



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

국제학석사 학위논문

# **Revisiting Umuganda in Rwanda**

: A Study of Umuganda Policy and Its Limitations

르완다 우무간다 정책의 효과 및 한계에 관한 연구

2018년 8월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

김예송

# Abstract

This thesis explores contemporary policy and practice of umuganda, a mandated community work in Rwanda, with an aim to examine to what extent umuganda is contributing to national development of the country as a mid-term policy review. Kagame government has formulated several national agendas that involves key objectives of poverty reduction; good governance and decentralization; and reconciliation and nation unity. As a strategic instrument to reach these interrelated national goals, umuganda was reintroduced as a compulsory community work to Rwandan society and has been systematically supported by the government than ever. However, there are both lights and shadows in every policy. Challenges faced in current umuganda practice are often largely neglected and underestimated by the leadership, which may mislead umuganda policy as a whole in the future. This thesis, therefore, aims to draw lessons that can be learnt from the challenges found in current umuganda practice for ways forward. It reveals that contemporary umuganda policy largely lacks its effectiveness, efficiency and equity in its implementation and argues that its nature of coerciveness and unpredictability as the underlying problems should be addressed for more fruitful and sustainable outcome.

**Keyword:** umuganda, mandatory community work, poverty reduction, recentralization, reconciliation, good governance

**Student Number:** 2015-25016

# Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>i</b>
<b>Table of Contents</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>Tables and Figures</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>I. Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1. Background and Definition .....	1
1.2. Preliminary Findings .....	4
1.3. Research Objective and Research Question.....	6
1.3.1. Research Objective.....	6
1.3.2. Research Question.....	6
1.4. Structure of this Thesis.....	7
1.5. Research Methodology .....	8
1.6. Research Framework.....	9
1.6.1. Policy-making Process and Policy Evaluation.....	9
1.6.2. Three-e Framework - Effectiveness, Efficiency, Equity.....	12
<b>II. Historical Background of Umuganda Policy and Practice</b> .....	<b>16</b>
2.1. ‘Voluntary’ Community Work: Umuganda in Pre-colonial Period (1800s-1895) .....	17
2.2. Becoming ‘Mandatory’ Labor: Umuganda in Colonial Period (1895-1962) .....	19
2.3. ‘Continuation’ of a Colonial Practice: Umuganda in Post-Colonial Period (1962-1985).....	20
2.4. An Effective ‘Tool’ for Genocide: Umuganda during Rwandan Genocide (1994).....	24
<b>III. Contemporary Umuganda Policy in Kagame Government</b> .....	<b>28</b>
3.1. Reintroduction of Umuganda in the National Framework.....	29
3.1.1. Definition, Objectives, and Mechanism of Umuganda.....	29
3.1.2. Governing Structure and Organs of Umuganda .....	32
3.1.3. Main Characters found in Contemporary Umuganda.....	35
3.2. Umuganda in relations with Other Government Initiatives.....	36
3.2.1. Economic Development: Poverty Reduction .....	36

3.2.2.	Political Development: Good Governance, Decentralization and Human Rights .....	41
3.2.3.	Social Development: Reconciliation and National Unity.....	43
<b>IV.</b>	<b>Evaluative Analysis on Contemporary Umuganda Policy .....</b>	<b>46</b>
4.1.	Umuganda for Poverty Reduction .....	48
4.1.1.	Low Productivity .....	48
4.1.2.	Opportunity Cost .....	52
4.1.3.	Summary and Implications .....	53
4.2.	Umuganda for Decentralization and Good Governance .....	56
4.2.1.	Recentralization.....	56
4.2.2.	Top-down Decision-making and Implementation.....	59
4.2.3.	Violation of Human rights .....	63
4.2.4.	Summary and Implications .....	67
4.3.	Umuganda for Reconciliation and National Unity.....	69
4.3.1.	Diminishing Motivation .....	69
4.3.2.	Reinforcement of Social Cleavages .....	76
4.3.3.	Summary and Implications .....	78
<b>V.</b>	<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>80</b>
	<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>85</b>
	<b>논문 초록 (Abstract in Korean).....</b>	<b>99</b>

## Tables and Figures

<b>Table 1.</b> Policy-making Process.....	10
<b>Table 2.</b> Summary of the history of umuganda.....	27
<b>Table 3.</b> Six Pillars of Vision 2020.....	37
<b>Table 4.</b> Economic Value of Umuganda Activities from July 2007 to June 2012.....	49
<b>Table 5.</b> Allport’s Conditions for Positive Intergroup Contact.....	70
<b>Figure 1.</b> Direction of the effects of changes in benefits and costs on effectiveness and efficiency .....	14
<b>Figure 2.</b> Structure of Supervising Committees for Umuganda.....	33
<b>Figure 3.</b> Elements of Administrative Unit Proliferation that leads to Recentralization .....	57

# I. Introduction

## 1.1. Background and Definition

Rwanda has experienced a notable social and economic development during last few decades. While majority of the Sub-Saharan African countries are still suffering from extreme poverty, Rwanda's stable growth has gained worldwide attention and many have attempted to provide valid explanation for its progress. Rwanda is particularly an interesting case since it suffered an ethnic genocide in 1994 which had taken away some 8 hundred-thousand lives of population. Notwithstanding such disadvantages, Rwanda is in a process of growth and there have been numerous attempts explaining its development. One of the most persuasive arguments is that account for the Rwandan leadership or the president of the country, Paul Kagame.

Paul Kagame was inaugurated as president in 2000 and has kept his presidency to present. He has been praised for his leadership and effective development strategies. Kagame government institutionalized a mandated community work program, umuganda, in 2008. It was in fact reintroduced to Rwandan society which was then full of devastation after having gone through the tragic genocide. On last Saturday of every month, citizens who age from 18 to 65 aged Rwandans gather in the morning for three hours to do public works collectively, such as construction of economic and social infrastructure (i.e. schools, hospitals), environmental protection projects (i.e. cleaning streets), or other community projects. During the hours, all transportation is prohibited

from operation and or all other types of work are not allowed. Kagame's strong support for umuganda can be often found through his actions as he himself engage in umuganda work from time to time and also through his words when he states:

“What we have achieved to date shows us what we are capable of and umuganda is an integral part of achieving even more..... Umuganda is one of the reasons we are moving forward, working together and believing in our common goal of transforming our lives and the lives of our families.” (Speech of Kagame as quoted in Kwibuka, The New times, 2015)

Umuganda is literally translated as ‘coming together in common purpose to achieve an outcome’ in Kinyarwandan local language. For example, people help each other's farming when they are in difficulties, building community's infrastructure such as schools, or providing transportation for those who are in urgent need. It is not a recent phenomenon, rather it has its roots from traditional practice and culture where people gather to help each other and cooperate between neighbors or families since pre-colonial period.

It has undergone several transformation stages along with political timeline in Rwanda. Its essence and core value of self-help and cooperation have been modified by the leadership of the time in order to serve specific interests of certain group of people. At present, umuganda has mostly lost its original meaning and no longer is a voluntary-based activity; but rather it has become as a compulsory community work having based

on two key legal documents under Kagame government, *Organic Law Number 53/2007 Governing Community Works* and *Prime Minister's Order Number 58/03*.

President Kagame's decision to bring back umuganda as a mandatory community work had several implications. It aimed to consolidate Rwandan society by reducing ethnic adversaries and prejudices through community development and contribution to national economic development. In addition, umuganda was understood as a good framework that can help foster decentralization leading to good governance.

It is not an extraordinary practice only limited to Rwandan case, in fact, since similar practices were also found to be exercised in nearby countries, such as Kenya, Tanzania, or Zambia, respectively called as *harambee*, *ugamaa*, and *humanism*. They all share a common basis, including umuganda, the notion of self-help. What makes umuganda a special case, however, is that Rwanda has witnessed a remarkable growth in recent years within which umuganda was absorbed into the national framework as a core development strategy.

Against this backdrop, this thesis revisits the policy and practice of umuganda focusing on post-genocide period, particularly during Kagame government, to explore whether its objectives of umuganda are being fulfilled and what are the consequences at this stage of policy as a mid-term policy evaluation. It cannot be stressed enough that monitoring and evaluation consist an integral part of an entire policy process. Although the initial intentions of a certain policy may have been good, oftentimes implementation can make a different case and bounce elsewhere.

## 1.2. Preliminary Findings

Recent studies on umuganda in post-colonial period have been conducted by several researchers. Among a wide range of research focus, there have been accumulated studies that explores 'dark sides' of umuganda. For example, Verwimp (2000) argues that dictators are fond of the economic development agendas such as umuganda program since it "gives them more resources to satisfy the elite's desire for consumption" which in turn can help expanding his or her arbitrary power. Verwimp (2003) also criticizes that umuganda was one of the top-down policy under Habyarimana (the former president of Rwanda before the genocide) government which put forth its objectives to justify its use of free labor. It was one of the ways the Rwandan government brainwashed people with the regime's ideology and created more rooms for themselves, politicians, their discretionary power and control. In other words, outcomes from umuganda was far from serving the interests of the people, but instead those of the ruling class at the time.

Bonnier et al. (2015) empirically examined how political elites have used umuganda to prepare the civilian population to participate in Rwandan Genocide. It was highly politicized and used as propaganda to promote political stance against the other ethnic group. It was found that one additional rainy Saturday, which was the umuganda day every week, dragged down the participation rate in genocide violence by five percent. This implies the causal relationship between the umuganda and the violent activities and can be interpreted that regular gatherings for umuganda on every Saturday

which accompanied discussions aggravated the ethnical cleavages and intensified rage against each other.

There are also studies that focus on the use of umuganda in recent Kagame government. Barnhart (2011) argues that umuganda is not an effective tool for nation building as Kagame government itself already lacks legitimacy and renders continuous schisms within the population which in effect hinders unification of national identity among people. Bates (2012) also attempted to track down historical roots and transformation of umuganda to find out its current use for economic and political development in Rwanda. Uwimbabazi (2012) has attempted to investigate umuganda with a thorough and comprehensive lens and have summarized related issues and lingering disputes about umuganda during post-genocide period.

Although there are some existing studies on umuganda in post-colonial period, the academic concentration rests mostly on the period of before and during Rwandan Genocide. Besides, most studies often lack closer analysis in the effects of umuganda in its achievement of the set goals. Furthermore, there is a lack of studies that tackles the human rights issues of umuganda as it takes a form of 'force labor'.

### **1.3. Research Objective and Research Question**

#### **1.3.1. Research Objective**

To add on to the previous literature, the ultimate goal of this thesis is to draw lessons from current umuganda policy and practice by exploring challenges and limitations for future policy improvements. The focus is on umuganda policy during Kagame government and how it has been developed as an official policy in accordance with other developmental goals from Rwandan context. The analysis will address issues of effectiveness, efficiency and equity of current umuganda policy and go beyond to figure out explanatory factors that have contributed to triggering or reinforcing the identified challenges.

#### **1.3.2. Research Question**

Based on the objectives of this thesis, followings are the research questions:

**[RQ1]** How is contemporary umuganda policy related to other governmental agendas in Kagame government?

**[RQ2]** Is current umuganda practice meeting its pre-set goals effectively, efficiently, and equitably? Why or why not?

In order to answer the above research questions, this thesis will discuss and validate the next following propositions:

[P1] Umuganda was reintroduced to Rwandan society by Kagame government, in close relations to other national objectives of poverty reduction, good governance and reconciliation.

[P2] Notwithstanding benefits umuganda has generated, there are challenges that need to be addressed in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Its characters of coerciveness and unpredictability are the underlying problems that breed such challenges.

#### **1.4. Structure of this Thesis**

This thesis is composed of total 5 chapters. After the introduction, there follows chapter 2 describing the historical background of umuganda until its reintroduction under Kagame government. It is to better understand umuganda from the context it was placed starting from pre-colonial period before delving into contemporary form of umuganda. The chapter will be fragmented into 4 different time period: pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial, and Rwandan genocide. The key idea that runs through different transformation stages is the nature of umuganda or how it became a mandated form of labor. In chapter 3, current umuganda policy under Kagame government will then be dealt with a closer lens, which includes definition,

main objectives, working mechanism, relevant government bodies. Additionally, other government initiatives of which objectives are in close connections with umuganda policy will be covered in detail. It is to appreciate umuganda from a bigger picture as part of the national development strategy in Rwanda.

In chapter 4, some critical challenges faced in current umuganda policy and practice in its implementation for the three national objectives will be analyzed as a mid-term policy evaluation. Main criteria in use will be effectiveness, efficiency, and equity, which will then lead the discussion to more fundamental problems of umuganda as main contributing factors to these identified challenges. Finally, chapter 5 will conclude by encapsulating my argument and adding some useful insights on current umuganda policy.

## **1.5. Research Methodology**

The data used in this thesis is only the secondary empirical data that already existed before this study, as I myself have not conducted any field study. Thus, this thesis is mainly based on previous research and data that have been collected for umuganda by Rwandan government and former researchers. I also have referred to news articles, interviews and documentation that are available online. However, as a non-French speaker, studies and data that are only available in French or other languages were excluded from this thesis.

## **1.6. Research Framework**

### **1.6.1. Policy-making Process and Policy Evaluation**

Once umuganda has revolved into a public policy and been reintroduced to Rwandan society by Kagame government, it was no longer a practice which used to be a voluntary community work that only limited to the boundary of grass-root level; rather it became as a part of the national framework in a gross sphere. Public policy can be defined in various ways, but the core idea that penetrates is that public policy is made and implemented by the government with authority. It is developed based on the issues or needs from the society which the government then recognizes and reflects into policy making process. Public policy can take different forms, but mostly formulated in a type of law or regulation that govern specific issues. It is crucial to monitor and review every phase of the policy-making process and consequences to create better ones or redirect the policy, if necessary.

Among several policy-making models, in this thesis, a classical model will be employed to explicate contemporary umuganda policy. It is an ongoing debate whether the stages can be clearly cut given that each of the stage is overlapping with one another and every event or action may not necessarily fall into a certain stage. Furthermore, policy-making process is generally understood to have neither of a definitive starting or an ending point in practice (Buck, 1989). Notwithstanding these criticisms against such cyclical model pointing out the discrepancies between the modality and reality, the

classical model is still a compelling and standard model when understanding public policies.

**Table 1.** *Policy-making Process*

<b>Stage</b>	<b>Policy Terminology</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Common sense</b>
1	Policy Agenda	Those problems, among many, that receive the serious attention of public officials	Getting the government to consider action on the problem
2	Policy Formulation	Development of pertinent and acceptable proposed courses of action for dealing with a public problem	What is proposed to be done about the problem
3	Policy Adoption or Legitimization	Development of support for a specific proposal so that a policy can be legitimized or authorized	Getting the government to accept a particular solution to the problem
4	Policy Implementation	Application of the policy by the government's administrative machinery	Applying the government's policy to the problem
5	Policy Evaluation	Efforts by the government to determine whether the policy was effective and why or why not	Did the policy work?

