



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

Master's Thesis of International Studies

**China-ROK Relations in Xi Jinping
Administration**

시진핑 시기의 한중관계

August 2018

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

Area Studies

Zhang Liuya

China-ROK Relations in Xi Jinping Administration

Name of Examiner: Young Nam Cho

Submitting a master's thesis of Public Administration

July 2018

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

Area Studies

Zhang Liuya

Confirming the master's thesis written by

Zhang Liuya

July 2018

Chair Cheong Young-Rok (Seal)

Vice Chair Jeong, Jong-Ho (Seal)

Examiner Cho Young-Nam (Seal)

Abstract

This thesis deals with China-ROK relations in the first term of Xi Jinping administration. It raises three research questions, including “did China-ROK relations at the initial stage of Xi’s administration (2013-2015) break the bridge of ‘hot economy and cold politics’ as Chinese state media commented? ”, “what kind of factors contributed to the downturn of bilateral relations since 2016?”, and “whether there are any Korean policy adjustments in Xi’s era?”

For the first question, it argues no significant progress has been made in either military or political arena in spite of more frequent high-level exchanges. The unprecedented mutual visits of the high-ranking officials only concealed their entrenched conflicts in THAAD issues, US-ROK alliance, approaches to North Korea nuclear issue, and their relations with Japan.

For the second question, it maintains that both domestic and external factors played a role in the downturn of bilateral relations since mid 2016. Domestically, leadership changes from progressive party to conservative party since 2008 foreboded a comeback of coercive postures toward the North, a strengthened alliance with the US, and a decreasing care for China’s demands. Park Geun-hye’s Trustpolitik is by large a new version of a tit-for tat reciprocity. The already accelerated missile defense system since Lee Myung-bak took office augured a possible consent to THAAD deployment in conservatives’ reign. An unanimous consent among conservative party members, and wide supports within the public for THAAD deployment. In terms of external factors, they include North Korea factor and US factor. North Korea’s more aggressive provocations (Byungjin Line) provided a pretext for US and South Korea to take more “proactive deterrence” measures and move closer in BMD domain. North Korea is also the only stated target of THAAD deployment in South Korea. Regarding US factor, in response to China’s rise and its new assertiveness after global financial crisis in 2008, US adopted “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In BMD domain, it readjusted previous Air Land Battle (ALB) Concept to AirSea Battle Concept so as to countervail China’s growing A2/AD capabilities. THAAD deployment is one crucial part of US rebalance to Asia.

For the last question, it asserts that the visible changes in Xi Jinping administration are China’s increasingly hard-line stance toward North Korea nuclear development, and more initiative in improving its economic and cultural ties with the South. Nevertheless, in effect, these changes do not contradict with the guideline of China’s Korea policy, namely to maintain peace and stability, and to enhance its influence in Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the article contends fundamentally, China’s Korea policy in Xi’s era has not changed, and there are only tactical changes in specific approaches.

Keywords: China-ROK Relations, Xi Jinping, THAAD issue, China-US relations, North Korea nuclear issue, China’s Korea policy

Student Number : 2015-25109

Table of Contents

Chapter I. Introduction.....	4
1. Research Questions and Background.....	4
2. Literature Review.....	5
3. Analytical Framework and Research Methodology.....	8
Chapter II. Undercurrents in the amicable China-ROK relations at the initial stage of Xi Jinping administration.....	9
1 Bilateral relationship in economic and social arena.....	9
2 Bilateral relationship in political arena.....	11
2.1 An overview of bilateral political relations.....	11
2.2 Reassessment of major events in bilateral political relations (2013-2015).....	13
2.21 President Xi's state visit to ROK in 2014.....	13
2.22 South Korea's participation in China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank in March 2015.....	17
2.23 President Park's attendance to China's military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in September 2015.....	19
2.24 The new strategic dialogue channel between the Korean Director of National Security Office and the Chinese State Councilor.....	20
3. Bilateral relationship in military arena.....	21
3.1 An overview of bilateral military relations.....	21
3.2 Reassessment of major events in bilateral military relations (2013-2016).....	23
3.21 Opening a hotline between South Korean and Chinese Ministry of National Defense	23
3.22 THAAD Issues	25
4. Conclusion.....	26
Chapter III. Cause analysis for the downturn of China-ROK relations in Xi Jinping administration-a case study of South Korea's THAAD deployment.....	27
1. Domestic Factors.....	27
1.1 The contrasting North Korea Policy between progressive governments and the conservative governments in South Korea.....	27
1.2 Park Geun-hye's Trustpolitik--a mirror of conservative party's North Korea policy.....	33
1.3 South Korean policy evolution on theater missile defense.....	35

1.4 The THAAD issue in Park Geun-hye administration.....	39
2. External Factors.....	44
2.1 North Korea factor: North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats.....	44
2.2 The US factor.....	49
2.21 China’s rise and its new assertiveness.....	49
2.22 The US rebalance to Asia-Pacific.....	53
2.23 The US Ballistic Missile Defense policy in the context of China’s increasing A2/AD capabilities.....	54
2.24 Understanding THAAD’s deployment in South Korea against the backdrop of US rebalance to Asia-Pacific in BMD domain.....	56
3. Conclusion.....	59
Chapter IV. China’s Korea Policy in the Xi Jinping administration: Changed and Unchanged.....	61
1. A sketch of China-Korea relations and China’s roadmap for Korean peninsula.....	61
2. The implementation of China’s Korea Policy in Jiang-Hu era.....	64
2.1 Equidistant diplomacy toward two Koreas.....	64
2.2 North Korea Regime Survival and Regime Reform.....	67
2.3 North Korea Denuclearization.....	69
2.4 China’s view on US-ROK alliance.....	72
3. China’s North Korea policy in Xi Jinping administration (2013-2016): a growing emphasis on North Korea denuclearization.....	73
4. China’s South Korea policy in Xi Jinping administration (2013-2016): a more initiative and proactive posture at first and a strong opposition to THAAD deployment.....	77
Chapter V. Conclusion and Future Prospects.....	80
Bibliography.....	82
Abstract in Korean.....	94

Chapter I. Introduction

I. Research Question and Background

With Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korea's President Park Geun-hye's inauguration in early 2013, China-ROK relations were firstly characterized by a swift closeness but then backslid to a perishing antagonism. There was an unexpectedly satisfactory opening with Park's official visit to China in June 2013, whose trip reached such applaudable effects far beyond its original plan of "trip of heart and trust". The two countries reached a consensus on further enriching the strategic cooperative partnership. The highlights of the first Xi-Park summit were exhibited in "The ROK-China Joint Statement for Future Vision", which contains a diverse array of pledges. Firstly, they reached a consensus to strengthen strategic communication by institutionalizing dialogues between the chief of national security at the Blue House and the Chinese state councilor, regularizing mutual visits between foreign ministers, and establishing institutionalization between the state-run policy think tanks. Secondly, they decided to establish a "ROK-China joint committee on humanities exchange" as a step to improve bilateral cultural ties.¹

As a reciprocal visit, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Seoul in July 2014, joined by 200 business leaders, which was the largest delegation of its kind to visit the ROK. This visit was spoken highly by both sides and in particular, the state media in China commented "it ushered in a new era in bilateral relations featured by 'warming politics, hot economy'"; "the short yet fruitful trip has pushed the strategic cooperative partnership between the two sides to new heights, setting a new milestone for the future development of bilateral ties."² In line with the joint statement of this summit, economically the two countries not only vowed to wrap up the negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement before the end of 2014, but also signed deals to launch a Renminbi clearing service in Seoul and to boost cooperation between their central banks. Culturally, they decided to "elevate bilateral personnel exchanges to 10 million in 2016, and celebrate the Year of Chinese Tourism in South Korea in 2015 and the Year of South Korean Tourism in China in 2016." Socially, they ratcheted up cooperation in specified-reduction of air pollution, collective rescue operations in cases of accidents and natural calamities, and increased cooperation in public health-with specific modes of operation and cooperation to be delineated. Politically, they agreed on to start official negotiations in 2015 regarding the demarcation of maritime boundaries, including exclusive economic zones (EEZ). As for regional and global cooperation, three issues were highlighted-climate change, cyber security, and intraregional nuclear plant safety.³

In September 2015, in spite of the US grievances, President Park insisted on attending Chinese 70th anniversary ceremony for the victory of WWII. This was interpreted by outsiders as ROK's tilting toward China. This upward momentum was further maintained along with Premier Li's visit in Oct 2015. During his trip Premier, Li and President Park agreed to beef up bilateral cooperation, especially in their respective development strategies, namely the "Made in China 2025" initiative and "South Korea's 3.0 strategy for manufacturing innovation". They also signed 17 cooperation agreements, which ranges from the fields of economy, technology, to social interactions.⁴

¹ Jaeho Hwang, *The ROK's China Policy under Park Geun-hye*, 2014.8

² "Chinese president ends visit to S. Korea", Xinhua News Agency, 2014.7.4

³ Chung, Jae Ho and Jiyeon Kim. 2016. "Is South Korea in China's Orbit? Assessing Seoul's Perceptions and Policies." *Asia Policy* (21): 123-145. <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1764648980?accountid=6802>.

⁴ "Premier Li meets with his South Korean counterpart in Seoul", Xinhua News Agency, 2015.10

All of these development in the China-ROK relations was in a striking contrast with China-DPRK relations. In DPRK's case, its relation with China was icy after Xi officially assumed his presidency in February 2013. No Politburo member had traveled to the North Korea until October 2015 not to mention President Xi's state visit which should have been carried out before Xi's visit to ROK. Moreover, DPRK only sent Choe Ryong-Hae, the last high-ranking North Korean official to attend China's military parade in celebration of the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII and many sources revealed Choe even failed to be granted with a private meeting with Xi.

Nevertheless, this unprecedentedly affinity did not sustain too long, and China-ROK relationship moved downward since early months of 2016 when President Park Geun-hye administration decided to initiate the "earliest possible" deployment of a THAAD missile battery, and plummeted to the nadir after July 2016 when ROK government finally decided to the install THAAD system regardless of Beijing's staunch opposition. During this process, more than half Koreans agreed on the installment of THAAD system, and they grumbled Beijing's wicked intention of interfering Korea's internal affairs. China opposed intensely, claiming that the THAAD deployment would allow US radar to track its missiles even more effectively, and threatened to make the South Korea pay the due price. As the follow-up measures for retaliation, China has imposed restrictions on Hallyu (Korean waves) and Chinese group tourism to ROK since the end of 2016.

This brief overview shows there was a shift in China-ROK relationship from 2013 to 2016 at least ostensibly. This research will address the following three questions: is it true that China-ROK relations at the initial stage of Xi's administration (2013-2015) were as good and stable as it looks from the appearance, and just as amicable as many Chinese officials commented-"China-ROK relations since Xi's inauguration broke the bridle of "hot economy and cold politics"? What kind of factors contributed to downturn of bilateral relations in 2016? Are there any Korean policy readjustments or aberrations in Xi's era?

2. Literature Review

In terms of China-ROK relations, there are three seminal English monographs, including Chae-jin Lee's "China and Korea: Dynamic Relations"⁵, Jae Ho Chung's "Between Ally and Partner"⁶, and Min Ye's "China-South Korea relations in the new era : challenges and opportunities"⁷. Lee's work gives an account of China-Korea relations from Korea War to mid 1990s, while Chung's work provides a more detailed record of China-ROK's normalization process, and a sketch of bilateral relations in post-normalization period (1992-2004). Min Ye's book adopts a thematic approach instead of a chronological one as its predecessors, and deals with bilateral relations in the 21st century through a multidimensional model, and he gives a succinct review of bilateral relations after normalization.

In addition, there are also some eminent articles that probes into the kernel of China's Korea policy, including Samuel S. Kim's "The Making of China's Korea Policy in the Era of

<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/cnleaders/lkq201510/index.htm>

⁵ Chae-jin Lee (1996), *China and Korea: Dynamic Relations*, Hoover Institution Press

⁶ Jae Ho Chung(2006), *Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China relations and the United States*, Columbia University Press.

⁷ Ye, Min. (2017). *China-South Korea relations in the new era : challenges and opportunities*. Lanham, Maryland : Lexington Books

Reform”, Xiaoming Zhang’s “China’s Relations with the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese View”, You Ji’s “China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience”, Avery Goldstein’s “Across the Yalu: China's Interests and the Korean Peninsula in a Changing World”.⁸ Although these scholars shed diverse lights on China-ROK or China-DPRK relations, they agree that China’s top priority on Korean Peninsula is peace and stability, and it seeks to expand its influence on peninsula by continuously improving ties with two-Koreas. Many of them also pinpointed that while China supports for North Korea regime survival and reform at best, China-DPRK relations are more fragile and conflictual than it looks like.

Furthermore, there are also a plenty of articles that look deep into China-ROK relations in pre-Xi Jinping eras, for instance, Taeho Kim’s “Sino-ROK Relations at 15: An Overview and Assessment”, and “Strategic Cooperative Partnership’ between Beijing and Seoul?”⁹; Jae Ho Chung’s “China’s Soft Clash with South Korea: The History War and Beyond”, “From a Special Relationship to a Normal Partnership?: Interpreting the ‘Garlic Battle’ in Sino-South Korean Relations”, “South Korea between eagle and dragon”;¹⁰ and Heugkyu Kim’s “Enemy, Homager or Equal Partner?: Evolving Korea-China Relations”, “The Formation of Korea-China Strategic Cooperative Partnership and the Prospects for Korea-China Relationship”.¹¹ These scholars view China-ROK relations from different lens, but they agree that even if two countries share the same interest in economic cooperation and North Korea denuclearization, in a broader sense, they possess more ingrained divergences in issues like readjustments in the US-ROK alliance, concrete approaches to North Korea nuclear issue, North Korean contingency, the reunification of Korean Peninsula, history controversies (e.g. Koguryo history), the North Korea refugees in China, the status of Korean-Chinese in northeast China. As Taeho Kim quipped, “they share common aversions, not common interests.”

With regards to China-ROK relations in Xi Jinping administration, Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, affiliated to CSIS, closely keep track of the new trends in China-Korea relations, and releases their ingenious articles quarterly.¹² In addition, a yearly-published China’s Political Situation Report (in Korean) offers a more deep analysis on China’s Korea

⁸ You Ji, “China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 10, No. 28 (August 2001), pp. 387-98 ; Avery Goldstein, "Across the Yalu: China's Interests and the Korean Peninsula in a Changing World," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 131-161. 327.52 J641n; David Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 43-56; Xiaoming Zhang, “China’s Relations with the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese View,” *Korean Observer*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 481-500.

⁹ Taeho Kim, “‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership’ between Beijing and Seoul? A Quest in Search of Reality,” *New Asia*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 2011), pp. 14-33; Taeho Kim, “Sino-ROK Relations at 15: An Overview and Assessment,” Working Paper Series No. 185 (August 2007), Center for Asian Pacific Studies (Lingnan University, Hong Kong),

¹⁰ Jae Ho Chung. 2004. "From a Special Relationship to a Normal Partnership?: Interpreting the "Garlic Battle" in Sino-South Korean Relations." *Pacific Affairs* 76 (4): 549-568. Jae Ho Chung, “SOUTH KOREA BETWEEN EAGLE AND DRAGON.” *Asian Survey*, vol. 41, no. 5, 2001, pp. 777–796. Jae Ho Chung, “China’s ‘Soft’ Clash with South Korea,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (May/June 2009), pp. 469-483.

¹¹ Kim, Heungkyu. 2009. “China’s Partnership Diplomacy: Concept, Process, and Implication.” *Korean Political Science Review* 43(2):287-305. Kim, Heungkyu. “Enemy, Homager or Equal Partner?: Evolving Korea-China Relations.” *Journal of International and Area Studies*, vol. 19, no. 2, 2012, pp. 47–62

¹² Articles are available at: cc.csis.org/relations/china-korea/

policy in Xi Jinping era.¹³ There are also articles that delineates the ebbs-and-flows of China-ROK relations in Xi Jinping era, including Ren Yuanzhe's "China's Perspective on the China-ROK Strategic Partnership: Developments, Debates, and Difficulties."¹⁴

Apart from this, there are a bunch of articles that give clear diagnosis of what has been changed or unchanged in China's Korea policy in Xi's era, including Kim Heung-Kyu's article of A View from South Korea on Sino-ROK Relations¹⁵, and Song Lin's dissertation of Xi Jinping Government's Foreign Policy toward South Korea¹⁶, Yu Tiejun's "The Significance of the Korean Peninsula in Xi Jinping's Global Strategy"¹⁷ and Scobell Andrew & Cozad Mark's "China's North Korea Policy: Rethink or Recharge?"¹⁸ Some of them distinctly point out unlike Hu's and Jiang's administration, Xi's administration has been promoting its relationship with North Korea as a normal-country relationship and actively presenting diplomatic charm offensive towards South Korea. Kim argues that the change is due to the evolution of China's Korea policy from previous "developing country school"(发展中国家学派) to "newly rising great power school"(新兴大国派). Song asserts that this is due to Xi Jinping administration's more assertiveness in China's "core interest. She maintains that for South Korea, against the backdrop of imminent power shifts between China and the US, China attempts to sever the US-Japan-South Korea alliance triangle by separating and drawing South Korea from the triangle so as to enhance its influence on the Korean Peninsula. China's assertive reaction to THAAD issue is also in line with this, given THAAD deployment threatened China's core interests. For Yu, he admits changes in China's South Korea policy, while views Xi's North Korea policy from the lens of consistency. As for China's South Korea policy, he mentions three factors that facilitate China's appreciation of South Korea's role, namely Seoul's crucial roles in helping China to offset the security pressure derived from US rebalance to Asia, and to confront Japan on its historical issues, as well as contributing to China's economic interest. He accounts for limited changed in China's North Korea by referring four factors, including ideological affinity, the geological factor, the traditional friendship based on "historical, cultural, and emotional memory, as well as economic factor". Scobell Andrew & Cozad Mark share a similar view with Yu, asserting that China's North Korea policy is a "recharge" rather than "rethink", citing China's firm belief in North Korea's geographic and strategic importance as a buffer zone.

¹³ 이동률, 2013 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제; 최명해, 2013 북중관계 동향과 향후 전망, 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 2014, pp 135-234; 이동률, 2014 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제, 최명해, 2014 북중관계 동향과 향후 전망, 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 2015, pp 187-322; 이동률, 2015 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제, 최명해, 2015 북중관계 동향과 향후 전망, 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 2016, pp 213-356; 이동률, 2016 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제, 최명해, 2016 북중관계 동향과 향후 전망, 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 2017, pp 219-370

¹⁴ Ren Yuanzhe's China's Perspective on the China-ROK Strategic Partnership: Developments, Debates, and Difficulties, The Chinese Perspectives Towards the Korean Peninsula: In The Aftermath of North Korea's Fourth Nuclear Test, STIMSON, June 2016, pp 53

¹⁵ Kim Heung-Kyu, A View from South Korea on Sino-ROK Relations, Joint US-Korea Academic Studies 2017

¹⁶ Song Lin, Xi Jinping Government's Foreign Policy toward South Korea, Academic Dissertation for Master Degree, Seoul National University, 2017

¹⁷ Yu Tiejun, The Significance of the Korean Peninsula in Xi Jinping's Global Strategy, The Chinese Perspectives Towards the Korean Peninsula: In The Aftermath of North Korea's Fourth Nuclear Test, STIMSON, June 2016

¹⁸ Scobell, A., & Cozad, M. (2014). China's north korea policy: Rethink or recharge? Parameters, 44(1), 51-63.

To sum up, these researches lay a solid foundation for the author to answer the last research question of what is changed or unchanged in China's Korea policy in Xi's era, however, for the first and second research question, resources are sporadically dispersed in the circles of English, Chinese, and Korean discourses. This research will do its utmost to compile these available and relevant information and provide a more thorough and in-depth exposition of China-ROK relations in Xi's era.

3. Analytical Framework and Research Methodology

For the first research question, this paper will choose several representative cases in the first three years of Xi Jinping office (2013-2015) and conduct a thorough analysis so as to better capture the nature of these events. For the second research question, the paper posits that both domestic and international factors are important in foreign policy decision, and it will utilize Putnam's two-level game frame to approach the question. For the third research question, by giving a brief review of China's Korea policy in Jiang Zemin-Hu Jintao era, it will give an overall assessment of what is changed or not in Xi Jinping administration.

The data and information used in this paper are either from government announcements, official remarks by the president, foreign minister or spokespersons, and other reliable media, such as Global Times, Yonhap News, and JoongAng Ilbo. Statistical data were retrieved from sources such as KOTRA, KITA, Ministry of Education of PRC, and US Department of Defence. Furthermore, the research referred to a combination of literatures written in Korean, Chinese, and English so as to consider diversified views.

Chapter II. Undercurrents in the amicable China-ROK relations at the initial stage of Xi Jinping administration

In this chapter, I will answer the first research question, namely “whether China-ROK relationship at the initial stage of Xi’s administration (2013-2015) is as amicable as it looks from appearance, or in other words, broke the bridle of “hot economy and cold politics”. Firstly, I will briefly look back on the past 24 years’ history in bilateral relationships, from economic arena, social arena, to political and military arena. Concerning the focus of this article is in political and military domain, I will elaborate more on major progresses in these two fields under Xi Jinping administration. Then I will take an in-depth look at those emblematic events in political and military arenas respectively, and find out how many concrete improvements were made in these occasions. Specifically, the four representative events in the political arena include President Xi’s state visit to ROK in 2014, South Korea’s decision to participate in AIIB in March 2015, and President Park’s attendance to China’s military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in September 2015, as well as the newly established strategic dialogue channel between the Korean Director of National Security Office and the Chinese State Councilor in June 2013. For the military arena, I selected one unprecedented achievement-opening a hotline between the ROK and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in 2015 as the object of my analysis. Moreover, in light of the widespread impacts of THAAD issue since 2016, I will also briefly touch upon it so as to unveil the entrenched interest disparity between China and ROK, which from my perspective is a structural problem, and is expected to prevail as a constant barrier to China-ROK’s affinity.

I concludes in this chapter with the argument that China-ROK relationship at the initial stage of Xi’s administration (2013-2015) did not break the bridle of “hot economy and cold politics.” No significant progress has been made in either military or political domain in spite of a more frequent high-level exchanges.

1. Bilateral relationship in economic and social arena

Since China and South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992, their economic relationship has made remarkable progress. China has overtaken the US, becoming South Korea’s largest trading partner since 2003. Bilateral trade volume has skyrocketed, surpassing the US \$200 billion within just two decades. As of 2015, the bilateral trade volume amounted to US \$227.4 billion, holding 24 percent of South Korea's total trade. The trade volume has overwhelmingly expanded by 36 times since 1992 (Figure 2.1).¹⁹

¹⁹ Diplomatic White Paper. 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; pp 270




Figure 2.1 Source: compiled from Korean International Trade Association website

The continuous improvement in bilateral economic relationship is concomitant with more frequent social exchanges. The number of mutual visits has ballooned from 400,000 in 1995 to more than 10 million in 2014. In 2013, Chinese visitors to ROK first surpassed ROK’s visitors to China. Replacing of Japan, China became ROK’s first tourist source country. Likewise, ROK has also outnumbered Japan since 2005, becoming China's first tourist source country.²⁰ Up until 2015, both countries have become the most inbound travelers' resource country for its counterpart. In 2014’s Xi-Park summit in Seoul, the two leaders further announced to hold “China’s Year of Tourism” in 2015 and “ROK’s Year of Tourism” in 2016, which undoubtedly accelerated this vigorous momentum (Figure 2.2).

With respect to the exchange of foreign students, when China and ROK established their foreign relations in 1992, there were only 24 Chinese students studying in ROK, comprising barely 1.5 percent of total foreign students in ROK; yet in 2016, this number has augmented by more than thousand times, reaching 37,036, comprising more than half of the total number of foreign students in ROK. China has also surpassed Japan, becoming the largest source of overseas students in ROK since 1996. In ROK’s side, ROK has always been China’s largest source of overseas students since the data is available in 2000, and the number has almost steadily increased ever since. In 2016, there are 70,540 Korean students in China, accounting for 15.9% of total number of foreign students in China. (Figure 2.3)

²⁰ “中韩旅游迈入“1000万时代” 互办旅游年促进新增长”, 新华社, 2015.1.20




Figure 2 Source: China National Tourism Administration (2000-2016 年中国旅游业统计公报); Korean Tourism Organization (1984-2016 출입국 국가별 월별 통계)




Figure 2.3 Source: Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China (2000-2016 年全国来华留学生数据统计); Korean Educational Statistics (1992-2016 Statistical yearbook of education)

2. Bilateral relationship in political arena

2.1 An overview of bilateral political relations

In terms of bilateral political relations, the two countries have upgraded bilateral relationship from “Cooperative Partnership” during Kim Dae-Jung’s state visit to China in November 1998, to “Comprehensive and Cooperative Partnership” during Roh Mu-hyun’s state visit to China in July 2003, then to “Strategic Cooperative Partnership” during Lee Myung-bak’s visit to China in May 2008. In light of the fact that their bilateral relationship is more in name than in reality, the two sides decided to enrich the contents rather than only

upgrade the bilateral relations superficially. Following Park Geun-hye's state visit to China in June 2013 and President Xi's state visit to Seoul in July 2014, the two leaders adopted the Korea-China Joint Statement on Future Vision and the Korea-China Joint Statement consecutively that laid out the blueprint for future development of bilateral relations.

In the 2013 Joint Statement, the most noticeable progress is that the two leaders decided to strengthen strategic communications by setting up four channels of strategic dialogues, namely dialogue between the Korean Director of National Security Office and the Chinese State Councilor; foreign policy and security dialogue; policy dialogue among parties; and a joint strategic dialogue between national research institutes.²¹ The two countries also agreed to hold the Vice Foreign Ministerial Strategic Dialogue twice a year. In the 2014 Joint Statement, both agreed to institutionalize and regularize mutual state visits, and establishing a track 1.5 dialogue that encompasses public and private sectors, and holding the Korea-China Young Leaders Forum on a regular basis.

Under the guidance of the two joint statements and the special attention from two leaders, ROK and China had officially launched all four strategic dialogue channels until 2015. A dialogue between the Korean Director of National Security Office and the Chinese State Councilor was held in Seoul in November 2013, the ROK China Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue was held in Beijing in December 2013, the ROK-China Joint Strategic Dialogue between the respective national research institutes of Korea and China was held in Seoul in December 2013, and the first Korea-China Parties Strategic Dialogue was also successfully launched in October 2014.²² For the Track 1.5 Dialogue, it was firstly launched in August 2015, and for the Korea-China Young Leaders Forum, it was convened in October 2015, with the participation of 100 young leaders from both countries.²³ Moreover, Chinese provincial senior officials were also invited by the Korean government in September 2014 as part of its program to invite "influential people of China". ROK also held China-ROK "future oriented exchange programs" of mid-level officials six times in 2014.²⁴

By 2015, Many bilateral strategic dialogues or high-level exchanges, ranging from foreign affairs, to security and parliamentary exchanges, have been regularized. For example, a telephone hotline between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries was established in 2005, the Security Dialogue was initiated in October 2002, regular foreign vice minister level talks were first held since May 2006, and exchange mechanism of the Korean National Assembly and China's National People's Congress was stipulated into the Protocol on Exchange and Cooperation in 2006. Since 2006, there have been at least three bilateral summits (including president-premier meetings) every year, more than five meetings once a year between Prime ministers, Foreign Ministers or Vice Foreign Ministers on average, no less than ten other high-level meetings once a year on average. In total, almost no less than twenty high-level meetings have been held every year. The frequency of high-level meetings shows that political relationship between China and ROK has been largely promoted, at least quantitatively. By dint of frequent bilateral high-level contacts, the two sides can exchange their views and deepen understandings to each other so as to respect the other's demands and interest, and increase their policy coordination. (Figure 4)

²¹ Diplomatic White Paper. 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; pp 84-89,

²² Diplomatic White Paper. 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015; pp 86

²³ Diplomatic White Paper. 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; pp 86-91

²⁴ Diplomatic White Paper. 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; pp 86




Figure 2.4 Source: Diplomatic White Paper. 2006-2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Speaking of the first three years in Xi Jinping administration, there had been nine China-ROK summit meetings.²⁵ In addition to the bilateral summits, meetings between Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and Vice Foreign Ministers were also flourishing. Foreign Minister Wang Yi held ten Foreign Ministers’ Meetings with his ROK counterpart.²⁶ From appearance, bilateral relations are as warm as Chinese official media reported: “China-South Korea relations, described as featuring ‘warming politics, hot economy’ are at the best in history since the two nations established diplomatic ties 23 years ago”.²⁷ However, findings after an in-depth look at those proclaimed major achievements in the first three years of Xi Jinping administration contradict with this judgement, and these findings actually unveil the fragility of bilateral political ties.

2.2 Reassessment of major events in bilateral political relations (2013-2015)

2.2.1 President Xi’s state visit to ROK in 2014

As for President Xi Jinping’s visit to ROK in 2014, it is well-known that there are several points strayed from Chinese diplomatic practices: firstly, it was the first time that Chinese leaders paid an official visit to Seoul prior to Pyongyang; secondly, Xi’s visit to South Korea was a single-country overseas trip, which used to cover at least four countries.

²⁵ Include two state visits of President Park to China in June 2013 and in September 2015, and one state visit of President Xi to ROK in July 2014, and one official visit of Prime Minister Li Keqiang to ROK, and other five conversation exchanges on the sidelines of the G20 Summit (St. Petersburg) in 2013, the APEC Summit (Bali) in 2013, Nuclear Security Summit (Hague) in 2014, ASEM Summit (Milano) in 2014, APEC Summit (Beijing) in 2014.

²⁶ Include ROK Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se’s visit to China in April 2013, the ASEAN+3/ARF Foreign Ministers’ Meetings in June 2013 and the UN General Assembly in September 2013, the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to ROK in May 2014, ARF Foreign Ministers’ Meetings in August 2014, APEC Summit in November 2014, Korea-Japan-China Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2015, ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers’ Meetings in August 2015, and ASEAN+3 Summit in November 2015.

²⁷ Gui Tao, Frequent exchange of high-level visits highlights closer China-South Korea ties, Xinhua News Agency, 2015.10.31

This was termed as ‘foreign policy acupuncture’(点穴外交),²⁸ which means to affect a large scale by hitting a vocal point. It was conceived that by only visiting South Korea, China could evoke a strong repercussions in other neighboring countries, like North Korea and Japan.²⁹ Chinese foreign minister commented the visit felt like a trip to see a relative.³⁰

However, it’s worth noting that the timing of Xi’s visit was coincidental. It was in the context that in response to US rebalancing to Asia, and a rapidly deteriorated China’s peripheral security situation, China just kicked off New Asia Security Concept, which envisions to displace the U.S.-led security order (formal alliances), and exchange economic baits for obeisance of Asian countries to China’s privileges.³¹ Although China was desperate for Seoul’s endorsement on this new foreign policy agenda, it was merely a jarring tone for South Korea, who lays its security foundation on ROK-US alliance to confront threats from North Korea. China was also apprehensive of Seoul’s possible consent to US-led missile defense system, which China adamantly opposed and viewed as a ploy to contain itself. Xi’s visit was also in the wake of Japan’s decision to reexamine the Kono Statement that refers to an official apology from Japanese government on comfort women, and to reinterpret its pacifist Constitution to allow itself to exercise collective self-defense right.³² The former ignited South Korea’s flames of fury, while the later unsettled China, its intended target. The worsened Japan-South Korea ties and increasingly intensified US-China rivalry in Asia thrust China to capitalize on such a good opportunity to separate South Korea from US and Japan. X’s visit was also on the heels of North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013, its obstinate disavowal of the consensus reached at previous Six-Party Talks, and its defiant threat of another nuclear test in April 2014. Although North Korea’s nuclear rearmament does not pose a grave threat to China, it do provide the best excuse for US to consolidate its presence in the region, and strengthen trilateral ties with South Korea and Japan, which might be used to contain China. Global Times commented that Xi’s visit was expected to exert “positive” pressure on Pyongyang, namely to push it reflect on its action and make diplomatic efforts to reinforce communication with Beijing given its reliance on China both politically and economically. It was also notified there was no change in China’s Korea policy.³³

In contrast, in South Korea’s side, North Korea nuclear issue topped the agendas.³⁴ On account of China’s enormous economic leverage on the North, Seoul pinned its hope on China’s greater pressure on North Korea’s nuclear development, which its Chinese counterpart who values stability most would be reluctant to cater to. The soured China-DPRK relations after North Korea third nuclear test also bestowed a good opportunity on Seoul to peddle its reunification gambit.

