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Master's Thesis

**Identity concepts of young political parties
in Taiwan and Hong Kong
after the Sunflower and Umbrella Movements:
The cases of the New Power Party and Demosisto**

헤바라기 · 우산운동 후에 대만과 홍콩의 신생 정당의
정체성 개념에 관한 연구:
시대역량과 데모시스토를 중심으로

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Seoul National University
Graduate School of International Studies
International Area Studies
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Abstract

Identity concepts of young political parties in Taiwan and Hong Kong after the Sunflower and Umbrella Movements: The cases of the New Power Party and Demosisto

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In the early 2010s, The Sunflower and the Umbrella movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong gained world-wide attention. In the aftermath of these protests, new political parties were formed that brought the movements' goals and values into the established political systems of Taiwan and Hong Kong. The identity concepts promoted by the New Power Party and Demosisto challenge Anthony D. Smith's categorization of civic and ethnic national identity. While recent academic work focused on the civic national identity concept to explain identity shifts in the region, this thesis seeks to find elements of the parties' identity concepts that do not fit into this category. The analysis will be based on texts produced by the parties, such as party programs, as well as media reports covering the parties' activities and a historical perspective on past identity changes. In doing so, it will suggest historical factors that influenced and still influence the dynamics between ethnic and civic national identity concepts in the region. The thesis argues that an interplay of civic and ethnic identification shapes the two parties' identity concepts.

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Keywords: Taiwanese identity, Hong Kong identity, civic national identity, ethnic national identity, New Power Party, Demosisto

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Abbreviations

ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CSSTA	Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
DPP	Democratic People's Party
ECFA	Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
HKFS	Hong Kong Federation of Students
KMT	Kuomintang
NPP	New Power Party
PRC	People's Republic of China

Note on the Romanization of Chinese Terms

The romanization of Chinese terms always bears some difficulty. For personal names, the version most commonly used in academia, the media, or other publications will be used. Otherwise, Pinyin will be utilized. For place, party or publication names in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the form that is most commonly known in the respective area will be used. Lastly, for words related to the People's Republic of China, Pinyin will be used if there is no other more common Romanization.

**Identity concepts of young political parties in Taiwan and Hong Kong
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I. Introduction

In the early 2010s, student demonstrations in Taiwan and Hong Kong gained worldwide attention. The international media portrayed the Sunflower and Umbrella Movements as fights for democracy with some activists even achieving an icon-like status (Wong 2017). Underlying identity issues, however, received less attention. In the aftermath of these protests, in both Taiwan and Hong Kong, new political parties were formed that brought the movements' goals and values into the established political system. In Taiwan, the New Power Party (*Shidai liliang* 時代力量, hereafter NPP) became a competitive third force uniting the Sunflower Movements' main actors. In Hong Kong, several different parties emerged from the Umbrella Movement. The most famous one, Demosisto (*Xianggang Zhongzhi* 香港眾志), was founded by the most prominent participants in the movement, such as Joshua Wong (Wong Chi-fung 黃之鋒). It gained only one seat in Hong Kong's legislative council that it later lost. Despite their different political power, the parties have in common that they promote a new idea of their countries' identity that incorporates civic values and a strong sense of distinctiveness from the Chinese mainland.

1. Research purpose

The main research question will be whether NPP's and Demosisto's identity concepts can be best explained by the civic national identity approach, as suggested by the academic literature on the recent movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong from which the two parties emerged, or whether there are certain elements to their identity concepts that do not fit into the standard definition of a civic national identity. The question is of great relevance for the future development of Taiwan and Hong Kong which the mainland Chinese government perceives as belonging to the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC). The thesis seeks to explore elements of civic and ethnic identity concepts in the party programs of two parties that were founded after the recent protest movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong by active participants. In Taiwan, NPP was established in January 2015, about a year after the Sunflower Movement. In Hong Kong, Demosisto was founded in April 2016 by activists of the 2014 Umbrella Movement. As the two parties only had limited success in their first elections, it should be kept in mind that their views can only reflect the ideas of a rather small group of the electorate. Their influence on society, also due to their rather recent appearance on the political stage, cannot be assessed as quite deep yet. Therefore, this thesis does not aim at analyzing broader shifts in Taiwanese or Hong Kong identity. Nevertheless, it is important to understand how the parties and the groups in society that they represent think of themselves. First, the fact that the parties were founded after the protest movements had ended, shows that the participants now aim at bringing their views into

the established political systems of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Second, like the protests, the parties are mainly driven by young and politically active people. If the identity concepts promoted by them are diametrically different from the PRC's idea of one "One country, two systems" (*Yiguo liangzhi* 一國兩制), this poses a major challenge to future Taiwan-PRC and Hong Kong-PRC relations. Finally, the Sunflower and the Umbrella Movement gained not only international media attention but were at times also capable to attract the sympathies of bigger groups within their own societies. While these sympathizers might not have completely supported all of the protesters' claims, they must have felt that they were somehow justified. Although the parties might not be able to generate broader public support for their political agenda, it is likely that some parts of society still perceive them as rather positive.

In the last years there have been numerous studies challenging the dichotomy of civic national identity and ethnic national identity (such as Veg 2017 and Wu 2016) that was introduced by Smith in the 1980s. The cases of the two parties in Taiwan and Hong Kong provide another example that underlines the importance of adding more facets to our understanding of national identities. This thesis therefore seeks to find out which elements of NPP's and Demosisto's identity concepts fit into the textbook definition of civic national identity and which elements seem to be at odds with Smith's predominant theory and deserve further elaboration. Furthermore, previous studies observed the recent identity shift mainly in the light of past democratic reforms in the region. The thesis seeks to put the recent evolution of Taiwan's and Hong Kong's

identity in relation to past changes of identity concepts. In doing so, it will suggest historical factors that influence the dynamics between ethnic and civic national identity concepts in the region.

2. Outline

After a brief review of the academic literature dealing with identity issues in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Smith's two-fold concept of national identity will be elaborated. The second chapter will have a closer look at the historical development of a unique identity in Taiwan and Hong Kong. This historic overview will highlight the way in which interactions with the mainland, for example through migration, and the experience of a colonial rule have shaped the self-awareness of people in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Moreover, it will discuss the dynamic between ethnic and civic national identity concepts that formed today's identities in the region. The third chapter will provide an overview on the protests movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong from which the two parties in concern, NPP and Demosisto, emerged. The focus of the chapter will be in how far identity issues played a role in the Sunflower Movement and the Umbrella Movements. In the fourth chapter, the political goals and identity concepts of NPP and Demosisto will be analyzed. The discussion will use texts produced by the parties, such as party programs, as well as media reports covering the parties' activities. Afterwards, it will be explored whether the two parties put forward an ethnic or civic identity concept or if there are aspects that do not fit neatly into one of the categories. Lastly, based on the observations of past identity shifts in the region and the analysis of

the party programs, the thesis seeks to find out factors which might have triggered the new dynamic in identity formations in Taiwan and Hong Kong.

3. Literature Review

While there is research conducted on various issues regarding the protest movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong during the 2010s, there is only little research on the parties that evolved from these recent protest movements and there is a lack of comparative perspectives on the issue. Several scholars already investigated similarities and differences in the identity concepts of the Taiwanese and Hong Kong society. However, so far, these studies have dealt with the society as a whole and did not focus on certain groups in particular. One such article by Malte Phillip Kaeding with the title “Identity Formation in Taiwan and Hong Kong – How Much Difference, How Many Similarities?” analyses “the formation of the Hong Kong identity, the changes it has undergone and the challenges it faces” (Kaeding 2011, 258). Building on this analysis, Kaeding seeks to find similarities and differences between the Hong Kong and Taiwanese identity formation. As a framework, he uses the construction of their identities based on the concepts of ethno-cultural and civic identity. He concludes that the civic identity approach seems to provide the best theoretical explanation for Hong Kong’s identity formation in the shadow of increased integration with the mainland while in Taiwan, “civic identity possesses the additional components of a successful democratic struggle and nationhood” (Ibid., 258). He further argues that the two countries differ slightly in their focus on localism. Hong Kong identity assumes a

unique local identity in contrast to the mainland's idea of "One country, two systems", while Taiwan, as the Republic of China, fully developed an identity that is perceived as a unique national identity (Ibid., 275). I believe that Kaeding's findings could prove to be very fruitful for my thesis as it will be interesting to find out in how far the new parties' identity concepts differ from the identity concepts of the public that Kaeding analyzed.

Another article dealing with national identity in Taiwan and Hong Kong is titled "Country, National, and Pan-national Identification in Taiwan and Hong Kong – Standing Together as Chinese" by Frank C. S. Liu and Francis L. F. Lee. The two researchers from Taiwan and Hong Kong conducted a survey in the two countries in 2011 that seeks to find out whether the respondents identify as Taiwanese, being from Hong Kong or as Chinese. Moreover, the study introduces the concept of pan-Chinese identification, that is, in how far people from Taiwan and Hong Kong feel to belong to the same Chinese identity. Their conclusions are quite multifaceted. However, an important point Liu and Lee elaborate is the difference in identity perceptions between older and younger citizens. In Taiwan, older and educated people are more likely to identify as Chinese, less likely to perceive themselves as Taiwanese, and less likely to be proud of the Republic of China. In Hong Kong, the older generation is more likely to identify with the PRC, while the younger generation is less likely to be proud of the PRC (Liu & Lee 2013, 1129-30). Although this article highlights the concept of pan-Chinese identity that will not be included in this thesis, I believe that Liu and Lee's findings on differences in national identity between old and young generations in

Taiwan and Hong Kong could be helpful in explaining identity concepts among the parties covered in this thesis as they were founded by young citizens.

Besides these comparative studies on national identity issues in Taiwan and Hong Kong, there exists a variety of research dealing with national identity regarding either only Taiwan or only Hong Kong. Regarding Taiwan, these studies mainly deal with recent shifts in Taiwan's national identity. They argue that ideas of a Chinese ethnic identity were gradually replaced by a distinctive Taiwanese identity. Most authors explain that these identity changes were stirred by the political and economic rise of mainland China and/or Taiwan's democratization process (such as Zhong 2016, Chen 2013, Shih 2007, Wang & Liu 2004). In addition, several articles deal with the top-down identity construction that was undertaken under the Kuomintang's (hereafter KMT) rule in the post-war period. They argue that the nationalism promoted by the KMT was characterized by a strong sense of traditionalism. The KMT government perceived itself as the guardian of traditional Chinese culture, a notion that it aimed to impose on its citizens through a common language, ideology and social movements (for example Chun 1996). Although no article explicitly deals with identity concepts among the young generation or the influence of the recent protests on the landscape of political parties in Taiwan, I believe that the general idea of an identity that is in a state of flux towards a distinctive local identity might resonate with the idea that the NPP, as a young progressive party, puts forward the concept of a distinctive Taiwanese identity based on civic values.

