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스포츠 매니지먼트 석사 학위논문

# Understanding the Controversy of Sport, City, and Environment:

A Case of Taipei Dome Complex Construction

스포츠, 도시와 환경의 상충관계의 이해:

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To You

For your faith, your effort, and your perseverance,

Because this thesis would not exist without you.

## **Abstract**

# **Understanding the Controversy of Sport, City, and Environment:**

## **A Case of Taipei Dome Complex Construction**

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The purpose of this study is to comprehend the controversy of Taipei Dome Complex Construction by analyzing the discourse, the governmentality, the actions of stakeholders, and the decision-making process of the Taipei Dome Complex. Taipei Dome Complex Construction, aka. Taipei Cultural and Sports Park Project is a complicated case intersecting with sport development, environmental issues, and the vision of urban development in

Taipei. Although the representation of this public construction attempted to guide the city toward a better future in an inclusive society, the Taipei Dome Complex, however, failed to meet this expectation in a highly politicized decision-making context. This case study initiates the discussion of the relation among motioned-elements for illustrating how the sports mega-project sets off a chance to raise an interdisciplinary discussion among sport management, environmental justice, and urban development. To better understand the reason why causes this conflict in the decision-making process, it is necessary to identify the stakeholders for comprehending the controversy of sport, city, and environment in Taipei Dome Complex. In this regard, this study presents three research questions: RQ1. Who are the stakeholders, and what are their interests in Taipei Dome Complex Construction? RQ2. What is the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex Construction? And RQ3. What are the issues in the decision-making process? For answering RQ1, this study adopts the Stakeholder Analysis(SA) to discuss the attributes among stakeholders in the Taipei Dome Complex for categorizing them into

two groups: the pros and cons of the coalition. To discuss RQ2, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) firstly builds up the decision-making process of the Taipei Dome Complex; the framework of Environmental Justices(EJ) leads this study to establish a chronological analysis from 1998 to 2020 for examining interactions amidst stakeholders in the context of Taipei Dome Complex. As for RQ3, based on the result of RQ1 and RQ2, RQ3 identifies issues causing the controversy in the decision-making process of the Taipei Dome Complex, thereby providing directions for future studies.

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**Keywords** : Taipei Dome Complex, Sport, City, Environment

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# **Chapter 1. Introduction**

## **1.1. Research Background**

Taipei Dome Complex Construction aka. Taipei Cultural and Sports Park Project is a complicated case intersecting with sport development, environmental issues, and the vision of urban development in Taipei. Although the representation of this public construction attempted to guide the city toward a better future in an inclusive society, the Taipei Dome Complex, however, failed to meet this expectation in a highly politicized decision-making context. This case study initiates the discussion of the relation among motioned-elements for illustrating how the sports mega-project sets off a chance to raise an interdisciplinary discussion among sport management, environmental justice, and urban development. To better understand how these three elements involved in this case study, it is inevitable to introduce the prologue interconnecting with sport, baseball, and urban development in

Taiwan before I enter the detailed analysis in this case.

Since 1991, Taipei Dome Complex has been regarded as the “panacea” of Taiwan Baseball for sweeping scandals, such as notorious five-time match-fixing in the Chinese Professional Baseball League (CPBL). It also aims to elevate the service quality of professional baseball, thereby creating a win-win for Taiwan Baseball as well as for the vision of sustainable city. The reason why Taiwan baseball fans desperately wanted a domed-stadium is simple and straightforward: baseball in Taiwan represents the zeitgeist in the history of the developmental path in Taiwan. In other words, baseball is not just a sport but also the soul of Taiwan. In short, the stadium is the flesh to contain the soul.

Taiwan baseball, also known as Taiwanese Pastime, has played the role of unifying the Taiwanese over a century since the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945). After WWII, especially, the Kuomintang(KMT, 國民黨) regime took this advantage to maintain their ruling legitimacy when the United Nations (UN) forced Taiwan (the Republic of China) to back down in

1971. It was 1968 when the tension in Taiwan Strait kept rising since the Korea War (1950-1953); the ruling party realized Taiwan would lose the seat in the UN because the rise of communist China had gradually acknowledged as only China in the world (Chang, 2011). Meanwhile, one elementary school baseball team, the Hongye (紅葉), beaten the Japanese delegation team of Kansai (關西), the world little league champion in 1968, in a friendship game (Hsieh & Hsieh, 2003). The result not only facilitated the government to built up the Taipei Municipal Baseball Stadium but also elicited the national pride of Taiwanese and opened the dominating era of world baseball tournament in Little League, Junior League, and Senior League in 1974, 1977, 1978, 1988, 1990, and 1991 in Taiwan baseball history respectively (Tseng & Yu, 2003). The glory history of the baseball becomes the media to resist the rise of communist China, reinforcing the Taiwanese Nationalism to legitimize the KMT regime (Wu, 2005).

Based on the Olympic Movement, the rise of communist China did not merely affect in the UN but also threatened the role of Taiwan in IOC. That is,

the excellent debating topic—Taiwan is not Chinese Taipei—came from after the 1981 Lausanne Agreement(Chan, 1985). At this nadir of Taiwan darkest age, it was the baseball that gave people strength of mentality from their national identity to be one of the Asian Tigers from the end of the 1970s to the 1980s. From the 1950s to the 1980s, Taiwan competed with the name of China with the People Republic of China through obtaining baseball tournament titles, for serving their political purpose. One of the Asian Tigers, South Korea, however, won the bid of the 1986 Asian Game and 1988 Summer Olympic resulting from the rising of competitive spirit among Taiwan politicians (Sun, 1990). Especially, Prime Minister Hao to initiate the idea of multi-usage domed-stadium, for leading Taiwan toward the world-stage(Sun, 1990). His decision, not to mention the fact of financial shortage, ignores the regulation of the urban planning system, leading to the conflicts between sport and city.

Earlier studies have documented the relationship between sport and city for illustrating how the rise of sport meets the metamorphosis of urban



formation, the disorder of social condition, and the need for quality of life(e.g., Rosentraub, 2009; Lin, 2016). Following their lead, it is widely accepted that this relationship enables to not only define the function of sport in the process of urbanization but also to identify differences for each city meticulously. To precisely locate each unique case, I adopt the perspective of historical, geographical materialism, which is proposed by Harvey(2018), to take the urban land development into account for restating the sports-city relation. Although the majority of these depth-studies that spotlight on cities in both Anglo-America and Europe context examines the dynamics between interests groups and physical structure of a city, it is clear that the production of sports surrounds the issue of land ownership and definition of public infrastructure since the beginning of urbanization in the United States. Looking at cities like New York, Boston, and Chicago from pre-industrial to post-industrial period, the transformation of sports landscape and urban spatial form in both urban and rural area discloses how varies partisans, merchandisers, ethics groups, social classes, and other stakeholders cast their power into the urban land

development as well as the Europe cases do(Adelman, 1986; Gems, 1997; Hardy, 1981; Koller, 2012; Terret & Heck 2012). With notably scholarships contributing to the in-depth studies of historical backgrounds in decision-making of financing stadium from city to city(e.g., Euchner, 1993; Danielson, 1997; Rich, 2001; Riess, 2006; Rosentraub, 2010; Long, 2014), it identifies the implementation of policy in taxation and public spending is the core of the strategy of urban land development—public-private partnerships(PPPs)(Rosentraub, 2019). The production of sports space, therefore, can attribute to urban land development, thereby restating the framework of western sports-city relations. The production of the sports space, therefore, is not merely the representation of the capital circuits, but also the reification of urban land development, emphasizing the dynamical social interactions affecting the capital flow in the capital circuits as well as the process of urbanization.

The modern sports facility, the park, was introduced to Taipei in Japanese occupied period, for demonstrating an establishment of civilized

lifestyle as well as for modernizing both city by implementing urban planning(Koshizawa, 1987; Goto, 1996; Goto, 1999; Ishida, 2013) The sport-scape in Taipei was mainly used for military training, school physical education, or even Japanese only sports park(Yukawa, 1932). One famous example is the Yuanshan Park built in the 1920s as the symbol of modernization. Until the 1930s, with the Japanese nationalism physical education, when sports became a powerful tool to assimilate Taiwanese, the ensuing amendment of the Urban Planning Act introduced the recreational park to the public (Yang & Hirano, 1999; Hsieh, 2011). The beginning of the post-war period (1945-1960) was a nightmare to Taiwan.

The well-known Chinese Civil War hindered the political leaders from appropriating the national funding from the military to invest in either urban planning or sports development (Chang, 1993; Suto & Koshizawa, 2004; Chen, 2011). Until the 1960s, as the economic growth benefits both countries, although both treated the sports as a political tool to convey the nationalism, they choose different development path to meet the reality based on the urban

development. Taipei faced severe population expansion, losing its control on urban public land. Therefore, the government decided to cancel the municipal tax at the 1964 amendment of Urban Planning Act, and Taiwan government lost the financial source to invest infrastructures; instead, an alternative financing method, *the Multi-usage of Infrastructure Act*, that is the prototype of PPPs, allows the private sector to acquire public land to build up the infrastructure(Chang, 1993). The sports policy, therefore, kept focusing on implementing an elite sports program and coaching program (Chen, 2011). That is to say, in the 1960s, the Taiwan government privatized the public land for public infrastructures, and the government eventually lost its management tool to supervise public land development to the cost of the public facility(Chang, 1993). After the Asia Economic bubble, the Taiwan government enacted “*Act for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects*” in 2000, which allow the private sector to use the facilities for fifty years in 2000 to alleviate the financial burden from national funding.

As every Taiwanese knows, until democratization in Taiwan, the environment has never counted in the discussion of the production of sports space in the process of urban development. It attributes to ubiquitous political intervention. Before declaring Martial Law in 1987, the local factions and politicians had used environmental issues to leverage their interests (Ho, 2001). This “political culture” has not changed with democratization. Instead, it has become the main force involved in the review system after the institutionalization of the Environmental Impact Assessment act since 2002. The situation where this review system is involved in politics is not only in the Environmental Impact Assessment but also in the field of urban planning and design review system. In other words, even if the concept of sustainable development, which is emerging in recent years, promotes green city governance, the decision-making process of this concept is also controlled by interest groups, not by the public interest. It can attribute to the historical context in which Taiwan’s urban development process only pursued economic growth. As one of the examples, the Taipei Dome is just a

coincidence of history.

From the perspective of urban development, the evolving production of sports space is not a coincidence; instead, it is inevitable in a city of a developmental state. The land reform benefits both Taiwan for rapid industrialization. For cultivating the urban industrial sector, both countries exploit the surplus created by the countryside from the primary sector to enhance the push-pull effect between urban and rural areas. When the national government set up the developmental strategy from Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) to Export-oriented Industrialization (EOI), the primary sector starts to shrink its demand on the labor market while the expansion of urban-industrial sector demands more labor from the rural area. This policy implementation causes migration from rural to urban mounted seven million population in Taiwan, respectively (Chou, 2004).

In order to elevate the quality of life, Taipei starts to implement recreational space, but abolishing the municipal tax law makes the implementation of the public facility (including sports facilities) become the

financial burden for the government(Tsai, 2008). Under the influence of neoliberalism, although the cities of the two countries have not been financed by Western countries(Harvey, 1989), however, with the increase in infrastructure funding and the economic and financial situation of unstable countries, and the state has decided to adopt a way that can decrease the risk of investment in public infrastructure: public-private partnership. Mega-events (such as the 2017 Taipei World Universiade), or the facility projects built in recent years, such as Taipei Dome Complex, can be considered in this category because Taipei has dreamed about being the first tire global city as Seoul did in 1988(Lin, 2016). Simply put, this development history intersecting baseball and Taipei caused the Taipei Dome Complex to include a means to achieve win-win in Taiwan as Figure 1 presented, but it raises the long-term conflict between the sport and the city.



Figure 1. Research Background

Source: Chang (1993); Ho(2001); Tseng & Yu(2004); Chou(2004); Chen(2011);  
Chan(2012); Lin(2016)

As the critical theory adopted in this section, the advent of infrastructures as well as the process of urbanization, concluding it represents the role of social reproduction that redistributes urban configuration of investment to either maintain the productivity of labor or enhance the performance of productivity so that the city can adequately function for capital accumulation (Harvey, 1995; Allmendinger, 2009). This capital accumulation in the city integrates the element of sport and environment, patriating toward the vision of a sustainable city based on the elevating quality of life. I, here, summarized the whole mechanism among sport, city, and environment into Figure 2.





Figure 2. Mechanisms among Sport, City, and Environment

Source: Chang(1991); Ahern(2007); Benedict & McMahon(2006); Chen(2011);  
Chan(2012); Lin(2016)

Through this accumulation process, it brings two crucial characteristics of urban infrastructures: first, due to the urban infrastructure includes into the social welfare system, it results from using the tax to support it for benefiting the public good; second, because the stagnation of capital accumulation will cause the capitalist society to collapse, the non-stop urbanization will result in a snowball effect of debt of urban infrastructure as well as the skyrocketing land cost to the government. Subsequently, some public services will be crowded out by the expansion costs of urban infrastructures, thereby forming the famous cliché dispute—whether investing public funds into sports

facilities' projects or cooperating with private sectors to these projects. Behind the story, this is a solution when sports infrastructures become the growth pole of urban development to resolve urban issues based on its local context. The cases in Taiwan confront the malfunction of planning tools for urban development and expand investment of infrastructure for urban sprawl. Moreover, accompanied by intense global city competition, the investment of investing in sports infrastructure construction will be higher.

From what has discussed, comparing with the dispute of sports welfare system in western context—the sports franchise and its home-stadium claimed that they could either boost the local economy or increase the quality of life for a host city—that revitalizes the declined downtown area (e.g., Rosentraub,1999; Rosentraub, 2010), the state-led model of sport-city relation address two points: First, the state-led model in Taiwan used the sports to imbibe the social-political change, thereby categorizing the sports facilities as one of infrastructure. Second, the PPPs ostensibly decentralize decision-making from the central government in Taiwan as if the US

government compromise with the private sector after fiscal austerity in the 1980s. Their experiences, notwithstanding, indicate that the government firmly holds the right of the decision by maintaining the bargaining power to assign the sport facility projects and to evaluate those projects. The Taipei Dome Complex construction, however, has led to a dispute with the crisis of cultural heritage, with environmental impact statement, and with the unknown operation plan for it since the 1990s.

As abovementioned, this dispute relates to political intervention. That is to say, in Taiwan, the public-private partnerships cause the central government to abuse its power to intervene in the self-government to implement those facilities whether it may deteriorate the quality of life in a city. The decision of construction Taipei Dome Complex is the exemplar to explain the context in Taiwan. To better understand why causes this conflict in the decision-making process, it is necessary to identify the stakeholders for comprehending the controversy of sport, city, and environment in Taipei Dome Complex Construction. In this regard, this study adopts a framework

of Environmental Justice(EJ) presented by Pellow(2002) to interconnect sport, city, and environment among stakeholders in the case of Taipei Dome Complex Construction, thereby providing recommendations as a reference toward the vision of Sports and Peace Development(SDP) for future studies.

## 1.2. Research Purpose

The purpose of this study is to comprehend the controversy of Taipei Dome Complex Construction by analyzing the discourse of governmentality, the actions of stakeholders, and the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex, thereby providing directions for future studies.

## 1.3. Research Questions

To comprehend the case of Taipei Dome Complex Construction, this study presents three research questions to the following:

RQ1. Who are the stakeholders, and what are their interests in Taipei Dome Complex Construction?

RQ2. What is the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex

Construction?

RQ3. What are the issues in the decision-making process?

#### 1.4. Research Significances

The results of this study will be of great benefit to the following:

1. Understand the contextual background of Taipei Dome Complex Construction. Data gathered will provide exhaustive information on how the Taipei Dome Complex becomes an intriguing mega-sports project in Taipei. The result will enable us to initiate the relationship between sports, city, and the environment with this first domed-project since the 1990s. This sport-city-environment relation will not only explicate this controversy but also provide an alternative perspective to examine the meaning of the Taipei Dome Complex.
2. Identify the stakeholders and their interests in Taipei Dome Complex Construction. The result of this study will identify the stakeholders—embroiled stakeholders comprised of both central and

Taipei government officials, sports administrators, real estate developer, environmental specialties, profession practitioner in spatial development, and neighbors who fight against with this domed-stadium project since the 1990s—and their interests in relation to Taipei Dome Complex Construction. Results would also address conflicts of interests among those stakeholders in order to detailed a portrait of the relationship between stakeholders in the frame of discussion given.

3. Comprehend the Decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex Construction. This study will provide information regarding the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex.

4. Address issues in the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex Construction. Based on the decision-making process affected by the conflicts of interest among stakeholders, this study will identify the issues made by policymakers, stadium developers, members of the review committee, and environmentalists to either convoy the possible loopholes in the current decision-making process or militate against it.

Results will also place these issues in the framework of the sport-city-environment relationship to identify its crucial position in this framework.

5. Provide future directions based on the controversy of Taipei Dome Complex Construction for sidestepping the same controversy. This study will not only conclude the etiology of issues in the decision-making process, but also extrapolate the possible solutions based on the stakeholders for Taipei Dome Complex as well as contribute recommendations for future reference and for similar sports mega-projects in Taiwan, for linking the environmental justice (EJ) with Sport and Peace Development (SDP).

## **Chapter 2. Review of Literature**

### **2.1. Genealogy Study of the Sport-City-Environment**

This session explores responses of academic researches to the development between sports and city, for not only locating the scholarly contribution of this study but also giving the theoretical implications to conduct this research. These responses from monographs either allude to the connection between sport, city, and environment or elucidate the sport-city-environment relation in monographs, books, and journal papers. Both categories adopt various epistemologies to discuss the core of sports in the city as well as methodologies to examine its significance. In order to specify my studies, I have selected references of what I define “Genealogy Study of the sport-city-environment”: this structures a theoretical framework of collaging those literature ranging from geography, sports, urban studies to elucidate the dynamics of this research through its historical background.



Although many scholarships have conceptualized the sports city into a framework(Pye, Toohey, & Cuskelly, 2015; Coalter, 2005), it overlooks a fact about how sports engaged into the city to promote what the advantages of social benefits and the vision of the livable city. The lack of historical context makes this framework indecisive. Therefore, the sports city literature, except directly emphasizing its social benefits and the application to urban planning, should meticulously review from the intersection of sports and space so that we can better understand the development trajectory of the concept of sports city. Besides, due to this study focuses on the case of Taipei Dome Complex Construction in Taipei, we must include the context of this case to locate the uniqueness of this research so that the production of sports spaces in Taipei can represent a particular ideology of urban development, corresponding to the accumulation of capitalism (Harvey, 1985). In spite of the emphasis on the literature centering to the core that discusses the interrelationship between the space, city, sport, and the environment (e.g., Bale, 1989; Gratton & Henry, 2001), this study also addresses the context of Taipei Dome Complex as a

prelude of the research in this chapter. Through the discussion, it helps this study to establish a solid theoretical statement to complete the puzzle of sport-city-environment relation through this case study.

The Genealogy Study of the sport-city-environment borrowed the concept of genealogy from Foucault (1984) to construct the conceptual framework between space, sport, city, and environment(See Figure 3). In Foucault's perspective, the myriad history interpreted by rulers should transform into a different time formation—a discontinuity of history to expose the dominators—so that the human being can reconstruct our subjectivity to debunk the historical narrators who effectively control the knowledge and to identify the dispersion of power that struggles for the stage of history(Foucault, 1984). He criticizes the linear progression of history to emphasize the contingency in our history, for reminding us of the discrepancy of history. Neither cynicism nor nihilism centers on his argument. Instead, seeing through the formation of the subject from its context locates the core of his concept. Numerous studies applied this methodology to identify those

external forces shaping the subject-in-process, and the influences from the politics and sociocultural aspects are determined through reconstructing the concept of the subject (e.g., Chang, 2009; Lin & Lin, 2012; Garratt, Piper, & Taylor, 2013). So, the concept of Genealogy not only demolishes the boundaries of subjects with which this study attempts to integrate but also enables us to open a new discussion based on different historical discourse.




Figure 3. Genealogy Study of Sport-City-Environment

Source: Foucault (1984); Bale (1989); Su (2000); Chang (2009); Lin & Lin (2012); Garratt, Piper, & Taylor (2013)

When the absence of environmental studies in the discourse of sport-city

relation especially, this perspective identifies the focus of the narrator for exposing the reason for ignorance on environmental issues. While the sport-city studies center of the matters in building environments for the vision of sustainable development, the sport-environment studies concerns about how sports contribute to the natural environment by playing as a role model. Both paradigms neutralize the environmental issues in both studies. The Genealogy Study of sport-city-environment relation is to construe the knowledge through restating the context. The production of sports space matters to this study because the genealogy is the methodology for the dimension of spatiality(Su, 2000). As mentioned in the introduction, the perspective of geographical history materialism bridges the production of sports space into the accumulation of capitalist society. It turns those normal things into abnormalities so that we can thoroughly examine how the social changes affect the objectives of building the facility to meet the urban transformation. To comprehend the production of the sports facility in the time-series, the decision units, the authority of implementing the sports and city policy,

should be addressed into this study. That is, the production of the facility does not merely represent the policy output of those decision units. It also reflects the outcome of the capital accumulation of society through the process of urbanization. It locates the study amidst the developmental trajectory of sport and the city, becoming the indispensable concomitant of the urbanization (e.g., Euchner, 1993; Danielson, 1997; Rosentraub, 2010; Lin, 2016; Joo, Bae & Kassens-Noor, 2017).

Based on those mentioned above, there are 3 focuses on the literature review. First, the literature of sports geography guides this study to initiate a new discussion of the sports-city-environment realm. Second, the scholarships of sport-city and sport-environment offer an appropriate perspective to examine the Taipei Dome Complex. Third, the insights of sport-city-environment studies contribute to the production of sport spaces in Taipei.

## 2.2. Sports and Geography

The nexus between sports and geography stimulates interdisciplinary studies to pay attention to the performance of sports in the spatial frame. One of its purposes is to draw a line to distinguish sports from pure recreation because sports activity always accompanies with a specialized kind of place(Wagner, 1981). The keyword of place guides the discussion toward to what human geography concerns the most: the human activities interact with their cultures, economies, politics, and the whole environment across the time-space form. Due to space and place barely absent from the subject discipline of geography, the sports activities as a human construction inscribing into the time and space link of the role of environment and place that can be seen as geographic complex for knowing ‘where places are’ or ‘knowing what places are like’(Wagner, 1981; Bale, 1989; Peet, 1998). Following the discipline of geography, Bale(1989) defined the objectives of sports geography into three points:

- 1) sports activity on the earth's surface and how the spatial distribution of sport has changed over time;*
- 2) the changing character of the sports landscape and the symbiosis between the sports environment and those who participate in it; and*
- 3) the making of prescriptions for spatial and environmental change in the sports environment(Bale, 1989).*

As his argument responds to sports space constructed by human experiences in the time-space frame and to explain the relationship between sports, human, and time-space, Bale(1989) applied the “territoriality” from Sack (1986) to express an expression of human power over space in a spatially confined place in the built environment. He argued the sport as a symbol that intersects with economic-social-political life embeds into the spatial dimension ranging from local to global scale (Bale, 1989). The earlier sports geography studies, however, used sports as a new layer to mapped out what sports activities were taking place in the geographical world (e.g., Rooney, 1967; Bale, 1978). The humanistic geographers criticized these

studies about this methodology as a cartographic fetishism (Bale & Maguire, 1994). It points to the Achilles Tendon of this Rooney-style sports geography studies. Sports geography, as the heir of the time geography, spotlights the interactions of different phenomena from individual entities in time-space (Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, J. Watts, & Sarah Whatmor, 2009), outweighs the constraining properties of the body, avoiding the determining effect upon the social institutions, such as power (Giddens, 1986). Rather than censuring the naive of time geography, Giddens (1986) integrates the historical materialism and time-space distancing to support his modes of regionalization, for comprehending zoning of time-space concerning social practices. As the critics from the geographers to sociologists, the sports geography turns the discussion from simply mapping description to an interpretive explanation of those places and practices producing social facts (Wanger, 1981; Ley, 1985), and one example is that Pred (1981) applied the time-geographic approach to demonstrate the relation between the time-space routine of blue collars and attendance at Major League Baseball games.



This paradigm shift of sports geography makes the discussion of sports space diversified, burgeoning the interdisciplinary sports studies. The most common types based on Bale and Dejonghe(2008) are: first, the relation between demography and economic performances of sports clubs to identify social issues(e.g., Connell, 1985; Bale, 1989); second, the impact of mega-events or stadiums on a specific area(e.g., Mason & Robins, 1991; Mason & Moncrieff, 1993; Chase & Healey, 1995; Van Dam, 2000).

This highly vigorous field of study may constitute the domain of sports geography—from descriptive geographical phenomenon to interpretation of production of social facts. In other words, it thus extends the discussion from physical specifications for sites to a spatial abstraction of social practices. In order that a more diversified sports geography studies may digress the realm of time-space, through its constant debate of time-space as well as in its ontology and epistemology system of definition, a complicated and abstract geographical study is demanded. However, it is a dream that the intrinsic deficiency of human geography will never approach. For the sake of

‘authenticity’ and ‘originality,’ human geographical studies never mention of class or gender, and this makes the humanistic concept of a place divided into series contrast groups: inside and outside, belonging and escaping, significance and superficiality, understanding and knowledge, leading either the sense of place or the spirit of place to be manipulated by politics or religious(Peet, 1998). As Giddens(1984) once pointed that the absence of social institution, the interpretation of the fact in these studies thus lost its position as an interpreter because they cannot approach knowing the consciousness of a subject where is being in the geographical world(Peet, 1998). Instead, Koch(2016) uses the theoretical umbrella of critical geographies of sports to bring the power, class, and politics back into the sports geography, for going beyond previous works inspired by Bale(1989). In her edited book, the *Critical Geographies of Sports* published in 2016, contributors adopt notions such like production of space, the spatial practice, and space of flow from Marxist geographers—David Harvey, Henri Lefebvre, and Manuel Castells—to discuss the cases either in terms of tangible

buildings ranging from a shopping mall to hosting the Mega-event or in the matter of intangible geopolitical competition(e.g., Castells, 1977; Castells,1983; Castells, 1992; Castells, 2010; Friedman, 2016; Lee, 2016; Shihade, 2016).




Figure 4. Argument Structure in Sports Geography Literature  
Source: Wagner(1981); Sack(1982); Giddens(1986); Ley(1985); Sack(1986); Bale(1989); Lefebvre(1991); Peet(1998); Bale & Dejonghe(2008); Harvey(2009); Koch, (2016)

As presented in the Figure 4, in the argument structure of Sports Geography literature, the significance of critical geography of sports as a theoretical framework to notice this research that sports itself can be a national-building landscape representing gender, geopolitics, urban-rural, socio-economic class affixations, and that spatiality of sport-scape can cause

conflicts between athletes, dwellers, urban planners, and government officials into the geographical time-space framework(e.g., Wu, 2005; Lin, 2007; Nelson; 2016; Koch, 2016; Lin, 2016). Neither we can notice this trifling power-sport relation embedded into space or can illustrate those geopolitics through the production of sports space in the urban if we do not take sports seriously.

### 2.3. Sports and City

The proliferation of sports and city studies spotlight a theoretical route for identifying the intersection between sports and city. From its wide-ranging sub-themes—first, sport, (post)colonialism, and modernity; second, sports, identity, and belonging to the city; and third, sport, neoliberalism, and urban transformation, it specifies those studies to mediate sports into the urban space for comprehending how agents and their social institution use ‘sports’ to transform urban landscapes(Koch, 2018). Given credit to the urban studies to portray how sporting institutions have been transformed by the urban

process(Koch, 2018), Koch's positive comments, however, make no mention of urban land-use that center to what critical geography is all about(cf. Koch, 2016). In order to bring it back to the discussion, we need to link the transformation of sport-scape with the development of urban planning philosophies. The transformation of the urban landscape relies on the decision-making of land-use institutions, and it represents how the urban process confines or disciplines the sport-scape. In other words, it is necessary to identify the original spatial form of sports and its transformation since the nineteenth century. Here, we use the Anglo-America literature to amplify how intriguing is this progress.

The division of labor leading the modern urban planning manages access to the public space to serve the urban dwellers(Bale, 1993). As the rapid urbanization, more spaces were assigned by specific usages, such as pedestrian, residential area, and business district; the sporting activities, therefore, can only take place in the public space(Riess, 1991). Until the advent of the formal aesthetic park in the 1850s, the recreation landscape was

once the place for sports activities(Low, Taplin, & Schield, 2005). When the first wave utopian urban planning thought—the Garden City and City Beautiful movement in the late nineteenth century—was introduced by planners, the parks, including playgrounds, were eventually organized into a more comprehensive system of city parks(Hall, 2014). For example, Chicago firstly introduced the prototype of zoning, the City Beautiful Movement, to remodel the city. While the city owns the authority to control land-use, the emerging phase of professional baseball can only follow its rules to build up the stadium where is located in the city downtown. For example, the Comiskey Park, home of the Chicago White Sox, which was built in 1910, is a classic example. Another case, the Wrigley Field, home of Chicago Cubs, represents a prototype of growth pole in this era because the municipal government suffered capital shortage so that they need the private sector to deliver the task of urban expansion in northern Chicago, and the ownership of sports club in early ages was composed of mass media, finance, and real estate(Riess, 2006). We may observe the same scenario that happened in Boston, between

the Braves and Red Sox, and the New York, between the Dodgers, the Giants, and the Yankees. As a matter of fact, from the 1930s to 1950s, the growing urban planning system constructed a high division and specified planning institution to govern the urban land in terms of the zoning system, and more recreational park and playground were financially supported by the government(Low, Taplin, & Schield, 2005; Hall, 2014). In general, both the public sports space or professional sports spaces does not like symbiosis but an opponent to competing for the resource in the city, concluding the methodology of financing stadium from public-owned toward to public-private partnerships to the ensuing externality of urbanization: the deterioration of the environment in the late nineteenth century, the decline of downtown from the 1930s, and the infinite urban sprawl since the 1950s(Lin, 2016). The decentralization of government structure, however, causes the sub-political system under each local autonomy, and this highly fragmented geopolitics challenges the rationale of policy implementation in terms of urban land-use for sports space. It exposes the biggest shortcoming of the

rational model of urban planning—lack of sensitivity to the local context and the real world.