In order to better appraise the result of this summit, it is necessary to take a close look at the joint statement of this summit. No doubt, two countries made giant strides on economic

²⁸ 김홍규, 중국국가 주석 시진핑의 2014 년 방한과 한중관계, 전략연구 21(4), 2014.11, 63-89, 한국전략문제연구소, <http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE02514565>, accessed date: 2017/06/16(KST)

²⁹ 解读：习近平“点穴式”外交有何特点, 人民网, 2014.8.26

³⁰ 外交部长王毅谈习近平主席对韩国进行国事访问, 新华网, 2014.7.4

³¹ David C. McCaughrin, What Does China's 'New Asian Security Concept' Mean for the US?, The Diplomat, 2017.1.21

³² China, SK share Japan concerns, Global Times, 2014.7.5, www.globaltimes.cn/content/868916.shtml

³³ Xi looks to North in landmark Seoul visit, Global Times, 2014.7.3, www.globaltimes.cn/content/868631.shtml

³⁴ (5th LD) Park, Xi vow denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, Yonhap News, 2014.7.3

and social arena, such as agreeing on pushing ahead of the China-ROK FTA, boosting the more flexible use of RMB, cooperating on Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), and strengthening China-ROK economic cooperation in Saemangeum industrial park. Nevertheless, they were more circumspect in taking any dramatic measures to solve long-pending political or military issues, such as maritime conflicts, bilateral relations with Japan, US, and North Korea. Whenever the talks wended its way towards political or military arena, the interest disparities would erupt conspicuously. South Korea dodged China coveted anti-Japan coalition, and restrained from endorsing China proposed New Security Concept, or publically opposing US-led missile defense system. China refused to side with Seoul to condemn North Korea nuclear weapons program exclusively, yet maintained its previous stance on denuclearization issue, namely “the denuclearization of Korean Peninsula”. There was also little change in China’s stance on the reunification issue. (Form 2.1)

Thus, the political and strategic differences on bilateral relations with North Korea, Japan and US have restricted the improvement of bilateral political ties. This summit was basically another show for both sides to confirm their divergence rather than convergence.

Form 2.1 : The result-analysis of China-ROK summit in July 2014³⁵

Field	Subject	ROK’s position	China’s position	Result
Strategic Cooperation	New Asian Security Concept	Prudent and cautious	Desire for ROK’s support	Not mentioned in official statements, but ROK unofficially expressed its concern
	AIIB	Prudent and cautious	Desire for ROK’s support	Not mentioned in official statements, but ROK unofficially expressed its concern
	Keeping Cooperation on issues with regards to Japan	Supporting in principle but showing prudence diplomatically	Desire for ROK’s strong support	Not mentioned in official statement, but ROK strongly supports it informally
	Deployment of US Missile Defense System (THAAD) in ROK	Prudent and cautious	Strong opposition	Informal objection
	Nuclear Security Regime in Northeast Asia	Enhancement	Enhancement	Discussion about practical cooperation
China-	China-ROK FTA	Prudently	Actively pushing	Planned to push

³⁵ 김홍규, 2014.11

ROK relations		pushing ahead	ahead	ahead within the year
	Boosting a more flexible use of RMB	Pushing ahead	Pushing ahead	The launch of the Chinese yuan (or RMB) clearance in Seoul; launch of direct trading between CNY and KRW
	Cooperation in Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI)	Pushing ahead	Pushing ahead	Pushing ahead
	Agreement on China-ROK economic cooperation industrial park in Saemangeum	Pushing ahead	Neutral	Reached agreement
	Issue of Operational order in the Yellow Sea of China/West Sea of ROK	Actively improving	Negative	Strengthening cooperation
	Delimitation of maritime boundaries in the East Sea of China/South Sea of ROK	Actively improving	Prevaricating and postponing	Initiated bilateral talks since 2015
	Issue of the notation of East Sea (ROK)/Sea of Japan	Improving	Prevaricating	No mentioning
	Strengthening cooperation in non-traditional security arena	Pushing ahead	Pushing ahead	Pushing ahead
	Enriching and institutionalizing bilateral strategic dialogues	Pushing ahead	Inactively Pushing ahead	Pushing ahead
	Improving people-to-people exchanges	Pushing ahead	Pushing ahead	Pushing ahead

Cooperation in policies with regard to North Korea	Denuclearization	Denuclearization of North Korea	Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula	Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula
	Resumption of Six-Party Talks	Request for North Korea's sincerity	Resumption first	Endeavoring to create better conditions for resumption
	The system-building of anti-North Korean ICBM	Improving	Prudent and cautious	Not mentioned
	ROK's peaceful reunification plan	Desire for China's support for Dresden Declaration	Prudent and cautious	China's support for Dresden Declaration in indirect way

2.22 South Korea's participation in China-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in March 2015

In October 2013, at the APEC Summit in Indonesia, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced to open a new China-led multilateral development bank (MDB), the AIIB. President Xi said that this bank “would promote interconnectivity and economic integration in the region and cooperate with existing multilateral development banks, including the World Bank and the ADB.”³⁶

The Bank is designed to extend financial supports for infrastructure demands in Asia-Pacific region, and in particular, to provide financing to the “One Belt, One Road(OBOR)” initiative. Nevertheless, from the lens of U.S-China rivalry in Asia, many observers view this as China's ambitious vision in reinforcing a regional infrastructure dominated by itself. By using this as a political tool, China desires to draw neighboring countries into its orbit, and defuse anxieties among its neighbors about its territorial claims.³⁷ The AIIB, as one observer commented, “can be seen as another prong in China's Monroe Doctrine, a signal that it should be free to call the shots in its own backyard.”³⁸ Others conceived this as its “deliberate effort to undercut the the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, international financial institutions established after World War II that are dominated by the United States and Japan.” These combined made the US take a cautious attitude to AIIB and lobby its allies not to join it. US officials said “they do not want to support an initiative Washington thinks is unlikely to promote good environmental, procurement and human rights standards in the way the World Bank and ADB are required to.”³⁹

³⁶ "President Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2013.10.2

³⁷Jane Perlez, U.S. Opposing China's Answer to World Bank, New York Times, 2014.10.9,

³⁸ Yoichi Funabashi, “A Futile Boycott of China's Bank Will Not Push Xi Out of His Back Yard,” Financial Times, 2014.12.9

³⁹Big nations snub Beijing bank launch after US lobbying, Financial Times, 2014.10.23,

In South Korea's case, during President Xi's visit to Seoul, he expressed the wish to President Park for South Korea's participation in the AIIB. In response, South Korea's presidential office stated that South Korea appraised China's constructive role in putting up with such a mechanism in order to improve the environment of infrastructure investment in the region, and it would keep consultations on this issue. In spite of South Korea's positive responses at the start, just four days later, Seoul reneged its previous stance on this issue after heeded US public warnings.⁴⁰ The U.S. government reminded South Korea that China might use this bank for political gains, and South Korea's membership of this bank would impair its credibility as an important U.S. ally.⁴¹

In reality, Seoul did not choose to stand with China dismissing U.S. grievances, actually it was Washington on 17 March 2015 who gave South Korea the green light, and proclaimed that it was up to individual country to make the final decision.⁴² After witnessing many of its important Western allies rushed to participate as 30 March deadline approached, the U.S. was no longer in the position to dampen Seoul's interest. In spite of Washington's pressure, following New Zealand's approval on January 1, Luxembourg's secret ongoing negotiation on March 11, 2015, Britain, as the first G-7 country, and one of the US's closest allies, publicly announced its decision on the bank's membership with virtually no consultation with its U.S. counterpart on March 12⁴³, followed by Switzerland on March 13, and France, Germany and Italy all together on March 16, and Austria joined several days later.⁴⁴ On March 17, Washington's top diplomat for East Asia hinted that "the concerns about the AIIB remained but the decision on whether to join was up to individual nations."⁴⁵ In this context, Seoul's declaration on its participation in AIIB should never be regarded as a move tilting toward China even economically. Without the US acquiescence, it is hard for Seoul to join AIIB arbitrarily. The release of U.S. pressure freed Seoul from previous absentee. This could be further substantiated by Seoul's official report about its decision to join AIIB on March 27, "Washington has said that the final decision rests with Seoul, and they have even acknowledged that there are investment-related demands that South Korean companies have the capability to meet."⁴⁶ Notably, Seoul only announced its decision three days earlier than the deadline, and almost a year after they first expressed the interest to join, and Seoul was also the last batch of U.S. ally to participate this bank for founding members. In this deliberation, Seoul apparently took full account of U.S responses before making such a decision, and only made the decision when time was ripe.

Therefore, Seoul's decision to join the AIIB should not be viewed as its leaning toward China at the cost of U.S.-ROK alliance, let alone an act of defiance. This is only a calculated

⁴⁰ Yoo Seungki, News Analysis: S.Korea selects national interests by joining AIIB, Xihuanet, 2015.3.27,

⁴¹ Moon Gwang-lip And Park Jin-seok, U.S. warns Korea against joining China's bank, 2014.6.30,

⁴² Ankit Panda, 'South Korea Joins the AIIB', *The Diplomat*, 2015.3.28, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/south-korea-joins-the-aiib/>

⁴³ Geoff Dyer & George Parker, US attacks UK's 'constant accomodation' with China, 2015.3.13, Financial Times,

⁴⁴ Jamil Anderlini, UK move to join China-led bank a surprise even to Beijing, Financial Times, 2015.3.27,

⁴⁵ Major U.S. allies to join China-backed bank - reports, Reuters, 2015.3.17; <https://in.reuters.com/article/europe-asia-bank-idINKBN0MD0BA20150317>

⁴⁶ S. Korea to seek AIIB stake commensurate with its economic size, Yonhap News, 2015 .3.27, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/full/2015/03/27/64/1200000000AEN20150327002800320F.html>

step for Seoul to secure its traditional ties with the US, while reaping economic benefit from its partnership with China.

2.23 President Park's attendance to China's military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in September 2015

Concerning President Park's attendance in Chinese military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in September 2015,⁴⁷ some people see this as evidence of South Korea's tilting toward China at the expense of the US⁴⁸ while others amplified China-North Korea splits by referring to North Korean representative-Choe Ryong-hae's inconspicuous position on the podium, which was in sharp contrast to the position of President Park, who stood alongside with President Xi. But a close look reveals that these statements are exaggerated. In essence, two countries failed to reconcile their disparity in a bunch of issues.

Firstly, speaking of President Park's special treatment in this military parade, it is conceivable on account of the symbolic meaning of Seoul's appearance at such a controversial gala, when all US allies and western countries snubbed and decried China's scheme to flex muscles. To some extent, it was a reward for Seoul's hard-won alacrity.⁴⁹ On the other hand, placing President Park at the middle of the front row conformed to China's interest. Through such a arrangement, China could send a signal of South Korea's inclination toward China.⁵⁰ Boggled in an intensified competition with the US for global leadership and a rat race with Japan for regional supremacy in Asia, China wanted to capitalize on the shared historical antipathy toward Japan between two countries so that alienate Seoul from Tokyo, and thwart US's conspiracy of beefing up triangular military cooperation in containing China. To China's dismay, South Korea remained reticent about public opposition to Japan's historical revisionism and its seeking for collective self-defense, which China was desperate for South Korea's united front .

Secondly, sensed of Washington's displeasure, Seoul deliberately calculated the date to announce Park's participation. Before announcing President Park's visit to China, South Korean foreign ministry unusually announced President Park's state visit to the US more than one month earlier than before. Analysts commented "Seoul wanted to announce Park's U.S. trip before her trip to China so as to stress the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance."⁵¹

Thirdly, from Seoul's view, the reason for President Park's presence is its high expectation on China's role in pressuring North Korea to disarm its nuclear weapons and standing by Seoul in reunification issue.⁵² While reiterating German's reunification by absorption, President Park commented that "its an important time to lay the foundation for unification because this year marks the 70th anniversary of the division of the Korean

⁴⁷ 서정경, 외교 : 열병식 이후의 한중관계, 성균차이나브리프, 2015, Vol.3(4), p.39

⁴⁸ Scott A. Snyder, "Park's Decision to Join Xi Jinping's World War II Commemoration," Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound, 2015/09/02

⁴⁹ 이동률, 2015 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제, 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 2016, pp 221-225

⁵⁰ Robert E. Kelly, Why Park Geun-hye Attended China's World War Two Military Parade, Sept 7, 2015, Lowy Institute, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-park-geun-hye-attended-chinas-world-war-two-military-parade>

⁵¹ Park will attend Xi's Victory Day military parade, Korea Joongang Daily, 2015.8.28;

⁵² Kim Kwang-tae, Park arrives in Shanghai after attending military parade , Yonhap News; 2015.9.3

Peninsula.”⁵³This betrays President Park’s intent to sever China and North Korea’s client-patron relationship , aggravate Pyongyang’s isolation, and if possible to implode it.⁵⁴

Fourthly, their disparate elaboration on the result of the summit meeting held on 2nd September prior to the military parade also testified the interest divergence rather than interest convergence between two sides. In contrast to South Korean official media, who optimistically reported “President Park Geun-hye and her Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, warned North Korea against taking any action that could escalate tensions and they renewed calls for the resumption of long-stalled talks on ending Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions,”⁵⁵Chinese official media only vaguely mentioned “the two sides (China and ROK) voiced opposition to any act that could escalate tensions”. China’s such admonition was actually target not only North Korea, but also ROK and US’s unilateral actions.⁵⁶

In sum, President Park’s presence on the military parade cannot be gloried as an evidence of China-ROK intimacy in political arena, or ROK’s tilting toward China. Their disparate agenda settings only portended the vulnerability of this short-lived amity.

2.24 The new strategic dialogue channel between the Korean Director of National Security Office and the Chinese State Councilor

The high-level diplomacy-security dialogue between the Korean Director of National Security Office and the Chinese State Councilor was established in June 2013, and was held its first meeting between Yang Jiechi and Kim Jang-soo in November 2013. South Korea media touted this channel as the highest level foreign policy & security policy dialogue channel, which connoted both sides reached consensus on promoting their coordination in North Korea issue and North Korea denuclearization issue.⁵⁷ However, after the first convention, this dialogue channel has been dormant, if not dead. Then how about the first talk?

First of all, with regards to the reports released after this meeting in both sides, we can find Seoul exclusively focused on North Korea issue, while Chinese side emphasized expanding bilateral cooperation in the aftermath of the successful convention of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, with no reference to North Korea nuclear issue.⁵⁸ It seems China preferred to separate its ties with South Korea from that with the North so as to defuse the illusion that China was moving close to Seoul or aligning with Seoul in Pyongyang’s nuclear issue..

Furthermore, according to South Korean media, one of key topics at this meeting was to discuss the resumption of Six-Party Talks, but as a matter of fact, no progress was made, as the two sides only reached a consensus on creating favorable conditions before resumption of the talk.⁵⁹With regards to the preconditions of resuming the talk, South Korea, with Japan,

⁵³ 박대통령 "北 올바른 변화 위해 중국이 중요역할 해야"(종합), 연합뉴스, 2015.9.4;

⁵⁴ Robert E. Kelly, 2015

⁵⁵ (5th LD) Park, Xi warn N. Korea against any provocations, Yonhap news, 2015.9.2;

⁵⁶ 习近平会见韩国总统朴槿惠, 人民网, 2015.9.2

⁵⁷ 중앙제츠-김장수, 18 일 첫 한중 고위급 전략대화(종합), 연합뉴스 , 2013.11.18,

<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2013/11/17/0503000000AKR20131117029051043.HTML>

⁵⁸ 杨洁篪会见韩国总统府国家安保室长金章洙, 外交部, 2013.11.18

⁵⁹ 중앙제츠-김장수, 18 일 첫 한중 고위급 전략대화(종합), 연합뉴스 ,2013.11.18, 김장수-양제츠 "北 비핵화 진전 모든 외교적 노력"(종합), 연합뉴스 , 2013.11.18

shored up the US allegation that North Korea should provide evidences of sincerity, or say pre-steps toward denuclearization before resuming Six-Party Talks, which was promptly rejected by North Korea.⁶⁰

3. Bilateral relationship in military arena

3.1 An overview of bilateral military relations

Compared to burgeoning momentum in bilateral economic and social relations, and quantitatively improved political relations, China-ROK military relations have been far more left behind. Since the Department of Defense Attache of ROK to China and the Department of Defense Attache of ROK to China were established in 1993 and in 1994 respectively, ROK has been quite active in dispatching its high-ranking military officers to China, while China has shown more passive and reluctant posture in promoting its military relations with ROK until 2000. (Form 2.2) To be noted, the year of 2000 is also a watershed in the history of China and DPRK relations, when bilateral relations not only underwent readjustments “from comrades in arms to allies at arm’s length”, but began to warm up after the high-profile state visit of Supreme People’s Assembly President Kim Yong-Nam in 1999, which was the first high-level state visit since President Kim Il-Sung’s visit in late 1991.⁶¹ China’s changed attitude in military exchanges with South Korea around 2000, concurrent with the improvement of China-DPRK relations reflected China’s prudent maneuvering of an equal-distance policy toward two Koreas, and its particular caution against irritating North Korea, or ruining an already fragile relations with North Korea at that time.

On the positive side, China-ROK high-level exchanges in military arena did improve a lot at least in number (Form 2.2). Before President Xi Jinping took office in 2013, China and ROK have established various regular high-level exchange mechanisms, including Strategic Defense Talk (Vice Defense Minister), Defense Policy Working Meeting, Foreign policy and Security Talks (2+2), Information Exchange Meeting, Meetings between ROK’s JCS and the PLA Chief of General Staff of China, and Bilateral Meetings of Armies and Navies or Air Forces. Besides, a direct phone line between China and ROK’s Navies and Air Forces was also set up, and both sides even conducted Search and Rescue Training for three times. (Form 2.3 & Form 2.4)

Nevertheless, evaluating China-ROK military relations in the first four years of Xi Jinping administration reveals that no significant progress has been made. Most of the high-level military exchanges were either held based on previously regularized mechanism, or conducted out of courtesy and without substantiality. For the former, they include the high-level talks between the Chairman of ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and PLA Chief of General Staff of China in June 2013,⁶² and high-level meetings between Chinese and South Korean Minister of National Defense in February 2015. Both of them were based on the precedently established mechanism in either 2001 or 2000. For military exchanges that were out of courtesy and without much meaningful contents, they include events of ROK’s dispatch of three representatives from the ROK Army, Navy, and Air Forces to attend China’s military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in September 2015, the Ministry of National Defense of ROK’s yearly repatriation of the remains of Chinese

⁶⁰ 한중 고위채널 상시 가동체제...6 자회담 재개 미지수 (종합), 연합뉴스, 2013.11.18

⁶¹ Samuel S. Kim, “China, Japan, and Russia in Inter-Korean Relations”, Korea Briefing 2000-2001 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002)
하도형, “한중 국방교류의 확대와 제한요인에 관한 연구”, 현대중국학회, <현대중국연구> 9 권 2 호 (2008), pp.1-35

⁶² 2014 Defense White Paper, pp.131-132

soldiers, and the first visiting performance of the Korean National Military Symphony to China in 2014. If there was any noticeable improvement to name out, it would be the reached consensus on opening a hotline between the ROK and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in 2014.⁶³

Form 2.2: Bilateral high-level exchanges in military arena (1992-2012)⁶⁴

		1992-1997	1998-2002	2003-2007	2008-2012
Korea	(Vice) Minister of National Defense		99, 91	05, 07	09, 12
	Chairman of the JCS	92, 94	00	03, 07	11, 12
	Army Chief of Staff		01		08
	Navy Chief of Staff		00	04, 06	08, 09
	Air Force Chief of Staff		02	05	08, 09
China	(Vice) Minister of National Defense		00	06	11
	The General Staff of PLA		02	07	09, 12
	Vice General Staff of PLA		98	03, 07	08
	Commander		01		08
Total		2	10	11	14

Form 2.3: Regular military high-level meetings (1992-2012)⁶⁵

Type	Current Status
Defense Strategic Dialogue (vice minister)	First held in 2011
The defense policy working meeting	Irregularly held since 1995, regularly held since 2004, 12 meetings until 2011 in total
Foreign policy and Security talks 2+2	Held for three times (in 2002, 2006 and 2007)
Information exchange meeting	Held for seven times since 1999, but

⁶³ 2016 Defense White Paper, pp 86-91

⁶⁴ 박창희, 한중수교 20 년과 한중군사관계 발전: 회고와 전망, 중소연구 2012 년 36 권 1 호, pp 17-36, 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터, 2012

⁶⁵ Ibid

	suspended due to Taiwan issue
Meetings between ROK's JCS and the PLA Chief of General Staff of China	Held in 2001 but suspended later
Bilateral Meetings of Armies/Navies	Held in 2008 for once
Bilateral meetings of Air forces	Held in every two years since 2004

Form 2.4: other important cooperation mechanism or activities⁶⁶

A direct phone line between China and ROK's Navies and Air Forces	Set up in 2008
Search and Rescue Training	Held for three times in total (2005, 2007, and 2008)

3.2 Reassessment of major events in bilateral military relations (2013-2015)

3.21 Opening a hotline between the ROK and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense

On Dec 31, 2015, China and South Korea opened a military hotline between their Ministry of National Defense. Regardless of the significance of this hotline in making China a particular country next to the US, with whom South Korea has such a high-level military hotline, Chinese Ministry of National Defense actually refused Seoul's request for phone consultations right after North Korea's nuclear test in 2016. This indicates a lack of substantial contents of this hotline.⁶⁷

3.22 THAAD Issues

Another issue in military arena that attracted most spotlight is the Seoul's decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. This issue surged in February 2016 after South Korea declared to officially discuss this with the US, and this controversy intensified when South Korea and the US announced THAAD deployment in July 7. From then on, China-ROK relations precipitously chilled down, synchronized with Chinese economic retaliation. China has used its economic leverage to orally issue travel bans and prevent group tourists from visiting South Korea, and put restrictions on the business activities of South Korea's entertainment and car industries, among which the situation of South Korean conglomerate Lotte Group, who sold its land to the military for THAAD deployment stood out most. In early 2017, Chinese regulators shut down seventy five Lotte stores in an excuse of inspection failures.⁶⁸ Until the end of 2017, bilateral relationship is still in slump. For that matter, both have their respective rationales.

⁶⁶ Ibid

⁶⁷ 한중 '군사 핫라인', 北 핵 실험에도 '뚜뚜뚜~...'; 연합뉴스, 2016.1.7.

⁶⁸ THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, Institute for Security & Development, 2017.10.

From South Korea's perspective, the culprit is North Korea's fourth nuclear test and its so-called successful launch of satellite (Kwangmyongsong-4) into space. It asserted that THAAD system would strengthen South Korea's missile defense capabilities and more effectively counter North Korea's potential missile attacks, and it did not target at any third countries. According to the Gallup Korea Survey after the announcement of THAAD deployment in July, 50 percent of the 1,004 respondents approved of the THAAD deployment while 32 percent opposed it. Within THAAD battery supporters, most of them claimed it will add to national security and safety.⁶⁹

In contrast, China's leaderships consider THAAD system from the strategic perspectives and believe it is a step of US rebalance to Asia and its containment policy toward China. First of all, China raises suspicions about the viability of this system given geographical proximity between two Koreas, and claims North Korea does not necessarily need to launch missiles if it wants to attack South Korea, since short-ranged artilleries and tanks that South Korea has little to counteract would be enough.⁷⁰ Secondly, China fears the deployment of THAAD would enable U.S. to integrate the defense systems in South Korea with that in US and Japan, and be used for the US to encircle China. It is also skeptical about the likelihood of a ring of X-band radar to be used for scanning deeper into China, and giving enough warning time and better detection capabilities for the US, thereby negating China's second-strike capability.⁷¹ China refutes that when the wartime operational control (OPCON) transfers between ROK and US is still pending, any military autonomy and oral promises from ROK would be groundless and unreliable. Thirdly, China is wary of the deployment of THAAD system which is a sign of South Korea's one step forward to form the US-Japan-ROK trilateral alliance, and an upgrade of ROK-US alliance to an equivalent of Japan-US alliance. In light of the great importance of Korean Peninsula to Chinese security, China considers the emergence of a coherent US-ROK-Japan military triangle to be a primary strategic hindrance. Beijing's efforts to foster flourishing economic ties with Seoul is largely under the consideration of preventing such an alliance from emerging.⁷²

In sum, whether there are more insidious motives behind ROK's sway towards deploying THAAD, it is unquestionable that in a foreseeable future, South Korea has to rely on US-ROK alliance to protect its national security when the Korean peninsula is still in the de jure state of war, and military threats from North Korea are imminent. Meanwhile, in order to resolve the nuclear standoff with North Korea and achieve Korean reunification, South Korea has to seek for China's cooperation in light of China's special relations with the North as that country's exclusive patron and the biggest trade partner, and the only country who could exert enormous leverage over the North Korean regime. For China, when US and China are intensely contending for Asia dominancy, it will become increasingly sensitive and vocal about US-ROK alliance. It appears that US-ROK alliance and China-DPRK alignment on the

⁶⁹ Half of S. Koreans support THAAD deployment: poll, Yonhap News, 2016.7.15,

⁷⁰ 韩美一意孤行部署萨德 地区军备竞赛或将开启, 环球时报, 2016.7.9

⁷¹ 外交部就美韩在韩部署“萨德”反导系统发表声明, 新华社, 2016.7.9

http://news.xinhuanet.com/2016-07/08/c_1119186942.htm

⁷² Sungtae “Jacky” Park, How China sees THAAD, CSIS, 2016.3.30

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-32-how-china-sees-thaad>

one hand strengthen China and South Korea's prestige in each other's strategic calculation,⁷³ on the other hand, it sets a ceiling for bilateral cooperation.

4. Conclusion

The brief review of past 24 years' history of bilateral relations shows economic arena, after twenty years' development, bilateral trade volume peaked in around 2014, and then has maintained somewhat slow downturns. It implies without new stimulation, bilateral economic ties are supposed to stagger or even backslide. This underlies the necessity of accelerating the conclusion of bilateral FTA talks. In social arena, Chinese visits to ROK is still booming, by contrast, the number of South Koreans' visits to China reached its apex in 2007, and since then it has hovered around 4 million. South Korea's keen interest on improving its ties with China is motivated by its high expectation to further exploit the potential of Chinese tourist markets. In contrast, the market saturation of South Korean tourists to China leaves China less passionate in promoting bilateral tourism with South Korea. This economic advantage gives China huge leverages in dealing with South Korea's THAAD issue.

In political arena, there is no doubt bilateral relations had at least improved rapidly in number since 1992, and many high-level talks had been regularized and institutionalized even before President Xi Jinping took office. China-ROK's warm relationship in political arena is somewhat exaggerated by the public media of both countries, and in reality no significant progress was made. Even for some new mechanisms, they are only in name, such as the new strategic dialogue channel between the Korean Director of National Security Office and the Chinese State Councilor. Besides, other claimed representative achievements, such as President Xi's state visit to ROK in 2014, South Korea's participation in AIIB, and President Park's attendance to China's military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in September 2015, only betrayed the divergent interest of two sides on their approaches to North Korea, Japan and the US. The outburst of THAAD issues exactly illustrated such discrepancies between two sides.

In military arena, growth trends have prevailed even before Xi Jinping ascended its power, which might be attributed to a lagging-behind development. However, since most high-level meetings held in past four years were based on either previously regularized mechanisms or simply out of courtesy, and without too much substantial contents, we cannot say any significant progresses were made in military arena, include the opening of a hot line between two countries' Ministry of National Defense. An in-depth analysis reveals this hotline is only in name, and up until the end of President Park's departure in early 2017, it has not been put into use. China's unilateral decline to answer the phone after the fourth nuclear test of North Korea in 2016 substantiates a lack of viability of this hotline.

In retrospect of past three years' developments of China-ROK relations, we can find China-ROK relation is like a bed-fellow with different dreams. Seoul's active engagement with China was undergirded by its intention to strive for China's supports on reunification issue and North Korea nuclear issue, while China's initiative posture was motivated by its will to weaken US-ROK alliance, and prevent military integration among US, Japan and ROK, which China conceives as a US vicious plot to thwart China's rise.

⁷³ 韓·美 멀어지면... 中, 오히려 한국을 경시할 것, NK 조선, 2014.7.18

Chapter III. Cause analysis for the downturn of China-ROK relations in Xi Jinping administration- A case study of South Korea's THAAD deployment

This chapter will deal with the second research question-“despite there is an undercurrent of antipathy in security or political issues, the ups-and-downs in China-ROK relations during past four years are still visible. If so, what kind of factors plays a role in the downturn of bilateral relation?” It is widely believed that the turning point of this dynamics is North Korea's missile launching and fourth nuclear test in early 2016. This was accused of catalyzing South Korea's reverse of its long-standing “strategic ambiguity” on THAAD issue, namely the three “no” stance-“on this issue there has been no request from the United States, no negotiations with the United States, and no decision by the Korean government”.⁷⁴ and finally led Seoul's determination on THAAD deployment. In Chinese side, however, many argue the timing of South Korea's THAAD deployment is factitious, and they conceived South Korea had overreacted, and North Korea's fourth nuclear test was only a fabricated excuse for Seoul's decision on deploying THAAD system. They understand South Korea's move through the lens of China-US rivalry in East Asia, and the US rebalance to Asia.⁷⁵ Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi metaphorized this as “Xiang Zhuang performed a sword dance as a cover for his attempt on Liu Bang's life” (an elaborate deception to hide malicious intent, “xiangzhuang wujian yizai peigong”); and “Sima Zhao's intentions are obvious to everyone”(an open secret, “simazhao zhixin luren jiezhì”)⁷⁶

In order to better capture the intricate nature of China-ROK relationship, and illustrate the logic of China's strong opposition to THAAD deployment, it is necessary to have a deep look at this issue, and unveil the pushing forces of Seoul's such decision behind the scene. From my perspective, South Korea's decision is based on a calculation of the Putnam's “two-level games”, namely it is affected by both domestic and external factors.⁷⁷ This section starts with the premise that domestic and external factors are the crucial determinants of foreign policy. I will categorized factors that affected South Korea's THAAD deployment into two groups, namely domestic and external factors. The domestic factors include the conservative nature rooted in Park Geun-hye government toward North Korean issues, an already accelerated development of missile defense systems since Lee Myung-bak administration, the downgrade of China's factor in South Korea's deliberation on THAAD issue after bilateral relations, deteriorated unanimous supports inside the ruling party, and overwhelming supports from the majority of South Koreans. The external factors include North Korea's continuous nuclear tests and missile launches, and its blatant ambitious for a nuclear power after Kim Jong-un ascended to power, and US pressures on Seoul regarding THAAD issue against the backdrop of its rebalancing to Asia. The final section will give a conclusion that all these

⁷⁴ Lee, H. J. (2015, March 27). Missile defense and South Korea: President Park's strategic ambiguity is warranted. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

⁷⁵ Sun Ru., Understanding China's responses to THAAD[J]. Contemporary International Relations,2017,(3);Liu Tiancong. ROK Factor for the Deployment of THAAD[J]. Contemporary International Relations,2017,(3)

⁷⁶ 王毅谈美拟在韩部署萨德反导系统 中华人民共和国外交部, 2016.2.13,

<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1340281.shtml>

⁷⁷ Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027697

domestic and external factors, and their linkages collectively precipitated President Park Geun-hye's decision on THAAD deployment.

