



저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:



저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.



비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.



변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는, 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 [이용허락규약\(Legal Code\)](#)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

[Disclaimer](#)

국제학석사학위논문

**A Review on the Buildup of Mistrust
between United States and South Korea
Alliance in the 1970's**

**Changes in domestic politics and values escalating
tensions during the Carter-Park era**

1970년대 한미동맹갈등에 관한 연구:
박정희-카터 시대의 외교정책 중심으로

2019년 2월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제대학원 국제협력전공

김광우

Master's Thesis

**A Review on the Buildup of Mistrust
between United States and South Korea
Alliance in the 1970's:**

**Changes in domestic politics and values escalating
tensions during the
Carter-Park era**

A thesis by

Kwang Woo Kim

Graduate Program in International Cooperation
For the Degree of Master of International Studies

February 2019

Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea

A Review on the Buildup of Mistrust between United States and South Korea Alliance in the 1970's

Changes in domestic politics and values escalating tensions during the
Carter-Park era

1970년대 한미동맹갈등에 관한 연구:

박정희-카터 시대의 외교정책 중심으로

지도교수 박태균

이 논문을 국제학석사학위논문으로 제출함

2019년 1월

서울대학교 국제대학원

국제학과 국제협력전공

김광우

김광우의 국제학석사학위논문을 인준함

2019년 1월

위원장 신성호 (인)

부위원장 한정훈 (인)

위원 박태균 (인)

THESIS ACCEPTANCE CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, appointed by

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

Has examined thesis titled

**A Review on the Buildup of Mistrust between United States and South
Korea Alliance in the 1970's**

**Changes in domestic politics and values escalating tensions during the
Carter-Park era**

Presented by **Kwang Woo Kim**

Candidate for the degree of Master of International Studies and hereby certify that it is
worthy of acceptance

Signature _____

Committee Chair *Sheen, Seong-Ho*

Signature _____

Committee Member *Han JeongHun*

Signature _____

Thesis Advisor *Park Tae-Gyun*

© Copyright by Kwang Woo Kim

All Rights Reserved

Abstract

This paper is to investigate the essence of R.O.K-U.S. alliance by evaluating the worst time in the history of the R.O.K-U.S. relationship, the Carter-Park era. As the Yushin regime escalated into a full conflict with the United States, the Carter administration implemented human rights policy emphasizing moral values despite lacking pragmatic security interests to maintain R.O.K-U.S. alliance. Many literatures on the R.O.K-U.S. alliance in the 1970s have traditionally used structural neo-realist approach and common threat perception analysis to explain the cause of the conflict between the two allies during the 1970s, emphasizing the notion that the change in international security environment acted as a main catalyst for the changing nature of the R.O.K-U.S. alliance. However, few literatures have linked changes in values and domestic political situations of United States as possible catalyst for the conflict in the R.O.K-U.S. alliance. By critically analyzing declassified diplomatic papers from the United States Congress, United States Department of State and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, newspapers, and autobiography of Jimmy Carter, this paper states will show how changes in United States foreign policy toward Soft Power during this particular period have acted as a catalyst in worsening the R.O.K-U.S. alliance during the Carter-Park era. In addition, by utilizing autonomy-security trade off model, this paper will illustrate that the conflict between the two countries escalated as United States was losing its leverage on South Korea in the 1970s since South Korea grew out from being heavily dependent on United States for economic and military aids. The different perception and methodological approaches on human rights and lobby scandal between two allies during this period almost led to the dissolution of alliance. As such, the paper reviews the R.O.K-U.S. alliance at its worst moment to draw an historical analogy that can be used to understand not only the current challenges of the R.O.K-U.S. alliance but also provide implications which can bolster ways to promote a stronger relationship between the two countries in the 21st century.

Keywords: R.O.K-U.S. alliance, Nixon Doctrine, Yushin, asymmetric relationship, balance of threat, Autonomy-security alliance, human rights, Jimmy Carter, Park Jung Hee

Student Number: 2015-25144

Table of Contents

Abstract	
Introduction	1
I. Literature Review	4
II. Research Question	9
III. Methods and composition of the Study	11
IV. Theoretical Discussion on Alliance and its patterns	12
4.1 Definition of Alliance	12
4.2 Balancing and Bandwagoning in the Alliance system.....	14
4.3 Factors that change the nature of Alliance system.....	16
4.4 Alliance Security Dilemma	19
4.5 Patron-Client state relationship: autonomy-security trade off	21
V. American Idealist Traditions and the rise of Moral Diplomacy	24
VI. Development of Détente regime and the changes in American Foreign Policy	28
VII. Carter's Human Rights Foreign Policy and Escalation of tension between U.S. and R.O.K.	34
7.1 Increase of U.S. Congressional power in alliance politics.....	34
7.2 Election of Jimmy Carter and the advent of moral value foreign policy	39
7.3 Implementation of soft power foreign policy by the Carter administration	41
7.4 Carter's moral foreign policy toward South Korea	44
VIII. South Korea's response to changes in American Foreign Policy and the Détente	47
8.1 Difference in threat perception of North Korean attack between U.S. and South Korea.....	47

8.2 Development of Yushin regime and America's response.....	52
IX. Political lobbying and the Korea-gate Scandal.....	54
9.1 Development toward the Korea-gate Scandal.....	54
9.2 Korea-gate Scandal.....	57
9.3 Implications of the Koreagate Scandal on the R.O.K-U.S. relationship	61
IX. Efforts made by R.O.K. and U.S. to reconcile worsening alliance relationship.....	67
X. Conclusion	70
References.....	75

Abstract in Korean

Introduction

1970s was a breaking point in terms of the history of South Korea-United States alliance. From liberation to early 1970s, Korea and United States maintained relatively amicable and cooperative stance towards each other, and thus the relationship between the two allies was depicted as 'honeymoon' era. However, from mid 1970s, the ironclad relationship dramatically worsened as the two allies during this time lacked common threat perception, which is a vital interest in establishing alliance. With the end of the Vietnam War, the traditional security environment changed abruptly as United States engaged in a new Détente policy which sought easing tensions and hostility with communist countries. This was inevitable as United States spent too much war expenditures during the Vietnam War, which severely degraded the dollar value and experienced chronic budget deficit due to excessive economic boom from the late 1960's. As dollar quickly lost its value, economic and military aid to its allies across the world became a huge burden for the United States. Moreover, anti-Vietnam War public sentiment began to spread like wildfire in the United States as the war prolonged with mass casualties without clear victory. In this context, the proclamation of the Guam Doctrine by President Nixon shocked many of its allies in Asia Pacific as United States openly stated that ally nations would have to defend for themselves while committed to providing nuclear umbrella only when requested. This meant that United States would downsize their ground troops in the Asian Pacific region and share the responsibility of defending the free world with its allies rather than taking on the entire responsibility to itself.

Eventually, the R.O.K-U.S. alliance was at its worst during the Carter-Park era. As the Yushin regime escalated into a full conflict with the United States, the Carter administration implemented human rights policy emphasizing moral values despite lacking pragmatic interests to maintain R.O.K-U.S. alliance. President Carter's moral diplomacy was a unique combination of changes in domestic politics as the public opinion opted for moral restoration of American politics after the Watergate Scandal and America's defeat in the Vietnam War, and his personal beliefs as a devout Christian to promote human rights as national interest. Carter genuinely believed that enhancing human rights and expanding democratic values across the world can promote cooperation and decrease confrontation with the Communist forces. As an outsider of Washington politics before becoming a President, President Carter's moral diplomacy acted as the antithesis against traditional policies of the Nixon-Ford era and caught the minds of the divided public opinion after the Vietnam War by unifying them under human rights, which was a universal value that was hard to contest about.

This paper investigates the essence of R.O.K-U.S. alliance by evaluating the worst time of its history, the Carter-Park era. Traditionally, an alliance is any official or unofficial pact between sovereign nations designed to mutually benefit each other militarily. In this context, alliance study was mainly focused on security interests between allied countries and many literatures on the R.O.K-U.S. alliance in the 1970s have traditionally used structural approach and common threat perception analysis to explain the cause of the conflict between the two allies, emphasizing the notion that the change in international security environment acted as a main catalyst for the changing nature of the R.O.K-U.S. alliance. However, few literatures have linked changes in

values and domestic political situations as possible catalyst for the conflict in the US-Korea alliance. In this context, this paper states will show how changes in U.S. foreign policy due to domestic political situations of United States changes in international environment have acted as a catalyst in worsening the R.O.K-U.S. alliance during the Carter-Park era.

Furthermore, before 1970s, most political and diplomatic disputes between United States and South Korea were generally handled through disclosed manner. However, the voice of the U.S. Congress on diplomatic matters became stronger than ever before as American public believed that the failure of Vietnam War was due to excessive powers given to the White House during the war. In this context, they created strong authority for the Congress to check the Executive branch and at the same time pursue their own diplomatic policies. United States Congress began pursuing idealistic foreign policies and thus raised human rights issues in Korea, which inevitably collided with the Yushin Regime. In this context, this paper will analyze how changes in domestic political atmosphere in United States led to series of lobbying scandals between United and South Korea as Seoul began to implement more aggressive and sophisticated approaches in dealing with the United States Congress, which showed a significant departure from its role as a traditionally passive recipient of United States economic and military support.

Lastly, by utilizing autonomy-security trade off model to analyze the Korea-gate Scandal, this paper will illustrate that by the Carter-Park era, United States was losing its leverage on South Korea as South Korea grew out from being heavily dependent on United States for economic and military aids. With decreasing influence on Korean

domestic and diplomatic affairs, United States quickly lost its grip on the authoritarian Yushin Regime on human rights problems and led to more confrontations.

I. Literature Review

Graham Allison (1971) created government politics model to explain about U.S. foreign policy decision making procedures during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. According to Allison, the government politics model extends its idea from the viewpoint that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy and articulates that government decisions are political resultants.¹ These resultants come from various actors with different interests competing and bargaining for their positions. Each individual player pulls and hauls with the power at his or her discretion for outcomes that will advance his or her conception of national, organizational, group, and personal interests.

Thus, government politics model help to explain how the U.S. foreign policy during the Carter era, which was made by diverse actors with many interests, exacerbated relationship with South Korea. As different groups and individuals within the Carter administration and U.S. Congress offered contrasting opinions that were built up to create U.S. foreign policies toward South Korea, it may have created a completely different political result in which President Carter might not have expected or intended.

¹ Allison, Graham., (2012). "The Cuban missile crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. foreign policy today." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91 , 11-16

Also, South Korea can perceive such political result as challenge to the current status quo of the alliance relationship, which can worsen the overall relationship between the two countries. Likewise, government politics model serves as the key theoretical perspective in how changes in domestic political situation or interests can exert influence on the alliance relationship.

Cohen (1993) argued that Carter's lack of experience and naivety in foreign relations did not match the special realities of the Korean peninsula and the Cold War environment during his presidency.² Cohen argues that Carter tried to continue the process of Détente with Soviet Union and end the Cold War, but his efforts became meaningless as his criticisms toward Soviet's human rights suppression exacerbated the security situation between U.S. and Soviet Union.

Morgenthau (1979) stated that Carter's human rights diplomacy was something that could not be feasible in international politics.³ The biggest problem of human rights is that it was a concept that was impossible to implement objectively among different states. Each state has their own history, culture and their own concept of human rights, which made it more difficult to be sued as a foreign policy initiative of the United States. Moreover, Morgenthau argued that a superpower country like United States have much important priorities to fulfill than human rights. Likewise, Morgenthau uses South Korea's case to show the failure of Carter's moral diplomacy. After taking office,

² Cohen, Stephen B., (1982) "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human rights Practice," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol.76, No. 2

³ Morgenthau, Hans J., (1973) *Politics among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf)

President Carter submitted an Act to U.S. Congress that limited or banned foreign aid support to states that oppressed human rights. However, South Korea and Philippines were exempt from this Act because these two countries were strategically important to the United States' national interest.⁴ Such situation was also prevalent with the Soviet Union and China. In principle, the Carter administration should have stepped in to human right issues in both Soviet Union and China. But, since there were many important issues and interests that United States wanted to pursue with these states, Carter administration did not make human rights policy a big deal with these two countries. Likewise, Morgenthau heavily criticized the 'double standards' of Carter's moral foreign policy during his presidency, which created more confusion to the traditional allies of the United States.

Nye (1990) coined the term Soft Power to illustrate a new form of power, which is the country's ability to persuade others without asserting force or coercion. Nye asserts that there are three specific types of soft power, which are political values, foreign policy, and culture.⁵ These types of power contrasts with coercive mechanism of hard power and instead relies on building networks, establishing international norms, and utilizing friendly gestures to naturally attract other states. In this context, Joseph S. Nye argued that successful countries need to be able to use both hard power and soft power to pursue their long-term and short-term interests.

Likewise, soft power deviates away from the traditional hard power centric policies

⁴ Osgood, Robert E., (1978) *Alliance and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Grosset& Dunlop)

⁵ Nye, Joseph S., (2004) *Soft power : the means to success in world politics* (New York : Public affairs)

that have been pivotal during the Cold War, primarily between the United States and Soviet Union. During the initial stages of the Cold War, both powers focused on increasing their military capabilities to deter the other party from a possible attack. As Cold War began to settle down and as détente began to shape the international order in the 1970s, American foreign policy began to focus more on soft power measures like human rights, free market economics, and liberal democratic values to win ideological competition against Soviet Union, to attract non-aligned states and to establish strong ties with its allies.⁶ Nye argued that soft power is a descriptive, rather than a normative ideology. In this statement, soft power can be used to initiate the wills of dictators like Hitler, Stalin, and Mao to pursue their interest.

Park Won Gon (2008) argued that unlike earlier researches on Carter-Park relationship, which showed that Carter administration emphasized security matters prevailed over human rights considerations, Carter administration continued to push human rights policy toward South Korea disregarding the practical security interests.⁷ Furthermore, he articulated that the human rights foreign policy toward South Korea did not question about individual human rights but also the effectiveness of the Korean parliamentary structure and the democracy itself.⁸ This was what fundamentally made the relationship between U.S. and South Korea difficult to resolve during the Carter-Park era. Moreover, Park articulates that United States used many means to pressure

⁶ Nye, Joseph S., "Limits of American Power" *Political Science Quarterly*, June 2016, Vol.131(2), pp.267-283

⁷ Park, Won Gon. (2012) "The U.S. Carter Administration and Korea in the 12/12 Incident: Concession of Moral Diplomacy" *Korean Social Sciences Review(KSSR)*, Vol. 2 No. 2, pp. 253-281

⁸ Park, Won Gon. (2012) *Op. Cit.*, pp. 253-281

South Korea to stop human rights oppressions, such as public criticism, withdrawal of USFK, and cutting economic and military aids to South Korea. These continuous policies conducted by the United States eventually became a basis for the downfall of the Park Jung Hee regime through the October 26th incident.

