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Causal Inference of Corruption Perception
-An Experimental Survey on the Framing Effect of Presidential Scandal in South Korea -

부패 인식에 대한 인과적 추론:
최순실 게이트 프레이밍 효과와 실험 설문

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An Experimental Survey on the Framing Effect of Presidential Scandal in South Korea

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Abstract

Causal Inference of Corruption Perception:
An experimental survey on the Framing Effect of Presidential Scandal in South Korea

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The core purpose of this research is to find out the causal inference of high-level corruption on corruption perception. In order to get a concrete picture of causal relationship, I conducted an experimental survey using the framing effect of recent presidential scandal of South Korea and the verdict as treatments. Also, so as to have comprehensive understanding of corruption, the definition of corruption is not limited to political realm, and distinctive individual consciousness regarding corruption were measured; The willingness to engage in corruption, the expectation of future corruption and the willingness to interfere others’ corrupt behavior. This research evinces that
the indication of high-level corruption and verdict both reduce the willingness to engage in corruption, decrease the expectation for future corruption occurrence and increase the willingness to interfere other’s corrupt behavior. Shift of corruption measures is more eminent with additional verdict information compared to the shift observed only with the information of recent presidential scandal. Also, in-depth analysis using ordered logit regression analysis indicates that verdict satisfaction is strong explanatory aspect for the corruption expectation and the willingness to interfere corruption. This bolsters the collective action theory of Ostrom that repeated games between players may establish inter-regulating system to benefit the entire society due to growing contingent self-commitment. Moreover, successful experience of monitoring and sanctioning may reinforce the mutual assurance that each member of the society will not engage in corruption for its profound cost when caught. Regardless of its’ academic achievements and its expected importance in the future to better handle corruption in reality, this research encompasses few limits. The survey experiment provides indirect causal inference due to the possibility of contamination on treatment effects. Also the scale of the survey experiment is limited to the case study of South Korea, and the extent of respondents is limited to 684. Further investigation of causal inference of corruption beyond the case study of South Korea for extended time of observation would provide more precise causal relationship regarding the issue.
Keywords:
Corruption, Survey Experiment, Framing effect, Choi Soon-Sil Gate

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1. Introduction

Due to the recent presidential scandal in South Korea, Korean society is alert in controlling corruption. Collusion for corrupt purposes between impeached former president Park Guen-Hye, her close friend Choi Soon-Sill and well known business figure Lee Jae-Young was debunked. This scandal entailed consecutive unprecedented scale of protest accusing corruption and requests for impeachment of the president. Disappointment pervades and social credibility is substantially damaged because South Korea was on the verge of democratic society not only in respect of faire and competitive election, but also for the fact that the society was aware of necessity in quality governance and impartiality. However, Korean citizen successfully carried out the impeachment of president, and strong legal accusation to those who involved in corrupt behavior was supported for the first time in South Korea’s political history. Consequently, current severity of political situation raises following questions: ‘Can high-level elite corruption effectively alter individual perception about corruption?’, ‘Would the recognition of high-level corruption be the only matter that influence corruption perception?’ More profoundly, ‘Wouldn’t be the satisfaction with punishment given to the culprits, not merely the exposure of corruption, be the core aspect that alters people’s perception on corruption?’ In order to answer above questions, I further elaborate current definition of corruption and former studies on
corruption perception change. Also, experimental survey measure is implemented to get a better picture of dynamics of perception change. This research is essential because it provides elaborate observation of corruption perception change in South Korea. Also, it may provide more reliable causal inference on corruption perception change using experimental survey.

2. South Korea’s Presidential Scandal

On 4th of April in 2018, Former south Korean President Park Guen-Hye was sentenced 24 years in jail and fined 17 million dollars for her allegations of cult activities, influence-peddling and leaks of classified information. This unprecedented presidential crisis brought to the surface in 2016 involving President Park Guen-Hye’s notorious friend Choi Soon-Sill and the de facto head of South Korea’s largest conglomerate, Samsung, Lee Jae-Young. In February 2018, Choi Soon-Sill was sentenced to 20 years in jail on 18 charges including abuse of power, coercion, fraud and bribe using her position as a close friend with President Park Guen-Hye, and fined 16.6 million dollars. Choi, although held no political office, influenced over the President Park to funnel money to organizations she controlled and get her daughter a place at an elite university. Meanwhile, in 2017, well known Korean billionaire Lee Jae-Yong was found guilty of bribery and embezzlement and sentenced to five years in prison, but in February 2018, a higher court reduced his sentence
and suspended it for four years\(^1\).

This presidential scandal had a ripple effect in Korean society starting from the disclosure of Choi’s tablet PC which evinced Choi and President Park’s collusion. This scandal initiated huge protest to impeach President Park Guen-Hye from the position. Eventually, Park Guen-Hye became South Korea’s first democratically–elected president to be banished. This historical scandal had a fundamental influence over the entire Korean society regarding consciousness with corruptive behaviors and perception. Corruption no longer means conceptually the use of public authority for privat gain. Instead, after what South Korea experienced, corruption infers the misuse of public power for unjust purpose which may disadvantage any member of the society from real life business contract to admission of university. Now that public recognized corruptive collusion between top political elites, highly influential business figure and a civilian living as a normal mother and a friend, South Korean public will not consider corruption as a mere distant concept but a real-life problem which needs to be eradicated in their society.\(^2\)

High-level corruption such as South Korea’s presidential scandal which


involves high public official and highly influential economic figure may have substantial influence in corruption perception of the people in the society. Moreover, due to the fact that the degree of corruption was far beyond what Korean citizen can imagine, in fact because South Korea experienced democratic change during 1980’s, the scandal’s influence on public perception related to corruption may be significant. In this respect, the question may arise, whether current scandal effectively changed people’s perception on corruption. Next, I will discuss the concept of corruption and former studies on corruption perception change.

3. The Definition of Corruption

Although there is no universal consensus regarding the definition of corruption, there are some accordance in academics in using the term, corruption. In many literatures, corruption occurs when a public official, acting for personal gain, violates the norms of public office and harms the interests of the public to benefits a third party who rewards the public official for access to goods or services which a third party would not otherwise obtain (Philp, 2016). This definition is taking followings as conditions.

1) The public office is defined by the public interest and the occupant of the public office’s private interest may be incongruent with the public interest.
2) Corruption involves distortion in the process of public office operation so that few undeservingly gains while the others lose who should not.

3) Three actors composed of the public office, the intended beneficiary of that office and the reasonable beneficially of the exercise of the public office are normally involved in or influenced by corruption.

Any kind of conducts that satisfy above definition are corrupt. Nonetheless, this definition is incomplete for two major reasons. First, there are some cases which are legal and publically approved so that it falls short of abovementioned definition but considered corrupt. For example, donations for a political party is legal and approved in some countries, while it is difficult to be differentiated from bribery for current or future benefits by the donor so that it is hard to know if the donation was done by a corruptive will or sole abetment for the party. The interpretation of corruption in terms of abovementioned definition may omit some unjust cases which needs more thorough examination. Second, the definition is incomprehensive in that not all corruptive activities are related to public office. Corruption is not only pervasive in regards to the public authority, but it is also prevalent outside of the political realm. However, as the definition indicates, if the corruptive conduct is conditionally related to the public office, other corruptive behaviors among social members outside of political arena cannot be interpreted as corrupt and recognized as a social problem. For instance, an
official in charge of admission fairs in a university may give a preferential
treatment in exchange for goods or services. In this case, it does not involve
public authority but it is regarded as a corruption because it violates the moral
norms. This incomprehensiveness of the definition of corruption indicates
that further elaboration needs to be made.

As there is an ambiguous area where corrupt and non-corrupt behaviors
are hardly differentiated, there is no universal consensus made with respect
to the definition of corruption. However, because corruption is a worldwide
social problem that needs to be dealt with, in 2002 United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, the member nations decided not to limit the corruption
into a defined terminology but to list particular types of corrupt behaviors. Many forms of listed corruptions are precisely defined in legal and academic
terms. While some types of corruptions are considered as criminal offenses
so that government is in charge of surveillance to prevent it, some types are
out of legal boundary so that it is rather dealt within the civil law controls.

The forms of corruption can be largely assorted as ‘Grand corruption’ and
‘Petty corruption’. Grand corruption refers to the corrupt activities that
pervades the highest levels of a national government, leading to a broad decay
of confidence in good governance, the rule of law and economic

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3 See ‘Anti-Corruption in Transition’ reports from World Bank (Gray, Hellman, &
Ryterman, 2004)
stability (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). On the other hand, petty corruption includes the exchange of money or valuable goods in order to provide preferential treatment or the employment to friends and relatives. The most essential difference is that grand corruption involves the distortion in the process and the performance of governance while petty corruption occurs within the established social frameworks and context. The most commonly encountered forms of corruptions are bribery, embezzlement, extortion, abuse of discretion, favoritism and nepotism, conduct creating or exploiting conflicting interests, and improper political contributions (Langseth, 2016).