(Source: James E. Anderson (2011); adapted from Anderson et al. (1984))

The general procedure of policy-making tends to follow sequential stages which can be broken into five different phases (Anderson, Brady, and Bullock III, 1984): 1) Policy Agenda, 2) Policy Formulation, 3) Policy Adoption or Legitimation, 4) Policy Implementation, 5) Policy Evaluation. Definition of each stage is described in the *Table*

1. This thesis is an attempt to provide some insights for the fifth stage, 'policy evaluation'. The main question here asked is whether 'the policy worked or not?'. Regardless of the answer to this question, it is necessary to find out the reason for its success or failure of the given policy. To this regard, in this thesis, the analysis goes beyond a superficial question of 'did it work?' and covers 'how it worked/did not work?'.

Among many different types of policy evaluation, three types can be distinguished depending on the time when the evaluation is conducted: ex-ante evaluation, process evaluation and ex-post evaluation. Whereas ex-ante evaluation is carried out in the planning phase before the policy is chosen, designed and implemented, ex-post evaluation is employed after the policy implementation to assess how a public policy has successfully influenced the original problem. Process evaluation literally refers to assessment that is conducted during the implementation of a certain public policy. It determines whether the program is being implemented as originally intended and aims to assess conditions that promote successful implementation for the stages ahead. It often involves identifying and addressing the obstacles to the program implementation (e.g. Demers, 1992).

Umuganda policy is in the midst of the implementation process after its readoption in early 2000s by Kagame government. Accordingly, this thesis aims to provide some valid ingredients for process evaluation and revisits current umuganda policy in Kagame government from a critical viewpoint. It pinpoints some of the problematic issues that rise at current stage of policy or should have been risen in previous policy-making stages. For example, evaluative questions such as 'is umuganda

policy effective in achieving the objectives?', 'is the implementation of umuganda policy is efficient?' or 'can the element of coercion be justified?' will unfold throughout this thesis. In the end, this thesis aims to be of help for the stakeholders or policymakers in redesigning and redirecting umuganda policy in order to adjust the policy in accordance with the realities in contemporary Rwanda.

### **1.6.2. Three-e Framework - Effectiveness, Efficiency, Equity**

Kagame government has continuously been monitoring umuganda policy and produced reports regularly, *Umuganda Annual Report*. What is regretful is that most of the analyses have only remained to be superficial and focus on its short-term effectiveness. For example, the government collates data from the bottom level for monitoring participation rate and economic value generated by umuganda. It is certainly a meaningful effort put together except the fact that the depth of the reports is relatively shallow. As a nationwide labor mobilization program, it surely deserves a closer investigation from diversified angles.

Against this backdrop, this thesis will employ three specific criteria for umuganda policy evaluation: effectiveness, efficiency and equity. The 3-e framework is one of the widely-used frameworks in public evaluation which is a combination of concepts of equity, efficiency and effectiveness. Most studies that used this framework have intended to evaluate programs or governmental interventions. For instance, Reinke (1994) has used these three criteria for general program evaluation. Aroian et al.

(2005) also examined the criteria in its application to evaluation of healthcare programs and Davis et al. (2013) evaluated hospital performance using the framework. There has been attempts of using 3-e framework in other areas beside health sector as well such as international development sector (OECD, 2012) and assessing climate change initiatives (Stern, 2007; Angelsen, 2009).

The conceptions of efficiency and effectiveness are in close relationship and thus often cause ambiguity. However, they are completely different terms; while the effectiveness is the observed distance between outputs generated and the pre-set goals (Golany & Tamir, 1995), efficiency is generally understood as the cost per unit of production. Efficiency can also be defined as “maximizing the total value to the member of the society obtained from the use of scarce resources” (Weimer & Vining, 2009). Borrowing OECD definitions for international development evaluation, effectiveness is “the extent to which the pre-set objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved”, whereas efficiency is “a measure of how economically resources/inputs are converted to results including outputs and outcomes”, or the input-output ratio.

Therefore, there is a clear difference between the two elements; an effective program does not necessarily imply efficiency and vice versa. General direction of effectiveness and efficiency according to the size of costs and benefits is described in *Figure 1*. (Nagel, 1986). It can be found that benefit and effectiveness is in a positive relationship, whereas efficiency shows more ambiguous and unpredictable results. Put differently, increased benefit does not guarantee efficiency, while decreased cost does not guarantee efficiency. Likewise, even an effective and efficient outcome does not

automatically lead to equity. As Frederickson (2010) notes, for instance, “the most productive governments, the most efficient governments, ... can still be perpetuating poverty, inequality of opportunity and injustice.” It is crucial, hence, to have a balanced and comprehensive approach when evaluating a certain policy.

*Figure 1. Direction of the effects of changes in benefits and costs on effectiveness and efficiency*

Benefits	Up	<b>Effectiveness up</b> <b>Efficiency up</b>	<b>Effectiveness up</b> <b>Efficiency up</b>	<b>Effectiveness up</b> <b>Efficiency ambiguous</b>
	Constant	<b>Effectiveness</b> constant <b>Efficiency up</b>	<b>Effectiveness</b> constant <b>Efficiency constant</b>	<b>Effectiveness</b> constant <b>Efficiency down</b>
	Down	<b>Effectiveness down</b> <b>Efficiency ambiguous</b>	<b>Effectiveness down</b> <b>Efficiency down</b>	<b>Effectiveness down</b> <b>Efficiency down</b>
		Down	Constant	Up
		Costs		

(Source: Stuart S. Nagel, 1986)

Equity is another dimension that constitutes an important part in both formulation and evaluation of a public policy. There are at least four sets of equity objectives as illustrated by Österle (2002) from accumulated studies (e.g. Barr, 1998; Badelt and Österle, 2001; Wilson and Wilson, 1991), one of which is that equity promotes social integration by reducing social exclusion. Equity can be understood in various ways, for the concept barely have a definitive and precise meaning. In general terms, nevertheless, equity involves “a fair distribution of resources and burdens” (Österle, 2002). In other words, it is about fair distribution of resources as the policy

outcome or burden that rises in the procedure. The former is so-called outcome equity; the latter is process equity. Easily put, outcome equity is obtained when the outcome of a certain program or intervention is equally distributed to the members of the group. On the other hand, process equity can be realized when all members perceive the process does not disadvantage any member from the group. Outcome equity and process equity does not guarantee each other.

In extending my argument, equity as process equity, or a question of whether the labor burden for umuganda is fairly distributed among those who are responsible, will be put more focus. That is, the definition of equity in this thesis leans more towards process equity particularly when elaborating the unequal cost allocation of umuganda labor and inequitable application of punishment. To recap, whether current umuganda policy in practice is sufficing the process equity will be examined together with its effectiveness and efficiency throughout the thesis.

## **II. Historical Background of Umuganda Policy and Practice**

This chapter explores the historical backgrounds of umuganda policy and practice by shedding lights on its origins and evolvement starting from pre-colonial period until recent Kagame government. It is in order to foster better understandings of umuganda which can then lead to our next steps for further discussions on the relevant issues. It is also particularly noteworthy given the extraordinary history of Rwanda which has undergone several political milestones such as colonization or ethnic genocide. The focus that will run throughout its history in this section will be placed on how umuganda has transformed to become a ‘compulsory’ activity notwithstanding its origin to be ‘voluntary’ out of sincere intentions. With knowledge of where it roots from and how it has been modified along with the historical events, it can help our appreciation of the current practice of umuganda from a more balanced perspective. It will be covered in a chronological order by breaking it down into several periods according to historical milestones, which, in fact, coincides with the major changes witnessed in umuganda policy and practice.

## 2.1. 'Voluntary' Community Work: Umuganda in Pre-colonial Period (1800s-1895)

Historical roots of umuganda can be traced back to pre-colonial period, or prior to Rwanda's colonization by Western countries in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. While it is still in a gray area when umuganda started to take place in Rwanda, what is proved is that umuganda around this era was a voluntary-based activity in which people willingly took part to help each other within their communities.

When the power of leadership in Rwanda has begun to be centralized in 16<sup>th</sup> century, it was the time when external threats from neighboring areas have been enlarged. Such difficult circumstances have provided sufficient grounds for a stronger leadership, or *mwami* at the time, and accordingly the control of power was on its way towards centralization (Bates, 2012). This eventually led to stronger patron-client relations between state (patron) and the people (client) (Des Forges, 1972). In other words, the ownership and property of the people have been shifted to the leadership as the leader in turn protected the people from external threats.

In 19<sup>th</sup> century, such relationship was gradually reinforced and contributed to introductions of wide range of instruments for social control. Among them was the evolvement of a social obligation called *uburetwa* during the rule of king Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860-1895) (Bates, 2012; Uwimbabazi, 2012). *Uburetwa* was an enforcement of the manual labor mainly on Hutu population (Ibid.). It was a similar practice with umuganda in terms that it brought out peasants, mostly consist of Hutu, to the site for particular number of days a week to work on the land. However, what is different between *uburetwa*

and umuganda in pre-colonial period was that the latter was only voluntary-based communal activity for mutual benefits (Ibid.). Thus, it is noteworthy that during this time umuganda still remained as a voluntary activity and was not a particular subject of the king's rule.

It was found that there was also another type of voluntary community agricultural work in pre-colonial period called *ubudebe* which is the communal digging of the soil preparing for the planting season (Kigabo, 2008). The difference between *ubudebe* and umuganda was that the latter was more extensive as to its coverage of work type since umuganda also included non-agricultural works such as building houses (Mukarubuga, 2006).

Umuganda during this period had several important functions. African Rights (1995) noted its role for intensifying social cohesion. It points out that umuganda bridged the gaps between pastoralist and agrarian communities which hence was helpful in bringing the entire Rwandan society together. It also highlighted that after umuganda work, people gathered and discussed items such as next activity plans or more comprehensive agendas including governance, neighborhood relationships and community-individuals' behavior over casual talks and small drinks. Therefore, umuganda meant more than mere physical community work and had significant role within the level of community while maintaining its essence of being 'voluntary'.

## **2.2. Becoming ‘Mandatory’ Labor: Umuganda in Colonial Period (1895-1962)**

Colonial period started when the German arrived the land who began to rule Rwanda indirectly from the 1880s. Indirect control meant that the German only controlled the country by using then existing chiefs on behalf of themselves. Control over Rwanda then shifted to Belgians upon the defeat of Germany in World War I.

It was during the direct rule under Belgians when the ethnic composition of the population had started to become to serve as a major factor in Rwandan politics. Belgian colonizers openly favored Tutsi over Hutu to ease their control over the country. Accordingly, Hutus were taken away power and their original positions (Des Forges, 1999). It highly interfered and jeopardized the traditional structure and system of the Rwandan society. One of the best representative examples was the growing emphasis on the gap between Hutus and Tutsis based on their socio-economic status (Bates, 2012; Lemarchand, 1994). While Tutsis represented pastoralists, who were the minority in terms of the size of the population, Hutus were the majority in number who were farmers and cultivators. Top positions were mostly assigned to Tutsi population when at the same time the large Hutu population were marginalized (Ibid.). Many Hutus were taken away their political rights and social rights such as education or quality job opportunities. When Tutsi began to claim Rwanda’s independence in 1950s, however, Belgians flipped around their stance and systematically supported Hutus by providing weapons and military to fight against the Tutsi. Once Hutu had taken over the power, this time they started removing Tutsi from the ruling positions. As the colonizers shifted

their political support from one to another strategically according to their own interest, the animosity in between two ethnicities aggravated which then led to the outbreak of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.

Along with such political background heavily driven by different colonizers, umuganda, which was only voluntary at the beginning of the era, was started being used in favor of the Belgian colonizers and forcefully put on the shoulders especially on the Hutus for economic activities (Sellström, 1996; Des Forges, 1999). As for umuganda tasks, labor for growing cash crops or building social infrastructure were forced by the colonizers (Sellström, 1996; Ministry of Local Governance, 2001). In this way, Belgian colonizers swayed the traditional Rwandan societal system and “introduced supervised development socio-economic infrastructure which focused mainly on foreign interests supported by forced labor” (Uwimbabazi, 2012). Thus, umuganda was at the heart of such forced labor system that eased the control of the colonizers over the land. In other words, the nature of umuganda had undergone significant change during this colonial period; and once it became compulsory, it turned out to be a hard task to reverse the nature as will be evidenced by the following political periods.

### **2.3. ‘Continuation’ of a Colonial Practice: Umuganda in Post-Colonial Period (1962-1985)**

At the point Rwanda declared independence in 1962 from Belgium, the political and economic power of Hutus outweighed that of Tutsis. Then president of the republic, Gregoire Kayibanda, the Hutu ethnic-based president, decided to make

continuous use of the social control practices from the colonial period, such as identity cards that made clear distinction between Tutsi and Hutu (Bates, 2012). On top of this, frequent invasions by the Tutsi refugees who had fled to neighboring countries and the border provided president Kayibanda good reasons to maintain centralized power and differentiate the Hutu from the Tutsi (Vidal, 1995; Bates, 2012). However, the performance of Kayibanda government did not necessarily satisfied the Hutu since it largely neglected the majority of Hutu population when its attention was only towards maintaining their own political privileges (Mamdani, 2001). This eventually ended up triggering a coup d'état led by Kayibanda's cousin General Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973 which turned out to be a successful turnover.

It is unfortunate that there is very limited record regarding *umuganda* during this period until the advent of Habyarimana government in 1974 who officially institutionalized *umuganda* in the same year (Ibid.). Since Habyarimana government realized the necessity to embrace the entire population in order to maximize the nation-wide production level, he emphasized collective activities and promoted participation in *umuganda* through which he thought his conception of the “true” Rwandan identity can be attained (Barnhart, 2011). It was, in fact, what made himself distinctive from the former president because while the Kayibanda government considered Tutsi only as a ‘race’, Habyarimana regarded Tutsi counterparts as an ‘ethnicity’ whom it needed to embrace as the indigenous group of Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001). Accordingly, *umuganda* was put forth so as to achieve reconciliation between the ethnicities.

Along with its function for reconciliation, umuganda policy during this period became a critical part of the development ideology. It also had a power control effect since it mobilized not only the peasant group and uneducated people but also intellectuals for physical work. This way, Habyarimana was able to maintain and reinforce his power (Boudreaux, 2009). Furthermore, umuganda has become an efficient way to mobilize the population and raise nationalism by implanting the importance of “ancestral values” and collective good (Verwimp, 2000). The emphasis on nationalistic sentiments Habyarimana manifested on umuganda for nation-building is summarized in his speeches:

“Umuganda – our collective work for development, that to the manual labor of everybody. It is inconceivable that we could do without umuganda. A country is constructed by hands not by words! ...The results obtained by umuganda, its remarkable realizations that many countries envy us, constitutes the best proof that it cannot be separated from the progress Rwanda made in the last 10 years, that is an essential part of that progress and that is corresponds without ancestral values – to engage oneself – so that everyone, by individual effort, performs better in a collectivity always in progress. Each intelligent and honest Rwandan can see this.” (Speech of Habyarimana in 1986<sup>1</sup> as quoted in Verwimp, 2000)

---

<sup>1</sup> “Youth and Development”. His speech at the National University of Rwanda in May 1986.

