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국제학석사학위논문

**Japan's Multilateral Initiatives:  
Comparing APEC and FOIP**

일본의 다자주의 이니셔티브:  
APEC 과 FOIP 비교연구

2020 년 2 월

서울대학교 국제대학원  
국제학과 국제지역학전공

배 유 진

**Japan's Multilateral Initiatives:  
Comparing APEC and FOIP**

by

Yoo Jin Bae

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for  
the degree of Master of International Studies

**Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University  
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지도교수 박 철 희

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국제학과 국제지역학전공

배 유 진

배유진의 석사학위 논문으로 인준함

2020 년 2 월

위 원 장 \_\_\_\_\_ 신 성 호

부위원장 \_\_\_\_\_ 남 기 정

위 원 \_\_\_\_\_ 박 철 희



## **Abstract**

### **Comparing Japan's Multilateral Initiatives:**

#### **Comparing APEC and FOIP**

#### **일본의 다자주의: APEC 과 FOIP 비교연구**

Name: Yoo Jin Bae

Major and department: International Area Studies

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

Japan has taken strong leadership in promoting large-scale regional multilateral initiatives several times. It was Japan's MITI that led the creation of APEC in the late 1980s to bring countries in 'Asia Pacific' together to promote the trade and regional economic cooperation. APEC, established in November 1989 as government officials from twelve countries, celebrated its 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary with twenty-one members last year. Recently, Japan has been at the center of another multilateral initiative called FOIP. It was Japan that suggested the concept, and it is actively encouraging other countries to join the initiative. Although FOIP is still in a fledgling stage, several key countries had already agreed to promote the initiatives.

However, one might wonder why Japan is taking such strong multilateral initiatives. Launching new multilateral initiatives is a tough, time-consuming task that

requires a lot of efforts. Given that U.S.-Japan alliance has been the ‘axis’ of Postwar Japanese diplomacy, it is quite puzzling that Japan takes such strong initiatives in promoting multilateral initiatives. To figure out why Japan is taking such strong multilateral initiatives despite the tremendous amount of costs to do so, when its ‘axis’ of diplomacy is the alliance with America, the thesis compare the creation of APEC and development of FOIP, after analyzing the respective cases through the lens of bandwagoning and soft-balancing.

In essence, the thesis argues that Japan contrives multilateral initiatives of bandwagoning, to support U.S. through promoting and reinforcing the principles shared by U.S. and Japan. By doing so, Japan can secure its own economic and political interests through the multilateral initiatives. Nevertheless, the initiatives do not always remain as a bandwagoning to America. They oscillate between bandwagoing and soft-balancing depending on the occasion, as Japan has a stake in both (1) managing good relationship with U.S. since it is largely dependent on U.S.-Japan alliance, and (2) maintaining the existing liberal international order and ensuring U.S. commitment to it to secure wealth— Japan’s major source of power. Japan’s multilateral initiatives transform into soft-balancing or lose some of the distinctive bandwagoning characteristics, when Japan’s economic stances or interests are at odds with America’s, due to America’s attempt to lean toward unilateralism and diverge from its role to keep the international order that U.S. itself has established. And because Japan’s multilateral initiatives are flexible and U.S.-Japan alliance is at the very center of Japan’s diplomacy, these

initiatives, whether intended or not, eventually come to have implications for the alliance, such as contributing to the strengthening the alliance or leaving room for an extension of the alliance in the future.

**Key Words:** Japan's multilateral initiatives, bandwagon, soft-balancing, APEC, FOIP, U.S.-Japan alliance

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## Abbreviations

APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense (in U.S.)
DOS	Department of State (in U.S.)
FOIP	Free and Open Indo-Pacific
IR	International Relations
JIIA	Japan Institute of International Affairs
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry (in Japan)
MOD	Ministry of Defense (in Japan)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in Japan)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
NIE	Newly Industrializing Economies
PAFTA	Pacific Free Trade Area
PAFTAD	Pacific Trade and Development
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PRC	People's Republic of China
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership

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# I. Introduction

## 1. Research Background and Puzzle

Recently, Japan has been at the center of a newly emerging regional multilateral initiative called Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Japanese Prime Minister Abe suggested the concept of this initiative in 2016 at the TICAD VI for the first time, and ever since then Japan has been actively encouraging other countries to join the initiative. While FOIP is still in a fledgling stage, several key countries such as U.S., India, and Australia had already agreed to promote the initiative and expressed their support for it. Actually, Abe administration is not the first Japanese administration to take such a strong initiative in creating and promoting multilateralism. Thirty years ago, Japan led the establishment of APEC to bring countries in ‘Asia Pacific’ together and promote free trade and regional economic cooperation. As of today, APEC, which began with government officials from twelve countries in November 1989, has grown into an initiative with twenty-one members.

Nevertheless, it was not that Japan always took strong leadership in multilateral initiatives. Indeed, it is U.S.-Japan alliance that has been constantly thought as one of the most –if not the most–important factors of Japanese diplomacy<sup>1</sup>. During the Cold War Era,

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<sup>1</sup> Majority of the Japanese political scientists including Akihiko Tanaka and Yoshihide Soeya

as Akihiko Tanaka points out, the alliance with the U.S. had been virtually the top priority for Japan, even though (1)UN-centered diplomacy, (2)cooperation with liberal democracies of the Western Alliance, and (3)identifying closely with Asian nations were officially announced as the three pillars of Japanese foreign policy in 1957. Tanaka explains that this was because U.S. was the most important country among the liberal democracies of the Western Alliance, while UN could hardly function during the Cold War and Japan did not have diplomatic relations with its biggest Asian neighbor, China, for a long time in this period (田中, 2010). Japan was well off with this strategy, as it emerged as the world's no.2 economy following U.S. during the Cold War. The emphasis on the relationship with America and the alliance with it has been persistent throughout the Post-Cold War Era as well, as can be seen from the constant strengthening of the alliance that has taken place during Hashimoto, Koizumi, and Abe administrations. While there were temporary tensions in U.S.-Japan relations, such as when Hatoyama administration tried to relocate the U.S. base in Okinawa, these short-lived tensions did not stop or reverse the general trend of Japanese diplomacy to put emphasis on the alliance or the bilateral relationship with America .

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agree that U.S.-Japan alliance has been the axis of Japanese foreign policy. Also, as Calder points out, many researches including works by McCraw or Delster, Sato and Fukui, argue that U.S.-Japan relations is a key determinant on Japanese foreign economic policy (Calder, 1988).

Then since around the end of the Cold War, amidst the increasing trend of multilateralism and regionalism in Asia, Japan, not only just joined the then-emerging multilateral frameworks, but also started to take strong initiatives in creating them (Fukushima, 1999). MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Japan) actively led the creation of APEC in the late 1980s. Although the initiatives were not realized eventually, the creation of East Asian Community was discussed during Koizumi administration, and the promotion of East Asian Community Initiative was explored during Hatoyama administration. Recently, Japan is promoting another multilateral initiative called FOIP.

However, Japan's such eagerness to initiate regional multilateralism seems quite puzzling. As U.S. Secretary of State James Baker stated in 1989, "there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things (cited in Terada, 2001)". Creating and spreading a huge-scale regional multilateral initiative definitely is a costly task, even for a wealthy country like Japan. Given that Japan's diplomatic axis has been the bilateral alliance with U.S. throughout the Cold War Era and that Japan had thrived during this period, it is difficult to grasp Japan's motivations for pursuing multilateral initiatives. Why does Japan take such strong multilateral initiatives in spite of the tremendous amount of endeavors and costs to launch one, when the most important factor in its foreign policy has been alliance with U.S. or the bilateral relationship with U.S.? And is there any relationship

between the alliance and the multilateral initiatives?

Figuring out answers to these questions is clearly important. It provides insights to Japanese diplomacy and deepen our understanding on the regional orders in Asia and beyond. Moreover, by closely examining the interaction between the U.S.-Japan alliance and the multilateral initiatives launched by Japan, one can also learn about the dynamics within asymmetrical relationship and behaviors of a state that is in a relatively weaker position.

## **2. Literature Review**

Since U.S.-Japan alliance has undeniably been the most important factor in Japanese foreign policy, many researches on Japanese foreign policy until the 1980s, especially those conducted in the West, largely focus on U.S.-Japan relations to grasp Japanese foreign policy behavior. Explaining his research as “broadly consistent with arguments stressing the importance of international considerations, particularly the U.S.-Japan alliance, in influencing Japanese economic behavior”, Kent Calder adopts the concept of “reactive state” to describe Japan’s foreign policy behavior. He argues that Japan often unsystematically “responds to outside pressures for change”, failing to come up with major strategic foreign policy initiatives on its own. He claims that Japan “has been consistently more cautious in taking international initiatives than most of major European governments”

and “more deferential to pressures from the United States” than other middle-range powers, due to its domestic political structure which “discourages pro-active policy behaviors,” and its heavy dependence on America (Calder, 1988).

However, contesting arguments that underline more proactive nature of Japanese foreign policy has emerged in Post-Cold War Era. Many studies highlighting Japan’s initiatives and independent efforts in pursuing multilateralism began to appear since this period, as Japan started to take active stance in multilateralism since around the end of the Cold War. Works in the late 1990s to the early 2000s focus on Japan’s attempt to establish APEC, and the studies published in the last couple of years traces the development and evolution of FOIP. While the researches also pay attention to U.S.-Japan relationship and other “outside pressures” that led to changes in Japan’s foreign policy behavior, they point out that the changes in Japan’s foreign policy behaviors are not mere passive reaction or mere acceptance of U.S. demands.

Kikuchi, based on his in-depth, chronological analysis on how and why Japan had come to launch APEC, argues that the creation of APEC was Japan’s attempt to find new regional order to secure its national interests, amidst the fluctuation of international free trade system triggered by declined U.S. hegemony and Europe’s emerging regional integration that seemed like “inward looking” (菊池, 1995).

Fukushima, examining Japanese foreign policy through the lens of multilateralism since the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 to the then-“emerging” APEC, claims that Japan turned into a “navigator” of multilateralism in East Asia in the Post-Cold War Era. She adds that focusing on U.S.-Japan alliance without much engaging in multilateralism as Japan did during the Cold War Era will “no longer suffice in the Post-Cold War era” due to the globalization and multipolarity that are in progress (Fukushima, 1999).

