저작자표시-비영리-변경금지 2.0 대한민국

이용자는 아래의 조건을 따르는 경우에 한하여 자유롭게

- 이 저작물을 복제, 배포, 전송, 전시, 공연 및 방송할 수 있습니다.

다음과 같은 조건을 따라야 합니다:

저작자표시. 귀하는 원저작자를 표시하여야 합니다.

비영리. 귀하는 이 저작물을 영리 목적으로 이용할 수 없습니다.

변경금지. 귀하는 이 저작물을 개작, 변형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다.

- 귀하는 이 저작물의 재이용이나 배포의 경우, 이 저작물에 적용된 이용허락조건을 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.
- 저작권자로부터 별도의 허가를 받으면 이러한 조건들은 적용되지 않습니다.

저작권법에 따른 이용자의 권리는 위의 내용에 의하여 영향을 받지 않습니다.

이것은 이용허락규약(Legal Code)을 이해하기 쉽게 요약한 것입니다.

Disclaimer
Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sports Movement:

Perceptions of Athletes and Executives in the Elite Sport in Colombia

2017년 8월

Mauricio Hernández Londoño
이 논문은 문화체육관광부와 국민체육진흥공단 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임

This work was supported by Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism and Sports Promotion Foundation
Abstract

Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sports Movement:

Perceptions of Athletes and Executives in the Elite sport in Colombia

Mauricio Hernandez Londoño

Global Sport Management, Department of Physical Education

The Graduate School

Seoul National University

Good governance in sport is a big issue in international sport management. Despite institutional efforts to solve these problems, scandals in sport administration are still happening. The concept of good governance in sport is addressed by democratic values and corporate management. The purpose of this study was to compare athletes' and executive board members' perception of the effectiveness of the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement (PGG) in elite sport in Colombia. This study examined knowledge, implementation and perception of the (PGG). The sample consisted of 62 elite athletes and 30 executives. Respondents completed an online questionnaire that included seven principles such as management, democracy, integrity, transparency, solidarity, athlete’s participation and autonomy. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the knowledge, implementation and perception of the PGG among participants. Overall, most of the participants do not know the PGG
(N=54, 83%). Into the athletes’ group, most of them do not know the PGG (N=50 out of 62); while into the executives’ group, most of them know the PGG (N=25 out of 29). There was a significant difference in the scores for each one of the seven principles (p<.0001). The perception of the implementation of PGG in elite sport in Colombia are statistically different between athletes and executives. All categories had negative means from athlete’s perspective, with the exemption of athletes’ representation (M= 0.028) and autonomy’s principles (M= 0.188). The executives had overall better perception of the application of PGG than athletes, all their means were positives. Implementing policies such as good governance requires diverse approaches. If the NOC wants to implement the PGG with themselves and national federations, it should start providing education.

**Keywords:** Good Governance, Sport Governance.

**Student:** 20217-22045
# Table of Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................10  
1.1. Background ......................................................................................................................10  
1.2. Objective .........................................................................................................................11  
1.3. Significance .....................................................................................................................13  
Chapter 2. Review of Literature ............................................................................................16  
2.1. Effectiveness ....................................................................................................................16  
2.2. Governance ....................................................................................................................20  
2.3. Governance Theories ......................................................................................................22  
2.4. Sport Governance ...........................................................................................................24  
2.5. Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance ...............................................................31  
2.6. Limitations of Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in Sport .....................34  
2.7. Elite sport context ............................................................................................................36  
2.8. Characteristics, Pressures and Challenges for Elite Sports Organizations ..................38  
2.9. The role of State ...............................................................................................................41  
2.10. Colombian Context .......................................................................................................43  
2.11. Colombian Sports Sector Context ................................................................................45  
2.12. National Sport System ...................................................................................................46  
2.13. The National Sports Plan ...............................................................................................47  
2.14. Previous research ..........................................................................................................48  
Chapter 3. Methodology ........................................................................................................51  
3.2. Sampling ..........................................................................................................................51  
3.3. Strategy of Inquiry .........................................................................................................52  
3.3. Instrument .......................................................................................................................52  
3.4. Data Analysis ..................................................................................................................54  
3.5. Ethical Considerations .....................................................................................................54  
Chapter 4. Results ..................................................................................................................55  
4.1. T-test results ....................................................................................................................55  
4.1.1. Knowledge of PGG ....................................................................................................55  
4.1.2 Application of PGG .....................................................................................................55
4.1.3. Perceptions of PGG

Chapter 5. Discussion

5.1. Comparison between athletes and executives

5.1.2. Athlete’s perspective

5.1.3. Executives’ perspective

5.1.4. Limitations

5.1.5. Proposals

5.1.6. Recommendations

Chapter 6. Conclusions

References

Appendix
List of Tables

Table 1. Goals derived from the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance (PGG) .. 33
Table 2. Categories and Dimensions of the PGG .......................................................... 53
Table 3. Knowledge and Application of PGG between athletes and executives .......... 56
Table 4. Consolidated scores for athletes and executives ............................................ 56
List of Figures

Figure 1. Stakeholders for NGBs ................................................................. 42
Figure 2. Scale to analyze the perception of the Athletes and the Executives ........ 54
Abbreviations

ASOIF- Association of Summer Olympic International Federations
BIBGIS- Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport
PGG- Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in Sport
COC- Colombian Olympic Committee
Coldeportes- Administrative Department of Sport, Recreation and Physical Activity in Colombia
IF- International Federations
IOC- International Olympic Committee
NF- National Federations
NSP- National Sport Plan
NSS- National Sport System
SGO- Sports Governance Observer
VSO- Voluntary Sport Organizations
WADA- World Anti-Doping Agency
Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Background

Questions of ethics, governance and corruption are closely linked (Chapelett, 2013). Journalists and scholars point a crisis in global sport management after years of scandals and allegations of corruption within International Sport Organizations. As it appears in the literature, the governance concept becomes popular when allegations of corruption and mismanagement appear in corporate and non-profit organizations (Chapelett, 2016).

Since the 1960’s, European States have tried to regulate sport establishing a legislative framework for sport organizations at a national level (Chapelett, 2013). The concept of governance gained more interest when the Salt Lake City scandal was exposed by the press. As a response from the Olympic Movement, the International Olympic Committee (IOC in after) operationalized the concept under the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in Sport (PGG in after), and is requested as mandatory to be adopted for all members of the Olympic Movement (IOC, 2008a). As a result, the European Union have funded several universities to assess governance in international and national sport organizations. These partnership has developed projects such as BIBGIS (Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport) (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013), SGO (Sports Governance Observer) (Geeraert, 2015) and others funded by the Olympic movement such as Governance Task Force (GTF) supported by ASOIF (Association of Summer Olympic International Federations) (ASOIF, 2017) and (ASOIF, 2018).

The problem behind governance goes beyond the establishment of parameters of good governance; as Gabriella Banttaini said in the International Forum for Sports Integrity “we have been talking about good governance and tackling corruption now as far as I know for twelve years, yet the scandals continue (...) and the universal governance principles of the IOC have not yet had
the transformative effect on the process and culture on international sport organizations that people like me helped” (IOC, 2017b).

The study of governance in sport is complex because the nature of sport organizations and their legal constitution. Sports organizations are constituted as non-profit organizations. Under this category, fit a broad range of organizations, from International Federations until local sport clubs, with different resources and capabilities, they operate under similar legal framework, but diverse range of motivations, standards of governance, challenges and practices.

When the PGG in the Olympic and Sport Movement were published, the IOC expected the adoption and implementation by the IF and the NOC. The questions of this research are: Do the executives of elite sport in Colombia know the PGG? Do elite athletes in Colombia know the PGG? Do they think those principles comply in the management of the elite sport in Colombia?

1.2. Objective

The literature review in governance in sport shows greater development in Europe and developed countries. Many initiatives from diverse organizations are acting to increase good governance in elite sport. Intergovernmental organizations such as the European Union, governments in Australia, New Zealand, the UK; the NGO such as Play The Game, New FIFA Now, regulators like IOC Ethics commission, World Antidoping Agency and more recently the IPACS (International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport) supported by the IOC are examples of it. Public debate on governance in sport has never take part in Colombia such as happened in Europe or developed countries.

This feature has limitations. Firstly; all these organizations and initiatives take place in Europe among developed countries, showing a limited part of the problem and the solution;
secondly, the language barriers keep off the public debate in countries where English is not understood or spoken. There are few academic research in this field in Latin America, where the corruption index is higher than any other countries (Transparency, 2016).

When the Basic Universal Principles of Governance in sport were presented by the IOC in 2010, they were mandatory for International Federations and National Olympic Committees. The response of other organizations was to adopt their own rules of good governance: the UCI (Cycling), FIFA (Football), FILA (wrestling), and FIBV (Volleyball) trying to preserve their autonomy (Chapelett, 2013). With this research I want to know what was the response of the elite sport system organizations in Colombia?

This study is a contribution to the field of researching in sports policy and management, adding new perspectives of the problem from countries like Colombia. In this country, corruption is considered systematic in both public and private organizations. With this research it is intended to:

RQ1. To evaluate athletes' and executive board members' knowledge of the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement in Elite Sport in Colombia.

RQ2. To find out the implementation of Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement among athletes and executive board members of Elite Sport in Colombia.

RQ3. To compare athletes' and executive board members' perception of the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement.
1.3. Significance

Sport is facing a lack of credibility. Corruption in sport has been well documented worldwide. Athletes taking illegal substances, match-fixing and bribes have produced a governance crisis and lack of credibility in International Sport Organizations. Part of this problem occurs because of the nature of these organizations. They are non-profit organizations running huge global businesses. These characteristics, plus a lack of transparency in voluntary management board members, and excessive commercialization in sport create a potential environment for corruption. Cheating in sport or inside sport organization is against values of excellence and fair play. The public conversation about good governance in sport in Colombia never have taken part. This research contributes on it.

The IOC, as the authority of the Olympic system, they established the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement and made it mandatory its application for International Federations (IOC, 2008a). In Europe, they ran several studies to define the principles of good governance in sport. These studies were under the scope of two approaches: Corporate and Democratic Governance. The Basic Universal Principles of governance in sport (PGG) are result of one of these studies (Chapelett, 2013).

By their side, instruments and tools to measure governance have been developed in European Universities in the highest ranked countries on the corruption perception index, all funded by the European Union (Alliance, 2017; ASOIF, 2017; Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013; Geeraert, 2015). Renowned scholars such as Chapelett, suggests running local studies to deconstruct the concept of good governance and translate it on evidence and measurable indicators (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013).
This research compares athletes’ and board members’ perception of the PGG application in elite sport in Colombia. A t-test will run with data collected from the questionnaire in a form of tables, charts and graphs. The respondents are active Colombian athletes involved in elite sport competitions under the called Olympic Cycle (Bolivian, South American, Center and Caribbean, and Pan-American and Olympic Games) by the Colombian Olympic Committee; and board members of the Colombian Olympic Committee (COC) or the National Federations (NF).

The PGG may have implementation issues. Firstly; Eurocentrism, indicators and tools were developed by European scholars at European Universities. The concepts of transparency, democracy, integrity, solidarity and ethics have different meanings and representations in Latin American countries. Secondly; the broad character of the PGG (Chapelett, 2013); sport organizations under the Olympic System are diverse in size and resources, indeed in the same country. Thirdly; a lead by example perspective is the IOC’s approach. They expect that all members under the rule of Olympic Charter understand and follow the rules as they promote (S. S. Andersen, Houlihan, & Ronglan, 2015). And lastly; fear of respondents, board members think resources will be given based on their answers. Typical work cultures showcase successes and hide failures (Sandberg & Grant, 2017). Managers and board members currently fill a request of compliance with standards, with no desired changes in management or practices. The public debate about governance in sport have been and are still absent.

