Organizational Control Mechanisms and Organizational Citizenship Behavior*

Jeong-Yeon Lee**

I. Introduction

Recent conflicting evidence against the traditional conceptualization of Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) (Organ, 1988) raises the need to further investigate how employees actually view and perceive OCB. Traditionally, OCB was considered an extra-role behavior where it is “(1) not specified in advance by role descriptions; (2) not recognized by formal reward systems; and

* This study was supported by the Institute of Management Research at Seoul National University.
** Seoul National University Business School (jaytalks@snu.ac.kr)
(3) not a source of punitive consequences when not performed by job incumbents" (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998, p. 108). However, there has been evidence that challenges this traditional conceptualization of OCB. For example, (1) OCB is considered an in-role rather than extra-role behavior by some employees (Morrison, 1994); (2) OCB is formally rewarded (Orr, Mercer, & Sackett, 1989); and (3) OCB might be self-serving rather than organization- or other-serving thus possibly downgrading the "willingness to cooperate" notion associated with OCB (Bolino, 1999). Acknowledging this evidence, Organ (1997) later redefines OCB in terms of contextual performance (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Motowidlo & Vanscotter, 1994) that does not preclude an employee's engagement in OCB to increase the possibility of reward (Lam, Hui, & Law, 1999).

Facing the traditional and, on the other hand, the newer conceptualization of OCB, researchers are left with the need to develop a theoretical framework that will neatly explain the conflicting characteristics of OCB. In other words, if OCB can be both an in-role and extra-role behavior, then what are the characteristics that make those different perceptions and what makes the perception of reward characteristics on OCB different among employees? Furthermore, how will these different perceptions impact the engagement of OCB and possibly propose a contingency where the relationship between the traditional antecedent of OCB and actual OCB may differ? These are the research questions that the present study will investigate.

To provide a theoretical framework that answers these questions, the current study emphasizes the view that a conflicting understanding (extra- vs. in-role, formally rewarded or not, self-serving vs. other serving) associated with OCB starts from how organizations view OCB and how organizations try to control it. This view is different from traditional approaches of OCB research where the main forces of OCB were left to individual discretion, i.e., personal attitudes and individual dispositions. This paper posits that if organizations view OCB as an important organizational asset and actively try to control it,
then an employee's definition of OCB depending on organizational control mechanisms will not only predict the level of OCB but also constrain or strengthen the relationship between attitudes/dispositions of OCB, which has been the traditional focus of OCB research (Organ & Ryan, 1995).

Thus, this paper theorizes how organizational control mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 1985; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Ouchi, 1979, 1980) might affect the perception of employees on OCB as an important part of their job behavior. The paper also provides the possibility that perception can be captured by the notion of the 'zone of indifference' developed by Barnard (1938).

II. Three Notions that Challenges the Traditional Concepts of OCB

OCB was traditionally defined as "individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization" (Organ, 1988). Organ further argues "by discretionary, we mean that the behavior is not an enforceable requirement of the role or job description, that is, the clearly specifiable terms of the person's employment contract with the organization: the behavior is rather a matter of personal choice, such that omission is not generally understood as punishable." Perhaps the discretionary nature and the lack of specification of OCB by the formal reward/punishment system is the strongest appeal as to why researchers typically have categorized OCB into extra-role behaviors (Van Dyne, Cummings, & Parks, 1995; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). In addition to the idea of OCB as an extra-role behavior, OCB has been typically understood as the currency of reciprocation on the basis of social exchange toward another individual within an organization (OCB-I) or employer (OCB-O) beyond short term self-interest. Due to the social exchange characteristics
that go beyond short term self-interest, typically the motivation behind OCB has been understood toward other-serving rather than self-serving. However, recently there have been theoretical accounts and empirical investigations that have challenged the traditional concept of OCB. Three notions that are of note here though somewhat interrelated are: (1) OCB may not be extra-role behaviors, (2) OCB may be formally compensated, (2) the motivational basis of OCB is not self-less but self-serving negating the notion of the "good soldier syndrome" but proposing a "good actor syndrome".