Regarding Hong Kong, older articles like “Claim Jumping at Century's End: University Student Identity in Late-Transition Hong Kong” by Stacilee Ford which was written in 1996 acknowledge that the young generation of the 1990s shared “a significant but undefined relationship with China and Chinese cultural traditions” based on anticolonial feelings (Ford 1996, 86). Nevertheless, she states that more and more students tend to develop a distinctive Hong Kong identity in the course of public debates on the unification with the mainland. In 2004, Anthony Fung observed in “Postcolonial Hong Kong Identity: Hybridising the Local and the National” that Hong Kong’s identity has been reconstructed after the handover in 1997. He claims that a “hybridisation of the national and the local” took place, resulting in a mixed Hong Kong-Chinese identity among most Hong Kong people (Fung 2004, 405). His results were based on interviews conducted between 1996 and 1999. Two more recent studies on identity issues in Hong Kong come to conclusions different from the older articles. Sebastian Veg and Malte Phillip Kaeding explain in their papers from 2017 that Hong Kong people have recently developed a distinctive local identity that is based on their positive identifying with democratic values, opposed to the mainland notion of one Chinese nation. This composes a shift from an ethno-cultural identity concept to a civic identity concept. Veg argues that especially the younger generation, born in the time of the handover, is identifying the least with the Chinese nation or is even rejecting it (Veg 2017, 324). As a result, there is a “growing disconnect between a democratic local community and the nation-state” (Ibid., 326). His research is based on an analysis of public localism discourses: the June Fourth vigil from 2009; the anti-National

Education movement in 2012; and the Umbrella movement in 2014. Kaeding comes to similar conclusions regarding the shift to a local identity based on civic values among the young generation. His research, however, is based on an analysis of the turnout of the 2016 elections in which new parties with agendas based on localism were quite successful among younger voters. He argues that the rise of localism is going to “dramatically transform Hong Kong’s political landscape” (Kaeding 2017, 157). I believe that especially the two recent studies by Veg and Kaeding will be useful for the thesis as they deal with the concept of civic identity in present-day Hong Kong and as they put an emphasis on the Umbrella Movement, from which Demosisto emerged. Moreover, Kaeding’s study will be helpful as it highlights the political consequences of the emergence of parties such as Demosisto.

By taking a closer look at the civic national identity concepts of NPP and Demosisto, the thesis is seeking to fill the lack in current research regarding the politically active young generation and their identity concepts in both countries. As younger people tend to hold rather progressive views and since they were at the frontlines of recent protest movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong, it might be interesting to see whether their views differ from the identity concepts of the larger Taiwanese or Hong Kong society. Since the parties at concern were founded by activists who participated in the *Sunflower Movement* and the *Umbrella Movement*, an examination of their ideas on identity will provide us with more information on national identity concepts that are held by those who participated in the protest movements and remained politically active.

4. Analytical framework

Before jumping into a brief analysis of past changes of identity perceptions in the Chinese world, I would like to add a few ideas on the concepts that will be used throughout the thesis. There are numerous theoretical approaches that deal with the subject of national identification. In the field of national identity, the dichotomy between civic identity versus ethnic or cultural identity proved to be most influential. The thesis is making use of Anthony D. Smith's deliberations in this field. He argues that civic national identity is rooted in the idea of a historic territory, a legal-political community, a set of rights and duties, and common civic culture among equal members of the political community. According to Smith, ethnic national identity is rooted in the idea of a community in which members are linked to each other through birth and native culture such as vernacular languages, customs and traditions (Smith 1991, 11-13).

Furthermore, the national identity concepts of the two parties will be compared. Malte Phillip Kaeding argues that Taiwan and Hong Kong "serve as excellent examples for a cross-case analysis of identity formation in the so-called Greater China area" as they underwent a similar social and economic development (Kaeding 2011, 258). Taiwan as well as Hong Kong went through periods of colonial rule. Moreover, both states were or are ruled by authoritarian systems with a strong emphasis on traditional Chinese culture. In addition, Taiwan and Hong Kong experienced periods of democratic transition processes and of economic rise in the period after the Second World War.

Until today, identity issues stir political and cultural debates in both countries. Due to these similarities, the two states provide a good background for comparison.

As the academic literature on the *Sunflower Movement* and the *Umbrella Movement*, from which NPP and Demosisto emerged, suggests that those who took part in the protests hold a civic national identity, the thesis is going to test whether this is also true for the two parties. In order to do so, the parties' official publications, statements, and political work will be analyzed for indicators that would support or contradict this view. Does the identity concept put forward by NPP and Demosisto meet Smith's criteria of civic national identity or are there other elements that cannot be explained by the civic national identity approach? The comparison between NPP and Demosisto's identity concepts will be based on a textual analysis of official documents, publications, statements and media coverage of their political work. The focus of the analysis will be on indicators for civic and ethnic identity concepts that can be found in the material. In order to make the comparison more systematic, the textual analysis will compare five categories of the material's political content that are expected to contain statements dealing with issues of identity.

First, it will be examined how the two parties refer to the territorial entity they act in. The reliance on a historic territory is part of the civic identity concept. Therefore, if the parties use a distinct terminology for the state or area they work in, this could hint at ideas of Taiwan and Hong Kong as territorial entities and an element of civic identity. Second, the political values that are promoted by the parties will be analyzed. Since civic national identity includes the acceptance of a certain set of civic rules that equal

members of society agree on, a focus on NPP and Demosisto's political goals could underline in how far the two parties promote such a set of civic values that would indicate a civic concept of identity. Third, the parties' views on issues such as culture and tradition will be scrutinized. As ethnic national identity is characterized by a focus on certain traditions and languages, their ideas on these issues could underline in how far NPP and Demosisto believe that Taiwan and Hong Kong are culturally unique. Such a view would indicate elements of an ethnic identity concept. Fourth, the thesis seeks to find out how the two parties assess the international status of their countries. Do their views on a distinct local identity culminate in ideas of self-determination and statehood? If so, in how far can these ideas be reconciled with the mainland's strategy of one Chinese nation? As the concept of civic national identity includes a legal political community, ideas on self-determination and statehood can highlight elements of this civic identity concept. Lastly, NPP and Demosisto's political goals in the field of migration will be analyzed. As parties have to define who belongs to their society and who disqualifies from belonging to it in order to formulate their positions on migration questions, this category sheds light on out-grouping processes within the party members. It will be interesting to see, whether the parties propose a system that integrates migrants who adhere to civic values, based on a civic identity, or who adapt culturally, for example by learning the local language, based on an ethnic identity. If the outcome of the analysis shows some variations from the civic national identity concept, the thesis seeks to find whether these could stem from historical factors that influenced identity formations in the region. Lastly, the thesis wants to contribute to

the research on the national identities in China's periphery by highlighting the limits of current approaches and giving new impulses on how to make sense of the identity concepts in the region.

II. A historical perspective on changing identity formations in Taiwan and Hong Kong

The following overview is aimed at providing the reader with a broader picture on how, over time, concepts of identity have changed in Taiwan and in Hong Kong. Wu argues that the rise of a unique self-understanding in the two areas "should be understood as a macro-historical sociological phenomenon" that has been affected, first, by tides of penetration through colonial forces and a geopolitical center located in China and second, by "a long-term process of peripheral nation-formation" (Wu 2016, 687). In other words, Taiwan's and Hong Kong's changing geopolitical relationship with colonializing powers and the mainland proved to have an impact on their sense of a unique identity. The following chapter seeks to provide an overview on these processes and how they still influence the way today's Taiwanese and Hong Kongers think of themselves.

1. Taiwan's changing identity formations and their influence on today's local identity

Taiwan's identity has been deeply affected by the penetration of various foreign powers such as the Dutch East India Company, the Qing imperial administration, the Japanese colonial government, and the KMT. The country's democratization process,

its current conflictual relationship with the mainland, and its self-understanding are embedded within the experience of the rise and fall of these foreign rulers. The following part will give a brief overview on these developments and how they influenced the changing identity formations in Taiwan until today.

1-1. Dutch and Qing rule

The island that today is called Taiwan experienced the rise and fall of several non-native rulers. In 1624, Dutch forces took control of the present-day city of Tainan and gradually expanded their rule over the native population on the island. Back then, the island was mainly inhabited by Austronesian aborigines and about 10,000 Han Chinese (Fujii 2006, 64). In 1661, the warlord Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 who was of Chinese-Japanese background seized the island from the Dutch and remained in full control until the Manchu troops of the Qing dynasty conquered Taiwan in 1683 (Jacobs 2012, 19-20). Under his rule, the number of Han Chinese people increased to about 200,000 as he encouraged migration from the mainland to Taiwan (Fujii 2006, 64). Although the Qing court held the island for more than two centuries, the relationship between the rulers and the native population remained somewhat ambivalent. For a long time, the Qing were unable to install a government that encompassed all parts of the island and Taiwan's indigenous population still found room to independently develop its aboriginal cultures, traditions, and language. According to Sheperd, this started to change drastically in the 19th century with the mass migration of Han Chinese mainlanders onto the island who colonized some of the aboriginal parts of Taiwan

(Sheperd 1995, 358-359). Those tribes in the assimilated parts were referred to as “cooked savages” (*shoufan* 熟蕃) and those tribes who were not assimilated were referred to as “raw savages” (*shengfan* 生蕃) (Lin 2012, 142). The latter group maintained a unique identity that was bound to small tribes with fluid membership that did not incorporate ideas of fixed boundaries or strictly differentiated between the different clans. Scott argues that they were essentially stateless (Scott 2015, 79-80). Despite the colonization drive, the Qing government still distinguished between indigenous and the Han Chinese population at the official level. Hsu highlights, for example, that after indigenous natives killed several shipwrecked sailors from Japan in 1871, the Qing argued towards Japan that it could not be held accountable for their behavior and that it would not interfere in their internal affairs (Hsu 1983, 316). At the same time, the Han Chinese population that by the 1860s had reached two million, started to consider Taiwan as their home. According to Fujii, a striking indicator for this new mindset was that the Han began to worship in their ancestral temples those who had established their lineage in Taiwan and not the clan founders from the mainland. Among these Han settlers, a small literate elite emerged that, on the one hand, associated with the Qing administration by taking part in the court examinations and, on the other hand, developed the idea of a distinct Taiwanese identity that culminated in their call for a Taiwanese Democratic Nation (Fujii 2006, 65-69). In conclusion, at the end of the Qing rule, the Taiwanese society was composed of a non-uniform aboriginal majority and a Han Chinese minority which, supported by the Qing

court, held the social, economic, and political power. Moreover, these two groups kept distinct identities. Interestingly, it was the group of the former migrants from the mainland that generated a Taiwanese consciousness.

