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國際學碩士學位論文

Consociationalism and Regional Division

- The Case of Belgium -

합의제 민주주의와 분리 독립: 벨기에를 중심으로

2019年 2月

서울大學校 國際大學院

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- The Case of Belgium -

A thesis presented

by

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
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Abstract

Regional divisions and secessionist movements in the European Union call for domestic and international attention and is augmenting to be a bigger issue that impacts politics at every level of the society: micro-level, regional, national, and the EU. Manifested particularly in multinational states, however, independence movements derived from ambitions for more autonomy, security, economic freedom, etc., are a historical phenomenon. Why secede? It is a question that has kept its place to impact many countries not only within the EU but around the world. The ongoing secessionist movements (i.e. Catalonia, Scotland) pose a major challenge to the European Union (EU) and its member states. Even though the Scottish and Catalan independence referenda have failed to pass, it has become globally evident that a fair number of subnational regions in the EU are making their endeavors to claim independence for reasons including but not limited to a greater autonomy, linguistic and cultural difference, and economic discrepancy. Belgium, in this context, though having had the similar reasons of cause for its subnational region's demand for independence, has not held a referendum or shown major intent for secession from either of the two regions (Flanders and Wallonia). What does Belgium have that keeps itself from being unified despite all the unfavorable circumstances? Does its power-sharing system have anything to do with it? If so, by how much, and is it effective in Belgium? What role does consociationalism play in

Belgium's subnational regions to make endeavors of achieving regional independence? This research purports the reasons behind Belgium's malingering propensity towards regional independence and to test the relationship between regional division and consociational tradition. I hypothesize that there is a correlation between the dependent variable (regional division) and independent variable (consociational tradition), and that Belgium's long-established tradition of consociationalism is encumbering the regions' action towards an outright, de jure secession.

Keywords: Consociationalism; regional division; secession; European Union; Belgium

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List of Abbreviations

COCOF: French Community Commission in Brussels

EP: European Parliament

EU: European Union

FPTP: first-past-the-post (plurality formula)

LSq: least-squares index (Gallagher index)

N-VA: Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie

PR: proportional representation

VB: Vlaams Belang

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
I. Introduction

Secessionist movements and regional divisions in the European Union call for domestic and international attention and is augmenting to be a bigger issue that impacts politics at every level of the society: micro-level, regional, national, and the EU. Manifested particularly in multinational states, however, independence movements derived from ambitions for more autonomy, security, economic freedom, etc., are a historical phenomenon. Why secede? It is a question that has kept its place to impact many countries not only within the EU but around the world. Following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, each nation state gained exclusive sovereignty over its territory, which ended up with hundreds of nations across the whole European continent squashed and grouped in a little over 50 states, very few of which that is over 90 percent ethnically homogenous (Connor, 1972). Seeing from this angle, then, it is not an erratic idea for some regions to have a desire to become independent and is rather much acceptable. As Duerr puts it, different languages, cultures, historic, and these diversities signify that “state is the most important vehicle of a people” (Duerr, 2015).

After the establishment of the EU upon the signing of the Treaty of Rome, no notable claims for outright secession amongst the member states were significantly recognized until recently, when the world saw and became alerted by the seriousness of such regions as Catalonia and Scotland demanding for de jure independence (see Figure 1). Flanders in Belgium, in

this context, though having had the similar motives and driving force to call for a referendum for self-sufficiency, has rather stayed relatively calm. What does Belgium have that keeps itself from being unified despite all the unfavorable circumstances? Does its power-sharing system have anything to do with it? If so, by how much, and is it effective in Belgium? What role does consociationalism play in Belgium’s subnational regions to make endeavors of achieving regional independence?

Figure 1 Percentage of each region’s support for independence¹



Among many other scholars, Arend Lijphart has strongly been arguing that Belgium “is not just a complete example of consociational democracy: it is the most perfect, most convincing, and most impressive

¹ Flanders: Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata (http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/belgium/) shows the percentage of support for Vlaams Belang, which is a right-wing populist and Flemish nationalist political party in the Flemish Region and Brussels of Belgium that calls for an outright secession.
 Catalonia: Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió.
 Scotland: ScotCen (<http://www.scotcen.org.uk/media/1361407/ssa16-2fr8m-1ndyref-2-Indyr8f-tw0-two.pdf>).

example of a consociation. Hence Belgium provides a highly valuable model that may be of great practical utility for other divided societies aspiring to democracy and peaceful coexistence” (Lijphart, 1980).

Consociationalism, in simple terms, is a type of democracy that is designed to reconcile societal fragmentations along linguistic, ethnic, or religious lines, regulate class conflict, and manages to establish a stable power-sharing system in which all groups, including minorities, are well represented on the political and economic levels.

According to the consociational model, citizens should remain deferent and passive (Lijphart, 1968; Bogaards, 1998) because their participation would hinder the fragile consociation between the segments (Huyse, 1970). Citizens’ input has been minimal in the process of federalization of Belgium throughout the years, and so it becomes more important to study how citizens view the future of Belgium in terms of the type of democracy they are living in because although they may not be the drivers of the political dynamics, they are supporters or at least recipients of politics and policies.

By using consociationalism as theoretical framework, of which its details will be explained in the later chapters, I will examine the case of Belgium in order to find the relationship between Belgium’s consociation model and regional division. There have been studies that assesses the level of consociationalism embedded in Belgium and how the model prevents

Belgium from having regional secessions. However, they are done in the macro level; in other words, no studies have been conducted in the micro level that tests whether consociationalism acts as a restraint to having a regional division in Belgium. The main aim of this thesis is to fill this research gap by testing the two most important characteristics of consociationalism with the dependent variable regional division, by using a survey data.²

II. Research Design

2.1 Methodology

This study conducts both qualitative and quantitative research. First, through literature review, I go through different studies conducted, which mostly focus on macro level analysis on consociationalism that unites Belgium and hinders from calling for regional independence. In terms of qualitative research, it uses an ethnographic model, in the field of anthropology, to study the culture of Belgium and its relationship with consociationalism and regional secession. Specifically, it first explores what consociationalism in the context of Belgium and sees what types of defining characteristics there exist. The process is also carried out in pursuance of identifying control variables that must be kept constant. The macro level of

² 2007 General Election Study Belgium dataset compiled by Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research / Point d'appui interuniversitaire sur l'Opinion publique et la Politique (ISPO/PIOP)

analysis is divided into two parts: first, by using dataset compiled by Strøm et al. (2015) that measures consociationalism through related variables across 180 countries, I test how consociational Belgium is both by itself and compared to other countries; second, relying on past literature, I examine the characteristics of consociational framework embedded in Belgium, of which keeps the country from being united and not having a regional division.

Then, through the micro level of analysis, I test (two most important factors recognized by Lijphart: grand coalition and segmental autonomy) in order to find out the relationship between regional division and consociationalism by using a survey data. The data has a few questions that ask the respondents regarding grand coalition and segmental autonomy (Appendix II), of which I use as indicators. I then analyze the distribution of each variable, and do a crosstab analysis according to people living in Flanders and Wallonia for each question. Then, I conduct a regression analysis. For the dependent variable, regional division, I use a question that asks people from each region:

Table 1Q.130 Evolution of the Belgian State

		Raw (absolute) frequencies	Percentages for Flanders	Percentages for Wallonia
1.	The unitarian Belgian state should be restored.	496	11.5	43.0
2.	The federal state should stay, but with more power to the central government than it is now the case.	353	11.4	22.4
3.	The present situation should be kept.	366	20.9	13.7
4.	The federal state should stay, but with more power to the communities and regions than it is now the case.	682	48.2	18.7
5.	Belgium should split.	106	7.9	2.1
		2003	100.0	100.0
7.	Don't know	35		
9.	No answer	10		

I set the variable to take the values zero and one as a binary-response:

responses from 1 to 3 as 0, which put more emphasis on federal level

Belgian state, and responses from 4 to 5 as 1, which put more emphasis on

regional autonomy. Refer to Appendix II for details on the questions that I

use for independent variables.

2.2 Variables and units of analysis

The dependent variable used in this study is regional division, and

the independent variable is consociational framework, which is

characterized by four principles: grand coalition, mutual veto,

proportionality, and segmental autonomy. According to Lijphart, who has

conceptualized the term, recognizes grand coalition and segmental

autonomy as the most significant factors (Lijphart, 1979, p.500), and so

these two characteristics will be used to test against the dependent variable, regional division.

2.3 Definitions

Consociationalism, federalism, and power-sharing

Consociationalism and federalism, are two interrelated concepts that must be distinguished in in discourses regarding institutional apparatus of corresponding ethnic and national diversity (Lijphart, 1979).

Consociationalism, among other factors, necessitates power sharing among the majorities and minorities, whereas federalism requires the authority to be “divided between central and provincial governments, of which both exploit constitutionally separate competencies” (O’Leary, 2001: 49-52). So, federations can be consociations, but not all federations can be consociations (Lijphart, 1977: 513). Lijphart, after 1969, started using the term ‘power sharing’ as a synonym for consociational democracy for the reason that ‘power sharing’ is simple to pronounce and is not esoteric, compared to the word ‘consociational.’ Power-sharing is what Lijphart identified with four characteristics of what he also termed consociationalism: (1) grand coalition; executive power sharing, (2) mutual veto (3) proportionality, and (4) segmental autonomy, such as federalism. And so, throughout the paper, power-sharing and consociationalism or consociational democracy / tradition are used interchangeably. Another point worth to mention is, the difference between consensus democracy and

consociational democracy, two terms that are synonymously used to each other. However, they are not coterminous to each other. Although they both represent non-majoritarian types of democracy, consensus democracy focuses more on formal system, while consociational democracy is recommended for deeply-divided societies like Belgium, as consociational democracy is more practical. Specifically, consensus democracy encourages power sharing, while consociational democracy goes further and prescribes the methods for related parties to participate in power sharing. In that regard, I intend to use consociational democracy as opposed to consensus democracy in my paper for the reasons that it is more practical and is a better medicine for deeply-divided societies.

Table 2 The characteristics of majoritarian democracy, consensus democracy, and consociational democracy (adapted from Lijphart 1984, 1989:40, 1999)

Majoritarian democracy	Consensus democracy	Consociational democracy
1. Minimal winning cabinets	1. Oversized cabinets	1. Segmental society
2. Cabinet dominance over legislature	2. Separation of powers	2. Grand coalition
3. Two-party system	3. Multi-party system	3. Proportionality
4. Plurality system of elections	4. Proportional representation	4. Segmental autonomy
5. Pluralist interest group system	5. Corporatist interest group	5. Mutual (minority) veto
6. Unicameralism	6. Bicameralism	
7. Unitary, centralized government	7. (Non-)territorial federalism and decentralizations	
8. Flexible constitution	8. Entrenched constitution	
9. Parliamentary sovereignty	9. Judicial review	
10. Dependent central bank	10. Independent central bank	

Types of power-sharing

Power-sharing is divided into three types: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining. *Inclusive power sharing* is a type of system that covers two of Lijphart’s consociationalism yardsticks: grand coalition and mutual veto.

Dispersive power sharing is an institution that distributes segmental autonomy like federalism among the decision makers. *Constraining power sharing* includes institutions that exist to protect individual and social groups’ rights from “encroachments and predation by, for example,

politicians or armed forces” (Strøm, 2015). Because power sharing covers different institutions, all three types have been included to be analyzed in the quantitative analysis.