Park Sun Won (2003) aimed to pinpoint President Carter's liberal view and how this view affected South Korean politics. He argued that Carter developed a special approach to South Korean politics, known as the Carter Formula, which is comprised of three specific interrelated levels: global, regional, and local.⁹ First, at a global level, Carter believed in U.S. superiority over Soviet Union and downplayed any potential Soviet threat. By utilizing Chinese influence to deter Soviet Union, Carter already believed that U.S. had full advantage over Soviet Union. This idea by President Carter demoted the strategic importance of Asian allies. In other words, Carter's moral policy toward South Korea was a result of continuous détente since the Nixon-Ford administrations and was nothing new. Secondly, at a regional level, Carter thought increasing South Korea's and Japan's share of defense burdens was necessary to maintain U.S. troops there. Lastly, at the local level, Carter believed that political liberalization was needed in South Korea to reduce military tension on the Korean peninsula. He thought that the reconciliation process between the North and the South was put to a halt because the Park regime was too aggressive toward the north. The Carter Formula, which was based on political liberalization and human rights, was mismatched with the national interests of South Korea, as it was unacceptable to the Park regime which focused on domestic legitimacy of his regime and maintaining

⁹ 역사비평직위원회 저. 2011. 『갈등하는 동맹, 한미관계 60년』, 역사비평사

security from North Korean threats.

II. Research Question

Since its creation in 1954, the United States and South Korean Alliance is a bold example of an asymmetric alliance, where United States is the stronger state and South Korea positioned as a weaker state. Under this relationship, the bargaining power of the United States is much larger than that of South Korea as the patron state seeks to intervene in client state's domestic affairs to promote their ideological, strategic, socio-political, and security interests. In this context, American foreign policy toward South Korea can be seen as a critical variable in maintaining or changing the nature of R.O.K.-U.S. alliance.

In this context, this thesis aims to find answers to three research questions. First, what kind of factors brought change to the American foreign policy from traditional realism of Nixon-Ford era to Carter's moral diplomacy and how did it affect South Korea? This paper will first define 'moral diplomacy' by analyzing Carter's personal belief and the international background surrounding its advent. Second, the paper will argue how the increasing role of U.S. Congress caused discrepancy with the White House on foreign affairs; which generated confusion and lost leverage toward South Korea. Eventually, this led South Korea to assertively lobby U.S. Congress which led to the Koreagate Scandal. Third, this paper will analyze how Carter's moral diplomacy failed to directly improve Korean authoritarian structure in the short term but was successful in stimulating Korea's democratic movement in the long term.

Secondly, this paper argues whether changes in common values between alliances can negatively impact its relationship. In other words, can loss in shared values exacerbate the alliance relationship? There have been many debates raised by previous research on whether sharing common values is just as important as emphasizing exclusive security link in maintaining alliances. This paper argues that difference in values between R.O.K. and U.S. during Carter-Park era played significant role in exacerbating their relationship, despite security first emphasis during the Cold War environment.

Lastly, despite the worsening relationship between U.S. and R.O.K. during this period, this paper aims to find out what kind of efforts two states gave to maintain and reconcile the broken alliance. Despite serious political breakdown between two states, both states managed to evade the collapse of the alliance relationship. Both United States and South Korea had different threat perception toward North Korea and the Carter administration often felt more uncomfortable with its ally South Korea than North Korea. The paper will argue that institutionalization and geographical factors kept the alliance together amid tough times between the two countries.

The nature of alliances can always alter as national interests of allies can differ based on the changes in the international environment. Likewise, maintaining alliance relationship is quite rigorous task for the parties involved. This paper is written to draw a historical lesson from the worst point in R.O.K.-U.S. history to understand not only the current challenges facing the R.O.K.-U.S. alliance but also provide thoughtful implications that can bolster ways to promote a stronger relationship between the two countries in the 21st century.

III. Methods and composition of the Study

This thesis will use primary resources from the White House, United States Department of State, Department of Defense and U.S. Embassy in Korea to first analyze the decision-making process of the United States foreign policy toward South Korea. By looking into different perspectives and dynamics of these institutions in creating foreign policies, this paper then aims to evaluate how R.O.K-U.S. alliance is structured from the United States and tries to answer how changes in American foreign policy from Nixon - Ford to Carter era affected South Korea. Also, by analyzing the Fraser reports and the primary documents from the U.S. Congress from 1972~1979, this paper will analyze how the U.S. Congress perceived the Authoritarian Yushin Regime of Korea and how the U.S. Congress conflicted with the Korean government and the White House on withdrawal of USFK issue and human rights issues.

The scope of this thesis will be primarily from 1976 to 1979, during the Carter-Park era. Before this period, R.O.K.-U.S. alliance began to crack as President Nixon sought rapprochement with China. By the Carter administration, two allies were at the worst period in the history of R.O.K.-U.S. relationship. Normally, alliance relationship is entered into by states only when there are more benefits that can result from mutual alliance agreement. However, President Park no longer trusted the Carter administration since they pushed ahead the withdrawal of USFK without consulting with the Korean counterpart. In this context, rather than acting as an alliance that act against a common threat, United States and South Korea alliance during this time, often conflicted with each other as if they were the threats against each other.

IV. Theoretical Discussion on Alliance and its patterns

4.1 Definition of Alliance

The state of anarchy is the basic nature of international relations as every individual state pursues their own national interests without any supreme authority or sovereign entity.¹⁰ Likewise, it is in the uttermost interest for the states to survive in the international order by either increasing their power independently or create an alliance with other countries and mutually benefit each other to ensure their security. However, as it is very financially expensive and cost inefficient for states to maintain their security independently, most states prefer ensuring their security through alliances. Sometimes, failure of being committed to an alliance can result in fatal national insecurity. A case in point is Korea's case in the early 20th century, as Korea became a colony of Japan after failing to build its arms independently without an adequate alliance.

Likewise, alliance can be defined as a union or association formed for mutual military cooperation or promise made between sovereign countries. According to Stephen Walt, alliance is any official or unofficial pact between sovereign nations designed to mutually benefit each other militarily. In this definition, Walt tries to differentiate official alliance pacts which countries sign through treaties and unofficial alliance pacts, which can be done through the implementation of mutual military exercise and implicit alliance agreements. Alliance is also very different from collective

¹⁰ Snyder, Glenn H., (1984) "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics", World Politics, Vol. 36, No.4.

security mechanism, which is another means of ensuring national security.¹¹ For instance, collective security does not specifically designate a potential enemy because the purpose of collective security is to prevent any potential threats from its members and those outside their membership. However, from its advent, states that enter into an alliance usually designate a potential and specific enemy to prepare against a possible invasion from this enemy. This means that unlike collective security, alliance has a black and white nature when it comes to designating which state is a friend or a foe. Simply put, the membership to an alliance is usually very closed and exclusive.

While there are many ways to classify different types of alliances, in international politics, there are three ways classify alliances based on autonomy of the actors participating in the alliance. First, states enter into alliances through defense pacts or mutual assistance treaties.¹² In this type of alliance, if any state which consented to the defense treaty gets attacked by an enemy state, then all the other signatories of the defense treaty have to go to war with the enemy state to defend the state in the alliance. Thus, this type of alliance emphasizes reciprocity of defense between the allies involved. The establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949) and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea (1953) are examples of this type of alliance. A second type of alliance is when states sign into neutrality pact or non-aggression. In this type of alliance, if a signatory to the neutrality pact gets attacked by a third aggressor, then other signatories does not declare war and

¹¹ Walt, Stephen M., (1987) *The Origins of Alliance* (Ithaca: The Cornell University Press)

¹² Walt, Stephen M., (1987) *Op.Cit.*

promise to be neutral.¹³ Although this type of alliance is quite unique, such pacts happened quite frequently throughout history, like the non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and Soviet Union in 1939, which gave Hitler stimulus to invade Poland without Soviet's intervention in this region. The final type of alliance is called entente. Entente is a French term which means 'understanding' or simply 'mutual relationship.' When allies enter into entente type alliance, they would enter alliances through negotiations and implicit deals rather than going through treaties.¹⁴ There have been numerous examples of Entente type of alliance in history like the Triple Entente, which linked Russian Empire, the French Third Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; which was an understanding between three countries to counter against the Triple Alliance, consisted of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy before and during World War I.

4.2 Balancing and Bandwagoning in the Alliance system

In his well-known book, *The Origins of Alliances*, Stephen Walt states that the purpose of maintaining alliances is to either into balancing or bandwagoning toward the stronger side.¹⁵ A central task is therefore to explain why states sometimes balance and why they sometimes bandwagon. Walt notes that in international relations, balancing is far more common, but also points out that bandwagoning do become frequent under

¹³ Walt, Stephen M., (1987) *Op.Cit.*

¹⁴ Walt, Stephen M., (1987) *Op.Cit.*

¹⁵ Walt, Stephen M., (1987) *Op.Cit.*

certain situations.¹⁶ The main reason why states enter into balancing is to prevent a potential threat to become a hegemonic power, which in this case, threatens both the autonomy and survival of the state. Another reason why states prefer balancing is to increase their leverage by siding with the weaker party. If a stronger party sides with a weaker party, then there is more chance that the weaker states would need strong state's help, which increases the strong state's influence in this alliance. However, if a state sides with other states which are much stronger, then it is more likely that this state would play minimum role in this alliance. Therefore, most states would prefer balancing because it prevents possible threat from becoming stronger and to secure their national interests.

Although it is rare, some states enter alliances through bandwagoning. Bandwagoning is when a weaker state allies itself with a relatively stronger state. According to Stephen Walt, there are two reasons as to why states go into bandwagoning. The state use bandwagoning to appease the stronger power. By aligning itself with the stronger power, the state tries to avoid potential threat of war. Furthermore, state uses bandwagon to the winning side to receive trophies of war when their side becomes victorious in wars. According to Walt, there are several conditions to bandwagoning. First, weak states tend to prefer bandwagoning than balancing. This is because even if weak states join into a balance against a stronger threat, it would not help the group since their powers are quite limited and entails possibility of receiving attacks from enemy forces.¹⁷ While strong states can overturn the balance to their favor,

¹⁶ Walt, Stephen M., (1987) *Op.Cit.*

¹⁷ Walt, Stephen M., (1987) *Op.Cit.*

weak states can't do the same, creating more risks in security. Second, if a weak state is geographically located near a strong threat and finds no other partner to balance against this threat, then it tends to bandwagon with the strong threat rather than balancing.¹⁸

In this context, most alliances in the international order are asymmetrical alliances, where states with power differences become allies. Each state has different purposes in maintaining alliance. Weaker states benefit from alliances since it helps maintain their national security by receiving military aids and protection from the strong state. However, stronger states do not benefit militarily and therefore lacks justification in keeping the alliance for security purposes.¹⁹ Despite losses in maintaining alliances, strong states support weak states only because they can exercise influence over weaker states decision making process. U.S. - R.O.K alliance is a prime example of this autonomy-security tradeoff, which is common aspect among asymmetric alliances.

4.3 Factors that change the nature of Alliance system

“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” In 1848, Lord Palmerston spoke about the essence of alliance by stating these famous words at the British Parliament. Likewise, alliance is always susceptible to change and there are various factors which lead to this change. As Holsti notes, there are five factors that can create changes in an alliance system: change in international order, change in threat

¹⁸ Walt, Stephen M., (1987) *Op.Cit.*

¹⁹ Walt, Stephen M., (1997) “Why Alliance Endure or Collapse”, *Survival*, Vol.39, No.1

perception, and change in interest between allies, change in the domestic politics, and loss of trust between allies.

First, whenever there is a change in the anarchic nature of international order, or change in the balance of power, the relationship among allies would likely change. According to Robert D. Kaplan, alliances would most likely change in a multipolar order than a bipolar one because changing alliances is much more flexible since states can rapidly shift their positions to different parties while pursuing their national interests.²⁰ Furthermore, when there is a change in relative power of states, alliances can shift. For example, when a core alliance actor gets stronger, the solidarity among allies become stronger. However, if the core alliance state weakens, the cohesion among allies severely weakens. A case in point is when the relationship between Soviet Union and North Korea broke apart in the late 1980s, when Soviet Union, which was a core alliance actor, disintegrated and weakened.²¹

Second, alliances change when there is a change in the perception of threat. Alliances are usually created to go against external threats. Likewise, if there is a change in what the allies perceive as an external threat, then the traditional alliance can either weaken or collapse. For instance, if state A, which is allied with state C perceives state B as a threat; while state C no longer perceives state B as a threat, then it is hard for state A and C to maintain their alliance due to the imbalance of threat perception.

²⁰ Kaplan, Robert D., (2003) "America and the tragic limits of imperialismThe Hedgehog Review," Spring, 2003, Vol.5(1), p.56(12)

²¹ Holsti, Kalevi J., (1977) *International Politics: A framework for Analyst*. (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice Hall

Third, alliance changes when the cost of maintaining alliance exceeds the benefit when the threat from its common enemy either reduces or ceases to exist. A state can also decide to cease alliance with the other party when they either believe that their power has increased to bear the threat alone or believe that they are capable of self-defense due to advancements in their national security.

Fourth, changes in domestic political situations can transform alliances either positively or negatively. Foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy. Often, foreign policy of one country is created to defend and promote its national interests from other countries. Brett A. Leeds states that when there is a transition from democratic to authoritarianism and vice versa, alliance relationship can turn into a conflict. For democratic countries, a power transition to a new administration can change foreign policy from its predecessor, which may cause a change in the alliance system.

Lastly, loss of trust between allies can lead to changes in the alliance relationship. Whenever there are incidents where the stronger party in the alliance does not fulfill its obligations under the pact, the weaker party feels unsafe and begins to mistrust the other party. According to Stephen Krasner, this problem arises when the allies are geographically far apart. This is due to lack of communication that can be built up due to geographical separation. However, he also illustrates that with the advancement of communication technology, allies can overcome this problem.

4.4 Alliance Security Dilemma

According to G.H Snyder, in a multi-polar world order, alliances are never defined in absolute terms, although allies agree into an alliance through a written document like a treaty.²² In this context, the fear of one actor being abandoned by the other actor is always present in alliance relationships. We call this type of situation ‘Alliance Dilemma.’ Snyder states that every party to an alliance faces the problem of ‘abandonment’ and ‘entrapment’, as these terms exist in a trade-off situation.

