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국제학석사 학위논문

A Comparison of the Right Wing
Populist Performance between the
2014 and 2019 European
Parliament Elections

2014년과 2019년 유럽의회선거의 극우
포퓰리스트의 성과 비교

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Abstract

This research aims to analyze what caused the change in the performance of the far right populist parties between the 2014 and the 2019 European Parliament Elections. The far right populist parties noticeably gained significant support during the 2014 European Parliament Elections. The increase in support is said to be due to the increased legislative role of the European Parliament and the second-order nature of the elections. Media analysis has been used to pinpoint the main issue of the far right populist parties. However, there has been debate on which issues are the most prominent and influential during the EP elections.

As previous research suggests, this research assumes that the immigration discourse published in the local newspaper causes the change in the performance of far right populist. Therefore, if the amount of immigration discourse increases, the support for the PRR should also increase. This research will attempt to answer the question by comparing the immigration discourse in five different cases during the 2014 and 2019 EP elections. The Cases are the Freedom Party of Austria (Austria), the Front National/ the National Rally (France), the 5 Star Movement (Italy), the Swedish Democrats (Sweden), and the Alternative for Germany (Germany). The amount of articles published and the context of the articles are analyzed in order to determine the role of immigration discourse during the 2014 and

2019 EP elections.

The quantity of immigration discourse in local newspapers were found to affect the performance of the AfD, SD and the FN/RN. However, it did not hold true for the FPÖ and the M5S. In order figure out what caused the change in performance, the control variable, Eurosceptic issues along with other factors were analyzed. It was found that the combination of the context and quantity of the issues and party competition on immigration policy led to the decrease in performance of the far right populist party.

The in depth analysis

Currently, media analysis on the PRR performance during the EP elections focus on a single election or there is limited data as many cases are not observed. Therefore, this research hopes to add onto existing research through comparative analysis of two European Parliament elections and to enlarge the scope of case countries. As the 2019 Elections is very recent, this research will also contribute to the study of the performance of the PRR during the most recent EP election.

Keyword: European Parliament elections; populist radical right party; immigration; media analysis

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List of Abbreviations

EP: European Parliament

PRR: Populist Radical Right

AfD: *Alternative für Deutschland*, Alternative for Germany

FPO: *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, Freedom Party of Austria

FN/RN: *Front national/ Rassemblement national*, National Front/ National

Rally

M5S: *Movimento 5 Stelle*, 5 Star Movement

SD: *Sverigedemokraterna*, Swedish Democrats

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Study Background

The nature of the European Parliament elections has undergone change along with the changes made over time in the European Parliament. The legislative role, power and interest of the European Parliament increased in 2009 with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. In 2014 the role and importance of the EP was further increased with the introduction of the ‘Spitzenkandidaten.’ For the first time ever, the different parties in the parliament could elect the president of the European Commission. The party which won the majority of the votes during the election would be able to send their representative (Spitzenkandidat) to be the president. As the European Parliament is the only European institution that is directly elected by the citizens, the increase in the role and power of the EP increased the interest the citizens (Heidi 2016). Following this pattern, the far right populist parties started to make an appearance during the 2009 EP elections and started to gain prominence during the 2014 EP elections (Hong 2017).

Far right populism is not thriving only in the European level, but has been thriving in the national level for a long time. As the history of far right

populism is long, the study of the party has existed for a long time as well. Currently, there is no one definition of far right populism. However, the core ideology is said to be a mixture of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. The phrase “for the nation, against the elite,” helps explain the core ideology as the party aims to protect the people and the national identity and culture which is under attack by the government and outsiders. (Joe 2017) It is widely accepted that in order to accomplish their goals, the far right populist parties utilize political policies in fields such as economic, anti-EU and immigration.

As the study of the far right populist parties is extensive, many studies have been done on the national level and on the European level. The actions of both voters and parties have been analyzed in order to understand the party better. Many studies have focused on voter behavior, however, there has been a rise in the study of party behavior such as campaigns. The content and locations of poster, radio programs, television advertisement and debate and newspaper advertisement and content have been analyzed. With time, it became evident that media was an important source for the behavior of voters which in turn, affected the vote shares of the far right populist parties (Hooghe *et al.* 2007). This resulted in the analyzation of political discourse through media study.

Through the analysis of media, it was widely agreed that not only voter behavior but party behavior also played a crucial role in the support

for the far right Populist Party. Within party behavior, policies were found to especially influential. In the case of far right populist parties, economic policies, immigration policies and Eurosceptic policies were thought to be the main issues that lead to the electoral success of the parties. Research has been continued in order to determine the most influential subject to the campaign of the far right populist parties (Hong 2017).

1.2. Purpose of Research

It has been widely argued that the actions and campaigns of the far right populist parties causes alterations to occur in the major parties and the government. This change occurs as other parties try to protect their own votes or to prevent the far right populist parties from gaining more support. It is generally agreed that parties change their campaigns in order to protect their own interest which is thought to change the overall discourse in the political arena (Lochocki 2018). Therefore, it can be said that the study of the performance of far right populist parties is crucial.

The aim of this research is to analyze the performance of the far right populist parties during the 2014 and the 2019 European Parliament elections. This research hopes to add onto existing research by offering an explanation or the role of immigration discourse in newspapers on the performance of far right populist parties. Although it is widely accepted that

economic policies, immigration policies and Eurosceptic policies all affect the electoral success of the far right populist parties, this paper will focus on the immigration issue and attempt to prove that the immigration issue is the main factor. Through the analysis of the media, this research hopes to add onto the study by arguing that the immigration issue is the most influential factor of the electoral success of far right populist groups. Therefore, the changes in immigration discourse will affect the support of the aforementioned party.

This qualitative study will compare the changes in the immigration discourse of five far right populist parties between the 2014 and the 2019 elections. The five parties were chosen based on the location proximity and the prominence of the nation state in the EU institutions. Through newspaper articles published during the elections, this study will attempt to analyze the difference between the two time periods and between the 5 cases. Not only will the amount of articles published be evaluated but the context of the articles will be studied as well. The five parties are as follows: The Freedom Party of Austria (Austria), the Front National/ the National Rally (France), the 5 Star Movement (Italy), the Swedish Democrats (Sweden), and the Alternative for Germany (Germany). It is important to note that in order to complete the contextual analysis, the newspaper articles were translated using an online translator. Therefore, it is possible for errors to exist in the contextual analysis.

This research will start off by reviewing the existing literature on the definition and nature of far right populist parties and on the electoral success of such parties in the European level. The research design and methodology will be briefly mentioned which will be followed by the qualitative analysis of the five parties. Lastly, in order to deeply understand the role of immigration discourse, an in-depth analysis will be performed on just the Freedom Party of Austria and the Alternative for Germany.

Chapter 2. Definition and Nature of Far Right

Populism

The study of far right populist parties is not new as the first wave of the studies is argued to have started in 1945 after the end of the Second World War. Starting from the Cold War, many scholars became interested in the topic due to the rapid growth of the far right populist parties. Although the study is longstanding, there is yet to be a consensus on a single, formal definition of the term 'far right'(Mudde 2017.) The term 'far right' is not consistent as the term differs among different scholars. The term varies as the parties also refuse to be coined as a far right populist parties due to the negative connotations.

This paper follows Cas Mudde's definition of far right populism as it is widely accepted. This section will first cover the different definition of far right populism and attempt to present the definition and terminology the rest of this research will follow. Next, this section will examine the unique nature of the party that sets it apart from other major political parties

2.1. Terminology and Definition of Far Right Populism

The far right populist parties itself is unique in that the party does not accept itself as a far right populist due to the negative connotation and due to the fact that it identifies itself as a party that falls in neither the traditional left or right (Rydgren 2018). It is also argued that the different terms and definitions stem from the long history of far right populism. When first introduced, the party was widely known as the 'far right' however with time and the change in the political environment, the names altered into terms such as 'extreme right,' 'radical right,' 'fascist' and 'neo-Nazi' (Eatwell 2000). The combination of the prior and latter are just some reasons why the different terminologies and definitions exists. Adding onto the historical reasoning for the diversity, some scholars have tried to define the far right populist by differentiating it from the new and from the old.

Old populists and new populists are also known as 'neo-fascism' and 'new populism.' This rhetoric argues that the current existing parties differ from the parties in the past in that there is very little fascist ideology. During the Cold War era, many of the leaders were from fascist groups. However, with the change of the socio-economic environment, the new far right populist group emerged. (Taggart 1995). However, this argument is not widely accepted as it is deemed out of date and because studies cannot be generalized through different far right populist parties (Carter 2005).

Another definition is to call the party a racist party but this is overgeneralized (Prowe 1994).

Mudde creates two subgroups called the 'extreme right' and the 'radical right.' The extreme right is classified to be 'blood racist' and reject democracy. The radical right on the other hand, accepts sovereignty and majority rule, therefore accepting democracy. According to the radical right, anyone who learns the culture and language can become a citizen so they are not blood racist (Mudde 2009). Therefore, this research will utilize the term 'far right populism,' 'far right,' 'radical right' and 'populist radical right (PRR)' and avoid the term 'extreme' right.

Although the definition varies, Far Right Populist Parties are broadly accepted to be anti-elite parties that advocate the protection of national identity and culture. The slogan "for the nation, against the elite" therefore, describes the general political standing and the beliefs of the party. The nation refers to the native people as well as the national identity and national culture. This is said to be under attack by 'the elite' which is mostly associated with the government but also at times, envelops the outsiders (Joe 2017, Mudde 1999). The outsiders are blamed to have brought on the social changes that threatens the existing national identity and culture. The government is thought to also add onto the threat by creating and enforcing 'liberal' policies such as pro-migration and pro-integration (Lochocki 2018). Along with this definition, the definition set by Cas Mudde and Bonnie

Meguid are widely accepted. This is based on the general understanding that the far right is a type of ideology that has a certain type of political style, strategy and a support base (Mudde 2017, Meguid 2010).

Mudde offers a set of 5 core ideological features of radical right parties which are anti-Semitism, welfare chauvinism, nativism, authoritarianism and populism. However, of the five, he states that all radical right parties “share a core ideology that combines (at least) three features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.” Nativism is defined to be a mixture of nationalism and xenophobia, authoritarianism is the following of strictly ordered and law abiding society and populism describes the split between the ‘corrupt’ elite and the ‘pure people.’ (Mudde 2009). Carter adds on to Mudde by offering a scale of each feature.

Nativism includes xenophobia and as a result, the racist agenda of the party is questioned. According to Carter, parties could have a ‘classical racist, ‘culturalist’ or no racist agenda at all. The first agenda states that the difference between people are based on race. In other words, only those with the ethnic blood of the country can be considered as the true citizens. Culturalists however, emphasizes the differences being based on culture rather than race. Therefore, multiculturalism is rejected as it endangers the national identity and culture. Although multiculturalism is rejected, one can become a member of society if they adopt the culture and identity by learning the language or abandoning their former nationality. In

the case of authoritarianism and populism, Carter states that there are groups that want to reject the current system and want to replace it but there are other groups that just want to reform the system. The group that wants to reform the system are against the systemness of the government and want to strengthen the executive branch of the government instead of evenly distributing power among the parliament (Carter 2013).

This research follows the terminology and the definition by Cas Mudde and Elisabeth Carter. The parties that will be examined do not completely reject democracy, as a result, the term 'extreme' will not be used to describe the parties. The parties also show a characteristic of culturalism as they are against outsiders as they see them as a threat to their national identity and culture rather than a threat to the race. Through the media analysis it is evident that the parties want to reform the system (European Parliament) rather than to reject it simply and want to strengthen the sovereignty of the nation. As the terminology and definition of the PRR is established, it is crucial to understand the nature of the party and how it differs from the major parties.

2.2. Nature of Far Right Populism

The Populist Radical Right parties, unlike the major parties, are classified as a niche party. As its name suggests, the niche party refers to a

variety of smaller parties. They differ from major parties in size, characteristics and age (how long ago it was founded). The niche parties are smaller and relatively new compared to the mainstream parties (Wagner 2011). Bonnie Meguid defines niche parties into 3 characteristics. The first is that niche parties reject class based orientation. Traditional class-based orientation refers to economic demands. Instead of focusing on economic issues, these parties campaign on issues that are traditionally not covered by the mainstream parties. Second, the issues advocated by the niche parties fall into neither the left nor right cleavage. Therefore, these parties are able to gather support from voters that do not identify as the political left or political right. The third characteristic is that niche parties restrict themselves to one issue. Even if more policies are adopted in the future, niche parties will be well known for their single issue. Therefore, the importance and the attractiveness of the issue determines the voter support (Meguid 2010).

The attractiveness and single issue rhetoric is widely accepted as a major characteristic of a far right populist party. The single issue the PRR adopts is widely debated on but the immigration issue is thought to be the main issue (Meguid 2010, Hong 2017, Lochocki 2018). As a single issue party, the PRR advocates anti-immigration policies in order to gain votes from the public. Traditionally, these issues are not covered by the mainstream parties, and this absence allows the far right populist parties to

become the ‘owner’ of the issue. This is argued to prevent other parties from gaining support from adopting the same stance as voters will vote for the original party (Meguid 2010). However, this is also heavily debated on and the argument will be discussed in depth later on in the research.