Finally, the studies about effectiveness are quite complex because the meaning of the concept. Indeed, supported by the thesis that effectiveness is a social construction, it was found by (Herman & Renz, 1999) that when asked how effective they think a certain organization is, most people find it easy to respond. When asked why, some reply that the organization is achieving its goals, others state that the CEO is effective, and still others cannot find anything to
say. One of the contributions of this study, is that establishes an operative definition of Basic Universal Principles of Governance for the elite sport system in Colombia. This could be useful in the future for assessment or advisory goals.
Chapter 2. Review of Literature

The literature review will be presented in several sections. There are covered the effectiveness concept, models and theories. The concept of governance, theories, approaches and the concept of sports governance. Later, it is covered the tools to assess sport governance, the background of The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement, and the specific context of Elite sport in Colombia. Finally, there are showed the previous research in the area of sports governance.

2.1. Effectiveness

The concept of effectiveness has been broadly covered by scholars in the field of corporate, non-profit organizations and sports management. Authors such as Quinn and Cameron (1983) cited by (Daprano, Pastore, & Costa, 2008) noted that organizational effectiveness has been described as a contradictory concept in management. A number of authors have studied organizational effectiveness from different perspectives and with a different criteria (Herman & Renz, 1999). Given the importance of organizational effectiveness to sport managers, researchers have examined effectiveness in a variety of sport organizations (Chelladurai, 2014).

Organizational effectiveness is described as which extent the organization have reached its goals. This approach puts trust in the goals and assumes that those goals are clear enough. They are known by all members in the organization, stable, specific and easily measured in a timely and appropriate manner (Herman & Renz, 1999). Obviously, this approach has been criticized because those assumptions in practice are not clear or problematic.

The goals model approach can be used for evaluating their elite sport programs. However, this approach is rejected for the evaluation of mass sport programs (Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991).
To overcome the faults of this assumption, much of the literature about organizational effectiveness describes alternatives. Scholars such as Chelladurai have described five significant models of organizational effectiveness, including the goals model, system resources, processes model, multiple constituency and competing values model (Chelladurai, 2014).

In the goals model of effectiveness, goal attainment is the criterion of effectiveness. The model is useful only to the extent that goals are specific and unambiguous and goal attainment can be easily measured (Chelladurai, 2014). In the system resource model, the input of resources is the measurement of organizational effectiveness because these inputs are indicative of the acceptability of the outputs. However, the model’s applicability is limited when an organization’s inputs are underwritten by a superior authority like the government does in most of the elite sports systems.

The process model is focused on the activities and tasks to get the goals. This approach put more attention in the learning processes than in outcomes, the danger lies in treating a process as the one best way, thereby making it an end in itself. Organizational effectiveness is considered multidimensional. To understand the complexity of it, it’s necessary to consider the goals, systems and process models. For example, for Bayle and Madella, the effectiveness of National Sport Organizations can be assessed from six perspectives (Bayle & Madella, 2002):

1. Institutional: To strength national teams and gain new members.
2. Social-internal: A positive and friendly environment among employees of the organization and between supervisors and employers.
3. Social-external: To establish good relationships with external stakeholders by achieving organizational goals.
4. Economic-financial: Securing resources and managing financial ties within public institutions.

5. Promotional: Increasing media coverage and creating public awareness of the organization.

6. Organizational: Managing the organization according to the environmental demands.

Connolly et al. criticized the assumption of the goal and system resource models of effectiveness for their assumption that ‘it is possible, and desirable, to arrive at a single set of evaluative criteria, and thus at a single statement of organizational effectiveness’. They proposed the multiple-constituency model, a model with ‘a view of organizational effectiveness in which several (potentially, many) different effectiveness statements can be made about the focal organization, reflecting the criterion sets of different individuals and groups we shall refer to as ‘constituencies’’. Basically, the idea of this approach is that different constituencies hold different goals (Connolly, Conlon, & Deutsch, 1980).

In addressing the varying perspectives of its constituents, an effective organization engages in contradictory activities, which contributes to the paradox of organizational effectiveness. This paradox says that ‘Organizational effectiveness is inherently paradoxical. To be effective, an organization must possess attributes that are simultaneously contradictory, even mutually exclusive’. In fact, Cameron (1986) found that ‘the organizations that achieved the highest levels of effectiveness were also those that satisfied the most separate constituency group expectations, even when different constituencies held contradictory expectations. Highly effective organizations were paradoxical in that they performed in contradictory ways to satisfy contradictory expectations’ (Cameron, 1986).
Despite the complexity of effectiveness and his assessment, the most appropriate approach to know the perception of the athletes and executives of the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in Elite Sport is the goals approach. One of the earliest approaches used to assess organizational effectiveness, specifically in sport organizations, was the goals approach (Daprano et al., 2008). This approach focuses on the goals or outputs of an organization and evaluating how well the organization meets those goals. Following the same study, the goals of the organization are an important way of communicating the values of the association both to members and to external constituent groups, such as sponsors, suppliers, and the general public. The strength of this approach is providing a systematic way of evaluating organizational effectiveness. In addition, using the goals approach offers an opportunity to capture the perspectives of different internal constituent groups (Daprano et al., 2008).

One limitation on this regard, is that The IOC do not offer specific metrics on PGG application, indeed, the IOC stated that, can more than 100 indicators can be derived from it (Chapelett, 2016). The PGG provide dimensions and sub-dimensions which were used to establish a goal approach to conduct this research. Using the dimensions as a guide to establish the goals, they formulated seven goals related to sport organizations: (a) To comply his mission, vision and strategy. (b) To be governed under democratic values. (c) To have high levels of ethical standards. (d) To be transparent in the management of resources. (e) To be equal in the distribution of his resources. (f) To be focused on the development of the athletes. (g) To be free of political or commercial interference.

The professors Robert Herman and David Renz (Herman & Renz, 1999) have developed six theses about the effectiveness of public benefit charitable nonprofit organizations (NPOs) which will be useful foreword in the analysis of governance in nonprofit sport organizations. These
theses are: (a) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is always a matter of comparison. (b) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is multidimensional and will never be reducible to a single measure. (c) Boards of directors make a difference in the effectiveness of NPO, but how they do this is not clear. (d) More effective NPOs are more likely to use correct management practices. (e) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is a social construction. (f) Program outcome indicators as measures of NPO effectiveness are limited and can be dangerous (Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991).

2.2. Governance

The concept of governance is the result of the mix between corporate and political governance. It is known as systemic governance. This concept was presented by Chapelett in the Handbook of Sport Policy. The first has its origin in corporate (or organizational) sector and it was promoted by the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD, to adopt managerial behaviors and practices in governmental and non-governmental organizations with stakeholders, rather than shareholders. The second approach (political governance) coincides with the New Public Management movement, who seeks to apply management techniques used for private companies to public administration (Chapelett, 2013). Under this definition; multiple stakeholders intervene in sports governance.

The concept is used for a number of social, economic and political practices in several spheres of social life. These include policy making, regulation, setting of rules, norms and standards or more broadly when it comes to the study of exercising authority (Bruyninckx, 2012). According to Chapelett, ‘the concept became important in management and political sciences in the 1990s and the term has now become part of the common lexicon, thanks to the adoption by intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank’ (Chapelett, 2016). Interest
in corporate governance as a field of research was first sparked by a series of failures in corporate governance in the UK in the early 1980s (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Indeed, standards of corporate governance have been established as a product of corporate governance failures (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). It’s no different when applied to the sporting world. It started to call attention towards governance in 1997, when the Australian Standing Committee on Recreation and Sport identified a major concern amongst the sporting community was a ‘perceived lack of effectiveness at board and council level in national and state sporting organizations’. A definition presented by Hoye and Cuskelly in the book Sports Governance, says that ‘organizational governance is the system by which the elements of an organization are directed, controlled and regulated’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). According to them ‘governance deals with issues of policy and direction for the enhancement of organizational performance as well as ensuring statutory and fiduciary compliance’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). In other words, governance is the way a system is managed, including the relationships with stakeholders, accountability, transparency and effectiveness. Other organizations such as the OECD says that governance ‘helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy’ (OECD, 2016).

Other definitions of governance came from the field of corporate and nonprofit sectors. They have similarities and differences between them. While corporate governance deals with profit-seeking and they are focused on enhancing shareholder value, nonprofit governance are concerned with the governance of voluntary organizations that seek to provide services for individuals in a variety of activities. Corporate and nonprofit organizations both have boards of elected or appointed individuals to govern their activities and are the subject of a variety of accountability mechanisms to their stakeholders. (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).
2.3. Governance Theories

Theoretical framework to study governance is described by scholars cited by Hoyle (2007). ‘Some of the major theories proposed to shed light on how the governance function is enacted within sport, corporate and nonprofit organizations include: agency theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory, network theory, stakeholder theory, a democratic perspective and managerial hegemony theory’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Each of these theories describes the interest focuses of board members, managers and stakeholders, the recommended source of board members and the role of the board.

Agency theory emphases on the internal monitoring issues of governance. For this approach, shareholders have different interests from managers. Shareholders’ interests should prevail in decisions concerning the operation of an organization. On the other side, managers (agents) should be subject to extensive checks and balances and monitoring to avoid mismanagement or misconduct of managers. This focus helps to explain partially how governance systems work. One limitation in sport is that there are no shareholders to allocate financial outcomes. A practical example of this approach is the guidelines for good governance in the UK in 2004, which emphasize the need for the board to monitor compliance issues (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

Stewardship’s theory, focuses on internal monitoring but starts from the opposite point of view, ‘managers are motivated by a need for achievement, responsibility, recognition and respect for authority, rather than seeking to maximize their own interests over those of shareholders’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

Institutional resource dependence and network theories, seek to explain ‘how organizations relate to their external environment and acquire scarce resources’ (Hoye &
Cuskelly, 2007). Under this approach, organizations adopt their governance models to obtain the resources they need to comply their mission. This is a clear example of how organizations are influenced to adopt traditional federated models.

Resource dependence theory proposes that ‘organizations are dependent on other organizations for survival and therefore need to manage their relationships with other organizations to ensure they get the resources and information they need’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

Network theory, intends to explain how organizations relate to their environment.

Stakeholder theory, examines the ‘relationships between organizations and their stakeholders and conceptualizes organizations as a series of relationships and responsibilities for which the governance framework must account’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). This is true for all organizations nowadays, which must comply with multiple stakeholders such as government, sponsors, athletes, board members and managers. For Hung (1998) cited by Hoyle, ‘organizations are not responsible to their shareholders or custodians but also to a wider range of societal groups’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

Managerial hegemony theory postulates ‘that although the key organizational stakeholders are legally in control of their organization, they rarely have effective control because it has been ceded to a new managerial class’.

Nowadays is not possible to understand the complexity under governance in non-profit sport organizations, it is necessary, to adopt a ‘multi-paradigm approach to allow the paradoxes, ambiguities and tensions involved in governance’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).
In addition, the participation of professional managers, specialized agents in the industry and pressure from government and other stakeholders has challenged the decision-making processes in these organizations, and leading a reduction in volunteer control of non-profit sport organizations (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

2.4. Sport Governance

The term first look hold in 1998, during the Salt Lake City Scandal (Transparency, 2016b). After that, the IOC had to do important reforms such as setting up an ethics commission, drawing up a code of ethics to sanction unacceptable behaviors and limiting terms of office (For example a maximum of 12 years for IOC president). Other important reforms were to accept new members representing athletes, National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and International Federations (IFs). The scandal was also used to create the World Antidoping Agency in 1999 in order to ‘fight against a phenomenon that sports organizations had proved unable to control and govern alone’ (Transparency International, 2016).

The word ‘governance’ appeared in the Olympic Charter for the first time in 2004, while ‘The IOC Executive Board approves all internal governance regulations relating to its organization’ (Chapelett, 2016).

Since the early 2000’s, innumerable definitions of governance have been put forward; Chapelett and Mrkonijc identified more than 35 sets of good governance principles in sport. The IOC systematically refers to more than 100 indicators that can be deducted from the PGG, even though they have proved difficult to apply (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013).