Abandonment is a type of defection to the alliance when a party to the alliance forms a new alliance with the enemy, deviates from the existing alliance, not fulfill the responsibility as an alliance, and fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected. On the other hand, entrapment is a situation where a country gets dragged into a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share and shares only partially. Likewise, Snyder points out that the most important determinant of alliance security dilemma is the relative dependence of the partners on the alliance, which can be mustered to how much they need each other’s support and their relative perceptions of each other’s dependence.

Here, Snyder comes up with two possible scenarios under this concept of abandonment and entrapment. First, when ally A provides a strong commitment to ally B, ally B will fully trust ally A and as a result, ally A will gain full trust from ally B. However, the possibility of entrapment increases which decreases ally A’s leverage

²² Snyder, Glenn H., (1984) “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, World Politics, Vol. 36, No.4.

against ally B in negotiations and lose the ability for ally A to realign with other alliances. Secondly, when ally A provides weak commitment to ally B, ally A will gain leverage against ally B and have many other options of realigning with other alliances. In this case, loss of trust may accelerate.

Abandonment and Entrapment can also be affected by polarity in international relations. Snyder also argues that there is a correlation between alliance dilemma and polarity in international politics. He states that alliance security dilemma is more likely to happen in multipolar order than a bipolar one because in a bipolar order, countries like United States and Soviet Union, which have far more strength than other states, will prevent abandonment of its allies with the use of threat and sanctions.

In these regards, Snyder argues that if states enter alliance relationships, alliance security dilemma will be inevitable.²³ Therefore, to avoid the problems associated with dilemma, each party need to precisely calculate and compare the costs and risks involved with abandonment and entrapment and coordinate a continuous dialogue among the alliance partners.

Lastly, alliance security dilemma may occur with burden sharing problem between allies. Alliance is a form of consensus between two or more parties to mutually assured safety from potential enemy state.²⁴ Here, the problem of burden sharing may arise between allies because there is limited number of resources available for each state to use it on the alliance. In this context, the problem of 'free riding' may occur between

²³ Walt, Stephen M., (1987) *Op.Cit.*

²⁴ Snyder, Glenn H., (1984) *Op.Cit.*

parties to an alliance. According to Mancur Olson, the free rider problem occurs when those who benefit from public goods, resources, services do not pay for them, which results in an under-provision of those goods or services. In other words, it can be rational action for people to free-ride without contributing to public goods due to logic of collective action. Hence, the free rider problem is quite common in alliance system because the resources in an alliance system has non-excludable and non-rivalry characteristics. The problem is, if too many actors start to free ride, a system will eventually not have enough resources to operate. This is the reason why more free-riding problems occur in multilateral security architectures than bilateral ones since there are more actors in multilateral settings. There are only two ways to solve such free riding problems in an alliance. The first way is to institutionalize the burden sharing procedure from the beginning and make sure that all allies understand their burden according to a written treaty. This way would make sure that allies understand their responsibilities from the initial stages of the alliance. Another way is for allies to continuously initiate dialogues and negotiations to let the other counterpart know that they are willing to share the burden and at the same time assure them that they will not retract from their responsibilities.

4.5 Patron-Client state relationship: autonomy-security trade off

The study on Patron-Client state relationship began in Anthropology where it was used to explain certain intertribal relationship between leaders and followers. In this context, the tribal chiefs of the community would give benefits to their subjects, or

clients, in return for their loyalty.²⁵ Later, political scientists began to utilize this concept to analyze the relationship between states, especially those in an asymmetric alliance system. In the patron-client relationship, the client state makes a deal with the patron state and receives security assistance at the cost of its autonomy. When a client state encounters a significant external threat, the state either tries to 'bandwagon' or 'balance against the threat. In this context, the client state positions itself to the stronger state, in which the stronger state provides security guarantee to the client state. Keal (1986) asserted that patron-client relationship can change depending on the nature and degree of the threat perception, the strategic importance of the client state to the patron state, and the level of trust that can be given to the client state by the patron state.²⁶

According to Shoemaker and Spanier (1984), the patron state's resources and the protection it offers to the client state normally have a strong monopolistic element.²⁷ In the patron-client relationship, the patron state has more bargaining power than the client state since it provides protection to the client state. The patron state tries to promote its national interest by seeking to control the client state. Such national interests are having ideological solidarity, common threat perception, and exercising influence on client state's policy decision making process. During the Cold War, United States and Soviet Union competed each other to attract more client states that can act in the interest of the patron state and go against the other threat. Some scholars argued that the Cold War

²⁵ Shoemaker, C. and J. Spanier, (1984) *Patron-Client State relationships*. (New York: Praeger Publisher.)

²⁶ Keal, P., (1986) *On Influence and Spheres of Influence*, in J. Triska, ed., *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States* (Durham: Duke University Press)

²⁷ Shoemaker, C. and J. Spanier, Op. Cit.

environment allowed patron state to support client states' economic development mainly for ideological and military reasons, to show their competitor that their ideology is far superior than that of its competitor.

The Patron-Client relationship can explain the autonomy-security tradeoff between the United States and South Korea during the Cold War. Scholars have analytically argued that the economic development of South Korea was the direct result of United States' effort to exercise influence on South Korea's domestic affairs and at the same time, promote ideological solidarity like democracy, freedom, and liberal market system. Also, since client state relied on patron state for security assistance, South Korea was able to concentrate on economic growth rather than spending much on military expenditures during the 1960s and 1970s.

However, as South Korea's economic development became successful in the 1970s, South Korea became less dependent on the United States. Unlike the 1950s when 80% of Korea's economy was reliant on foreign aid from the United States, South Korea was able to self-sustain itself by the mid-1970s. South Korea also developed an authoritarian Yushin regime, which deviated away from shared ideological unity with United States. But as American influence on Korea's autonomy weakened, it was burdensome for United States to directly intervene in South Korean domestic politics. Moreover, Park regime tried to influence key U.S. Congress officials to stop United States from withdrawing its troops from South Korea by lobbying them. This reversal in patron-client relationship caused conflict between the two countries since distorted the traditional patron-client relationship between the United States and South Korea that has been in place since the end of World War II. Therefore, by the Carter-Park era, the

traditional patron-client relationship began to weaken due to rapid changes in the international environment and the weakening of United States' influence on South Korean politics.

V. American Idealist Traditions and the rise of Moral Diplomacy

President Carter's moral foreign policy that emerged amidst the *Détente* was not a sudden diplomatic anomaly or a deviation from American foreign interests.²⁸ Rather, Carter's moral policy represent age-old American idealist traditions that are embedded into the bedrock of the American foreign policy. Since the birth of the nation, America followed a strong isolationist tradition, which is a policy that is based on remaining apart from other state or group's affairs. Unlike the European region, which was filled with constant wars and conflicts; America was geographically surrounded by the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean, which acted as a natural bulwark against its enemies. For example, after the War of 1812, mainland United States was attacked only once by a foreign power, which was the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 1941, by the Japanese Navy.

Likewise, many Americans perceived themselves as maritime power that followed the traditions of the British Empire and Athens during Ancient Greece. Although United States seems like a continental power, if it was to be compared to the Eurasian continent, United States is perceived by many to be a big island surrounded by two huge

²⁸ Lipset, Seymour Martin., (1996) *American exceptionalism: a double-edged sword*, (New York : W.W. Norton)

oceans. This perception gave birth to a strategic thinking that one single power should not dominate the Eurasian continent, since it would be detrimental to the vital interests of the United States. Amid the intense hegemonic competition between U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, this strategic thinking developed into Containment Policy that contained Soviet Union's control over the Eurasian continent. In sum, the geographical location of the United States provided a background for isolationist foreign policy throughout the 18th and 19th century.

In addition to the isolationist policy, American exceptionalism was another feature of the idealist tradition that paved way for American foreign policy. In *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955), Louis Hartz argued that Americans had different perceptions from other European countries because colonialists who came over to the new world built a new country based on freedom, liberty and democracy to escape from norms of the old world such as traditional feudal systems, established churches, and hereditary nobility.²⁹ Thus, after the American Revolution, Americans adopted Constitutional republicanism to establish a common law, embrace free market and capitalism, establish the moral norms of Protestantism, and protect private property of its citizens.³⁰ Moreover, America is a land of immigrants where people from diverse backgrounds, culture, religion, and race can come together and assimilate into the American culture. To accommodate such diverse backgrounds of immigrants, the founding fathers of the United States embraced liberalist ideas of enlightenment

²⁹ Hartz, Louis (1955) *The Liberal tradition in America : an interpretation of American political thought since the Revolution*, (New York : Harcourt, Brace)

³⁰ Osgood, Robert E., (1978) *Op. Cit.*

thinkers like John Locke and applied basic and universal principles like life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that could be applicable to all humans in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution.³¹

Regarding the establishment of unique American moral values, Seymour Martin Lipset argued that American moral value was formulated by vast degrees of Protestant sectarianism, which reinforced social and political individualism.³² Protestant sectarian ideology promoted individuals to pursue a personal relationship with God, one that was free from external power or common biblical interpretation. This moral tradition was very different from other countries where religion was often mediated by the state or a religious leadership to conform the society into social hierarchy and justifying state power. Moreover, sectarian ideology advocated the perfectibility of human kind, where the nature of mankind was free from human weakness and assumed individuals as flawless, moralistic people.³³ Such Protestant inspired moralism strongly valued individualism based on rights and provided logical justification to protect individual human rights and denounced human right violation, especially human right abuses made by the central authority.

In this context, Lipset further asserted that Americans became utopian moralists who worked hard to institutionalize virtue and brought a sense of moral absolutism into

³¹ Paterson, Thomas G. and others. (2004) *American Foreign Relations* (6th ed. 2 vol, Wadsworth)

³² Lipset, Seymour Martin., (1996) *Op. Cit.*

³³ Lipset, Seymour Martin., (1996) *Op. Cit.*

the society.³⁴ Such moral absolutism was prevalent in American foreign policy as America insisted on unconditional surrender of its enemies or potential enemies around the world. Such principle can be applied to America's reaction to the expansion of Communism as America strived "to make the world safe for democracy" and refused to recognize any states that followed communism as they were deemed unbearable to America's standards.³⁵ Some of the early architects of American foreign policy during the Cold War like George Kennan and President Truman utilized such methodology to justify America's contention with evil communist forces. Hence, the combination of isolationism and American exceptionalism created a unique foreign policy initiative called moral diplomacy, which became the pinnacle of American idealist traditions. This policy was first initiated and conceptualized by President Woodrow Wilson during his Presidential campaign in 1912. President Wilson strongly believed that democracy was the most fundamental aspect of a stable nation. Furthermore, he believed that it was moral duty for America to support countries which promoted democratic ideals and damage non-democratic nations through various means like sanctions and embargo.³⁶ Non-democratic countries were seen as a potential threat to the interest of the United States and Wilson pursued a foreign policy which hoped to increase number of democratic nations across the world, predominantly in Latin America. This idea further developed into what is known as Missionary diplomacy, where Wilson denied any government in Latin America that not accept democracy as their main form of

³⁴ Lipset, Seymour Martin., (1996) *Op. Cit.*

³⁵ Lipset, Seymour Martin., (1996) *Op. Cit.*

³⁶ Osgood, Robert E., (1978) *Alliance and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Grosset& Dunlop)

government.³⁷ Woodrow Wilson, who was a prominent scholar before entering the Presidential office, believed that ethics and moral standards were crucial to America's foreign policy. He believed that nations, just like individuals, should be subjected to high moral standards and viewed that democracy was the only standard that should be accepted. In this context, Wilson opened up a new form of foreign policy which disregarded distinct characteristics of states and applied universal characteristics like moralism, idealism, humanitarian ends to all countries.³⁸

As the national power of the United States increased in the early 20th century, the urge to change other countries to adopt American values and institutions became one of the main interests in the America's foreign policy. As this urge to pursue this interest became a specific policy, American foreign policy transitioned from isolationism to active interventionism after World War II.

VI. Development of Détente regime and the changes in American Foreign Policy

The American foreign policy after World War II and up until the 1970s was largely committed to the containment policy, which was a pivotal part of the Truman Doctrine, to contain communist forces from spreading to free world countries. The eruption of the Korean War in 1950 and the unexpected "loss of mainland China to

³⁷ Horgan, Paul., *Great River: the Rio Grande in North American History* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1984), 860-872

³⁸ Hermann, Margaret G.; Kegley, Charles., (1998) "The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record". *International Interactions*. 24 (2): 91-114.

Communist forces” in 1949 provided ideological and practical basis of which United States took the role of world police and assertively used their power to contain Soviet expansion and help America’s allies overcome communist threats.³⁹ In this context, America’s initial reaction to the expansion of Communism force and growing sphere of influence of Soviet Union in Asia and Europe can be summarized as unconditional surrender of Communism and no compromise with the enemy. Early architects of American foreign policy during the Cold War period like George Kennan, John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, and George Marshall, viewed the relationship between Soviet and United States as battle of good versus evil, where Soviet Union was the evil that must be defeated. This notion, which is identified as realist internationalism, was used by the United States to both expand and protect values that shape American exceptionalism such as democracy, human rights, and liberalism from Communist countries and if necessary, use unilateral measures like military intervention to protect these values.⁴⁰ In this regards, realist internationalists emphasized the importance of building up military strength to overcome its enemies. Thus, Presidencies of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson largely followed the Truman Doctrine as its main foreign policy objective, despite differences in their party affiliations.

The Republic of Korea was a huge beneficiary of this policy during the initial years of the Cold War. From 1954 to 1968, R.O.K-U.S. alliance strengthened significantly as

³⁹ Holsti, Kalevi J., (1977) *International Politics: A framework for Analyst*. (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice Hall

⁴⁰ Allison, Graham., (2012). “The Cuban missile crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. foreign policy today.” *Foreign Affairs*

it became more institutionalized.⁴¹ Moreover, the relationship was at its peak when South Korea sent combat troops to Vietnam to help United States, which in return reaffirmed United States' commitment to secure South Korea and provide economic aid to establish economic development. Although Kennedy and Johnson administration internally considered withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea, this plan eventually subsided as South Korea assertively aided United States with combat troops to Vietnam. The Park regime tried every way to deter U.S. from pulling out of Korea by institutionalizing R.O.K-U.S. alliance to secure the status of U.S. troops in Korea and pushed for a settlement of Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter; SOFA) which was settled by U.S. and R.O.K on July 9th, 1966.⁴²

However, new changes to the Cold war regime in the early 1970s brought two significant variations to the American foreign policy. After Cuban missile Crisis in 1962, the mutual military tension and hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union subsided significantly as both powers realized the nature of mutually assured destruction and effects it could bring to the international order. Therefore, both U.S. and Soviet Union sought peaceful coexistence and relaxation of international tensions. Furthermore, the failure of Vietnam War showed that containment policy likely resulted in endless entrapment of the United States, which resulted in massive U.S. casualties and criticisms by the international community. The Johnson administration insisted on

⁴¹ Lee, Chae-Jin. (2006) *A Troubled Peace: U.S Policy And The Two Koreas*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

⁴² Kim, Se-Jin., (1976) *Documents on Korean-American relations 1943~1976*. (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification)

looking at the world through only bipolar perspective, where it created a dangerous black and white thinking that divided states that were for communism and those that were not. Likewise, United States misjudged the character of nationalistic movement in Vietnam as communism scare or pro-communism sentiment and thus was dragged into this unpopular war. The impact of Vietnam was a crucial lesson to the United States and by the late 1960s; United States critically evaluated the containment policy and began to politically deviate away from it.