Bribery is bestowing of a benefit in order to inappropriately influence an action or decision. Commonly, bribery is criminalized when it necessarily involves public official which accordingly exercised to influence public function or public duties. Moreover, bribery ought to be controlled due to its high likelihood of entailing other type of corruption from the high elite to the bottom. Specific types of bribery are as follows: influence-peddling, offering or receiving improper gifts, gratuities, favors or commissions, bribery to avoid liability of taxes or other costs, bribery in support of fraud, bribery to avoid criminal liability, bribery in support of unfair competition for benefits or resources, private sector bribery and bribery to obtain confidential or unauthorized information. Second, embezzlement relates to the taking or conversion of money or valuables by an individual who is not entitled to them but only has the authorized accessibility to them. It can be extended to non-
public and non-judicial sphere in forms of theft and fraud. For example, an official who intentionally request excessive amount of government aid and procurement in purpose of personal use or sales is corrupt. In case of businessman, intentional misuse of information to allure fraud investment of capital owners is corrupt behavior. Third, extortion, unlike bribery facilitating positive incentives, involves coercion to induce cooperation. For instance, an official with judiciary duties and functions to initiate criminal prosecution or punishment may threat other individuals to cooperate for their private gain. Also, in low-level extortion, over charging a driver for exceeding speed limit is extortion case of corruption. Extortion may carry convoluted corruption because one who committed corruption may depend on other corruptive activities to secure themselves from exposure and punishment. Fourth, abuse of discretion often occurs in bureaucracies where there is broad individual discretion with insufficient accountability structures or where the decision-making process is complicated. To illustrate, an official who is responsible to make government contracts to purchase a service from a company for international fair may use one’s discretion to further promote one’s personal gain or interest. Fifth, favoritism and nepotism is related to abuse of discretion but distinctively not for individual’s private interest, but for the interest of family members, political party or religious groups. Employing a potential candidate for the diplomatic position who shares identities such as educational ground, gender or geographical factors is assumingly a conduct
of corruption. Sixth, conduct of creating or exploiting conflicting interest, in broader terms, indicates that an individual causes the conflict between personal interest and the responsible duties which ought not occur considering the accountability given to the person regardless of the duties involving public or private sector. Finally, improper political contributions are easily under the mask of political donations in support of particular parties and shared norms. For this reason, anti-corruption measures are difficult to be made and applied although it is legally approved for enactment. Unlike donations, improper political contributions can be found only when the contribution of the values are given for the purpose of present or future influence when the party win election.

Another approach to conceptualize corruption was made by the Quality of Government Institute led by Bo Rothstein and Aiysha Varraich (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017). In the verge of understanding how people make sense of corruption, concept of corruption was analyzed. They revisit each conceptualization of corruption in economics, legal, sociology, anthropology and philosophy fields and the classic republican ideas of understanding society. Consequently, the concept of corruption is grounded in collective action and classic republican perspective. Collective action assumes that individual decision is made with the reflection of previous decisions made by the others. The classic republican understanding presupposes that a society is a whole and distinctive unite of concept which the resulting dynamics are not
equal to the sum of individual conducts and interests. Therefore, corruption occurs not merely by an individual will to distort existing function of the society for interest-maximizing purpose, but also by social aspects such as institutional characteristics, cultural understandings, or existing social atmosphere which may affect the expectation on the other’s decision making and the result of collective action at last. Moreover, the most recently elaborated concept of corruption in sociology and anthropology indicates that corruption should be interpreted beyond the system of governance. Anthropologists observed that corruption occurs although people view corrupt conducts immoral and not abiding social norms. Rothstein and Varraich further explain that because corruption involves in the input of governance while people judge and raise their voice regarding the output of governance, it is difficult to be recognized and controlled. Also, although corruption unveils, public’s satisfaction with the outcome of incumbent government allows corruption uncontrolled, resulting ingrained institution for entrenched corruption. Therefore, given the fact that, in most cases, corruption is defined as distortion of government function while the control is rarely successful due to convolution of governance process, existing definition does not essentially pinpoint the core concept of corruption nor effective to control prevalent real-world corruption. As a solution, Rothstein purport counter concept of corruption which is justice and impartiality(Rothstein & Teorell, 2015). This approach allows indirect
conjecture of what corruption is and expected to allow effective preventative measures of corruption from the input of governance and in the society as a whole. In this research, the counter conceptualization will be applied to the concept of corruption in order to have comprehensive understanding of corruption perception change. Next part will visit theoretical grounds for understanding corruption perception change.

4. Former Studies

1) Path-Dependency Theory

Path-dependency theory assumes strong adherence to the existing institutional settings for any future changes. According to the ‘feedback effect’ and ‘path dependency’ logics, once certain type of institution is established, dramatic change is hardly made unless game changing incident occurs and influence entire society to inspire institutional change (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Li & Abiad, 1990; Pierson, 2000). Both Rothstein and Uslaner point out that path dependency has integral influence over institutions inclined to corruption so that undermining its’ effect is difficult. Once an institution which endures corruption established, it is highly likely that corruption facilitating institutions will further be ingrained in the society entailing stronger endurance to the corruption. This vicious cycle cannot easily meet a
break through although its inefficiency and malfunction is recognized. The stimulation must be grand enough to uproot the grounding institution of the society (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). Taking path dependency into account, Francis Fukuyama argues that an empowerment from the bottom of the society is the most probable solution to make the changes in existing vicious institution. He further explains that what event becomes a turning point may be a coincidence. Nevertheless, continuous incidents to enlighten people to make it a turning point is the solution to bring changes in existing institutions (Fukuyama, 2011). With this in mind, recognition of corruption and frequent exposure of high-level corruption may provide more chance to inspire an institutional breakthrough and empower other elites or the mass bottom of the society to bring alteration of the current institutional cycle. To illustrate, unknown corrupt activities hidden under the vicious institutions may be intuitively assumed by the people and easily mitigated since it is difficult to be debunked. However, if existing corruption, especially grand scale one by the public officials who are obliged to public interest becomes evident, it may increase the chance to strengthen the controlling system, society’s will to control corruption and at last, and institutional change may occur. For example, a dictator Chun Doo-Hwan of South Korea confronted strong public demonstrations when he took over the presidential authority by a military coup d’état. Since, the same happened before his regime, he was cleaver enough to facilitate more institutions and legal system that may
provide him the accountability to his unjust take over for the presidential position. Many young people struggled to unveil the unjust take over of the position and kept enlightened the public which consequently, made Chun to step down from the presidential position by himself. This example infers that although the game changing turning point unforetold, maintaining resistance against corrupt at last brought changes. Regardless of strong explanatory advantage of path-dependency perspective, the causal inference for corruption is unclear, and the causal inference for dynamics of corruption is even more unclear. Under the path-dependency perspective, recent presidential scandal in South Korea may become turning point which may change existing corruption facilitating institutions in South Korea. This is because the scandal has strong ripple effect not only in the political realm but also in the social realm. It resulted in the first official impeachment of incumbent president and unprecedented scale of protest in the country. It definitely enlightened mass bottom and empowered them to actually make the steps to bring changes in current political situation. Although, institutional change is only observable with at least a decade analysis, this research may provide a glance for its possibility by examining citizen’s perceptional change in regards to corruption after recent presidential scandal. Perceptual change is strongly correlated to the possibility of empowerment and movements from the mass bottom.
2) Collective Action Theory

Initially, collective action theory challenged the optimism that rational and self-interested individuals will voluntarily cooperate in order to pursue their common interest. Olson questioned the premise of former optimism by highlighting that the possible benefit of a group may not be sufficient enough to generate collective action unless the group is small or coercion is given to abide by the common interest (Olson, 2009). This initial stage of collective action theory explains that in a large group, without an enforcement, the information for each individual to take account is limited so that the common interest is unfathomable or easily undervalued. Meanwhile, one chooses a strategy to maximize one’s interest based on what one believes others’ decision would be in order not to become a sole ‘sucker’ (Aumann & Dreze, 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005; Olson, 2009; Ostrom, 2015; A. K. Sen, 1967). In this perspective, an individual will exercise corrupt behavior when the others are expected to be highly corrupt. Therefore, we can presume that corruption may occur and the actors will maintain it as long as they expect other members will engage in corruption resulting outweighing cost over the benefit by not participating in corruptive behaviors. Given that corruption occurs abide by collective action theory, disclosure of high-level corruption among elite members of the society will signal other members of the society that other actors are using corrupt strategies, so that one might be
disadvantaged if one does not consider corruption as an appealing strategy.