The salience of the immigration issue is crucial in maintaining the electoral support of the PRR. The rise in immigration rate is said to be one of the factors that maintains the importance of the immigration issue. The 2015 migration crisis is an example that aided the immigration discourse. During this time there was a sudden increase of refugees and immigrants in the EU member states. The PRR parties used this event to blame the elite (the government) for allowing the crisis to occur and used fear tactics to warn the disappearance of national identity and national culture due to the influx of migrants (Dostal 2017, Lochocki 2018). Therefore, the socio-political context can be said to affect the salience of the immigration issue.

Following the existing research, this paper defines far right populist parties as a single-issue, anti-elitist party. Single issue does not mean that the party only advocates one issue but that the party is widely known for the one issue, in this case, immigration. Although the PRR does call for the protection of the people from the elite and outsiders, it does not call for the complete eradication of foreigners or the current government.

Chapter 3. Electoral Support of Political Parties

In order to understand the changes in the performance of far right populist parties, it is crucial to recognize the factors of electoral support of political parties. This chapter will go over the current literature on electoral success. In order to fully understand the support for the PRR, first the factors for success of major mainstream parties will be analyzed. Then the section will move onto cover the factors for far right populist parties. As national elections differ from European parliament elections, the final section will go over the literature on how parties succeed in the European level.

3.1. Electoral Support for Major Parties

To understand the factors and models that affect electoral success, the motives of the actors must be observed. The actors of political elections can be said to be the voters and the candidates and parties. The motives and the roles of the actors can be understood through the demand and supply of elections. The demand refers to the demand of the voters and the supply refers to what the candidates and the parties offer to the voters. It was

widely accepted that the electoral success of a party was based on the ideological identity and the permanent party membership of the voters (Van Kessel 2013). In other words, the attitude and the opinion of the voters were crucial as they set the demands that the candidates should fulfill. Further studies later proved that the supply of the candidates also played a crucial role in the electoral success.

The supply side focuses on the success by individual candidates. Two factors are said to determine the success of the individual candidates. The first is the political capital and the second factor is individual motivation. Political capital are the resources such as financial assets, experience, education, profession, gender and age of the candidate. Candidates that have a stronger financial backing and previous experience in government positions are more likely to experience greater support. Individual motivation refers to the psychological motives of the candidates and the institutional context (Van Kessel 2013). In order to understand the electoral support of major parties both the attitude of the voters and the candidates must be taken into consideration. The following models and theories are a mixture of both the supply and demand of elections.

The Downsian Proximity Spatial Model is just one of many factors of electoral success that is widely agreed upon. The model touches upon

voter behavior as it argues that the electorate will vote for a candidate or a party that advocates the most similar ideologies as their own.

“In spatial modeling we focus on how issue positions of both voters and candidates (or parties) are translated into voter preferences and candidate strategy. In any spatial model of electoral competition, both voters and candidates are located at ideal points in a multidimensional space, each dimension of which represents a certain issue.” (Merrill and Grofman 1999 p. 4).

This model creates a link between the electorate and the candidate. The issue mentioned above can be on any issue that is relevant in the electoral arena. A popular example would be welfare issues. The issue could range in scale from the government should provide welfare for all citizens to welfare should only be provided to those who hold citizenship. In turn, party strategies are affected as candidates will try to exert a more centrist stance in order to attract more voters. Therefore, it can be said that party ideology is decisive in determining electoral success as the electorate will support parties that are closest to their own ideals and parties will try to match their campaigns in order to receive the most support. (Merrill and Grofman 1999).

Along with the spatial model, party competition is also an important factor that determines the support of major parties. Traditionally the competition is between the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ and these two factions were the biggest competitor for each other. Parties utilize their political stance in order to gain votes from the voters. In the past, the ideological split was

based on the economic policies, however, the changing dynamics of the world has added onto the ideological split (Carter 2005). Budge and Robertson offers an explanation on the left-right ideological split:

“classic economic policy conflicts-government regulation of the economy through direct controls or takeover... as opposed to free enterprise, individual freedom, and economic orthodoxy”
(Budge and Robertson, 1987 p. 394–5).

Previously, conflict existed among economic policies in which on side supported the government to directly regulate the economy. The opposing party advocated for a free economy in which there was no government intervention. However, the changing world order has caused the ideological split to change as well. Some of the new splits are between globalization and protectionism and the split between authoritarianism and democracy (Carter 2005).

The proximity spatial model and party competition utilizes the ideology of both the party and the electorate. The next factors focus mostly on the supply side of the candidates and parties. The institutional environment refers to the impact of electoral systems and electoral laws on the parties. Duverger explains that this due to the fact that the “votes translated into seats induces a psychological effect on both voters and the party elites” (Rydgren 2018). This means that voters are more likely to support a larger group with more seats because a vote for a smaller party is seen as a wasted vote than a vote that greatly matches their own ideals.

Similarly, the more the electoral system favors larger parties, the more likely people will vote for the larger parties (Carter 2005).

“It goes almost without saying that, ceteris paribus, restrictive electoral systems which impose high thresholds and which offer major bonuses to large parties will be most unlikely to provide incentives for small party support. It can therefore be suggested that more proportional electoral systems will be more likely to favour small parties, and hence we can formally hypothesize that the small party vote will be greater in more proportional electoral systems” (Carter 2013 p. 147)

This means that electoral systems with higher thresholds will influence voters to support large party groups rather than the smaller groups as it is easier for larger groups to gain more seats in the national parliament. As voters are rational, they will vote for parties that is closest to their belief rather than waste their vote. Electoral law refers to the laws on media broadcasts (free airtime parties receive for campaigning) and the regulations on state subventions, or the funding parties receive from the government for campaigns. Financing was found to be crucial to the electoral success as in some countries elections are very costly. Receiving funding allowed for parties to buy more advertising space on newspapers and Television (Carter 2013). Scholars like Alexander and Fisher agree that finance was important in the electoral and political sphere as it serves as a source of power and gives parties and candidates more of a chance to promote themselves (Alexander et al. 2009).

Another important factor of electoral success was found to be on party organization and party leadership. Parties that are stable were stable

were found to receive more support than unstable parties. Political experience such as previous participation in an election and previous position in a party organization played a role in electoral success. However, it is important to note that previous experience did not directly affect the voter behavior. Instead previous experience affected the campaign strategy of the candidate which in turn indirectly affect the voting behavior.

Current literature stresses the importance of both the voter behavior and party behavior. The different models proved that voters are rational and that the political ideal, stability and the strategy of the parties affected the electorate. Recently, with the rise of technology, political strategy utilizing the media has become increasingly important to the electoral success of parties. Overall, party proximity, political ideology and the electoral system mainly affected the electoral support. The next section will discuss which factors affected the electoral support for far right populist parties

3.2. Electoral Support for Far Right Populist Parties

To answer the question of how the far right populist groups gain votes, many scholars have analyzed the motion of the electorate and the parties. Although many factors exist for the success of the parties, the policy preferences of the voters and the political ideologies of the far right populist parties were found to be one of the influential reasons for the electoral

support of the PRR parties (Carter 2013). Therefore, the next question that must be answered is which political ideology the far right Populist Party adopts as its main issue. Some scholars argue that the far right populist parties are a single-issue party that advocates only one issue. (Meguid 2010, Lochocki 2018). However, it is widely accepted that a single issue cannot solely explain the electoral success of the PRR. Parties instead use a mixture of different ideological standpoints. Such stance is said to be based on grievances on economics, politics and immigration.

Grievance is a complaint or a negative reaction that is caused by certain changes. Some scholars claim that adopting an ideology from a relevant grievance leads to the growth in support for the far right party. Scholars such as Downs, Lipset and Rokkan and Inglehart emphasizes the importance of the role of ideology in electoral support and also stresses the relationship between ideology and the grievance model. The Downsian Economic Theory states that in a multi-party government, it is beneficial for parties to maintain a unique ideological stance. According to Downs, newer parties fare well when there is an important change in political events that might cause the redistribution of voters. Lipset and Rokkan's Political Sociology Tradition also states that a societal change will lead to a grievance which will lead to a change in the party system (Ivarsflaten 2008).

Scholars claim that the grievances from economic changes are due to the shift of the economy to a new sector and the appearance of new

technology. Before 1980, the economy was more industrial based but as time went on the economy became more service based. Not only this the rise of technology such as communication and transportation methods also led to a major change as trade and specialization became more popular. These economic changes also caused political changes as more effort was put into increasing trade by making policies that lowered trade barriers. In the case of Europe there was increased policies that strengthened the integration of the European Union that allowed for the free travel of goods, people, and services. Scholars agree that far right populist parties were able to gain support through the redistribution of voters that occurred due to the economic changes (Mudde 1999). There is a general agreement that the changes in the economic structure allowed for the far right populist parties gain popularity. Some scholars like Kitschelt believe that parties are seen as attractive due to the new economic policies that they advocate such as the 'neo-liberal economic policies.' However other scholars believe that the PRR gain votes due the dissatisfaction the voters feel about the economic changes.

The grievance due to the political disillusionment can said to be stemmed from European Integration. The formation of the European Union and the strengthening of regional integration can be said to be a major change in the political arena after the cold war. Since the formation of the ECSC many countries have joined the EU and policies have been made to

strengthen the supranational entity. This change has caused people to believe that the integration process is an “elite driven project” that is filled with corruption and undermines democracy. As the electorate start to form a distrust towards the political elite, the PRR, as a new party, can gain support from these voters by adopting an anti-EU ideology.

The third grievance derives from the immigration issue. The immigration crisis has been a longstanding problem in Europe. The Western European countries especially experienced an influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe and also from Muslim countries. Although strict bans were in place, European countries experienced immigration crises in the 1980s and the 1990s. The public became concerned with the rapid increase of immigrants and the political elite were not able to make a solution for the public. The far right populist parties were able to gain the support of the public who wanted stronger immigration policies and border control.

The study of grievance models has proven that in order for the far right populist parties to gain support, they should adopt an ideology and a policy that stems from a certain change. Three ideologies were found to be beneficial in the growth of the far right populist parties’ support: the economic, political and immigration policies.

Although the PRR were found to gain support from the three policies, not all three have the same weight on success and in some cases, were not mobilized by the PRR. The economic policies were found not to be unique

to the PRR parties as the mainstream parties also had clear economic policies (Ivarsflaten 2008). Studies have shown that the economic situation also does not greatly affect the far right populist parties. If economic policies were the central ideology of the PRR, the presence of a far right populist party should be stronger in a country that has a relatively weak economy. However, this is not the case and in fact economically stable member states have a stronger presence of PRR parties (Mudde 1999). The political policy regarding European integration and immigration policies were seen to be more consistent throughout the different far right populist parties. However, the immigration issue was the main appeal for all of the far right populist parties (Ivarsflaten 2008). Through empirical analysis of newspaper articles in 2014, Hong found that the anti-EU policy also played an important role compared to the economic policies. However, the immigration policy was the strongest factor and was consistent throughout the different PRR parties (Hong 2017). Arzheimer also found that immigration issues played the most important role in the electoral success

Previously, the far right populist parties were known as a single-issue party. However, continued research has proved that this is not necessarily true. The issues covered by the PRR fall neither under the traditional left nor right cleavage and the issues advocated by the far right populist group are not covered by the major parties (Meguid 2010). The major issues covered by the PRR are anti-elitism, anti-EU and also anti-

immigration (Mudde 2017). However, most scholars agree that the main policy issue covered by the PRR are focused on the anti-immigration issues. However, for the issues to be influential, the issue must be salient during the time of the campaign and the time of the election (Lochocki 2018). Immigration has been a great issue in Europe since the 1980s Immigration Crisis. There were problems of inter-EU immigration due to the free movement of people. The immigration has till then evolved into an issue involving non-EU migrants and refugees and Asylum-seekers. The PRR groups utilize the perceived threat of immigrants as the main political issue (Doestal 2017).

The institutional environment, as mentioned previously, describe the impact of electoral systems and electoral laws on the electoral success of the PRR. The PRR are thought to perform better if there is a lower threshold and if the electoral formula follows the proportional formula instead of the majoritarian formula (Rydgren 2018). This is due to the representation of the far right populist party. It is difficult for smaller parties like the PRR to gain seats in the parliament in a high legal threshold as they need a lot of votes to be represented in the parliament. Similarly, in a majoritarian formula (absolute majority) the smaller parties would not have a chance to be represented as they are less likely to gain majority votes. However, in a low threshold, proportional formula electoral system, the PRR is more likely to gain support. The parties and candidates now have a chance to gain seats

in the parliament and are represented in the government (Carter 2013). As mentioned before, voters are rational actors, therefore, they will not vote for a party if it will not be represented in the government since their vote would have been a waste.

Electoral laws regarding the access to broadcast media and the regulations regarding state subvention also influenced the performance of the PRR. With the growth of new technology, people now have access to television and the news (including online newspaper). Therefore, the media has become a major channel for parties and candidates to communicate with voters. If it is easier for the PRR to get access to broadcast time, it will positively affect the votes for the party. Financing is also important for the performance of the PRR however, it was found too difficult to measure in the case of the PRR as many of the parties did not report the income and expenditure as there was a lack of rules (Carter 2013).