1. Domestic Factors:

1.1 The contrasting North Korea Policy between progressive governments and the conservative governments in South Korea

After the Korean War, South Korean society laid its foundation on close alliance with the US, and adopted democracy and anti-communism ideology. Setting this as a criterion to define conservatives and progressive in South Korea, we can conclude that those who prioritize US-ROK alliance, economic growth and national security are conservatives; and those who seek for more national independence and autonomy from US-ROK alliance, espouse social distribution, and unification are progressives,⁷⁸ given conservatives refer to “political factions that favor tradition in the face of external forces for change, and are critical of proposals for radical social change”⁷⁹, with progressives on their opposite side.

South Koreans view North Korea as both a foe and a sibling. The duality identities of the North within South Koreans leads to internal divisions on issues with regards to national security and reunification. The conservatives, through the lens of a “state” paradigm, views “the North has no intention to change or open the door”, and believes its peace offensive is aiming at unifying the South under the banner of communism. It leans to count the North as a threat, and energize a hardline stance. In contrary, its progressive counterpart believes the North is not inherently unchanged, and asserts it is possible for the North to take Chinese-style pragmatic paths and undergo gradual changes if external environment is benign, and what the South should initiate is to create such a favorable environment. Since it views the North from an “ethnicity” paradigm rather than a “state” paradigm as conservative camp does, it underlines the identical Korean ethnicity between the North and the South, while downplaying the conflicting ideology of communism and capitalism. Under the guidance of this thought, progressives champion a friendly engagement approach to the North.⁸⁰

More specifically, although both sides consent on peaceful unification led by the South, they use different yardstick to measure the implementation result of such a goal. This led to their contradicting stances in North Korean nuclear issue, North Korean human rights issue, humanitarian assistances to North Korea issue, inter-Korean economic cooperation issue, and the inter-Korean exchanges. Before examining their differences in specific North Korea issues, it is necessary to take a glance at their opinions on reunification. Conservatives, focusing on visible and tangible North Korea's changes, emphasize North Korea denuclearization, and hold the belief that its nuclear weapons program is the main barrier to

⁷⁸ 김용호, 최연식, 2007, “대북정책에 있어서 보수-진보논쟁에 대한 고찰: 대외위협 인식의 역사적 고찰을 통한 현재의 조명.” 한국과 국제정치제 23 권 3 호. 서울: 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 pp 165-166

⁷⁹ Mastin, L. (2009, January). Existence and Consciousness.

https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_conservatism.html

⁸⁰ 김형석 (Kim Hyung-suk). (2017). 한국 보수·진보 정부의 대북정책 비교 분석과 통합 가능성 모색. 통일문제연구, 29(2), 241-269.

reunification.⁸¹ They predispose to catalyze North Korea's regime collapse or the South-led unification by absorption. To the contrary, progressives regard the extent of the formation of North-South Korea peaceful economic community as a milestone to reunification. They underline a gradual and step-by-step approach to unification, namely "enlarged inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, and deepened trust between two sides --> North Korea's autonomous open-door and reform policy, increased inter-Korean interdependence --> North Korea's soft landing, and established North-South economic community --> a permanent prosperity and a peace regime in Korean peninsula".⁸² This contrasting beliefs on unification result in their disparate stance on specific North Korea issues.

First of all, in North Korea nuclear issue, conservatives, through the prism of "state"-focused paradigm, believe by developing nuclear weapons, the North can gain an asymmetric military superiority over the South, which will pose a serious threat to South Korea's national security, and Seoul-led absorption way of unification. Correspondingly, they support for North Korea denuclearization antedating to inter-Korean exchanges, and tit-for-tat reciprocity.⁸³ In order to reduce threats posed by the North, they prioritize US-ROK alliance, and contend to form international united fronts to isolate and pressure the North. When needed, they are geared to take more assertive military measures to retaliate. In short, they support for containment rather than engagement. In contrast, progressives, through the lens of "ethnicity" paradigm, consider the root of North Korea's nuclear development lies in its sense of regime insecurity. They argue that reducing the hostility between the US and North Korea, and improving inter-Korea relations are foremost and prerequisite for addressing North Korea nuclear issue. Instead of tit-for-tat reciprocity, they espouse "diffuse reciprocity",⁸⁴ aiming at accumulating mutual trust through engagement and altruistic assistances, and peaceful approaches, such as dialogues in resolving North Korea nuclear issue.⁸⁵

Secondly, in North Korea human rights issue, conservatives, standing for "liberal rights", assert to impose public and direct pressure to the North by actively participating in UN Human Rights Council activities and NGOs; human rights activities. In contrast, progressives put more importance to "social right". They believe questioning human rights issues in other countries infringes on their sovereignty, and this in a sense interferes in others' domestic affairs. They refuse to publicly criticize North Korea's human rights violation as their conservative counterparts do, on the premise that this would sometime backfire, and exacerbate North Korea's human rights situations.

⁸¹ 김계동, 한국의 대북한 정책변화에 대한 이론적 연구, 국방정책연구 제 24 권 제 1 호 서울: 한국국방연구원, 2008, p.34

⁸² Hong Nack Kim, South-North Korean Relations Under the Roh Moo-Hyun Government, *International Journal of Korean Studies*, Spring/Summer 2006 • Vol. X, No. 1

⁸³ 성경룡(Kyoung Ryung Seong). (2008). 김대중-노무현 정부와 이명박 정부의 대북정책 추진전략 비교: 한반도 평화와 공동번영 정책의 전략, 성과, 미래과제. *한국동북아논총*, 48(0), 285-31

⁸⁴ Robert Koehane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986), pp 1-27.

⁸⁵ 김형석 (2017). pp 241-269.

Thirdly, in humanitarian assistances issue, for fear that the North would convert foreign humanitarian resources to its military rearmaments, conservatives highlight distribution transparency, oppose no-strings-attached humanitarian aids from NGOs, and advocate to provide humanitarian aids on the condition of political-security situations. Progressives disassociate humanitarian assistances with political-security issues, and insist on continuous and large-scale humanitarian and developmental assistances to the North from both NGOs and governments.

Fourthly, in terms of inter-Korean economic cooperation issues, conservatives, based on the economic rules and productivity, argue that economic cooperation or investments in the North should be preconditioned on a well-sound investment environment in the North. They underscore small-scale and gradual inter-Korean economic cooperation and link economy with politics. In contrast, progressives hold the view that economic cooperation will gradually contribute to peace. Rested on the conviction that the North and the South belong to the same ethnicity, they are less cared about economic feasibility, incline to disconnect economy with politics, and encourage comprehensive and consecutive economic cooperation between two sides.

Finally, concerning the inter-Korean exchanges, the conservative, grounded on the spirit of the National Security Act, regard North Korea’s proposal of bilateral exchanges and cooperation as malice intrigues to unify the South under the banner of communism. Nonetheless, its progressive counterparts are more influenced by the spirit of “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act”, and stand for comprehensive and free exchanges.

In a word, conservative governments and progressive governments hold a divergent view on every North Korea issue, albeit their consensus on the South-led peaceful unification. Here is an overview of North Korea Policy in different governments (from 1998-2017) and the following policy outcomes, categorized on the basis of governments’ political preferences (progressive or conservative). (Form 3.1-3.4)⁸⁶

Form 3.1: North Korea Policy in different governments

Classification	Progressive governments		Conservative governments	
	Kim Dae-jung Administration	Roh Moo-hyun Administration	Lee Myung-bak Administration	Park Geun-hye Administration
Ideological tendency	Rational progressive	Independent progressive	Internationalized pragmatic conservative	Moderate conservative
Official	The	Peace and Prosperity	The Policy of Mutual	

⁸⁶ Source of Form 3.1-3.4: the author updated small portion of the information and most of its contents were translated from the following article: 류호국 (Ryu Ho-kook). (2017). 역대정부(진보/보수)의 대북정책 비교 연구. 군사논단, 91(0), 172-209

name of North Korea Policy	Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy vis-à-vis the North	Policy	Benefits and Common Prosperity	
North Korea nuclear issues	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. KEDO/S hinpo-lighter-water nuclear reactor 2. Second nuclear crisis 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. An Important Proposal⁸⁷./ Suspension of KEDO 2. North Korea's first nuclear test 3. Six-party Talks 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. North Korea's second nuclear test 2. North-South contacts regarding denuclearization 	North Korea's third, fourth, fifth nuclear test
Aid project to the North	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Large-scale humanitarian aids 2. Food loans 3. Enlarged public and private aids 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Large-scale humanitarian aids 2. Food loans 3. Enlarged public and private aids 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Humanitarian aids limited to the underprivileged 2. Increasing the transparency of distribution and monitoring 	Limited humanitarian aids
South-North economic cooperation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The separation of politics and economics 2. Vitalizing economic exchanges 3. Tourism in Mount Kumgang Region and Kaesong Industrial Park 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The separation of politics and economics 2. Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Office 3. Tourism in Mount Kumgang Region and Kaesong Industrial Park 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Linking economics with politics 2. Suspending 3. Tourism in Mount Kumgang Region/5.24 measures 4. Restricting large-scale investment in the North 	Shut-down of Kaesong Industrial Park
South-North	The First North-South Summit	1. Combine nuclear issue with the North-	1. Prioritizing the resolution of nuclear	The high-level

⁸⁷ This proposal include a supply of 2 million kilowatts of electricity aid annually to the North which is equivalent to the output of two unfinished nuclear plants, and immediate large infusion of aid, including 500,000 tons of rice, raw material for shoes, clothing and soap and South Korea's assistance in renovating of mines, and accelerating the development of rail lines at an industrial park in return for North Korea's commitment to nuclear dismantlement.

Dialogue	Meeting	South issues 2. The Second North-South Summit Meeting 3. The working-level talks in different issue-based areas	issue 2. Promoting working-level talks 3. Unveiled the North-South secret contacts	official contacts between the North and the South
Social Culture	Comprehensive exchanges	Comprehensive exchanges	Limited exchanges	Limited exchanges

Source: Ministry of Unification yearly “unification white paper”, the history of inter-Korean relations

Form 3.2 Inter-Korean Meetings in different governments

Classification		Summit meeting	Premier-level meeting	Minister-level meeting	Vice-premier-level meeting	Working-level meetings	The red-cross-level meetings	Private-level meetings	In total	
Progressive	Kim Dae Jung Administration	1	/	17	19	39	9	2	87	256
	Roh Moo-hyun Administration	1	1	20	17	105	17	8	169	
Conservative	Lee Myung-bak Administration	/	/	/	/	10	6	/	16	53
	Park Geun-	/	/	2	2	29	3	1	37	

	hye Admin istratio n									
--	-------------------------------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Form 3.3 Data for “Reunion for Separated Families” in different governments

Classifica tion	Progressive governments		Conservative governments	
	Kim Dae-jung Administration	Roh Moo-hyun Administration	Lee Myung-bak Administration	Park Geun-hye Administration
Face-to- face meetings	6 times/6,210	10 times/10,002	twice/1,774	twice/1,173
Video Meetings	/	7 times/3,748	/	/

Form 3.4 Humanitarian Aids toward the North in different governments (billion, won)

Classifica tion	Progressive governments		Conservative governments	
	Kim Dae-jung Administration	Roh Moo-hyun Administration	Lee Myung-bak Administration	Park Geun-hye Administration
Governm ent level	358.6	802.6	102.4	41.6
Civilian level	224.3	471.9	155.1	25.8
In total	582.9	1274.5	257.5	67.4

Source: South Korea’s National Statistical Office (NSO) “Current situations on Aids toward North Korea”

From the form 3.1 to 3.4, we can learn that when progressive governments held the power from 1998 to 2007, inter-Korean relation was roughly smooth and amicable. Bilateral exchanges no matter in political level, economic level, or social level maintained a sound momentum, and far surpassed the time when conservatives were in power. Faced with sporadic skirmishes near the Northern Limit Line, the second nuclear crisis, and the first North Korea nuclear test, progressive governments, like Kim Dae-jung (DJ) government and Roh Moo-hyun government stuck to their previous engagement policy. This, in turn, contributed to a roughly stable and peaceful environment in Korean Peninsula, embodied by

June 15 Joint Declaration and October 4 Declaration ensuing twice North-South Summits in 2000 and 2007 respectively.

In contrast, the hardline approach taken by conservative governments, like Lee Myung-bak government and Park Geun-hye government, resulted in a downward spiral in inter-Korean relations, and aggravated North Korea's aggressive provocations. By comprehensive negating the engagement and reconciliation policy of its progressive predecessors, "ABR" (Anything but Roh Moo-hyun), Lee Myung-bak(MD) government's North Korea policy evolved through four components: "De-nuke, Open 3,000"⁸⁸ and "the Grand Bargain' initiative"⁸⁹, the "Sangsaeng Gongyoung (Mutual Benefits and Common Prosperity) policy", the "May 24 Measure"⁹⁰, and "the three-stage approach to unification"⁹¹ and "the unification tax".⁹² Irrespective of the semantic revisions, in essence, MD's North Korea policy was consistent in setting North Korea's denuclearization as a precondition for inter-Korean exchanges and adopting a tit-for-tat reciprocity, as well as pinning its hope on North Korea's regime collapse. As a retaliation to the shooting death of a South Korean female tourist in Mount Keumgang in July 11, 2008, MD government halted Mount Kumgang tourism project, and as a retaliation on the sinking of Cheonan naval vessel and the shelling of Yeonpyeong island in 2010, it adopted "May 24 Measures", which suspended all economic cooperative projects, and exchanges with one exception of KIC.

As a result, before Park Geun-hye took office, inter-Korean dialogues have been ceased by large, their relations have hit rock bottom, and mutual trust built in progressive governments was wearing thin. It is against this backdrop that Park Geun-hye government proposed "Trustpolitik", aiming at recovering inter-Korean trust, and alleviating intensified tensions in Korean Peninsula.

1.2 Park Geun-hye's Trustpolitik-a mirror of conservative party's North Korea policy

The debut of President Park Geun-hye's trustpolitik was along with the release of the article named as "*A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang*" in 2011. While emphasizing restoring trust, she proposed "a new alignment policy" that is "buttressed by public consensus and remain constant in the face of political transitions and unexpected

⁸⁸ 비핵-개방-\$ 3,000, assisting North Korea in achieving a \$3,000 per capita income within 10 years in exchange for denuclearization.

⁸⁹ It consists of four major elements, including calling for close policy coordination among the five member nations of the Six-Party Talks in dealing with North Korea, reiterating the South will do its utmost to assure regime security in North Korea and facilitate its economic reconstruction on the condition that the North chooses verifiable denuclearization, stressing the combination of dialogue and pressure as well as reward and punishment, advocating a package deal in which North Korea's denuclearization is tied to appropriate compensation as a single package rather than a step-by-step approach

⁹⁰ Adopting a "proactive deterrence" military posture, suspending all economic exchanges and cooperative projects, with the exception of the Gaesung Industrial Complex, and internationalizing North Korea's rogue behavior and seeking a coordinated sanction regime, one independent of the nuclear policy framework)

⁹¹ The formation of peace community on the condition of the denuclearization of the North->the formation of economic community-->the realization of "national community"

⁹² Moon, Chung-in. "Between Principle and Pragmatism: What Went Wrong with the Lee Myung-bak Government's North Korean Policy?" *Journal Of International And Area Studies* 18, no. 2 (December 2011): 1-21.

domestic or international events, and would involve aligning South Korea's security with its cooperation with the North, and inter-Korean dialogue with parallel international efforts, as well as would entail assuming a tough line against North Korea sometimes and a flexible policy open to negotiations other times.”⁹³ It appears President Park was seeking to soften her conservative predecessor’s hardline policy, combine hardline approach with engagement approach, and pursue inter-Korean reconciliation through principled engagement while holding North Korea to account.⁹⁴ A close look, however, reveals that this trustpolitik largely resembled that of its conservative predecessor in its prioritization of North Korea’s denuclearization and tit-for-tat reciprocity.⁹⁵

The Economist satirized that “this policy of carrots and sticks, rewarding the north for co-operating and punishing its provocations, should be named as distrustpolitik”, and it further commented that “the south does not trust the north to keep its promises; the north does not trust the south to follow through on its admonitions.”⁹⁶ The inability of the Park government to move away from hardliners’ approach proved to be the biggest barrier to inter-Korean relations. By the end of Park’s tenure in early 2017, inter-Korean relations have hit rock-bottom, and even worse than that in MD government. The following brief review about inter-Korean relations from 2013 to 2016 could give us better understanding of Park Geun-hye government’s hardline approach to North Korea issues.

Just before Park’s inauguration, the North first tested a controversial long-range missile in the end of 2012, and then conducted third nuclear test in February 2013, which became the first litmus test for Park’s trustpolitik. In response, the U.S. and ROK began conducting military exercises in March, when nuclear-capable U.S. bombers (B-52 bomber and the B-2 Spirit bomber) flew over South Korea in a show of force. The North then reacted with declaration of a complete nullification of Armistice Agreement and a “state of war” with the South⁹⁷, and unilaterally severed the inter-Korean military hotline, as well as blocked exits from the KIC and withdrew North Korean workers from the KIC. In spite of a sporadic detente in the second half of 2013 and 2014 regarding KIC, and reunion for separated families and high-level official exchanges in Incheon Asian Game, Seoul’s proactive gesture in unification since 2014 infuriated the North again. Park’s first public mentioning about “unification is a jackpot”, and her subsequent speech in Dresden calling for unification through economic exchanges and humanitarian aid touch off intense spats between two sides, with North Korea’s state media criticizing Seoul laid expectation on North Korea’s collapse and the South-led unification by absorption.

Beginning in early 2015, there were hopes about two Koreas to commemorate the important dates of June 15 and August 15 together, however, Park Geun-hye government

⁹³ Park Geun-hye, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang”, Foreign Affairs, September–October 2011.

⁹⁴ Scott A. Snyder, North Korea’s Test of Trustpolitik, January 31, 2014 <https://www.cfr.org/blog/north-koreas-test-trustpolitik>

⁹⁵ Seong-ho Sheen, Dilemma of South Korea’s Trust Diplomacy and Unification Policy, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol.23, No.2, 2014.12, pp 97-122

⁹⁶ Nuclear North Korea: Bad or mad?, The Economist, 2013.10.26

⁹⁷ Send the Nukes Back to South Korea, Foreign Policy, 2013.5.6, foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/06/send-the-nukes-back-to-south-korea/

showed a lukewarm attitude and insisted on only allowing non-political exchanges. The opening of the field office of UN High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) in South Korea to conduct researches and information collection activities on North Korea human abuses offended Pyongyang again, who denounced this as “a heinous anti-DPRK plot-breeding organization”.⁹⁸ In August 2015, after two South Korean soldiers in the DMZ were seriously injured by landmines placed outside of their guard posts, the South, blaming this for the North’s plot, resumed nearly two decades halted (since 2004) loudspeaker propaganda along the border. This resulted in a barrage of crossfire between two sides around the DMZ, and the two Koreas were at the brink of war.

In response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and a successful satellite launch in early 2016, the South shut down the KIC, the only surviving joint project between two Koreas inherited from the “Sunshine” era (1998-2007).⁹⁹ In order to tighten sanctions enforcement following the adoption of UNSCR 2270, and curb illicit North Korean revenue streams, President Park paid state visit to North Korea’s long-standing military customers, including Iran, Uganda, Cuba and Ethiopia in mid-2016.¹⁰⁰ As such, the two Koreas backslid to a status of violent confrontation comparable to that during the Cold War periods.

These “tit-for-tat” maneuvers indicated that by maintaining a hardline policy of deterrence and sanctions, Park Geun-hye government took a position of containment rather than engagement policy toward the North, and showed little change from its predecessor.¹⁰¹ This hardline approach to North Korea provocations ingrained in conservative governments like Park Geun-gye government offers us insightful clues for understanding Seoul’s decision to accept THAAD deployment, a synonym to strengthening U.S-ROK alliance in missile defense domain.

1.3 South Korean policy evolution on theater missile defenses

Their divergent views on North Korea issue also foment their disparate attitudes toward missile defense system. Compared to conservatives, progressive governments think highly of self-reliant defense, and understate threats from the North. They endorse more balanced relations between U.S and China, and seek for engagement policy toward the North, and more empathize with China, who has long held a strong aversion to US-led missile defense system. Accordingly, in the progressives’ one decade’s reign, South Korea kept a fairly slow path in acquisition of missile defense systems. Wary of China’s opposition, they declined to join a U.S-led Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in Asia-Pacific even under U.S.’s constant pressures, and in the face of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.

⁹⁸ Aidan Foster-Carter, “South Korea-North Korea Relations: From Snakes to Ladders?” *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 17, No. 2, Sept. 2015, pp. 87-100.

⁹⁹ Aidan Foster-Carter, “South Korea-North Korea Relations: Sunshine’s Final Sunset? Maybe Not,” *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 18, No. 1, May 2016, pp.79-90.

¹⁰⁰ Andrea Berger, *North Korea’s Military Partnerships Under Threat?* 38 *North*, June 17, 2016

¹⁰¹ Brendan Howe, Kyung Min Lee . (2016). *Trustpolitik: The Failure to Build Trust in Inter-Korean Relations*. *Journal of Peace and Unification*, 6(2), pp 95-124.

In Kim Dae-jung's reign, Seoul's stance on TMD is "South Korea would not join the TMD system on the grounds that it would provide little benefit to the defense of Korea".¹⁰² After North Korea's launch of a Taepo Dong-1 rocket over Japan on August 31, 1998, the U.S. expressed interest to South Korea in building up a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in Asia-Pacific, which Japan consented with great alacrity. However, DJ government showed more reservations, and it also questioned the efficacy of this system in preventing North Korea, and reasoned that accepting such a system might stirred up strong oppositions from neighboring countries, and costed South Korea a large amount of budgets.¹⁰³ Obviously, DJ government preferred to maintain good relations with China on account of China's important role in unification. Meanwhile, compared to investing in procuring exorbitant missile defense systems from the US, it favored an engagement policy to the North by increasing aids and easing tensions through inter-Korean exchanges and peaceful talks. Guided by this way of thinking, DJ government refused to participate in US' TMD system at the expenses of its just recovered relations with China and North Korea. Instead, it began to develop an indigenous "medium-range surface-to-air missile (M-SAM)" in 1998. Additionally, a sound US-DPRK relationship in this time lowered the urgency for Seoul to purchase missile defense systems or joining the US-led TMD. Thanks to the Sunshine Policy, and mediation of President Kim Dae-jung in Pyongyang-Washington relations, U.S-DPRK relations embraced a short spring after Kim Jong-il's second-in-command, Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok's visit to Washington in October 2000, and Secretary of State Madeleine K Albright's reciprocal visit to Pyongyang shortly thereafter. In this upward favorable environment, North Korea had strictly complied with a moratorium in testing any long-range missiles after 1999, which was only aborted when North Korea's relations with US soured in 2006.¹⁰⁴ The North-South detente, and restrained North Korean provocations held back Seoul's proclivity toward missile defense systems.

Inherited the spirits of Sunshine Policy, Roh Moo-hyun administration also insisted on an engagement policy in dealing with North Korea's 7 missiles' launches, and its first nuclear test in 2006. After North Korea's missile launches, President Roh Moo-hyun avoided acknowledging the missile launches in public. A notice on the presidential website pointed that "the firing of the Taepodong-2 constituted no crisis, because it was not aimed at any particular party".¹⁰⁵ Roh's government maintained pretty sanguine attitudes towards North Korean short-range missiles tests, claiming that they were only parts of training activities, and not offensive in nature, irrespective of the U.S. constant warnings that these missiles were solely targeted at South Korea. Instead of criticizing North Korea's provocations as its conservative successors would do, it requested the U.S. to urge Japan from releasing information on the North's firing of missiles.¹⁰⁶ In the wake of North Korea's first nuclear test,

¹⁰² Tae-Hyung Kim, South Korea's Missile Defense Policy: Dilemma and Opportunity for a Medium State, *Asian Politics & Policy*—Volume 1, Number 3, pp 371–389.

¹⁰³ Joshua H. Pollack, Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat, in "Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century", CISSM Collection of Papers, January 2017.

¹⁰⁴ Robbie Gramer, Emily Tamkin, Decades of U.S. Diplomacy with North Korea: a Timeline, *Foreign Policy*, March 12, 2018

¹⁰⁵ Asia: Sunshine and storms; the Koreas. (2006, Jul 15). *The Economist*.

¹⁰⁶ [Analysis] A war of nerves on NK missile tests, July 9, 2007, *Hankyoreh*.

Roh's government stuck to previous cooperative economic programs with the North in spite of U.S. strong displeasure, who had ridiculed these programs were barely filling Kim Jong-il's coffers.

Moreover, the Roh Moo-hyun administration sought for greater independence from US-ROK alliance and pursued greater "equality" in this alliance and touted "cooperative self-reliant defense" as a primary objective of its national security strategy.¹⁰⁷ In defiance of US desires, South Korea refused to take part in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a measure targeted at interdicting suspicious vessels that were carrying weapons of mass destruction or related materials, reasoning this might result in an unintentional inter-Korean naval clashes.¹⁰⁸ It went ahead with the OPCON transfer talks and clinched a deal with the US against the backdrop of North Korea's nuclear test. Rather than turning to U.S-ROK alliance or joining US-led regional TMD systems ensuing North Korea's missile launches and nuclear test, South Korea announced to develop an indigenous Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) in October 2006. Instead of purchasing such from US, it began to negotiate with Germany about a viable acquisition of PAC 2 for missile defense since 2005, which would last for years and was only finalized after Lee Myung-bak took office in 2008.¹⁰⁹ The slow-path of acquiring BMD systems indicated a low priority for missile defense systems in progressive governments, and their stress on self-reliant security, as well as their reluctance to join US missile defense initiative.

In addition, China's opposition was another main factor that deter Seoul's move in BMD acquisitions. Reminiscent of progressives' engagement approach to North Korea issues, and their top priority of peace maintenance on peninsula, there is no doubt China and South Korea in progressives' rule share more similarity and common interest on these issues. And Seoul would easily find its preferences were at conflicts with that of Washington, who cared more about the nuclear dimension other than peace and stability of Korean peninsula.¹¹⁰ This, compounded with Roh Moo-hyun government's quest for a more equal US-ROK alliance, and its expectations on China's constructive role in Korean unification, led to a tighter China-ROK collaboration on North Korea issues, from denuclearization, to expanding economic assistances, and to the North's human rights violations. This made Seoul controlled by progressive governments more attentive to China's oppositions to its participation in US-led regional TMD system.

In contrast, conservative governments like Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye governments, were paranoid about North Korea's provocations. They averred that Pyongyang's nuclear dismantlement should go before any economic assistances, which contradicts to China's appeals for peaceful approach and engagement policy toward North Korea issues. Accordingly, conservative governments always put the U.S.-ROK alliance as

¹⁰⁷ "A Comparison of the U.S. and ROK National Security Strategies: Implications for Alliance Coordination toward North Korea," in Philip W. Yun and Gi-wook Shin, eds., *North Korea: 2005 and Beyond* (Stanford: Walter A. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, 2006), pp. 149-166

¹⁰⁸ Donald G. Gross, *North Korea Tests a Nuke and Returns to the Six Party Talks*, Comparative Connections Volume 8, Issue 4, January 2017. cc.csis.org/2007/01/north-korea-tests-nuke-returns-six-party-talks/

¹⁰⁹ Joshua H. Pollack (January 2017)

¹¹⁰ Suk Hee Han.(2008). From engagement to hedging: South Korea's new China policy. *Korean journal of defense analysis*, 20(4), 335-351.

the top priority, and less concerned about China's opposition. This made them more receptive toward joining a US-led missile defense program and preferred to join the US-Japan-ROK triangle to hedge against China's rise. Two evidences of this were Seoul's decision to join US-led PSI in 2009, and its consistent expression of interest in joining US-led missile defense program. Lee Myung-bak government from its inauguration had hinted about a possible full-fledged participation in PSI and even US-led MD program.¹¹¹ It finally decided to join the former after North Korea's nuclear blast in 2009,¹¹² which its progressive predecessor had handled with great restraint and delayed for years regardless of US constant pressures. In missile defense issues, Defense Minister Kim Tae-young stated in 2010 that "Seoul is carefully studying the possibility of participating in BMD". While it refrained from an early participation, Seoul accelerated its pace in acquiring BMD capabilities through close cooperation with the US.¹¹³ Apart from concluding finalizing negotiations with Germany concerning 48 PAC-2 interceptors' purchases in 2008, South Korea also procured several types of SM-2 standard missiles from the US, which were commissioned in the Navy between 2008 and 2012.

Park Geun-hye government also boosted missile defense developments. In early 2012, the defense ministry of Park Geun-hye government indicated that South Korea planned to allocate almost fifteen percent of the total budget to develop its missile defense capabilities.¹¹⁴ In February 2013, Seoul pledged to accelerate the fulfillment of the KAMD system.¹¹⁵ In response to North Korea's missile tests, South Korea began to integrate a "Kill Chain (an integrated information, surveillance, and strike system)",¹¹⁶ and "Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR)"¹¹⁷ with previous KAMD system so that enable it to preemptively strike North Korea's nuclear weapons facilities and if necessary to take down its commander (decapitation).¹¹⁸ It procured two Green Pine land-based radar systems from Israel in 2012, and the purchase of the Iron Dome from Israel was also under serious deliberation. It also negotiated new and more lenient guidelines to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) with US in October 2012 so as to raise its missile range to cover all of North Korea. In June 11 2013, Seoul announced to establish a Missile Destruction System by 2020, which aims at detecting imminent North Korean missile launches and enables South Korea to strike

¹¹¹ Foreign Ministry urges participation in Proliferation Security Initiative, Hankyoreh, 2008.1.12

¹¹² Lee Chi-dong, S. Korea plays PSI card to counter N. Korea's brinkmanship, Yonhap News, 2009.5.26

¹¹³ The Korean Peninsula: North Korea's Rapid Succession of Power and the ROK's Changing Security Policy, East Asian Strategic Review 2012

¹¹⁴ Bruce E. Bechtol, South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat, American Enterprise Institute, 2013.11.5

¹¹⁵ Zachary Keck, South Korea Goes All In On Missile Defense, The Diplomat, 2013.7.26,

¹¹⁶ Theoretically, the South Korean Kill Chain could detect North Korean intermediate missiles, which use liquid-fuel rather than solid-fuel and are large enough to be detected by spy satellites during the missiles' fuel injection time (about an hour and a half to three hours), before launch against South Korean targets.