1. OCB may not be an extra-role behavior

The first notion that made researchers rethink the concept of OCB is the evidence that OCB is defined as an in-role rather than extra-role behavior by some employees. Morrison (1994) especially emphasizes the subjective nature of employees in understanding OCB as part of their role behavior. She further suggests that the way employees define their responsibilities (especially the broadness of perceived responsibilities) will predict their engagement in OCB.

Bacharach and Jex (2000) discovered that people with a positive mood state tend to interpret the job behaviors as a more broad, confirming the ‘job breadth’ notion of Morrison (1994). The result of their study indicated that a mood state can cause a wider interpretation of role behavior. Even though Bacharach and Jex (2000) did not suggest this, it implies that it follows Morisson's (1994) idea that this wider interpretation then will somehow cause different levels of OCB. In other words, a mood state (or fairness perception) and OCB will be mediated by a wider role or job breadth.

A wider interpretation of role behavior in explaining OCB and also employee attitude is seen with more sophistication by the study of Tepper, Lockhart, and Hoobler (2001). They further tested Morrison's (1994) idea of job breadth or role definition affecting citizenship behavior. They focused on two possible
effects of role definition: a role discretion effect and a role enlargement effect. A role enlargement effect depicts a situation where role definition (OCB as in-role/extra-role) mediates employee attitudes and OCB as Morrison (1994) suggested. And, a role discretion effect happens when role definition moderates employee attitudes and OCB. They found support for a role discretion effect where role definition moderated the linkage between attitudes and OCB. More specifically, the relationship between attitude and performance was stronger for those who perceived OCB as in-role behaviors than those who perceived OCB as extra-role behaviors. This is somewhat different from Morrison’s idea in that job breadth directly affects the levels of OCB. In other words, a wider role perception may not directly affect the levels of OCB but moderate attitudes and OCB.

2. OCB may be formally compensated

Against the traditional notion that OCB is not formally rewarded or punished, Orr, Sackett, & Mercer (1989) argue that supervisors take OCB into consideration when they attach a dollar value to work performance. Performance appraisal which is most likely to turn into organizational reward is repeatedly proved to be significantly related with OCB (Allen & Rush, 1998; Mackenzie, Podsakoff, & Fetter, 1991, 1993; Podsakoff, Ahearne, & MacKenzie, 1997; Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1997). Hui, Lam, and Law (2000) also showed that employees are aware of the instrumental value associated with OCB, the value achieved typically through promotion. They learned that employees reduce the amount of OCB after they are promoted. The results of these studies support the idea that employees are aware of the formal compensation that is associated with OCB. However, I believe that the employee awareness of the formal compensations of OCB does not necessarily mean that the employees will be opportunistic in exerting OCB, an idea discussed in the next section.
3. The motivation behind OCB may be self-serving

Bolino (1999) and others (Eastman, 1994; Fandt & Ferris, 1990; Ferris, Judge, Rowland, & Fitzgibbons, 1994) suggest that the motivational basis of OCB may be self-serving and opportunistic. In addition to traditional motives that are based on social exchange and personality such as conscientiousness, Bolino (1999) identifies impression-management motives as the precursor of OCB. Bolino did not miss the point of Organ (1998) in that the display of OCB on a frequent basis might influence the impression that an employee makes on a supervisor or coworker, and the suggestion of Podskoff, MacKenzie, and Hui's (1993) point that it can be interesting to see how employee's political motives are related with OCB. Political upward influence and political behavior (Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989) and self-monitoring characteristics of the employee (Blakely, Fuller, & Smith, 1996) are also found to be the related with OCB based on the idea that OCB is not an self-less act. Rioux and Penner (2001), using factor analysis, also identified impression-management motives as the one of the three motives (two others being prosocial values and organizational values) behind employee engagement in OCB.