Theoretically, the party competition for the PRR should be the major right wing party. This is due to the proximity and political space between the two parties. In order to gain more votes, the major right wing might adopt more extreme stance or more moderate stance. When the mainstream party takes a more extreme stance, the voters might opt to support the larger party. However, if the mainstream party takes a more moderate stance, the PRR's electoral performance will increase even if the PRR also adopts a moderate stance (Rydgren 2018). Whether or not the

mainstream competition decides to address the far right party's issue also affects the electoral support. If the mainstream party does not address the issue, the electoral support of the PRR might drop due to the decreased amount of exposure to the voters (Lochocki 2018). The mainstream party has the power to control the attractiveness of the issue by not mentioning the issue at all, copying the PRR stance or campaigning that the PRR issue is irrelevant. Policy convergence is when the mainstream party adopts a similar stance in order to draw voters from the PRR to their own. Another strategy is policy divergence in which the mainstream party campaign against the PRR ideals in order to convince voters to move to their own party (Meguid 2010).

Issues as well as the socio-political environment was found to be crucial for the electoral success of the far right populist groups. Although it is widely accepted that the issues the PRR adopt are a mixture of economic, Eurosceptic and immigration issues, it was found that the economic discourse did not affect the electoral support. Instead the Eurosceptic discourse and the immigration issue was found to be more influential. However, the immigration discourse was consistently argued to be the most important and consistent issue of the different PRR parties. Media analysis further supported the fact that the immigration issue played the most crucial role for the support of the far right populist parties.

3.3. Voting Success of the Far Right during the European Parliament Elections

It is generally contested that Far right populist parties perform better during the European Parliament elections rather than in the national elections. This is due to the fact that the EP elections are considered as a “second order election (SOE).” The first order elections are considered to be the national parliamentary or presidential elections. The SOE theory states that for the EP elections, there will be a lower turnout rate as the elections are not deemed as important by the electorate, candidates and the media. The theory also argues that smaller parties are more likely to perform better as voters utilize the votes as a form of punishment (protest voting) or a reward (sincere voting) (Reif and Schmitt 1980).

Along with the SOE narrative scholars have also found that the PRR perform better during the European Parliament elections, if they take place during the midterm period of the national elections. Therefore, if the EP elections take place in between the national elections, there will be a higher change of protest voting if people are unsatisfied with the major party. This would lead to a higher voter percentage for the PRR (Jensen and Spoon (2010). However, if the EP elections are to take place near the national elections, the PRR is expected not to perform as well (Mudde 1999).

As mentioned before the main ideologies of the PRR are nativism, authoritarianism and populism. According to Hong the main issues could be anti-immigration, Euroscepticism, and anti-political establishment (Hong 2017.) Through her analysis Hong found that the success of the PRR in 2014 was largely due to the “protest voting against established EU politics” therefore European considerations were important. However, this does not mean that the immigration issue played a small role as “sincere voting on immigration” also played a crucial role for the overwhelming support of the PRR during the 2014 elections (Hong 2017). Although Mudde states that the Immigration issue is not the most important issue for the PRR, Hong proves that immigration did indeed play a big role in the support during the 2014 EP elections. Arzheimer, Yilmaz and Wodak also claim that anti-immigration issue plays a large role for the support of the PRR parties. Yilmaz also adds that for Austria and Germany, there was also an increase of Islamophobic discourse with the increase of anti-migration (Woodak 2012, Yilmaz 2012, Arzheimer 2018).

Lochocki, also offers a strong argument on the importance of immigration issues to the PRR’s campaign. PRR’s adopt positions that are dropped by the conservative party. For a long time the missing narrative was on migration issues. Once the PRR picked up the issue, they started to gain more support. Lochocki found that the performance of the far right populist parties rose when there was an absence of conservative stance on

immigration and when the perceived cultural threat is large. Therefore, the salience of the immigration issue also affects the performance of the PRR regarding its stance on immigration (Lochocki 2018). Immigration is an important issue in society when immigration figures rise and unemployment rates rise as well (Mudde 2017). However, after the immigration crisis of 2015, the influx of immigrants became an important issue in Europe (Dostal 2017). Therefore during this time, it can be said that immigration is an influential issue to the PRR.

Although an attractive issue is one of the most important factors that leads to the successful performance of the role of the media has started to influence the agenda setting and the support of the PRR. Over the years, more political articles have been published and as a result, more of the PRR's discourse have also being published. As the tabloid narrative was similar to the PRR's narrative there were more articles being published about the PRR which led to an increase of influence of the PRR (Mudde 2013). A media study on Belgium and the Netherlands showed that the increase of immigration discourse in the newspapers led to an increase in the support of the anti-immigrant PRR parties (Boomgaarden et al, 2007). As the average supporter of the party is mostly interested in immigration, more comparative studies on the immigration discourse of the PRR is needed. Hong also has analyzed the media coverage of the PRR but found that due to the different political and historical background of the case countries, the

salience of immigration could not be generalized (Kim and Hong 2012). However, a later study by Hong proved the positive influence of the immigration issues on the performance of the PRR but the focus of the research was on the different type of voters rather than the discourse itself. (Hong 2017). Therefore, this research will try to add to previous research by comparing the media discourse among member states that are similar with one another during the 2018 elections.

Recently, there has been research that showed the relation between media coverage and the rise of the performance of the PRR. If there is a lot of coverage on immigration in the newspaper, the PRR received a higher vote percentage. Media refers not only to paper newspapers but any sort of news platform. Therefore, it can be said that the development of the internet also influenced the performance of the PRR

Chapter 4. Research Design and Methodology

4.1. Research Design

Austria, France, Italy, Germany and Sweden were chosen as the cases as they are some of the most influential member states in the EU. Altogether, the five member states take up about 39.5 percent of all seats in the European Parliament. Austria takes up 19 seats, France has 79 seats, Sweden has 21 seats, Italy has 76 seats and Germany has 96 seats. With the exception of Germany, the number of seats will increase for each of the countries after Brexit. The voter turnout for each of the five countries is higher than the EU average turnout.¹ The case countries can be said to be very significant in Western Europe as they take up a significant amount of seats in the European Parliament and the voters can be said to be more interested in the elections compared to other member states.

The far right populist parties for each of the cases are also very well-known and can be said to be important actors during the EP elections. The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the National Front/ National Rally

¹EU elections: how many MEPs will each country get in 2019?: News: European Parliament. (2018, February 7). Retrieved from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180126STO94114/eu-elections-how-many-meps-will-each-country-get-in-2019>.

(FN/RN) and the Swedish Democrats (SD) have a long history and have existed since the cold war. The FPÖ was established in 1950, the FN was established in 1972 and the SD was established in 1988. The three parties also have a significant support base during the national elections as well as the EP elections. The Five Star Movement (M5S) from Italy and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) are newer parties compared to the previous three parties. The M5S was established in 2009 and the AfD was established in 2013. As these parties are new, they do not have as much support as the other three parties but have been rapidly gathering support in the recent years. Although the five parties have different core policies they share a commonality in that they all have anti-EU and anti-immigration sentiment.

Over time, the role of media has become very important. However, there is a lack of case studies in media analysis. The current media analysis also fails to compare different cases and instead focuses more on a single case. Although single case research has been carried out for Germany, Belgium and the Netherland's national case, there is currently very little research done on Western European countries during the European Parliament elections. This was mainly due to the lack of data. Previous elections could not be compared due to the different nature of the elections. 2009 marks the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, which also means the strengthening of the legislative power of the European Parliament. Therefore post 2009 and pre 2009 elections could not be analyzed. Starting

from 2014 the Spitzenkandidat was introduced in order to facilitate more interest in the European Parliament. Therefore, it could have been difficult to compare the two elections. However, during the 2014 and the 2019 elections no significant structural changes were made of the European Parliament.

Although there was no comparative media analysis of the European Parliament elections, Hong did conduct media analyses on single elections. In her research, she proved that the immigration issues were very important and influential in the electoral success of the PRR. However, her analysis did not measure between two different time points. According to research done by Hong and Boomgaarden, if there is an increase in the immigration discourse, then there should be a growth of electoral support for the far right populist parties.

Another limitation on the current literature is that most scholars only focus on media analysis and voter behavior. A lot of research is done on what issues and discourse is relevant to the support of the parties and what kind of voter chooses which party. However, there is not a lot of media analysis that also takes into consideration the socio-political environment and also the political competition.

This research aims to answer the question of what causes the change in performance of the far right populist parties in Austria, France, Italy, Germany and Sweden. It will also try to answer how the immigration issue

affected the electoral success, how much the discourse changed over the years and if the quantity of discourse affected the performance of the PRR. The research will mainly focus on the changes in the immigration discourse of the far right populist parties but will also try to look at the changes in the socio-political environment, if there were any. Following previous research this paper hypothesizes that the increased quantity of immigration discourse in the newspaper, will lead to the increased support of the PRR parties. Similarly, if there is a decrease in coverage of the immigration issue, this paper hypothesizes that there will be a decrease of electoral support.

Therefore, the unit of analysis of this research would be the articles published on the far right populist parties' immigration discourse. Only the topic of immigration regarding the PRR parties will be analyzed meaning that all other articles will not be included in the analysis. The dependent variable, or the performance, will be measured by the percentage of votes won by each of the far right populist groups. The independent variable is the different socio-political environment, the type of immigration discourse, and party competition if there is any. The Eurosceptic discourse will be the control variable. However, the control variable will only be measured during the in-depth analysis of the Freedom party of Austria and the Alternative for Germany. The measurement for the total vote shares will be found on the European Parliament website and the articles will be collected through the online newspaper subscription.

4.2. Methodology

The goal of this paper is to collect mass media data and try to explain the changes in the performance of the far right populist groups. As this paper hypothesizes that the immigration discourse is responsible for the change in performance, the immigration discourse from both 2014 and 2019 will be gathered for each of the five cases. The quantity articles covering the immigration discourse will be analyzed. Previous mass media studies on the European Parliament elections showed that tabloid newspapers, television news and right oriented upmarket newspapers increased the support for far right parties (Doroshenko 2018). However, tabloids were also found to not have as much coverage as most of the publications were filled with pictures rather than articles (Schulze 2016). Therefore, this research tried to avoid analyzing tabloids.

Due to accessibility purposes, television news was not analyzed and only the upmarket newspapers were chosen to gather the materials from. Although left leaning papers were seen to decrease support, in order to have a wider range of articles and to analyze the most popular newspaper in the country, one paper with a right political alignment and one with a left one was chosen for each country. The newspapers were chosen according the previous research done by Schulze, Doroshenko and the PIREDEU project. The newspaper articles were all accessed through online subscription.

The newspapers chosen for Austria were “Di Presse” and “Der Standard.” The French paper were “Le Figaro” and “Le Monde.” For Sweden “Svenska Dagblade” and “Aftonbladet” were chosen. The Italian newspapers analyzed were “Il Gironale” and “Il Corriere della Sera.” Lastly, the German newspapers were “Frankfurter Allegmeine Zeitung” and “Süddeutsche Zeitung.” (Table 1) Previous research analyzed the “Svenska Dagbladet” and the “Dagens Nyheter.” However, for this research it was not possible to gain access to the “Dagens Nyheter” articles without a Swedish phone number. Therefore, instead of an upmarket newspaper, a tabloid was chosen as the PIREDEU project already proved the “Aftonbladet” to be one of the most read and influential media source in Sweden.

Country	Newspaper	website	Political Alignment
Austria	Die Presse	https://www.diepresse.com	Center-Right
	Der Standard	https://www.derstandard.at	Center-Left
France	Le Figaro	https://www.lefigaro.fr	Right
	Le Monde	https://www.lemonde.fr/	Center-Left
Sweden	Svenska Dagbladet	https://www.svd.se/	Center-Right
	Aftonbladet	https://www.aftonbladet.se/	Center-Left
Italy	Il Corriere della Sera	https://www.corriere.it	Center
	Il Giornale	https://www.ilgiornale.it	Right
Germany	Süddeutsche Zeitung	https://www.sueddeutsche.de	Center-Left
	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	https://www.faz.net	Center-Right

<Table 1: Local Newspaper and Political Alignment>

Articles were filtered out on a two-step process. First, the articles were filtered by the party's name and non-party name. Only the articles that mentioned the party's name were recorded. (Ex. In the case of Germany the articles would be filtered into "AfD" and "non-AfD.") Then the articles with the party's name were then filtered using keywords that fit into the category of anti-immigration, anti-refugee, and anti-Islam. The Keywords were 'immigrant,' 'Migration,' 'refugee,' 'asylum,' 'Muslim' and 'Islam.' The keywords were chosen from previous research by Doroshenko on the immigration discourse in newspapers. The immigration discourse covers not only negative immigration sentiment but also negative sentiment towards refugees and Muslims. Refugees and Muslims are also seen as a type of migrants and were also seen as a threat to national identity and culture (Rydgren 2018).

For the contextual analysis, the articles were filtered again a second time. Articles that were not found to be related to the party and the immigration discourse were discarded. Thus, the article count after the second filtering was considered as the final count. During the second filtering, the articles were classified based on the type of discourse, the type of policy and the actor that delivered the discourse.