Along with these changes to the international environment, the second factor emerged within United States. Due to excessive expenditure on the Vietnam War by the United States government, the value of American dollar plummeted in the international market. Moreover, American economy faced severe chronic deficit after an excessive economic boom as America spent millions of dollars supporting its allies in defending the free world from the communist threat. This led to inflation in prices of goods in the American market and caused economic difficulty to the United States. At the same time, the U.S. government faced deep criticism from the American public for intervening in the Vietnam War. Media captured images of massive casualties resulting from the war and anti-war protests spread across the United States and pressured politicians to rearrange a new foreign policy that can end the war and stabilize the international order.

In this context, on July 25th, 1969, President Nixon declared a new Asian policy called the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ during a press conference in Guam.⁴³ First, the President asserted that “Asia poses, in my view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of

⁴³ National Archives and Records Administration, “Informal Remarks in Guam Newsman” (July 25, 1969)

the century, the greatest threat to the peace of the world, and, for that reason, the United States should continue to play a significant role.”⁴⁴ Here, Nixon argued that United States frequently intervened in Asian states’ affairs without a long-term foreign policy and with the rise of China, hostility of North Vietnam and possibility of domino effect in Northeast Asia; he believed that Asian region would be vulnerable to regional conflicts that pose a risk to world peace.

Secondly, Nixon stated, “Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated to from outside, Asia for Asians. And that is what we want, and that is the role we should play. We should assist but we should not dictate.” Through this argument, Nixon wanted to fix the entrapment problem that America faced with its allies in Asia and emphasized United States’ role in Asia as an assistor rather than an interventionist.⁴⁵

Lastly, President Nixon reiterated that the United States would honor its treaty commitments with Asian states and added “that as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.”

The shocking statement by President Nixon was a clear deviation from the past Truman Doctrine. Nixon Doctrine did not declare abandonment of defense

⁴⁴ National Archives and Records Administration, “Informal Remarks in Guam Newsman” (July 25, 1969)

⁴⁵ 외교통상부 외교사료관. 「“1970 년대미국의외교정책(1970.3.5.)」 『Nixon, Richard 미국대통령의외교교섭』 pp.32~48. MF.C-0036(3430).

commitments toward its allies but rather pointed out the fact that America will not intervene directly into conflicts of Asian states. However, through this new declaration, many states in Asia had a misconception that United States was retracting away from Asia both politically, socially, and economically.

To fulfill Nixon Doctrine to withdraw ground troops from Asian region, Nixon ordered reduction of United States military presence in Korea. Under National Security Decision Memorandum 48 (hereinafter; NSDM 48) President Nixon ordered reduction of United States military presence in Korea by pulling out one division from Korea, which was equivalent to 20,000 U.S. military personnel.⁴⁶ In return for the reduction, President Nixon promised \$200 million dollars to modernize Korean army and develop a five-year special military assistance to the Park regime.⁴⁷

The Nixon Doctrine was a symbolic critical juncture that signified that America's foreign policy would deviate away from realistic internationalism and transition to realistic isolationism. Unlike previous Presidents before him, President Nixon declared that America would not intervene in superfluous foreign matters. In other words, America was retracting from its role as World Police and focused on selectively intervention in areas where America deemed as vital interest. Furthermore, as American economy degraded after Vietnam War, United States reverted back to protectionism policies, to protect American industries.⁴⁸ Last but not least, United States focused on

⁴⁶ Nixon, Richard M., (1967) "Asia After Vietnam", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.46, No.1

⁴⁷ FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME I, FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY, 1969–1972

⁴⁸ Sang-Yoon Ma. (2007) "Alliance for self-reliance: R.O.K.-U.S. Security Relations", 1968-1972", *미국학논집* 제39집 1호.

expanding and intensifying American exceptionalism values at home rather than spreading it to other countries. Likewise, when President Carter came into office, the foreign policy notion

VII. Carter's Human Rights Foreign Policy and Escalation of tension between U.S. and R.O.K.

7.1 Increase of U.S. Congressional power in alliance politics

Although deemed as a failed war, Vietnam War was an opportunity that revived the age-old tradition of 'checks and balances' to the United States. Throughout the Cold War, the executive branch was the absolute holder of American foreign policy and Presidents during this time enjoyed freedom in making foreign policy decisions that decided the fate of United States. While analyzing U.S. foreign policy making during the Cuban missile crisis, Allison observed that various actors outside the executive branch play a far less influential role in policy making than those inside.⁴⁹

In terms of foreign policy, U.S. Congress acted as an advisory board to the President, which ratified the decisions already made by the executive branch. However, with anti-war sentiments and reformist movement spreading across America in the early 1970s, U.S. Congress began to criticize the monopoly of foreign policy powers of the executive branch. In 1973, U.S. Congress passed the War Powers Act to limit the powers of the President and reassert the balancing role of the Congress in foreign

⁴⁹ Allison, Graham., (2012). *Op. Cit.*

affairs.⁵⁰ With this act, U.S. President now required consent from Congress to send armed forces into action overseas, which was virtually immune since the Truman Doctrine. Also, the Act stated that this process was able only when a declaration of war was stipulated by the U.S. Congress.

At the mid-term election of 1974, many new liberal personnel who opposed the foreign policy of Nixon and Ford administration were elected to the Congress. The election result was due to the outcries of political reformation by the American people after the Watergate Scandal and the chronic inflation that endured during and after the Vietnam War. Those elected were much more idealistic in their policies toward its allies than their predecessors, emphasizing values such as freedom and democracy. In this context, human rights became a key issue for the Congress after the Vietnam War and it was a stimulus that increased the role of the U.S. Congress in foreign affairs. Likewise, new Congressmen like Tom Harkins of Iowa and Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota became influential figures within American politics in assertively advocating human rights policies.⁵¹ Fraser was exceptionally notable for his role as the chair of the International Organizations and Movements subcommittee. Raising more than 15 Congressional hearings on human rights alone in 1973, Fraser revealed many human rights infringements conducted by allies that were supported by the United States such as Chile and South Korea. Especially, the human rights violations of South Korea's Park Jung Hee regime were always on top of the committee's agenda and thus allowed

⁵⁰ Declassified Documents Reference System, "Korea, 1977-1980," Library of Congress.

⁵¹ Smith, Tony; Richard C. Leone (1995). *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. (Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-04466-X.)

the Congress to investigate the relationship between U.S. and South Korea.

The Congress began pressuring the White House by passing several human rights related laws in the late 1970s. In 1976, the Congress ratified the Foreign Assistance Act, which emphasized that “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”⁵² However, the reservation clause of the Foreign Assistance Act stated that foreign aid by the United States was only permissible to these countries when the people of those states that violated human rights can directly benefit from it. These exceptions had to be explained by the President of the United States with specified findings and reports to Congressional committees and if either the Senate or the House of Representatives disapproved such reservations, Congress had right to stop assisting those countries.

But the biggest issue was that U.S. Congress used this Act to justify limiting security assistance to those states that were marked by Congress to be inhumane and violating human rights. Congress began to voice out their opinions in completely halting all military and good aid to those countries which violated human rights. During subcommittee session in 1974, Fraser argued that “America should not waste taxpayer’s money on governments that violate human rights.”⁵³ In the Senate, Senators like Walter Mondale of Minnesota took the initiative in promoting human rights issues in foreign

⁵² Kim, Se-jin. (1976) *Documents on Korean-American relations 1943~1976*. (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification)

⁵³ House Committee on Armed Service, Report on Impact of Intelligence Reassessment on Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from South Korea by the Investigations Subcommittee (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office)

affairs. As member of the Budget committee and later the intelligence committee, Mondale believed that national interests of the United States were being hindered as American values such as freedom, justice and liberty were deemed equivalent to the values of dictators of so-called oppressive states, which inspired Communist forces.⁵⁴

With increasing role of U.S. Congress on Human rights on foreign affairs, the Department of State began to change its stance on human rights as well. Henry Kissinger, who was the Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, was a strong advocate of real politics of which the goal of United States is to ultimately win over Soviet Union by achieving dominant position in terms of power. During his term as the Secretary of State, Kissinger was known to have exercised more authority over U.S. foreign affairs than any of his predecessors in the 20th Century. In his mind, world politics was dominated by competition of power between great powers and periphery states were relatively unimportant to U.S. interests. Likewise, Kissinger had no interest in human rights and deemed it irrelevant to U.S. national interests. Instead, he believed in moral relativism between states. He believed that moral values such as human rights cannot be used in diplomacy because every state and ethnic group had different traditions and history which cannot be universally accepted. Thus, Kissinger argued that such talks on moral diplomacy can create accelerate conflicts in the International community. Furthermore, Kissinger was worried that human rights issues of periphery states in South America, Africa and Asia were becoming popular among the American people and rising as a new issue in American foreign policy. He thought that problems of the

⁵⁴ House of Representatives, "Investigation of Korean-American relations, Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978)

periphery states can create a wrong signal toward great powers, which can become disrupt the world order and create an obstacle to peace.

Nevertheless, the conflict between the State department and U.S. Congress was inevitable. Kissinger always believed that the role of U.S. Congress on foreign affairs should be limited because he thought that “the method in which Congress approached foreign affairs was too transparent, rigid and oppressive to the extent which can hurt U.S. national interests.” With support from the American public and the media, U.S. Congress continued to pressure the State department to follow the human rights issues. As Foreign Assistance Act was passed by the U.S. Congress, the Department of State felt heavy pressure as they needed approval from the U.S. Congress in endorsing foreign aid to other countries, especially to allies in Asia and Europe. Furthermore, conflict with the U.S. Congress would inflict damages not only the State department but also the entire executive branch where people would lose trust of the President’s leadership. In this context, the State department sent telegrams to 68 U.S. Embassies stationed in foreign aid recipient states to comprehensively report on political criminals and their status. Shortly after, the State department created ‘Human rights and Humanitarian Office’ in 1975.

With Executive branch under President Nixon and Ford and the U.S. Congress constantly having discordant perspectives on foreign policy, many key allies of United States were confused and frightened at the same time. South Korea was especially taken aback by sudden switch of U.S. foreign policy objective from economic and military agenda to human rights and moral diplomacy. President Park, who sent combat troops to help United States to strengthen R.O.K-U.S. alliance, was greatly disappointed by the

new atmosphere change of the U.S. foreign policy.

7.2 Election of Jimmy Carter and the advent of moral value foreign policy

When Jimmy Carter declared to run for President in 1976, only 2% of the American constituents knew his name. A relatively unknown figure in Washington, Jimmy Carter previously served as the Governor of Georgia (1963-1966) and later Senator of Georgia (1971-1975).⁵⁵ However, Carter quickly rose to fame as many American people gained trust and confidence of the fact that Carter was an outsider to traditionalist Washington politics. Many Americans were getting tired of traditional politics as the failure of Vietnam War and the infamous Watergate Scandal shocked the nation. In 1971, Daniel Ellsberg of New York Times revealed a series of class I documents, known as the Pentagon Papers that showed how United States initiated The Gulf of Tonkin incident to justify its involvement in the Vietnam War and Secret bombings on Cambodia and Laos which were not disclosed by the media.⁵⁶ Moreover, global financial crisis was taking its toll on low employment levels and high inflation, which disheartened many hard-working American laborers and manufacturers.⁵⁷ America was getting divided between different factions and the people no longer trusted their politicians, who they perceived as deceitful and cheating. Carter emphasized that he was different from established politicians by emphasizing morality rather than

⁵⁵ Dumbrell, John., (1995) *The Carter Presidency: A re-evaluation* (Manchester UK; Manchester University Press)

⁵⁶ Meernik, James., (1996) "United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy". *Journal of Peace Research*. 33 (4): 391-402.

⁵⁷ 황수현 저. 2016. 『한미동맹갈등사』, 한국학술정보.

political rhetoric. He captured minds of millions of Americans with his emotional speeches that promised to return America back to moral normalcy state. Eventually, Carter defeated incumbent President Ford in the Presidential election of 1976 and became the 39th President of the United States.

During his inaugural address on January 20th, 1977, President Carter strongly emphasized that foreign policy of the United States will be based on morality. He stated that,

*“We have already found a high degree of personal liberty, and we are now struggling to enhance equality of opportunity. Our commitment to human rights must be absolute, our laws fair, our national beauty preserved; the powerful must not persecute the weak, and human dignity must be enhanced.”*⁵⁸

Likewise, he was committed to be different from previous Presidents of the United States by emphasizing moral leadership rather than relying on political or military policies. It is hard to pinpoint why Carter reshaped American foreign policy based on human rights, but many historians have articulated that Carter's belief on human rights foreign policy was based on three factors: personal conviction, need for creating a common consensus among the American people and changing world order during the Detente period.⁵⁹ First, Carter was a well-known believer of the Southern Baptist Church which shaped his commitment toward moral ideals such as ethics and human

⁵⁸ Carter, Jimmy. (1982) *Keeping Faith: Memories of a President*. (New York: Bantam Books)

⁵⁹ Cohen, Warren I., (1995) *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume 4, America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991* (Cambridge UP)

rights.⁶⁰ Here, Carter linked his personal beliefs of human dignity from the bible to reshaping American foreign policy in the late 1970s. President Carter believed that exercising moral principles can provide optimal basis to regain America's power and influence on world politics. Second, historians like John Dumbrell stated that President Carter have used human rights issues to unify the country together by reviving the common good and creating an atmosphere for a consensus among the public.⁶¹ Lastly, historians argued that Carter's pursuit on human rights was an extension to Detente atmosphere during this time. Carter believed that issues regarding war and peace could not be separated from moral ideals like rule of law, democracy and human rights and thus wanted to devise such ideals into American foreign policy. In this viewpoint, he thought cooperation with the communist bloc was possible under these moralistic ideals and believed in the universality of human rights rather than differential application of human rights.