The idea that impression-management motives, which can be self-serving rather than other-serving, are related to the second notion that was stated in the aforementioned section: OCB may be formally rewarded. If OCB is rewarded by a performance appraisal, the idea that impression management affects performance appraisal (Wayne & Liden, 1995) makes a valid point. For those whose motives are impression-management based, the amount of OCB will be reduced after the performance appraisal (Hui et al., 2000).

4. OCB in Need for Organizational Control

These alternative notions of OCB challenge the traditional conceptualizations
of OCB: An employees' discretionary extra-role behavior that is directed toward others despite the fact that the behavior is not formally compensated. Alternatively, the three notions suggest that employees might engage in behaviors that are directed toward others because they perceive those behaviors (e.g., helping others) as part of their job. Moreover, those behaviors might be considered in a supervisor's performance evaluation, and employees do this not only to stay within the organization but for their own sake to assure future promotions and success. Even though it is not explicitly recognized or suggested by these alternative notions, these different conceptualizations of OCB raise a fundamental point that OCB may be a function of how employees perceive the way the organization controls their behavior, especially toward OCB. In other words, depending on the control mechanism directed toward OCB, the sense of OCB as a core part of their job, whether these behaviors are compensated or not, might differ and then the perceptual variance. This sense of OCB will then govern not only the amount of what OCB is actually displayed but also the relationship of how attitudes are linked with OCB.

The review of literature related with traditional and alternative theories of OCB suggests that a meaningful question raised is why these different thoughts on OCB are possible. The insightfulness of OCB lies in the mysteriousness of employee willingness or spontaneity for cooperation even though it is not formally rewarded. Thus, the source of this cooperation and the mechanism that explains this mysteriousness has traditionally been considered important. The new notions, however, suggest that OCB can be a function of the way employees perceive how OCB is controlled by an organization. In other words, it may be a function of an employee's subjective understanding regarding the way the organization communicates and requests OCB from an individual. And depending on the way of communication, an employee can understand OCB as a core part of their role behavior. That is to say that the control mechanism that deals with those communications might be an important predictor of OCB.
These new notions suggest that in-role or extra-role perceptions are related with the frequency of OCB (Morrison, 1994) or the way people display OCB as a function of attitude (Tepper et al., 2001). However, there is a lack of knowledge regarding what causes certain OCB to be more core or marginal behavior in an employee’s mind in terms of doing his/her job, and the notion of job breadth is limiting, thus needing more investigation. I believe that these subjective feelings of imperatives associated with OCB (core vs. marginal thing to do) are related to organizational control mechanisms and its inducement that such mechanisms offer. Therefore, the current research will investigate the employee perceptions regarding OCB under the assumption that such perceptions will be influenced by organizational control mechanisms. Then, the following thought is possible: organizations might control OCB, and the way an individual perceives how OCB is controlled will affect the way he/she performs OCB. Viewing OCB as a fundamental asset for an organization to succeed is the basis of such an idea. However, the viewpoint of OCB as an organization asset poses a serious problem from an organizational control point of view. The overall conceptual idea is summarized in Figure 1.

(Figure 1) Overall Idea of the Paper

5. Problems of OCB from Organizational Control Viewpoint

In this paper, the assumption is made that OCB reflects an employee’s “willingness to cooperate”, that can also be considered a fundamental asset for an organization to survive. Regarding the willingness to cooperate, Barnard (1938) states:
By definition, there can be no organizations without persons. However, as we have urged that it is not persons, but the services or action or influences of persons, which should be treated as constituting organizations, it is clear that willingness of persons to contribute efforts to the cooperative system is indispensable (p. 83).