¹¹⁷ KMPR is undertaken through the deployment of missiles and special forces against the North Korean leadership in the event of an attack.

¹¹⁸ Osamu Koike, Deployment of the THAAD System to South Korea—Background and Issues Osamu Koike, Research Fellow, Security Studies Department, The National Institute for Defense Studies Commentary, March 28, 2017.

missile sites before an attack is carried out. And it announced to open the Air and Missile Defense Cell (AMD-Cell) in July, which is a command and control center for the entire KAMD enterprise.¹¹⁹In July 2013, South Korea stated it was upgrading its KDX-III vessels with SM-6 surface-to-air missiles, and this was expected to be in place by 2016. In April 2014, Seoul passed a \$ 1.3 billion plan to upgrade the ROK's PAC-2 air defense system and buy PAC-3 missiles by 2020,¹²⁰ and planned to have its indigenous Kill Chain in place by 2021.¹²¹

As its KAMD system was taking shape, South Korea began to discuss the subject of interoperability between allied defense systems with Washington. This goal was reaffirmed by South Korean Ministers of National Defense in each joint statement of the annual ministerial-level U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) after 2012. In January 2016, the MND announced plans to install a Link 16 tactical data link between the allies respective BMD command centers at Osan Air Base.¹²²Shortly thereafter, South Korea and the U.S. announced to carry out missile defense drills during annual joint exercises starting in March 2016.¹²³ In November 2016, amid domestic outcry, the Park government went on to sign the GSOMIA with Japan, which was another step forward to joining US-led missile defense system.¹²⁴

In short, the different views and approaches to North Korea's threats of conservative and progressive governments resulted in different perspectives toward ROK-US alliance, and China-ROK relations. Less concerned about North Korea and China's displeasures toward its missile defense development, and more reliant on US-ROK alliance in countering North Korea threats made conservative governments like Park Geun-hye government more receptive to US-led missile defense program, and more easily-infuriated by North Korea's provocations. This, accompanied with an already expedited progress in missile defense system, augured a highly probable consent by South Korean government to THAAD deployment.

1.4 The THAAD issue in Park Geun Hye administration

Following North Korea's long-range rocket launch in December 2012, Seoul announced to bolster a multi-layered defense, in particular, to acquire higher-tier missile defense. On October 14, 2013, Yonhap News reported that "South Korea's procurement agency and Air Force officials showed interest in a long-range surface-to-air system during their visit to the U.S. in April 2013 and their discussions are currently under way on whether to acquire THAAD or develop an indigenous program that fits the role." On 15 October 2013, a ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok hinted at a possible purchase of THAAD missiles in order to

¹¹⁹ Zachary Keck (2013)

¹²⁰ Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hidreth & Susan V. Lawrence, April 3, 2015, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, Congressional Research Service, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf>

¹²¹ Park Jin, Korea Between the United States and China: How Does Hedging Work? Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/south-korea-goes-all-in-on-missile-defense/>

¹²² Joshua H. Pollack (January 2017)

¹²³ USFK Deploys Another Patriot Missile Battery, Chosun Ilbo, 2016.2.15

¹²⁴ S. Korea, Japan to sign inter-sharing pact Wednesday, Yonhap News, 2016.11.21

compensate for the weakness in South Korea's low-tier indigenous KAMD system.¹²⁵ Amid strident suspicion that the government was attempting to make the decision furtively, Defense Minister Kim Kwan-Jin refuted on the following day that "the military is not currently considering purchase of SM-3 or THAAD interceptor missiles that form the core of the program."¹²⁶ After that Seoul maintained strategic ambiguity over this issue, namely Three Nos' stance. Meanwhile, it also announced to develop long-range surface-to-air missiles (L-SAM) in June 2014 with its indigenous technology rather than procuring such system from the US, and planed to deploy it between 2023 and 2024. The L-SAM system was designed to intercept missiles at an altitude of 50-60 km, so it was conceived as an alternative to the THAAD system, which would intercept missiles at an altitude of 40-150 km.¹²⁷ Keeping this in mind, we can have an inkling that the main pushing-hand in THAAD deployment might not be Seoul, which I will discuss later.

In spite of South Korea's official denial, it appears that there were ongoing covert discussions about possible THAAD deployment between US and South Korea, and the THAAD option had always been on the table. In May 2014, it was disclosed that "the U.S. has conducted a site survey in South Korea for possible locations for a THAAD battery, but no final decisions have been made to deploy the system."¹²⁸ In June 2014, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of the US Forces Korea, clarified that it was the U.S. who had proposed the installation of THAAD system in South Korea.¹²⁹ During testimony on June 2014, in front of the ROK National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin claimed that "he would not oppose U.S. deployment of the THAAD system and acknowledged the advantages of the THAAD system."¹³⁰ The new Defense Minister Han Min-koo, who replaced Kim on 30 June, while reiterating the benefits of THAAD system first on September 16, 2014, and then on October 7, 2014, claimed that this system was quite conducive to strengthen South Korea's security posture on the peninsula.¹³¹ In September 2014, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work's reaffirmed that the U.S. was thinking about deploying THAAD in South Korea.¹³²

On March 18, 2015, Kim Min-seok, a spokesman for the South Korean Defense Ministry, implied more flexibility in THAAD issue, stating that "Seoul had no intention of purchasing

¹²⁵ Kim Eun-jung, S. Korea seeks multi-layered missile defense against North, Yonhap News, 2013.10.15

¹²⁶ Gov't Has 'No Plans' to Join US Missile Defense, Chosun Ilbo, 2013.10.17

¹²⁷ S. Korea to Develop Indigenous Missile Defense System Instead of Adopting THAAD, Xinhua English News, 2014.6.3

¹²⁸ Barnes, J. E. (2014, May 28). World news: Washington considers missile-defense system in South Korea. Wall Street Journal

¹²⁹ Daniel Pinkston, No Such Thing as a Free Ride? ROK Missile Defense, Regional Missile Defense and OPCON Transfer, International Crisis Group, 2014.7.29

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Kyung-young Chung, Debate on THAAD Deployment and ROK National Security, East Asia Institute, October 2015.

¹³² Work, Robert O. 2014, "Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work on the Asia-Pacific Rebalance,"

the missile defense system, but might allow the United States to deploy it in South Korea.”¹³³ In April 2015, Adm. Samuel Locklear, Commander of the US Pacific Command, said at a Senate Armed Services Committee that “the US was in discussions about potential deployment of an additional THAAD battery, beyond the one that’s in Guam, but on the Korean Peninsula, and this decision process is under way right now.”¹³⁴ Ironically, this statement contradicts with what the South Korean Minister of National Defense Han Min-woo and the U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter delivered, namely “the THAAD program was still in production in the US”.¹³⁵ On May 21, 2015, Defense Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok reaffirmed at a regular briefing that the proposal of deploying the THAAD battery for the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) was under review.¹³⁶ In October 2015, Mike Trotsky, vice president of air and missile defense at Lockheed Martin, stated during a National Press Club news conference that South Korea and the US have been in “formal and informal discussions” on this sensitive issue, and said discussions are at “a very beginning state.”¹³⁷ In September 2015, former ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace made clear that “Park’s attendance at Beijing’s military parade would help reassure China over the potential deployment of the THAAD system on the Korean Peninsula.”¹³⁸

These signs reveal that South Korean government approved of the benefits of introducing THAAD system, and extended their understanding about US desire for protecting its 28,500 troops in South Korea by introducing such a system. Starting in mid 2014, South Korean officials began to show more flexibility toward THAAD deployment, asserting that they would not oppose if it were deployed by USFK. This largely conformed to the final decision on THAAD deployment. Namely, THAAD system was operated and funded by USFK, and even the land- a former golf club site in Seongju, where THAAD batteries are installed, would be handed over to USFK.¹³⁹ In a nutshell, it appears since mid 2014, both South Korea and US have already reached a consensus that THAAD would be deployed as a US military asset.

In light of Seoul’s need for such a system and its acquiescent to USFK’s deployment of such a system, why Seoul maintained a strategic ambiguity in this issue? The answer lies in China’s strong opposition. Chinese governments, from President Xi Jinping, to Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and to Defense Minister Chang Wanquan,¹⁴⁰ used various venues to lodge

¹³³ CHOE, S. (2015, Mar 18). South Korea tells china not to meddle in decision over missile system. International New York Times

¹³⁴ TRANSCRIPT: Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the U.S. Pacific Command & US Forces Korea, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 2015.4.17

¹³⁵ US commanders’ comments contradict previous government statements on THAAD deployment, Hankyoreh, 2015.4.18

¹³⁶ (LEAD) S. Korean lawmakers differ over THAAD introduction, Yonhap News, 2015.5.21,

¹³⁷ Chang Jae-soon, (5th LD) Pentagon rejects Lockheed Martin's claim about THAAD talks with S. Korea, Yonhap News, 2015.10.30

¹³⁸ Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, “China-Korea Relations: A Complex China-ROK Partnership”, Comparative Connections, Vol. 17, No. 3, Jan. 2016, pp.97-108.

¹³⁹ S. Korea to conclude land acquisition for THAAD battery this week, Yonhap News, 2017.2.26

¹⁴⁰ Ser Myo-ja, “China’s Defense Chief Raises THAAD”, Korea JoongAng Daily, 2015.2.5

protests against THAAD's possible introduction to South Korea since 2014. For instance, China's Assistant Foreign Minister openly cautioned South Korea in March 2015 to "importantly think about Beijing's attention to and concerns over the deployment of THAAD in the peninsula."¹⁴¹ This piqued Seoul so much that it fired back to admonish China for meddling in South Korea's domestic affairs. Park Geun-hye's government, as it had carefully dealt with delicate issues like AIIB membership and President Park's attendance to China's military parade, was again walking on a tightrope in order not to rock the boat with China, but satisfy US demands. There is no doubt that China-US rivalry casted its unimaginable repercussions in Korean Peninsula. Although Seoul was unable to cater to China's wishes at the expenses of its US ally, it had to care about more Chinese displeasures, and did it utmost to avoid nettling China unnecessarily. This accounts for South Korea's choice to maintain strategic ambiguity on this sensitive issue, while not giving up backdoor discussions with US.

It appears that Seoul's decision on THAAD deployment in 2016 was not an incredible political flip-flop or a policy turnabout. Rather, given Park Geun-hye government's conservative nature, and its emphasis on US-ROK alliances and missile defense, it might be much earlier than 2016 that Seoul had already inclined to stand with US in this issue, although it restrained from clinching such a deal at that time. The authoritative left-wing newspaper--Hankyoreh revealed that Seoul had decided on THAAD deployment as early as mid 2015.¹⁴² In addition to China's factor, a short-lived inter-Korean detente from spring 2013 to summer 2015 also deterred Seoul's full embrace of THAAD deployment. Low threats from North Korea at least in nuclear domain made Seoul felt less motivated and less justified to take such an imprudent move. In short, South Korea's insistence on a strategic ambiguity stance on THAAD issue before 2016 is under a careful judgment that the timing was yet unripe.

North Korea's nuclear test in 2016 changed the whole favorable atmosphere surrounding the peninsula since August 2015. It not only disrupted the inter-Korean detente, but also drove a sharp wedge between China and ROK. To Seoul's dismay, irrespective of a China-ROK honeymoon, President Park failed to directly get in touch with President Xi and the newly-opened defense hotline between two countries was inoperative in the wake of North Korea's fourth nuclear test.¹⁴³ President Xi only responded to the phone from South Korea after one month later. This left President. Park convinced that China was unable to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions, and it was apathetic about Park's "trustpolitik" strategy of paralleling engagement approach with hardline approach when the North stirred up provocations.¹⁴⁴

As a conservative government, fighting back fiercely by imposing strong sanctions and imposing pressures on the North other than through dialogues that China and its progressive predecessors preferred was the backbone of Park's North Korea policy. As it turned out, this hardline approach Seoul opted for deepened the rift between itself and China. A week after

¹⁴¹ Song Sang-ho, "Seoul Fires Back at China's Opposition to THAAD," Korea Herald, 2015.3.17.

¹⁴² "박근혜 정부, 사드 배치 2015년 초중반에 이미 결정했다", 한겨레, 2017.5.1

¹⁴³ Shannon Tiezzi, North Korea Nuclear Test Reveals the Limits of China-South Korea Cooperation, The Diplomat, 2016.1.14

¹⁴⁴ Jane Perlez, For China, a Missile Defense System in South Korea Spells a Failed Courtship, The New York Times, 2016.7.8

North Korea's fourth nuclear test, President Park, in her annual New Year address and press conference on January 13, 2016, called for the "strongest yet sanctions" on Pyongyang, and reminded China, North Korea's exclusive patron, to take the responsibility of employing more pressures on the North.¹⁴⁵ Such high expectation would China not be able to live up to. There is no doubt that China would never prefer a high-handed containment policy toward North Korea at expenses of the regime collapse or even joining a united front, like three or five party talks that exclude the North as Seoul proposed, since China sees this as a intrigue to sow discord between itself and the North. Given China's unshakable interests in all three domains regarding Korean Peninsula, namely denuclearization, stability, and dialogue, with stability as an unspoken top priority, Park Geun-hye government's hardline approach to the North heralded a doomed ending of China-ROK honeymoon.

As cleavages between China and South Korea on North Korea issues exasperated, President Park declared on January 13, 2016 that her country will officially start to deliberate on THAAD deployment issue based on national security and interests.¹⁴⁶ North Korea's successful launch of another long-range missiles on February 2016, seems to be the last straw. President Park Geun-hye in a February 16 speech declared "the North has responded to such efforts and assistance from our Government with nuclear tests and missile launches, and now it is causing consternation across the world with its claims regarding a hydrogen bomb test...North Korea's nuclear weapons are aimed at none other than us...From this moment on, the Government will employ tougher and more effective measures...In the process, solidarity with our ally the United States, as well as trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan, will be enhanced"¹⁴⁷ On February 7, the US and South Korea announced to set up a joint task force to discuss the issue of THAAD system deployment; and both sides officially initiated a joint working group to discuss a possible deployment on March 4, and announced the decision on July 8.

This was accompanied with an almost unanimous consent inside the ruling party--Saenuri Party and an overwhelming public supports for THAAD deployment. According to the Joong Ang Ilbo report, in its interview with 217 congressmen in 20th National Assembly in July 2016, when asked about their opinions about THAAD deployment, 95.7% Saenuri Party members chose agree, which formed a sharp contrast with the result in the greatest progressive party-Democratic Party of Korea, where the majority (74.3%) chose for opposition.¹⁴⁸

Form 3.5 Congressmen's views on THAAD deployment

Party affiliation	①strongly oppose	②oppose if deploying without China's permission	③agree but note to take supplementary measures to soothe China's	④strongly agree
-------------------	------------------	---	--	-----------------

¹⁴⁵ Shannon Tiezzi (2016)

¹⁴⁶Chronology of events leading to THAAD deployment, Yonhap News, 2017.9.6

¹⁴⁷ Address by President Park Geun-hye to the National Assembly on State Affairs, 2016.2.16.

¹⁴⁸ 새누리 85% “사드 조건부 도입”에 김종인 등 36명 동의, 중앙일보, 2016.07.05

			opposition	
Saenuri Party (92)	0	3.3%(3)	84.8% (78)	10.9%(10)
	3.3%(3)		95.7% (88)	
Democratic Party of Korea (84)	15.5 % (13)	58.8% (50)	24.7 % (21)	0
	74.3% (63)		24.7% (21)	

For the public polls concerning THAAD deployment, according to the Gallup Survey, the rate of supporters for THAAD deployment to opponents was first 50% to 32% in July 2016, and then rose to 56% to 31% in August.¹⁴⁹ With little hindrance except for spasmodic protests from residents in Seongju County where THAAD was deployed, the THAAD deployment was kicked off ahead of schedule in April 2017.

In short, the intrinsic nature of conservative governments, like Park Geun-hye government, augured a hardline approach in response to North Korean fourth nuclear test. The main hindrances for Seoul's full embrace of THAAD system initially were China's strong opposition and comparatively lower sense of threats from North Korea in nuclear domain from mid-2013. However, after North Korea's fourth nuclear blast, both inter-Korean detente and China-ROK honeymoon shattered, which naturally downgraded China factor in Seoul's calculation on THAAD's deployment. Moreover, North Korea's provocations awakened Seoul to reinforce the U.S-ROK alliance, and stand firmly with the US in security issues, like THAAD deployment. Domestic factors, like a consensus among ruling party members on THAAD deployment, and overwhelming public supports further spurred and justified Seoul's such decision.

2. External Factors:

2.1 North Korea factor: North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Threats

As a peace regime is pending, Korean peninsula is still in a de jure state of war. This has brought about persisting hostilities and tensions between two sides ensuing the signature of Armistice Agreement in 1953. In light of the indispensable and reliable role of asymmetric nuclear forces play in a modern warfare, North Korea attempts to possess such weapons to compensate for its backwarded conventional weapons system. Considering that illustrating North Korea's motivations behind its nuclear developments and missile advancements involves cumbersome records of inter-Korean relations and DPRK-US relations,¹⁵⁰ and is beyond the extent of this thesis, I will only delineate North Korea's missile and nuclear

¹⁴⁹ 한국갤럽 데일리 오피니언 Gallup Korea Daily Opinion, 제 263 호 2017 년 6 월 3 주(13~15 일)
www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportDownload.asp?seqNo=839

¹⁵⁰ Please refer to books like Jack Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy (The Brookings Institution, 2007); Mike Chinoy, Melt Down (St. Martins Press, 2008); Funabashi Yoichi, The Peninsula Question (The Brookings Institution, 2007); Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, Going Critical (The Brookings Institution, 2004; Christopher R. Hill, Outpost (Simon & Schuster, 2014); William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink; A Sharper Choice on North Korea, (CFR, 2016); 장달중, 이정철, 임수호 저, 북미 대립(서울대 출판문화원, 2011)

developments from South Korea's and the U.S' perspectives, which the latter always view as major threats, and use to justify their missile defense system.

From the early 1990s, the U.S. and North Korea has made consistent efforts in negotiating North Korea's denuclearization. These efforts are awash with decades of crisis, stalemates and intermittent progresses towards denuclearization. From 1994 Agreed Framework, to 9.19 Joint Statement in 2005, 2.13 Agreement in 2007 and to 10.3 Agreement in 2007 at the Six Party Talks, all melted into thin air. The effusion of optimism about resuming negotiations on a denuclearization agreement was rekindled on February 29, 2012, when North Korea consented to resume a moratorium on long-range missile tests, and to suspend further nuclear tests or nuclear activities, such as uranium-enrichment activities at Yongbyong, and to allow IAEA inspectors return to the country. In exchange, the U.S. pledged to deliver more than two hundred thousand tons of targeted food aids. To most people's disappointment, this euphoria was ephemeral as before. Pyongyang's satellite launch in April 2012, just over a month after the deal, sealed the coffin on the Leap Day Agreement. Irrespective of international condemnation, it successfully launched another Kwangmyongsong-3 Unit 2 satellite in December 2012. After the rupture of this deal and new UNSC resolutions of 2087 in 2013, along with a new leadership transition in North Korea, the pace of its missile and nuclear tests has accelerated unprecedentedly. (Figure 3.1)

Figure 3.1 North Korean Missile Launches



Source: CSIS Missile Defense Project, North Korean Missile Threat.

<https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/>

North Korea in Kim Jong-un's rule has clearly displayed a different posture in denuclearization and missile launches. In Kim Jong-il's reign, North Korea at least publically

alleged its commitment to denuclearization. However, after the leadership change in December 2011, North Korea began to declare itself as a nuclear state. More than anything else, North Korea after 2012 is apparently seeking to be treated as a nuclear state like Pakistan, India and Israel, possessing nuclear weapons outside the framework of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).¹⁵¹ In May 31 2012, at the 12th Supreme People's Assembly, North Korea passed constitutional amendment to proclaim itself as a "nuclear power state".¹⁵² Furthermore, in March 2013, consequent to the adoption of UNSC resolution 2087, the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of North Korea further adopted a "Byungjin Line" of pursuing "a new strategic line on carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously."¹⁵³ Kim noted "Byungjin is permanent and not intended as a political bargaining chip. The nuclear shield is for self-defense, and the nuclear armed forces should be expanded and beefed up qualitatively and quantitatively until the denuclearization of the world is realized." He also instructed the military to integrate nuclear weapons into its "war strategy" and "combat posture."¹⁵⁴

In terms of two major parts of a nuclear weapons system, a detonator and a delivery system, North Korea has advanced firmly toward building a sophisticated and miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be mounted on an intermediate-range missile delivery system.¹⁵⁵ In the detonator front, every nuclear test marked a new improvement. In addition to increased yields, North Korea also made technological progresses. North Korea claimed its third nuclear test in 2013 as "a smaller and lighter A-bomb," and some experts argued it was used to test highly enriched uranium-based devices. The fourth nuclear test in January 2016 was pronounced as a successful test of a hydrogen bomb. For the fifth test on September 2016, the North averred it was a nuclear warhead, which implied a step forward in the miniaturization of nuclear weapons. For the largest explosion to date at the equivalent of 100 kilotons TNT on September 3, 2017, the North alleged the device was a hydrogen bomb that could be mounted on an intercontinental missile.¹⁵⁶ Notwithstanding a wide skepticism about these assertions, many experts are convinced that an increasing larger explosive yields indicate a boosted thermonuclear device.

For the delivery system, apart from developing a long-range missiles, such as Taepodong series, the tests carried out in Kim Jong-un's era indicate the country is seeking ways to diversify its missile force in order to achieve greater mobility to increase the likelihood that missiles will survive during combat.¹⁵⁷ It has made constant efforts to develop road-mobile

¹⁵¹ N. Korea as nuclear state, *The Korean Times*, 2016.6

¹⁵² See the Korean version of the preamble of the DPRK's constitution, 2012.5.20,

¹⁵³ "Report on Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee," Korean Central News Agency of DPRK (KCNA), 2013.3.13

¹⁵⁴ Policy Brief No 51 - North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine under Kim Jong Un, *The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)*

¹⁵⁵ Edward Kwon. South Korea's Deterrence Strategy Against North Korea's WMD, *East Asia* (2018) 35: 1. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-018-9282-9>

¹⁵⁶ North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts, *CNN Library*, 2018.4.3

¹⁵⁷ Naoko Aoki, "Seeing Missile Defense as U.S. Hostility, North Korea Aims at More and Better Weapons," *CISSM Publication*, January 2017

missiles with greater ranges. For instance, it upgraded credibility of the Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that can reach all of East Asia, including crucial U.S. bases in Guam and Okinawa, and improved KN-08 and KN-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) that can reach the U.S. continent.¹⁵⁸ It has also been testing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It was reported that SLBMs were launched three times in 2016, one of which flew about 500 km towards Japan, making it the most successful attempt thus far.¹⁵⁹ Finally, it has been working on solid fuel rocket technology that would make its missiles quicker to launch and easier to store and transport. For instance, it has made strides towards the range of the KN-02 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).

In all, by the outset of 2016, Pyongyang owns a considerable arsenal of various ranges of ballistic missiles commissioned in the military. According to some sources, this arsenal include 1) 600 Scud-B missiles with a range of 300 km; and 2) almost 200 Nodong missiles with a range of 1,000 km. North Korea also has a small stockpile of about 100 KN-02 missiles with a range of 170 km. It has also displayed two longer-range ballistic missiles: the Musudan missiles and the KN-08 ICBM. (Form 3.6)

Form 3.6 The current situation of North Korea's ballistic missiles¹⁶⁰

Classification	Type	Launch Platform	Missile Ranges	The number in reserve
SRBM	KN-02	Transporter erector launchers (TEL)	170	100
	Scud B		300	600
	Scud C		500	
	Scud ER		700	
MRBM	Nodong		1,000-1,300	175-200
IRBM	Musudan		3,000-4,000	50-75
ICBM	Taepodong 1	Launch pad (above-ground platform)	2,500	
	Taepodong 2		6,700	
	Taepodong 3		10,000	
	KN-08		8,000	
	The number in reserve in total	TEL		1,000

¹⁵⁸John Schilling, A Partial Success for the Musudan, 38 North, 2016.6.23

¹⁵⁹ Naoko Aoki (January 2017)

¹⁶⁰ 모준영 (Mo Juneyoung). (2016). 한반도 내 THAAD 배치와 미국의 전략. 민족연구, 67(0), 27-47

North Korea's consistent nuclear tests and its increasingly diversified missile systems have posed a serious threat to South Korea, Japan and US. Clearly, the threats from the North is the greatest factor, from South Korea's view, for it to initiate KAMD program in 2006, and accelerate the pace of its developments from 2008 onwards. As I mentioned before, deploying THAAD system is conceivable considering the conservative nature of Park Geun-hye government, and the already accelerated pace of South Korea's missile defense system since Lee Myung-bak government took office. For Seoul, Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test, and its second successful TD-2 launch in February 2016 were last straws that made Seoul resolved to clinched the deal of THAAD deployment.

This applies to the US as well at least on the surface. For U.S., nuclear threats from nuclear terrorism, such as Al Qaeda and their extremist allies, and nuclear proliferation caused by North Korea in Asia-Pacific, and Iran in Middle East, as well as North Korea and Iran's frequently testing of new ballistic missile system have been the official justification for U.S. BMD system in Obama administration.¹⁶¹ For instance, in the most authoritative Department of Defense (DOD) directive on BMD policy-“The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR)”, it stated that “regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue to develop long-range missiles that will be threatening to the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking to counter this threat with various measures, including the deployment of increasingly capable BMD systems.”¹⁶²

In THAAD issue, US and South Korea have reiterated that North Korea is the only target of THAAD deployment in South Korea. This could be confirmed by two official ROK & US Joint Statements regarding THAAD system. Aware of China's strong opposition, both statements contained the similar sentences, like “when the THAAD system is deployed to the Korean Peninsula, it will be focused solely on North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not be directed towards any third party nations.”¹⁶³

Regardless of the official rhetoric, how about the real efficacy of THAAD system in protecting both South Koreans and USFK from North Korea's threats? Evaluating this will help us better understand to what extent North Korea posed threats to South Korea and US security that prompted them to deploy THAAD system.

Foremost, it is needed to notify, from the author's perspective, US is the main pushing hand behind THAAD deployment in South Korea. Because THAAD is fully funded and operated by USFK. As I mentioned before, instead of purchasing THAAD system, South Korea decided to develop its own L-SAM in 2014 to counter North Korea's long-range missiles, and to upgrade current PAC-2 missiles to more advanced PAC-3 missiles in order to protect Seoul metropolitan areas, which are excluded from the THAAD coverage. This conjecture was also directly or indirectly confirmed by both South Korean and US officials, such as Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. Forces Korea(USFK); US Secretary of State John Kerry; General Vincent Brooks, head of the U.S. Army Pacific Command and so

¹⁶¹ US Department of Defence, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April, 2010

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010

¹⁶²US Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 2010

¹⁶³ ROK-U.S. Joint Announcement, Feb 7, 2016, United States Forces Korea; ROK & U.S. Joint Statement: ROK-U.S. Alliance agrees to deploy THAAD, July 7, 2016, United States Forces Korea

on, and some South Korean military officials.¹⁶⁴ Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti proclaimed in June 2016 that “it (THAAD deployment) is a U.S. initiative, and in fact, I recommended it as the commander.”¹⁶⁵ South Korean officials also disclosed that the major mission for THAAD would be to protect American troops and their equipment in South Korea.¹⁶⁶ Thus, it is important to understand how this system to be deployed will protect the U.S, and to a less significant sense, to protect South Korea from North Korea’s threats.

It is known that being deployed in Southern part of South Korea-Seongju County, THAAD system could be out of range of the North’s long-range artillery, and get rid of North Korea’s new 300 multiple rocket launch system, which has a range of 200 kilometers.¹⁶⁷It could safeguard important U.S. troops and assets in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province; Daegu; and Gunsan, North Jeolla Province, and probably even US forces in Guam and Okinawa.¹⁶⁸It is said that “Pyeongtaek will be home to the new headquarters for the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), while the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command, the logistics provider of the USFK, is stationed in Daegu. The U.S. Air Force has a large presence in Gunsan. The U.S. naval base at Chinhae on the southern coast, as well as Camp Carroll, a U.S. Army facility located nearby is also within the coverage.”¹⁶⁹ Moreover, it was disclosed that “the south-central region was strategically chosen in order to protect the cities of Busan, Ulsan, and Pohang from North Korean missile attacks; this is also where U.S. reinforcements and supplies would enter South Korea in the event of an attack, and where the country’s major nuclear plants, oil facilities, and storages are located.”¹⁷⁰ This careful site selection indicates U.S.’s deliberation of protecting USFK in South Korea in contingencies of Korean Peninsula. This substantiates that the main reason for U.S. to deploy THAAD system here in a short/medium-term is to fend off threats from North Korea.

For South Korea, deploying THAAD system would also be profitable. Without paying a coin, more than half of South Korea’s territory and residents there, as well as South Korea’s Gyeryongdae military headquarters in South Chungcheong Province would be shielded from North Korea’s missile attacks.¹⁷¹ Frankly speaking, on account of a close South Korea-US alliance, protecting USFK and its facilities in South Korea is equal to safeguarding the military capacity of South Korea itself.

¹⁶⁴ Jack Kim, *Between U.S. and China, South Korea in bind over missile*, March 17, 2015; Transcript: Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr. at Global Missile Defense Conference, May 28, 2014, Atlantic Council

¹⁶⁵ 2nd LD U.S. mulls deploying MD system in S. Korea: USFK chief, *Yonhap News*, 2014.6.3

¹⁶⁶ *Thaad won’t protect Seoul area*, *Korea Joong Ang Daily*, 2016.7.13,

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁸ *THAAD Will Not Protect South Korea*, *The Korea Expose*, 2017.3.29

¹⁶⁹ Kang Seung-woo, *Seongju confirmed as site for THAAD*, *The Korea Times*, 2016.7.11,

¹⁷⁰ *THAAD on the Korean Peninsula*, Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2017.10, *THAAD on the Korean Peninsula*, Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2017.10, <http://isdpeu.org/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf>

Bruce W. Bennett, *Why THAAD is Needed in Korea*, *The Rand Blog*, 2017.8.6, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/08/why-thaad-is-needed-in-korea.html>

¹⁷¹ Yoon Min-sik, *THAAD to be deployed in Seongju*, *The Korea Herald*, 2016.7.13

In conclusion, both the official rhetoric and real efficacy of THAAD system in protecting US and South Korea from North Korea's threats showcase that for Seoul, there is no doubt that its decision to agree with US deploying THAAD is largely related to North Korea's provocations, and for US, at least in short/medium-term the main target of this system is North Korea.