7.3 Implementation of soft power foreign policy by the Carter administration

In the midst of Cold War, both United States and the Soviet Union implemented soft power to propagandize its ideology to attract other states to join their side and to wear down each other. While the Soviet Union used its soft power to convince other countries the attractiveness of its communist system, United States promoted liberal democracy, free market system, and value centric ideologies like human rights. The two

⁶⁰ Freedman, Robert (2005). "The Religious Right and the Carter Administration". *The Historical Journal* . 48 (1): 231–260.

⁶¹ Dumbrell, John., (1995) *Op. Cit.*

countries fiercely competed each other and as a result, the world was divided between the communist bloc, which were states attracted to communist ideologies and western bloc, where states were influenced by the United States.

During the presidency of Jimmy Carter, influence of soft power on American foreign policy was at its peak as Carter, who was a progressive evangelical, supported foreign policy focused on human rights and Christian humanitarian values.⁶² Such ideology was not new however, as President Wilson initiated moral diplomacy during his presidency to promote a moral mandate for the United States for world leadership position before and after World War I. But, the difference was that Wilson emphasized more on democratic principles while Carter emphasized human rights and the fact that United States was quantitatively stronger than Wilsonian years.

With the rising pacifist sentiment following the détente, Carter began to exercise soft power in various regions across the globe such as the Middle East, Asia, Americas, and Europe. In the Middle East, President Carter tried to facilitate a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, by convincing Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to come to an agreement for peace in the Middle East. Such efforts by President Carter resulted in the signing of Camp David Accords.⁶³ Carter's highlight on soft power came however with thawing relationship with China. Both countries achieved the most dramatic moment in Sino-US relations when United States and People's Republic of China (Hereinafter: PRC) officially recognized each

⁶² Kaufman, Victor S., (1998) "The Bureau of Human Rights during the Carter Administration," *The Historian*, Vol.61, September.

⁶³ Carter, Jimmy. (2010) *White House Diary* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux)

other and set up formal diplomatic relationship on January 1st, 1979. This was a revolutionary feat of reconciliation as United States never had diplomatic relationship with PRC. As part of this deal, President Carter invited Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping to the White House and both leaders concluded agreements on various issues such as academic exchanges, Consular exchanges, cooperation on scientific and technology innovation, and sports exchanges.⁶⁴ This was a symbolic achievement by the United States during the Cold War that emphasized strategic interests focused on attractiveness rather than military might.

President Carter also made remarkable soft power achievements in Latin America, as United States concluded Torrijos- Carter treaty, in which United States gave back eventual control of Panama Canal to Panama. This treaty embarked a deep economic cooperation between United States and Panama, thus stabilizing Central America and preventing many Latin American countries from siding with Soviet Union. For decades, America was seen by Panama and other Latin American countries as imperialist country that violated their sovereignty.⁶⁵ However, by giving back the Panama Canal to Panama, United States was able to defend itself from ‘imperialism’ allegations posed by Soviet Union to degrade America’s influence in Latin America. Thus, America tried to elevate its national interest in Latin America by increasing its attractiveness as a benign actor.

⁶⁴ Harding, Harry., (1992) *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972*. (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution)

⁶⁵ Spencer, Donald S., (1988) *The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur style of Diplomacy*, New York: Prager.

7.4 Carter's moral foreign policy toward South Korea

The Carter administration used human rights policy and withdrawal of USFK as two pivotal foreign policy toward South Korea. Using these two factors to grab President Park's attention, Carter tried to cajole Park to improve its domestic human rights conditions and release of political dissidents. Right after his inauguration, President Carter sent envoys to key US allies to purport foreign policy objectives of the new administration. President Carter sent Vice President Mondale to visit Japan and Europe, but intentionally left out South Korea from its tour list. Feeling uneasy and insecure, President Park of South Korea officially requested Vice President Mondale to visit South Korea, but the Carter administration declined the offer, reasoning that United States cannot send envoy to a country violating human rights policy of the United States.

The strategic thinking of the Carter administration on the Korean peninsula was quite different from the realist perspective of Nixon-Ford administrations. President Carter believed that due to the increase in mutual dependency between states, cooperation was much important than military capability. So, Carter thought that security situation surrounding the Korean peninsula could be stabilized by the improvement of U.S.- China relationship and felt that the necessity of containing Communist bloc was no longer viable.

Before Carter administration, human rights issues in South Korea were significant to the U.S. Congress, but were less influential due to passive stance of the White house. Without backing of the Executive office, U.S. Congress had hard time

promoting human rights policies to South Korea by itself and therefore had little influence on South Korea. However, when the Carter administration came into power in 1977, both the Executive office and the U.S. Congress publicly criticized the Yushin regime and tried numerous ways to prevent South Korea from human right oppressions to its dissidents.⁶⁶

However, bureaucratic politics approach came into play as there was discordance among the White House officials in handling South Korean matters. In dealing with delicate Korean issue, each key official in the Carter administration had strategies based on different perceptions of which outcomes will best serve their organizational and personal interests regarding South Korea. For example, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wanted to promote security matters before human rights.⁶⁷ They felt that this was right for the strategic point of view since there was no guarantee that President Park would administer human rights values and could possibly turn more authoritarian when pressured by the United States. On the other hand, President Carter and White House national Security Advisor Brzezinski were very persistent in promoting human rights policy toward South Korea. They favored pressuring South Korean government through many diverse ways such as cutting foreign aid, public reprimands, pressure through the U.S. embassy and the withdrawal of USFK. Without a clear union strategy toward South Korea, foreign policy toward Korea was confusing and was vulnerable to miscommunication between

⁶⁶ House of Representatives, "Investigation of Korean-American relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978)

⁶⁷ Declassified Documents Reference System, "Korea, 1977-1980," Library of Congress.

R.O.K and U.S.

The escalation of tension between President Carter and President Park reached full heights when President Carter visited South Korea in 1979. At this historical R.O.K-U.S. summit, President Carter specifically asked for the release of political dissidents and the abolition of emergency provisions which banned any anti-government protests. However, President Park declined the request by stating that situation in the Korean peninsula was special and that anti-government forces would try to overtake the government once the emergency provisions were lifted. During his stay in Korea, President Carter made a speech in the Korean National Assembly on the importance of human rights and met with political opposition leader Kim Young Sam and sent a direct request of freeing hundreds of political prisoners who were still in captivity to President Park through the U.S. embassy in Seoul. These actions were not looked upon favorably by President Park and the tension between the two Presidents worsened. Moreover, President Park was worried that direct confrontation on human rights issues by the United States would inspire more anti-government protests. The anti-government protests did in fact erupt in major cities across Korea during Carter's visit to Korea in 1979. However, Park wanted to amend the rifted relationship with the U.S. and decided to temporarily relieve the tension by allowing agreeing to free political dissenters within six months and allowing a prominent human rights activist Lee Tae Yong to visit United States.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ 역사비평직위원회 저. 2011. 『갈등하는 동맹, 한미관계 60년』, 역사비평사.

President Carter's moral diplomacy, which centered mainly around human rights policy, caused many strains that exacerbated the R.O.K-U.S. alliance. The Park regime was applying authoritarian Yushin regime since October 1972 and heavily oppressed any dissidents who went against the regime by taking nine emergency measures. On the other hand, President Carter was elected by emphasizing moral politics. After becoming president, he pursued foreign policy based on human rights, which became grounds for series of strategic policies that were implemented to South Korea. Such discrepancy in political and social values between United States and South Korea led to a conflictual relationship which severely weakened the R.O.K-U.S. alliance.

VIII. South Korea's response to changes in American Foreign Policy and the Détente

8.1 Difference in threat perception of North Korean attack between U.S. and South Korea

In international relations, having common threat perception is critical in maintaining alliance relationship. For President Park, the primary security goal for South Korea was to defend South Korea from North Korea's provocations and counter it with strong military actions. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, North Korea initiated multiple military provocations to South Korea. A case in point, armed North Korean commandos attempted to raid the Blue House on January 24th, 1968, with aim to kill President Park and his aides. Two days later, U.S. Navy intelligence ship USS Pueblo, was hijacked by North Korean patrol ships in open water near Wonsan, North Korea.

During this process, 82 U.S. Naval officers and sailors were detained in North Korea until they were released later that year.⁶⁹ These series of provocations by North Korea shocked President Park and the South Korean people in many aspects.

However, United States did not respond assertively to the January 21st Blue House raid conducted by North Korean special forces. President Park was furious with what had happened and wanted to exercise strong military retaliation on North Korea, but the U.S. embassy in Korea and the State department did everything they can to stop its ally from being too aggressive with North Korea. But the attitude of United States completely changed when U.S.S. Pueblo was hijacked by North Koreans. Instead of consulting with South Korea, United States sent 350 fighter jets to South Korea and sent aircraft carrier U.S.S. Enterprise to the shores of North Korea.⁷⁰ During this process, United States did not consult with South Korea. AS a result, President Park was frustrated that United States gave more attention to U.S.S Pueblo incident rather than a Blue House raid by North Korean commandos than nearly took his life. To the eyes of South Koreans, the U.S.S. Pueblo incident was a secondary issue. The different attitude that United States showed regarding the 1.21 Blue House raid and the U.S.S. Pueblo incident clearly showed the difference in threat perception between the two countries

Nixon Doctrine and the change in American foreign policy during Détente was portrayed by Park regime as an abandonment of United States' alliance commitments to South Korea. In 1971, when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had a secret meeting with

⁶⁹ Yang, Joon-seok. (2017). The ROK Government's Counter Strategy to the US at the Beginning stage of the 1968 Pueblo Incident - Focused on the Fear of Abandonment -. *Military History*, (105), 151-188.

⁷⁰ Yang, Joon-seok. (2017). *Op. Cit.*

Henry Kissinger, President Park was deeply frustrated with the attitude of the United States, to the extent that he conveyed this meeting as a declaration that United States would not help South Korea if there was another invasion by North Korea.

Likewise, Carter administration was focused on continuing rapprochement with China, which was initiated by Nixon and Ford administrations, and began to restructure the American foreign policy. In the meanwhile, South Korea emphasized security measures only limited to the Korean peninsula. Although two countries shared strategic interests on the Korean peninsula, they both had different thoughts on how to implement those strategic interests. Carter feared that United States might be engaged in entrapment in the Korean peninsula while South Korea feared being abandoned by the United States.⁷¹ President Carter initially wanted to withdraw USFK from South Korea because he believed that North Korea posed no threat to South Korea. By reevaluating North Korea's military threat, he asserted that North Korea was not strong enough to start another war in the Korean peninsula.⁷² Furthermore, with Carter formula in his mind, Carter believed in U.S. superiority over the competition between Soviet Union. America was already having an amicable relationship with China since the beginning of the détente period and analyzed that China would not become a factor that can aggregate North Korea to go into another war in the Korean peninsula. Likewise, Carter found that North Korean military provocation to South Korea was impossible without provisional support from Soviet Union and China and thus undervalued North Korean

⁷¹ Young-Joon, Kim. (2014). Appeasing the Fear of Abandonment in Asymmetric Alliances: The ROK-US Alliance Case. *The Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 11(4), 79-96.

⁷² Strong, Robert A., (2000) *Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

military buildup in 1978.

With this perception in mind, Carter also thought that increase in defense capacity of Korean military enough to handle North Korean provocations. In fact, when Deputy Secretary of State Habib met with President Park to discuss about the withdrawal of USFK in 1977, he stated that “It is very hard to justify the legitimacy of United States Forces in Korea since South Korea’s defense capabilities have increased due to rapid economic development and persistent efforts by the Korean government to promote self-defense.”⁷³

Park, on the other hand, was deeply worried that withdrawal of USFK can pose a grave threat to the national security of South Korea since it can prompt North Korea to take advantage in the vulnerability of defense by invading South Korea. As the leader of South Korea, President Park focused his attention protecting the people and property of South Korea. Moreover, after May 1978, North Korean military began to rapidly strengthen their military capacities, which was perceived by President Park as a serious threat to national security.⁷⁴

Likewise, the two Presidents argued about the withdrawal of USFK from the Korean peninsula. During the summit meeting on July 1979, President park argued that the security situation in the Korean peninsula will not be improved despite betterment of Sino-American relationship and Carter administration’s diplomatic efforts due to Soviet

⁷³ Telegram from Secretary of State to Embassy of Seoul, “Letter to President Park”. February 14, 1977. DOS. DDRS.

⁷⁴ 미 하원 국제관계위원회 국제기구 소위원회 저, 한미관계위원회 역. 1986. 『프레저 보고서』 서울:실천문학사.

expansionism and military buildup of North Korean military.⁷⁵ Park tried to convince President Carter that complete withdrawal of USFK would bring great insecurity not only to the Korean peninsula but also to Asia as a whole. On the other hand, President Carter responded to President Park's plea by stating that Korean government needs to overcome the military imbalance between North and South Korea and stated that Korean government needs to strengthen its military to replace U.S. ground troops in Korea. Carter's logic was based on the correlation between Korea's economic growth and modernization of Korean military. President Carter believed that since Korean economic was booming, Korean government need to show more responsibility in increasing its military and allow USFK to leave the Korean peninsula.⁷⁶ The summit, however, ended with little success and eventually the two sides was not able to come to an agreement on the withdrawal of USFK issue. On July 20th, 1979, the withdrawal plan by President Carter eventually came to a complete halt when President Carter declared that he would cease complete withdrawal of USFK from South Korea. The cause of sudden declaration by President Carter to forfeit his withdrawal plan was due to a mixture of strong objection by the U.S. Congress, many dissenting voices objecting the withdrawal from within the government, and most importantly, reevaluation of North Korean military which showed significant military buildup that threatened South Korea.⁷⁷ Therefore, President Carter, who naively proposed controversial withdrawal

⁷⁵ Oberdorfer, D., (1998) *The Two Korea: A Contemporary History*. (London: Little, Brown and Company)

⁷⁶ Young-Joon, Kim. (2014). "Appeasing the Fear of Abandonment in Asymmetric Alliances: The ROK-US Alliance Case." *The Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 11(4), 79-96.

⁷⁷ Smith, Gaddis., (1986) *Morality, Reasons and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years*, New York: Hill and Wang.

plan along with moral diplomacy, eventually backed down after being faced with the reality of critical security situation in Korean peninsula.