Secession, regional division, devolution, independence, separatism

The central variable in this study is regional division, also called secession, separatism, devolution, and independence, all of which this paper uses interchangeably, after having discussed their differences. According to Michael Stein, separatism is the “advocacy of separation or secession by a group or people from a larger political unit to which it belongs” (Stein, 2006). Furthermore, many studies have examined the relationship between devolution and secession, particularly focusing on whether devolution fosters secession. There are mainly two opposing groups: a school of scholars that maintains the idea that devolution is an antidote against secession, and the other that contends consociationalism actually fuels secessionist aspirations. The former group supports the idea that consociationalism exacerbates secessionism within nationalism, while the latter group that opposes the given matter contends that Nagle argues that consociationalism “allied to regional devolution provides a logical context for the context for the paradoxical situation of contemporary Irish nationalism” (Nagle, 2013).

The next section presents a theoretical framework through which we can identify consociational framework and Belgium as a country with

profound social divisions, but at the same time the first and foremost democratic country.

III. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Consociative democratic country

Belgium has maintained itself as a politically consolidated country with rather *sui generis* conceptions that are obscure to Anglo-Saxon academic discourse (De Winter *et al.* 2006). Among them, such terms include *verzuiling* or *pillarisation*, *partitocracy*, *dissociative federalism*, etc. The most discussed and debatably credible disciplinary jargon is ‘consociationalism,’ of which its context is most analyzed by Arend Lijphart as the “government by elite cartel to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.” (Lijphart 1969: 216). Consociationalism, simply put, is power-sharing. As explained in the previous chapters, Belgium is a country that is constitutionally divided in political, cultural, linguistically, and ethnically divided. Nonetheless, it manages to remain as a stable state, which makes Belgium a ‘consociational state.’ Lijphart stated that “Belgium is the most through example of a consociational democracy,” and that it “is the most perfect, most convincing, and most impressive example of a consociation” (Lijphart, 1981). Lijphart recognizes four major organizational characteristics of a consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1981):

1. ***A grand coalition; executive power-sharing.*** Grand coalition denotes that the “political leaders of all of the segments of the plural society jointly govern the country” (Lijphart 1979). It is also used interchangeably with the term ‘power-sharing,’ and the elites make efforts to gather with the interest of making consolidation, as they recognize the problems that will be brought upon if they do not cooperate. In the case of Belgium, the Belgian constitution states that “with the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet comprises an equal number of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking Ministers.”³
2. ***Mutual veto.*** Synonymous with the ‘concurrent majority’⁴ principle, mutual veto provides a guarantee that a share of power is not to be outvoted when main interests are at stake. Majority role is ratified by consensus, and mutuality that forms in mutual veto means that “the minority is unlikely to successfully block the majority.” (Lijphart 1977).
3. ***Proportionality.*** Proportionality, which is opposite from the winner-take-all majoritarian rule, refers to representation based on population. It acts as a special safeguard to minorities and the

³ Belgian constitution, Article 86B.

⁴ Coined by John C. Calhoun, concurrent majority is a constitutional means to enable minorities to block the actions of majorities that could threaten the rights of the minorities by making them veto groups.

fundamental standard for “political representation, civil service appointments, and the allocation of public funds” (Lijphart 1979). Also, political representation is based on the percentage of population.

4. ***Segmental autonomy and federalism.*** Segmental autonomy purports that “decision-making authority is delegated to the separate segments as much as possible” (Lijphart 1979). Distinguished from the majority rule, it is indicated as minority rule “over the minority itself in matters that are the minority’s exclusive concern” (Ibid.). Complemented with the principle of grand coalition, it allows decisions of common interest to be jointly made by the leaders of segments; however, on other matters, decision-making is placed to each section. Through segmental autonomy, a sense of individuality is created, and it allows for disparate societal laws based on culture.

These four characteristics will be used throughout the paper in defining the independent variable ‘consociationalism.’


IV. Literature Review

4.1 Historical background

This section expounds upon the background history of Belgium as a country and Belgium’s political structure as well as regional information in order to better grasp the lowdown of Belgium’s consociational tradition.

Situated in the North-West region of Europe, Belgium covers an area of 30,528 square kilometers and has a population of approximately 11.27 million. Belgium's capital and largest city is Brussels, and its neighboring countries include France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The politics ensue in the structure of a federal, representative democratic, constitutional monarchy.

Figure 2 Administrative Regions in Belgium




Belgium has three Regions that are each defined by its Constitution: the Walloon Region, the Flemish Region, and the Region of Brussels-Capital. Belgium also has three Communities that are discrete from Regions: the Flemish Community, the French Community, and the German-Speaking Community. Pursuant to the Constitution, a substantial degree of autonomy

is appropriated to the Regions and Communities, and each Region and Community:

- “has a parliament, known as a Council (of the Region or the Community) and an executive, the Government (of the Region or the Community). The Regional and Community Councils are directly elected every five years;
- passes decrees (ordinances in the case of the Region of Brussels-Capital) which have the force of statute;
- controls their own budget, whose considerable resources come from both fiscal and non-fiscal revenues” (Istaz, 2000).

Figure 2 Belgium and its Regions, Communities, Provinces, Municipalities



There exists an asymmetry in the structure of institutions between the Regions (See Figure 4). In 1980, there was a unification of the Regional and Community on the Flemish side, which resulted in the Flemish Community being accountable for matters in both Community and regions. Also, “parts of responsibilities of the French Community are transferred to the Walloon side, and responsibilities of the French Community that concern Brussels are transferred to the French Community Commission in Brussels” (COCOF).

Figure 3 The institutional structure of federal Belgium




Table 3 Relationship between the political-administrative levels, planning levels and planning instruments⁵

Political level	Planning level	Instruments	Status
Belgium (federation)	Belgium	None	None
Region	Region (3)	Regional structure plan -Brussels (1) -Flanders (1) -Wallonia (1) Regional destination plan -Brussels (1) -Flanders (1)	Adopted (1995) Adopted (1997) In preparation In preparation N/A
	Planning region -Brussels (1) -Flanders (25) -Wallonia (23)	Regional plan	None
	Sub-region -Brussels (1) -Flanders (25) -Wallonia (23)	Sub-regional plan -Brussels (1) -Flanders (25) -Wallonia (23)	Adopted, will be replaced by the Regional destination plan Adopted some under revision Adopted some under revision
Province	Province -Flanders (5) -Brussels Capital (0) -Wallonia (5)	Flanders -Provincial structure plan -Provincial destination plans	All in preparation
Municipality	Municipality -Brussels (19) -Flanders (308) -Wallonia (262)	Brussels -Municipal destination plan Flanders -Municipal destination plan -Municipal structure plan Wallonia -Municipal structure plan	In preparation Some adopted Some in preparation Some adopted
	Sub-municipality	Brussels -Particular destination plan Flanders -Particular destination plan -Spatial implementation plan Wallonia -Particular destination plan	Some adopted Several adopted N/A Several adopted

The number between (brackets) refers to the number of regions, sub-regions, etc.

⁵ The EU compendium of spatial planning systems and policies – Belgium (2000). Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (European Commission), European Commission. CX-10-97-542-EN-C. <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/7b4561d9-56a3-43e6-94d4-373928195f67>

Legal Framework

Elections in Belgium hold a legal framework that constitutes the Constitution, the Electoral Code, and process legislations. The bicameral federal parliament that embodies the 150-member House of Representatives and the 60-member Senate, of which all the MPs serve five-year terms. Within the regional proportional representation (PR) system, the members of the House of Representatives are elected, and the number of seats per each constituency out of 11 that correspond to the Provinces are allotted according to official population figures. The Senate is composed of 60 members. *Acts* are what the legislative power of the federal state exercises. *Decrees* are enacted with the exercise of the legislative power of the Communities and Regions. *Ordinances* (or *Ordonnanties/Ordonnances*) are exercised in the case of Brussels Capital Region.

Table 4 Legal terminology of Acts, Decrees, Ordinances and Decisions in a federal Belgium⁶

Name	Issued by	Type
Act	Federal Parliament	Legislation
Decree	Flemish Council	Legislation
	Council Walloon Region	Legislation
	Council French Community	Legislation
	Council German-Speaking Community	Legislation
Ordinance	Council of the Brussels Capital Region	Legislation
Royal Decree	King and federal ministers	Implementation of an Act
Decision of the regional government	Regional government	Implementation of a Decree or Ordinance
Decision of the community government	Community government	Implementation of a Decree
Ministerial decision	Federal minister	Implementation of a Royal Decree
	Regional minister	Implementation of a Decision of the regional government
	Community minister	Implementation of a Decision of the community government

Voter registration and voting methods

As I intend to use a survey data in my micro level quantitative analysis based on Belgium General Election, it must be mentioned how voting works in the country, who gets to vote, etc. First, “all citizens above

⁶ Ibid.

the age of 18 who are registered in a municipality or a diplomatic representation and are not deprived of their voting rights by court order are eligible to vote. As of 1 March 2014, 8,003,856 voters were registered for the elections, including 129,139 out-of-country voters.”⁷ Voters are registered by municipalities, not by themselves. Furthermore, “the law offers five options for casting a ballot: voting in person or via proxy at polling stations in Belgium or, for citizens residing abroad, to vote in person or via proxy in diplomatic and consular representations or by mail. Voters residing abroad must indicate their voting option and their municipality when registering with the consulate” (Ibid.). In special cases such as voters being in prison or in military service, ill, etc., he or she may appoint a proxy to vote on their behalf.

Social and economic cleavages between the regions in Belgium

The two most apparent cleavages between Flanders and Wallonia are related to issues with language and economy. The former, as explained in detail previously, deals not only with the fact that the three communities do not interact and make a concession of which of the three official languages to use in the micro level, but also that in and around Brussels, the Flemish and French-speakers cohabit and incite “struggles about political representation and language use in public services” (Vandecasteele et al.,

⁷ Kingdom of Belgium: Federal Elections 25 May 2014. OSCE/ODIHR NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT.


2012). The latter is a rift that concerns a historical issue, in which the hub of economic engine in Belgium has shifted from Wallonia in the 19th century to Flanders throughout the 20th century, as Wallonia succeeded in industrial modernization with heavy steel and coal industries.

Table 5 Average economic growth rate 1995-2003 (%), Belgian regions

Flanders	2.2
Wallonia	1.6

Source: IRES, INR, Regional Accounts, 2005 – Voka.

Figure 4 Comparison of each regions' GDP per capita (2006-2016)




Overall, socioeconomic indicators show favorable results for Flanders. For example, in 2016, GDP per capita in euro purchasing parity in Flanders was 38,288 euros while in Wallonia it was 27,220 euros. Also the rate of unemployment appears to be much higher in Wallonia than in

Flanders: 9.8% in Wallonia and 4.4% in Flanders.⁸ Furthermore, Flanders' Gross Regional Product grew by 30% since 1990, whereas the rate was 20% for Wallonia. The average annual incomes for both Flanders and Wallonia are increasing, but with the constant disparity of 12-13% change between the two regions (See Figure 6).