English	immigrant	migration	refugee	asylum	Islam	muslim
German (AU)	Einwanderer	Migration	Flüchtlinge	Asylanträge	Islam	muslim
French	l'immigration	Migrant	réfugié	l'asile	Islam	musulman
Swedish	invandrare	migration	flykting	asyl	Islam	muslim
Italian	immigrazione	migrante	profughi	asilo	Islam	musulmano
German (DE)	Einwanderer	Migration	Flüchtlinge	Asylanträge	Islam	muslim

<Table 2: Immigration Discourse Keywords>v

The media was found to cover the EP elections less intensively compared to the national election. This meant that there would be very few articles published regarding the EP elections. In order to collect concrete and more stable data, only the articles published during the latter half of the election were collected. The dates analyzed were three weeks before the elections. This is due to the fact that it has been proven that articles on the EP elections are covered the most during this period All 5 countries held the elections on the same day in both 2014 and 2015. As the Election Day in 2014 was on May 24th, therefore the articles were collected from May 5th to May 23rd. The 2019 European Parliament elections took place on May 26th, so the dates collected were from May 6th to May 25th (Schuck et al. 2010)

Country	2014 Elections	2014 Newspaper	2019 Elections	2019 Newspaper
Austria	May 25 th	May 5 th – May 24 th	May 26 th	May 6 th – May 25 th
France	May 25 th	May 5 th – May 24 th	May 26 th	May 6 th – May 25 th
Sweden	May 25 th	May 5 th – May 24 th	May 26 th	May 6 th – May 25 th
Italy	May 25 th	May 5 th – May 24 th	May 26 th	May 6 th – May 25 th
Germany	May 25 th	May 5 th – May 24 th	May 26 th	May 6 th – May 25 th

<Table 3: Election Dates and Dates for Newspaper Analysis>

Chapter 5. Immigration Discourse in the Media in the 2014 and 2015 EP Elections

The quantity of articles on the far right populist parties' discourse on immigration was gathered from both 2014 and 2019. There is no drastic change in the percentage of immigration discourse between the two years. However, with the exception of the FN, there was a rise in media coverage of the immigration discourse of the far right populist parties during the 2019 elections. All five cases showed a similarity in the context of the immigration discourse covered by the media. In 2014, the articles published mostly explained what the European Parliament elections were and introduced the candidates of different parties. In 2019 the articles were less focused on explaining the elections and the immigration discourse was covered through current events and through speeches from the candidates.

Of the immigration issues both migration and refugee issues were covered extensively by all of the parties. All 5 parties discussed the threat of both European and non-European immigrants and advocated for stronger migration policies. Although the FPÖ, FN and the AfD had Islamophobic rhetoric, the M5S and the SD did not include this in their immigration campaign. Of the refugee issues, one prominent issue was the criminal

activity of the illegal immigrants and asylum seekers. The PRR called for the strengthening of legislation for these criminal activities. The anti-Islam discourse were centered on individual party members or supporters. However, as the discourse was centered on an individual it is difficult to state that the Islamophobia discourse represents the overall PRR campaign.

It is also important to note that during the 2019 elections, some parties experienced a political scandal or party competition that affected the immigration discourse. This means that during 2019, some media coverage on immigration discourse was actually part of an article referring to the scandal or party competition. The following section will start off with a contextual analysis of all 5 cases. This will be followed by a comparison of all 5 cases.

5.1. Contextual Analysis of the Media

Freedom Party of Austria

91 articles were published by the Austrian newspaper about the FPÖ in 2014 and 595 articles were published in 2019. 3.3 percent of the 91 articles published in 2014 were about the immigration discourse of the FPÖ. In 2019 there was an increase of articles published as 5.4 percent of the total 595 were on the party's immigration discourse. Migration did not make up the majority of the discourse during both elections. However, for both time

periods, it was apparent that the Freedom Party of Austria was an anti-immigration party.

In 2014. There was only one article that was directly related to the FPÖ 's stance on migration. The articles published during this time did not concentrate on the policies but it was clear that the FPÖ was an anti-immigration party. The article containing the immigration discourse was an interview of each of the candidates from different parties in order to introduce the different parties and their political standings. The candidate that was interviewed was Franz Obermayr who stated that the EU should not take the stance of being fully accepting of refugees as it is detrimental not only for the nation state but for the asylum seekers as well.

“...it [Europe recognizing that it is a continent of immigration] is certainly the wrong way to go. It is precisely this attitude that gives false hope to economic refugees, which leads them to believe that Europe has unlimited absorption capacity, that jobs are available in abundance, and that our welfare state can easily accommodate all migrants and their families. These are false hopes...”(Der Standard 2014)²

As the quote mentions, the candidate is against the image of becoming an all accepting entity for refugees. The ‘false image’ leads more people to flock to EU borders which will lead to problems at the borders and in the country. Although only one article was published on the FPÖ’s stance on migration, it sent a clear message that the party was against immigration.

More articles were published during the 2019 election period

² Listenzweite: Von Ameisenhaufen, Idealismus und galoppierenden Pferden. (2014, May 13). *Der Standard*. Retrieved from <https://www.derstandard.at/story/1399506920906/eu-wahl-die-zweite-reihe>

totaling up to 27 articles. Of the 27 articles, 33.3 percent mentioned the immigration policies of the FPÖ while 66.7 percent mentioned comments regarding the stance and the political standing of the FPÖ. The policies could be separated largely into border control, laws on residential immigrants and blocking the overall migration flow. The comments showed that the FPÖ was an anti-immigration party and also pointed out the similar stance of the FPÖ and the Austrian People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP). The FPÖ strongly supported border control in the Schengen area and also advocated the need for the reconstruction of national laws on immigrants. Headscarves and the naturalization of immigration and refugees were some of the main focal points. The first initiative was made in order to protect the social identity and beliefs of Austria while the second initiative allegedly was to assist the migration process.

The FPÖ supported the headscarf ban which prohibits students from wearing religious clothing and head covering at school. The religious garment was said to hinder the education in school and also affected Austrian values of gender equality.

"The general aim of the initiative is to "prohibit the wearing of ideological or religious clothing with which the head is covered". This is justified in the legislative proposal with "the social integration of children in accordance with local customs and customs, the preservation of the constitutional basic values and educational goals of the federal constitution and the equality of men and women." (Die Presse 2019)³

³ Dritter Anlauf für Kopftuchverbot an Volksschulen. (2019, June 8). *Die Presse*. Retrieved from <https://www.diepresse.com/5623855/dritter-anlauf-fur->

This initiative can be said to be aimed at Muslim migrants as the law did not cover other religions such as the Jewish Kippah. The FPÖ repeatedly claimed that this particular religious garment repressed women and therefore should be eliminated in schools immediately.

The second law was focused on the nationalization of immigrants and refugees. Currently, NGOs are in charge of providing legal assistance to the refugees and immigrants when they are in court. However, the FPÖ wants the government to take control of this legal assistance. Refugees and immigrants will be able to receive legal counseling during a deportation trial. This initiative is expected to lower costs and bring the control back to the state rather than relying on an external third party. With the control of the legal assistance, the FPÖ also hopes to reject all asylum seekers and lower the refugee acceptance rate to zero.

The last policy is related to the flow of migration in Austria. FPÖ candidates and leaders have made it clear that the final goal is to block all migration flow for both immigrants and refugees. Interior Minister Herbert Kickl's reasoning for the total rejection of asylum seekers was due to the fact that "Austria is surrounded by safe states" (Der Standard 2019)⁴ and therefore does not have the responsibility. During the 2019 elections, the

[kopftuchverbot-an-volksschulen](#)

⁴ Bricker, I. (2019, May 22). (Ex-)Asylminister Kickl: Die Spur des Demagogen. *Der Standard*. Retrieved from <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000103644433/ex-asylminister-kickl-die-spur-des-demagogen>

FPÖ targeted certain immigrants as they “called [to] stop immigration from Africa and the Middle East.” (Der Standard 2019)⁵

Concrete policies were made for border control, residential immigrants and migration flow. The remaining articles focused more on the stances that the party had on immigration. The comments were related to the fear tactic used by FPÖ leaders, the need for a stronger migration policy and the comments highlighted the similar migration policy of the ÖVP and FPÖ. In line with the theory, the FPÖ used multiculturalism as a fear tactic and blamed it to be a threat to national security, identity and culture:

“The [FPÖ] apparently succeed in addressing people's deep-seated fears of being exchanged, pooling them and redirecting the associated anger reaction to scapegoats in the form of immigrants and refugees.”

By utilizing the fear, the FPÖ was able to advocate the need for stronger migration and asylum policies.

After the Ibiza crisis, the ÖVP and FPÖ alliance broke apart which led to the former to become more vocal of its policies and became a competitor to the FPÖ.

“In terms of content, the two parties are pretty much alike when it comes to migration. It is to be expected that there will be a contest of horrors on this topic during the election campaign.”(Der Standard 2019)⁶

⁵ EU-Wahl: Breite Gegenwehr gegen "neue Ära" der Rechten. (2019, May 19). *Der Standard*. Retrieved from <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000103428012/eu-wahl-breite-gegenwehr-gegen-neue-aera-der-rechten>

⁶Kotynek, M. (2019, May 19). Österreich braucht jetzt einen Staatsmann an der Spitze, keinen Wahltaktiker. *Der Standard*. Retrieved from <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000103440778/oesterreich-braucht-jetzt-einen-staatsmann-an-der-spitze-keinen-wahltaktiker>

The ÖVP also became an anti-immigrant party that called for stronger border control and more legislation against criminal activities by immigrants. In order to counter the ÖVP, FPÖ politicians such as Herbert Kickl stated past achievements that differentiated the FPÖ from the ÖVP:

“[The FPÖ] was the only one to stand for a strict asylum policy. The FPÖ was responsible for the rejection of the UN migration pact. Even when deporting aPRRentices without a reason for asylum, they had to prevail against the ÖVP.” (Der Standard 2019)⁷

The statement shows that the party is against the immigration issue from being solved at the EU level. The candidates and the politicians of the FPÖ added the Eurosceptic discourse to the migration issue in order to recover from the Ibiza crisis.

During the 2014 elections, only one article was published regarding the immigration discourse of the FPÖ. Therefore, it is difficult to make a comparison between the two elections. However, it is notable that during the 2014 elections only mentioned the stance of the party while the 2019 articles gave concrete policies and expanded the immigration issues to residential immigrants as well. The articles published during the later elections also focused more on the party rather than the individual.

Front National/ National Rally

The Front National was the most unique in that the media covered

⁷ Stuißer, P. (2019, May 14). Der Kanzler als Brückenabbrecher. *Der Standard*. Retrieved from <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000103199353/der-kanzler-als-brueckenabbrecher>

the immigration discourse in both the 2014 and 2019 elections as opposed to having just one or no articles at all. During both the elections, the media coverage focused more comments describing the anti-immigration nature of the parties rather than the actual policy of the party. The policies remain relatively the same and focus on border control.

During the 2014 elections the main policy was border control. The FN wanted to break away from the Schengen agreement and also to solve the illegal immigration issue.

“To stop Schengen is to break away from the laxity of the European Union, for which the only response to illegal immigration consists in encouraging mass reception and almost systematic regularizations. In our view, this measure must be completed [with] the suppression in our law of the possibility of regularizing illegal immigrants” (Le Monde 2014)⁸

As the quote states, the party advocated the pulling out of the Schengen agreement and stated that laws should be made in order to control the illegal immigrant issue. The party suggests a policy that gradually decreases the amount of immigrants accepted into France.

The remaining articles during 2014 focused on the success of the FN through immigration. The FN was the only party that was faring well on utilizing the immigration discourse. The FN’s usage of immigration was successful as it also utilized the fear of immigration on threatening the national identity and culture of France. The FN used anti-Islam sentiments

⁸Européennes : comparez les programmes des principaux candidats. (2014, May 22). *Le Monde*. Retrieved from https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2014/05/22/europeennes-comparez-les-programmes-des-candidats_4423193_4355770.html

in order to maximize the immigration discourse.

“This phenomenon of massive immigration is aggravated here by a religious fact: a large part of these immigrants are Muslims, a religion which has a conquering vocation, all the more conquering that it feels strong and that they feel numerous. It goes so far as to conquer, even in our own ranks - not in the FN but in France...” (Le Figaro 2014)⁹

In 2019, the border control policy remained the same. The National Rally (RN) wanted to regain its own borders in order to control the inflow of migrants. It was especially difficult to control the inflow of asylum seekers with shared borders.

“Asylum will only be granted following requests submitted to the embassies of the countries of origin or neighboring countries” (Le Monde 2019)¹⁰

The RN proposed that along with withdrawing from the Schengen, the asylum policy should be strengthened by restricting entrance of asylum seekers. The policies were focused more on border control and the FN rejected the redistribution of refugees among EU member states.

During this time, it is also important to note that Emmanuel Macron’s party, En Marche, had a goal of reducing the number of votes for the FN.

“Emmanuel Macron explains that his only goal is to eliminate Marine Le Pen. Marine Le Pen explains that her only

⁹«Monseigneur Ebola» : la solution de Jean-Marie Le Pen face à l’immigratio. (2014, May 21). *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/couacs/2014/05/21/25005-20140521ARTFIG00054-monseigneur-ebola-la-solution-de-jean-marie-le-pen-face-a-l-immigration.php>

¹⁰ Elections européennes : des clivages classiques sur les frontières et les réfugiés. (2019, May 18). *Le Monde*. Retrieved from https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2019/05/18/europeennes-des-clivages-classiques-sur-les-frontieres-et-les-refugies_5463899_3210.html

objective is to beat Emmanuel Macron, it doesn't make sense [...] We offer another route, a list that firmly believes in Europe and a Europe that defends its borders in the face of immigration, which reaffirms its identity.”(Le Figaro 2014)¹¹

Therefore, during the 2019 European Parliament elections, Macron adopted a similar stance on immigration as the RN. Macron’s party adopted an anti-immigrant rhetoric by advocating the reduction of immigrants and to control the number of illegal immigrants in France. Not only was the RN competing with En Marche on immigration issues, it was also competing with the “Unbowed France” (LFI).