Because of the failure of the rational urban planning procedure, the other new philosophy named the advocacy planning endowed the planners to evaluate the optimal proposal to meet every interest groups' expectation, decreasing the legitimacy of public-sector for building sports facilities based on its unique urban functions. Despite vagaries, academic works have identified the functions of sports-city relation, Gratton and Henry(2001) proposed the model of the relationship between sport and social and economic benefits to concluding two functions of sport in the city: economic regeneration, and social regeneration. While the former can affect either the tangible economic force and urban land development, the later represents the intangible urban identity and branding, and quality of life(e.g., Baade & Dye, 1994; Rosentraub, 2000; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000; Aiken, Campbell & Koch, 2013). This discrepancy, however, drags academic discussions among these studies down to inconsequential moral debates(e.g., Baade, 1996;



Chema, 1996; Rosentraub, 1996). On the one hand, the empirical shreds of evidence from the economists examine the insignificant correlation between building a sports facility to host a mega-event or a professional team, repudiating the rationale of using tax money for financing sports facilities (Baade & Dye, 1988; Baade & Dye, 1988a; Baim, 1990; Friedman, Andrews, & Silk, 2004; Zimbalist, 2015). The urban studies scholars, on the other hand, contents those findings disregard the urban issues, such as the revitalization of a declined downtown for local dwellers, so that the objectiveness numbers from the statistics cannot persuade local dwellers to veto this fact (Rosentraub, 1996). While both exclusive mutual perspectives have debated for the investment of the project since the 1970s after the retrenchment of the federal fund (e.g., Noll, 1974), it overlooks a reason why the public funding had invested millions of dollars into the urban land for producing sports space. The methodology of those studies causes overweight the economic output of the sports industry rather than comprehend the developmental path of a sports industry in the city. This methodology draws

two significant drawbacks. Firstly, due to the character stadium that is a space of reproduction to elevate our standard of living, it is futile to argue whether this space can generate economic revenue because the surplus capital will be exploited by beneficiaries so that the redistribution of resources via urban planning can only rely on the tax. Secondly, it neglects dynamic of urban development that results from a parochial sports landscape where only consists of spectators, of a sports club, of a million-dollars stadium, of how models interpret the legitimacy of financing a stadium with public funding, dropping the fact that the partnership between the stadium and urban has been obtained for over hundreds of years since the industrialization changed our way of life. It affects not only those private sports facilities but also those public sports facilities.

In other words, the urban land-use for sports space is the crucial factor to comprehend how the funding system and tax reform affect the transformation of it, thereby establishing this contradiction. In this sense, Rosentraub(2009) proposed the concept of ‘sports welfare system’ to explain

the formation of financing stadium: from the 1950s to 1980s, the declination of downtown and suburbanization caused the massive middle class to the suburban area; considering their votes, the government uses sports to meet their political interests. Hence, the sports welfare system falters decentralized systems because of the financial crisis. As Euchner (1993) and Gratton and Henry(2001) maintain the outbreak of federal financial retrenchment in the 1980s caused both sporting investment from the state government as well as the social services to decline, also causing the government, as a result, adopted Public-Private Partnerships to transfer cost of constructing sports facilities to private sectors. As a result, this fiscal austerity weakened the role of the government in the negotiation of PPPs, turning the balance of sport-city relation to private sectors' advantage, forcing the government to compromise with private sectors(Zimbalist, 2003), leading the city toward to the neoliberal city where the orthodox managerialism like urban planning system lost its control to entrepreneurs. In the 1980s, the conflicts of White Sox's new stadium project at South Armor Square is precisely the case to see

through its dynamics between sports, urban planning. Because middle-class districts have segmented this area, both the government and ballclub aggress to demolish more than a thousand families' homes for their new ballpark project, rejecting any substitution options for the win-win(Euchner, 1993). In fact, due to the lopsided federal funding system, either the federal government or the state government refused to build up amateur sports facilities except those built during the Great Depression, giving such decision-making to the referendum (Houlihan, 1997). For achieving the distributive justice between sports and city, the US Congress had amended several Tax Reform Act from the 1970s to 1980s to impede the funding abuse by the government and benefit the development of amateur sports(Chalip, Johnson, & Stachura, 1996). This amendment, however, did not efficiently manage the funding abuse.

The inveterate, therefore, political decentralization system crippled the bargaining power of the public sector. Furthermore, the disequilibrium of PPPs, thus, squeezed the national funds for sports facilities (Rosentraub,

1999). The sport-city relation, therefore, crowds out other social services, thereby determining the relation between the sport and the city as an adversary (Lin, 2016). Through the processes, the sport-city relation changes with urbanization (Danielson, 1997); it dynamically affects the system of government, the redistribution of resources, and the development strategy of urban planning. More specifically, from the pre-industrial to post-industrial era, the sport-city relation evolved because of the urban politicians and associated regimes that utilized their clout to protect their investment in sport (Stone, 1989; Riess, 2000; Garratt, Piper, & Taylor, 2013), for transformation the sport-scape. Also, since the local government holds the autonomy to govern the city public affairs, the transformation of the policy-making structure in sports city studies plays a crucial role. To identify those agent and institutions involved into this process, Rosentraub (2009) named this partnership 'the growth collation' involving government officials, interests groups, and sports spectators to support not only the sport's welfare system in the name of the public good but also to maintain their interests in

the city. This coalition recoups the stadium on a dollar-for-dollar basis through the local does not agree with it (Pelissero, Henschen, & Sidlaw, 1991; Johnson, 1993), for securing the benefit from rent-seeking in the city (Rosentraub, 2009). Simply put, as demonstrated in Figure 5, the existence of this alliance has embedded in the production of space since the beginning of urbanization throughout the discussion of sports and city literature.




Figure 5. Argument Structure in Sports and City Literature

Source: Stone(1989); Riess(1991); Pelissero, Henschen, & Sidlaw(1991); Euchner (1993), Baade(1996); Chema(1996); Resentraub(1996); Daneilson(1997); Johnson(2000); Gratton & Henry(2001); Riess(2006); Garratt, Piper, & Taylor(2013); Koch(2018).

Although the Anglo-America literature cannot explicate the context worldwide, both urban planning and sports development deeply affect our

case. As we have discussed before, the purpose of the genealogy does not reconstruct a discourse to build up a new timeline. Instead, through the deconstruction of sport-city relation in the history, we identify three sources in which growth coalition mediates the power relation to exposing the power struggle—the uneven development of sports spaces for rent-seeking in the city; the urban land development strategy in the city; the sport-city policy-making—for connecting with the experience of sport-environment studies.

#### 2.4. Sport-City and Environment

Although exhaustive literature has introduced the relationship between two sets of combinations: sport-city and sport-environment, these two sets of literature seldom interconnect with each other because of the different scope of the focus in each group. While sport-city studies are mainly about how they leverage the cost and benefit for archiving a better quality of life through the development of stadium politics, sport-environment studies focus on how sports exploits its social influence to raise the awareness of environmental

sustainability as well as the peace development(Riess, 2001; Erten & Özfiliz; 2006; Wilson, 2012; McCullough & Kellison, 2018). It puts one fact that the paradigm of the environment affects inputs of these scholarships as well as the output. As Bale(1989) defined a humanistic approach to comprehend how human beings practice sports in the geographical time-space framework, the sports had been crystallized into a confined space. To be more specific, such space constructed in the second nature—so-called the city or building environment—formed a new relationship between human beings and nature itself(Lefebvre, 1991).

This epistemology implies a sociological imagination to obtain the context of how human behavior shapes the sports space(Wilson, 2012). That is the sport-city studies center to the production of stadiums, including its context and stakeholders. The sport-environment studies, on the other hand, render the sports is such a media that embedded in the mother nature, assuming the relationship between sport and environment is a self-perpetual existence, simplifying the dynamical world shaping the relationship between



human and sports. Instead of stating the sport is a connection between humans and nature (McCullough & Kellison, 2018), this assumption turns the sport-environment studies overlook why the sports also have full responsibility to engage with both building and natural environmental issues, for approaching the vision of sustainable development. Based on the abovementioned, this study asserts that sport-city and sport-environment studies are inter-contextual discourses emphasizing on the spatiality for reconstructing the paradigm for recontextualization both studies. For achieving this vision, current academic works have offered some clues to follow.

The rise of environmentalism is a consequence of the development because it admonishes us what happened in the city where the failure of articulation of economic growth, social equality, and environmental protection has been identified (Brand & Thomas, 2005). In his sense, environmentalism in cities is not merely for those sounding issues, climate change, or waste production, but for identifying those inequalities in the building environment. Environmentalism, therefore, is an integral part of the

transformation of the time-space framework in a city (Brand, 2007). In other words, the environmentalism is not merely for discussing ecological problems, but also issues of human survival. More specifically, Wilson(2012) employed the idea of Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield, and Bradley (2002) to identify three inequalities—intergenerational inequality, transfrontier inequality, and intra-generational inequality—for explicating how the environmental problems impact more vulnerable groups in human society. This potential threat to human society makes sustainability a pivotal concept to solve these inequalities because sustainability is such an environmental, social, and economical idea connecting to the planet, people, and profit(Kellison & Kim, 2014).

Given the above discussion about environmentalism, the concept of sustainability can render as a way to not only passively avoid deprivation of the right to live but also actively protect the equality of society by development. This position can expound the reason why the residents in South Armour Square, where is a declined area in downtown Chicago, were

against the Chicago White Sox's New Stadium project in the 1980s. In the case of South Armour Square, the rationale of White Sox's new stadium project using the name of urban regeneration for improving the quality of life in downtown Chicago belied the purpose of slum demolition for protecting the privilege of middle-class living nearby(Euchner, 1993). This case is an example of how sport-city studies connect to the environment, based on the presumption that environmentalism is such a concept relating to the transformation of social conditions.

Despite the environmentalism, the discussion of sustainability leads us to the other abstract concept—the Ecological Modernity(EM). The Ecological Modernity is the process that industrialization facilitates new and greener technologies for approaching sustainability to provide scientific solutions, thereby offering a better living environment, such as the greenwashing sports(Brand & Thomas, 2005; Wilson & Millington, 2015; Miller, 2016). Although the Ecological Modernity seemly offers a framework to discuss the transformation of how city or sport uses some "greening"

implementations to prove their pro-environmental intention, it implies that the environmental improvements manipulated by entrepreneurial agents in the free market (Fisher & Freudenburg, 2010; Miller, 2018). In short, sustainability is a zero-sum game under a capitalist society. For example, Kahn (2006) observed the relationship between urban development and greening implementations are essentially driven by free-market growth leading to the M-shaped cities: while the richer cities keep investing capital to increase the living quality, the rest of them may suffer from the negative effect of environmental degradation. Therefore, concluding sustainability as the catalyst for sidestepping social exclusion through promoting either the sport or urban development might repeat the Chicago White Sox's case. From the Chicago White Sox's experience, sustainability is a contested field involving various interests' groups' ideas, suggestions, and expectations. It is the supplement to the lack of discussion of the interaction between human behavior and its social institution (Giddens, 1984; Peet, 1998); furthermore, it addresses how the human beings group as alliances to support or to oppose

their interest. Instead of referring the conflicts to the sin of being in the capitalist society, the actions among diverse groups, therefore, are the key pillar to discuss whether implementing a sport mega-project. In this sense, it is possible to render environmentalism is the medium to revisit the concept of sustainability by identifying how actions made by interests groups toward a stadium project in the decision-making process.

The presented discussion implies both environmentalism or sustainability unseemly meet the fact of the existence of classification in a capitalist society. It is necessary to establish a theoretical framework that can both supervise the solution that may both supervise the implementation and identify the conflict between stakeholders in such dilemma. Wilson & Millington(2015) propose the concept, Sports Management Environmentalists(SMEs) as advocacy agents who prioritize the environmental issues in the first place, to mediate various stakeholders in the sports organization or public sectors. That is, the reason why the research field of sport management need to cover the case of Taipei Dome Complex.

An interdisciplinary case offers the opportunity for future sport administrators to mediate with other professions. Responding to this, Wilson & Millington(2015) asserted that the SMEs should meet the circumstance of post-politics to deal with different voices. The lack of empirical data as well as the generality traits, however, may need more scholars to establish basic research data, for supporting the SMEs to do the decision-makings. As the identification of stakeholders in the decision-making process centering to our main concern, here, the alternative idea proposed by Pellow(2002), the framework of Environmental Justice(EJ), identifies three elements—social exclusion and inclusion, conflicts of stakeholders, debates of sustainability—for helping us to build up an empirical database toward the vision of SMEs. Sze(2009) adopted this EJ framework for detailed examining the case of the controversy of The Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn, for not only dialectically comprehending the case as a place where covers the hidden power but also identifying the conflicts in intra-generation, social stratification, racial issues. This theoretical framework guides this study to

detailed examine the context of the Taipei Dome Complex by identifying crucial stakeholders and by comprehending the case as a place where covers the hidden power and other tension. Following this regard, the series Sport-City and Environment literature offer a rich insight to interconnect the sport and environment in the framework of EJ as presented in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Argument Structure of Sport-City and Environment Literature

Source: Pellow(2002); Brand & Thomas(2005); Brand(2007); Sze(2009); Fisher and Freudenburg (2010); Wilson(2012); Giulianotti(2015); Wilson & Millington(2015); Miller(2016); McCullough & Kellison(2018)

Under the guidance from the sports environmentalism, the ultimate goal of examining the Taipei Dome Complex is to comprehend how the sports development in Taiwan raises conflicts among stakeholders. On the other hand, it revolves around the vision of peacebuilding based on Sport for

Development and Peace(SDP). Within its flexible framework, the sport is not merely a means to promote Development Goals(MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs) by the SDP program but an interface comprised of policy implementers, private sectors, NGOs, participants, and the other possible social movement(Giulianotti, 2004; Giulianotti et al., 2016; Suzuki, 2017; Jarvie & Ahrens, 2018; Jarvie & Ahrens, 2019). In other words, the SDP offers rooms to discuss the experience of various stakeholders in the local context.

As aforementioned, the sport-city and sport-environment studies are inter-contextual discourse because both are embedded in this society, for finding a way to resolve the social inequalities by building an inclusive society for people. In this sense, the paradigm of sport environmentalism and sport and peace development pursues the same vision—social equality. The discussion of sports-city and environment, therefore, can link environmental justice(EJ) with sport and peace development(SDP), guiding this research that solving the controversy of Taipei Dome Complex to restate the vision of



sustainable development in the discussion of sport-city-environment.

## 2.5. Context of Taipei Dome Complex Construction

On the evening of Nov 11, 1991, Game seven of the Chinese Professional Baseball Championship (CPBL) in Taipei Municipal Baseball Stadium between the Wei Chuan Dragons (味全龍) and Uni Lions (統一獅) was tight and excited. This final game of the second season of CPBL drew the Prime Minister (1990-1993), Pei-Tsun Hau(郝柏村), to cheer for both teams. A steady rain, however, abruptly appeared. The aging stadium, which was built in 1959, could not drain the water away, but clogged on the field. Eventually, the umpire delayed the game. “We want a domed-stadium!” Thousands of enthusiastic fans expressed their resentment to Mr. Hau(Chen, 1999).

As aforementioned, the baseball nationalism makes Taiwanese recall the memory “glory time of baseball.” The nostalgia of baseball romanticizes the feasibility of building a state-of-the-art stadium in Taiwan. Although there

are some doubts about the decision-making of government, this concern had been wiped out because the government used its state-led model to make this idea come true.

While fans were shouting at him for a domed-stadium, he, later, announced that he would include a domed stadium as part of a six-year National Development Plan (Clean Government Committee, 2015). In 1993, he successfully listed this project into the plan and assigned the mayor of Taipei, Da-Zhou Huang (黃大洲), to evaluate the feasibility of the domed-stadium project (Chen, 1999). That same year, Mayor Huang suggested building up a publicly owned domed stadium with tax money at the suburban area of northern Taipei, Guandu (關渡), on the site of a nature reserve area. In his vision, this project would not only meet the need of baseball fans but also turn Taipei into a city with the capability to bid for the 1998 Asian Games (Chao, 2018).

Taipei City Council declined this proposal because of unviable financial feasibility: the idea of the proposal would expropriate nearly 90.8 hectares for

the domed stadium and would cost 1.6 billion US dollars(Chen, 1999). Due to financial difficulties, Mayor Huang countermanded the idea. After the 1994 Taipei mayoral elections, the new mayor, Sui-Bien Chen (陳水扁), who was the first Taipei Mayor from Democratic Progressive Party(DPP, 民進黨), took over this responsibility. He zealously considered three possible sites as other alternatives to place the domed-stadium: the Zhongshan Soccer Field(中山足球場), Songshan Tobacco Factory(松山菸廠), and Taipei Municipal Baseball Stadium. These options still failed(Chen, 1999).

Although the Zhongshan Soccer Field did have enough hinterland for a domed-stadium, its geographical location caused this idea to be declined. Wang (2007) states that Zhongshan Soccer Field locates at the intersection between Zhongshan North Road and Minzu West Road, whose transportation's level of service is one of the worst in Taipei, building a domed-stadium would crash the transportation system. The other option, the Songshan Tobacco Factory, belongs to the provincial government, and they refused to corporate with Taipei City because of the discrepancy of political

belief (Chen, 1999). The last option, the Taipei Municipal Baseball Stadium, turned down by Mayor Chen because of the budget problem. The reason why the public sector consecutively dropped this project is obvious: the whole taxation system in Taiwan caused the government to suffer serious budget deficit since 1964 when the congress agreed to lower the Urban Property Tax rate and to eliminate the responsibility to pay the Municipal Tax(Chang, 1993). This major systematic deficiency drove both central and local government to put these kinds of mega-projects in state-owned or public-owned land, which results from the whole land development system highly relied on the private constructors to mitigate the financial burden of government.

Until the concept of public-private partnership, also known as Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT), was adopted by the government in 1997, this domed-stadium could fail again and again. The budget seems like everything, but the political boycott from the KMT to DPP is the crucial factor why Mayor Chen could not succeed in leveraging this project. When it met the

1998 Taipei mayoral elections, the two-time Taipei Mayor Ma(1998-2006), Ying-Jeou Ma (馬英九), who was a rising star and a power broker in KMT, successfully negotiated with the provincial government to claim the Songshan Tobacco Factory, where there are nearly 19 hectares, with 820 million US dollars by tax money(Chan, 2012; Lin, 2016).

The Songshan Tobacco Factory, built-in 1937, was the landmark of industrialization of Taiwan in the Japanese colonial period. It was selected as a monument by academic expertise and the Ministry of Culture. Because of its intangible value to the city, some scholars urged to have a consensus before starting this construction (Lin, 2016). The Taipei government attempted to lobby various fields of expertise to fortify the legitimacy of building a domed-stadium. In this regard, three hearings were held by the Taipei City government from June to August in 2000, but these hearings did not come up with a conclusion between the local dwellers, expertise, and government officials because of information asymmetry among these agents(Taipei City Government, 2000a; Taipei City Government, 2000b;

Taipei City Government, 2000c). Even so, the Taipei City Government kept working with Xin-Hua Lo's Architectural Firm (羅興華建築師事務所), which becomes Archasia Design Group(瀚亞國際設計) later, to implement the domed-stadium project and to take advantage of the Urban Planning Act #27, which turns that discussion in three hearings to be the references of the proposal. According to the Feasibility Study Report of Taipei Dome(2003) made by Lo's firm, it ignores those comments made by residents, experts, and other interest groups. Also, Lin(2016) identified that these reports might intentionally underestimate the profit of a Domed-Stadium for other purposes. It truly fits what happened next. Based on Lo's estimation, this domed-stadium complex project would annually generate 11.5 million US dollars revenue loss. Then, they rendered this as the primary concern to investors and requested to build up affiliated buildings for commercial usage to balance the revenue loss of the domed-stadium(Lin, 2016). In 2004, however, Mayor Ma ceded this land for free to a private company—the Farglory Group—by making the notorious BOT contract(see Table 1.).

Table 1. Timeline of BOT Contracting Process between Farglory Group and Taipei City Government

Date	Event
03-Dec-2003	the Taipei government confirmed the draft of the BOT contract.
17-May-2004	the Farglory Group(with the Takenaka Construction Company, and Pei-Sen Liu's Architectural Firm) become the preferable tender without "Royalty."
17-Jun-2004	First Stage of First contract meeting
24-Jun-2004	First Stage of Second contract meeting
1-Jul-2004	Second Stage of First contract meeting (Agree to delete subsidiary business to make up for the loss of Taipei Dome Complex)
8-Jul-2004	Second Stage of Second contract meeting
14-Jul-2004	Second Stage of Third contract meeting (Agree to delete "takeover right")
22-Jul-2004	Second Stage of Fourth contract meeting (Agreed to add to the right to be transferred and to be leased out")
29-Jul-2004	Second Stage of Fifth contract meeting (a. The operating assets obtained by Party B may be leased out and conditionally transferred (b. The Taipei City Government agrees to assist in deregulating the height restrictions. (c. The subject of transfer is changed from "all existing operating assets" to

	"existing buildings and equipment".
05-Aug-2004	Second Stage of Sixth contract meeting (Farglory stated that it is willing to collect one-thousandth of royalties based on net profit, while the Taipei City Government also insisted that the royalties should be calculated as a percentage of annual turnover. Besides, the provisions in the agreement were changed to "Compulsory Arbitration")
19-Aug-2004	Third Stage of First contract meeting
01-Sep-2004	Third Stage of Second contract meeting (The Taipei City Government still insisted on charging the royalties)
20-Sep-2004	Mayor Ma met CEO Chao, and both reached an agreement on waiving the royalties and on assisting the Farglory Group for reviewing the Urban Plan.
23-Sep-2004	Third Stage of Third contract meeting (Agree to waive the royalties and to review the Urban Plan)
30-Sep-2004	The Third Selection Committee (The Taipei City Government and Farglory Group agreed with the BOT contract.)
25-Nov-2004	The Fourth Selection Committee (The Takenaka Construction Company, the company that designed Tokyo Dome, dropped out this BOT project.)
31-Jan-2005	The Fifth Selection Committee (The Farglory announced the Populous, the famous American sports stadium design



	company, as the new vendor. The committee maintained that this situation is in line with the contract.)
23-May-2005	The Sixth Selection Committee
05-Jul-2005	The Seventh Selection Committee (the committee requested the documents of the Populous; 7 to 9, the committee refused the Populous as the new partner of Farglory Group.)
09-Jan-2006	The Second time of the Seventh Selection Committee (the committee refuted Populous to be the new partner.)
19-Jun-2006	The Eighth Selection Committee (9 to 2, the committee acknowledged the Populous as the new partner.)
14-Aug-2006	The Ninth Selection Committee
03-Oct-2006	The Taipei City Government contracted with the Farglory Group.

Source: Clean Government Committee(2015); Songsshan Tree Group(n.d.).  
Retrieved July 10, 2016.

In 2004, even the Farglory Group changed the partners from the Takenaka Construction Company to the Populous that violates the rationale of qualification of best tender in the BOT contract. According to the contract, once the bidding group was dismissed, the government should declare the invalid tender and redo the tender. However, the Taipei City government still

choose to approve their amendment to replace the partners and to sign the contract with Farglory Group in 2006. After contracting with the government in 2006, the Taipei Dome Complex Project officially started. However, they could not meet the requirement of the Taipei Urban Design Committee and Taipei Environmental Impact Assessment Committee because of the design of the project exceeded the legal floor area written in the BOT contract. According to the contract, the floor area limit is 317,356.8m<sup>2</sup>, but Farglory Group's design was 590,100m<sup>2</sup>. Because of this, both committees insisted on reassesses this project until a sounding alternative submitted by Farglory Group instead of declining their project. These abnormal actions were corrected by Control Yuan in September 2009, a governmental institution that exposes maleficence in public sectors. The Control Yuan indicated that Farglory Group had numerously violated the BOT Contract with and Taipei City Government.

Meanwhile, the Taipei City Government intentionally shield its illegal actions. That is, the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex

Construction has gone far from the right track. That is, the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex Construction has gone far from the right track. Although this corrective measurement did not achieve its expectation to stop such behavior, it has raised the awareness of how important the decision-making process is in this case.

From the end of 2010 to 2011, under the supervise of Mayor Ma's successor, another two-time Taipei Mayor (2008 to 2014), Long-Bin Hao (郝龍斌), the Farglory Group apace got the construction permit, the approval of design modification, and approval of the environmental impact statement in six months. That is, the consequence when the caucus holds the call for any decision-making process. For example, at December 2010, in the 296<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Review Committee, even committee members and local residents doubted the Taipei Dome Complex Project based on its inarticulate simulation and its rationale of the design concept, the Deputy of Department of Urban Development in Taipei, Yu-Chun Ding(丁育群), abused his power to manipulate the result to approve the domed-stadium project. This example

reveals a long-term problem of the review committee system in Taiwan: the chairperson has the advantage to place human resources in the committee for monopolizing the final decision-making, excluding other opinions(see Table 2).

Table 2. List of Key Review Committees

Date	Event
05-Jun-2000	The Taipei Parliament looked for the central government's support.
Jan-2001	The Taipei City Government proposed the "Taipei Cultural and Sports Park and Taipei's Amendment Plan" The district plans and expected to develop in the form of BOT to reduce the government's financial burden.
19-Dec-2002	The Executive Committee of Urban Planning Committee approved "the Rezoning of the Master Plan Taipei Cultural and Sports Park " and submitted it to the Urban Planning Committee for consideration.
10-Jul-2003	The Twenty-eighth Environmental Impact Assessment Committee of the Taipei City Government approved the environmental impact assessment review of the "Master Plan of Taipei Cultural and Sports Park."
22-Jul-03	The 564 <sup>th</sup> Urban Planning Commission in the Ministry of the Interior approved the

	Master Plan of Taipei Cultural and Sports Park.
15-Aug-03	The 516 <sup>th</sup> Taipei Urban Planning Committee approved the detailed plan.
7-Oct-08	The detailed construction method of the 209 protected tree transplantation plan was reviewed and approved by the Tree Protection Committee.
11-Sep-09	The Department of Environmental Protection held the Third environmental impact assessment committee and rejected the Taipei Dome Complex because the Control Yuan corrected this case.
11-Sep-09	The Department of Urban Development held the Third Executive Committee of Urban Design Committee for the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park: Domed-Stadium Project. (Review was suspended because the Control Yuan corrected the case)
09-Dec-2010	The 296 <sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee approved the "Urban Design Review Report" submitted by Farglory Group.
26-May-2011	The Environmental Impact Assessment Committee conditionally approved the case.
30-Jun-2011	Farglory Group obtained the construction permit.
20-May-2015	Construction Management Office inspected seventy-nine main structures that did not conform to the approved plans. The Department of Urban Development

	suspended the Taipei Dome Construction construction.
14-Oct-2019	The 538 <sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee approved the 3 <sup>rd</sup> Amendment to Taipei Cultural and Sports Park Project.
25-Mar-2020	The 221 <sup>st</sup> EIA Committee approved the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park Project
07-May-2020	The Taipei City Government approved the 4 <sup>th</sup> 3 <sup>rd</sup> Amendment to Taipei Cultural and Sports Park Project.

Source: Department of Sports, Taipei City Government(n.d)  
(<https://sports.gov.taipei/Default.aspx>).

Since 2008, for pursuing the social justice and for improving the loopholes in both legal system and review system, Yi Yo(游藝), who is just an ordinary resident nearby Taipei Dome, involved into this complicated political game, and formed Songshan Tree Group to collect all related-data to support their ultimate purpose—Turning the Dome into a forest park. Achieving this goal, he chooses to cooperate with politicians, including Mayor Ko, for expanding the influence of these issues. There were two major successful events. First, the parade of Anti-Dome in 2015, over 1000 people participated, forced both DPP and KMT politicians to open a window for him

to discuss the future of the dome. Second, Anti-Dome Public Forum in 2016, the former Olympic medalist, Cheng Chi (紀政), came to this forum to support the movement. Both raised the awareness of citizens toward this so-called legal but unreasonable Taipei Dome Complex.