2.2 The US factor:

2.2.1 China's rise and its new assertiveness

Since 1978, the world has witnessed the unprecedented two-digit economic growth of China, while this speed has a little bit slowed down after 2008 global financial crisis, it still hovered around seven to nine percentage growth rate in recent years. In 1978, when China just started reform and open-door policy, the GDP gap between China and the U.S. was over thirteen times. However, since then, China has been recapturing its share of global GDP, and regaining its status as the "Middle Kingdom", when it had accounted for between 22 and 33 percent of world GDP for two thousand years, and its gap with the U.S. is shrinking fast and remarkably. In 2008 US GDP was only three and a half times that of China. In 2010 China overtook Japan, rising as the world's second-largest economy. In 2012, when Xi Jinping ascended to power, China's economy has reached to more than half of US economy's size and its GDP size constituted 11.5 percent of the global GDP. According to the purchasing-power-parity valuation (PPP) of a country's GDP, China's economy had outstripped that of the U.S. in 2014.¹⁷² In other economic realms, such as foreign trade, from 1978 to 2013, China jumped from the 32nd to the largest trading nation in the world. And from more than two decades, China has been one of the largest recipients of direct foreign investment. China also overtook Japan, becoming the country with the largest foreign currency reserve in the world in 2006. By 2014 China's foreign currency reserve grew to \$ 4 trillion.¹⁷³ In contrast, the U.S. is taking a divergent path. Its share of global GDP was 31.6 percent in 2002, and by 2008 it precipitated to 23.1 percent, and in 2012 it further declined to 21.7 percent. (See figure 3.1)¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, March 20, 2018, at <http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/WEOWORLD/CHN/JPN/USA?year=2022>

¹⁷³ Guoli Liu, *China Rising: Chinese Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Palgrave, 2017, 74-75

¹⁷⁴ Edited by G. John Ikenberry Power, *order, and change in world politics*, Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2014, Michael Mastanduno, *Order and Change in World Politics*, pp 162-191




Figure 3.2 The end of the age of America: Share of World GDP (current prices)

Data: International Monetary Fund, April 2018

Source: <http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/WEOWORLD/CHN/JPN/USA?year=2018>

In the military arena, China's military expenditures are skyrocketing, which largely changed the balance of power between China and the US. According to the SIPRI military expenditures database, US military expenditures in 1992 were almost twenty times larger than China's military expenditures. In 2002, US military expenditures were eight times larger than China's; and in 2012, this gap shrank to four times, and by 2016 US military expenditures (\$ 610 billion) were no more than three times China's expenditures.¹⁷⁵ The constant increase of military expenditures, concomitant with a low transparency of Chinese security strategy and military modernization alarms its US counterparts. For instance, the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2005 questioned Chinese leaderships about why China was devoted to spend such a substantial military budget in a relatively peaceful time.¹⁷⁶

Table 3.1 Comparative data on military expenditure in US \$ millions

Country	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
China	28,446	27,857	43,261	72,467	113,542	169,382	215,176
US	515,431	410,141	415,259	583,090	683,776	706,918	611,186

¹⁷⁵ Stig Stenslie and Chen Gang, XI Jinping's Grand Strategy, Jo Inge Bekkevold and Robert S. Ross editors, Introduction: China's new leadership in Domestic and International Politics, China in the era of Xi Jinping: domestic and foreign policy challenges; Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016. P 92-111

¹⁷⁶ Richard D. Fisher Jr. "Power Projection' Chinese Struggle", The Wall Street Journal (Europe), 2006,4.12

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Meanwhile, under the guideline of pursuing “local wars under condition of information,” China has made strides in all sectors, ranging from naval and air forces, nuclear weapons, to the outer space, cyberspace, and the Arctic, and it has been fairly successful in leapfrogging, modernizing, and narrowing down its capability gap with the U.S.¹⁷⁷ Many in Washington are viewing China’s military modernization as an “ominous sign of instability to come.”¹⁷⁸ What concerns the U.S most is China’s distinguished breakthrough in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) domain, employing sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles along with air and maritime defense systems to counter U.S. military operations within the first or second island chain in contingencies. For instance, China’s DF-21D Anti-Shipping Ballistic Missile (ASBM) could prevent American aircraft carriers from accessing waters within the first island chain, thereby considerably neutralizing US power projection capabilities in this region.¹⁷⁹ A possible China-US conflicts over Taiwan’s reunification or its alleged independence situations, and the presence of more than thousands’ SRBM of Chinese side to units opposite Taiwan further aggravated U.S. concern.¹⁸⁰

Most of all, the US appears to be more concerned about China’s intentions backed by its sustained economic growth and military modernization. Unlike the Soviet Union, who was a military giant and economic dwarf, and Japan, which has been an economic power with stunted military development and little normative attraction beyond its borders, China explicitly quests to become a great power of comprehensive strength.¹⁸¹ China’s new assertiveness ensuing the financial crisis in 2008 inflamed a myriad of controversies. Scholars debated about whether it is unusual or not, citing evidences like China’s more assertive diplomacy at the Copenhagen conference on climate change in December 2009; its evidently excessive claims over the territory disputes in South China Sea in March 2010; and its hardline approach toward Japan’s detention of a Chinese trawler captin in September 2010.¹⁸²

Although explanations vary from “premature triumphalism”, “reactive insecurity”, to “regime besieged” and “bureaucratic pluralism” (the later two are integrated into one spectrum),¹⁸³ most China analysts agree that China’s self-image of its power has gradually

¹⁷⁷ For more details, see Jae Ho Chung (edited), *Assessing China’s Power*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp 65-129

¹⁷⁸ Kennedy, A.B (2008), “China’s perceptions of US intentions toward Taiwan”, *Asian Survey* (47), 268-287

¹⁷⁹ Swaine, Michael (2011), *America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

¹⁸⁰ *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010*, Office of the Secretary of Defense

¹⁸¹ David M. Lampton, *The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 253

¹⁸² Derek McDougall, "Response to 'Rising China' in the East Asian Region: Soft Balancing with Accommodation," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 73 (January 2012), pp. 1-17

¹⁸³ Andrew Scobell & Scott W. Harold (2013) An “Assertive” China? Insights from Interviews, *Asian Security*, 9:2, 111-131, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2013.795549 See, respectively, Michael D. Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” *China Leadership Monitor* No. 32 (May 11, 2010), pp. 1–19; Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part One: On Core Interests,” *China Leadership Monitor* No. 34 (February 22, 2011), pp. 1–

transformed from a developing country to a great power after 2008 global financial crisis. They state that China's claims of sovereignty over disputed territories per se is not new given that sovereignty claims have been its long-standing stance, but China has put more teeth behind its territorial claims.¹⁸⁴ An interesting metaphor of China's ambitious strategy behind these coercive actions is "cutting skirt edges little by little" (剪裙边), referring to "cutting off the left and right arms and legs one by one of the US would eventually isolate and defeat the superpower". Given US position in Asia is established on multifarious network of alliances and partnerships, by dampening its allies' confidence in US' will and capabilities to protect them, China could easily cripple US position in Asia.¹⁸⁵ Whatsoever, China is moving toward a new foreign policy direction, while walking away from its long-standing low-profile foreign policy guideline of "taoguang yanghui", and its decades-long foreign policy guideline for China-US relations--"learning to live with the hegemon".¹⁸⁶

2.22 The US rebalance to Asia-Pacific

From US views, China's assertive postures in safeguarding core interests in Asia, buttressed by increased military capabilities and economic leverages on neighboring countries illustrated China's lust to impair U.S presence in Asia, which threatens the U.S-dominant Asia-Pacific order.

In response, in October 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed a blueprint of "America's Pacific Century", delineating a "strategic turn" to the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁸⁷ In a November 2011, President Barack Obama articulated this shift in his speech before the Australian Parliament: "As we end today's wars (Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority."¹⁸⁸ In his speech, Obama also underlined the three pillars of the rebalance include security, prosperity, and values (democratic values), which distinctly prioritize the security demands. This shows the U.S is seeking to maintain pre-eminence in this region ranging from economic arena to military and soft-power domains through rebalancing. Three announcements from the U.S. Department of Defense, including the Defense Strategic Guidance in January 2012, named as "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for Twenty-First Century Defense,"¹⁸⁹ and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's remarks at the

25; Michael Yahuda, "China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 22, No. 81 (May 2013), pp. 446-459; Thomas Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011), pp. 54-67; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "A Shift in Perceptions of Power," *The Los Angeles Times*, April 6, 2011, p. 17; Dan Blumenthal, "Riding a Tiger: China's Resurging Foreign Policy Aggression," *Foreign Policy*, Shadow Government Blog, April 15, 2011; Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 7-48

¹⁸⁴ Suisheng Zhao (2015), *China's Power from a Chinese Perspective*, in *Assessing China's Power* edited by Jae Ho Chung, Palgrave Macmillan, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, P261

¹⁸⁵ Suisheng Zhao (2015) *A New Model of Big Power Relations? China-US strategic rivalry and balance of power in the Asia-Pacific*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24:93, 377-397, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2014.953808

¹⁸⁶ Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005)

¹⁸⁷ Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", *Foreign Policy*, 2011.10.11

¹⁸⁸ Barack Obama, "Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament", 2011.11.17

¹⁸⁹ "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for Twenty-First Century Defense," U.S. Department of Defense, 2012.1

Shangri-La Security Dialogue in June 2012, as well as Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter's remarks before the Asia Society in August 2012¹⁹⁰ outlined more details of the administration's plan for the military portion of the rebalance. For example, according to Secretary Panetta's speech, "by 2020 the Navy will re-posture its forces from today's roughly 50/50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between those oceans. That will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and submarines."¹⁹¹ The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review confirmed this rebalance strategy and the redistribution of US navy assets.¹⁹² From 2012 then on, the U.S. military has boosted rotational deployments to Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea so that normalize US troops' presence in these regions, and has also promised to introduce the most advanced weapons (such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) to this region as soon as possible.¹⁹³

In economic arena, while pressuring its allies not to join China-led AIIB, US revived negotiations on Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement since 2008 to contain the rapidly increasing influence and power of China in this region, and thwarting the emergence of a China-centered East Asian trading bloc, like Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). US-led TPP negotiation has "deliberately" excluded China, but include a bevy of countries seeking to hedge against Chinese influence, such as China's major competitor for regional power-Japan.¹⁹⁴ President Obama's statement on TPP in 2015 accurately depicted US calculations behind this agreement, as he asserted that "we can't let countries like China write the rules of the global economy...we should write those rules..."¹⁹⁵ The high threshold set by the US for TPP memberships in environmental standards, labor standards, intellectual property rights, and its stringent limitation on state-owned enterprises' privileges in trade, known as "competition neutrality", has kept China at bay.¹⁹⁶

2.23 The US Ballistic Missile Defense policy in the context of China's increasing A2/AD capabilities

Guided by its rebalancing to Asia roadmap, the U.S. security strategy that used to focus on the concept of Air Land Battle (ALB) has gradually shifted toward Air Sea Battle (ASB) since 2009. This was after serious deliberation of the predominantly maritime operating environment that characterizes the Asia-Pacific theatre. Compared to the emphasis of rear echelon degradation of ALB, ASB underlines to "minimize or defeat the Anti-Access/Area

¹⁹⁰Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, "The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective", New York City, 2012.8.1

¹⁹¹Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, "Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore", June 02, 2012 <http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5049>

¹⁹² Quadrennial Defense Review Report, U.S. Department of Defense, 2014.2

¹⁹³ Murphy, Terence M, The Pacific phased adaptive approach: U.S. BMD in response to the DRPK, December 2014, Calhoun,

¹⁹⁴ Min Ye (2015) China and Competing Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, RCEP, and the New Silk Road, Asian Security, 11:3, 206-224, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2015.1109509

¹⁹⁵ Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, The White House, 2015.10.5

¹⁹⁶ Peng Li, Strategic Game between China and the US from the Perspective of TPP, Journal of China and International Relation, Vol 3 No 2 (2015) , 2015,11.30:

Denial (A2/AD) capabilities of adversaries by employing a strategy of D3- disrupt, destroy and defeat”, within which BMD plays a key role.¹⁹⁷ Specifically, Aegis allows “US naval forces greater freedom of movement in hotly contested zones of conflict, for example the South and East China Seas in the event of a conflict with China; BMD in the form of THAAD and PAC-3 will also minimize the impact of pre-emptive ballistic missile attacks on US facilities and strategic assets in the region.”¹⁹⁸ In essence, BMD is tightly integrated into ASB, aiming at countering adversaries’ A2/AD capabilities so that facilitate US force projection capabilities and freedom of movement in the event of a conflict, particularly in the maritime environment that characterizes Asia.¹⁹⁹ As I mentioned before the proclaimed target of US missile defense in East Asia is North Korea, however, it targets at China in the medium/long run.

Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010 and 2014, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and the US 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) offer us insights about how US assesses the threats China posed in A2/AD domain. For the report in 2010, in the section of “Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments”, it raises similar concern about China’s military modernization as it has toward North Korea and Iran’s advancement in ballistic missile systems, claiming “China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization programs, raising a number of legitimate questions regarding its long-term intentions...”

Following this description, it continues that “U.S. power projection forces also confront growing threats in other domains. In recent years, a number of states have acquired sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles, quiet submarines, advanced mines, and other systems that threaten naval operations... Several states have the capability to disrupt or destroy satellites that provide surveillance, communications, positioning, and other functions important to military operations.”²⁰⁰ These sentences refrains from pointing out a specific country, yet given China has all the attributes as listed, we can reckon that US has already regarded China as a major threat to US power projection capabilities in Asia-Pacific.

Likewise, with reference to both China’s and Iran’s pursuit of “asymmetric means to counter or power projection capabilities,” 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states that “the U.S military will invest in BMD as one of several approaches to ensure continued power projection capabilities in A2/AD environment.”²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ Air-Sea Battle Office, AIR-SEA BATTLE: SERVICE COLLABORATION TO ADDRESS ANTI-ACCESS AREA DENIAL CHALLENGES, 1 (ed. US Department of Defense, United States Military, 2013).

¹⁹⁸ James Dwyer, Ballistic Missile Defence and the Changing Nature of Deterrence: The US Rebalance and China’s Nuclear Strategy, 13 US-China L. Rev. 474 (2016)

¹⁹⁹ Air Sea Battle Concept, Air Power Development Center Bulletin

²⁰⁰ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010

²⁰¹ Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hidreth, & Susan V. Lawrence, April 3, 2015.

The report in 2014, while reiterating the U.S. rebalance to Asia-Pacific strategy, identifies possible origins of future conflicts, namely “ranging from a hybrid contingency against proxy groups using asymmetric approaches, to a high-end conflict against a state power armed with WMD or technologically advanced A2/AD capabilities.” It again fails to name out a specific country in this section, nevertheless, in the latter part of this report it only cites China’s A2/AD capabilities as an example--“in the coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking to counter U.S. strengths using A2/AD approaches and by employing other new cyber and space control technologies.”²⁰² This illustrates that U.S. has conceived China with advanced A2/AD capabilities as a huge threat to US national security even equivalent to that from rogue countries.

In the same vein, the US 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) confirms this concern. In addition to pointing out urgent nuclear threats from Al Qaeda and their extremist allies, and nuclear proliferation North Korea and Iran, this report extends same concern to China’s military modernization. To be specific, the NPR claims that: “At the same time, the United States and China’s Asian neighbors remain concerned about China’s current military modernization efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal...the lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear programs-their pace and scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guides them- raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions.”²⁰³

Therefore, we can infer that although China is not a stated target of US BMD programs at least in the short-term, the unpredictability posed by the aggressive nature of China's nuclear and military posture, and its noticeable A2/AD capabilities, in effect, has provided a robust impulse for the US to beef up BMD construction in the region. The BMD system will allow the US to countervail potential threats from China, and equip the US with a powerful capability to defeat China’s A2/AD facilities.²⁰⁴ The CRS report in 2015 acknowledged that “as a matter of policy, U.S. missile defenses are not intended to alter the balance of nuclear deterrence with the major nuclear-armed states, i.e. Russia and China. U.S. and allied BMD assets in the Asia-Pacific region are, however, inherently capable of intercepting short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) in East Asia that are launched not just from North Korea, but also from China. Future U.S. BMD capabilities in the region may be designed to counter much longer-range ballistic missiles regardless of their country of origin.”²⁰⁵

2.24 Understanding THAAD deployment in South Korea against the backdrop of US rebalance to Asia-Pacific in BMD domain

In line with this new security concept, and the intention to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, Obama administration made major strides in improve BMD systems in Northeast Asia. It deployed a THAAD battery, including a AN/TPY-2 radar to its military base in Guam

²⁰² Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2014

²⁰³ US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April, 2010

²⁰⁴ James Dwyer, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the Changing Nature of Deterrence: The US Rebalance and China's Nuclear Strategy," *US-China Law Review* 13, no. 6 (June 2016): 474-490

²⁰⁵ Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hidreth, & Susan V. Lawrence, April 3, 2015.

in April 2013,²⁰⁶ Patriot/PAC-3 batteries in Okinawa, Japan in 2013,²⁰⁷ and the second AN/TPY-2 radar at the at Kyogamisaki Sub Base in Kyoto prefecture of Japan in December 2014 (the first one was deployed at Shariki Military Base in Aomori Prefecture in 2007).²⁰⁸

Most of all, Obama administration also beefed up interoperability and integration of US-Japan-ROK BMD system, which to some extent signals a possible formation of US-Japan-ROK military triangle that might be used for containing China. The “Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020”, released in December 2013, calls on the U.S. military to “integrate air and missile defense capabilities with allies and to adjust partners’ contributions.”²⁰⁹ The signature of U.S.-Japan-South Korea military information-sharing arrangement, a revised version of GSOMIA in 2014 represents the first step toward a common US-Japan-South Korea missile defense system, and a trilateral military alliance. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Air Forces Pacific opened the Pacific Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Center in October 2014 so that enhance multinational integrated IAMD capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region and to operate as a hub for corresponding training and education.²¹⁰ In 2016, the US, Japan and South Korea held the first anti-missile exercises among three countries, called “Pacific Dragon.” The US side commented that “Pacific Dragon not only allows participants the opportunity to exercise ballistic missile defense but it enhances the already strong relationship of all three nations participating.”²¹¹

It is in this context that the US pushed forward THAAD deployment. In other words, THAAD’s deployment conforms with US rebalancing strategy in Asia, and its BMD strategy in this region. As I have mentioned before, the US was the major pushing-hands here. From the beginning, US purposes for deploying THAAD in South Korea are multifaceted rather than one-fold as US has professed, namely only targeting at North Korea. It was as early as 2008, that the US already considered to deploy such a system in South Korea. In 2008, at his nomination hearing, USFK Commander General Walter Sharp claimed that “THAAD system would be vital to provide the layered, systematic missile defense capability required to protect critical United States facilities in the Republic of Korea.”²¹² General James D. Truman’s testimony at his nomination hearings as USFK Commander in 2011 confirmed this idea again. He asserted “the system that would best support the layered defense employment principle is a THAAD system which can engage inbound TBMs at either the terminal or mid-course of flight. A THAAD system could be used to provide layered defense and also improve early warnings for the Korean Peninsula as well as enhance Ballistic Missile Defense early warning

²⁰⁶ Zach Berger, Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2), Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, March 2017

²⁰⁷“Patriot units to be deployed in Okinawa permanently.” The Japan Times, 2013.4.13

²⁰⁸ “Japan, U.S. to Deploy Second TPY-2 Long-range Radar in Kyoto City,” United Press International, October 4, 2013.

²⁰⁹ Martin Dempsey, “Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020,” U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2014.12.13

²¹⁰ Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hidreth, & Susan V. Lawrence, April 3, 2015,

²¹¹ Chang Jae-soon, U.S., S. Korea, Japan conduct first joint missile-tracking exercise, Yonhap News, June 29, 2016; Lee Chi-dong, no trilateral missile drills planned this year: source, Yonhap News, September 10, 2013

²¹² Nominations before the Senate Armed Services Committee. (2008, May 22). Second session, 110th congress. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg46092/html/CHRG-110shrg46092.htm>

in the region.”²¹³ In the discussion and deployment process, US repeatedly defended that THAAD deployment only targets at North Korea. However, on account of US rebalance to Asia and its accelerated pace in developing BMD systems in Asia, such claim cannot hold water. As General James D. Truman’s testimony that “THAAD could improve early warnings for the Korean Peninsula as well as enhance Ballistic Missile Defense early warning in the region” succinctly captures, the calculus behind THAAD deployment is never confined to Korean Peninsula, rather, it covers the whole Asia-Pacific region with China at the target.

If so, how THAAD deployment in South Korea will impair China’s A2/AD capabilities, or say a crucial part of this-China’s nuclear deterrent capabilities? The answer lies on THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar. To recap, a typical THAAD battery comes with two fire control centers, 6-9 launch vehicles, and a ground-based radar- Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) radar, and 48-72 missiles (8 missiles per launch vehicle).²¹⁴ This radar can be used in two modes: the forward-based mode, and the terminal mode. Estimates of the range of these two modes varies but basically Terminal Mode is short range (c. 600 km) while Forward-based Mode may be up to 3000 kms, deep into China and Russia.²¹⁵ In the forward-based mode, the radar, deployed independent of THAAD, detects and tracks all classes of missiles in their launch/boost phase, and subsequently hands off collected information to the wider Ballistic Missile Defense System. In the terminal mode, it works with THAAD battery, and monitors incoming missiles and warheads in the terminal phase of their trajectory to enable interception by its THAAD battery.

If the AN/TPY-2 radar in South Korea is used for forward-based mode, it could firstly give US extraordinary surveillance penetration into sensitive Chinese missile testing and military activities in the remote inland of China. Secondly, it could also work with another two AN/TPY-2s in Japan, and one in Guam to greatly enhance the resolution of US data on incoming Chinese warheads and thereby severely weakening China’s second-strike capabilities. It is said that the radar in South Korea could have a unique vantage point to observe the back of the Chinese warheads overflow the northeastern China, and thus degrade the penetration aids for China’s ICBMs--such as decoy warheads.²¹⁶ The pre-THAAD situation is China has a great deal of SRBMs and MRBMs that, in contingencies, would be able to destroy U.S. forward bases. After THAAD was deployed, China’s A2/AD capabilities will be largely neutralized.²¹⁷ US accelerated move in strengthening interoperability and integration of US-Japan-South Korea BMD systems only fostered such perception.

Thirdly, both US and South Korea has claimed that the one stalled in South Korea is different from those in Japan which are forward-based modes, and what South Korea installed is Terminal-based, thus only covering North Korea. However, facts speak louder than words. Foremost, it has been confirmed by the Pentagon document that the two modes have identical

²¹³ Ibid

²¹⁴ THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, Institute for Security & Development Policy, October 2017

²¹⁵ “THAAD Radar Ranges,” Mostlymissiledefense.com, 17 July 2016.

²¹⁶ Park Hyun, AN/TPY-2 radar could track any Chinese ICBMs as they pass over the Korean peninsula, Hankyoreh, June 2, 2015

Park Hyun, THAAD missile defense system could be used to defend against Chinese attack on US, June 2, 2015

²¹⁷ Are China’s THAAD Fears Justified? *The Diplomat*, February 20, 2015.

hardware, with trivial differences in their controlling software, which technically only needs eight hours for conversion.²¹⁸ Besides, the radar is under the purview of the USFK, so it is highly possible that the South Korean government have no ideal about what mode it is being operated in. Finally, it is dubious considering US and South Korea declined China's request for technical adjustments of this radar system, or permission for an on-site inspection. In March 2016, when South Korea and US embarked on formal talks on THAAD installations, China had requested South Korean government for technical adjustments to the radar system so that the radar's detection capabilities could be neutralized and affect China less. To China's dismay, Seoul refused its request. After the THAAD was stationed in 2017, it was reported that China demanded Seoul to take more practical measures to allay China's concerns, for instance, to explain to Beijing the technical side of THAAD battery, or to allow for an on-site inspection of THAAD,²¹⁹ or to set up a shield against THAAD radar so that make sure THAAD's powerful radar is unable to spy on its own military maneuvers, or to hold bilateral military talks over this system.²²⁰ All of these remedial measures have been turned down by Seoul, claiming they are excessive demands, or outside Seoul's purview, reasoning THAAD is a US military asset.²²¹

To sum up, these evidences indicate that THAAD deployment in South Korea should be understood through the lens of U.S. rebalance to Asia-Pacific. North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile tests might be one reason for US' active postures in promoting missile-defense system in Asia. Nevertheless, China's ascendancy would be an equally important factor that facilitated US decision on THAAD deployment. THAAD deployment in South Korea will enable the USFK to expand its current MD system from a terminal lower-tier intercept system to a terminal upper-tier intercept system, and drastically reduce blind spots in existing US detection and tracking system, giving the US remarkable surveillance insight into sensitive Chinese missile testing in the remote inland of China. It will also enable US militaries to establish an early warning system against China's long-range ballistic missiles so as to increase US military capacity in intercepting Chinese ICBMs more effectively, while neutralizing China's A2/AD capabilities. In the long-run, THAAD deployment in South Korea would contribute to the US dominance in this region.

3. Conclusion:

Using Putnam's two-level approach as a framework, this chapter analyzed both domestic and external forces behind Seoul's decision to deploy THAAD system. For domestic factors, leadership changes from progressive party to conservative party since 2008 foreboded a comeback of coercive postures toward the North, a strengthened alliance with the US. In THAAD issue, inherently Park Geun-hye's Trustpolitik resembles Lee Myung-bak's "denuclearization, opening, and \$ 3,000 per capita GDP, and at best it is another version of a tit-for tat reciprocity. This conservative approach in nature portends South Korea's harsh retaliation in response to the North's brinkmanship, and the death of China-ROK honeymoon after North Korean nuclear test. The already accelerated missile defense system since Lee

²¹⁸ Park Hyun, Pentagon document confirms THAAD's eight-hour conversion ability, Hankyoreh, June 3, 2015

²¹⁹ Seoul has no plan for talks on THAAD with China, Yonhap News, November 2017,

²²⁰ China Demands On-Site Inspection of THAAD Battery in Korea, Chosun Ilbo, June 14, 2017

²²¹ More Bullying from Beijing, Yonhap News, November 24, 2017

Myung-bak took office provided another clue for a possible consent to THAAD deployment in conservatives' reign. North Korea's fourth nuclear test and second successful long-range missile launch in early 2016 made the timing ripe, and convinced Seoul of entrenched differences in North Korean denuclearization between China and itself, which in turn lowered the influence of China factor in Seoul's calculations for THAAD deployment. In addition, an unanimous consent among conservative party members, and wide supports within the public collectively spurred Park Geun-hye administration to agree with THAAD deployment.

For external factors, North Korea's more aggressive provocations after the breakdown of "Leap Day Agreement" on February 29, 2012 provided a pretext for US and South Korea to take more "proactive deterrence" measures and move closer in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) issues. Meanwhile, the officially-alleged explanation for South Korea-US THAAD deployment belied another equivalently important factor-the implications of US rebalance to Asia in BMD arena. In a sense, THAAD deployment is only one calculated step for the U.S. to deter China's A2/AD capabilities, and to maintain its superiority in Asia-Pacific. It is in line with the major trend of US-led expedited missile defense developments in Asia. In a nutshell, both domestic and external factors combined put pressures on Park Geun-hye government in weighing on whether to deploy THAAD system or not. North Korea's fourth nuclear test and missile firings are the last straws that forced Seoul to clinch it.

Therefore, the complexity of THAAD issue, which intertwined domestic factors (conservative nature of Park Geun-hye government, overwhelming supports within party and in the public) with external factors (US rebalance to Asia, and North Korea provocations) explains why it is difficult for China and South Korea to step back on this issue, and why both sides did nothing but allowed this issue to escalate into a lose-lose situation. For South Korea, it blames for North Korea's provocations and China's appeasement in North Korea nuclear issue. In contrast, for China, it grumbles the conservative nature of Park Geun-hye government in overreacting to North Korea's provocations, and strengthening alliance with US and intensifying cooperation with Japan, which aims at containing itself. In this context, the downturn of China-ROK amicable relationship in 2016 is conceivable trend, considering the inherent disparity between two sides in North Korea issue, and US-ROK alliance even at the initial stage.

Chapter IV. China's Korea policy in the Xi Jinping administration--changed and unchanged

This chapter will answer the third research question of “whether there are any Korean policy adjustments or an aberration in Xi's era”. Before expounding China's Korea policy, it is necessary to have a brief review of China-Korea relations in history in order to better understand China's interest and stakes in Korean Peninsula. Then I will discuss the guideline of China's Korea policy-“to support and maintain peace and stability”, and the concrete embodiments of this guideline and their implementation in Jiang-Hu era. The concrete China's Korea policies include to maintain “equidistant diplomacy toward two Koreas”, shore up “North Korean regime survival” and seek for “regime reform”, realize “denuclearization of Korean Peninsula”, as well as estrange South Korea from US-ROK alliance or at least preventing the formation of US-Japan-ROK military triangle in containing China. Finally, I will reflect on China's Korea policy toward two Koreas respectively in Xi Jinping administration, and give an overall appraisal of what has been changed and unchanged in China's Korea policy in past four years (2013-2016).

1. A sketch of China-Korea relations and China's roadmap for Korean peninsula

Traditionally, China used to viewed the Korean peninsula as a crucial region that is tightly correlated with the vicissitudes of the mainland. The peninsula used to be depicted as a “dagger” pointed at the neck of the Chinese dragon. On the basis of geostrategic calculations, in the late sixteenth century, the Ming Imperial Court sent great armies to aid Chosun to repulse the marauding Japanese. The Qing dynasty fought another arduous war against Japan over the suzerainty of Chosun. China's disgraceful defeat in this war ended not only its suzerainty of Chosun but also precluded an eight-years' strenuous anti-Japanese war.²²²

The history lessons of Japan that used annexation of Korea as a bridgehead to invade China, warned the leaderships of the newly established PRC of formidable threats to Chinese security on the heels of US control of the Korean Peninsula. China's decision to getting involved into the Korean War by sacrificing its own interests to save Pyongyang offers the best example of China's stake in Korean peninsula. Such geopolitical and strategic rationale also underpinned China's reluctant engagement with North Korea in Cold War era, when it needed an ally to defended against either “US imperialists” and “Japanese militarists”, or Soviet revisionist. The same logic accounts for China's decision to sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with North Korea in July 1961, which was arranged just five days after a similar treaty was signed between Pyongyang and Moscow.²²³ When Cold War ended, the fragile China-US collaboration that used to deter Soviet Union's expansionism terminated, and the discourse of “China threat” came up and then run wild in the following two decades. This defined US-China relationship more as rivalry than as strategic partnership. This forged China-Korea relations subjugated to China-US relations, and China's objective in Korean Peninsula has readjusted to resist the US hegemony and Japan's expansionism by guaranteeing North Korea as a buffer zone, and preventing Seoul from joining a hostile and diversionary US-Japan-South Korea military

²²² Jae-Ho, Jung (2007), pp 12-18

²²³ Chae-Jin Lee, (1996), pp. 59-88

alliance against itself.²²⁴China normalized its previously hostile relations with Seoul in 1992, and its Korea policy finally evolved from one-Korea (pro-Pyongyang) policy to a one-Korea de jure/ two-Korea de facto policy and finally to a two-Korea de facto and de jure policy. To whatsoever, the geopolitical significance of Korean Peninsula to China's security and China's intricate historical relations with it has defined China's persistent stake and interest in peninsula.