The Australian Sports Commission (ASC) defined sport governance in 2004 as ‘the structures and processes used by an organization to develop its strategic goals and direction,
monitor its performance against these goals and ensure that its board acts in the best interest of the members’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). In recent upgrading of his approach, ‘Governance structures significantly affect the performance of sporting organisations. Ineffective governance practices not only impacted sport but also undermined confidence in the Australian sports industry as a whole.’ (ASC, 2015) Despite this, Hoyle says that ‘there is no universal consensus about what sports governance is’. The former Sport and Recreation New Zealand (SPARC) now Sport New Zealand provides an undated definition of sport governance as ‘the process by which the board; ensures the organizations complies with all legal and constitutional requirements; sets strategic direction and priorities; sets high-level policies and management performance expectations; characterizes and oversees the manages of risks; and monitors and evaluates organizational performance in order to exercise its accountability to the organizations and owners’ (Sport New Zealand, 2017). As it is clarified in that paper, the governance definition identifies key elements of governance based on governance as performance as it will show later. It also implies a separation of roles between the board and management and highlights some aspects of those relationships.

Despite generalized concern about the governance in sport, awareness of poor or ineffective governance practices in sport organizations are not a new phenomenon (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Many of the governance problems in sports organizations occur by a failure in the definition of the roles of board members, or they are not prepared to do their duties. The common governance challenges for sport organizations commented by (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007) could be grouped in two categories. First, related to board members and their roles. For example boards focusing too much on operational and reviewing decisions rather than making decisions or steering strategic issues. Also, the boards failing to define appropriate accountability
measures, results to achieve, defining responsibilities, managing relationships with staff, and providing a framework for board members to carry out their duties. Second, with human resources and their education, training and performance (for example, members reactive rather than proactive, the wrong people appointed to the board or poor skilled or inexperienced board members) (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

The broad concept of sport, the incremental money from government, betting and advertising industries, the participation of multiple stakeholders, the social uncertainty of sport, and the request of autonomy by the sport organizations side, make the governance of sports organizations more complex. ‘Governance is an important issue for sport and for the organizations that co-produce sport (clubs, federations, etc.), which increasingly have to work in conjunction with public bodies, nongovernmental organizations (NDOs), other non-profit organizations and commercial companies, most notably sports equipment companies, sponsors and the media’ (Transparency, 2016b).

UK Sport (2004) identified that governance problems in sport organizations have emerged because a lack of adequate controls, monitoring and reporting lines, individuals having inadequate skills and a lack of succession planning. (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007)

Other scholars (Misener, 2012), show the concept of sport governance from three different approaches; governance for performance, governance for networks and good governance. In the first approach, governance is seen as a steering mechanism. The emphasis is on the capacity of reaching goals. The focus in this approach is efficiency and effectiveness. So, in this approach, governance is perceived as performance. The second interpretation is focused on the process of rules and norm settings and highlights their networked nature. Participatory or networked governance is compared to traditional top-bottom state-centered forms. The process is
the focal point of this approach. And third, governance is often used in the context of international organizations such as The World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. It refers to ‘good governance’ as qualities such as legitimacy, democracy, transparency, clear legal and ethical frameworks, etc. It sets a sort of normative benchmark by which to judge governance practices (Misener, 2012).

Governance in sport is particularly self-steered oriented topic, ‘The world of sport has predominantly managed to live by its own set of rules and regulations and has for a long time objected to state intervention at the national and certainly the international level’ (Misener, 2012) Despite this, they have escaped to the rules against monopoly, competition or regulatory competences and it has become a point of serious debate within the European Union.

The sport sector is considered rule-driven sector; ‘the sport world is driven by, and often obsessed with rules’. As it writes Bruyninckx, they are extremely rule-driven sectors. He shows with examples in many leagues, that ‘the connection between the rules of the game and the economic reality of the sport is abundantly obvious.’ They state the rules of the game, but these rules do not always coincide with broader societal conventions. For example, ‘players in many sports can use several levels of violence without much fear of a criminal charge being brought under the normal legal system’ Also, they can choose monopolies, set contract rules, have internal tax systems, design solidarity mechanisms, control the behavior of their athletes and so on (Bruyninckx, 2012).

There are other characteristics presented by Bruyninckx to analyze the governance of sport, those are the commercialization, the anti-regulation attitude, the dominant position of sport organizations.
Commercialization; the rapid, massive and global commercialization of sport. Several researches and journalists cited by Bruyninckx say that ‘the commercial character has become the most defining element and driving force’ (Bruyninckx, 2012).

Anti-regulation attitude; ‘the powerful actors in sport have shown objections against more public control over norm setting and regulation’ (Bruyninckx, 2012). This aversion for external regulation have been presented also for Houlihan and others (S. S. Andersen et al., 2015) (Chapelett & Mabbott, 2008).

Dominant position; international sport organizations such as FIFA, the IOC, or UEFA have shown that ‘they work in networks only based on their own terms and conditions’. They strengthen the position of private authority and governance as they do not fundamentally challenge the nature of sports. These networks tend to be a closed nature as partnerships are based on a logic of ‘exclusive partners’ (Geeraert, Scheerder, & Bruyninckx, 2013). This logic handled by sport organizations are against the logic embedded in theories of governance, which refers to networks as horizontal forms of organization, lacking strict hierarchy and with shifting composition (Spaargaren, 2011).

For Bruyninckx, new forms of governance that are being developed. One is the intervention by means of court cases, as in Bosman (Chapelett & Mabbott, 2008), Meca Medina (Geeraert et al., 2013), and more recently, the case of Tuitert and Kerstholt (Garcia, 2017). Other ways are the roles of the European Union stimulating the debate and preparing initiatives as Lisbon Treaty (García & Weatherill, 2012). Other actors who can play an important role in this complex environment are the World Antidoping Agency (WADA), the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), who did the first global treaty against doping in sport and the legal cornerstone of
the emerging global sports governance. ‘Regardless of the European Union and other attempts at the multilateral level, the public regulation of sports in the international arena remains surprisingly weak’ (Bruyninckx, 2012).

An important event in the history of sports governance occurred in 2001, when the European Olympic Committees in partnership with the international Automobile Federation, held a conference in Brussels called ‘The rules of the game: first international governance in sport conference’ (Transparency, 2016b). On that date, the former IOC president Jaques Rogge defended the idea of promoting governance in these words ‘Since sport is based on ethics and competition on fair play, the governance of sport must comply with the highest standards in terms of transparency, democracy and accountability’ (Transparency, 2016b). Other efforts on this regard has been done by Australian government to the governance in the Australian Soccer Association and Athletics Australia in 2003 and 2004 respectively (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

Indeed, was in Australia and later in New Zealand, South Africa and the UK when were published guidelines promoting governance in forms of codes or principles to be applied by sports organizations. Some examples of this are the set of governing principles for national sport organizations (Australia 2002 and 2005); Nine Steps to Effective Governance guide in 2004 (New Zealand); set of Best Practice Principles of Good Governance in Sport in 2004 (South Africa) and Good Governance Guide for National Governing Bodies in the same year (UK) (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

Governance in sport has been a scandal driven issue. The response of the sport organizations can be summarized in these attitudes. First, in the face of any attempt of regulation, they have promised to set-up stronger systems of self-governance sending a message of ‘we know your concerns, but do not intervene in our business, we can and will take care of this
ourselves’ (Misener, 2012). Second, legitimate governance. ‘They have sought to network with multilateral institutions to create legitimacy and networked authority’. Alliances between the IOC with UN on such issues as development (UNDP), culture and education (UNESCO) and the environment (UNEP) are examples of this (Misener, 2012). Third, is the aversion to external rules or regulations. The IOC supported the Lisbon Treaty, but stressed that the EU should ‘support and not regulate sport’. They insist on appealing of the autonomous nature of sport. For them, ‘public support are welcomed if it is in forms of financial means, infrastructure and security, but regulation should be avoided’ (Misener, 2012).

As a criticism on sports governance overall, and to show that corruption in sport governance is systematic, Bruyninckx says that ‘football federations have very close and friendly relationships with selected politicians, they select the same people to sports leadership without any problem and hardly any questions about the process or the outcomes are asked in public. National parliaments are hardly involved (in the bidding process and hosting mega events), indeed those who ask critical questions about the opportunity cost of bidding for an event are regarded as disloyal or unpatriotic’. Lastly, the lack of authority and hierarchy is evident in the current dynamics of governance. This brings conflicts in sports governance, because the relations between different bodies are unclear, there are overlapping functions and responsibilities leading to multilevel conflicts and endless procedural battles that undermine the legitimacy of the system (J. S. Andersen, 2012; Bruyninckx, 2012; Misener, 2012).

The use of indicators, codes, guidelines, voluntary agreements and bench mark approaches appears as ‘innovative policy approaches’ with positive connotation. They are considered more flexible and adaptive, and therefore more effective and efficient, fast and proactive, participatory and bottom-up or networked (Misener, 2012).
Despite this, there are still an integrity problem in sport organizations; for Bruyninckx, ‘Transparency, accountability and legitimacy at times seem to be as rare as a snowball in the desert within the functioning of the largest sport federations’. For this author, ‘the functioning of these governance arrangements remains highly problematic therefore’ (Bruyninckx, 2012).

The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement (PGG here in after) are one of those examples. They became mandatory for International Federations and National Olympic Committees after 2008.

2.5. **Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance**

The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance (PGG) appeared officially in 2008 as a response of the IOC to tackle mismanagement issues on international sport organizations. The attitude of the IOC and other sport organizations have been to keep away any attempt of control or external regulation implementing their own codes of good governance. As it is pointed out by Bruyninckx, they are sending a double message: ‘we have understood your concern, but do not intervene in our business, we can and will take care of this ourselves’ (Bruyninckx, 2012).

There are several examples of this attitude such as the rules of good governance were introduced by the Union Cycliste Internationale in 2004, closely followed by the Dutch NOC and the United States Olympic Committee in 2005, the Commonwealth Games Federation in 2006 and the European Team Sports Association in 2008. Governmental or intergovernmental organizations such as UK Sport (in 2004), the European Union (in 2000 and 2007) and the Council of Europe (in 2004 and 2005) did likewise (Chapelett, 2016).

The narrative in the discourse of the IOC’s president, Thomas Bach reflects this attitude: ‘the IOC has created a template that NOCs can use to build a partnership with governments
respecting the autonomy of sport organisations on the one hand and good governance on the other hand’ (Bach, 2017). Part of same speech follows: ‘accountability is linked to the autonomy of sport. Accountability requires transparency and good governance. Just like we expect politics to respect the autonomy of sport to determine the rules governing sports organisations, our stakeholders from politics and society rightly expect that the world of sport is also run according to the standards of good governance. Only in this way, we as sports organisations can maintain our credibility in the eyes of the public. With autonomy comes responsibility for the sports movement. This is why responsible autonomy and good governance are two sides of the same coin. Responsible autonomy implies rights, but also duties for the sports movement’ (Bach, 2017).

As it was mentioned in this section, The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance (PGG) arise as the capacity of self-regulation of sport organizations as long as they respect their autonomy. For the IOC, the basis to secure autonomy is good governance; it was confirmed in the second seminar on the Autonomy of the Olympic Movement in 2008, when the resolution adopted underlined the fact that good governance in sports organizations is the fundamental basis to secure Autonomy of Olympic and Sports organizations and to ensure that this Autonomy is respected by our stakeholders’ (IOC, 2008b)

The PGG consist in a set of 7 dimensions and 38 sub-dimensions to be filled by The International Federations and The National Olympic Committees. (Chapelett, 2016). Despite the broad character of PGG and the multiple interpretations they can be, it was summarized the goals derived from the PGG. (Table 1.)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of PGG</th>
<th>Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vision, mission and strategy</strong></td>
<td>(a) To comply his mission, vision and strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structures, regulations and democratic process</strong></td>
<td>(b) To be governed under democratic values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Highest level of competence, integrity and ethical standards</strong></td>
<td>(c) To have high levels of ethical standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability, transparency and control</strong></td>
<td>(d) To be transparent in the management of resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solidarity and development</strong></td>
<td>(e) To be equal in the distribution of his resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Athletes’ involvement, participation and care</strong></td>
<td>(f) To be focused on the development of the athletes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Harmonious relations with governments while preserving autonomy</strong></td>
<td>(g) To be free of political or commercial interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOC and self-elaboration.