After the 2014 Taipei mayoral elections, the populist Mayor, Wen-Je Ko (柯文哲), started to investigate the corruption of the Taipei Dome Project with Songshan Tree Group. He aimed to clarify any significant malfeasance since 1998. Mayor Ko found two problems. First, egress design in Taipei Dome would cause safety issues if a seven earthquake rattled the Taipei because the evacuation plan made by Farglory Group did not meet the latest international standards. Taipei Dome design committee, formed by expertise from Taiwan and Japan, confirmed this in 2015. Second, he also confirmed that the dome would not "fit in the international standard" in the guideline book of World Baseball and Softball Confederation. The standard, however, does not provide an objective design regulation because the standard is

precisely followed by the Official Baseball Rules(2019). According to the Official Baseball Rules(2019):

*"All competition facilities shall fulfill the requirements established by the IBAF and will be subject to inspections by IBAF representatives to verify their use during the official competitions(Official Playing Rules Committee, 2019)."*

Mayor Ko, therefore, suspended the Taipei Dome Complex Construction based on improper construction that may cause life-threatening circumstances to happen on 20 May 2015(Taipei City Government, 2015b). After the suspension, both sides had commenced a series of lawsuits. Until October 2019, when the Urban Design Review Committee accepted the revision of technical drawing submitted by Farglory Group, this domed-stadium case becomes intriguing. In June 2020, Farglory Group resubmitted the building permit to the Taipei City Government for applying for the reconstruction at the beginning of June; Taipei City Government, on the other hand, was ready to approve such request, expecting date of completion of Taipei Dome



Complex at the beginning of 2022, right before the end of Mayor Ko's second term in the Taipei City Government(Kuo, 2020). On the surface, the two sides seem to have compromised each other. It is only an inevitable result caused by the monopolized decision-making structure.



Figure 7. Briefing of the Context in Taipei Dome Complex Construction  
Source: Chen(1999); Tasi(2008) ; Chen(2011); Chan(2012); Chao(2018); Taipei City Government(n.d).

As indicated in Figure 7, throughout the preparation since 2000, the context of Taipei Dome Complex Construction may be preposterous. However, it is precisely how the decision-making process causes this controversy to intersect with the dominant political intervention, the vagaries stakeholders, the broken environment, the angry dwellers, the helpless expert,

and the absence of sports in this controversy. Although the Taiwanese deeply believe the power of stadium as the famous quote "If we build it, people will come," from *the Field of Dreams* (1989), the dream of a field in Taiwan still waits for the pending adjudication. Because no one knows who will come? How will they come? And why will they come? If we remained unknown, we would have liked those fans who were waiting for the rain to stop. With this regard, this study aims to identify the hidden context of Taipei Dome, which relates to review committees. As the stakeholders have been identified, the actions of stakeholders can help this study to better understand what happened in the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex Construction.

### **Chapter 3. Methodology**

In this section, I outline the strategies I used to learn more about the case of Taipei Dome Complex for answering the research questions presented above. In the research design section, I begin by offering the rationale of choosing the qualitative case study methodology to define the scope of the case and to identify the units of analysis through suppositions of the research questions for determining a case study protocol to decide what kind of data should be collected and how it should be analyzed. The section of the research procedure, therefore, provides a full map of the process of this research so as to link the data collection and analysis section consistently to the initial questions. Moreover, the data collection section detailed describes the selection criteria of data, and the data analysis explains the methods of how to interpret those collected data in this research.

### 3.1. Research Design

Because the focuses of research questions on investigating in-depth contextual conditions of Taipei Dome Complex, the case study is a proper research method to obtain a better understanding of this study. Before designing this research, Yin(2014) recommends implementing the criteria for judging the quality of research design-construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability—for evaluating the methodology from research design to data analysis(see Table 3). In this section, the research design follows the third test, external validity, to examine the analytic generalization of the research questions for conducting the case study research. The rationale of research design can not only provide a plan to organize the strategies to learn more about Taipei Dome Complex through the research questions but also build up the consistency of methodology form the research questions to the data analysis. For achieving this vision, it is necessary to define which type of case study may be apropos to this research.

Yin (2014) divided the case study research into three types: the exploratory case study, the explanatory case study, and the descriptive case study for avoiding the misfits by defining the type of research question because it associated with the following data collection. Although the RQ1 use “who” as research questions, they still meet the requirement of the case study question type because both imply the meaning of “how” and “why.” Due to the case study methodology require such type of research question, the proposition from RQ1 to RQ3 in this study are favorable questions for collecting documentary information and for conducting interviews in this case study research because these questions deal with operational link requiring to be examined through time(Yin, 2014). However, the further research design should define in what specified scope these research questions can appropriately guide this research toward the favorable data source for achieving the expected research significances as abovementioned.

Table 3. Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests

Test	Case Study Tactic	Phase of Research in which Tactic Occurs
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Construct Validity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Use multiple sources of evidence</li> <li>● Establish chain of evidence</li> <li>● Have key informants review draft case study report</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Data collection</li> <li>● Data collection</li> <li>● Composition</li> </ul>
Internal Validity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Do pattern matching</li> <li>● Do explanation building</li> <li>● Address rival explanations</li> <li>● Use logic models</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Data analysis</li> <li>● Data analysis</li> <li>● Data analysis</li> <li>● Data analysis</li> </ul>
External Validity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Use theory in single-case studies</li> <li>● Use replication logic in multiple-case studies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Research design</li> <li>● Research design</li> </ul>
Reliability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Use case study protocol</li> <li>● Develop case study database</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Data collection</li> <li>● Data collection</li> </ul>

Source: Yin(2014).

In order to bound this research for meeting the required level of conducting a case study research, Yin(2014) suggested five components of a research design are essentially ineluctable—a case study’s questions; its propositions, if any; its unit(s) of analysis; the logic linking the data to the

proposition; and the criteria for interpreting the findings. The first three elements define the scope of this study for specifying the unit(s) of analysis to avoid digressing from the research as well as targeting the wrong data. That is, the column of the research question and proposition of research that is derived from the literature review contribute to identifying three units of analysis for determining specific units to focus on the case of Taipei Dome Complex (see Table 4). With the propositions of research and the identified units, the following steps will describe the third element about how to link the data to research propositions.

Table 4. Defining the Scope of the Study

Research Question	Proposition of Research	Unit(s) of Analysis
RQ1. Who are the stakeholders and what are their interests in Taipei Dome Complex Construction?	As a national-building project representing social and economic benefits, Taipei Dome Complex causes conflicts between stakeholders who have different interests.	The conflicts of stakeholders' interests in Taipei Dome Complex

<p>RQ2. What is the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex Construction?</p>	<p>Based on post-political structure, the growth coalition leading the project of Taipei Dome Complex either exploits loopholes of the legal system (e.g., Urban Planning Act, Environmental Impact Assessment Act) or takes advantages of the rules of procedure in the review committees.</p>	<p>The decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex.</p>
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RQ3. What issues we can identify in decision-making process?	The seemingly promising review committees precipitate this controversy, raising possible issues in the decision-making process.	Its issues raised by stakeholders in or in Review Committees.
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Source: Adapted from Yin(2014).

As Table 4 presented, RQ1 and RQ2 portray the inside politics and to expose specific controversy in stakeholders in order to identify the issues in the Taipei Dome Complex. This structure of analytic units derives from Pellow (2002)'s analytic framework, environmental justice, not only to identify the contextual issues of Taipei Dome Complex but also emphasize on those stakeholders in this conflict. Although the RQ2 focus on the Taipei Dome Complex, it emphasizes on the insights of the case itself. RQ3, on the

other hand, focuses on the identification of issues in the decision-making process. The proposition of RQ1 and RQ2 demarcates the boundary of the contextual framework to archival records relating to the Taipei Dome Complex, outlining the etiology of the controversy between sport, city, and environment, for identifying the findings of the Taipei Dome Complex can be for further references when conducting such research in terms of environmental justice to respond to the real-world case. The RQ3 mainly emphasizes on the results from the RQ1 and RQ2, proposing possible issues identified in the decision-making process. The proposition of RQ1 evinces the interest of conflict between stakeholders in this case study. The proposition of RQ2 goes into the details of the decision-making process of the case in parliamentary sittings or application review committees for confirming such procedure causes the controversy. Last, the proposition of RQ3 renders this seemingly promising decision-making process as the field for identifying possible issues. Also, it complements the reason why and how the issues in the decision-making resulting from the final controversy. These

different analyzing units make this research an embedded case study that has multi-units, such as individuals, groups, and the system relating to Taipei Dome Complex, for identifying the constitutions of the analyzing units from each proposition of research question (see Table 5).

Table 5. Constitutions of the Analyzing Data in Each Unit of Analysis

	Unit of Analysis	Constitution(s) of the Analyzing Data	Source of Evidence
RQ1	The conflicts of stakeholders' interests in Taipei Dome Complex	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Interviewees from public sectors: government officials, members of Application Review Committee.</li> <li>2. Interviewees from non-public sectors: former government officials, sports administrators, the real estate developer, environmental specialties, profession practitioner in spatial development, and local resident.</li> <li>3. Archival records from central government: Legislative Yuan's Sitzings, Executive Yuan's sittings.</li> <li>4. Archival records from local government (Taipei): Parliamentary Sitzings, Urban Planning Committee, Urban Design Committee, Environmental Impact Committee, BOT Contract</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Interviews</li> <li>2. Archival records</li> <li>3. Theories in literature</li> </ol>

		Negotiation Meeting, and Clean Government Committee.	
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RQ2	The decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Documentation and archival records from central government: Legislative Yuan's Sitzings, Executive Yuan's sittings.</li> <li>2. Documentation and archival records from local government (Taipei): Parliamentary Sitzings, Urban Planning Committee, Urban Design Committee, Environmental Impact Committee, BOT Contract Negotiation Meeting, and Clean Government Committee.</li> <li>3. Interviewees from Public sectors: government officials, members of Application Review Committee.</li> <li>4. Interviewees from non-public sectors: former government officials, sports administrators, the real estate developer, environmental specialties, profession practitioner in spatial development, and local resident.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Documentation</li> <li>2. Archival records</li> <li>3. Interview</li> <li>4. Theories in literature.</li> </ol>
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RQ3	Its issues raised by stakeholders in Review Committees.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Documentation and archival records from central government: Legislative Yuan's Sitzings, Executive Yuan's sittings.</li> <li>2. Documentation and archival records from local government (Taipei): Parliamentary Sitzings, Urban Planning Committee, Urban Design Committee, Environmental Impact Committee, BOT Contract Negotiation Meeting, and Clean Government Committee.</li> <li>3. Interviewees from Public sectors: government officials, members of Application Review Committee. Interviewees from non-public sectors: former government officials, sports administrators, the real estate developer, environmental specialties, profession practitioner in spatial development, and local resident.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Documentation</li> <li>2. Archival records</li> <li>3. Interview</li> <li>4. Theories in literature.</li> </ol>
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Source: Adapted from Yin(2014).

With detailed analyzing data and multi-source of evidence, the last element of research design, the criteria for interpreting the findings, guides this research to answer the interests of the research questions by analyzing case study data to enhance the quality of overall case study research(see Table 6). The analytic strategy of this research follows Yin's suggestion to adopt three analytic strategies and techniques, respectively (Yin, 2014). The three analytic strategies are: developing a case description for identifying the appropriate explanation, relying on theoretical propositions for helping to organize the relevant contextual conditions, and examining plausible rival explanations for enhancing the validity of findings from the case study research (Yin, 2014). In this study, most of the work relies on developing a case description. The source of evidence answering RQ1 and RQ2, mainly, is used to construct the contextual situation of the Taipei Dome Complex, while the RQ3 shares mostly The same source with RQ2. That is, how and why such context leads to the current intriguing circumstance. Through this descriptive framework, the outline of the Taipei Dome Complex may identify

the stakeholders for answering RQ1, comprehending the decision-making process for RQ2, underlining issues in the decision-making process for RQ3. Together with this descriptive work, the rival explanations explicate the opposing views or propositions from data or literature, leading to complement the argument from the RQ1 and RQ2. The proposition of RQ1 is to point out the etiology of controversy in Taipei Dome Complex; the best way to underline this fact is to add documents with pros and cons' position. Similarly, RQ2 presents the voice from different stakeholders for enumerating how the interest of conflict causing the issues in the decision-making process of Taipei Dome. With the descriptive information and rival explanations from RQ1 to RQ2, it contributes to answering for the case as well as future reference. As for the RQ3, it is considering it proposes to establish a solid statement for concluding research findings, aka — issues among stakeholders in the decision-making process from both RQ1 and RQ2. RQ3, in this regard, contributes to the concluding work at the end of this study.

Despite these two analytic strategies, relying on theoretical propositions



examines the existing theory of critical geography using sport as a nation-building landscape in RQ1, of sport-city studies identifying the growth coalition and of sport environmentalism proposing the sports management environmentalist in RQ2, of the identification of possible issues in the decision-making process, thereby achieving the vision of sports for development and peace—alleviating the conflicts among stakeholders.

Table 6. Data Analytic Strategy and Technique

Research Question	Source of Evidence(s)	Analytic Strategy(s)	Analytic Technique(s)
RQ1. Who is the stakeholder and why are they interested in Taipei Dome Complex?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Interviews</li> <li>2. Archival records</li> <li>3. Theories in literature</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Rely on theoretical propositions</li> <li>2. Developing a case description</li> <li>3. Examining plausible rival explanations</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Patterning matching</li> <li>2. Explanation building</li> </ol>

RQ2. What is the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex Construction	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Documentation</li> <li>2. Archival records</li> <li>3. Interview</li> <li>4. Theory in literature.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Rely on theoretical propositions</li> <li>2. Developing a case description</li> <li>3. Examining plausible rival explanations</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Patterning matching</li> <li>2. Explanation building</li> </ol>
RQ3. What issues we can identify through decision-making process of it?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Documentation</li> <li>2. Archival records</li> <li>3. Interview</li> <li>4. Theory in literature.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Rely on theoretical propositions</li> <li>2. Developing a case description</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Patterning matching</li> <li>2. Explanation building</li> </ol>

Source: Adapted from Yin(2014).

In this section, this study has established an underlying rationale of research design to conducting a case study research for not only linking the research question to data analysis but also provide a preliminary guideline to the following sections. In the next section, the research procedure will provide an overview of the research procedure of this case study.

### 3.2. Research Procedure

Under the guidance from Yin(2014) as Figure 8 presented, the research procedure indicates that the initial step in designing a case study research should consist of theory development. In this study, the concept of environmental justice is the theoretical framework to examine the controversy of the selected case, the Taipei Dome Complex. Then, based on the research questions and the research propositions derived from the literature review, this study defines the type of case study, of the units of analysis, of the link between data and the research questions, and the strategies of data analysis. This research design identifies a unit of analysis from RQ1 to RQ3, consisting of a whole embedded case study where convergent evidence is identified from the facts. Concluding this case contributes to not only the modification of theory as presented above but also the recommendations of policy implementation.




Figure 8. Research Procedure of This Study

Source: Adapted from Yin(2014).

### 3.3. Data Collection

The rationale for choosing the methods to collect research data is based on the characteristics of this case study. The case study method can help us to glean part of the documentation or achieves from both public and private institutions for understanding the context of the Taipei Dome Complex. The in-depth interview method, to the contrary, allows us to collect individual primary data, including personal perceptions and professional recommendations, as the supplement to the secondary data, thereby mapping the controversy of the Taipei Dome Complex.

In order to meet the requirement of the test of construct validity and reliability, this section employs the chain of evidence to detailed illustrate the prospective source of evidence identified by earlier research design. As abovementioned, documentation, archival records, and interview are the source of evidence in this case study. The implementation of the chain of evidence offers data tracking for readers who curious about the reference or specific citations in this study.

### 3.3.1 Documentation and Archival Records

Because the Taipei Dome Complex is an ongoing project, the case study method allows this research to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of the research object in a real-life context. Especially, since the government introduced Taipei Dome Complex in the 1990s, it has not only become a gregarious BOT project in the history of Taiwan but also evokes numerous researchers to conduct the same research methodology based on different research perspectives to comprehend its contextual

conditions(e.g., Chen, 1997; Chen, 2011; Chan, 2012). From their leading works, we identify preliminary sources to collect the data of Taipei Dome Complex, which includes the field of sports administrations, urban planning and design, and environmental impact assessment from either online government database or online news database. To further establish the method of data collection, we list the sources and the name of data for this case study(see Table 7).

Table 7. Chain of Evidence

Source of Evidence	Type of Data	Case Study Database	Citations to Specific Source
Documentation	Public Document	Taipei Dome Open Resource	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>“Proposal of Taipei Dome Project.”**</i></li> <li>2. <i>“Taipei Dome Master Plan.”**</i></li> <li>3. <i>“Proposal of Taipei Dome Urban Design.”</i></li> <li>4. <i>“Environmental Impact Statement of Taipei Dome Project.”**</i></li> <li>5. <i>“BOT Contract of Taipei Dome Complex.”**</i></li> <li>6. <i>“Investigation Report of Taipei Dome from Clean Government Committee</i></li> </ol>

			<i>in Taipei City Government.</i> ”**
	Non-Public Document	Songshan Tree Group’s Private Database	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>“Long-term Strategy of Songshan Tree Group.”</i></li> <li>2. <i>“Minutes of Songshan Tree Group Meeting.”</i></li> </ol>
	Academy Scholarship	Airiti Library Database	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>“Field of Dreams -- The Social Production of Taipei City Dome.”**</i></li> <li>2. <i>“Exploring Sustainable City: A Case Study of Taipei Dome Complex in Songshan Tobacco Factory.”**</i></li> <li>3. <i>“Exploring Spatial Justice: A Case of Taipei Dome Complex.”**</i></li> </ol>
		Book	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>“Critical Geographies of Sport: Space, Power and Sport in Global Perspective.”**</i></li> <li>2. <i>“Major League Winners: Using Sports and Cultural Centers as Tools for Economic Development.”**</i></li> <li>3. <i>“Garbage Wars: The Struggle for Environmental Justice in Chicago.”**</i></li> <li>4. <i>“Routledge Handbook of</i></li> </ol>

			<i>the Sociology of Sport.</i> ”**
		Journal Paper	1. <i>“Sports and Environmental Justice “Games” of Race, Place, Nostalgia, and Power in Neoliberal New York City.</i> ”** 2. <i>“Sports, Environmentalism, Land Use, and Urban Development.</i> ”**
	News Archives	UdnData	1. Taipei Dome Complex related news.
	Documentary	Program of Public Television Service in Taiwan	1. <i>“The Intriguing Profit of Taipei Dome(2008).”</i> 2. <i>“The Dream of Domed-Stadium(2016).”</i>
Archival Records	Miniates of Taipei Dome related Sitings	Taipei Dome Open Resource	1. Meeting Minutes of Urban Design Commission 2. Meeting Minutes of Taipei Dome Complex Routine Meeting 3. Meeting Minutes of



			<p>Environmental Impact Assessment Commission</p> <p>4. Meeting Minutes of Taipei Dome Project Meeting</p> <p>5. Meeting Minutes of other Taipei Dome related meetings.</p>
	<p>Minutes of Central Government Meetings and of Local Government Meetings.</p>	<p>Archival Records</p>	<p>1. Executive Yuan Gazette</p> <p>2. Legislative Yuan Gazette</p> <p>3. Taipei City Parliament Gazette</p>
Interview*	<p>Interviewees from Public sectors: government officials</p>	<p>Transcript Database</p>	<p>1. Government officials</p> <p>2. Members of Application Review Committee.</p>
	<p>Interviewees from non-public sectors:</p>		<p>1. Former government officials</p> <p>2. Sports administrators</p> <p>3. Real estate developer</p> <p>4. Environmental specialties</p> <p>5. Profession practitioner in spatial development</p> <p>6. Local resident</p> <p>7. Volunteer of Songshan Tree Group</p>

\*the plan of Interview will discuss below.

\*\*detailed citation information place in the bibliography.

Source: Developed for this study.

### 3.3.2 Interview

Despite the documentation and archival records, this research adopts the in-depth interview method for collecting motivations, beliefs, attitudes, and feelings of interviewees when they engage in the Taipei Dome Complex. The interview method may enable us to establish a whole map of Taipei Dome Complex through its policy-making and decision-making process. In order to fit the research design, the selection of interviewees should involve in either the decision-making or negotiating process in the case of the Taipei Dome Complex.

That is, they should serve or once work for public sectors or private sectors; moreover, these respondents should be familiar with either sport, city, or environment issues so that they are legitimate to select as interviewees in this study. Considering the stakeholders involved in this case, we target some specific identities, such as the politicians, government officials, experts who

serve in the commission of Taipei City Government, experts who once served for the Taipei City Government, a representative from Farglory Group, and local opinion leader and protest group(Songshan Tree Group).

From the selection standard, we select fifteen candidates as the interviewees(see Table 8.). Considering this research may expose each interviewee's identity as well as their sensitive personal opinions that lead to jeopardizing their career. The true Identity of the interviewee will leave anonymous so as to protect their interest. Based on their profound experience in the case of Taipei Dome Complex, this study adopts semi-structured interviews to enable both interviewer and interviewees can make flexible adjustments during the interview. In addition, this study divides the interview questions into two parts: general questions and specific questions. While the former one may apply to all of the interviewees, the later one may only apply for each specific Identity (see Appendix I and II.). The interview conducted from 30/1/2020 to 22/2/2020 and each interview should be no longer than ninety minutes.

Table 8. List of Interviewees(anomalous)

ID of Interviewee	Identity	Position	Area of Expertise
UCSCE01	Former commissioner of Urban Design Committee, and Environmental Impact Committee in Taipei City Government	Professor at University	Disaster Management
UCSCE02	Former commissioner of Environmental Impact Committee	Professor at University	Environmental Engineering
UCSCE03	Former official in Department of Sport and in Taipei Dome Preparation Office at Taipei City Government	Professor at University	Sports Management and Administration
UCSCE04	Former official in Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government	Private Company	Urban Planning, Design, and Architecture
UCSCE05	Former Commissioner in Clean Government Committee at Taipei City Government	Self-Employed	Public Administration and Politics
UCSCE06	Lawyer	Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association, Taiwan	Environmental Act
UCSCE07	Former Taipei City Council Member	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	Public Administration

			and Politics
UCSCE08	Former Congressperson	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	Public Administration and Politics
UCSCE09	Taipei City Council Member	Non-Partisan	Public Administration and Politics
UCSCE10	Local Opinion Leader	Resident in Shin-Ren Village	Public Administration and Politics
UCSCE11	Operating Officer	Farglory Group	Domed-Stadium Operation
UCSCE12	Volunteer	Songshan Tree Group	Environmental Protection
UCSCE13	Volunteer	Songshan Tree Group	Environmental Protection
UCSCE14	Volunteer	Songshan Tree Group	Environmental Protection
UCSCE15	Resident/ Volunteer	Songshan Tree Group	Environmental Protection

Source: Developed for this study.

### 3.4. Data Analysis

In order to analyze the collected data of the Taipei Dome Complex, this research firstly adopts the test of internal validity recommended by Yin (2014) for enhancing the overall credibility and reliability of data analysis. As the

research design section mentioned, the master plan of data analysis is comprised of the analysis analytic strategies and analytic techniques. The analysis strategies, including relying on the theoretical proposition, developing a case description, and examining plausible rival explanations, are the primary criteria of the test in the internal validity of a case study research. The analysis techniques, on the other hand, offer the tool for this research to reorganize the collected data. The pattern matching is such a tool for the predicted pattern of necessary descriptive conditions was defined before data collection; the explanation building is for analyzing case study data to offer explanations to the case; time-series analysis investigates presumed causal events for including more variables and despondent variables (Yin, 2014). The former one defines how to analyze data to meet the interest of research questions; the later one identifies the specific perspective of data interpretation for matching the data with the former one. In brief, both cannot separate from each other in the context of case study research because this

study needs both to construct a solid description imbibing the different rival explanations.

This research mainly relies on descriptive work of the data that can not only provide an appropriate explanation to respond to the theoretical proposition as well as to include rival explanations. No matter what the source of evidence used in this study, describe the real-situation of the Taipei Dome Complex. Since the Taipei Dome Complex is a twenty-eight years old public project in Taiwan, it is inevitable to use government official documents to construct its time-series sequence as well as a detailed explanation in this period. For example, “*Proposal of Taipei Dome Project*” offers a position of the government for why Taiwan needs a domed-stadium and why Taipei may be the optimal option to build up this project. Although this is the blueprint back to the 1990s, which is far from enough to explain the whole map of the case, the other printed public documents, such as “*Investigation Report of Taipei Dome.*” that this report is the first and the latest version to examine the controversy of the Taipei Dome Complex, can help this study to develop

the case description as well as identify a part of the stakeholders from public sectors.

With the outline of this case, this study, therefore, starts to profile the government reports and gazette for matching each specific timing when they are identified as controversial moments and to detailed revert policy-making or decision-making processes. This pattern-matching analysis provides more insights to explain why and how the Taipei Dome Complex becomes such a controversial case. The rival explanations offer another alternative pattern to match this descriptive work, making arguments or explanations to be reliable. For instance, the meeting minutes of application review meetings may have committee members or other interest groups against this case, and their voices or opinions may be regarded as a counter-argument to fortify the overall structure of the case description. From the matching process, the rival explanations (e.g., opponents) can be identified in the descriptive framework.

Through the demonstration, it is evident that analytic strategies and techniques toward identifying the stakeholders and placing them into the



contextual situation of Taipei Dome Complex. The background information provided by documentation establishes a prototype of the story, and those compliments from either supporters or opponents will make this story well-established. The policy-making or decision-making process also plays into our discussion of the dialect of sport-city-environment for addressing main concerns from each side to pinpoint the tensions between these three elements. Instead of stagnating in this stage, the analysis uses interview transcripts from the stakeholders as the complement for corresponding the tension of the dialect from the secondary data, thereby making the whole statement of the dialect between sport-city-environment a quagmire for addressing possible solutions to Taipei.

The same pattern applies to interpret the interview data. Transcript analysis is an analytical method for the analysis of social products. In this research, a transcript should place in its context, for complementing some lost details of the case. In order to know the production of text in its space-time context, the relevant social and political factors should be further analyzed to

make the social text more appropriate and in-depth understanding because the text is also engaged in the sociopolitical relationship. That is, the transcripts can be deconstructed and reconstructed based on its time-space context, for pointing out those unsaid or unsayable messages in the interview. For example, at 7 April 2015, one opponent expresses an argument—"While stadiums in the USA has been examined its safety since 1909, I cannot believe that we are still using the lowest standard to examine the safety issue of Taipei Dome"—against with the rationale of approving the construction of Taipei Dome Complex. The context of this statement happened when safety issues chased by media because the constructor violated the code of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act. This context offers a better understanding of what happened during the specific conflicts between stakeholders and their actions. Through this process, we can revisit the transcripts several times for placing it in time series of the Taipei Dome Complex. Moreover, this analysis may offer an alternative explanation to the dialect of sport-city-environment in this case study to address the solutions

representing both the objective analysis and subjective opinions for the future reference.

That is, both developing the case description and pattern matching will be interpreted by the researcher in a particular perspective responding to the theoretical proposition. With sufficient explanations to the case, the final stage of this study will be making theoretical arguments respond to the theoretical proposition, such as the concept of environmental justice, growth collation, sport management environmentalist, and the sports for development and peace in the context of Taipei Dome Complex(see Table 9).

Table 9. Data Analysis Strategies and Techniques

Source of Evidence	Type of Data	Citations to Specific Source	Analytic Strategy(s)	Analytic Technique(s)
Documentation	Public Document	1. <i>"Proposal of Taipei Dome Project."</i> ** 2. <i>"Taipei Dome Master Plan."</i> ** 3. <i>"Proposal of Taipei Dome Urban Design."</i> 4. <i>"Environmental</i>	1. Developing a case description	1. Pattern Matching 2. Time-Series Analysis 3. Explanation on Building

		<p><i>Impact Statement of Taipei Dome Project.”**</i></p> <p>5. <i>“BOT Contract of Taipei Dome Complex.”**</i></p> <p>6. <i>“Investigation Report of Taipei Dome from Clean Government Committee in Taipei City Government.”*</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">*</p>		
	Non-Public Document	<p>1. <i>“Long-term Strategy of Songshan Tree Group.”</i></p> <p>2. <i>“Minutes of Songshan Tree Group Meeting.”</i></p>	<p>1. Examining plausible rival explanation</p>	<p>1. Pattern Matching</p> <p>2. Explanation on Building</p>

	Academy Scholarship	1. <i>“Field of Dreams -- The Social Production of Taipei City Dome.”**</i> 2. <i>“Exploring Sustainable City: A Case Study of Taipei Dome Complex in Songshan Tobacco Factory.”**</i> 3. <i>“Exploring Spatial Justice: A Case of Taipei Dome Complex.”**</i>	1. Examining plausible rival explanations	1. Pattern Matching 2. Explanation on Building
		1. <i>“Critical Geographies of Sport: Space, Power and Sport in Global Perspective.”**</i> 2. <i>“Major League Winners: Using Sports and Cultural Centers as Tools for Economic</i>	1. Relying on theoretical proposition	1. Pattern Matching 2. Explanation on Building

		<p><i>Development.”*</i></p> <p>*</p> <p>3. <i>“Garbage Wars: The Struggle for Environmental Justice in Chicago.”**</i></p> <p>4. <i>“Routledge Handbook of the Sociology of Sport.”**</i></p>		
		<p>3. <i>“Sports and Environmental Justice “Games” of Race, Place, Nostalgia, and Power in Neoliberal New York City.”**</i></p> <p>4. <i>“Sports, Environmentalism, Land Use, and Urban Development.”*</i></p> <p>*</p>	<p>1. Relying on theoretical proposition</p>	<p>1. Pattern Matching</p> <p>2. Explanation on Building</p>
	News Archives	<p>1. Taipei Dome Complex related news.</p>	<p>1. Examining plausible rival explanation</p>	<p>1. Pattern Matching</p> <p>2. Explanation on</p>

			n	Building
	Documentar y	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <i>“The Intriguing Profit of Taipei Dome(2008).”</i></li> <li>2. <i>“The Dream of Domed-Stadium(2016).”</i></li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Developin g a case descriptio n</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Explanati on Building</li> </ol>
Archival Records	Miniates of Taipei Dome related Sittings	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Meeting Minutes of Urban Design Commission</li> <li>2. Meeting Minutes of Taipei Dome Complex Routine Meeting</li> <li>3. Meeting Minutes of Environmental Impact Assessment Commission</li> <li>4. Meeting Minutes of Taipei Dome Project Meeting</li> <li>5. Meeting</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Developin g a case descriptio n</li> <li>2. Examining plausible rival explanatio n</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Pattern Matching</li> <li>2. Time- Series Analysis</li> <li>3. Explanati on Building</li> </ol>

		Minutes of other Taipei Dome related meetings.		
	Minutes of Central Government Sitting and of Local Government Sitting.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Executive Yuan Gazette</li> <li>Legislative Yuan Gazette</li> <li>Taipei City Parliament Gazette</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing a case description</li> <li>Examining plausible rival explanation</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pattern Matching</li> <li>Time-Series Analysis</li> <li>Explanation Building</li> </ol>
Interview*	Interviewees from Public sectors: government officials	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government officials</li> <li>Members of Application Review Committee.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing a case description</li> <li>Examining plausible rival explanation</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pattern Matching</li> <li>Explanation Building</li> </ol>
	Interviewees from non-public sectors:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Former government officials</li> <li>Real estate developer</li> <li>Environmental specialties</li> <li>Profession practitioner in</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Developing a case description</li> <li>Examining plausible rival explanation</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pattern Matching</li> <li>Explanation Building</li> </ol>



		spatial development 5. Local resident 6. Volunteer of Songshan Tree Group		
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Source: Developed for this study.