Table 6 Labour market indicators (%), Belgian regions

	Employment rate (2017)	Unemployment rate (2017)
Flanders	77.7	4
Wallonia	67.7	10.5

Figure 5 Average annual income in Belgium from 2006 to 2016, by region (in euros)



⁸ Source: Statbel. bestat.economie.fgov.be

In regard to the emergence of the two most evident cleavages – linguistic and regional cleavages in Belgium, scholars are largely divided into two groups in their lines of argument. Specifically, the arguments are based on the fundamental question of whether such conflicts such as political crisis are a product of cleavages, or vice versa. Lipset and Rokkan introduce *passe-partout* theory (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) in their comparative study on social cleavages and political consensus. They claim that conflicts are developed from cleavages, having incited from a revolution between “central nation-building elements and cultural peripheries” (Ibid.). In other words, rather than cleavages being the product of conflicts, communal conflicts, such as politicization of language, are the result of a cleavage. Whereas Urwin contends that the “center-periphery cleavage coincided to a marked extent with the linguistic division of the country,” (Urwin, 1970) Hill and Zolberg also argue that such cleavage could not have been forged along the linguistic lines (Hill, 1974). Furthermore, Huyse maintains that although the Francophone was culturally apart from the major population, they were still very much active in the political sense, seeing that the politically active minority in the Flanders region were the Francophone (Huyse, 1981). In fact, what triggered the process of linguistic politicization, according to Zolberg, is industrialization from 1850, as it increased the relative costs of linguistic disadvantages. Specifically, as industrialization grew, the tertiary sector of jobs such as

management and white-collar occupations demanded more of skills owing to language-specific training rather than that of physical. And so, more and more jobs involved selecting those with formal education and training, “all of which increased the significance of language in the allocation of scarce resources” (Ibid.). Aside from language politicization, industrialization also changed the two distinct regions in terms of economic status. Prior to industrialization, Wallonia was economically far better off with its rich land and raw materials as well as resources that fostered the region’s mining and metallurgy. Huyse terms Flemish as the “language of backwardness, French the tongue of modernism, culture, and dynamic change,” as modernization and industrialization “laid the first sociological foundations for the transformation of a linguistic *prise de conscience* into an ethnic we-feeling” (Ibid.). Furthermore, Huyse specifies another factor that led to politicization in Belgium – the establishment of universal suffrage. In 1893, the first reform allowed all male adults to vote, which meant that Flemish people became better off, as Flanders had a bigger demographic population and a higher birth rate than the Wallonia region. In 2007, Belgium underwent a political crisis due to diverging parties and some of which had ambitions for independence. Specifically, its liberal New Flemish Alliance from Flanders and the pro-unity Socialist Party from Wallonia hindered the federal government to form a coalition, which ended up Belgium to undergo 300 days of political deadlock. In ‘Belgium as a Crucial Test of

Consociationalism: The 2007-2011 Political Crisis,' Zsofia Pales challenges consociationalism as a method for mitigating ethnic conflicts in Belgium, and argues that consociationalism itself is the reason for and is actually a causal factor for the 2007-2011 political crisis, as the "institutions provide the means and incentives for ethnic parties to have more extreme demands and pursue a road towards secession." (Pales, 2011). The methodology Pales uses to determine whether consociationalism is the cause for Belgium's ethnic conflict is *process-tracing*, of which it is the means for figuring out the origins of the crisis by exploring "the chain of events of the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes" (Van Evera, 1997). Pales distinguishes several factors that led to the political deadlock. First, she recognizes the economic disparity between the Flemish region and the Walloon region as the most significant factor. She also identifies the Brussels-Halle Vilvoorde (BHV) conflict, which is a sensitive dispute in Belgium that has led to the 2007-2011 political crisis as one of the major actors. The conflict involves around linguistic cleavage, in which the area embodies the bilingual Brussels-Capital Region as well as thirty-five municipalities in the Flemish Region. With this division, the French-speaking parties "can canvas for votes with their leading politicians in federal and European elections in the thirty-five Flemish municipalities. In return, Flemish residents of Brussels can vote for Flemish candidates in Halle-Vilvoorde. However, consociationalism itself cannot be the reason for

the political crisis and is actually the factor that has abated the conflict by pushing towards the elite cartel to form commitment to the cohesion of the political system and constitute a grand coalition.

Pro-independence parties in Flanders

The only political party in Flanders that calls for outright independence from Belgium is Vlaams Belang (translates to Flemish Interest), which sets independence as its highest priority, of which is stated in every party publication, broadcast, and statement. Their belief in a nutshell is that every problem in Flanders can be more easily fixed if Flanders become independent. Vlaams Belang started as Vlaams Blok in 1977 with very extreme platforms on constitutional reform and introducing itself as a radical party (Laible 2001, 230). Vlaams Blok gradually gained support, and in 1999, it gained 12 seats. However, in early 2000s, the party was judged in a court to be racist, so it had to be disbanded. It then changed its name to Vlaams Belang (VB), and also adjusted its image from being radical to being conservative. Conforming to traditional Western values, it opposes to multiculturalism but is open to immigrants who are willing to become Flemings:

“We are a Flemish party and we are fighting for Flemish interests and identity, so if there are immigrants who agree and consider themselves as part of our society, that is a good thing and we agree. We welcome that. But we only work with them as such, as people who have integrated into our society. So we don’t want to reach out to them as Moroccan and Turks or whatever. If these people consider themselves Flemings, well we do too, then we don’t have any reason to do anything special for them. (Duerr’s interview with MEP Philip Claeys (2003-present) on April 9, 2010).

The former Vlaams Blok, as well as Vlaams Belang at the initial stages of its commencement was radical, Eurosceptic, and not open to immigration and minorities. However, as can be observed in the interview, people are changing to previously banned ideas and opening up to non-European immigrants.

Practical and legal obstacles for Flanders to achieve independence

There are no major indication of Flanders to secede from Belgium in the near future, and even if the societal inclination becomes favorable towards its independence, Flanders does not have the ability to make a quick, outright independence. In order for Flanders to achieve de jure secession, there still remain legal obstacles that it needs to undergo. First, a re-negotiation of accession to the EU needs to be completed, and even when the negotiation is successful, it needs to have its membership approved by all the EU member states. Furthermore, such issues as European citizenship, currency, and adaptation of international treaties must be concluded.

4.2 The consociationalist logic

Lijphart recommends a set of policies that can mitigate the challenges faced by deeply-divided societies like Belgium. Focusing on constitutional engineering, Lijphart's set of recommendations puts emphasis on power sharing and autonomy. As broad as the two factors might sound, they are in fact optimal and crucial for societies that endeavor to achieve democracy by overcoming such obstacles of having different cultures or languages within one society, or subdivisions that are not parallel in terms of economic status, etc. These two elements are the two most important characteristics of consociational democracy, and when the basic requirements are met, divided societies are able to achieve power sharing democracy with group autonomy. This is mentioned because this constitutional design presented by Lijphart is not a one-size-fits-all. In particular, as mentioned, Horowitz has constantly criticized consociationalism that it cannot be easily adopted due to the specific requirements that the societies should be equipped with. However, once implemented correctly, states are able to enjoy a full-fledged consociational democracy, as did Belgium, South Africa, and Lebanon. In other words, states need to actually work to be able to achieve consociationalism. For example, Belgium implemented a policy that require equal numbers of the two major ethnolinguistic groups (i.e Flanders and Wallonia); South Africa granted "all parties with a minimum of 5 percent of the legislative seats the

right to be presented in the cabinet”; and Lebanon “permanently earmarked the presidency for one group and the prime ministership for another” (Lijphart, 2007). Lijphart further puts forward nine areas of constitutional design.

The legislative electoral system

The three major electoral systems include proportional representation (PR), majoritarian system, and intermediate systems. Among the three, Lijphart praises PR to be most effective for deeply-divided societies. Horowitz, in contrary, suggests majoritarian system to be a better choice; however, Larry Diamond contends that “If any generalization about institutional design is suitable... it is that majoritarian systems are ill-advised for countries with deep ethnic, regional, religious, or other emotional and polarizing divisions. Where cleavage groups are sharply defined and group identities (and intergroup insecurities and suspicions) deeply felt, the overriding imperative is to avoid broad and indefinite exclusion from power of any significant group (Diamond, 1999).

Guidelines within PR

Even after narrowed down with PR, societies need to determine which type of PR to settle down with. Lijphart recommends to choose the simplest system to operate, especially for states that are newly introduced to democracy. Once set, “several desiderata can be derived: a high, but not necessarily perfect, degree of proportionality; multi-member districts that

are not too large, in order to avoid creating too much distance between voters and their representatives; list PR, in which parties present lists of candidates to the voters, instead of the rarely used single transferable vote, in which voters have to rank order individual candidates; and closed or almost closed lists, in which voters mainly choose parties instead of individual candidates within the list” (Lijphart, 2007).

Parliamentary or presidential government

Lijphart’s next concern is the choice between the different forms of government, namely parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential. Lijphart contends that for societies like Belgium, parliamentary government is the best medicine. Presidential form of government is well criticized by Juan Linz, who argues that this type has the strong tendency to be taken as the ‘winner-take-all’ form of so-called democracy. What is more, he emphasizes two additional problems, which are “frequent executive-legislative stalemates and the rigidity of presidential terms of office” (Ibid.). Lijphart believes that semi-presidential form is an upgraded version of presidential form, but not much better, in that power sharing is not flexible. It is maintained that parliamentary system is a better option mostly for the reasons regarding the smooth flow of power sharing.

Power sharing in the executive

Parliamentary system promotes power-sharing, but Lijphart raises the concern that collegial cabinets “do not by themselves guarantee that

power sharing will be instituted” (Ibid.). He gives two examples to support his argument. Belgium ensures the equal number of Dutch-speaking cabinet members and French-speaking cabinet members, while in South Africa, there is too much discrimination against some races and ethnicities that hinders from having an executive power sharing. And so, South Africa provides power sharing in the political party level, through which any party of any race or ethnicity that has more than 5% of the seats in the parliament can participate in the cabinet. Lijphart suggests the Belgian model to be more preferable in two ways: first, “it allows for power sharing without mandating a grand coalition of all significant parties and therefore without eliminating significant partisan opposition in parliament; second, it allows for slight deviation from strictly proportional power sharing by giving some overrepresentation to the smaller groups, which may be desirable in countries where an ethnic majority faces one or more ethnic minority groups” (Ibid.).

Cabinet stability

Lijphart mentions that there is one possible problem with parliamentary system, which is that because cabinets are dependent on the majority support of the parliament, “and can be dismissed by parliamentary votes of no confidence may lead to cabinet instability – and as a result, regime instability” (Ibid.). This is the reason for states to write a provision in the constitution that allows cabinets to form legislative proposals.

Selecting the head of state

The head of state can vary in the parliamentary system, from prime minister (which is mostly the case), constitutional monarch, etc. Lijphart advises that the president should have little power over politics, and should not be elected by popular vote, as this could prompt the president to having more power than intended.

Federalism and decentralization

Lijphart recommends federalism for deeply-divided societies, as it allows for autonomy among communal groups that are geographically concentrated, but not in the system where “two legislative chambers with equal, or substantially equal, powers and different compositions [because it] makes too difficult the forming of cabinets that have the confidence of both chambers” (Ibid.).

Nonterritorial autonomy

For divided societies in which communal groups that are not geographically concentrated, Lijphart contends that autonomy, in this case, can be formed on a nonterritorial basis. For example, Belgium bestows autonomy to schools by supporting them with equal state finance, which allows for neutrality in the field of education, even if the state is divided between religion and state.

Power sharing beyond the cabinet and the parliament

Aside from the cabinet and the parliament, power sharing should also be allowed in civil service, judiciary, police, and military. Lijphart says this “aim can be achieved by instituting ethnic or religious quotas... for example, instead of mandating that a particular group be given exactly 20 percent representation, a more flexible rule could specify a target of 15 to 25 percent” (Ibid.).

