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**Master's Thesis of Public Administration**

**The Factors Affecting Citizens' Engagement in  
Petty Corruption:**

**Focusing on the Relative Importance between Cultural Norms  
and Immediate Rewards in Kyrgyzstan**

**시민이 사소한 부패를 저지르는 요인에 대한  
분석:**

**키르기스스탄의 문화적 규범과 즉각적 보상의  
상대적 중요성을 중심으로**

**August 2019**

**Graduate School of Public Administration**

**Seoul National University**

**Global Public Administration Major**

**Ramazan Khilou**



**The Factors Affecting Citizens' Engagement in  
Petty Corruption:  
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and Immediate Rewards in Kyrgyzstan**

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# **ABSTRACT**

## **The Factors Affecting Citizens’ Engagement in Petty Corruption: Focusing on the Relative Importance between Cultural Norms and Immediate Rewards in Kyrgyzstan**

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This study examines the underestimated side of corruption research and analyzes the factors that influence ordinary citizens to participate in small-scale corruption with a focus on Kyrgyzstan. The purpose of this study was twofold. First, the relationship between cultural norms, immediate rewards and institutional factors with perceptions of corruption and petty corruption experience of citizens in Kyrgyzstan was considered. Second, which factor has a stronger relationship with petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan: cultural norms or immediate rewards? At the same time, the influence of institutional factors on corruption was also added and considered.

This research is meaningful because it expands the previous studies developed about corruption and compared the impact of different factors on petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan for the first time. Additionally, future researchers and policymakers can use this research for better understanding the causes of petty corruption from the side of ordinary citizens’ in Kyrgyzstan.

**Keywords: petty corruption, cultural norms, immediate rewards**

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# CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 gave sovereignty to five Central Asian states. Among them was Kyrgyzstan. Since independence, corruption has been a very serious problem and dangerous threat, not only for ordinary people, but also for the whole country. The source of the occurrence of corruption returned to the time when they became independent, since corruption ended up being a typical element for all Central Asian states (Kobonbaev, 2008). It disseminates in various ways: business, education, police and health care. Kyrgyzstan was immediately recognized for its democratic principles among all the Central Asian states (Baimyrzaeva, 2012).

As for the socio-economic and political conditions in Kyrgyzstan, it was a fundamental fact that corruption led to a tulip uprising in 2005, the old administration of Askar Akayev was overthrown, and another administration was ruled by Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Five years later, in April, the Bakiyev administration fell because of another uprising. The next president was Roza Otunbayeva. Another version of the Constitution was adopted, and the presidential type of government changed to parliamentary (OECD, 2013).

After that, the administration began to initiate a strategy aimed at changing governance in order to reduce the level of corruption; it did not bring tangible results (Baimyrzaeva, 2012). She explains that one of the principal explanations for this is the lack of enthusiasm for improving the conditions of political leadership. (Baimyrzaeva, 2012). Global donors sought to help reduce corruption through the privatization of real estate, rather than focusing on strengthening governance and population. Therefore, as a result, “donors paid for policy changes, not for policy implementation” (Baimyrzaeva, 2012).

Corruption in Kyrgyzstan has become huge. It has become one of the components of the functioning of the government, which is an integral part of human contacts and business. Moving on, this leads to huge imbalances in not

only the managerial structure and state institutions, yet in addition leads to significant changes in the human being perception of the principles of life, which lose confidence with the government of Kyrgyzstan and trust in justice. Kyrgyz citizens get used to the corruption method of tackling any issue. Ordinary citizens ceased to perceive it as harmful; rather they take it as usual day-to-day conduct. The young generation in Kyrgyzstan foresees to obtain a high position in the public sector to have entrance to state money that is the simplest route of individual enrichment and well-being. Unethical and unlawful measures give grounds for young generation, since the goal is to become quickly rich.

Data from several sources indicate a high prevalence of corruption in key government institutions where the police, education, health and judicial system invariably recognized as generally dishonest. For instance, as specified by results of the Life in Transition Survey managed in 2006-2010, unofficial instalment for receiving particular state amenities increased sharply from 2006-2010. Even more as of late, the Global Corruption Barometer in 2013 discovered that unofficial payment while getting to state amenities paid by 45 percent of respondents from Kyrgyzstan. Basic state amenities, for instance, health and education services distinguish by a top level of unofficial payment in both Life in Transition Survey and Global Corruption Barometer. The need for unofficial payment for the last three years were announced by 56% of businesspersons and 50% of the population in survey result issued by Economy Ministry of Kyrgyzstan in 2014.

Among the FSU countries, the topic of state corruption constantly arises. The population is convinced that corruption is wide, and everyone has stories that can be told either at their specific meetings or on receiving notification from others. They are disappointed in the light of the fact that little is being done about the circumstances and on the grounds that they feel powerless and consider themselves playable for fools (Karklins, 2005).

Albeit some petty corrupt acts can allow people to beat formality, corruption has high costs for society. Corruption involves spending for citizens, as assets redirected from payment of government products, for example, to security, social administrations, the maintenance of the fund, and fair tuition fees for civil servants. It was found that corruption reduces evaluation revenue and is strongly associated with a decline in the provision of civil services. A bad administration cuts people off. (Karklins, 2005)

To get a good or a service is the main interest of the bribe-givers at the lower level of government. From harmless gifts to officials (for example, chocolate or cigarettes) to significant cash payments that drain the budgets of the poorest citizens, there may be petty corruption. A robbery of one hundred thousand dollars has a terrible impact on the national financial system, but it will not always destroy the welfare of an ordinary family. In the preferred case, petty corruption is more at odds with people who care, because they do not have a way out of the vicious cycle of bribery. Small corruption most harms ordinary citizens.

Consequently, this thesis focused on petty corruption, not grand corruption. For example, it is possible to distinguish the forms of corruption by the difference in which they occurred. If this occurs as a daily link between civil servants and the population, it is petty corruption or if it occurs at a higher level of state, for example, grand corruption.

In the studies and practice of combating corruption, a civil service oriented approaches prevail, with moderately less consideration to corruption initiated by citizens. In this investigation, more consideration was on the role of corruption in daily relationships amongst population and the state. Therefore, the focus of the study was from the point of view of ordinary people who use gifts and bribes to influence the authorities and their decisions in everyday life. The society most outrageously treats corruption among the highest authorities and politicians, to a lesser extent, abuse by lower-level authorities and is easily

justified for petty corruption acts committed by themselves (Grodeland, Koshechkina, & Miller, 1998).

According to the North (1990), if the government is strong enough to protect citizens from corruption, there is no guarantee that the same government will not be utilized by the same state for corruption at the expense of citizens. In this way, a fruitful study in the corruption area requires a model in which responsiveness equally allocated amongst citizens and the government.

As indicated by the survey outcomes, 39% of respondents expressed that the state agent shows or requests an unofficial payment. Across the country, 33% of respondents expressed that the family member offers unofficial payment voluntarily, and 27% expressed that the sum and methods of payment known in advance, so it not talked.

Thus, corruption is one of the most hazardous occurrence for the country and transformed into a real threat to the country's national security. In addition, corruption is the essential barrier to the development of the state. Corruption humiliates population, particularly if this marvel lives within the framework of the young population of any state. For instance, corruption in colleges demolishes younger generation impression of right and wrong. Because the youth is the hope of any country, the major advantage, that promotes state forward to the development.

The primary motivation behind this examination was to distinguish the causes and factors influencing the populace engage in petty corruption. The underlying argument in the investigation was that, in the fight against corruption, most of them ignore the fact that bribery and corruption in general are a reciprocal process and that citizens can also play a decisive role in this process, and not just government employees. When bribery can be recognized that there is not only the demand side, but also the supply side, respectively. This is generally equivalent to the level between the level of demands for bribes and the level of offers for bribes. Which factor has a greater impact on petty

corruption: cultural norms or an immediate reward? A citizen-oriented approach was utilized in an attempt to get a clear picture of the nature of petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan.

The structure of the thesis is as follows: the introductory part is given below. The second chapter presents a theoretical framework covering scientific work on corruption and a discussion of the causes of corruption in general. The third chapter describes the questions and research methodology that used in the study. The fourth part of the study focused on the analysis and interpretation of research results. The fifth chapter discussed the issue of the consequences of research results, gave some practical recommendations and ends with the final part, which summarizes the main conclusions.

## **CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

When reviewing the literature, all previous works of prominent scientists in the field of corruption were taken into account in order to get a clear idea of the theories and evidence in this particular field. In addition, it was demonstrated how scholars from various educational institutions (such as economic, political, sociological sciences, etc.) were added to the differences in the influence of petty corruption. The necessary keywords and suggestions were received to continue future work.

A theoretical understanding of corruption will lead to an in-depth study of corruption. Other theoretical principles of bribery and petty corruption, understanding the factors that affect citizens engage in corruption, as well as which factor have a greater impact in the explanation of petty corruption: cultural norms or immediate rewards, will give a deeper knowledge of bribery and petty corruption.

### **2.1. The causes of corruption**

Basically everybody in this world has caught wind of corruption, and no less than 1.5 billion individuals have by and by experienced it in 2011 (International, 2011). Such a number as of now appears, to the point that corruption is a significant issue for some people around the world. However, not just has corruption suggestions for the influenced people yet additionally for the assurance of a general public in general (Svensson, 2005). However, not only has the consequences for corruption for affected individuals, but also for the morale of society as a whole (Svensson, 2005). Consequently, governments and the general society as a whole perceive corruption as a problem and, accordingly, exert the strongest effort in the fight against corruption.