Suppose an organization can do without true cooperation from the employee, and true cooperation is reflected by OCB. Then, the need for an organization to control such cooperative behavior will be high. Therefore, the following propositions are possible:

*Proposition 1-1: To the extent that OCB reflects true cooperation, organizations will consider employee OCB an important organizational asset, thus actively try to control it.*

*Proposition 1-2: The criteria of the willingness to cooperate should be used to consider an action or service of an individual as OCB.*

Proposition 1-1 suggests that organizations will actively engage in controlling OCB to the extent that the organizations are aware of the importance of OCB toward organizational success. This position is somewhat different from the traditional theories of OCB which emphasize individual discretion, such as individual personality or attitudes in predicting OCB. Proposition 1-2 suggests that in theorizing OCB, the criterion of the willingness to cooperate is important. If this criterion is used, to the extent that the motive behind OCB is opportunistic, the apparent OCB should be lacking the characteristics of true cooperation, thus lacking the characteristics of OCB. In other words, one conflicting nature (whether it is self-serving or other-serving) of OCB is not a definition problem but rather a measurement problem. Any existing measurement of OCB cannot distinguish between true OCB (based on the "willingness to cooperate") and pseudo OCB (opportunistic OCB).
Despite the great need to control OCB, organizations face some fundamental problems associated with controlling OCB: (1) the performance ambiguity associated with OCB and (2) the opportunistic nature in conducting OCB due to the divergent goals between employer and employee, which are precisely pointed out by Ouchi (1980) as problems of cooperation.

6. Controlling OCB: Market or bureaucracy?

Ouchi (1980) argues, according to Williamson’s (1975a) transaction cost of economics, that the problem of cooperation due to a lack of overlapping goals (Barnard, 1938; Mayo, 1945) will produce high governing costs, or transaction costs, that is necessary to incur to ensure fair transactions between two parties. Suppose what is exchanged between employee and employer is OCB, a service that can be provided by employees as a representation of a “willingness to cooperate”. Under a situation where employer goals and employee goals are divergent (when this opportunistic tendency is high), there are two control mechanisms that an organization can adopt to control the opportunism associated with divergent goals: (1) market and (2) hierarchy. In the market, the opportunistic tendency will be tolerated by easily specifying what is exchanged and attaching a fair economic value on what is exchanged, called price. Thus, the transaction cost that arises from gathering information about a trustful buyer and seller to reduce the opportunism (diverging goals between employer and employee) can be tolerated by specifying what is bought and what is sold. Therefore, without monitoring the tendency of buyers who prefer to pay less than what they receive and sellers who prefer to get more than what they provide, the price will easily promote equitable transactions. Under the market, the main transaction cost arises from specifying what is exchanged.

Markets will be efficient when there is low performance ambiguity associated with OCB under the condition that OCB can easily be specified. However, the
problem associated with OCB is that the performance ambiguity associated with OCB is high. Employees and employers do not know whether a certain action (e.g., helping others) of an individual that represents a willingness to cooperate is truly contributing to organizational success compared to a situation where the individual focuses on some alternative action (such as focusing on role description). Scholars generally agree with the idea that OCB as an aggregate will help the organization, but the specific intensities of improved organizational effectiveness due to employee engagement in OCB is highly ambiguous. Another problem is that OCB as true cooperation might be a scare asset which can weaken market forces. The provider characteristics of OCB, such as position and power of the employee within the organization, also contribute to the performance ambiguity associated with OCB. Unlike typical in-role behavior, true cooperation is not an object that can be easily stated in the contract.

This concept of performance ambiguity by Ouchi (1980) is highly related with Williamson's (1975b, 1991) notion of "asset specificity". According to Williamson (1991), asset specificity "has reference to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value (p. 281)…When asset specificity is zero, the identities of buyers and sellers are irrelevant (p. 282)." Due to the performance ambiguity associated with OCB, OCB as focal assets exchanged between employer and employee will have high asset specificity. This high asset specificity and high performance ambiguity makes the market unable to clearly specify true cooperation. Facing this problem, the market fails because of (1) the uncertainty associated with obtaining true cooperation, (2) the bounded rationality associated with accounting what the true cooperation are in advance, (3) the small numbers associated with providers of true cooperation, and (4) the opportunistic nature associated with buyer and supplier over getting more than what they are supposed to buy or supply. This condition forces the market to fail. As long as the transaction costs of specifying true cooperation that are bought and sold are higher than
the transaction cost associated with monitoring the sellers and buyers of OCB, bureaucracy over market is preferred. And to the extent that the hierarchy can bear the cost of gathering information about the other party to ensure an equitable transaction, the hierarchy will replace the market mechanism instead of trying to indicate what the true cooperation is in advance through the contract. Thus, the failure of the market to control OCB will bring forth bureaucracy where a performance ambiguity problem can be tolerated by an improved solution to the problem of divergent goals by employing performance monitoring mechanisms.