Although the party went through major changes such as the change in leadership and the change in the party name, the immigration policy remained relatively the same. In both 2014 and 2019 elections, the party wanted to leave the Schengen agreement in order to get control of the border to prevent refugees and immigrants from freely entering the country. In both years, the threat of immigration was utilized in order to instill fear of immigrants into the public. However, during the 2019 elections, the RN was faced with competition on the immigration issue as a major party also adopted a similar stance and policies. The majority of the articles published were focused on the similarity between the two parties.

Swedish Democrats

¹¹ Pascual , P. J. (2019, May 18). Elections européennes : des clivages classiques sur les frontières et les réfugiés. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from <https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/wauquiez-les-europeennes-ne-sont-pas-le-troisieme-tour-de-la-presidentielle-20190512>

The amount of media coverage of the Swedish Democrat was small compared to the long history and popularity of the SD. 3.7 percent of all articles on the SD covered the immigration discourse and this dropped to 2.4 percent in 2019. In 2014 the media not only stated the anti-immigration nature of the SD, but also covered the immigration policies of the party. In 2019 44.4 percent of the immigration discourse covered the policies while 55.6 percent covered the general nature and comments of the SD.

“The party has run campaigns for limited immigrant quotas, minaret bans and the expulsion of "criminal immigrants". (Svenska Dagbladet 2014) ¹²

During 2014, the media coverage, albeit limited, focused the regulated migration policy of the SD. The SD advocated for the reduction of immigration into Sweden and to deport immigrant criminals. The article focused on the stance of the party in general rather than an individual candidate. It can be said that the SD’s anti-immigration stance was portrayed in 2014.

In 2019, the main policies were centered on the transit center and the sovereignty of the immigration issue. Border control was an important issue of the SD. The SD campaigned for a transit center outside of the EU for refugees to gain access to the EU.

“Also in the Swedish parties' election manifesto, a lot of talk about strengthened border protection. The SD and the

¹² Lovén, A. (2014, May 23). SD:s ”bröstoffilm” högerpopulistisk Schweizimport. *Svenska Dagbladet*. Retrieved from [Vhttps://www.svd.se/sds-brostfilm-hogerpopulistisk-schweizimport](https://www.svd.se/sds-brostfilm-hogerpopulistisk-schweizimport)

Moderates in particular emphasize this.”(Aftonbladet 2019)¹³

“if you are seeking asylum you should do so from the transit center on the other side of the Mediterranean.” (Svenska Dagbladet 2019)¹⁴

In order to get permission to enter Sweden, refugees should apply in an area outside of the EU. This means that the SD supports a common EU border for the asylum seekers. However, the party is against the equal distribution of immigrants therefore rejecting a common European system. The SD adds that the refugee issue should be solved at the national level rather than at the EU level.

Other articles published in 2019 highlight the anti-immigration nature of the EU and also the need for stronger migration policies. These articles make it apparent that migration issues play a crucial role for the Swedish Democrats. These two are important in the 2019 election campaign.

The articles published in both 2014 and 2019 were mostly reported on the overall opinion of the party and not of the candidate and politicians of the Swedish Democrats. Although the immigration discourse in 2014 was mostly focused on the immigrants currently residing in Sweden in 2019, the main focus was on the border

¹³ Sprickor i svenska migrationslinjen. (2019, May 17). *Aftonbladet*. Retrieved from <https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/4qWvJo/sprickor-i-svenska-migrationslinjen>

¹⁴ Peter Lundgren (SD): Sverige värre än Polen. (2019, May 17). *Svenska Dagbladet*. Retrieved from <https://www.svd.se/peter-lundgren-sd-sverige-varre-an-polen>

5 Star Movement

The 5 Star Movement is another party that did not have clear immigration discourse covered during the 2014 elections. However, the immigration discourse is covered in depth during the 2019 elections. The policies makeup 34.7 percent of the total immigration discourse while comments about the stance of the M5S take up 65.3 percent. The policies focus on the repatriation, redistribution and blocking migration altogether. The remaining media coverage focused on the difference and conflict between the Lega Nord (LN) and the 5 Star Movement.

Before discussing the policies, it is important to cover the conflict between the Lega Nord and the 5 Star movement. Italy is experiencing a refugee issue with the NGO-run ship called ‘Seawatch.’ Matteo Salvini, the leader of the LN is against the acceptance of the refugees on board the Seawatch and calls for the closing of all ports. The M5S on the other hand criticized the LN stating that closing the ports was not enough to solve the migration crisis in Italy. The disagreement has led to conflict between the two parties.

“This intervention is enough to make us understand how high the tension can be in the yellow-green majority which in fact splits once again on the migrant front.” (Il Giornale 2019)¹⁵

The majority of the immigration discourse news coverage, therefore,

¹⁵Di Maio ora va all'attacco: "Porti aperti ai migranti? Salvini ministro, spieghi". (2019, May 20). Retrieved from <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/maio-ora-va-allattacco-porti-aperti-ai-migranti-salvini-1697965.html>

focuses on the conflict between the LN and the M5S. The LN accuses the M5S of re-opening the ports and accepting migrants while the M5S denies such claims and advocate for a different policy.

"The real topic is now about repatriation, and we are ready to help the Home Secretary if necessary." (Il Giornale 2019)¹⁶

"...by the security law bis because there is nothing on the repatriation. The theme is not the arrivals we have stopped." (Corriere Della Sera 2019)¹⁷

The quotes above explain the stance of the M5S on the Seawatch situation and against the accusation by the LN. The M5S argues that the main agenda of the migration issues should be repatriation and not border control. Instead of focusing the immigrants that have not yet entered the Italian borders, the M5S's policy is focused on the illegal immigrants that are already present.

"Luigi Di Maio, who in recent weeks had repeatedly reprimanded the leader of the Carroccio, guilty according to the pentastellato leader of not having solved the main problem, that of the return of foreigners illegally present on Italian territory." (Il Giornale 2019)¹⁸

Not only does the M5S wants to return all illegal immigrants to their original country but they would also want to burden-share the refugees with

¹⁶ Lo strappo sui porti fa infuriare i 5 Stelle: un blitz anti-Toninelli. (2019, May 12). *Il Giornale*. Retrieved from <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/strappo-sui-porti-fa-infuriare-i-5-stelle-blitz-anti-1693055.html>

¹⁷ Di Maio attacca Salvini: «Nulla sui rimpatri». La replica: «Decido io chi entra e chi esce». (2019, May 11). *Corriere Della Sera*. Retrieved from http://www.corriere.it/politica/19_maggio_11/dl-sicurezza-maio-attacca-salvini-nulla-rimpatri-non-vorrei-fosse-coprire-caso-siri-0ab3dbe4-73cd-11e9-a46f-84c039eb72db.shtml

¹⁸ Superpoteri al Viminale. La norma è già a rischio. (2019, May 21). *Il Giornale*. Retrieved from <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/superpoteri-viminale-norma-gi-rischio-1698338.html>

other EU member states. The second policy that the M5S advocates is redistribution. The party believes that there should be an EU-wide agreement for fair distribution of refugees.

“... there are European nations willing to take on arriving migrants: those whom Salvini does not want to land.” (Corriere Della Sera 2019) ¹⁹

“On immigration, which appears to be the most divisive issue, the choice is mandatory: fair distribution of immigrants among all EU member countries.” (Il Giornale 2019) ²⁰

The two quotes describes the redistribution policy of the M5S. The party is confident that other European parties will accept the immigrants aboard the Seawatch and believe that an EU initiative should be made in order to equally distribute the immigrants that enter Italy. Simply just blocking the entry of immigrants will not solve the migration crisis that is already present in the country.

In the case of Italy, it is interesting to note that the policy is focused more on redistribution and repatriation rather than border control or on legislative initiatives on existing immigrants. The 2019 election media coverage mostly consisted of the conflict between the LN and the M5S. The LN constantly accused of the M5S of being ‘immigration friendly,’ while the latter criticized the former for ignoring the main problem. Overall 65.4

¹⁹ Salvini e Di Maio, il tentativo di riscrivere il contratto senza rompere. (2019, May 9). *Corriere Della Sera*. Retrieved from https://www.corriere.it/opinioni/19_maggio_09/salvini-maio-tentativo-riscrivere-contratto-senza-rompere-e4ea57ba-728e-11e9-861b-d938f88a2d19.shtml

²⁰ Ue, migranti, ambiente: Pd-M5s copia e incolla con i programmi uguali. (2019, May 24). *Il Giornale*. Retrieved from <http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/ue-migranti-ambiente-pd-m5s-copia-e-incolla-i-programmi-1700366.html>

percent of all media coverage on the M5S's migration discourse was on the Seawatch issue and disagreements between the two parties.

Alternative for Germany.

The Alternative for Germany is a relatively new party that was formed in 2013. As it was a new party there were no articles that directly mentioned the immigration issue discourse of the AfD. During the 2014 elections, the German media mostly explained what the European Elections were, when they will be held and described the importance of the elections. However in 2019 media coverage on the immigration discourse of the AfD accounted for 3.4 percent of all articles published on the AfD. 37.5 percent of these articles mentioned concrete policies while 62.5 percent mentioned the stance of the far right party. The policies mostly covered border control and legislative action on residential immigrants. The remaining articles stated the AfD's stance on the current existing asylum law and migration policies and also the usage of fear.

“Schengen has failed, rights such as AfDand call for complete isolation”(Süddeutsche Zeitung 2019)²¹

The lack of borders due to the Schengen agreement has caused migration problems for many European countries. Refugees and other immigrants, upon being granted access to the EU, were free to move about

²¹ "Europa kann nicht mehr mit Grenzen leben". (2019, May 14). *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Retrieved from <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/schengen-grenzkontrollen-europa-1.4444152>

the different member states. The AfD advocated for complete isolation and to opt out of the Schengen agreement in order to achieve stronger border control. The party also focused on legislative changes that have to be made for the migrants and refugees that currently reside in Germany. It is widely accepted that the current leading party of Germany does not have a strong legislative policy against criminal immigrants.

“Politicians are now about to make the same mistake twice, AfD chief Markus Wagner warned. After the Turkish-Arab clans, Syrians and Iraqis are now increasingly entering the criminal market. Lebanese already hired young migrants as drug dealers who later formed their own networks.” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2019)²²

“... the AfD called for harsher penalties and more expulsions of criminal foreigners...” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2019)²³
The statements show that the AfD is unsatisfied with the current

handling of the criminal activities of immigrants. There has been a rise of ‘crime clans’ that have negatively affected German cities. According to the leaders of the leaders of the AfD, the crime rate has risen due to the influx of immigrants. However, currently, the response to the crime is very weak. Markus Wagner, the chief of the AfD, warns that if harsher penalties are not made and criminal immigrants are not deported, Germany might be faced with an increase of such crime groups. Crime by immigrants were utilized to propose a policy in this case. However, immigration as a threat was also

²² Landtag gegen Clan-Kriminalität: "Jetzt räumen wir auf!". (2019, May 24). *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Retrieved from <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/landtag-duesseldorf-landtag-gegen-clan-kriminalitaet-jetzt-raeumen-wir-auf-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-190523-99-350881>

²³ Ibid.

utilized in order to highlight the anti-immigration stance of the AfD.

“The AfD accused the coalition of allowing excessive immigration.” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2019)²⁴

“the migration from 2015 and the following years only triggered the problem. Now pretending a ban solves the problem is pure hypocrisy. Not a single one will be impressed or stopped by crime.” - Stephan Brander (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2019) ²⁵

Crime by immigrants was an issue that the AfD emphasized during 2019.

The quotes above show that the AfD blames the CDU-CSU coalition for the influx of immigration and that the 2015 refugee crisis caused the increase of crime by immigrants. Stephan Brander, an AfD member of the Bundestag, emphasizes the need for harder punishments on criminal immigrants. He refers to the current stabbing by four immigrants and criticizes that the government’s solution, a knife ban, is too soft and will not defer the situation. Not only criminals, but the threat of regular immigrants were mentioned in the immigration discourse.

Similar to the FPÖ, the AfD supported the headscarf. Allegedly, this was to help migrants to integrate into society and to protect the social norms and identity of Germany. The AfD has been pushing this issue for a long time but the issue became more prominent after Austria passed the headscarf

²⁴ Streit im Bundestag über Einwanderung von Fachkräfte. (2019, May 9). *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Retrieved from <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundestag-streit-im-bundestag-ueber-einwanderung-von-fachkraeften-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-190509-99-141931>

²⁵ Keine Messer, wo viele Menschen sind: Neues Waffengesetz. (2019, May 12). *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Retrieved from <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/kriminalitaet-berlin-keine-messer-wo-viele-menschen-sind-neues-waffengesetz-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-190512-99-183913>

ban.

In the German results, it was difficult to differentiate between policies and comments. This is because some articles only mentioned the AfD's stance on a certain issue while others clearly pointed out the specific policy. During the 2019 elections, the AfD advocated for the strengthening of borders by discarding the Schengen agreement and to create stronger punishment against criminal immigrants. The media coverage mainly focused on the opinion of the entire party rather than the stance of individual politicians and candidates.

5.2. Comparison of the Parties

This section will organize the materials gathered through the media. The amount of immigration discourse published will be analyzed first. A Contextual analysis of the individual articles will follow. In the contextual analysis, the type of immigration discourse, the immigration of the policies, and the terminology used in the discourse will be evaluated. Through comparative research, the information will be compared between the 2014 and 2019 elections and also between the different parties.