Before proceeding on a review of literature, it is valuable to determine a meaning of corruption. The definition described in detail (Treisman, 2000), as it is regularly used in various scientific articles related to corruption as “Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain”. This definition is short, but it covers the essence of corruption according to the opinions of many researchers. Although the above definition is similar to simplifying an unpredictable subject, there is still no comprehensive consensus on the more accurate meaning of corruption from perspective of population. However, some researchers found deficiencies in this definition. According to Hodgson and Jiang (2007) the primary deficiency is that the focal point of corruption scholars, using the stated definition, on public sector, even as neglecting private sector. They displayed that presently commercial enterprises and different private actors participate in corruption as extensively as state bureaucracy. The second deficiency of corruption definition that Hodgson and Jiang note, is utilitarian treatment of corruption as always related to “private benefit”, even as neglecting ethical normative problems involved. The authors cited that guiltless lives saved through bribery and breaking the rule of law underneath totalitarian regime. As a result, authors has outlined corruption as “the breach and moral violation of established or ingrained social rules, with the effect of undermining their future efficacy” (Hodgson & Jiang, 2007). Typically, the notion of corruption does not make feel in reliable contexts and most of scholars agreed with that. For example, public interest remains non-existing in a patrimonial societies and Huntington (1968) defined it as “corruption is... a product of the distinction between public welfare and private interest which comes with modernization”.

Not only the definition of corruption is uncertain, the same applies to the causes of corruption in society. Studies show that at the macro-level there are three common factors that can be related to the level of corruption, namely institutional, economic and cultural (Bayley & Perito, 2011). In any case, the

greatest consideration of scientists and policy advisers has been given to institutional and economic approaches over the past decade (Pillay & Dorasamy, 2010). This applies to academic research and the creation and implementation of anti-corruption policies (O'Connor & Fischer, 2011). An example of this direction is the preference for the general anti-corruption policy applied in each country by institutions such as the World Bank (Campbell & Saha, 2013), which suggests that changing institutions will lead to a reduction in corruption and the use of economic theories, suggesting that corrupt officials are using rational and personal interests. Nevertheless, some manifestations of corruption have occurred in cultural studies. Different authors like (Husted, 1999; Kimbro, 2002a) and (Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007) directed similar examinations in which they presumed that there is a noteworthy connection between national culture and corruption. In addition, their conclusions are encouraging in terms of cultural characteristics, which explain why corruption varies in different countries. Unfortunately, in empirical work, it was impossible to consider the possible consequences of these cultural ties for the corruption that countries are using in the fight against corruption (Shah & Huther, 1999).

### **2.1.1. Institutional factors**

The first reason for corruption is the institutional factor. In the literature on corruption, this reason recognized as an important factor in corruption. Various viewpoints inside this factor emerge as fundamental variables of impact. The starting point was the nature of the judicial structure and the rule of law in the state. A firm judicial branch is much more ready to accuse and deny people or associations that file a corruption demonstration. Such a power shows a greater hindrance for corruption exchanges. In addition, a reasonable legislative framework and sufficient enforcement can remove opportunities for corrupt behavior (Banuri & Eckel, 2012). Besides, there is part of the political

framework. It can be argued that democracy should lead to a reduction in corruption due to greater transparency and accountability. But this happens only when democracy has existed for more than 40 years and to a lesser extent between 30 and 40 years (Morgan, 1998; Treisman, 2007). If democracy is more youthful, the impact is negligible or even negative as far as corruption. The latter perspective concerns the existence of the free press and the quality of society. In a well-working democracy system these establishments have the possibility and commitment to screen the public administration. This implies the chance on public exposure is considerably higher for corrupt civil servants, which makes it less alluring to submit a corrupt act (Brunetti and Weber 2003). The third and last factor contributing to corruption is the country's economic development. An investigation of the literature demonstrates that economic development and the apparent level of corruption in the state are associated (Huberts & Change, 1998; Kimbro, 2002a; Treisman, 2000). Nevertheless, it is difficult to find out which specific factors of economic development contribute to corruption. The first possible view is the spread and growth of salaries of government officials in the state (Banuri & Eckel, 2012). One could accept that the lower their salary, the more corrupt they are on the grounds that they need to expand their pay via corruption. In any case, there is an idea of this connection (Azfar, Lee, Swamy, & Science, 2001), which is vague and general inessential, which makes it an implausible reason. The second economic thing, which can determine the level of corruption, is the scale of competitiveness in the country's market. The proof suggests to that amount a market that is extra competitive through deregulation, developed market guidelines and laws is negatively associated within corruption. This is due to the fact that it reduces the number of government officials having power over the market, for instance, bribing shares of companies (Svensson, 2005).

### **2.1.2. Economic factors**

Studies of corruption are dominating by econometric literature. Because of the very idea of their field, economic scientists are keen on corruption practices with money related rents, so their exploration is vigorously centered around bribery. The literature on economic development contends that economically advanced states have a lower degree of corruption, since the evolution of the economy contributes to the growth of the quality of education and the ability to read and write. Thusly, it increases the likelihood of subjection to corruption acts and lessens the level of tolerance for corruption, and leads to depersonalized connections in economic resolutions that include not less than one side and equal rights for each of the representatives (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Treisman, 2000). Paldam (2002) found that corruption level and GDP per capita are negatively associated. Notwithstanding, for reasons of this there cannot be a causal connection amongst GDP per capita and corruption, says J. G. Lambsdorff (2002), since we cannot know if the state is poor for the reason of corruption or it is corrupted for the reason of poverty. Expecting that global commerce and investment will avoid markets with high level of corruption, Wei (2000) suggests that accessibility of domestic markets to global commerce is an indicator of the purity of the state and finds observed support for his proposal. He additionally tests and indicates a negative association of the connection amongst levels of foreign direct investment and levels of perceptions of corruption in one investigation. In light of the supposition that low-paid workers will try to expansion their earnings with unofficial rewards, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) tested connection amongst civil service wages and corruption levels and discovers a negative connection amongst variables. Rauch and Evans (2000) examined identical assumption, however they could not discover a solid connection. Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000), investigating the connection amongst the scale of the

shadow economy and corruption, argues that the major factor in the scale of shadow economic activity is not a levy scale, but corruption. Corruption through the main apparatus, such as the shadow economy, is in depth ingrained in community.

The aspect considered by Graf Lambsdorff (2005) and Jong-Sung and Khagram (2005) is a contradiction in the connection. They suggest a hypothesis that corruption affects the level of economic development and that there is no growth and sustainable economic development until the level of corruption decreases. Italy that have notable corruption are example of this contradiction, nevertheless in recent decades it has experienced economic development. Clarification for this contradiction put forward by Getz and Volkema (2001) is that Italy had noticeably rapid economic progress compared to the development of institutions. Hence, the nation got wealthier, yet the corruption level did not fall proportionately, while in nation that accomplished a more feasible financial development there was a decline of the rate of corruption.

This last contention shows that it is difficult to decide whether there is a causal connection between corruption and economic growth, or that it just appears a clear connection since corruption additionally has an impact on the economic evolution in a state. Anyway, a negative connection amongst corruption and economic growth anticipated, since almost all books indicate that countries with low economic growth have a tendency with high levels of corruption.

### **2.1.3. Cultural factors**

Compared with the other two factors, the least empirical studies were made on a cultural factor. In addition, much of the research on the relationship between culture and corruption was applied at the macro level (Hofstede, 2001; Hooker, 2009; Husted, 1999; Morgan, 1998). Despite the fact that it is hard to find out

the association amongst corruption and culture, have been discovered in recent decades, mainly through the use of a number of models of intercultural psychology. However, most publications on the relationship between culture and corruption take into account additional factors or have a field of research in a more specific area in the fight against corruption. One of the first authors to study the interrelation of culture and corruption was Hofstede with using his own model. (Hofstede, 2001). Other studies on this relationship using the Hofstede model in another context (Getz & Volkema, 2001; Tsakumis, Curatola, & Porcano, 2007). These studies were focused on the empirical determination and investigation of the relationship. Subsequent studies Tsakumis et al. (2007), which examined the relationship between tax evasion and culture and study of Cheung and Chan (2008), which examines the relationship between corruption and culture using the influence of education, also found significant relationships between culture and corruption.

The last practical illustration of the causal relationship between culture and corruption was an article of Fisman and Miguel (2007), which proves this connection, based on the fact that unpaid parking violations are much more accumulated by envoys from countries with high levels of corruption in New York under the influence of cultural norms from their home country.

In conclusion, there are many alleged causes of corruption, such as cultural, economic, and institutional. However, most of the literature does not indicate the causes of corruption on the part of citizens, and it addresses the general causes of corruption.

#### **2.1.4. The causes of citizens' engagement in corruption**

The theory of the structure of opportunities indicates the economic causes of citizens' participation in corruption, such as limited resources, economic backwardness and poverty. As for individual battles for limited resources, the

economic perspective indicates the predominance of the choice of specific participants based on an analysis of the costs and benefits of the structure of economic opportunities. The main problem is that actors choose corruption, because this is the most reliable way to obtain limited resources. One such hypothesis is the work of McMann (2014) "Corruption as a last resort". The author of this work speaks about the standard use of corruption by citizens for obtaining public goods in three post-Soviet states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Despite the fact that the author was thinking about the correct investigation of the interests of citizens, her consideration along with obvious merits has some unanswered questions. The McMann (2014) exam emphasizes the vital role that extended family ties and clans play in the lives of ordinary people in the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia. The predominance of nepotism, the association of social capital, enrollment in cadasters and other informal methods of overcoming social problems is an unmistakable analysis of the still traditionalist nature of these societies. None of the associations of informal communities, such as McMann (2014), can provide employment and loans needed for individuals. Accordingly, McMann (2014) distinguishes, perhaps, a useful way of further study.