Notwithstanding its positive functions, umuganda related policies pertained the essence of colonial form of umuganda (Schaefer 2001; Verwimp 2003), namely forced labor for public projects. It underwent partial modifications such as punishment and the number of work days; for instance, Habyarimana government started to fine those who did not participate in the community work while people were physically punished during colonial period (Uwimbabazi, 2012). As for the work days, it was reduced to one day per week (Ibid.). Nonetheless, it was still a mandated labor practice instead of being reversed into voluntary-based participation.

Based on the factual descriptions, the ultimate objectives of umuganda policy during this period can be summarized as the national development and economic growth together with intensified social control. People worked for various social projects such as their main agricultural production, in which coffee took a large part, or building social infrastructure. The consequences turned out to be favorable to economic development as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) indicator<sup>2</sup> of Rwanda increased steadily under the Habyarimana's regime until the collapse of the coffee industry in 1980s with the global plummet of coffee prices (Bates, 2012).

Nevertheless, it did not mean that people were always supportive about umuganda and accepted it naturally without having any serious contemplation. As Mamdani (2001) notes, "peasants were often doubtful of its social benefit" and they, in late-1980s, became reluctant to take part in umuganda. Such discontent aggravated and also is known to partially contributed to the outbreak of Rwandan Genocide in 1994.

---

<sup>2</sup> Data from World Bank.

## **2.4. An Effective ‘Tool’ for Genocide: Umuganda during Rwandan Genocide (1994)**

The genocide was triggered when the President Habyarimana was killed by a plane shot. Habyarimana was on his way back from Arusha Accords, which was an effort to compromise and find balance of power in between Hutu and Tutsi, or MRND (National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development) which was the political party of President Habyarimana, and RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) representing Tutsis. As Tutsis or RPF were blamed for being responsible for the plane crash of President Habyarimana, it served as a direct catalyst for the outbreak of the Rwandan Genocide. More than 8 hundred thousand people were killed throughout the country and many fled to neighboring countries such as Burundi or Uganda. It is a well-known fact that Hutus made use of communication tools during the genocide, particularly Radio Rwanda and a private-owned extremist radio station, Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) (e.g. Li, 2004). By broadcasting repetitively, it sought to spread out Hutu’s ideology and encourage people to attack “enemy” Tutsis (Bates, 2012).

While the genocide was taking place, the entire country, though there might have been variations depending on districts, was in a chaos. Accordingly, there is less evidence that umuganda was carried out normally during this period; however, there is some substantial evidence that umuganda also worked as an effective strategy used for the massive killing. For instance, in the early 1990s until the outbreak of Rwandan Genocide, MRND’s propaganda using umuganda became blatant than ever as they

considered those who failed to attend umuganda as ‘enemies’ of the country (Thomson, 2009). During the genocide, Straus (2006) argues that the Hutu were able to successfully mobilize the population for the systematic and collective killing through utilization of umuganda. Indeed, 88 percent of perpetrators turned out to have participated in umuganda (Straus, 2006). The meaning of umuganda ‘work’ changed to ‘clearing out the weeds’ or ‘killing the Tutsis’ (Prunier, 1995; Mamdani, 2001). The slogan ‘clearing bushes and removing bad weeds’ was used and as to its expressions it can be assumed that umuganda was originally related to ordinary agricultural work (Uwimbabazi, 2012). What is noteworthy is that MRND was already getting prepared for this mass murder in the 1980s by making umuganda a well-established framework (Verwimp, 2000). Likewise, umuganda was not in operation; instead it was being effectively used as a tool to motivate and communicate with people.

There are several explanations that account for the main driving force that enabled such mass murder among ordinary citizens. Some argue that people were overly used to obeying orders which had been a long-existing practice; thus, in many case people did not question their behaviors (Hintjens, 1999). Bates (2012) points out that the traditional labor system in Rwanda, including umuganda, cultivated the obedient character within people, which later eased the mobilization of people during the genocide. Straus (2006) also blames Rwanda’s long-existed hierarchical structure that facilitated the massive killing.

On the one hand, some focus on the role of the elite ruling class, namely elite manipulation. Threats of punishments was repetitively broadcasted over the radio and

people were endlessly brainwashed with other communication tools such as meetings, speeches, songs and slogans (Bhavnani, 2006). While it is still controversial whether it is the subservient people or the elite who mainly caused the genocide, both explanations may rather be complementary to each other (Uvin, 2001). What is still valid whatsoever is that umuganda acted as an effective tool for kindling people to commit unprecedented genocide.

*Table 2* shows a brief summary of history of umuganda and main elements that feature umuganda practice of each period. The key characteristic that should be highlighted is the type of umuganda which indicates whether umuganda at that time was either voluntary or mandatory.

However, it should be noted here that this thesis is not to argue that mandated community work is always bad and voluntary work is always good. It is in fact not a dichotomous matter of what is good and bad; rather it is related to discussions on whether which type of work in nature is more efficient and effective in achieving the goals that have been laid out. Has mandated community work been effective in attaining its purposes? Has it been efficiently delivered? Has the work burden been equitably distributed? How does it relate to the fact that it is a forced work, rather than a voluntary service?

**Table 2.** *Summary of the history of umuganda*

<b>Period</b>	<b>Form of political rule</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Features</b>
<b>Pre-colonial</b>	Hierarchy and centralized kingdom (monarchy)	Social institution	Mutual obligation community, self-reliance, household food security, individual social security, local community enforced compliance
<b>Colonial</b>	Centralized and authoritarian state	Mandatory	Forced, unpaid collective labor; mandatory coffee and tea cultivation; enforcement compliance was colonial and local; accountability was to the colonial master not the community
<b>Post-colonial</b>	Centralized and authoritarian government	Mandatory	Controlling people, mobilizing people for political gain, continuation about cash crop growing
<b>Rwandan Genocide</b>	Anarchy, No state control	Mandatory	Mass mobilizing for genocide, mobilization for equipment for genocide, use of modern mass media, no formal accountability, shift from economic mobilization to non-economic purpose

(Source: Uwimbabazi, 2012; as extracted from Newbury (1988), Newbury (1991), Mamdani (1996), Hintjens (1999), and Verwimp (2004))

### **III. Contemporary Umuganda Policy in Kagame Government**

After its role during Rwandan genocide, umuganda was reintroduced to Rwandan society in the form of public policy by President Kagame. This chapter focuses on the policy and practice of umuganda under contemporary government. Definitions, objectives, governing organs, and working mechanism of umuganda will be described by reviewing specific pieces of legal documents such as law and ministerial order. In doing so, two of the main characters of contemporary umuganda policy will be drawn out which, as I assert in the following chapter, are the stimulators of the emerging challenges in umuganda policy.

Having experienced the tragic event, Rwanda was in urgent need for recovery in every sector of the country. Facing these difficulties, President Kagame has adopted developmental agendas in order to rebuild the nation and the institutionalization of umuganda was at the heart of such efforts. *Vision 2020*, for example, is a long-term visionary development plan of Kagame government from which many different policies including decentralization, good governance, or unity and reconciliation policies have revolved. In this regard, other government strategic documents that share the developmental objectives with umuganda policies will also be covered in this chapter.

### **3.1. Reintroduction of Umuganda in the National Framework**

Kagame was a leader who well understood the value of umuganda in the early stage of his presidency when he carefully planned the reconstruction and development of the country. Umuganda, notwithstanding its ‘evil’ use during the genocide, was therefore once again placed in the center of political ideology deliberately as an instrument that will contribute to attaining the national development goals such as poverty reduction, good governance and reconciliation.

Kagame government, or Ministry of Finance and Economic planning (MINECOFIN), re-established umuganda in 2001 and officially institutionalized the practice by passing *Organic Law Number 53/2007* in 2008. In addition, *Prime Minister’s Order No 58.03* was adopted in the following year, in 2009. While the former is the initial legal framework, the latter was the institutional framework that established a nationwide systematic structure for the management. These two documents are the key legal frameworks current umuganda has its foundational basis on.

#### **3.1.1. Definition, Objectives, and Mechanism of Umuganda**

In 2007, Kagame government passed a law called *Organic Law Number 53/2007 Governing Community Works*, as a re-establishment and regulation for umuganda. The law is under control of the administration of the Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs (MINALOC). It consists of

five chapters and fifteen articles. Each article elaborates umuganda work, including the definition and objectives, participants, work hours, prohibition on compensation, equipment procurement, exemptions, establishment of committees, penalties, etc. It also prescribes the evaluation of umuganda works in which the supervising committee at each level and its work is explicitly determined.

Umuganda is a community work that is a “gathering of efforts of many people in order for them to carry out a general public interest activity” (Article 2). It also aims “to promote development activities in the framework of supporting national budget and to provide an opportunity for conviviality among people”. All Rwandans between eighteen years and sixty-five years of age should take part in umuganda (Article 3a) with possible exemption for the disabled. Foreigners or people over age of sixty-five-year are also encouraged to participate (Article 3b).

It is scheduled every last Saturday of each month starting from 8 o'clock in the morning for at least three hours (Article 4a). It can be flexibly changed when agreed with the participants and the supervising committee of that level (Article 4b). This is expected to allow some decision-making power to the local level and make the practice flexible according to local contexts. Article 5 indicates explicitly that there is no compensation of any kind for the community work. As for the working tools, Article 6 regulates the equipment needed for the umuganda activity which will have to be mostly provided within the community. For instance, in order to acquire certain equipment that cannot be found from the participants, the supervising committee of the concerned level shall be in charge of its provision and budget entailed.

Responsibility of these supervising committees is mainly to plan, organize, supervise, and evaluate umuganda activities (Article 7). Their primary roles start with specifying and notifying the planned activities including venue and types of equipment to those who are involved at least seven days prior to the activity. Another main job of the supervising committee is to prepare a report at the end of the activity including its monetary value (Article 11a). This report should be delivered to the higher organ which will then be submitted to the higher level (Article 12a) to be collated. The supervising committee from the national level shall report to the Prime Minister every six months (Article 12b). At the end of each community work, participants should gather to hear the results of the umuganda from the supervising committee, to discuss community agendas, and to decide the next umuganda activity (Article 11b).

Article 9 and Article 10 provide details in managing participants and non-participants. The supervising committee together with the population should develop modalities to take the attendance of the participants and to make notes of those who did not participate (Article 9). Any person in the latter group should inform the relevant committee (Article 10) and if their excuses cannot be justified, supervising committees, with consultation with the participants, has the authority to fine them of maximum five thousand Rwandan francs (Article 13a). The fines collected should be used for the community works at that level (Article 13b).

Apart from such monetary penalty, the participation is also managed through the operation of attendance card system by which the provision of government service is determined. That is, when a person fails to get a stamp on the card, he or she may be


rejected to receive certain government aid or service. Besides, the government has attempted to initiate an innovative competition program in district, provincial and national level since 2009 to boost participation in which the best performance is awarded with a certificate with cash prize (MINALOC presentation on Umuganda, 2016).

### **3.1.2. Governing Structure and Organs of Umuganda**

Rwandan government can be largely discussed in twofold: central and local government. While the central government is responsible for providing national guidelines to the local entities, the local governments are asked to speak up for their local needs that reflect contextual circumstances. Under the central government, local governments of each province (Eastern, Southern, Western and Northern) is established which then can be fragmented into those of districts, sectors, cells and villages. Village level is the lowest administrative level where all umuganda activities are actually being delivered.

By adopting *Prime Minister's Order No 58.03 on Community Works Umuganda Supervising Committees* in 2009, Rwandan government has laid out the foundation and refined the structure of its management system, both from the central and the local government. The purpose of this Order is to “determine the attributions, organization and functioning of community works supervising committees and their relations with other Organs” (Article 1).

**Figure 2.** *Structure of Supervising Committees for Umuganda*



(Source: Prime Minister’s Order No 58.03)

This order also stipulates the structure of the supervising institutions of umuganda that engage in planning, organizing, adopting, assessing and reporting. Supervising Organs can be divided into largely two bodies: Steering Committee and Technical Committee (Article 2a). While both Steering Committee and Technical Committee should exist at the National level, Provincial level and Kigali City level, lower governmental levels shall only have a Technical Committee (Article 2b). Assumed by the structure, the function of each level is different but related in hierarchical order. Its structure is visualized in *Figure 2*.

The functions and responsibilities of these institutionalized entities are elaborated in following sections of the Order. The significant difference of expected functions between Steering Committee and Technical Committee is that the latter conducts more practical and technical activities. For instance, while Steering Committee at the National level shall organize and plan the community works, adopt national policies with respect to community works, encourage participation, and publicize the

outcome of community works (Article 3); Technical Committee at the same National level engages in more detailed work such as coordination of community works, monitoring and evaluation of participation, development of criteria for community work assessment, and analysis of reports that come from below levels (Article 4).

The members of Steering committee at the National Level consist of ministers of each ministry department including Minister in charge of Local Government, Defense, Infrastructure, Agriculture and Animal Resources, Internal Security, Public Service and Labour, Education, Finance and Economic Planning, Youth, Gender and Family Promotion, and Natural Resources (Article 11). Similarly, the Technical Committee at National level is comprised of Directors in the relevant ministries who are responsible for planning (Article 12). Basically, committees at the national level function as a holistic manager and seek to align umuganda activities with national policies and visions. They shall convene twice a year and whenever needed (Article 21a) and shall be chaired by the representative of the ministry in charge of community works (Article 20).

Steering Committee and Technical Committee at the Provincial and Kigali City level consist of officers, coordinators, representatives of each relevant ministry or institutions (Article 13, 14) and they shall convene four times a year (Article 21b). Steering Committee and Technical Committee at this level are supplementary to each other to carry out their functions such as preparation, supervision, evaluation, advisory, population mobilization, report to the upper National level and coordination of umuganda works in Districts (Article 5, 6). Likewise, the Technical Committees at the

lower level essentially share similar administrative responsibilities in order to ensure the sublime coordination of umuganda activities from the highest to the lowest, village, level, where umuganda is implemented (Article 7, 8, 9, 10) and they shall hold meetings at least once a month (Article 21c).

### **3.1.3. Main Characters found in Contemporary Umuganda**

From two main legal bases laid out for umuganda and its practice, two important features of current umuganda policy can be derived: coerciveness and unpredictability. Based on several articles of *Organic Law Number 53/2007*, such as Article 3, 4 or 5, the government is imposing labor duty upon the population, which in fact was a decision to continue the colonial practice of umuganda when the colonizers have utilized umuganda as forced labor for their own interests. From moral viewpoint, forced labor cannot be justified under any circumstances; however, even putting such moral issues aside from the discussion, the question of whether it is worthy to mobilize every aged person nationwide should be dealt with closer attention.

Unpredictability is another feature that is found throughout current umuganda practice. This specifically comes from vagueness of umuganda law in Article 4 which states that in addition to the regular umuganda on monthly basis, individual umuganda work can be organized when considered to be necessary. This gives flexibility to umuganda policy implementation which may allow the localities that are in charge of umuganda activities more decision-making power, help improve their capabilities and foster bottom-up practice.