Amount of Articles Published

There is no significant difference between the amount of articles published during the 2014 and the 2019 European Parliament Elections. However, with an exception to the FN, all the parties experienced an increase in the immigration discourse of the far right populist parties. FN had the most papers published in 2014 but the amount of papers on the immigration discourse dropped significantly in 2019. Therefore, the hypothesis held true for the AfD, FN and SD. In the case of the AfD and the SD, the immigration discourse increased and the support of the party increased as well. The FN and the SD experienced the opposite effect in that the immigration discourse decreased and the parties also experienced a decrease in support during the 2019 elections. The FPÖ and the M5S experienced an increase in the coverage of the immigration discourse between the 2014 and 2019 elections but the electoral success of the party did not rise

	2014	2019
FPÖ	1.1%	4.5%
FN	12.6%	4.9%
SD	2.3%	4.0%
M5S	0%	6.3%
AfD	0%	3.4%

**<Table 4: Articles Published on the Immigration Discourse of the
PRR>**

Types of Immigration Discourse

When analyzing the content of the media, the articles were separated into ‘policy’ or ‘comment.’ Policies were classified as statements that contained actual proposals and legislative actions that the party advocated for in their campaigns. Comments referred simply to the parties stating their political stance. In other words, whether the party accepted or rejected a certain policy.

Although there is not a lot of data, in 2014, the media covered mostly consisted up of comments rather than policies. This is because the articles published in 2014 were focused more on explaining what the EP elections were and who the different candidates and parties were. Therefore,

during this time the articles commented on the anti-immigration stance of the far right populist groups. In 2019 there was an increase in the coverage of specific policies of the PRR. However, similar to the 2014 elections, the newspaper articles focused more on the comment rather than specific policies of the radical right parties.

	Type	2014	2019
Austria	Policy	-	33.3% (9)
	Comment	100% (1)	66.7%t (18)
France	Policy	14.3% (1)	5.9% (1)
	Comment	85.7% (6)	94.1% (16)
Sweden	Policy	100% (1)	44.4% (4)
	Comment	-	55.6% (5)
Italy	Policy	-	34.7% (9)
	Comment	-	65.3% (17)
Germany	Policy	-	23.1% (3)
	Comment	-	76.9% (10)

<Table 5: Types of articles: Policy or Comment>

Policies of the PRR

Contextual analysis also showed the great differences between the parties. The table below shows the different policies that the parties campaigned for in both the 2014 and the 2019 elections. With an exception to the M5S, all parties mentioned the border control as a part of their policy.

The FPÖ, FN/RN, SD and the AfD wanted to retreat from the Schengen agreement as they blamed it for the lack of internal border that allowed for easier travel for the immigrants. Although the FPÖ and the AfD campaigned for the sovereignty of border control, the specific policies differed from the RN and the SD which called for a common European checkpoint outside of the EU. Migrants and refugees would be able to enter from these checkpoints rather than at the national borders.

The SD and the M5S were the only parties to mention repatriation. Repatriation is the policy in which refugees and asylum seekers are returned to their home country. The FPÖ and the AfD on the other hand, also mentioned deportation but it only applied to the criminal immigrants. More than half of the political policy discourse of the AfD and the FPÖ were focused on immigrants that were already residing in the country. Both parties wanted to create legislative initiatives that will lead to harsher punishments and even deportation of criminal immigrants. Policies such as the ‘headscarf’ ban were proposed in order to protect the national values and to facilitate integration of the migrants into society. The M5S also proposed policies on the residential migrants but the coverage was not as extensive as the previous two parties.

The FPÖ and the M5S also supported policies that would completely stop the flow of migration. The M5S showed a unique characteristic in that it was the only party whose policy supported the ‘fair’ distribution of

refugees and immigrants among EU member states. It is also interesting to note that the M5S and the SD supported a common EU asylum policy (common checkpoint, redistribution of immigrants, etc.). The other three parties on the other hand, were strongly against the common European asylum policy and called for the migration issues to be completely sovereign issues.

	FPÖ	FN/RN	SD	M5S	AfD
1. Border	11.1 % (1)	100% (1)	50% (2)	-	33.3% (1)
2. Repatriation	-	-	50% (2)	33.3% (3)	-
3. Residential	55.6% (5)	-	-	22.2% (2)	66.7%t (2)
4. 0 migrants	33.3% (3)	-	-	11.1% (1)	-
5. Distribution	-	-	-	33.3% (3)	-

<Table 6: Policies of the Far Right Populist Parties>

Terminology used in the articles

The terms used in the immigration discourse differed between the 2014 EP and the 2019 EP elections. The keywords used in the discourse can be categorized into 'immigration', 'refugee' and 'Islam.' As mentioned earlier in the research, these categories are all terms that describe the immigration issue and the discourse of the far right populist parties. The terms immigration and migration fell under the 'migration' category, the terms refugee and asylum were categorized under 'refugee' and Muslim and Islam were categorized under 'Islam.' During the 2014 elections, only the Austrian, French and the Swedish newspapers covered the immigration discourse of the far right populist parties. The terms under the migration category were repeated the most. The FN was the only party in which Islam terms were used in the immigration discourse.

The FPÖ and the SD repeated refugee terms the most while the RN, M5S and the AfD repeated migration terms the most during the 2019 elections. Compared to the 2014 elections, the discourse covered all of the topics evenly. However, the SD is the only party in which terms regarding Islam was not utilized in the immigration discourse in both 2014 and 2019. However, it is difficult to say if the repetition of terms affects the immigration discourse or the performance of the parties in any way

		Migration	Refugee	Islam
Austria	2014	2	1	0
	2019	27	33	10
France	2014	14	0	2
	2019	48	21	18
Sweden	2014	2	0	0
	2019	39	54	0
Italy	2014	0	0	0
	2019	78	8	9
Germany	2014	0	0	0
	2019	40	19	12

<Table 7: Terms Repeated in the Articles>

5.3 Findings

	2014 Articles	2019 Articles	2014 Vote Shares	2019 Vote Shares	Hypothesis
FPÖ	1.10%	4.50%	19.7% (4 Seats)	17.2% (3 Seats)	X
FN/RN	12.60%	4.90%	24.9% (23 Seats)	23.3% (22 Seats)	O
SD	2.30%	4%	9.7% (2 Seats)	15.3% (3 Seats)	O
M5S	0%	6.30%	21.2% (17 Seats)	17.1% (14 Seats)	X
AfD	0%	3.40%	7.1% (7 seats)	11% (11 Seats)	O

<Table 8: Overview of the Articles and Vote Shares>²⁶

The aim of the research was to figure out the cause of the change in the performance of the Far Right Populist parties. This research hypothesized that with the increase of immigration discourse published in the newspapers, the electoral support of the PRR would increase. Likewise, if there was to be a decrease of discourse, the electoral support will decrease as well. The hypothesis of the amount of migration discourse held true for

²⁶ www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/mobile-country-se-2014.html

three parties and false for the remaining two. The Alternative for Germany and the Swedish Democrats experienced a rise in the immigration discourse and was able to increase the number of seats in the European Parliament in 2019 compared to 2014. The Front National fit into the hypothesis but in that the immigration discourse decreased and the number of seats decreased in 2019 as well. However, the Freedom Party of Austria and the 5 Star Movement did not fit with this hypothesis.

In 2014, no articles were published on the immigration discourse of the AfD. However, during the 2019 EP elections, 3.4 percent of all articles published on the AfD covered the immigration discourse. The German newspapers focused more on the comments of the AfD rather than the actual policies. The policies that were published were based on order control and applying stricter laws on criminal immigrants. As the terms relating to the migration were repeated the most, it can be said that migration issues were the focus of the immigration discourse in 2019.

Similar to the AfD, the SD also experienced an increase of articles published on immigration issues and also the increase of vote shares. In 2017 2.3 percent of all articles on the SD covered the immigration issue and this rose to 4 percent in 2019. Although in 2014, only policies were covered, the 2019 discourse covered the comment on the SD's stance on migration more rather than the policies of the SD. The SD called for a common border outside of the EU for migrants and refugees to enter and also advocated for

the repatriation of immigrants and refugees. In 2014, migration terms were utilized the most but in 2019 there were more terms under the refugee category than the migration category.

The FN/RN is unique in that it is the only party in which the immigration discourse decreased from 12.6 percent of all FN articles in 2014 to 4.9 percent of all RN articles in 2019. The discourse was mostly comprised of comments for both elections and migration terms were utilized the most in the newspaper articles. In both 2014 and 2019 the main policy focused on border control. Although the party maintain relatively consistent, the RN experienced a loss in the vote shares compared to the 2014 elections. The appearance of the leading party's En Marche's migration policy set the 2019 elections apart from the 2014 elections. Macron's En Marche also adopted an anti-immigration stance which acted as competition for the RN. It can be assumed that this could have led to the decrease of immigration discourse and the support for the RN in 2019.

The FPÖ is one of the parties that did not match with the hypothesis. Although there was an increase of immigration discourse from 1.1 percent to 4.5 percent of all articles. For both the 2014 and 2019 elections, the FPÖ focused on the comments rather than the actual policies of the FPÖ. In 2019, there was an increase in the usage of refugee terminology rather than the migration terms. Similar to the AfD, the FPÖ's policies were based on stricter border control and the harsher legislative actions against the

residential immigrants in Austria. However, a political scandal in which AfD members were involved called the 'Ibiza Gate' caused my voter to mistrust the voters and for the FPÖ and the ÖVP coalition to break off.

The M5S did not match the hypothesis as the voting rate decreased even though the amount of immigration discourse increased. In 2014 the M5S won a total of 17 seats, earning 21.1 percent of the total vote but in 2019 only won 14 seats which accounted for 23.3 percent of the total vote. However, media coverage rose to 6.3 percent compared to the lack of coverage in 2014. The M5S's main migration policy was to return all refugees and migrants back to their original country, block all future immigration and supported the redistribution of migrants across the EU member states. During the three weeks before the election, it was evident that the M5S and the Lega Nord did not have good relations. M5S was not satisfied with LD's migration policy and LD accused the M5S of allowing refugees into the country. Thus, during the 2019 elections it can be said that the M5S experienced party competition.

Upon comparison of the five parties, the appearance of a competitor on immigration issue appears to cause a deviation in the results. Nevertheless, as three of the two cases fit into the hypothesis, the increase or decrease of immigration discourse can be said to have caused the change in the performance of the PRR. The question however, now becomes why the

hypothesis did not fit into all of the cases and therefore other factors must be analyzed in order to determine what causes the altering performance of the far right populist parties. The next chapter will attempt to answer this question through an in-depth analysis of the FPÖ and the AfD.

Chapter 6. The FPÖ and the AfD

This chapter will attempt to go into an in-depth analysis of the Freedom Party of Austria and the Alternative for Germany in order to answer what causes the change in the performance of far right populist parties. The two parties were chosen based on the geographical proximity and similar history, culture and language that they share (Rydgren 2018). The FPÖ and the AfD also share common ideologies in which both parties believe that the immigration issue is the most important issue and sees Islam as a threat (Wodak et al., 2012). Both parties also uses Christianity and its narratives in order to fight the growth of Islamic presence in the country. The AfD has created a set of “Christian occidental values” while the FPÖ partnered up with Judaism and created a set of “Jewish-Christian Cultural Value.” For both parties the anti-Islam discourse did not exist in 2014 but showed up during the 2019 election period (Rydgren et al., 2019). The migration policies for both parties are also similar. The parties do not want to kick out migrants and refugees that are already in the country but want to create stricter immigration policies and integration policies. The stricter immigration policies should limit the inflows of migrants into the country. Also they propose laws that would integrate migrants into the national

identity and advocate for stronger laws against criminal behavior of migrants. Integration policies would be laws put in place for the migrants that are already in the country (Dostal 2017, Lochocki 2018, Rydgren 2018).

The two parties not only share similar ideals but the parties itself are also interconnected and have a very close relationship. This was evident through the Ibiza Gate Scandal. This was a corruption scandal in which a video of FPÖ leader, Heinz-Christian Strache was caught discussing ways to cheat the election and to strengthen his power by gaining support from the Russians. The FPÖ experienced an excruciating loss in support but the AfD faced losses as well. This also affected both of the parties' discourse in the news. The scandal video was leaked on May 17th 2019. 73.2 percent of the articles on FPÖ's immigration policy were written before May 17th of the only 25.4 percent of the articles were written after the incident. The AfD experienced a similar trend in which 62.9 percent of the immigration discourse articles were written before the leak of the video and only 30.8 percent of the total was published after the Ibiza Affair. It is important to note that the M5S and the FN did not experience such change and the articles increased as the election date became closer. The question now becomes why only the hypothesis held true for AfD and not the FPÖ despite the similarities. This section will continue by briefly describing the history

and the development of both parties and then present two possible reasons for this outcome.

This section will first describe the political background of the two parties. Then a comparison will be done of the theoretical factors of success that was mentioned earlier on in the paper. Finally, the control variable, Euroscepticism, will be analyzed for the FPÖ and AfD during the 2014 and 2019 elections.

6.1. Background of the Freedom Party of Austria

The Freedom Party of Austria has a long history that dates back to the 1950s. In the beginning of the party, there were many former Nazi supporters in the group. However, the demographic changed later on. Throughout history, the FPÖ remained as a popular party in Austria. In order to strengthen their party even more, a coalition was formed with the Austrian People's Party. (ÖVP). However, after the cooperation, many of the supporters, especially the blue collared workers were unhappy with the newly made 'neo-liberal' economic policies. The supporters were also unhappy with the FPÖ being part of the national government despite being an anti-establishment party. These changes led to the loss of support and votes for the FPÖ. The instability led to the split of the group in 2005. This

paper will therefore focus on Austria post-2005 (Nielsen et al. 2017).