In 2012, the IOC made an evaluation to 28 IF using these principles. The result of it was the provisional exclusion of wrestling, because IF had no women on its decision-making bodies with no athletes’ commission and failed to follow the concepts of good governance, strongly criticized by Chapelett because their lack of accuracy and broad character (Chapelett, 2016).
The European Union has been a key actor in the field of sports governance, they introduced the adoption of article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty) (Chapelett, 2016) and funded projects such as Action for Good Governance in Sport and Good Governance in Grassroots Sport in order to assess governance in IF and in Grassroots sports respectively (Geeraert, 2015).

All these approaches lay down in the ideal of Western democracy, presented by Cornforth and cited by (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007) which are based in open elections on the basis of one person one vote; pluralism. The other idea is that elected representatives will represent interests other than their own; accountability to the electorate and separation of elected representatives, the people who the make policy rather than the executive who implement the policy.

2.6. Limitations of Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in Sport

The PGG are one example of guideline for improve governance in sport organizations. Other organizations across the Olympic Movement have developed their own codes and tools assess sport governance. There are very few examples of tools for measuring sports organization governance. Exceptions include, for instance, UK Sports 11 ‘Governance Requirements’, the Australian Sports Commission’s 20 Mandatory Sports Governance Principles, the 63 Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (BIBGIS), the Sports Governance Observer for IF and NF (SGO), and the First Review of IF Governance run by ASOIF Governance Task force in April 2017’. (Chapelett, 2016) It will be shown the limitations of the specific PGG in the Olympic and Sport Movement.
Firstly, agency problem. The nature of the sport organizations is one of the reasons why the reforms in governance are slow and difficult to implement. Those reforms have to be approved by a general meeting of the organization in question, – that is, by the very people who will be the most affected by them. Moreover, there are many agent-principal problems; as Thibault notes: ‘The same individuals are involved in both the management and control of decision making’ (Chapelett, 2016).

Secondly, Commercial interest of International sport Federations. Despite some authors considering sport organizations non-profit organizations and autonomous, Bruynikx argues the contrary, for him, the international sport organizations are driven by economic interests ‘is obvious that commercial interests are a major preoccupation of them’ (Bruyninckx, 2012); and ‘it is absurd to accept the notion that they (sport organizations) are non-governmental organizations’. For him, ‘the organization of sports is mostly different from political-multilevel organization, thus making the matching of normative framework and government arrangements rather difficult’.

On one side, is the ‘unspecified’ and broad concept of ‘good’ governance (Chapelett, 2013), and on the other side, is the huge range of sport organizations under the Olympic System, which are diverse in size and resources, indeed in the same country. When the indicators were presented, there were no chance for NOC’s of IF’s to participate in building process, the IOC expected that all members under the rule of Olympic Charter understand and follow the rules as they promote (S. S. Andersen et al., 2015).

When the PGG became mandatory for NOC’s and IF’s, they were used as a tool to evaluate good governance in IF, the Wrestling’s IF was provisionally banned by IOC for had no women on its decision-making bodies and no athletes’ commission (Chapelett, 2016). As a consequence
of this kind of model, board members and managers felt and thought that resources would be given based on their answers, so they will do anything to comply standards without changing behaviors or mismanagement of practices.

2.7. Elite sport context

The former called amateur sport is now recognized as elite sport. It encompasses the national and international structures involved to deliver excellence in sport through high levels of human performance. Except for the United States, there is a global trend of governments to invest public funds in this kind of sport.

A report presented by The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China in 2005 defines it, ‘Elite sport is what others would refer to as high-performance sports. Elite sports, or high-performance sports, are sports engaged in by elite athletes who achieve, or aspire to achieve, or have been identified as having the potential to achieve, excellence in world class competitions such as the Olympic Games and World Championships’ (Legislative Council, 2015)

According to the Colombian law (Coldeportes, 2004), there are no definition of elite sport there, but there are four branches of sport -associated to elite sport- (associated, competitive, high performance, and amateur) that can be grouped under the elite sport definition.

Certainly, Associated Sport; is developed by a set of private sport organizations, hierarchically organized to develop competitive programs in the National, Departmental and Municipal level. Competitive Sport; is a set of events, competitions and tournaments whose primary goal is to reach a high technical level. It belongs to Associated Sport organizations’ structure. High Performance Sport; it has its place in higher development levels, comprehends
processes oriented towards high performance through scientific and technological advantages. Also, Amateur Sport; which do not admit payment or compensation in favor of players, different to the expenses caused during the exercise of the sport activity. As is noticed, there are common elements under the elite sport definition: Organizations hierarchically set high-performance oriented competitions and the amateur ideal is still alive in this law. It is necessary to clarify also, that this law was promulgated in 1995 and there is a project in congress to update it.

Elite sport takes part under a network of organizations called the Olympic System. It is defined by Chapelett and Kubler-Mabbott as ‘a vast network that encompasses a broad range of partners: public, private, and associative, and national, international and transnational. No single partner really dominates world sport (...) their reason to be revolves around the organization of competitions at all levels, of which the most prestigious has been the modern Olympic Games, first held in 1896’ (Chappelet & Kübler, 2008).

Briefing the Olympic System, they explain that there are five established actors as the IOC, The Olympic Games Organizing Committee (OCOG), The International Federations (IF’s), The National Olympic Committees (NOC’s), The Association of National Olympic Committees, ANOC; continental associations (as; The Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa, ANOCA; The Pan American Sports Organization, PASO; The Olympic Council of Asia, OCA; The European Olympic Committees and the Oceania National Olympic Committees, ONOC), and The National Federations (NF’s). There are three regulators of the system as The Court of Arbitration of Sport (T/CAS), The World Anti/doping Agency (WADA), and The IOC Ethics Commission. And there are four new actors that follow; the governments, global sponsors, national sponsors and professional teams or athletes and American professional team leagues. In this regard they say ‘the importance that elite sport has taken on today, and particularly on an
economic and social level, tends to favor the emergence of other representative structures (groups of athletes, athletes’ unions, owners of teams or tournaments) and to threaten this unified determination on the part of the sports sector’ (Chapelett & Mabbott, 2008)

The five established and main actors operate under the non-profit organizations umbrella. Those organizations have unique characteristics as it will be shown later, more in the field of sport, where it had (remove) created a governance framework different to corporate governance. As other non-profit organizations, its governance involved a greater number of stakeholders, pressures and challenges in their decision-making structures and processes (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

2.8. Characteristics, Pressures and Challenges for Elite Sports Organizations

Elite sport organizations are managed under the legal figure of non-profit organizations. Differences in management, values, beliefs and the core of the business in the elite sport are presented in this section.

There are differences among nonprofit organizations and profit-oriented firms presented by Peter Drucker cited by (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007): ‘organizational mission; the outcomes of the organization; strategies to market their services and raise funds; the need to attract, develop and manage volunteers; managing a diversity of constituent groups; fund raising and fund development; problems with individual burnout; and importantly, the very different role that the board plays in the nonprofit institution’.

Authors such as Alexander and Weiner cited by Hoyle & Cuskelly, argue that nonprofit organizations may not be able to adopt corporate governance models because strong pressures to adhere traditional values of voluntarism, constituent representation and stewardship.
Other scholars cited by Hoyle & Cuskelly, defined non-profit organizations as ‘member-benefit organizations’ that are created and maintained by the members who consume the services provided by the organization. Indeed, sport organizations operate under the common understanding of the volunteer character of the members at the top ‘the institutionalized nature of the governance structures of nonprofit sport organizations, where there is universal acceptance of the volunteer board at the top of the hierarchy of authority’ (Hoyle & Cuskelly, 2007).

Monopolistic business. The Olympic System is focused in the organization of competitions at all levels, being the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, the most known. As says Jens Andersen, ‘this has been to the great advantage of sports organisations, who, for their part, are in a market with very little competition. Within each sport they are de facto monopolies’ (J. S. Andersen, 2012)

The nature of management in non-profit organizations in society are shared by non-profit sport organizations, and it has implications for his governance: First; difficulties to monitor performance. They are not driven solely by financial motives, and they may have imprecise objectives; they have many stakeholders including their members, users, government, sponsors, volunteers and staff; complex organizational structures, especially if they have adopted a federated or representative model to facilitate the involvement of a wide range of diverse stakeholders; they rely heavily in the input of volunteers for governance roles and delivery’s services; the relationship between the board and paid staff is potentially difficult if there remains uncertainty over who is in control of the organization and; these organizations are created on the basis of a set of values or beliefs about the service or opportunities the organization provides. Conflict over direction or priorities can arise through differing interpretations of these values, making it difficult to govern (Hoyle & Cuskelly, 2007).
There are two types of non-profit voluntary sport organizations (VSO). The traditional, and the contemporary. The first have strong collective identities, operate as cooperatives and consider professionalism and external assistance from government as a treat. The second, more flexible and adaptable to changes, are business like and receptive to external assistance (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

The challenges within the governance in VSO’s described by Cuskelly are low participation, recruitment, ageing of board members and increased bureaucracy. ‘Decreased number of volunteers in the last 5 years; recruitment difficulties in national governing bodies (NGB); increasingly ageing volunteer force, especially for core administrative and governance roles; volunteers are devoting more time in response to increased bureaucracy and pressure to implement changes imposed by sport NGB and legislation’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

While sport has received more attention for his social boundaries and for his role as national pride and political identity mean, the VSO have strengthened their ties with governments. ‘In exchange for government funding, National Governing Bodies are responsible for the delivering of both high-performance programs for elite athletes and sport development initiatives designed to increase involvement in regular organized sport. The activities of nonprofit sport organizations are becoming increasingly tied to the aims of governance policies’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007) Governance in these organizations are indirectly influenced and shaped by governments, whose request increasing levels of accountability under the increased funding carries (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

In Colombia, the NOC remains separated from government, but the state exert strong influence by funding the NOC and the National Federations direct and indirectly.
2.9. The role of State

The role of the state in the governance of the VSO have been broadly covered in the literature review. One of the best partners of elite sport organizations is government, and VSO know that, adapting their governance structures to comply their requirements and obtaining public funding in exchange. ‘Nonprofit organizations have subsequently entered into contractual arrangements to deliver more and more services on behalf of government. The relationship between government and the nonprofit sector generally has shifted ‘towards notions of social contract, mutual obligation and partnerships between individuals, communities and the state’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007) Nevertheless, funding is not the only way to cooperation between them, ‘the funding arrangements take many forms: grants, free for service contracts or government loans and sport organizations may also receive other types of support such as access to facilities or expertise, or even direct organizational support’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

Governments have taken part in that monopoly as an active partner, playing a critical role in the development of the elite sport system. His main function as sponsor of elite sport events and delivering high performance national athletes have shaped different forms of relationships such cooperative, complementary, co-optive or confrontational (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

Despite the nature of VSO as non-profit organizations, they have increased their power and influence at the level of global corporations because governments and private companies have been interested in sponsor elite athletes and events like The World Championships, The FIFA World Cup and The Olympics (Bruyninckx, 2012).