However, since there is no specific legal foundation that provides explicit guidelines for such additional type of umuganda, decisions such as types of work, venue, frequency, length of work are solely on the localities' responsibility. Flexibility without specific guidelines often ends up with bringing unpredictability. Umuganda that is organized by the localities in addition to the monthly umuganda is being perceived as 'informal' umuganda. In fact, it was found that citizens in Western province in Rwanda do not necessarily distinguish weekly informal umuganda from the formal ones since the former is already absorbed to the latter already (Uwimbabazi, 2012).

There can certainly be other aspects of umuganda; nevertheless, this thesis will focus on these two characters as significant factors and uncover how coerciveness and unpredictability have been hindering the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of umuganda policy from reaching the objectives.

## **3.2. Umuganda in relations with Other Government Initiatives**

### **3.2.1. Economic Development: Poverty Reduction**

Many sub-Saharan African countries have suffered from extreme poverty and Rwanda was not an exception. The 1994 Genocide was, without a doubt, a critical event that destroyed every foundation in economic, political, and social sectors in Rwanda. The GDP indicators have plummeted to 753.6 million<sup>3</sup> in 1994 with the outbreak of

---

<sup>3</sup> Data from World Bank.

genocide from 1.972 billion in the previous year. The entire country was put into a very hopeless position where the urgent need for development and reconstruction was called for as the national agenda. Although Rwandan economy seemingly was on its way for recovery until the advent of Kagame government, it was quite evident that Rwanda was still trapped with the remnants from the genocide and had already lost its momentum for growth. At the time when President Kagame inaugurated as the president of Rwanda in 2000, he faced these great challenges across the country and devastation and dismal was all that left after the genocide. He started to pursue national developmental policies and set governmental goals and visions.

**Table 3.** *Six Pillars of Vision 2020*

<b>Pillar</b>	<b>Visions</b>	<b>Cross-cutting areas of &lt;Vision 2020&gt;</b>
1	Good Governance and a Capable State	
2	Human Resource Development and a Knowledge-based Economy	1. Gender Equality
3	Private Sector-led Economy	2. Protection of environment and sustainable natural resource management
4	Infrastructure Development	
5	Productive high value and Market Oriented Agriculture	3. Science and technology, including ICT
6	Regional and International integration	

(Source: MINECOFIN, 2000, p.14)

Against this backdrop, Kagame government launched *Vision 2020*<sup>4</sup> as a long-term national developmental strategy looking for more collective and established efforts.

<sup>4</sup> <Vision 2020> was later revised in 2012; the document under discussion is the original version devised in July 2000 in order the better understand the surrounding circumstances at the time.

The ultimate objective of this ambitious plan is to “transform Rwanda into a middle-income economy by the year 2020” (MINECOFIN, 2000). It identifies a few major constraints including barriers for trade economy, low agricultural productivity, low level of human resource and low infrastructure development. To confront such economic situations, *Vision 2020* lists specific six pillars through which the objectives are to be realized until 2020 as visualized in *Table 3*.

Umuganda is not irrelevant to *Vision 2020* as it has great potentials to contribute to these pillars. The first pillar, for example, ‘good governance and a capable state’, stresses the establishment of rule of law and protection of the rights of people that ensure the consolidation of the nation. Good governance as defined here is the “increased accountability, transparency and efficiency in deploying resources and respect to democratic structures and processes that commit to the rule of law and the protection of human rights” (Ibid, p.15). Besides, good governance can be realized with the expansion of grass-root participation through decentralization process where the localities and people can strengthen their capacities. This is precisely where the leadership links umuganda with good governance and eventually with the ultimate goal of poverty reduction. Relying on the functions and operations of the governing bodies of umuganda that have been laid out systematically to the bottom level, the decision-making process that takes place throughout umuganda policy implementation and management technically utilizes a bottom-up democratic approach, which thus, theoretically, leads to decentralization and good governance.

Umuganda is also directly linked to the fourth pillar, ‘infrastructure development’. *Vision 2020* realizes the necessity of well-founded infrastructure for business-friendly environment in the sectors of land use, urban development, transport network, communication & ICT, energy, water and waste management. In fact, it is the pillar to which umuganda’s contribution is the most direct and clear. An array of umuganda projects initiated by various stakeholders from national level to local level are often associated with infrastructure development for it delivers projects such as constructing roads, schools, or bridges; installing water pipes; and planting trees for environment protection.

Likewise, *Vision 2020* has been a comprehensive core development document around which many different planning strategies have revolved. Within this timeframe, the second *Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy* or EDPRS II in 2012, an extension from EDPRS I, has been formulated as a medium-term economic strategy where the role of umuganda is highlighted as an effective instrument in attaining the overarching goals for poverty reduction.

Aligning with *Vision 2020*, the goal of EDPRS II is more concrete: “accelerate progress to middle income status and better quality of life for all Rwandans through sustained average GDP growth of 11.5% and accelerated reduction of poverty to less than 30% of the population” (EDPRS II, MINECOFIN, 2013). The four thematic areas in EDPRS II laid out in order to foster growth and combat poverty are: 1) economic transformation, 2) rural development, 3) productivity and youth employment, 4) accountable governance. In doing so, it respects five specific principles of innovation,

emerging priorities, inclusiveness and engagement, district-level development, and sustainability.

In fact, it was learned during EDPRS I period that home-grown and community based initiatives including umuganda were largely successful and formed an integral part of the plan (Ibid.) as a fast-track and cost-effective implementation tool. Umuganda is also understood as an opportunity for decentralization for it can function as existing platform which strengthens community level engagement and provides forums for discussions and feedback.

Overall speaking, it is somewhat evident, from economic perspective, that umuganda cannot be unworthy given its nature of 'free' labor. By taking the advantage of the free large-scale labor regularly, umuganda relieves government expenditure on services. Most of this labor force is invested on the public construction works such as schools, bridges, and roads, health centers, water supply equipment, administration offices, genocide memorials, police stations, soil erosion control infrastructures, etc., all of which normally belong to public sector covered by governmental expenditure. Therefore, free labor procurement through umuganda, in short term, allows more flexibility to Rwandan government expenditure which can be saved and invested elsewhere for national development.

Such great deal of efforts put together by Kagame government is resulting in some fruitful outcomes in Rwanda as can be hinted by several economic indicators such as rise in GDP. Meanwhile, continuous pursuit of umuganda policy and its expansion

since its reintroduction reflect how umuganda is being acknowledged as a powerful tool under Kagame government.

### **3.2.2. Political Development: Good Governance, Decentralization and Human Rights**

The conceptions of good governance and decentralization are closely interlinked and often dealt together in practice. Good governance is a quite trendy term and its definition is still flexible. The concept was initially introduced by the donor countries who argued that the overall failure of the underdeveloped countries originates from the poor system layout and bad practice in governance, such as institutional arrangements, non-transparency or corruption. Therefore, according to this claim, less-developed countries are advised to establish more inclusive and appropriate institutions in order to foster growth and democracy.

While there are variations in the definition of good governance, there seems to be an agreement to that the key ideas rest on the quality institutions and the manner of political power use. Rwandan government understands good governance holistically from six attributions: state capability, accountability, responsiveness, fairness, inclusiveness, legitimacy (Joint Governance Assessment, 2008). Within this definition, decentralization is regarded as one of the necessary components to reach good governance as it can strengthen the capacity of the local authority and make more responsive and transparent institutions by dispersing the power and diverging the channels. Nevertheless, good governance should be differentiated from 'good

government' paradigm, which was once considered to be a mainstream during the Cold War period when centralized state, unlike decentralized state from good governance, was the main source for growth (Naddem, 2016).

Good governance and human rights also has a close relationship as they are known to be mutually reinforcing (UNCHR, 2007). Human rights principles and values provide the guideline for a government and other related actors should respect in their operation. On the other hand, human rights norm requires a good governance for its principles and values to be realized in practice (Ibid.). When combined with poor governance, legal foundations or institutions that form political, social or economic fields are less inclined to respond to the human rights.

*Vision 2020* is a comprehensive long-term plan document that encompasses political agendas as well such as good governance and decentralization. Along with economic goals envisioned by *Vision 2020* and EDPRS frameworks, Kagame government have formulated *National Decentralization Policy* in 2000 by MINALOC and adopted the revised version in 2012. The adoption of decentralization policy was Kagame government's resolution in response to the quests for good governance and local economic development (National Decentralization Policy, p.10). It was also a global trend at the time, in which many less developed countries have started to join the wave since 1980s following on a nationwide realization of the fundamental human rights and human dignity. Decentralization was considered to promote good governance through active public participation and localities with increased transparency and

accountability (Ibid.). Furthermore, decentralization can help efficient and effective implementation of local projects through evidence-based planning and by being more responsive and sensitive to the local needs.

Meanwhile, umuganda is considered as a useful action tool in reaching these goals in *National Decentralization Policy*. Umuganda provides a platform for the process of ‘promoting integrated citizen-centered local and national development planning’ by allowing more public engagement in every stage of decision making, including initiation, implementation, evaluation and feedback processes. Since umuganda is an opportunity for people in the community to convene regularly and discuss their own matters and agendas, people can naturally engage in the decentralization process and promote citizen-centered development. This can empower the people as well as relevant local institutions that operate umuganda and build confidence as influential players in the decision-making process. Furthermore, umuganda can also function as the channel for government to easily reach out to the community members and vice versa, which can strengthen joint plans between central and local governments. Likewise, umuganda has a great potential to help enhancing effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of government services for decentralization and good governance.

### **3.2.3. Social Development: Reconciliation and National Unity**

Given Rwanda’s history, Rwanda had long sought a single unified national identity in order to glue all population together by overcoming the divisionism and discriminations that swept the preceding era. Sentiments of hatred against each other

blossomed during colonial period and burst out with the outbreak of Rwandan Genocide. After experiencing the tragedy, Kagame government once again prioritized the unity and reconciliation agenda. It was a critical task that required long-term efforts and Kagame government accordingly has established reconciliation policies and programs. Reconciliation was understood as a necessary condition for successful nation-building for steps forward. Reconciliation was an agenda that is not only significant in itself; it was also a prerequisite for other developmental agendas as well such as economic growth and good governance.

The *National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation* has been designed in alignment with several governmental initiatives such as *Vision 2020* and Good Governance principles, or legal frameworks such as Rwandan Constitution. From Rwandan context, the definition of unity and reconciliation is “a consensus practice of citizens who have common nationality, who share the same culture and have equal rights; citizens characterized by trust, tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementary roles/interdependence, ... with the objectives of laying a foundation for sustainable development” (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission; NURC). NURC was established in 1999 from the national recognition for the need of unified and reconciled country for sustainable development in which people share same culture and common nationality and in which people are respected with equal rights, human rights, and rule of law (Ibid.).

The specific objectives of this policy are laid out as: 1) to combat divisionism and discrimination, 2) to fight against genocide ideology, 3) to sensitize Rwandans at all

level to strive and value their unity, 4) to empower Rwandans with the capacity to analyze their problems and find adequate solutions to them, 5) to promote a culture of peace based on trust, tolerance and respect for human rights, 6) to mentor Rwandans on patriotic values and on actively playing part in the governance of their country, and 7) to promote values existing in the Rwandan culture that are capable of contributing to development and national unity. In order to reach the goals, various programs are being implemented through civic education, community sensitization, advocacy, research, consultative discussions, promotion of partnership, and combating poverty.

All these objectives and devices are in close relationships with umuganda policy. Umuganda can play a significant role as a channel for imbuing values and educate people on peace and unity. Umuganda can create solidarity and unity among the participants through their collective actions. Also, umuganda can reinforce social cohesion, social trust and reconciliation in Rwanda by lowering the walls between neighbors and communities and fostering togetherness. While spending time together and discussing agendas during umuganda meetings, they share ideas and experiences which can constructively reshape their prejudices that have been pervasive against each other. Likewise, umuganda is certainly an invaluable practice and serves as an opportunity to foster inclusiveness, especially for those who have been largely marginalized historically, and eventually realize reconciliation and unified society in Rwanda.

## **IV. Evaluative Analysis on Contemporary Umuganda Policy**

Notwithstanding systematic and collective efforts for umuganda than ever, the policy is yet to be a complete success story. It certainly has brought some significant, tangible and intangible outcomes such as infrastructure and togetherness among people; nevertheless, it is too naïve to only focus on the bright side. This chapter uncovers some critical shortcomings of current umuganda policy and practice based on three criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. There have been various attempts to review umuganda and its effects; however, it is regretful that much of its emerging challenges at current stage have not yet been seriously nor sufficiently dealt. Therefore, in this section, I attempt to go beyond simple listings of phenomena, and explain further on more fundamental and structural problem in terms of its coerciveness and unpredictability.

Umuganda as a core strategy and development instrument for Rwandan national goals of poverty reduction, good governance, and reconciliation, deserves a closer investigation of umuganda in its current status and process for reaching the pre-set goals. This does not intend, by any means, to undercut the collective efforts that have been put together for umuganda; rather it is to raise some reasonable doubts in order to propose relevant thinking points for further improvements and better policies of umuganda in near future. However, it should be noted that there may have been

limitation to access to reliable data sets and the argument is based on the sources that were only available online.

As nicely explained in the previous chapter about how different initiatives were deeply related to each other, similarly there is no clear-cut distinction between economic, political, and social effects due to their interrelatedness in nature. Thus, goals of umuganda, poverty reduction, good governance and reconciliation, do not exist in a separate form. Each goal may influence one another, though there might be difference in the extent or its process. For instance, good practice of governance can foster economic growth and reduce poverty; or reconciliation may help bring good governance.

Notwithstanding such reciprocal relationship, this chapter will be divided into three large portions for the sake of better understanding. This three-way approach is not only related to the three key government programs as identified in chapter 3, but also based on overall comprehension of aggregated Rwandan government documents. For example, borrowing from *Community Development Policy* adopted in 2001 (revised in 2008), in which umuganda is placed in the center of the policy, the key community development objectives are formulated in three dimensions: 1) economic development 2) social development and 3) good governance.

## 4.1. Umuganda for Poverty Reduction

### 4.1.1. Low Productivity

One of the most instinctive questions in terms of umuganda's contribution to poverty reduction can be whether umuganda is truly efficient when considering its input and output. To find out its productivity, I have conducted a simple calculation based on the data provided by Rwandan government. It was found that many of the government documents and reports often lack objectivity in assessing the outcome of umuganda due to its selectiveness of data. Generally speaking, data should be dealt cautiously and the interpretation of the given data may not be trustworthy when certain set of data is presented selectively. It could blind the readers and the citizens from seeing what the actual size of contribution is and mislead the entire policy. Therefore, this section attempts to draw out meaningful facts that have been hidden or overshadowed. It is regretful, as also should be noted beforehand, that the access to the full and recent data was limited and the matter of data credibility is beyond the boundary of this thesis.

*Table 4* shows a detailed estimation of economic values that have been created from umuganda works from July 2007 to June 2012. The original data provided officially by the government was only Column 1 and Column 2; Column 3 has been newly inserted in order to help understanding of its economic value from global standards (1 Rwf = 0.0011 USD). Based on the given estimation, new values from a simple calculation are presented in Column 4, which raises our attention with regards to the efficiency of umuganda.