## **Chapter 4. Results and Discussion**

### **4.1. Stakeholder Analysis of Taipei Dome Complex**

Following on the concept of stakeholder to comprehend specific individuals or groups that obtain the capability to affect the direction of a specific event(Freeman, 1984), it enriches this study to identify such legitimate agents related to the case of Taipei Dome Complex Construction, for initiating a systematically interactive analysis by studying their knowledge, interests, positions, alliances, and importance suggested by Schmeer(1999). This section, adhering to her guidance for conducting a stakeholder analysis, aims to yield precise and useful input for further analysis. According to Schmeer's suggestion, a sound stakeholder analysis contains five steps (discussion below), comprised of data collation, analysis, and application (Schmeer, 1999). First, considering the organization of both direct and indirect data, Schmeer(1999) stated that a stakeholder table

efficiently defines the fundamental characteristics and position among stakeholders. Second, to the extent of the systematical table, it is inevitable to prioritize these stakeholders via a power and leadership analysis so as to pinpoint the importance of stakeholders (Schmeer, 1999). Third, to build up an inclusive stakeholder analysis for those smaller priority groups, a cross-analysis named knowledge analysis centers to examine whether both supporting and opposing groups have a consistent knowledge level to the policy(Schmeer, 1999). Fourth, identifying the clusters and visualizing them on a map for detailed analyzing interest data of stakeholders, Schmeer(1999) claimed that the presentation of stakeholders' position illustrates where these actors are by sectors, how important those agents by color along with the result of P/L analysis, and what kind of positions—support, neutral, or opposition—they uphold. Last, with these cross-references, the table presented the interest of stakeholder's emphasis on those specific P/L level stakeholders pinned on the map as the reference into the decision-making analysis, thereby producing a solid and logical method of problem

identification based on the result of stakeholder analysis via the decision-making progress(Schmeer, 1999).

This promising guidance guides this study to not merely position those stakeholders listed on the prospective interviewees. It discovers additionally hidden but essential stakeholders. Addressed in the section of methodology, both first-hand and second-hand data bolster the argument of this study, while the limitation of data collection impedes the output of the research, especially when the list of prospect interviewees does not include the critical decision-group—Mayor of Taipei and his small group—of the Taipei Dome Complex Construction because of the sensitivity of the issue. This circumstance is, undoubtedly, inexorable but surmountable. The cross-references from both sources of data attempt to build up an omniscient stakeholder map, overcoming the hindrance of the absence of voice from those key pillars. From this adapted analytical strategy, this section expects to place stakeholders into their best fit for the position in this case study. In the preliminary observation, as this study addressed from previous chapters, three

main interest groups, public sectors, private sectors, and civil society, have interwoven the Taipei Dome Complex construction since the late twentieth century. Exactly because of this convoluted circumstance made by political struggles, it has baffled scholarships about adopting such a research method to clarify this relationship because a reportage of an event cannot meet the requirement of being an academic work. In order to break this bottleneck, the stakeholder analysis leads this study to define the attributes of each stakeholder in a stakeholder table, as Table 10 presented.

The stakeholder table herewith adapted from Schmeer (1999) spread out ten characteristics of stakeholder: (A)I.D. Number; (B)Position and Organization; (C)Internal/External; (D)Knowledge; (E)Position; (F)Interest; (G)Alliances; (H) Resources; (I)Power; and (J) Leadership(for full definitions, please refer to the appendix III), and result of attributes from stakeholder would be addressed below in accordance with the sequence of characteristics.

As Table 10 summarized, fifteen stakeholders from the list of interviewees are coded anonymously and are numbered from 01 to 15 in the

column (A). All of their current or former position and organization detailed placed in columns (B). This study identified 8 positions among stakeholders: (1)former commissioners of the committee at Taipei City Government; (2) former higher officials at Taipei City Government; (3) lawyer; (4) local key opinion leader; (5) operating officer at Farglory Group; (6) former congressperson; (7) former and current Taipei City Council members; and (8) volunteers at Songshan Tree Group. 7 out of them, except operating officer at Farglory Group, are categorized as external stakeholders because their current institutions are not promoting or implementing the Taipei Dome Complex. This result, fortunately, does not affect the quality of the analysis because the decision-making mechanism of the institution relatively remains stable, comparing with personnel changes in the institution. That is to say, once the stakeholders had work experience in the institution, their sharing is representative of the operation of the decision-making mechanism in the institution. Besides, because of the long war between opposing and supporting group, of exposure from the mass media, and the societal changes

raising the public awareness, this case not only sweeps under the carpet came to the fore but led some actors to be an active learner to overcome the threshold of understanding this complicated case through involving in it. As respondents pointed it out:

“[When I became a Taipei City Council Member], my assistant brought piles of documents [related to Taipei Dome Complex]. There are stacks of documents in Yi You’s place. Even we learned by studying [these data], but what would it be like? The feeling was like UCSCE09. When you are a City Council Member, which part should I emphasize on? For me, I came out with three main parts: committee, decision-making mechanism, and the attitude of the government (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).

“[What I have learned from Taipei Dome Complex is that] I have a deeper understanding of what government official is, of how to communicate with them, and of what taboos they might care

(UCSCE09, personal communication, February 11, 2020).”

“Once I found there was no way for me to speak out my own voice when the Chou-Min Lin’s, commissioner in Department of Urban Development, [host the Urban Design Committee] ...I started to think about how to be expertise like him so as to convey the local residents’ opinions as soon as possible. It becomes one of my duty to search for data, to think about how to properly present my idea in [the Urban Design Committee] (UCSCE10, personal communication, February 12, 2020).

“...[the meaning of participating in anti-Taipei Dome Complex movement ] is a learning process of life, as a person who just obtained the high-school degree, has fought against this case for 13 years. It was like an EMBA course, but pricier (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 2, 2020).”

The voices presented above, mainly from the civil society or legislators, expose the fact that the sector to which stakeholders belong determines



whether they should prepare themselves to fit the rule of a social institution rather than being listened to. This phenomenon will be further discussed later.

Simply put, this unequal relationship is such an ironic fact that the public-private partnership of building the Taipei Dome Complex excludes the voices of civil society. Shared with limited information, civic stakeholders carry the responsibility to establish their database. In this regard, it is not surprised why these stakeholders obtain an above-average knowledge level. All of them are defined as level 2 or 3, to the Taipei Dome Complex Construction in the column (D). In such high knowledge level of the case, the definition of the policy implementation made by each stakeholder is toward a direction of philosophical meanings. After summarizing the definition of implementing Taipei Dome Complex from the fifteen stakeholders, it stated that the Taipei Dome Complex is such a pork-barrel resulting from political struggles that the politic outperforms the professionalism. Beyond the story of pursuing a dream field for the future of Taiwan baseball, it corresponds to the high knowledge level when building a mega-sports stadium construction is a

perplex political issue instead of a pure public building. However, a more specific definition of political struggles herein should be precisely characterized because the concept of political struggle is too broad to discuss. In so doing, several interviewees had offered similar ideas to help this study to narrow it down to a concrete definition:

“I think it [the Taipei Dome Complex] was a political chip so that it turns into a real project (UCSCE13, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

Both statements illustrate the Taipei Dome Complex Construction as an object for politics to leverage other interests so that it would create a mutual benefit for those who participate in this project. Apparently, according to the BOT contract, Taipei City Government and Farglory Group may be the best fit. Primarily when other stakeholder provided more detailed descriptions:

“It [the Taipei Dome complex] is a case colluded by the government and enterprise (UCSCE10, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

Although this indicated that the actors who are playing the seesaw game in this case, the reason why they should leverage on this issue and what they are looking for remains vague. To answer both questions, a more philosophical identification listed below from the other three stakeholders offers more room to focus on how stakeholder's decision which affects the result of the policy implementation:

“Before this project begins, it has been a highly politicized issue.

Otherwise, why we choose this site to build it? It is politics, doesn't it (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020)?”

“ In my perspective, public space is such a contested field. That is to say, here has a large scale of public space...if this large space is going to be a park, what will it look like and decide by whom (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020)?”

“I think the result of site selection [for the Taipei Dome Complex] is a political choice (UCSCE12, personal communication, January 30, 2020).”

Following the statements, it constitutes a highly politicalized issue with choices made by specific individuals or groups that causes the place chosen to construct such a building that involves numerous stakeholders. The concept of contested field raised by UCSCE 07 extends the perspective of merely addressing the political struggles toward a sophisticated network among stakeholders, thereby forming the decision-making mechanism for leveraging this issue to achieve self-interests. Once the character of the policy implementation is determined by the aggregation of stakeholders' ideas, their position or attitude toward the case of Taipei Dome Complex identifies the nuance of the interests among stakeholders, putting forward to comprehend the differences between stakeholders in the same alliance. This presupposition highlights the analysis on the row (E), which is divided into three evaluation mechanisms: self-interest, from a stakeholder toward other stakeholders, and final evaluation, building an evaluation system avoiding mispresent stakeholder's position (Schmeer, 1999). Prior to the analysis, this systematical cross-reference method provides a spectrum to gauge interests

coded from Supporter(S), Moderate Supporter (MS), Neutral(N), Moderate Opponent (MO), and Opponent(O) (Schmeer, 1999). In this spectrum of stakeholder's position, MS and MO, based on the definition of Schmeer, are:

*“Those who express some, but not total, agreement with the policy should be classified as moderate supporters (MS). Finally those who express some, but not total, opposition to the policy should be classified as moderate opponents (MO)(Schmeer, 1999).”*

Schmeer's category contribute to locate each stakeholder into specific position based on their interview transcript as column (E) presented. The first step of position analysis, the self-interest evaluation, is an intuitive idea raised by stakeholder toward the Taipei Dome Complex that attitude leans to actions of being either opposition or supporting the idea of implementing the stadium. The result of subjective identification from stakeholders themselves offers an intriguing outcome that overturns the expected relationship of stakeholder among three sectors. First and the foremost, 11 out of 15 stakeholders are prone to MO, 2 out of 15 are inclined to O, 1 out of 15 is tend to MS, and

only 1 out of 15 supports the policy. It is worthy to note that 11 stakeholders categorized as MO are from each of three groups. This clearly indicated there are some concerns for stakeholders to carefully consider the rationality of the Taipei Dome Complex Construction:

“You should go to check which country in the world would select the site like this, and you should ask all expertise in transportation [about the traffic plan of Taipei Dome Complex]. Who dares to guarantee such a plan that it works (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020)?

“The location of Taipei Dome Complex is at the most exclusive area in Taipei. This is worthy of thinking about [the site] (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

“The public safety issues in it [the Taipei Dome Complex] has not been noticed (UCSCE04, personal communication, February 17, 2020).”

“At the time, when the baseball fans asked Pei-Tsun Hau, the Prime Minister (1990-1993) of Taiwan, to build up a Domed-Stadium, he decided to do it. That was his considerations at that time. [But], without holding the Environmental Impact Assessment and hearings, this is not right (UCSCE05, personal communication, February 2, 2020).”

“From the case of Taipei Dome Complex, the necessity of policy did not address well [by the Taipei City Government]. In the perspective of sports policy, despite the requirements of hosting international [baseball] tournament, what else could you do (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020)?

“This [Taipei Dome Complex] is a scandal (UCSCE06, personal communication, February 6, 2020).”

“I think it also has a great significance for the issue of [social] justice because Farglory Group has used a lot of improper means to achieve its commercial interests during these two or three decade

(UCSCE09, personal communication, February 11, 2020).”

Voices from above convey the most seven repetitive worries of stakeholders and the public. First, the problematic traffic plan raises a series of public safety issues, including the controversial evacuation plan and the control of several persons in the Taipei Dome Complex. Second, the site selection, although it is too late to discuss at present, would cause an environmental impact to damage the quality of life in the local neighborhood. Third, the building structure remains a tremendous concern because it does not meet compliance with Act 97 and Act 127 in *Building Technical Regulations*. Fourth, the policy of implementing a domed-stadium since the late 1990s failed to follow the administrative process, which mainly based on the regulation of "*The Administrative Procedure Act*" and "*The Freedom of Government Information Law*," for conducting a sound assessment procedure and holding hearings for the public. Fifth, for building such a gigantic project, Taipei City Government is lack supporting measures to organizing sports industry, sports facility management, and vision of urban development as



entirety. Sixth, since the beginning of open tendering procedures in 2004, although the Farglory Group won the tender, numerous city council members and mass media had doubted the qualification of Farglory Group because of misrepresenting the tender document in the section of maximum floor area. Furthermore, after Farglory Group was named the preferred bidder for a BOT contract, Shu-De Lee(李述德), the former commissioner of department of finance at Taipei City Government and the negotiator of BOT contract, adjudicated to abolish royalty of operating the Taipei Dome Complex during the second negotiating meeting at third stage on 23 September in 2004, which results from a 3 billion NTD loss for Taipei city government annually for the next fifty years. Shu-De Lee was accused of line moguls' pockets and was sentenced ten years in jail. Seventh and the last, the so-called social justice is how the Taipei government renegotiate the BOT contract with Farglory Group, for returning "excess earnings" from operating the domed-stadium to the Taipei City Government. All of these critical concerns will be further discussed in the decision-making process.

Despite these opposing statements, both MS from the interviewees are expressing more positive opinions about the completion of the Taipei Dome Complex. Comparing with those opposing ones focusing on the possible conflicts in the Taipei Dome Complex, macro perspectives provide totally different voices toward this project:

“Because I was a government official, my opinion is from the perspective of policy implementation. Taiwan bided the Universiade before, including Taipei and Kaohsiung City, but we failed because of a lack of proper stadiums. The other example was in the late 1990s when we tried to bid Asian Games, and we had faced the same problem. Another was at the end of 2019 when Taipei or New Taipei City wanted to bid 2030 Asian Games. No matter what sports mega-events Taiwan wants to bid, a proper stadium is central to the bidding. In this regard, as expertise in sports management, I have an expectation of constructing a high-

quality sports environment for Taiwan(UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020). ”

“As you have known that Taipei Arena has boosted the development of the sports industry as well as the entertainment industry. From the experience of Taipei Arena, Jim Small, [the Senior Vice President of Asia-Pacific office at Major League Baseball], said they are willing to visit Taiwan, but Taipei Dome Complex is the key pillar...In terms of Chinese Professional Baseball League (CPBL), based on previous experience, if you have such a domed-stadium, the average attendance will increase....their average attendance will increase with no doubt, but it depends on how ball clubs put their efforts on marketing. Not to mention the entertainment industry, Jay Chou, [one of the most popular singers in Taiwan], was rejected by Taipei Arena for hosting the concern, so he is waiting for the Taipei Dome Complex....So, about the vision of Taipei Dome Complex, I think

it will boost the growth of the entertainment-related industry

(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).

These presented a chain effect of how a new construction as a growth pole to benefit the overall environment in both Taipei and Taiwan. The sound vision of completion of Taipei Dome Complex deeply rooted for part of people to dream about the day when Taiwan elevates onto the world stage and when Taipei becomes the first-tier global city like Tokyo and Seoul. While this picture met this original vision when the government decided to build it, the vision, however, has perished under the shady conflicts that endow other meanings for it. At first glance, these statements would be outweighed by those opposing voices. As a matter of fact, it offers a premise of achieving the win-win by discussing how stakeholders respond to this project, for mapping the relationships step by step. Therefore, the intention here is not merely a juxtaposition of two completely different positions. Instead, through this analysis, the discourse from stakeholders spread out their concerns to this topic, concentrating on specific aspects of the conflicts,

contributing to a consistently analytical premise. In other words, the position of each stakeholder is not utterly a descriptive statement but an analytical discourse for this study to reconstruct the context responding to the information they delivered. In this concern, the subjective identification of each stakeholder draws a preliminary picture of how their perspective affects the position with which they stand.

The perspective from a stakeholder toward other stakeholders, the second step of position analysis, adopts other stakeholders' viewpoints for granting a relatively objective evaluation so as to cross-reference either stakeholder misrepresented themselves or researcher misconceived the stance of each stakeholder. Albeit the outcome from this step is within expectations, compared with the subjective evaluation, it draws subtle differences to comprehend how stakeholders' image was belying other's opinions. The result of evaluation herein has two types: the result is consistent with self-evaluation. Second, the result is divergent from expectations. Here are some latter examples:

“No matter what kind of buildings, a domed-stadium or something else, will be built, if that is compliance with the administrative procedure, [it will be okay]. I have told UCSCE15 those ancillary buildings, [including theater, department store, and office building], to Taipei Dome Complex can be removed from the plan because those are not part of the original plan.... but why these [environmental protection] groups do not follow what has been written on the law? If they won't tear down the Taipei Dome Complex, it is against the intention of this project. (UCSCE05, personal communication, February 2, 2020).

“Does Taipei need a domed-stadium? Does East District [in Taipei] need a forest park? This has been an unchanging battlefield [in this project] (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).

“I had discussed it with UCSCE13. I think UCSCE15 is a complete idealist, but I think I am a realist, and I could accept to comprise something in it [Taipei Dome Complex]. For example, I could

possibly accept the proposal [proposed by Taipei City Government] if [Farglory Group] took the department store away from the site, leaving some buildings amid [the sports cultural park] (UCSCE14, personal communication, February 1, 2020).”

“Both sides, [the Farglory Group and Songshan Tree Group], are toward a zero-sum game in this project. If so, to be honest, there are no rooms to compromise. If they would be willing to compromise, we could discuss how to rearrange [the design of Taipei Dome Complex]. Unfortunately, instead of maintaining their position of anti-construction to this project, they did not even [think about compromising] (UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).

Since the beginning of the Taipei Dome Complex, opposing groups, especially environmental protection groups, have been rendered as an extremist who shall not compromise by other stakeholders. This, however, ignores the internal differences and the dynamic changes in the environmental

protection groups. UCSCE14 pointed out the different stance with UCSCE15 in order to create a room to negotiate with both public and private sectors. Although the ultimate goal for the social movement is to show forth the ideology of social justice through tearing down the unjust Taipei Dome, they, meanwhile, have considered how to leverage an acceptable plan as compensation with those seeming ideal appeals as UCSCE14 addressed:

“However, this society needs those idealists so that we can leverage something [from those rooms]. If everyone chose to compromise at the very beginning, we, then, would be led to the side where is the most reluctant to compromise. (UCSCE14, personal communication, February 1, 2020).”

The diverse members cause the internal differences to enrich the discussion of stakeholders for comprehending the know-how of stakeholders to affect the decision-making in this project. The other example, the malpresentation of UCSCE04 among stakeholders represents the type one circumstance that has implying meanings to its position, compared with the



type two's direct messages:

“I do not think UCSCE04 wants to tear down [the Taipei Dome Complex]; instead, UCSCE04 wants Farglory Group to follow the regulation, to follow the blueprints [approved by the government] (UCSCE14, personal communication, February 1, 2020).

“Every time UCSCE04 found the construction defects, UCSCE04 claimed to halt the construction to apply for compensation from Farglory Group. (UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).

“If UCSCE04 could stay in the Taipei City Government, he would find a way to stop this project (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

“Ladies and gentlemen, pro-Taipei Dome Complex, or anti-Taipei Dome Complex are not a person's likes or dislikes. This is about the law, a science, and the safety [issues] to the city (UCSCE04, personal communication, February 22, 2020).

In the case of UCSCE04, despite the spectrum of position, it refers to those times when UCSCE04 served in the public sector. The power abusing mentioned by UCSCE11 indicates the discretionary power obtained by a city government official, resonating what UCSCE03 raised about the attitude of UCSCE04. This so-called battle between the dove and the hawk in the Taipei City Government has been noticed in the first term of Mayor Ko since 2014. According to UCSCE04's statement, however, UCSCE04 rendered this case of a severe violation, engendering the whole society, refusing such battle that it exists. Within this consideration, "the way" commented by UCSCE02 echoes to what UCSE14 mentioned about following the regulation as well as the blueprints rather than abusing power as UCSCE11 insisted. Form this case. Apparently, the implying messages are the blurring boundaries between Moderate Support and Moderate Opponent.

Despite the emphasis of the domed-stadium itself, another example is the UCSCE08 positioned at the MO and offers a macroscopic perspective to deliver his recommendation for the Taipei Dome Complex:

“There have never thought about the relation between baseball and city so as to building such a domed-stadium in Taipei. Is baseball an essential sport that Taipei must develop? Is baseball a very important thing in this city? Should this city have its own one or two professional baseball teams? Does this city recognize baseball as an important symbol in this city? Is baseball a national pastime? What attitude should Taipei be to baseball? To be frank, I think that government decision-makers in the past did not think about the abovementioned. So, this results from the communication problem between government and residents in Taipei from the beginning (UCSCE08, personal communication, February 06, 2020).”

From the UCSCE08’s perspective, the so-called supporting measurements raised by UCSCE07 does not only relate to the policy. It indicates how the government decision-makers perceive the vision of Taipei through urban planning. The Taipei Dome Complex, in UCSCE08’s opinion, will be one of the key pillars. Although the UCSCE08 renders the Taipei

Dome Complex as a scandal representing the fact that politicians in Taiwan are either short-sighted or like the frog in the well knows nothing of the great ocean since Mayor Ma, the UCSCE08, however, had proposed two feasible solutions, for solving those seven concerns mentioned above.

The first solution, instead of halting the Taipei Dome Complex Construction, UCSCE08 proposed an idea to revitalize the East District area from MRT Zhongxiao Dunhua Station to MRT Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Hall Station by implementing Zhongxiao East Rd Section 4 Underground Project in 2014, making the Zhongxiao and Guangfu intersection a pedestrian zone. This project, on the one hand, will create much more space for evacuation, solving both concerns in the traffic as well as the evacuation plan in the Taipei Dome Complex. On the other hand, this project will revitalize the PATH in the East District for attracting private funds into the shopping district. In the second solution, UCSCE08 brought forward the East District Grand Park Project to link the open spaces in Songshan and Xinyi District with Taipei Dome Complex by the air corridor. The air corridor named “butterfly wing”

bridges those open spaces—including Taipei Mold Loft of Taiwan Railway, Songshan Creative Park, Sun Yat-Sen Memorial Hall, Taipei City Council, and Taipei City Hall—for building the central park in Taipei. It does not merely aim to construct a green belt system in the crowded downtown Taipei but also to integrate with the first solution to revitalize the East District so as to integrate with the new CBD in Xinyi District, thereby creating the brand-new development axis for Taipei.

For solving other concerns, the UCSCE08 claimed that the Taipei City Government should cancel the BOT contract with the Farglory Group and take over the Taipei Dome Complex Construction for the sake of social justice. The Taipei Dome Complex, therefore, could be part of the discussion in the UCSCE08's blueprint:

“This [the BOT contract between Farglory Group and Taipei City Government], in my opinion, is guilty as a cat in a fishbowl. So, when I was in the 2018 Taipei Mayor Campaign, I proposed to cancel the BOT contract and to take over the Taipei Dome Complex.

Rather than tearing down the Taipei Dome Complex, we, then, could revise [the whole Taipei Dome Complex Project by putting it into the second solution] (UCSCE08, personal communication, February 06, 2020).”

Obviously, the UCSCE08 saw the potential in urban planning that could turn the crisis of Taipei Dome Complex into the opportunity for establishing a new vision for the future Taipei. This, however, did not meet the expectation from the citizens in Taipei because the expenditure for those 2 solutions would cost 10 billion and 400 million NTD respectively:

“I simply thought we could make a revision for it from the perspective of Urban planning. So, I came with the East District Underground Project in 2014. You saw I talked with Mayor Ko in 2018. Even until now, I thought it is the optimal solution [for the Taipei Dome Complex]. Why did I not mention it during the 2018 Taipei Mayor Election? It was because Mayor Ko preferred to save

the public fund. That project would cost around 10 billion

NTD(UCSCE08, personal communication, February 06, 2020).”

While the UCSCE08’s idea did not come true after losing the 2018 Taipei Mayor Election, the UCSCE08 offers an alternative to revisit the possibility of planting a domed-stadium in the downtown Taipei if the Taipei City Government has a well-organized urban development plan.

Simply put, the concerns toward the case can be recognized as either an opponent for the sake of opposition or support for the sole purpose of benefits. To avoid such a homogeneous view to both sides, position analysis in this step has presented three solid examples to note the internal differences of stakeholders whose concerns are possibly different from not only those from the opposite side but even from the same alliance. Through these analyses, the final result of the position evaluation is as column (E) presented, remaining consistently but complicatedly.

The column (F), Schmeer(1999) defined the interest as “the interest the stakeholder has in the policy, or the advantages and disadvantages that

implementation of the policy may bring to the stakeholder or his or her organization,” resonates with the seven concerns stated abovementioned. That is, the traffic plan and evacuation plan relate to urban disaster management; the site selection procedure of Taipei Dome Complex and the lack proper administrative procedure arise suspicion of transparency; the building structure of Taipei Dome Complex has seriously violated the *Building Technical Regulations*, resulting from series of safety issues in this case; the shady scandal draws both the suspicion on the transparency and the qualification of the preferable tender to the Farglory Group; the public have grave doubts about the lack supporting measurements to this project, and the method of returning the royalty for social justice in Taipei remains unknown. These concerns shape the interest of stakeholders, even most of them have left their position in the Taipei City Government. As dwellers in Taipei, these profoundly relate to their daily life, not to mention those from civil society. Therefore, based on previous analysis, this research divided the



stakeholders into two groups, supporting group and opposing group, as showed in the column (G).

The column (H), the resources which divide into two parts: quantity of resources and ability to mobilize, examines the ability of data access amidst stakeholders in the current position. The result of the examination scores from 3 to 1 and the scoring index is the ordinal scale. Considering the alliance of opposing groups has obtained internal information and shared it with stakeholders from civil society since 2007, it leads the average of the number of resources to score from 3 to 2, while their position affects the scoring of ability to mobilize. Such as UCSCE09, UCSCE10 score 2 on the ability to mobilize because they play the role to mobilize resources, including mass media, local residents, and UCSCE04 exposes part of internal information based on UCSCE04's expertise on the social network and successfully draws attention from the media. UCSCE04 is graded by 2. The rest of the members in the opposing group are rated 2 on the number of resources and 1 on the ability to mobilize. In the supporting group, on the other hand, because the

position of UCSCE11, which promotes the policy and keeps updated with the latest internal information, lead UCSCE11 scoring 3 on the number of resources and 2 on the ability to mobilize. The other member of the supporting group, UCSCE03 has its network to gain the information, so UCSCE03 is rated 3 on the number of resources and 2 on the ability to mobilize based on UCSCE03's current position and status.

Power in the column (I), Schmeer(1999) defined as “the combined measure of the number of resources a stakeholder has and his or her capacity to mobilize them,” shows only 5 out 15 amidst the stakeholders score 2, and the rest of them is graded by 1. The reason for such a scoring circumstance is because of the stakeholder's current position from which mobilizes the resources. In the last column (J), leadership is characterized as “the combined measure of the number of resources a stakeholder has and his or her capacity to mobilize them” by Schmeer(1999). Under the definition of Schmeer(1999), leadership does not directly relate to the position where stakeholders stand. Instead, the willingness offers a broad definition of leadership on the initiative,

any activities or suggestions to either against the policy or support the implementation of that policy. In this regard, the UCSCE01, UCSCE02, and UCSCE05, who have raised questions about the evacuation plan and large building mass respectively in the review committees, are in this category, not to speaking of UCSCE03 and UCSCE04, who served as commissioners in the Department of Sport and Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government, close to the core of decision-making. In terms of the sector in civil society, UCSCE15 who led the UCSCE06, UCSCE12, UCSCE13, and UCSCE14 to fight against the Taipei Dome Complex Construction, can be included.

Furthermore, the UCSCE10 representing the local community to speak out their voice meets the requirements of this category. Last, the UCSCE11 employed by Farglory Group holds power to decide the operating direction of the Taipei Dome is counted as well. About the status of UCSCE07 and UCSCE09, because their responsibility is mainly about supervision, the policy implementation, which stands at a relatively objective position, rather

than initiating a direction to force the city government, it does not fit in this category. The last stakeholder, UCSCE08, had initiated some solutions to Taipei dome Complex when UCSCE08 participated in the 2018 Taipei Mayor election. Within this circumstance, UCSCE08 is counted in this category.

