publication called <511 Taiwan Name Rectification Memo> (《511 台灣正名說帖》) with 46 passages on the movement which were written by individual authors including Zainichi Taiwanese, or reprinted in newspapers such as Liberty Times (自由時報) and Taiwan Daily (台灣日報) (Tsai, 2003). To some extent, these articles directly or indirectly reflect the reasons behind the claims of the movement supporters. For example, in <Tomorrow, the Great Parade of Taiwan Name Rectification> (《明天,「台灣正名」大遊行》) written by Ling, he argues that “Taiwan is Taiwan, and by no means China...the ROC has already lost its legitimacy and justice in the international arena since the UN admitted that PRC is the only legitimate representative of China. Thus as long as Taiwan uses the names which contains China or Chinese, it will be easily misrecognized as part of PRC”³ (Ling, 2002). In <Settle down in Taiwan, Become United> (《落地生根, 台灣團結》) written by Zhu, his points of view is that “Taiwan has already had the basic conditions to establish a modern count: territory, people, government, sovereignty...and it’s so sad that Taiwanese

³ Translated by author.

people themselves have a vague consciousness on their national identity” (Zhu, 2002).⁴ In <National Mobilization for Rectifying Taiwan’s Name> (《全民動員為台灣正名》), Chen wrote that “In the 53 years since its establishment in 1949, PRC hasn’t governed Taiwan for even a one day. But now it’s spreading the lie that Taiwan is a province of China...We can’t tolerate the existence of these lies anymore...Taiwan is not a province of China, and Taiwan and China are two different countries which are not affiliated with each other.” (Chen L. , 2002)⁵

Basing on the glimpse of articles above, we can find that generally the supporters for the movement mainly stand for 3 points for the rationality of name rectification: 1) ROC now only exists with a name in international arena and this name is now an obstacle for Taiwan to be admitted as an independent regime; 2) PRC has never really governed Taiwan thus has no connection with Taiwan in fact; 3) Taiwan itself has already become a de facto independent country with all necessary conditions possessed. What the supporters in mind is that, Taiwan is just Taiwan and belongs to none. They are trying to let all the members of the world, including themselves, to confirm that Taiwan is a single separate political entity, with no mark on either culture or political side. Having this belief in mind, rectifying

⁴ Translated by author.

⁵ Translated by author.

Taiwan's name is no doubt the first and necessary step for achieving a greater goal, for example, establishing the Taiwan Republic.

4. Main Activity 1: Rectifying the Registered Nationality on Identity Certificates

4-1 The Root behind This Rectification

The issue of registered nationality on their identity certificates has been a historical problem left for Zainichi Taiwanese. According to the report by <Tokyo Zainichi Chinese Newspaper> (《東京華僑會報》, the third postwar alien registration update was implemented from September 9th 1952 across the nation. Under the requirements, the former “nationality” item which was registered on alien registration card as “China”, “ROC” or “Taiwan” would all be integrated as “China” (He, 2014). In 1970s and 80s, there were scattering protests about the false registration by Taiwanese students who went to Japan. But all were rejected by the Japanese government. The starter of Name Rectification Movement was exactly one of these students. As Lin said in his book <Mother's Name is Taiwan>, “the dignity of all Taiwanese including the Zainichi Taiwanese was being trampled on” (Lin, 2003).

But it was until 2001 when Lin founded the TAJ did this issue start to become a focus by the massive Zainichi Taiwanese. Holding the signatures from 105 Zainichi Taiwanese groups, the TAJ along with other groups made a protest on July 9th by handing in written protest to the then Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association(日本台灣交流協會) to ask for replacing the “Chinese nationality” on Alien Registration Card by “Taiwanese nationality”⁶. The Japanese government representative replied this request by stating that: 1) Zainichi Taiwanese don’t necessarily think themselves as Taiwanese; 2) The Taiwan government has never protested on the nationality item that Taiwanese registered in Japan; 3) The Japanese government will not accept the request made by folk groups as it cannot represent the opinion of Zainichi Taiwanese public (Lin, 2003). What’s more, when the Japanese government implemented the third postwar alien registration update in 1952, Zainichi Taiwanese’ real nationality is “citizen of (Republic of) China”, which also proves the validity of such a registration way to regard them as Chinese. This method has been kept since then, and not changed even in 1972 when Japan broke off the diplomatic with ROC. Seeing in this way, what was blocking Zainichi Taiwanese to change their registered nationality was the name of ROC. Only by separate Taiwan from the empty shell of ROC will this issue possible to be solved. This is also where the necessity of Name Rectification Movement lies in.

4-2 Parades and Protests

Though failed to get a satisfactory reply from the Japanese government in the July 9th protest, Zainichi Taiwanese and supporting groups continued to organize more relevant movements. On August 8th 2001, the TAJ and Taiwan Kenkokubanza (台灣研究論壇) lunched the first big scale demonstration to the Japanese government. The procession departed from the most bustling Ginza at 7 am and proceeded via Tokyo Station, finally arrived at Otemenchi at 10am with more than 200 participants. Demonstrators publicized their requests by shouting slogans and making speeches to passer-by and the staff of Japanese Immigration Bureau. This activity didn't finish until 6 pm on that day (Lin, 2003). On May 11th 2003, in order to further encourage the movement supporters in both Japan and Taiwan, TAJ together with Friends of Lee-Tenghui in Japan (日本李登輝之友會, Lee Friends in Japan hereafter) lunched the Tokyo Name Rectification Parade in Shinjuku downtown. As reported by the Liberty Times on the next day, the almost 300 participants shouted out their requests by slogans like “Taiwan is Taiwan, not part of China”, “We oppose China’s intervention in Taiwan’s entry into the WHO” etc. (Zhang M. , 511 台灣正名遊行 東京街頭熱鬧進行, 2003), and successfully

caught the attention from Japanese and Chinese in downtown. The former Taiwan president Lee Tenghui appeared in this parade too. He expressed his thanks to the Japanese supporters, and emphasized the request the Japanese government to address the problem of Zainichi Taiwanese's registered national identity (Lin, 2003).