Let's focus on the relationship between "basic needs", survival and corruption as the building blocks of McMann's work. As can be seen from her design, she used the theory of rational choice, but does not provide more information about the choice of variables. In particular, the theory of rational choice (Olson, 1965) argues that public goods can belong to different categories. They cannot be excluded if one person cannot prevent another from using the public good. For instance, safety and security on the streets or the ecological safety of water are not subject to an exclusion of public goods. Public goods can also be uncompetitive, that is, the consumption of this type of product by one person does not affect the speed with which it consumes others. For example, the consumption of streetlights or national defense by one citizen will

not reduce the amount of this resource available to the rest of the community. As a result, competition between people should be transformed into a discussion about survival, bribery and favoritism only in the case of excluded and / or competing public goods - for example, providing work, obtaining university admissions for a limited number of places, obtaining a procurement contract, securing a loan or loan from government programs. However, such non-exclusive public goods as obtaining licenses and certificates, medical or higher educational institutions, cannot invite civil competition, as the consumption of these services by one citizen does not reduce the availability of these services to other citizens. Given this, McMann's work will contribute to the difference between these aspects of public goods, which is important for the results of research and conclusions.

At the beginning of her work, she notes that the main focus of her research is "the basic needs [which] include employment, credit, money, food, clothing and housing" (McMann, 2014). Moreover, the provision of criteria by which the author chooses and determines the content of these "basic needs" will contribute to the explanatory power of the work. Nevertheless, one of the criteria that determine McMann's "basic needs" is their rivalry, and in some cases their exceptional characteristic goods from the state farm (McMann, 2014) is a cash loan from the local administration (McMann, 2014), which is more likely, offer competition among the population because of the limited nature of these goods and services. The authoritarian emphasis on such highly excluded and competing public goods as "money, credit and employment" (McMann, 2014) also affects its results. However, it was assumed that such non-excluded and uncompetitive public goods, such as medical care or higher education, are also part of "basic human needs". Examples of education and medicine are important, as studies show that the post-Soviet population paying bribes in these areas of "basic need" not because of a problem of survival, but for completely different reasons: students pay bribes for obtaining diplomas for

inefficient system of education (Sadigov, 2014), or patients offer unofficial payments to doctors as a token of gratitude. As a result, bribes are not necessarily limited to people's competition for resources and, ultimately, survival. Therefore, the inclusion of non-exclusive and non-competitive public goods in McMann's dependent variable list of "basic needs" can provide a greater balance for her research. Among the "basic needs" McMann says that at least hiring and money can be provided through retraining, training and other efforts to break out of the vicious circle of local corruption and lack of opportunities. In her studies, there is no evidence that highly qualified local residents in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have turned into retraining, improved agriculture or other production methods to access higher employment or more money, and therefore ultimately separated from the need to survive, using corruption. Thus, the McMann study will be useful to consider this variable, which is the third alternative to the two options set forth by the author: that the population must necessarily face a choice between survival or corruption. Central Asians, like citizens of other countries and regions, are not necessarily fatalistic puppets in bureaucratic hands.

Another important aspect of McMann's research is her emphasis on market reforms. Since Soviet institutions compared with post-Soviet ones, they guaranteed basic social needs, such as employment, and since the market project did not exist in the Soviet project, McMann states that during the "Soviet period ... bribes and connections were useful primarily for obtaining a higher quality goods and services ... In modern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan ... bribes, connections and promises of political support are useful for meeting basic needs, such as work, credit, money" (McMann, 2014). However, according to some sources (A. Ledeneva, 2003; A. V. Ledeneva, 1998), informal exchanges (including blat) played one of the central roles in obtaining all goods that were scarce, and this can be both high-quality goods and low-quality goods in the Soviet Union. The systemic difference between the Soviet and post-Soviet

societies in terms of corruption is monetization (the presence of something to buy). The absence of the very possibility of buying the necessary goods and services in the conditions of a deficit in the Soviet economy led to the appearance of the blat as a non-monetary exchange. In the post-Soviet period with its open borders there is no shortage of goods and services, but the problem of low purchasing power of the population. Thus, the inclusion of a deficit as an important element of the Soviet system would benefit McCann's work. Therefore, the conclusion that the provision of "basic needs" by the state should lead to lower competition among the population, and lower rates of corruption are not supported by previous Soviet periods in the region. However, in addition to the above-mentioned points, McMann's research provides important information about the daily struggle of Central Asian citizens who are faced with the need to obtain excluding and / or competing public goods. The author's recommendation to expand access to non-state sources of loans and income is also important in the light of our research, since it allows citizens to have a greater supply of opportunities not to participate in paying bribes.

A Taiwanese study by Chiu, Smith, Morlock, and Wissow (2007) showed the exercise of sick people providing unofficial payments to doctors for clinical services deeply entrenched in factors related to society and culture. Considering in what way unofficial remittances described by news media of Taiwan, they discovered that unofficial payments had been are usually depicted as suitable method to receive superior healthcare treatment. Representation of medical staff with money or so-called "red envelopes" was considered as a normal expression of thanks. The transfer of cash must occur separately, in that way, both sides can go on to regard as that the doctor assists to the sick people, based on his goodwill. The media justified this behavior, referring to traditional culture, and the difficulties with which doctors turned money. Falkingham (2004) in his study also refers to the tradition on access to healthcare system in

Tajikistan. In spite of the growing tendency towards official payments, presents or cash were still considered to be acts of gratitude.

Some economic theories point to poverty as the main reason for paying bribes by ordinary citizens (Kostadinova, 2012; Sindzingre, 2011). Using relatively small amounts of bribes, a bad population gets in exchange relatively large social benefits and welfare funds and, therefore, can live better. Thus, the population uses petty corruption to survive. Another example of corruption initiated by a citizen is the sale of votes (Alpaslan, Green, & Mitroff, 2008; Domínguez, 2014; You, 2015). The poor are exchanging votes for immediate payments, instead of thinking about the long-term political consequences of their sale of ballots. Greene argues that "poverty feeds on corruption, since it's hard for hungry people not to sell their votes for a bag of flour" (Alpaslan et al., 2008). Disproportion in the distribution of wealth undermines the social cohesion of societies and ultimately leads to corruption (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).

Bribing officials for bending rules. Corruption in daily meetings between officials and citizens usually involves bribing officials to violate rules and regulations. Surveys of households in post-communist countries show that payments to the police, especially the traffic police and medical services, account for about half of all bribe spending. Also often there are bribes related to the education system, especially its higher levels. Such a bribe is more or less an open social secret, but some cases are proven in court.

According to numerous researchers, it is understandable that a significant part of the definition of corruption is centered around civil servants. Most researchers argue that corruption and bribery is carried out by civil servants to receive benefits. However, the main purpose of this research was to determine which of the factors (economic or cultural) affect population to pay bribes (informal or unofficial payments) and which of those two factors were more important in explaining petty corruption. The main argument in this

investigation was that in the best approach to fighting corruption, as a rule, people tend to believe that corruption and bribery are a mutual procedure and that citizens can also take on the role in this process not only government officials. In bribery, it can be separately distinguished between the party of request and the party of delivery. This is usually equivalent to taking into account the level of demand for bribes and the level of offers for bribes.

Economic and cultural factors additionally have a role. A few members noticed that ordinary citizens make contribution to the issue by paying unofficial payments. The survey also noted the participation of ordinary citizens in supporting corruption because about 40% of the respondents showed that corruption is prevalent mainly by the population. Participants of the survey noted that Kyrgyz citizens need things done rapidly, so they pay influences for administration that is more proficient: "If we want to obtain a certificate from the government service, we prefer to pay a bribe and get it quickly, rather than wait and go through the procedures". Others noticed, "People are used to the system, this is a habit acquired from parents." It keeps alive the sequence over ages. Also other member indicated that "children witness corruption practices and do not learn in different ways", and in order to reduce corruption, "we need to start teaching good lessons to children" (Group, 2016).

## **2.2. The seriousness of petty corruption**

In the literature on corruption, the negative consequences of petty corruption are noted, which come as a crippling approach and significant weights for the middle class and poor people. Small payments to public officials that citizens provide in everyday government affairs are usually defined as petty corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). According to Amundsen, petty corruption is a small-scale corruption activity with a decrease in political or social level (Amundsen, 1999); petty corruption reveals frequent, small payments to low-

level civil servants; petty corruption is associated with small payments and the speed of money for low-level bureaucrats (J. Lambsdorff, 2007). Shah and Schacter (2004) added that small amounts of money per transaction could be defined as petty corruption, respectively. In addition, petty corruption cannot influence policy formation (Jain Arvind, 2008). In other words, the activity associated with frequent transactions and small amounts of money for a transaction and arising on every day of interaction of residents with state administrative institutions and usually taking the form of bribery can be defined as petty corruption. Petty corruption is devastating for society and is often found in two of the most common forms: bribery or nepotism. Petty corruption continues to correspond to the most common definition of corruption, because it is associated with abuse of office, personal gain and denial of public interest. One of the most widely known forms of corruption is bribery, involving at least two parties - payers of bribes and bribes takers. Bribes constitute the demand for corruption, and payers of bribes are part of corruption. Administrative corruption is the personal interaction of people and companies with government officials that arise when a bribe is paid. Administrative corruption can be petty, involving low-ranking officials and small bribes, in which bureaucrats provide illegal benefits to certain individuals and firms in exchange for bribes, profits and other benefits (Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000). Measuring corruption is a complex task, and data is not available for all types of corruption. Investigation of Staphenurst and Langseth (1997) affirmed it. For instance, colleges in Kyrgyzstan, where generally petty corruption happens through regular financial exchanges. Pupils pay unofficial payments to educators for evaluations and omissions, and educators receive them. In addition, corruption in advanced education is a noteworthy occurrence, because two sides gain benefits (Petrov & Temple, 2004).