1-2. Colonialization under Japanese rule

After the First Sino-Japanese War, the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded Taiwan to the Japanese in 1895. A Japanese colonial administrative structure was established and industrialization gain momentum. Like in other Japanese colonies, the colonial government sought to assimilate the natives and impose a Japanese identity on them. Consequently, the official language changed from the Qing literary language to Japanese and people had to carry Japanese names. Furthermore, the gradual expansion of a Japanese-style educational and administrative system, together with the emerging Japanese mass media, brought the Japanese worldview into every household (Ibid., 72-73). Ching argues that in reaction to this strategy of imposed assimilation “for the first time in Taiwanese colonial history, the struggle over identity emerges as the dominant discourse for the colonized” (Ching 2001, 13). The Imperial Subject literature produced by the Taiwanese literati in Taiwanese addressed the issue of a distinct Taiwanese identity that was perceived as being on an equal level with Japan (Fujii 2006, 71). In consequence, a triangular model of Taiwanese identity emerged among the Han Chinese elite and the aboriginal land-owning class: There was an awareness of a unique Taiwanese identity that was perceived as being within the Japanese empire and the Han Chinese ethnology. Taiwanese identity became a relational concept,

somewhere in between China and Japan, resulting in coexisting identity formations (Ching 2001, 54-56). In addition, among the Han elite, an imaginary vision of the Chinese mainland was perceived as a place of hope for future self-determination. The Japanese colonial government sought to suppress those groups who identified with their ancestral land. Besides, these idealized ideas of a pan-Chinese identity were met by the colonial government with suspicion. Instead, it sought to establish a distinct Taiwanese consciousness that saw Taiwan as a part of the Japanese colonial empire. In short, Taiwanesehood was welcomed while a universal Chinese identity was suppressed (Ibid., 57-62). Regarding the current debate on Taiwanese independence or unification with the Chinese mainland, the Taiwanese colonial rule and its triangular identity concept provides an important subtext in which the differentiation between Taiwanese and Chinese remains embedded.

The most striking reform on the side of Taiwan's native population began under the new land distribution law put in place by the colonial government that granted rights to settled Han but not aboriginal communities. In consequence, these indigenous groups had to change their nomadic lifestyle and were resettled. In this resettlement process, the Japanese administration grouped the aboriginal communities into a set of new ethnic categories. Consequently, their fluid identification with different tribes was changed into fixed ethnic identities imposed from above. The arbitrary classification remained in place until the early 2000s. (Scott 2015, 81-83).

In conclusion, the period of the Japanese colonial rule proved to be the most influential period in terms of Taiwan's changing identity. During the time, the elite manifested a

distinct Taiwanese identity that reflected the country's geopolitical relations to the mainland and Japan. At the same time, there was still ethnic differentiation between the Han majority, aborigines, and Japanese settlers, making it difficult to pinpoint a uniform Taiwanese identity shared by most of the people at the time.

1-3. Kuomintang rule

Following the end of Japanese rule in 1945, Taiwan's total population numbered less than six million. As a consequence of the end of Japan's colonial rule, about 300,000 ethnic Japanese left Taiwan where some of them had lived for all their life. At the same time, as a result from the Chinese Civil War, about 1.1 million ethnic Chinese from the mainland fled to Taiwan. These numbers underline the radical societal change that Taiwan underwent after the end of the Second World War. According to Huang, this huge number of mainland Chinese refugees, who had fought Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War, brought with them a perception of Japan that was diametrically different from the view that Taiwanese natives had on their former colonial rulers. While the mainlanders held a rather hostile post-war view on Japan, the latter ones had a more complex post-colonial relationship with Japan that affected the two groups self-understanding (Huang 2015, 133-134). As the Kuomintang gained power, the narrative of the newcomers on the Japanese colonial period and the nationalist idea of a single Chinese people dominated the public debate and were imposed as the predominant view through the new national education system. Huang argues that local Taiwanese ideas on these issues were replaced "with the discourse of an external group" (Ibid.,

135). Furthermore, the dual identity of belonging both to the former Japanese empire and to a distinct Taiwanese nation was suppressed under the new regime and “went through a process of transformation, comparison, and resistance, developing into a peculiar expression of self-identity” (Ibid., 140). In other words, as the new foreign administration sought to annihilate the Japanese influence on Taiwan and established a restrictive political system, many people saw the Japanese colonial rule in a more positive light and started to defend their Japanese-Taiwanese mixed identity even more fiercely. In consequence, among the native Taiwanese, the Chinese part of the formerly triangular identity concept was repelled while the newcomers referred to their ancestral home on the mainland.

The distinction between native Taiwanese and new migrants from the mainland not only led to conflicting views on the Japanese dimension of Taiwan’s identity, it also led to the emergence of new ethnic concepts. The term “people from the outer provinces” (*Waishengren* 外省人) was used for those mainland Chinese who arrived after 1945. For the Taiwanese natives, the term underlined the fact that these people were perceived as colonizers who came from outside to rule Taiwan. For the newly arrived mainlanders, the term manifested their idea of Taiwan as a temporary place of exile and as a province of a greater Chinese nation. Over time, the term also designated what both sides perceived as ethnic differences. The *Waishengren* who came from various regions with different dialects could communicate with each other in standard Mandarin. However, the main languages spoken in Taiwan were Holo and Hakka of

the early Southeast Chinese settlers that over time had become indigenized. Therefore, Taiwanese natives recognized the new migrants as a homogenous group of people they could not communicate with and that had different traditions. As a result, the *Waishengren* started to think of themselves as one ethnic group (Corcuff 2002, 148-150). In conclusion, in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan's society experienced many profound shifts that left the country divided on its relations with China and Japan and the effect of these relations on Taiwan's self-understanding. Moreover, new ethnic cleavages emerged that became embedded in Taiwan's political system.

1-4. Democratization from the 1970s

Taiwan has developed a vibrant civil society in the course of a democratization process that gained momentum in the 1970s. Wu argues that the KMT regime, that emerged after the Chinese Civil War, can be best understood as a "settler state – an ethnically stratified political structure in which the emigre Mainlander settlers, a minority group, dominated the native Taiwanese who constituted an absolute majority of the total population" (Wu 2002, 174). As a result, the political opposition was composed of a suppressed ethnic majority. Therefore, according to Wu, Taiwan's democratization can be best understood as a process of nativization, or Taiwanization, of the state. The opposition movement of the 1970s and the Democratic People's Party (hereafter DPP), founded in 1986, aimed at overthrowing the KMT regime and building a native-dominated government (Ibid., 174-175). The KMT reacted to these developments by

making their party more accessible to native Taiwanese people. Finally, in 1988, Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 who represented the new moderate branch of the KMT was elected as Taiwan's first native president. According to Wu, Lee incorporated the opposition's idea of a unique Taiwanese identity while acknowledging a cultural connection with the mainland. His agenda aimed at uniting the different ethnic groups behind the common effort of democratization (Ibid., 178). Lin describes the democratization as a "pulling force" that drew the different ethnic groups together through shared political participation and a sense of loyalty to Taiwan's democracy that they had built together. Besides, since the deterioration of the relations with the PRC in the 1990s, a perceived "ever-growing threat from China is fostering a sense of common suffering among all people of Taiwan regardless of ethnicity" (Lin 2002, 205). In short, Taiwan's democratization process did not only change the political system but it also affected identity perceptions on the island. While the 1970s were still shaped by an ethnic cleavage, the democratization process brought forward an alternative civic national identity model that is based on identification with Taiwan's democratic institutions.

1-5. Taiwan's identity issues today in the light of the China factor

In present day Taiwan, despite the predominant civic national identity model, there is still division with regards to the role of China and political forces remain divided into two camps: On the one hand, the KMT promotes a pan-Chinese nationalism; while on the other hand, the DPP and NPP focus on Taiwanese independence from the mainland. The political landscape of the 1990s and early 2000s was characterized by several

student movements that dealt with Taiwan's relationship with China. For example, The *Wild Strawberry Movement* of 2008 protested the visit of Chen Yunlin 陈云林, the mainland chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) at the time. The following years, under the KMT government of Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, a *Waishengren*, saw a warming of Taiwan-PRC relations. For example, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a preferential cross-Strait trade agreement, came into force in 2010. However, the agreement was highly debated among the Taiwanese public as it raised concerns of a too strong economic reliance on the mainland among those who would rather not have a too close relationship with the PRC. Besides, the Hong Kong business man Jimmy Lai 黎智英 sold his Taiwan branch of Next Media to pro-China Taiwan-based media mogul, Tsai Eng-meng 蔡衍明 who now held control over about 45 percent of Taiwan's media market. This merger led to protests concerning free speech and diversity in the Taiwanese media in which a lot of young activists participated which underlined their identification with Taiwan's democratic institutions. Later, the movement also incorporated issues such as nuclear energy, the right of aborigines, and locally limited forced evictions. Justin P. Kwan argues that many of the young political activists involved in these protests also joined the *Sunflower Movement* in 2014 (Kwan 2016, 954-954).

The historic developments elaborated above still have an impact on Taiwan's self-understanding. First, due to their different historic relations with the mainland,

Waishengren and native Taiwanese remain divided when it comes to the way cross-strait relations should be designed. Second, despite this split, both sides identify with Taiwan's democratic system that emerged in the 1970s and maintain aspects of a civic national identity. Third, there is an awareness of different ethnicities and social imbalances resulting from belonging to different ethnic groups that is being addressed on the political level. In other words, the student protests in the early 2000s have shown that there is a social consensus on the idea that the different ethnic groups should have the same rights, an aspect that hints at a strong loyalty to Taiwan's political system.

2. Hong Kong's changing identity formations and their influence on today's local identity

Like Taiwan, Hong Kong's self-understanding has been deeply influenced by the presence of a colonial power and its changing relationship with the mainland. Against this backdrop of changing geopolitical realities, the people of Hong Kong constantly had to re-define the view they had on themselves.