The Tokyo parade in 2003 can be the one with the biggest scale and influence among name rectification movements in Japan so far. There were still others with smaller scale happened in cooperation. For example, on July 27th 2008, there were pro-Taiwan independence Japanese communities gathered in front of the Yasukuni Shrine to request Japanese government solve the nationality problem⁷. On January 12th 2009, the Kanagawa branch of Friends of Lee in Japan organized similar movement, and propagandized that “Democratic Taiwan is not autocratic PRC”, “Japan and Taiwan share the same destiny”⁸. In conclusion, the great number in both supports and activity times successfully formed a scale effect of the Name Rectification Movement⁹, which directly pushed the solution of Zainichi Taiwanese' nationality issue on their identity certificate.

⁷ For relevant video: <https://youtu.be/SAVzNwKxrb0>

⁸ For relevant video: <https://youtu.be/A2XtGiCXui0>

⁹ For more relevant videos: https://youtu.be/r0AkZUeUI_A <https://youtu.be/o69mzuLnJrY>

4-3 The Release of New Residency Card

Though has gone through a tough time for struggling, the movement for rectifying Zainichi Taiwanese' registered national identity finally reached a satisfactory result. On July 9th 2012, the new residency management system, which is in line with the amendment to Japan's immigration law passed in July 2009, was started to all foreign nationals residing in Japan. Under this new system, the former alien registration system will be abolished, at the mean time a resident card will be issued to all qualifying foreign nationals (Immigration Bureau of Japan). One of the most important changes is that for Zainichi Taiwanese, "Taiwan" will replace "China" as their nationality on the new resident card (Yang & Liu, 2012).

After years of efforts, this change was received warm welcome by the Zainichi Taiwanese. On July 9th, there was already a long queue of Taiwanese waiting in front of the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau one hour before the office time 9 o'clock. The number of applicants reached almost two hundred one hour later (中文导报综合报道组, 2012). Zainichi Taiwanese were enthusiastic enough to receive their new registered nationality as "Taiwanese". Huang Junyang, a Taiwanese student who was doing a PhD program at Waseda University, and Lian Genteng, a Taiwanese who has been living in Japan for 50 years as a permanent

resident, successfully got the first and second new resident card (Zhang M. , 2012). In a subsequent interview made by the group Lee Friend's in Japan, Huang said that "he's so moved that he's able to fight for life as a Taiwanese from today, and he hopes Taiwanese people can have a clearer self-conscious to devote to their own nation---Taiwan". Lian also shared his happiness to the news reporter by showing off his new resident card, saying that "Today, after receiving this (residence card), I am truly happy. I have finally gotten my Taiwanese identity back... I am looking forward to this. It's like waiting for a lover. My country is my love, and maybe even more important than a lover"¹⁰. Similar reactions can also be found in SNS such as Facebook and Blog written by Zainichi Taiwanese, expressing how happy they were to be identified as "Taiwanese" instead of "Chinese".

Taking an overview of the whole process, the importance of this rectification movement not only lies in that it solved the historic problem which has made Zainichi Taiwanese suffered from for such a long time, but also lies in its unprecedented influence. There were movements that require the Japanese government to recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state and Taiwanese as an official nationality for Zainichi Taiwanese as well. But the movement this time has achieved the result that former ones have never made before, as it

¹⁰ For relevant video: <https://youtu.be/FSZtX11OHMg>

successfully affected the Japanese government decision. Though the Japanese government later clarified that the aim of establishing this new system is just to make an efficient control of illegal immigrants inside the country, and the government position on One-China policy has never changed, this change from “Nationality-China” to “Nationality/Area-Taiwan” was still the first official change since Japanese normalized the Sino-Japanese relations in 1972 (He, 2015).

5. Main Activity 2: The Taiwan 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games Name Rectification

The rectification of Zainichi Taiwanese’ registered nationality on their residence card can be regarded as a climax of the whole Name Rectification Movement in Japan. But the movement supporters were not resting on their achievement. From 2014, petition related to rectify the name of “Chinese Taipei Team” started to appear in both Taiwan and Japan. Currently this movement is still ongoing. Japan is acting as an important platform for supporter to publicize their idea and recommendation and absorb more people who were sharing or start to share same view with them.

5-1 The origin of “Chinese Taipei”

It is a fact that the name of “Chinese Taipei” is awkward enough for the athletes of Taiwan in international competitions. For example, in the Taipei 2017 Universiade, the Taiwan athlete Jason Jung (庄吉生) successfully won the gold medal in the tennis men’s singles. Though this result is exciting enough, there was no audience threw the ROC national flags to the athlete, a way that is generally used for victory celebration in sporting events. This was not the first time that such a ironic scene has appeared. The reason behind lies in the political sensitivities of the ROC flag it represents and the historical issue of “Two China” in international sports events.