**Table 4.** *Economic Value of Umuganda Activities from July 2007 to June 2012*

(1 Rwf = 0.0011 USD <sup>5</sup> )				
	Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4
Fiscal Year	Participation (people)	Value of activities (Rwf)	Value of activities (USD)	Output per participation (USD/person)
2007	8,638,958	4,112,943,849	4,524,238.234	0.523701844
2008	10,772,719	4,852,758,196	5,338,034.016	0.495514087
2009	18,342,740	9,451,364,195	10,396,500.61	0.566791036
2010 <sup>6</sup>	16,165,082	7,980,872,879	8,778,960.167	0.543081697
2010-2011	7,219,508	7,347,720,172	8,082,492.189	1.119535042
2011-2012	18,853,592	12,524,063,160	13,776,469.48	0.730707946
<b>Total</b>	79,992,599	46,269,722,451	50,896,694.7	0.636267546

(Source: Ministry of Local Government)

It is indeed a significant amount of total value that has been generated through umuganda and it should be respected; however, the figure presented in Column 1,2, or 3 alone can be misleading. For example, Column 4 indicates the ratio of the value generated in USD and the people who contributed to the umuganda activities throughout the year. In other words, it is the amount of value that a person who participated in umuganda work has created in one fiscal year, starting from 2007.

<sup>5</sup> Exchange rate between Rwandan franc and US dollar has been fixed throughout the given years.

<sup>6</sup> In 2010, Rwanda aligned its budget calendar with that of the EAC by adopting July-June fiscal year instead of calendar year.

This poses a critical question regarding the efficiency or productivity of umuganda work. It can be interpreted that a person who carried out umuganda work has contributed approximately 0.64 USD per year in average. Provided that the formal umuganda supposedly takes place every last Saturday by the law, which makes 12 times a year, it can be inferred that the economic value a person creates by participating every umuganda activity is only about 0.053 USD. This result is quite striking since it suggests that people are spending at least 3 hours for every umuganda work only to contribute much less than their average wage per hour, 450 Rwandan Franc which equals to 0.52 USD (Besamusca et al., 2013). What should not be neglected is the existence of informal umuganda which is organized in irregular basis, especially in rural areas, in addition to the monthly formal umuganda. The figure is more than discouraging, therefore, given the commitments the participants have willingly shown for the great cause of national development. Current operation of umuganda hardly seems to have been efficient nor productive in any sense.

Such perspective is also being supported by some participants as they argue that they feel from their experiences that most of the umuganda work, say cleaning streets, can be done with much less people efficiently and not bothering the entire community for such type of work (Uwimbabazi, 2012). About one-third of the population were not satisfied with the outcome of umuganda, according to a survey conducted by Rwandan government (CRC survey<sup>7</sup> from Rwanda Governance Board, , 2017).

---

<sup>7</sup> Citizen Report Card (CRC) survey; It is annually produced by Rwanda Governance Board with

What causes such low efficiency when the participation rate is so high? There may be various explanations such as poor organization or incompetent bureaucracy; but adding on this, what substantially contributes to the participant's inertia is its form of mandatory labor and unpredictable calls of informal umuganda. For people are obliged to work without being compensated in a concrete way, it affects their motivation for active engagement. For example, even if they participate, people only come to get a stamp on the attendance card, or many young generations come to date (Mwijuke, April 2014, *The East African*). Mandatory participation can expedite expanding participation in a short period; but it may not be effective due to the lack of real engagement (McBride et al., 2006).

Furthermore, frequent and poorly organized informal umuganda supplementing the formal ones complicates the entire system. Since important information of when and where informal umuganda will take place is unpredictable and is often informed to the people in the last minute, people come less prepared. For instance, they often fail to bring the required tools for the work to be done (An interview in Uwimbabazi, 2012). Besides, repetitive calls of informal umuganda eventually make people tired and less engaged in the actual work, having detrimental impact on the efficiency of umuganda after all.

---

a purpose to collect the feedback from the grass-root about the services by public institutions. In this 2016 CRC survey, total 11,013 household members have been visited for response.

#### 4.1.2. Opportunity Cost

Is umuganda really a 'free' labor? It may be only a wishful thinking of the leadership when considering the hidden costs of operating nationwide umuganda. Hidden cost, which also can be understood as opportunity costs, here refers to the expenses that are not monetarized but excluded from the total value estimation. In case of umuganda, the opportunity cost will be other activities that people would have spent their time and the benefits people could have obtained otherwise, when people are pulled out to umuganda sites to devote their time and energy. This cost is frequently disregarded and the current leadership does not seem to be as attentive as it need to be in dealing this issue.

During umuganda, all other main activities are restricted; cars are prohibited and people are to stop their own businesses or work. Normally, the length of time allotted for umuganda is expected to be more or less than 3 hours per month; but it is quite far from the reality, it usually exceeds 3 hours per week as there are more umuganda works since communities call for informal umuganda more often. For example, according to survey and interviews that have been conducted, residents from the rural area have shown their strong discontent in the umuganda work as it hinders them from working for their farm from which they make their lives (Uwimbabazi, 2012). Such level of complaints is especially higher in rural areas since rural residents are more often called for informal umuganda in addition to the regular umuganda (Ibid.).

The monetary value of total opportunity cost will not be dealt in this thesis; nevertheless, the time and energy loss incurred by every umuganda is, without a doubt, considerably large. It is therefore questionable whether umuganda is helping or aggravating economic situations in Rwanda. That is, there is high chance in which the cost of umuganda outweigh the benefit.

Because of such opportunity costs, the participation motivation is also affected directly. In other words, when people feel that the opportunity cost of participating in umuganda work is larger than that of engaging in other activities, people would rationally choose to do the latter. The fact that umuganda work oftentimes do not relate to interests of themselves or the community also contribute to higher opportunity cost. Since people perceive the gain of participating in umuganda is neither direct nor tangible to their own lives, their motivation to participate fades. What is more, since umuganda from the beginning is not of entirely free of choice by people, this may breed stronger discontent among them. Unlimited frequency and unlimited length of time of informal umuganda implies greater possibility of the increase in opportunity cost. In other words, due to coerciveness and unpredictability found in contemporary umuganda, higher opportunity cost can be noxious for economic development.

### **4.1.3. Summary and Implications**

In this section, two issues regarding poverty reduction have been explored: 1) productivity of labor input and 2) hidden opportunity costs. Such approach is meaningful since there has been vast negligence in most umuganda related official

reports produced by Rwandan government. First, it delved into the monetarized value of the economic outcome by umuganda work during last few years and figured out the ratio between the input and output. It was found that the ratio of economic value (output) of umuganda and number of participants (input) is not very persuasive and turned out to be largely inefficient. The output itself may seem substantial; however, when considering the size of labor as an input, the return is only limited. Moreover, when considering the opportunity costs, though it may be non-monetarized costs, it virtually increases the total costs of current umuganda policy in the long run. High opportunity cost will also decrease people's motivation in the end. Therefore, while umuganda may be effective for poverty reduction by taking advantage of free labor in the short run, it is largely inefficient at current stage and eventually will harm the effectiveness due to high opportunity cost in the long run.

Therefore, instead of solely relying on umuganda, other alternative solutions that can be more efficient should also be taken into account. Human resource development, say, can be the key to poverty reduction. This may require more time and tenacious efforts and may only have limited impact in the short run. For example, education as a foundational element for human development can be powerful way to reach the same goal in the long-run. It is a widely-accepted, now common knowledge that the impact of education on economic growth is positively related (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974; Psacharopoulos, 1984). Wang and Liu (2016) have added that higher education, than primary education and secondary education, on economic growth was found to be significant. Thus, instead of mobilizing youths for umuganda, absorbing

and helping them to receive adequate higher education can be more productive for economic improvements.

This is especially the case in rural area where informal umuganda takes place irregularly and more often than urban areas, local people, especially those who can otherwise spend time for educational activities in higher education, are withdrawn their opportunities for education. It also can be extended to equity issue as well. This is not a problem only limited to personal level, but it will also have negative impact in the national development in the end.

Although this thesis will not delve into comparing the economic outcome of investing time in higher education and that of umuganda, since the total amount of value created through every umuganda work by a person, as evidenced earlier, is considerably small, it should be noted that such opportunity costs will be taken into account when evaluating umuganda policy. I argue that there can be other better policies that can efficiently reach the same objectives than umuganda policy. Hence, although umuganda can contribute to some extent to poverty reduction, forfeiting people's valued time and energy for umuganda work, coercively and unpredictability, may not be the most cost-efficient way to reach the same goal.

## 4.2. Umuganda for Decentralization and Good Governance

### 4.2.1. Recentralization

Although decentralization has gained theoretical prominence during last few decades, it is still argumentative whether decentralization is effective for bringing country-wide good governance practice. Recentralization, as a rebound of decentralization, recently has begun to be recognized as one of the side-effects of rapid decentralization reforms building on some substantial counter-evidence. For instance, the primary aim of decentralization – devolution of authority to localities – has often turned out to be failing in many countries (Falleti, 2010). Dickovick (2011) also notes that several states are ending up with experiencing recentralization after having adopted decentralization reforms. Borrowing Sommers' (2012) words, “decentralization process appears to provide the national government with opportunities to expand, rather than transfer or devolve, its power and influence”. To put differently, decentralization has tendencies of reinforcing the top-down decision-making process which in the end can lead to the recentralization, instead of decentralization.

Lewis (2014) examined the extent of decentralization and recentralization in Uganda which has adopted decentralization policies along with many sub-Saharan African countries of the time, and investigated how the administrative unit proliferation has reinforced the intergovernmental fiscal, administrative, security and political affairs as illustrated in *Figure 3*. The author asserts that the increased number of administrative

units has, in fact, formed the conditions that allowed power redistribution in favor of the center, instead of the local authorities.

*Figure 3. Elements of Administrative Unit Proliferation that leads to Recentralization*

Fiscal Centralization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Larger quantity of smaller local administrative units; diminished bargaining power with the center</li> </ul>
Administrative Centralization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Lower average capacity of local administrative units</li> </ul>
Security Centralization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•More expansive, far-reaching monitoring network of the center</li> </ul>
Political Centralization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•More expansive, far-reaching patronage network for the center</li> </ul>

(Source: Janet I. Lewis, 2014)

The structure of umuganda is aligned with the administrative structure which consists of multiple levels of layers: National, Province and Kigali City, Districts, Sectors, Cells, and Village or Umudugudu. In each level, as defined in the Prime Minister’s Order, governing bodies are institutionalized to manage and monitor umuganda work from the lower levels as well as that level. While numerous research has been conducted on decentralization process in Rwanda, the role of umuganda and its contribution to decentralization has largely been marginalized from the mainstream.

Despite such structural layout for devolvement of power, umuganda faces several obstacles for strengthening decentralization in Rwanda. The implication for

umuganda can take from Lewis' model is that the increasing number of institutions or units as main stakeholders that have been created for umuganda can result in bringing counter-effects. Unprepared decentralization, for instance, can cause chaos. When rapid proliferation of small units takes place, it only allows little time for the localities to build their capacity to lead.

In fact, decentralization process brought profound and rapid institutional changes in Rwanda (Chemouni, 2014). Undergoing several transformations in 2006, total 14,744 village level units have been newly created and it can be inferred that accordingly 14,744 technical committees for umuganda were also newly institutionalized based on the Prime Minister's Order. Village level is a non-administrative unit; however, it was a main channel for grass-roots mobilization and dissemination of information (Ibid.). According to the Prime Minister's Order, these supervising committees at village level (Article 10) are in charge of wide range of key responsibilities that are indispensable for maintaining umuganda such as planning, preparing, supervising, evaluating, coordinating, sensitizing, and reporting. The operation of local umuganda committees is therefore central for successful implementation and outcome. Therefore, since umuganda mainly takes place from that level, the capacity of village level becomes important when it comes to success of decentralization through umuganda.

However, discouragement is that umuganda technical committees in the village level and those who lead umuganda are not yet experienced in managing umuganda works. According to several reports, the Rwandan government already recognizes the challenges they face in terms of the capabilities of umuganda committees

at District level and below (Umuganda Annual Report, MINALOC, 2011). It is not too surprising, in fact, given that in most cases, particularly in rural areas in African states, newly created units are exposed to weak and fragile conditions where they have many constraints in infrastructure or quality skilled labor (Grossman & Lewis, 2014). They often lack administrative capacity and face difficulties in supporting and sustaining decentralization. For instance, majority of them lack skills for writing reports which may require complex skills. Given these contexts, it is very likely that they become incompetent units or dependent on the center levels and eventually becoming recentralized by reversing decentralization effects.

#### **4.2.2. Top-down Decision-making and Implementation**

As one of the strategic actions for promoting decentralization and good governance, bottom-up process such as needs identification, planning, monitoring, or evaluating have been emphasized (National Decentralization Policy, MINALOC, 2012). Umuganda can foster the bottom-up decision-making practice and encourage people's participation. Active involvement of the public is the essential element that is considered to be valued in decentralization process. In spite of the fact, unfortunately, how umuganda is being carried out in the reality is quite distant from its idealistic type. Types of decisions that could be made for umuganda is vast, including what types of work to be delivered, length of the working time or how often umuganda should take place. However, people are barely given opportunities to freely choose due to the authoritative procedure in practice (Uwimbabazi, 2012). More likely is the types of umuganda work

for that month are only notified to them prior their work regardless of what they think they need (Ibid.).

Top-down decision-making process found throughout umuganda implementation is evidenced by many reports, articles and surveys. For example, majority of participants have shared their thoughts in a survey conducted by Uwimbabazi (2012), that the main reason for the establishment of umuganda after the genocide was to ‘create a channel for communication’ (Kigali 41%, Western Province 32%)<sup>8</sup>. Some respondents and a umudugudu leader in Western Province have interviewed that it is a pervasive perception among people that this type of communication refers to a one-way that comes from the above levels so as to ease the government’s control over people and to make people to commit to the government’s plans (Ibid.).

Another interesting result from this survey was that about 57% of the respondents in Kigali and 73% in Western Province have shared their views that the initiator of current umuganda is the ‘political leaders’. Only 9% and 8% from respective district area have said that umuganda is initiated from ‘community request’. Majority of people think that the traditional element of umuganda, mutual assistance, is fading and the benefits of umuganda no longer reflects the needs of the people; instead it was that of the leadership. Such public perception on contemporary umuganda is exactly the opposite form of how decentralization process should take idealistically.

---

<sup>8</sup> Second highest response was to ‘train the population for self-solving problems’ (Kigali 34%, Western Province 27%).

In addition, the government's perception towards umuganda is not very different from that of the public. Such top-down process is also hinted through expressions used in Rwandan official documents in describing umuganda. For example, a governmental document that outlines the community development strategy illustrates the main use of umuganda as: "dissemination of the local agendas through radio channels and umuganda" (National Strategy for Community Development and Local Economic Development, MINALOC). It is interesting that government perceives umuganda as an effective tool for 'dissemination' of local agendas. This suggests a one-way communicative relationship between the government authority and the local people where umuganda can hardly function key player for bottom-up channel.