Soeya, stressing strategic and proactive aspects of Japanese diplomacy regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance and diplomacy based on this bilateral alliance, argues that there is a tradition of “middle power diplomacy” in Japan that dates back to Yoshida Doctrine, and interprets Japan’s multilateral initiatives through this this framework of middle power diplomacy. According to Soeya, unlike great power diplomacy, which involves unilateralism and control on the basic structure of international system through security sector, middle power diplomacy accepts the international system determined by the great powers as a given condition and strives to avert confrontations with great powers, while seeking the nation’s autonomy in sectors other than security. He argues that Japan’s foreign policy has been middle power diplomacy backed up by its clear support for the U.S.-Japan alliance, and views Japan’s cooperation with Australia that led to APEC as part of this middle power diplomacy (添谷, 2005).

Tanaka rather vaguely maintains that creation of APEC was Japan's attempt to prevent deterioration of the U.S.-Japan relations amidst the U.S.-Japan trade conflicts in the 1980s (田中, 2007; Tanaka, 2017). Regarding FOIP, he insists that the initiative should be understood in the context of Japan's efforts to pay attention to world's "center of growth" (Tanaka, 2018).

Works by Yuichi Mataka Kamiya and Yuichi Hosoya both trace recent changes in FOIP to incorporate opinions of other countries. However, rather than viewing the change as a passive response, they view it as a clever development to draw more members into the initiatives that Japan hopes to promote (Kamiya, 2019; Hosoya, 2019).

Likewise, against Calder's famous argument of "reactive state," these works on Japan's Post-Cold War multilateral initiatives validly suggest that Japan's foreign policy is more than just short-term, ad hoc responses to "outside pressures" or mere acceptance of U.S. demand, and indicates that Japan's foreign policy actually entails a long-term strategy. However, as most of these researches focus on a single case, often tracing its historical development without theoretical frameworks, there are few works that can offer generalizable explanation on which occasions Japan take multilateral initiatives or what strategy and purpose lie behind Japan's multilateral initiatives.

Reflecting on this lack of more general explanation on why Japan takes multilateral initiatives in the existing researches, this thesis attempts to provide a relatively more generalizable and comprehensive insight via a comparative analysis based on multiple cases. And in doing so, the thesis takes a look at how the multilateral initiatives is related to the U.S.-Japan alliance that is admittedly the most important factor in Japanese diplomacy.

### **3. Research Methods and Procedures**

For clarification, this section introduces cases selected, research methods, theoretical frameworks, and key concepts that are used in the following chapters.

#### **3.1 Case Selection and Methods**

The thesis conducts a comparative study by analyzing multiple cases on Japan's multilateral initiatives. Beside APEC and FOIP, there have been multilateral initiatives that were discussed among Japanese officials and scholars without being realized, such as East Asian Community during Koizumi administration or East Asian Community Initiative during Hatoyama administration. For an in-depth analysis, instead of exploring all the initiatives and visions discussed in Japanese government, the thesis chooses to examine only APEC and FOIP, the two most successful initiatives that actually came to be realized.

However, in order to minimize the problem of selecting cases based on dependent variables or the problem of omitted variables, which is well-known as the limitation of qualitative researches with a small number of cases (Mahoney, 2004), the thesis adopts process tracing for these case studies. The thesis examines the emergence of APEC and its predecessors from the late 1960s, and FOIP from the early 2000s to the present, by analyzing relevant government documents and publications, newspaper articles, books, and papers.

### **3.2 Theoretical Frameworks for Analysis**

Since the purpose of this study is to understand why Japan is taking strong multilateral initiatives in regard to U.S.-Japan alliance, analytical tools that help explaining Japan's action in regard to the alliance or its relationship with U.S. are necessary. Therefore, this thesis adopts the following theoretical frameworks that offer insights for the behaviors of a state that is in a relatively weaker position to analyze the creation of APEC and FOIP.

#### ***Bandwagoning***

Bandwagoning is a concept to describe a weaker power's alignment with a stronger one. However, specific definitions may differ depending on whose definition one chooses to adopt. As Schweller points out, by and large, there are two streams for the definition of bandwagoning in international relations; (1) definition based on balance of power by Wright and Waltz, and (2) definition based on balance of threat by Walt. Since

Waltz's definition better reflects the "conventional usage" of the term 'bandwagon' that does not assume involuntary support gained through coercion (Schweller, 1998), and better grasp the Japan's alignment with U.S., this thesis follows Waltz's definition of bandwagoning. Therefore, here in this thesis, bandwagoning refers to an alignment with the predominant power. It is the opposite concept of Waltz's balancing, which is alignment against the prevailing side (Waltz, 1979).

### ***Soft Balancing***

Pape and Paul suggest a useful concept called "soft-balancing" to describe a strategy that a relatively weaker state can take when its interests are conflicting with a dominant state. According to Robert Pape, soft balancing is utilizing indirect tools such as territorial denial, entangling diplomacy or economic strengthening "to make a superior state's military forces harder to use, without directly confronting the state's power with one's own forces". Although soft balancing measures do not directly challenge a hegemon's military preponderance, they can "delay, complicate, or increase the costs of using that extraordinary power, and can establish a basis of cooperation for more forceful, hard-balancing measures in the future" (Pape, 2005). Similarly, T.V. Paul argues that great powers have been pursuing "limited tacit, or indirect balancing strategies largely through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions", to constrain U.S. power in the Post-Cold War Era. For the three conditions in which soft balancing behavior occurs, he suggests followings: (1) while hegemon's

power position and military behavior are problematic, it does not pose a serious threat to sovereignty of the great powers, (2) the hegemon is the major source of public goods, and (3) the hegemon cannot easily retaliate (Paul, 2005).

To sum up, soft balancing is an indirect, limited, and rather subtle attempt to contain a hegemon, in case the hegemon is not thought to be a serious threat and a direct confrontation with the hegemon seems to be an unwise choice. And one way to soft balance a hegemon is to entangle the hegemon into an institution or a diplomatic frameworks.

### **3.3 Definition of Multilateralism: “Logic of Multilateralism”**

Lastly, it is necessary to clarify what key concept ‘multilateralism’ means before proceeding to analyses. While there are several definitions regarding this concept, as this study tries to explore the emergence and development of APEC and FOIP, the thesis adopts Fukushima’s concept of multilateralism, because her concept best reflects the characteristics of these initiatives.

However, as Fukushima came up with her definition after exploring widely-used definitions of multilateralism by Keohane and Ruggie and modifying them, it is necessary to take a look Keohane and Ruggie’s definition before introducing Fukushima’s definition.

Keohane defines multilateralism as “the practice of coordinating the national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions” (Keohane, 1990). Ruggie’s definition is similar to Keohane’s, as he defines it as “coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles”. However, Ruggie’s definition is narrower than Keohane’s, since he emphasizes two aspects of multilateralism: (1) “generalized principles” logically entailing an *indivisibility* among the members, (2) generating expectations of “diffuse reciprocity” among the member states (Ruggie, 1992).’ Based on these two attributes he identified, Ruggie concludes that “multilateralism is a highly demanding institutional form”.

On the other hand, while exploring the multilateral initiatives that Japan has joined or taken part in creation, Fukushima defines multilateralism as the following.

“... the author, while agreeing with Ruggie’s definition of multilateralism, defines multilateralism as *‘the logic of multilateralism’* to avoid the confusion that multilateral institutions in their formal state are a prerequisite for multilateral cooperation. In other words, the author believe that multilateral cooperation can be pursued without a formal intergovernmental organization, but it does require *a certain set of norms or principles for policy cooperation, hence the word ‘logic.’* Such principles do not have to be stipulated in writing in order for norms to evolve. Moreover, even the written codes of conduct can be interpreted more flexibly. Therefore, in the post-Cold War era, the key to

sustainable cooperation may be a shared sense of an evolving logic of multilateralism (Fukushima, 1999, *emphasis added*).”

This thesis adopts Fukushima’s definition of multilateralism, which stresses the shared logic of principles and norms for policy coordination without emphasizing stipulation in certain forms, because this is the most appropriate concept to grasp the essence of Japan’s initiatives. As will become clear in later chapters, what Japan was pursuing through the search and promotion for APEC and FOIP were spread and consolidation of broad principles and norms like free trade, the rule of law, and freedom. For instance, Japan was trying to promote free trade while preventing the advent of protectionism, but Japan was hardly picturing specific images of free trade in detail. Moreover, this “logic of multilateralism” is particularly adequate for describing FOIP, which for now is greatly about broad norms, values, and ideas with hardly any reference to a particular form of implementation, as it is in its fledgling phase.

The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter 2, the thesis analyzes Japan’s intention and a series of events and circumstances that led to APEC. In chapter 3, the thesis analyzes the ideas and situations leading to FOIP. Based on these case studies, in chapter 4, the thesis analyzes the similarities and differences between APEC and FOIP.

## **II. The Creation of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation**

This section delves into how APEC was established what influence it had on Japanese foreign policy. This section examines how Japan began to pursue a regional multilateral initiative as a form of bandwagoning to U.S., then later pursued soft balancing against U.S. while coping with the changes in the international trade system. Finally, it reveals the unintended consequences of APEC in political realm that set foundations for Japan's bandwagoning to U.S. in the Post-Cold War World.

### **1. The Origin of Japan's Vision Regarding Pacific Cooperation in the 1960s: Kennedy Round and Japan's Bandwagoning to U.S.**

The first regional multilateral initiative in Asia-Pacific suggested by Japan, which eventually paves a way to the creation of APEC decades later, dates back to the PAFTA initiative in the 1960s. The plan for this initiative, mainly led by Japanese economists together with their Australian counterparts, emerged as a means to protect Japan's national interests after GATT Kennedy Round.

At Kennedy Round, U.S. called for reductions in tariffs and trade barriers for the favors of its homeland farmers and political implications of Western solidarity during the Cold War (CIA, 1964). Japan, a U.S. ally against Soviet threat that had been undergoing

rapid economic growth under the liberal international trade system led by U.S. hegemony, had been advocating free trade as well.

However, after witnessing the stalemates in the negotiations for the Kennedy Round and phenomena in Europe and developing countries, Japanese economist Kojima Kiyoshi began to question the feasibility of global-scale international free trade. He doubted that the declining U.S. hegemony might no longer be able to sustain the GATT system. In his 1969 book, Kojima argues that the world economy is “fluctuating” with the weakening of U.S. predominance. He claims that the deadlock in international monetary system, international trade system, capital flow, North-South problem and increasing influences of developing countries in the aforementioned sectors suggest decline of America’s international economic status and loss of U.S. leadership. He comments that the U.S. predominance in terms of Cold War is merely sustained by disruption between Soviet Union and China (小島, 1969).