In deeply divided societies, political violence is more likely to prevail than in societies without cleavages. Through a majoritarian type of democracy, it is comparatively hard to resolve political conflicts and competitions in such divided societies, as the numerical majority of a population would have the final say when making an outcome of a decision, leaving out all others, including minorities. This is the reason for coining of the term ‘tyranny of the majority’ by Alexis de Tocqueville and is of a great concern to scholars such as John Stuart Mill because if the majority is given the power to determine major political decisions, it is assumed that they would tyrannize over minorities. Also, if election by census is brought about by ethnically-motivated voting, and each groups’ “share of the electorate is reflected in the votes for each political party, there is a great possibility of minorities to be permanently excluded from office” (Chandra & Boulet, 2005). Also, Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) adds that when an ascriptive group of a certain ethnicity is pertinent, the “threat of coethnic challengers can discourage party leaders from generating cross-group electoral appeals,

[of which it could lead to parties being] driven to engage in ethnic-outbidding and act to advance mutually exclusive group claims to power.” Furthermore, it could also be challenging regarding the supplying of public goods, as officials elected in the majority-type democracy could transmit resources to coethnics in a narrow channel (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). All these factors account for ethnically heterogeneous societies to be more prone to having ex ante challenges to the enactment of stabilization than are homogeneous societies, as the social divisions will crack itself more deeply. In the extreme end, scholars such as Chesterman (2004) and Snyder (2000) disclose that peaceful, full-fledged democracy is impossible in states with ethnic cleavages because of unbearable political competition, and advise that autocratic regimes could rather be the best alternative means to tolerate such complications.

Such complications are, in theory, solvable through a consociational type democracy, based on the premise that institutions are of consequence for politics: “that the formal rules of the state, constitutional and otherwise, both structure political competition and have fundamental, generalizable, long-run consequences for a wide range of political outcomes” (Selway and Templeman, 2012). And so, consociational framework is believed by many scholars to be the best “solution” to such social divisions, through two main practices: (a) power sharing, or grand coalition of all relevant social groups in the executive decision-making process, and (b) segmental autonomy or

federalism, of which it allows all relevant social groups to have a say over the issues of their own communities. On the electoral system, Lijphart suggests a proportional representation system, or a closed-list PR with large district magnitudes (2004), and strongly discourages the majoritarian system. When considering the fact that PR gives comparatively more quality to all groups in political representation in the electorate, PR is clearly more preferable than majoritarian type. Lijphart argues that the more majoritarian the electoral system, the greater possibility of more disproportionality in the conversion of votes into seats, which also means the “less accurate and secure” representation of minorities will be (Lijphart, 2004, p.100).

Furthermore, my research mostly focuses on two most important characteristics of consociationalism: grand coalition and segmental autonomy. One other characteristic that Lijphart also stresses, as mentioned previously, is proportionality, which refers to the proportional representation system that encourages and facilitates minority cooperation. Consociationalism prefers the proportional representation (PR) system mainly because it is the most simple and flexible mechanism to represent the most minority groups. In that regard, Belgium is a model state for such doings, as it was the first country ever to take the system in pursuance of reserving seats from various parties including those of subcultures. Although not analyzed in my research, Wesselkamper (2000), in his research ‘Electoral System Design and Ethnic Separatism: A Rationalist

Approach to Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe,' attempted to find the relationship between proportionality of the electoral system and ethnic separatism. His hypothesis was: "The less disproportional the electoral system (that is, more proportional), the lesser the degree of ethnic separatism. He uses a sample of 21 cases with minorities at risk and 52 group-years (See Table 7).

Table 7 Countries, Ethnic Groups, and Group-Years

Country	Ethnic Group	Group-Years
Albania	Greeks	1992,1993,1995,1998
Bulgaria	Turks	1991,1992,1995,1998
	Roma	1991,1992,1995,1998
Croatia	Serbs	1993,1996
	Roma	1993,1996
Czech Republic	Roma	1991,1993,1997
	Slovaks	1991,1993,1997
Estonia	Russians	1993,1996
Hungary	Roma	1991,1995
Latvia	Russians	1994,1996
Lithuania	Poles	1993,1997
	Russians	1993,1997
Macedonia	Albanians	1991,1995
	Serbs	1991,1995
	Roma	1991,1995
Moldova	Gagauz	1995
	Slavs	1995
Romania	Hungarians	1991,1993,1997
	Roma	1991,1993,1997
Slovakia	Hungarians	1991,1993,1995
	Roma	1991,1993,1995

Wesselkamper measures his dependent variable, separatism, by deriving an index from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Dataset Phase III.

Table 8 Measuring Separatism

Score	Description
1	“Latent” Separatism, meeting one or both of the following conditions -Ethnic group was historically autonomous, or -Ethnic group was transferred from another state, either physically or in terms of jurisdictional modification
2	Historical Separatism: The group gave rise to a separatist or autonomy movement that persisted as an active political force for five or more years in their region of origin (Between 1940 and 1980).
3	Active Separatism: The group has an active separatist or autonomy movement in the 1980s or 1990s.

Then, Wesselkamper used Gallagher’s Least Squares measure of disproportionality (LSq) (Gallagher, 1991) as a measurement for the degree of proportionality, which is one of his independent variables. I focus only on this variable due to the purpose of my research. LSq basically “measures an electoral system’s relative disproportionality between votes received and seats allotted in a legislature”⁹ (Ibid.). The index is calculated by taking the square root of half the sum of the squares of the difference between the percentage of votes (V_i) and the percentage of seats (S_i) for each of the political parties ($i = 1 \dots n$). The larger the value of index, the larger the disproportionality. Gallagher index is used here among others, as other

⁹ Special Committee on Electoral Reform (a Canadian Parliamentary Committee) (December 1, 2016). Report 3: Strengthening Democracy in Canada : Principles, Process and Public Engagement for Electoral Reform (Report). Parliament of Canada. p. 69 (or p. 83 in PDF search). Retrieved December 26, 2016. One tool that has been developed to measure an electoral system’s relative disproportionality between votes received and seats allotted in a legislature is the Gallagher Index, which was developed by Michael Gallagher (who appeared before the Committee).

indices including the Loosemore-Hanby index is more sensitive to small discrepancies. LSq is calculated on the following formula:

$$LSq = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - S_i)^2}$$

where V_i = the popular vote share of party i
 S_i = the seat share of party i in the lower house

Wesselkamper's results proved his hypothesis to be right; however, it did not achieve statistical significance, and it had the weakest result from his other variables. The following is his table of results.

Table 9 Model of Ethnic Separatism

Variable	Beta	T	Sig.
LSq	.084	.683	.498
Economic Discrimination	-.127	-.944	.350
Political Discrimination	-.142	-1.118	.270
Spatial Distribution	.490	3.679	.001

N=52

F=6.820

Sig.=.000

Adjusted R²=.327

What Wesselkamper's findings can suggest is that although more proportionality in the electoral system does have a curvilinear relationship with ethnic separatism, there is not much statistical significance. However, it must also be noted that the small number of countries that are observed in Wesselkamper's research have to do with consociational democracy. It is, though, interesting to see that proportionality, one of the main

characteristics of Lijphart's consociational framework, and ethnic separatism have a minor significance in their relationship, which suggests that there should be a similar research done with only the states with consociational democracy.

4.3 Debate on the validity of consociationalism

Critics of consociational theory raised a series of arguments concerning the “fluidity of ethno-political identities and the validity of incentives for cooperation among communities” (Norris, 2008). In a nutshell, in plural societies, Lijphart argues that PR is the most effective for democratic consolidation, while Horowitz supports the majoritarian electoral system for such matter. The main line of argument in terms of political relevance of social identities contends to a constructivist perspective, which indicates that the multiple identities in a society are socially constructed, and that their shared interests derived from the identities are funneled and organized by “community leadership elites into grievances and demands requiring a collective response in the political system” (Lijphart, 2004). Furthermore, Horowitz argues that consociationalism is a system that is “inapt to mitigate conflict in severely divided societies,”¹⁰ as Roeder also makes a point that “Belgian power

¹⁰ Horowitz, David. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. p. 256 as cited in O'Leary, Brendan. "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments." In: S. Noel. Ed. *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-*


sharing was most stable as long as ethnicity was not elevated above other group rights and institutional weapons did not concentrate in ethnic foci,” claiming that consociationalism ultimately intensified the tensions between the Flemings and the Walloons, as it contributed the ethnic groups the incentives to become more assertive of their ethnicity. It is for the same reason that Norlinger and Cornell argue that consociationalism leads to secession, with the idea that it can lead to extreme polarization and ultimately the collapse of federalism, as ethnic groups have the means to demand concessions. (Nordlinger, 1972) (Cornell, 2002). Due to its fundamental characteristic, consociationalism can reduce interaction between the elites and the ethnic groups, as the elites have the power to make consolidations through executive power-sharing with a top-down approach. This top-down approach power-sharing, according to Rothchild and Philip, provides the ethnic groups the incentives and the means to intensify the conflicts (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). Horowitz also asserts that consociations are not capable of mitigating conflicts in divided societies as they are “the products of resolved struggles or of relatively moderate cleavages” (Horowitz, 2000).

Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies. McGill-Queens University Press, 2005. p. 4.

What evidence is there that resolves this debate?

In order to touch upon the issues that underlie the claims above, Pippa Norris conducted an analysis that first classifies power-sharing electoral systems, identifies the types of electoral system and the positive action strategies for minority representation, using worldwide nation states, using the dependent variable of democratic consolidation. Using 191 nation states, Norris classifies them into them having a system of majoritarian (75), combined (39), PR (68), and no direct elections (9). Figure 7 is a comparison of trends in types of electoral systems used among worldwide states, and as can be observed, states that have no competitive elections drastically fall in the 1990s, and while all other types slowly rise in trend, PR rises the most in popularity.

Figure 6 Trends in types of electoral systems used worldwide, 1973-2003¹¹



¹¹ Coded by Pippa Norris, using the source from Arthur S. Banks. 2005. *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*; Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly, Eds. *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*. 2nd ed. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Then, she makes a classification of electoral systems with different variables in order to compare the three different systems (Table 10).


Table 10 Characteristics of contemporary electoral systems, 2000¹²

	PR	Combined	Majoritarian	N
(i) Largest governing party, % of seats	44.4	53.7	68.1	158
(ii) Rae party fractionalization index	65.2	54.6	34.6	189
(iii) Mean number of all parliamentary parties	9.3	8.7	5.0	175
(iv) Mean number of relevant parliamentary parties	4.7	4.4	3.2	175
(v) Herfindahl index for all parliamentary parties	0.33	0.39	0.57	153
(vi) Effective number of parliamentary parties	3.69	3.77	2.33	103
(vi) Index of proportionality	90.4	83.2	83.1	110
(vii) Effective electoral threshold	11.3	24.5	35.4	148

¹² Notes from Pippa Norris: (i) The number of seats held by the largest governing party in the lower house of each country's national assembly (Banks 2000).
(ii) The Rae party fractionalization index (Banks 2000).
(iii) The mean number of parliamentary parties with at least one seat in the lower house of the national parliament (calculated from Elections around the World).
(iv) The mean number of relevant parliamentary parties (those with more than 3% of seats in the lower house of the national parliament) (calculated from Elections around the World).
(v) The Herfindahl index for all parliamentary parties, ranging from 0 to 1, representing the probability that two randomly selected members of the lower house of parliament belong to different parties (The Database of Political Institutions Keefer/World Bank 2005).
(vi) The Rose index of proportionality (a standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby index) (Rose 2001).
(vii) The effective electoral threshold, using the formula $(75/m+1)$, where m refers to the district magnitude or the number of members returned in the electoral district (calculated from Rose 2001).