The competition of naming their sports team between mainland and Taiwan, or more accurately, between PRC and ROC, started from the 1952 Summer Olympics in Finland. After the foundation of PRC in 1949, it was in this Olympics when the issue of “Two China” was first put forwarded for discussion. The solution that the International Olympic Committee (IOC hereafter) made was both PRC and ROC teams were allowed to compete, with the team of ROC was only allowed to use “Taiwan” as their representing name in the basketball match. This naming competition was ended with ROC’s quit from the Finland Olympics. In the later thirty years, there were conflicts between the two sides on team naming too. But

with the interference of political factors, the situation for ROC teams became more and more disadvantaged. In 1971, the PRC government replaced ROC as a permanent member of the UN, and since then many of the legitimate right the ROC once owned were deprived. In 1979, the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué was signed, making the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic tie. At the same time, the once diplomatic relation between ROC and the U.S. was broke, bringing further reducing of ROC's international position which had an effect on its right for sports team naming. "The International Olympic Committee (IOC) passed the Nagoya Resolution, conferring on Taiwan the name "Chinese Taipei" and banning its Olympic committee from using the ROC flag or national anthem" (Griffiths, 2016). On March 23rd 1981, the "Agreement between the international Olympic Committee, Lausanne and Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, Taipei" was signed in Lausanne, confirmed the official name, flag that will be used by ROC athletes in sports events in written. "Chinese Taipei" is set as the "Olympic model" since then.

5-2 The Name Rectification Petition in Japan

Different from the rectification of Zainichi Taiwanese's registered nationality which was initially lunched by Zainichi Taiwanese representatives, this time the

movement in Japan was started by pro-Taiwan independence Japanese Hideki Nagayama (永山英樹) and his supporters as early as 2016 in the form of petition to IOC on Japanese petition website change.org. At the beginning of this movement, there was no specific group or community that in charge of publicizing and organizing. The signing was completely made by volunteers. According to the statistic by the website until January 2017, there're already 70,667 supporters signed for this petition, and if by referring to the relevant third party reporting, this number can be as large as 100,000 (Ma, 2017). Promoters declared their request with quite simple and clear words as “We require calling Taiwan rather than Chinese Taipei....from the perspective of Japanese who launched this signature campaign, we keenly hope Taiwan to participate by the representation of Taiwan in 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games” (change.org). This petition was upgraded by the setting up of website “Taiwan 2020 Tokyo”¹¹ as a formal platform for providing petition material, publicizing and reporting offline activities. Movement promoters hold that the “regulation which was set by IOC that Taiwan athletes can only compete in Olympics in the name of Chinese Taipei is dwarfing Taiwan’s international status, meaning that Taiwan is a part of China., and Chinese Taipei is actually a name which has never existed” (Taiwan 2020 Tokyo). This proposition can be easily seen in the official signing form used in this movement, representing

¹¹ To visit the website: <http://taiwan2020tokyo.org/>

the basic standing point of this rectification.

Along with the expand of relevant activities, organizers led by Hideki Nagayama also founded the group “2020 Tokyo Olympics Taiwan Name Rectification Promotion Community” (2020 東京五輪「台湾正名」推進協議会) (Promotion Community hereafter) to make the activity more structured ¹². The official website of Promotion Community gathers relevant activity reporting from different media such as the Liberty Times and Taiwan People News. Recorded videos of the foundation of Promotion Community which cover the whole process and detailed introduction of important members are also displayed, bringing supporters who joined the movement later an empathy engagement and more expectation for future events. Opinions on the legitimacy of this rectification are pooled into a single section for visitors to get a deeper understanding.

While in offline, Promotion Community organized signing petition on busy streets in downtown area of Tokyo by utilizing their official website along with the Taiwan 2020 Tokyo website to propagandize activities. On January 3rd 2017, the Promotion Community lunched the first signing petition in front of Yasukuni

¹² To visit the website: <http://2020taiwan-seimei.tokyo/index.html>

Shrine¹³. Leading organizer Hideki Nagayama was wearing T-shirt with slogan “2020 free Taiwan” on it and distributed the activity posters to passers-by. Organizers including one Zainichi Taiwanese took turns making lectures, emphasizing that “Taiwan is not Chinese Taipei” and “Taiwan is not a part of China” by both lecture and pictures on which Taiwan athlete team was joining the Olympics opening ceremony with the name “Taiwan” on their placard. It is said this activity has won thousands of signatures from supporters. In the petition hold on February 12th 2012 in Shinjuku, Xu Yaqi (許亞齊), a member of Taiwan Solidarity Union (台灣團結聯盟) stated that “rectifying the name of Taiwan team from Chinese Taipei is a matter of Taiwan’s dignity, international status, value and right to speak”¹⁴. Similarly, on the March 3rd petition in Asakusa, the then vice president of WUFI Shen Qingkai (沈清楷) was invited made speech. He combed the history of Taiwan with PRC and ROC to give evidence that Taiwan has connection with neither regime¹⁵. The Name Rectification Petition was further promoted in the following months in Shinjuku, Shibuya, Ueno and other busy districts in Tokyo. With the affected area expanding and the inner thoughts being known by more people, the Taiwan 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games Name Rectification is under smooth development until now. Though it is still unknown

¹³ For relevant video: <https://youtu.be/HGtOhAzWwjs>

¹⁴ For relevant video: <https://youtu.be/enrCrd4d11s>

¹⁵ For relevant video: https://youtu.be/RqQc_SerEeY

whether Taiwan can really escape the name of “Chinese Taipei” in the 2020 Olympics, what cannot be denied is that, the idea that Taiwan is an independent regime is being accepted by more people inside Japan, and the Taiwanese national identity is spreading fast among Zainichi Taiwanese.