According to this market vs. hierarchy framework, true cooperation (the focal asset) from an employee that can probably be tapped by the concept of OCB will be highly specific thereby becoming subject to the control mechanism of the bureaucracy rather than the market. This is probably why most organizations use employment contracts to obtain ambiguous and hard-to-measure but important contributions from employees through employment relationships. Thus, the following proposition can be made:

*Proposition 2: OCB will be controlled through employment contracts by the bureaucracy rather than the market due to the highly specific nature and ambiguous fair value associated with OCB.*

*Table 1* An Organizational Failure Framework by Ouchi (1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Control</th>
<th>Normative Requirements</th>
<th>Informational Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimate Authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
<td>Traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legitimate Authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common values and beliefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. OCB within Bureaucracy

As opposed to providing a fair price given the market mechanism or spot-market contracting, i.e., paying employees for each OCB display they show, organizations are likely to provide employment contracts to secure the contributions from their employees because of the performance ambiguity associated with OCB. Accordingly, the bureaucracy as opposed to the market as a more efficient control mechanism might predict higher OCB levels. In other words, a regular employee under an employment contract compared to a marginal employee will show more OCB.\(^1\) This line of thought (Organ & Paine, 2000; Van Dyne & Ang, 1998)\(^2\) suggests that organizations seem to understand that OCB is an important organizational asset, but they also understand that OCB cannot easily be priced as a result of its highly ambiguous yet important value.

The fundamental characteristics of bureaucracy or hierarchy is that the division of labor and authority hierarchy will be enforced by formal rules and regulations (Weber, 1947). The rules and regulations should be clear, and those rules should be applied uniformly. The basis of bureaucracy is to make the role and authority chains clear by rules so that employees conduct what is required of them. Ouchi (1980) argues that there are two advantages to a bureaucracy over a market for controlling employment contracts: (1) employment contracts as an incomplete contract can be used thus reducing the transaction cost associated with the specification of OCB and (2) the trust between employer and employees can be promoted thereby reducing the problem of divergent goals between employer and employees.

The first advantage of bureaucracy is that, at the time of the employment

---

\(^1\) And interestingly, this is where the notions of social exchange Blau, P. M. 1964. *Exchange and Power in Social life*. New York: J. Wiley. can make the same prediction

\(^2\) There is also evidence that did not prove this idea Pearce, J. L. 1993. Toward an Organizational-Behavior of Contract Laborers - Their Psychological Involvement and Effects on Employee Coworkers. *Academy of Management Journal*, 36(5): 1082-1096.
contract, the employment relationship enables the employer to pay for the privileges of postponing certain behavior that will be communicated to the employees as role behaviors at a later point (Simon, 1957). OCB is likely to be such a behavior due to the problem of high asset specificity. However, this does not mean that OCB is always extra and marginal role behaviors compared to what is typically written in employment contracts. The problem of OCB is not that it is necessarily an extra-role behavior or a highly discretionary behavior but that it is not specifiable; it requires close, but equitable monitoring. Thus, the following proposition is made:

Proposition 3: A bureaucracy (not to mention the market) cannot enforce OCB by specifying it on an employment contract in advance because of performance ambiguity, but this does not rule out OCB as a major part of job behavior. Rather, OCB can be an important job feature depending on how the bureaucracy effectively promotes true cooperation.