Petty corruption from economic perspective happens when private players cooperate with civil servants, especially at bottom levels (Elliott,

1997). Karklins (2002) analyzes corruption activities, depending on the level of their harm to the population and implications from the political perspective. She argues that when people initiate an unofficial payment (for instance, for the road police officer), it is less important politically than when civil servants organize extortion from citizens. Nevertheless, Klitgaard (1988) suggested that, after a while, petty corruption, likewise be all the more politically forceful, because it influences more people all the time.

People hurt by petty corruption. Ordinary citizens, for the most part influenced by petty corruption. Despite the fact that a bribe at a low level is visited, it is gaining weight for poor people and middle classes. An unofficial payment of \$ 200 to obtain a driver's license is an aggravation for the average owner, but this is a real waste for the worker. For instance, in Nigeria, a driver is forced to pay illegal duties at a police checkpoint, and pensioners are encouraged to pay compensation for providing their benefits (Smith, 2007), which is a significant contribution to needy individuals. An organizational owner may be unhappy with unofficial payments; nevertheless, their contributions will not have long individual consequences. If there is a coincidence that an unofficial payment is necessary to receive crisis human services or to solve its problem, at that moment a person faces two decisions: to pay a win that can be a significant measure of money or deprivation of his well-being. Richer people can maintain strategic distance from this cycle, traveling abroad to receive medicines, but poor people cannot. Thus, the consequences to prosperity and financial results are more justified for poor people and even for the working class. Small corruption especially harms social orders, which must provide certain security networks to poor people. Funds that need to be improved through rehabilitation, educational and social administrations are stolen, making the poor difficult to pay for the administration, which must be sponsored. In conclusion, if most low-level officials request remuneration, the nature of organizations supported by

taxpayers is significantly reduced. Laws and controls are updated from time to time, as attention is paid to private development, not to well-established skills.

Putnam (1993) stated that petty corruption is usually terrible in Italy, because Italian government employees seem "legitimate, illiberal, elitist, hostile to the use and practice of pluralistic politics, mostly undemocratic". Russian administrators are described as intrigued, mainly in private improvement, although this is inconvenient, and the majority rule (Della Porta & Mény, 1997). Rose–Ackerman (2008) observes that a significant low level of corruption causes wastefulness and unclaimed for the distribution of benefits, weaker open projects, more formalities and lower state reliability.

In addition, petty corruption disproportionately leads to a lack of impartiality and fairness for the general public (Kurer, 2005), while hitting certain vulnerable classes is more difficult than others ("the poor" compared to the "rich") (Johnston, 2005). For example, in Burundi, a recent report found that 90% of business people are associated with unofficial payments, due to a common desire, that this is the best approach to obtaining licenses, reducing evaluation or retaining penalties (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2012a). In Uganda, payment and acceptance of unofficial payments is a way of life (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2010).

The Korean parent supported the provision of unofficial payments to a Korean teacher (big grades were extremely important to get into excellent colleges) due to the concern that if the influence was not given, the teacher would treat the child differently, unlike different students (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2012b).

According to Johnston (1998), petty corruption turns into a piece of inevitable disorder that keeps poor people poor. Broader petty corruption takes assets from the allocation of resources over a long period of individual and group evolution, which is likely to be spent on current needs, for example, on the payment of traffic police, teachers and doctors. Petty corruption in its trend

affects the more "poor" than the "rich" among the general public. More deprived classes do not additionally have data and associations to facilitate the bribe process. Small corruption incentives help to disappoint less favorable classes that can lead to a reduction in state assets. Thus, society suffers at an individual level, because petty corruption encourages people to earn at the subsistence level, rather than seek higher needs or desires. It can be explained that the seriousness of petty corruption such as: 1) The heavy financial burden for the poor and middle class; 2) The inability of the poor to have access to public services and safety nets; 3) Insufficient policy implementation.

The public danger of petty corruption lies in the fact that giving bribes permeates almost all spheres of life of the society - economic, political, social, legal, moral, spiritual. A particular danger is the penetration of this phenomenon into the spiritual and moral spheres, making it clear that everything is sold and bought in our country, and that giving a bribe is not a crime, but a kind of "norm of life".

### **2.3. Importance of cultural and economic factors in explaining petty corruption from citizens' side**

The idea of culture is an intricate subject as it is difficult to characterize which components can be shared among culture and which cannot. It was utilitarian to begin with a piece of a well-known definition by Hofstede (2001): "The essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived a selected) ideas and especially their attached values".

Particularly it is important to define "their values", because they determine and give a good reason for the functioning of social institutions and what their goals and methods are. In addition, people in society use these cultural values to select actions, assess people and explain or justify their actions and assessments

(Licht et al., 2007).

However, as a rule, there is no simple observation of the true culture of the country. As expressed before values are the center of culture. The cases of these values are discrepancies between rational and irrational or moral and immoral. After that, these values show themselves in viewpoints such as rituals, heroes and symbols and together frame the acts of society. Since, the outsider interprets these methods from his basic values, misinterpretations happen. Affected by globalization and the harmonization of cultural practices around the world a talk rose up if practice on the surface could affect the basic values of society.

Strangely, it can be said that at the moment the national culture is relatively impenetrable for change (Newman & Nollen, 1996). This means that measurements of cultural values are carried out only over the past 30 years. In at least the last 20 years, many explanations in the field of intercultural psychology have been published to measure the true values of society. One of the explanations that has often been used in a number of studies is the theory of Hofstede (2001), which serves as a basis for understanding differences in national culture. When Hofstede (2001) received all the data he then built on lists of questions that were divided into factors, six cultural dimensions that can describe the differences between national cultures.

Numerous researchers have successfully used this model to study culture and corruption. This study was carried out for many purposes. Tsakumis et al. (2007) completed an extensive statistical study of the relationship between cultural dimensions and tax avoidance. Réthi (2012) deliberately considered the relationship between culture and corruption with different cultural dimensions, including the Hofstede hypothesis. The study of (Kimbrow, 2002b) further concerned an experimental test for the analysis of factors influencing corruption, as well as Hofstede's estimates in his study. Finally, a study of (Newman & Nollen, 1996) examined the impact of culture on efficiency policies in

organizations. They also used the measurements of Hofstede to determine the culture for their studies.

Nevertheless, the model has drawbacks, and there are several arguments or warnings that need to be considered when the Hofstede model is used for such examination. Williamson (2002) and McSweeney (2002) give notices that can be divided into three categories. The first warning is the risk that scholars assume that all individuals of the nation have the same cultural characteristics, in other words, that the culture can be homogeneous.

The second cautioning originates from (McSweeney, 2002) that one can foresee the behavior of an individual entirely from its cultural origins. This was due to a common error in foreseeing human behavior based on cultural data. After all, there is a trap in order to perceive cultural dimensions too literally, and treat them as approximate measures, because a number of other social and physical factors also determine the behavior of members in the group. These cautioning words are useful when they draw conclusions from statistical studies.

Culture cooperates with corruption through official institutions and social standards that can contrast with each other over countries. For an administration that seeks to contain corruption, the goal is to develop formal institutions that can strengthen existing social standards. Official and unofficial rules may not coincide with each other. As a definition of this, Wade (1982) discovered that Indian residents described an unofficial payment as one where authorities requested an informal payment that was above the market level of unofficial payment, faced with formal decisions that limited fixes of any size. In different countries, for example, in the United States, any interest in influence will be seen as corrupt. Scientists identified four main components of randomization that strengthen commitment to casual contracts: reciprocity, hostage-taking, reputation, trust (Cramton & Dees, 1993; O'Brien, 1976; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). These social norms contribute not only to legitimate, but also to corrupt deals and was distinguished by culture. In order to show the link between belief

and corruption, other things being equal, communities with a higher scale of interpersonal belief must demonstrate a higher scale of "both corrupt and donative transfers" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). This is due to the fact that belief connection lessens the risk of revelation in corrupt deals. People from communities where dependence on unofficial agreements (which may or may not be corrupt) are usual, will most likely be associated (and participating) in unofficial agreements in the future. This points to a cultural transfer of corruption (Barr & Serra, 2010; Hauk & Saez-Marti, 2002): people from societies that are dominated by corruption deals are more likely to participate and anticipate the involvement of others in corruption. Thus, the norms of corruption are a certain type of social norms and give orders to what level people participate and anticipate that others will participate in corruption, in spite of establishments. Hypothetical work proposes that, additionally to the institutional past that influences economic productions (North, 1990), institutional past influences the incidence of corruption in community. For instance, Andvig and Moene (1990) and Tirole (1996) utilize the theoretical foundations of the game to demonstrate that corruption can be the result of a collaboration issue in an environment with various balances, and therefore history decides the success of the intervention. Contextual investigations in Bolivia and Venezuela indicated that institutional past can have solid implications for the appearance of corruption (Dininio & Orttung, 2005). Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) utilize a model with overlapping crops to indicate how esteems are transmitted between crops. They contend that endeavors to convert norms might be more fruitful than sanctions: policies aimed at raising children on the vices of corruption are likely to be much more successful than the costs of monitoring and penalizing.