In line with this perspective, Bo Rothstein emphasized that low social trust entails asymmetry of information and ineffective anti-corruption policy performance which results in aggrandized corruption in the society. In his research, an experiment is conducted to prove that public official’s corrupt behavior is highly influential compared to the same corrupt behavior exercised by general individuals in individual’s social trust level (Rothstein, 2011). A scenario which allowed participants of the experiment to imagine that they experienced particular corrupt situation was given, and later, participants were asked how their social trust changed after reading the scenario in 6 aspects: the authority’s way of handling his work, the authority’s way of helping people, authority in general in the city, the authority as a fellow person, the initiator of the bribery, and the people in general in the society of scenario setting. The different scenario settings were given to the participants to find out if the type of authority has distinct influence on participant’s social trust level. One scenario assumed a case where a doctor was the authority who can provide necessary medical treatment in exchange of bribe. The other scenario assumed a case where a police officer was the authority. The result of the experiment says the highest social trust level was built when the bribery was initiated by the others and declined by the authority holder. On the other hand, the lowest social trust level was built when the authority holder was the initiator of the bribery and accepted. More
importantly, in both trust shifting cases, people had stronger influence in their level of social trust when the authority holder was public officer (police officer) compared to the private individual (doctor)\(^4\). Given this experiment, public official corruption may cause stronger distrust between members of the society and ingrain corruption when their corrupt activities are disclosed.

On the contrary to the initial collective action approach, further elaboration conducted by Ostrom opened up the possibility of collective action in a large group without coercion. Using the empirical evidence of long lasting common-pool resource (CPR) situations, she argues that repeated games allow participants to design their own contracts in light of the information they have at hand (Ostrom, 2015). The design principles for achieving institutional robustness in common-pool resource setting are the followings.\(^5\)

1. Clearly defined boundaries
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
3. Collective-choice arrangements
4. Monitoring
5. Graduated sanctions
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize
8. Nested enterprises

\(^4\) For detailed information see (Rothstein, 2011, pp. 180–189)

\(^5\) For detailed explanation, see (Ostrom, 2015, pp. 90–102).
Implementing these into our concern, ‘corruption-free society’ would be the common interest, or common-pool resource, although technically different, it is applicable in that the corruption-free society may ultimately benefit the entire appropriators. Now the crux of dealing corruption is inferred in principal 4 and 5, which is monitoring and graduated sanctions. Here, Ostrom brings up the concept of ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ which is originally elaborated by Levi stressing the contingent nature of a commitment to comply with rules in a repeated setting without external coercion.\(^6\) The researcher explains that monitoring is a by-product of the appropriators’ strong motivations to savor the benefit of CPR, in this research, corruption-free society which effectively results in well performing governance accordingly to the political and economic input. This makes appropriators as a monitors at the same time, and therefore, reduce the cost of monitoring. In settings where the information of repeated previous games is shared, once built contingent self-commitments motivate actors to monitor others to assure themselves that others are complying rules. In turn, successful monitoring and its consequential benefit of shared interest reinforce contingent self-commitments. The importance, in this cycle, is that a contingent self-commitment should be built once by successful monitoring and sanctioning experience. According to the later elaborated collective action theory, an

\(^6\) For detailed information, see (Levi, 1989, pp. 52–54).
experience of monitoring and imposing sanctions to those who engage in corrupt behavior may have strong influence in reducing later corruption, ultimately making corruption-free society, by altering actors believes in others’ decision.

Accordingly, based on former studies, I will examine if recent presidential scandal resulted perceptional change in the society with regards to corruption. First, in path dependency theory, this Choi Soon-Sil Gate may be a stimulating events to empower the mass citizen of South Korea to bring about less corrupt institutions. Second, in initial collective action theory, the recognition of high-level corruption in the society would influence people to choose corrupt strategies, aggrandizing the expected cost of becoming a ‘sucker’. Third, in later collective action theory, recent political crisis and imposed sanction may reinforce individuals’ contingent self-commitment to bring changes in their corruption perception. Next part explains the methodology in use of this research.

5. Methodology

1) Experimental Survey

The purpose of experiment in science is to observe or to make causal inference by intentionally interrupting natural phenomena. Treatments or
artificial settings in the experiment are necessary in that it shortens the time it takes in observing targeted phenomena and enables unobservable phenomena observable. However, due to such interruption or intentional treatment, experiment was not allowed in political science for long time. Political science is related to the human life and dynamics of individuals and groups in the society. This aspect deters experimental methods to be applied to political science research. Nevertheless, thanks to the development of informational technology and interdisciplinary research, the use of experiment in political science became available and regarded as significant. In terms of political science, experimental methodology is applied for the purpose of elaborating precision in measuring political phenomena and projecting causal inference. Elaborating precision in measurement means that experiment enables researchers to have more concrete picture of the degree of political phenomena and the dynamics or the process of a particular political phenomena (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia, 2011; Ostrom, 1998). There are three types of experimental methodology in political science: Lab experiment, field experiment, and experimental survey. Lab experiment use artificially built and intentionally defined settings for the observation. Although it allows highly reliable observation of phenomena under control, political phenomena are an extremely sensitive matter because the unit of

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measure is often individual human being or group of individuals, so that
controls may meet ethical deterrence. Moreover, due to the complexity of
political phenomena, experimental control is difficult. Next, field experiment
is more acceptable in political science for the reason that it allows more
natural observation of research subject without excessive controls. Still, the
limits exist in that field experiment necessarily requires considerable time and
often, astronomical budget. Also, specific characteristic of particular time and
space of the observed field prevent generalization of the projected causal
inference. Lastly, experimental survey is the most frequently used
experimental methodology due to abovementioned limitations of both lab and
field experiments.

Experimental survey was initially devised as a solution for existing
predicaments of survey methods itself such as spurious correlation, reliability
and endogeniety problems. Giving different treatments to the survey subjects
may cause different outcomes. Then, we can presume the causal inference
between the different conditional settings and the consequential differences.
The new approach allowed highly practical observation of concrete picture of
survey participants’ decision making or value ordering process. Researchers
in political psychology and public opinion facilitate experimental survey for
this advantage. Now, the use of experimental survey is not merely for the
purpose of mitigating survey problems, but for the purpose of identifying how
citizens make political decisions as a response to the real-world political
situations and elaborating causal inferences (Gaines, Kuklinski, & Quirk, 2006). Experimental survey also reduces social desirability effects when asking about sensitive social topics such as race, gender, and social norms. Substantive matters are usually asked in surveys and use of words and ordering may have critical effect in answering those questions (Sniderman & Grob, 1996; Zaller & Feldman, 1992).

Experimental methodology has not been adopted in political science for long, because political science is studying individual human being or the dynamics of groups of people which hardly allows researcher’s intentional interference or control. Such ethical consideration and hardship in controlling experimental settings around individuals caused late application of the methodology in political science research. However, the essential advantage of experimental methodology in finding causal relationship between variables is highlighted as opportune approach in political science. Experimental methodology enabled more divine and polished observation of political phenomena with complexity and intricacy. It can be categorized as lab experiment, field experiment, and survey experiment. Although all three types of experimental approach have their own strength, in this research, I will focus on experimental survey for few essential aspects. Compared to other experimental approaches, survey experiment is efficient considering the time and fiscal needs in conducting an experiment. Not only that, given that this research is focusing on individual’s perception and behavior of corruption,
survey experiment is apt for such micro level studies. Most importantly, experimental survey is highly effective in projecting real-world political perception or opinion if the issue of the question is related to normative and socially ethical concerns causing imprecise measure of actual perception or behavior due to its sensitivity and privacy (Azfar & Murrell, 2009; Park, Ahn, & Hahn, 2013). Therefore, in searching for elaborative consciousness of corruption, experimental survey can relatively give us more accurate picture of our concerns. On the contrary, there are some misleading aspects in practice of experimental survey. First, a researcher needs to consider the duration of the treatment because short lasting effect of the treatment may not influence the result while it does in reality. Second, mutual causation needs to be thoroughly deemed before the experiment. Due to often used one-shot studies, with respect to the fact that researcher designate independent and dependent variables, endogeniety is often ignored before the practice of experimental survey. Third, use of more than one treatment may cause inexplicit effect resulting greater chance of systematic, cross-experiment effects (Gaines et al., 2006). For above reasons, experimental survey may not provide direct causal inference and portrait of decision or preference making mechanism. These obstacles in experimental survey will be under careful consideration in this research.
2) Framing effect

There are two essential types of experimental survey. One is using ‘framing effect’, and the other type uses ‘listing effect’. Listing experiment alleviates reliability problem in case when participants refuse to give honest answer due to moral consciousness or external accusation. Fundamental logic of listing experiment is to compare two different surveys with one excludes sensitive question while the other includes among other relatively non-sensitive questions. The difference in result may infer the preference of participants regarding sensitive subject matter (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia, 2006; Kim, 2010). The other type of experimental survey uses framing effect.