According to Ouchi (1980), the employment contract under a bureaucracy means "to appoint superior officers who can (1) direct the work activities of the employee from day to day, thus overcoming the problem of dealing with the future all at once and (2) closely monitor the employee's performance, thus minimizing the problem of opportunism" (p. 134). Consequently, the existence of a higher authority to equitably monitor OCB will promote an employee display of OCB. This presence of a higher authority should be distinguished from personal characteristics that the supervisor bears affecting the perception of employee equity. The sense of effective bureaucratic control seems to be related with the existence of an impersonal authority who will evaluate the quality of cooperation fairly. Also, the ability of an organization to appoint a capable technocrat who will equitably monitor employee OCB might be related with an
employee perception of the effectiveness of the bureaucracy. Depending on the control effectiveness of the bureaucracy, trust can be promoted and therefore reduce the problem associated with divergent goals, which Ouchi (1981) considered the second advantage of a bureaucracy over a market.

Proposition 4: Within a bureaucracy, OCB will be promoted by a sense of a proper authority (supervisor) to monitor OCB and equitably consider OCB into a performance appraisal at a later point. Thus, the perception of the employees regarding the effectiveness of the bureaucracy in this aspect (existence of proper authority and equitable consideration of contribution) will affect the employee display of OCB.

8. Need for Clan Control

A bureaucracy over the market to control OCB still raises a valid question: did the employment relationship, that is, the adoption of hierarchy (bureaucracy) solve the problem associated with an employee's true cooperation, i.e., OCB? The problem of performance ambiguity can be tolerated to a certain degree, and the problem of employment divergent goals can be reduced to a degree by ensuring trust between employer and employee based on the norm of reciprocity by employing a higher authority. According to Ouchi (1980) the question is related with the extent to which a specific OCB bears performance ambiguity. If the performance ambiguity associated with OCB is extremely high, the attempt to identify the contributions of individual OCB in the whole organization process is meaningless. Therefore, the adoption of a higher authority to monitor individual contributions bears too much cost. As a result, the bureaucracy will fail. In this case, the problem associated with not being able to identify individual contributions will be tolerated by the extent to which employee and employer
goals are aligned. This is what Ouchi (1980) refers to as clan control. These problems of OCB and effective control mechanisms are described in Figure 2.

![Figure 2] Ouchi (1980)'s control types and the problems associated with OCB

In sum, a bureaucracy might be a necessary condition for obtaining OCB, but again it might not fully eliminate the issue of performance ambiguity. Caused by this extreme performance ambiguity, the cost of monitoring is unbearable. Organizations should depend on clan control where it focuses more on goal alignment between employer and employee. Both markets and bureaucracies with its formal mechanism can be used to deal with the transaction costs associated with asset specificity (or performance ambiguity), but clan control as informal organizations focuses on controlling goal congruity. Ouchi (1980) introduces the following excerpt of Barnard (1938) to emphasize the role of clan control:

The most intangible and subtle of incentives is that which I have called the condition of communion…. It is the feeling of personal comfort in social relations that is sometimes called solidarity, social integration…. The need for communion is a
basis of informal organizations that is essential to the operation of every formal organizations (p. 148).

Clan control refers to control based on the concept of solidarity by Durkheim (1933). Social solidarity "arises because of a certain number of states of consciousness are common to all members of the same society" (Durkheim, 1933, p. 64). Social solidarity depends on shared moral sentiments and beliefs that are reinforced by common emotional experiences. Although Ouchi (1980) based his notion of clan control on the concept of organic solidarity by Durkheim (1933), the clan control mechanism can base itself on both mechanical and organic solidarity. Mechanical solidarity arises from homogeneity (e.g., same religion, ethnic group, and national sentiments) that was more prevalent in a pre-industrial society whereas organic solidarity comes from heterogeneity that comes largely from the division of labor in society. Thus, social solidarity based on heterogeneity stems from a sense of functional interdependence out of an increasing division of labor, which is more likely to appear in modern business organizations. And for Durkheim (1933), organic solidarity comes before increasing contractual relationships due to the increasing division of labor in society. However, the collective consciousness that comes from mechanical solidarity even in an organic society (solidarity that comes from a similarity within occupational groups and professional groups) is still as imperative as organic solidarity where the weakened collective conscience is based on more abstract and general values. Durkheim (1933) states:

The rules of occupational morality and justice, however, are as imperatives as the others. They force the individual to act in view of ends which are not strictly his own, to make concessions, to consent to compromises, to take into account interests higher than his own. Consequently, even where society relies most completely upon the division of labor, it does not become a jumble of juxtaposed atoms, between which it can establish only external, transient contracts. Rather, the members are
united by ties which extend deeper and far beyond the short moments during which the exchange is made (p. 227).

Using the concept of organic solidarity, what Ouchi (1980) considers goal congruency refers to the sense of interdependence between employer and employee, and this sense becomes norms and beliefs in OCB. However, not only in organic solidarity but also in mechanical solidarity that comes from similarities within the same occupation or industry, moral values can be formed regarding OCB. Therefore, the following proposition is made:

Proposition 5: Clan control will be used to tolerate the high performance ambiguity problem associated with OCB by reducing the problem associated with OCB that comes from the divergent goals between employee and employer.

The proposition made in this section suggests that OCB can be a function of effective bureaucracy and clan control in governing the problems associated with OCB. In the former case, if bureaucracy control works effectively, the imperatives associated with OCB will be included in appropriate authority functions (such as ensuring norm of reciprocity) that are given by the bureaucracy; and in the latter case, the imperatives associated with OCB will be associated with membership, socialization processes, and tradition. Employees will engage in OCB both from the equity concept imposed by the bureaucracy that is governed by formal organizations and also by a sense of morality and common values which comes from informal organizations (Barnard, 1938).

Given the importance of effective control mechanisms regarding the control of the problems associated with OCB, an issue in research points to the inability to observe the objective reality of control mechanisms. What is important is how employees perceive these control mechanisms. The rationale here is that
if organizations are successful in terms of communicating the need for OCB, then the employees will perceive an OCB imperative. And, this understanding can be subjective. Hence, the current research focuses on the subjective understanding of employees regarding OCB.

It is posited here that employee subjective perception regarding OCB is important to capture an organization's control effectiveness whether it is a market or a bureaucracy. In other words, if an employee feels that OCB is controlled by the organization through bureaucracy or market, then the adequateness perception of conducting such behavior on the job will be high. I suggest that the clearest concept that can represent the employee perception of organizational control on OCB in the literature is what Barnard (1938) terms the "zone of indifference" ("Zone of Acceptance").

9. A Control Mechanism in an Individual Mind: The Zone of Indifference by Barnard (1938)

Barnard (1938) introduces the concept of the zone of indifference. The phrase "zone of indifference" may be explained as follows:

If all the orders for actions reasonably practicable be arranged in the order of their acceptability to the person affected, it may be conceived that there are a number which are clearly unacceptable, that is, which will not be obeyed; there is another group somewhat more or less on the neutral line, that is, either barely acceptable or barely unacceptable; and a third group unquestionably acceptable. This last group lies within the "zone of indifference" (Barnard, 1938, p. 138).

The concept of the zone of indifference refers to the sets of perceived obligations that an individual accepts without question. Barnard (1938) also states that "a 'zone of indifference' [exists] in each individual within which orders are acceptable without conscious questioning of their authority" (p.167). Whether
it is ordered by supervisors, written in job descriptions, implicitly required, or morally obliged, if an organization tries to control OCB, it will be in Barnard’s (1938) term, "communicated" to employees. In other words, OCB should be within the area of the "zone of acceptance," which some researchers consider to be the same as the "zone of indifference".

The insight that Barnard (1938) shares with the concept of zone of indifference is that he recognized the subjective perceptions of employees regarding what is acceptable and what is not. This is consistent with the research stream of psychological contract and Morrison’s (1994) view regarding an employee’s subjective understanding of OCB as in-role vs. extra-role behavior. Eventually, it will be an individual who accept and reject a communicated need of OCB from an organization.