2-1. Hong Kong before and under British colonial rule

When Hong Kong was occupied by the British colonial forces during the first Opium War in 1841, it was a sparsely populated area that consisted of about 20 villages which were merely inhabiting 7,500 people that mainly worked in agriculture or fishery (Mathews et al. 2008, 23). With Hong Kong's emergence as an important haven for the colonial trade, and with basically no migration control, more and more people from the

Southern provinces of the mainland poured into the village so that by the end of the century, it grew to 250,000 inhabitants. While the city offered economic liberty to the Chinese merchants, they were racially segregated from the British elite in all other aspects of daily life. The British administration aimed at maintaining social order but did not implement any form of political institutions or social services open to the public. The only exception to this system of racial separation were a few wealthy Chinese merchants that cooperated with the British administration. Jacquet argues that, in consequence, most of the Chinese living in Hong Kong did not develop any feeling of belonging vis-à-vis the city and were planning to go back to their hometown after making some money (Jacquet 1997, 22-24). In short, for most of the early Hong Kong residents, their stay in the city was perceived as anything but permanent so that none of them developed an identity bound to Hong Kong. Most would still refer to the area on the mainland that they were from. Moreover, at the time, neither the Chinese side nor the British colonial administration significantly limited population mobility across the newly established border. In consequence, in cases of political unrest on the mainland, there occurred waves of migration from the Southern Chinese provinces to Hong Kong. First such waves were caused by the Taiping uprising, the 1911 revolution, and during the Japanese invasion of Guangdong during the late 1930s. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Chinese Communist Party's (hereafter CCP) take-over in China as well as the Great Leap Forward triggered two more big waves of illegal migration (Law & Lee 2006, 219).

Despite these waves of migration from the mainland, Law and Lee argue that by the 1960s, with a crackdown on illegal immigration by the mainland Chinese government and with the introduction of an immigration quota by the British colonial administration, “Hong Kong had become a rather localised society, with more than half the population locally-born” (Ibid., 220). Moreover, while a few more Chinese acquired wealth during the industrialization of the 1950s and 1960s, most Hong Kong’s residents still lived and worked under poor conditions and riots started to emerge. Although the British colonial administration made the political system more accessible to locals and established labor laws, Jacquet concludes that by the 1960s, the Chinese residents of Hong Kong still mostly perceived themselves as refugees from the mainland and identified with their places of origin rather than with their current place of living (Jacquet 1997, 25). Mathews, Ma, and Lui describe the state of identity during that time as a “refugee mentality” (Mathews et al. 2008, 27-29). According to them, the migrants avoided the complications of belonging to any nation, accepted the status quo of colonial Hong Kong in order to regain a more favorable economic status, lived on a day-to-day basis, and had a “sense of transience” as their stay in Hong Kong was perceived as limited to a certain amount of time.

This changed dramatically when governor MacLehose got into power in 1971. Under his administration, the colonial government sought to construct a community instead of merely trying to control the masses. His policies aimed at creating a civil society and a model citizen based on civic values. According to Jacquet, this was the first time the colonial state and the media spoke in terms of “citizen” and even “Hong Konger”

(*Heungkong yan* 香港人) (Jacquet 1997, 25). A distinctive Hong Kong cultural identity was imposed on Hong Kong from atop. For example, more and more programs in Cantonese dealing with issues related to Hong Kong aired. Urbanization programs drove people out of shanty towns and into their own flats. Mass media and education reforms created Cantonese as a common language among the migrants from different Chinese provinces. Moreover, the children of those who came to Hong Kong after the Second World War were about to grow up (Mathews et al. 2008, 31). However, even before MacLehose's, this generation had already developed a sense of community in the 1967 riots. The protesters demands were rather diffuse but had in common that they were pushing for reforms to the way the colony was run. According to Mathews, Ma, and Lui, these protests in which Hong Kongers protest over Hong Kong issues can be seen as "the birth of a distinct Hong Kong identity" (Ibid., 33). Furthermore, they created a sense among the Hong Kong public that the cultural other was not the colonial state of Hong Kong, but the mainland Chinese order.

2-2. Hong Kong's protracted democratization process before the handover

Hong Kong's identity historically has been deeply influenced by migration from the mainland. But stricter regulations on migration from the mainland to the colony curbed the influx of mainland Chinese to the city state, while the colonial government sought to impose a civic identity on its citizens. In consequence, by the 1990s, many people in

Hong Kong perceived themselves as different from the mainland – both culturally and politically.

Hong Kong experienced, according to Ortmann, a “protracted democratization process” from the 1960s until its handover to the PRC in 1997 (Ortmann 2015). During the 1960s, several riots driven by poor working and living conditions happened in Hong Kong. In 1967, these culminated in a labor dispute that killed 56 people. As described above, these riots pushed the colonial administration to conduct fundamental changes in the way the colony was run and to implement social programs to help low-income residents. At the same time, Hong Kong’s economic growth created a high degree of social mobility and provided legitimacy for the colonial administration and its political reforms (Ibid., 35).

During the 1980s, enhanced activism and demands to speed up democratic reforms emerged. The nature of protests in Hong Kong shifted from an anti-colonial to a pro-democracy attitude. Besides, the protesters bonded with their like-minded neighbors on the mainland so that a new form of pan-Chinese solidarity between the democracy movements was established. Ortmann argues that “(t)he violent crackdown of the Tiananmen protest movement in Beijing on 4 June 1989 had a deep and lasting impact on Hong Kong” (Ibid., 40). Many of Hong Kong’s democracy activists had hoped for democratic change in both the colony and the PRC, but their hopes were shattered with the Tian’anmen Incident in 1989. Nevertheless, democratic parties were on the rise when Hong Kong held its 1995 elections for the Legislative Council after a profound electoral reform – a consequence of the democracy movement during the 1980s (Ibid.,

41). Jacquet argues that by the 1990s, the people of Hong Kong had developed an identity that was based on democratic values and active political participation, for example in charity organizations, as well as cosmopolitanism (Jacquet 1997, 30-31). However, Law and Lee argue that, in consequence, stereotypes of people started to be “coded in terms of place of origin, like Guangdong yan, Beijing yan and Shanghai yan and the like”. The concept of *Hong Kong yan* became the pre-condition for differentiating local and mainland Chinese (Law & Lee 2006, 237). While the unique identity of Hong Kong united the former refugees from the mainland in the city, it also distinguished them from the mainland Chinese. When in the early 1980s waves of Vietnamese and Chinese refugees poured into Hong Kong, the locals attitude towards them became increasingly hostile. Vietnamese and Chinese refugees alike became “them” in the eyes of the Hong Kongers (Mathews et al. 2008, 37).

2-3. Hong Kong’s identity issues today in the light of the China factor
During the negotiations on the handover with the United Kingdom, the Chinese government accepted that it would not change Hong Kong’s political and economic system until 2047. However, after the handover, several actions by the Chinese government challenged this principle. On July 1, 2003, protests erupted on the sixth anniversary of the handover after the local government sought to enact a security law that would prohibit any form of subversion towards the mainland Chinese government (Kwan 2016, 945). Kwong argues that the 2003 protests urged the mainland government to speed up the social and economic integration of Hong Kong. While the

economic integration was mostly welcomed by the Hong Kong public, the social aspect of integration ran into opposition. A lot of former democracy activists from the 1980s who strongly identified with the mainland while opposing the CCP's rule greeted these policies aimed at building a pan-Chinese identity. Among other opposition groups, however, China's growing influence on Hong Kong triggered anti-Chinese sentiments and they started to call for self-determination. While Beijing mostly accommodates the pan-Chinese democratic camp, it opposes the new localist opposition movement (Kwong 2018, 6-7). Polls on Hong Kong's identity reflect this division within the society. Mathews, Ma, and Lui point out that in the aftermath of the handover, many people have developed a sense of a mixed identity and refer to themselves as both Hongkonger and Chinese. While before the handover many people had a strong sense of a localized culture of Hong Kong, the lines between Hongkongese and Chinese became blurred (Mathews et al. 2008, 97). According to a poll by the University of Hong Kong, from 2003 to 2009, for the first time since 1997, more people identified as "Chinese" rather than "Hongkonger" (University of Hong Kong 2017). However, after 2009, Hongkongers regained the sense of a localized identity different from the mainland. According to Kwong and Yu, the reason for this shift in identity was triggered by the fact that the consequences of economic and political integration started to change the everyday life of Hongkongers leading to a critical reassessment of these policies among the public (Kwong & Yu 2013, 134-136). Veg uses the example of the commemoration events for the Tian'anmen incident in Hong Kong to underline how especially younger people gained a strong sense of a

Hong Kong civic identity. On the 20th anniversary of the crackdown in 2009, participation in the candle vigils increased massively while the protesters themselves became significantly younger with many of them younger than 30. Moreover, these protests triggered debates on China's human rights situation and can be perceived as the starting point for the identification with civic values among the Hong Kong youth and a "diminishing sense of responsibility for China" (Veg 2017, 331-335). Indeed, the poll by the University of Hong Kong shows that in recent years, the divide between people identifying as Hongkonger or Chinese became gradually bigger. In 2017, 38.8 percent referred to themselves as "Hongkonger" while only 14.5 percent saw themselves as "Chinese". Nevertheless, 45.1 percent feel that they have a mixed identity (University of Hong Kong 2017).

In conclusion, from a historic perspective, Hong Kong's society has undertaken a dramatic shift from a "refugee mentality" to a sense of a localized civic identity distinct from the Chinese mainland. While there is still a majority of those having a sense of a mixed identity, Hong Kong is currently witnessing a radicalizing development in the sense that two camps with a strong sense of a unique Hong Kong identity or a pan-Chinese identity emerged.

3. Similarities and differences in Taiwan's and Hong Kong's process of identity formation

Although Taiwan and Hong Kong have experienced, as outlined above, somewhat different colonialization and democratization processes, these developments led to

similar changes in their identity concepts. First, people that first inhabited the two entities had not been aware of a distinct identity but it was created in interaction with actors from outside, such as colonial powers or mainland settlers. Both Taiwan and Hong Kong have experienced decades of colonial rule by a foreign power that sought to actively shape their identity concepts. Moreover, the former colonial rulers still serve as a point of reference and influence the way the two societies think of themselves. Second, the countries' geopolitical position at the periphery of the Chinese mainland affected the development of their identity. For example, several waves of migration led to the emergence of an ethnic cleavage that underlined the differences between those who have been living in Taiwan and Hong Kong for a long time and those who recently migrated to the countries, despite their similar origins. Moreover, both entities are not formally independent from the mainland – a factor that is shaping the Taiwanese and Hong Kong consciousness. As their interaction with mainland China has been rather limited from the 1950s to the 1970s, Liu and Lee argue that this “served as an important condition for the emergence and crystallization of strong Taiwanese and Hong Kong identities” (Liu & Lee 2013, 1112). Third, democratization processes created a sense of civic national identity that transcends ethnic cleavages in both cases resulting in the fact that identity issues are today linked to a loyalty to democratic institutions and political participation that widened the identitarian distance between Taiwan and Hong Kong on one side and the PRC. Lastly, pressure from the mainland that threatens the young democracies tends to lead to an enhanced sense of a local identity, such as when Taiwan had been under military pressure in the 1990s or

when the mainland government sought to change Hong Kong's political system in recent years.