In order to construct a peaceful and prosperous periphery environment conducive to its domestic economic developments in which neighboring states do not become pawns of any foreign power hostile to PRC, the pillar of China's Korea policy has always been "to support and maintain the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula."²²⁵ This policy was first declared by President Jiang Zemin in 1995²²⁶, and then reaffirmed by both Hu Jintao administration and Xi Jinping administration. After North Korea nuclear issue surfaced, and in the midst of the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, this guideline was specified by Hu Jintao administration as three NOs policy-"no war, no instability, no nukes" (不战, 不乱, 无核) in 2010, with the strategic priorities in descending order.²²⁷The three NOs policy was again recalibrated by Xi Jinping administration in 2013 after North Korea nuclear issue upsurged, to three principles-"denuclearization, peace and stability, and the resolution of issues through dialogue and negotiation". Regardless of these syntactical alterations, the gist of China's Korea policy has always been consistent and clear-cut, namely to maintain peace and stability.

Here peace refers to the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas. China's peaceful development, and national rejuvenation, or its pursuit for China's dream are all is conditioned on favorable surroundings. If military conflicts escalate on the Peninsula, China might be reluctantly implicated in such a conflict according to the 1961 security treaty with the North, even against its will. A refusal of treaty obligations would deeply embarrass China diplomatically and incur damages to China's national security if hostile forces come to the China-Korean border.²²⁸This explains why since late 1990s China has warned the North in various venues that China would only observe the treaty when the North encounters an unprovoked assault externally-an extremely impossible event.²²⁹ Recently, it was even revealed that Beijing made efforts to persuade Pyongyang to remove the clause in the treaty

²²⁴ Chung Jae Ho, China as much as the US is between "strategic alliance" and "strategic partnership," *Agony over China* by Chung Jae-Ho, p. 242, 245, 261

²²⁵ Avery Goldstein (2006), pp. 131-161; Taeho Kim, "Sino-ROK Relations at 15: An Overview and Assessment," Working Paper Series No. 185 (August 2007), Center for Asian Pacific Studies (Lingnan University, Hong Kong)

²²⁶ 杨昭全, 孙艳姝著, 《当代中朝中韩关系史 (下卷) 》, 吉林文史出版社, 2013年, pp 643

²²⁷ Cheng, Xiaohu. (2012). From Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao: The Evolution of China's Policies toward the Korean Peninsula*. *Korea Observer*, 43(4), pp 693

²²⁸ Chen Ping, China's (North) Korea Policy: Misperception and Reality (An Independent Chinese Perspective on Sino-Korean Relations), Gilbert Rozman edited, *China's Foreign Policy: Who Makes it, and How is It Made?* The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Seoul, Korea, 2011, pp 253-274

²²⁹ A Testing Ground for China's Power, Prosperity and Preferences: China's Post-Cold-War Relations with the Korean Peninsula, *Pacifica Review: Peace, security & global change*, 13:1, 31-40, DOI:10.1080/13239100120036027;

Eric A Mcvaden . (2010). Korean issues in U.S.-China relations 1990-2010. *Korean journal of defense analysis*, 22(2), 141-162.

that confined Beijing's choices in the event of conflicts.²³⁰ The same logic also applies to China's aspiration to transform its special ties with the North to normal state-to-state relationship. These reflects China's will to avert entrapment from its currently "special" relations with North Korea stipulated by the treaty.

Stability refers to maintaining the "status quo," though the best scenario for China is "status quo plus". A divided Korea conforms to China's interests in short and long-run. Officially China declares it supports for "an autonomous and peaceful unification of Korean Peninsula, without external interference". This means China supports for a natural development of an international situation and an independent choice of Korean people not forced nor hastened by outsiders, like the US. China opposes any dramatic change in Korean Peninsula, either in the form of a bloody Vietnam type unification followed by the collapse of North Korean regime, or the German unification model reunification-by-absorption scenario.

This is under a consideration that reunification led by Seoul would firstly signify China's consistent policy of buttressing North Korea's system had failed, which might evoke the specter of "peaceful evolution" in China, and jeopardize Chinese authoritarian political system. Moreover, being bereft of North Korea as a buffer zone, concomitant with an influx of North Korean refugees or the presence of a North Korean government in exile, would probably pose a danger to China's border security. Thirdly, Korean reunification might also disrupt the delicate balance of power in Northeast Asia. There is no guarantee that a unified Korea would show friendliness and cooperation toward China. If a unified Korea were to conclude a security treaty with the US or allow a US military presence, China's desire to keep preeminent foreign power out of the Korean Peninsula, the major reason for its involvement in Korean War, and to preserve the balance of strategic interests in the region would be thwarted.²³¹ Finally, even if Korean reunification is conducted peacefully, the great uncertainty of a unified Korean government also raises severe concerns in Chinese side. China has to face a wide range of conflicts with a united Korea over territorial issues, such as the demarcation of Changbai/Baekdu Mountains and the Yellow Sea, and social issues, like the status of two million ethnic Koreans in Northeast China, and other historical issues, like Goguryeo controversies. In short, China is reluctant to champion immediate Korean unification following either the Vietnam or German model, and instead, opts for the status quo of Korean Peninsula.

In line with this guideline, China has tried to adopt "equidistant diplomacy" to two Koreas. For the North, China has extended abundant assistances for the survival of North Korean regime, and encourage North Korea to embark on reform, while standing firmly on denuclearization issue. For the South, China has continuously boosted bilateral relations for the sake of deterring Seoul from joining in US-Japan-ROK military alliance to contain itself.²³²

²³⁰ Bonnie S. Glaser, China and Japan's Perspective on North Korea, Council on Foreign Relations, October 21, 2014, <https://www.cfr.org/event/china-and-japans-perspectives-north-korea-0>

²³¹ Samuel Kim (2001), pp 399-404; Chae Jin-Lee (1996), pp 170-176

²³² David Shambaugh (Spring 2003), pp. 43-56

조영남. 2006. 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』. 파주: 나남, pp. 257

Regardless of the leadership reshuffle, China has maintained these policies for the sake of its own interest, and only adjusted concrete approaches to adapt to changed situations. Reminiscent of past two and a half decades' history, we can find there is almost no sea change in China's equidistant diplomacy toward two Koreas. It has flexibly dealt with the issue of North Korea's reform and regime survival, while seeking for better relations with South Korea. The visible changes in Xi Jinping administration are China's increasingly hardline stand toward North Korea nuclear development, and more initiative in improving its ties with the South. However, in effect, these changes do not contradict with the guideline of China's Korea policy, namely to maintain peace and stability, and to enhance its influence in Korean Peninsula. Thus, fundamentally, China's Korea policy in Xi Jinping administration has not changed, and there are only tactical changes in specific approaches.

2. The implementation of China's Korea Policy in Jiang-Hu era:

2.1 Equidistant diplomacy toward two Koreas

China aims to maintain its traditional friendly relations with North Korea, while deepen already robust ties with South Korea so that enhance its influence and leverages toward two Koreas. The inter-Korean detente in Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun government gave China more spaces to maneuver between two Koreas without at expenses of either side. As a step to take an even-handed stance in dealing with two Koreas' issues, China downgraded its relations with the North from special "blood alliance" to "traditional amicable relations" since late 1990s, while increased its relations with Seoul from "Cooperative Partnership" in November 1998, to "Comprehensive and Cooperative Partnership" in July 2003, then further to "Strategic Cooperative Partnership" in May 2008.²³³ It is worth noting that China's upgrade of its relationship with Seoul should not be viewed as its preference to Seoul, rather, it conforms to China's interest in keeping a delicate balance between two Koreas. After all, its relationship with the North still sits at a higher level according to its foreign relation classification.²³⁴

In Jiang Ze-min's rule, China embarked on this equidistant diplomacy once its relations with the North rehabilitated after a eight-year hiatus of high-level exchanges. On the heels of Kim Yong Nam-led "military-first" delegation's visit to China in 1999, it for the first time agreed on high-level military exchanges between Beijing and Seoul, which was manifested by the first-ever meetings between Chinese and South Korean defense ministers in Beijing (in August 1999) and Seoul (in January 2000). In May 2000, during Kim Jung-il's visit to China, Jiang Zemin tailored a set of sixteen-character principles that guided its relations with North Korea, namely "inheriting tradition, facing up to the future, building a good neighborhood, and strengthening cooperation"(继承传统, 面向未来, 睦邻友好, 加强合作).²³⁵ On the other hand, as a posture to maintain balance in two Koreas, Zhu Rongji visited Seoul in October 2000 in an effort to strengthen the twenty-first-century-oriented partnership with the

²³³ 박종철, 중국의 대북한관계 변화와 지속: 감정은의 체제유지와 시진핑의 현상유지강화의 타협으로서 적대적 동맹, 중국의 대한반도 정책, 국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소, 2015. pp 28

²³⁴ Since 1996, China classified its foreign relations into five types. On the top is "blood alliance", then is "traditional friendly cooperation", "partnership", "good-neighborly and friendly relationship" and pure normalization. For the type of partnership, it is subdivided into comprehensive partnership, cooperative partnership, and coordinative partnership.

²³⁵ Cheng, Xiaohu. (2012), pp 675-699.

South. In this meeting, both sides reached consensus on promoting their relationship to “comprehensive cooperative partnership.” Similarly, Kim Jong-il and Jiang Zemin’s mutual visit in January 2001 and September 2001, was synchronized by a mutual visit of China and South Korea’s parliament leaders, and South Korea Prime Minister Lee Han-dong’s visit to China.²³⁶

After Hu Jintao took office in 2002, China continued the similar path of striking a balance between two Koreas. For instance, shortly after his state visit to Pyongyang in October 2005, Hu Jintao visited Seoul in November 2005. Even if China harshly censured Pyongyang’s nuclear test in 2006 by using the word like “flagrantly”, which was interpreted as a tilting toward Seoul, it retarded further bilateral military exchanges with Seoul, and even refused Seoul’s request for upgrading bilateral relations to a higher level in January 2007. This was under the consideration that when it estranged the North in denuclearization issue, China did not want Pyongyang to misperceive its motive as favoring Seoul in other domains, and thereby messing up its delicate balance between two Koreas.²³⁷ On the surface, it appears China was more inclined to North Korea after conservative government-Lee Myung-bak government ascended to power, and many testify this argument by citing China’s “willful blindness” in Cheonan sinking incident and Yongpyong Island shelling incident in 2010. Rather, in nature, it only reflects China’s top priority for peace and stability, and its reluctance to form a united front with Seoul and the US to condemn the North when succession issue unfolded and regime survival was at stake. From China’s perspective, this was at the risk of backfiring, and might prompt North Korea to go for outrageous and probably disastrous reactions that will imperil regional stability.²³⁸

China’s such balancing strategy was also reflected in its relatively neutral position in both Four-Party Talks (1996-2002) and Six-Party Talks (2003-2009). For instance, in Four-Party-Talks, China opposed Pyongyang’s demand that the issues of US troop presence in South Korea and US-North Korean peace treaty should be included in the agenda, while rejected US-ROK’s proposal that the talks address tension-reducing and confidence-building measures. Instead, Beijing advanced its relatively detached line that the four countries should primarily discuss the improvement of bilateral relations.²³⁹ Likewise, in Six-Party-Talks, while declined ROK-Japan-US’s demand for giving aids on the condition of North Korea’s Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID), it also rejected North Korea’s proposal for fully disarming its weapons program after normalizing relations with US, and concluding a peace regime in Korea Peninsula. Rather, China proposed a milder, step-by-step solution, namely each step of nuclear disarmament will be followed with certain rewards.

In economic arena, while maintaining a skyrocketing trade relationship with Seoul as I mentioned in the second chapter, China also developed a closer cooperation with the North. After deterioration of North Korea-Soviet Union relations in 1990, and North Korea’s previous major trade partners-Japan and South Korea tightened sanctions, China has been

²³⁶ 杨昭全, 孙艳姝 (2013 年), pp 839-846

²³⁷ 何喜有, 申相振, 《从相互隔绝到战略合作: 建交后中韩政治经济关系的演化》, 复旦大学出版社, 2016, pp 171, pp 227

²³⁸ Ibid, pp 237


²³⁹ Samuel S. Kim (2001), pp. 395

North Korea's biggest trade partner from 2000s then on. It comprised almost 30 percent of North Korea trade volume in 1990s, and this number rose to 40 percent after 2004, and further ballooned to 70 percent in 2010 (See figure 4.1-4.2).

Figure 4.1



Figure 4.2



Source (Figure 4.1 & 4.2): Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)

The figure was retrieved directly from the following website:

<https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/china-dprk/total-trade>

In the wake of North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009, it was disclosed that a Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) meeting was convoked by President Hu in

August 2009 to review China's North Korea policy. The conclusion of this high-level meeting was to adhere the previous guideline: no war, no instability, no-nuke, and no reunification at the South's initiative. An important resolution of this meeting was to separate North Korea issue from North Korea nuclear issue, and disassociate bilateral economic cooperation from North Korea nuclear tests.²⁴⁰ In line with this, it only took four months before high-level exchanges resumed, and Premier Wen Jiabao visited Pyongyang for celebrating 60th anniversary of forging diplomatic ties with promised aid and a revitalized economic exchanges, including assisting with building another bridge across river border.²⁴¹ In order to boost and normalize bilateral economic cooperation, Hu Jintao revised China's basic doctrines on economic cooperation with North Korea from "government-guided, private participation and market principles" toward "government-led, enterprise-driven, market principles and mutual profits" at the Changchun summit with Kim Jong-Il in August 2010. In November of the same year, the "Rason Economic Trade Zone and Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Island Joint Development and Management Agreement" was signed without precedent on a central government level.²⁴²

2.2 North Korea Regime Survival and Regime Reform

There are three salient features of North Korea's economy, namely a shortage of food security, a lack of energy (most notably oil), as well as a deficiency of foreign currency.²⁴³ In order to shore up North Korea regime and relieve public suffering in North Korea, China has extended its aids to North Korea, ranging from food supplies to energy provisions. It is unclear about the exact amounts of these aids, but it is estimated that about a hundred thousand tons of food-stuff and five hundred thousand tons of heavy-fuel oil, and merchandise worth twenty million dollars are supplied annually, irrespective of specific demands and circumstances, which constitutes more than half of North Korea's energy and food imports.²⁴⁴ Based on the calculations of the World Food Program, China provided almost seventy percent of the 372,000 metric tons in food aids to North Korea.²⁴⁵ In addition, China also supplied other free assistances, although the exact scale and content are unknown. As for China's extra aids in 2011, for instance, they include five hundreds thousand tons of food and more than two hundreds thousand tons of crude oil, which were used to support for "the stability of the new regime".²⁴⁶ On account of the big share of China's trade in North Korea's

²⁴⁰ Ohn Daewon & Mason Richey (2015) China's Evolving Policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under Xi Jinping, *Asian Studies Review*, 39:3, 483-502, DOI: 10.1080/10357823.2015.1052778

²⁴¹ Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, China's Nuclear North Korea Fever, CSIS, *Comparative Connections* Volume 11, Issue 3, October 2009

CHOE, S. (2009, Oct 05). Mending fences for 2 asian leaders; 2 asian leaders try to mend relations. *International Herald Tribune* Retrieved from <https://search.proquest.com/docview/319011612?accountid=6802>

²⁴² Choi Myeong-Hae, China's Strategic View of the Korean Peninsula, *SERI Quartely*, July 2013, pp 76

²⁴³ Fei Su & Lora Saalman, China's Engagement of North Korea: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe, *SIPRI*, February 2017, pp 25

²⁴⁴ Bonnie S. Glaser (Nov 2012), Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, A Report of The CSIS, pp 19

²⁴⁵ Mark E. Manyin & Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, *CRS report*, April 2, 2014

²⁴⁶ Bonnie S. Glaser (Nov 2012)

trade volume, it could be inferred that China is the major source of North Korea's foreign currency.

In addition, for fear of a mass exodus and its negative repercussions on North Korea regime, China has worked closely with the North to sign Agreement on Cooperation in Border Areas for the Maintenance of National Security and Social Order in 1998, and Border Cooperation Agreement Between The Ministry of Defense of PRC and The People's Armed Forces of Defense Commission of DPRK in 2003 and promised to repatriate North Korean refugees. Since then, the task of guarding China-DPRK borders has been transferred from Public Security Frontier Detachment to PLA, and the border guards has been formalized as a plethora of barbed wires and surveillance cameras were set up.²⁴⁷

For North Korea's succession issue, China has always extended supports unstintingly. After Kim Il-sung died in July 1994, China conducted large-scale military drills in Northeastern China to showcase its commitment to North Korea.²⁴⁸ In the wake of Kim Jong-il's death, China moved quickly to express support for Kim Jong-un, with full participation of nine CCP Politburo Standing Committee members into Pyongyang's embassy in Beijing to express their condolences, and large-scale economic aids and cooperation was proceeded against such a background. The editorials in Chinese state-run newspapers emphasized the need for a stable transition, while the *Global Times* said that "China should be a powerful and secure backer for a smooth transition of power."²⁴⁹ In all, China's aids and economic exchanges with North Korea have prevented its economy and society from disintegration, and its firm supports for power transition has guaranteed a stable political environment in the North.²⁵⁰

For the sake of its long-term interest, and convinced the only viable option for North Korea to avert national suicide is to emulate China's reformist, Beijing has been the most enthusiastic external proponent of undertaking widespread economic and social reforms within Pyongyang's autarkic Juche system. In order to nudge North Korea to undertake reform, Chinese leaderships have earnestly coaxed North Korean leaders by showing them the remarkable achievements of China's economic reforms. Notably, during Kim Jong-il's seven visits to China in 2000s and 2010s, carefully orchestrated by his Chinese counterparts, he managed to tour the Zhongguancun computer district in Beijing, space-age skyline and a well-developed subway system in Shanghai, hi-tech factories in Guangzhou, and export industries in Shenzhen, as well as Changchun, Jilin and Tumen area, which might be viewed as a more applicable model for North Korea economic reform.²⁵¹ The geographic locations and the major industrial sites that Kim Jong-il visited clearly indicate China's strategic

²⁴⁷ 陈晓舒, 解密中朝边境往来者:哪边能吃饱饭, 就涌向哪边, 中国新闻周刊, June 30, 2009, http://intl.ce.cn/gjzh/200906/30/t20090630_19427228.shtml

²⁴⁸ Hochul Lee (2013) China in the North Korean Nuclear Crises: 'interest' and 'identity' in foreign behavior, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 22:80, 312-331, DOI:10.1080/10670564.2012.734085

²⁴⁹ Troy Stangarone and Nicholas Hamisevicz, The Prospects for Economic Reform in North Korea after Kim Jong-il and the China Factor, *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2011, 175-197

²⁵⁰ David Shambaugh (Spring 2003), pp. 43-56

²⁵¹ Aidan Foster-Carter, "Chat-to-China" Choo Choo: Kim Rides the Rails Again, 38 North, May 23, 2011

<https://www.38north.org/2011/05/fostercarter052311/>

calculations to inform North Korean leader of the conspicuous achievements of China's economic and industrial reform.²⁵²

North Korea leaders since 1990s have also realized the fact that “North Korea's future is implicit if embark on reforms, but it will be doomed without reforms”, so since 2000, North Korea has intensely translated and introduced a mass of Chinese preliminary reform policies in 1970s and 1980s, and has also intentionally conducted abundant surveys about China and Vietnam reforms. In particular, in 2009 and 2010, it sent many local and central leaders to conduct field trips in China and investigate China's reform experiences.²⁵³ Although North Korea's path to reform was fitful and reversible in the past, there are still optimistic signs of its commitment to economic reform, manifested by the official permission for the formation of unofficial markets in 2002, the adoption and renewal of Economic Management Improvement Measures that allowed for more autonomy of entrepreneurs and farmers in 2002, and 2013²⁵⁴, and the opening of two North Korean Economic Development Zones with China, namely Rason and the Hwanggumpyong-Miwha Island Zone, and the elevation the Rason Economic and Trade Zone to the new status of “special city”.²⁵⁵ According to many Chinese experts, after Kim Jong-un took power, the marketization in North Korea has been reinforced. He has set an economic guideline featured by “our won style economic management method”, based in part on the “6.28 Measure”, and “5.30 Measure”. The former is focused on agricultural reform while the later addresses expanding reform in factories and enterprises. The pilot programmes of North Korea's agricultural reform-“Pojon Responsibility System” was implemented nationwide in 2015, which resembles China's household responsibility system. Moreover, North Korea has proactively revitalized its economic zones since 2013, adding thirteen new economic zones in 2013, six in 2014 and one in 2015.²⁵⁶

2.3 North Korea Denuclearization:

North Korea acquisition nuclear weapons will damage China's interest in following domains. Firstly, it will introduce a new source of instability to Northeast Asia. Specifically, it will agitate Japan, South Korea, and probably Taiwan to strenghten their nuclear capabilities, provide the pretexts for US to strengthen trilateral defense coordination (e.g. missile defense) with Japan and South Korea that will be used for containing China, and justify Japan's military build-up, as well as trigger military conflicts between the US and North Korea that might embroil China into an unwanted war. Secondly, it will undermine China's nuclear status as the only legitimate nuclear power in East Asia. It might be in China's concern that if one day two Koreas are reunified, a unified Korea with nuclear capabilities will challenge China's supremacy in East Asia. Thirdly, it will put China in a predicament, either choosing

²⁵² Andy Lim and Victor Cha, Dataset: China-DPRK High Level Visits Since 1953, Beyond Parallel, March 17, 2017.

²⁵³ 郑继永. (2012). 朝鲜的政治稳定性分析与中国的朝鲜半岛政策. 한국평화연구학회 2012 하계 국제세미나, 46-57.

²⁵⁴ Andrei Lankov, Kim Jong Deng: Why North Korea Is Choosing Market Reforms, Carnegie Moscow Center, Feb 25, 2015, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/59170>

²⁵⁵ Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Prospects for Economic Reform in North Korea, China Perspective, No. 2012/4 <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6050?file=1>

²⁵⁶ Fei Su & Lora Saalman (February 2017), pp 35

for North Korean regime survival by playing duplicity on UN sanctions, or safeguarding its international image as a responsible major power, a member of NPT, and the chair of Six-Party-Talks by strictly observing UNSCRs. Fourthly, it might pose dire threat to China's security, if Pyongyang transfers nuclear materials and know-how to other countries or non-state actors, such as Tibet or Xin Jiang separatists; or if it uses nuclear weapons to deter China's intervention in contingencies; or blackmails China for more aids and assistance when bilateral relations goes rocky. Finally, it will also cause environmental hazards (i.e., radioactive) to China's Northeast regions.²⁵⁷

Regardless of these adverse factors, China for a long time had put North Korea denuclearization on a lower rank in the list of its interests on the Korean Peninsula, which only changed after Xi Jinping took office. Including Xi Jinping administration, for China, the goal of North Korea denuclearization is inextricably correlated with no instability. China purports that the denuclearization can only be pursued on the grounds that North Korea's regime stability is not at expenses. Different from US, who is more focused on WMD domain and regards this as a regional issue, China's top priority is North Korea's regime survival. Next to this, it asserts that the North Korea nuclear issue is the intertwined outcome of Pyongyang's military-first politics and Juche ideology, as well as its obsolete Cold War mindset. Admittedly, the ever-lasting and high pressure from the US-ROK military alliance has worsened North Korea's security situation and its Cold War mentality. Therefore, in order to solve the North Korea nuclear issue completely, relevant countries should guide North Korea to get rid of its erroneous security policy not only by imposing sanctions, but also by addressing its primary security concerns. It suspects US motivation to entangle China in this issue, and reckons US schemes to make China the scapegoat, manifested by US concocted "China responsibility theory" recently.

As for sanctions. China claims they can only be the means for pressing North Korea to return to negotiation tables rather the ends, and by contrast, it advocates for dialogues and negotiations. They see US and its allies' urges for China's full cooperation in sanctions as their ill will to catalyze North Korea regime collapse at best, or cause discords in China-DPRK ties at the minimum.²⁵⁸ This deliberation explains China's behavior pattern regarding implementation of sanctions: "a pragmatic move to punish the North Korean government, but within conditions that would not cause internal instability."²⁵⁹ In all, although a nuclearized

²⁵⁷ Jae Ho Chung & Myung-hae Choi (2013) Uncertain allies or uncomfortable neighbors? Making sense of China-North Korea Relations, 1949-2010, *The Pacific Review*, 26:3, 243-264, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2012.759262

²⁵⁸ Fu Ying, *The Korean Nuclear Issue: Past, Present, and Future: A Chinese Perspective*, Johnl Thornton, China Center at Brookings, Strategy Paper 3, May 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/north-korean-nuclear-issue-fu-ying.pdf>; 社评：“放弃朝鲜”的主张过于幼稚和极端，*环球时报*，2013.4.12; <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-04/3824176.html>; 社评：美对朝鲜“赴汤蹈火拥核”颇有贡献，*环球时报*，2016.2.20 <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2016-02/8572460.html>; 新华国际时评：朝核问题困境美国难辞其咎，*新华网*，2016.10.26 www.xinhuanet.com/2016-10/26/c_1119794017.html; 美评论员：美屯重兵于韩国逼朝鲜走向核武化，*环球时报*，2013.2.17 <http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-02/3647651.html> 社评：朝鲜半岛风急，中国更需战略定力，*环球时报*，2013.2.16 <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-02/3642393.html> 时永明：美不应为对朝政策失败开脱，*环球时报*，2014.4.4, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2014-04/4953602.html 美防长将朝核则仍推中国遭打脸，朝鲜称美国才是推手，*环球时报*，2016.9.20 <http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-09/9429176.html>

²⁵⁹ Wang Junsheng (June 2016), pp 53

North Korea is unacceptable for China, it feels incapable to resolve this issue, and reluctant to shoulder the burden if that means to jeopardize North Korea's regime survival, or severely impair China-DPRK friendly relations. Its competitive and conflictual relations with US and Japan make it more resolved to keep an inactive stance in this issue. In both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era, China had restrained in taking any initiatives toward North Korea nuclear issue if the situation was not at stake. Obviously, China in Xi Jinping administration has encountered a more ambitiously nuclearized North Korea than its predecessors, and in response, it has adopted a more hardline approach to this issue. Yet, to be noted, it has never given up its top priority for stability, and what is different is that China this time decides to take more initiatives in contributing to such stability.

China's involvements either as a country of "cautious accomodator" or a country of "active constructor" into two nuclear crises are the best evidences of its top priority for stability other than denuclearization. In the first nuclear crisis in 1993-1994, before such crisis reached climax in May 1994, China had maintained an onlooker stance that "the issue was a direct mater between the DPRK, and the three sides—the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States, and the Republic of Korea."²⁶⁰ However, when rumors of US military strike on the Yongbyong nuclear facilities following Pyongyang's threat to reprocess 8,000 fuel rods into weapon-grade plutonium run rampant, China began to play in behind-scene, warning Pyongyang not to cross the "red line". In June 1994, the Chinese foreign minister warned its North Korean counterpart that the North should not look upon China's limitless assistance when it confronted with the US, and also hinted the possibility of China's acceptance of US proposed economic sanctions on the North. This partly played a role in forcing Kim Il-sung to soften his stance and sent an invitation to former US President Jimmy Carter to Pyongyang, which prevented a possible military confrontation in peninsula.²⁶¹

At Bush-Jiang summit in October 2002, in response to President Bush's proposal for building multilateral mechanism to resolve North Korea nuclear issue, President Jiang Zemin noted that "China does not associate itself with North Korea's nuclear program, and the problem is a bilateral issue between the US and North Korea." However, China reversed this stance in early 2003 after witnessing US flagrant invasion on Iraq, the beef-up of US military forces in the Pacific, and the hints of US possible military strike on North Korea. In order to pressure the North to step back, and ease the escalating tensions, Beijing cut off the oil pipeline to North Korea for three days, and dispatched Vice Premier Qian Jichen to visit Pyongyang and persuade North Korea to participate in multilateral talks. The combination of persuasion and pressure produced positive results of trilateral talks among US, China and North Korea in April 2003.²⁶²

China's priority for stability to denuclearization is also reflected by its duplicity in applying UN sanctions. While criticizing North Korea's nuclear tests, China has been more prudent in imposing tough sanctions on North Korea especially that might impair the stability

²⁶⁰ Anne Wu (2005) What china whispers to North Korea, *Washington Quarterly*, 28:2, 35-48, DOI: 10.1162/0163660053295239

²⁶¹ Hochul Lee (2013)

²⁶² Bonnie S. Glaser & Wang Liang (2008) North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?, *Washington Quarterly*, 31:3, 165-180, DOI: 10.1162/wash.2008.31.3.165

of North Korean regime. It has reiterated that sanctions are only means not the ends, and urged to add the clause of “sanctions are not targeted against the livelihood of the DPRK people” into all resolutions. As the figure 4.1 shows, in Hu Jintao era, even if China agreed to adopt the UNSC 1718 and 1874, bilateral trade relations was almost immune to these sanctions. High-level exchanges also recovered promptly. Two countries held 7 times of high-level exchanges in 2006-2008, and 16 times high-level exchanges in 2009-2012.²⁶³

If China in Jiang’s era concerned less about North Korea nuclear weapons was attributed to China’s disbelief about North Korea’s capability to possess such weapon systems²⁶⁴ and its reluctance to take responsibility when its foreign policy was guided by taoguangyanghui, and its relations with the North was still in the shadow of China’s two Koreas policy, China’s restraint toward North Korea increasing nuclear capabilities in Hu Jintao era would be ascribed to its preference for system stabilization rather than denuclearization in a time of strategic uncertainties. As trustworthy reports about the poor health of Kim Jong Il were sprawling after August 2008, and the level of sanctions in the aftermath of North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009 was enhanced, and it was assessed that the US and its allies were beefing up efforts to foment North Korea’s regime change, China under Hu Jintao’s rule was more worried about the regime collapse in North Korea. This made it to put overriding priority at that time on the stability other than denuclearization. Under such deliberation, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s administration have downplayed North Korea denuclearization.

2.4 China’s views on US-ROK alliance

Apart from economic incentives, after the inauguration of conservatives government in Seoul, one pillar of China’s motivation to improve its relationship with South Korea is to estrange Seoul from forming a tight alliance with Washington, or even worse to establish a military triangle with both Washington and Tokyo, which from Chinese perspective is to contain itself. The consolidation of US-Japan alliance with the 1997 Defense Guideline revision, and US bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, as well as the EP-3 incident in 2001 fostered China’s suspicions about US ill wills of encircling itself. The increasing US-China rivalry in the post 9/11 era further magnified China’s such concern. However, the cacophonous US-ROK alliance and Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-hyun government’s sympathy for China’s interest alleviated China’s suspicion and alertness toward ROK-US alliance. Kim Dae-Jung government’s refusal to join US-led MD system (distinguished from Japan and Taiwan), and Roh Moo-hyun government’s quest for “independent diplomacy with self-esteem” embodied by its initiation of wartime operational control, and its reservation about “strategic flexibility” of the alliance convinced China of a possible dissolution of this alliance in a long-term. Many Chinese analysts in this period even used the term of “lianmeng”(loose associations or alignments) rather than “tongmeng”(alliance) to refer to ROK-US alliance.²⁶⁵

However, after Lee Myung-bak government took office, who placed the restoration and consolidation of Korea-US alliance on its top priority, and upgraded this alliance from a

²⁶³ Park Ci Yeon, *China’s Policy on North Korean Nuclear Tests: Changed and Unchanged*, Master Thesis, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, July 2016, pp 43

²⁶⁴ Jae-Ho.Jung (2007), pp 86-90

²⁶⁵ Jae Ho Chung (2014) *China's Evolving Views of the Korean–American Alliance, 1953–2012*, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23:87, 425-442, DOI:10.1080/10670564.2013.843882

“strategic alliance for the 21st century”, and a “comprehensive strategic alliance” in 2008 and 2009 respectively, China’s sanguine views toward ROK-US alliance gave away to increasingly uneasiness over US-ROK alliance. In 2008, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang remarked that “ROK-US alliance is a historical relic from the Cold War era, and unfit approach to current security issues.”²⁶⁶ This was illustrated by China’s vehement opposition to South Korea-US joint military manoeuvres in the Yellow Sea in 2010, which the US and ROK claimed as a counter measure to Cheonan Incident, while China perceived as a threat to its security.²⁶⁷ China’s such uneasiness and grievance toward ROK-US alliance has been further amplified against the backdrop of US rebalance to Asia, and intensified US-China rivalry in the region after Xi Jinping took office.