Obviously, one way to bypass laws is to bribe civil servants. In corrupt states, authorities can simply obtain an unofficial payment to issue licenses, which potentially make easier entrepreneurial cases, and, specifically firms

passage into the formal market. Corruption can be viewed as expanding the "speed of money", which significantly lessens the unhurried queues in public institutions, for instance. The hypothesis of "grease the wheels" refers noticeably to the literature on the impacts of corruption (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965). Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) likewise suggested that corruption enhances effectiveness. Nye (1967) contends that corruption can be an approach to overcome prejudice against individuals of the minority, which in fact can stop entrepreneurs from gaining access to markets. This is due to the fact that ineffective rules represent an obstacle to investments that can be overcome by buying off civil servants. Méon and Sekkat (2005) sum up the arguments advanced in favor of the "grease the wheels" theory. To begin with, corruption can enhance the rapidity with which public officials issue permissions. Thus, bribes serve the capacity of offering stimulation to civil servants, by accelerating process (Leys, 1965; Lui, 1985). Méon and Sekkat refer to Huntington (1968), contending that corruption accelerates the construction of railways, utilities and industrial companies, which leads to higher development.

The poor functioning of bureaucracy is considered the most noticeable inefficiency that corruption can lubricate. Huntington (1968) said: "In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized, honest bureaucracy". Finally, Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) suggested that corruption can enhance the choice of the right decisions by officials. If bureaucrats do not have sufficient information or are not competent with respect to certain decisions, corruption can repeat the results of a competitive auction.

Less investigations about the civil society side of corruption: in a review of the literature on corruption, Olken and Pande (2012) alluded to "bureaucrats" or "bureaucracy" 46 times and "citizen" 5 times. However, it is feasible that

individuals assume a part in keeping alive corruption. Specifically, in the previous conceptual literature, it is noted that corruption can "grease the wheels" in conditions of humble bureaucracy quality: paying an unofficial payment can allow individuals to entrance state amenities more quickly than switching to rules and regulations in a swollen civil service (Leys, 1965; Lui, 1985). In short, individuals can give bribes because they enhance the productivity of their deals with the country.

Most scientists claim that bribery and corruption are owned by civil servants for benefits. However, it is necessary to understand the causes of corruption by citizens. We are going to study informal payments or what factors affect ordinary citizens in order to pay a bribe as a disregarded party of petty corruption. According to the Temple and Petrov from various forms of corruption, bribery is the "the most widespread form of corruption" in the post-Soviet countries (Petrov & Temple, 2004). Sadigov expressed that the start of different types of corruption, for instance embezzlement, nepotism/clientelism or extortion, to a great extent relies upon state authorities, but bribery can be started equally by officials and by ordinary citizens (Sadigov, 2016).

A citizen-oriented approach was used in an attempt to get a clear picture of the nature of petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan. The nature of bribe offers from citizens and the measurement of those factors that have a greater influence on the explanation of petty corruption: cultural norms or immediate rewards?

The main purpose of the work was how ordinary citizens are ready to support petty corruption in the country. Therefore, in order to effectively fight or curb corruption, policymakers should not focus exclusively on "bribery requirements", but also pay attention to "bribe proposals" (Sadigov, 2016).

# CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

## 3.1. Hypotheses

As literature review suggest there many causes of corruption, in particular causes of corruption from the side of citizens can be explained. In this research it was explained that the institutional factors from citizens' side are important, but economic and cultural factors are the most important in explaining petty corruption from the citizens' side in Kyrgyzstan, especially cultural norms and immediate rewards. In addition, it was compared which of above factors has stronger relationship and impact on petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan.

Research conducted by World Bank (2016) revealed that economic and cultural factors of corruption from side of the citizens have a role. A few members noticed that ordinary citizens make contribution to the issue by paying unofficial payments. Ordinary citizens are part in sustaining corruption was likewise noted in the overview comes about: 40% of respondents demonstrated that corruption was propagated for the most part by population. Participants of the focus group noted that Kyrgyz citizens need things done rapidly, so they pay influences for administration that is more proficient: "If we want to obtain a certificate from the government service, we prefer to pay a bribe and get it quickly, rather than wait and go through the procedures" (Bank, 2016). Therefore, the research question from this part was: What is the relationship between immediate rewards and citizens' engagement in petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan?

Other respondents in research by World Bank (2016) noticed, "People are used to the system, this is a habit acquired from parents." This sustains the cycle crosswise over ages. From this part the following research question was

compiled: “What is the relationship between cultural norms and citizens’ engagement in petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan?”.

In addition, the link between institutional factors and corruption was tested. First, corruption was divided into two models, one of which was a general perception of corruption, and petty corruption experience of citizens was the second model. Secondly, these two models were tested for a positive relationship with independent variables. The following hypotheses were:

***Hypothesis 1:*** There is a positive relationship between cultural norms and corruption in Kyrgyzstan;

***Hypothesis 2:*** There is a positive relationship between institutional factors and corruption in Kyrgyzstan;

***Hypothesis 3:*** There is a positive relationship between immediate rewards and corruption in Kyrgyzstan;

The most important part of the study, where it was compared, which of the factors has a greater impact on petty corruption. The research question was “Which factor has a stronger relationship with petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan: cultural norms or immediate rewards?”. In addition, an institutional factor was added. To analyze the greater effect/influence of the independent variables on dependent variables corruption was again divided into two models. As in above section, the perception of corruption was the first model and petty corruption experience of citizens the second. The influence of the following hypotheses was tested using standardized (Beta coefficients). These standardized (Beta coefficients) helped to compare the coefficients for cultural norms, immediate rewards and institutional factors, which were measured differently, putting everything in a common metric: standard deviation units (Allison, 1999).

The following hypotheses were measured influence of independent variables on perception of corruption and on petty corruption experience of citizens:

*Hypothesis 4:* Cultural norms have an important effect/influence on corruption in Kyrgyzstan;

*Hypothesis 5:* Institutional factors has an important effect/influence on corruption in Kyrgyzstan;

*Hypothesis 6:* Immediate rewards have an important effect/influence on corruption in Kyrgyzstan.

## **3.2. Methodology**

The goal of this paper was twofold. First, the relationship between cultural norms, immediate rewards and institutional factors with the perception of corruption and petty corruption experience of citizens in Kyrgyzstan was considered. Secondly, the most important thing was considered, which factor has a stronger relationship with petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan: cultural norms or immediate rewards? At the same time, the influence of institutional factors on corruption was also added and examined.

The quantitative survey method was used for the study because the researcher, in order to answer questions and receive information about corruption, must request them directly from the target population, as required by the study. One of the main prerequisites of the method is that the answers provided will accurately describe the characteristics of the population (Fowler, 2014). Numerical statistical testing required varying the variables and determining the relationship between them to prove or disprove hypotheses that cannot be provided by qualitative research methods (Salkind, 2008). A descriptive comparative study method was used. Zero intervention and non-manipulation as distinctive attributes when comparing groups.

### **3.2.1. Target population**

The respondents who participated in the study consisted of ordinary Kyrgyz citizens who live in the state. The questionnaire was conducted in Russian and English languages.

Letters referring to the survey questionnaire were sent by e-mail with a request to respond to the survey questionnaire, which consisted of 6 questions about cultural norms, 5 questions about immediate rewards, 2 questions about future intention to engage in petty corruption, 3 questions about anti-corruption factors and the remaining questions concerned the general perception of corruption and demography. Electronically designed survey was operated. Assent to participate electronically in the survey was on the first page of the survey. Therefore, if respondents were disagreeing to participate in the survey, they were automatically transferred to the end. Access of the participators to the electronically designed survey was via link that was dispatched in the e-mail letter. Anonymity of the participators' responses and personal information were guaranteed by the researcher. Survey questions were close-ended as portrayed by Babbie (2013) where the respondent was solicited to choose at least one from the given answers (Babbie, 2013). We selected closed-ended questions for the reason that "they provide a greater uniformity of responses and are more easily processed than open-ended ones" (Babbie, 2013). Each survey participant was allowed to answer questions through survey managed online and was accessible for almost two and half months.

### **3.2.2. Instruments**

Online survey questionnaire was composed of six small sections beginning with the questions about corruption perception, came behind by the cultural norms indicators, followed by the immediate rewards factors. After that, questions about the intention of citizens to participate in petty corruption were asked, accompanied by questions about the fight against corruption. Finally,

demographic questions were asked. As mentioned above, the completion of the online electronic survey was conducted using the Survey Monkey online platform.

To measure how culture affects the perception of corruption and the petty corruption experience of citizens, Hofstede's cultural dimensions were used. There are six different cultural aspects. However, this study used two of the six cultural aspects, in particular the "culture of masculinity" and the "culture of collectivism". It was assumed that these two measurements are most suitable for this study. Also other arguments are mainly based on a studies that was previously conducted on this issue. The masculinity culture is defined as where there are traits that are classified as men, such as strength, domination, self-confidence and selfishness. As Hofstede argued, the culture of masculinity makes great efforts to achieve a society that focuses on material success in an "unjust world" (Hofstede, 2001). Husted (1999) believes that in a country where the culture is more masculine, the level of corruption is higher. According to Hofstede, culture of collectivism is defined as a preference for cohesion in a society in which people can expect their relatives or members of a certain group to follow them in exchange for unquestionable loyalty. The position of society on this dimension is reflected in whether people's self-determination is defined in terms of "I" or "We" (Hofstede, 2001). As Husted (1999) argued, there is a link between collectivism culture and corruption. In particular, the concern of collectivist societies about a group – family circles, friends - can repeal written laws, especially if they conflict with more powerful group code. The main reason for choosing Hofstede's cultural dimensions was that the level of trust in the measurement of cultural diversity of his model was proven in different countries during past 30 years. Thus, cultural differences were still usefully predicted by the Hofstede model. To measure immediate rewards factors the reciprocity theory was used. Reciprocity involves exchanges between people in kind - responding to the actions of another with another equivalent action. It

was assumed that ordinary citizens are trying to bribe in exchange for something. Usually the exchanges of gifts or money are reciprocal.