Table 10. Stakeholders' Table

A	B	C	D		E			F	G	H		I	J	
I.D.#	Position & Organiza tion	Internal/E xternal	Knowledge		Position			Interests	Alliances	Resources		Power	Lea der	
			Le vel 3,2 ,1	Definitio n	Se lf	Others		Fi nal	Advantage/dis advantage	Organizat ions Mentione d	Quan tity 3, 2, 1	Abili ty to mobi lize 3, 2, 1	Resou rces avera ge 3, 2, 1	Yes No
					S, M S, N, M O, O	S, M S, N, M O, O	I. D. #	S, M S, N, M O, O						
UCSC E01	Civil Expertise (Former Commiss ioner of Urban	External	3	Political struggle outperfor ms professio nalism	M O	M O	#0 4 #0 9 #1 1	M O	Disadvantages of and of professionalis m, disaster management	Opposing Group- Civil Expertise	2	1	1	Y

	Design Committee at Taipei City Government)						#1 3 #1 5							
UCSC E02	Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Environmental Impact Committee at Taipei City Government	External	3	Taipei Dome Complex Construction represents the symbol of social injustice.	M O	M O	#1 5	M O	Disadvantages of professionalism, and of social justice	Opposing Group- Civil Expertise	2	1	1	Y

	ent)														
UCSC E 03	Civil Expertise (Former Official in Departme nt of Sport at Taipei City Governm ent)	External	3	Political advice outweigh s professio nal advice	M S	M S	#0 4	M S	Advantages of sport development. Disadvantages of professionalis m, and of civil service system	Supportin g Group- Governm ent Official	3	1	2	Y	
UCSC E 04	Civil Expertise (Former Official in Departme nt of	External	3	The Taipei Dome is such a terrible political performa	M O	M O	#0 1 #0 2 #0 3 #0	M O	Disadvantages of professionalis m, social justice, and of civil service system	Opposing Group- Governm ent Official	3	2	2	Y	

	Urban Develop ment at Taipei City Governm ent)			nce colluded by the Taipei City Governm ent and Farglory Group.			7 #0 8 #0 9 #1 0 #1 1 #1 2 #1 3 #1 4 #1 5							
UCSC E 05	Civil Expertise (Former	External	3	Political struggle hoodwink	M O	M O	#1 5	M O	Disadvantages of transparency,	Opposing Group- Civil	2	1	1	Y



	Commissioner of Clean Government Committee at Taipei City Government)			shows us into thinking it offers a transparent view of the case.					and of credibility	Expertise				
UCSC E 06	Lawyer at Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association, Taiwan	External	2	A collusion between government and enterprise.	O	O	#0 4 #1 2 #1 3 #1 4 #1	O	Disadvantages of social justice, environment protection, and of civil service system	Opposing Group-Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association, Taiwan	2	1	1	Y

							5								
UCSC E 07	Former Taipei City Council Member	External	3	Taipei Dome Complex is such contested public space.	M O	M O	#0 4 #1 2 #1 3 #1 4 #1 5	M O	Disadvantages of transparency	Oppsing Group- Former Taipei City Congress person	2	1	1	N	
UCSC E 08	Former Congress person	External	2	Taipei Dome Complex is a scandal.	M O	M O	#0 6 #1 2 #1 3 #1 4 #1	M O	Disadvantages of social justice, of urban development, and of sport development.	Supportin g Group- the Legislativ e Yuan	2	1	1	Y	

							5								
UCSC E 09	Taipei City Council Member	External	3	Taipei Dome Complex Construct ion represent s the symbol of social injustice.	M O	M O	#0 7 #1 4	M O	Disadvantages of social justice	Opposing Group- Taipei City Council Member	2	2	2	N	
UCSC E 10	Local Opinion Leader at Shin-Ren Village	External	2	In this case, political considera tion is everythin g.	M O	M O	#0 1 #0 4 #0 9 #1 1 #1	M O	Advantages of those retail shop owners. Disadvantages of the transparency, of the credibility, o the	Opposing Group- Local Resident	2	2	2	Y	

							5		professionalism, of the social justice, of quality of life, of civil service system.					
UCSC E 11	Operating Officer at Farglory Group	Internal	3	This is such a case with political struggle, leaving the professionalism behind.	S	S	#0 1 #0 4 #1 5	S	Advantages of sport industry, of entertainment industry, of sport development, and of economic development	Opposing Group-Farglory Group	3	2	2	Y
UCSC E 12	Volunteer at Songshan Tree	External	3	The Political choice determine	M O	O	#1 3 #1 4	M O	Disadvantages of social justice, of environment	Opposing Group-Songshan Tree	2	1	1	N

	Group			s the direction of Taipei Dome Complex Construct ion			#1 5		protection, of civil service system	Group				
UCSC E 13	Volunteer at Songshan Tree Group	External	3	Taipei Dome Complex is a political bargainin g chip	M O	O	#1 2 #1 4 #1 5	M O	Disadvantages of social justice, of environment protection, of civil service system	Opposing Group- Songshan Tree Group	2	1	1	N
UCSC E 14	Volunteer at Songshan Tree Group	External	3	Taipei Dome Complex is for pork barrel.	M O	O	#1 1 #1 2 #1 3	M O	Disadvantages of social justice, of environment protection, of civil service	Opposing Group- Songshan Tree Group	2	1	1	N

									system					
UCSC E 15	Volunteer at Songschan Tree Group	External	3	Tear down the Taipei Dome Complex, and turn it into a forest park.	O	O	#0 1 #0 4 #0 7 #0 9 #1 0 #1 1 #1 2 #1 3 #1 4	O	Disadvantages of social justice, of environment protection, of civil service system	Opposing Group- Songschan Tree Group	2	1	1	Y

Source: Adapted from Schmeer(1999)

Within the comprehensive analysis of stakeholders, a clear database of characteristics among stakeholders should have enough information for more detailed analysis. Regarding the complexity of this project, indirect information, including official documents and interview transcripts, indicated that hidden stakeholders who have been mentioned in both sources must be addressed and included in the stakeholder analysis. This meets the procedure designed by Schmeer (1999) to include more actors into the Power and Leadership Analysis (P/L Analysis). The purpose of conducting a P/L Analysis is to prioritize the importance of stakeholders to portrait their ability of affection to the implementation of policy (Schmeer, 1999).

In order to locate those hidden stakeholders, the 7 concerns repetitively mentioned open a shortcut to secure those. First, the concern of the traffic plan and evacuation plan raised by UCSEC01 in the Environmental Impact Assessment Committee at Taipei City Government does have the source of law, Subparagraph 2, in Article 4 of the Environmental Assessment Act, for entrusting the EIA committee to review those plans. Therefore, the EIA

committee and its competent authority, the Department of Environmental Protection at the Taipei City Government, should include the list of stakeholders. Second, according to the letter No. 1042916189 from the Construction and Planning Agency at the Ministry of Interior, the problematic building structure mentioned by UCSCE04, which causes the public safety issues in the evacuation, is under the Urban Design Review Committee at Taipei City Government and its competent authority, the Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government. The Urban Design Committee and the Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government should take into the stakeholder's list. Third, the renegotiation of the BOT contract with Farglory Group relates to the Taipei Dome Preparation Office and Department of Sport at the Taipei City Government because both are the competent authority of Taipei Dome Complex. Fourth, the responsibility of promoting supporting measures and the whole direction of the Taipei Dome Complex is the Mayor of Taipei and its subordinate agencies, the Deputy Mayor of Taipei, the Mayor Office, and The Secretariat



at Taipei City Government. Fifth and the last, the issues of social justice related to the quality of life for local residents(including retailer owners and non-retailer owners), the Parent's Association at Taipei Municipal Gwangfu Elementary School(台北市立光復國小), and the political achievements for City Council Members from Kuomintang(KMT, 國民黨), Democratic Progress Party(DPP, 民進黨), New Power Party(NPP, 時代力量), and People First Party(PFP, 親民黨). As a result, both are qualified into the list of stakeholders. With these hidden stakeholders, the P/L Analysis in the next section will introduce how they perform their role within its position.

Based on the grouping rules proposed by Schmeer(1999), the P/L Analysis emphasizes on three main groups: first, stakeholders who have with leadership and higher power is Group1(Level 3); second, stakeholders who have leadership and medium power is Group2(Level2); third, stakeholders who do not have the leadership but have high to medium power(Level 2 or Level 3). All the source of information is from the table of stakeholders and actual data, including interview transcripts, official documents, and the facts

of what happened in the Taipei Dome Complex Construction. The final result of the P/L Analysis as Table 11 presented. Group 1, not surprisingly, is stacked with the official institutions because these institutions hold the absolute power to make the direction of policy implementation. Group 2 relatively hold medium power, which means those stakeholders who obtain the ability to affect or to block the policy are 1 of the decision-makers through the process. In this regard, The expert committees, including Environmental Impact Assessment Committee, Clean Government Committee, and Urban Design Committee, are limited by its organization regulations, dividing into two types of commissioners: official commissioners from City Government and Civil commissioners who are recommended by a legal person, institutions, college and university, and academy institutions, and other interest groups and are approved by the city Government. Farglory Group is the implementer based on the BOT contract, so the implementer has the responsibility to cooperate with the Government. The Local Opinion Leader and Parent's Association are two local interest groups to speak out their voice

to both implementer and organizer for leveraging the quality of life. Group 3 is mainly constituted by local residents and legislators. Although they do have the influence to advance their agenda onto the stage of referendum or city council, their position remains as a watcher instead of a progressive supervisor in this case. In other words, they are often grouping with others instead of initiating an activity individually against the policy.

Table 11. Results of Power/Leadership Analysis

Group 1: Leadership & High (3) Power	Group 2: Leadership & Medium (2) Power	Group 3: No Leadership, but Medium or High (2 or 3) Power
Department of Sport at Taipei City Government	Farglory Group	Taipei City Congressperson (Non-Partisan)
Taipei Dome Preparation Office at Taipei City Government	Local Opinion Leader	Local Residents (Non-retailer owners)
Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government	*Urban Design Committee	Local Residents (retailer owners)
*Mayor of Taipei	*Environmental Impact Assessment Committee	*City Council Member (DPP, KMT, NPP)
*Deputy Mayor of Taipei	*Clean Government Committee at Taipei City Government	*Political Parties (DPP, KMT, NPP)
*Director of Taipei Mayor's Office	*Parent's Association at Taipei	

	at Municipal Guangfu Elementary School	
*Department of Environmental Protection Office at Taipei City Government		

Source: Table format adapted from Schemeer(1999).

\*According to sufficiently indirect information from the respondents and second-hand data, these stakeholders are key pillar to the decision-making process, although there are no respondents listing in the interviewees from those positions in this research

From the P/L Analysis, stakeholders from public sectors occupied the most crucial position in decision-making progress, and this phenomenon causes the unequal severe power between the supporting group and opposing group to aggravate, although their alliances comprised of diverse members (see Table 13) with average high knowledge level (see Table 12) toward the Taipei Dome Complex. While the Schmeer(1999) recommended crossing the result of P/L analysis with the knowledge level table so as to target those with the lowest knowledge of the Taipei Dome Complex, this cases, as abovementioned, has built up its own sharing database in opposing alliance, which is as productive as supporting group, because the opposing group once helped the supporting group to reorganize internal information about the Taipei Dome Complex in 2015. Moreover, the other reason is that Taipei City Council Members have also helped the opposing group to access private information for them. Within this contextual difference, although this cross-reference cannot locate a specific group to develop communication strategies as Schmeer(1999) suggested, this analysis not only solidifies the rationality

of stakeholder analysis but also offer a whole map to secure the interest of stakeholder-based on their position. The potential vital alliances, both supporting and opposing groups, map out a clear current status toward the Taipei Dome Complex. Among stakeholders, the political parties, of course without the matter of which party, are affected by its members' political intentions so that taking a step back from the frontline is the way they often choose, leaving all the members the freedom of choice. That is the reason why those parties can keep a foot in both camps. Conducive to better virtualization of the stakeholder's position, a stakeholder map-in color has crossed analyses conducted above, and presented in the Figure 9.

Table 12. Knowledge Level

<b>Group 1: Medium</b>	<b>Group 2: High</b>
Local Opinion Leader at Shin-Ren Village	Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Clean Government Committee at Taipei City Government)
Former Congressman(DPP)	Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Environmental Impact Assessment Committee)
*Local Residents at Shin-Ren Village	Official in Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government
*Parent's Association at Taipei Municipal GuangFu Elementary School	Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Environmental Impact Assessment Committee)
	Department of Sport at Taipei City Government
	Taipei Dome Preparation Office
	Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Urban Design Committee)
	Taipei City Council Member(DPP)
	Volunteer at Songshan Tree Group
	Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association, Taiwan
	Operating Officer at Farglory Group
	*Mayor of Taipei
	*Director of Taipei Mayor's Office
	*Department of Environmental Protection Office at Taipei City Government
	*Taipei City Council Member(KMT, NPP)

Source: Adapted from Schmeer(1999).

\*According to sufficiently indirect information from the respondents and

second-hand data, these stakeholders are key pillar to the decision-making process, although there are no respondents listing in the interviewees from those positions in this research.

Table 13. Table Potential Key Alliances

<b>Supporting Group</b>	<b>Opposing Group</b>
Farglory Group	Civil Expertise (Former Official in Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government)
Taipei Dome Preparation Office	Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Urban Design Committee at Taipei City Government)
Civil Expertise (Former Official in Department of Sport at Taipei City Government)	Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Environmental Impact Committee at Taipei City Government)
Former Congressperson (DPP)	Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Clean Government Committee at Taipei City Government)
*Department of Sport at Taipei City Government	Songshan Tree Group
*Mayor of Taipei	Local Residents at Shin-Ren Village (Non-retailer owners)
*Deputy Mayor of Taipei	Former City Council Member (DPP)
*Director of Taipei Mayor's Office	City Council Member (Non-partisan)
*Department of Environmental Protection Office at Taipei City Government	Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association, Taiwan
*Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government	*City Council Member (DPP)
*City Council Member (DPP, KMT)	*City Council Member (KMT, NPP)
* Environmental Impact Assessment Committee at Taipei City Government	*Parent's Association at Taipei Municipal GuangFu Elementary School



* Urban Design Committee at Taipei City Government	*Local Residents at Shin-Ren Village (non-retailer owners)
*Local Residents at Shin-Ren Village (retailer owners)	

Source: Table format adapted from Schmeer(1999).

\*According to sufficiently indirect information from the respondents and second-hand data, these stakeholders are key pillar to the decision-making process, although there are no respondents listing in the interviewees from those positions in this research.

According to the Figure 2, it demonstrates the tendency and the internal difference of each stakeholder. It is worth noting that the P/L 1 is added into this diagram for establishing a whole map of relationships among stakeholders. From its distribution, those stakeholders defined as P/L 1 are mainly from civil society, and most of them are willing to exhibit their leadership against the Taipei Dome Complex Construction. The effectiveness of those activities, however, is limited by its low influence on the policy implementation, even with stakeholders' help, such as Local residents (non-retailer owners), Local Opinion Leader, Parents' Association, and City Council Member (DPP, KMT, NPP, PFP, and Non-partisan), from P/L 2 with Leadership and P/L 2 or 3 without Leadership. This exposes the weakness of

the power of supervision obtained by City Council Member because it is not mandatory for the City Government to satisfy what City Council Member requested as UCSCE04 stated:

“I can tell you. If the city government officials execute its power in bad faith. A City Council Member obtaining supervisory power cannot manage it. It is so terrible (UCSCE04, personal communication, February 17, 2020)!

Holding onto the power, the city government teams with the supporting group, Farglory Group and Local Residents (retailer owners), becoming a growth coalition that controls the direction of development of Taipei Dome Complex Construction, ignoring other oppositions from other stakeholders. After mapping out the stakeholder's position, the situation is good for one side obtaining the power, but this cross-analysis leads us toward the next step by using the data presented here.




Figure 9. Stakeholders' Position Map-in Color

White= P/L 1; Bisque=P/L 2 with leadership; Light Yellow=P/L 2 or 3 without leadership; Brown= P/L 3

Source: Table format Adapted from Schmeer(1999).

\*According to sufficiently indirect information from the respondents and second-hand data, these stakeholders are key pillar to the decision-making process, although there are no respondents listing in the interviewees from those positions in this research.

The last step of stakeholder analysis is to integrate both results from stakeholder's position and the P/L Analysis into a table with different interests of stakeholders by their position and P/L categories. The Table 14 indicates those stakeholders targeted in this case study, including P/L Supporter 1 to 3, Neutral 1 and 2, and Opponent 1 and 2.

Table 14. Matrix for Identifying Stakeholders in Decision-making Process

		Level of Support		
		Supporter	Neutral	Opponent
Power/Leadership (PL) 1=low 2=medium 3=high	Supporter P/L 3	Supporter P/L 3	Neutral P/L 3	Opponent P/L3
	Supporter P/L 2	Supporter P/L 2	Neutral P/L 2	Opponent P/L2
	Supporter P/L 1	Supporter P/L 1	Neutral P/L 1	Opponent P/L1

Source: Adapted from Schmeer(1999).

The diverse stakeholders' interests, as presented in Table 15 echo the seven concerns mentioned at the beginning of the stakeholder analysis. This high consistency demonstrates the importance of these issues in decision-making progress. In other words, these stakeholders are the key pillars to put forth their effort to either promote or block the policy implementation. It is necessary to fully examine its historical context for comprehending how the interaction among stakeholders can affect the Taipei Dome Complex and what has happened in this project. In the next section, this research, thus, will examine the decision-making progress and its political network among stakeholders so as to meet its contextual background, thereby constructing an event timeline with fluctuation between supporting groups and opposing

groups.

Table 15. The Interest of Stakeholders from P/L Analysis

POSITION	INTERESTS
<b>P/L 1 Supporters</b>	
Former Congressperson (DPP)— UCSCE08	Solve the scandal of Taipei Dome Complex; redress the contract between Taipei City Government and Farglory Group; rethink the character of Taipei Dome in Taipei; rethink the rule of politicians outweighs everything.
Civil Expertise (Former Official in Department of Sport at Taipei City Government)—UCSCE03	Building high-quality sports environment for both Taipei and Taiwan; promote sports-for-all, improve the service quality of sports facility; promote Taiwan onto the world stage through sport; rethink the rule of politicians outweighs everything.
<b>P/L 1 Neutrals</b>	
Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Clean Government Committee at Taipei City Government)—UCSCE05	Unveil government documents about Taipei Dome Complex to public; compliance with laws, <i>Administrative Procedure Act</i> and <i>The Freedom of Government Information Law</i> ; improve the transparency of decision-making process; hold a public hearing or file a referendum for Taipei Dome Complex; rethink the rule of politicians

	outweighs everything.
Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Urban Design Committee at Taipei City Government)—UCSCE01	Rethink the logic of public safety, and of disaster management issues in Urban Design Committee; unveil government documents about Taipei Dome Complex to public; rethink the rule of politicians outweighs everything.
<b>P/L 1 Opponents</b>	
Former Taipei City Council Member (DPP)—UCSCE07	Building a platform for increasing the participation, communication and discussion among all stakeholders to meet the expectation as a democratic society; improve the transparency of decision-making process; unveil government documents about Taipei Dome Complex to public; rethink the rule of politicians outweighs everything.
Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association—UCSCE06	Amend the <i>Environmental Impact Assessment Act</i> ; reform Environmental Impact Committee; increase the civic participation in the machoism of review committee; unveil the complete review committee's minutes for public; rethink the rule of politicians outweighs everything.
Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Environmental Impact Committee at Taipei City Government)—UCSCE02	Promote social justice, morals, and ethics by overall investigating possible scandals in the case of Taipei Dome Complex; increase the awareness of environmental impact profession to public; A

	fair, transparent review procedure; rethink the politicians of man outweighs everything.
Civil Expertise (Former Official in Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government)— UCSCE04	A fair, transparent, and inclusive review procedure for public safety issues; convey the hidden details to public; redress false information related to public safety issues in Taipei Dome Complex construction from both government and Farglory Group; rethink the politicians of man outweighs everything.
Songshan Tree Group— UCSCE012, UCSCE013, UCSCE014, UCSCE015.	Pursue the social justice; improve the citizenship education; more fair, transparent, inclusive, and citizen-oriented standard operation procedure; reform the social institution; reform the structure of commissions in review committee; promote the idea of inclusive public construction; rethink the rule of politicians outweighs everything.
<b>P/L 2 Supporters</b>	
Operating Officer at Farglory Group—UCSCE011	Growth of entertain industry, sports industry and other related-industry; lead Taiwan baseball toward world stage; a fair, transparent review procedure to this case; rethink the rule of politicians outweighs everything.
*Local Residents at Shin-Ren Village (retailer owners)	The rise of land price; economic benefits.
*Taipei City Council Member(DPP, KMT)	Maintain the partnership based on spirit of a BOT contract between Taipei City Government and Farglory.
*Environmental Impact Committee at Taipei City Government	Review the project related to Environmental Impact issues with Farglory Group.
*Urban Design Committee at Taipei City Government	Review the design related to evacuation, safety issues with Farglory Group.

<b>P/L 2 Neutrals</b>	
Commissioner of Clean Government Committee at Taipei City Government	Unveil government documents about Taipei Dome Complex to public. Avoid any possibility of malfeasance on Taipei Dome Complex Construction.
*Taipei City Council Member (DPP, KMT)	Maintain the partnership based on spirit of a BOT contract between Taipei City Government and Farglory.
<b>P/L 2 Opponents</b>	
Local Opinion Leader at Shin-Ren Village—UCSECE010	Protect the quality of life; promote inclusive living environment with mega facility; more inclusive participation in decision-making process.
Taipei City Council Member (Non-partisan)—UCSECE009	Pursue the social justice; act as a better communication liaison role between public and city government; rethink the rule of politicians outweighs everything.
*Taipei City Council Member(DPP, KMT)	Maintain the partnership based on spirit of a BOT contract between Taipei City Government and Farglory; a fair, transparent, and inclusive review procedure for issues in Taipei Dome Complex Construction; act as a better communication liaison role between public and city government.
*Taipei City Council Member (NPP)	A fair, transparent, and inclusive review procedure for issues in Taipei Dome Complex Construction.
*Local Residents at Shin-Ren Village (non-retailer owners)	Protect the quality of life; a fair, transparent, and inclusive review procedure for issues in Taipei Dome Complex Construction.
*Parent Association at Taipei Municipal Guangfu Elementary	Request the Farglory Group to solve the problem of reflectivity from the roof of Dome.



School	
<b>P/L 3 Supporters</b>	
*Mayor of Taipei	Completion of the Taipei Dome Complex in his 2 <sup>nd</sup> term.
*Deputy Mayor of Taipei	Completion of the Taipei Dome Complex; renegotiate the BOT contract with Farglory Group; discuss the safety issues with Farglory Group; compliance with the direction of administrative plan of Taipei City Government.
*Director of Taipei Mayor's Office	Completion of the Taipei Dome Complex; compliance with the direction of administrative plan of Taipei City Government.
*Taipei Dome Preparation Office	Completion of the Taipei Dome Complex; compliance with the direction of administrative plan of Taipei City Government.
*Department of Sport at Taipei City Government	Completion of the Taipei Dome Complex; compliance with the direction of administrative plan of Taipei City Government.
*Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government	Completion of the review of urban design committee on Taipei Dome Complex; completion of the review of building permit on Taipei Dome Complex; completion of the review of user license on Taipei Dome Complex; compliance with the direction of administrative plan of Taipei City Government.
*Department of Environmental Protection Office at Taipei City Government	Completion of the review of environmental impact committee on Taipei Dome Complex; compliance with the direction of administrative plan of Taipei City Government.

Source: Table format adapted from Schemeer(1999).

\*According to sufficiently indirect information from the respondents and

second-hand data, these stakeholders are key pillar to the decision-making process, although there are no respondents listing in the interviewees from those positions in this research.

#### 4.2. Decision-making Analysis of Taipei Dome Complex

The decision-making progress of the Taipei Dome Complex is such a complicated procedure because this project has crossed over a long-time span, elevating its complexity in figuring out its standard procedure in terms of the administrative process. Since the late 1990s, the government started to assess whether building a domed-stadium in Taipei has financial and political feasibility. As a result, without a doubt, it was approved by the central government and assigned the Taipei City Government to undertake this task. During this period of nearly thirty years, the Taipei Dome Complex has experienced numerous challenges, such as the suspicion of transparency related to social justice issues and the building structures linking with public safety issues. Among these conflicts, Taipei Dome Complex has been rendered as the field for political struggles instead of a public building project with public-private partnerships. This circumstance, thus, has triggered the

public to overly emphasize those conflicts, leaving those professional reviewers, the expertise in sport-related, city-related, and environment-related major, for instance. The profession has been used as a means to achieve political achievements for politicians. To bring the profession back to the discussion of the decision-making process in the Taipei Dome Complex, there is a need to link the stakeholders with the decision-making procedure in this case.

Although the stakeholder analysis in the last section introduced the attribution of each stakeholder, the limited understanding of how the decision-making was made impedes this study to put forward the effort, the expected discussion about the interaction amidst stakeholders, into its context. This section, thus, will first introduce the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and political network approach as the method to outline what are the possible factors to influences the interaction between different coalitions for compromising an alternative through the governmental institutions. Second, then, the application of the Taipei Dome Complex demonstrates an example

to spread out the ACF component. Third, an event timeline of the Taipei Dome Complex will be meticulously established and thoroughly examined. Fourth and the last, through this process, a preferable explanation of the attribution of interaction among stakeholders will provide the route to locate the identical problems through the discussion of the decision-making process for the next section.

To begin with, the ACF proposed by Sabatier(1988) offers a policy analysis model to examine the interaction of stakeholders within a policy community for comprehending the time-span of the policy change. In the process of the policy change, the ACF emphasizes how policy subsystems comprised of different actors from various institutions interested in a policy area to develop such a policy program that it makes participants a positive learner toward the policy implementation in a coalition belief (Sabatier, 2007). In this sense, the participant would be affected by the interaction with other actors, be influenced by the belief whether it is from collation's collective actions or form an ideological belief, and be involved in a self-alteration

process by participating the policy change.

Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier (1994), thus, listed 9 premises of ACF in order to expand the applicability and the depth of discussion while adopting this framework presented in Table 16. Hypothesis 1 to 3 are concerning advocacy coalition. These address the formation of the different coalition because of the controversial policy core beliefs. It then invokes participants to form a consensus on the issues related to the core beliefs but less on the secondary aspect. Until they acknowledge the flaw of the policy, they will second aspects of a belief system. Hypothesis 4 and 5 offer a concern about policy change. While the subsystem policy coalition who occupied the leading position of decision-making is unlikely to revise the direction of policy, the governmental program is not preferable to change if significantly extraneous events fail to shake the foundation of the subsystem. It extrapolates the importance of political uncertainty in the progress of policy change. When it comes to hypotheses 7 to 9, these focus on the premises of coloration learning. The policy-oriented learning is conducive to such a problem within conflict

across belief systems, within professions eagerly participating in the different coalition, causing the domination of professions to happen. Furthermore, it is more preferable to have policy-oriented learning when the data is mainly quantitative instead of being qualitative and where the variables can be well-controlled in a natural system rather than a sociopolitical system. Simply put, these are essential implications when ACF as a proper means to study the complexity constructed both policy subsystems and policy beliefs among stakeholders through the progress of policy change.

Table 16. Hypotheses Drawn from the Advocacy Coalition Framework

Hypotheses Concerning Advocacy Coalitions	
Hypothesis 1	On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so.
Hypothesis 2	Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to the policy core but less so on secondary aspects
Hypothesis 3	An actor or coalition will give up secondary aspects of a belief system before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core.
Hypotheses Concerning Policy Change	
Hypothesis 4	The policy core attributes of a governmental program are unlikely to be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition which instituted the program remains in power.
Hypothesis 5	The policy core attributes of a governmental action program are unlikely to be changed in the absence of significant perturbations external to the

	subsystem, i.e. changes in socio-economic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems.
Hypotheses Concerning Coalition Learning	
Hypothesis 6	Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is an intermediate level of informed conflict between the two coalitions. This requires that: i) Each have the technical resources to engage in such a debate; and that ii) The conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system and core elements of the other or, alternatively, between important secondary aspects of the two belief systems.
Hypothesis 7	Problems for which accepted quantitative data and theory exist are more conducive to policy-oriented learning across belief systems than those in which data and theory are generally qualitative, quite subjective, or altogether lacking.
Hypothesis 8	Problems involving natural systems are more conducive to policy-oriented learning across belief systems than those involving purely social or political systems because in the former many of the critical variables are not themselves active strategists and because controlled experimentation is more feasible.
Hypothesis 9	Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there exists a forum which is: i) Prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate; ii) Dominated by professional norms.

Source: Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier(1994)

The Figure 3 presented the framework of ACF divide the components of ACF into three sections: relatively stable parameters that lead to the long-term coalition opportunity structures and affects the external(system) events, external(system) events bringing the short-term constraints and resources of

subsystem actors, and policy subsystem. Each section has its subsection to form its function in this model. All the sections will be furthered explain herewith. Based on their explanation, the relatively stable parameters is a set of parameters comprised of essential attributes of the problem area(or good), of primary distribution of natural resources, of fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure, and underlying constitutional structure, representing a stable circumstance within or external to the policy subsystems in a long period of time for both structuring the nature of the problem and constraining the accessibility of resources to participants(Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The external(system) events, including changes in socio-economic conditions changes in public opinion, changes in the systemic governing coalition, and policy decision and impacts, present a dynamical in relation to the fluctuation of constraints and opportunities confronted by actors and an unceasing test for participants to learn the know-how of coping with the subsystem actors based on their beliefs(Sabatier, 1988). Last, the policy subsystem constituted by actors as advocacy coalitions



and policy brokers, policy beliefs, institutional authorities, and rules, is the representation of the complexity of modern society, of the functions in the public sector, and of the most pressures for specialization raised by the policy problems from technical nature (Sabatier, 1988).