Starting from 2005, the FPÖ's main interest were anti-establishment, anti-migration and advocated the protection of the Heimat (homeland). Protecting Austrian culture and national sovereignty was the number one priority and the threat were the vast number of immigrants (Rydgren 2017). The Heimat discourse further proved the FPÖ to be a niche, single party as the issue lied neither on the "right" nor the "left." In the past the FPÖ was pro EU as it was thought that it would help protect the Heimat but after the introduction of the Eurozone, they became anti-EU. Some campaigns that are used by the FPÖ are "Homeland instead of Islam" and "Austria rethinks. Too much EU is silly." (Hotz-Bacha, 2017). Both campaigns are emphasizing the national identity and sovereignty of Austria. It can be said that this emphasis allowed for the FPÖ to regain its loss popularity pre-2005 (Rydgren 2017).

6.2. Background of Alternative for Germany

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) was formed in 2013 right before the national elections in Germany. Due to its short preparation time, the party could not gain a seat in the Bundesrat. However, it was able to grow through very strong campaigns based on German nationalism and Euroscepticism. AfD also experienced a spilt in 2015 between the

nationalist wing and the Eurosceptic wing. The issue arose from the nationalist wing wanting to expand their campaigns to immigration issues and against multiculturalism. The Eurosceptic wing on the other hand wanted to focus on systematically leaving the Eurozone and also the EU. The latter ended up breaking off and only the nationalist wing remained. This led to the strengthening of the anti-immigrant and anti-Islam discourse in the campaigns (Dostal 2017).

The AfD claims that most of Germany's problems and crimes are due to the influx of immigrants and also claim that the immigrants are threatening the national identity of Germany. The AfD constantly uses campaigns such as "In order not to be Eurabia" which warns the people and instills fear that the Christian German will turn into an Islamic one. (Holtz-Bacha, 2017). The AfD not only wants to protect the national identity of Germany but also wants to leave the EU treaties especially after the Greece financial crisis. Since its formation in 2013, the AfD has been steadily rising in both the national and European elections (Rydgren, 2018).

6.2. Comparison of the Parties

Protest Vote

Although both parties are similar in nature, there are crucial differences between the two parties. One is the timing of the national elections and the other is the role of the opposing party. According to the Second Order Election theory, the people are more likely to vote for a single issue party if the EP elections are held during the midterm period as a type of protest vote (Mudde 1999). Lochocki claims that the immigration discourse of the mainstream party also affects the performance of the PRR parties as far right populist groups normally take on issues and stances that are not covered by the bigger parties. Therefore, a deeper analysis should be done on the two parties.

The Austrian National Council (Nationalrat) elections take place every 5 years while the German Federal elections (Bundesrat) takes place every 4 years. However, the election dates are more flexible in Austria and an election can be held when need. (Rydgren 2018) For both countries, the national election right before and after the 2014 election was included. In both Germany and Austria, the elections before and after the EP elections were held in 2013 and in 2017. The 2014 elections can therefore, be considered to have taken place during the midterm period. Following the

SOE theory, there was a rise in the vote shares from 2013 to the 2014 EP elections for both the FPÖ and the AfD.

It is difficult to say that the same situation applies for the 2019 EP elections. The previous national election for both Austria and Germany took place in 2017 but the following election would take place differently. In Germany, the next election is due to take place in 2021, therefore, the 2019 elections also took place during mid-term season. Austria on the other hand had the elections earlier due to the Ibiza Affair. Due to the corruption scandal the opposing party successfully convinced the Austrian government to have another election as soon as possible. As a result, the elections took place in September of 2019. The FPÖ no longer had the advantage as the 2019 elections took place close to the national elections. Therefore, it can be said that the protest vote narrative did not apply to the FPÖ during the 2019 EP election.

Party Competition

Lochocki claims that the support of the PRR rises when there is no conservative position for the immigration issue. This means that if the main conservative party does not have a conservative stance on immigration, people will be more likely to vote for the far right populist parties. In Germany, the main conservative party is the CDU but over the years it has

made itself to be a “catch all party” instead of a conservative party. The CDU supports mass migration and this could be said to be reason for the 2015 refugee crisis in Germany. Before the crisis there was a welcoming attitude for all migrants and refugees but when the CDU refused to create strict immigration laws and to close its borders, citizens started to show more support for the AfD (Dostal 2017).

Similar to the AfD, the FPÖ was the anti-immigrant party of Austria. However, in 2017, the FPÖ formed a coalition with the conservative government, the ÖVP. In 2019, this coalition backfired as the coalition broke due to the Ibiza Affair. The FPÖ was no longer the only party with a conservative migration policy as the ÖVP also adapted a conservative stance. Lochocki states that once a conservative discourse on immigration is taken by the mainstream party, the PRR loses its support. The articles about the clash between the ÖVP and the FPÖ in 2019 state that both parties have a similar standing on migration policy.²⁷ The only difference is that the ÖVP is more policy and law based than the FPÖ and wants to change the issues at the EU level. The FPÖ on the other hand wanted Austria to have sovereignty and for the immigration issues to be solved at the Austrian level²⁸. As the

²⁷ Polit-Journal nennt Bundeskanzler Kurz "the Gambler". (2019, May 17). *Die Presse*. Retrieved from <https://www.diepresse.com/5629844/polit-journal-nennt-bundeskanzler-kurz-the-gambler>

²⁸ Strache doch offen für EU-Vertragsänderung: "Immer unser Wunsch". (2019, May 7). *Der Standard*. Retrieved from <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000102644250/fpoe-chef-strache-doch-offen-fuer-eu-vertragsaenderung-war-immer>

FPÖ was no longer the main party with conservative immigration issues, the support for the FPÖ could have dropped despite the increased coverage of immigration issues in the media.

Immigration Rate

The raw numbers of the immigration rate differ greatly between Austria and Germany. However, the pattern of the fluctuations between the two parties are very similar. From 2012 to 2014 there was a steady increase of immigrants. However, during the refugee crisis of 2015, there was great fluctuation in the number of immigrants that entered. The migration flow continued to grow steadily for both parties. However, it is important to note that it is widely debated on whether or not immigration rate plays a large role in the performance of the far right populist parties.

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Austria	91,557	101,866	116,262	166,323	129,509	111,801
Germany	592,175	692,713	884,893	1,543,848	1,029,852	917,109

<Table 9: Immigration Rate>

It is widely argued that the number of immigrants present in the state does not matter but that perceived threat of the immigrants are

important. As a result, even if the people do not have direct contact with the immigrants simply hearing about the immigration people from other people or on the media is enough. As the immigration rate increases for both parties, and the migration pattern is similar, it is difficult to state that the immigration rate is the cause of the performance.

Institutional Environment

	Electoral formula	threshold	State subvention
Austria	proportional	4 %	Easy
Germany	proportional	5 %	Easy

<Table 10: Institutional Environment of Austria and Germany>

The institutional environment of parliamentary counties is said to affect the performance of the far right parties. In this type of government, far right parties perform better in countries with a proportional electoral formula rather than a majoritarian formula as it is easier for smaller parties to be represented. A lower threshold is said to help the far right parties as they are able to gain seats in the parliament and the access to state subvention is said to also positive affect the performance of the parties (Carter 2005).

Austria and Germany share similar institutional environments that make it easier for smaller parties to perform well. Both countries have a proportional electoral formula and have a threshold that does not exceed 5 percent. It is also easier for parties to receive state funding during the campaigning period. As there is almost no difference between the two countries in regards to the environment, it is difficult to state this factor as the reason for the different results.

Eurosceptic Discourse

The existing literature on the media study of the PRR has shown that the immigration issue is the most consistently influential for the electoral success. However, the Eurosceptic discourse is also seen as influential albeit not as much as immigration (Hong 2017). As far right populist parties are also understood as ‘anti-elite parties,’ the Eurosceptic discourse in the newspaper should also be analyzed.

It was assumed that the PRR parties would maintain an anti-EU stance and the political stance would not differ greatly between the two elections. Therefore, the Eurosceptic discourse was set as the control variable. This section will examine the quantity of Eurosceptic discourse between the two elections and move onto the contextual analysis.

The Eurosceptic terms were determined from the anti-EU policies of the FPÖ and the AfD. ‘EU skeptische (EU Sceptic),’ ‘Eurozone,’ ‘anti-europäisch (Anti-European)’ and ‘Europäische Sozialunion (European Social Union),’ were used to filter the newspaper articles. However, The Eurosceptic discourse was very minimal for both parties. The issue was barely touched on and the only Eurosceptic discourse was related to the common European asylum law. (However, this was seen more of an immigration issue rather than an Eurosceptic issue)

As there was a lack of coverage of the Eurosceptic issues for both the 2014 and the 2019 elections, it is possible to say that the Eurosceptic discourse did not change between the two periods. It can also be said that this discourse was not the main focus of the parties during the EP elections. Therefore, the Eurosceptic discourse can be said to not have affected the different electoral performance of the FPÖ and the AfD.

From the comparison it is evident that the two parties and the two countries are very similar. They share similar institutional environment, the pattern of immigration has been similar for the past couple of years, and the Eurosceptic discourse did not play a significant role in either or the elections. The difference seems to stem from the protest voting and the party competition. As the elections for the FPÖ was pulled forward due to the political scandal, it is difficult to state that the SOE theory had an effect in the 2019 elections. However, it is evident that the FPÖ did suffer due to the

competition with the ÖVP. The AfD on the other hand was the only anti-immigration party during the 2014 elections. Even though both parties were affected by the Ibiza Gate scandal, only the support of the FPÖ decreased. Therefore, the party competition can be said to be one of the factors that led to the change in the performance of the far right populist groups in 2019.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

The Far Right Populist Parties are parties that take on an issue that traditionally neither belong to the “left” nor the “right.” The parties also pick up a narrative that is important to the current context but is currently not being discussed. In this paper it was found that such issue was the immigration issue. Existing literature stated that the immigration issue influenced the performance of the PRR. The analysis of media was proven to show the relationship between the immigration issues and the voter percentage since more coverage in the media led to the higher performance of the PRR. However, the existing literature failed to compare the two elections as there were not enough data and the nature of the EP elections changed after 2014. Therefore, existing literature only measured the immigration discourse in the national elections or just one of the EP elections

This paper attempted to add onto existing research by adding the 2019 elections and comparing it to the 2014 elections. The paper hypothesized that there would be an increase of immigration discourse and that such increase would lead to the increase of voter percentage. (In the same way, if there should be a drop of immigration discourse then the party’s support should also decrease.

The hypothesis only held to be true for the AfD, SD and the FN. But not for the FPÖ and the M5S. Articles about the immigration issues increased for the AfD and SD in 2019 and the party performed better than the previous election. The immigration discourse decreased for the FN in 2019 and the party also lost votes compared to the 2014 elections. This might be due to the lack of an “original” migration policy as the leading party of France, decided to also advocate the need for stronger migration policies.

As the hypothesis did not hold true for all parties an in-depth analysis was made between the AfD and the FPÖ in order to figure out why this might be so. Both parties are very similar in nature and are very closely inter-related. If the Ibiza scandal had detrimental effects on the FPÖ, it should have had the same effects on the electoral support of the AfD as the quantity of the discourse was effected like the FPÖ. It was found that the breakoff of the FPÖ and ÖVP coalition was the cause for the decrease of votes as the latter adopted the same migration policy and became a type of party competition.

The party competition existed for the FN and the M5S as well during the 2019 elections. All three parties that were affected by this factor experienced a decrease in the support of the parties. Although there was an increase of political discourse for the FPÖ and the M5S, most of the articles described the struggle of the PRR by describing not only the policy of the PRR but of

its competitors as well. Duverger and Downs argue that as voters are rational, they will vote for the larger party if issues coincide.

The quantity of immigration discourse did correlate with voting percentages but party competition can also be said to be another reason that caused the performance of the PRR to change. However, this paper cannot be generalized as the case countries were all Western European countries. More research needs to be done on a variety of member states.

This research has many limitations in that it is not an empirical study and that an online translator was used for the context analysis. As this research is not on data it is difficult to state that the immigration issue had more salience than another issue or factor. As an online translator was used, some parts might have been misinterpreted or excluded. The use of only online newspapers can also be said to be a limitation. Previous studies relied on both printed newspaper and online newspapers. Therefore, not all the articles published in the prospective country during the 2014 and 2019 period might have been analyzed for this research. This could answer why there was a lack of data in 2014.

The accessibility of and the readership online newspapers also needs to be analyzed. This research could not access the Swedish newspaper “Dagens Nyheter” without a Swedish phone number. In fact, it was found that the readership of online newspaper was falling due to the expensive subscription fees and the difficulty to access the articles. If this is true for all

parties, the immigration discourse might not be influential to the performance of the PRR as the majority of the voters would not have access to the papers.