Due to time limitations, quantitative research design and convenience sample method was used instead of random sample method which means that the research outcomes cannot be relevant to the rest of countries population. Also the regression model in this research provided an association between variables, not a causal relationship as assumed.

## **CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH FINDINGS**

The primary intention of this research was to test which of the factors cultural norms or immediate rewards has more impact on petty corruption. To find out this hypothesis we examined the relationships of cultural norms and immediate rewards with general perception of corruption and also with citizens' experience with low-level corruption. The outcomes of this research make available knowledge that will give an entire understanding of the causes why citizens participate in petty corruption.

The research also gives better comprehension of the factors which has greater influence on petty corruption from the side of ordinary citizens.

The target population for the research was consisted of ordinary citizens who was not public officials and reside in Kyrgyzstan

The survey questionnaire was made up of six sections beginning with general questions about corruption, came behind by the questions about cultural norms, immediate rewards, future intention to participate in petty corruption and lastly by the demographic questions. The survey questionnaire was electronic and finished utilizing Survey Monkey, an online survey instrument. Collection of the data was from July1, 2018 to September 20, 2018. At the end of data gathering, it was coded in Microsoft Excel and uploaded to SAS for examination.

### **4.1. Demographics of the Survey Participants**

According to the survey demographics the sample was composed of 275 participants; 62.22% (n=162) of the participants were females and the rest 37.78% (n=102) were male respondents. Compared to the demographics data provided by National Statistic Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (KGStatistics,

2009b) 51% from the total population are females which means that our sample was slightly over-represented by the females.

Age of the participants was divided into 5 categories, where 49.63% (n=134) were at the age above 40 years old, while the rest 50.37% (n=136) were at the age under 40 years' old. According to the World Factbook (Factbook, 2017) the median age of the Kyrgyzstan population is 26.5 years which implies that the survey sample to some degree over-represented by older people.

Concerning education level of the sample, more than half 74.07% (n=200) were holders of the middle or high school diplomas, and respondents who had Bachelor's or Master's degree were around 25.93% (n=70). In this case, survey sample matched with the data provided by National Statistic Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (KGStatistics, 2009a) about literacy of population where approximately 82% of the population had middle or high school education level.

Approximately 77.04% (n=208) of the survey participants live for the income less than 100 dollars per month, while the remaining part has an income above 100 dollars per month. In accord with 2017 data of Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States the minimum wage in Kyrgyzstan was 1060 Kyrgyzstan soms which equivalent approximately to 15 USD (CISStat, 2017). It is the lowest minimum wage among CIS countries (CISStat, 2017). In this sense, it can be concluded that survey sample matched to the data provided by Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Almost half (41.48%) of the respondents had selected the option "Other" which means that they work in other sector, not included in the survey. Participants who work in non-profit sector and private sector were about 32.96%. Unemployed participants of the survey were around 25.56%. Compared to the World Bank data (Bank, 2017) where unemployment rate for the 2017 year in Kyrgyzstan was 7.284% which implies that the survey sample was a little bit biased towards unemployed respondents.

<b>TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHY OF THE RESPONDENTS</b>		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent %</b>
Gender	Male	102	37.78%
	Female	168	62.22%
Age	18-20	18	6.67%
	20-30	53	19.63%
	30-40	65	24.07%
	40-50	45	16.67%
	Above 50	89	32.96%
Education	Middle school	134	49.63%
	High school	66	24.44%
	Bachelor	69	25.56%
	Master and plus	1	0.37%
Monthly income	Less than 100 USD	208	77.04%
	100-200 USD	36	13.33%
	200-300 USD	15	5.56%
	300-400 USD	5	1.85%
	Over 400 USD	6	2.22%
Occupation	Non-profit sector	5	1.85%
	Public sector	34	12.59%
	Private sector	50	18.52%
	Unemployed	69	25.56%
	Other	112	41.48%

## 4.2. Descriptive statistics for the survey

Responses frequency for each statement were checked on the first step of the data examination. Answers were different on a 5-point Likert-style scale varying between 1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree”. This step verified that our data was properly gathered by Survey Monkey and were correctly downloaded. SAS frequency function was utilized. The variables sample size, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum measures were determined by the descriptive statistics.

The mean of the variable “Help expecting rewards” was the lowest in the model and standard deviation also was very high which means that people's opinions differ about it and they think that it is not important. “Importance of legislation” had the highest average score and standard deviation is very small which implies that citizens' opinions are not that much different. This was very interesting because people indicated that “Importance of legislation” is very important. Regarding masculinity culture factor people in general agree that there is a masculinity culture but standard deviation was high, so citizens' opinions will be different regarding this factor, although the average score suggests that the level of masculinity culture is very high. Answers about “Collectivism culture”, “Importance of networking” and “Help expecting reciprocity” also demonstrated support towards those factors with high mean score and small standard deviations which implies that citizens agree with the importance of those indicators. Generally, survey participants' responses supported other factors as important with high average score, however, high scores of standard deviations meant that the opinions of the respondents are different.

**TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std Dev</b>	<b>Lower 95% CL for Mean</b>	<b>Upper 95% CL for Mean</b>
Collectivism culture	256	3.60	1.027	3.47	3.73
Collectivism culture 2	256	3.91	.845	3.81	4.01
Masculinity culture	256	3.86	1.243	3.71	4.01
Masculinity culture 2	256	3.98	1.079	3.84	4.11
Importance of networking	256	3.82	.926	3.71	3.93
Importance of legislation	256	4.25	.803	4.15	4.35
Actions expecting reciprocity	253	3.31	1.169	3.17	3.46
Compliments expecting reciprocity	253	3.33	1.095	3.20	3.47
Help expecting reciprocity	253	3.82	.935	3.71	3.94
Favors expecting reciprocity	253	3.69	1.018	3.56	3.82
Help expecting rewards	253	2.96	1.193	2.81	3.11
Willingness to give informal payments	253	3.57	1.198	3.42	3.72
Influenced willingness to give informal payments	253	3.58	1.217	3.43	3.73

Note: For measurement 5-point Likert-style scale was used

### 4.3. Corruption perception level

First of all, to determine the level of perception of corruption, respondents were asked a question about the degree of corruption in Kyrgyzstan. To measure the perception of corruption, the 5-point Likert-style scale was used in the range of 1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree”. The average response score of survey participants was very high, and a small standard deviation with a 95% confidence level showed that the level of corruption is very high. The percentage of respondents who answered that the level of corruption is high or very high is about 80%. According to Global Corruption Barometer Survey 2013 (International, 2013) it was found that 91% of the people said that corruption is a problem in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, if we compare the results of the survey and Global Corruption Barometer score across the countries it turns out that the level of corruption in Kyrgyzstan is very high.

**TABLE 3: STATISTICS FOR THE LEVEL OF PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION**

<b>The Level of Corruption Perception</b>					
<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std Dev</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Lower 95% CL for Mean</b>	<b>Upper 95% CL for Mean</b>
4.0872727	.7297271	1	5	4.0006434	4.1739020

### 4.4. Hypotheses tests

To clarify the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables, hypotheses were investigated. All hypotheses were tested using multiple regression analysis in SAS. Cultural norms, institutional factors, and

immediate rewards were independent variables. The general perception of corruption and the petty corruption experience of citizens were among the dependent variables.

#### **4.4.1. The results of Multiple Regression between Independent Variables and Corruption.**

In the first hypothesis, which refers to the fact that there is a positive relationship between cultural norms and corruption, two models were tested. The first model was citizens' perception of corruption, and the second model was petty corruption experience of citizens. Citizens' perception of corruption was statistically insignificant, which means that the factors of "cultural norms" do not have statistically significant coefficients for predicting citizens' perception of corruption. For the first model it can be concluded that there was no relationship between "cultural norms" and citizens' perception of corruption. Concerning the second model, where the relationship between "cultural norms" and petty corruption experience of citizens' were tested, it was found that there was a statistical significance ( $p$ -value = .0031) and 11% of the total variability in petty corruption experience of citizens' can be explained by "cultural norms" indicators. However, among all cultural norms indicators only "masculinity culture" indicated that it was statistically significant. It means that the model predicts that with each additional unit increase in "masculinity culture" petty corruption experience will increase, on average by .314 points. In other words, for the second model it can be concluded that a higher level of the "masculinity culture" strongly correlated with a higher petty corruption experience of citizens.