These obstacles of international free trade system that Kojima pointed out encouraged Japan to contrive a bandwagoning strategy. To secure Japan’s national interests as a country whose power derives from wealth and thus put great emphasis on

technoeconomic interests<sup>2</sup>, Japan had begun to explore creating a multilateral initiative to support America's attempt to maintain international free trade system. Kojima, skeptical of the prospect of global-scale trade liberalization and concerned that Japan would be marginalized if Europe came up with "inward looking" system after realizing "Greater European Integration" or Britain joined U.S. and Canada to create NAFTA(North Atlantic Free Trade Area), called for the creation of PAFTA (Pacific Free Trade Area). Kojima's plan was to construct a regional free trade area that could be realized at once, consisting of the five developed countries in the Pacific region-Japan, U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand(小島, 1969). With the request from Prime Minister Miki, who was deeply interested in the economic cooperation among the Pacific countries, Okita and Kojima began preparation for an international conference to examine the feasibility of the PAFTA initiative. In January 1968, the first PAFTAD (Pacific Trade and Development) conference was hosted by JIIA (Japan Institute of International Affairs) in Tokyo. During the PAFTAD conferences, Japanese economists worked especially closely with their Australian counterparts such as Peter Drysdale and John Crawford to realize the multilateral initiative in the Pacific region<sup>3</sup>, forming the network of intellectuals that made a considerable

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<sup>2</sup> Refer to Heginbotham and Samuels' "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy" to see how much Japan value technoeconomic interests.

<sup>3</sup>The Australian counterparts thought that the economic order in Asia Pacific was fluctuating due to the weakening U.S. leadership and measures should be taken in order to restore U.S. leadership

contribution in spreading the ideas of the Pacific economic cooperation in each country for the following years (菊池, 1995).

The exploration of this bandwagoning initiative had continued on in Japan. In early 1970s, seven experts consisting of economists, journalist, and bureaucrats from MITI and MOFA worked together under the lead of Okita and Kojima for the research on economic cooperation in the Pacific region (大来, 1971). Then, in the late 1970s, the regional multilateral initiative, which has long been discussed among the economists in the form of PAFTA, emerged as a diplomatic agenda in Japanese government for the first time under Ohira's leadership (菊池, 1995). Ohira was enthusiastic about this search for new regional multilateral initiative, as he was seeking ways to expand Japan's role in international affairs<sup>4</sup> and sought ways to widen Japan's diplomatic horizon based on the strengthened

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and alleviate America's burden. Aware of the strategic thinking of strengthening U.S.-Japan partnership in shaping regional order, and based on the judgement that Japan should share America's burden, Australian scholars advocated Kojima's argument. They considered a regional framework is necessary to allow Japan's burden sharing without resistance from other Asian countries. The experts from the two countries conducted their joint research and projects throughout the 1970s (菊池, 1995).

<sup>4</sup> Ohira argued Japan should play more active role in creating international peace and prosperity rather than to remain "passive beneficiary of world peace and prosperity" (Terada, 2001). He also

U.S.-Japan security ties under Ford and Miki (Soeya, 2017). Much of the ideas of PAFTA were succeeded to Ohira administration's initiative "Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept" as Ohira's initiative also aims to promote "free and open interdependence" within the region, which is "by no means an exclusive and closed regionalism vis-a-vis outside of the region." Also like PAFTA, this concept is also based on the concern over "what appears to be a decline in the free and open international economic system grounded in the GATT and IMF arrangements"(Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept Study Group, 1980). However, Ohira administration's initiative offers broader concept than the previous initiative in terms of the actors and the region. As suggested in the expressions in MOFA's official documents (Terada, 2001), and what Ohira said during the first meeting of the Study Group (Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept Study Group, 1979), this initiative explicitly included the Southeast Asian countries, and the concept of 'Asia Pacific' was being slowly shaped around this time regarding the initiative.

To realize this multilateral initiative, Japan asked Australia to take the leadership in public. The reason why Japan asked Australia to take lead was to avoid other Asian

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called for the Comprehensive National Security, which is pursuing military, economic and domestic security through combined efforts of enhancing Japan's own defense capability, improving U.S.-Japan security framework, and developing favorable international environment. This principle that had made a fundamental part of the LDP leadership election and then was succeeded to the following administrations as well (Soeya, 2017).

nations' criticism that Japan is trying to rule Asia or that it is trying to establish an Asian bloc. By asking Australia, a U.S. ally and a member of the Western Alliance, to lead the initiative and host the seminar, Japan thought it could avoid such criticisms while expressing its diplomatic presence relatively better than when pursuing it with U.S. (菊池, 1995). When Ohira visited Australia in January 1980, Ohira and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser consented to have a seminar to discuss the realization of the initiative. Therefore, the Canberra Seminar, which later known as the first PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council) meeting, was held at Australian National University in September 1980.

Thus, based on the Ohira-Fraser agreement, PECC was launched in 1980<sup>5</sup>, to begin Pacific cooperation. Although PECC was closely linked to participants' governments, officially it is a loose, consensus-based, non-governmental meeting for the regional cooperation. The participants for the 1980 meeting were Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States, and Pacific Islands of Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. The delegation from each country or region consists of three members: (1) one senior government official, (2) one business leader, and (3) one academic member. Yet, as Kikuchi points out, all

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<sup>5</sup> The term PECC was used since the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting (菊池, 1995).

delegates participated as *individuals*, as there were countries that had not established diplomatic relationships. Through the establishment of this PECC, the individuals who were working on the researches and movement for Pacific cooperation on their own were able to get together. (菊池, 1995).

## **2. The Fledgling Multilateral Initiative in the 1980s: Japan's Soft Balancing against U.S. and the Creation of APEC**

Several important changes took place during the 1980s, and encouraged Japan to make further efforts in pursuing regional multilateralism and establish a government-level initiative.

At international level, the international free trade system seemed to be in a great peril by the end of the 1980s. The GATT system had been fluctuating, as the negotiations for Uruguay Round did not go well and were often suspended. Protectionist arguments were increasing in European countries amidst its regional integration, as many Western countries were losing comparative advantages in the labor-intensive manufacturing sectors whereas Newly Industrializing Economies (NIE) were rising in Asia (菊池, 1995).

In bilateral level, U.S.-Japan economic relationship throughout the 1980s indicated U.S. and Japan had conflicting interests and diverging stances regarding the trade with each other. Despite the fact that U.S. and Japan had been cooperating closely against the commonly perceived Soviet threat in security sector and had further strengthened their alliance during Reagan-Nakasone period, there were serious economic frictions between the two countries in the 1980s. While the two countries had already undergone the trade conflicts from the late 1960s to the early 1970s regarding Nixon's quotas on textile products, those past disputes did not last long as the issue was settled with Japan imposing three years of voluntary restraint (Soeya, 2017). However, the economic frictions that returned once again in the 1980s, as U.S. shifted its economic policy from Keynesianism to "Reaganomics," developed into a much more serious trouble. U.S. strongly urged Japan to make "policy coordination" to adjust its balance of payments, and Japan eventually had to accommodate the demand. Moreover, Reagan's new trade policy that was outlined a day after signing of the Plaza Accord emphasized launching a new GATT round in the fields where U.S. was highly competitive and conducting bilateral and regional trade and commerce negotiations (Tanaka, 2017). In 1986, with U.S. demand, Japan had to sign the Semiconductor Agreement and adjust the price of semiconductors, following America's "anti-dumping." Furthermore, in April 1987, Reagan decided to impose a 100% tariff on some of Japanese high-tech products "to enforce the principles of free and fair trade" (New York Times, 1987).

Upon the U.S. demands during the economic friction, Japan had come to believe that U.S. was making “unilateral” attempts for its own benefits. Against Reagan’s decision to take measures for *fair trade*, Japanese Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari responded that “Japan finds it deeply regrettable that the United States Government has put into effect unilateral measures against Japan” (New York Times, 1987). Thus Japan was naturally worried about the formation of an “inward looking” regionalism upon the conclusion of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in January 1988, believing that U.S. was pursuing national interest through bilateral and regional frameworks rather than the international framework of GATT (Tanaka, 2017).

Under these circumstances, Japan strived to come up with a soft balancing strategy to (1) mildly deter U.S. from taking “unilateral” measures in trade issues through entangling diplomacy, (2) counter the formation of “inward looking” trade system in Europe and North America and (3) support the tradition of GATT system. Japan was in no position to risk a direct confrontation with U.S., when the hegemon U.S. was eyeing Japan’s growing power with suspicion<sup>6</sup> and Japan was militarily counting on U.S. to deter Soviet threat, though the level of Soviet threat decreased in the late 1980s as Gorbachev

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<sup>6</sup> With the economic frictions and declining Soviet threat, a growing number of Americans had come to view Japan “not so much as an ally but more as an economic rival.” U.S. media began to address Japan with words like “danger”, “revisionism” and “containing” (Tanaka, 2017).

became general secretary of the Communist Party. Therefore, based on the judgement that an informal and non-government institution of PECC was insufficient, Japan decided to launch an economic multilateral initiative at the government level to promote free trade and deal with America..

Since around the mid-1980s, MITI took initiatives in conducting researches on government-level institution building in the Asia-Pacific, and confirmed the necessity of establishing one (Terada, 2001). The efforts for the multilateral initiative were accelerated and the plans were further specified in 1988, with Sakamoto Report. In early 1988, through his visit to America, Prime Minister Takeshita learned that U.S. was considering FTA with Asia-Pacific nations, including Japan. With Takeshita's order to examine the issue, the Study Group for Asia Pacific Trade Development was created. The Study Group, led by Yoshihiro Sakamoto, submitted an interim report that advocated the creation of an Asia Pacific Economic forum to prevent the world from splitting into competing regional economic blocs. The report emphasizes "role-sharing" with U.S. rather than just depending on U.S., openness and inclusiveness, and Japan's role in achieving those purposes (Funabashi, 1995). The followings are several important points of the Sakamoto Report summarized in Funabashi's book.

- "The region's economic and trade structure should be changed from "development through US dependency" to "development through role-sharing cooperation in the region"

- “The OECD model of rigid organization is not tenable in the Asia Pacific, which requires a forum that would allow for greater diversity. Any new effort toward economic cooperation must smoothly relate to existing regional forums such as ASEAN, operate by consensus, progress gradually, and remain open to other regions.”

- “To promote the above ideas, Japan must expand its imports, increase its FDI in the region, and support regional human resources development.”

- “Japan should approach Australia about taking public leadership for the forum because of Australia’s non-threatening nature and interest in building broader ties with both Asia and North America”.