III. Recent protest movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong and underlying identity issues

The 2010s saw the emergence of protest movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong that were triggered by government policies that aimed at accommodating Beijing. As China still serves as a point of reference in the field of identity questions, these protests also had an identity dimension. Moreover, they led to the creation of new parties in Taiwan and Hong Kong, such as the NPP and Demosisto. The following chapter is providing an overview on the movements and their role in the ongoing identity discourse.

1. Sunflower Movement: Emergence, issues, processes, and outcome

The term *Sunflower Movement* refers to a series of peaceful protests that culminated in the occupation of the Legislature Yuan, the Taiwanese parliament. The movement was triggered in 2014 by a follow-up agreement to the ECFA, the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). In the years before the ECFA, then-president Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九 of the KMT implemented a policy that aimed at normalizing cross-strait relations with the PRC through closer economic cooperation that culminated in the signing of the free trade agreement. Later, many other economic agreements, such as the CSSTA followed. The DPP held a rather critical position towards the agreements,

but as the main opposition force sought to revise them rather than outright rejecting them. The CSSTA was then approved by the parliament, but should be revised at a later time (Ho 2015, 77-78). Nevertheless, the pact was heavily criticized by civil society actors as it was perceived to have been negotiated between the PRC and Taiwan behind closed doors and without the consultation of domestic economic leaders and other relevant oppositional voices (Kwan 2016, 954). Moreover, on March 13, 2014, the KMT sabotaged the CSSTA's second reading by concluding the session in the parliament after only 30 seconds. Ho argues that "(t)he KMT lawmakers' controversial maneuver seemed to substantiate the image of the CSSTA as an undemocratic 'black box'". In consequence, the DPP joined Taiwanese NGOs and other civil society groups in becoming a firm opposition to the agreement. On March 18, the Democratic Front, a coalition under which numerous civil society groups opposing the CSSTA had been organized, sought to block the rushing through of the CSSTA by storming the Legislative Yuan. In the end, about 300 students peacefully occupied the legislative chamber. They demanded the government to conduct an article-by-article review of the trade agreement and a transparent and open dialogue between civil society and political groups, as well as policy makers (Ho 2015, 84-87). According to Krumbein and Wacker, the protests revealed three main cleavages in Taiwanese politics: People are divided over their relationship with the PRC, social injustice, and a politicization of the younger generation. Therefore, the main issues of the protests were fears among the politicized and Taiwan-conscious youth of a sellout of Taiwan to China and the demand for a more transparent political system (Krumbein

& Wacker 2016, 2-3). After several violent clashes between protesters and security forces and a passive reaction by the KMT, public support for the movement increased, culminating in the biggest rally of the Sunflower Movement that attracted about 500,000 supporters. Both the mass rally as well as the occupation of the Legislative Yuan remained peaceful. On April 6, legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng 王金平 of the KMT sought to reconcile the rigid positions of his own party, the DDP and the protesters and met with the protesters in the Legislative Yuan. He promised to implement a framework that should monitor all future cross-strait agreements. In consequence, the protesters cleaned up the parliament and left it on April 10. On the same day, the parliament drafted a monitoring mechanism that required all future Sino-Taiwanese agreements to be sent to the Legislative Yuan for ratification (Lin 2015, 3-4). The protesters' demands were met.

Apart from a more active involvement of the younger generation in politics, the movement triggered the emergence of the NPP which seeks to bring the broader demands of the Sunflower movement such as greater transparency and public participation into the political mainstream (Chen 2015). To sum up, in retrospect, the Sunflower Movement was widely positively assessed as the protesters were able to push their government towards transparent processes in cross-strait policy making while building on mainly peaceful means. The protesters' Taiwanese consciousness and fear of a too close relationship with China were paired with demands for greater government accountability.

2. Umbrella Movement: Emergence, issues, processes, and outcome

After the handover in 1997, Hong Kong ceased to be a British colony and developed into a Special Administrative Region of China with the guiding principles of “one country two systems” as well as “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong”. This meant that the city state should maintain a high level of political authority while keeping its status of an autonomous region of China for the following 50 years (Kwong 2018, 2). Fong argues, however: “Since the July 1, 2003 protest, Beijing has gradually abandoned the noninterventionist approach of the initial post-handover era and adopted state-building nationalism to incorporate and subject Hong Kong to greater central control on the political, socioeconomic, and ideological fronts” (Fong 2017, 548). Kwong describes the current state of Hong Kong’s political system as a hybrid regime that “maintains a limited electoral franchise with a certain level of civil liberty” (Kwong 2018, 2). The enhanced political pressure put on Hong Kong’s system by the mainland resulted in a backlash that culminated in the Umbrella protest movement.

In 2014, the Hong Kong public engaged in a discussion about electoral reforms that should culminate in the introduction of universal suffrage by 2017, as promised by the Basic Law. According to Ortmann, the “Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) played a key role in developing alternative proposals over how universal suffrage should be implemented.” Their proposal ended up being one of three among which Hong Kongers could choose in a referendum. Although the HKFS’s proposal did not gain a majority, with 38.4 percent of the vote they could prove that students have

become an influential actor in Hong Kong politics (Ortmann 2015, 45). In the aftermath of the referendum, the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee implemented their own electoral reform that did not take into account any of the proposed ideas or the outcome of the referendum. In consequence, university students started to boycott classes and several university professors organized talks close to the government center around Admiralty. When students tried to reach the Civic Square, police forces dispersed them with pepper spray. This harsh reaction triggered public support for the students. On September 28, a variety of groups that were organized under the name Occupy Central took to the streets and blocked major roads in central Hong Kong. Ortmann argues that while "students were not in control of the movement, they were still regarded as the main protagonists" (Ibid., 46). For instance, government officials agreed to a televised debate with five representatives of the HKFS. Veg describes this debate as the highlight of the movement in which the five students put "forward their demands in a calm, rational manner that was highly persuasive for prime-time TV viewers" (Veg 2015, 60). Moreover, three students attempted to fly to Beijing to directly negotiate with the mainland Chinese government but were not allowed to board the plane. According to Partaken, the students were not only pushing for an electoral reform but for limiting the PRC's influence on Hong Kong in general. He quotes a student as saying: "Hong Kong people want to escape from China control, as they are not willing to give up freedom such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of expression, so they fight for democracy to protect the basic rights we enjoying (sic) now" (quoted in Partaken 2017, 4). Therefore, ideas

of self-determination, democratic reform, and a Hong Kong consciousness were intertwined in the Umbrella Movement.

Lin argues that the debate between the protesters and officials reached an impasse as both sides stuck to repeating their claims without offering a sort of compromise. In consequence, between November 25 and December 15, police forcibly cleared the protest sites and brought an end to the Umbrella Movement. Moreover, in June 2015, the Hong Kong legislative failed to implement a reform bill on future elections of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council. Therefore, direct elections became more unlikely to be implemented (Lin 2015, 5). In short, while the protesters remained peaceful in blocking public areas, the government's reaction to them was partially violent. Besides, the movement failed to get any of their proposals on electoral reform, most importantly universal suffrage, implemented. These political demands were backed by a strong sense of a unique Hong Kong identity.

3. Comparison of the two movements

The two movements share some similar features. First, it is striking that students played a vital role at all stages of the movements. Second, activists in Taiwan and Hong Kong shared ideas of democratic values and self-determination without Chinese influence. Moreover, these ideas were interconnected with the idea of a unique Taiwanese and Hong Kong identity. Third, both movements stuck to peaceful means of protest while occupying key political or economic areas.

Despite their similarity, the Sunflower Movement and the Umbrella Movement varied in their topical focus and had quite different outcomes. While the protesters in Taiwan emphasized their domestic government's accountability and pushed for greater transparency in politics, the protesters in Hong Kong focused on the mainland government's influence on domestic politics. According to Lin, this difference in the addressee of the protest stems from the different political systems in Taiwan and Hong Kong. While the Taiwanese government remains independent from Beijing's influence, the system of Hong Kong is much more interconnected to the government on the mainland (Lin 2015, 9). Moreover, deLisle argues that while protesters in Taiwan could rely on well-established and functioning democratic channels between government and citizens, Hong Kong's authoritative political decision-making remains beyond the reach of the public (deLisle 2017, 224-225). These varying degrees of political interconnectedness with the mainland and the state of the domestic political system also influenced the outcome of the two movements. While protesters in Taiwan gained public support and achieved their short-term goals, the Hong Kong protest movement failed to achieve its goal of free elections.

IV. Analysis of the political orientation and identity concepts of NPP and Demosisto

After the protests, the movements in both countries re-organized themselves into new political parties and sought to make their demands heard in the domestic political arena. In Taiwan, NPP was formed by leading activists of the Sunflower Movement and, in

their first elections in 2015, won five seats in the legislative making it the third largest party in the Legislative Yuan. Jones and Su argue that these developments highlighted the shift from an anti-democratic opposition to a competitive rival of Taiwan's established parties, KMT and DPP (Jones & Su 2017, 26). In Hong Kong, the protesters also sought to enter the political system but the opposition camp remains split with parties such as Youngspiration, Hong Kong Indigineous, Democracy Groundwork, and Demosisto competing against each other in the elections (Kwan 2016, 960). The most prominent students which took part in the Umbrella Movement formed Demosisto based on their past cooperation in the pro-democracy student group Scholarism. In the elections for the Legislative Council in 2016, they gained one seat (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government 2016). However, Nathan Law later lost his seat when failing to properly take part in the oath taking ceremony for the Legislative Council (Lui 2017).

In the following chapter, the two parties which emerged from the protest movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 2010s will be analyzed with a focus on their political orientation and what it tells us about the identity they promote. First, the terminology NPP and Demosisto utilize when talking about their country and the people that live there will be focused on. The way the two political forces talk about themselves gives us a hint about their self-understanding and the way they think of themselves and their country. Second, both parties promote a certain set of political values. Are these values in line with a civic national identity or are they rather based on an ethnic concept of identity? Third, from the parties' standpoints on the promotion of a certain culture and

traditions we can gain a better understanding of their idea on common traditions in the society they feel connected with. Fourth, both parties have distinctive views on their countries position in the international arena and its relations with the PRC. From these positions, we can deduct how NPP and Demosisto see their countries' national identity vis-à-vis mainland China. Lastly, the two parties' views on migration offer an insight to their ideas on who belongs to their respective societies. Do they hold a rather limited view on membership in their society or is it open to everyone? Is it based on adherence to civic values or cultural integration?