3. China’s North Korea policy in Xi Jinping administration (2013-2016): a growing emphasis on North Korea denuclearization

Situations changed after Xi Jinping administration inaugurated. Firstly, most Chinese scholars study on North Korea now believe that the regime stability has been restored and it is now able to resist immense external pressures without collapsing.²⁶⁸ Secondly, North Korea’s accelerated pace in nuclear and missile developments and its blatant proclamation as a “nuclear-weapon state” since 2013 stood out as a major destabilizing factor in the region, which catalyze strengthened ties between US and its Asian allies-ROK and Japan. This prompted China in Xi Jinping administration to attach more importance to North Korean denuclearization.

After North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013, China’s persistent three Nos’ policy changed to three principles of “denuclearization, peace and stability, and the resolution of issues through dialogue and negotiation”,²⁶⁹ with denuclearization being elevated to the top priority. A little bit divergent from its past practices, Xi Jinping administration showed sterner stance toward North Korea nuclear tests. Shortly after North Korea’s third nuclear test, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly summoned North Korea’s ambassador to protest,²⁷⁰ Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson-Hua Chunying unusually referred the Sino-DPRK relations to “normal state-to-state relationship”, which had not been used since 2006.²⁷¹ 2013 also marked a turning point in China’s attitudes toward UN sanctions. Notably, shortly after Resolution 2094 took effect, China’s Ministry of Commerce for the first time released a specific prohibition item list. China also reversed its previous disapprovals for articles that will allow for examining cargo originated from or heading toward North Korea. In addition, after the passage of Resolution 2321, China declared to suspend coal imports

²⁶⁶ Michael Ha, “Chinese Official Calls Korea-US Alliance ‘Historical Relic’,” Korea Times . 28 May 2008, . www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/04/116_24932.html

²⁶⁷ Li Xiaokun and Ai Yang , US-ROK drill in Yellow Sea 'by early Sept', China Daily, July 22, 2010 www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/22/content_11033164.htm

²⁶⁸ Marthieu Duchatel & Phillip Schell, China’s Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Dsiarmament, SIPRI Policy Paper, December 2013, pp 20-21

²⁶⁹ 王毅强调中方在朝鲜半岛问题上三个”坚持”立场, 2013.4.13, 中华人民共和国外交部

²⁷⁰ Agence France-Press, ‘China summons North Korea ambassador over nuclear test’, South China Morning Post, 13 Feb. 2013.

²⁷¹ 2013年3月8日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会, 中华人民共和国外交部, 2013.3.8

from North Korea for three weeks.²⁷²In February 2017, China resumed ban on coal for the remainder of the year after North Korea's missile tests. As the Figure 4.1 shows, in Xi Jinping era, bilateral trade suffered setbacks due to North Korea's three nuclear tests in 2013 and 2016, the same as bilateral economic cooperation programs. For instance, the project of constructing Rason and Hwanggumpyong special economic zones has stagnated.²⁷³China's application of enhanced economic pressure even engendered harsh verbal attacks from Pyongyang in 2017, who threatened China to be ready for facing the catastrophic consequences in the relations with the DPRK, if it keeps applying economic sanctions on the DPRK.²⁷⁴

From 2013 to 2016, high-level exchanges between two sides were also constrained seriously. China-DPRK's discord on denuclearization was evidently illustrated by Choe Ryong-hae's visit in May 2013, as President Xi urged North Korea to commit to denuclearization, but the latter only confirmed its willingness to six-party talks with no strings attached on denuclearization.²⁷⁵The purge of Jang Sung-taek in December of 2013, who China viewed as a trustworthy senior official with good access in Pyongyang and an adamant proponent for better China-North Korea economic ties, further strained bilateral relations. Notably, in contrast to Premier Wen Jiabao's high-profile visit to Pyongyang in celebrating 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, Beijing did not send any officials to Pyongyang for commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of bilateral relations in 2014, nor gave coverage of this event by state media. President Xi Jinping's unprecedented visit to Seoul in 2014 also proved distrust between two leaders in Beijing and Pyongyang. The most noticeable sign of China's discontent with North Korea was decreased party-to-party exchanges through the CPC's International Liaison Department when the Foreign Ministry replaced the former in interactions with North Korea. For instance, the inter-party strategic dialogues that initiated in 2011 has been delegated to strategic communication between vice foreign ministers.²⁷⁶Beijing also displaced CPC International Department head Wang Jiarui, who maintained good personal ties with key figures in Pyongyang, and appointed Song Tao, the former vice minister of MFA with limited knowledge about North Korea, in 2015. This reflected the desire of Xi Jinping administration to change its special ties with North Korea to "a normal state-to-state relations".²⁷⁷

Nonetheless, China's emphasis on North Korea denuclearization should not be interpreted as the downgrade of the importance of stability, just to the contrary, it reflected China's resolve to maintain regional stability by strangling North Korea's nuclear ambitions

²⁷² Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, "China-Korea Relations: Two Koreas Defy Chinese Sanctions," *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 83-94; Fei Su & Lora Saalman, *China's Engagement of North Korea: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe*, SIPRI, February 2017, pp 16-17

²⁷³ Scott Snyder & See-Won Byun, *Beijing Ties Uneven with Seoul, Stalled with Pyongyang*, *Comparative Connections* Volume 16, Issue 3, January 2015, cc.csis.org/2015/01/beijing-ties-uneven-seoul-stalled-pyongyang/; Scott Snyder & See-Won Byun, *Under New Leaderships*, *Comparative Connections* Volume 14, Issue 3, January 2013, <http://cc.csis.org/2013/01/under-new-leaderships/>

²⁷⁴ Chen Ping, *US, not China, has the key to solving the North Korean nuke issue*, *Global Times*, June 13, 2017

²⁷⁵ (3rd LD) Kim Jong-un's special envoy meets Chinese president, *Yonhap News*, May 24, 2013

²⁷⁶ 최명해, 2014, pp 204-206,

²⁷⁷ 최명해, 2016, pp 320

and compelling it to back to the negotiation tables, but no at the expenses of North Korea's regime survival. For instance, Foreign Minister Wang Yi remarked in March 2016 that "sanctions are necessary measures, keeping stability is the top priority, and negotiation is the fundamental way to resolve North Korea nuclear issue."²⁷⁸ This is also reflected in the clause of livelihood exemption in Resolution 2270 and Resolution 2321. Although China agreed on and complied with these UNSCRs, it reiterated that "sanctions should not affect normal trade and people's livelihoods", and held fast to the principle that sanctions are only means to rein in North Korea nuclear programs, and oblige it to return to negotiation tables rather than the ends to regime change or instability in the peninsula.²⁷⁹ While bilateral trade suffered from the repercussions of UN sanctions against North Korea's nuclear test, local governments have become the spearheads of bilateral economic cooperation, as this does not violate UNSCRs due to the livelihood exemption. For instance, although Chinese central banks ceased their business with North Korea, the business of local banks in Northeast China, such as Hunchun Rural Commercial Bank, has expanded since 2013. Moreover, an August 2016 report by the Yanbian Development and Reform Committee proposed to strengthen economic cooperation with North Korea in the following three fields: electricity, logistics at the Rajin port and cross-border tourism.²⁸⁰ Likewise, In December 2016, the city of Tumen in Jilin province ALSO pledged to further expand logistics, business, and tourism in North Korea.²⁸¹ This shows UN sanctions did not significantly influence China-North Korea economic cooperation in the local governments' level.

Moreover, notwithstanding China firmly stick to denuclearization principle and engage in applying sanctions to North Korea, it still managed to strike a balance between two Koreas, and avoid severe damages to bilateral relations. Amid clamorous speculations that China was tilting toward Seoul signified by President Park Geun-hye's attendance at Beijing's military parade, in September 2015, a commentary in Global Times refuted that even if China and North Korea disagree on nuclear issue, bilateral relation is still under control, and both sides maintain the frame and rhythm of "China-DPRK friendly relations".²⁸² As a concrete measure, Beijing sent Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan to Pyongyang in October 2015 for 70th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), which was the first-ever visit to Pyongyang by a Politburo Standing Committee member after Kim Jong-un ascended to power in late 2011.²⁸³ On the heels of North Korea's fourth nuclear test, Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China's two-track approach to North Korea nuclear issue in March 2016, stating "China-DPRK relation is a normal state to state relation with profound traditional friendship. China both values friendship and stands on principles. We cherish our traditional friendship with the North, and if North Korea seeks for development and security, we are willing to provide supports and assistance. At meantime, we firmly stick to the denuclearization principle, and will not make concessions to North Korea's

²⁷⁸ 王毅谈半岛核问题：制裁是必要手段，维稳是当务之急，谈判是根本之道，中华人民共和国外交部，2016.3.8，

²⁷⁹ Fei Su & Lora Saalman(February 2017), pp 7-8, 13-19

²⁸⁰ Ibid, pp 18

²⁸¹ Ibid, pp 17

²⁸² 社评：外界想拆散中朝友好关系，这须被注意到，环球网，2015.9.8

²⁸³ 최명해, 2016, pp 342

development of nuclear weapons and missile systems.”²⁸⁴ In June 2016, when President Xi met North Korean Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea Ri Su-yong, he underlined the importance of developing China-DPRK friendly relationship, and China’s firm stance in denuclearization of Korean Peninsula.²⁸⁵

This indicate, China in Xi Jinping era after some twists and turns to recalibrate China-DPRK relations at the initial stage, has returned to its predecessors’ approach to North Korea nuclear issue-disassociating North Korea issue with North Korea nuclear issue and underscoring stability management since 2015.²⁸⁶ One reason might be strengthened US-Japan alliance. In May 2015, Japan and US finalized the new US-Japan Defense Guidelines, which affirmed the inclusion of the controversial Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the security alliance system, and extended the tentacles of Japanese forces to “the globe”. China decried this as US and Japan’s attempt to contain China’s rise now even without disguises.²⁸⁷China’s such concern was reflected in its newly released Military Security Strategy in May 2015, which revised the previous notion of “the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new era” to “the military strategy of active defense in the new situation.”²⁸⁸This semantic revision illustrates that China now is more apprehensive of the imminent challenges on its periphery, where US carriers on its rebalance to Asia strategy, Japan dodges its post-war mechanism and overhauls its security policies, as well as a group of countries contend with China over territory disputes on South China Sea.²⁸⁹When Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan visited North Korea, he transited Xi Jinping’s signed letter to Mr Kim, which underscored the importance to recover bilateral relations in “the new situation”²⁹⁰Similarly, in Song Tao’s reception to North Korean envoy Ri Su-yong in May 2016, he repetaed to improve bilateral relations in “the new situation”.²⁹¹

In short, indisputably, Pyongyang’s blatant nuclear ambitions in Kim Jong Un’s rule were the major impediments to China-DPRK traditional friendship. When concerns about a stable power transition abated with Kim Jong-un’s growing power consolidation, North Korea’s increasingly aggressive nuclear programs become the root of instability on Korean Peninsula, which forced China to put denuclearization on the top of its agendas. The notable progress of Chinese governments in imposing UN sanctions demonstrate the clear position of China on North Korean denuclearization. However, this does not mean China give up its commitment to stability and North Korea regime survival, rather it only means China’s resolve to tempt North Korea back to the negotiation tables. Moreover, even if China’s such

²⁸⁴ 王毅谈中朝关系：中国既重情义也讲原则，人民网，2016.3.8

²⁸⁵ 习近平会见朝鲜劳动党代表团，新华社，2016.6.

²⁸⁶ 최명해, 2018, pp 356-358

²⁸⁷ US-Japan defense guidelines danger to Asia, Global Times, April 30, 2015
www.globaltimes.cn/content/919536.shtml

²⁸⁸ 최명해, 2017, pp 315

²⁸⁹ China’s Military Strategy, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015,

²⁹⁰ 刘云山会见金正恩转交习近平总书记亲署函，新华网，2015.10.10

²⁹¹ 최명해, 2016 북중 관계 동향과 향후 전망, 2016 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 외교안보연구소 중국연구센터, 2017, pp 332-333

hardline approach might impair its friendly relationship with the North, and incurred widespread speculations on the viability of China's equidistant diplomacy toward two Koreas, it conforms to China's fundamental interest in Korean Peninsula- peace and stability. The tendency for stability management has been further consolidated and amplified since 2015.

4. China's South Korea policy in Xi Jinping administration: a more initiative and proactive posture at first and a strong opposition to THAAD deployment

Since President Xi Jinping took office, China's pace to achieve "national revitalization" has accelerated, which is crystalized by Xi Jinping administration as "China's Dream". In line with this blueprint, China's foreign policy objective is now readjusted to actively construct, instead of "passively to maintain", a peaceful and stable periphery environment that favors China's sustainable economic development, and contributes to its international prestige as a global power.²⁹² In terms of China's Asia strategy, President Xi Jinping, at the Central Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013, instead of talking about "taoguangyanghui", emphasized "enthusiastically striking points, move forward along with time changes, more proactive." He also laid the guideline for China's neighborhood policy, namely "to forge friendship and partnerships with neighboring countries and foster an amicable, secure, and prosperous neighborhood based on the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness."²⁹³ At the first session of the 12th National People's Congress in March 2014, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi depicted the most distinct characteristics of Chinese diplomacy in 2013 as "proactive striking (主动进取) and vowed to let the world hear about Chinese solutions and Chinese voice (中国方案, 中国声音)."²⁹⁴ These new signs exhibit China in Xi Jinping era more values its relations with neighboring countries, and views its neighboring diplomacy as a tool to effectively employ China's increased power to back up for an ardent, long run, and more strategic foreign policy agenda. China is now geared to engage in altering a part of the primary foreign policy procedures and international relations, which have defined the post WWII-order, especially in Asia.²⁹⁵

There have been hot debates within Chinese scholars about whether China should resort to its own "Monroe Doctrine" and kick the US out of this region. The spreading de-Americanization atmosphere has also begun to influence China's foreign policy.²⁹⁶ In his May 2014 speech on Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), President Xi mentioned about a new Asian security concept of "Asia for Asians".²⁹⁷

As Jae-Ho Chung summarized, The China-US rivalry in East Asia is characterized in these fields: "(1) the US strategy of alliance consolidation vs. China's partnership extension

²⁹² 조영남, 중국의 꿈: 시진핑 리더십과 중국의 미래, 서울: 민음사, 2013; P260-265

²⁹³ 习近平: 让命运共同体意识在周边国家落地生根, 新华社, 2013.10.25

²⁹⁴ 外交部部长王毅就中国外交政策和对外关系回答中外记者提问, 中华人民共和国外交部, 2014.3.8

<http://bd.china-embassy.org/chn/zgyw/t1135388.htm>

²⁹⁵ Michael D. Swaine, Xi Jinping's Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics, China Leadership Monitor, No 46. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Michael_Swaine_CLM_46.pdf

²⁹⁶ Suisheng Zhao (2015)

²⁹⁷ Kor Kian Beng, "Don't bet on China's 'Asia for Asians only' vision yet," Straits Times, May 30, 2014

strategy; (2) America's 'pivot to Asia' vs. China's 'peaceful rise'; (3) the US concept of AirSea Battle vs. China's A2/AD; (4) Washington's TPP strategy vs. Beijing's FTA (or RCEP) counter-strategy; and (5) America's 'Washington Consensus' vs. China's 'Beijing Consensus'".²⁹⁸ In addition, a worsened China-Japan relations in the context of China's discontent over Japan's visit to Yasukuni shrine, its political right deviation, its quest for a great military power. A strengthened US-Japan alliance and US's plan to interoperationalize the US-Japan and US-ROK alliances has further amplified China's security concern. The zero-sum nature of China-US rivalry for global influence, and China-Japan competition for regional power has prompted China to attach greater importance to Korean Peninsula.

As for South Korea, China is convinced that it is the linchpin ally of US but most vulnerable to Chinese influence owing to China-North Korean special relations, South Korea's tight economic ties with China, and historical legacies. The two countries shared the same painful memory of history and a displeasure with Japan's historical revisionism, so China considers South Korea could play a crucial role in confronting Japan on historical issues with itself. Given South Korea's distinctive role in China's major-country relations with US and Japan, Xi Jinping administration reiterates that "China-ROK relations have an important place in China's overall foreign relations".²⁹⁹ China's proactive posture toward South Korea in the first three years, characterized by President Xi Jinping's unprecedented visit to Seoul in 2014, and his urge to cement China-ROK social and economic exchanges, are the best illustrations. Many analysts contended that the strategic calculation of China-ROK FTA outweighs its economic benefits. It is not only a step for China to entice South Korea into its sphere of influence by offering massive economic incentives, but also a move to ratchet up its preferred regional economic integration mechanism-FTAAP so as to confront US-led TPP initiative.³⁰⁰ The logic of China's intention to strengthen bilateral ties in social arena is unveiled by some Chinese scholars-if US-ROK alliance is based on democratic values, China-ROK partnership could be grounded on shared historic-cultural values (e.g. shared values originated from confucianism).³⁰¹ Through intensified social and economic interaction with South Korea, China attempts to assuage Seoul's concerns about its new assertiveness in security domain and to prevent Seoul from joining US-Japan-ROK military triangle to contain itself.³⁰² The same logic applies to explanation for China's strong opposition to THAAD deployment in South Korea.

Seoul's decision on THAAD deployment, which implies a stronger alliance with US, and increasing cooperation with Japan, went far against China's expectation, and crossed China's bottom line regarding China-ROK relations-namely no tolerance for an integrated

²⁹⁸ Jae Ho Chung (2014), pp 425-442

²⁹⁸ Ibid

²⁹⁹ Yu Tiejun (June 2016), pp 24

³⁰⁰ 경제적 이익보다 전략적 고려 앞선 한·중 FTA, 아산정책연구원, 2014.11.10, www.asaninst.org/contents/경제적-이익보다-전략적-고려-앞선-한중-fta/

³⁰¹ 미래 한중관계에 "중일관계 악화를 반면교사로", 연합뉴스, 2013.9.26

³⁰² 이동률, 중국 주변외교의 진화와 한중관계, 2014 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 외교안보연구소 중국연구센터, 2015, pp 190-198; 김영준, 신종호, 중국의 대한미동맹에 대한 입장, 중국의 대한반도 정책, 국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소, 2015, pp 182-184

US-Japan-ROK military cooperation, which from Chinese perspective, omens a crucial step toward an “Asian NATO” targeting at China. From Chinese perspective, South Korea to play a role in the US containment policy definitely does not conform to the warming ties in other domains of the bilateral relationship.³⁰³ This is why during an interview with Reuters on Feb. 12, 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in response to Seoul’s initiation of discussing THAAD deployment with US, unusually added the new principle of demanding the guarantee of China’s legitimate national security interests to its previous approach to addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, which only consisted of using dialogue and negotiations.³⁰⁴

³⁰³ Wang Junsheng (June 2016), pp 51.

³⁰⁴ China adds security interests to its three principles for N. Korean denuclearization, Hankyoreh, 2016.2.16, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/730595.html

Chapter V. Conclusion and Future Prospects:

The first four years of Xi Jinping administration witnessed a visible ups-and-downs in China-ROK relationship. This paper is developed regarding three questions, namely “whether China-ROK relationship broke the bridge of hot economy and cold politics as Chinese media advocated? What factors played a role in the downturn of bilateral relations? Whether there are any Korean policy adjustments or aberrations in Xi’s era?” For the first question, a close look at so-called major achievements reveals that these unprecedented mutual visits of the high-ranking officials only concealed their entrenched conflicts in THAAD issues, US-ROK alliance, and approaches to North Korea nuclear issue, and their relations with Japan. Following the outburst of THAAD issue, China and South Korea’s previously hidden but deep-rooted discrepancy came to the surface.

In terms of the second research question, on the surface, South Korea’s THAAD deployment is the major culprit. A reassessment of this issue unveils that Seoul’s ostensibly reckless act was convoluted with a bunch of domestic and external factors. Domestically, leadership changes from progressive party to conservative party since 2008 foreboded a comeback of coercive postures toward the North, a strengthened alliance with the US, and a decreasing care for China’s interest. Park Geun-hye’s Trustpolitik is by large a new version of a tit-for-tat reciprocity. This conservative approach in nature portends South Korea’s harsh retaliation in response to the North’s brinkmanship, and the halt of China-ROK honeymoon after North Korean nuclear test. The already accelerated missile defense system since Lee Myung-bak took office provided another clue for a possible consent to THAAD deployment in conservatives’ reign. North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and second successful long-range missile launch in early 2016 made the timing ripe, and convinced Seoul of entrenched differences in North Korean denuclearization between China and itself, which in turn lowered the importance of China factor in Seoul’s calculations for THAAD deployment. This was further abetted by an unanimous consent among conservative party members, and wide supports within the public collectively. For external factors, North Korea’s more aggressive provocations after the breakdown of “Leap Day Agreement” on February 29, 2012 provided a pretext for US and South Korea to take more “proactive deterrence” measures and move closer in Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) issues. Meanwhile, the officially-alleged explanation for South Korea-US THAAD deployment belied another equivalently important factor-US rebalance to Asia. This is materialized in BMD domain as US readjusted AirSea Battle Concept in order to countervail China’s growing Anti-Access/Anti-Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and to maintain US superiority in Asia-Pacific. THAAD deployment is one crucial part of US rebalance to Asia militarily.

In response to the third research question, a careful examination demonstrates China in Xi’s administration shows more initiatives in solving North Korea nuclear issue and improving bilateral ties with South Korea. This is in line with Xi Jinping’s more proactive periphery diplomacy, namely to construct rather than merely passively react to external circumstances. North Korea’s new policy agenda of Byungjin Line in Kim Jong-un’s reign, and its blatant ambitions for becoming a nuclear state power apparently contradicts to China’s persistent commitment to denuclearization. A strong conviction of North Korea’s regime stability after a successful power transition allows for more space manoeuvres for China in North Korea denuclearization issue. However, China’s priority for denuclearization does not necessarily go against its supports for North Korea regime, or its goal for stability. This policy adjustment is not a complete reversal of China’s past North Korea policy, rather it is a strategic tactic to serve for China’s twofold interest concerning North Korea—a stable regime but without nuclear weapons. Speaking of South Korea, China in Xi Jinping’s rule shows

more initiative and proactive posture in improving bilateral relationship, particularly in economic and social arena. This is due to a consideration for drawing South Korea into China's sphere of influence or at least thwarting US's scheme of containing itself and distancing Seoul from Tokyo.

By the time I finished this paper, there have been leadership reshuffles in South Korea, with progressives ascended to the power after ten years hiatus. In dealing with the hot potato-THAAD issue, South Korea assured China with the statement of "three no's" in October 2017, namely no additional THAAD deployment, not joining of a region-wide US missile defense system, or a military alliance with the U.S. and Japan.³⁰⁵ In essence, South Korea agreed to at least symbolically distance itself from a US-led strategy of containing China, and both sides agreed to put their bilateral relations back on track. There are many signs that China has gradually lifted its economic sanctions on South Korea, albeit to a limited extent by far.³⁰⁶ The first half of 2018 was brimmed with hopes and blessings. The inter-Korean detente was remarkable and promising. As North Korea pledged to swerve from Byungjin Line to a focus on economic development and denuclearization, South Korean president Moon Jae-in has met his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-un twice by the end of May 2018. Following the first Moon-Kim summit in April 2018, the two Koreas released the Panmunjeom declaration, swearing to convert the Korean Armistice Agreement into a full peace treaty so that formally end wars and hostilities in the two sides. South Korea has also played a crucial role in facilitating a prospective first-ever Washington-Pyongyang summit that is scheduled in June 12, 2018 in Singapore. As two Koreas bury the hatchet, China-DPRK relations are also warming up. President Xi Jinping met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un first in March and second in May, and reaffirmed North Korea's commitment to denuclearization. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether such cordial and friendly atmosphere will sustain, and the denuclearization of North Korea will be finally achieved. After all, North Korea's commitment to denuclearization is premised on the improvement of US-DPRK relations, but so far it seems US and North Korea still have vast divergences on approaches to North Korea denuclearization, with the US's preference for Libya model of unilateral denuclearization, and North Korea's inclination to a phased and synchronised measures.³⁰⁷ For sure, as progressives took office in South Korea, who put emphasis on inter-Korean reconciliations, and a more balanced role in China-US relations, China-ROK relations will not backslide to the nightmares when conservatives were in office.

³⁰⁵ Andray Abrahamian & Daewon Son, Moving On: China Resolves THAAD Dispute with South Korea, 38 North, 2017.11.9, <https://www.38north.org/2017/11/abrahamianson110917/>

³⁰⁶ US, China in talks over THAAD withdrawal, The Korea Times, 2018.5.4, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/05/120_248454.html

³⁰⁷ How the 'Libya Model' Became a Sticking Point in North Korea Nuclear Talks, The New York Times, 2018.5.16, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/world/asia/north-korea-libya-model.html>

Bibliography

1. Korean References

김영준(2015), 신중호, 중국의 대한미동맹에 대한 입장, 중국의 대한반도 정책, 국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소

김용호, 최연식(2007) “대북정책에 있어서 보수·진보논쟁에 대한 고찰: 대외위협 인식의 역사적 고찰을 통한 현재의 조명.” 한국과 국제정치제 23 권 3 호. 서울: 경남대학교 극동문제연구소

김형석 (2017). 한국 보수·진보 정부의 대북정책 비교 분석과 통합 가능성 모색. 통일문제연구, 29(2)

김계동(2008), 한국의 대북한 정책변화에 대한 이론적 연구, 국방정책연구 제 24 권 제 1 호 서울: 한국국방연구원

김홍규, 중국국가 주석 시진핑의 2014 년 방한과 한중관계, 전략연구 21(4), 2014.11, 63-89, 한국전략문제연구소, <http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE02514565>, accessed date: 2017/06/16

김장수-양제츠 "北 비핵화 진전 모든 외교적 노력"(종합), 연합뉴스, 2013.11.18

성경룡 (2008). 김대중-노무현 정부와 이명박 정부의 대북정책 추진전략 비교: 한반도 평화와 공동번영 정책의 전략, 성과, 미래과제. 한국동북아논총, 48(0)

서정경, 외교 : 열병식 이후의 한중관계, 성균차이나브리프, 2015, Vol.3(4), p.39

경제적 이익보다 전략적 고려 앞선 한·중 FTA, 아산정책연구원, 2014.11.10, www.asaninst.org/contents/경제적-이익보다-전략적-고려-앞선-한중-fta/

미래 한중관계에 "중일관계 악화를 반면교사로", 연합뉴스, 2013.9.26

모준영 (2016). 한반도 내 THAAD 배치와 미국의 전략. 민족연구, 67(0), 27-47

박종철(2015), 중국의 대북한관계 변화와 지속: 감정은의 체제유지와 시진핑의 현상유지강화의 타협으로서 적대적 동맹, 중국의 대한반도 정책, 국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소

박창희, 한중수교 20 년과 한중군사관계 발전: 회고와 전망, 중소기업 2012 년 36 권 1 호, pp 17-36, 한양대학교 아태지역연구센터, 2012

“박근혜 정부, 사드 배치 2015 년 초중반에 이미 결정했다”, 한겨레, 2017.5.1

박대통령 "北 올바른 변화 위해 중국이 중요역할 해야"(종합), 연합뉴스, 2015.9.4

이동률, 2013 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제; 최명해, 2013 북중관계 동향과 향후 전망, 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 2014, pp 135-234

이동률, 2014 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제, 최명해, 2014 북중관계 동향과 향후 전망, 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 2015, pp 187-322

이동률, 2015 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제, 최명해, 2015 북중관계 동향과 향후 전망, 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 2016, pp 213-356

이동률, 2016 한중관계의 현주소와 대중국외교 과제, 최명해, 2016 북중관계 동향과 향후 전망, 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 중국연구센터 2017, pp 219-370

조영남(2013); 중국의 꿈: 시진핑 리더십과 중국의 미래; 서울 : 민음사

조영남(2006) 『후진타오 시대의 중국정치』. 파주: 나남

장달중 (2011), 이정철, 임수호 저, 북미 대립, 서울대 출판문화원

중앙재즈-김장수, 18 일 첫 한중 고위급 전략대화(종합), 연합뉴스, 2013.11.18

최명해(2017), 북중 관계 동향과 향후 전망, 2016 중국정세보고, 국립외교원 외교안보연구소 중국연구센터, 2017

류호국 (2017). 역대정부(진보/보수)의 대북정책 비교 연구. 군사논단, 91(0)

새누리 85% “사드 조건부 도입”에 김종인 등 36 명 동의, 중앙일보, 2016.07.05

한국갤럽 데일리 오피니언, 제 263 호 2017 년 6 월 3 주(13~15 일)

www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportDownload.asp?seqNo=839

한중 '군사 핫라인', 北 핵 실험에도 '뚜뚜뚜~...!', 연합뉴스, 2016.1.7

하도형, “한중 국방 교류의 확대와 제한요인에 관한 연구”, 현대중국학회, <현대중국연구> 9 권 2 호 (2008), pp.1-35

한중 고위채널 상시 가동체제...6 차 회담 재개 미지수 (종합), 연합뉴스, 2013.11.18

2. English References

Address by President Park Geun-hye to the National Assembly on State Affairs, 2016.2.16.

Andrew Scobell & Scott W. Harold (2013) An “Assertive” China? Insights from Interviews, *Asian Security*, 9:2, 111-131, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2013.795549

AREA DENIAL CHALLENGES, 1 (ed. US Department of Defense, United States Military, 2013)

Air Sea Battle Concept, Air Power Development Center Bulletin

Are China’s THAAD Fears Justified? *The Diplomat*, February 20, 2015.

Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 7-48

Air-Sea Battle Office, AIR-SEA BATTLE: SERVICE COLLABORATION TO ADDRESS ANTI-ACCESS

Avery Goldstein (2005), *Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press)

Avery Goldstein, "Across the Yalu: China's Interests and the Korean Peninsula in a Changing World," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), *New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 131-161. 327.52 J641n

Ankit Panda, ‘South Korea Joins the AIIB’, *The Diplomat*, 2015.3.28, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/03/south-korea-joins-the-aiib/>

Asia: Sunshine and storms; the Koreas. (2006, Jul 15). *The Economist*.

[Analysis] A war of nerves on NK missile tests, July 9, 2007, Hankyoreh.

“A Comparison of the U.S. and ROK National Security Strategies: Implications for Alliance Coordination toward North Korea,” in Philip W. Yun and Gi-wook Shin, eds., *North Korea: 2005 and Beyond* (Stanford: Walter A. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, 2006), pp. 149-166

A Testing Ground for China's Power, Prosperity and Preferences: China's Post-Cold-War Relations with the Korean Peninsula, *Pacifica Review: Peace, security & global change*, 13:1, 31- 40, DOI:10.1080/13239100120036027

Aidan Foster-Carter, “Chat-to-China” Choo Choo: Kim Rides the Rails Again, *38 North*, May 23, 2011

<https://www.38north.org/2011/05/fostercarter052311/>

Aidan Foster-Carter, "South Korea-North Korea Relations: From Snakes to Ladders?" *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 17, No. 2, Sept. 2015, pp. 87-100.