The second hypothesis concerned the relationship between the institutional factors and corruption. The institutional factor was represented by the variable "importance of legislation". As in the previous hypothesis, two models were

tested. The first model showed its statistical significance (p-value = .0155), which means that about 7% of the total variability in citizens' perception of corruption can be explained by institutional variables, and that the model predicted that with each additional unit increase in "importance of legislation" the corruption perception goes up, on average, by .15 units. The conclusion of the first model is that an increase in perceived level of "importance of legislation" strongly correlated with an increase in citizens' corruption perception. As for the second model, in which the relationship between the "importance of legislation" and petty corruption experience of citizens was tested, the institutional factor again showed its statistical significance (p-value = .0474), which means that 11% of the total variability in petty corruption experience of citizens can be explained by the institutional factor. This implies that with each additional unit increase in the "importance of legislation" petty corruption experience goes up, on average, by .20 points. It can be concluded that an increase in "importance of legislation" strongly associated with an increase in petty corruption experience of citizens.

Finally, the third hypothesis was the relationship between immediate rewards and corruption. Two models were again considered. However, both models of the third hypothesis were not statistically significant, which means that the "immediate rewards" variables did not have statistically significant coefficients to predict citizens' perception of corruption and petty corruption experience of citizens. It can be concluded that there was no connection between immediate rewards factors and corruption.

#### **4.4.2. The results of Multiple Regression on effect/influence of independent variables on corruption.**

Regarding the fourth hypothesis that refers to the fact that cultural norms have an important effect/influence on corruption in Kyrgyzstan case, and to

figure out this influence, the hypothesis was tested through standardized (Beta) coefficients. These standardized (Beta) coefficients helped to compare coefficients for cultural norms, institutional factors and immediate rewards that were measured in different ways by putting everything in a common metric: standard deviation units (Allison, 1999). Two models were measured. In the first model, “cultural norms” factors were not statistically significant with citizens’ perception of corruption, which means that “cultural norms” factors did not have any influence on perception of corruption and that “cultural norms” factors cannot explain much about perception of corruption in Kyrgyzstan case. Regarding the second model of the first hypothesis, when the fact that “cultural norms” had an important effect/influence on petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan was examined, it was found that the only statistically significant factor of cultural norms was specifically related to the “masculinity culture”. The outcome showed that 1 standard deviation increase in “masculinity culture” strongly correlated with an increase of .28609 in petty corruption. It can be concluded that cultural norms have little impact on petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan case, because of all the factors of “cultural norms” only one factor is significant, specifically related to the “culture of masculinity”, which means that cultural norms cannot explain much.

In the fifth hypothesis the effect/influence of the institutional factors on corruption was tested. The hypothesis testing was divided into two models. In the first model, it was found that the “importance of legislation” from the institutional factors is the only statistically significant indicator out of all independent variables and the result showed that for 1 standard deviation increase in “importance of legislation” there is a strong association with an increase of .17387 of standard deviations in “citizens’ perception of corruption”. The second model also showed its statistical significance and the outcome was that 1 standard deviation increase in “importance of legislation” strongly associated with an increase of .13829 standard deviations in petty corruption

experience of citizens. It can be concluded that institutional factors showed consistent statistical significance and numbers supported the hypothesis that institutional factor has an important effect/influence on petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan case.

Corruption was tested for the effect/influence of “immediate rewards” factors in the sixth hypothesis. However, the “immediate rewards” factors did not show statistical significance in the first hypothesis testing model, which means that the “immediate reward” factors have no effect on the overall perception of corruption. Finally, in the second model “Immediate rewards” indicators as in previous model, showed their statistical insignificance towards petty corruption which means that “immediate rewards” cannot explain much about petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan case. It can be concluded that the hypothesis was not confirmed.

In this sense, the conclusion is that general perception of corruption and petty corruption experience in Kyrgyzstan case can be explained more by institutional factors rather than cultural norms or immediate rewards factors as it was assumed by the hypotheses.

**TABLE 4: REGRESSIONS TO EXPLAIN PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION AND EXPERIENCE WITH PETTY CORRUPTION**

Independent variables	Perception of corruption		Experience with petty corruption	
	b (std. error)	Beta	b (std. error)	Beta
Collectivism culture	.023 (0.046)	.035	.098 (.077)	.087
Collectivism culture 2	.024 (.055)	.030	.077 (.092)	.055
Masculinity culture	-.034 (.055)	-.062	-.024 (.092)	-.026

Masculinity culture 2	.096 (.063)	.150	.314 (.104)	.286**
Importance of networking	-.021 (.051)	-.029	-.032 (0.086)	-.025
Importance of legislation	.148 (.060)	.173**	.201 (.101)	.138**
Actions expecting reciprocity	.057 (.043)	.098	.004 (.072)	.004
Compliments expecting reciprocity	-.03341 (.049)	-.053	-.031 (0.083)	-.029
Help expecting reciprocity	-.0002 (.051)	-.0003	-.013 (.086)	-.010
Favors expecting reciprocity	.032 (.047)	.047	.042 (.079)	.036
Help expecting rewards	-.051 (.045)	-.089	.050 (.076)	.052
Willingness to give informal payments	.028 (.056)	.049	.047 (.093)	.049
Influenced willingness to give informal payments	.062 (.055)	.112	-.033 (.092)	-.035
N	235		235	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.0642		.114	
F	2.23		3.32	
Significance	.0092		.0001	

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Note: Statistically significant: \*\*\* $p < .10$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*  $p < 0.01$ .

**TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TESTING AND RESULTS**

<b>Hypothesis</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	
	<b>Perception of corruption</b>	<b>Petty corruption experience</b>
Relationship between cultural norms and...	Not confirmed	Confirmed only “Masculinity culture” (p-value= .0031)
Relationship between importance of legislation and...	Confirmed (p-value= .0155)	Confirmed (p-value= .0474)
Relationship between immediate rewards and...	Not confirmed	Not confirmed
Relationship between future intention to engage in petty corruption and...	Not confirmed	Not confirmed
Cultural norms have an effect/influence on...	Not confirmed	Confirmed (Beta= .286)
Immediate rewards have an effect/influence on...	Not confirmed	Not confirmed
Institutional factor have an effect/influence on...	Confirmed (Beta= .173)	Confirmed (Beta= .138)

#### **4.5. Anti-corruption**

To find out the opinions of the survey participants on anti-corruption measures, several questions were asked. First, it was asked about their opinion

of whether weak punishment is the major cause of petty corruption. For the measurement, a 5-point Likert-style scale was used, which ranged from 1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree”. The mean score of the answers that survey participants’ provided was very high and standard deviation was low at 95% confidence level which means that opinions of the respondents are not too much different and practically all of them agree that weak punishment is the major cause of petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan.

Second, it was asked if they agree or disagree with the statement that strong punishment for participation in petty corruption will reduce the level of petty corruption. The average score of the responses was very high and standard deviation was low, which implies that people agree that strong punishment for participation in petty corruption will reduce the level of petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan.

The last question asked if they agree or disagree with the statement that ordinary citizens also deserve to be punished for paying informal payments to civil servants. The average score of the responses was high which means that people agree that ordinary citizens deserve to be punished for paying informal payments to civil servants in Kyrgyzstan, however, a high standard deviation implies that opinions of the people about this issue differs.

**TABLE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION RESPONSES**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std Dev</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Lower 95% CL for Mean</b>	<b>Upper 95% CL for Mean</b>
Weak punishment consequence	4.0118577	.8930162	1	5	3.9012875	4.1224279
Strong punishment effects	4.0632411	.9322020	1	5	3.9478191	4.1786631
Deserving for punishment	4.0434783	1.1313037	1	5	3.9034042	4.1835524

In order to understand who bears a responsibility for rampant corruption the respondents were asked next question: “How do you think who is responsible for corruption?”. The results were interesting because just 5.82% think that politicians are the only responsible for corruption, 1.82% think that about low-rank officials, being this lowest value. The results were higher for the high-rank officials (30.85%) and citizens (13.45%). Nevertheless, the answer that involves all of them as responsible got 48.36% which is the big majority. This might reflect the fact that corruption has the participation of all the actors and all of them hold the responsibility even if their actions or benefits differ among them.

**TABLE 7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRUPTION**

<b>Who is responsible for corruption</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent %</b>
Politicians	16	5.82
Low-rank officials	5	1.82
Citizens	37	13.45
High-rank officials	84	30.55
All	133	48.36

## **CHAPTER 5. IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

As earlier discussed in previous chapters, the level of corruption in Kyrgyzstan remains very high. Every new president and government try to solve this issue but without any visible results. Therefore, it seems that corruption penetrates deeper and deeper in all sectors of the state and spheres of life. The main purpose in this research was to find the roots or causes of citizens' engagement in petty corruption by comparing two different theories towards this issue. Hofstede cultural dimensions' theory and the reciprocity theory were selected as the most appropriate for this research. Those theories were chosen in order to find out which theory has a stronger influence or affection on the decisions of ordinary citizens to participate in low-level corruption and to try to find the most appropriate answer.

### **5.1. Implications**

The numbers did not support the first model of the first hypothesis and a positive relationship was not found between “cultural norms” and perception of corruption. This means that citizens' corruption perception cannot be explained by “cultural norms” factors and there is no relationship between them. Regarding the second model of the first hypothesis, it was statistically significant and the model indicated a positive relationship between cultural norms and petty corruption experience of citizens. However, not all cultural norms factors can explain changes in citizens' petty corruption experience. In this case “masculinity culture” showed that it can predict petty corruption experience of citizens', which means that a higher level of the “masculinity culture” is linked to a higher petty corruption experience. Each unit increase in “masculinity culture” is associated with an increase in experience with petty

corruption. It can also be concluded that if people have a higher masculine culture, this is due to the higher experience of citizens with petty corruption.