6. Core Figure Lee Tenghui and His Allies

6-1 Lee—the Source of Spiritual and Practical Supporting

In the past years of Name Rectification Movement in Japan, Lee Tenghui has been acting as the core figure among Zainichi Taiwanese. What he brought was not only the spiritual but also the practical support.

As the first president came from KMT party and elected by Taiwanese people, Lee was both a symbol of ROC and KMT. But the way he used for governing Taiwan during his administration was far from KMT’s line of approach. Especially in the post-administration period, his words and actions on Taiwanization were already out of their tolerance thus led him expelled by KMT Party. But this is exactly the reason why Lee is seen as the spiritual leader of Name Rectification Movement advocators in Japan. Lee gave his support for the name rectification by both

lectures and action. In 2003, Lee joined the 511 Tokyo Parade and requested the Japanese government to rectify the registered nationality of Zainichi Taiwanese through public speech. As the movement participant who once had the highest position in Taiwan, his action no doubt brought Zainichi Taiwanese great encouragement to stick to their belief and further promote the movement.

In addition, Lee was providing practical support for the process of movement by utilizing his natural connection and influence to Japan. Born in the colonial period, Lee had experience of studying and living in Japan and was greatly influenced by Japanese culture. Generally Lee is categorized as pro-Japanese politician. His actions such as visiting Yasukuni Shrine in 2011, statements such as “referring to Japan as Taiwan’s motherland in WWII” in the interview by Japanese magazine <Voice> in 2015, “the colonized Taiwan by Japan was full of happiness and proudness” in his book <With the People Always in My heart> in 1999 etc. all showed his friendly attitude to Japan. In return, there is also a big group of Japanese whose position on Taiwan issue is pro-Taiwan or pro-Lee Tenghui in more precise way. One of the groups formed by these people is the one we have mentioned many times in above: The Lee Friends in Japan. This group set its mission as “Corresponding with Mr. Lee Tenghui’s thought that Japan and Taiwan

share the same destiny and promoting the combination of the two countries”. It has its academic section called “The Japanese Lee Tenghui School” (日本李登輝学校) to provide courses on Taiwan culture, politics, economy, history etc. and opportunities for Japan-Taiwan communication. It also has its own magazine <Co-Prosperty between Japan and Taiwan> (《日台共荣》) to provide platform for message exchange between the two sides. This community locates itself as the connection between Japan and Taiwan, and therefore played important roles in the Name Rectification Movement in Japan. The flags of Lee-Friends in Japan can be easily seen in almost all parades and petitions. For example, this group was one of the main organizers of the 511 Tokyo Parade. Moreover, by setting the rectification of Zainichi Taiwanese’ registered nationality as one of its recommendations, the Lee-Friends in Japan hold a series of relevant parades and meetings, published lots of articles during the process and made in person interviews to key actor in the movement such as Lian Genteng after the issue of new resident card. In the movement for “Taiwan 2020 Tokyo”, the Lee-Friends in Japan also joined the signing petitions as coordinator for help. So seeing from the above facts, it’s easy to find that the Lee-Friends in Japan is an active enough group to frequently appears in name rectification activities with different themes, and if further considering its original connection with Lee Tenghui, this group can be seen as a

tool by which Lee was able to further support the movements in Japan.

6-2 The Japanese Participants — Fighting for Taiwanese as Non-Taiwanese

Except for Lee Tenghui and relevant group's support for the movements in Japan, there are still Japanese participants who don't have any connection with Taiwan but purely share the same points of views. These participants include individual person and organized groups, all of which can be regarded as the allies for Lee Tenghui and Zainichi Taiwanese to some extent. The then governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintaro is one typical example. In his visit to Taiwan in 2003, Ishihara made a stated that "Taiwan should protect the hard-won democracy and freedom" (Ding, 2008), showing his position of pro-Taiwan. While in the rectification movement of Zainichi Taiwanese's registered nationality, the queries on this issue which was made by the then member of the House of Representatives Shingo Nishimura (西村真悟) in 2002 pushed the progress by proposing different opinions among Japanese. Another involved Japanese who is important enough to be paid attention to is Hideki Nagayama. As we've mentioned in the former section, Nagayama together with the Promotion Group which he established were the main force of the

Taiwan 2020 Tokyo Name Rectification. Hideki is a firm pro-Taiwan Japanese and believe in the “sharing destiny between Japan and Taiwan”. In his own blog, he published a great amount of articles which elaborate the reason why Taiwan should be an independent country and why it’s necessary for Taiwan to rectify its name. Similar opinions and statements are easy to be found in his public speeches in the signing petitions that he and the Promotion Group organized. So in summary, the point that the above Japanese share is that they are all pro-Taiwan and pro-Taiwan independence. By leading or joining the Name Rectification Movement in Japan, these people together with the group they are in supported for the movement for Zainichi Taiwanese by providing home power. They run through different name rectification movements and keep fighting for the right of Taiwanese as non-Taiwanese.

IV. Seeing through the Name Rectification Movement

So far, we’ve covered the general background where the Name Rectification Movement in Japan stays in and the process with main activities in the movement.