Elite sport organizations have pressures from multiple stakeholders involved. As is shown by Cuskelly, each of those stakeholders have interest in the governance of the VSO. The
power and characteristic of influencing of each stakeholder can chance according to the nature and the power of the National Governing Body. (Figure 1)

**Figure 1. Stakeholders for NGBs**

![Stakeholders for NGBs diagram](image)

Source: Adapted from (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

In terms of governance and management, VSO have committed with four main goals. Firstly, run programs for elite sport athletes, trying to deliver excellence in a global sport context, which is more competitive these days. Secondly, encourage governments to host and share the costs of all kinds of sporting events. Thirdly, govern sport in a specific territory, according to technical standards, developing coaches’ and referees’ capacities (e.g. coach training, accreditation and registration and member registration). And lastly, complying governance standards according to one or more sponsors’ demands (e.g. greater accountability for funds received, social inclusion, equal access, child protection) (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).
Despite characteristics, pressures and challenges of governance in VSO, ‘there was sufficient evidence to suggest that at least some organizations are well placed to cope with these increasing pressures and that the capability of individual organizations to cope with these pressures should be taken into consideration’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

2.10. **Colombian Context**

Colombia has an estimated population of 47,698,524 and the ethnic groups are mestizo and white 84.2%, Afro-Colombian (includes mulatto, raizal, and palenquero) 10.4% among others (Agency, 2017). Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador share the same flag colors because until 1831 these three countries were one. The country included the territories of present-day Panama, northern Peru, western Guyana and northwest Brazil. The Great Colombia (Gran Colombia) was a failed state, they only existed from 1819 to 1831.

For journalists, scholars, and historians, Colombian society is still regretting Spanish occupation. Colombian people think they were stolen with blood and death. The average Colombian is someone with strong capacity to overcome hard situations, but always lack a little to achieve what they want. Colombia is a land of contradictions. Their citizens assessed themselves as one of the happiest in the world (Agencia EFE, 2018), but they live in an inequality and violent environment. The Country’s history has been surrounded by tragedies and violence in a cycle that seems to have no end. Also, it looks like the Independence Wars were the arena in which elites foraged for the constituents of new states and nations (Brown, 2006).

In this country, income inequality is among the worst in the world, and more than a third of the population lives below the poverty line. Colombia is the largest source of Latin American refugees in Latin America, nearly 400,000 of whom live primarily in Venezuela and Ecuador. Forced displacement remains prevalent because of violence among guerrillas, paramilitary
groups, and Colombian security forces. As of February 2017, an estimated 7.4 million people have been internally displaced since 1985, the highest amount in the world. These estimates may undercount actual numbers because not all internally displaced people are registered.

Historically, Colombia also has one of the world's highest levels of forced disappearances. About 30,000 cases have been recorded over the last four decades - although the number is likely to be much higher - including human rights activists, trade unionists, Afro-Colombians, indigenous people, and farmers in rural conflict zones. More than 31,000 former paramilitaries demobilized by the end of 2006 and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia as a formal organization ceased to operate. In the wake of the paramilitary demobilization, organized criminal groups arose, whose members include some former paramilitaries. After four years of formal peace negotiations, the Colombian Government signed a revised final peace accordance with the FARC in October 2016. The agreement was taken to a referendum and voters in Colombia rejected it in a result with 52% voting against it (BBC News, 2016). Even with this agreement, with voters were divided, and with some politicians against it. Finally, the agreement was ratified by the Colombian Congress with a bitter feeling that half Country supported the peace and the other did not. Despite this, the risk of displacement remains as other rebel groups fill the void left by the FARC (Agency, 2017).

There are reasons to believe that the conflict in Colombia is already over, and the official statistics are showing it; according to the Colombian National Institute of Forensic Medicine cited by the newspaper, there were 210 homicides in 2016, 92.2% less from 2002, when occurred 2,713. Also, the report underscores the decrease in deaths in operations of the Armed Forces against the armed groups, which went from 594 in 2004 to 117 cases in 2015 and 51 in 2016 (El Tiempo, 2017). Despite these statistics, there have been at least 51 human rights activists killed
in 2017. Nobody knows exactly how many people have been killed or disappeared this year. Official source speak 52 homicides from January to June, the United Nations recorded 41 until May. "Beyond the numbers, the issue is that there is targeted violence and it has become sharper in some areas with the FARC leaving," says Carlos Guevara from We Are Defenders, who estimates 51 homicides in the last six months (Palomino, 2017).

2.11. **Colombian Sports Sector Context**

The sports sector context shares some issues identified in VSO world-wide with others as a consequence of external environment. Several diagnoses have shown a problematic situation within the sport in Colombia, in terms of coordination, articulation, achievement, and measurement of objectives. There are some characteristics identified in elite sport system related to previous diagnoses (Coldeportes, 2013).

- Disarticulation between the actors, subsystems and subsectors that make up the National Sports System (NSS).
- To ignore recreation, community, physical activity and dance organizations associated with sport and try to reduce or associated with old structures of associated sport (Clubs, Leagues, Federations).
- Lack of clarity about the roles and relationships between NSS actors.
- Low capacity for planning and addressing the public and private actors that make up the NSS.
- Lack of visibility of the sector's impact in National development goals.
- Weak capacity to get resources (funding) of amateur sport, especially new manifestations of sport, or less popular sports.
- High dependency of public funds.
• Weak sustainability of sectoral public policies subject to lack of planning in the management of resources.

• Excessive centralism in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of sectoral policies, programs and projects

A master thesis about autonomy in sport organizations in Colombia showed that there is a systemic problem in elite sport context in Colombia; by the elite sport side, there is a lack of capabilities and by the state’s side, a control’s deficiency; ‘most of sports managers do not have enough time or knowledge to run the organizations, and Coldeportes does not have enough administrative capacity to exert control as the lead agency of sport in Colombia’ (Villareal, 2017).

2.12. National Sport System

According to the National Sports Law (Coldeportes, 2004), the sport is a constitutional right and the state must support, promote, foster and coordinate all sporting activity in Colombia. The government set up a system to assure the universal access to sport through The National System of Sport (NSS). Literally, the NSS is the set of agencies, articulated among themselves, to facilitate communities’ free access to sport, recreation, leisure and physical education.

The NSS is constituted by two branches, one public and other private. And these branches have three levels according to the administrative and political division in Colombia; so, in this case, it is existing a National, Departmental, and Municipal/Private level and other National, Departmental, and Municipal/Public level. This system (NSS) has been criticized among years due to centralism, bureaucracy, mismanagement in sports events, corruption in sports infrastructure projects, sports managers without experience of no background related, and high political interference in sport organizations (Coldeportes, 2013).
The NSS was created in 1995 according to the demands of the context for that time, now, more than twenty years after that, other subsystems such as physical education, physical activity and sports for all are requesting their own space, far from hierarchically and traditional old structures. The need of updating the law have been pointed also by Villareal ‘from a legal standpoint all the respondent stated the need to update the 1995 sports law because it is often unclear due to legal loopholes and problems concerning its interpretation arise constantly’ (Villareal, 2017).

The NSS has been criticized by their slowness, passivity and low operative capacity. It seems to be well planned and structured, but it does not work in practice. More than twenty years of diagnoses and evaluations have shown the complexity in the management of the system.

2.13. The National Sports Plan

Despite the above, there is a National Sports Plan (Coldeportes, 2013) where Coldeportes was a steering actor leaded before 2009. This was the first long term-effort to lead a Public Policy for Sport in Colombia. The Ten-Year Plan for Sport, Recreation, Physical Education and Physical Activity for Human Development, Coexistence and Peace 2009-2019 is considered the document where the Public Policy of Sport in Colombia is extensively explained.

The Ten-Year Plan mentions several things such as the superior purposes, the human development, coexistence and peace. The vision of this plan is to show in 2019, public indicators in terms of coexistence, public health and achievements in high performance sport. In Colombia they call it ‘continental sports power’ (Coldeportes, 2013). This is positive for Elite sport system in Colombia because they receive public funding to achieve this. The NOC and the NF benefit from this policy. There is vast evidence showing a direct relationship between public funding and success in international sport (Truyens, De Bosscher, Heyndels, & Westerbeek, 2014).
2.14. Previous research

In the literature review about governance in elite sport organizations, there are numerous studies assessing governance in sport (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013; Geeraert, 2016; Geeraert, Mrkonjic, & Chappelet, 2015; Geeraert et al., 2013).


Five thesis (Alvarado, 2017; Ayouni & Kim, 2017; Octaria, 2015; Said, 2015; Shahbaz, 2015) on good governance in sport and autonomy have explored governance in sport using the
Basic Indicators for Better Governance in Sport (BIBGIS) (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013).

In Latin American context, there was done a research about manager’s perceptions and acceptance of the Basic Indicators of Better Governance in Guatemala. In overall results, the researcher found that although managers acceptation of the indicators was high (average above 3/5 points), stakeholder representation was under mean (2.44/3). This means, that, for managers, there is not important to have diversity in governance. That could happen because they are not agreed with his participation. That is not clarified at the study. Also, there is mentioned that is necessary to work in the organizational culture, showing that, to have indicators or codes about governance is not enough if the culture of the Federate Sport remains the same (Alvarado, 2017).

Other thesis on this topic is the assessment of good governance practices in the Indonesian Olympic Committee at 2015. BIBGIS model (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013) was applied with positive results in four to seven dimensions. Recommendations are under the scope of fill some requirements related to have a code of ethics, clear objectives, statutes, rules and regulations, but the most important was, the understanding and implementation of accountability and transparency (Octaria, 2015).

Sport Governance in Pakistan were studied by Ibrahim Shahbaz, he assessed governance in Pakistan Sports System using BIBGIS model. In most of the dimensions the governances’ scores achieved were very low, which means that there were no good governance practices in the Pakistan Sports System (Shahbaz, 2015).

Other thesis assessed and compared Governance in World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) before and after 2004. They found that WTF after 2004 succeeded in the betterment of most
dimension of governance, doubling the scores in most of seven dimensions of good governance except for the solidarity and organization transparency (Ayouni & Kim, 2017).

Other thesis used The Play the Game assessment tool Action for Good Governance in International Sport (AGGIS). The study addressed the good governance practices in the Egyptian Archery Federation (EAF). The findings showed the urgent need to implement policy which will compel EAF to start embracing good governance principles and indicators to measure the governance and performance (Said, 2015).

There is a thesis about autonomy of sports organizations in Colombia where it was found that the national sport system has structural and functional weaknesses, the sports organizations have a deficient system of control, insufficient managerial knowledge and/or commitment. About sports organizations and law, they suggested that the law does not affect them, however, ‘there is a clear need update the national sports law, and to establish a clear structure and defined roles, regulate processes, create and implement code of ethics, disciplinary code, and other mechanisms that ensure compliance with the rules’ (Villareal, 2017). Despite sport organizations in Colombia have been showing positive results in terms of medals in the Olympic Cycle, there is a weakness in adequate management and internal processes as is pointed by Villareal (Villareal, 2017).
Chapter 3. Methodology

The methodological considerations for this study will be explained in this chapter. It was applied a survey to Athletes and Executives of the Colombian Olympic Committee and the Sport Federations in Colombia. The validation of the survey followed five stages. Firstly, the initial construction of the survey instrument was based on a review of the literature, mainly the questions were taken from the IOC’s working paper Consolidated Minimum Requirements For The Implementation Of The Basic Principles Of Good Governance For NOCs (IOC, 2016), the Sports Governance Observer (Geeraert, 2015) and the Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013). Second, an expert review and approval. Third, it was done a double translation to identify misunderstandings. Fourth, a pilot test and five, appropriate revisions to the instrument were made after each phase of testing.

3.2. Sampling

The sampling method is convenience sampling. The respondents of study are active Colombian Athletes involved in elite sport competitions under the called Olympic Cycle (Bolivarian, South American, Center and Caribbean, and Pan-American and Olympic Games) by the Colombian Olympic Committee (n=60); and Executives of Sport Federations in Colombia or the Colombian Olympic Committee (n=30).

It will be applied a t-test. Dependent variable is the Athletes’ and Executives’ perception of the effectiveness of the PGG and the independent variable are the seven dimensions of The PGG.
3.3. Strategy of Inquiry

It will be used an online survey to collect data. The technology used to send and administrate the data collection will be Google forms. The software used to analyze the information will be Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

Despite the broad character of PGG (Chapelett, 2016), The IOC established ‘The consolidated minimum requirements for the implementation of the Basic Principles of Good Governance and a self-evaluation tool’ in order to provide specific indicators to National Olympic Committees and International Federations (IOC, 2016).