Results show that the largest number of seats held by the largest governing party was in majoritarian system and the least in PR, which suggests that PR is more likely to develop coalition governments. Also, it was found that facilitates elections of many smaller parties, shown by the fact that the indicator of the effective electoral threshold is systematically the lowest as well as the high value of Rae party fractionalization index for PR. These outcomes certainly show positive evidence that PR is favorable in regards to the variables used, but is it then safe to say that proportional representation is the most operative system for democratic consolidation? By using the analysis of variance (ANOVA), Pippa used the major types of electoral systems used around the world, and found that PR is significantly the most democratic, next to combined types of electoral system, and to majoritarian that was consistently less democratic (Figure 8). In the long run, PR electoral system was proved to be more democratic than that of the majoritarian.

Figure 7 Levels of democracy by type of electoral system, 2000¹³



Another factor of consociationalism that needs to be assessed for its validity is federalism, which generates vertical power-sharing between several layers of government. Pippa analyzes federal constitutions in way of creating social stability and making democratic consolidation in multinational states. In a nutshell, federalism strengthens state's right and regional autonomy, which allows for power devolution from the national

¹³ Note from Pippa Norris: The four scales measure *liberal democracy* (Freedom House 2000), *constitutional democracy* (Polity IV 2000), *participatory democracy* (Vanhanen 2000), and *contested democracy* (Cheibub and Gandhi 2000). When tested by ANOVA, the differences between mean scores are significant (At the p=.001 level). Contemporary electoral systems are classified in 191 nation-states worldwide on the basis of the Technical Appendix in Andrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis, 2005. *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The type of electoral system was classified into three categories: *majoritarian/plurality* (single member plurality, second ballot, bloc vote, alternative vote, and single nontransferable vote), *proportional representation* (party list and STV), and *combined* (using more than one type of ballot in simultaneous elections for the same body).

level to the subnational level, as well as create a safeguard of self-government for minorities. Discussion on debate regarding decentralized governance is necessary here, whether it is an effective way of advocating constitutional solutions for reducing conflicts, protecting the interests of marginalized communities in deeply divided societies. First, theorists including but not limited to Montesquieu to Madison claim that decentralized governance is advantageous for (i) “for democratic participation, representation, and accountability; (ii) for public policy and governmental effectiveness; and (iii) for the representation and accommodation of territorially based ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences” (Erk, 2006). Lijphart further conjectures that if social boundaries are reflected by political boundaries in subnational governments, homogeneity can exist in distinct plural societies, which would develop political stability and facilitate diverse interests that embrace the boundaries of a state. He also argues that in plural societies where ethnic groups are dispersed geographically, “administrative and political decentralization also helps to promote accommodation, for example, allowing minorities to elect local representatives who could manage policies toward culturally sensitive issues such as education” (Norris, 2008). Bermeo also claims that armed rebellions are far more conventional in unitary state than that of federal, while they also undergo lower levels of discrimination and grievances (Bermeo, 2002). Another scholar who agrees with decentralization for

stability and consolidation in multinational states is Stephan, who argues that “plural societies without federalism, such as the Russian Federation and Burma/Myanmar will never achieve consolidated democracies” (Stephan, 1999).

Opponents of decentralized governance


Critics focus on efficiency when it comes to debating on the effectiveness of decentralized governance. They argue that an extra layer of government bureaucracy generates “increased costs, poorer service efficiency, worse coordination, greater inequality among administrative areas, and macroeconomic instability”(Prudhomme, 1995), while “centralized government is thought to enhance integration, decisiveness, uniformity, economies of scale, and cost efficiency” (Ranson & Stuart, 1994).

What evidence is there that resolves this debate?

In order to prove that federalism in decentralized governance is worth the extra layer of government bureaucracy that critics say is inefficient, Pippa compares 191 nation states worldwide, 25 (13%) of which have federal constitutions, but because many of them are geographically large countries, 41% of the world’s population is living under federal constitutions, which makes the study more credible. Hybrid unions that are common in Western Europe and Asia-Pacific regions are counted to be 22, and unitary constitutions are counted to be 144 out of 191. Using the Polity


IV 100-point index of democracy, Pippa finds that federal constitutions scored 69% on average (Figure 9). Also, federal constitutions have shown to be consistently better in the records of democracy than unitary states and hybrid unions (see Figure 10). The results showed that compared with unitary states and hybrid unions, federal states showed stronger performance of democracy.

Figure 8 Levels of democracy by type of constitution¹⁴



¹⁴ *None from Norris*: The type of constitution was classified using the definitions in the text according to data derived from Griffiths (2005), Watts (1999), and Banks (2004). The four scales measure *liberal democracy* (Freedom House 2000), *constitutional democracy* (Polity IV 2000), *participatory democracy* (Vanhanen 2000), and *contested democracy* (Cheibub and Gandhi 2000). When tested by ANOVA, the differences between mean scores are all significant (at the p=0.001 level).

Figure 9 Trends in democratization by type of constitution



As much as it is successful when implemented correctly and appropriately, consociational democracy is in reality complex to instigate and not undemanding of the necessary requirements. This is probably one of the main reasons that consociationalism is much debated for its validity. Consociationalism has of course failed in some states like Cyprus and Uruguay; however, it should be noted that consociationalism requires different constraints, with which Cyprus and Uruguay were not successful. As mentioned previously, for consociationalism to be successful, (1) elites have to have the motivation and capability to listen to the needs of the

minority groups; (2) which “requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures” (Lijphart, 2007); (3) which “in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability” (Ibid.); (4) and all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation” (Ibid.). With these requirements, successful consociational democracy is met, as did with the Low Countries, Switzerland, Austria, and Lebanon. As Lijphart stresses, successful consociationalism has to do with “inter-sub-cultural relations at the elite level, inter-subcultural relations at the mass level, and elite-mass relations within each of the subcultures” (Ibid.). In sum, power sharing is the best medicine for deeply-divided societies like Belgium; however, it must be prescribed to the ‘right’ deeply-divided societies that follows the necessary requirements and societal characteristics, in order for it to be lucratively exploited.

V. Macro Level of Analysis

5.1 How consociational is Belgium?

This section analyzes Belgium’s consociational framework in macro level. Relying on data compiled by Strøm et al. (2015) and other literature, I test how consociational Belgium is in terms of different characteristics defined by Lijphart (1991). The way I utilize Strøm’s dataset is two-fold. I

first see how consociational Belgium is by itself; second, because the level of consociationalism can also be relative, I also see how consociational it is compared to other states. 180 states are available from the dataset over the period 1975 to 2010, and I take all 180 states measured in the most recent year, 2010.

The main variables I use to test consociationalism are inclusive power-sharing and dispersive power-sharing, which covers all of Lijphart's key factors of consociationalism: inclusive power-sharing (grand coalition and mutual veto) and dispersive power-sharing (proportional representation and segmental autonomy). Specifically, for inclusive power-sharing, grand coalition is coded in two types: "one mandated by constitutions or peace treaties (*mandated grand coalition*) and de facto grand coalition, i.e., governments of national unity, which are usually installed by peace treaties (*unity*). Mutual veto provision (*mutual veto*) is coded 1 if there is a constitution or a treaty provision that provides a minority veto over legislation" (Urwin, 1970). Mandated reserved legislative seats (*resseats*) captures the number of seats reserved for minorities that is divided by the total number of seats in that house of the legislature. For dispersive power-sharing, three factors are calculated: (1) "the powers allocated to subnational governments; (2) the accountability of subnational governments to citizens;

(3) the representation of subnational constituencies in the central government”.¹⁵

Belgium is coded 1 for *gcseats* as it (1) has the two largest parties both in government; (2) government is a majority government; and (3) the legislature is competitive. There is a provision for minority veto over policies (*mveto*); for mandated reserved legislative seats (*resseats*), the value is 0.1408. Table 4 shows the mean, standard deviation, maximum value, and minimum value of the variables inclusive and dispersion power-sharing compiled with 180 countries for the year 2010.

Table 11 Mean, STD, max, and mean of inclusive and dispersive power-sharing index


	Inclusive	Dispersion
Mean	-0.06382	0.153948
STD	1.018401	0.871059
MAX	7.312246	2.090979
MIN	-0.19827	-0.78917

Belgium was given the value 1.33752 for inclusive power-sharing, and 2.090979 for dispersion power-sharing, which is 1.40134 and 1.937031 higher than average respectively. For a clearer visualization of where

¹⁵ For an exhaustive account of all variables and detailed coding of data, refer to *Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint (IDC)* dataset, which is available online for public. <https://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=doi:10.7910/DVN/27961&versionNumber=1>

Belgium stands in terms of level of consociationalism compared to other countries, a scatter plot is created (Figure 11). This self-made scatter plot indicates where each selected country situates on a table where x-axis is inclusive power-sharing and y-axis is dispersive power-sharing. The values are extracted from *Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint* dataset. See Appendix I for the values of the variables in each dimension for all countries.


Figure 10 Scatter plot of dispersive and inclusive power-sharing index among 29 countries



The countries that are used to compare are other European Union members states, as well as Canada, the US, and Australia. The figure shows that among these countries, Belgium has comparatively high numbers for both dispersive and inclusive power-sharing indices. Other high-ranking countries in this plot include Poland and Canada, two of which countries that are both high in inclusive and dispersive power-sharing, despite its

political and social cleavages. Furthermore, Lijphart (1999) presents an empirical location of 36 countries according to his dimensions of consensus democracy for 1945-1996 over the two dimensions: federal-unitary / divided power and executive-parties / shared power (Figure 12).

Figure 11 Empirical location of 36 countries according to Lijphart's dimensions of consensus democracy



These results show that Belgium is classified, with comparison with other states, one that is high in executive-parties/shared power, which means that

it has a solid grand coalition with leaders representing significant segments of society. Having a little over 0.00 index for federal-unitary/divided power infers that it is both segmentally autonomous and federal, which has been continuously clarified throughout the research: that it gives minority groups the possibility for self-rule within the boundaries of the state.

5.2 Is consociationalism keeping Belgium united?

How are consociational rules effective in consolidating democracy in Belgium with deeply divided groups? *Distinct ethnic communities in multiethnic societies*. First, consociationalism is based on the principle that the social psychological attachment toward group identities – based on shared language, culture, religion, etc. – are the force of power that divide the multiethnic societies. Consociationalism handles ethnic identities in one large unit instead of cross-cutting groupings, as exhibiting group interests and psychological alignment, and as being able to override “other social and political cleavages, like those that come from socioeconomic status, ideology, or gender” (Chandra, 2005). In this schema, language and ethnic divisions in Belgium are taken for granted “as the unshakable building blocks that have to be recognized and accommodated... in which the social-psychological prism regards these communities as each sharing largely homogenous preferences and fixed boundaries, where politics represents a zero-sum game” (Norris, 2008). What this means is that the entrenched social and political cleavages in Belgium, such as those of linguistic and

ethnic identity are taken for granted, and are considered intractable, and such accommodations accounts to achieving realistic reconciliation within the boundaries of a common state. *A grand coalition*. Before the constitutional amendment in 1970, the Belgian constitution had an informal power-sharing arrangement that had existed for years, by which the number of ministers in cabinets are almost equal for the Flemish majority and the Walloon minority. The 1970 amendment made it formal, stating that “With the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet comprises an equal number of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking Ministers.”¹⁶ The principle of consociationalism is to share executive power in a comprehensive coalition, and the constitution of Belgium offers an excellent example of a grand coalition where power is shared among the representatives of the three different linguistic communities in which the society is partitioned. *Proportional representation system that facilitates minorities*. Proportional representation (PR) is considered to be the best form of institutional mechanism that reflects most number of minorities, as they are simple, flexible, and least contentious to take distinct minority communities representing in the election of parties. PR is a system in which votes are translated into seats at the final stage, unlike majoritarian electoral system, so a healthy party competition can be suggested, prohibiting a level

¹⁶ Belgian constitution, Article 86B.

playing field from being generated in preceding stages during recruitment, campaigning, and securing elected office. Norris further compares with majoritarian electoral system that PR provides lower hurdles for minority parties. Belgium was the first country worldwide to introduce this electoral system at national level, with the objective of attributing a number of seats to candidates of different parties from communities including those of minorities. Also, Belgium has a large number of parties within a proportional electoral system that does not hamper a conversion of social cleavages into party system cleavages. Belgium's efforts for proportionality make a division of the parliamentary seats among the different parties that are proportionate to the votes they receive, and both the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives are elected by proportional representation.