Table 1 shows the main elements of this movement. The Name Rectification

Movement in Japan these years not only progressed a lot in quantity but also in

quality. It reflects the revival and upgrade of Zainichi Taiwanese’ national identity trend, and also brings puzzle for the reason behind the sudden development. So is it possible for us to answer our research question, that is: Why did the upsurge of Taiwanese national identity among Zainichi Taiwanese appear only in recent years but not earlier? Also, as a minority group living in a foreign country, how did they make the achievements beyond their own abilities?

Table 1: Main Elements for the Name Rectification Movement in Japan

Motivation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Taiwan is an independent regime; 2. Taiwan has no connection with PRC or ROC
Recommendations	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Recognition of “Taiwan” as the official name and Taiwan as an independent country in international affairs, organizations etc.; 2. Recognition of Zainichi Taiwanese’ nationality as “Taiwan” in all aspects
Participants & Organizers	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Zainichi Taiwanese; 2. Pro-Taiwan Japanese (officials & folks); 3. (former & current) Taiwan government officials

1. Reasons behind the Revival of Taiwanese Consciousness

From the motivation that drives the movement and the process which contains

participants' recommendations and slogans, we can briefly summarize that what the Zainichi Taiwanese wish to achieve from the movement is the total independent from both ROC and PRC while at the same time this independent status should be recognized by the globe in all aspects, for example, the nationality of Zainichi Taiwanese. By seeing through the Name Rectification Movement in Japan, here we suggest that, the revival of Taiwanese national identity consciousness among Zainichi Taiwanese is mainly due to the following two factors shared with local Taiwanese if seeing from both the primordialism and modernism view of national identity theory.

1-1 1st Factor: Shared Pursuit of Taiwanese Identity

As what we've found from the review of the movement process, Zainichi Taiwanese' motivations for this movement can be apparently seen from their public speeches and slogans: to divide clear lines between Taiwan and ROC or PRC. Seeing from the primordialism view of national identity theory, this demand can be understood as a byproduct of their Taiwan origin. After all, they still have their natural connection with Taiwan even with the reality that they've been living in Japan for generations. This connection also determines that the influence from Taiwan can be bigger to Zainichi Taiwanese compared to that from other sources.

It is generally believed that from 1970s and 1980s, a Taiwanization process started in Taiwan as part of the big “Taiwanization” movement (Bentuhuayundong, 本土化运动). It is hard to give an accurate definition for what Taiwanization is. But generally it “emphasizes identification with Taiwan, consciousness of Taiwan, and even Taiwan nationalism” (Jacobs, 2013).

Historically, this rise is a revolt to the long suppression of Taiwan cultural and self-determination awareness made by KMT. During the 40 years govern by Chiang Kaishek and Chiang Chingkuo, they put forward the policy that emphasize the utilization of people with origin outside Taiwan (Waishengren, 外省人) in politics while discriminate the local Taiwanese (Liu, 2002), and Waishengren enjoy a priority on different rights while local Taiwanese are not. This unequal treatment caused strong dissatisfaction among local Taiwanese and further accelerated the formation of Taiwan national consciousness (Li, 2017) . Meanwhile, after the 2.28 Incident in 1947, local Taiwanese were totally frustrated with the authorized govern of KMT and there started to have a growing chorus of disapproval. Some of the local Zainichi were actually “pushed” to the national identity as Taiwanese. The reason from PRC side also leads to the rise of Taiwanese national consciousness.

As said by the chairman of People First Party(亲民党, PFP hereafter) James Soong Chuyu (宋楚瑜) in a lecture in Tsinghua University “400 years of alienation, 100 years of isolation, 50 years of confrontation, especially the different political systems, are making more and more misunderstandings between China (PRC) and Taiwan. Some of the Taiwanese are worried that, their years of efforts will be gone because of the change of current situation (between two sides). A highly self-protected Taiwan national consciousness is therefore constructed in this way.” (Hsu, 2013).

In recent years, the rise of Taiwan national consciousness in recent years has been connected with a series of de-Sinicization (去中国化) reforms introduced by the former president Lee Tenghui and Chen Shuibian in the cultural and identity aspects. In 1997, the ROC government introduced a new textbook for secondary schools entitled “Getting to Know Taiwan” (认识台湾, Renshi Taiwan). This represented a shift away from the China-centric historiography, in which Taiwan was viewed as a peripheral part of China, to that of Taiwan as a maritime island with links to various cultures including the former Western colonial powers and Japan (Wang F. , 2005). Moreover, the native languages in Taiwan were also introduced to the school education. In the identity aspect, the then president Lee

Tenghui introduced the new ethnic concept of “New Taiwanese” to include all people who identify Taiwan as the new Taiwan citizens. These reforms affected a lot on Taiwanese national identity consciousness, especially to the younger generation, who mostly feel that they are Taiwanese, with few historical and ethnic links to the mainland China (Zhou, 2014).

Therefore, what local Taiwanese currently pursue is a new and independent identity as only “Taiwanese” without any connection with PRC and ROC. This is acting as their shared point with Zainichi Taiwanese’ pursue on their national identity. It interacts with the natural origin connection between the two communities and reinforces each other. So when the new ethnic concept of “New Taiwanese” was introduced to local citizens, it is not surprising that Zainichi Taiwanese is willing to set their national identity as new Taiwanese too. Here we suggest that this shared pursuit of Taiwanese national identity is acting as the first factor that behind the revival of Taiwanese national identity consciousness among Zainichi Taiwanese.