8.2 Development of Yushin regime and America's response

The Yushin regime started out as a response against America's detente policy. On October 16th, 1972, South Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong-Pil sent a message to the U.S. Ambassador to Korea Philip Habib, stating that Korean politics would face a great upheaval.⁷⁸ The very next day, President Park declared the Yushin constitution, which gave powerful authority to President Park and allowed him to dissolve the National Assembly, eradicate the current powers of the Constitution, declare martial law and unlimited term limit to the President. President Park also censored every press in Korea and closed all universities, which were deemed as symbol of anti-government protests. The justification of the Yushin regime was to effectively respond to external security threats from North Korea and to maximize social mobilization to enhance economic development. With ongoing Detente and the rapprochement between United States and China, South Korea was anxious of being abandoned by the United States. The change in American foreign policy toward Korea, which is symbolized by the Nixon Doctrine, did not consider the special situation of the Korean peninsula and put pressure and insecurity anxiety on the Park regime. President Park felt deeply betrayed by what he once thought to be a trustworthy ally becoming friends with the Communist forces. Thus, he became obsessed with mobilizing internal unity to overcome such

⁷⁸ Sang-Yoon Ma. (2007) "Alliance for self-reliance: R.O.K.-U.S. Security Relations", 1968-1972", 미국학논집제 39 집 1 호.

external difficulties and decided to create the Yushin regime.

Ambassador Habib quickly sent a telegram to Washington, warning that South Korea will become an authoritarian state and President Park would remain in power for at least 12 more years. The Nixon administration felt deeply betrayed by South Korea. Washington analyzed that President Park's motive in establishing authoritarian Yushin regime was because America overlooked and neglected Park's process of transitioning into authoritarian state. United States during this time was preoccupied with ending the Vietnam War and was not able to react to their allies becoming authoritarian states. Just three weeks prior to the declaration of Yushin regime, Ferdinand Marcos of Philippines imposed martial law and eradicated democratic principles to make himself a dictator.

However, U.S. did not do anything to stop Marcos from transitioning to authoritarianism and this event set a precedent for President Park to follow through his Yushin plan.⁷⁹ United States did not know what to do in terms of treating their weaker allies that were giving up democratic principles which they have defended for decades. Especially, the case of South Korea stunned the White House because United States has defended South Korea to protect freedom and principles of liberal democracy during the Korean War against the Communist forces. Initially, Nixon-Ford administration prioritized strategic importance of Korea over political ideologies and did not intervene in stopping the Park regime. However, the problem was that as liberal democracy was replaced by authoritarian Yushin regime in South Korea, it was very hard for the

⁷⁹ Spencer, Donald S., (1988) *The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur style of Diplomacy*, New York: Prager.

Executive branch to convince the American public and the U.S. Congress in granting military and economic aid to South Korea. The attitude of Nixon administration toward South Korea was a severe blow to the national security of South Korea. President Park felt deeply betrayed by the ally and to respond to external threats by North Korea, became absolutely obsessed with social cohesion.⁸⁰ Such obsession to respond to external threats made Seoul to be confident about creating an authoritarian government that unquestionably assured social cohesion. The changing international atmosphere created an authoritarian regime that was far from liberal democratic structure.

In 1976, when the Yushin regime was at its peak, Jimmy Carter became the President of the United States. Unlike his predecessors, Carter strongly opposed Park's oppression of human rights under the Yushin regime. During Nixon-Ford administration, the White House was very reluctant to address human rights issues to South Korea since security and strategic issues were given priority than human rights issues.

IX. Political lobbying and the Korea-gate Scandal

9.1 Development toward the Korea-gate Scandal

In the mid 1970's, Korea began to implement more aggressive and sophisticated approaches in dealing with United States, which showed a significant departure from its role as a traditionally passive recipient of U.S. economic and military support. These

⁸⁰ Park, Tae-gyun. (2013). "Changes in Korean-US Relationship during the Vietnam War." *Military History*, (89), 331-361.

new approaches included Seoul's increasing reliance on direct lobbying to convince many Washington policy makers to act or implement policies favorable to Korea's interests.⁸¹ Korean government's lobbying strategies during this period became so frequent and pervasive in America that it eventually evolved into what is known as Korea-gate, a huge series of illicit transnational lobbying scandal between Korea and U.S. that exposed negative perspectives of the Park regime to the American political and public spheres.

The relationship between Korea and U.S. was rapidly diminishing in every aspect before the Koreagate scandal. In terms of security affairs, President Nixon announced a new security strategy plan in East Asia called the Nixon doctrine, which pushed for gradually removing U.S. troops in Korea and reduction of military aids and support to Korean troops. Nixon instead promised the Korean counterpart complete modernization of the Korean armed forces within five years after withdrawal of U.S. troops in Korea. The promise was offered as a temporary panacea to appease outraged Korean government. However, this plan was also continuously delayed by the Nixon administration due to lack of general support from the U.S. Congress, an entity in the U.S. government which controlled the flow of national budget and funds. Moreover, on December 1972, U.S. Congress decided to reduce over 90 million U.S. dollars spent on military expenditures in Korea, to protest human right violations initiated by President Park, who had recently declared a strict crackdown on his political dissidents across

⁸¹ Boettcher, Robert B.; Gordon Freedman, (1980). *Gifts of Deceit: Sun Myung Moon, Tongsun Park, and the Korean Scandal*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Korea as preliminary step toward stabilizing the Yushin system.⁸²

With a mixture of anxiety and desperate mind, Korea began to take various measures to influence United States Congress through multiple lobbying initiatives, to maintain sufficient amount of military aid and to bolster its military capacity to defend South Korea from a possible North Korean aggression. The Korean government first tried indirect lobbying to influence the congress by pressuring policy makers through their constituents and organize networks of grass-roots activists to mobilize proxy lobbying to hinder congress from reducing military budgets spent on Korea. Initially, this indirect form of lobbying worked to some extent, as many Congressmen were continuously pressured by their own constituents to approve American military aid package toward Korea. However, this conventional lobbying began to fail as the public sentiment toward the authoritarian Park regime began to turn negatively due to repeated human right violations exposed by U.S. media outlets such as Washington Post and the New York Times. Furthermore, the kidnapping of opposition candidate, Kim Dae Jung by KCIA agents on August 8th, 1973, created a huge anti-Park regime sentiment to spread across Washington.⁸³ Pressured by security concerns and finding ways to block unfavorable criticisms toward Korea, Seoul felt more desperate than ever before to provide more influential lobbying techniques to convince Washington lawmakers. From this point on, the lobbying process toward United States was considered as a vital national interest which can act as a tool to reconstruct the weakening relationship

⁸² House of Representatives, "Investigation of Korean-American relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978)

⁸³ House Ethics Report: Korean Influence Investigation, report, pp. 183~187

between U.S. and South Korea.

With ambitious plans to directly lobbying U.S. Congress, President Park soon realized that for lobbying to be successful, a strong political intermediary who knew well about the American political circle was needed. In this context, a stout and ambitious man named Park Dong Sun immediately caught the attention of Seoul. A Georgetown graduate with endless list of political affiliates in Washington, Park was quickly seen as the Seoul's navigator in the complex political maze of Washington. Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), under direct orders from the Blue House, gave Park Dong Sun many favorable business incentives, such as exclusive monopoly on the Korean rice imports from the U.S. and large sum of U.S. dollars each month, in return for Park to make a 'Korean friendly' environment in the U.S. Congress.⁸⁴ This paved way for what is known to many as the famous 'Koreagate scandal.

9.2 Korea-gate Scandal

On October 24th, 1976, a front page of the weekend Washington Post depicted a general description of Park Dong Sun's illegal lobbying activities which included his expenditures amounting to nearly 10 million dollars per year in bribing key members of the United States House of Representatives since 1972.⁸⁵ On October 28th, 1976, New York Times reported on the front page that over 90 congress members were assumed to be involved in the lobbying process through what is called 'Georgetown club,' a private

⁸⁴ Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Report, p.155-157

⁸⁵ Washington Post, 1976-10-24

social club organized by Park Dong Sun which included some of the most influential people in Washington, such as Supreme Court Justices, numerous United States Senators and House of Representatives, the Vice President and even President Gerald Ford himself.⁸⁶

The press and the public across America began to set their eyes on the development of the illicit lobbying process which obviously started from an unusual Korean individual. By utilizing comprehensive investigation report on Park Dong Sun by Department of Justice in 1976, Washington Post further revealed that more than twenty incumbent Congressmen were on the investigation list and two former congressmen and one former Governor of Louisiana had strong accusations in taking bribes from Park Dong Sun.⁸⁷ Moreover, a new piece of evidence collected by U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation shortly after the Washington Post headline revealed that Korean Central Intelligence Agency, or KCIA, was heavily involved in assisting Park Dong Sun in carrying out his illicit lobbying activities.

With the American public outraged by escalation of another huge scandal shortly after the Watergate scandal, the U.S. Congress decided to take strong actions on its own and created Special Investigation Committee under House of Representatives committee on Ethics led by Philip Lacovara, former special prosecutor during the Watergate scandal who was famous for leading the investigation team on the Nixon

⁸⁶ New York Times, 1976-12-06

⁸⁷ House of Representatives, "Investigation of Korean-American relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978)

administration.⁸⁸ Furthermore, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Donald Fraser received full investigation rights from the State Department and created a separate committee called “Investigation of Korean-American Relations,” which not only dealt with the ethics portion of the lobbying scandal, but also investigate the overall relationship between South Korea and United States. Both committees began to competitively gather information and evidences which could take a strong lead in the case.

However, a new twist between U.S. and South Korea began to escalate when it was revealed that many evidences of the Korean lobbying case came through from United States intelligence wiretapping the Blue House by using special razor equipped wiretapping device. Initially, the U.S. intelligence started wiretapping the Blue House in fear of Park’s secretive negotiations with the North without United States and to gather information on Park’s human right violations in domestic politics. As wiretapping continued, U.S. intelligence picked up many crucial information on the lobbying case and sent them to Under Secretary of State Department, Habib, who gave more than 200 confidential information on Park Dong Sun’s illicit lobbying activities to U.S. Department of Justice and the Fraser committee.

However, the wiretapping incident caused two significant problems. First, wiretapping the chief institution of the Korean government itself caused a tremendous diplomatic problem between U.S. and Korea. It was obvious that wiretapping activities of U.S. intelligence on President Park was clearly an evident violation of Korea’s sovereignty. U.S. Congress fell into a huge dilemma because to prove Korea’s

⁸⁸ House Unit Discloses Korean Plan To Manipulate US Organizations; House Unit Discloses South Korea Plan to Manipulate US Organizations, “New York Times”, November 30, 1977

involvement in the lobbying scandal, U.S. Congress had to use evidences they gained from illegally wiretapping the Blue House, which proves that America had explicitly violated Korea's sovereignty. The second problem was more legal oriented issue. Evidences gathered from wiretapping could not be used as real evidence in the face of court because most of them were obtained illegally. This complicated the entire situation because to solve this problem, a live testimony from Park Dong Sun, who had fled to Seoul, was needed.

Meanwhile, the Korean government strictly denied being involved in the lobbying activities and reported to Washington that Park Dong Sun was not affiliated with the Korean government. Furthermore, Seoul criticized lawmakers in Washington for falsely accusing President Park for ordering a state organized illicit lobbying and denied all accusations presented by the House Committee. Tensions between U.S. and Korea escalated from a simple lobbying scandal to a much deeper level in 1977 as U.S. Congress began to investigate other issues related to Korea such as human right violations and political oppressions of the Park regime. As time passed by, both Korean and United States government fell into a bitter dilemma through different reasons.

For Carter, withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea was essential and to achieve this, modernization of Korean armed forces was crucial. However, the ROK military modernization plan required budget approval from the U.S. Congress, which was against supporting security aid toward Korea because of the Korea-gate scandal and human right issues in Korea. Heavy contention fell upon the executive and legislative branch, as Carter desperately tried to separate Korea-gate with security aid issues which failed due to lack of support from the Congress. Korea, on the other hand, had much bigger dilemma. As one of the key allies of the United States which was heavily reliant

on its security, it was in the best interest for Korea to quickly end the conflict between United States and Korea as soon as possible. Furthermore, to gain the modernization security aid from the United States government, Korea had no choice but to fully cooperate with the investigations by Fraser and the U.S. Congress, which can expose several secrets which an embarrassment can be and detrimental to Korea's image in the United States. Locked in the mixture of security and lobby scandal deadlock, the Korea-gate scandal lasted for two more years into Carter administration, and the investigations were largely extended to key Korean figures in Korea such as Moon Sun Myung, (founder of Unification Church) Kim Dong Jo, (former Korean Ambassador to the United States) and Kim Hyung Wook. (Former Director of KCIA) The Korea-gate scandal was finally put to a close when United States Congress reprimanded three congress members and adopted series of comprehensive report on the Korea-gate in 1978.⁸⁹

9.3 Implications of the Koreagate Scandal on the R.O.K-U.S. relationship

The Korea-gate Scandal was an event which showed the worst relationship status between Republic of Korea and United States during the Carter-Park era. Prior to the Korea-gate issue, the Korean government considered lobbying as the most important tactic in creating a Korea friendly environment in the U.S. government. Initially, what Korea wanted to gain from the United States were budgets for the modernization of Korean armed forces and the guarantee of security aid, in exchange for the withdrawal

⁸⁹ Declassified Documents Reference System, "Human Rights, 1977-1980," Library of Congress

of American forces in Korea.

However, Nixon administration ambiguously replied by stating that security aid had to be approved by the U.S. Congress due to limitations of executive power because of separation of power under U.S. Constitution. Even during the bilateral meeting between President Park and vice President Agnew on July 1970, Agnew firmly told Park that U.S. Congress had the final decision to authorize security aid packages to Korea. In this context, the Korean government decided to change course and was determined to persuade U.S. Congress directly influencing key congress officials.

However, what has started as a naive lobbying for security aid became distorted and prolonged in 1972 when President Park declared Yushin system, which was severely criticized by the U.S. Congress for its accounts of human right violations.⁹⁰ As U.S. Congress began to organize hearings on Korea's human right violations, Korean government changed their position and began to use various lobbying tactics specifically in preventing criticism of Park government and the Yushin system within Congress. During this period, U.S. Congress was predominantly occupied by liberal majority, who had deep negative views on the Yushin system and who were worried about the contentious political suppressions towards the opposition. In this context, investigations on Korea-gate became primarily targeted toward the main author of Yushin system, Park Jung Hee.

Therefore, we can speculate that American government's dissent towards the Yushin system was one of the prime causes of the Koreagate scandal. Furthermore, the

⁹⁰ Purdum, Todd S. (April 15, 2005). "The New York Times : Accusation Against Lobbyist Echo Charges in 70's Scandal". New York: The New York Times Company.

deep contention espoused by the Korea-gate showed an asymmetrical relationship because the conflict itself was driven not at the state versus state level, but rather a unique relationship where a sovereign state (Republic of Korea) conflicted with a subpart of the American government (U.S. Congress). In other words, the main actors in this dispute were narrowed down to the Korean government vs. U.S. Congress. In this case, two significant characteristics can be seen from this asymmetric relationship.