1. Terminology

From having a closer look on how the two parties refer to the entity they live in one can learn more about their self-understanding. At a first glance, it becomes clear that both parties refrain from using the term "China" (*Zhongguo* 中國) to refer to themselves. Rather, the two parties use distinctive words for the state entity they act in. While NPP makes use of the word Taiwan (*Taiwan* 台灣), Demosisto seems to prefer the word Hong Kong (*Hongkong* 香港). Consequently, the people living in the respective areas are referred to as Taiwan people (*Taiwanren* 台灣人) or Hong Kong people (*Hongkong yan* 香港人). These terms are quite telling, because they underline a key element of the identity promoted of the two parties: That they are somewhat distinct from mainland China. An interesting aspect about Demosisto is that they also

use the term “local” (*bentu* 本土) to refer to various issues they are dealing with, such as the defense of a local culture against migration pressures (Demosisto 2016d), while NPP makes no use of such terms. This minor difference could stem from the fact that while Taiwan is not exposed to direct political influence from the mainland, Hong Kong’s political system is much more intertwined with the CCP. It is not clear, however, whether the usage of these terms indicates a civic or an ethnic identity concept. While they hint at the fact that the parties seek to differentiate between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China, they do not imply whether these distinction is made based on perceived different civic values or different ethnicities.

2. Political values

Civic national identity unites people through the acceptance of certain civic values that all members of society more or less agree on. Ethnic national identity, on the other hand, binds people together through a shared ancestry. Therefore, by highlighting certain civic values that the parties promote, it could become clearer to which category the respective party’s identity concept belongs to.

NPP’s major political goal is to enable Taiwan’s citizens to more direct participation in the country’s politics. Therefore, the party pushes for more referendums on issues of public interest. For instance, NPP recently set up an initiative for a “referendum on the creation of a minimum wage” (*Zuidigongzifa chuangzhi gongtougou* 最低工資法創制公投) (NPP 2018a). With their focus on more direct participation, the

party acknowledges that it aims at “fundamentally changing the nature of Taiwan’s political system” (Fanzhuan Taiwan de zhengzhixingge 翻轉台灣的政治性格) (NPP 2018b). Apart from direct democracy, according to its chairman, Huang Kuo-chang 黃國昌, NPP’s political program focuses on bringing more transparency into Taiwan’s political processes. He underlines that “whether it is the government, parliament or political parties, we have to break the black box and shed light on those political affairs that are part of the public domain” (Ibid.). One recent action by the party aimed at bringing more transparency into Taiwan’s political and legal processes was the public presentation of a draft aiming at revising the country’s “judge law” (*faguanfa* 法官法) to tackle various loopholes of corruption among judges (NPP 2018c). Moreover, in his welcome note on the party website, Huang explains that NPP aims at “serving as a platform that is open for the whole population and that enables all kinds of progress-oriented forces in society and reform ideas to come together and become an engine for Taiwan’s new politics” (NPP 2018b). Moreover, NPP aims at reforming Taiwan’s taxation and legal systems, at protecting the environment and freedom of the press, and at protecting the rights of workers, retirees and children (NPP 2018d). For example, the party states on their webpage that they aim at “strengthening environmental protection” (*Qianghua huanjing baohu* 強化環境保護) through amending the “Environmental Impact Assessment Law” (*Huanjing yingxiang pinggufa* 環境影響評估法) and the

“Air Pollution Prevention Act” (Kongqi wuran fangzhifa 空氣污染防制法) and through the implementation of a “Tree and Wild Plant Protection Act” (Shumu ji yesheng zhiwu baohufa 樹木暨野生植物保護法) (NPP 2018f). These ideas show that NPP’s political orientation is predominantly democratic and that the party promotes civic values. Contrary to Demosisto, however, NPP does not explicitly state that the Taiwanese identity should be based on the acceptance of these values.

On their webpage, Demosisto describes itself as a “movement-style party” (*yundongxing zhengdang* 運動型政黨) that aims at “developing a unique platform for participation that promotes community and society movements that are non-governmental and spontaneous”. Moreover, Demosisto perceives itself as a “young party that promotes democracy in Hong Kong through peaceful resistance and by building a civil society”. At the same time, “through different means of resistance”, they seek to “establish a self-consciousness among Hong Kong people”. Overall, they state that they are fighting for democratic self-determination as well as political and economic independence as “in the 19 years after the handover of sovereignty, Hong Kong’s situation got steadily worse under the reckless suppression of the Chinese Communist Party and the supremacy of the capital.” (Demosisto 2016b). The party also states ten crucial policy goals: freedom of information and the internet, freedom of sexual orientation and gender equality, reform of migration policies, defense of Hong Kong’s culture and freedom of the press, environmental and resource protection, equal

accumulation of wealth, stopping the mainland's meddling in educational policies, more support for workers' rights, animal rights, and urban planning that reflects the needs of all citizens (Demosisto 2016a). While these main goals include many elements that are classic democratic values promoted by most progressive parties around the globe, some of them also address Hong Kong's unique situation: the rising influence of the CCP on Hong Kong's education system, a large-scale influx of Chinese people from the mainland, or real estate speculation. Lastly, Demosisto puts forward a clear view of who should belong to the society of Hong Kong. Regardless of skin color, social class, or descent, everyone can be a member if he or she accepts shared liberal values such as freedom and democracy (Demosisto 2016c). Such a view on the membership of their society is a textbook example of civic national identity as it is based on shared civic values and not bound to an ethnic heritage.

The most obvious similarity between the two parties is their position on promoting democratic values such as freedom of the press, transparency, and active citizens' participation. Moreover, both parties promote rather progressive political goals such as workers' rights and environmental protection. Despite their similar political orientation, NPP and Demosisto differ slightly in their positions on their countries' national identity. While Demosisto is clearly stating that there is a certain set of civic values its followers should identify with, NPP does not explicitly mention who, from their point of view, belongs to Taiwanese society. Nevertheless, by promoting democratic values and by aiming at shaping their countries' political landscape both parties create the idea of a citizen that is living according to a set of certain civic principles. Therefore,

NPP's and Demosisto's political values propagate an identity not based on ethnic heritage but based on the acceptance of civic values.

3. Position on culture and tradition

From a groups stance on what can be regarded as traditional practices in their country, we can gain some insights into that groups self-understanding. Are these traditions based on a shared heritage or are they rooted in civic values?

NPP is stating on its website that they are aiming at establishing the “principle of the priority of the Taiwanese culture” (*Taiwan wenhua youxian zhi yuanze* 台灣文化優先之原則) (NPP 2018e). Therefore, NPP seeks to establish “governance mechanisms in the field of culture” (*Taiwan wenhua zhili jizhi* 文化治理機制) and “cultural legislative procedures” (*Wenhua lifa chengxu* 文化立法程序), as well as a “cultural administrative department to control these mechanisms” (*Wenhua xingzhengbumen zhi jiandu jizhi* 文化行政部門之監督機制) (Ibid.). This political goal shows that NPP understands that there is a distinctive Taiwanese mainstream culture that is worth preserving. At the same time, NPP acknowledges that there are different ethnicities with distinctive cultures that should be preserved and aims at granting them the same rights that every Taiwanese citizen enjoys. On their webpage, NPP states that they “are advocating that the collective rights of Taiwan's many ethnic groups should be actively protected” (*Zhuzhang ying*

jiji baozhang Taiwan duoyuan minzu zhi jiti quanli

主張應積極保障台灣多元民族之集體權利) (NPP 2015). For example, NPP wants to enable those groups to pass their native language on to future generations. Its aim is to preserve indigenous languages and traditions through a “Basic Law regarding indigenous peoples” (*Yuanzhu minzu jibenfa* 原住民族基本法) (Ibid.). The fact that NPP promotes multiculturalism in Taiwan while advocating for all members of society, regardless of their cultural background, to enjoy the same civil rights, hints at them promoting a rather civic national identity. For them, the belonging to Taiwanese society is not based on ethnic traits but rather granted by universal civil rights. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that there is a unique cultural heritage in Taiwan.

Like NPP in Taiwan, Demosisto believes that Hong Kong has a distinctive local identity that needs to be preserved. Demosisto also acknowledges that Hong Kong’s society is multi-ethnic and that everyone, regardless of their background, should be an active member of this society based on the acceptance of civic values, as described in the previous chapter. Moreover, the party perceives culture as an important medium to foster Hong Kong’s local identity. For example, on their website, they claim:

“Culture is entertainment and reasoning. But it plays even more a significant part in the support for the identity of Hong Kong’s people. It encourages independent thinking and value judgement.” (*Wenhua shi yule yeshi sixiang, gengshi zhicheng Xianggangren shenfen de zhongyao goucheng, youzhu qidi wocheng duli sikao he jiazhi panduan.* 文化是娛樂也是思想，更是支撐香港人身份的重要構成，有助啟迪我城獨立思考和價值判斷。) (Demosisto 2016e)

Towards the outside, Demosisto clearly states that Hong Kong's local culture has to be *defended* (*Weihu bentu wenhua* 維護本土文化) (Demosisto 2016d). The party is advocating for “independence in population policy” (*Renkou zhengce zizhu* 人口政策自主), for instance, through “the establishment of a unified immigration system” (*Jianli tongyi yimin zhidu* 建立統一移民制度) (Ibid.). Moreover, Demosisto argues on their homepage that according to a study by the Home Affairs Bureau conducted in 2014, 27 percent of new immigrants were not able to speak Cantonese. From Demosisto's point of view, they represent a group of people that “enters Hong Kong and faces language barriers” (*Lai Gang miandui yuyan de kun'nan* 來港面對語言的困難) (Ibid.). With regards to the Cantonese language, the party further states:

“First of all, Cantonese helps new immigrants to build a new life in Hong Kong. At the same time, it is also helps to preserve the local culture and to integrate the new immigrants into the community.” (*Guangdonghua yifangmian bangzhu xinyimin zai Gang zhankai xinshenghuo, tongshi yi youzhu weizhi bendi wenhua, bangzhu xinyimin rongru shequ* 廣東話一方面幫助新移民在港展開新生活，同時亦有助維持本地文化，幫助新移民融入社區) (Demosisto 2016d)

It is interesting that although Demosisto acknowledges the different ethnic and cultural backgrounds of Hong Kong's society, when it comes to cultural issues, the party puts a lot of emphasis on the Cantonese culture and language only. While this could hint at the fact that the identity promoted by Demosisto is partly based on a distinct cultural

heritage, we should keep in mind that this heritage, especially the language, is presented as learnable (Wu 2016, 699). Contrary to ethnic nationalist ideas, according to which people are born into a society, Demosisto underlines that essentially everyone who is willing to learn Hong Kong's culture is welcome. If one keeps in mind that most of today's migrants settling in Hong Kong are from the Chinese mainland and with regards to their problematic relationship with the local community, it seems as if the party seeks to establish a society that is everything but Chinese in culture.