(Funabashi, 1995)

As Sakamoto Report’s conclusion suggests and just like the launching of PECC, Japan once again asked Australia to take leadership, and Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke made the proposal for building this government-level regional multilateral initiative. At Seoul on January 31, 1989, Hawke announced a plan to create a government-level institution for economic cooperation in Asia Pacific as an attempt to support GATT system that is in “its most crucial test.” He pointed out that (1) “bilateral trade pressures associated with the significant trade imbalances between a number of

regional countries and the United States”, (2) “a trend towards the formation of bilateral or regional trading arrangements which run the risk of undermining a truly multilateral trading system”, (3) and “fundamental tensions within the GATT framework of multilateral trade” as is apparent in Montreal impasse, are posing serious threat to the international trade system, and stated that it is difficult to tackle these issues and address policy issues with only PECC, due to its informality. He emphasized the merit of OECD-model, arguing that he is seeking to develop “a capacity for analysis and consultation on economic and social issues, not as an academic exercise but to help inform policy development by our respective governments”. Then he articulated the principle of free and open trade.

“Australia's view is that the essence of a properly functioning trading system is, of course, that countries should seek multilateral trade balance, not bilateral balance with all countries.

Equally, we believe the newly industrialising countries have a responsibility to liberalise further their own markets to reflect their phenomenal growth in trade and investment. And where such liberalisation occurs, it must not be used to escalate trade frictions being encountered with certain countries. This is anathema to the principles of free trade, and only invites counter-retaliation by those third countries whose interests are damaged.

As a region we must investigate the scope for further dismantling of barriers to trade within the region, consistent with the GATT framework.

(....)

I must stress that my support for a more formal vehicle for regional co-operation must not be interpreted as suggesting by code words the creation of a Pacific trading bloc. Australia's support for non-discriminatory multilateral trading solutions in the GATT framework is clear, long-standing and unambiguous. I have made it clear that a major priority of any regional effort would be the strengthening of the GATT system". (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1989)

After Hawke's speech, both Australia and Japan visited prospective member countries including many of the NIEs in Asia Pacific to discuss the membership issue. Australian Envoy Woolcott visited New Zealand in March, ASEAN, South Korea, and Japan in April, and Hong Kong, China, U.S., and Canada in May. Muraoka visited ASEAN, Hong Kong, South Korea in March, and U.S. in April. The membership -of U.S., PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan- was an especially important discussion point.

It was not that inclusion of the U.S. was welcomed by all states from the beginning. Australia<sup>7</sup> and majority of ASEAN countries except for Singapore were initially hesitant

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<sup>7</sup> While there is a debate over why Australia wanted to exclude U.S. in the beginning, it seems Australian political leaders such as Hawke, Duffy and Evans, were not looking forward to U.S.

about including U.S. in APEC (Funabashi, 1995). On the other hand, for Japan, which had to settle the escalating U.S.-Japan trade conflict and determined to counter the advent of closed regional economic blocs around the world, wanted to include and entangle U.S. into this economic multilateral initiative of APEC. During his rounds to Southeast Asian countries, Muraoka tried to convince ASEAN nations to support the U.S. participation emphasizing that it “would perhaps be more effective to *combat and contain US unilateral actions* on trade issues if we could include the United States in the forum” (Funabashi, 1995, *emphasis added*). In the end, U.S. joined this Asia-Pacific’s multilateral initiative, as U.S. Secretary of States James Baker formally acknowledged the APEC proposal and implied America’s willingness to participate during the speech to the Japan Society in New York on 26 June 1989.

Issues regarding China’s membership were far more complicated, since what each state wanted was greatly different. Both Japan and Australia supported the eventual inclusion of the three Chinas-PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, they disagreed on since when China should be included. Australia wanted an immediate inclusion of China from the beginning whereas Japan wanted to delay the discussion on China’s membership for the time being, out of concern that it would trigger politicization of APEC. U.S. was

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participation in the beginning and Australia’s ambivalence increased tensions between U.S. and Australia (Funabashi, 1995)

also concerned that China's membership issue might hinder APEC's realization. ASEAN countries did not want to include PRC without including Hong Kong and Taiwan. In contrast to ASEAN's stance, PRC was adamant that only PRC should be included. When Woolcott paid visit to PRC in May 1989, PRC officials expressed both their interest to the initiative and their uncomfortable feelings about the inclusion of Hong Kong and Taiwan. They argued that "Hong Kong and Taiwan should be excluded" from this "ministerial meeting of countries" "by definition", since "only sovereign states had ministers"(Funabashi, 1995).

Eventually, ministers from the twelve countries in the Asia-Pacific region gathered in Canberra for the inauguration of APEC in November 1989. The founding members are Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Canada, and the United States. China joined APEC with along with Hong Kong and "Chinese Taipei" in Brunei, two years after its inauguration.

### **3. New Regional Scope for U.S.-Japan Alliance and Foundations for Japan's Bandwagoning to U.S. in the Post Cold War Era: From 'Far East' to 'Asia Pacific'**

Likewise, Japan's regional multilateral initiative in Asia Pacific, which was first

contrived as a form of bandwagon to U.S., led to the development of APEC, an attempt to soft-balance U.S. unilateralism and counter development of exclusive economic blocs in the West. The entangling diplomacy through APEC made U.S. to continue to have connections with the region even after the collapse of Cold War system. Also while the initiative mainly started for an economic purpose, it gradually came to have political implications after inauguration of APEC and eventually contributed to setting foundations for Japan's further bandwagoning to U.S. and strengthening of U.S.-Japan alliance.

After its establishment, APEC has become "a forum for political and security discussions" as well, with the advent of the APEC Leaders' Meeting in which heads of the states of APEC members annually gathered since 1993 (Green, 2009). Indeed, it was through 1993 Seattle APEC Summit that U.S. president and Chinese president met for the first time after the Tianmen Square Incident (Muraoka, 2017), and the 2001 Shanghai APEC Summit following the September 11 terrorist attack, put considerable emphasis on counterterrorism cooperation. Although Japan had little political intentions when it was designing APEC in the late 1980s under MITI's initiative, once a broad regional multilateral framework was created, it began to serve multiple purposes regarding regional affairs.

Moreover, ‘Asia Pacific’<sup>8</sup>, the regional concept that had developed in the process of pursuing the regional multilateral initiative and become widely accepted since the creation of ‘Asia Pacific’ Economic Cooperation, widened the strategic scope in security realm as well. As no consensus was made on the Post-Cold War security system and new regional security challenges such as North Korea’s nuclear threat emerge in the absence of the clear security strategy, Japan began to reconsider the role and scope of the then-“drifting” U.S.-Japan alliance. In the process, the concept of “Asia Pacific” replaced “Far East” as a regional concept that defines the scope of the alliance.

The regional concept of ‘Asia Pacific’ first emerged as security concept in the mid-1990s during the discussions of Prime Minister Hosokawa’s private advisory group on defense issues, which was set up in February 1994 after the North Korean Nuclear Crisis broke out in 1993. During the group’s discussions, Watanabe Akio<sup>9</sup>, who believed that

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<sup>8</sup> The concept became distinct during the Ohira administration in Japan. MOFA requested Ohira to use the term ‘Asia Pacific’ instead of ‘Pacific’ to better include ASEAN when promoting the regional initiative. Improving the relationship with ASEAN had become one of the top priorities in Japanese diplomacy since the mid-1970s as Japan witnessed ASEAN’s anti-Japan sentiments during Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to ASEAN countries in 1974 (Terada, 2001).

<sup>9</sup> During his a-year long visit to Woodrow Wilson Center from the summer of 1988 to the summer of 1989, Watanabe learned that scholars from U.S. and Soviet Union were discussing Post-Cold War security, based on the prediction that Cold War system will end soon. Watanabe became worried that Japan would be left out and ignored under those circumstances. Upon learning opinion leaders of Canada and Australia began considering establishing a multilateral, cooperative

Japan should “proactively” take part in shaping a “comprehensive” “multilateral” Asia Pacific order in the Post Cold War Era, suggested to come up with a new regional concept. He believed that keep using “Far East” as a concept for security scope was not a good idea, as the concept is prone to invoke wrong images since majority of people already have prejudices regarding the concept. Moreover, pointing out that there were a number of military powers armed with nuclear weapons, Watanabe argued that Japan should seek ways to further strengthen U.S.-Japan alliance (河野, 2016).

Greatly reflecting the suggestions by Watanabe who wrote the first two chapters of the report, Higuchi Report, submitted in August 1994 and published in February 1995, focuses on the security dynamics in Post-Cold War world and highlights the significance of multilateral cooperation and the U.S.-Japan alliance in the context of Japan’s security strategy in Post-Cold War *Asia Pacific* region. Analyzing the “qualitative changes in security environment” of Post-Cold War, the report states that “we find ourselves in an opaque and uncertain situation”, facing “a more difficult security environment in the sense that we must prepare for unpredictable dangers and maintain a stance of responding quickly to such dangers” in the absence of “balance of terror”. To cope with this new

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security framework through which Asia Pacific countries can get together and discuss security issues, Watanabe argued that Japan should “proactively” take part in shaping the regional order. (河野, 2016)

situation, the report calls for multilateral cooperation and states that there is gradual increase in multilateral security cooperation on both UN-level and regional level. Regarding regional multilateral cooperation, the report greatly highlights the importance of maintaining U.S. presence.

“In relation to the security environment in the Asia/Pacific region, cooperation between Japan and the United States is an essential factor. In view of continuing need to ensure that the U.S. commitment to this region is maintained as desired by many Asian nations, it is highly significant that Japan and US should renew their determination to maintain their security relation. .... it is of great significance to the security of this region as a whole that the United States should continue its existing frameworks of security cooperation with nations of this region, (...) From this international and regional view points, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will assume a greater significance than ever before”  
(Advisory Group on Defense Issues, 1994)

The Higuchi Report based on the concept ‘Asia Pacific’ eventually led to the expansion of the bilateral alliance in ‘Asia Pacific’, as the devisers of the Report hoped for. The U.S. security counterparts, who set off to examine the significance of U.S.-Japan alliance since the summer of 1994 under Clinton administration, shared the similar views regarding the general role and importance of U.S.-Japan alliance with the members of the

Advisory Group(河野, 2016). On the one hand, they were also concerned that the Higuchi Report was putting too much emphasis on multilateralism. Therefore, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr. came up with the Nye Report, arguing that U.S. should deploy 100,000 troops in East Asia and redefine its alliance with Japan (Murata, 2017). Based on the shared necessity to strengthen the alliance, Clinton and Hatoyama had a Joint Declaration on Security entitled “Alliance for the Twenty-First Century” in April, 1996. The declaration “reaffirmed their [Clinton and Hatoyama] commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies” and stated that the alliance “will remain vital in the twenty-first century.” The declaration also “redefined” the alliance in the context of Asia Pacific, saying that “Japan-U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of U.S.” and emphasizing that the U.S. engagement contributes to the “the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in *the Asia-Pacific region*(MOFA, 1996,*emphasis added*).” Thus the regional scope of the alliance had officially extended from Japanese homeland and its surrounding areas (Far East) to the whole region of Asia Pacific, both widening and deepening the U.S.-Japan cooperation.