Mutual veto and legislative office that encourage elite cooperation. While the British constitution only requires a simple parliamentary majority to make amendments, that of the Belgian obliges a two-thirds majority in all legislative chambers. Also, the constitutional reform in 1970 allowed for a minority veto on non-constitutional matters for the purpose of protecting the Walloon minority against the Flemish majority. For this purpose, any bill that affects the cultural autonomy of any linguistic groups "requires not only the approval of two-thirds majorities in both chambers, but also majorities of each linguistic group – a good example of John C. Calhoun's famous "con-current majority" principle" (Lijphart, 1980). For example, on all non-


financial bills, the Walloon minority has the right to appeal to the cabinet if they feel that their group's interests are threatened. Furthermore, with a higher chance of being elected to the representative assemblies than in other electoral systems, minority group leaders have the incentive to cooperate, bargain, and compromise, "through the give and take of legislative politics at elite level" (Ibid.). In Belgium, they negotiate with other in coalition governments face-to-face, which results in strengthening cooperation of inter-community and having minority vetoes recognized constitutionally. In other words, they have the power to veto against proposals or decisions that could threaten their group interests and security, for example matters that involve language policy, cultural rights, or freedom of religious expressions.

Inclusiveness that strengthen community support. Consociationalism allows for inclusiveness of minority groups, as has been constantly described, and in Belgium, this acts as a psychological agent and a safety controller for tensions, therefore decreasing inter-communal conflicts, strengthening harmonious developments, and enhancing democratic consolidation.

Segmental autonomy and federalism. According to Lijphart, Belgium is an "outstanding example of the non-territorial form of federalism" (Ibid.). The constitutional amendment made in 1970 clearly stated that "There is a cultural council for the French cultural community made up of the members of the French linguistic group of both Houses and a cultural council for the Dutch cultural community made up of the members of the Dutch linguistic

group of both Houses.”¹⁷ Both these councils have the right to form laws regarding cultural matters for communities; for example, the Dutch cultural council legislates for Flanders and the Dutch-speaking minority in Brussels that is a bilingual region. Furthermore, the three autonomous regions (e.g. Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels) are divided upon a territorial federal pattern, and autonomy is granted on a non-territorial basis. Pippa Norris, in “Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?” (2008) summarizes the core sequential steps in consociational theory (Figure 13).

Figure 12 The core sequential steps in Consociational Theory¹⁸



¹⁷ Ibid., Article 59B, Section 1.

¹⁸ Norris, Pippa (2008). “Driving democracy: Do power-sharing institutions work?” Cambridge University Press.

VI. Micro Level of Analysis

The purpose of this section is to observe the relationship between citizens' attitude towards regional division and consociationalism. Past literature focused on consociationalism at macro level, whether it unites Belgium and hinders from calls for regional independence. The following provides a micro level analysis. The survey data I used here gathered responses from 2048 Belgian residents (1084 from Flanders, 717 from Wallonia, and 247 from Brussels) older than 18 that are eligible to vote for the federal election in 2007. After the removal of missing data in R and number of respondents from Brussels, the total number of respondents was 1471. From the data, I was able to find 3 questions each that relate to each of the independent variables: grand coalition and segmental autonomy.

Creation of x variables. I first found questions that ask the respondents' opinions on Belgium's grand coalition embedded in the political sector. I was able to find three questions, and they all have credibility to use as indicators for grand coalition because who is in power should make a difference in order for consociationalism to work, and it should not be put back into people's hands – it should be put into ministers representing the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking ministers, with two or more parties in coalition. Also, for consociationalism to work, there shouldn't be one leader who carries out what the majority thinks – there should be a grand coalition with “power that is shared among representatives of the different

communities into which the society is divided” (see Appendix II for the questions chosen). Using SPSS, I confirmed that all the questions (x11, x12, x13) regarding grand coalition were consistent with the same direction (correlation coefficient of *regional division* for x11: -0.099; x12: -0.134; x13: -0.0315). The correlation analysis between the *grand coalition* variable and the *regional division* variable made by combining the three x1 variables showed that the correlation coefficient had a negative correlation with -0.1295, and the significance probability was very significant with 0.000; therefore, it was appropriate to construct *grand coalition* variable by summing the three variables x11, x12, and x13. Similarly, for segmental autonomy to work, there should be a non-territorial form of federalism, where two cultural councils (French and Dutch) have the sovereignty to make or amend laws on issues for communities that are only outlined in territorial terms. So, the less the degree of preference for responses, the higher likely respondents are ok with consociationalism. It was confirmed that all the questions (x21, x22, x23) I chose as indicators were consistent with the same direction (correlation coefficient of *regional division* for x21: -0.4269; x22: -0.4362; x23: -0.1549), and the correlation analysis between the *segmental autonomy* variable and the *regional division* variable made by combining the three x2 variables showed that the correlation coefficient had a negative correlation with -0.4887, with the significance probability of 0.000. Based on the result of the same directionality of the correlation of the

three variables, logical validity was secured of constructing the *segmental autonomy* variable with their sum. Therefore, the two x variables used are *segmental autonomy* and *regional division*, which are the two key characteristics of consociationalism based on Lijphart's framework.

Descriptive Statistics

	Min.	Max.	Mean.	Std.
Regional division	0	1	.43	.496
x11	1	11	5.44	2.582
x12	1	5	2.50	.921
x13	1	5	3.44	1.055
x21	1	11	6.76	2.907
x22	1	11	7.17	3.290
x23	1	4	2.97	.248
Grand coalition	4	21	11.39	3.190
Segmental autonomy	3	26	16.90	5.553
education	1	10	6.40	2.693
satisfaction with democracy	0	5	2.69	.926

Correlation

	Regional division	x11	x12	x13	x21	x22	x23	Grand coalition	Segmental autonomy
Regional division	1	-	-.134	-	-.427	-	-.155	-.129	-.489
		.099		.031		.436			
		.000	.000	.227	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

As a result of Chi-squared analysis on the *religion* distribution by region, the probability of significance was 0.01, and it was confirmed that there is a distribution difference: $\chi^2 = 8.9425$, $df = 2$, $p\text{-value} = 0.01143$.

Gender. The *regional division* mean score of male group was 0.4708, which was higher than that of female group 0.4013, and the significance probability from ANOVA was 0.0073. As a result of the Chi-squared test for *gender*, there was no significant difference by region. This confirms that the sample collection is correct: $\chi^2 = 0.005668$, $df = 1$, $p\text{-value} = 0.94$.

Control variables. Education attainment. A correlation analysis with *education* showed that correlation coefficient was 0.1636, indicating that there was a slight positive correlation, and as the educational level increased, the *regional division* score became closer to 1 than 0, and the significance probability was also 0.0000. As a result of ANOVA, it was found that the *education attainment* average score of Flanders was 6.3938 and 6.3986 for Wallonia. Also, the significance test of the difference showed that the significance probability was 0.984, which is not a significant difference, but a difference by chance. In other words, there was no difference in *education* score between regions. *Satisfaction with democracy.* As a result of a correlation analysis with *satisfaction with democracy*, there was a small negative correlation coefficient of -0.0519, and the significance probability was 0.05, indicating a significant correlation. However, the correlation coefficient itself is small, so there was not a large correlation. As a result of

the ANOVA, there was a difference of 2.5575 in the *satisfaction with democracy* average score in Flanders and 2.8977 in the *satisfaction with democracy* score in Wallonia. In addition, the significance test of this difference shows that there is a very significant regional difference with a significance probability of 0.000, and that Wallonia has a statistically higher *satisfaction with democracy* score than Flanders. *Religion*. The *regional division* mean score was the largest with the people who were Christians or Protestants, and least with the Catholics. Also, the statistical significance of the difference in *regional division* means cores between the observed groups was 0.0041, which showed a very significant difference. *Party choice*. The *regional division* mean score for each group is shown as follows, and as a result of ANOVA, the significance probability is 0.0000, and it is confirmed that the difference of *regional division* mean scores among the groups is statistically significant. As a result of Chi-square test for the distribution of supportive political parties in each region, the probability of significance is 0.000, and it can be confirmed that there is a difference in distribution: $\chi^2 = 1366.4$, $df = 13$, $p\text{-value} < 2.2e-16$. *Region*. The mean score for each region is 0.5774 and 0.2063, which is a big difference. As a result of ANOVA, the significance was 0.0000, indicating that the difference between the *regional division* means scores was statistically significant. *Province*. The mean score for each group is shown below, and with the significance probability

of 0.0000, the difference in *regional division* means scores among the groups is statistically significant.

The result of the cross tabulation analysis between the x1 variable *grand coalition* and y variable *regional division* is shown in Appendix V. As a result of confirming through the Chi-square test whether the differences in the composition ratios are significant, the significance probability was less than 0.05, which means that the difference is significant. Also, the result of cross tabulation analysis between the x2 variable *segmental autonomy* and y variable *regional division* is as follows. As result of confirming through the Chi-square test whether the differences in the distribution ratios are significant, the significance probability was less than 0.05, which means that the difference is significant.

In order to see the relationship between people's attitude towards regional independence and the control variables, I conducted a cross tabulation for the control variables with the dependent variable (Appendix VI). First, *region*. The result of cross tabulation analysis between the two regions Flanders and Wallonia with the y variable *regional division* is as follows. As a result of confirming through the Chi-square test whether there was a significant difference in the distribution of *region* values according to the dependent variable values, the significance probability was less than 0.05, which means that the difference is significant. Second, it was also interesting to see how the choice for political party affects the cross

tabulation result with the opinion on regional division. The result showed that the significance probability is 0.000, which proves that it is very significant, and there was a significant difference in the distribution of *party choice* values according to the dependent variable values.

Table 12 Analysis of dependent variable and control variables

a. region * y(regional division) cross tabulation

count		Regional division		Total
		0	1	
region	Flanders	382	522	904
	Wallonia	450	117	567
Total		832	639	1471

Chi-square test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-square	195.292 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	193.785	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	205.107	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
N. of valid cases	1471				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 246.30.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

b. Education attainment * y(regional division) cross tabulation

Count		Regional division		Total
		0	1	
Education attainment	1	24	9	33
	2	96	59	155
	3	90	29	119
	4	68	40	108
	5	56	37	93
	6	90	54	144
	7	114	102	216
	8	81	64	145
	9	154	151	305
	10	59	94	153
Total		832	639	1471

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	53.352 ^a	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	54.524	9	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	39.360	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	1471		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.34.

c. Party choice * y(regional division) cross tabulation

Count

		y		Total
		0	1	
z4	Blanc	22	17	39
	CD&V NVA	124	212	336
	CDH	66	18	84
	Ecolo	58	16	74
	FN	9	3	12
	Groen!	25	36	61
	Lijst Dedecker	14	25	39
	MR	145	34	179
	Open VLD	71	84	155
	Others	10	3	13
	PS	159	40	199
	PTB-UA	2	1	3
	sp.a-spirit	90	76	166
	Vlaams Belang	37	74	111
Total		832	639	1471

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	220.210 ^a	13	.000
Likelihood Ratio	230.752	13	.000
N of Valid Cases	1471		

a. 2 cells (7.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.30.