Regarding their views on their respective country's culture and tradition it becomes clear that both NPP and Demosisto feel that there is a local Taiwanese or Hong Kong culture that is worth preserving. However, the two parties differ in their perception of the state of their culture with regards to the promotion of mainland China's mainstream culture. While NPP merely seeks to foster its domestic and indigenous cultures, Demosisto's position of defending their local culture shows that the young party feels that Hong Kong culture is threatened by an increasing Chinese influence. This can be explained by the different levels of migration from the mainland the two countries have been subject to. While Taiwan, due to their political relationship with the PRC, has not witnessed any significant increase in migration from the mainland recently, Hong Kong is receiving an enhanced influx of mainland Chinese people after the handover. In the past, when the city received several waves of legal and illegal migration, these developments resulted in severe social conflicts. In consequence, "Chineseness" was stigmatized which triggered social division between new migrants and older Hong

Kong society. It is likely that the current migration from the mainland to Hong Kong is having similar effects.

4. International status of their respective country

Since its founding in 1949, the PRC raises political claims on Taiwan and Hong Kong. Wong Yiu-chung argues that in the 1980s, the idea of “One country, two systems” first emerged in mainland Chinese circles. Interestingly, back then, the concept was applied to Taiwan, not yet Hong Kong, as the unification with Taiwan remained one of the CCP’s most important foreign policy goals throughout the 1980s and 1990s. With the outlook of the handover of Hong Kong, the principle had profound influence on the Sino-British Joint Declaration signed in 1984 (Wong 2008, 13). In short, “One country, two systems” is a concept of non-interventionism that grants Hong Kong a high level of autonomy for fifty years after the handover. Its legal basis is the so-called Basic Law (Ibid., 8). Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that the CCP perceives Taiwan and Hong Kong as its territory but acknowledges their right to different political systems. With regards to identity concepts, from a mainland Chinese point of view, people living in Taiwan and Hong Kong belong to one Chinese nation. However, while during the 1980s and 1990s, the mainland’s focus rested on the Taiwan issue, as a result from the handover in 1997, it shifted to Hong Kong during the late 1990s. In consequence of mainland China’s idea of “one country”, identity formations in Taiwan and Hong Kong are heavily influenced by this position and have to address the notion of belonging to one Chinese country. The view a citizen in Taiwan or Hong Kong holds on the validity

of the PRC's claims on his or her homeland are crucial for an individual's self-understanding. Therefore, NPP's and Demosisto's stance on the international status of their countries can be an indicator for the ideas the two parties have on their countries identity.

From a foreign policy perspective, NPP claims it is "pushing for the normalization of Taiwan's status as a nation" (*Tuidong Taiwan de guojia diwei zhengchanghua* 推動台灣的國家地位正常化) and they are "advocating Taiwan's active participation in the international community" (*Zhuzhang Taiwan jiji canyu guoji shehui* 主張台灣積極參與國際社會 (NPP 2015). An example for such a policy goal is that recently, the party supports the call for holding a referendum on Taiwan's independence from the mainland. At the end of such a process, NPP envisions to change their country's name from Republic of China to Taiwan and to participate as an independent country under the name of Taiwan in international organizations from which it is currently excluded due to the PRC's pressure (Focus Taiwan 2018). These ambitions in the field of foreign policy show that NPP aims at securing Taiwan's status as an independent country outside the mainland's sphere of influence.

As mentioned above, the international position of Hong Kong is different from Taiwan. Fong argues that especially in the period after the 2003 protest waves in Hong Kong, Beijing's grip on its special administrative region became tighter. Ironically, this exertion of influence stirred localist tendencies among opposition groups (Fong 2017,

548f.). As one party with a high degree of localism in its policy goals, Demosisto is focused on advocating for independence from the PRC and its political influence on Hong Kong's domestic affairs. The party frequently makes use of words such as "autonomy" (*zizhu* 自主) and "self-determination" (*zijue* 自決). For example, Demosisto states in their "About" section that they are "promoting democratic-self-determination as well as political and economic independence" (*tuidong minzhu zijue, zhengjing zizhu* 推動民主自決、政經自主) (Demosisto 2016b). The English version of the same section summarizes these thoughts in a more direct way:

"Demosistō aims to achieve democratic self-determination in Hong Kong. Through direct action, popular referenda, and non-violent means, we push for the city's political and economic autonomy from the oppression of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and capitalist hegemony." (Demosisto 2018)

These differences regarding the parties' foreign policy goals reflect to a certain extent ideas about their countries identity based on their shared opposing position towards the PRC's principle of "one country". Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that these differences could also be rooted in the different relationships the two sides currently have and historically had with the PRC. While Taiwan's domestic affairs are currently independent from direct influence by the mainland's government, Hong Kong's relationship with the mainland is much closer due to the historical reasons elaborated above. Therefore, one could argue that the political groups which perceive themselves as independent from the PRC make use of different foreign policy strategies in dealing with Chinese influence. While a relatively independent Taiwan can focus on

strengthening its position in the international arena, independence-seeking groups in Hong Kong that is closely monitored by the mainland will first seek to eliminate Chinese influence in domestic affairs.

What do NPP's and Demosisto's foreign policy goals tell us about their identity? While we gain less information on the nature of their identity concepts, it becomes clear that the two parties' goals are shaped by the idea of state entities that should be separated from the PRC. For NPP, Taiwan is a separate state that should be actively engaged in the international arena. For Demosisto, Hong Kong should seek more independence from Chinese meddling in domestic affairs.

5. Views on migration

While a national identity has a unifying element as it gives an idea of what kind of people belong to a nation, it also incorporates ideas on who does not belong to a nation. When formulating their policies on migration, parties have to decide who they would allow to become a member of their society and what kind of people they would rather keep from becoming members of their society. From examining the parties' stance on migration, we can deduct who they believe can be part of Taiwanese or Hong Kong society. This position will tell us more about the criteria people have to fulfill in order to belong to Taiwan or Hong Kong. Do they have to abide to a set of civic values or do they have to have a certain ethnicity?

NPP does not explicitly mention the topic of migration in their publications or their party program (NPP 2018d). This does not necessarily mean, however, that the party

holds a very open position on migration. It could also be the case that migration is not of great concern to current Taiwanese politics.

Demosisto, on the other hand, clearly states political goals in the field of migration. The party claims on its website that it would seek to restore independence from China in the field of population policies as this issue is rather conflict-prone:

“The main contradiction in Hong Kong’s current population policy is that the SAR government merely reduces the population policy to a ‘labor force policy’, cutting off itself from the fight for the right to examine and approve One-way Permits. This resulted in various conflicts between China and Hong Kong on daily life and political border issues.” (Xianshi Xianggang renkouzhengce de zhuyao maodun, zaiyu tequzhengfu zhi jiang renkouzhengce yuehua wei ‘laodonglizhengce’, ziyue zhengqu danchengzheng de shenpiquan, yinzhi gezhong zhonggang zhijian gezhong richangshenghuo ji zhengzhi bianjie de chongtu.
現時香港人口政策的主要矛盾，在於特區政府只將人口政策約化為「勞動力政策」，自絕爭取單程證的審批權，引致各種中港之間各種日常生活及政治邊界的衝突。(Demosisto 2016d)

It seeks to replace the migration system managed by the Chinese side with a new one based on own admission quotas and criteria for possible immigrants that reflect the needs of Hong Kong’s society and its ability to accommodate new migrants (Demosisto 2016d). Besides, as elaborated above, Demosisto aims at providing migrants with Cantonese language courses to adapt to Hong Kong’s local culture and better integrate into Hong Kong’s society (Ibid.). Interestingly, language skills and cultural differences, not different views on civic issues are perceived as a barrier to successful migration. This could hint at the fact that although Demosisto promotes a

civic national identity, there are elements of an ethnic national identity that resonate with the party members or voters.

In comparison, Demosisto focuses much more on migration-related issues than NPP. However, the difference in the two positions cannot be clearly traced back to a major difference in the national identity concepts of the parties. Rather, the different levels of attention they put on population policies could stem from the different current migration flows that affect Taiwan and Hong Kong and public debates regarding these issues within the two societies. Especially in Hong Kong, migration from the mainland has been negatively assessed by the media and the public. In one such instance in 2012, smaller protests erupted in Hong Kong when luxury retailer Dolce & Gabbana prevented people from taking pictures of its store front but mainland tourists were granted exceptions from this ban (Apple Daily 2012). The incident shows that even such minor differences in the treatment of mainland Chinese people and Hong Kongers can stir heated protests. As the migration issue is of great concern for Hong Kong's voters, a party such as Demosisto, that seeks to promote self-determination, has to find new approaches to migration procedures.

6. Main findings and comparison of the identity concepts promoted by NPP and Demosisto

Although, at a first glance, it seems as if the parties promote a very similar idea of their national identity, there are certain elements that are different from each other. First of all, both NPP and Demosisto offer to their sympathizers an identity concept that is

based on the acceptance of a set of democratic principles such as human rights, political participation, and the rule of law. Moreover, both parties seek to underline their area's difference from the Chinese mainland. Not only in the field of culture where local traditions and languages are in the focus of their political agenda, but also in the political sphere where differences in the political systems are clearly articulated. Nevertheless, there was a set of differences in their policies that could be identified. The most obvious difference lies in migration policies. While NPP does not publicly advocate for a certain direction in Taiwan's migration policies, Demosisto calls for a change in Hong Kong's immigration system. It is quite likely that these differences do not stem from a more radical out-grouping process on the side of the Hong Kong party but rather from the different degree with which the mainland's government is influencing domestic policies in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Another difference in their policies can be found in the parties' foreign policy goals. While NPP is pushing for greater Taiwanese involvement in international affairs in general, Demosisto focuses on a tougher stance towards the CCP's growing influence on Hong Kong. Again, these variations do not stem from a fundamental difference in the two groups' identity but rather from their homeland's relations with the mainland.

7. Civic national identity, ethnic national identity or none of them?

The analysis of their public statements and political goals reveals that NPP and Demosisto advocate democratic principles and civic values while underlining unique local traditions that differ from those of the mainland. While they do acknowledge that

belonging to Taiwan and Hong Kong is based on the acceptance of democratic values, at the same time, they promote some features that would be in accordance with a rather ethnic concept of identity such as their local heritage, traditions, and languages. Consequently, elements of both civic national identity and ethnic national identity can be found. The two cases challenge the dichotomy of identity concepts as they blur the line between the two categories.