In addition, the economic frictions between the two countries comes to be settled around this “redefinition” of the alliance. Although the U.S.-Japan trade frictions “entered their final period of tension during the early to mid-1990s”(Murata, 2017), in June 1995, the two countries reached an agreement on automobile trade (New York Times, 1995).

Following several months after the Joint Declaration, the Semiconductor Agreement signed in 1986 came to termination.

Along with resolving of the economic conflict and strengthening of the alliance, Japan was able to set foundation for bandwagoning to U.S. in the unipolar world led by U.S. primacy. Based on the foundation of “redefined” alliance in Asia Pacific, Japan have continuously pursued bandwagoning policies for the following decades, particularly during the Bush-Koizumi period, in which the alliance was even more strengthened against terrorism and North Korean nuclear threat.

### **III. The Development of Free and Open Indo-Pacific**

This section explores how FOIP was initiated and came to the form that it now is in. This section argues that FOIP was first contrived as a bandwagoning strategy to U.S. in the unipolar world, and continued to have strong bandwagoning characteristics until around 2017. However, for the recent couple of years, FOIP began to show subtle changes as its bandwagoning characteristics has come to be diluted. .

#### **1. The Origin of FOIP in the First Abe Administration: The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and Bandwagoning to U.S. in Unipolar World**

The ‘Arc of Freedom and Stability’, which is now considered to be the original form of FOIP, initially began as the combination of an attempt to support the U.S. foreign policy in unipolar world and Japan’s own efforts to further secure its diplomatic and economic interests. There are three underlying factors that should be particularly explored to fully understand the purpose of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.

First, Japanese diplomat Yachi Shotaro’s motivation to pursue a vast, brand-new regional initiative. Yachi, who has been interested in settling territorial disputes with

Russia, is one of the key figures who contributed greatly to contriving the idea of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and FOIP (鈴木, 2017). One of his earliest inspirations for the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity came from Bush administration. In U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review published in 2001, Bush administration points out the security uncertainty in Asian region and describes the region as “Arc of Instability.’ The paper particularly emphasizes the security challenges in the region “from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan.”

“Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests. In particular, Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition. Along a broad *arc of instability* that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, the region contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers. The governments of some of these states are vulnerable to overthrow by radical or extremist internal political forces or movements. Many of these states field large militaries and possess the potential to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task. The possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region. *The East Asian littoral - from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan - represents a particularly challenging area. ... (DOD, 2001, emphasis*

added)”

Having recognized the security concern in the region, Bush administration, in an attempt to carry out War on Terror, unofficially asked Japan to “fill in the blank that has been formed in the Central Asia”(鈴木, 2017). Upon hearing this, Yachi thought that Japan should support countries in Central Asia in economic and education sectors, as Japan was unable to offer military support. Combining this U.S. offer regarding Japan’s role in the Arc of Instability and his own determination to show the influence of Japanese diplomacy to Russia for the purpose of dealing with territorial disputes between Japan and Russia, Yachi decided to create an ‘arc’ by connecting the nations in Eurasia (鈴木, 2017). It is not a coincidence that the range or regional scope of Arc of Freedom and Prosperity almost exactly overlaps with that of the Arc of Instability mentioned in U.S. QDR.

Another important factor that lies behind this initiative is China. Since around 2004, Japanese government has begun to express growing concern over the regional security environment, mentioning China. The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) argues that Japan should “remain attentive” to China’s future actions, as China “continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces,” while “expanding its area of operation at sea” (MOD, 2004)<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup>The 2004 NDPG is Japan’s first official document that explicitly mentions China as sec

Lastly, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's interest in India and his belief to maximize Japan's interest. Abe showed great interest in India even before he begins his first term as Prime Minister of Japan in September 2006. In his book, which was published in July 2006, he stresses India's importance and argues that "strengthening relationship with India is extremely important for Japan's national interest".

"Although India's current population is about one billion, it is expected to increase even more and eventually reach 1.6 billion in the future. India possesses many hard-working, talented people, and is one of the leading IT countries in Asia. Strengthening relationship with India is extremely important for Japan's national interest.

According to India's opinion poll, Japan is No.1 country that Indians feel close to. However, unfortunately, the interaction between Japan and India is feeble and the economic relationship is shallow. However, as nobody expected that Japan-China trade would exceed Japan-U.S. trade 10 years ago, it is not surprising even if Japan-India trade exceeds Japan-China trade after few decades. (安倍, 2006)"

Based on this positive view on India, he further goes on advocating the cooperation

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urity concern.

among Japan, India, Australia, and U.S. to spread universal values across Asia.

“I think it is great to have Summit or Minister-level meeting among Japan, U.S., Australia, and India to have strategic discussions on how the four countries can contribute and cooperate to share these universal values [freedom, democracy, basic human rights, rule of law] with other countries in Asia. Japan should show leadership for this(安倍, 2006).”

As a mixture of these multiple intentions, the first Abe administration's bandwagon foreign policy based on stable U.S.-Japan relations, which set foundation for FOIP, emerged. Yachi's attempt to connect U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan's diplomatic interests, security concern shared within Japanese government since 2004, and Abe's interests in India and Japan-U.S.-Australia-India cooperation were all incorporated into “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”. After about two months since Abe took office, Foreign Affairs Minister Taro Aso introduced “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” that stretches from “Northeast Asia to Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states,” along with the concept of “Value Oriented Diplomacy”, which is placing emphases on the "universal values" such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. During his speech in November 2006, comparing democracy to a “never-ending marathon,” Aso argued that Japan would serve as an “escort runner” to support Eurasian countries in this Arc of

Freedom and Prosperity that have just started into the marathon of democracy, and help them “find their freedom and democracy, market economies, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.” (MOFA, 2006).

Then, in March 2007, through his another speech, Aso made it clearer that the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was an attempt of bandwagoning that aims to enlarge Japan’s diplomatic role based on the U.S.-Japan alliance, while creating economic and security environment that is favorable to Japan. While acknowledging that U.S.-Japan alliance has been and will continue to be the “cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy”, Aso emphasized the necessity for Japan to “broaden the horizons” of diplomatic activities and undertake “new investment” “in the foundations of the Japan-US alliance”. He also insisted that Japanese companies would be able to have better businesses environment abroad by spreading Japanese working style through the initiative (MOFA, 2007a).

Based on this vision, Abe delivered a speech at Indian Parliament on August 22, 2007. Quoting the title of Mughal Prince Dara Shikoh’s book *Confluence of the Two Seas*, he emphasized the increasing exchanges between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, the importance of strategic partnership between Japan and India in the increasingly integrating regions, and their shared interests in the security of sea lane as maritime states (MOFA, 2007b).

## **2. The Emerging Multilateral Initiative in the Beginning of the Second Abe Administration: Indo-Pacific Strategy as Bandwagoning to U.S. amidst U.S.-China Rivalry**

Although Abe was eager to realize his diplomatic vision, his first administration did not last long enough to carry it out, as he had to resign after LDP's defeat at 2007 Upper House election. Therefore, his diplomatic plan had to wait for few more years to come to a concrete form, until he becomes re-elected in 2012. Meanwhile, several significant changes took place in East Asian international relations that encouraged the second Abe administration to emphasize the security aspect and bandwagoning characteristics of its diplomatic vision. With the rise of China, U.S. predominance that led liberal international order, which is the foundation for Japan's economic and security interests, was put into questions. In addition, the increased tension between Japan and China, and Japan's relative decline in economic status made Japan greatly anxious.

At international level, U.S. hegemony no longer seemed to be as firm and certain as it did in the previous years. In 2008, global financial crisis that massively damaged U.S. economy and European economy broke out in the United States, triggering the discussions on relative decline of U.S. dominance, China's possible replacement of U.S. as hegemonic power, and hegemonic competition and the transition of power.<sup>11</sup> This financial crisis

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<sup>11</sup> Unlike during the 1990s and the early 2000s, when IR scholars were focusing on unipolarity,

encouraged U.S. to reconsider its foreign policy. With the urgent economic crisis at home and increasing fatigue of carrying out wars in the Middle East, U.S. voters demanded to reduce interventions abroad<sup>12</sup>. Barack Obama promised to withdraw most of the U.S. troops from Iraq within 16 months during his presidential campaign in 2008 (New York Times, 2008). Indeed, Obama, few months after his inauguration, announced to cut down military budget (Washington Times, 2009). Contrary to U.S., Japan, and European nations whose real GDP growth rates turned negative due to the financial crisis, Chinese economy remained robust and managed to keep its growth rate over 5%, as shown in the Figure 1. Moreover, China hosted 2008 Beijing Olympics successfully, demonstrating its economic successes over the past decades. Under these circumstances, Chinese development model, or what Ramo named as “Beijing Consensus” in 2004, started to attract renewed


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since after few years from the global financial crisis, IR scholars began discuss decline of U.S. hegemony and possible transition of power. For example, Cheon explores several theoretical frameworks including transition of power to explain the changes in East Asia, pointing out that “the relative decline of U.S. leadership and revival of geopolitics are important factors of the international politics in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (전재성, 2014)”. Also Graham Allison explores the possible hegemonic confrontation between the United States and rapidly rising China based on historical analysis (Allison, 2017).

<sup>12</sup> According to Stephen Sestanovich, an expert on presidential foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, retrenchment is “what the country wanted”. He says “If you come into office in the middle of a war that is not going well, you’re convinced that the American people have hired you to do less.” He argues that “If John McCain had been elected in 2008, you would still have seen some degree of retrenchment” (Goldberg, 2016)

attention.<sup>13</sup> In addition, after 2008, China began to make more claims in diplomatic arena. In May 2009, China made official submission to UN and claimed ownership of the entire South China Sea based upon historical discovery and use (Simon, 2012).