Despite the three categories ('clearly acceptable, barely acceptable, and unquestionably unacceptable') that are distinguished in explaining the zone of indifference, a sense of the zone of indifference has not been completely theorized and tested in the field. I propose that the sense of organizational control will be reflected in an employee’s zone of indifference.

*Proposition 6: An employees’ sense of OCB within the zone of indifference (or acceptance) will be formed by the two types of organizational control: bureaucracy and clan.*

### III. Discussion

The current research provides an integration of conflicting findings between traditional and newer conceptualizations of OCB. Specifically, the question as to (1) whether OCB is an in-role behavior or extra-role behavior, (2) whether OCB is formally rewarded, and (3) whether OCB is driven by self-serving as
opposed to other-serving motives can be very subjective depending on an individual's perception regarding how organizations control OCB, and how these control patterns are communicated to employees. This perception then will result in the consideration of OCB as an important job feature, which was theorized in this paper as the locus of OCB on the zone of indifference. In sum, it suggests that depending on the effectiveness of control mechanisms that are used by an organization, the conflicting evidence can both make sense. Theoretically, the location of OCB within the zone of indifference could be driven by an individual's perception regarding the efficiency of organizational control be it market, bureaucracy, or clan.

Secondly unlike traditional OCB research which has focused on an individual's discretionary nature to engage in OCB thus hypothesizing on an employee's personal attitude and disposition predicting OCB, the paper takes the view that organizations will face a fundamental problem to control OCB and that OCB may depend on how organizations effectively deal with problems associated with OCB. This position is possible under the assumption that OCB will reflect true cooperation from the employee side, the component without which organizations will fail to survive and that organizations will actively try to control OCB. The traditional conceptualization of OCB put an emphasis on the aspect that OCB is not captured by a formal reward system so it may be under an employee's discretion. The view in this paper stresses that even if it will not be easy to specify in an employment relationship in advance, it will still be controlled by different organizational control mechanisms that are adequate to deal with the problem of 'hard-to-specify-in-advance.'
REFERENCES


Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 45(1): 140-158.
Should Be Distinguished from Contextual Performance. Journal of Applied
Organ, D. W., & Paine, J. B. 2000. Contingent and marginal employment,
commitment, and discretionary contributions. Research in the Sociology
of Work, 9: 253-270.
Organ, D. W., & Ryan, K. 1995. A meta-analytic review of attitudinal and
dispositional predictors of organizational citizenship behavior. Personnel
Orr, J. M., Mercer, M., & Sackett, P. R. 1989. The Role of Prescribed and
Ouchi, W. G. 1979. A conceptual framework for the design of organization
Pearce, J. L. 1993. Toward an Organizational-Behavior of Contract Laborers –
Their Psychological Involvement and Effects on Employee Coworkers.
behavior and the quantity and quality of work group performance. Journal
behavior on organizational performance: A review and suggestions for


조직제어 메커니즘과 조직시민행동

이 정 연*

요 약

본 논문은 조직시민행동의 세 가지 자기모순점을 고찰한다: (1) 조직시민행동이 역할외 행동이라는 역할내 행동일 수 있다. (2) 조직시민행동은 공식적으로 보상받을 수도 있다. 그리고, (3) 조직시민행동을 이끄는 동기는 이기적인 것일 수 있다. 이러한 개념들이 전통적인 조직시민행동 개념과는 상충된 면이 있음에도 불구하고, 조직이 동적으로 조직시민행동을 조종하려는 상황에서는 이러한 개념들이 가능한 것을 본 논문은 제시한다. 또한 본 논문은 이러한 가능성이 조직이 조직시민행동을 조직효과성에 기여하는 근본적인 자산으로 간주하는 정도에 달려 있음을 제시한다.

* 서울대학교 경영대학(jaytalks@snu.ac.kr)