1-2 2nd Factor: Shared Pursuit of Democratic Politic System

Another shared point between Zainichi Taiwanese and local Taiwanese is in

accordance with the modernism view of national identity theory, that is, the democratic political system. Though Zainichi Taiwanese is only a community rather than a polity and have to follow the political system of Japan, they still have their clear preference. Due to their residence location, Zainichi Taiwanese are able to be free from the control of their homeland government, and join in political activities with a favorable condition of “unaccountable situation” which is proposed by long distance theory. This is particularly true in the White Terror Period, when even discussing the 2.28 Incident was illegal in Taiwan. Immediately after the incident happened in Taiwan, the then vice-chairman of Tokyo Overseas Chinese Federation Yang Chunsong (杨春松), the representative of the Delegation of the ROC such as Xie Nanguang (谢南光), Li Binghan (李秉汉) and Qu Luochen (瞿珞琛) quickly formed the “2.28 Incident Processing Committee” (二二八惨案处理委员会) to investigate the related person and make protest to KMT with signatures by Zainichi Taiwanese (Hsu, 2013). Books which are focused on the detailed description of 2.28 Incident were published in the 1970s by written in Japanese due to the special political environment in Taiwan (He, 2015). Even after the 2.28 Incident has passed for years, Zainichi Taiwanese is still playing an important role in the handing down of this historical memory. What they try to memorize is not only the incident itself, but also the tragedy brought by the

authorized govern of ROC and the horrible political system. Democratic system is believed as a much better and humanitarian one by Zainichi Taiwanese.

While on the other side, Taiwan has been evolving “from a colonial backwater under one-party rule to an exemplar of equal economic development and peaceful democratization during the second half of the 20th Century” (Sullivan, 2005). This democratization process was started by the then premier Chiang Chingkuo. During 1986-87, “Chiang played a leading role at critical junctures by insisting on reform initiatives. He appointed a twelve-person committee to study reform measures, taking as priorities the suspension of martial law and the legalization of political opposition” (Tien & Shiau, 1992). In 1986, Taiwan's first opposition party----the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP hereafter) was formed and approved by the ROC government. In 1987, Chiang lifted the almost four decades Martial Law and led Taiwan to the truly democratization era. Two institutional reforms were made since 1990 under the lead of then premier Lee Tenghui: In 1991, the members of first ROC National Assembly were forced to retire, and later in 1992, the regular reelection of the Legislative Yuan was put into effect. These two institutional reforms laid solid foundation for the pluralism in democratic Taiwan, which can be indicated by the number of parties. According to the statistics made by ROC

Ministry of Interior, by 2016 the number of legally registered party has already exceeded 300, indicating government's tolerance to the opposition parties under the new democratic system.

What is always mentioned as a mile stone for Taiwan's democratic process is the president election in 1996. Lee Tenghui, as the candidate from KMT party, was elected as the first president who satisfied the majority of Taiwanese citizens. Lee played an important role in the promotion of democratization. Even before the election he has already promoted the amendment of constitution and the institutional reform in 1991 and 1992 that mentioned above, therefore he is also called as "Mr. Democracy". Taiwan's democratic process is further accelerated by the existence of a new system of competing parties, with one party dominating (Tien & Shiau, 1992). This system marked Taiwan's transition from the system of one-party authorization to the system of multi-party competition and rotation. In 2000, Chen Shuibian won as the first president from DDP in the election. KMT's 50 years govern was ended and Taiwan accomplished the first regime rotation. In the next almost twenty years, the KMT and DPP were successively in power. Meanwhile, the number of social movements also increased in Taiwan. These movements not only prompted a series implementation of the demand came from

Taiwanese, but also called on more people to be familiar with and participate in the democratic activities. Thus the rise of social movements also accelerated Taiwan's democratic process.

To wrap up, as a community who once able to escape from the White Terror, Zainichi Taiwanese share the same preference on democracy with local Taiwanese. Especially when comparing the current political environment in Taiwan and PRC, the democratic system in Taiwan is definitely more attractive to Zainichi Taiwanese and thus strengthens their confidence to identify themselves as Taiwanese. By summing up the above analyzation, here we suggest that the shared pursuit of democratic politic system is acting as the second factor that behind the revival of Taiwanese national identity consciousness among Zainichi Taiwanese.

2. Reasons behind the Upgrade of Movement Influence

The Taiwanese national identity is not something that newly rises among Zainichi Taiwanese. As we mentioned in chapter 3, there were already protests by Zainichi Taiwanese students on their registered nationality in early years. But why this issue only became a topic that is hot enough with scale effect during the 10 years from

2002 to 2012? Also as a minority group, how could it be possible that they can make an achievement that was much beyond their own abilities? By seeing through the participants and organizers in the Name Rectification Movement in Japan, here we suggest that the upgrade of movement influence Taiwanese national identity among Zainichi Taiwanese is mainly due to the following two pushing powers: the one from the Taiwan government and the one from the Japanese Right-Wing