Such top-down practice and recentralization is deeply related to two main characters of current umuganda policy: coerciveness and unpredictability. Umuganda policy retains regulatory essence in nature or 'control over people' in order to induce certain desired behavior from them, which in fact largely contradicts with the idea of 'bottom-up'. Once the government has institutionalized umuganda as part of the national framework in the form of mandated labor by passing the umuganda law and made the lower umuganda governing bodies to report to the upper levels by adopting the Prime Minister's Order. This inevitably leads to convergence of the ultimate power to the central government, or recentralization.

On top of this, unpredictability of umuganda worsens the top-down practice. In fact, the existence of informal umuganda complicates the organization and

management of umuganda policy as a whole. For example, people are less informed about the schedule of umuganda until the last minute which hinders them from making their own plans. That is, decisions of informal umuganda is not predictable, unlike formal umuganda.

Predictability is a fundamental part for realization of rule of law together with legal stability (Schwarzschild, 2007). Again, rule of law constitutes an important pillar for good governance. Without respect for predictability, the power of the state has tendencies to be enlarged unlimitedly and become unchecked arbitrary power after all. People under rule cannot decide their own affairs based on the norms that are not trustworthy. Thus, lack of information about when and what type of umuganda work will be organized is certainly a downside of current practice of umuganda.

Unpredictability is also extended to its frequency of umuganda as there is no specific legal basis that stipulates informal umuganda. Seemingly, it was found that people in rural areas, Western province to be specific, residents became to perceive weekly informal umuganda, instead of the monthly formal one, as the main umuganda. (Uwimbabazi, 2012). Too frequent umuganda now became to confuse people of which ones were supposed to be the formal ones. People in Western province have responded in a survey as to the frequency that umuganda is carried out once a week (78%) while most of respondents (95%) in Kigali City have answered as once a month (Ibid, 2012). This leads to another critical social concerns about the gap between urban and rural areas, which will be dealt later in this chapter.

The matter of who is accountable for informal umuganda is another important issue. While formal umuganda refers to the regular umuganda that is mostly led by the government authorities, informal umuganda is organized irregularly mostly depending on the decisions by the state or any institution such as ministries, banks, churches, civil society, and military (Ibid.). Since majority of initiatives are organized from wide range of public institutions and civil associations, it is difficult to identify who holds the accountability. In order for systematic management, it must be clearly defined who and which organizations hold the authority to initiate umuganda, instead of randomly choosing depending on circumstances.

Such coerciveness and unpredictability found throughout umuganda implementation is resulting in reinforcement of top-down practice and recentralization, especially when combined with the incompetent localities. This results in raising doubts about the effectiveness of umuganda in fostering good governance and decentralization. Clearly, top-down process is prevailing in which the decisions regarding even the least part of umuganda such as contents of work and the schedules are not in the hands of those who are the real grass-roots.

#### **4.2.3. Violation of Human rights**

Despite good intentions of umuganda, many have contentiously raised questions on ‘why mandatory?’. Pushing people to umuganda sites, especially those who are not willing to devote oneself to umuganda, is not natural and such forced labor cannot be easily justified. It is actually one of the central issues that may even override

all other listed shortcomings. This human rights issue is a fundamental problem that should have been dealt seriously by Rwandan leadership but failed to be up until now.

As described earlier, the practice of umuganda has become a mandatory practice since colonial period. Before becoming a mandated work, it was a tradition and a voluntary community work that did not entail specific official punishments. However, once it has become a compulsory practice, the leadership that followed to continue to take advantage of umuganda as they experienced great potentials in umuganda use such as development or social control. Kagame government has persistently pursued umuganda policies since its re-adoption in 2007. Ever since president Kagame himself has shown strong official support for umuganda and has participated in umuganda from time to time to encourage people to join the mandatory work.

The utmost human rights issues related to current umuganda policy is about its element of 'forced' labor. Forced labor is strictly forbidden by the international society and Rwanda is also bound by the international law as it has ratified the relevant international conventions. In addition to international law, umuganda also inherently contain potentials to be conflictual with other Rwandan labor related laws or regulations.

Putting aside a wide debate over whether and to what extent international law is legally binding domestically, as Rwanda has joined International Labour Organization (ILO), an international organization that aims to promote labor rights and justice, in 1962 and became a member country. Conventions that have been agreed and ratified by Rwandan government in due course should be respected as a guideline in forming and adjusting domestic laws accordingly. Two of eight effective ILO Fundamental

Conventions directly deals with forced labor issues: Forced Labour Convention (1930, ratified in 2001) and Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957, ratified in 1962). Also, Rwandan Labour Law established in 2001 explicitly forbids forced labor in any circumstances (Article 4) in accordance with ILO conventions.

Forced labor is defined as “all work or service which is extracted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily” (Forced Labour Convention, Article 2.1). Nevertheless, there is some leeway under certain circumstances as Article 2.2 lists and one of which is as follows:

Article 2.2 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Convention, the term forced or compulsory labour shall not include:

(e) *minor communal services* of a kind which, being performed by the members of the community in the *direct interest* of the said community, can therefore be considered as normal civic obligations incumbent upon the members of the community, provided that the members of the community or their direct representatives shall *have the right to be consulted* in regard to the need for such services.

Proponents of mandatory umuganda may argue that it can be understood from the extension of ‘minor communal services’ as in Article 2.2 and thus it does not fall under the international definition of forced labor.

However, umuganda, which mandates almost all population from wide range of age groups, is far from being a *minor community service*, as defined in the criteria to be excluded from forced labor. It is rather a large-scale practice in terms of both the size

of participants but also the size of the work. The ILO Committee has noted from 107<sup>th</sup> session as a Direct Request to Rwandan government in 2017, that “the large-scale participation in umuganda is compulsory and that the infrastructure construction is one of the main activities, the Committee requests the Government to take the necessary measures in order to ensure that community services are limited to ‘minor services’, which constitute an exception to forced labour as provided for in the Convention”. Rwandan government is thereby advised to be cautious about its misuse of umuganda as forced labor. However, unfortunately, Kagame government has not taken any specific measures with regards to such request.

Besides, in many aspects, umuganda does not reflect the *direct interest* of the community as noted in top-down practice in decision making process and implementation. Furthermore, though community members or direct representatives might have been entitled to *rights to consult* policymakers regarding the need for umuganda, but it is not being fully practiced in the reality. Top-down process is already pervasive throughout the practice. Hence, this exception clause, Article 2.2., for forced labor can hardly be applied to umuganda policy.

Furthermore, what makes human rights situation even harder is the existence of informal umuganda. Informal umuganda is basically allowing arbitrary power to the localities in which the power can be overused without checks and balance. This can ultimately infringe the essence of human labor rights and harm rule of law. Such entire complication originates from vague statement in umuganda law, specifically Article 4, where it opens up room widely for unlimited arrangements of umuganda.

One of the primary characteristics of Rwanda is that it maintains two-track strategy in which it fosters relationships with foreign or Western countries, while disregarding the Western norms for human rights and democracy (Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, 2007). It may be an effective strategy; it should be noted, however, if a country does not abide by the law and regulations that they have created on their own or have agreed to, especially when it comes to human rights norms, it inevitably undermines the accountability of government. While Kagame government strives for good governance, umuganda as a forced labor can hardly be justified and is largely incompatible with human rights based political development.

#### **4.2.4. Summary and Implications**

Good governance and decentralization are the primary political goals of umuganda policy. This section examined whether umuganda is effectively attaining these goals and identified several limitations such as recentralization, top-down process, and violation of human rights in nature. First, even though the vertical structure of current umuganda is laid out to decentralize power, there has been counter-effects throughout umuganda practice, due to low capacity of the localities accompanied with rapid proliferation of local units without sufficient preparation or trainings. Power redistribution when local people and leadership who are in charge of main responsibilities to carry out umuganda at the village level are not fully ready eventually can result in recentralization of power, instead of decentralization.

Furthermore, prevalent top-down decision making process is another obstacle that hinders good governance. Although umuganda pursues bottom-up process and implementation ideally and encourages public participation, most of the grass-root level are still excluded from such core processes and instead have fallen to be passive labor provider for the government agendas. Most of the umuganda work are already decided from the higher level which often are alienated from real needs and voices from the local level.

Last but not least, human rights issue is the underlying issue regarding contemporary umuganda that may even override all the other shortcomings. 'Is such mandated form of labor the last resort to be effective?' is an important question to be addressed but often failed to be. Forced labor, without any doubts, is a clear infringement of fundamental human rights and thus good governance cannot be fully obtained unless the element of coercion is eliminated, or at least reduced to acceptable level, from umuganda policy.

What triggers these phenomena? Umuganda as mandatory labor is not only immoral from human rights perspective, but since it already retains the character of regulatory control over the population in itself, it allows recentralization and top-down process. Also, vast unpredictability found in informal umuganda can enlarge the arbitrary and unlimited power of the influential, and eventually harm human rights. Besides, when such unpredictability is combined with incompetence of the localities, it provides reasons for recentralization. Thus, as a combined challenge, it can be inferred

that the effectiveness of umuganda for good governance and decentralization is under constraints due to coerciveness and unpredictability by its structure and practice.

### **4.3. Umuganda for Reconciliation and National Unity**

#### **4.3.1. Diminishing Motivation**

Reconciliation and national unity have been continuously the main interest of Rwanda and umuganda is being valued as an effective instrument to promote the process. How umuganda can help national reconciliation process can be explained with contact theory (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). This meta-analysis study finds that contacts and interactions between groups, so-called intergroup contact, have propensity to decrease the prejudice and foster togetherness among them. Similarly, other studies support that frequent contact between groups can foster connections; for example, Lett (1945) asserted that interracial experiences can bring mutual understanding among them and when groups “are isolated from one another, prejudice and conflict grow like a disease” (Brameld, 1946, p. 245; Watson, 1946).

It was Allport (1954) who first proposed this intergroup contact hypothesis when he categorized four key conditions in which contact situation can bring positive effects: equal status, intergroup cooperation, common goals, and support by social and institutional authorities. *Table 5* describes each condition Allport suggested that should be sufficed to some extent in order to reduce the level of prejudice against one another. Brophy (1946) also support that more frequent contact between different ethnicities

can evolve into developing positive attitudes to one another; or more prone to have friendships that overcome prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998).

*Table 5. Allport's Conditions for Positive Intergroup Contact*

<b>Condition</b>	<b>Meaning</b>	<b>Example</b>	<b>Evidence</b>
<b>Equal Status</b>	Members of the contact situation should not have an unequal, hierarchical relationship	Members should not have an employer/employee, or instructor/student relationship	Evidence has documented that equal status is important both prior to (Brewer & Kramer, 1985) and during (Cohen & Lotan, 1995) the contact situation
<b>Cooperation</b>	Members should work together in a non-competitive environment	Students working together in a group project	Aronson's 'jigsaw technique' structures classrooms so that students strive cooperatively (Aronson & Patnoe, 1997), and this technique has led to positive results in a variety of countries
<b>Common Goals</b>	Members must rely on each other to achieve their shared desired goal	Member of a sports team	Chu and Griffey (1985) have shown the importance of common goals in interracial athletic teams who need to work together to achieve their goal
<b>Support by Social and Institutional Authorities</b>	There should not be social or institutional authorities that explicitly or implicitly sanction contact, and there should be authorities that support positive contact	There should not be official laws enforcing segregation	Landis' (1984) work on the importance of institutional support in reducing prejudice in the military

(Source: Allport, 1954; Everett J.A.C., 2013)

The first step for reconciliation in Rwanda will be to overcome malicious prejudice and history of adversaries between Hutu and Tutsi. Current umuganda policy is designed to help out this process and umuganda in practice also suits the four key conditions proposed by Allport to large extent. Simply put, during umuganda as they work collaboratively (*Cooperation*) for a common task (*Common Goals*), all properly aged Rwandans (*Equal Status*) are asked to participate by the umuganda law and supervised by governmental institutions and organs (*Support*). Thus, thanks to umuganda program people can share moments and make contacts, though mandatorily, not only while carrying out physical commitments, but also while having discussion over their own agendas during and after umuganda work. This can in the end lead to reducing prejudice and completing reconciliation process effectively.

Nevertheless, such scenario can only be effective under the condition of active public participation. The turnout rate of umuganda, formal umuganda, according to the estimation provided by MINALOC, is fairly high. From accumulated annual reports on umuganda, the rate has been on the incremental rise and reached an average of 91.30% in the fiscal year of 2015/2016 (MINALOC, 2016). The participation rate varies across provinces and Kigali City: Northern Province (94.03%), Southern Province (93.69%), Eastern Province (90%), Western Province (89%), and Kigali City (82.2%). The rate is lowest in Kigali City which is the most urbanized area in Rwanda. Despite distinctive gap between urban and rural areas, it is certainly a large number of participants and their contribution is considered to be invaluable.

Umuganda policy basically harnesses ‘carrot and stick’ strategy to increase the awareness of the necessity of umuganda and encourage participation. The government offers a ‘carrot’ to those who best performed through competitions. This Competition was introduced in the year of 2010 and started to reward best umuganda projects and communities. For instance, the best performance from each district is awarded with funding for future umuganda projects, while the best three projects in the national level are also awarded with prize in cash.

On the other hand, participation is also encouraged by punishments, so-called ‘sticks’. People who failed to participate are required to pay fine of FRW 5,000 (about 10 USD) per day according to umuganda law. What is more, umuganda runs an attendance card system in which a card for each person needs to be signed every umuganda (MINALOC). People should carry this card and are asked to present their card whenever the person requests for governmental services. In case the person was found out not having carried out umuganda too often, he or she may be refused to get need from the government. It is also a clear sign that manifests social monitoring and control by the government through umuganda system.

Despite such efforts, it appears that ‘carrot and stick’ strategy is not sustainable, though it might be effective in the short-run, unless the essential nature of umuganda as mandatory labor is eliminated. Due to the existence of attendance card and monetary penalty as punishments, as will be elaborated later, there is growing negative perception among the public about umuganda. This can discourage the sense of motivation and eventually affect the participation rate.

Therefore, it may be too naive to be reassured by the high participation rate at this stage. Participation is certainly an indispensable factor for umuganda, especially for umuganda to complete its mission of national reconciliation. Having based on the intergroup contact theory, the reconciliation process requires as much interactions between people as possible, and larger number of participants can induce increased interactions. To determine their participation, however, they need sufficient level of motivation. Even though umuganda is not of entirely free of choice in terms of participation, there is still autonomy, again, though very limited, for people to self-determine; thus, motivation matters.

Notwithstanding high rate of participation, many local media discover umuganda is largely losing its appeal. People from young generation, for example, perceives umuganda as tiresome extra work. Furthermore, even if they participate, motivation is somewhat spoiled as some youths only come to umuganda every month to chase girls/boys (Mwijuke, April 2014). Because most of the young generation have not experienced the Genocide or only have limited second-hand experience, their motivation for reconciliation may also be less substantial. Since young population is the engine for umuganda in terms of its size and potentials, low interest and diminishing motivation pervasive among youth is certainly a drawback for sustainable umuganda policy.