**Figure 1: real GDP growth rate before and after 2008 global financial crisis**



(\*chart from BBC News, 2018)

To reduce the burden of foreign intervention and maintain its global leadership while

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<sup>13</sup> While Suisheng Zhao cautiously concludes “it is too early to assert that the China model will replace the Western model of modernization”, his 2010 article explores significance and limitations of Chinese development model as a response to the active discussions whether Beijing Consensus would replace Washington Consensus.

coping with the potential challenger in East Asia, Obama administration decided to carry out gradual retreat from Middle East and shift the focus of U.S. diplomacy from Middle East to Asia Pacific. In 2009, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the administration is eager to make “more rigorous and persistent commitment”, “ready to work with leaders in Asia to resolve the economic crisis”, and eager to strengthen its alliances, partnerships, and bonds with Asian nations during her remarks at Asian Society in New York (Clinton, 2009).

At bilateral level, a series of events that took place in 2010 made Japanese extremely alerted and threatened of China. On September 7, a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard’s patrol boats collided near the disputed island (Senkaku/Diaoyu) in East China Sea. Japanese authorities arrested and held the Chinese captain in custody, sparking the diplomatic tensions between the two countries. When Japan did not comply China’s repeated demands to release captain, including Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s urge, the exports of rare earth from China to Japan suddenly stopped. Although Chinese government had never admitted that it had imposed embargo on Japan, Japanese officials suspected that the sudden stop of the exports was due to the boat collision incident, given that there was no change regarding the exports to other countries(日本經濟新聞, 2010a). The export halt heightened sense of distrust and concern toward China in Japan, encouraging Japan to seek ways to substitute imports from China (日本經濟新聞, 2010b).

Adding insult to the injury, China's economy surpassed that of Japan in terms of nominal GDP for the first time in 2010. Although China surpassed Japan several times before based on quarterly data, it was the first time for China to ever excel Japan on a full-year basis, which is the standard generally used for global rankings (Wall Street Journal, 2011). Since then, Japan-China relations have remained tense –if not further worsened–hardly improved for years until around 2018.

It was in this context that Abe returned to office and began his second term and announced his upgraded version of bandwagoning policy to America, through *Asia's Democratic Security Diamond*, a piece of writing released a day after his inauguration. Asia's Democratic Security Diamond is an explicit form of bandwagoning to U.S. as it aims to contain a potential hegemon China through multilateral cooperation based on U.S.-Japan alliance. However, Abe administration was taking far stricter stance toward China than Obama administration. Actually, in 2011, Clinton once again emphasized the importance of Asia Pacific for U.S. diplomacy, and promised America's engagement in the region through alliances and multilateral institutions. Considering that she mentioned South China Sea issue as a regional challenge that requires U.S. engagement, stating that “here are challenges facing the Asia Pacific right now that demand America's leadership, from ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to countering North Korea's provocations...” in Asia, it seems U.S. was also wary China to certain degree (Clinton, 2011). Nonetheless, there were not distinct actions from U.S. by the time Abe returned to

office in 2012. Therefore, he decided to nudge and urge U.S. and other countries to take a stronger stance by suggesting Asia's Democratic Security Diamond. In his article, Abe, expresses great wariness over China, as arguing that China was trying to "establish its jurisdiction in the waters surrounding the islands as *a fait accompli*" and South China Sea was becoming "a Lake Beijing." Insisting "If Japan were to yield, the South China Sea would become even more fortified. Freedom of navigation, vital for trading countries such as Japan and South Korea, would be seriously hindered," Abe once again maintains that Japan and India should 'join together to shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the Pacific and Indian oceans,' and calls for the formation of multilateral cooperation mainly led by Japan, U.S., Australia and India (the Democratic Security Diamond), urging Britain and France to "stage a comeback" to Asia (Abe, 2012).

Although Japan's obviously strong wariness over China was not exactly welcomed by the aforementioned countries in the following couple of years, Abe and Obama reached an agreement to further strengthen U.S.-Japan alliance, upon the changes in Chinese foreign policies under Xi administration. As Xi Jinping came to power in China in March 2013 and introduced 'Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),' a grand regional strategy involving massive scale of infrastructure-building throughout Eurasia<sup>14</sup>, in the fall of 2013, calling

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<sup>14</sup> BRI is an attempt to create a single economic community in Eurasia by connecting important

for “China Dream,” U.S. and Japan set off to strengthen the alliance. The amended ‘Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation’ in 2015 emphasizes “seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses” to ensure Japan's security “under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies”, and to “promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond” (MOFA, 2015). Following this guideline and to ensure the “seamless” defense cooperation, Japan had undergone amendment of a series of security laws to allow itself to exercise its collective self-defense right to aid the United States in case of breakout of contingencies.

Several months after the amended security laws came in effect, Abe introduced diplomatic vision called ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ at TICAD (Tokyo International

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states in each region through transportation networks of railroads, roads, harbors, airports and so on. The strategy is a combination of “Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)” and “21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)”. SREB, inspired by the overland silk road of Han Dynasty, is first introduced in September 2013 during President Xi’s visit to Kazakhstan. SREB is a plan to connect China, Central Asia, Middle East and Europe through northern overland routes. MSR, on the other hand, is an attempt to connect China, Southeast Asia and Middle East through southern maritime routes, inspired by maritime silk road during Ming Dynasty. This grand strategy aims at supporting China’s economic growth by creating economic driving forces and securing energy resources outside, and leading regional economic integration(주용식, 2015). Moreover, to establish a Eurasian financial infrastructure to support this initiative, Xi proposed the establishment of the multilateral bank and China actually began to run a multilateral development bank called Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) since 2016 (World Bank, 2019).

Conference on African Development) VI in August 2016. The basic idea of this strategy is reminiscent of Abe's argument regarding the Confluence of the Two Seas and Asia's Democratic Security Diamond in that the strategy emphasizes the roles of Japan, United States, India and Australia in promoting the rule of law, the market economy, and freedom from force or coercion (MOFA, 2017). Following is part of Abe's speech at TICAD VI.

“Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous. Japan wants to work together with you in Africa in order to make the seas that connect the two continents into peaceful seas that are governed by the rule of law (MOFA, 2017).”

However, this strategy differs from the former plans in two ways. First, the strategy keeps milder tone regarding China than the Democratic Security Diamond, as it does not directly mention China's threat, though its intentions were rather clearly implied; given that (1) U.S. was claiming freedom of navigation in South China Sea to counter China's actions for territorial claim, (2) Permanent Court of Arbitration called for China stopping what it has been doing in the disputed island with Philippines in 2016, and (3) the fact Japan suffered sudden stop of rare earth imports from China after the incident in Senkaku/Diaoyu in 2010, it is highly likely that his proposal was targeting China.

By alluding Japan's alertness toward China rather than articulating its almost hostile attitude toward China like in 2012 Democratic Security Diamond proposal, it seems Abe was trying to reach out more to the "Swing States." A year before his speech, JIA dedicated a series of researches to explore the "Swing States"—specifically India, Indonesia, (the rest of) ASEAN, and Australia. The journal argues these states with (1) certain degree of powers, (2) potential to further increase their powers in the future, (3) geographical significance, (4) willingness to enlarge their roles in the region and beyond, have *not* come to clear decision in foreign policy strategy yet, amidst U.S.-China rivalry. It argues that these swing states, even though they lack capability to shape international order on their own, will exert great influence in shaping future regional order, and securing close relationships with these states and inducing them to support the regional order that is desirable for Japan are of great importance to Japanese diplomacy (菊池, 2015). Keeping milder tone would make FOIP more approachable to those swing states that are hesitant to come up with clear stance regarding U.S.-China rivalry.

Second, FOIP stresses the importance of improving the "connectivity" of the region through measures like building infrastructures, but strives to distinguish itself from BRI that has been criticized as "debt trap" emphasizing that it will respect sovereignty of the countries involved.

"Japan will expand infrastructure development, trade and investment, and enhance business environment and human development from East Asia as a

starting-point, to the Middle East and Africa. In addition, Japan will provide nation-building support in the area of development as well as politics and governance, *in a way that respects the ownership of African countries, and not by forcing on or intervening in them* (MOFA, 2017, *emphasis added*).”

This FOIP strategy had gained supports from its designated key cooperators by the end of 2017, as Indian Prime Minister Modi promised further alignment between Japan’s “Free and Open-Indo Pacific Strategy” and India’s “Act East Policy” in September 2017, and U.S. President Trump agreed to promote “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” during his visit to Tokyo in November 2017(MOFA, 2018).

### **3. Changing Dynamics Regarding the Multilateral Initiative: Trump, China, and Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative**

However, as Trump administration shifts U.S. trade policies, demonstrating diverging economic stance with “America First” as the administration’s theme amidst the improving Japan-China relationship, FOIP began to lose some of its distinct and explicit characteristics of bandwagoning to America.

Trump had taken several, quite unilateral measures, under “America First” policy. He had withdrawn U.S. from TPP, asked its allies including Japan to pay more for hosting

U.S. Forces, and waged a “trade war” against China by raising tariffs against the country as it did against Japan in the late-1980s.

Of course, U.S. and Japan still share many strategic interests, and they seem to be in a very good relationship with Trump and Abe frequently visiting and meeting each other. Today Japan and U.S. share general threat perception regarding China. U.S. under Trump administration describes it as a “revisionist power” (DOD, 2019) and Japan view it as a country “engaging in unilateral and coercive attempts to change the status quo based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order” that carries out “dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences”(MOD, 2019). The two countries also agreed to work together to promote FOIP, as Trump administration shows great eagerness in promoting the initiative, publishing multiple reports solely dedicated to FOIP within a year(DOD, 2019; DOS, 2019).

However, a series of events indicate that the two countries are developing diverging strategies, especially regarding trade and financial issues. Abe has constantly advocated free trade throughout both of his terms, emphasizing it in every speech he gave regarding multilateral initiatives such as Confluences of Two Seas, Democratic Security Diamond, and supported TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership). In striking contrast, Trump, who has

criticized the existing U.S. multilateral trade deals<sup>15</sup> and called for “fair” bilateral deals rather than multilateral deals that “ties up and binds” U.S. and allow other states to “cheat” (Time, 2016), eventually withdrew from TPP and imposed high tariffs S. seeks ways against China. Also he is asking U.S. allies including Japan to pay more for U.S. Forces in Japan (朝日新聞, 2019). While no explicit conflicts are detected between U.S. and Japan as of now, as the issue has not yet been discussed in depth, it is unsure that Japan will comply to U.S. demand without any protest in the future.