These Basic Principles of Good Governance refer to seven topics (IOC, 2017a):
- transparency of rules, management and managers;
- risk management;
- efficient internal communication;
- shared and controlled responsibilities;
- regular and legitimate elections;
- the right to appeal all forms of disciplinary measures; and
- the respect of minorities.

3.3. Instrument

Initial construction of the survey instrument was based on a review of the literature (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013; Geeraert, 2015; IOC, 2008a, 2017b). The instrument contained two sections. In the first, there is a user characterization. There was asked if they know the Basic Universal Principles. If they do, it was asked if they think they are applied in the elite sport in Colombia. If they don’t, they can follow the next section. Respondents were asked in a Likert’s scale (from Unfulfilled to Highly fulfilled; or no knowledge or opinion), to indicate for
twenty-three (23) subdimensions and (7) seven dimensions of Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance. Content and face validity were established by submitting the survey to a panel of experts and by conducting a pilot test. A pilot test was then performed with a master’s students of Dream Together Program at Seoul National University (n=25). Appropriate revisions to the instrument were made after each phase of testing.

They were grouped the PGG in categories according to the content of the principles. Some have two or three concepts, for example, the first refers to vision, mission and strategy. Those were grouped in the category ‘Management’. Other concepts refer to the structures, regulations and democratic processes were categorized under ‘Democracy’, and so on. This grouping of concepts is explained in the table 2.

**Table 2. Categories and Dimensions of the PGG**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Dimension of PGG</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Vision, mission and strategy</td>
<td>(a) To comply his mission, vision and strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Structures, regulations and democratic process</td>
<td>(b) To be governed under democratic values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>Highest level of competence, integrity and ethical standards</td>
<td>(c) To have high levels of ethical standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency (control)</td>
<td>Accountability, transparency and control</td>
<td>(d) To be transparent in the management of resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Solidarity and development</td>
<td>(e) To be equal in the distribution of his resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>Athletes’ involvement, participation and care</td>
<td>(f) To be focused on the development of the athletes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Harmonious relations with governments while preserving autonomy</td>
<td>(g) To be free of political or commercial interference.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each dimension of the PGG had between four or two sub-categories. They were rated by the participants in a scale of six perception items. They reflected the perception of the participants. Each perception item was codified like this: Unfulfilled: -2; Slightly fulfilled: -1; Neutral: 0; Fulfilled: 1; Highly fulfilled: 2, and Do not have knowledge or opinion: ( ). For example, if he or she thinks that some principle does not comply, it was assigned a value of -2, or, if he or she thinks that the principle completely applies, so it was given a value of 2. I will show each of the seven principles analyzing the sample, the mean, the standard deviation (Std Dev) and the Minimum and Maximum.

*Figure 2. Scale to analyze the perception of the Athletes and the Executives.*

-2 Unfulfilled  -1 Slightly fulfilled       0 Neutral     1 Fulfilled   2 Highly fulfilled ( )No opinion

3.4. Data Analysis

There was conducted a t-test analysis to estimate the difference between the groups relative to the variability of the scores in the groups. There was calculated the standard deviation, variance, mean and alpha level (Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).

3.5. Ethical Considerations

The participants of this study are adults. It was explained the title and main goal of the study and confidentiality was assured. They were informed that their participation was voluntary, and the information collected used for academic purposes. They were informed about researcher and current tutor basic data as email and telephone numbers.
Chapter 4. Results

4.1. T-test results

An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the perception of the PGG between athletes and executives from the National Olympic Committee and National Federations. There was a significant difference in the scores for each one of the seven principles (p<.0001). These results suggest that the perception of the application of PGG in elite sport in Colombia are statistically different between athletes and executives. All categories had negative means from athlete’s perspective, with the exemption of athletes’ representation (M= 0.028) and autonomy’s principles (M= 0.188). The executives have overall better perception of the PGG than athletes, all their means were positives. The scores for athletes and executives were consolidated for the seven PGG in the Olympic and the Sport Movement in the table 2.

4.1.1. Knowledge of PGG

The first question was about the participants’ knowledge have about the PGG. The question was if they knew the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement. Overall, most of the participants do not know the PGG (N=54, 83%). Into the athletes’ group, most of them do not know the PGG (N=50 out of 62). While into the executives’ group, is the opposite, most of them know the PGG (N=25 out of 29). The results are shown in table 4. The differences between them were significant.

4.1.2 Application of PGG

The participants who knew the PGG (37%); were asked if they think the PGG overall apply to elite sport in Colombia. There were three choices. Apply, do not apply or partially apply. Only 18 (48%) persons replied this question, for them, those principles apply; other 19 participants did not reply. (Table 3).
Table 3. Knowledge and Application of PGG between athletes and executives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>12 (13%)</td>
<td>50 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>25 (28%)</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37 (41%)</td>
<td>54 (59%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P-values <0.0001*

4.1.3. Perceptions of PGG

The athletes’ scores covered from transparency (M= -0.330, SD=1.108) and autonomy (M=0.188, SD=1.113). Their perception of the application of PGG in elite sport are between neutral and lightly negative. The lowest scored principle (transparency) is related to accountability, control, management of resources, and checks and balances. On the other side, the highest scored principle (autonomy) is related to have harmonious relations with government and be free of political or commercial interference.

Table 4. Consolidated scores for athletes and executives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Diff</th>
<th>t value*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>1.235</td>
<td>-1.266</td>
<td>-4.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.253</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>1.118</td>
<td>-1.424</td>
<td>-5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.388</td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>-1.361</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.295</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-0.330</td>
<td>1.108</td>
<td>-1.682</td>
<td>-5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.239</td>
<td>1.097</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-0.196</td>
<td>1.076</td>
<td>-1.244</td>
<td>-6.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.486</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>-1.049</td>
<td>-3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.077</td>
<td>1.025</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>1.113</td>
<td>-1.244</td>
<td>-4.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Executives</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.431</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant differences in all principles
The executives’ scores covered from athletes’ representation (M=1.077, SD=1.025) and solidarity (M=1.486, SD=0.857). Their perception of the application of PGG in elite sport are all positive. The lowest score principle (athletes’ representation) refers to athletes’ involvement, participation and care; while the highest scored principle was solidarity, which is related to be equal in the distribution of his resources and develop the sport in less privileged regions.

The executives have better perception of management than athletes. The mean for athletes were negative (M=-0.013), so their perception is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). The mean for executives were positive (M=1.253). The standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.235) were higher than the executives (SD=1.007). According to that, athletes have more distinct perceptions of management in the elite sport in Colombia. The maximum and minimum scores were the same for both, some participants of both groups perceive that vision, mission and strategy unfulfilled (-2) and others remark that they highly fulfilled (2).

The executives have a positive perception of democracy (M=1.388) than athletes (M=-0.036), whose had perceptions somewhat moving to ‘slightly fulfilled’. The executives have more favorable perception of democracy than athletes. The mean for athletes were negative (M=-0.036), so their perception is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). The mean for executives were positive (M=1.388). The standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.118) were higher than the executives (SD=0.823). According to that, athletes have more diverse perceptions of democracy in the governance of elite sport in Colombia. The maximum and minimum scores were unfulfilled (-2) and highly fulfilled (2) for athletes and for executives, were from slightly fulfilled (-1.75) and highly fulfilled (2).

The mean for athletes in integrity principle was negative (M=-0.0662), so their perception is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). The mean for executives were positive
(M=1.295). As in other categories, the executives had a better perception (M=1.295) than athletes (M=0.066), whose had perceptions somewhat moving to ‘slightly fulfilled’. The standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.003) were higher than the executives (SD=0.928). The maximum and minimum scores were unfulfilled (-2) and highly fulfilled (2) for athletes and for executives were from slightly fulfilled (-1.5) and highly fulfilled (2).

The executives have better perception of transparency than athletes. The mean for athletes were negative (M=-0.330), so their perception is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). The mean for executives were positive (M=1.239). The standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.108) were higher than the executives (SD=1.097). The maximum and minimum scores were the same for both, from the minimum possible (-2) score and the maximum score (2).

The executives have better perception of solidarity than athletes. The mean for athletes was negative (M=-0.196), so their perception is in between slightly fulfilled (-1) and neutral (0). The mean for executives was positive (M=1.486). The standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.076) were slightly higher than the executives (SD=0.857). The maximum and minimum scores were the same for both, from the minimum possible score and the maximum score.

The second higher mean in data analysis for athletes (M=0.028) were found in Athlete’s representation. By contrast, the lowest mean (M=1.077) in executive’s data were for Athlete’s representation. In despite of this, the perception is still better in executives than in athletes. Just in Autonomy and Athletes representation, means were positive for athletes. The standard deviation for athletes was (SD=1.085) and for executives was (SD=1.025). The maximum and minimum scores were the same for both.

The executives have better perception of autonomy than athletes. The mean for athletes were positive (M=0.188). This means that the athletes perceive that the elite sport system in Colombia
is free of political and commercial influence. The mean for executives were also positive (M=1.253). The executives have more positive perception of autonomy than athletes. The standard deviation for athletes (SD=1.113) were higher than the executives (SD=1.033). The maximum and minimum scores were for athletes, from (-2) to (2). For executives, scores range was from -1.5 to 2.

In suggestions at the end of the questionnaire, two executives wrote comments as well. First, said that the ‘sport level, sets the social, economic and political development of a country’. And the second commented ‘I propose to you to lead an evaluation project of the National Federations using one of the current tools.’ Curiously, more than ten athletes commented in this section. Some of them said the necessity of social security system for athletes after retirement, because when they retired of sport, at certain age, they do not have professional experience, making more complex their adaptation to labour market. Others suggested that administrators and coaches should be assessed according to their position and tasks, not by athlete’s sport success. Also commented that there are a lot of information are not shared with athletes, even other stakeholders; and no equity in the distribution of resources. Latest comments pointed out the necessity to increase public and athlete awareness in these topics, especially, athletes’ involvement.
Chapter 5. Discussion

There is very little published in academic journals about athletes’ perception and governance in elite sport. Despite the evolution of the Olympic Movement is going towards ‘ensure the respect for the athletes who are at the heart of the Olympic Games’ (IOC, 2014; MacAloon, 2016), the voice of the athletes tends to be sidelined. Interviews with scholars such as Borja Garcia and Barrie Houlihan confirmed this appreciation, even more, in a conversation with professor Jean Loupe Chapelett he said, ‘the view of athletes is not well taken into account.’

A recent study about ‘stakeholder perspectives of the governance of schoolboy football in Ireland’ showed an ‘ineffective stakeholder management (poor communication practices, perceptions of inaccurate disclosures, perceived lack of inclusion in decision-making, perceptions of organizational injustice, confusion over role clarity and responsibilities)’ (Finnegan, McArdle, Littlewood, & Richardson, 2018).

One of the biggest studies with athletes and governance was developed by the players’ union for professional footballers (FIFPro) in Eastern Europe. Researchers found issues related to delays on payments, violence, bullying and harassment, match-fixing and discrimination (FIFPro, 2012). After the publication of this report, FIFA made significant changes in the governance of football (FIFA, 2016). Those changes were possible due to the strong pressure footballers did on FIFA, the popularity of football, the crisis raised on FIFA-Gate scandal in 2015 and the economic power of some professional football players whose can afford lawyers researchers and managers. The situation in other sports could be the same, even worst, were decisions made by clubs or NOC’s were challenged by CAS to protect contractual or legal rights and the principle of good faith (Rigozzi, 2010).
The more renowned studies on governance in sport organizations have been done by the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF, 2018) and Play the Game (Play the Game, 2015). NOCs do self-assessment on governance but not as a product of academic initiative, and their results remain private.