The concept of frame and framing is defined in two typical ways. First, some scholars define the term as the words, images, phrases, and presentation style that a speaker uses when relying information to another, or what can be called ‘frames in communications’. Second, the other scholars use frame in terms of an individual’s cognitive understanding of a given situation, or what can be called ‘frames in thought’. The former definition is prominently used in studies of elite discourses. Such as the way in which political figure opinionates and appeals to the public. On the other hand, the later definition of frame is apt for experimental survey, because it describes an individual’s perception of a situation (Nelson & Kinder, 1996). Therefore, I will assume
the term ‘frame or framing’ in respect of frames in thoughts in this paper from now on.

Framing can be distinguished by its effects. One type, an equivalency framing effect, examines how the use of different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases cause individuals to change their preferences. It occurs when the same information in either positive or a negative nuance results in different individual preferences. For example, 20% possibility to survive is equivalent to 80% to die. Despite the equivalence, the interpretation may differ due to different wordings. The other type of framing effect is an emphasis framing. An emphasis framing effect works by causing individuals to focus on certain aspects or characterizations of an issue or problem instead of other (Druckman, 2001). It is different from the equivalence framing effect in that a treated expression may not be equivalent to the untreated expression. For example, same welfare policy can be described as promoting quality of human rights while it can also be put into a frame which emphasis the cost of implementing welfare policy, so to speak, increasing taxation.

As it is discussed, experimental survey is effective in capturing causal inference and to observe dynamics of preference change. Although it may

8 See ‘The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice’ for further information on equivalency framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
9 See ‘Issue framing and public opinion on government spending’ for further information on emphasis framing effect (Jacoby, 2000).
need some profound structuring of experiment settings to avoid abovementioned disadvantages in practice, advantages of experimental survey on corruption perception outweighs disadvantages. In next part, I will discuss the experimental survey design for this research in detail.

6. Research Design

1) Experimental Survey Design

In this research, in search of causal inference related to perceptions on corruption, experimental survey will be conducted. There are three different sets of questionnaire given to each three groups: Control group, a group with information on presidential scandal (Treatment I), and a group with information on presidential scandal and the verdict (Treatment II). Each question sets are commonly including three essential questions regarding corruption in that the real-life experience of high-level corruption may have different degrees of influence with different scope of self-determination. First question (A) is set to identify individual’s willingness to engage in corrupt behavior. Second question (B) is set to find out individual’s expectation on future corruption in the society, or personal judgement regarding corruption over the others. Third question (C) is set to observe if one is willing to interfere and control corrupt situation if one recognizes a corrupt conduct
carried out by the others. Three types of questions are different in that each investigates corruption perception with different degrees of volition. To illustrate, question B requires the least amount of self-determination than the other two questions. This is because, judgment making on others is easier than self-regulation (question A) and regulating others (question C) which requires actual autonomy to make actions. Also, question B asks personal expectation on future corruption in the society as a whole which makes it easier for the respondents to answer than judging particular person or group of people because the society feels more distant than family or acquainted members of the neighborhood. Question A and question C may have similar discretional degree for both observe one’s willingness to regulate the corrupt actions either committed by oneself or the others. The difference is that the type A identifies one’s inclination to regulate oneself while the type C identifies one’s willingness to hamper others’ corrupt action. The difference is critical because, sociological and anthropological approach in corruption recognized that people may engage in corruptive conduct regardless of their understanding of immorality and malfunction of corruption. This explains a possible situation where an individual may decide to interfere corrupt behaviors carried out by the others while oneself engages in corruption. For above differences, three types of questions are designed to get more concrete picture of corruption perception and the influence of the recent presidential scandal in South Korea.
Most importantly, in order to get a causal inference using an experimental aspect in this research, respondents will be randomly assigned to each three groups: Control group, Treatment I group and Treatment II group. The treatments will be given using the framing effect of survey questions. Control group will be directly asked with the questions A, B and C (survey set 1) related to the consciousness of corruption. Treatment I group will be asked the same questions with additional stimulant information on the recent presidential scandal, or Choi Soon-Sill Gate (survey set 2). The information will operate as a catalyst which will bring clear memories of high-level elite corruption in the South Korean society. This treatment is designed in order to find out the effect of high-level corruption recognition on people’s perception related to corruption. With respect to the definition of corruption, Choi Soon-Sill Gate is suitable as a stimulant because the case was not limited to political realm but also engaged in business and social realms. Its scale is colossal enough to cover recent understanding of corruption concept. The scandal involves not only the inappropriate use of authority of public official but it also encompasses injustice use of power by high-elite figures in politics, business and society. Therefore, regarding the up to date definition of corruption, the scandal may be an effective catalyzer for the experiment which may provide us better understandings than Rothstein’s experiment. Lastly, treatment II group will be asked the same questions with two additional information related to the presidential scandal (survey set3). Unlike
treatment I group, treatment II group will be given the same catalyzing information on the scandal and, additionally, the current verdict sentenced to the main culprits. Also, in order to get more clear picture of respondents’ perception, in treatment II group, additional question identifying the degree of satisfaction with the current verdict will be given. In brief, there will be three different groups each assigned different survey set respectively. In each survey set, general questions related to age, gender, residence, education, income and political affiliation will be asked for further investigation on corruption perception. The respondents are randomly selected among South Korean nationality according to the allocation of residence and age. Online survey was conducted from May 10th to May 18th, 2018 by a research company, Macromill Embrain. Total of 684 responses are collected, and 227, 228, 229 respondents are randomly assigned to each groups respectively.

Table 1. Survey Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions on Corruption</th>
<th>Control: Group C (227)</th>
<th>Presidential Scandal: Group T1 (228)</th>
<th>Presidential Scandal &amp; Verdict: Group T2 (229)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Willingness to engage in corruption</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A’</td>
<td>A”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Expected future</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B’</td>
<td>B”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 See more information about online penal in [http://www.embrain.com/power/power2.asp#box2](http://www.embrain.com/power/power2.asp#box2)

corruption

3. Willingness to interfere corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C</th>
<th>C&quot;</th>
<th>C&quot;&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey Set 1</td>
<td>Survey Set 2</td>
<td>Survey Set 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(number of respondents)
Group name will be called C, T1 and T2 from below.

(1) Survey Set 1. (Control)

Q1. Do you Agree or disagree with following statement? (Four-level Likert scale answer)

I can give preferential treatment using my authority, if my family or close friends ask me a favor.

① strongly agree ② inclined to agree ③ inclined to disagree ④ strongly disagree

Q1. 아래 내용에 대해 찬반 선호를 답변해 주세요.

가족이나 친한 친구가 부탁하면 자신의 지위를 이용하여 어느 정도의 특혜를 줄 수 있다.

① 매우 찬성 ② 찬성하는 편이다 ③ 반대하는 편이다 ④ 매우 반대

Q2. How frequently do you expect the use of authority for private gain or personal connection will occur in the future? (Five-level Likert scale answer)

① definitely more ② little more ③ same as now ④ little less ⑤ definitely less

Q2. 향후, 한국 사회에서 얼마나 빈번하게 인맥을 활용한 지위 남용과, 특혜 제공이 일어날 것으로 예상하십니까?

① 매우 빈번하게 ② 조금 더 빈번하게 ③ 지급과 동일 ④ 조금 드물게 ⑤ 매우 드물게

Q3. Do you agree or disagree with following statement? (Four-level Likert scale answer)

If I witness other person using the authority for personal gain or personal connection, I will report to the related audit office or institution.

① strongly agree ② inclined to agree ③ inclined to disagree ④ strongly disagree

Q3. 아래 내용에 대해 찬성 혹은 반대로 답변해 주세요.
(2) Survey Set 2. (Presidential Scandal: Group T1)

(Please be aware of below information before answering the questions)

Recently, South Korea experienced presidential scandal (Choi Soon-Sill Gate) which indicates the use of public power for private gain by an incumbent president, a business elite and a close friend of the president.

| Questions identical to Set1 |

(3) Survey Set 3. (Presidential Scandal & Verdict: Group T2)

(Please be aware of below information before answering the questions)

Recently, South Korea experienced, presidential scandal (Choi Soon-Sill Gate) and the trial is underway. Currently, Korean President Park Guen-Hye is sentenced 24 years in jail and fined 17 million dollars. Choi Soon-Sill is sentenced to 20 years in jail and fined 16.6 million dollars. Lee Jae-yong was sentenced to five years in prison, but in February 2018, a higher court reduced his sentence and suspended it for four years.

| Questions identical to Set1 |

Q4. Regarding recent presidential scandal, are you satisfied with the current verdict given to former president Park Guen-Hye, Choi Soon-Sill and Lee Jae-Yong? (Five-level Likert scale answer)

① strongly satisfied ② little satisfied ③ so-so ④ little unsatisfied ⑤
strongly unsatisfied

Q4. 최근 최순실 국정농단 사건에 대하여, 귀하는 현재 박근혜 전 대통령, 최순실, 그리고 이재용에게 선고된 법적 판결에 만족하신가?