Amidst the diverging stances between Japan and U.S. regarding trade and financial issues, On the other hand, Japan-China relationship has marked improvement throughout 2017 and 2018. In 2017, Abe expressed his support for BRI during his speech in June, and participated in a ceremony that celebrates of the normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relationship as Japanese Prime Minister for the first time in 15 years. Then, in 2018, the two countries resumed the high-level economic talks that had been stopped for the last eight years, and agreed to cooperate for infrastructure-building in the third countries (大庭, 2018). In October, Abe claimed that Japan and China are neighbors that

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<sup>15</sup> Trump called NAFTA “the worst trade deal in the history” and TPP “the greatest danger”(Time, 2016).

are “partners” and not “threat to each other” (外務省, 2018).

Amidst these changes, Japanese government started to address FOIP in a slightly different way. *Diplomatic Bluebook 2018*, in mentioning Japan’s efforts to promote FOIP, left out “democracy” even though Japan had emphasized since 2006, only emphasizing the following three things: (1)the rule of law and freedom of navigation, (2)“Quality Infrastructure development in accordance with international standards,” and (3) “assistance for capacity building on maritime law enforcement, disaster risk reduction and non-proliferation”(MOFA, 2018).” By the end of 2018, FOIP became a “vision” or an “initiative” rather than a “strategy.” It was because Abe administration did not want FOIP to be “misunderstood as a containment strategy against China,” and Abe “did not want to unnecessarily irritate China” by using a term “strategy,” hoping to relationship with China through the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and People’s Republic of China’(Kamiya, 2019).

It was around this time that Japanese IR scholars started to highlight that FOIP is not entirely about containing China. Some alludes that there may be cleavages in Japan’s FOIP and America’s FOIP.

Through an article in early 2018, criticizing the media coverage that depicts FOIP as a containment to China, Akihiko Tanaka argues that FOIP is more than a mere response to China's rising power. Mentioning Japan's past regional economic initiatives such as Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, he claims that the initiative should be understood in the context of Japanese diplomacy's constant endeavors to connect Japan to the world's center of growth. Furthermore, he insists that FOIP is "complementary with BRI," considering the lack of infrastructures and the demand for them in Indo-Pacific (田中,2018).

By the end of 2018, Ken Jimbo argues that FOIP is both "competitive strategy" and "cooperative strategy" regarding China. He explains that while (1) freedom of navigation and spread of the rule of law, (2) pursuing economic prosperity by increasing the region's connectivity through building 'Quality Infrastructure,' and (3) ensuring peace and stability through measures like maritime law enforcement and reducing risks are features of "competitive strategy," Japan and China's agreement to cooperate in the third country comprise the factor of "cooperative strategy" (神保2018).

Yuichi Hosoya, describing the initiative since 2006 to before August 2016 as "FOIP 1.0" and the initiative afterwards as "FOIP 2.0," and focuses on the changes in

FOIP. Pointing out that “the period when Japan has been promoting this diplomatic initiative [FOIP 2.0] largely overlaps the time of Japan-China rapprochement,” he argues that the latter, which includes “all people,” embraces China. Alluding to the differences between America’s approach on FOIP and Japan’s approach, stating “one of the most significant problems of Japan’s FOIP is that this diplomatic initiative is often confused with American Indo-Pacific strategy which is more military-oriented “Quad”” and “Japan’s FOIP would be able to be more acceptable to ASEAN countries, as well as to India and Australia which are less confrontational to China than is the US,” he concludes that “Japan’s move from FOIP 1.0 to FOIP 2.0 was a necessary evolution to respond to the voices of Asian countries.” He further insists that Trump administration’s measures actually encourage reconciliation between Japan and China, saying “as Donald Trump’s administration intensifies its confrontational stance toward China as is shown in *NSS*, Xi’s administration approaches to Tokyo have become more conciliatory than before” (Hosoya, 2019).

Matake Kamiya suggests similar but a slightly different view, exploring the dual aspects of FOIP and arguing that Japan must maintain aspects of “cooperative strategy” if it were to successfully carry out a “competitive strategy” against China. Pointing out that “it is impossible for Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy to lose its direction to the “competitive strategy”” because “Japan’s fundamental motive of proposing this strategy lies in its desire to safeguard the existing liberal, rules-based order in the face of the increasing

assertiveness of China,” he argues that it is imperative for Japan to “avoid giving impressions to other countries that Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy is exceedingly confrontational toward China” to attract other countries to join the initiative and prevent them from withdrawing (Kamiya, 2019).

Of course, one can hardly say that Japan has stopped taking bandwagoning strategies toward U.S., considering that Japan and U.S. currently maintain very close relations and that security concern posed by China has never diminished. However, it is noteworthy that Japan demonstrates changes—albeit subtle—regarding FOIP after U.S. and Japan began to develop diverging stances regarding trade and conflicting interests in burdening defense costs, whereas Japan-China relationship has improved. As a number of Japanese IR experts underlines, it is quite clear that FOIP has developed characteristics of “cooperative strategy” toward China, losing some of its old characteristics of manifest bandwagon to U.S.

## IV. Comparison

This section analyzes similarities and differences between launching of APEC and FOIP based on what has been explored in the previous chapters. For smooth comparison, it is necessary to first recall the gist of the case studies.

### 1. Summary of Case Studies

**Table 1. Summary of APEC**

<b>Phase</b>	<b>Background Events</b>	<b>Economic Stance of Japan and U.S.</b>	<b>Threat Perception of Japan and U.S.</b>	<b>Type of State Behavior</b>	<b>Multilateral Initiative / Diplomatic decision</b>
<b>Origin</b> (60s~1980)	-Kennedy Round, -EC	Converging  (advocating free trade)	Converging  (against USSR)	<b>Bandwagoning</b> for economic purpose	-PAFTA, -Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, -PECC
<b>Formative Period</b> (80s~early 90s)	-Uruguay Round -US-Japan economic friction -NIES	Diverging  (Japan's free trade vs. America's fair trade)	Converging  (against USSR)	<b>Soft Balancing</b>	Inauguration of APEC
<b>Afterwards</b> (mid-90s~early 2000s)	Post-Cold War uncertainties including North Korea threat	Converging/ No confrontation  (economic frictions settled by the mid-90s)	Converging  (against uncertainties and North Korea nuclear threat)	<b>Bandwagoning</b>	“reaffirmation” & “redefinition” of alliance in “Asia-Pacific,” further strengthening of alliance in the early 2000s

Japan's attempt for creating multilateral initiative in Asia Pacific first appeared during the 1960s, as the prospect of the international free trade system looked gloomy with difficulties in Kennedy Round and European regional integration that might develop into exclusive regional economic bloc. During this period, Japan shared the same economic stance with U.S., as both countries were advocating global free trade. They also had converging threat perception toward Soviet Union, and strengthened their security alignment during the 70s. Thus Japan chose to bandwagon to U.S., contriving PAFTA and PBCC initiatives to U.S. and U.S. efforts to sustain the international free trade system. The initiatives eventually led to the creation of informal multilateral initiative PECC.

However, in the 1980s, as trade conflict erupted between the two countries, Japan found America's demand for "free trade" "unilateral." Thus the two countries come to have diverging economic stance despite the fact that they actually strengthened their alliance and were cooperating very closely with each other against the increasing Soviet threat in the 1980s. This divergence in trade issue along with further fluctuation in international free trade system promoted by the emergence of NIEs and rising protectionism in Europe, triggered Japan to seek creation of government-level multilateralism with NIEs in the Asia Pacific to soft-balance U.S. and counter formation of regional economic blocs. Therefore, APEC was created under MITI's initiative.

By the mid-1990s, Post-Cold War security concerns that originates from uncertainties generated by the collapse of “balance of fear” and North Korean nuclear threat had become significant. Under these circumstances, as Watanabe pointed out, Japan found itself in need of security alignment with U.S. and keeping U.S. presence in the region. On the other hand, the economic frictions between the two countries came to subside around the mid-1990s, and there no longer were economic confrontations between U.S. and Japan. Therefore, Japan sought ways to further bandwagon to U.S. As U.S. security counterparts shared the perceptions on the Post-Cold War security concerns, both countries agreed to expand and deepen the bilateral alliance based on the regional concept “Asia Pacific”, the concept that developed in the process of searching for the regional initiatives and consolidated through the establishment of APEC.

**Table 2. Summary of FOIP**

<b>Phase</b>	<b>Background Events</b>	<b>Economic Stance</b>	<b>Threat Perception</b>	<b>Type of State Behavior</b>	<b>Initiative</b>
<b>Origin</b> (early 2000s, mainly during the 1 <sup>st</sup> Abe administration)	-Arc of Instability and US request, -Northern Territory dispute -China as security concern	Converging/ No confrontations  (both advocating free trade)	Converging  (against North Korea and terrorism)	<b>Bandwagoning</b> mainly for political purpose	Arc of Freedom and Prosperity
<b>Fledgling Period</b> (2012~2016, the beginning of the 2 <sup>nd</sup> Abe administration)	-rise of China since 2008 (financial crisis, GDP, territorial dispute) -Xi administration's foreign policy -Swing States	Converging/ No confrontations	Converging in general direction (mainly against China),  but differing in the level of threat perception	<b>Bandwagoning</b> , Nudging US to contain China	-Asia's Democratic Security Diamond,  Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy
<b>Formative Period</b> (2017~)	America First Policy by Trump administration  Improvement in Japan-China relationship	Basically diverging without direct confrontation So far -U.S.-trade wars, withdrawal from TPP and America First policy vs. <b>Japan-free trade</b>  -may disagree on defense cost issue in the future	Converging  (against China)	<b>Weakened characteristics of Bandwagoning</b>	Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative

When Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, the initial version of FOIP, was first contrived, U.S.-Japan relationship had been very stable under the unipolar system led by U.S. primacy. During Koizumi-Bush period, the two countries further strengthened their alliance to combat terrorism, and shared threat perception regarding North Korea. They did not have any economic confrontations either. U.S. even asked Japan to support U.S. by aiding it in dealing with the Arc of Instability. Utilizing this U.S. request and combining it with Japan's own diplomatic and security interests, Japan decided to pursue a bandwagoning strategy, arguing for the creation of Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.

However, salient rise of China since around 2008 with the breakout of global financial crisis, Beijing Olympics, and China's replacement of Japan as world's second largest economy, and deterioration of Japan-China relationship triggered by the boat collision incident near the disputed island, led to the strengthening of bandwagoning characteristics in the second Abe administration's multilateral initiative. During this time, U.S. and Japan were cooperating in economic realm, as Obama and Abe were pursuing regional economic initiative such as TPP together. Also, U.S. and Japan strengthened their alliance amidst China's increasingly assertive actions near the South China Sea and expanding diplomatic strategy. Although U.S. and Japan had generally converging threat perception regarding China, it seems the level of threat perception differed in the two countries. Whereas Obama attempted to manage the security concern of China through engagement, Abe, after encountering China's aggressiveness through the territorial dispute

in 2010, found engagement strategy insufficient. Instead of following Obama's approach, he called for creation of Asia's Democratic Security Diamond, and then later suggested Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2016, nudging U.S. and other countries to build a multilateral coalition to counter China's assertiveness, and seeking closer ties with the Swing States.