First, the negative aspects of the Korea-gate scandal were exposed more than usual because the target of the lobby was mainly toward U.S. House of Representatives, an organization that is heavily based on its strict regulations and tendency to promote political transparency and ethics as representatives of the American public.⁹¹ Especially after the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, American constituents demanded more transparency and reforms in the American political sphere. During this process, the Korea-gate scandal was fully exposed to the public and the media which created immense pressure on the U.S. Congress. As a result, many Congressmen in the investigation process viewed this case only from the American perspective and tried to expose the scandal to gain both public support and popular votes.

U.S. Congress forgot the fact that they were dealing with a state with sovereignty and believed that Korea would fully comply with the investigation, thinking that Korea was heavily dependent on economic and military aid and using aid as bargaining leverage would make them fully comply with their demands.⁹² However, by this period, Korea's economic position had already grown to the point where it was no

⁹¹ 미 하원 국제관계위원회 국제기구 소위원회 저, 한미관계위원회 역. 1986. 『프레이지 보고서』 서울:실천문학사.

⁹² Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A contemporary History*, Chapters 4-5, pp. 84-138

longer fully dependent on the United States. Not only did the economic aid reduction threatened by the U.S. Congress had little impact on Korea's compliance to the investigations, but also created anti-American sentiments to spread among the top layers of the Korean society. (Predominately the military and the government)

In the past years, Korea regarded economic and military interest as their top national priority. However, as the Korean government began to beef up its economic power, it realized that saving face was a crucial part of their national interest. Nevertheless, the Park regime was furious over America's lack of respect towards Korea's national sovereignty.

Second, the internal discrepancy between the U.S. Executive branch and the Congress was also another example which further exacerbated relationship between Korea and U.S. In the early 1970s, Nixon and Ford Administration received numerous reports about the illicit lobbying activities of Park Dong Sun in the U.S. Congress but largely ignored them since Korea was a close ally which had sent their troops to Vietnam alongside U.S. troops. In fact, the ambiguous attitude of the Executive branch came to be understood by Koreans as a tacit approval from the White House and instigated Korea to be actively engaged in the lobbying process. When the Korea-gate issue was publicly exposed by the media and investigations under U.S. Congress, the White House played very passive and minor role in solving this issue directly with the Korean government. This can be resulted from the fact that the White House was already under a lot of heat after the Watergate scandal and the pardoning of Nixon by President Ford. In this context, the White House was afraid of having another major scandal which can be detrimental to the image and works of the administration and kept its distance from the Korea-gate scandal. Furthermore, while the Ford and Carter

administration proclaimed security first policy in engaging with Korea, (Carter switched his position on Korea during his presidency from human rights to security first policy) the more liberal U.S. Congress asserted human right first policy. What is more contentious is that both executive and legislative branch claimed that their policy was what was best serving the American national interest.

The South Korean government, not realizing this matter, became very confused by series of discordant reactions from the U.S. government, which was driven by two clearly divided interests; passive, relatively inactive side of the Executive branch favoring Korea, and active, uncompromising position taken by the U.S. Congress. Initially, Park regime believed that the Korea-gate scandal itself would take only two or three months and created task forces under Korean Embassy in Washington to quickly settle agreements with the Ford and Carter administration. In fact, the White House and the Department of State believed that Korea-gate issues were irrelevant to the U.S. interests, and emphasized more on bolstering security relationship with Korea.

On the other hand, U.S. Congress and the media, discontented with the human right issues of Park regime, took a different turn and publicly denounced Park regime which caused tremendous diplomatic discourtesy to Korea. For example, the investigation committees of House of Representatives tried to tie Korea-gate scandal with vehement criticism toward Park regimes over human right issues, which were supposed to be dealt separately. As the White House and U.S. Congress collided over these issues, the public image of Korea was severely damaged and the relationship between Korea and U.S. was at its worst since liberalization of Korea in 1945.

From 1976 to 1978, Korea-U.S. relationship was at its worst since the Korean liberation in 1945. A case in point, according to a survey conducted by the Potomac

Association in 1978, a majority (78%) of American public opinion considered South Korea as one of the most untrustworthy allies of the US, largely falling behind India, West Germany and Japan.⁹³ In this context, Korea-gate was the main catalyst which fueled gasoline to an already heated relationship between U.S. and Korea which developed deep antipathy against each other.

Likewise, Korea-gate was a unique case in the U.S.-Korea relations, which for the first time, showed asymmetric relationship between a sovereign state (Republic of Korea) and a government organization (U.S. Congress). As each actor had different perceptions and interests toward one another, it was very hard to reach an appropriate point of agreement, ultimately leading to continued presence of distrust between these two countries.

Discontented by ongoing investigations and the huge scale of illicit lobbying process, both American public and the political sphere became utterly disgusted and grew tired of Korea. However, the same was also true for Koreans as well. The lack of respect for Korea as a sovereign nation by the US Congress and the media caused deep anti-Americanism to assimilate among the members of the Park regime, which eventually spread to the public as well.

Therefore, the Korea-gate scandal showed that the very nature of alliance between America and South Korea had dramatically changed over time. This event was a genuine representation on ‘the pinnacle of the growing pain’ the two allies had to endure, to break away from traditional alliance formation built mainly upon security and aid diplomacy. After the Korean War, America focused on establishing stability in

⁹³ Ralph Clogh and William Watts, *The United States and Korea: American Attitudes and policies, ‘a 1978 Survey’*, Potomac Associates, Washington, 1978.

Korea by emphasizing security as their highest priority in Korea. So, the traditional alliance system subsequently represented an asymmetric form of alliance where the United States had always been Korea's main security guarantor and Korea as a follower to American policies. But after Vietnam war, Washington policy makers began to doubt the legitimacy of shared values and perspectives they thought to have shared with Korea, as Korea's democracy and its respect for human right began to retreat after enforcement of stricter martial laws and political oppressions under Park regime. This doubt eventually grew into a full out conflict which caused political and diplomatic pressures to accumulate on both sides.

IX. Efforts made by R.O.K. and U.S. to reconcile worsening alliance relationship

The Carter administration and the Park regime experienced the worst period in the history of R.O.K.-U.S. alliance. Due to the difference in threat perception between the U.S. and R.O.K., the Carter administration planned to withdraw USFK from South Korea while at the same time pressuring the Yushin regime for adhering to human rights purposes. In this context, President Carter ignored a long-trusted ally, South Korea, for violating his political beliefs and disregarded the special situation of the Korean peninsula. For example. U.S. Ambassador to Korea, William Gleysteen Jr. spent incredible amount of effort to reconcile the demands of the Carter administration with President Park. In the late 1970s, United States and Republic of Korea alliance relationship was on the verge of collapsing and dissolving altogether. However, despite such critical situation, the two states tried their best to maintain the alliance. This effort

was to further institutionalize R.O.K-U.S. alliance to prepare for the dissolution of the United Nations Command. Their solution was to create the R.O.K./U.S. Combined Forces Command (hereinafter: CFC)

The practical talk on the establishment of CFC was held at the 9th Security Consultative Meeting (hereinafter: SCM) in Hawaii. The SCM was held amid intensive talks between Republic of Korea and United States on withdrawal of USFK and human rights issues. While preparing for the establishment of CFC, President Park thought that a U.S. military commander unilaterally controlling Korean troops was problematic and therefore requested that the new CFC can be structured to include active participation of Korean military on every process of the War-time Control. President Park also strongly wanted to create a military committee that operated like NATO because NATO's operation and management responsibilities and principles were equally distributed among the member states. South Korea was fairly attracted to the NATO idea since a member state can exercise its responsibility in operating NATO through consensus procedures regardless of state power. This was a clear indication of dissatisfaction that President Park had on America's unilateral military alliance structure that was persistent throughout the history of R.O.K.-U.S. alliance.

At the 11th SCM, which was held in San Diego on July 1978, South Korea and United States finalized the function and organization of the new CFC.⁹⁴ By October 1978, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Dong Jin and U.S. Ambassador to Korea William Gleysteen reaffirmed the establishment of the CFC and on November 7th, 1978,

⁹⁴ Young-Joon, Kim. (2014). "Appeasing the Fear of Abandonment in Asymmetric Alliances: The ROK-US Alliance Case." *The Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 11(4), 79-96.

South Korea-U.S. Military Committee officially announced the creation of CFC and assigned four-star U.S. Army General Vassey as the first commander of the R.O.K/U.S. Combined Forces Command.⁹⁵ Shortly after the commencement of CFC, South Korean troops under the former UN command were transferred to CFC operational control.

The establishment of R.O.K/U.S. CFC showed that despite severe disagreement in values between Carter and Park, both leaders emphasized security assurance for realistic reasons. Furthermore, President Park did not trust the Carter administration and often blatantly criticized United States' self-righteous foreign policy toward South Korea. On the other hand, President Carter lacked trust with his South Korean counterpart since it established an authoritarian Yushin regime that went against human rights principles. However, in the later years of Carter's presidency, the Carter administration recognized that security issues were of greater importance than soft power issues. To that extent, both states felt the necessity to institutionalize military relationship so that R.O.K-U.S. alliance would not fall apart completely and therefore created CFC. By putting Korean and U.S. soldiers on an equal basis in various operations and having the CFC commanded by both leaders, it institutionally created more military cooperation between the two countries and acted as strong deterrent against North Korean military provocations and threats

⁹⁵ Cha, Sang-chul. (2010). "President Park Chung-hee and the ROK-US Alliance in the 1970s." *Military History*, (75), 331-356.

X. Conclusion

From the inauguration of President Carter on January 1977 until the death of President Park Jung Hee on October 1979, Carter-Park era was one of the worst periods of R.O.K-U.S. alliance. As relatively weaker party in the asymmetric alliance relationship, the Korean government had to yield many of its autonomy to United States in return for military and economic assistance from the United States. The Carter administration, on the other hand, utilized idealistic foreign policy toward Korea that emphasized human rights without considering the special security situation of the Korean peninsula. In this context, the R.O.K-U.S. alliance almost went into near collapse by late 1970s.

Since the end of world War II, the United States often directly and indirectly intervened in the domestic politics of South Korea in the sense that the realization of democracy in Korea was consistent with its national interest. The justification of such intervention was that the relationship between U.S. and Republic of Korea was asymmetrical, where U.S. acted as a patron state while Republic of Korea was the client state that received military and financial support. United States wanted to achieve their interest by establishing a state in Korea that had similar political values like promoting democracy and human rights to stabilize the Korean politics.

However, to promote primary security interests and effectively deter spread of Communism, United States and South Korea sacrificed secondary interests like human rights, cultural and economic principles. In this context, security was the most important factor that defined R.O.K.-U.S. alliance during the Cold War. To simply put, security interest was a crucial driving force of the R.O.K-U.S. alliance and even today, is seen as

the main national interest for both parties. This shows that the nature of R.O.K-U.S. alliance was mostly, if not fully, based on hard power, which was based on quantitative military and economic power, mutual defense, and military action. Therefore, disregarding security interest in analyzing R.O.K-U.S. alliance during the Cold War period was thoroughly unrealistic and does not present an accurate perception of the alliance system between the two allies.

Unlike previous administrations, President Carter began to implement soft power policies in the international stage by staging constructive engagement as an alternative to military action and began to cut back on military commitments with its allies. As animosity between communist and capitalist bloc weakened during *Détente*, President Nixon declared the Nixon Doctrine, which United States declared ‘Vietnamization of the Vietnam War’ by augmenting South Vietnamese troops while at the same time pulling out ground forces from Vietnam. The same logic applied to South Korea through ‘Koreanization of Korean security’ that focused on decreasing the number of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and promoting military augmentation of the Korean military. This logic indicated that the United States may pull out their troops in its entirety from South Korea if the Korean military was deemed to be strong enough to defend itself. Hereafter, the Nixon administration pulled out 20,000 troops from South Korea.

Likewise, President Carter used security interest as a leverage to promote domestic political interest and at the same time implement idealistic moral diplomatic measures toward South Korea. Unlike President Nixon and Ford who focused on partial withdrawal of U.S. troops in South Korea, Carter ran for the Presidential campaign on a

promise for a total withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.⁹⁶ The problem was that Washington tried to implement withdrawal of U.S. forces without consulting their Korean counterparts in Seoul. This action caused the Park regime to be very concerned about Korea's national security as President Park felt that Korea was being abandoned by the United States.

Carter put most of his energy on implementing soft power values like human rights to allies of the United States. This new shift in American foreign policy emphasizing soft power values created many confusions to many of its traditional allies like South Korea, where military confrontation in the Korean peninsula was still present and North Korean security threat remained active.

Furthermore, one crucial factor that weakened the R.O.K-U.S. alliance was the fact that President Carter did not consider the uniqueness of Korean situation and tried to promote idealistic foreign policy based on universality like human rights. Such human rights issues were very sensitive to President Park and was something that he could not accept. To his standards, maintaining strong military to both stabilize Korean society and defend it from North Korea was a crucial national interest. While previous administrations took the uniqueness of Korean situation into consideration while dealing with promoting democracy and human rights in South Korea, Carter administration did not put any exceptions on South Korea. While the relationship between South Korea and U.S. began to temporarily thaw after the R.O.K.- U.S. Summit in 1979, Carter's persistent request for human right policy toward South Korea

⁹⁶ Carter, Jimmy. (2010) *White House Diary* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux)

put huge pressure on the Park regime and continuously instigated political and social conflicts between the two states.

Rather than sharing common threat perception, South Korea and United States fiercely confronted each other as if they were a threat to each other. President Carter, who initially valued moral ideals during his presidency, often perceived South Korea as more undemocratic and authoritarian state than North Korea. President Carter frequently pressured President Park Jung Hee of South Korea to improve human rights situation while at the same time being relatively lenient toward North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung on human rights issues. Such differences in common perception between South Korea and United States caused significant political discrepancy which weakened R.O.K-U.S. alliance during the Carter-Park era.

The direct cause of the political lobbying conflict in the late 1970s comes from the fact that the traditional pattern of political intervention was reversed, as Korea tried to exert political influence on American politics. Traditionally, United States intervened in domestic Korean politics to pursue their interests. However, the Park regime began to lobby key U.S. government officials to gain support from the United States on security issues. After the proclamation of Nixon Doctrine, Korean government pursued tirelessly to reverse the damages being made to Korean security. However, during Carter years, political lobbying issue became complicated as the purpose of lobbying.