The result of regression analysis of the model with extended region and control variables gave a regression model $regional\ division = 1.88936 - 0.014238 * grand\ coalition - 0.035252 * segmental\ autonomy + 0.017557 * education - 0.228740 * Wallonia - 0.039421 * female$, and the significance probability was 0.0000, which is a very significant model. In addition, the significance of each regression coefficient is also significant, with a significance of 0.0692 for the *female* variable and a significance of 0.0000

for the remaining variables. As *grand coalition* increases by 1, *regional division* decreases by 0.14238, and as *segmental autonomy* increases by 1, *regional division* decreases by 0.03525. Also, the *regional division* score increased by 0.017557 as the *education* score increased by 1, and for the case of Wallonia, the *regional division* score is lower than Flanders by 0.228740, and for the case of *female*, the *regional division* score is lower than *male* by 0.039421. In other words, there was a clear correlation between the independent variables *grand coalition* and *segmental autonomy* and the dependent variable *regional division*. Below is details on the result of the regression analysis. The analysis proved that there is a statistically significance in the correlation between the independent variables (opinion on consociationalism) and the dependent variable (opinion on regional independence): specifically, the higher the preference for consociationalism, the lesser the preference for regional independence. The result of the regression analysis proved that there was a lesser score for Wallonia than for Flanders (by 0.228740), which makes sense because there is a greater percentage for Flanders who seek regional autonomy than for Wallonia, of which puts more emphasis on power on the federal level.

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. of the estimate
1	.552 ^a	.305	.303	.414

a. Predictors: (constant), Wallonia, education, woman, grand coalition, segmental autonomy

ANOVA^a

Model		SS	df	MS	F	Sig.
1	Regression	110.246	5	22.049	128.605	.000 ^b
	Residual	251.173	1465	.171		
	Total	361.419	1470			

a. dependent variable: Regional division

b. Predictors: (constant), Wallonia, education, woman, grand coalition, segmental autonomy

Coefficient^a

Model		Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		t	Sig.
		B	Std. error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	1.189	.067			17.706	.000
	Grand coalition	-.014	.004	-.092		-4.012	.000
	Segmental autonomy	-.035	.002	-.395		-16.809	.000
	education	.018	.004	.095		4.154	.000
	female	-.039	.022	-.040		-1.819	.069
	Wallonia	-.229	.024	-.225		-9.634	.000

a. dependent variable: Regional division

VII. Conclusion

To rephrase George Orwell, all political systems are unique, but some are more unique than others. The distinctive features of political system that Belgium possesses certainly falls into the ‘more unique’

category, and the fact that this deeply-divided society with its uniqueness is better compatible with consociational democracy than any other country makes it all the more interesting.

This paper analyzed the relationship between consociational framework and regional independence. Past literature focused on consociationalism at macro level, stating whether or not the deeply embedded tradition unites Belgium and hinders it from having regional secessions. None provided a micro level quantitative analysis between the push for regional independence and consociationalism, and did not explain the relationship between the two variables through the eyes of the Belgian citizens. This research, analyzed the issue not only at macro level, but also at micro level, observing how the citizens' view of consociational democracy affects their opinion on regional independence. Analysis on macro level looked at how consociational Belgium is both by itself and compared to other states, and whether consociationalism is keeping Belgium united. Analysis on micro level used a general election survey data that asks the respondents (1471) regarding each variable that are identified to be used as indicators. I set 'regional division' as the dependent variable and two major characteristics of consociational framework ('grand coalition' and 'segmental autonomy') as independent variables. Each variable was analyzed about their distribution, followed by a crosstab analysis that is conducted according to people from each region (Flanders and Wallonia).

Then, I ran a regression using SPSS. The results proved that there is a statistically significance in the correlation between the independent variables (opinion on consociationalism) and the dependent variable (opinion on regional independence): specifically, the higher the preference for consociationalism, the lesser the preference for regional independence. It is also meaningful to observe the correlation compared between the citizens of Wallonia and Flanders, and as a result of setting ‘region’ as a control variable,’ it was proven that there was a lesser score for Wallonia than for Flanders (by 0.228740), which makes sense because there is a greater percentage for Flanders who seek regional autonomy than for Wallonia, of which puts more emphasis on power on the federal level.

Table 13 Analysis between independent variables and dependent variable

a. x1(Grand coalition) * y(regional division) cross tabulation
count

		Regional division		Total
		0	1	
x1 (grand coalition)	4	2	4	6
	5	13	4	17
	6	24	22	46
	7	45	40	85
	8	49	64	113
	9	83	94	177
	10	96	91	187
	11	89	77	166
	12	100	79	179
	13	80	44	124
	14	84	35	119
	15	53	31	84
	16	42	17	59
	17	36	17	53
	18	21	8	29
	19	10	8	18
	20	2	3	5
	21	3	1	4
	Total	832	639	1471

Chi-Square test

	value	df	Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	48.509 ^a	17	.000
Likelihood ratio	49.469	17	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	24.644	1	.000
N. of valid cases	1471		

a. 6 cells (16.7%) is a cell with an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.74.

b. x2(segmental autonomy) * y(regional division) cross tabulation

count

	count	Regional division		Total
		0	1	
x2	3	0	6	6
(segmental	4	0	6	6
autonomy)	5	5	43	48
	6	0	10	10
	7	5	22	27
	8	6	21	27
	9	8	48	56
	10	8	33	41
	11	11	42	53
	12	13	38	51
	13	25	39	64
	14	19	39	58
	15	83	57	140
	16	38	29	67
	17	50	37	87
	18	52	35	87
	19	55	29	74
	20	108	30	138
	21	63	18	81
	22	60	17	77
	23	63	13	76
	24	23	4	27
	25	136	23	159
	26	1	0	1
Total		832	639	1471

Chi-Square test

	value	df	Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	376.463 ^a	23	.000
Likelihood ratio	409.510	123	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	351.116	1	.000
N. of valid cases	1471		

a. 7 cells (14.6%) is a cell with an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .43.

Limitations of this research contends the fact that the latest survey data available for Belgium's general election is from 2007 data, which is arguably a long time ago. ISPO/PIOP is currently updating the data with new election results and survey, which will be useful in conducting an

updated version of the research. Furthermore, the independent variables (grand coalition and segmental autonomy), although are not numerically defined in the first place by Lijphart, cannot be downright defined by the three questions that are found in the survey data, which lowers the credibility of the research; however, they were the closest questions to each variable, and they were all consistent with the same direction when tested through a correlation analysis.

Overall, this research has important policy implications for future conflict management in deeply divided countries like Belgium, and presents a possible model framework and possible implications for developing countries that are maturing their democracy. As mentioned, an updated version of the research with the newer Belgium General Election survey data, of which ISPO/PIOP is making its endeavors to update, will be interesting to observe, especially as regards to how Belgian citizens have changed their views after the political deadlock crisis between 2007 and 2011.

Appendix

Appendix I. Values of variables for the scatter plot of dispersive and inclusive power-sharing index among 29 countries

Australia	AUS	-0.19827	1.573984
Austria	AUT	-0.19827	2.090979
Belgium	BEL	1.33752	2.090979
Canada	CAN	0.781989	2.090979
Croatia	HRV	0.008044	1.18673
Cyprus	CYP	5.891853	-0.78917
Czech Rep.	CZE	-0.19827	0.03159
Denmark	DNK	-0.19827	0.669878
Estonia	EST	-0.19827	-0.78917
Finland	FIN	-0.17854	-0.32982
France	FRA	-0.19827	1.18673
FRG/Germany	DEU	-0.19827	2.090979
Hungary	HUN	-0.19827	0.210525
Ireland	IRL	-0.19827	0.669878
Italy	ITA	-0.19827	2.090979
Latvia	LVA	-0.19827	0.032838
Lithuania	LTU	-0.19827	-0.78917
Luxembourg	LUX	-0.19827	-0.78917
Malta	MLT	-0.19827	-0.78917
Netherlands	NLD	-0.19827	1.090034
Poland	POL	0.781989	1.549387
Portugal	PRT	-0.19827	-0.24772
Romania	ROM	0.015619	0.185928
Slovakia	SVK	-0.19827	1.573984
Slovenia	SVN	-0.11068	-0.78917
Spain	ESP	-0.19827	2.090979
Sweden	SWE	-0.19827	0.490943
UK	GBR	-0.19827	1.032535
USA	USA	-0.19827	2.090979

Appendix II. Questions from the General Election Study dataset

a. Regarding dependent variable 'regional division'

		Raw (absolute) frequencies	Percentages for Flanders	Percentages for Wallonia
1.	The unitarian Belgian state should be restored.	496	11.5	43.0
2.	The federal state should stay, but with more power to the central government than it is now the case.	353	11.4	22.4
3.	The present situation should be kept.	366	20.9	13.7
4.	The federal state should stay, but with more power to the communities and regions than it is now the case.	682	48.2	18.7
5.	Belgium should split.	106	7.9	2.1
		2003	100.0	100.0
7.	Don't know	35		
9.	No answer	10		

b. Regarding independent variable 'grand coalition'

x11

Q103 WHO IS IN POWER MAKES A DIFFERENCE

Some people say it makes a big difference who is in power. Others say it doesn't make any difference who is in power. Use Card No. 54. "0" means that it makes a big difference, "10" means that it doesn't make any difference. Where would you place yourself?

[response card 54]

0. Large difference	131	6.2	7.5	4.9
1.	92	4.7	4.8	3.3
2.	216	10.4	12.1	7.3
3.	365	20.5	14.1	18.3
4.	197	9.9	8.5	12.6
5.	427	18.7	22.3	27.6
6.	128	5.6	5.6	11.4
7.	177	9.2	9.3	4.9
8.	135	6.6	7.2	5.3

x12

Q105_3 POWER NEEDS TO BE PUT BACK INTO PEOPLE'S HAND

The power needs to be put back into people hands.

[response card 55]

1. Completely disagree	161	8.5	7.8	5.7
2. Disagree	991	53.8	47.8	30.5
3. Neither agree nor disagree	461	22.7	24.0	19.1
4. Agree	347	12.4	17.6	36.2
5. Completely agree	68	2.5	2.8	8.5
	-----	-----	-----	-----
	2028	100.0	100.0	100.0
7. Don't know	10			
9. No answer	10			

x13

Q105_5 NEED FOR A LEADER WHO CARRIES OUT WHAT THE MAJORITY THINKS

We need a strong leader who carries out what the majority thinks

[response card 55]

1. Completely disagree	70	2.8	3.8	5.3
2. Disagree	410	17.9	25.6	14.6
3. Neither agree nor disagree	330	16.2	14.3	22.0
4. Agree	989	51.9	44.1	48.0
5. Completely agree	233	11.3	12.2	10.2
	-----	-----	-----	-----
	2032	100.0	100.0	100.0
7. Don't know	13			
9. No answer	3			

c. Regarding independent variable 'segmental autonomy'

x21

Q89 FLANDERS-WALLONIA / BELGIUM MUST DECIDE

The form of state that the country should have is still a matter of discussion. Some think that "Flanders and Wallonia must each be able to decide over everything by themselves". Others think that "Belgium, Flemish and Walloons together, must be able to decide about everything". Where would you place yourself on the scale?