The ASOIF and Play the Games studies been self-assessed and voluntary studies, arising the agency problem described by Hoye (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007). Which means that results can be biased by officials (agents) who want to show an image about the governance, while the government or the IOC (shareholders) want to discover fails on it. Agency theory has been the predominant theoretical approach to the study of corporate governance (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

The ASOIF questionnaire consists in 50 measurable indicators divided into five sections: Transparency, Integrity, Democracy, Development and Control Mechanisms. IFs were asked to determine a score for each question on a scale from 0 to 4 (0 – Not fulfilled at all; 1 – Partially fulfilled; 2 – Fulfilled; 3 – Well-fulfilled according to published rules/procedures; 4 – Totally fulfilled in a state-of-the-art way) according to defined criteria, and to provide explanatory evidence, such as a hyperlink to a relevant page on their website. According to the report, ‘there are improvement in the governance of IF individually and collectively. However, a great deal of work remains to be done and there are very large differences between the best performing IFs and the weakest’ (ASOIF, 2018).

AGIS project (Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organizations) ‘identified serious governance deficiencies in international sport. It shows that most international sports federations fail to comply with basic standards for democracy, transparency and accountability.’ Play the Game, the NGO responsible of the study, are running out a benchmarking tool that assesses the level of governance in national sports federations. It expects
a report at the end of 2018 (Play the Game, 2015). Unfortunately, none of those studies, consider the opinion or athletes’ perception.

Play the Game project, the dimensions of good governance are transparency, democratic processes, internal accountability and control and societal responsibility. Those dimensions are set by forty-six principles and two hundred seventy-four (274) indicators. The indicators were divided in three categories, such as basic indicators (minimum standard of good governance); advanced indicators (costlier and, thus, more demanding to implement) and state of the art indicators (highest standards of good governance).

5.1. Comparison between athletes and executives

Comparison between groups, showed significant differences in the seven PGG (p<.0001). The perception about the application of those principles for athletes are in between (-1 slightly fulfilled) and (0 neutral). For executives were in between (0 neutral) and (1 fulfilled). These results suggest that the perception of compliance of PGG in elite sport in Colombia are statistically different between athletes and executives, they have overall better perception than the athletes, however both are close to have a neutral perception. All scores in executives were positives, while 5 up to 7 were negative in athletes.

These findings open a discussion regarding the problems raised with Top-to down approach proposed traditionally by the IOC, the effectiveness of the implementation policies and the management of stakeholders by the NOC. So, one question arised from this could be what implementation strategy is appropriate in the specific contexts of NFs? Those problems are discussed later.
5.1.2. Athlete’s perspective

From athlete’s perspective, with the exemption of athletes’ representation and autonomy’s principles, other principles had negative means, from Transparency to Management. A study conducted within French Rugby Union showed agreement and conflict between the actors. Lack of engagement from these stakeholders (athletes) may result in a limited impact of sport policy. Researchers suggest that a “one size fits all” approach should enable a degree of regional freedom for sport governing bodies that include organizational membership (Viollet, Minikin, Scelles, & Ferrand, 2016).

Other survey study involving 261 elite athletes from 51 different countries and four international sports federations, conducted by Swedish scholars focusing on elite athletes’ perceptions of anti-doping, showed that the athletes had concerns about the legitimacy of the way the rules and principles are enforced in practice, specifically with regard to matters of privacy, lack of efficiency and equal conditions as well as athletes’ involvement in the anti-doping work (Efverström, Ahmadi, Hoff, & Bäckström, 2016).

Athletes are not involved with the administration, even with the governance of sport; results showed that just 13% know the PGG, and 6 of them think those comply, others did not reply. Further studies could find out how many athletes are involved now in the administration of sport, or why other athletes do not want to be involved with it. A Canadian scholar suggest that a real democratization of sport should be possible, if the sport organizations were controlled by the athletes (Donnelly, 2015).

National Federations are generally composed by leagues or clubs, not for athletes. In Colombia, NF are composed by leagues, which are associations of clubs. Chapelett suggests a new form of sport organization to improve the autonomy and governance at international sport
level with the creation of cooperatives of athletes in a given sport. This would give more voice to the athletes (one athlete=one vote) which would help run not-for-profit activities along commercial activities within the framework of a social and solidarity-based economy (Chapelett, 2016). This proposal could bring a new vision of sport organization and would open a new field of research in sport management area, with cooperatives as a new form of sport organization.

The lowest scored principle (transparency) is related to accountability, control, management of resources, and checks and balances. This principle is probably the most sensitive item because it relates directly with the administration of resources. Transparency is an ideal proposed by the IOC. Reporting transparency is a regular practice in high developed democracies, but there is not the same in Colombian context. This country has rules and public agencies in charge of oversight the transparency in public organizations. The COC is legally a private organization. Despite the COC uses public funding, they are not required to comply those regulations, and they do not do it. Each principle is critical for the governance of the system, but from IOC’s perspective, transparency is critical.

Agenda 2020 is a group of IOC’s 40 recommendations to implement within the Olympic Movement. They shape of what the future of the Olympic Movement will look like. Recommendation 27 says: "Comply with basic principles of good governance". It details that all organizations belonging to the Olympic Movement to accept and comply with the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (“PGG”). The IOC suggests periodical updates of PGG and to self-evaluate it, 'emphasizing the necessity for transparency, integrity and opposition to any form of corruption'. There is a consolidated list with practical implementation and minimum requirements/ expectations for NOCs. There are three issues here. First, language barriers. The document in English just can be read for few
people inside the COC. Second, the minimum requirements are vague and easily manipulated, even more when self-evaluation is proposed. Organizations can show written vision, mission and codes for preventing corruption, even they can reach their goals; but, how are they doing that? What about the practices behind those outputs? Having rules in place or documents do not guarantee transparence in processes, democracies in Latin America are the same proof of it. Minikin (Minikin, 2015) showed that it is relatively easy for individuals to manipulate the established rules in order to obtain and retain power. Third, even if a self-evaluation is proposed, it requires a staff to do that, that is, resources for it. Despite the elite sport in Colombia is highly funded, resources to reach international sport success and demands of elite athletes are increasing, and resources from government (main source) are considered scarce.

Other principles from smallest to highest within athletes’ perspective were solidarity; integrity; democracy; management; athletes’ representation; and autonomy.

Despite each of those principles were explained before each question, there is needed more education and therefore, more athlete’s participation in the administration and governance of the system. Donnelly points that despite growing public awareness of the problems of governance in sport, there has not yet been a grassroots movement attempting to bring about reform – and problems such as corruption and match-fixing continue (Donnelly, 2015). He also propones as Chapelett does, ‘a democratization of sport in which the players became more involved in the organization of their sports’.

5.1.3. Executives’ perspective

The executives’ scores covered from athletes’ representation and solidarity. Their perception of the application of PGG in elite sport were all positive.
The lowest score principle, athletes’ representation refers to athletes’ involvement, participation and care. This means that the lowest perception of compliance of PGG has direct relationship with athletes. This output is completely opposite to the study done by Alvarado (Alvarado, 2017), who asked which principles of good governance were most important for Guatemalan Sport Managers, and they perceived as important the dimension of democracy but not considered important the dimension of Stakeholder Representation (athletes representation). Donnelly highlights the necessity of the involvement of athletes in the governance of sport. For him, executives and owners of professional teams in sport are largely unaccountable to players and fans (Donnelly, 2015). These results can be interpreted as the executives in Colombia recognize the necessity of more participation of athletes in the governance of the elite sport system.

Transparency was the lowest score for athletes and the second lower for executives. This suggest the importance of this principle to both groups. Colombia is one of the countries with more institutions and rules in place to prevent corruption, (Political Constitution, Anticorruption statutes, Penal Code, State Contract Law, Unique Disciplinary Code, etc. Entities specialized in controlling, monitoring, disciplining, investigating and prosecuting: Procurator, Comptroller (national, departmental and municipal), Public Prosecutor's Office, Accounting, internal control offices) (Editorial, 2018). And the ranking of Colombia in the World’s Corruption Perception Index keeps the same scores from 2012 until 2017 in the 96 position (36-37, the lowest score, the worst perception) (Transparency, 2017).

Solidarity was the highest scored principle, which is related to be equal in the distribution of his resources and develop the sport in less privileged regions. Executives perceive this principle as the most compliant in elite sport system in Colombia.
5.1.4. Limitations

Is easy to identify structures of good governance in organizations but is much more difficult to measure corruption alongside the organization. One example of it is the case of FIFA. They were ranked in second place when Play the Game did a measurement of governance in 2013. Structures and codes can be in place, but it looks like this is not enough to avoid corruption. Effective organizations can engage in contradictory activities, which contributes to the paradox of organizational effectiveness. This paradox says that ‘Organizational effectiveness is inherently paradoxical. To be effective, an organization must possess attributes that are simultaneously contradictory, even mutually exclusive’. In fact, Cameron (1986) found that ‘the organizations that achieved the highest levels of effectiveness were also those that satisfied the most separate constituency group expectations, even when different constituencies held contradictory expectations. Highly effective organizations were paradoxical in that they performed in contradictory ways to satisfy contradictory expectations’ (Cameron, 1986).

Nowadays is not possible to understand the complexity under governance in non-profit sport organizations, it is necessary, to adopt a ‘multi-paradigm approach to allow the paradoxes, ambiguities and tensions involved in governance’ (Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007).

When the PGG became mandatory for NOC’s and IF’s, they were used as a tool to evaluate good governance in IF, the Wrestling’s IF was provisionally banned by IOC for had no women on its decision-making bodies and no athletes’ commission (Chapelett, 2016). Because of this kind of model, board members and managers felt and thought that resources would be given based on their answers, so they will do anything to comply standards without changing behaviors or mismanagement of practices.
The ‘unspecified’ and broad concept of ‘good’ governance (Chapelett, 2013), and the huge range of sport organizations under the Olympic System, which are diverse in size and resources, indeed in the same country make highly complex and ambiguous the ambition of good governance. When the indicators were presented, there were no chance for NOC’s of IF’s to participate in building process, the IOC expected that all members under the rule of Olympic Charter understand and follow the rules as they promote (S. S. Andersen et al., 2015). Is difficult to have Universal Principles for all the NOC, even for all NF when there are huge gaps between NOCS and NF. As the study in French Rugby Union, is necessary to move away from a ‘Top-Down’ approach to strategy development as this may lead to a potential lack of consistency with regional contexts. At a National level may occur the same, there are NF plenty of resources and others struggling to survive. However, there are some expectations or minimum standards which all federations would have, for example, to have a strategic planning, to publish their statutes, to establish term limits. Some IF had presidents or chief executives for 20 or more years in charge, this is not good a good example of good governance.

Since the early 2000’s, innumerable definitions of governance have been put forward; Chapelett and Mrkonijc identified more than 35 sets of good governance principles in sport. The IOC systematically refers to more than 100 indicators that can be deducted from the PGG, even though they have proved difficult to apply (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013).

As it was commented for Houlihan (Houlihan, 2018), those principles are open to a lot of interpretation, we should deep beneath those words. For example, do the votes in the congress should be public or secret? What kind of people should conform the executive board? Should they represent regionally the country? Or they should be selected for professional profiles and specific skills?
Other principles such as solidarity could be easily abused by executives for their own benefit. That means that cooperation resources, or solidarity founds could be manipulated for executives to assure their reelection with regional clubs, as it happens with IF and NF.

Current studies on governance do represent a snapshot in time, as it recognizes ASOIF study, and ‘an analysis of documents, procedures and structures does not take account of behavior and organizational culture.’

5.1.5. Proposals

Good governance has a cost, it is not cost free, some NF could pay a staff to look after governance, but not all can do that. The NOC could provide a scale or a gradation of those PGG to help to NF how to reach, minimum standards of good governance (Houlihan, 2018). Even more, they should start by asking NF what is and what should be governance for them.

Looking for future proposals, Chapelett suggests that the Olympic Movement is a pyramidal system, so each level should push the next level for better governance, starting from the IOC to IF and NC, and so on. One example of this is how the policies on gender equality have changed the structures in the executive boards of IOC and IF.

The government is another key stakeholder. Probably the most important after the athletes. They can stablish minimum parameters of how should be governed the elite sport in their territory. The best practices in UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are good examples of it.

The NOC can play other critical role in order to help NF and to help itself to improve standards of good governance leading a public conversation of what do they consider good governance and why is important to have this on place.
5.1.6. Recommendations

PGG should be updated, for Chapelett, they are too many not practical, that’s why he recommends following the principles used by ASOIF to measure governance.