Appendix

Appendix I. Contextual analysis of the FPO

2014							
Date	Title	Url	etc	FPÖ	P/C	Policy	Actor
13-May	Listenzweite	https://www.fpo.at/ep-candidates		EP candidates	2	N/A	1
2019							
Date	Title	Url	etc	FPÖ	P/C	Policy	Actor
06-May	Libyen: Kne	https://www.fpo.at/migration-policy		migration policy	2	N/A	1
06-May	Strache will	https://www.fpo.at/common-migration-policy		common migration policy	2	N/A	3
07-May	Faktencheck	https://www.fpo.at/anti-migration-anti-islam		anti-migration/ anti-islam	2	N/A	2
08-May	Finale im EU	https://www.fpo.at/migration-not-introducing		migration not introducing	2	N/A	2
08-May	Die große A	https://www.fpo.at/immigration-as-fear-tactic		immigration as fear tactic	2	N/A	2
08-May	"Time-out-F	https://www.fpo.at/kick-out-disruptive-immigration		kick out disruptive immig	1	3	2
08-May	FPÖ will m	https://www.fpo.at/eu-training-mission-commission		EU training mission: com	2	N/A	1
08-May	Dritter Anla	https://www.fpo.at/headscarf-ban		headscarf ban	1	3	2
09-May	Niederöster	https://www.fpo.at/fpo-anti-migration		Fpo anti migration	2	N/A	2
09-May	Verstaatlich	https://www.fpo.at/stronger-legal-counseling		stronger legal counseling	1	3	2
09-May	Kurz zu UN	https://www.fpo.at/hardline-asylum-policy-commission		hardline asylum policy c	2	N/A	1
13-May	Neos werbe	https://www.fpo.at/border-control		border control	1	1	2
15-May	Der Kanzler	https://www.fpo.at/ovp-fpo-migration-sin		OVP FPO migration sin	2	N/A	2
15-May	Terrorermit	https://www.fpo.at/anti-population-exchange		anti-population exchange	2	N/A	2
16-May	Nationalrat	https://www.fpo.at/nationalization-of-refugees		nationalization of refuge	1	3	1
16-May	headscarf b	https://www.fpo.at/headscarf-ban		headscarf ban	1	3	2
17-May	Polit-Journa	https://www.fpo.at/ovp-fpo-migration-sin		OVP FPO migration sin	2	N/A	1
18-May	Die Neuwa	https://www.fpo.at/reduce-illegal-immigration		reduce illegal immigratio	2	N/A	1
18-May	Kickl will ü	https://www.fpo.at/block-all-asylum		block all asylum	1	4	1
19-May	Österreich t	https://www.fpo.at/ovp-fpo-migration-sin		OVP FPO migration sin	2	N/A	2
19-May	EU-Wahl: E	https://www.fpo.at/migration-policy		migration policy	1	4	1
19-May	Aufmarsch	https://www.fpo.at/anti-population-exchange		anti population exchange	2	N/A	2
20-May	Good Cop, I	https://www.fpo.at/fpo-vs-ovp-migration		FPO vs OVP migration	2	N/A	2
20-May	"Machtbeso	https://www.fpo.at/fpo-and-ovp		FPO and OVP	2	N/A	2
22-May	(Ex-)Asylm	https://www.fpo.at/0-refugees-in-austria		0 refugees in Austria	1	4	1
24-May	Hofer am V	https://www.fpo.at/refugee-should-not-be-e		Refugee should not be E	2	N/A	1
24-May	Größte Gef	https://www.fpo.at/migration-policy-for-right-mig		migration policy for right mig	2	N/A	2

Appendix II. Contextual analysis of the RN/FN

2014							
Date	Title	Url	etc	<u>FN</u>	P/C	Policy	Actor
18-May	once les «francoscepti	140518A	anti-immigration		2	N/A	1
19-May	uroscepticisme marq	en-franc	ation major theme		2	N/A	2
20-May	Le Pen : ce qui les r	9-jean-l	anti-immigration		2	N/A	1
21-May	olution de Jean-Marie	FIG0005	migration/ anti muslim		2	N/A	1
21-May	d'immigration, une sin	le-virus	migration fear tactic		2	N/A	1
22-May	ez les programmes de	eennes-	er immigration laws		1	1,3	2
24-May	s enjeux des élections	24/tout-	ation major theme		2	N/A	2
2019							
Date	Title	Url	etc	<u>RN</u>	P/C	Policy	Actor
06-May	Républicains se donner	seille-le-	anti-immigration		2	N/A	1
09-May	era Jordan Bardella	pmenard-	immigration party		2	N/A	2
10-May	tre les mains des élec	ir-entre-	vs FN (immigration)		2	N/A	1
10-May	ent le Rassemblement	-rassem-	inst redistribution		2	N/A	2
10-May	ent ont voté les 82 é	comment-	inst redistribution		2	N/A	2
12-May	ne sont «pas le troisiè	mes-ne-	vs FN (immigr	order contr	1	1	2
14-May	appelle à voter RN «	nchon-a-	anti-immigration		2	N/A	2
18-May	A Milan, la	vini-et-le-	reserve identity		2	N/A	2
18-May	ont réunis à Milan aut	partis-d-	reserve identit	anti islam	2	N/A	2
18-May	divages classiques sus	-des-clit-	rid of schengen		2	N/A	1
20-May	la dramatisation et le	ctorale-l-	focus: migration		2	N/A	2
20-May	s enjeux européens, u	rale-des-	important to RN voters		2	N/A	2
21-May	nes» à voter pour le	Rts-jaune-	against LFI	ol, stricter	2	N/A	2
22-May	Le Pen cible le mouve	te-marin-	against LFI	ol, stricter	2	N/A	2
22-May	once les «méthodes p	-denonc-	against LFI	ol, stricter	2	N/A	2
22-May	enchon «craint une	als-melen-	against LFI	ol, stricter	2	N/A	2
22-May	ine Le Pen appelle au	e-le-pen-	protect identity		2	N/A	2

Appendix III. Contextual analysis of the RN/FN

2014							
Date	Title	Url	etc	<u>SD</u>	P/C	Policy	Actor
23-May	SD:s "bröstfil	https://	regulated migration		2	N/A	2
2019							
Date	Title	Url	etc	<u>SD</u>	P/C	Policy	Actor
5-May	Dramatic char	https://	stronger migration less EU integ		2	N/A	2
13-May	Partier strider	https://	no redistribution, stronger bord		1	1	2
16-May	Peter	https://	no redistribution, transit center		1	1	1
17-May	Sprickor i sver	https://	border control, transit center ou		1	1	2
17-May	Peter Lundgre	https://	migration policy (Australia)		1	1	2
19-May	Nej, sätt inte	https://	stronger migration policy (SD's		2	N/A	2
23-May	Ta ansvar, EU	https://	no redistribution, stronger bord		2	N/A	2
23-May	Migrationsfrå	https://	anti migration		2	N/A	2
25-May	SD:s linje kan	https://	migration policy important		2	N/A	2

Appendix IV. Contextual Analysis of the M5S.

2019							
Date	Title	Url	etc	M5S	P/C	Policy	Actor
09-May	Salvini e Di Maio, il te	https://	M5s vs LN	fair redistribu	1	5	2
10-May	5S dichiarano guerra	http://	clash in immigr	ation policy	2	N/A	2
10-May	Nuovo strappo M5s:	http://	M5S vs LN	Pickcs up refu	2	N/A	2
10-May	Così i Cinque stelle d	http://	M5S vs LN	Pickcs up refu	2	N/A	2
10-May	Di Maio fa il giustizia	http://	M5S vs LN	Pickcs up refu	2	N/A	2
10-May	Migranti, la Mare Jor	https://	M5S vs LN	fair redistribu	1	5	1
11-May	Per 4 italiani su 10 i	http://	stronger migration/	refugee	1	4	2
11-May	Salvini contro Conte,	http://	M5S vs LN		2	N/A	2
11-May	Di Maio attacca Salvir	https://	M5S vs LN	fair redistribu	1	5	1
12-May	Lo strappo sui porti	http://	M5S vsLN	Want Repatria	1	3,4	2
14-May	La Corte Ue: no all'es	https://	migration poli	Want Repatria	1	5	1
17-May	Migranti, Salvini: "Sor	http://	M5S vsLN	agagainst secu	2	N/A	2
17-May	Decreto sicurezza bis	http://	M5S vs LN	agagainst secu	2	N/A	2
17-May	La svolta dei Cinque	https://	against immigration		2	N/A	2
17-May	I 5 Stelle: «Salvini pu	https://	M5s vs LN	Salvini arroga	2	N/A	2
18-May	Di Battista: «Salvini fa	https://	M5s vs LN	Salvini arroga	2	N/A	1
20-May	Di Maio ora va all'att	http://	M5S vs LN	agagainst secu	2	N/A	2
20-May	Sea Watch, grillini die	http://	M5S vs LN	redistribution,	1	5	1
20-May	"Salvini fa il paraculo	http://	M5S vs LN	accusation M:	2	N/A	2
21-May	Mirandola, il M5S coi	http://	M5S vs LN	accusation M:	2	N/A	2
21-May	I magistrati vanno in	http://	M5S vs LN	different stan	2	N/A	2
21-May	Sea Watch, giallo sull	http://	M5S vs LN	different stan	2	N/A	2
21-May	Superpoteri al Vimin	http://	sea watch	Want Repatria	1	3,4	2
22-May	Due donne bruciate	http://	M5S vs LN		2	N/A	2
23-May	Gemelli di governo, l	https://	M5s vs LN		2	N/A	2
24-May	EU, migrants, environ	http://	fair redistribution		1	5	2

Appendix V. Contextual Analysis of AfD

2019							
Date	Title	Url	etc	AfD	P/C	Policy	Actor
06-May	Keine Einb	https://	islamic polygamy threat t		2	N/A	1
08-May	Protest be	https://	headscarf		2	N/A	2
09-May	Seehofer l	https://	stronger migration policy		2	N/A	2
09-May	"Es geht n	https://	asylum law not good en		2	N/A	2
09-May	Streit im B	https://	asylum law not good en		2	N/A	2
10-May	Das leise E	https://	harsher on migrant crim		2	N/A	1
10-May	Haft- und	https://	harsher on migrant crim		2	N/A	1
12-May	Keine Mes	https://	harsher on m migrant re		2	N/A	2
13-May	Fürchtet e	https://	use christian narrative ag		2	N/A	1
14-May	"Europa k	https://	stronger border control		1	1	2
16-May	Scharfe Kr	https://	asylum law not good en		2	N/A	1
17-May	Integrator	https://	headscarf ban		1	3	2
24-May	Landtag g	https://	harsher on migrant crim		1	3	2

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국문초록

본 연구는 2014 년과 2019 년에 각각 시행된 유럽의회 선거에서 극우 포퓰리즘 정당들이 거둔 성과가 왜 차이가 나게 되었는지를 구명하고자 한다. 극우 포퓰리즘 정당들은 2014 년 유럽의회 선거에서 괄목할만한 지지를 얻어냈다. 이처럼 지지세가 증가한 것은 유럽의회 입법적 기능이 강화되었고 2 차 선거였기 때문이다. 미디어들은 다양한 분석을 통해 극우 포퓰리즘 정당들의 중요 이슈들을 집어내기도 하였다. 그러나 유럽의회 선거에서 어떤 이슈가 가장 중요하고, 가장 영향을 미쳤는지는 여전히 논란 중이다.

기존의 연구에서와 마찬가지로, 본 연구는 국내 신문에 게재된 이민 담론이 극우 포퓰리즘의 성과에 영향을 미친다고 가정한다. 따라서 이민담론의 양이 늘어나면 PRR 에 대한 지원도 커져야 한다. 본 연구는 2014 년과 2019 년에 시행된 유럽의회 선거에서 다섯 건의 사례들을 선택해, 이들 사례들에 나타난 이민담론을 비교하여 해답을 얻고자 한다. 본 논문에서 선택한 사례는 ‘오스트리아자유당’ (FPÖ, 오스트리아), ‘국민연합’ (FN/RN, 프랑스), ‘5 성운동’ (M5S, 이탈리아), ‘스웨덴 민주당’ (SD, 스웨덴), ‘독일을 위한 대안’ (AfD, 독일)이다. 2014 년과 2019 년에 시행된 유럽의회 선거에서 이민담론이 어떤 기능을 하였는지를 규명하기 위해 당시 발행된 기사들을 분석하였고 이 기사와 관련된 사항들도 분석하였다.

지역 신문이 쏟아낸 이민담론은 AfD, SD 와 FN/RN 의 성과에 영향을 끼쳤다. 하지만 FPÖ 와 M5S 에는 영향을 끼치지 않았다. 극우정당의 효력의 변화를 일으킨 원인을 파악하기 위해 변수인 반-유로주의 담론과 다른 요인들을 함께 분석을 하였다. 이 분석에 따르면 이민정책에 관한 이슈의 수량과 관련이슈의 수량, 정당경쟁 등이 극우 포퓰리즘 세력을 약화시키는 요인임을 알 수 있다.

현재 유럽의회 선거 기간의 극우정당 성과에 관한 미디어 분석은 단일 선거에 초점을 맞추거나, 더 많은 사례에 대해 긴밀한 연구가 이루어지지 않아 데이터가 한정 되어 있다. 따라서, 두 건의 유럽의회 선거에 대한 비교 분석을 한 본 연구도 어느 정도 한계를 보일 수 밖에 없다. 따라서 앞으로의 연구에서는 사례 국가의 범위를 넓히기를 희망한다. 그럼에도 2019 년 선거가 가장 최근에 시행된 유럽의회 선거이기 때문에, 본 연구는 유럽의회 선거 기간에 거둔 극우정당의 성과에 관한 최신 연구에 어느 정도 기여할 수 있을 것이다.

주요어: 유럽의회 선거, 극우 포퓰리즘, 이민, 언론 분석