① 매우 만족 ② 조금 만족 ③ 보통 ④ 조금 불만족 ⑤ 매우 불만족

There are several considerations embedded in above survey design. First, the duration of treatment is relatively effective enough to derive causal inference on corruption perception. Although the emphasizing framing effect with additional information in the survey may not provide respondents an entirely new experience, due to the fact that all Korean citizen experienced recent scandal and, most importantly, the framing effect is consequential in survey research, the emphasis on recently experienced high-level corruption will remind the respondents the clear memories and may cause different choices. This way, by posing an additional information of high-level corruption in the survey, the respondents will have treatment effect compared to the control group. To be more specific, group C will indicate their perception with relatively minute deliberation regarding the scandal, while group T1 will indicate their perception with greater account of the experience regarding the presidential scandal. Second, mutual causality may not be a problem in this case because people’s perception on corruption does not necessarily entails high-level corruption in the society. Also, the treatment given to the respondents are timely ordered for it given before the questions so that it can help people to be reminded of the scandal before answering the
questions. Lastly, spillover effect of more than two treatments may not occur in above experiment. One respondents will be assigned single survey set so that there will be an influence of one treatment at a time. In brief, comparison between control group and group T1 may infer influence of high-level corruption experience on corruption perception. On the other hand, comparison between group T1 and group T2 may infer the influence of monitoring and enforced sanction of the presidential scandal on corruption perception. Group T2 is included in the survey design in order to find out if sole recognition of high elite corruption is the matter of influence or the contentment with follow-up measures taken after the exposure of corrupt activities is a more precise matter of influence. Therefore, in comparison between group T1 and T2, T1 group will function as a control group while the intended treatment will be given to group T2 by intentionally emphasizing the follow-up measures taken for the recent corrupt activities with more information.

2) Model & Hypothesis

The research model and detailed hypothesis are as follows.

**Model 1:** \( C_T = C_{T-1} + \text{PSE} \)

**Model 2:** \( C_T = C_{T-1} + \text{PSE} + \text{VE} \)

Where \( C = \) Consciousness of Corruption

(Willingness to engage in corrupt behavior, corruption expectation and willingness to interfere corruption)
PSE = The Presidential Scandal Effect (Indication of others’ corrupt behaviors)
VE = Verdict Effect (Indication of monitoring)
T = Time

Additionally, in order to have thorough understanding of the correlations between the variables, I conducted an ordered logit regression analysis using the survey data for each corruption related variable.

**Hypothesis**

H1. (Information on the Presidential Scandal)

a. Indication of high-level corruption will increase the willingness to participate in corruptive conduct.

b. Indication of high-level corruption will increase the expected corruption in the future.

c. Indication of high-level corruption will decrease the willingness to interfere other’s corrupt behavior.

H2. (Information on the Verdict)

a. Indication of the verdict will decrease the willingness to participate in corruptive conduct.

b. Indication of the verdict will decrease the expected corruption in the future.

c. Indication of the verdict will increase the willingness to interfere other’s corrupt behavior.

7. Measurements

In measuring the concept of corruption perception, the term ‘corruption’ is not used in order not to limit people’s understanding that corruption is related to the public authority, and additionally so as to alleviate the sensitivity
with the concept, the negative notion a person may have on the term corruption. In the survey, the concepts regarding demographics, political affiliation, three crucial consciousness of corruption and current issue perception are operationalized and measured as follows.

First, demographic concepts are operationalized by the composing variables: sex, age, residence, education and income. Sex is measured ‘0=male, 1=female’. Age is measured from lowest 14 to highest 76. Residence is coded from 1 to 17 according to the administrative classification: 1. Seoul, 2. Busan, 3. Daegu, 4. Incheon, 5. Gwangju, 6. Daejon, 7. Ulsan, 8. Gyeonggi-do, 9. Gangwon-do, 10. Chungcheongbuk-do, 11. Chungcheongnam-do, 12. Jeollabuk-do, 13. Jeollanam-do, 14. Gyeongsangbuk-do, 15. Gyeongsangnam-do, 16. Jeju-do, 17. Sejong Education is scaled from 1 to 5, low to high. Income is scaled from 1 to 10, from monthly income below 1000,000 won to over 9000,000 won. Second, political affiliation is operationalized with two variables, preference for political party and political ideology. Political Party is measured in 7 scales including main 5 political parties in current parliament, others and none. Also, political ideology is measured in 5 scales, ‘1=Strong Progressive, 2=Little Progressive, 3=middle, 4=Little Conservative, 5=Strong Conservative’. Third, corruption consciousness is operationalized in three variables. One is ‘Willingness to engage in corruption’, the preference to engage in corrupt behavior. This is measured in 4 scale from 1=strong disagree to 4=strong
agree. Higher scale infers higher willingness to be corrupt. Another variable is ‘Corruption Expectation’, expected frequency of corrupt activities in the society. Corruption expectation is measured in 5 scale from 1=definitely less to 5=definitely more. Higher scale infers that the society is expected to be more corrupt in the future. The other variable is ‘Willingness to interfere corruption’, the willingness to monitor and regulate corruption by reporting. It is measured in 4 scale from 1=strong disagree to 4=strong agree. Higher scale indicates higher willingness to control corrupt activities. Lastly, perception on the presidential scandal is operationalized as ‘Verdict Satisfaction’. Verdict Satisfaction is measured in 5 scale, from 1=very unsatisfied to 5=very satisfied. Higher scale infers higher satisfaction in regards to the sentences given to the culprits of the presidential scandal.

8. Analysis

1) Experimental Survey Result

Experimental survey on each corruption related variables displayed different results according to the information provided in each experiment group. First, willingness to engage in corrupt behavior changes according to the treatment information provided to each group.
Figure 1. Willingness to Engage in Corruption

Figure 1 demonstrates more than double increment (+10.05%) of strong disagreement to engage in corruptive conduct when additional information of recent presidential scandal is given. This infers that high-level corruption experience does have negative effect on people’s willingness to be corrupt. Unlike the initial collective action theory perspective, indication of other’s collusion may not automatically change people’s decision to choose corrupt strategies in order not to be the only ‘sucker’ (H1-a). Also, given that we use the term ‘offering preferential treatment’ instead of ‘corruptive benefit’, this result indicates that people connect recent corruption crisis with their daily life corrupt misbehaviors. Therefore, this proves that the concept of corruption in peoples’ understanding is no longer limited to the political realm, but comprehensively in our social life. Compared to the group with only the information on the presidential scandal, group with additional information on verdict displays even stronger tendency of disagreeing (+3.18%) to engage in corruption. This goes well with the later collective action understanding. A
successful monitoring and sanctioning may strengthen individuals’ contingent self-commitment and affect individual decision to abide by the social rules, not to commit corruption (H2-a).

Second, expectation on future corruption had distinct results in each group.

Figure 2. Corruption Expectation

In <Figure 2>, compared to the control group, the group with extra information on presidential scandal demonstrates increasing proportion of respondents who expect less corruption in the future (+4.73%) while, the tendency to expect more corruption in the future stays almost the same. This contradicts the hypothesis (H1-b) based on initial collective action theory. The recognition of the fact that few elite members in the society are corrupt does not affect individual expectation that many others are corrupt. On the other hand, when it comes to the comparison between the second group and the third group with additional information on verdict, the tendency to believe that society will be more corrupt evidently decreases (-4.51%), while the
expectation of less corrupt society increases (5.57%). This implies that knowing well-functioning system of motoring and sanctioning in our society may strengthen individuals’ mutual belief that mass will not be corrupt due to the possible loss for choosing corrupt strategy (H2-b).

Lastly, willingness to interfere others’ corrupt behavior has different results in each group of the experiment.

**Figure 3. Willingness to Interfere Corruption**

![Figure 3](image)

<Figure 3> indicates increasing proportion of strong agreement (+4.74%) to interfere other’s corruptive conduct with additional information of recent presidential scandal. This contradicts the hypothesis that recognition of other’s corruption will decrease the willingness to obtrude corrupt behavior (H1-c). Also, it belies the view of initial collective action theory that egocentric and rational decision making nature of individual and the expected high cost of monitoring with uncertain benefit in return makes people not to engage in regulating behaviors to prevent corruption. The proportional change from the second group to the third group with additional information
on verdict, implies that later elaborated collective action theory is convincing. The percentage of those agreeing to report others’ corrupt behavior to the regulating institution increases. Prominently, those who strongly agree to interfere corruption increases by 5.56%. This infers that successful monitoring and sanctioning for recent presidential scandal may assure people that the benefit of monitoring corruption is effectively shared by all the members of the society. Moreover, the information that culprits are debunked and had a judicial punishment may strengthen the function of individual as both an appropriators of common-pool resource, corruption-free society in this case, and a monitor. Consequently, the information of the verdict does have positive effect in willingness to interfere corruptive conducts of the others (H2-c).