Population with sufficient income, or middle class and higher, is also rapidly losing their interest in taking part in umuganda (Ibid.). The penalty for non-participation is not a big deal for them and they would rather pay the fee and choose to spend time

on their own. Some people even think that umuganda is only for the lower class, low-paid or unemployed (Ibid.). They often avoid their umuganda duties by sending someone else whom they pay, for instance, and spend their spare time at home during the weekend. It is also related to the high opportunity cost of participating in umuganda as explained in the earlier section. In fact, this raises the equity issue between social classes which will be dealt in the following section of this thesis.

Some people do not appreciate the need of the community work as they think it is already “always clean” and some grudge about double charge of fee (Ibid.). At some sector level, people are required to pay a mandatory fee of FRW 1,000 per month for cleaning services and people question why they should do umuganda when they have already paid for the work (Ibid.). Besides, people distrust the leadership who only appear in the last minute for the picture time or for the meeting that takes place after the umuganda to chair the discussion (Ibid.).

Growing discontent and complaints should not be overshadowed by the optimistic turnout rate. These unfolding signs will eventually affect people’s motivation in deciding their participation. Stukas et al. (1999) argued mandatory volunteerism is found to reduce the motivation of participation. This study was organized and conducted to examine mandatory volunteerism programs, particularly those in schools, to find out the effects of requirements on future behavioral intentions. The result was quite straightforward – when people feel stronger external controls to carry out a certain behavior, the level of intention of volunteering in future diminishes.

McBride et al. (2006) also argue that the success of a certain government service program depends on the participant's motivation. Sen (1999) asserted that policies with freedom of choice can bring more sustainable outcomes. Obadare (2005) argued that requirements without being given freedom of choice can hinder developing active citizenship. As many scholars have evidenced, it needs to be reminded that mandatory-based umuganda will gradually nibble on people's motivation and therefore will not be effective in attracting as much as participation in the long-term despite the high turnout rate at current stage and eventually end up with disappointments.

Given all these contexts, will umuganda be effective and successful in reaching the goals of reconciliation? The answer will be – it depends on how much people can be motivated. Reconciliation requires participation, and in order to increase the participation rate, people must be motivated other than being simply mandated. Coercion may seem effective as a working strategy in the short term, but it certainly will not last as long as the leadership might expect. Based on the findings from Stukas et al. (1999) and others, compulsory and regulative umuganda policy will eventually lessen people's intention to participate in future umuganda works and there are already emerging signs throughout Rwandan society. Thus, the coercive nature of contemporary umuganda policy renders itself unsustainable and less effective for reconciliation and unity.

### 4.3.2. Reinforcement of Social Cleavages

Triggers for social cleavage are not only limited to ethnicities, but also can be based on class, gender, race, religion, or generation, etc. It generally undermines social cooperation and stimulate social conflicts. Reconciliation efforts in Rwanda, including umuganda, has been mainly focused on rebuilding amicable relationship between ethnicities who have long histories of adversaries to one another. However, while concentrating reconciliation efforts for ethnic division, cleavages are also being found to be elsewhere in Rwandan society and umuganda seems to be in the midst of developing and reinforcing new sets of social cleavages such as rich versus poor or urban versus rural.

This issue particularly concerns ‘equity’ from 3-e framework. Process equity can be examined by seeing whether the duty of umuganda policy is equally distributed to every person, without advantaging or disadvantaging certain group of people. Even though it is institutionalized to be equally applied to every eligible Rwandans, how it is being practiced in the reality is a different story. In other words, umuganda can become inequitable while being implemented despite its right intentions.

First, the coercive nature of contemporary umuganda policy can ignite a social issue of income gap. The monetary penalty for not attending umuganda is FRW 5,000 and it is the fixed value that is equally applied to every Rwandan who has the duty. Penalty is a type of punishment to induce desirable behavior from people; however, how effective the penalty is not absolute, rather it is relative and subjective. In fact, FRW 5,000 is a large amount of money for many people in Rwanda given that median

net hourly wage is FRW 450 (Besamusca et al., 2013). Those who feel pressure will make their way to attend umuganda, while it is a negligible amount to people in middle or higher class. In this case, the poor do most of the physical work while the rich enjoy their time by simply paying the fine or paying someone else to substitute him or her.

On the one hand, unpredictability that comes from informal umuganda is also a contributing factor to exacerbating the geographical gaps between urban and rural areas. First of all, there is more frequent call for umuganda in rural areas. When considering that main umuganda activities are cleaning streets, building houses, and constructing roads, and the fact that umuganda can be called whenever deemed necessary in addition to the formal ones, residents from rural areas are more often asked for umuganda than those in urban areas. Uwimbabazi (2012) observed that in Western Province residents carry out weekly, not monthly, umuganda. This may partially attribute to the different starting point between rural and urban areas. Because rural areas are less developed, there is higher possibility for such need, and thus more often people are forced to commit themselves to physical work. For instance, during the rainy season in Rwanda the rural area where often lack infrastructure such as poor roads, people are asked to carry out umuganda to clean the streets that have been flooded by the hard rain (Ibid.; from a focus group discussion in December 2010).

Furthermore, it turned out that the participation rate is substantially higher in the rural area than in Kigali City (from multiple Umuganda Annual Reports, MINALOC). Only 4% of Kigali residents have answered that they participate in umuganda 'all the time', while 41% have responded so in the Western Province

(Uwimbabazi, 2012). There may be several different explanations in account for the gap such as less control over people in Kigali City or weak application of penalty system; nevertheless, regardless of the reasons, it implies that if you live in rural area, you are more exposed to the environment to make yourself available for umuganda work, either voluntarily or involuntarily.

To recap, current umuganda practice and its features manifest great potential of becoming a source for creating or reinforcing adversaries and discrimination, between rich and poor; urban and rural. This is certainly a step backward from the goal of reconciliation and national unity as the original mission was to seek values such as trust, tolerance, mutual respect, and equality throughout the nation.

#### **4.3.3. Summary and Implications**

Because the mandated labor mobilization system of umuganda is less attractive in the long term, the motivation for people to decide their participation can inevitably decrease. To attain reconciliation and national unity, however, public participation is an indispensable factor since it requires people's physical gatherings and contacts which can help them overcome the prejudice against each other. Not only coercive umuganda but unpredictable umuganda also frustrates residents. Thus, if the motivation decreases, it is quite natural that the participation rate will diminish and eventually effectiveness of umuganda for achieving reconciliation becomes highly questionable.

Another issue that revolves around umuganda's mission for unity and reconciliation is whether the duty for umuganda is equally levied upon every member

regardless of their residence or social class. There turned out to be high tendency that those who are poorer and those who live in rural areas actually do more umuganda work due to coerciveness and unpredictability. The implication here is that umuganda policy is yet to obtain the process equity. Although, by umuganda law, every properly aged person should take part in the activities, there exists a clear gap in the frequency of umuganda work and the level of pressure a person feels from the penalty for non-participation and the actual burden, which, in effect, harm the 'equity' dimension of umuganda policy. In the long run, it should be warned that this equity issue can transform into a contributing source for newly creating or reinforcing social cleavages which may reverse unity and reconciliation effects of umuganda.

## V. Conclusion

There are both lights and shadows in every policy. Policy review with a balanced approach at the adequate timing can help realize its strengths and weaknesses and redirect the policy if necessary. Umuganda is a multi-purposed mandatory community work program in Rwanda and has evolved in close relations with other governmental programs under Kagame government. In spite of its good intentions, how effectively, efficiently and equitably current umuganda policy is being carried out is an important, but often disregarded question. Numerous government reports and policy documents have been found to easily presume umuganda as a successful policy without a serious contemplation based on balanced and long-term perspective. This thesis, therefore, aimed to raise awareness on the less successful side of current umuganda policy at this stage and to provide some useful insights for for better policy outcomes in the future.

Umuganda, since its revival in Rwandan society, has become more systematic and organized community work than ever in its history. Kagame government has laid out the specifics of umuganda and legally institutionalized its governing organs and working mechanisms. It, indeed, brought economic and social benefits by contributing to national projects such as infrastructure construction or environment protection activities and by acting as a forum for community as part of the community development scheme. The absolute figure of the estimated economic value generated from umuganda is certainly a remarkable achievement given the harsh initial conditions.

Such economic contribution is quite straightforward as it exploits free public labor without concrete compensation. Besides, it is acknowledgeable that there are bright sides for it indeed enhances, to some extent, public participation and thereby helping redistribution of power to localities and grassroots. It also contributes to fostering social cohesion among community members and brings togetherness.

Notwithstanding the benefits, it should not be overshadowed that the emerging challenges in current implementation of umuganda policy may reverse the positive effects of umuganda in the long run. In order to secure more successful and lasting outcomes, I assert that its objectives should be attained more effectively, efficiently, and equitably by tackling the underlying structural problems of coerciveness and unpredictability.

Due to its coerciveness, it affects public's attitude towards umuganda. It reduces people's motivation to actively engage in umuganda works, which thereby not only decreases participation rate, but also lowers efficiency or productivity. Since people are pulled out forcefully to attend umuganda, people cannot make rational decisions based on their own calculations of the opportunity cost, which eventually increases the total cost of umuganda policy and nibble on its effectiveness for poverty reduction.

Not only that, but compelled participation also couples with the top-down practice detected throughout overall umuganda structure, because in its nature the central government already controls over people by setting out the governing organizations. It is quite ironic that while having extensive influence and control over

people, the government seeks decentralization and bottom up effects. Besides, it inherently violates human rights in the form of forced labor which raises reasonable doubts on the effectiveness of umuganda on good governance.

Similar story applies to the other pillar of unity and reconciliation – forced participation is not sustainable and there are emerging signs of complaints and dissatisfaction about disparity found throughout implementation of umuganda. This is detrimental in fostering unity, which requires physical and mental interactions with one another while being engaged in the activities. Once they feel mistreated or do not appreciate the necessity of umuganda work, their motivation for participation fades away and eventually harm unity and reconciliation efforts.

The other important character of umuganda, unpredictability, is mainly developed from informal umuganda, which is a type of umuganda that is implicitly encouraged by the gray area of existing regulation. By allowing other authorities such as social institutions and localities the leverage of organizing umuganda, umuganda activities are practically arranged more than once a month, which is originally supposed to be the formal umuganda day. What matters more to most of the population is the informal umuganda, as it is being overly used. Many of the decisions made for informal umuganda such as venue, frequency, or accountability, is highly unpredictable.

Such unpredictability of umuganda can cause low productivity in many sense. Since people are only informed in the last minute of the umuganda work, and even in some cases, people do not carry the tool necessary for the work due to lack of

information. Furthermore, their motivation for active participation is affected when umuganda is organized in a random schedule by a wide range of institutions. This is a source for tremendous increase in opportunity cost since unpredictable umuganda implies an unlimited frequency with unlimited length of work time.

In fact, unpredictability is another way of understanding 'flexibility'. Such flexibility was originally designed to empower localities instead of focusing decision making power to the center; nonetheless, it turned out that unpredictability, especially when combined with the incompetence of the local institutions, such as poor planning or overall administration, reinforced recentralization, instead of idealistic decentralization. Also, arbitrary implementation infringes the essence of human labor rights and rule of law for good governance.

Unclear and vague regulation of informal umuganda is also working as a source for inequitable allocation of the burden between people. Rural people are called more often for umuganda work than those who reside in urban areas in which rural residents are inequitably treated. Together with the social cleavage between the poor and the rich due to its coerciveness, contemporary umuganda, in its nature, triggers or reinforces new or existing social cleavages in Rwandan society.

Likewise, due to the structural deficiencies of contemporary settings for umuganda, it is having undeniable impacts on the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of umuganda policy. All these shortcomings found in current umuganda may not be entirely new and Rwandan government may already have recognized some of these

challenges. Nonetheless, there seems to be clear lack of resolution and specific action plans from the governmental level and yet it is less willing to address these problems more upfront.

This is by no means to argue that current policy and practice of umuganda is a complete failure; rather, this thesis proposes that a careful reexamination of current umuganda policy at this point is a prerequisite for fruitful outcomes in the long run. By building a balanced knowledge base from multi-perspective with regards to current umuganda policy and identifying its consequences, more informed policy-making and adjustments can be realized for better policy outcomes. It is also recommendable that those countries that have shown sincere interests in importing umuganda to their countries, for instance, by only looking at its commendable aspects, should ponder on the real fit of umuganda policy into their country contexts by considering these significant challenges Rwanda faces nowadays.

# Bibliography

- African Rights (1995). *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*. London.
- African Development Report (1999). *Africa in the World Economy: Infrastructure and Development in Africa*. African Development Bank. Oxford University Press.
- Allport, G.W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. MA: Addison Wesley.
- Anderson, J.E. (2011). *Public Policymaking: An introduction* (7th ed.). Boston, MA: Cengage.
- Anderson, E.J., Brady, W.D., & Bullock, C. III (1984). *Public Policy and Politics in the United States* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Monterey, CA:Brooks/Cole.
- Angelsen, A. (Ed.) (2009a). Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options. *Center for International Forestry Research*, Bogor.
- Angelsen, A. (2009b). Policy options to reduce deforestation. In: Angelsen, A. (Ed.), Realising REDD+: National Strategy and Policy Options. *Center for International Forestry Research*, Bogor, pp. 125–138.
- Aroian, K.J., Wu, B. & Tran, T.V. (2005). Healthcare and social service use among Chinese Immigrant elders. *Research in Nursing and Health*, 28(2).
- Aronson, E. & Patnoe, S. (1997). *The jigsaw classroom: Building cooperation in the classroom*. New York: Longman.
- Badelt, C. and A. Österle (2001). *Grundzüge der Sozialpolitik. Allgemeiner Teil: Sozialökonomische Grundlagen*, 2nd ed. Wien: Manz.

Bates, S. (2012). From the Ground Up: The Historical Roots of Umuganda in Rwandan Economic and Political Development. *Master of Arts in Liberal Studies (MALS) Student Scholarship*. 83. Retrieved from [https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/mals\\_stu\\_schol/83](https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/mals_stu_schol/83)

Barr, N. (1998). *The Economics of the Welfare State*, 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barnhart, J. (2011). Umuganda: The Ultimate Nation-Building Project?. *The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee*. 2(1): Article 3.

Becker, G. S. (1964). *Human Capital*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Besamusca, J., Tijdens, K., Tingum, E.N. & Mbassana E.M. (2013). Wages in Rwanda: Wage Indicator survey 2012. *Wage Indicator Data Report*. Amsterdam: Wage Indicator Foundation.

Bezy, F. (1990). Rwanda: Bilan socio-économique d'un régime 1962-1989. Louvain-la-Neuve, France: Instiut d'etude des pays en developpement.

Bhavnani, R. (2006). Ethnic Norms and Interethnic Violence: Accounting for Mass Participation in the Rwandan Genocide. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(6): 651 -669.

Bonnier, E., Poulsen, J., Rogall, T. & Stryjan, M. (2015). Preparing for Genocide: Community Work in Rwanda. *Working papers from Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)*. Stockholm School of Economics.

Boudreaux, K. (2009). Land conflict and genocide in Rwanda. *The Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development*, 1(3).

Brameld, T. (1946). *Minority problems in the public schools*. New York: Harper.