Figure 10. Diagram of Advocacy Coalition Framework(ACF)

Source: Sabatier& Weible(2007)

Although the ACF offers a comprehensively analytical tool, one reminder raised by Schlager(1995) about the formation of power in the policy

subsystem triggers this study to develop an adapted framework by integrating with the policy network approach. As Adam and Kriesi (2007) concluded that the policy network approach is an appropriate method to examine the type of policy network depended upon the dimension of distribution of power, thereby establishing such relationships between stakeholders within mutual interests. Because of differences in the distribution of power, it affects how coalition groups develop their actions in order to achieve policy change. Responding to this loophole, Schlarger(1995) proposed two hypotheses to redress this issue:

*“Hypothesis A: In a separation of powers system, coalitions (both winning and losing) press for legislatively imposed structures that insulate and constrain the operation of a public agency, paying less attention to ensuring the effectiveness of a public agency and the policies it implements; hypothesis B: In a two party parliamentary system, the ruling party legislates public agencies and policies that effectively promotes its policy desires, insulating its creations*

*through informal mechanisms of cooptation(Schlarger, 1995).”*

Within this consideration, this research adopts the typologies of network structure proposed by Adam and Kriesi (2007). Based on their two-dimensional typologies, the attribute of actors and degree of cooperation among actors and collations, they break down into two tables: the typology of network structures, which demonstrates six types of policy network among stakeholders(see Table 17); the typology of policy change, which illustrates the possibility of policy change based on the six types of policy network(see Table 18). That is, along with the time span, the result of the decision-making is not only the collective actions among stakeholders but the corollary of the power structure. The adapted analytical framework, therefore, presented as Figure 4 in order to bridge the box of external(system) events with the three-folder contexts—transnational context, national context, and f policy-domain specific context—for identifying forces shaping the structure of policy network, which is constituted by the actors from policy subsystem. Along with the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex, the result is

expecting to portrait dynamic interactions among stakeholders so as to comprehending what attribution of a policy network, of potential for policy change, and type of policy change. To preliminarily portrait the attribution of the Taipei Dome Complex into this broad framework, the summary of the case study will be discussed in the following section.

Table 17. Typology of Network Structures

<b>Distribution of Power</b>	<b>Type of Interaction</b>		
	<b>Conflict</b>	<b>Bargaining</b>	<b>Cooperation</b>
<b>Concentration</b>	Dominance	Asymmetric Bargaining	Hierarchical cooperation
<b>Fragmentation</b>	Competition	Symmetric Bargaining	Horizontal cooperation

Source: Adam & Kriesi (2007).

Table 18. Typology of Policy Change

<b>Distribution of Power</b>	<b>Type of Interaction</b>		
	<b>Conflict</b>	<b>Bargaining</b>	<b>Cooperation</b>
<b>Concentration</b>	Moderate potential for rapid (serial) shift	Low to moderate potential for incremental change	Low potential for change—maintenance of status quo
<b>Fragmentation</b>	High potential for rapid (serial) shift	Moderate to high potential for incremental change	Low to moderate potential for change—maintenance of status quo

Source: Adam & Kriesi (2007).




Figure 11. The Adapted ACF Model

Source: adapted from Sabatier(1988); Adam & Kriesi (2007)

Unlike other institutional explanation focusing on the governmental rules and procedure (Schlanger, 1995), the summary of ACF applied to the Taipei Dome Construction introduced the basic feature of the case, the complexity of the policy subsystem, and the beliefs systems shaping the possible learning process. That is, an introduction of the Taipei Dome Complex draws the attribution of the case in order to map out the environment where actors within collations have carried out actions toward to affect this project.

In the context of the Taipei Dome Complex, the basic attribute of the problem is originated in the geographical limitation resulting from a rocket rise in the land value and lack of green space. On the one hand, according to the statistical data of land value in 2019 from Department of Land at Taipei City Government, the average land price of Taipei City in 2018 is worth approximately 110,660 NTD/m<sup>2</sup> , not to mention those exclusive Taipei downtown areas where the Taipei Dome Complex is covering the area with 10.2 hectare that is worth around 35 billion NTD(339,696 NTD/m<sup>2</sup>)(Department of Land administration, n.d). On the other hand, according to the statistical data of urban green space for each person in 2018 from the National Statistics, each dweller in Taipei shares only 5.79m<sup>2</sup> urban green space(National Statistics, n.d). Looking into Da'an(大安) and Xinyi(信義) Administrative District where the Taipei Dome situated in downtown Taipei, both districts share 1.93m<sup>2</sup> and 2.44m<sup>2</sup> for each person, respectively. That is even lag behind the average of Taipei City. Within this consideration, when Taipei Dome Complex plans to build at public land, the basic attribute

of the problem in this project is whether Taipei needs such a mega-project at this precious and valuable public land that the conflict between the quality of life and economic growth comes to the fore.

The basic distribution of building a multi-use domed-stadium is not disputed, but its location at Songshan Tobacco Factory is. Since the Japanese-occupied period, this Tobacco Factory is the first industrialized facility built in 1937, and it has been assigned as a municipal historic site in 2001(Songshan Cultural and Creative Park, n.d). Regarding its land ownership, this eighteen-hectare area should be the buffer zone for alleviating the externalities from the development of Taipei. The development direction of Taipei, however, chooses to pursue the dream of being a global city, adopting the BOT (building-operation-transfer) as a means of achieving the public-private partnerships for lightening the long-term financial burden of developing public facilities. While the approximately 8-hectare area has become Songshan Cultural and Creative Park(松山文創園區) under the BOT contract, the rest of 10-hectare area has adopted the same method to initiate

the Taipei Dome Complex Project as part of Taipei Cultural and Sports Park(台北體育文化園區). Taipei government rapidly turns those public spaces into commercial usage without considering the externalities of the developmental programs. This refers to the deep-seated ideology in Taiwan's cultural value and social structure.

According to the Maddison Project Database 2018, as of 1950, while the GDP per capita in Taiwan was 1,335 US dollars, Taiwan in 2016 skyrocketed to 42,165 and 36,103 US dollars (University of Groningen, n.d). Furthermore, the GDP growth of Taiwan is approximately 32 times as the size in 1950, ranked third place among other countries from 1950 to 2016 in the world economy historical statistics(University of Groningen, n.d). As an exemplar of the developmental state, it is worth to note that the success of Taiwan since the 1960s, compared with how Latin America countries failed to achieve the rapid economic growth, as cases that are unable to reproduce(Wade, 1990; Öniş, 1991; Meredith, 1999). First, Given by its post-war geopolitical strategical position, Taiwan was threatened by the communist alliance, the



People Republic of China, which results in the US Aid for investing in industrial infrastructures(Castells, 1992). Second, the resource redistribution by land reform extirpates the traditional landlord class for concentrating the power to the central government for implementing policies (Wade, 1990). Third, manipulating the central bank to control the interest for lowering the labor's wage, for reinvesting the surplus into the target industry as the way to rapidly accumulate capital (Castells, 1992). Fourth, the powerful bureaucracy controls the political agenda and development strategy concomitant of the educated labor force(Öniş, 1991, Castells, 1992); Fifth, dismantling the social equality or welfare for either investing that capital into the designated industry or fortifying the social control from the government(Öniş, 1991). From these five points, it can attribute the successful of Taiwan as a newly industrialized country to two main reasons: first, centralization of decision-making massively increased the efficiency in implementing policy, although it did confine the human right; second, the economic-centered policies contribute to the economic miracle in Taiwan, but leaving all the

developmental externalities behind. In other words, although the democratization of Taiwan in the late 1980s successfully overturned the power inequality between citizen and government, this inequality remains under the table because the policy subsystem yet liberated from those political elites to the public. That is, the shadow of Authoritarian legacy deeply affects the implementation of the Taipei Dome Complex.

The constitutional structure in the case of the Taipei Dome Complex is straightforward. According to the BOT contract, Farglory Group is the implementer, and the Taipei City Government is the competent authority. Although the Taipei Dome Complex is part of the five-year key public building project from the central government back to the 1990s, Taipei City Government is assigned to take over the responsibility of policy implementation at the beginning of the 2000s. This case, therefore, will be mainly discussed the interaction among actors as well as the policy subsystems at the local government level.

Based on the definition from Weible and Sabatier(2007), the policy subsystem is divided into three scope—the territorial scope, substitutive scope, and policy participants—so as to frame the boundary of policy-making progress. For the Taipei Dome Complex, because the whole project is located in downtown Taipei, its territorial scope of policy subsystem relates to Taipei City, and its substantive scope is mainly about the project of Taipei Dome itself. About the policy participants within the coalitions as the section of stakeholder analysis mentioned, all stakeholders have been identified and put into Table 19.

Centering to the individuals, Weible and Sabatier(2007) summarized that “the ACF’s model of the individual motivates policy participants to seek out like-minded allies and form advocacy coalitions.” In order to further exploring this statement for searching out what mechanism triggers them, Sabatier(1988) named it as beliefs systems and divided this structure into deep core belief relating to normative and ontological axioms, near (policy) core that means policy positions concerning the fundamental strategies for

achieving the normative axioms of deep core, and the secondary aspects belief regarding the instrumental decisions and information searches to implement policy core, for minimizing the resistance to the policy change(Sabatier, 1988). In connection with the relatively stable parameters, the deep core beliefs in the Taipei Dome Complex is the ideology of developmentalism derived from the economic miracle since the 1960s, the policy core beliefs, pro-development beliefs, buttress the deep core beliefs in terms of the conflict between environmental protection and economic development, and the secondary aspects beliefs establish solid governmental rules to promote the policy implementation. Under the influence of the policy beliefs, it forms the two ciliation, the supporting and opposing group comprised of participants from the public sector, private sector, and civil society as stakeholder analysis identified.

The policy brokers, who are responsible for mediating the conflicts between advocacy coalition, are trusted by both sides and obtained the decision-making power (Sabatier& Weible, 2007). It is considered natural

that government officials are the brokers in the context of Taipei Dome Complex because the distribution of power confines the public to efficiently affect this policy implementation. To better emphasize the person mediating this case, the elected governmental servant, Mayor of Taipei, not only owns the absolute power in decision-making progress but also highly related to every critical moment in the decision-making progress of Taipei Dome Complex. For instance, the latest Mayor of Taipei, Wen-Che Ko, as presented in the Table 19, chose to compromise the case on 8 September 2016 after claiming to rebuild the partnership with Farglory Group for solving this case with flaws all over the progress. Besides, we should notice that both collations almost share the number of sources of information, including official documents, resources from the politician, public opinion, except the authority of decision-making in this case. Therefore, the venue where they exhibit their influences to promote or block is full of high-quality debate.

Although this is an ongoing case within numerous uncertainties, it is necessary to address the policy changes through this process. Referred to the

components divided by Sabatier & Weible (2007), there are three mechanisms of policy change, including the accumulation of evidence, hurting stalemate, and external (events) shock. First, the accumulation of evidence leads the governmental transparency to actively expose governmental documents to the public, establishing the credibility of government and releasing some of the power for the public to act as if a supervisor. The hurting stalemate, in this case, indicates an ultimate lose-lose circumstance because of the fluctuation of decision-making direction from governmental servants. This will be further discussed. It is such a controversial situation that part of the public loses confidence in the liability of elected government officials, fueling the public to learn what is the reality of politics in Taiwan. The last element of policy change mechanism, the external shocks, bring about a high awareness from the public of the controversial in Taipei Dome Complex to the public. In spite of the minimal effect on civic participation encouraged by the change, the beginning of concerning a public event contributes to the vision of being a mature civil society.

Table 19. Summary of Application of the ACF Applied to the Taipei Dome Construction

ACF Component	Taipei Dome Construction
<p><b>Relatively Stable Parameters</b></p> <p>Basic Attribute of Problem</p> <p>Basic Distribution of Natural Resources</p> <p>Fundamental Cultural Values and Social Structure</p> <p>Basic Constitutional Structure</p>	<p>Precious public space</p> <p>Dispute of building a multi-use domed-stadium at Songshan Tobacco Factory.</p> <p>Developmentalism and Utilitarianism</p> <p>Concentrated governance under Taipei City government.</p>
<p><b>Policy Subsystem</b></p> <p>Territorial Scope</p> <p>Substantive Scope</p> <p>Policy Participants</p>	<p>Taipei City</p> <p>Taipei Dome Complex Project</p> <p>Farglory Group, Taipei Dome Preparation Office</p> <p>Civil Expertise (Former Official in Department of Sport at Taipei City Government), Former Congressperson (DPP), *Department of Sport at Taipei City Government, *Mayor of Taipei</p> <p>*Deputy Mayor of Taipei, *Director of Taipei Mayor's Office, *Department of Environmental Protection Office at Taipei City Government</p> <p>*Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government, *City Council Member (DPP, KMT), *</p> <p>Environmental Impact Assessment Committee at Taipei City Government, *</p> <p>Urban Design Committee at Taipei City Government, *Local Residents at Shin-Ren Village (retailer owners), Civil</p>

	<p>Expertise (Former Official in Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government), Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Urban Design Committee at Taipei City Government) , Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Environmental Impact Committee at Taipei City Government), Civil Expertise (Former Commissioner of Clean Government Committee at Taipei City Government), Songshan Tree Group, Local Residents at Shin-Ren Village (Non-retailer owners), Former City Council Member (DPP) City Council Member (Non-partisan), Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association, Taiwan *City Council Member(DPP, KMT), *City Council Member(NPP), *Parent's Association at Taipei Municipal GuangFu Elementary School, *Local Residents at Shin-Ren Village (non-retailer owners)</p>
<p><b>Belief Systems</b></p> <p>Deep Core Beliefs</p> <p>Policy Core Beliefs</p> <p>Secondary Beliefs</p>	<p>Developmentalism beliefs</p> <p>Pro-development beliefs</p> <p>Specific institutional rules regarding this project</p>
<b>Advocacy Coalitions</b>	Pro-construction vs. Anti-construction.
<b>Policy Broker</b>	Wen-je Ko, Mayor of Taipei, compromised the case on September 8 in 2016.
<b>Resources</b>	Formal legal authority to make decisions,



	public opinion, government documents, political resource.
<b>Venues</b>	Administrative Court, District Court, Criminal Court, Taipei City Council, Urban Design Committee, and Environmental Impact Assessment Committee.
<b>Mechanisms of Policy Change</b> Accumulation of Evidence Hurting Stalemate  External Shock	The transparency of government. Policy broker exploited both sides in order to benefit his/her career. Growth of awareness from civil society on the issue of transparency and social justice toward the dispute of Taipei Dome Complex Construction.

Source: Table format adapted from Weible& Sabatier(2007)

\*According to sufficiently indirect information from the respondents and second-hand data, these stakeholders are key pillar to the decision-making process, although there are no respondents listing in the interviewees from those positions in this research.

In light of the ACF model, a preliminary application of the Taipei Dome Complex has been addressed into this framework. For comprehending the decision-making progress from the governmental institutions, this research herewith systematically maps out its administrative procedures to meet the requirements of completion of a construction project. As outlined in the Figure 12, there are four steps to adhere to initiation of the development

activity, approval of the assessment mechanism, confirmation of building permit, and confirmation of building use permit. Once the implementer completed all the steps, it is the official completion of the project. This subsection will be detailed to examine each step in terms of legal aspect of procedure-related regulations.




Figure 12. Decision-Making Process (Governmental Institution Rules)

Source: developed for this study

First, the initiation of development activity, following *Act for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects*, the *Tender Announcement(2018)*, the *Taipei Dome Complex BOT Contract*, the tenderer

needs to meet the governmental requirements as an enterprise whose authorized capital is no less than 1 billion NTD or as an enterprise alliance whose leading enterprise's authorized capital is about 300 million NTD and the total authorized capital of the alliance is above 1.5 billion NTD(Taipei City Government, 2003). Besides, if the tenderer is a legal person or an enterprise alliance, the tenderer is required to launch a new company to manage the construction and the operation of the Taipei Dome Complex once the tenderer is selected as the preferable tender. To submit the proposal, the tenderer needs to prepare an investment proposal and a 30 million NTD security deposit to the Taipei City Government. After completion of this preparation work, the government will initiate a selection committee to proceed two stages assessment: the first stage is about the eligibility assessment to each tenderer, and the second stage is to select the preferable tender. When the Taipei City Government and the preferable tenderer agree with every article on *the Taipei Dome Complex BOT Contract*, it then advances to the next stage: the approval of the assessment mechanism.

Second, the assessment mechanism focuses on the rationality of the design of the building mass from the investment proposal. Typically, the preferable tenderer would develop a scheme design in order to calculate the return on investment in the investment proposal. After being named as the preferable tender, the implementer will furtherer developed the design under the regulations of *the Environmental Impact Assessment Act(2003)*, the *Building Technical Regulations(2019)*, and *The Taipei City Urban Design and Land Development Review Regulations(2014)*. Each legal regulation is in charge of an essential part in the review system. Article 3 in the *Environmental Impact Assessment Act(2003)* addressed that “the competent authorities at all levels shall establish an Environmental Impact Assessment Review Committee.” The review scope of a project in the EIA review committee based on Article 6 in *Environmental Impact Assessment Enforcement Rules* is:

- 1) “The creation of such public nuisances as water pollution, air pollution, soil pollution, noise, vibration, noxious odor, waste,

toxic substance pollution, land subsidence or radioactive pollution;

- 2) The endangerment of the reasonable use of natural resources;
- 3) Damage to the natural scenery or ecological environment;
- 4) Damage to the social, cultural or economic environment;
- 5) Other circumstances officially announced by the central competent authority(Environmental Impact Assessment Enforcement Rules, 2018).”

That is, the review scope of the EIA review committee is not merely for the natural environment affected by development activity but for the building environment as well as the living environment where could be influenced by the project. In this sense, the EIA review committee is such comprehensive institution that examines the possible impact from the development activity. For establishing the EIA review Committee to review a project in Taipei, it needs to follow the regulation in accordance with Subparagraph 4 of Article 3 in *the Environmental Impact Assessment Act*:

“Special municipality competent authorities shall draft the organizational rules of the Committees established by special municipality competent authorities and shall submit said rules to the authorized agency for approval and announcement (Environmental Impact Assessment Act, 2003).”

Based on this regulation, Taipei City Government sets *the Taipei City Environmental Impact Assessment Review Committee Organizational Rules*, and formulates the structure of committee organization, which follows on subparagraph 2 of Article 3 in *Environmental Impact Assessment Act*:

“Terms for the members of the Committee in the foregoing paragraph shall be two years and experts and scholars may not account for less than two-thirds of the total number of committee members (Environmental Impact Assessment Act, 2003).”

This article regulates the structure of committee members and the term in office when local government selects the possible candidates as EIA committee members. For detailed composition of a committee in Taipei City

Government, it refers to Article 2 in *Taipei City Environmental Impact Assessment Review Committee Organizational Rules*. Following on Article 2, the total number of the committee members of the Environmental Impact Assessment Review Committee is twenty-one people, including fourteen civil scholars and seven governmental officials. 5 out of 7 government officials are the Deputy form Department of Industry Development, Public Works Department, Department of Transportation, Department of Urban Development, and the Chief Secretary from Research, Development and Evaluation Commission. The Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the EIA review committee are the Commissioner and the Deputy of Department of Environmental Protection. Moreover, its subparagraph 2 and 3 regulate its term and the gender ratio among the committee members:

“The term of the committee members in the preceding paragraph shall be two years, and they shall be renewed (assigned) once. The gender ratio of all members shall not be less than one third of the total number of members(Taipei City Environmental Impact

Assessment Review Committee Organizational Rules, 2005).”

Although these fourteen civil scholars are the majority in the EIA committee, it does not mean that the seven governmental officials are placed at a disadvantage. This composition merely represents the simplest way to include voices from civil society, ignoring the attributes from each case. The attributes of each case, regarding this, brings potential concern about the conflict of interest among the committee members. Especially when the project is a BOT project making the government be both the implementer and competent authority at a time. In order to avoid the conflict of interest, the Article 5-1, revised on 3 July in 2015, in the *Environmental Impact Assessment Enforcement Rules* regulate such situation when:

“The Article Association of Environmental Impact Assessment and Review Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) which was made by the competent authorities of all levels by Article 3 shall include avoidance requirement in this Act and follow principle of avoiding members’ interest as well as relevant



regulations in Administrative Procedure Act(Environmental Impact Assessment Enforcement Rules, 2018).”

After meeting all the regulations by the legal system, to form the resolution in a EIA review committee meeting, it is compliance with the Subparagraph 3 of the Article 4 in *Taipei City Environmental Impact Assessment Review Committee Organizational Rules*(2005):

“Unless otherwise stipulated in this law, the resolutions discussed by the committee of this committee shall be agreed upon by more than one-half of all members and more than half of the members present; the positive and negative opinions shall be determined by the chairman(Taipei City Environmental Impact Assessment Review Committee Organizational Rules, 2005).”

This indicates that the EIA assessment committee adopts the cumulative voting system to decide whether a project can obtain the approval, retrial, or rejection by the committee.

The other similar case is the Urban Design Committee, which is accordance with Article 95 in *Taipei City Zoning Regulations(2011)*—the municipal government may set up a Taipei City Design and Land Use Development Licensing Review Committee as necessary. Its scope of review is defined by Subparagraph 2 of Article 9 in *the Comprehensive Review of Urban Planning Regulation(2017)*:

‘The content of the urban design depends on the actual needs and indicates the following:

- 1) Public open space system configuration and its greening and water conservation matters;
- 2) The configuration of moving lines of pedestrian spaces, trails or bicycle lane systems;
- 3) The transportation system, parking spaces of cars, locomotives and bicycles and the configuration of access lines;
- 4) The subdivision scale of the construction base and the restrictions on the excavation of the basement;

- 5) The items of building configuration, height, shape, color, style,  
green building materials and water resources recycling;
- 6) Environmental protection facilities and resource reuse facilities  
allocation matters;
- 7) Landscape plan;
- 8) Disaster prevention and evacuation space and facility  
configuration matters;
- 9) Management and maintenance plan(Comprehensive Review of  
Urban Planning Regulation, 2017).

Although this regulation offers a framework to review the cases, this broad scope of review cannot fit in the local circumstance. To solve this, the *2019 Taipei City Urban Design and Land Use Development License Review Committee Review Reference Examples*, which lists examples of principle, generality, locality, advertisement, and the principle of urban design, offer series review reference for committee members. Although this review reference provides detailed conditions for the committee members, it

remains its flexibility on the review scope when the introduction of the principle on this review reference addressed that:

“This reference example is for the reference of the planning and design of the application unit and the design unit in the review of the relevant urban design and land use development license. Restrictions or actual requirements cannot be implemented, and after deliberation and approval by this committee, they are not subject to the "principles" provisions (Taipei City Government, 2019).”

This explanation stated that the principles could be altered depending upon the circumstance of the reviewing case. The flexibility, on the one hand, could be a double-bladed sword if the consistency of the review principle cannot be achieved, and this would jeopardize the credibility of the whole system. On the other hand, the adapted methodology would meet the local condition for the sake of the case itself.

About the structure of the committee member of the Urban Design

Committee, it is comprised of twenty-three committee members, including fourteen civil scholars and nine governmental officials, based on the Article 2 in *Taipei City Urban Design and Land Use Development Licensing Committee Organizational Regulations*(2014):

The chairman is concurrently served by the commissioner of Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government; the Deputy of Department of Urban Development at Taipei City Government serves as the Vice Chairman. The remaining members are recruited (delegated) by the Taipei City Government for the following relevant personnel: 1) Deputy of Department of Public Works; 2) Deputy of Department of Transportation; 3) Deputy of the Department of Environmental Protection; 4) Deputy of Department of Culture; 5) Deputy of Taipei City Fire Department; 6) Deputy of the Geotechnical Engineering Office at Department of the Public Work; 7) Deputy of the Taipei City Construction Management Office; 8) 1 representative from the Architects

Association; 9) 1 representative from the Real Estate Development Association; 10) 2 urban planning experts; 11)3 urban design experts; 12) 2 architectural design experts; 13)1 expert in gardening and landscape design; 14) 1 expert in geology and geotechnical engineering; 15) 1 expert in transportation planning; 16) 1 culture and art experts; and 17) 1 representative of the relevant public interest group(Taipei City Urban Design and Land Use Development Licensing Committee Organizational Regulations, 2014).

The various backgrounds among committee members endow the review system to cover a wide range of cases. When it comes to the term of the committee member follows on the Subparagraph 2 of Article 3 in *Taipei City Urban Design and Land Use Development Licensing Committee Organizational Regulations*(2014):

“The term of the members in the preceding paragraph shall be one year, and the members of the local government shall be reappointed

upon expiry of the term; if the term of the members outside the government shall be renewed upon expiry, the term of renewal shall be limited to two terms. Those who have been employed continuously for three years shall be re-appointed after three years. If there is a vacancy during the term of office, a supplementary bank may be recruited (assigned) until the expiration of the original term(Taipei City Urban Design and Land Use Development Licensing Committee Organizational Regulations, 2014).”

Besides, in order to maintain the flexibility of the review committee, the Subparagraph 4 of Article 3 in *Taipei City Urban Design and Land Use Development Licensing Committee Organizational Regulations(2014)* addressed that:

“Depending on the needs of the case, the government may select and appoint personnel to serve as advisory committees to provide professional advice and assist in deliberation. The appointment period is one year. 1) Experts in land development and financial

analysis; 2) Legal experts; 3) Experts in cultural assets; 4) Other relevant professional experts.

Last, the decision-making of the Urban Design Review Committee is as theoretically same as EIA review committee, considering the Subparagraph 2 of Article 4 in *Taipei City Urban Design and Land Use Development Licensing Committee Organizational Regulation*(2014):

“At this meeting, more than half of the members shall attend the meeting before the meeting; with the consent of the majority of the members present, a resolution may be made; if the same number is available, the chairman shall decide(Taipei City Urban Design and Land Use Development Licensing Committee Organizational Regulations, 2014).”

Within abovementioned, it seems these two review committees are seeming similar, but they are different. According to UCSCE01, the UCSCE01 offers an insight to both review systems:



“Theoretically, the EIA review committee backed up by the *Environmental Impact Assessment Act*. This endows the EIA committee its legal position, while Urban Design Review Committee does not have such legal source (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

From UCSCE01’s perspective, this fundamental differences in terms of legal aspect, offering the EIA gives the committee the enforcement of veto power while the Urban Design Committee only has the right to review the case:

“Both the EIA review committee and Urban Design Review Committee are totally different. Because the former one obtains the veto power, but the later does not have it(UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

That is, the Urban Design Committee can merely decide with approval or retrial to every case. In the reviewing procedure, the Taipei Dome Complex has gone numerous retrials for revising its design for meeting the

requirements from the Urban Design Review Committee. In addition, the Urban Design committee should follow on the EIA review committee as a reference because the EIA review committee is obtaining a higher legal rank than Urban Design Committee, although both the EIA review committee and Urban Design Committee have a flexible scope of review:

“Anything you want to change the decision [or any fixed number] from Environmental Impact Assessment Meeting [in the Urban Design Review Committee], you must go back to redo the Environmental Impact Assessment Review before doing the Urban Design Review Committee(UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

Both review committees, responding to UCSCE01, has a cross-reference relation in order to thoroughly examine the case for the vision of developmental sustainability for both natural and living environment. For example, if the EIA Review Meeting approved the maximum capacity of Taipei Dome Complex is 59,833 persons, the Urban Design Review

Committee should be accordance with this number to examine whether the design of the Complex meets this requirement. Despite these nuances aforementioned, a key element raised by UCSCE01 in the review system is the flexibility:

“[When] we are talking about the safety issues in the Taipei Dome Complex. The basis behind it is human behavior and psychology. This matter is important, but it does include in our regulations. The Urban Design Review Meeting [therefore,] is the only occasion that has flexibility. So, I also reminded the Taipei City Government that both review committees are important (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

Within this understanding, flexibility establishes an adaptive perspective in the review instead of sticking or interpreting the regulations. For instance, when Taiwan is lack legal source to examine whether the evacuation plan in the Taipei Dome Complex works during the outbreak of emergencies, the review system can make supplements to those loopholes for checking the

feasibility of design in the complex. When the case gets approval from both committees, the implementer will move onto the third step for obtaining the building permit.

In order to construct the project, the implementer needs to pass the review by Taipei City Construction Management Office in accordance with the *Building Technical Regulations(2019)*, a rigid regulation with meticulous building code. An architect from the Architects Association will take the responsibility to examine all the technical drawings submitted by the implementer. After confirming the correctness of the drawings, the Taipei City Construction Management Office will officially grant the implementer a building permit for constructing the project. The other alternative of obtaining the building permit is to adopt *the Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac(2017)*, which has established for reviewing the building project terms of fire safety and evacuation issues since 2004, for pursuing a better aesthetics of architecture and user-friendly architecture. According to

Dai and Zou(2018), Chou Min Lin stated the reason why Taiwan needs this alternative approach to evaluate a building design:

*“Nowadays, buildings are gradually developing towards high-rise, large-scale and multi-composite development, coupled with novel design concepts. Traditional specifications and regulations (the Building Technical Regulations)[, however,] seems inconvenient for designers. If the building design cannot meet the requirements of the current regulations, you can choose the performance-type regulations(the Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety) reviewed by the Construction and Planning Agency in Ministry of Interior(內政部營建署) and the Taiwan Architecture & Building Center(財團法人台灣建築中心). This approach can maintain fire safety and increase design flexibility, while safety is still taking into account(Dai and Zou, 2018).”*

From Chou-Min Lin, former Commissioner of Urban Development in Taipei City Government, point of view, by using this method an obtaining the

approval from Construction and Planning Agency in the Ministry of Interior, the project can be exempted from part of fire safety-related building codes in the *Building Technical Regulations(2019)* as presented in Table 20.