[response card 40]

0. Flanders/Wallonia should decide	102	8.8	1.0	0.4
1.	62	4.8	1.0	1.6
2.	116	8.9	2.4	1.6
3.	152	10.0	4.9	4.1
4.	134	8.4	4.2	5.8
5.	435	17.3	26.9	24.3
6.	156	5.7	7.6	16.9
7.	233	8.2	14.9	16.5
8.	208	8.4	13.5	9.1
9.	113	3.5	7.5	9.5
10. Belgium should decide	310	15.9	16.2	10.3
	-----	-----	-----	-----
	2021	100.0	100.0	100.0
77. Don't know	23			
99. No answer	4			

x22

Q90

DEFEDERALIZE SOCIAL SECURITY / FEDERALIZE SOCIAL SECURITY

Some people think that the social security should be split completely, so that Flanders and Wallonia have to stand for themselves for their social security. Other people think that the social security should be strengthened on the federal level. Where would you place yourself?

[response card 41]

0. Defederalize social security	187	9.1	9.3	9.3
1.	88	4.3	4.4	13.6
2.	151	7.4	7.5	21.1
3.	132	6.4	6.5	27.7
4.	92	4.5	4.6	32.2
5.	312	15.2	15.5	47.7
6.	105	5.1	5.2	52.9
7.	143	7.0	7.1	60.0
8.	207	10.1	10.3	70.3
9.	122	6.0	6.1	76.3
10. Federalize social security	477	23.3	23.7	100
	-----	-----	-----	-----
	2016	100.0	100.0	100.0

x23

Q73_3_15 SATISFACTION WITH TOPIC: SOCIAL SECURITY (IN GENERAL)

[response card 28]

1. Very bad work	4	2.3	0.0	0.0
2. Rather bad work	25	14.4	0.0	0.0
3. Neither good nor bad work	82	45.4	0.0	60.0
4. Rather good work	66	36.8	0.0	40.0
5. Very good work	2	1.2	0.0	0.0
	-----	-----	-----	-----
	179	100.0	0.0	100.0
7. Don't know	3			
8. Not applicable	1866			

Appendix III. Correlations of x variables

Correlations

	x11	x12	x13	x21	x22	x23	Grand coalition	Segmental autonomy
Regional division	-.099	-.134	-.031	-.427	-.436	-.155	-.129	-.489
	.000	.000	.227	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	1471	1471	1471	1471	1471	1471	1471	1471

Appendix IV. Control variables

a. religion

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Catholic	874	59.4	59.4	59.4
	Christian or Protestant	250	17.0	17.0	76.4
	Others	347	23.6	23.6	100.0
	Total	1471	100.0	100.0	

Report

Regional division religion	Mean	N	Std.
Catholic	.40	874	.491
Christian or Protestant	.52	250	.501
Others	.46	347	.499
Total	.43	1471	.496

ANOVA

		SS	df	MS	F	P-value
Regional division * religion	Between groups	2.692	2	1.346	5.509	.004
	Within groups		1468	.244		
	Total		1470			

b. gender

gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	man	701	47.7	47.7	47.7
	woman	770	52.3	52.3	100.0
	Total	1471	100.0	100.0	

Report

Regional division gender	Mean	N	Std.
man	.47	701	.500
woman	.40	770	.490
Total	.43	1471	.496

ANOVA

		SS	df	MS	F	p-value
Regional division * gender	Between groups	1.770	1	1.770	7.231	.007
	Within groups		1469	.245		
	Total		1470			

c. choice of party for the 2007 general election
Party choice

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Blanc	39	2.7	2.7	2.7
	CD&V NVA	336	22.8	22.8	25.5
	CDH	84	5.7	5.7	31.2
	Ecolo	74	5.0	5.0	36.2
	FN	12	.8	.8	37.0
	Groen!	61	4.1	4.1	41.2
	Lijst Dedecker	39	2.7	2.7	43.8
	MR	179	12.2	12.2	56.0
	Open VLD	155	10.5	10.5	66.6
	Others	13	.9	.9	67.4
	PS	199	13.5	13.5	81.0
	PTB-UA	3	.2	.2	81.2
	sp.a-spirit	166	11.3	11.3	92.5
	Vlaams Belang	111	7.5	7.5	100.0
Total	1471	100.0	100.0		

Report

Regional division

Party choice	Mean	N	Std
Blanc	.44	39	.502
CD&V NVA	.63	336	.483
CDH	.21	84	.413
Ecolo	.22	74	.414
FN	.25	12	.452
Groen!	.59	61	.496
Lijst Dedecker	.64	39	.486
MR	.19	179	.393
Open VLD	.54	155	.500
Others	.23	13	.439
PS	.20	199	.402
PTB-UA	.33	3	.577
sp.a-spirit	.46	166	.500
Vlaams Belang	.67	111	.474
Total	.43	1471	.496

ANOVA

		SS	df	MS	F	p-value
Regional division * Party choice	Between groups	54.105	13	4.162	19.732	.000
	Within groups	307.315	1457	.211		
	Total	361.419	1470			

d. region of residence
region

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Flanders	904	61.5	61.5	61.5
	Wallonia	567	38.5	38.5	100.0
	Total	1471	100.0	100.0	

Report

Regional division

region	Mean	N	Std
Flanders	.58	904	.494

Wallonia	.21	567	.405
Total	.43	1471	.496

ANOVA

		SS	df	MS	F	p-value
Regional division * region	Between groups	47.983	1	47.983	224.883	.000
	Within groups	313.437	1469	.213		
	Total	361.419	1470			

e. province of residence

Province

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Antwerp	245	16.7	16.7	16.7
	East-Flanders	200	13.6	13.6	30.3
	Flemish-Brabant	116	7.9	7.9	38.1
	Hainau	254	17.3	17.3	55.4
	Liege	143	9.7	9.7	65.1
	Limburg	83	5.6	5.6	70.8
	Luxemburg	43	2.9	2.9	73.7
	Namur	68	4.6	4.6	78.3
	Wallon-Brabant	59	4.0	4.0	82.3
	West-Flanders	260	17.7	17.7	100.0
Total	1471	100.0	100.0		

Report

Regional division
province

	Mean	N	Std
Antwerp	.55	245	.498
East-Flanders	.65	200	.478
Flemish-Brabant	.59	116	.495
Hainau	.17	254	.376
Liege	.26	143	.439
Limburg	.54	83	.501
Luxemburg	.19	43	.394
Namur	.18	68	.384
Wallon-Brabant	.29	59	.457
West-Flanders	.55	260	.498
Total	.43	1471	.496

ANOVA

		SS	df	MS	F	p-value
Regional division * province	Between groups	50.678	9	5.631	26.475	.000
	Within groups	310.741	1461	.213		
	Total	361.419	1470			

Appendix V. Cross tabulation analysis between two independent variables and dependent variable

c. x1(Grand coalition) * y(regional division) cross tabulation
count

	Regional division		Total
	0	1	
x1 (grand coalition) 4	2	4	6
5	13	4	17
6	24	22	46
7	45	40	85
8	49	64	113
9	83	94	177
10	96	91	187
11	89	77	166
12	100	79	179
13	80	44	124
14	84	35	119
15	53	31	84
16	42	17	59
17	36	17	53
18	21	8	29
19	10	8	18
20	2	3	5
21	3	1	4
Total	832	639	1471

Chi-Square test

	value	df	Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	48.509 ^a	17	.000
Likelihood ratio	49.469	17	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	24.644	1	.000
N. of valid cases	1471		

a. 6 cells (16.7%) is a cell with an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.74.

d. x2(segmental autonomy) * y(regional division) cross tabulation
count

	Regional division		Total
	0	1	
x2 (segmental autonomy) 3	0	6	6
4	0	6	6
5	5	43	48
6	0	10	10
7	5	22	27
8	6	21	27
9	8	48	56
10	8	33	41
11	11	42	53
12	13	38	51
13	25	39	64
14	19	39	58
15	83	57	140
16	38	29	67
17	50	37	87
18	52	35	87
19	55	29	74
20	108	30	138
21	63	18	81
22	60	17	77
23	63	13	76

	24	23	4	27
	25	136	23	159
	26	1	0	1
Total		832	639	1471

Chi-Square test

	value	df	Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	376.463 ^a	23	.000
Likelihood ratio	409.510	123	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	351.116	1	.000
N. of valid cases	1471		

a. 7 cells (14.6%) is a cell with an expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .43.

Appendix VI. Cross tabulation analysis of dependent variable and control variables

d. region * y(regional division) cross tabulation

count	region	Regional division		Total
		0	1	
	Flanders	382	522	904
	Wallonia	450	117	567
	Total	832	639	1471

Chi-square test

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-square	195.292 ^a	1	.000		
Continuity Correction ^b	193.785	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	205.107	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
N. of valid cases	1471				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 246.30.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

e. Education attainment * y(regional division) cross tabulation

Count	Education attainment	Regional division		Total
		0	1	
	1	24	9	33
	2	96	59	155
	3	90	29	119
	4	68	40	108
	5	56	37	93
	6	90	54	144
	7	114	102	216
	8	81	64	145
	9	154	151	305
	10	59	94	153
	Total	832	639	1471

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	53.352 ^a	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	54.524	9	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	39.360	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	1471		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.34.

f. Party choice * y(regional division) cross tabulation

Count

		y		Total
		0	1	
z4	Blanc	22	17	39
	CD&V NVA	124	212	336
	CDH	66	18	84
	Ecolo	58	16	74
	FN	9	3	12
	Groen!	25	36	61
	Lijst Dedecker	14	25	39
	MR	145	34	179
	Open VLD	71	84	155
	Others	10	3	13
	PS	159	40	199
	PTB-UA	2	1	3
	sp.a-spirit	90	76	166
Vlaams Belang	37	74	111	
Total		832	639	1471

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	220.210 ^a	13	.000
Likelihood Ratio	230.752	13	.000
N of Valid Cases	1471		

a. 2 cells (7.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.30.

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국문 초록

지속적으로 이어지고 있는 지역 분열과 분리 독립운동에 대한 문제는 사회의 모든 수준에서 유럽연합과 주변국들에게 큰 도전을 제기한다. 분리 독립운동의 대표적 사례인 스코틀랜드와 카탈루냐의 독립 투표가 통과되지는 않았지만, 유럽연합의 상당수 하위 지역들이 자치권 및 언어, 문화적 차이와 경제 등의 이유로 독립을 요구하고 있는 상황은 세계적인 현상이다. 이러한 맥락에서 볼 때, 벨기에의 두 지역 (플란데런과 왈롱)이 각자의 독립을 요구할 이유가 충분히 있음에도 불구하고 현재까지 독립에 관한 투표를 하고 있지 않을 뿐만 아니라, 두 지역 중 어느 한 지역도 분리 독립을 거론하고 있지 않다. 그렇다면, 여러 정황으로 불리한 상황임에도 불구하고 벨기에의 분리 독립에 대한 의지를 억제하고 있는 것은 무엇인가? 합의제 민주주의라는 특별한 정치 체계와 관련이 있을까? 만약 그렇다면, 이러한 요인들은 얼마나 많은 영향을 주고 있을까? 이러한 의문에 대해 본 연구는 지역적 분열과 합의제 민주주의 사이의 관계를 고찰하고, 거시적, 미시적 두 가지 측면에서 양적, 질적 분석을 통해 이 관계를 살펴 보고자 한다. 마지막으로, 본 논문은 종속 변수인 "분리 독립" 과 독립 변수인 "합의제 민주주의" 사이에 상관관계가 존재한다는 가설을 전제로 벨기에의 오랜 전통인 합의제 민주주의가 어떻게 통합 모델로 작용하고 있는지 연구하고자 한다.

주요어: 합의제 민주주의, 분리 독립, 지역 분열, 유럽연합, 벨기에