Recently, authors started to make use of the concept of localism to find alternative explanations for national identities, especially in Hong Kong. According to Madanipour and Davoudi,

“localism indicates attachment to a locality in which individuals or groups live, with all the ideas, sympathies and interests associated with such attachment, amounting to an outlook that favors what is local.” (Madanipour und Davoudi 2015, 11)

In applying this concept on Hong Kong’s current identity debate, Veg seeks to locate Hong Kong’s identity in a four-dimensional concept that takes local or pan-Chinese identification and civic or ethnic identity concepts into account. He comes to the conclusion that “the civic-based expression of a Hong Kong community (...) has become less and less compatible with the dominant mode of identification with a greater Chinese nation in cultural-ethnic terms” (Veg 2017, 343). He notices, however, that theoretically, this concept would still allow for a pan-Chinese identification based on civic values. Therefore, from his point of view, the most significant change in Hong Kong’s identity has not been “the tilt towards localism” but the shift from an ethnic national identity to a civic national identity.

First, I believe that Veg's approach fails to take long-term geopolitical ruptures that affect identity forming processes in peripheral countries such as Hong Kong and Taiwan into account. Based on the overview on past identity shifts in Taiwan and Hong Kong, it can be concluded that military or political pressure from the mainland usually triggered feelings of distinct "Taiwanese" or "Hongkongness" among the local population. Historically, this distinctiveness has not been grounded in different preferences regarding their political systems but in the idea of a different cultural heritage between the mainland and the peripheries. This observation is shared by Wu who describes this process quite fittingly as "anti-center peripheral nationalism" (Wu 2016, 687). Coming back to the present debates on identity in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the rise of China to a global power could have triggered the most recent emergence of ethnic demarcation that is also reflected in the party programs of NPP and Demosisto.

Second, from my point of view, Veg's analysis is lacking a closer look at the ethnic or cultural dimension of Hong Kong's localist discourse. Political goals such as the preservation of Cantonese as Hong Kong's dominant language hinder the possibility of a pan-Chinese identification. Besides, Chinese migrants are portrayed as foreigners whose migration numbers should be strictly limited. The mainlanders are inherently non-Hongkongese. NPP's political goals in the field of culture also do not seem to be open to a pan-Chinese identification. For instance, the party is aiming at providing a platform for the different aboriginal cultures and including them into the Taiwanese cultural discourse, not a broader Chinese one. These views on the ethnic or cultural differences between people from the mainland and those from Taiwan or Hong Kong

suggest that even if there would be a pan-Chinese identification with civic values, the two parties would still perceive the others as non-Taiwanese or non-Hongkongese.

To sum up, NPP and Demosisto promote the idea of a Taiwanese or Hongkongese citizen that is identifying with civic values and the political system of the state they live in. In addition, not only this civic dimension of their identity separates them from their mainland neighbors, but also a distinct ethnic and cultural sense of belonging. While in the past, perceived threats from Beijing tend to have triggered ideas of ethnic distinctiveness, more recently, the rise of China, as a non-democratic state, is underlining the three nations' different political systems. As a result, an awareness of different civic identity aspects emerged, as put forward by NPP and Demosisto, that is conflated with the idea of a different ethnic identity.

V. Conclusion

The literature review has shown that most authors dealing with recent shifts in Taiwan's and Hong Kong's identity make use of the concepts of ethnic and civic national identity. Some come to the conclusion that the two societies are undergoing a change from a predominantly pan-Chinese ethnic or cultural identity to a distinct civic national identity based on democratic values. Other authors seek to explain these societal developments through the lens of localism, a concept that refers to the identification with a certain locality.

However, the analysis of NPP and Demosisto's statements and political goals revealed that their identity concepts do not fit neatly into the two proposed categories and that a concept taking the ethnic or cultural dimension into account needs to be added. The brief historical overview on identity formations in Taiwan and Hong Kong suggested that ideas of a unique ethnic identity are deeply rooted within the two societies. Current shifts in identity concepts have to be understood against this backdrop. Historically, enhanced interaction with the mainland has been accompanied by a rise in Taiwan and Hong Kong's self-awareness – not only at a political, but also at an ethnic or cultural dimension. It is likely that China's rise to a global power and deeper economic and political interconnectedness with Taiwan and Hong Kong has triggered the renewed emergence of a unique Taiwanese or Hong Kongese self.

With regards to future challenges to the region, the international community should be aware of a generation in the Chinese sphere of influence that is politically well organized and that opposes the PRC's concept of pan-Chinese ethnic identity. The current state of Chinese politics does not allow for the incorporation of a pan-Chinese civic identity as in Taiwan and Hong Kong civic identity is tied to democratic principles. China could open up to democratic reforms but this is highly unlikely given the crackdowns on civil liberties under the Xi administration. Moreover, these grievances not only affect relations between the countries, they are also a challenge to social peace inside the societies as ideas about who is Chinese differ greatly among governments, civil society actors, classes, and different generations.

Possible further research could focus on the way the two parties seek to influence their domestic political systems and in how far the shift from civil disobedience to a parliamentary third force was successful. Research in that field could focus on the following questions: Are the two parties successful in shaping Taiwan and Hong Kong's political landscape? What is their influence on different social groups in their country such as progressive students or more conservative older generations? Will the two parties be able to provide their society with a meaningful alternative identity? Will their political activism have a long-lasting impact on Hong Kong and Taiwan and the policies toward China? Given their limited political success, especially in the case of Hong Kong, will the two parties be able to achieve political change? Moreover, it might be interesting to focus on interactions between the new movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Do their political goals and ideas on identity provide a common ground for cooperation? Would such a cooperation challenge the PRC's claims on the Taiwan and Hong Kong? What influence could the movements have on the mainland's political system and self-understanding? Lastly, the concept of a local identity rooted in a strong sense of a unique local civic and ethnic identity deserves further research. Are there other geographic areas with a similar identity concept and under which parameters did it develop? By identifying and analyzing similar local identities in other places and their relationship with other entities it might be possible to draw lessons from these observations for the East Asian case.

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Appendix: Cited Paragraphs from Chinese Literature

1. NPP 2018b

2015年1月25日，時代力量正式成立政黨。這段時間以來，我們充分感受到，社會對於時代力量黨的期待與支持。身為時代力量的第一任執行黨主席，不只是作為時代力量的代表，更是要承載著人民的期待與囑託，為台灣的新生開創出路，為這個時代的難題找到答案。

台灣的民主發展走到現在，必須邁入新的階段。過去我們經歷過數十年的威權暴政，接著又花了三十年一步步邁向民主化。如今，我們又遭遇到台灣發展的轉捩點。尤其過去的八年讓我們深切感受到，台灣得來不易的民主成果，其實一直都沒有脫離中國極權威脅的陰影，社會的公平正義，也不斷在錯誤的政策下遭受侵蝕。

現在，該是台灣突破困境，尋求新生的時代了。而要落實屬於這個時代的新政治，台灣必須要有承載進步價值的新力量注入，這是時代力量的信念，也是我們接下來努力的目標。

我們承諾，要戮力做一個透明的政黨。不論是政府、國會及政黨，要打破黑箱，讓屬於公領域的政治事務，攤開在陽光下，隨時接受人民的檢驗，以確保權力總是為人民服務，而不是為腐敗或特權服務。

我們承諾，要堅持做一個開放的政黨。時代力量黨做為一個向全民開放的平台，讓各種進步的社會力量與改革理念能夠匯集，成為推動台灣新政治的火車頭。

我們承諾，要徹底做一個參與的政黨。從候選人的產生、政策的擬定到政黨的運作，都歡迎具有共同理念的朋友一起投入，讓政治成為人人皆可實質參與的公共場域，而不是少數人把持的權力遊戲。

我們承諾，要持續做一個行動的政黨。哪裡有不公不義，哪裡就有我們的身影，時代力量將永遠站在改革的最前線，為最需要幫助的人們奮鬥。

各位朋友，台灣究竟要邁向新政治，還是繼續停留在舊政治，已經到了關鍵的時刻。台灣需要更好的民主，人民值得更好的政治，我們值得更好的未來。請加入時代力量的行列，與我們攜手匯集力量，共創屬於人民的新時代。

2. Demosisto 2016c

自由、民主之基本秩序必然包含人性尊嚴。一個香港人，擁抱核心價值以及熱愛香港，也同時可以有多元的身分認同。能操廣東話的印度裔、澳洲裔演員；祖上三代在新界務農的外姓圍村人；在米線店鄉音未改卻知你喜好的店員，於習俗、膚色、種族之上，在一己崗位盡善，腳踏實地定居我城，活出自重與尊嚴，他們都是真正的香港人。

국문초록

해바라기·우산운동 후에 대만과 홍콩의 신생 정당의 정체성 개념에 관한 연구: 시대역량과 데모시스트를 중심으로

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2010년대 초 대만의 해바라기 운동과 홍콩의 우산운동이 전세계의 주목을 받았다. 이러한 운동이 추구한 목표 및 가치는 이후 출범한 신생정당인 ‘시대역량 (New Power Party·時代力量)’과 ‘데모시스트 (Demosisto·香港眾志)’를 통해 기존 정치체제에 도입되었다. 이 두 정당이 주장하는 정체성의 개념은 앤서니 D. 스미스가 제시한 시민적·민족적 정체성의 분류법과 상충된다. 최근 학술연구는 시민적·민족적 정체성 개념에 초점을 맞춰 대만과 홍콩 지역의 정체성 변화를 분석하였는데, 본 논문은 신생정당의 정체성 개념에 있어 이 범주에 속하지 않는 요소를 찾고자 한다. 본 연구는 정당 강령과 같이 당에서 직접 발표한 문서를 비롯해 정당의 활동을 다룬 언론보도, 그리고 과거 정체성 변화에 대한 역사적 관점을 기반으로 분석을 수행한다. 그렇게 함으로써 이 지역의 시민적·민족적 정체성 개념 사이의 역학관계에 영향을 미쳐온 역사적 요인을 제시하고자 한다. 결론적으로 이 논문은 ‘시대역량’과 ‘데모시스트’ 두 정당의 정체성 개념은 시민적 정체성과 민족적 정체성 간의 상호작용을 통해 형성된다고 주장한다.

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주요어: 대만의 정체성, 홍콩의 정체성, 시민적 정체성, 민족적 정체성,
시대역량, 데모시스트

학번: 2016-26733