Table 20. Items of Verification in the Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac(2017)

Item(s)	Exempted Regulations from the Building Technical Regulations	Summary of Regulations	Verification Item(s)
Building Structure	Article 70	The fire protection time of the main structural parts of the building	1. Structural fire resistance performance 2. Evacuation performance(the whole building)
	Article 79	Method of fire protection zoning of the fire protection structure	1. Fire Prevention performance 2. Evacuation performance(the whole building)
	Paragraph 1 in Article 79-2	Method for vertical fire division of fireproof structure building	
	Article 79-3	Prevent the upper layer from burning	
	Article 83	Fire protection zoning method for	

		the area above the 11 <sup>th</sup> floor of a fireproof structure building	
Decoration Material Restrictions	Article 88	Building interior decoration materials	1. Fire prevention performance 2. Evacuation safety performance(level to level)
Evacuation Facilities	Article 90	The stairs to the outside entrance	Evacuation safety performance(the whole building)
	Article 90-1	The width of the entrance and exit of the evac level	
	Article 91	Width of entrances and exits on floors other than the evac level	Evacuation safety performance(level to level)
	Article 92	Width of corridor	
	Subparagraph 2 in Article 93	Walking distance to the stairs	
	Article 94	Walking distance to the evac level	Evacuation safety performance(the whole building)
	Article 98	Total width of the staircase	
	Others	After the assessment agency examines the verification project, it will be submitted to the central competent construction authority for approval	

Source: Construction and Planning Agency(2009 December 23)

The fourth and the last step, after getting the confirmation by the architect in the Taipei City Construction Management Office, the project will be granted the building permit. If the implementer completed the construction of the project and reported to the Taipei City Construction Management Office, the project, final acceptance, will be conducted by government officials from Taipei City Construction Management Office and an architect from Architects Association. Once the implementer passed the final project acceptance, the building project will be certified as the building use permit. The project then completes the administrative procedure.

From the abovementioned, the four steps procedure is established by purely legal regulations, as presented in the lower part of Figure 12, but it cannot explain the reason why this straightforward four steps have delayed the Taipei Dome Complex for over than a decade. As the upper part and actors presented in the Figure 12, the interaction between stakeholders from various institutions could be the key to address what has happened in the case of the



Taipei Dome Complex. To specify this focus, the following section will introduce the interactions among stakeholders in the historical time sequence.

For rebuilding the timeline of Taipei Dome Complex for focusing on a specific event, another decision-making progress adding the sociopolitical context provides an alternative to study how these external events affect the decision-making among stakeholders from different institutions. In this Figure 13, it indicates what Taipei Dome Complex has experienced under three different Mayors and six times Mayor election since 1998, and it juxtaposes the progress of Taipei Dome Complex Project, the summary to each stage, the critical events of the project, and demonstration of administrative procedure, for revisiting the Taipei Dome Complex. In order to examine such a timespan, this research divides it into six parts for meeting some critical events and actions from stakeholders: first, eight years of Mayor Ma since 1998 to 2006 representing the period of plan and tender in the developmental context of Taipei Dome Complex; second, the first term of Mayor Hau from 2006 to 2010 reflecting the time of frustration in Taipei

Dome Complex; third, the second term of Mayor Hau from 2010 to 2014 illustrating the solid will of policy implementing; forth, the first half in the first term of Mayor Ko from 2014 to 2016 showing a strong resistance toward the Taipei Dome Complex; fifth, the second in the first term of Mayor Ko from 2016 to 2018 demonstrating a policy U-turn to the direction of Taipei Dome Complex; sixth, the second term of Mayor Ko from 2018 to present time representing the reality of Taiwan politics by resuming Taipei Dome Complex Construction.




Figure 13. Decision-Making Process (Policy Changes in Sociopolitical Context)

Source: developed for this study

#### 4.2.1. Decision-making Process(1998~2006)

Before the construction of the Taipei Dome Complex, it was a long-war between central and local governments to consider whether this policy implementation could be a feasible option. The summary presented as Figure 14 addressed the details in this timespan.




Figure 14. Decision-Making Process of Taipei Dome Complex(1998~2006)

Source: developed for this study

Although Taipei City Government had evaluated Taipei Dome Complex since 1992 when The Executive Yuan instructed Taipei City to construct an indoor stadium by an official letter, Taiwan No. 4795, on 28 August in

1992(Clean Government Committee, 2015), those actors—including former Major Ta-Chou Huang(黃大洲) from 1990 to 1994 and Mayor Shui-Bian Chen(陳水扁) from 1994 to 1998, and other subordinates—failed to form the consensus about the site selection until the Mayor Ma won the 1998 Taipei Mayor election. In 1999, Mayor Ma overrode the policy of building the domed-stadium at the Taipei Municipal Baseball Stadium made by former Mayor Chen and decided to build the Taipei Dome at the Songshan Tabaco Factory after reassessing the feasibility among three poetical sites, the Guandu Plain(關渡平原), the Taipei Municipal Baseball Stadium(台北市立棒球場), and SongshanShan Tobacco Factory. Jin-De Ou(歐晉德), the Deputy Mayor of Taipei as well as the Commissioner of the Taipei Dome Preparation Committee, made such a decision based on financial feasibility, transportation, and public poll(Chin, 1999). This decision, however, draws lots of suspicions. First, those data in the analysis made by the Taipei Dome Preparation Committee were possibly contaminated by unknown reasons. While Guandu Plain located in the suburban area is less competitive to other

sites situated in downtown Taipei, the rank of transportation of Municipal Baseball Stadium and of Songshan Tobacco Factory was C and A respectively, not to mention both ranked B in financial feasibility (Kang, 2007). Also, the result of the public poll indicated that 13.2 percent of dwellers supporting the site of Guandu Plain, 40.8 percent of dwellers supporting the location of Municipal Baseball Stadium, and 39 percent of dwellers supporting the site of Songshan Tobacco Factory (Tung, 1999). Third, Mayor Ma overly simplified the circumstance of building the stadium at Songshan Tobacco Factory when he stated that “the location of Songshan Tobacco Factory is better than Municipal Baseball Stadium because it does not have problems such as transportation and the building height limitation; it is way easier to negotiate the land ownership with Central Government” (Chu, 1999). This statement, comparing with what truly happened to this case, is a mistake. Within the leading of Mayor Ma, the final decision of the site for building the Taipei Dome went to Songshan Tobacco Factory.

After deciding the site selection, the Taipei City Government then

initialed a preliminary assessment of the feasibility of building a domed stadium in Taipei, for obtaining the support from the central government in May 1999. Within the support from the Chao-Hsuan Liu(劉兆玄), the Taipei City Government expected to build a domed-stadium whose compacity is around 25,000 to 30,000 seats(Niu, 1999). But this decision was immediately opposed by residents and legislators. Concerning to the externalities of traffic, noise, other environment pollutions, and the possible damages to the historic buildings in Songshan Tobacco Factory, Taipei City Council Members, expertise in cultural preservation, and residents from 7 villages, including Shin-Jen(新仁), Shinlong(興隆), Chenghe(正和), Sichun(西村), ChongShing(中興), Dunhou(敦厚) and Gwangju(廣居), were against this policy, causing the City Government to hold the project(Chu, 1999a).

Because of the 2000 Presidential Election, the Taipei Dome Project was set aside until former Mayor Shiu-Bian Chen, the DPP presidential candidate, won the election in March 2000 and started his first term on 20 May in 2000. Mayor Ma relaunched the Taipei Dome Project and met President Chen to

propose a vision of bidding the 2009 Asian Game for obtaining support from the central government to solve the landownership of the Songshan Tobacco Factory for Taipei Dome so as to bid the sports mega-events in Taipei(Tung, 2000). This echoed to what UCSCE03 earlier stated the requirement of hosting sports mega-events or an international sports tournament is the quality and scale of the sports facilities in one city. As a matter of fact, despite building a domed-stadium with around 30,000 seats, Ma's city government has launched the construction of Taipei Arena with 17,500 seat project at the site of Taipei Municipal Baseball Stadium and planned to revitalize the Taipei Municipal Stadium.

In Mayor Ma's ideology, as he proposed a campaign slogan—Make Taipei a World-class Capital—as the vision in his first term as a Taipei Mayor during the 1998 Taipei Mayor Election(Liou, 1999), he was eager to build up his political legacy in Taipei, although sports firstly were not part of this plan. Taipei Dome, however, might elevate his reputation. To implement the Taipei Dome Project, solving the problematic landownership of the Songshan

Tobacco Factory obtained by the central government becomes his first priority. On June 8 in 2001, Mayor Ma received the suggestion from Fei Tang(唐飛), the Premier of Executive Yuan from May 2000 to October 2000, for adopting the public-to-private approach to build the Taipei Dome Project in Songshan Tobacco Factory if he could integrate both elements of sport and culture into the project and resolve the problems of building height limitation and preservation of historic buildings(Kao, 2000). Although such a statement has been redressed as a case waiting for the cooperation between central and local government by Executive Yuan(Lin, 2000), the recommendation undoubtedly brought massively opposing voices from expertise in cultural preservation, local residents, and Taipei City Council Members.

The expertise supporting cultural preservation filed a referendum in order to remind the government to protect the cultural value of the Songshan Tobacco Factory followed the regulation in the *Cultural Heritage Preservation Act*. To be more specific, instead of partial reserve adhering to the Taipei Dome Project, Chien-Lang Li(李乾朗), the professor in



Department of Architect at Chinese Culture University, claimed to designate the whole area of the Factory as a cultural reserve because the space of the Factory is valuable for Taipei; meanwhile, Heng Ping( 平玢), the Chairman of Performing Art Alliance, worried about the lack long-term comprehensive plan that could cause the factory to become a deserted space(Chou, 2000).

Although the local residents raised the same concerns to the externalities from the project, Tsai-Chiu Li( 李財久), the Chief of Shin-Jen Village, indicated the city government did not inform any information to local residents but briefing their proposal to Executive Yuan and obtaining the support from the Premier; within this consideration, he and Yung-Te Chen( 陳永德), a KMT member of Taipei City Council, tried to mobilize the other residents from other 8 villages, including 3 located in Da'an District and 5 located in Xinyi District, against this policy implementation if the city government refuses to hold a hearing(Chan, 2000).

Behind the frontline, Wei-Jen Chen( 陳威仁), the Commissioner of Department of Urban Development in Ma's City Government, mediated the

issue of building height limitation with Civil Aeronautics Administration and Executive Yuan(Yang, 2000), the problem of traffic plan with Department of Transportation(Chou, 2000), and the assessment of adopting BOT model instead of the public-to-private approach with National Property Administration at Ministry of Finance, for solving the financial difficulties in this project(Chao, 2000). Besides, the Sports Affairs Council at Executive Yuan also supported the idea of Taipei Dome and would offer the necessary help(Huang, 2000). In order to cast aside the doubt from the Academia as well as from the public, the City Government planned to host hearings for scholars who are expertise on sport, cultural preservation, and architecture in the Mid of June 2000.

The first hearing on June 9 2000, formed two advocacy collations: pro-construction and anti-construction of Taipei Dome at Songshan Tobacco Factory. The former collation is comprised of sports professionals and enterprises who were willing to launch this project as soon as possible while the latter one involved cultural professionals and art-performance

professionals insisted on the reassessment of this reckless project (Taipei City Government, 2000a). Part of voices from pro-construction collation is:

*“Taipei is the capital of Taiwan, where the population is over 2 million. Comparing with other cities around the world, the sports facilities are relatively less than those cities; along with the policy of a week of two days off, the rapidly increasing demand from dwellers is the reason for building an indoor stadium(Department of Education at Taipei City Government) (Taipei City Government, 2000a ).”*

*“Building the Domed Stadium is seemingly for sport, but it may benefit the art industry. For example, in the stadium in France, after its third year of completion, 60 percent of activities are art, while 40 percent of them are sports (Tien-Siou Liu, Professor in Department of Physical Education at Shu-Te University) (Taipei City Government, 2000a ).”*

*“Why is the historic site that important? I hope Songshan Tobacco*

*Factory can preserve its façade, integrating with the sports facility*  
*(Cheng-Hao Peng, Chairman of Chinese Taipei Baseball*  
*Association) (Taipei City Government, 2000a ).”*

*“Taipei needs such space like domed-stadium, and there will have*  
*many businesses here(Han-Jen Hsia, the Far Eastern Group)*  
*(Taipei City Government, 2000a ).”*

The presented ideas addressed the economic impact of building the domed-stadium, expecting this domed-stadium could be the growth pole for Taipei toward first tier world city. The cultural aspect, however, was outweighed by those statements. On the other hand, the anti-construction collation stated their concerns to this project:

*“When I visited the Songshan Tobacco Factory last year, I think it*  
*should be preserved because the dwellers in Taipei need such a*  
*place to relax(Ing-Tai Lung, Commissioner of Department of*  
*Culture at Taipei City Government) (Taipei City Government,*  
*2000a).”*

*“A public building should refer to public policy. It does not only matter for the opinions of scholars, from experts in cultural professions or in sports professions. Instead, it should consider the voices from dwellers in Taipei(Gu-Fang Lin, Professor in the Department of Art at Fo Guang University) (Taipei City Government, 2000a).”*

*“There will have more than twenty thousand people in it. Once the earthquake broke out, no one could escape from it(Mei-Hui Chou, Chairperson of Yen-Hui Dai’s Foundation) (Taipei City Government, 2000a).”*

*“From the perspective of planning methodology, the Department of Urban Development only stands with the pro-construction side. If you have the pilot study to know where should be preserved, the result might be suitable for building an indoor stadium or a swimming pool. This is much more logical(Professor in the department of Architect at Chung Yuan Christian University)*

*(Taipei City Government, 2000a).*

*“Building a domed-stadium takes a few years, and I doubt the assessment of site selection because there are many resistances that have not discussed. If sport in Taiwan needs such a space, why cannot consider the second place [of site selection] (Fu-Gou Mi, Professor in Department of Architect at Tamkang University) (Taipei City Government, 2000a)?*

Compared with the pro-construction coalition, the anti-construction coalition focused on the impact of the developmental activity on the community surrounding the Taipei Dome Complex. It should meticulously examine the feasibility as well as the rationality through comprehensive pilot studies. Both advocacy coalitions, apparently, could not form the consensus in the first hearing because of the imbalance of information between the government and other participates. Although some sports professions supported the idea of building the Taipei Dome project, the legitimacy of implementing such a project was not solid enough to outweigh the concerns

of externalities as well as the future of Songshan Tobacco Factory. The second hearing on June 23 in 2000, thus, focused on the issues of cultural preservation, leaving these opinions during the hearing:

*“Sport and Culture are no conflicts. Since the time of Olympia, there were art performances in the stadium (Chin-Hsiung Lu, Professor in Department of Architect at Tamkang University) (Taipei City Government, 2000b).”*

*“The designation of the historical site is not well-established....Regarding the designation of Songshan Tobacco Factory as the historic site, it is an opportunity to establish an interagency committee to mediate this problem. Because the local government does not have the regulation like Enforcement Rules of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, within the conflict in the vision of Songshan Tobacco Factory, Taipei City Government can suggest supporting measures...(Yu-Chien Hsu, Professor in Department of Architect at Huaan University) (Taipei City*

*Government, 2000b).*

*“Considering the long-term vision [of the development in Taipei], large sports facilities should be planned in Guandu [Plain] (Fu-San Huang, Department of History at National Taiwan University) (Taipei City Government, 2000b).”*

*“This redesigns the daily life of residents in Taipei. I think bringing the baseball into this place is quite awkward, and the concept of the historic site is also chaining. The key point is creativity. Taipei should have such thinking of creativity, leading us to think the whole map of the relocation of the historic site. [In this regard,] I refute such a relocation without cultural considerations (Pai-Hsing Hsiao, Professor in Department of Architect at Huaan University) (Taipei City Government, 2000b).”*

*“Taipei Dome does not only serve for baseball but welcoming all kinds of sports. According to the proposal, baseball activities are only a quarter of all events annually. Integrating with other*



*activities, it would carry forward the historic site (Bai-Tung Chen, General Manager in Chinese Taipei Baseball Association) (Taipei City Government, 2000b).*

*“The reason why this policy causes such problems to happen here is that the government did not inform the public in advance (Zu-Hua Chiu, Chairman of Institute of Historical Resources Management) (Taipei City Government, 2000b).”*

As the last statement claimed, the unbalanced information between the government and the public is the key question echoed to what Premier Tang requested Taipei City Government to achieve, forcing the city government to rebuild the communication with local residents. This, however, was not even initialed by the city government itself but by the Taipei City Council Members and local residents. On June 15 2000, Yung-Te Chen host the hearing with the slogan—Songsshan Tobacco Factory does not need a domed stadium but the culture—in the Taipei City Council, and he mobilized Li-Hui Chen(陳麗輝), the other KMT member in Taipei City Council, two KMT

congressperson, Ming-Zu Mu(穆閏珠) and Hui-Zu Chin(秦慧珠), Chiefs from fifteen villages surrounding the Songshan Tobacco Factory, and about 200 local residents against this policy(Chan, 2000a). Responding to this opposition, Taipei City Government chose to wait and see.

On July 6 2000, amidst the struggle between development or cultural preservation, the Professor Yu-Chien Hsu invited over 10 congresspersons to participate his tour in Songshan Tobacco Factory, raising their awareness to support the preservation of the Factory; To Wang(王拓), a DPP congressperson, invited government officials from Executive Yuen to host a hearing to discuss the know-how of preserving the Songshan Tobacco Factory(Chou, 2000a). 11 days after, on July 17 2000, the other hearing hosted by DDP Taipei Council Party Caucus invited city government officials, scholars in cultural preservation and experts in art performance, Chief from villages, and other local residents discussed the issues in Songshan Tobacco Factory, claiming the position of the anti-construction coalition to the city government(Chan, 2000b).

Because of the awareness from the intellectuals, the Taipei Dome Project becomes the hot potato for both the Central and Local government. Taipei City government, on the one hand, decided to play the political stunt to intensifying the issues in Songshan Tobacco Factory, creating an opposition between central and local governments. This strategy worked. Premier Tang decided to form an interagency committee, the Taipei Sports Culture Park Committee, for helping Taipei City Government to mediate the problem of building height limitation, historic building, and land ownership(Yang, 2000), thereby developing a sound Taipei Dome Project by BOT model. In addition, he suggested the Taipei Dome Projects should include the element of sport, culture, and the MICE industry, but the Taipei Dome itself should lower its capacity that is no more than 25,000 seats(Li, 2000). On the other hand, the City Government decided to expand the all level communication with the public for their support; except the hearing for each administrative, the government advertised the rationale of building a domed-stadium and the inclusive idea of implementing the sport cultural park in Songshan Tobacco

Factory(Tasi, 2000).

The policy achievement manifested on the public poll made by Research, Development and Evaluation Commission at Executive Yuan, which indicated that 53 percent of dwellers support to build the Taipei Dome at Songshan Tobacco Factory and 72 percent of dwellers support the inclusive ideal of implementing the sport cultural park at Songshan Tobacco Factory, encouraging the Central Government to propose the vision of bidding 2009 Asian Game with Taipei Government(Lin, 2000). The result of the poll, however, was not the approval rate from the local residents. During the third hearing host by Taipei City Government on August 9 2000, the government invited Chief from different villages surrounding the Songshan Tobacco Park. They presented a series of unsatisfaction to this policy implementation:

*“Sport and culture are part of life. It can elevate the quality of life....We hope to collect your opinions to promote this policy, and the city government will respect everyone’s opinion(Department of Education at Taipei City Government)(Taipei City Government,*

2000c).”

*“Songshan Tobacco Factory is a precious space. Here is a lack of cultural elements. We should preserve this space for our children(Lai-Fu Chen, Chief of Gwangju Villiage) (Taipei City Government, 2000c).”*

*“Is this a fixed project? If this policy is already determined [by the city government], its meaningless to attend such meetings at the present time (Hsi-Yung Chang, Dean of students at Municipal Guangfu Elementary School) (Taipei City Government, 2000c).”*

*“I don’t even dare to think about the traffic in the near future. There are activities in the World Trade Center, and it paralyzed the traffic [nearby my neighborhood] (Chun-Fu Yin, Chief of Chengho Villiage) (Taipei City Government, 2000c).”*

*“Today’s hearing, we’ve chiefs from different villages surrounding the factory. The site selection of building the Taipei Dome has been disputed for years. Dwellers in Guangdu support this policy, but*

*those residents living nearby here or Municipal Baseball Stadium are against this policy. Taipei Dome is not merely a stadium for art performance, but also a baseball stadium. During the regular season, it is expected to host many games for consecutive 8 months. This will cause serious traffic problems (Yung-Te Chen, Taipei City Council Member) (Taipei City Government, 2000c).”*

*“The policy of implementing the Taipei Dome has promoted for years. City Government has never ever hosted the policy meeting. It even didn’t include into district policy meeting. [the government] doesn’t care about the people (Tsai-Chiu Li, Chief of ShinJen Village) (Taipei City Government, 2000c).”*

The repeated issues, including the traffic, quality of life, and the damage to the historic site, have come to a cliché when it comes to talking about Taipei Dome Project. Although the local residents relentlessly spoke out their voice against this project. Their voice, apparently, was not that powerful to affect the policy implementation. When the City Government town down Taipei

Municipal Baseball Stadium on November 26 2000, Mayor Ma readdressed his dream of building a domed-stadium for Taipei as well as for Taiwan(Lin, 2000). In January 2001, to meet the guidance from the Executive Yuan, Taipei City Government revised their proposal and renamed it as “Taipei Cultural and Sports Park and Indoor Stadium Revised Proposal, expecting to build up a domed-stadium with 40,000 seats by BOT model. This plan temporarily halted by the designation of Songshan Tobacco Factory as the ninety-ninth historic site in Taipei on May 31 2001(Tsai & Chen, 2001), but it was soon relaunched by the government because of Chinese Taipei Baseball Team had an outstanding performance in 2001 World Baseball Tournament(Yang, 2000a). For years, the fundamental problems of the Songshan Tobacco Factory are the landownership owned by Central Government—if the Taipei City Government acquires those land, it will cost the city government around 25.3 billion NTD—and the 60-meter build height limitation(Yang, 2001). After the official announcement of the designation of offices, tobacco factory, boiler room, and warehouse No.1 to No.5 as historic buildings in Songshan

Tobacco Factory on September 6 2001, the Taipei City Government assigned the HOK Sports to reevaluate the feasibility of the Taipei Dome Project: the result was positive, but the capacity would be from 30,000 to 40,000 seats(Yang, 2001). With this evaluation, Mayor Ma submitted the revised proposal with 40,000 seats to the Executive Yuen on December 27 2001.

The revised plan yet solved the problems identified by the Executive Yuan like the schedule of historic building designation of Songshan Tobacco Factory, building height limitation, financial plan, funding, construction, and operation...etc; the Taipei City Government, therefore, resubmitted the plan and provided two design alternatives, integration of the domed-stadium and the historic buildings and the separation of the two, for meeting the development of culture and sport(United Daily News, 2002). After reviewing both alternatives, the Council for Economic Planning and Development at Executive Yuan approved the revised plan and claimed to disburse 29.2 billion NTD as compensations for expropriation, for obtaining the while area of Songshan Tobacco Factory(Chiu, 2002). Meanwhile, the Executive Yuan



has four demands for Taipei City Government before building the Taipei Dome at Songshan Tobacco Factory: first, the Taipei City Government must overcome the developmental impact on the historic building; second, the development impact on the height of Songshan Airport must be solved; third, the opposition of nearby residents must be contained; fourth, the compensation of land acquisition can be either paid by cash or exchanged by equivalent land(Hsu & Tung, 2002). Suffered the financial difficulties, the Taipei City Government mediated with the Taipei City Council, and with the Council for Economic Planning and Development for surmounting the budget limitation. Although the result was yet clear, the Taipei City Government started to develop both a master plan and a detailed plan for Taipei Cultural and Sports Park and completed the policy meeting at Songshan High School on October 18 2002. According to their calculation, if the construction of the Cultural and Sports Park is fully developed by the city government, it would need 43.393 billion NTD, and if it was carried out by BOT investment, the City Government then only needed to spend the 24.813 billion NTD(Lin,

2000). Finally, on October 26 2002, even though the DDP party caucus attempted to boycott the vote, the Taipei City Council approved the 24.8 budget for Taipei Cultural and Sports Park located at Taipei Tobacco Factory and decided to adopt BOT model to promote and project(Lin, 2000). In addition, the Taipei City Government would exchange 8.2 hectares of Songshan Tobacco Factory and its buildings with A21 land, which is worth around 16 billion in Xinyi District, and with a 2-floor parking lot(Lin, 2000). The remaining insufficient part, around 12.8 billion NTD, would be paid in cash. At the time, Gallup conducted a poll about people's willingness to establish a Cultural and Sports Park, and the result indicated around 80 percent of dwellers support to establish the park.

This complicated policy-making process of Taipei Cultural and Sports Park, here, had come to an end since 1991, advancing this policy onto the stage of selection of BOT tenderer. Regarding the administrative procedure, before the selection of the BOT tenderer, the Taipei City government must confirm the development activity of Taipei Cultural and Sports Park obeying

the regulations of the *Urban Planning Act* and *Environmental Impact Assessment Act*. While the former one regulates the zoning for controlling the development activity in each specific category of urban land use, the latter one is to manage the possible resolution for reducing the impact of the development activity. Because Songshan Tobacco Factory was the site where has been categorized as industrial land since 1937 for serving the industrial purpose, the City Government has to modify its zoning from industrial land to cultural sports district to meet their expected purpose. In this regard, the city government needs approval from the Urban Planning Committee. Furthermore, to build a domed-stadium with 40,000 seats, the scale of development activity must be approved by the Environmental Impact Assessment Committee in advance so that the city government could expect the possible externalities and its resolutions. That is, the foundation regulates the BOT tenderer to obey the regulations made by the government.

For preparing the required document for Urban Planning Committee and Environmental Impact Assessment Committee, the Taipei City Government

entrusted the Development Feasibility Assessment and Preliminary Plan of “Taipei Cultural and Sports Park” to Shao-Yo Hsu’s Architectural Firm on November 28 2002. At the end of 2002, Mayor Ma successfully won the 2002 Taipei Mayor Election within 64 percent of total votes, beginning his second term as Mayor of Taipei. The Taipei Cultural and Sports Park was then approved by Urban Planning ad hoc for the modification of land use from industrial land to cultural and sports district on December 19 2002.

Along with the approval from the Urban Planning ad hoc, the 507<sup>th</sup> Urban Planning Committee approved the master plan of Taipei Cultural and Sports Park, proposing an alternative of the financial plan for the Taipei City Government to self-help construction if the tender of BOT failed in near future(Chen, 2003). In this regard, Taipei City Government was zealous to host hearing with professions so as to absorb vagarious ideas from the public as well as to dispel the concerns from the public. The first hearing was for Scholars who majored in Physical Education. In terms of the general direction of the hearing, the scholars suggested adopting consumer-oriented thinking

for both tender and operation(Niu, 2003). The second hearing was for professions in art performance. While some experts indicated the high rental prices could cause the demand to decrease, the other addressed that once the operator meticulously provides a user-friendly environment so that this space would be helpful for the Art industry(Yang, 2003). For solving the long-term concern about the traffic, the Department of Transportation at Taipei City Government proposed three alternatives: maintain the current situation, set up pedestrian-only phases, and adding footbridge(Chou, 2003). It was not that difficult to observe that Mayor Ma paced up the project implementation as he set up the timeline to complete this project in three-year from September 2004. In order to stick with this tight schedule, the City government decided to begin the BOT tender at the end of 2003(Niu, 2003a).

The pace of promoting the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park became faster after the 28<sup>th</sup> Environmental Impact Assessment Meeting at Taipei City Government, and 564<sup>th</sup> Urban Planning Committee at Ministry of Interior approved the master plan of the park. Although both committees raised

similar concerns— the rationale of implementing large-scale building in downtown Taipei, the strategies of traffic, the unsolved building height limitation— to Taipei City Government, the city government proposed a sound response and promised to meet all the conditions requested by the committees. It was hard to give all the credit to Taipei City Government. In point of fact, when President Chen made a statement support the Taipei Dome, and the Executive Yuan included the Taipei Cultural Sports Park as a major public construction project, the central government had assisted the city government in acquiring not only the ownership of Songshan Tobacco Factory from National Property Administration at Ministry of Finance but also negotiate the possibility for losing the building height limitation from 60-meter to 85-meter with Civil Aeronautics Administration. The latter one was finally approved on February 13 2004.

After the Haigo Shen International Engineering Consultants, the contractor of Taipei City Government for preparing the BOT tender documents, completed the preparation, the first Taipei Cultural and Sports

Park(Taipei Dome Complex) Investment Briefings on November 3 2003 successfully drew the attention from Conglomerate like Uni-Group, Farglory Group, Far Eastern Group...etc(Yang, 2000). On December 30 2003, the race of the tender for Taipei Dome Complex began. The City Government expected to decide the preferable tender by May 2004, to sign the 50-year BOT contract with the tender by the end of 2004, to begin the construction in 2005, to complete the construction in 2007, and to operate in 2008(Yang, 2000a).