- Brewer, M.B., & Kramer, R.M. (1985). The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behavior. *Annual review of psychology*, 36(1): 219-243.
- Brophy, I.N. (1946). The luxury of anti-Negro prejudice. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 9: 456-466.
- Buck, Susan J. (1989). Cultural Theory and Management of Common Pool Resources. *Human Ecology*, 17: 101-116.
- Chemouni, B. (2014). Explaining the design of the Rwandan decentralization: elite vulnerability and the territorial repartition of power. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8(2): 246-262. DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2014.891800
- Christenson, J.A. & Robinson, J.W. (1989). *Community development in perspective*. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- Chu, D. & Griffey, D. (1985). The contact theory of racial integration: The case of sport. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 2(4): 323-333.
- Cohen, E.G. & Lotan, R.A. (1995). Producing equal-status interaction in the heterogeneous classroom. *American Educational Research Journal*, 32(1): 99-120.
- Davis, P., Milne, B., Parker, K., Hider, P., Lay-Yee, R., Cumming, J. & Graham, P. (2013). Efficiency, effectiveness, equity (E3). Evaluating hospital performance in three dimensions. *Health policy*, 112(1-2), 19-27. DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.02.008
- Demers, A. & Renaud, L. (1992). Formative Evaluation of a Nutritional Marketing Project in City-Center Restaurants. *Evaluation Review*, 16(6): 634-649.

Des Forges, A. (1999). *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Des Forges, A. (1972). Defeat is the only bad news: Rwanda under Musiinga, 1896-1931. Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University.

Dickovick, J.T. (2011). *Decentralization and Recentralization in the Developing World: Comparative Studies from Africa and Latin America*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Dickovick, J.T. & Eaton, K. (2004). The Politics of Re-Centralization in Argentina and Brazil. *Latin American Research Review*, 39(1): 90-122.

Dunbar, O.J. (2011). The Bedrock of Community Development, *Journal of the Community Development Society*, 3(2): 42-53. DOI: 10.1080/15575330.1972.9674817

Everett, J.A.C. (2013). Intergroup Contact Theory: Past, Present, and Future. *In-Mind* (17).

Falleti, T.G. (2010). *Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Frederickson, H.G. (2005). The state of social equity in American public administration. *National Civic Review*, 31–38. Retrieved from Academic Search Premiere.

Frederickson, H.G. (2010). Social equity and public administration: origins, developments and applications. Armonk, NY: M.C. Sharpe.

Grossman, G. & Lewis, J.I. (2014). Administrative Unit Proliferation, *American Political Science Review*, 108(1): 196–207.

Golany, B. & Tamir, E. (1995). Evaluating efficiency-effectiveness-equality trade-offs: a data envelopment analysis approach. *Management Science*, 41 (7): 1172–1184. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.41.7.1172

Guo, Y., Fu, Y., Chui, E. & Xue M. (2016). Equity, efficiency and effectiveness: an evaluation study of the urban minimum livelihood guarantee scheme in China, *Journal of Asian Public Policy*, 10(2): 143-157, DOI: 10.1080/17516234.2016.1242187

Hintjens, M.H. (1999). Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37(2): 241-286.

Human Development Report (2009). United Nations Development Program. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ife, J.J. & Fiske, L. (2006). Human rights and community work: Complementary theories and practices. *International Social Work*, 49(3): 297-308.

International Labour Organization (1930). Forced Labour Convention.

International Labour Organization (1957). Abolition of Forced Labour Convention.

Jefremovas, V. (1997). Contested identities: Power and the fictions of ethnicity, ethnography, and history in Rwanda. *Anthropologica*, 39(112): 91-104.

Kakumba, U. (2010). Local government citizen participation and rural development: reflections on Uganda's decentralization system, *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 76(1): 171-186, DOI: 10.1177/0020852309359049

Kigabo, T.R. (2008). Leadership, Policy-making, Quality of Economic Policies and their inclusiveness: The case of Rwanda. *Commission on Growth and Development*. Washington, DC. pp. 1-19.

Lemarchand, R. (1994). Managing transition anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi, and South Africa in comparative perspective. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32(4): 581-604.

Landis, D., Hope, R.O. & Day, H.R. (1984). Training for desegregation in the military. In Miller & Brewer, pp. 257-278.

Lett, H.A. (1945). Techniques for achieving interracial cooperation. Proceedings of the Institute on Race Relations and Community Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago and the American Council on Race Relations.

Lewis, I. J. (2014). When Decentralization Leads to Recentralization: Subnational State Transformation in Uganda, *Regional & Federal Studies*, 24(5): 571-588. DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2014.971771

Li, D. (2007). Echoes of violence: Considerations on radio and genocide in Rwanda. In Thompson, A. (Ed.). *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* (pp. 90-109). London: Pluto Press.

McBride, M. A., Brav, J., Menon, N. & Sherraden, M. (2006). Limitations of civic service: critical perspectives, *Community Development Journal*, 41(3): 307-320. DOI: 10.1093/cdj/bsl010

Mamdani, M. (1996). *Citizen and Subject: contemporary Africa and the Legacy of late colonialism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mamdani, M. (2001). *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Matfess, H. (2015). Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental Authoritarianism and the New Politics of African Strong Men. *African Studies Review*, 58: 181-204. DOI: 10.1017/asr.2015.43

Mezirow, J. D. (1963). *Dynamics of community development*. New York: Scarecrow Press.

Mincer, Jacob (1974). *Schooling, Earnings, and Experience*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Muller, D., & Judd, C.M. (2005). Direct and indirect effects. In B. Everitt, & D. Howell (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of statistics in behavioral science*. New York, NY: Wiley.

Mukarubuga, C. (2006). The Experience of Social Forums Against Poverty: the case of Rwanda. *Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development*, pp. 1 - 36.

Mwijuke, G. (2014, April 4). 'Umuganda' losing appeal among Rwandan youth and middle class. Retrieved from <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/magazine/Umuganda-losing-appeal-among-Rwandan-youth-and-middle-class/434746-2270658-opad4j/index.html>

Nadeem, M. (2016). Analyzing Good Governance and Decentralization in Developing Countries. *Journal of Political Science and Public Policy Affairs*, 4(3): 209. DOI: 10.4172/2332-0761.1000209

Nagel, S. (1986). Efficiency, effectiveness and equity in public policy evaluation. *Policy Studies Review*. 6(1): 99–120. DOI: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.1986.tb00651.x

Nagel, S. (2001). *Handbook of public policy evaluation*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.

Newbury, C. (1988). *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960*. New York: Columbia University.

Newbury, D. (1991). *Kings and Clans*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Newbury, C. (1995). "Background to Genocide: Rwanda Issue." *A Journal of Opinion*, 23(2): 12-17.

Obadare, E. (2005). *Statism, Youth and the Civic Imagination: A Critical Study of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) Programme in Nigeria*, a research report, Center for Social Development, Washington University, St. Louis.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2007). *Good Governance Practices for Protection of Human Rights*.

Österle, A (2002). Evaluating Equity in Social Policy: A Framework for Comparative Analysis. *Evaluation*, January 2002, 8(1): 46-59. DOI: 10.1177/1358902002008001516

Pettigrew, T.F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. *Annual review of psychology*, 49(1): 65-85.

Pettigrew, T.F., & Tropp, L.R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5): 751-783. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.751

- Popple, K. (1995). *Analysing Community Work. Its Theory and Practice*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Pottier, J. (2002). *Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century*. New York: Cambridge University.
- Prendergast, J, & Thomas-Jensen, C. (2007). Blowing the Horn. *Foreign Affairs*, 86(2): 59–74.
- Prunier, G. (1995). *The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of Genocide*. London: Hurst.
- Psacharopoulos, G. (1984). *The Contribution of Education to Economic Growth: International Comparisons*. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co.
- Reinke, W.A. (1994). Program Evaluation: Considerations of Effectiveness, Efficiency and Equity. *Journal of Family and Community Medicine*, 1(1): 61-71.
- Republic of Rwanda (2007). Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda. Law Establishing Community Work in Rwanda. No 53/2007 of 17/11/2007. Kigali.
- Republic of Rwanda (2009) Prime Minister's Order No 58.03 on Community Works Umuganda Supervising Committees. Kigali.
- Republic of Rwanda (2001). Community Development Policy. Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Kigali.
- Republic of Rwanda (2008). Community Development Policy Revised Version. Ministry of Local Government. Kigali.
- Republic of Rwanda (2003). Rwandan Constitution. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2012). National Decentralization Policy Revised Version. Ministry of Local Government. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2007). Rwanda Decentralisation Strategic Framework: Towards a sector-wide approach for decentralization implementation. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2000). Vision 2020. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2009). Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy I. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2013). Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy II. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2007). National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation. National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2011). Umuganda Annual Report 2010/2011. Ministry of Local Government. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2016). Umuganda Annual Report 2015/2016. Ministry of Local Government. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2007). Rwanda Decentralisation Strategic Framework: Towards a sectorwide approach for decentralization implementation. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Kigali.

Rwanda Governance Board (2017). Impact Assessment of Umuganda 2007-2016. Kigali.

Republic of Rwanda (2008). Rwanda Joint Governance Assessment Report. Kigali.

Schaefer, B. (2001). Social Struggle, Genocide and World Market Integration in Africa. *Anti-Imperialism in Africa Discussion*, 1(1): 1-32.

Schwarzschild, Maimon (2007). Keeping it Private. *San Diego Law Review*, Vol. 44; San Diego Legal Studies Paper, No. 08-006. Available at SSRN: [ssrn.com/abstract=1084988](https://ssrn.com/abstract=1084988)

Sellström, T. (1996). The international Response to conflict and Genocide: lessons from Rwanda Experience. Steering committee of the joint evaluation of emergence assistance to Rwanda, pp.1-92.

Sen, A. (1999). *Development as freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, D.N. (1998). The psychocultural roots of genocide: Legitimacy and crisis in Rwanda. *American Psychologist*, 53(7): 743-53.

Sommers, M. Stuck (2012). *Rwandan Youth and the Struggle for Adulthood*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Stern, N. (2008). The Economics of Climate Change. *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings*, 98(2): 1-37.

Straus, S. (2006). *The Role of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*. London: Cornell University.

- Stukas, A.A., Snyder, M., & Clary, G.E. (1999). The Effects of "Mandatory Volunteerism" on Intentions to Volunteer. *Special Topics, General*. Paper 40.
- Thomson, S. M. (2009). Resisting Reconciliation: State Power and Everyday Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda. PhD Dissertation in Political Science. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University.
- Uvin, P. (2001). Reading the Rwandan genocide. *International Studies Review*, 3(3): 75-99.
- Uwimbabazi, P. (2012). An Analysis of Umuganda: The Policy and Practice of Community Work in Rwanda. PhD Dissertation in Policy and Development Studies. Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal.
- Uwimbabazi, P. & Lawrence, R. (2011). Compelling Factors of Urbanization and Rural-urban Migration in Rwanda. *Rwanda Journal*, 22(B): 9-26.
- Verwimp, P. (2000). Development Ideology, the Peasantry and Genocide; Rwanda Represented in Habyarimana's speeches. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2(3): 325-361.
- Verwimp, P. (2003). The Political Economy of Coffee, Dictatorship, and Genocide. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 19(2): 161-181.
- Verwimp, P. (2004). Death and Survival During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. *Population Studies*, 58(2): 233 - 245.
- Verwimp, P. (2005). An Economic Profile of Peasant Perpetrators of Genocide, Micro-level Evidence from Rwanda. *Journal of Development Economics*, 77(2): 297-323.
- Vidal, C. (1995). Les politiques de la Haine. *Les temps modernes*, 583: 6-23.

Voth, D.E. & Brewster, M. (1989). An overview of international community development. In James A. Christenson, J.A. & Robinson, J.W. Jr. (ed.). *Community Development in Perspective* (pp. 280-306). Ames: Iowa State University Press.

Wang, Y. & Liu, S. (2016). Education, Human Capital and Economic Growth: Empirical Research on 55 Countries and Regions (1960-2009). *Theoretical Economics Letters*, 6: 347-355. DOI: 10.4236/tel.2016.62039

Watson, G. (1946). Unity for action. *Jewish Affairs*, 1: 3–22.

Weimer, D.L. & Vining, A. (2009). *Policy analysis: concepts and practice*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

White, C.S. (1996). Depoliticising development: The uses and abuses of participation, *Development in Practice*, 6(1): 6-15, DOI: 10.1080/0961452961000157564

Wilson, T. and D. Wilson (Ed.) (1991). *The State and Social Welfare. The Objectives of Policy*. London: Longman.

Wunsch, J.S. (2001). Decentralization, Local Governance and “Recentralization” in Africa, *Public Administration and Development*, 21: 277–288.

## **Websites**

Chieni, S.N. *The Harambee Movement in Kenya: The Role Played by Kenyans and the Government in the Provision of Education and Other Social Services*. Department of Educational Foundations. MOI University. Kenya. Retrieved from <http://boleswa97.tripod.com/chieni.htm/> Accessed on 12 December 2017.

Kwibuka, E. (2015). Umuganda is essential to our development, Kagame says. *The New Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-11-01/194003/> Accessed on 4 November 2016.

Rwanda Governance Board. *Umuganda*. Retrieved from <http://rgb.rw/home-grown-solutions/rwandas-hgs-good-practices/umuganda/> Accessed on 12 December 2017.

## 논문 초록 (Abstract in Korean)

# Revisiting Umuganda in Rwanda

: A Study of Umuganda Policy and Its Limitations

김예송

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

2000년 폴 카가메 정부의 등장 이후 르완다는 정치·경제·사회·문화적 붕괴를 초래한 1994년 르완다 학살의 상흔을 딛고 국가발전의 토대를 마련하기 시작하였다. 빈곤감소를 비롯하여 정치 권력의 분산, 민주화 및 인권보호, 대국민화해 등 당면한 국가과제들을 해결하기 위한 노력의 일환으로 정권 초기에 국민동원운동인 우무간다 정책을 공식적으로 채택하였다. 도입 결정 이후 약 10여년간 전국적으로 시행된 우무간다 정책은 성과에 대한 낙관적인 기대를 바탕으로 현 카가메 정부의 꾸준한 지지를 받고 있다. 하지만 사실상 전국민의 참여가 전제된 동 정책의 규모에 비해 보다 더 진지한 고민과 성찰은 전반적으로 결여되어 있다. 해당 논문은 우무간다 정책의 표면적인 성과에 가려 그간 저평가되거나 충분히 고려되지 않았던 한계점에 대해 분석하고자 하였다. 구체적으로는 효과성(effectiveness)과 효율성(efficiency), 형평성(equity) 등의 측면에서 동 정책의 한계점을 확인하고, 우무간다 정책의 본질적이고 구조적인 특성에서 비롯된 강제성(coerciveness)과 예측불가능성(unpredictability)을 근본적인 원인으로 지목하여 증명하고자 하였다. 본 논문은 카가메 정부 하의 우무간다 정책에

대한 종합적인 이해를 도모하고 향후 정책의 개선방향에 대한 주요한 논의점을 제공한다는 점에서 학문 및 정책적 의의가 있다.

**주요어:** 우무간다, 국민동원운동, 빈곤감소, 권력의 재집중, 국민화해, 굿거버넌스

**학 번:** 2015-25016