For all three changes regarding corruption measurements, this may imply the possibility of grand institutional change according to the path dependency perspective. Although the consequential changes cannot be observed so soon after the recent presidential scandal, we may project that the intensifying willingness to prevent oneself and the others from corruption and the expectation for the future corruption indicates the ongoing empowerment from the mass bottom. Consequently, the presidential scandal may become a focal point which brings about the institutional change with virtuous cycle.
2) Ordered Logit Regression Result

For each dependent variable related to corruption, I conducted an ordered logit regression to have elaborate statistical inference from the survey result and to observe verdict satisfaction effect on three dependent variables. To begin, the statistical result of willingness to engage in corruption is displayed in the followings.

Table 2. Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Willingness to Engage in Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Presidental Scandal (Model 1)</th>
<th>Presidental Scandal and Verdict (Model 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-0.26 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.26)</td>
<td>-0.30 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.03*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02* (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>0.06** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.11 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>0.00 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>0.08 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.35** (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.16 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdict</td>
<td>N: 227</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Standard Error)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
According to the analysis, in control group, age and residence are the statistically effective variables in explaining individual willingness to participate in corruption. Although the significance of residence is quite strong (p value=0.04<0.05), the actual significance of the variable is doubtful in that the proportion of the respondents in each residence is greatly imbalance, strongly concentrated in Seoul and Gyeonggi-do. On the other hand, the significance of age (p value=0.001<0.01) is prominent. Marginal effect of age on willingness to engage in corruption is as follows.

**Figure 4. Marginal Effect of Age on Willingness to Engage in Corruption**

![Marginal Effect of Age on Willingness to Engage in Corruption](image)

Interestingly enough, figure 4 indicates that younger people tend to engage in corrupt behavior more than older people. With the later collective action perspective in mind, we may construe that older people have more contingent self-commitment not to participate in corruption since, an individual may have more experience of monitoring and sanctioning corruption during their life. Such repeated experience of banning corruption and frequent awareness that society hampers corruption would influence elder people to follow social
norm and rules.

In model 1, with additional information on presidential scandal, the significance of age and residence decreases while that of political ideology (p value=0.026<0.05) increases greatly. The marginal effect of political ideology on willingness to participate in corruption is displayed below.

**Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Political Ideology on Willingness to Engage in Corruption**

![Diagram showing marginal effect of political ideology on willingness to engage in corruption.]

Above figure implies that conservative person is more likely to involve in corruption than those who are more progressive. Such result may have relation to the fact that the culprits for recent presidential scandal were mostly elites in South Korea’s social structure. However, the emphasis in Table 2 should be on the reduction of the significance of political ideology in model 2 (p value=0.32) compared to model 1 (p value=0.026). This is crucial in that the fact evidently supports both former and later collective action theory. With
only the information that corruption occurred, conservatives who may be in similar position to the elites involved in recent presidential scandal may recognize that others are using corrupt strategies. Hence, those conservatives may get a signal that they may become a ‘sucker’ and choose a strategy not to become one. Meanwhile, when it comes to model 2, which provided extra information on the result of monitoring and entailing verdict sentenced to the culprits, this treatment may indicate the respondents that the cost of engaging in corruption is grand. The difference in model 1 and model 2 may evince that long-term game with repeated amendment of contracts between the members allow establishment of inter-regulating institutions without exclusive coercion. In model 2, none of the variables were statistically significant enough to explain the willingness to involve in corruptive conduct.

Next, statistical analysis of corruption expectation is as follows.
According to Table 3, the significance of age is prominent in all three groups regardless of experiment treatment provided for each respondents during the survey. Unlike the willingness to behave corruptly, age is likely to influence expectation of corruption so strong that the influence pertains indifferently to recent corruption scandal and verdict information. Thus, with resembling coefficient and the direction of correlations, marginal effect of age in all three group have similar tendency in its change. The marginal effect of age on

Table 3. Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Corruption Expectation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Presidential Scandal</th>
<th>Presidential Scandal and Verdict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td>0.17 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>-0.04*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.02*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.03*** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residence</strong></td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.05* (0.03)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>0.06 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.13)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>0.07 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Party</strong></td>
<td>0.08* (0.05)</td>
<td>0.09** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Ideology</strong></td>
<td>0.01 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Issue</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Verdict Satisfaction</td>
<td>-0.24* (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>227</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo R2</strong></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Standard Error)

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
corruption expectation in control group is shown below.

**Figure 6. Marginal Effect of Age on Corruption Expectation.**

Figure 6 implies that older people are inclined to believe less corruption in the future society. Comparable to the interpretation of the relationship between age and willingness to engage in corruption, in line with later collective action theory, above statistical analysis may also imply that uncountable experiences of repeated regulation and sanctions on corruption may have changed people’s expectation that corruption will occur less frequently in our society. This is cogent in that South Korea encountered various corruption problems since 1960’s with sky-rocketing development in economic scale and newly addressed political system from US, democracy. The distinct developing phases between politics and economy brought strong presidential authority which may facilitate corruption for its astronomical benefit. Meanwhile, South Korea has undergone several remedying process to reach corruption free society.

In model 1, the significance of age stays the same while that of residence
and political party accentuates. As mentioned earlier, residence may only be statistically significant due to excessively inclined respondents in two residential district\textsuperscript{12}. Also, political party may not have significant implication in reality in that the respondents tend to prefer either Democratic Party of Korea or none. Moreover, the proportion of those who expects no difference in the future corruption is fairly high in both political parties. The distribution of respondents according to political party and corruption expectation is displayed in Figure 7.

**Figure 7. Corruption Expectation & Political Party**

![Corruption Expectation & Political Party](image)

In model 2, verdict satisfaction appears statistically effective in explaining corruption expectation. Its significance (p value=0.054<0.1) is quite noticeable. The marginal effect of verdict satisfaction on corruption expectation is demonstrated in Figure 8.

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\textsuperscript{12} For better understanding, see Figure 10 in the appendix.
Figure 8. Marginal Effect of Verdict Satisfaction on Corruption Expectation

Figure 8 infers that the stronger the satisfaction with the sanction imposed on corrupt behavior, the less a person expects for future corruption. Hence, it is evident that successful monitoring and sanctioning carried out for those who are accused of corruption may inform people that the checking system in their society is well-functioning that the cost of corruption is prima facie. Satisfaction variable strongly supports the convincingness of collective action theory elaborated representatively by Ostrom.

Lastly, statistical analysis on willingness to interfere corruption indicated distinct differences between the models.
Table 4. Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Willingness to Interfere Corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>President I Scandal (Model 1)</th>
<th>President I Scandal and Verdict (Model 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td>-0.05 (0.30)</td>
<td>-0.26 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residence</strong></td>
<td>-0.05 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>0.09 (0.15)</td>
<td>-0.25* (0.14)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>-0.06 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.12* (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.14* (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Party</strong></td>
<td>0.03 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.17*** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Ideology</strong></td>
<td>-0.26 (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.20 (0.17)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Issue</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verdict Satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.30** (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>227</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo R2</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Standard Error)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

Table 4 indicates that, in control model, none of the variables are statistically significant in explaining the willingness to interfere corruption. On the other hand, in model 1, education and income variable appears statistically meaningful with the additional information on recent presidential scandal. Negative coefficient for both education and income insinuate that a person with higher education and monthly income is likely not to interfere others’
corruptive behavior while a person with lower education and lower monthly income tends to interfere corruption. This statistical result may also relate to the fact that the accused culprits of the Choi Soon-Sil Gate are the social elite who had strong authority in politics and business. However, in this case, the significance for education (p value= 0.066<0.1) and income (p value=0.078<0.1) is not strong enough to convincingly support the collective action theory.