Nevertheless, there seems to be subtle changes regarding FOIP in the last couple of years. Although the two countries share threat perception regarding China and there are no direct economic confrontations between Japan and U.S. in economic realm so far, their basic economic stances seem to differ. Trump administration is pursuing America First policy, withdrawing from TPP and emphasizing "fair trade," whereas Japan sticks to its advocacy for the free trade. On the other hand, Japan-China relations have improved. Upon these changes, FOIP's characteristics as a bandwagoning strategy toward U.S. has come to be diluted compared to the past.

## **2. Similarities**

APEC and FOIP are similar in that both of them were initially contrived as bandwagoning strategies to America. APEC first started as PAFTA initiative, an attempt to support relatively declining U.S. hegemony to maintain the international trade system. FOIP originated from the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, an attempt to widen Japan's diplomatic horizon based on U.S.-Japan alliance and secure its economic interests. While there has been differences in the degree of bandwagoning, FOIP has always been a

bandwagoning strategy, choosing to side with U.S., both under the unipolar system and amidst the U.S.-China rivalry. Considering U.S. constantly has been a hegemon and Japan has thrived as its ally throughout the Postwar Era, it is not surprising that bandwagoning to U.S. is Japan's all-time favorite strategy, and that Japan often leans toward U.S. without much hesitation even when the U.S. hegemony is questioned.

However, it is not that Japan's multilateral initiatives always manifest unwavering characteristics of bandwagoning to America. The initiatives shift to soft-balancing or weakens the characteristics of bandwagoning in case economic interests conflict between U.S. and Japan. APEC was realized as an attempt of soft-balancing against U.S. amidst U.S.-Japan trade frictions, despite the fact that its predecessors that set foundation for the initiative were born out of bandwagoning to America. Also FOIP that had been clear bandwagoning strategy until the beginning of the second Abe administration weakened its bandwagoning characteristics, with increasingly diverging economic interests between U.S. and Japan. It seems that economic interests play pivotal role in deciding which direction Japan's strategy revolving regional multilateral initiatives heads to. This is quite understandable that much of Japan's power derives from its technoeconomic capability, as the country lacks military capability.

Also both initiatives have important implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Although APEC mainly began with economic purpose under MITI's leadership, APEC later came to hold regional forums to discuss Asia Pacific's political and security affairs, and set foundations for strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, as it contributed to the development of a brand-new regional concept called "Asia Pacific." On the other hand, security implications of FOIP is much more obvious as the initiative and its predecessors –Arc of Freedom and Prosperity and the Democratic Security Diamond–have been pursued on the foundations of the alliance with U.S. all the time. FOIP is firmly linked to the U.S. alliance system as its leading countries consists of U.S., two major U.S. allies–Japan and Australia–and a U.S. security partner–India. Although Hosoya tries to distinguish Japan's FOIP from "America's Indo-Pacific strategy which is more military-oriented "Quad,"" one can rarely deny that there are still chances that FOIP will evolve into an extended alliance in the future, given the membership of the key countries and shared threat perceptions between U.S. and Japan.

In addition, in both initiatives, Australia and ASEAN are key members. For their geographical advantages and economic values, Australia and ASEAN are on Japan's top list of prospect member countries. Japan asked Australia to take leadership in public when it was seeking ways to promote both PECC and APEC, and named Australia as one of the four key countries in promoting the Democratic Security Diamond and FOIP. During the Ohira administration, ASEAN became the first economy besides "the five developed countries" to be namely included in Japan's regional initiative, and is the only region to be

thoroughly explored as one of the “Swing States,” besides India and Australia that are among the four key countries, in the promotion of FOIP. It is clear that Australia and ASEAN are very important partners for Japan.

### **3. Differences**

Nevertheless, there have been differences between these two grand multilateral initiatives. First and foremost, the core pillar for APEC has always been economic interests, whereas FOIP has harbored much more of political intentions than economic intentions. APEC and its predecessors were driven by the economic interest since the beginning in the late 1960s. Since it was an initiative for economic benefits and promoting growth in the region, APEC was founded as incorporating NIEs. On the other hand, although Japan was not unaware of the economic benefits of pursuing the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity or FOIP Strategy, and the “market economy” has been one of the important principles Japan sought to promote through those initiatives, the diplomatic and security intentions were of much more importance in initiating FOIP, especially from the early 2000s to around 2016. This has been quite clear, given the Northern Territory issue, the rise of China, escalating tension between Japan and China followed by strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Even today, this diplomatic security implication remains there, considering that Japan still views China as a security concern, and FOIP is driven by Japan and U.S. that share threat perceptions regarding China. While it is true that Japan has become more cautious in choosing which principles should be articulated and choosing words to describe FOIP in

order not to stimulate China, it does not necessarily mean that Japan is no longer anxious about China.

In addition, Japan's approach in promoting the multilateral initiatives differed in the two cases as well. In promoting PECC and APEC, Japan refrained from taking leadership in the front line and asked Australia to take the leadership, as it was afraid of what other states-especially Asian countries that have bitter memories on Japan's invasion-would think. In striking contrast to that, Japan has never been hesitant to suggest the vision by itself and take leadership in public to initiate FOIP. Part of the reasons why Japan take such different approaches may be because Japan had been rapidly rising to the point that some consider it as a possible challenger to U.S. while the memories of the second World War were relatively fresh in the 80s, whereas China is considered to be the challenger to U.S. predominance while the memories of the war have relatively faded in the 2000s.

## **V. Conclusion**

So far, this thesis has delved into the creation and development of APEC and FOIP to understand why Japan takes strong multilateral initiatives when bilateral alliance with U.S. has been the “axis” of its diplomacy, and how those initiatives are related to the U.S.-Japan alliance,

According to what the thesis has explored, the promotion of APEC and FOIP are distinct in that APEC had been driven by economic purpose and Japan had tried to stay in shadow during its promotion, whereas FOIP has been largely pursued for political purpose and Japan claims its leadership out in the public.

However, there were also commonalities between the two initiatives. Based on these commonalities, it is quite clear that Japan contrives multilateral initiatives to support U.S. by promoting and reinforcing the principles shared by both U.S. and Japan, so that it can secure its own economic and political interests through the initiatives. However, regardless of the fact that the initiatives’ original purpose of bandwagoning, Japan utilizes the initiatives to serve multiple purposes when circumstances change. Japan shifts the strategy from bandwagoning to soft-balancing and vice versa, depending on the occasions. It turns out that Japan’s multilateral initiatives transform into soft-balancing or lose some

of the bandwagoning characteristics when Japan's economic interests are at odds with America's, as U.S. tries to lean toward unilateralism diverting from its role to keep the international order that U.S. itself has established. It is no wonder Japan's multilateral initiatives oscillate between bandwagoning and soft-balancing, considering that Japan has a stake in both (1) managing good relationship with U.S. since it is largely dependent on U.S.-Japan alliance, and (2) maintaining the existing liberal international order and ensuring U.S. commitment to it to secure wealth— Japan's major source of power. And because Japan's multilateral initiatives are flexible and U.S.-Japan alliance is at the very center of Japan's diplomacy, the multilateral initiatives eventually come to have implications for the alliance. APEC contributed to the strengthening the alliance. For FOIP, there seems to be always room for an extension of alliance centering America. .

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## Abstract in Korean (국문 초록)

일본은 역내 대규모 다자주의 이니셔티브를 발족하고 추진하기 위하여 적극적으로 노력해 왔다. 일본은 1980년대 후반에 ‘아시아 태평양’ 지역의 무역증진과 경제협력을 도모하기 위해 통상산업성의 주도 하에 APEC을 창설하였다. 89년 당시 12개국으로 발족되었던 APEC은 30년이 지난 현재 21개국을 가입국으로 둔 다자주의 기구로 성장하였다. 그리고 지금 일본은 최근 형성되기 시작한 FOIP이라는 새로운 거대 다자주의 이니셔티브의 중심에 서 있다.

하지만 다자주의 이니셔티브를 추진하는 데에 소요되는 시간과 비용을 고려한다면, 미일동맹을 외교의 “기축”으로 둔 일본이, 왜 굳이 막대한 비용을 감수하면서까지 다자주의 이니셔티브에 노력을 기울이는지 의문이 든다. 본 논문에서는 일본의 다자주의 이니셔티브 추진 배경 및 의도를 파악하기 위하여, “bandwagoning”과 “soft-balancing”이론에 비추어 APEC의 창설 과정과 FOIP의 발족 과정을 분석하고, 두 사례를 비교한다.

본 논문은 다음과 같이 주장한다. 일본은 미일이 공유하는 원칙의 확산을 통해 미국을 지원하려는 목적으로, bandwagon 성격의 다자주의

이니셔티브를 고안한다. 다자주의 이니셔티브를 통해 미일 양국이 공유하는 원칙과 가치를 보급 및 정착시키는 과정을 통해 자국의 정치·경제적 이익을 확보할 수 있기 때문이다. 그런데 일본은 미일동맹을 외교의 기축으로 둔 나라로써 미일관계도 중시해야 하지만, 국력의 대부분이 경제력에 기인하는 국가의 특성상 현존하는 자유주의 국제질서의 유지에도 힘써야 한다. 그렇기 때문에 일본의 다자주의 이니셔티브는 비록 bandwagoning 으로 시작되기는 하지만, 상황에 따라 bandwagoning 과 soft-balancing 사이를 오가며 다목적으로 활용된다. 특히 미국이 스스로 이룩한 자유주의국제질서에서 이탈하여 독단적인 결정을 함으로써 미일 간에 경제 기조 혹은 이익이 충돌하게 될 경우, 일본의 다자주의 이니셔티브는 soft-balancing 으로 변모하거나 bandwagoning 의 성격을 약화시키게 된다. 또한 일본의 다자주의 이니셔티브가 이와 같은 유연성을 띠고, 미일동맹이 일본외교의 중심에 있기 때문에, 일본의 다자주의 이니셔티브는, 동맹이나 안보적 목적을 고려하여 고안하지않았다 한더라도, 미일동맹에 대한 함의를 갖게 된다.

**주제어:** 일본의 다자주의 이니셔티브, bandwagoning, soft-balancing, APEC, FOIP, 미일동맹

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