2-1 1st Pushing Power: from the Taiwan Government

Obviously, the typical representative of this power is the former Taiwan president Lee Tenghui, and Chen Shuibian is another similar example. The climax of the de-Sinicization and name rectification movements was during the post-administration of Lee and administration of Chen, a period when the implementation of the above measures was progressing the most smoothly. In the first place, the supporting and promoting from government helped these movements make big progresses during that period, bringing more possibilities for the revival of Taiwanese national identity among both local and Zainichi Taiwanese. Moreover, as the implementation of policies and activities were led by the government, that is, from top officials to down folks, the efforts of implementation

and results were better ensured, leading to a faster acceptance rate and a stronger penetration of Taiwanese national identity among Zainic. Lastly, as we described in former chapter, Lee is acting as the connector of 3 pairs of group: between Zainichi Taiwanese and local Taiwanese, between Zainichi Taiwanese and Japanese, between local Taiwanese and Japan. When Lee joined the movements and activities in person, what his appearance brought was not only himself, but also the whole Taiwan. To some extent, the outsiders are easily to equal his actions and statements to the positions of Taiwan, as he could still represent his country to some extent, even though he's retired. This logic applies to other Taiwan officials too. So when the official shows an attitude or request to an issue, this is always faster solved compared to the problems proposed by folks. The rectification of Zainichi Taiwanese's registered nationality is a case good enough to prove this. When this issue was simply put forwarded by Lin Jianliang and the name rectification groups, the representative of Japanese government directly rejected their proposal by stating that it cannot represent the massive opinion of public as this proposal was raised by folk communities. But when the same request was put forwarded by Lee publicly in a parade, it could be understood as a national will, and along with the rising voice from folks cooperating, the issue of Zainichi Taiwanese' registered nationality thus was solved in 2012.

Thus for Zainichi Taiwanese, what the Taiwan official did was like a booster to the whole movement progress. We are not sure whether the final achievement will still be made or not. But we are sure that the progress of the movement will be much slower and may even stagnant. Both local and Zainichi Taiwanese' national identity will stay unclear for a much longer time. Thus here we suggest that, the pushing power from Taiwan government is acting as the first pushing power for the upgrade of national identity movement influence during that period of time.

2-2 2nd Pushing Power: The Japanese Right-Wing Forces

Except for the power from Taiwan government, another power that affects the influence of Zainichi Taiwanese' movement for name rectification comes from the Japanese Right-Wing forces. The Japanese participants that we've mentioned in last chapter can all be categorized into this force, with pro-Taiwan as one of its features.

This force has its power to affect the decision of Japanese government. Seeing from historical perspective, it first emerged after the WWII, and then entered into Japanese politics by the lead of then Japanese premier Kishi Nobusuke. In the

following years, the Japanese Right-Wing forces experienced germination, recession, flourish, and finished members succession of the new to the old in 1990s. The current Japanese premier Shinzo Abe is one of the typical examples of the members.

The Japanese Right-Wing force has a close relationship with Taiwan since early time. Generally this power supports for the Taiwan independence issue in the following ways. Firstly, they support for Taiwan's political status as "belong to none", arguing that since the First Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan has already formed a culture which is different from that of China, thus it has the right to require a politically independence status. Secondly, they favor the democratization of Taiwan and tried hard for the realization and promotion. By supporting these two opinions, the Japanese Right-Wing force is affirming and advertising the Taiwan independence and democracy. Some of the members also take part in relevant activities that were organized by civic communities. Moreover, it provides convenience in Japan for the Zainichi Taiwanese to show their opinion. For example, the civic group Lee-Friend was prompted by the Japanese Right-Wing force. Although the Japanese Right-Wing force is not directly affecting the national identity choice of Zainichi Taiwanese, it does accelerate the process from the side.

Thus here we believe that the power from the Japanese Right-Wing force is acting as another power resource which pushed the rise of Taiwan national identity among Zainichi Taiwanese. Thus here we suggest that, the pushing power from Japanese Right-Wing forces is acting as the second pushing power in for Zainichi Taiwanese to make a substantial achievement in recent years.

3. Good Time Point: Japan's Plan on Prevention of Illegal Alien Resident

Except for the above four factors which promoted the expand of Taiwanese national identity among Zainichi Taiwanese, the time point of the Name Rectification Movement also facilitated itself with more possibilities to successfully affect Japanese government's decision, therefore achieve the goal of rectifying their recognized nationality on alien registration card. When the movement was in progress from early 2000s, the Japanese government was also considering revising its alien registration law to prevent the illegal foreign residents. As shown by the statistics by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP hereafter), the security situation in Japan was deteriorating rapidly since 2000s, and the number of crimes by foreign residents was almost 10 times compared to the

number in 1980s (LDP, 2003).The LDP has already proposed to cut the then 250,000 illegal immigrants by half in five years in the <Suggestions on Strengthening Emergency Security> (治安強化に関する緊急提言) (LDP, 2003). Similarly, in the Crime Prevention Council (犯罪対策閣僚会議) in July 2003, specific measures were recommended in the <Actions Plan> (犯罪に強い社会の実現のための行動計画) with the same goal. Measures including eliminating the seedbed for crime and decrease the number of illegal foreign resident by promoting relevant control policies, strengthening the exposing of illegal foreign resident in concentration region, tightening the application of alien registration law by checking the immigration application and preventing the illegal use of alien registration card, as this certificate was also issued to illegal immigrants. One measure among these is to set a new registration system of immigrations' status of residence, in which the illegal ones will be expelled from (犯罪対策閣僚会議, 2003). So this action plan can be seen as a merest hint of the later new Japanese residence system.

Two year later in 2005, the LDP formally proposed to issue new IC residency card in the <Recommendation for New Immigration Management Policy> (新たな入国管理施策への提言). In this proposal, the new IC card will only be issued to legal

immigrants with registered information such as name, birthday, status of residence etc. (自由民主党政務調査会, 2005). The item of “nationality” is also required information on the card, and therefore became a breakthrough point for Zainichi Taiwanese to regain the Taiwan nationality which they originally belong to. In the later “The fifth Immigration Policy Council” (第五次出入国管理政策懇談会), the participants reached an agreement on the necessity of revising the current alien registration law basing on the problem spots that, the Ministry of Justice was not able to trace the latest information change of foreign residents; the information grasped by the Ministry of Justice and Immigration Office has difference and therefore decreased the reference value; the current alien registration card can result in a misleading that the illegal foreign residents are recognized as legal ones etc., and the amendment to Alien Registration Law will be introduced to the congress no later than 2009 (Ministry of Justice , 2008).