In model 2, education variable lose its statistic effectiveness in explaining the willingness to interfere corruption while the income variable survives with fairly low significance. The interesting aspect is that political party variable and verdict satisfaction variable newly arise with strong explanatory effect on the dependent variable when the verdict information is provided. As mentioned earlier, regardless of the statistic importance of political party, the significance in reality is mitigated since the respondent are excessively inclined to two options, The Democratic Party of Korea and none. On the contrary, verdict satisfaction may have importance both statistically (p value=0.026<0.05) and in reality. The marginal effect of verdict satisfaction on the willingness to interfere corruption is demonstrated below.
Figure 9 indicates that in all satisfaction level, most people tend to interfere corruption with high probability. The fact that absolute tendency is to regulate corruption supports the concept of contingent self-commitment in Ostrom’s long lasting common-pool resource game. In other words, people volunteer to become both appropriator and monitor in our society in pursuit of corruption-free. However, interestingly enough, respondents with stronger verdict satisfaction has slightly more likelihood of being negligent to the observed corruption. In my conjecture, this may occur due to the assurance that the current monitoring system and institutional measures are well functioning. Therefore, a rational and self-interested actor would reduce one’s time and effort (cost) to monitor corruption since they believe the institutional regulation itself is regulating corruption well.

In conclusion, the experiment to find out causal inference of corruption perception evince that the indication of high-level corruption and verdict both
reduce the willingness to engage in corruption, decrease the expectation for future corruption occurrence and increase the willingness to interfere other’s corrupt behavior. The tendency of corruption index changes is more prominent in model 2 when the information on verdict is provided. This bolsters the later elaborated collective action theory of Ostrom that repeated games between players may establish inter-regulating system to benefit all due to growing contingent self-commitment. In in-depth analysis for each corruption index, the result infers that the verdict satisfaction is strong explanatory aspect for the corruption expectation and the willingness to interfere corruption. This again, supports the projection that successful experience of monitoring and sanctioning may reinforce the mutual assurance that each member of the society will not engage in corruption for its profound cost when caught. Additionally, from the path dependency projection, recent presidential scandal in South Korea may become a focal point in the history which alters current institutional cycle into a virtuous one.

9. Conclusion

The core purpose of this research is to find out the causal inference of high-level corruption on corruption perception. In order to get a concrete picture of causal relationship, I conducted an experimental survey using the framing effect of recent presidential scandal of South Korea and the verdict
as treatments. Also, so as to have comprehensive understanding of corruption, the definition of corruption is not limited to the political realm, and distinctive individual consciousness regarding corruption were measured; The willingness to engage in corruption, the expectation of future corruption and the willingness to interfere others’ corrupt behavior. This research evinces that the indication of high-level corruption and verdict both reduce the willingness to engage in corruption, decrease the expectation for future corruption occurrence and increase the willingness to interfere other’s corrupt behavior. Shift of corruption measures is more eminent with additional verdict information compared to the shift observed only with the information of recent presidential scandal. Also, in-depth analysis using ordered logit regression analysis indicates that verdict satisfaction is strong explanatory aspect for the corruption expectation and the willingness to interfere corruption. This bolsters the collective action theory of Ostrom that repeated games between players may establish inter-regulating system to benefit the entire society due to growing contingent self-commitment. Moreover, successful experience of monitoring and sanctioning may reinforce the mutual assurance that each member of the society will not engage in corruption for its profound cost when caught. Regardless of its’ academic achievements and its expected importance in the future to better handle corruption in reality, this research encompasses few limits. The survey experiment provides indirect causal inference due to the possibility of
contamination on treatment effects due to the rapidly changing reality situations. Also the scale of the survey experiment is limited to South Korea and the extent of respondents to 684. Further investigation of causal inference of corruption beyond the case study of South Korea for extended time of observation would provide more precise causal relationship regarding the issue.
Bibliography


Appendix

Survey Questions (Korean)
사회 인식 조사 (Type A)

I. 응답자 현황

1. 연령
   ① 만19세 미만 ② 만19~29세 ③ 30~39세 ④ 40~49세 ⑤ 50~59세 ⑥ 60세 이상

2. 성별
   ① 남성 ② 여성

3. 소재지 (주민등록주소지 기준)
   ① 서울 ② 부산 ③ 대구 ④ 인천 ⑤ 광주 ⑥ 대전 ⑦ 울산 ⑧ 경기 ⑨ 강원
   충북 ⑩ 충남 ⑪ 전북 ⑫ 전남 ⑬ 경북 ⑭ 경남 ⑮ 제주 ⑯ 제주

II. 개인의 자발적 의지 및 선호 (부패 행위에 대한 개인적 선호)

문1. 아래 내용에 대한 찬반 선호를 답변해 주세요.
가족이나 친한 친구가 부탁하면 자신의 지위를 이용하여 어느 정도의 특혜를 줄 수 있다.
   ① 매우 찬성 ② 찬성하는 편이다 ③ 반대하는 편이다 ④ 매우 반대

III. 타인의 행동에 대한 기대 및 평가 (타인의 부패 행위에 대한 기대)
문2. 향후, 한국 사회에서 얼마나 빈번하게 인맥을 활용한 지위 남용과, 특혜 제공이 일어날 것으로 예상하십니까?

① 매우 빈번하게 ② 조금 더 빈번하게 ③ 지금과 동일 ④ 조금 드물게 ⑤ 매우 드물게

IV. 개인의 타인의 행동에 대한 개입 의지 (타인의 부패 행위에 대한 개인의 자발적 개입 의지)

문3. 아래 내용에 대한 찬반 선호를 답변해 주세요.

타인의 인맥을 통한 특혜 제공 및 지위 남용을 목격한다면, 관련 감사기관에 신고해야 한다.

① 매우 찬성 ② 찬성하는 편이다 ③ 반대하는 편이다 ④ 매우 반대

V. 정치성향

문4. 귀하께서 가장 가깝게 느끼시는 정당은 어느 당 입니까?

① 더불이민주당 ② 자유한국당 ③ 바른미래당 ④ 민주평화당 ⑤ 정의당 ⑥ 기타( ) ⑦ 없다

문5. 진보와 보수로 이념 성향을 나누어 볼 때, 귀하의 성향은 어느 쪽에 가깝습니까?

① 매우 진보 ② 조금 진보 ③ 중도 ④ 조금 보수 ⑤ 매우 보수
VI. 인구학적 요소 (Demographics)

문6. 귀하의 최종 학력이 어떻게 되십니까?
   ① 초·중등 졸업이하  ② 고등 졸업  ③ 전문대 졸업  ④ 일반대 졸업
   ⑤ 석·박 졸업이상

문7. 귀하의 한달 소득(월급, 상여금, 은행이자 등을 모두 포함)은 얼마나 되십니까?
   ① 100만원 미만  ② 100-199만원  ③ 200-299만원  ④ 300-399만원
   ⑤ 400-499만원  ⑥ 500-599만원  ⑦ 600-699만원  ⑧ 700-799만원
   ⑨ 800-899만원  ⑩ 900만원 이상

설문에 응해 주셔서 감사합니다.
사회 인식 조사 (Type B)

I. 응답자 현황

1. 연령
   ① 만19세 미만  ② 만19~ 29세  ③ 30~39세  ④ 40~49세  ⑤ 50~59세
   ⑥ 60세 이상
2. 성별
   ① 남성  ② 여성
3. 소재지 (주민등록주소지 기준)
   ① 서울  ② 부산  ③ 대구  ④ 인천  ⑤ 광주  ⑥ 대전  ⑦ 울산  ⑧ 경기  ⑨ 강원
   ⑩ 충북  ⑪ 충남  ⑫ 전북  ⑬ 전남  ⑭ 경북  ⑮ 경남  ⑯ 제주  ⑰ 제주

문항1부터 문항3 까지는 아래 내용을 숙지하고 답변해 주세요.
최근, 최순실 게이트 사건을 통해 박근혜 전 대통령과 최순실, 그리고 삼성그룹 부회장 이재용이 공적 권력을 사적으로 활용한 사실이 드러났다

II. 개인의 자발적 의지 및 선호 (부패 행위에 대한 개인적 선호)

문1. 아래 내용에 대한 찬반 선호를 답변해 주세요.
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III. 타인의 행동에 대한 기대 및 평가 (타인의 부패 행위에 대한 기대)

문2. 향후, 한국 사회에서 얼마나 빈번하게 인맥을 활용한 지위 남용과, 특히 제공이 일어날 것으로 예상하십니까?

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IV. 개인의 타인의 행동에 대한 개입 의지 (타인의 부패 행위에 대한 개인의 자발적 개입 의지)

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타인의 인맥을 통한 특혜 제공 및 지위 남용을 목격 한다면, 관련 감사 기관에 신고해야 한다.

① 매우 찬성 ② 찬성하는 편이다 ③ 반대하는 편이다 ④ 매우 반대

V. 정치성향

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문5. 진보와 보수로 이념 성향을 나누어 볼 때, 귀하의 성향은 어느 쪽에
가깝습니까?

① 매우 진보 ② 조금 진보 ③ 중도 ④ 조금 보수 ⑤ 매우 보수

VI. 인구학적 요소 (Demographics)

문 6. 귀하의 최종 학력이 어떻게 되십니까?