Based on the analysis of the Carter-Park era, this paper argues that the nature of R.O.K.-U.S. alliance is not as strong and robust as expected by many people in both countries. This means that R.O.K.-U.S. alliance is not an alliance that is given for free but intricately crafted alliance based purely on realistic national interests of both United States and South Korea. Although the nature of R.O.K. and U.S. alliance is a special

alliance, it leaves room for fragility that needs to be continuously maintained and kept administered by both states. However, both states were able to maintain the alliance despite severe conflicts of interests since they were able to align their vital interests throughout the Cold war through anti-Communism. To meet such ends, United States and South Korea worked tirelessly to overcome conflicting factors and respectively putting numerous efforts to reconcile their differences.

Historian E.H. Carr emphasized the importance of learning from past historical events and having insights by stating that “If we can widen the range of experiences beyond what we as individuals have encountered, then , although there are no guarantees , our chances of acting wisely should increase proportionately.”⁹⁷ Thus, this paper reviewed the worst moment in the history of U.S.-R.O.K alliance, the Carter-Park era, to draw up valuable historical lessons we can learn and adopt to keep the alliance healthy and beneficial to both countries in the future. In this context, past valuable experiences endured by both countries will always provide us with wise and realistic lessons that we can utilize today to confront vast challenges of the alliance.

⁹⁷ Carr, Edward Hallet, (1961) *What is history?* (New York : Alfred A. Knopf)

References

1. 국문 1 차 자료

- 국방대학교 합동참모대학. 2003. 『연합작전』 서울:국방대학교 합동참모대학.
- 국방부 전사편찬위원회, 1981. 『국방조약집, 1945-1980』 서울: 국방부 군사편찬위원회.
- 대통령비서실, 1969. 『박정희 대통령령연설문집: 제 5 집』 서울: 청와대비서실.
- 미 하원 국제관계위원회 국제기구 소위원회 저, 한미관계위원회 역. 1986. 『프레이저 보고서』 서울:실천문학사.

2. 국문 2 차 자료

- 김경호. 2000. 「부마민주항쟁의배경과정치사적의의.」 『21 세기정치학회보,』 10(1), 1-21.
- 김봉중. 1999. 「카터인권외교에대한재조명.」 『미국사연구,』 10, 181-213.
- 김형곤, 2003, 「지미카터대통령의지도력에관한소고」, 『중앙사론.』 제 18 집
- 외교통상부외교사료관. 「“1970 년대미국의외교정책(1970.3.5.)」 『Nixon, Richard 미국대통령의외교교섭』 pp.32~48. MF.C-0036(3430).
- 박태균, 2006. 『우방과제국, 한미관계의두신화: 8.15 에서 5.18 까지.』 파주: 창비.
- 박태균. 2018. 「테탕트와한반도, 실현되지못한제 3 의길.」 『역사비평,』 86-115.
- 황수현 저. 2016. 『한미동맹갈등사』, 한국학술정보.
- 오관치, 차영구, 황동준 공저. 1990. 『한미군사협력관계의 발전과 전망』, 세경사.
- 역사비평직위원회 저. 2011. 『갈등하는 동맹, 한미관계 60 년』, 역사비평사.

3. Foreign Primary Sources

Carter, Jimmy. (1982) *Public Papers of the President, 1977-1982* (Washington D.C.: government Printing Office)

Carter, Jimmy. (1982) *Keeping Faith: Memories of a President*. (New York: Bantam Books)

Carter, Jimmy. (2010) *White House Diary* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux)

Carter, Jimmy. "Address at the Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame," May 22, 1977, John T. Woolley and Gerhard, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database), available from <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php>

Carter, Jimmy. January 22, 1977. "Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter," Public Papers of the President of the United State: Jimmy Carter, Book I (Washington, DC: Government Printing office)

Declassified Documents Reference System, "Korea, 1977-1980," Library of Congress.

Declassified Documents Reference System, "Human Rights, 1977-1980," Library of Congress

Declassified Documents Reference System, "National Security Council Weekly Report, 1977-1980," Library of Congress.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969-1976, VOLUME I, FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY, 1969-1972

General Accounting Office, "General of the United States: Factors Affecting the withdrawal of U.S. Ground Combat Forces From the Republic of Korea," (Washington D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1979)

House Committee on Armed Service, Report on Impact of Intelligence Reassessment on Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from South Korea by the Investigations Subcommittee (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979)

House of Representatives, "Investigation of Korean-American relations, Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978)

House of Representatives, "Investigation of Korean-American relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1978)

International Security Assistance and Armed Export Control Act of 1976, sec. 301(a)

Memorandum of Conversation, meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Park Tong-Chin, March 8, 1977. White House, DDRS.

National Archives and Records Administration, "Informal Remarks in Guam Newsman" (July 25, 1969)

Telegram from Secretary of State to Embassy of Seoul, "Letter to President Park". February 14, 1977. DOS. DDRS.

U.S Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, Vol.76 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978)

4. Foreign Secondary Sources

Allison, Graham., (2012). "The Cuban missile crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. foreign policy today." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 91 , 11-16

Boettcher, Robert B.; Gordon Freedman, (1980). *Gifts of Deceit: Sun Myung Moon, Tongsun Park, and the Korean Scandal*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. ISBN 0030445760.

Cha, Sang-chul. (2010). "President Park Chung-hee and the ROK-US Alliance in the 1970s." *Military History*, (75), 331-356.

Carr, Edward Hallet, (1961). *What is history?* (New York : Alfred A. Knopf)

Cohen, Stephen B., (1982). "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human rights Practice," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol.76, No. 2

Cohen, Warren I., (1995). *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume 4, America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991* (Cambridge UP)

Council on Foreign Relations., (2002). *America and the world : debating the new shape of international politics*. New York : Council on Foreign Relations Press ; Distributed by W.W. Norton and Co.

Dumbrell, John., (1995). *The Carter Presidency: A re-evaluation* (Manchester UK; Manchester University Press)

Freedman, Robert (2005). "The Religious Right and the Carter Administration". *The Historical Journal* . 48 (1): 231–260.

Gleysteen JR. William H., (1999). *Massive Entanglement, marginal Influence: Carter*

and Korea Crisis. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Gries, Peter Hays., (2014). *The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives over Foreign Affairs*, (Stanford University Press)

Harding, Harry., (1992). *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972*. (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution)

Hartz, Louis (1955). *The Liberal tradition in America : an interpretation of American political thought since the Revolution*, (New York : Harcourt, Brace)

Hermann, Margaret G.; Kegley, Charles., (1998). "The U.S. Use of Military Intervention to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record". *International Interactions*. 24 (2): 91–114.

Holsti, Kalevi J., (1977). *International Politics: A framework for Analyst*. (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice Hall)

Horgan, Paul., (1984). *Great River: the Rio Grande in North American History* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press)

Jones, Charles O., (1998). *The Trusteeship Presidency: Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press)

Lee, Chae-Jin., (2006). *A Troubled Peace: U.S Policy And The Two Koreas*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.)

Jeong, Chun-Koo., (2012). "Korea's Security Dilemma and the Value of the ROK-US Alliance." *Unification Strategy*, 12(3), 9-45.

Kaplan, Robert D., (2003). "America and the tragic limits of imperialismThe Hedgehog Review," *Spring*, 2003, Vol.5(1), p.56(12)

Kaufman, Victor S., (1998). "The Bureau of Human Rights during the Carter Administration," *The Historian*, Vol.61, September.

Keal, P., (1986). *On Influence and Spheres of Influence, : in J.Triska, ed., Dominant Powers and Subordinate States* (Durham: Duke University Press)

Kim, Se-jin. (1976). *Documents on Korean-American relations 1943~1976*. (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification)

Kim Sung-Han. (2010). "The Present State and Future Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance." *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 17(1), 37-65.

- Lipset, Seymour Martin., (1996). *American exceptionalism: a double-edged sword*, (New York : W.W. Norton)
- Lowenthal, Abraham F., (March 1, 1991). *Exporting Democracy : The United States and Latin America*. The Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-4132-1.
- Meernik, James., (1996). "United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy". *Journal of Peace Research*. 33 (4): 391–402.
- Morgenthau, Hans J., (1973). *Politics among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf)
- Na, Seung Hak. (2016). "A Study on Factors that Continues the Alliance between Korea and the U.S.: Focusing on Comparisons between the Cold War and Post-Cold War Periods." *THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, 19(2), 121-150.
- Niksich, Larry., (1981). "U.S. Troops Withdrawal from South Korea: Past, Shortcomings and Future Prospects", *Asian Survey*, Vol.21, No.3.
- Nixon, Richard M., (1967). "Asia After Vietnam", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.46, No.1
- Nye, Joseph S., (2004). *Soft power : the means to success in world politics* (New York : Public affairs)
- Nye, Joseph S., "Limits of American Power" *Political Science Quarterly*, June 2016, Vol.131(2), pp.267-283
- Oberdorfer, D., (1998). *The Two Korea: A Contemporary History* (London: Little, Brown and Company)
- Osgood, Robert E., (1978). *Alliance and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Grosset& Dunlop)
- Park, Tae-gyun. (2013). "Changes in Korean-US Relationship during the Vietnam War." *Military History*, (89), 331-361.
- Park, Tae Gyun. (2018). "Detente and the Korean Peninsula in 1970s : Failure of Road to the Peace Regime.", *Critical Review of History*, 86-115.
- Park, Won Gon. (2012). "The U.S. Carter Administration and Korea in the 12/12 Incident: Concession of Moral Diplomacy" *Korean Social Sciences Review(KSSR)*, Vol. 2 No. 2, pp. 253-281
- Paterson, Thomas G. and others. (2004). *American Foreign Relations* (6th ed. 2 vol, Wadsworth)

- Purdum, Todd S. (April 15, 2005). "The New York Times : Accusation Against Lobbyist Echo Charges in 70's Scandal". New York: The New York Times Company.
- Sang-Yoon Ma. (2007). "Alliance for self-reliance: R.O.K.-U.S. Security Relations", 1968-1972", *미국학논집제 39* **집 1 호**.
- Shoemaker, C. and J. Spanier, (1984). *Patron-Client State relationships*. (New York: Praeger Publisher.)
- Spencer, Donald S., (1988). *The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur style of Diplomacy*, New York: Prager.
- Snyder, Glenn H., (1987). *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca: The Cornell University Press.)
- Snyder, Glenn H., (1984). "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics", *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No.4.
- Smith, Gaddis., (1986). *Morality, Reasons and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years*, New York: Hill and Wang.
- Smith, Tony; Richard C. Leone (1995). *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. (Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-04466-X.)
- Strong, Robert A., (2000). *Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Walt, Stephen M., (1987). *The Origins of Alliance* (Ithaca: The Cornell University Press)
- Walt, Stephen M., (1997). "Why Alliance Endure or Collapse", *Survival*, Vol.39, No.1
- White, Natan N., (1979). *U.S. policy toward Korea: Analysis, Alternatives, and Recommendations*. (Boulder: Westview Press)
- Yang, Joon-seok. (2017). The ROK Government's Counter Strategy to the US at the Beginning stage of the 1968 Pueblo Incident - Focused on the Fear of Abandonment -. *Military History*, (105), 151-188.
- Young-Joon, Kim. (2014). "Appeasing the Fear of Abandonment in Asymmetric Alliances: The ROK-US Alliance Case." *The Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 11(4), 79-96.

한글 초록

이 연구는 1970년대 중후반 한미동맹사의 최악의 시기였던 박정희-카터시대를 재조명함으로써 한미동맹 갈등 원인 요소들에 대해 논의하고자 한다. 본 논문은 자율성-안보 교환 모델에 의거하여 동맹관계에서 상대적 약소국인 대한민국이 강대국인 미국으로부터 안보를 보장받는 대가로 동맹의 주도권을 미국에게 양보하였다고 본다. 이에 따라 데탕트라는 기조 속에서 생긴 미국의 대한국 정책 변화가 이 시기에 생긴 한미동맹 갈등의 주요 변수라고 판단하였다. 기존연구들은 동맹을 군사적 요인으로만 판단하고 데탕트라는 거시적 범위에서 위협인식 변화라는 틀 안에서 한미동맹 갈등이 지속되었다는 연구가 지배적이다. 그러나 이 연구는 비밀 해제된 1차 자료들을 통해 카터 정부와 박정희 정부의 갈등은 단순히 군사적 요인이 아닌, 심각한 정치 및 사회적 가치 갈등의 심화로 인해 더욱 악화된 갈등 사례라고 판단한다. 베트남 전쟁 패배, 경제악화 그리고 스캔들로 얼룩진 미국 정치권에 카터라는 인물이 인권외교라는 새로운 외교적 가치를 내세우면서 대통령으로 선출 되었고 이를 박정희 정부에게 적극적으로 시행하면서 큰 갈등관계를 야기시켰다. 카터 이전의 미국 정부들은 한반도의 특수성과 안보적 요소들을 고려하여 인권문제에 대해 암묵적이었는데 카터는 이런 예외를 두지 않았다. 또한 기존의 외교정책은 미 행정부의 고유권한이었는데 베트남전쟁 이후 새롭게 부상한 미국 의회의 영향력은 대한민국의 인권 개선을 직간접적으로 강요함으로써 이러한 추세를 더욱 부추기었다.

이에 한국은 급속도의 경제발전으로 미국의 원조에 더이상 절대적으로 의존하지 않는 국가가 되었으며, 미국의 공공연한 내정간섭에 반기를 들기 시작하면서 갈등은 더욱 심각해졌다. 이 시기에 코리아게이트라는 스캔들이 터지면서 한미 양국민들과 언론들의 신뢰가 더욱 더 추락하는 요인이 되었다. 박정희 정부와 카터 정부시기는 동맹 수립이후 한미동맹에 있어서 최악의 시기로 평가되지만, 양국은 대립관계 속에 갈등극복을 위한 노력을 지속적으로 병행함으로써 동맹이 와해되지 않고 지속시킬수 있었다. 그것은 바로 한미연합사령부를 상설하여 동맹관계를 제도화 시키는 방법이었다. 따라서 이 논문은 한미동맹은 최악의 시기인 박정희-카터 시대를 분석함으로써 21세기 한미동맹의 갈등요소들을 이해하는 데 사용될 수있는 역사적인 교훈을 이끌어 내는 동시에 한미간의 동반자 관계 증진 방안을 강화할 수있는 시사점을 제시하고있다.

주제어: 박정희, 카터, 한미동맹, 권위주의, 인권외교, 주한미군, 코리아게이트, 유신

학생번호: 2015-25144