No public discussion about governance in sport have been done in Colombia. Who should take the first step? The PGG should have an operative goals of minimum standards as a starting point, according to the goals model proposed by Chelladurai (Chelladurai, 2014). The concept of governance may have different approaches as is pointed by (Bruyninckx, 2012). He shows the concept of sport governance from three different approaches; governance as performance, as process and governance as an ideal, or good governance.

The professors Robert Herman and David Renz (Herman & Renz, 1999) have developed six theses about the effectiveness of public benefit charitable nonprofit organizations (NPOs) which helps from further research projects. These theses are: (a) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is always a matter of comparison. (b) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is multidimensional and will never be reducible to a single measure. (c) Boards of directors make a difference in the effectiveness of NPO, but how they do this is not clear. (d) More effective NPOs are more likely to use correct management practices. (e) Nonprofit organizational effectiveness is a social construction. (f) Program outcome indicators as measures of NPO effectiveness are limited and can be dangerous (Chelladurai & Haggerty, 1991).
Chapter 6. Conclusions

This study tried to know more about the knowledge, application and perception of the athletes and executives about the PGG in elite sport in Colombia. Overall, most of the participants do not know the PGG. Into the athletes’ group, most of them do not know the PGG (N=50 out of 62). While into the executives’ group, is the opposite, most of them know the PGG (N=25 out of 29).

With participants who knew the PGG; it was asked if they think the PGG overall apply to elite sport in Colombia. There were three choices. Apply, do not apply or partially apply. Only 18 persons replied this question, for them, those principles apply; other 19 participants did not reply.

The participants’ perception of the PGG in elite sport are between neutral and lightly negative. Athletes’ had scores covered from transparency and autonomy. The executives’ scores covered from athletes’ representation and solidarity. Their perception of the application of PGG in elite sport are all positive. The lowest score principle (athletes’ representation) refers to athletes’ involvement, participation and care; while the highest scored principle was solidarity, which is related to be equal in the distribution of his resources and develop the sport in less privileged regions.

If the NOC wants to implement the PGG with NF and themselves, it should start providing education. Implementing policies such as good governance requires diverse approaches. The Sports Governance Observer provides valuable insights about implementing good governance policies in sport organizations.
Journalists and scholars point a crisis in global sport management after years of scandals and allegations of corruption within International Sport Organizations. They have raised public awareness at a national level also. Globalization, institutionalization and commercialization are characteristics which have brought serious problems for democracy into them (Donnelly, 2015).

The problem with governance has been addressed by the IOC stablishing the PGG (IOC, 2008a), other sport organizations (ASOIF, 2017, 2018), reinforced by BIBGIS project (Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport) (Chappelet, Jean-Loup and Mrkonjic, 2013) and SGO (Sports Governance Observer) (Geeraert, 2015) and other countries which have adopted codes and guidelines for improving governance. Despite those instruments represent a progress for good governance in sport, there is still a necessity of having education, appropriation, implementation and feedback activities at all levels of sport.

When the PGG in the Olympic and Sport Movement were published, the IOC expected the adoption and implementation by IF and NOC under the top-to-down model and “one size fits all” approach. As it was showed in this research, the lack of knowledge and negative perception of PGG could be improved through education and increasing the participation of athletes in the governance of the system.

This study highlights the necessity of athletes’ involvement in the governance of the sport in Colombia. Having an athletes’ commission do not guarantee the compliance of the PGG. As it was showed in the literature review, the existing mechanisms for legitimizing member based sport organisations can lead to poor governance and accepted democratic processes can be manipulated to suit the personal agenda of individuals over the vision of the organization (Minikin, 2015).
References


Geeraert, A. (2016). Indicators and benchmarking tools for sports governance. In G. Sweeney & K.
McCarthy (Eds.), *Global Corruption in Sport* (p. 398). Abingdon, Oxon.


Global Environmental Change, 21(3), 813–822.
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GLOENVCHA.2011.03.010


between government and elite sport organizations in Colombia. Seoul National University.


Appendix

Survey

Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in the Olympic and Sport Movement

This survey is for ‘The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance the Olympic and Sport Movement’.

The main goal of this research is to know athletes' and executive board members' knowledge, implementation and perception of the PGG in Elite Sport in Colombia.

Your participation is voluntary, there is no good or bad answers and the information collected will be used only and exclusively for academic purposes. It is assured your complete anonymity and confidentiality. Preliminary results of this study will be sent to you in November.

This survey will take approximately 15 minutes of your time. I appreciate your honesty filling out all the fields.

This study is conducted by Mauricio Hernandez ( ), currently a Master's Candidate in Sport Management at Seoul National University. Currently under tutoring by Professor Chung Gun Lee ( )

User characterization

Please, answer these questions before starting the survey.

1. What is your role in Colombia's Elite Sport System?
   - An athlete
   - An executive of Sport Federation or Colombian Olympic Committee

2. Which of the following organizations do you belong to?
   - The National Sport Federation
   - The Colombian Olympic Committee (Only valid for Board Members)

3. Do you know the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in sport? *
   - Yes
   - No

Do you think the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in sport overall applies to elite sport in Colombia?
The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (2008), are a set of items of principles and elements to be mutually recognized and respected by the National Olympic Committee and the competent government authorities, respecting the autonomy of sports organisations on the one hand and good governance on the other. According to the Code of Ethics, all members of the Olympic Movement must adopt, as their minimum standard, these Basic Principles of Good Governance. They refer to:

- Transparency of rules, management and managers;
- Risk management;
- Efficient internal communication;
- Shared and controlled responsibilities;
- Regular and legitimate elections;
- The right to appeal all forms of disciplinary measures; and
- The respect of minorities.

Does the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance in sport overall apply in Colombia's elite sport?

- Yes
- No
- Partially

The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (2008), are a set of items of principles and elements to be mutually recognized and respected by the National Olympic Committee and the competent government authorities, respecting the autonomy of sports organisations on the one hand and good governance on the other.

**Instructions**

Please tell us if any of the following statements are applied to your organization. If a principle highly applies or not, please judge on the follow scale for each category and indicator.

1. Vision, mission and strategy

Every Federation should consider having a clear-cut and strong statement of its vision, mission, and objectives which details its apical purposes and processes. The absence of such a forthright vision and mission statement itself can be considered a sign of ineffectiveness (Chelladurai, 2015)
2. Structures, regulations and the democratic process

The democratic processes concern rules and norms inherent to a democratic code of conduct (Mouffe, 1993). In particular, they refer to participation in policy processes by those who are affected by the policy (Arnstein, 1969; Pateman, 1970). Democratic processes increase the accountability and effectiveness of organisations (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989; Fearon, 1999; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2004).
3. Highest level of competence, integrity and ethical standards

Integrity is a set of actions against doping and any other forms of cheating in sport on the one hand, and the strengthening of ethics with improvements in transparency, good governance and accountability of sports organisations on the other. Integrity entails credibility, and the credibility of competitions and sports organisations is one of the three pillars of Olympic Agenda 2020. If the credibility of sports competitions suffers, then sooner or later the credibility of sports organisations will suffer. The same is true the other way around (IOC)
4. Accountability, transparency and control

Accountability is the obligation of an individual or organisation to account for its activities, accept responsibility for them, and communicate and report about them in a transparent manner (IOC, 2016).

Transparency pertains the “degree of openness in conveying information” (Ball, 2009). Transparency allows external actors to monitor the workings of an organisation and therefore decrease the likelihood of opportunistic behavior.

Control procedures are paramount to prevent the concentration of power in and they ensure that decision-making is robust, independent and free from improper influence. They ensure that no senior official or department has absolute control over decisions, and clearly define the assigned duties (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000).
5. Solidarity and development

Refers to expressing responsibility towards internal and external stakeholders. This involves practices relating to contributing to a better society and a cleaner environment by integrating social and environmental concerns in operations and interactions with stakeholders (SGO, 2015). The principle of equity in the BUPs is applied in several contexts such as the distribution of resources, the organisation of competitions, the bidding process for hosting events, and the participation of athletes in competitions (Romon, 2011).
6. Athletes’ involvement, participation and care

The sport organization is responsible, in particular, for the participation of the athletes in competitions in close coordination with other organizations (IOC, 2016).

The sport organization should contribute to the creation of a safe environment for athletes, ensuring a safe and supportive environment for athletes to practice their sports in the best conditions.

It is recommended that such a safeguarding policy addresses the following:
- Specification of what constitutes harassment and abuse in sport;
- Reporting procedure in response to an alleged incident;
- Investigation procedures in response to an alleged incident;
- Mechanisms for decision-making.
7. Harmonious relations with governments while preserving autonomy

The autonomy of sport is often assimilated with broad concepts such as independence or freedom, or narrower ones such as self-government and self-determination (Thing and Ottesen, 2010) or self-regulation of the sporting world.
Final Comment

Please, let us know if you have any other comments or suggestions. We appreciate your time and all information provided will be kept confidential.

Comment

______________________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________________

Thank you for your answers!

The final report of this research will be presented at Seoul National University on the first week of December 2018. You will receive a preliminary report in Spanish, three months after all surveys have been answered.

If you need any more information about this project, please contact me at mauroh06@seoul.ac.kr or skype: mauroh02

For more information about the academic program you can visit http://dtm.snu.ac.kr ;
For more information about Good Governance in Sport visit: https://www.olympic.org/good-governance.
초 록

올림픽과 스포츠 무브먼트에서의 좋은 거버넌스의 기본 원칙:

콜롬비아 엘리트 스포츠 선수와 임원의 인식

마오리시오 헤르난데즈

서울대학교 대학원

체육교육과 글로벌스포츠매니지먼트 전공

스포츠에서 좋은 거버넌스는 국제 스포츠 매니지먼트의 큰 화제이다. 이와 관련한 문제들을 해결하기 위한 제도적 노력에도 불구하고, 스포츠 행정의 스캔들은 여전히 일어나고 있다. 스포츠에서 좋은 거버넌스의 개념은 민주적 가치와 협력 관리에 의해 다루어진다. 이 연구의 목적은 콜롬비아 엘리트 스포츠에 있어 올림픽 및 스포츠 무브먼트에 대한 선수들과 이사회의 행정가들의 좋은 거버넌스의 기본 원칙들의 효과성에 대한 인식을 비교하는 것이다. 표본은 62 명의 선수들과 30 명의 임원들로 구성되었다. 응답자들은 경영, 민주주의, 통합, 투명성, 결속, 선수들의 참여와 자치의 일곱 가지
원칙들을 포함한 온라인 설문조사를 완료하였다. 참여자들 간 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙에 대한 실행과 인식을 비교하기 위해 독립 표본 T 검정을 수행하였다. 전반적으로, 대부분의 참여자들은 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙에 대해 알지 못하였다(N=54, 83%). 임원 집단에서는 대부분이 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙에 대해 알고 있었던 반면(N=25 out of 29), 선수 집단에서는 대부분이 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙을 알지 못하였다(N=50 out of 62). 7 가지 원칙들에 대한 차이는 모두 유의하게 나타났다. 콜롬비아 엘리트 스포츠의 좋은 거버넌스의 원칙의 실행에 대한 인식은 선수들과 임원들 간에 통계적 차이가 있었다. 선수들은 그들의 대표성(M= 0.028)과 자치성(M= 0.188) 원칙을 제외한 모든 영역에서 음의 평균을 나타냈다. 임원들은 좋은 거버넌스 원칙의 적용에 대한 인식에서 전반적으로 선수들보다 나은 인식을 가지고 있었으며, 모든 영역에서 정의 평균값을 나타냈다. 좋은 거버넌스와 같은 정책의 실현은 다양한 접근방식을 요구한다. 만약 국가올림픽위원회(NOC)가 그들 스스로 국가 연맹과 함께 좋은 거버넌스 원칙의 실행을 원한다면 이에 관한 교육을 시작해야 할 것이다.

주요어: Good Governance, Sport Governance

학번: 20217-22045