In the second hypothesis a positive relationship was found between institutional factors and corruption in both models. The most influential variable in the first model was “importance of legislation”, which implies that if the people strictly observe the laws, their perception of corruption will be higher due to their awareness. The second model was also supported by the numbers and showed that the institutional factors also can predict citizens’ petty corruption experience which means that if the people have a higher “importance of legislation” it is linked to an increase in petty corruption experience of citizens’. It can be concluded that an increase in “importance of legislation” strongly associated with an increase in citizens’ petty corruption experience overall perception of corruption. Each unit of increase in “importance of legislation” was associated with an increase in petty corruption experience and general perception of corruption which confirmed the second hypothesis.

Both models of the third hypothesis were statistically insignificant and there was no proof of a positive relationship between “immediate rewards” factors and corruption. This means that citizens’ perception of corruption and petty corruption experience of citizens’ cannot be explained and predicted by the immediate rewards factors. It can be concluded that the third hypothesis was not confirmed.

Finally, according to the results of multiple regression analysis the major implication is that the institutional factors such as “importance of legislation” is the most important issue in Kyrgyzstan case. “Masculinity culture” is important in explaining petty corruption experience of citizens’, however, it did not show any relation in explaining general perception of corruption, while “importance of legislation” was consistently significant in both models with citizens’ perception of corruption and petty corruption experience of citizens’. It means that perception of corruption and petty corruption experience of

citizens can be explained by the institutional factors rather than cultural or economic factors. Also the result of the influence measured in standard deviations showed that in the first model with institutional factors 1 standard deviation increase in “importance of legislation” is strongly associated with an increase of standard deviations in citizens’ perception of corruption and in the second model with institutional factors 1 standard deviation increase in “importance of legislation” is strongly associated with an increase of standard deviations in petty corruption experience of citizens’. It can be concluded that strict enforcement of the laws has more important effect/influence on corruption rather than cultural norms and immediate rewards factors. In this sense, the conclusion is that people think that the most serious problem in Kyrgyzstan case is that since the laws are not well enforced therefore there are prevalence of the corruption.

In this sense, the conclusion is that people believe that the most serious problem in Kyrgyzstan is that, since the laws are not respected, therefore corruption prevails.

## **5.2. Recommendations**

There are several recommendations that could be done to implement in the field after analyzing the outcomes of the research. First recommendation is that policymakers should take into consideration that ordinary citizens also can be a cause of petty corruption.

The second recommendation is that policymakers instead of increasing the cost of corruption need to focus more on strict enforcement of the laws because based on the results of the research findings the institutional factors is more important than other types of culture and other kinds of economic incentives.

The third recommendation is that policymakers should carefully analyze the things that weaken the strict enforcement of the laws to identify possible

solutions, considering that there was a direct relation with both perceptions of corruption and petty corruption experience of citizens’.

The fourth recommendation relates to the first hypothesis, which indicated statistical significance and confirmed a relationship between masculinity culture and petty corruption experience of citizens’. However, the “masculinity culture” was valid only to the petty corruption experience of citizens’ and changes in perception of corruption cannot be explained by the “masculinity culture”. Therefore, the recommendation is that policymakers should not increase the cost of corruption and focus on changing the culture.

Finally, the last recommendation is that since the research did not show any relationship and an effect/influence of “immediate rewards” and “cultural norms” indicators on citizens’ corruption perception and institutional factor confirmed that effect/influence, the recommendation is that policymakers at the time of designing new anti-corruption policies should take into consideration the fact that “importance of legislation” or strong enforcement of the laws have more effect/influence on corruption perception and not “immediate rewards” or “cultural norms” as it may seem.

### **5.3. Conclusion**

One of the main purposes of this research was to determine which of the factors has a stronger relationship with petty corruption in Kyrgyzstan: cultural norms or immediate rewards.

As a conclusion, surprisingly the results of the research shows that institutional factors such as “importance of legislation” are more influential than the obvious ones such as “immediate rewards” and “cultural norms”. This reflects the need for policymakers to go deeper and further in the research of the causes; only by this, they will be able to design effective policies that are not misled by conceptions that at first seem to be obvious or popular.

There should be an integral strategy from the government directed to all sectors, because instead of increasing the cost of corruption, policymakers should focus more on strict enforcement of the laws as indicated before.

Policymakers should take advantage of the fact that, in this case, citizens include themselves as part of the problem of corruption, recognizing that they are also responsible for petty corruption. Usually citizens only blame the ones in power, but this case opens an opportunity to work with the people.

It could also be assumed that policies will be successful if they are diffused and implemented together with the citizens because if they accept their participation in the problem, they might accept their participation in the solution. It is important that policies, strategies, campaigns and decisions are well informed to all the population counting on their active support. Citizens participation is an interesting component because they are not outsiders anymore. This kind of study is very useful because it includes a wide variety of variables because this is the only way it can provide a complete view of the problem.

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# APPENDIX

## Survey Questionnaire

Survey on Attitudes of Corruption

Thank you for your contribution!

Hello,

My name is Ramazan, and I am a researcher from Seoul National University.

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey!

Your participation is anonymous and voluntary. The information you give will be kept confidentially and utilized only for research purposes. The survey should take about 5-10 minutes to complete and will be in Russian and English language. By continuing to the next page, you indicate that you have read this page and consent to participate.

The purpose of this survey is to investigate what factors affect ordinary citizens' engagement in corruption so that I can contribute to the existing literature about corruption. Filling out this survey will not help you directly, but maybe it will help to researchers and policy makers to better understand one of the causes of existing corruption in our country. Your honest responds will be highly appreciated.

If you have any questions about the research, please do not hesitate and contact me at

Thanks again!

Please tick (  $\checkmark$  ) or cross ( X ) to indicate your responses on the followings questions and statements.

Question	Very low	Low	Moderate	High	Very high
Q1. How do you see the level of corruption in Kyrgyzstan?					

Question	Never	A few times	Sometimes	Often	Always
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Q2. In your opinion, how often, if ever did your family members, friends, relatives have to pay an informal payment, give a gift, or do a favor to civil servants in order to get certain essential government services you needed from this services? (For example traffic police, education, healthcare)					
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Question	They were asked to pay	They were not asked to pay but they knew that an informal payment was expected	They offered to pay, to get things done quicker or better	They were not asked to pay but they wanted to express their gratitude
Q3. In your opinion, why did they make an informal payment for services they should have received for free? (Please rank your choice from 1 to 4)				

Question	Politicians	Low-rank officials	Citizens	High-rank officials	All
Q4. How do you think who is responsible for corruption in Kyrgyzstan?					

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?					

Q5. Group welfare is more important than individual rewards					
Q6. Being accepted by the members of your workgroup is very important					
Q7. It is more important for men to have a professional career than it is for women					
Q8. Solving difficult problems usually requires an active, forcible approach, which is typical of men					
Q9. It is important to have personal contacts, social ties and/or relationships to get things done					
Q10. It is important to strictly observe laws					

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?					
Q11. To help somebody is the best policy to be certain that s/he will help you in the future, even despite the price paid for it					
Q12. When I pay someone compliments, I expect that s/he in turn will answer the same, in spite of anything					
Q13. If someone is helpful with me at work, I am pleased to					

help him/her, despite costs I bear					
Q14. When someone does me a favor, I feel committed to repay him/her, no matter what the costs					
Q15. I expect some kind of reward if I help someone					

Question	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree
Q16. In your opinion, will you give an informal payment to certain essential government services to quickly get things done? (For example traffic police, education, healthcare)				
Q17. In your opinion, will you give an informal payment to get certain essential government services because everybody gives it? (For example traffic police, education, healthcare)				

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?					
Q18. Weak punishment is the major cause of petty corruption					
Q19. Strong punishment for participation in petty corruption will reduce the level of petty corruption					
Q20. Ordinary citizens deserve to be punished for paying					

informal payments to civil servants					
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These are background questions.

Gender	Male	Female

Age	18-20 years	20-30 years	30-40 years	40-50 years	50 years and above

Education	Middle School	High school	Bachelor	Master and plus

Monthly income	Less than 100 USD	100-200 USD	200-300 USD	300-400 USD	Over 400 USD

Occupation	Non- profit sector	Public sector	Private sector	Unemployed	Other

Thank you very much for your time and completing this survey!

## 국문초록

# 시민이 사소한 부패를 저지르는 요인에 대한 분석:

## 키르기스스탄의 문화적 규범과 즉각적 보상의 상대적 중요성을 중심으로

Ramazan Khilou

서울대학교 행정대학원

글로벌행정전공

본 연구는 기존의 부패 연구에서 과소평가된 일반시민의 소규모 부패에 영향을 미치는 요인에 대해 키르기스스탄을 중심으로 분석한다. 본 연구의 목적은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 문화적 규범, 즉각적 보상과 제도적 요인의 관계를 시민의 부패에 대한 인식과 사소한 부패에 대한 경험을 고려하여 분석한다. 둘째, 문화적 규범과 즉각적 보상 중 어느 요인이 키르기스스탄의 사소한 부패와 더 깊은 연관성이 있는지 살펴본다. 또 제도적 요인이 부패에 어떤 연관성이 있는지를 추가적으로 고찰한다.

본 논문은 부패에 대한 기존의 연구를 확장하고, 처음으로 키르기스스탄에 도입하여 사소한 부패에 영향을 미치는 요인들을 비교한다는 점에 의의가 있다. 또 향후 학자들과 정책가들이 키르기스스탄의 일반시민에게 나타나는 사소한 부패의 원인에 대해 심층적으로 이해할 수 있는 바탕이 될 것이다.

주제어: 사소한 부패, 문화적 규범, 즉각적 보상

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