To Zainichi Taiwanese, the registered nationality on their alien certificate is almost the most important recognition of their own national identity when living in a foreign country. Therefore this time the revise of Alien Registration Law in Japan happened to provide them with a good enough opportunity to struggle for their Taiwan nationality and further expand the Taiwanese consciousness. Though

finally “Taiwan” is only recognized as the information of “area” rather than “nationality” on the new residency card, it was still this opportunity that helped upgrading the influence of the national identity movement by Zainichi Taiwanese to a governmental level. Thus here we suggest that, Japanese government’s plan on preventing illegal alien residents and the following action of new system releasing provided a good enough time point for Zainichi Taiwanese to upgrade their movement influence.

V. Conclusion

This study attempts to explore the reason behind the revival of Taiwanese national identity among Zainichi Taiwanese and the huge progress made by their movement in recent years. In the long history of Taiwan and Japan, Zainichi Taiwanese has always been a special existence. They have been under the affect that come from the outside factors, and a floating and sensitive national identity is the basic feature for them. There were split on national identity views among them in the past, and it was not until recent years that a main tendency starts to appear, with more and more Zainichi Taiwanese willing to identify themselves as Taiwanese, an identity which was long depressed by surrounding environment.

For some Zainichi Taiwanese, their struggling for the identification of Taiwanese national identity has lasted for a long time but fruitless. It was not until recent years did the movement make a huge progress that the registered nationality of Zainichi Taiwanese is rectified from China to Taiwan. This result reflects that the influence of Zainichi Taiwanese's struggling for seeking their own national identity has enhanced to a new level which can even affect the decision of Japanese government. To find the reason behind, we chose the Name Rectification Movement as the window for us to seek for answers for our research questions. Basing on the background and process of the movement, along with the unique feature of Zainichi Taiwanese that they have both connections with Japan and Taiwan, our finding suggest that, the Taiwanese consciousness which was originally in some Zainichi Taiwanese' mind was strengthened by the rise of this consciousness in Taiwan, while the shared pursuit of democracy further make Zainichi Taiwanese willing to identify themselves as Taiwanese. These two factors laid the basic foundation for the revival of Taiwanese national identity among Zainichi Taiwanese. In addition, the supporting power which come from the Taiwan government leader side and the Japanese right-wing forces are pushing the potential motivation to real actions, which formed a scale effect and in return absorbing more and more Zainichi Taiwanese to recognize themselves as

Taiwanese. Lastly, Japanese government's plan on preventing illegal alien residents and the following action of new system releasing provided a good enough time point for Zainichi Taiwanese to upgrade their movement influence.

In the long future, this tendency has a great possibility to continue and may finally become the mainstream of Zainichi Taiwanese' national identity. Though under the great pressure comes from PRC, the petition for advocating Taiwan join in the 2022 Tokyo Olympic Games with the name of Taiwan instead of Chinese Taipei is still going on, and Japanese government's tactic attitude is providing more space for the development. All in all, a bright future is possible to be waiting for Zainichi Taiwanese to become real Taiwanese in both thinking and practice. But before the total realization of that with, there is still a long way to go.

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국문 초록

재일대만인의 내셔널 아이덴티티에 관한 연구:

정명운동을 중심으로

야오리우

국제학과 국제지역학 전공

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이 연구는 재일대만인이 가지고 있는 내셔널 아이덴티티에 대한 인식 회복과 재일대만인들이 해 왔던 운동의 영향이 향상된 이유를 밝히는 데 그 목적이 있다.

역사적으로 재일대만인들의 내셔널 아이덴티티는 국제적인 구조의 변화에서 받은 큰 영향 때문에 변이되고 있다고 믿어져 왔다.

그러나 최근에는 재일대만인의 내셔널 아이덴티티가 재일대만인들 가운데 점점 주류가 되면서 관련 운동도 역시 일본 정부가 지행하는 정책의 영향으로 인해 시민 레벨로부터 정부 레벨로 향상되었는데 정명운동을 그 전형적인 예로 들 수 있다.

본고에서는 정명운동의 과정을 전체적으로 살펴보는 것과 동시에 깊은 분석을 하는 것을 통하여, 재일대만인의 내셔널 아이덴티티에 관한 공유된 추구, 그리고 재일대만인과 현지 대만인들 사이에 존재하는 민주주의를 재일대만인들의 내셔널 아이덴티티에 대한 의식 회복에 있어서 두 가지 요인으로 생각한다.

이러한 예측이 가능한 경향을 실제로 영향을 미치는 현상에 적용하기 위하여, 본고에 있어서는 대만 정부의 관여와 일본 우익 세력의 간섭이 두 가지의 활동적인 힘으로 작용하고 있으며, 또한 외국인 불법 체류자를 방지하는 일본 정부의 계획과 새로운 제도의 시행이 재일대만인들이 정명운동의 영향을 향상시키는 데 좋은 시간적인 관점을 제공하였다는 입장을 취한다.

키워드: 재일대만인, 대만인의 내셔널 아이덴티티, 정명운동, 민주주의, 타이와나이제이션, 대만 정부, 일본 우익 세력

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