① 초·중등 졸업이하 ② 고등 졸업 ③ 전문대 졸업 ④ 일반대 졸업
⑤ 석·박 졸업이상

문 7. 귀하의 한달 소득(월급, 상여금, 은행이자 등을 모두 포함)은 얼마나 되십니까?

① 100만원 미만 ② 100-199만원 ③ 200-299만원 ④ 300-399만원
⑤ 400-499만원 ⑥ 500-599만원 ⑦ 600-699만원 ⑧ 700-799만원
⑨ 800-899만원 ⑩ 900만원 이상

설문에 응해 주셔서 감사합니다.
사회 인식 조사 (Type c)

I. 응답자 현황

1. 연령
   ① 만19세 미만 ② 만19~29세 ③ 30~39세 ④ 40~49세 ⑤ 50~59세
   ⑥ 60세 이상
2. 성별
   ① 남성 ② 여성
3. 소재지 (주민등록주소지 기준)
   ① 서울 ② 부산 ③ 대구 ④ 인천 ⑤ 광주 ⑥ 대전 ⑦ 울산 ⑧ 경기 ⑨ 강원
   ⑩ 충북 ⑪ 충남 ⑫ 전북 ⑬ 전남 ⑭ 경북 ⑮ 경남 ⑯ 제주 ⑰ 제주

문항1부터 문항3 까지는 아래 내용을 숙지하고 답변해 주세요.

최근, 최순실 게이트 사건을 통해 공적 권력을 사적으로 활용한 사실이 드러났다. 이후 대규모 촛불시위가 벌어졌고 이어서 박근혜 전 대통령이 대한민국 최초로 민주적 절차에 의해 탄핵 되었으며, 현재 주요 인물들에 대한 재판이 진행되고 있다. 박근혜 전 대통령은 1심에서 징역 24년과 벌금 180억원을 선고 받았다. 최순실은 징역 20년과 벌금 72억원을 선고 받았으며 이재용 삼성 그룹 부회장은 1심에서 5년형을 선고 받았으나 2심에서 징역 2년 6개월과 집행유예 4년을 선고 받았다.
II. 개인의 자발적 의지 및 선호 (부패 행위에 대한 개인적 선호)

문1. 아래 내용에 대한 찬반 선호를 답변해 주세요.

가족이나 친한 친구가 부탁하면 자신의 지위를 이용하여 어느 정도의 특혜를 줄 수 있다.

① 매우 찬성 ② 찬성하는 편이다 ③ 반대하는 편이다 ④ 매우 반대

III. 타인의 행동에 대한 기대 및 평가 (타인의 부패 행위에 대한 기대)

문2. 향후, 한국 사회에서 얼마나 빈번하게 인맥을 활용한 지위 남용과, 특혜 제공이 일어날 것으로 예상하십니까?

① 매우 빈번하게 ② 조금 더 빈번하게 ③ 지금과 동일 ④ 조금 드물게 ⑤ 매우 드물게

IV. 개인의 타인의 행동에 대한 개입 의지 (타인의 부패 행위에 대한 개인의 자발적 개입 의지)

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타인의 인맥을 통한 특혜 제공 및 지위 남용을 목격 한다면, 관련 감사기관에 신고해야 한다.

① 매우 찬성 ② 찬성하는 편이다 ③ 반대하는 편이다 ④ 매우 반대

V. 최순실 국정농단 사건 관련 인물에 대한 판결 만족도
문4. 최근 최순실 국정농단 사건에 대하여, 귀하는 현재 박근혜 전 대통령, 최순실, 그리고 이재용에게 선고된 법적 판결에 어느정도 만족 하십니까?

최근 최순실 게이트, 국정농단 사건으로 박근혜 전 대통령은 1심에서 징역 24년과 벌금 180억원을 선고 받았다. 최순실은 징역 20년과 벌금 72억원을 선고 받았으며, 이재용 삼성 그룹 부회장은 1심에서 5년형을 선고 받았으나 2심에서 징역 2년 6개월과 집행유예 4년을 선고 받았다.

① 매우 만족 ② 조금 만족 ③ 보통 ④ 조금 불만족 ⑤ 매우 불만족

VI. 정치성향

문4. 귀하께서 가장 가깝게 느끼시는 정당은 어느 당 입니까?

① 더불어민주당 ② 자유한국당 ③ 바른미래당 ④ 민주평화당 ⑤ 정의당
⑥ 기타( ) ⑦ 없다

문5. 진보와 보수로 이념 성향을 나누어 볼 때, 귀하의 성향은 어느 쪽에 가깝습니까?

① 매우 진보 ② 조금 진보 ③ 중도 ④ 조금 보수 ⑤ 매우 보수

VII. 인구학적 요소 (Demographics)

문6. 귀하의 최종 학력이 어떻게 되십니까?

① 초·중등 졸업이하 ② 고등 졸업 ③ 전문대 졸업 ④ 일반대 졸업 ⑤ 석·박 졸업이상
문7. 귀하의 한달 소득(월급, 상여금, 은행이자 등을 모두 포함)은 얼마나 되십니까?

① 100만원 미만 ② 100-199만원 ③ 200-299만원 ④ 300-399만원
⑤ 400-499만원 ⑥ 500-599만원 ⑦ 600-699만원 ⑧ 700-799만원
⑨ 800-899만원 ⑩ 900만원 이상

설문에 응해 주셔서 감사합니다.

Figure 10. Corruption Expectation & Residence (Model 1)
Abstract (Korean)

국문초록

부패 인식에 대한 인과적 추론: 최순실 게이트 프레이밍 효과와 실험 설문

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나예진

본 연구의 주요 목적은 사회 고위층 부패가 부패 인식에 미치는 영향에 대한 인과적 추론을 경험적으로 분석해보는 것이다. 보다 구체적인 인과적 관계를 확인해 보고자, 본 연구에서는 실험적 설문 방식을 활용하였다. 최근 대한민국에서 벌어진 국정농단 사건과 그 처벌에 대한 프레이밍 효과를 설문에 적용하여 실험을 진행하였다. 또한, 보다 포괄적인 부패에 대한 이해를 위해 정치적 영역에만 그 정의를 국한하지 않고 사회 전반적인 영역에서 발생하는 부패로 그 정의를 넓게 적용하였다. 더 나아가, 부패를 부패 행위에 참여할 의지, 향후 예상되는 부패 수준 그리고 다른 이의 부패 행위를 규제할 의지로 측정하였다. 본 연구의 분석결과에 따르면 고위층 부패와 그 처벌에 대한 인식은 부패 행위에 참여할 의지를 감소시키고, 향후 예상되는 부패 수준을 감소하게 하며 타인의 부패 행위를 규제할 의지를 증가 시킨다. 이러한 부패 측정 지표들
의 변화는 최순실 사건 발생에 대한 정보만 주었을 때 보다 처벌에 대한 정보가 더 주어졌을 때 더욱 뚜렷하게 드러난다. 뿐만 아니라, 보다 심층적인 분석을 위해 진행한 순서형 로짓 회귀 분석 결과에 따르면 처벌에 대한 만족도가 향후 예상 부패 수준과 타인의 부패 행위 규제 의지에 강한 설명 변수로 작용한다. 본 연구의 결과는 반복적인 게임을 통해 참여자들의 경험적 자기 헌신(Contingent Self-Commitment)이 강화되고, 따라서 전체의 이익을 위한 내부적 규제 시스템이 형성된다는 오스트롬의 집합 행동 이론을 증명한다. 또한 성공적인 규제와 처벌의 경험은 부패 행위에 대한 비용이 분명함을 인식하도록 하고 각각의 구성원들이 부패 행위를 저지르지 않을 것이라는 상호 신뢰성을 강화한다. 본 연구는 집합 행동 이론을 적용하여 고위층 부패와 그에 대한 적발과 처벌이 사람들의 부패 인식에 어떠한 영향을 미쳤는지 밝혀냈다는 점에서 그 학문적 의의를 지닌다. 나아가, 반부패 운동이 확장되는 오늘날, 세계적으로 부패 문제를 해결하는 데에 도움이 될 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 본 연구는 몇가지 한계점을 지닌다. 실험적 설문 방식은 자극 효과가 현실적 상황들에 의해 오염되어 적용될 수 있다는 점에서 그 분석 결과가 자극의 직접적인 효과에 의한 것으로 해석될 수는 없다. 또한 본 연구의 실험 설문은 대한민국, 한 국가를 대상으로 하였고 그 응답자 수가 684명에 국한 되었다는 점에서 한계를 지닌다. 한국뿐만 아니라 여러 국가들을 대상으로 더 오랜 시간 동안 부패에 대한 인과적 추론 실험이 이루어진다면, 향후 부패에 대한 보다 명확한 인과적 관계를 추론해 볼 수 있을 것이다.

주요어: 부패, 실험설문, 프레이밍 효과, 국정농단 (최순실 게이트),
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