Aidan Foster-Carter, "South Korea-North Korea Relations: Sunshine's Final Sunset? Maybe Not," *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 18, No. 1, May 2016, pp.79-90.

Andy Lim and Victor Cha, Dataset: China-DPRK High Level Visits Since 1953, *Beyond Parallel*, March 17, 2017

Andrei Lankov, Kim Jong Deng: Why North Korea Is Choosing Market Reforms, *Carnegie Moscow Center*, Feb 25, 2015, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/59170>

Andray Abrahamian & Daewon Son, Moving On: China Resolves THAAD Dispute with South Korea, *38 North*, 2017.11.9, <https://www.38north.org/2017/11/abrahamianson110917/>

Agence France-Press, 'China summons North Korea ambassador over nuclear test', *South China Morning Post*, 13 Feb. 2013.

Anne Wu (2005) What china whispers to North Korea, *Washington Quarterly*, 28:2, 35-48, DOI: 10.1162/0163660053295239

Andrea Berger, North Korea's Military Partnerships Under Threat? *38 North*, June 17, 2016

Bruce W. Bennett, Why THAAD is Needed in Korea, *The Rand Blog*, 2017.8.6, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/08/why-thaad-is-needed-in-korea.html>

Big nations snub Beijing bank launch after US lobbying, *Financial Times*, 2014.10.23

Bruce E. Bechtol, South Korea: Responding to the North Korean threat, *American Enterprise Institute*, 2013.11.5

Barack Obama, "Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament", 2011.11.17

Barnes, J. E. (2014, May 28). World news: Washington considers missile-defense system in South Korea. *Wall Street Journal*

Brendan Howe, Kyung Min Lee . (2016). Trustpolitik: The Failure to Build Trust in Inter-Korean Relations. *Journal of Peace and Unification*, 6(2), pp 95-124.

Bonnie S. Glaser & Wang Liang (2008) North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership?, *Washington Quarterly*, 31:3, 165-180, DOI: 10.1162/wash.2008.31.3.165

Bonnie S. Glaser (October 21) , China and Japan's Perspective on North Korea, *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2014, <https://www.cfr.org/event/china-and-japans-perspectives-north-korea-0>

Bonnie S. Glaser (Nov 2012), Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, *A Report of The CSIS*

Christopher R. Hill, *Outpost* (Simon & Schuster, 2014); William J. Perry, *My Journey at the Nuclear Brink; A Sharper Choice on North Korea*, (CFR, 2016)

Chang Jae-soon, U.S., S. Korea, Japan conduct first joint missile-tracking exercise, *Yonhap News*, June 29, 2016; Lee Chi-dong, no trilateral missile drills planned this year: source, *Yonhap News*, September 10, 2013

China Demands On-Site Inspection of THAAD Battery in Korea, *Chosun Ilbo*, June 14, 2017

CHOE, S. (2015, Mar 18). South Korea tells china not to meddle in decision over missile system. *International New York Times*

Chang Jae-soon, (5th LD) Pentagon rejects Lockheed Martin's claim about THAAD talks with S. Korea, *Yonhap News*, 2015.10.30

Chronology of events leading to THAAD deployment, *Yonhap News*, 2017.9.6

China adds security interests to its three principles for N. Korean denuclearization, Hankyoreh, 2016.2.16, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/730595.html

China's Military Strategy, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, 2015.5

Chen Ping, US, not China, has the key to solving the North Korean nuke issue, Global Times, June 13, 2017

Chung Jae Ho, China as much as the US is between "strategic alliance" and "strategic partnership," Agony over China by Chung Jae-Ho, p. 242, 245, 261

Cheng, Xiaohe. (2012). From Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao: The Evolution of China's Policies toward the Korean Peninsula*. Korea Observer, 43(4), pp 693

Chen Ping, China's (North) Korea Policy: Misperception and Reality (An Independent Chinese Perspective on Sino-Korean Relations), Gilbert Rozman edited, China's Foreign Policy: Who Makes it, and How is It Made? The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Seoul, Korea, 2011, pp 253-274

CHOE, S. (2009, Oct 05). Mending Fences for 2 Asian Leaders; 2 asian leaders try to mend relations. International Herald Tribune, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/319011612?accountid=6802>

Choi Myeong-Hae, China's Strategic View of the Korean Peninsula, SERI Quarterly, July 2013

China, SK share Japan concerns, Global Times, 2014.7.5, www.globaltimes.cn/content/868916.shtml

David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 43-56

Difficulties, The Chinese Perspectives Towards the Korean Peninsula: In The Aftermath of North Korea's Fourth Nuclear Test, STIMSON, June 2016, pp 53

David C. McCaughrin, What Does China's 'New Asian Security Concept' Mean for the US?, The Diplomat, 2017.1.21

Daniel Pinkston, No Such Thing as a Free Ride? ROK Missile Defense, Regional Missile Defense and OPCON Transfer, International Crisis Group, 2014.7.29

Donald G.Gross, North Korea Tests a Nuke and Returns to the Six Party Talks, Comparative Connections Volume 8, Issue 4, January 2017. cc.csis.org/2007/01/north-korea-tests-nuke-returns-six-party-talks/

David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 253

Derek McDougall, "Response to 'Rising China' in the East Asian Region: Soft Balancing with Accommodation," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 73 (January 2012), pp. 1-17

Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, "The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective", New York City, 2012.8.1

Diplomatic White Paper. 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Diplomatic White Paper. 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Diplomatic White Paper. 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Eric A Mcvadon . (2010). Korean issues in U.S.-China relations 1990-2010. Korean journal of defense analysis, 22(2)

Edward Kwon. South Korea's Deterrence Strategy Against North Korea's WMD, East Asia (2018) 35: 1. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-018-9282-9>

Foreign Ministry urges participation in Proliferation Security Initiative, Hankyoreh, 2008.1.12

Funabashi Yoichi, The Peninsula Question (The Brookings Institution, 2007); Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, Going Critical (The Brookings Institution, 2004)

Fei Su & Lora Saalman, China's Engagement of North Korea: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe, SIPRI, February 2017

Fu Ying, The Korean Nuclear Issue: Past, Present, and Future: A Chinese Perspective, John Thornton, China Center at Brookings, Strategy Paper 3, May 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/north-korean-nuclear-issue-fu-ying.pdf>

Guoli Liu, China Rising: Chinese Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Palgrave, 2017, 74-75

Geoff Dyer & George Parker, US attacks UK's 'constant accommodation' with China, 2015.3.13, Financial Times,

Gui Tao, Frequent exchange of high-level visits highlights closer China-South Korea ties, Xinhua News Agency, 2015.10.31

G. John Ikenberry Power, order, and change in world politics, Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2014, Michael Mastanduno, Order and Change in World Politics, pp 162-191

Gov't Has 'No Plans' to Join US Missile Defense, Chosun Ilbo, 2013.10.17

Half of S. Koreans support THAAD deployment: poll, Yonhap News, 2016.7.15

Hong Nack Kim, South-North Korean Relations Under the Roh Moo-Hyun Government, International Journal of Korean Studies, Spring/Summer 2006 • Vol. X, No. 1

Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", Foreign Policy, 2011.10.11

How the 'Libya Model' Became a Sticking Point in North Korea Nuclear Talks, The New York Times, 2018.5.16, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/world/asia/north-korea-libya-model.html>

Hochul Lee (2013) China in the North Korean Nuclear Crises: 'interest' and 'identity' in foreign behavior, Journal of Contemporary China, 22:80, 312-331, DOI:10.1080/10670564.2012.734085

Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hidreth & Susan V. Lawrence, April 3, 2015, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, Congressional Research Service, , <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf>

International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, March 20, 2018, at http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/WEO_WORLD/CHN/JPN/USA?year=2022

Jack Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy (The Brookings Institution, 2007); Mike Chinoy, Melt Down (St. Martins Press, 2008)

Jack Kim, Between U.S. and China, South Korea in bind over missile, March 17, 2015; Transcript: Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr. at Global Missile Defense Conference, May 28, 2014, Atlantic Council

John Schilling, A Partial Success for the Musudan, 38 North, 2016.6.23

Jae Ho Chung (edited), Assessing China's Power, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp 65-129

Jane Perlez, For China, a Missile Defense System in South Korea Spells a Failed Courtship, The New York Times, 2016.7.8

Joshua H. Pollack, Ballistic Missile Defense in South Korea: Separate Systems Against a Common Threat, in "Missile Defense, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation in the 21st Century", CISSM Collection of Papers, January 2017.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "A Shift in Perceptions of Power," The Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2011, p. 17; Dan Blumenthal, "Riding a Tiger: China's Resurging Foreign Policy Aggression," Foreign Policy, Shadow Government Blog, April 15, 2011

"Japan, U.S. to Deploy Second TPY-2 Long-range Radar in Kyoto City," United Press International, October 4, 2013.

James Dwyer, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the Changing Nature of Deterrence: The US Rebalance and China's Nuclear Strategy," US-China Law Review 13, no. 6 (June 2016): 474-490

- Jae Ho Chung (2014) China's Evolving Views of the Korean–American Alliance, 1953–2012, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 23:87, 425–442, DOI:10.1080/10670564.2013.843882
- Jae Ho Chung & Myung-hae Choi (2013) Uncertain allies or uncomfortable neighbors? Making sense of China–North Korea Relations, 1949–2010, *The Pacific Review*, 26:3, 243–264, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2012.759262
- Jae Ho Chung(2006), *Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China relations and the United States*, Columbia University Press.
- Jae Ho Chung (2004). "From a Special Relationship to a Normal Partnership?: Interpreting the "Garlic Battle" in Sino-South Korean Relations." *Pacific Affairs* 76 (4): 549-568. Jae Ho Chung, "SOUTH KOREA BETWEEN EAGLE AND DRAGON." *Asian Survey*, vol. 41, no. 5, 2001, pp. 777–796. Jae Ho Chung, "China's 'Soft' Clash with South Korea," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (May/June 2009), pp. 469-483.
- Jaeho Hwang, *The ROK's China Policy under Park Geun-hye*, 2014.8
- Jane Perlez, U.S. Opposing China's Answer to World Bank, *New York Times*, 2014.10.9,
- Jamil Anderlini, UK move to join China-led bank a surprise even to Beijing, *Financial Times*, 2015.3.27
- Kor Kian Beng, "Don't bet on China's 'Asia for Asians only' vision yet," *Straits Times*, May 30, 2014
- Kim Jong-un's special envoy meets Chinese president, *Yonhap News*, May 24, 2013
- Kang Seung-woo, Seongju confirmed as site for THAAD, *The Korea Times*, 2016.7.11,
- Kennedy, A.B (2008), "China's perceptions of US intentions toward Taiwan", *Asian Survey* (47), 268-287
- Kim Eun-jung, S. Korea seeks multi-layered missile defense against North, *Yonhap News*, 2013.10.15
- Kyung-young Chung, *Debate on THAAD Deployment and ROK National Security*, East Asia Institute, October 2015.
- Kim Kwang-tae, Park arrives in Shanghai after attending military parade , *Yonhap News*; 2015.9.3
- Kim, Heungkyu. 2009. "China's Partnership Diplomacy: Concept, Process, and Implication." *Korean Political Science Review* 43(2):287-305. Kim, Heungkyu. "Enemy, Homager or Equal Partner?: Evolving Korea-China Relations." *Journal of International and Area Studies*, vol. 19, no. 2, 2012, pp. 47–62
- Kim Heung-Kyu, *A View from South Korea on Sino-ROK Relations*, Joint US-Korea Academic Studies 2017
- Li Xiaokun and Ai Yang , US-ROK drill in Yellow Sea 'by early Sept', *China Daily*, July 22, 2010
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/22/content_11033164.htm
- Lee, H. J. (2015, March 27). *Missile defense and South Korea: President Park's strategic ambiguity is warranted*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- Lee Chi-dong ,S. Korea plays PSI card to counter N. Korea's brinkmanship, *Yonhap News*, 2009.5.26
- Moon Gwang-lip And Park Jin-seok, U.S. warns Korea against joining China's bank, 2014.6.3
- Major U.S. allies to join China-backed bank - reports, *Reuters*, 2015.3.17; <https://in.reuters.com/article/europe-asia-bank-idINKBN0MD0BA20150317>
- Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010*, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Michael D. Swaine, "Perceptions of an Assertive China," *China Leadership Monitor* No. 32 (May 11, 2010), pp. 1–19
- Michael D. Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior—Part One: On Core Interests," *China Leadership Monitor* No. 34 (February 22, 2011), pp. 1–25
- Michael D. Swaine, Xi Jinping's Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics, *China Leadership Monitor*, No 46. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Michael_Swaine_CLM_46.pdf

Michael Yahuda, "China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 22, No. 81 (May 2013), pp. 446-459; Thomas Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011), pp. 54-67

Mastin, L. (2009, January). Existence and Consciousness.

https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_conservatism.html

More Bullying from Beijing, *Yonhap News*, November 24, 2017

Martin Dempsey, "Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020," U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2014.12.13

Moon, Chung-in. "Between Principle and Pragmatism: What Went Wrong with the Lee Myung-bak Government's North Korean Policy?" *Journal Of International And Area Studies* 18, no. 2 (December 2011): 1-21.

Murphy, Terence M, The Pacific phased adaptive approach: U.S. BMD in response to the DRPK, December 2014, Calhoun,

Min Ye (2015) China and Competing Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, RCEP, and the New Silk Road, *Asian Security*, 11:3, 206-224, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2015.1109509

Michael Ha, "Chinese Official Calls Korea-US Alliance 'Historical Relic'," *Korea Times* . 28 May 2008, . www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/04/116_24932.html

Marthieu Duchatel & Phillip Schell, China's Policy on North Korea: Economic Engagement and Nuclear Dsiarmament, SIPRI Policy Paper, December 2013, pp 20-21

Mark E. Manyin & Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, CRS report, April 2, 2014

Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Prospects for Economic Reform in North Korea, *China Perspective*, No. 2012/4

<https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6050?file=1>

Nominations before the Senate Armed Services Committee. (2008, May 22). Second session, 110th congress. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg46092/html/CHRG-110shrg46092.htm>

Nuclear North Korea: Bad or mad?, *The Economist*, 2013.10.26

North Korean Policy?" *Journal Of International And Area Studies* 18, no. 2 (December 2011): 1-21.

N. Korea as nuclear state, *The Korean Times*, 2016.6

North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts, CNN Library, 2018.4.3

Naoko Aoki, "Seeing Missile Defense as U.S. Hostility, North Korea Aims at More and Better Weapons," CISSM Publication, January 2017

Osamu Koike, Deployment of the THAAD System to South Korea—Background and Issues Osamu Koike, Research Fellow, Security Studies Department, The National Institute for Defense Studies Commentary, March 28, 2017.

Ohn Daewon & Mason Richey (2015) China's Evolving Policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under Xi Jinping, *Asian Studies Review*, 39:3, 483-502, DOI: 10.1080/10357823.2015.1052778

Park Ci Yeon, China's Policy on North Korean Nuclear Tests: Changed and Unchanged, Master Thesis, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, July 2016

Park Geun-hye, "A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang", *Foreign Affairs*, September–October 2011.

Park Jin, Korea Between the United States and China: How Does Hedging Work? Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/07/south-korea-goes-all-in-on-missile-defense/>

Park, Xi vow denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, *Yonhap News*, 2014.7.3

Park, Xi warn N. Korea against any provocations, Yonhap news, 2015.9.2

Park will attend Xi's Victory Day military parade, Korea Joongang Daily, 2015.8.28;

"President Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2013.10.2

Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427-460. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027697

Policy Brief No 51 - North Korea's Nuclear Doctrine under Kim Jong Un, The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)

Peng Li, Strategic Game between China and the US from the Perspective of TPP, *Journal of China and International Relation*, Vol 3 No 2 (2015) , 2015,11.30:

Park Hyun, Pentagon document confirms THAAD's eight-hour conversion ability, Hankyoreh, June 3, 2015

Park Hyun, THAAD missile defense system could be used to defend against Chinese attack on US, June 2, 2015

Park Hyun, AN/TPY-2 radar could track any Chinese ICBMs as they pass over the Korean peninsula, Hankyoreh, June 2, 2015

"Patriot units to be deployed in Okinawa permanently." *The Japan Times*, 2013.4.13

"Premier Li meets with his South Korean counterpart in Seoul" , Xinhua News Agency, 2015.10

<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/cnleaders/lkq201510/index.htm>

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2014

Robert Koehane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986)

Robert E. Kelly , Why Park Geun-hye Attended China's World War Two Military Parade, Sept 7, 2015, Lowy Institute, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpretor/why-park-geun-hye-attended-chinas-world-war-two-military-parade>

Robbie Gramer, Emily Tamkin, Decades of U.S. Diplomacy with North Korea: a Timeline, *Foreign Policy*, March 12, 2018

"Report on Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee," Korean Central News Agency of DPRK (KCNA), 2013.3.13

Richard D. Fisher Jr. "'Power Projection' Chinese Struggle", *The Wall Street Journal (Europe)*, 2006,4.12

ROK-U.S. Joint Announcement, Feb 7, 2016, United States Forces Korea; ROK & U.S. Joint Statement: ROK-U.S. Alliance agrees to deploy THAAD, July 7, 2016, United States Forces Korea

Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, "China-Korea Relations: Two Koreas Defy Chinese Sanctions," *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 83-94; Fei Su & Lora Saalman, China's Engagement of North Korea: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe, SIPRI, February 2017, pp 16-17

Scott Snyder & See-Won Byun, Beijing Ties Uneven with Seoul, Stalled with Pyongyang, *Comparative Connections* Volume 16, Issue 3, January 2015, cc.csis.org/2015/01/beijing-ties-uneven-seoul-stalled-pyongyang/;

Scott Snyder & See-Won Byun, Under New Leaderships, *Comparative Connections* Volume 14, Issue 3, January 2013, <http://cc.csis.org/2013/01/under-new-leaderships/>

Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun, China's Nuclear North Korea Fever, CSIS, *Comparative Connections* Volume 11, Issue 3, October 2009

Scott A. Snyder, North Korea's Test of Trustpolitik, January 31, 2014 <https://www.cfr.org/blog/north-koreas-test-trustpolitik>

Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, "China-Korea Relations: A Complex China-ROK Partnership", *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Jan. 2016, pp.97-108.

Seong-ho Sheen, Dilemma of South Korea's Trust Diplomacy and Unification Policy, *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol.23, No.2, 2014.12, pp 97-122

Send the Nukes Back to South Korea, *Foreign Policy*, 2013.5.6, foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/06/send-the-nukes-back-to-south-korea/

"Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for Twenty-First Century Defense," U.S. Department of Defense, 2012.1

Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, "Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore", June 02, 2012 <http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5049>

Sun Ru., Understanding China's responses to THAAD[J]. *Contemporary International Relations*,2017,(3);Liu Tiancong., ROK Factor for the Deployment of THAAD[J]. *Contemporary International Relations*,2017,(3)

Suk Hee Han.(2008). From engagement to hedging: South Korea's new China policy. *Korean journal of defense analysis*, 20(4), 335-351.

Seoul has no plan for talks on THAAD with China, *Yonhap News*, November 2017

S. Korea, Japan to sign inter-sharing pact Wednesday, *Yonhap News*, 2016.11.21

S Korea to Develop Indigenous Missile Defense System Instead of Adopting THAAD, *Xinhua English News*, 2014.6.3

S Korea to conclude land acquisition for THAAD battery this week, *Yonhap News*, 2017.2.26

S. Korean lawmakers differ over THAAD introduction, *Yonhap News*, 2015.5.21,

Ser Myo-ja, "China's Defense Chief Raises THAAD", *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 2015.2.5

Song Sang-ho, "Seoul Fires Back at China's Opposition to THAAD," *Korea Herald*, 2015.3.17.

Shannon Tiezzi, North Korea Nuclear Test Reveals the Limits of China-South Korea Cooperation, *The Diplomat*, 2016.1.14

See the Korean version of the preamble of the DPRK's constitution, 2012.5.20,

Stig Stenslie and Chen Gang, XI Jinping's Grand Strategy, Jo Inge Bekkevold and Robert S. Ross editors, Introduction: China's new leadership in Domestic and International Politics, *China in the era of Xi Jinping: domestic and foreign policy challenges*; Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016. P 92-111

Swaine, Michael (2011), *America's Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Suisheng Zhao(2015), China's Power from a Chinese Perspective, in *Assessing China's Power* edited by Jae Ho Chung, Palgrave Macmillan, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, P261

Suisheng Zhao (2015) A New Model of Big Power Relations? China-US strategic rivalry and balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24:93, 377-397, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2014.953808

Statement by the President on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, *The White House*, 2015.10.5

2nd LD U.S. mulls deploying MD system in S. Korea: USFK chief, *Yonhap News*,2014.6.3

Scobell, A., & Cozad, M. (2014). China's north korea policy: Rethink or recharge? *Parameters*, 44(1), 51-63.

Song Lin, Xi Jinping Government's Foreign Policy toward South Korea, *Academic Dissertation for Master Degree*, Seoul National University, 2017

S. Korea to seek AIIB stake commensurate with its economic size, *Yonhap News*, 2015 .3.27, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/full/2015/03/27/64/1200000000AEN20150327002800320F.html>

Scott A. Snyder, "Park's Decision to Join Xi Jinping's World War II Commemoration," Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound, 2015/09/02

Samuel S. Kim, "China, Japan, and Russia in Inter-Korean Relations", Korea Briefing 2000-2001 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002)

Sungtae "Jacky" Park, How China sees THAAD, CSIS, 2016.3.30

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-32-how-china-sees-thaad>

Taeho Kim, "'Strategic Cooperative Partnership' between Beijing and Seoul? A Quest in Search of Reality," New Asia, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 2011), pp. 14-33

Taeho Kim, "Sino-ROK Relations at 15: An Overview and Assessment," Working Paper Series No. 185 (August 2007), Center for Asian Pacific Studies (Lingnan University, Hong Kong),

Troy Stangarone and Nicholas Hamisevicz, The Prospects for Economic Reform in North Korea after Kim Jong-il and the China Factor, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2011

"THAAD Radar Ranges," Mostlymissiledefense.com, 17 July 2016.

Thaad won't protect Seoul area, Korea Joong Ang Daily, 2016.7.13,

THAAD Will Not Protect South Korea, The Korea Expose, 2017.3.29

THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2017.10 , <http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Background-2.pdf>

Tae-Hyung Kim, South Korea's Missile Defense Policy: Dilemma and Opportunity for a Medium State, Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 1, Number 3, pp 371–389.

TRANSCRIPT: Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the U.S. Pacific Command & US Forces Korea, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 2015.4.17

The Korean Peninsula: North Korea's Rapid Succession of Power and the ROK's Changing Security Policy, East Asian Strategic Review 2012

USFK Deploys Another Patriot Missile Battery, Chosun Ilbo, 2016.2.15

US commanders' comments contradict previous government statements on THAAD deployment, Hankyoreh, 2015.4.18

US Department of Defence, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April, 2010

US Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 2010

US, China in talks over THAAD withdrawal, The Korea Times, 2018.5.4,

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/05/120_248454.html

US-Japan defense guidelines danger to Asia, Global Times, 2015.4.30, www.globaltimes.cn/content/919536.shtml

Work, Robert O. 2014, "Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work on the Asia-Pacific Rebalance,"

Xiaoming Zhang, "China's Relations with the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese View," Korean Observer, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 481-500.

Xi looks to North in landmark Seoul visit, Global Times, 2014.7.3, www.globaltimes.cn/content/868631.shtml

Yoon Min-sik, THAAD to be deployed in Seongju, The Korea Herald, 2016.7.13

Ye, Min. (2017). China-South Korea relations in the new era : challenges and opportunities. Lanham, Maryland : Lexington Books

You Ji, "China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 28 (August 2001), pp. 387-98

Yu Tiejun, The Significance of the Korean Peninsula in Xi Jinping's Global Strategy, The Chinese Perspectives Towards the Korean Peninsula: In The Aftermath of North Korea's Fourth Nuclear Test, STIMSON, June 2016

Yoichi Funabashi, "A Futile Boycott of China's Bank Will Not Push Xi Out of His Back Yard," Financial Times, 2014.12.9

Yoo Seungki, News Analysis: S.Korea selects national interests by joining AIIB, Xihuanet, 2015.3.27,

Zachary Keck, South Korea Goes All In On Missile Defense, The Diplomat, 2013.7.26

Zach Berger, Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2), Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, March 2017

3. Chinese References

陈晓舒, 解密中朝边境往来者:哪边能吃饱饭, 就涌向哪边, 中国新闻周刊, June 30, 2009, http://intl.ce.cn/gjzh/200906/30/t20090630_19427228.shtml

2013年3月8日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会, 中华人民共和国外交部, 2013.3.8

何喜有, 申相振, 《从相互隔绝到战略合作: 建交后中韩政治经济关系的演化》, 复旦大学出版社, 2016

韩美一意孤行部署萨德 地区军备竞赛或将开启, 环球时报, 2016.7.9

解读: 习近平“点穴式”外交有何特点, 人民网, 2014.8.26

刘云山会见金正恩转交习近平总书记亲署函, 新华网, 2015.10.10

美评论员: 美屯重兵于韩国逼朝鲜走向核武化, 环球时报, 2013.2.17 <http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-02/3647651.html>

美防长将朝核则仍推中国遭打脸, 朝鲜称美国才是推手, 环球时报, 2016.9.20 <http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-09/9429176.html>

新华国际时评: 朝核问题困境美国难辞其咎, 新华网, 2016.10.26 www.xinhuanet.com/2016-10/26/c_1119794017.html

杨昭全, 孙艳姝著, 《当代中朝中韩关系史(下卷)》, 吉林文史出版社, 2013年

外交部长王毅谈习近平主席对韩国进行国事访问, 新华网, 2014.7.4

外交部就美韩在韩部署“萨德”反导系统发表声明, 新华社, 2016.7.9

外交部部长王毅就中国外交政策和对外关系回答中外记者提问, 中华人民共和国外交部, 2014.3.8

<http://bd.china-embassy.org/chn/zgyw/t1135388.htm>

社评: 外界想拆散中朝友好关系, 这须被注意到, 环球网, 2015.9.8

社评: “放弃朝鲜”的主张过于幼稚和极端, 环球时报, 2013.4.12; <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-04/3824176.html>;

社评: 朝鲜半岛风急, 中国更需战略定力, 环球时报, 2013.2.16 <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2013-02/3642393.html>

社评: 美对朝鲜“赴汤蹈火拥核”颇有贡献, 环球时报, 2016.2.20 <http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2016-02/8572460.html>

时永明: 美不应为对朝政策失败开脱, 环球时报, 2014.4.4, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2014-04/4953602.html

王毅谈美拟在韩部署萨德反导系统 中华人民共和国外交部, 2016.2.13,
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1340281.shtml>

王毅强调中方在朝鲜半岛问题上三个“坚持”立场, 2013.4.13, 中华人民共和国外交部

王毅谈中朝关系: 中国既重情义也讲原则, 人民网, 2016.3.8

王毅谈半岛核问题: 制裁是必要手段, 维稳是当务之急, 谈判是根本之道, 中华人民共和国外交部, 2016.3.8,

习近平会见朝鲜劳动党代表团, 新华社, 2016.6.

习近平: 让命运共同体意识在周边国家落地生根, 新华社, 2013.10.25

习近平会见韩国总统朴槿惠, 人民网, 2015.9.2

杨洁篪会见韩国总统府国家安保室长金章洙, 外交部, 2013.11.18

“中韩旅游迈入“1000 万时代” 互办旅游年促进新增长”, 新华社, 2015.1.20

郑继永. (2012). 朝鲜的政治稳定性分析与中国的朝鲜半岛政策. 한국평화연구학회 2012 하계 국제세미나, 46-57.

국문초록

이 논문은 셋 가지의 연구 질문에 초점을 두고 시진핑 임기 초기 한중 관계의 현황을 검토할 것이다. 첫째, 과연 시진핑 집권 초기의 한중 관계는 많은 중국 매체의 보도처럼 경열정온(经热政温)의 양성적인 궤도에 진입했는가? 둘째, 2016년부터 한중관계가 급속히 냉각해지는데 그 와중에 어떠한 요인이 있었는가. 셋째, 시진핑 시기의 중국의 한반도 정책은 과거 장쩌민 시기와 후진타오 시기에 비교해 볼 때 어떠한 새로운 변화가 있었는가?

첫 번째 연구 질문에 대해서 저자는 비록 한중 관계가 정치적인 영역에서 고위급 회담이 더욱 빈번해졌지만 여러 가지 대표적인 회담의 성과물을 검토한 결과에 따르면 큰 성과를 거두지 못했고 한미동맹, 대북 정책, 및 대일관계 등 중요한 이슈에 대해서는 양국이 적잖은 입장 차이가 있었다고 주장한다.

두 번째 연구 질문에 대해서 이 논문은 한국을 중심으로 이 문제를 분석하고 국내 및 국제 요소가 모두 2016 중순부터의 한중관계 즉각 냉각에 큰 영향을 미쳤다. 국내요소에 있어서 2008년 이명박 정부의 집권은 보수파의 대북정책의 회귀를 의미하고 박근혜 정부의 외교정책은 보수파의 외교정책에서 크게 이탈하지 못했다. 이로써 한중관계는 박근혜 정부 집권 초기부터 미중관계, 대북정책에 둘러싸고 많은 분쟁과 다툼이 내재하고 있었다. 박근혜 정부의 사드배치는 보수 정부 외교정책의 편향성을 충분히 보여주었다. 즉 대북 강경정책과 안보 영역에 무조건 한미관계를 우선시하는 것이다. 외부요인은 북한요인과 미국요인으로 나뉘질 수 있다. 북한요인에 있어서 김정은 집권 이후에 북한은 핵 정책에 있어서 과거와 달리 더욱 강경해지고 심지어 병진정책을 내세워 공개적으로 핵무기 개발과 보유를 정당화시키고자 한다. 미국 요인에 있어서 미중관계가 글로벌 라이벌이라는 현실이 더욱 심각해지는 상황에서 오바마 행정부는 아시아 재균형 정책을 취하고 한미동맹을 더욱 강화하고자 한다. 사드배치는 미국의 아시아 재균형 정책의 중요한 일환이라고 볼 수 있다.

셋 번째 연구 질문에 대해서 저자는 시진핑 시기에 외교정책에 있어서 더 많은 능동성을 보였다고 한다. 북한 핵문제에 있어서 과거 정부와 달리 더욱 강경한 입장을 보였고 북한 제재에 적극적으로 동참했으며 한국에 대해서는 미국의 아시아 재균형 정책으로 인한 한미동맹 강화를 막기 위해 한중관계 개선에 열심히 노력했다. 그렇지만 중국의 이런 대한반도 정책의 조정은 구체적인 방법론의 전환뿐이지 기존 한반도 정책의 기본적인 지침을 바꾸려는 시도가 아니다.

주요어: 한중관계, 시진핑, 사드이슈, 미중관계, 북핵문제, 중국의 한반도 정책

학번: 2015-25109