Until April 30 2004, the deadline of proposal submission, only one group, the Taipei Dome Enterprises' Alliance formed by Farglory Group, Takenaka Construction Company, and Pen-Sen Liu's Architectural firm, submitted the proposal, and later was selected as the preferable tender in the Second selection committee on May 17 2004(Lu, 2015). About the decision-making from the Second selection committee, although one committee member confirmed there were many ambiguous answers during the QA section resulting from the influence of grading the tender, Shu-Te Li(李述德)

reminds that:

“According to the Tender Announcement, our duty is to select the preferable tender in this meeting. There will have other committees to negotiate the contract with Farglory Group...(Li Shu-Te, Commissioner in Department of Finance at Taipei City Government)(Transcript of second Selection Committee, 2004)”

Within his remind, the Taipei Dome Enterprises' Alliance became the preferable tender with an average score of 201.64 on May 17, 2004. The Taipei City Government, then, holds thirteen official meetings for reaching a preferable BOT contract with Farglory Group from June 17, 2004, to September 30, 2004(see table 1) (Clean Government Committee, 2015). Through this negotiation process, it represents the will of the Taipei City Government to carry out this policy implementation with the Farglory Group; even the Mayor Ma came forward to reach an oral agreement with CEO Chao on September 20, 2004 and made the BOT contract favors the Farglory Group on September 30, 2004. While the Taipei Dome Enterprises' Alliance



seemingly took the advantage from the government, this alliance, however, tore apart because of the unknown internal conflict of interest with Pei-San Liu's Architectural firm:

“In the beginning, the Farglory Group grouped with Liu's firm for this case and became the preferable tender, but there were some conflicts between two companies. To be frank, I cannot state it clearly because it might only relate to both CEO of the companies, Mr. Chao and Mr. Liu, respectively(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

Although this was identified as the Rashomon in the tender process, it forced the Farglory Group to regroup its tender alliance based on the regulation of the tender with the Taipei City Government:

“After the Farglory Group split up, we had to find another partner who is much better than the original one for meeting the conduct of the tender process because the government was willing to carry out the process with us. In this regard, both Populous and Obayashi

construction teamed up with us at the time(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

For solving this regrouping issue, the Shu-Te Li and other selection committees set up the agenda to clarify the internal conflicts for carrying out the policy implementation in the Fourth selection committee on November 25 2004, and to request required documents for proving that the new alliance, with Populous and Obayashi construction, is better than the original one in the Fifth selection committee on January 31 2005(Clean Government Committee, 2015). Later, although the decision-making in the Seventh selection committee was to disqualify the Farglory Group as the preferable tender and to redo the tender on July 5 2005, the Eighth selection committee overrode the conclusion and approved the acknowledged the Populous and the Obayashi Construction as the new partners with Farglory Group on June 19 2006(Clean Government Committee, 2015). Finally, the Taipei City Government and signed the BOT contract with Farglory Group on October 3 2006(Taipei City Government, n.d).

After completion of the BOT agreement, in the 1<sup>st</sup> policy meeting at Municipal in Bo-I Elementary School on November 17 2006, Taipei City Government and Farglory Group received critiques and doubts from local residents, experts and scholars, environmental groups, and Taipei City Council Members(Yang, 2006). They kept questioned the resolution to the impact on traffic, the impact on the quality of life, but the government maintained their cliché statement to promise they will consider all the opinions in this meeting(Yang, 2006).

From 1998 to 2006, Mayor Ma's Taipei City Government demonstrated the determination to promote the project of Taipei Dome at any cost. As this study has discussed earlier, this tough attitude frustrated the opposing groups, even they had exhibited their opposition to this policy. The will of the Mayor Ma, apparently, drew the voters' attention except those who live surrounded the Songshan Tobacco Factory. As a result, supporting groups had never ever considered any concerns from local residents, thereby forming a fundamental gap between the supporting groups and the opposing groups and increasing

the conflicts for Mayor Ma's successor—Mayor Hau, the other KMT politician.

#### 4.2.2. Decision-making Process(2006~2010)

Despite repeating the unresolved dispute in the Taipei Dome Complex between supporting and opposing groups, the first term of Mayor Hau offers the experience of how the opposing groups systematically reorganize their alliance and strategically conveyed their demands to the public, although they were relatively powerless(see Figure 15).




Figure 15. Decision-Making Process of Taipei Dome Complex(2006~2010)

Source: developed for this study

That is the effectiveness of policy-oriented learning to those participants standing with the anti-construction coalition. This reflects on how the opposing group participates both Urban Design Committee and the Environmental Impact Assessment Committee. In this regard, it is necessary to comprehend the context of the establishment of the anti-construction alliance and how it affects the implementation of the Taipei Dome Complex.

After the long-term ignorance from the policy-making and the affection of the chaotic tender process, local residents determined themselves against the Taipei Dome policy by conveying their voice in every public occasion related to the Taipei Dome Policy meeting rather than being mobilized by specific interests' groups. Within this consideration, comparing with the opposing groups in Mayor Ma's first term from 1998 to 2002, Mayor Hau faced more harsh challenges because the doubts and the distrust made the local residents organize as a solid group against this policy as UCSCE15 stated:

“[In 2000], the policy meetings were for Chief of the village, some retailer-owners, and some scholars interested in historic buildings. We, as local residents, would not know such a meeting. Of course, back to the time, not many local people were interested in this case or other like green space preservation. We didn’t have an active attitude to concern such issues because we were used to obeying what the government told us to do instead of doing self-reflection on what kind of living environment we need (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

It was the reflection of his living environment leading the UCSCE15 began to concern this issue, but what inspired UCSCE15 to become an anti-construction activist was because of the environmental groups—Wild at Heart Legal Defense Association(WHLDA) in Taiwan:

“In 2006, I participated a tour that introduces major environmental issues in each city. I participated in Taipei's. When we took a rest at 228 Memorial Park, Professor Ding-Mao Chung(鐘丁茂) said,

'people living in Taipei are stupid. Why are you making such precious land an urban jungle?' The land he mentioned is the Taipei Dome Project. Suddenly, I was shocked. When we lived nearby Municipal Guangfu Elementary School, we knew there would build up a domed-stadium. At that time, I was thinking to transplant those trees [in the Songshan Tobacco Factory] to our school....I thought that 'yeah. Why can't we leave that piece of land, and the trees don't need to be transplanted. Is it better to stay there and to be a park?" From that day, I really wanted to know what really happened here. Therefore, I looked at the WHLDA for help because I was a member of WHLDA. ...I asked the WHLDA about where I could get the information about the Taipei Dome. They, then, referred me to the Green Party—Han-Sheng Pan(潘翰聲) (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

Since then, UCSCE15 and Han-Sheng Pan began to convey their demand—the pro-Songshan Park Alliance—in every Taipei Dome policy

meeting:

“On November 17, 2006, that was my first time attending the Taipei Dome policy meeting with Han-Sheng Pan(潘翰聲)⋯.Before that, we, the local residents, did not know this development activity. We only knew there would build up a domed-stadium and sport park. (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

It is because the participation of the policy meeting, UCSCE15 felt shocked about the truth of what would happen nearby UCSCE15's neighborhood in the near future. To stop this, UCSCE15 decided to oppose this project at any cost:

“When I participated in the policy meeting on November 17, 2006, for the first time, I saw their model that is quite similar to nowadays. There does not have green space. Besides the Taipei Dome, there is a department store, theatre, hotel [nearby the dome]. They look like that since I have seen it for the first time. At the moment, I determined myself against the Taipei Dome Project. Since then, I



officially participated in this anti-construction movement.

*(UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020). ”*

To stop the construction of Taipei Dome, their methodology was not only depending upon their sense of environmental justice, but relying on building social networking among other opposing groups:

“When we began to protest, Jing-Hua Chen(陳金花), [Chief of Huasheng Village], allowed us to use his office to have our own meeting. Then, that place becomes a space for the meeting. Sometimes, we would put some fliers, flags, and other protest-related stuff there. She also participates in every policy meeting. In addition, she will hand those documents related to the meetings to us because we can only take those handouts in the venue. At the time, there was no such thing as an online announcement as well as online digitalize documents. It was just a soft-copied document to the chief of the village. Once she got the announcement, she would share with us. *(UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3,*

2020).

Indeed, the low accessibility of the source of data impeded civic participation as if those chiefs and local residents had suffered during that 8-year under Mayor Ma's control. Instead of relying on one source, UCSCE15 and Han-Sheng Pan looked for city council members for help to access those data:

“Including UCSCE07, others like I-Hua Lin(林奕華), and Wen-Ing Li(李文英) are willing to help us to access those data. In fact, many City Council Members are willing to do it, and they will not use those data to leverage their media exposure. Instead, they seldom talked about it in public (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

Within this powerful alliance, although the UCSCE15 and Han-Sheng Pan could use those data for enriching their discourses on conveying their demand, UCSCE15 mentioned about one precaution while using this source:

“We would access various sources of data from different City

Council Members so that they would not know for which I am looking. So, those council members who are willing to help would be requested to access only part of the data, respectively. Until the data are ready, we will integrate those data as one. (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

Through this process, UCSCE15 has learned not merely to cooperate with other opposing groups, but also realized the risk of putting all your eggs in one basket. This interviewee demonstrates a highly political sense of collecting specific information so as to achieve his purpose. Indeed, their approach was quite practical and strategic, although the opposing groups were relatively powerless. This, however, becomes their weakness if they attempted to address their demand on a specific occasion. For instance, during the 3<sup>rd</sup> policy meeting in Municipal GuanFu Elementary School, residents doubted the economic feasibility of the Taipei Dome Project, requesting Mayor Hau to host a meeting for residents (Yang, 2007). But, when he heard about the protest during the meeting, he would merely make an official

statement like “we will get to know what truly happened, but we believed this policy had been fully examined and assessed [by the former government] (Yang, 2007a).” This ambiguous attitude toward the opposing groups looks neutral, but it implies what has done cannot be undone. The other example is during the 4<sup>th</sup> policy meeting at Songshan High School. When Tsai-Chiu Li, Chief of ShinJen Villiage, provided a resolution to solve the possible traffic problems in lane 553—an 8-meter alley where is the only entrance for ShinJen Village—by building a new viaduct from Civic Boulevard to Yixian Road(Yang & Lin, 2007). The officials, however, did not accept it.

Both cases indicated the government's attitude toward public opinions is the key pillars to affect this policy implementation. For grouping more alliances to maintain their faith in this movement, Han-Sheng Pan was eager to file the referendum for impeding the Taipei Dome Project since it needs approval from the Urban Design Committee and Environmental Impact Assessment Committee(Yang & Lin, 2007). That is to say, except forming the civic force against the policy implementation, the city council member that

could supervise the policy implementation is a vital force as UCSCE07 stated:

“Within the authority of being a City Council Member, we have the chance to balance the power [of decision-making from the government and the review committee] through studying the massive volume of structured and unstructured data (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

It indicated that the power balance from the government supervisor is such a chance that it could not be possibly achieved. Responding to what UCSCE15 stated earlier about the multi-sources approach, the circumstance of data access for each city council member could be different. It could depend upon your background, party, political inclination, and social network in the city government. The mechanism of government supervision, thus, is such an intriguing process that it could determine whether they could obtain the valid information from the government as they expected:

“It is because the government apparatus is much bigger than we could imagine. It causes the government supervision to use written

question, or to question different departments in the city council, or to establish a committee to do such a supervision.... It highly relates to the government attitude, higher officials I mean. They can decide the level of information disclosure, the speed of information provided. Of course, it relates to whether his response is an acute one or ambiguous one while being questioned by the City Council Members (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

UCSCE07 provided a clear picture of how a City Council Member supervises the government. It addressed the effectiveness of government supervision depends upon the government attitude, although it is how the government supervision works under normal status. For BOT cases like Taipei Dome Project, he addressed some concerns in supervising such a large scale of BOT project:

“Simply put, the reason why I mentioned the government attitude and mayor’s attitude is because both decide the result of carrying

out the policy....Let's assume that they want to carry out this BOT project. Because of its public-private-partnership, the government has 2 characters: partner and supervisor. When the government chooses to be the partner so that they will carry out that project, so, the government would use its executive power and its review committee to implement this BOT project. I am not sure whether it is a professional judgment. I have to put a question mark here. At that time, every committee's decision-making could end this case, or the case would be stopped by the decision. So, how do we make such decision-making to decide whether to implement the policy? This is what I was trying to communicate with Hao's City Government. The most important thing was to suggest them rethink this project to reflect if this project could be implemented in terms of policy perspective (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020)."

Following on UCSCE07's perspective, the policy-making and policy-

implementing are two different paradigms because both relate to a different stage of policy-making. Especially in the first term of Mayor Hau, the City Government just signed the BOT contract with Farglory Group. Either the design of the Taipei Dome or the environmental impact assessment had yet approved by review committees. It should have chances to rethink the feasibility of the project or the way to implement the project based on the sociopolitical context back to the time. Hao's government firmly stood with the position to carry out this BOT project, as UCSCE07 stated:

“...For Hao's government, their attitude toward Taipei Dome Project was like an established policy. So, when I recalled my memories about the decision-making process, their way was relatively tougher (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

As an established policy, the Taipei Dome has carried out the dream of Taiwan Baseball. In the level of policy-making, the Taipei Dome can be the growth machine of Taiwan baseball, leading it toward a bright and better



future. When it comes to the policy-implementation, UCSCE07 recognized there did not make any supporting measures to exploit the advantage of building a domed-stadium completely:

“The most common term is about the prerequisite of hosting the international convention and exhibition. It is probably the cliché around the world. Because I want to host sports mega-events or exhibitions, I need to build up a stadium. That is what we always heard about(UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

In other words, while looking for help from the higher officials is a deadlock, conveying the voice of civic groups in a specific decision-making committee is the only chance to stop it. The design change of the Taipei Dome, however, became the last hope for the public group to claim that the Taipei Dome Complex is such nonsense policy-implantation. As Chun-Fu Yin, Chief of Chengho Village, stated:

*“Residents concern those impacts made by Taipei Dome Project*

*on traffic and noise toward our community. According to the implementer's blueprint, they increase the building height from 55-meter to sixty two-meter, adding more than 6611.6m<sup>2</sup> floor area. They even design the office building, hotel, and department store in this park. If this policy is merely for promoting sports, we would not say a word. But, if this policy only serves a specific purpose for the implementer in the name of sport, it will sacrifice the rights of residents(Lin, 2007)."*

The satisfaction of the residents kept causing conflict at the policy meeting. As the First Environmental Impact Assessment Meeting on May 22 2007, the residents refused to agree with the plan and turned to protest in front of the Taipei City Hall for urging the Department of Environmental Protection to review this case on May 25 2007 strictly(Yang, 2007b). These anti-construction movements relentless happened during the first term of Mayor Hau because they believed the social justice is the way to get even. On the other hand, UCSCE11 stated about the communication with the anti-

construction coalition led by UCSCE15:

“I respect UCSCE15, but UCSCE15’s problem is too paranoid about communicating. In other words, both sides are playing a zero-sum game that would have no rooms to compromise. If there were any possibility of negotiating the rearrangement [of the design], we would like to do it. But, UCSCE15 did want to compromise. From UCSCE15’s perspective, you should not build it for any reason. In such zero-sum circumstance, there was nothing we could discuss (UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

That is to say, even the Farglory Group hosted more than 10 policy meetings with residents, including the anti-construction coalition, there was still a huge gap between both sides. Although the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park has been approved on August 15 2003, within the design change of the Taipei Dome caused severe conflict between both sides, on June 25 2007, the Farglory Group submitted to redo the Environmental Impact Assessment based on Article 38 in the Environmental Impact Enforcement Rules:

*“Those developers that modify the contents of an original application and for whom one of the following circumstances applies shall reconduct an environmental impact assessment for the parts of the application that are to be modified.*

*I. Those circumstances in which planned production capacity or scale is expanded, or a roadway is extended, by ten percent or more*

*II. Those circumstances in which the modification of land use involves an existing protection area, greenbelt buffer zone, or other area for which human development is prone to cause severe change to or destruction of the environment.*

*III. Those circumstances in which the handling capacity or efficiency of an environmental facility is reduced*

*IV. Those circumstances in which there is concern of an increase of impact on the living, natural or social environment or protected objects within the scope of impact due to the modification of the plan*

*V. Those circumstances in which modifications are adverse to the maintenance of environmental quality*

*VI. Other circumstances determined by the competent authority*

*Those circumstances in Subparagraph 1 or Subparagraph 2 in the foregoing paragraph that receive the authorization of the competent authority and industry competent authority shall not be subject to this restriction.*

*For those circumstances in which there is an expansion of scope or expansion of construction after a development activity is completed and permission to operate is obtained, an environmental impact assessment shall still be conducted pursuant to Article 5 of this Act.*

*(Environmental Impact Assessment Enforcement Rules , 2018).”*

Both pro-construction and anti-construction coalition, thus, officially engaged in the review committees, fighting for their benefit. And the premise of the zero-sum game has reminded us that both coalitions would not compromise during these review committees; instead of that, both sides

would attempt to prove they are right at no cost. In this circumstance, the agenda of the meeting in each review committee would affect the final decision-making. Put simply, from 2006 to 2010, and there were 3 Environmental Impact Assessment Committee Meetings and 8 Urban Design Committee meetings to review the Taipei Dome Complex. Unfortunately, 5 out of 8 Urban Design Committee meetings did not release its minutes on the internet. Still, their focuses were mainly similar to the EIA committee meetings on the scale of the building mass, the improper traffic plan, and the inappropriate transplanting of trees in Songshan Tobacco Park. We, here, will mainly summarize the progress of EIA committee meetings and one key meeting in the Urban Design Committee.

During the 65<sup>th</sup> EIA Committee Meeting on January 28 2008, anti-construction groups doubted the content of development activity proposed by Farglory Group:

“In this proposal, 26 percent of the total floor area is the Taipei Dome, while the rest of the 74 percent of the total floor area is

commercial facilities. This not the main purpose of this development activity....There is a hotel whose height is 170 meters, but there are no further explanations about it (Han-Sheng Pan, Anti-construction coalition) (Taipei City Government, 2008).”

“Table 6 in appendix 3 from this proposal, it mentioned about the questionnaire of the poll. We recommended redoing this poll because it is invalid. From my written opinions has addressed this pool does not follow the conduct (Yi, You, Anti-construction coalition)( Taipei City Government, 2008).”

“I doubt the simulation of evacuation plan in this proposal (Chin-Hua, Chen, Chief of Huasheng Villiage)( Taipei City Government, 2008).

“...I have lived in ShinJen Village for 60-year. In terms of the poll, I cannot say all of us are against this project. As far as I know, however, there is at least 85 percent of the residents against this project...(Tasi-Chiu Li, Chief of ShinJen Village)( Taipei City

Government, 2008).

Although other concerns included the quality of air and the impact on students who study in Municipal Guangfu Elementary School, the statements were suggesting the committee to rethink the rationale of this proposal. On the other side, the pro-construction coalition simply addressed:

“About the building with 170 meters high, it is unfixed. We would follow the regulations of the building height limitation.... We do care about the student in Guangfu Elementary School...(Teng-Hsiung Chao, CEO of Farglory Group) (Taipei City Government, 2008).”

Not surprisingly, the EIA committee decided to go for a retrial after revising the proposal—including the attribution of the 170-meter high hotel, the traffic plan, the comparison between the 2003 EIA report and the 2007 EIA report—and redoing the poll(Taipei City Government, 2008).

When it came to the 81<sup>st</sup> EIA Committee Meeting on April 17, 2009, the anti-coalition not only maintained their strategies to those unreasonable parts



in the EIA report. It also raised some key questions to doubt the building bulk listed in the BOT contract related to the rationale of the total floor area that could be designed in this project:

“Last time, the EIA report listed the total floor area of the Cultural and Sports Park is 360,893 square meters. Then, the tender announcement stated the [limitation of] total floor area is 317,355 square meters. At the time, it did meet the requirement of EIA. After the tender, however, how to calculate the building bulk in this case.... so that it can turn into around 590,000 square meters [of total floor area] (Yi, You, Anti-construction coalition)(Taipei City Government, 2009).”

This design change was announced on August 24 2009, when the Farglory Group host the Environmental Impact Assessment Meeting at Municipal Chunglun High School. Farglory Group said it would increase the floor area of hotels, department stores, or office premises by nearly 127,000 square meters, and the stadium and ancillary facilities will increase by more

than 42,000 square meters (Chiu, 2008). To be more specific, the anti-construction coalition grouped with environmental lawyers to initiate the battle in the court:

“Yesterday, I represented the relevant groups and went to Taipei High Administrative Court to file a civil lawsuit following the Environmental Impact Assessment Act. I mainly confirmed that the 1992 environmental impact assessment review conclusion was invalid (San-Chia, Lin, Environmental Lawyer) (Taipei City Government, 2009).”

Civic groups were focusing on those possible illegal matters to spread out their opinions about how serious this is in the Taipei Dome Project. At the end of 81<sup>st</sup> EIA Committee Meeting, the committee suggested to do a retrial after reassessing the traffic plan, the arrangement of the parking lot, the fire safety design, emergency plan for transplanting the trees, the capacity of sanitary equipment...etc, and the committee requested to submit the information related to the BOT tender process as a reference (Taipei City

Government, 2009). About why the committee member asked the BOT related documents, UCSCE02, who participated in the 81<sup>st</sup> EIA Committee Meeting, addressed:

“I raised this issue during the meeting. If there have such dramatical differences [in the definition of total floor area], I want to check those official documents. In my opinion, I do not think any government officials can make this decision. It needs someone to confirm, doesn't it? Who made the order and the decision? The government should provide those documents to us. There are 2 things in my mind. First, [as an EIA committee member], I concern about justice. Second, if someone cheated during the entry test, no matter how good he is, he does not deserve to stay here (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

The anti-construction coalition drew the attention of the committee members to sanction those documents during the tender process between Taipei City Government and the Farglory Group. From their perspective, if

the tender process has the possibility of lining moguls' pockets by offering 2 different definitions on building bulk, the Farglory Group should not be the preferable tender. It should submit their EIA report to this committee. The member of the anti-construction coalition found these loopholes during participating in these meetings from the BOT contract, and it then became the source of the statement for Control Yuan, the supreme supervision institute in Taiwan, for correcting the Taipei BOT contract. UCSCE15, here, was the one who wrote this statement:

“When I found these problems [in the BOT contract], I consulted some lawyers. They said it would not be the case. But I did not give up. I used my way, which was learned from UCSCE06 when we were working for the lawsuit, to present those pragmatic parts attached with the evidence (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

It is worth to note that the reasons for UCSCE15 to submit the statement up to the Control Yuan as an alternative instead of reporting it to the anti-

coalition.:

“Because...no one wants to stand in front of us, whether it is a City Council Member or a Congressperson. No one wants to seriously check how ridiculous this project is (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

The action of UCSCE15 demonstrates how the anti-construction coalition distrusts the government and the review system to this case. The long-term ignorance of the public, as well as the lack of supplements for building the Taipei Dome Complex, urged civic to look for any alternatives for stopping this case. Although the anti-construction coalition has established a seeming alliance to stop the Taipei Dome Complex, this raises another issue in the anti-coalition because they were too naïve to play political stunt:

“In the earlier stage, Han-Sheng Pan was the leader because none of us knew about the boundaries between politics and social movement. If he hosts a press conference, we just follow without a

word. At the time, it worked well. We took the lead in this issue....but only one thing we had never expected was the negative impact raised by Han-Sheng Pan, a candidate of the 2008 congressperson election...Later, we realized a member of us attempted to participate in not only the congressperson election but also the city council member election while participating in this social movement. Other current council members and congresspersons, thus, do not want to involve in this issue. So, in Songshan and Xinyi District, as we have known, none of the city council members put their efforts into this issue. Few of them host the press conference for media exposure, but they did not question those departments in the city council(UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

The internal conflict reflects the mechanism of Taiwan politics relating to constituency and apportionment. If the issue could raise media exposure for politicians to obtain more potential votes in the next election, they would

team up with the civic group. In this highly politicized case, however, Han-Sheng Pan harvested the spotlight from the mass media, accumulating his political capital. His action affected how those legislators supervise this case in the City Council as well as choose alliance to benefit their political interest. Under this political reality, not every City Council Members were willing to help the anti-construction coalition because it might risk their political career to improve their potential opponents:

“Few City Council Members are close to us. They told me that  
“Honestly, Han-Sheng Pan always wants to compete with us. If I  
help you guys, it will only cripple my political life because he will  
take all the credit away. If so, he might become the next City  
Council Member, and I would fail the election.”(UCSCE15,  
personal communication, February 3, 2020). ”

As stated above, scaring the failure of election, politicians are worried about increasing their rivals' media exposure so that they may attract more attention from the constituencies. UCSCE07 confirmed this perspective:

“Of course, for the City Council Members who are in the same apportionment, they might not put much effort on this issue because it might benefit their rivals, and they might not question this topic that often in the city council because it might improve your rivals’ political reputation(UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

“Except for the City Council Members or the legislators, even the residents are very sensitive to what Han-Sheng pan did. They thought this social movement is only for those who want to have media exposure so as to participate in the election instead of fighting for a park....There are thousands of people living but less than a thousand participating in this movement. It is because they do not like the politics or because the residents here are the supporter of KMT. They do not want us to criticize Mayor Ma to follow our step against him. Anyway, there might have lots of reasons to explain why people here do not participate in our social



movement(UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

Rather than trapping in the deadlock of the political reality, UCSCE15 was so determined to submit the statement to Control Yuan in July 2008 as a means to pinpoint the problems of the Taipei Dome Complex. For maintaining the coalition with a few city council members as well as the residents, the anti-construction coalition members tried to persuade Han-Sheng Pan not to participate in the election while fighting against the Taipei Dome. Notably, they were taking the lead during the EIA Committee Meeting for the second time. five months after, on September 10 2009, the Control Yuan officially corrected thirty-nine faults in the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park BOT Contract:

“During [the first term] of Mayor Hau, the Control Yuan corrected Taipei Dome because the BOT contract is partial to the Farglory Group (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

“When the Control Yuan corrected the Taipei Dome. It was

September 2009. Mayor Hau decided to halt the project, to review it, and to renegotiate the BOT contract(UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

Hwang-Shiung Huang, Members of Control Yuan, indicated, “At the time of the planning of the Taipei Dome, the central and local government were different parties. Now that the central government and the city government are in power with the same party. The municipal government should review this case(Li & Chien, 2009).”Under the influence of the correction from the Control Yuan, the committee members in Fifth Urban Design Committee Meeting on May 15 requested the Farglory Group to reduce its total floor ratio of domed-stadium to other commercial buildings(Chien, 2010). Furthermore, The anti-construction coalition released a poll with 2923 samples from the parents whose children studying in Municipal Guangfu Elementary School: 28 percent of the total parent accept the combination of Taipei Dome and Park, 60 percent of them take the only park, and only 4 percent of them accept the combination of Taipei Dome

and commercial buildings(Chien, 2010).

Later, EIA Committee Meeting on June 28 2010 rejected the Taipei Dome Project with 2 reasons—large building mass and unsolved traffic problems—and asked the Farglory Group to propose other alternatives to reduce the building mass:

“It is difficult for us to consider the disputes of the building mass alone. If the review is based on the proposal submitted by the implementer in August 2009, once the ultimate plan review conclusion is different, this review conclusion will be meaningless. So, this case is not suitable for consent(Ping-Du Li, Commissioner of Environmental Impact Assessment Committee) (Taipei City Government, 2010).”

As Ping-Du Li addressed, this inconsistent number in the building mass is such an essential factor in assessing the scope of impact in this developmental activity. In this regard, as a committee member at the time, the UCSCE02 make a supplement to Li’s point of view:

“Why were we against this case? Or even rejected it instead of approving it? There were several reasons. The most important thing is the building scale is too large. We wanted them to revise, but they refused. So, we thought no need to keep reviewing it. [Second], even they reduce 30 percent of the total building mass, the problems remain there. Again, they refused to revise. That’s it (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

It could extrapolate the large building mass of the Taipei Dome Complex caused all of the problems, such as impacts on traffic, evacuation, and the public safety issues, and the attitude of the implementer refused to revise it. Similar concerns about the traffic problems caused by the large building mass have been discussed during the Urban Design Committee Meeting as well. For instance, on January 24 2008, the Urban Design Committee suggested revise the traffic and the evacuation plan and reviewing the impact of large building mass on the surroundings(Taipei City Government, 2008a). And on February 5 2009, the Second Urban Design Committee recommended

reviewing the space for evacuation at the ground level because it has been occupied by commercial buildings(Taipei City Government, 2009a). The reason why both committee members mentioned about the dispute of the building mass is that all the conflicts come from one of the corrections to the BOT contract from Control Yuan is the vague definition of building bulk:

“During the tender process, you should treat them equally instead of being partial to the specific tenderer. But the contract did not clearly state the total floor area as well as the royalties (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

In UCSCE02’s point of view, the niche point of the Taipei Dome Complex’s EIA review committee has been wrong because of the ambiguous definition of building bulk. Although the definition of building bulk is the other Rashomon in the Taipei Dome Complex, the UCSCE02 speculated the purpose of making such completely different definition is because:

“The reason why they set up this ambiguous definition of building bulk is that they do not want those unlike-minded companies to be

tenderers. If they are trying to be the tenders, they can use something to make you unprofitable and even lose money. However, if it is a like-minded company, they can reduce the royalties, or even completely waive it. Then, they can maximize your total floor area [for the preferable tender] (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020)."

From UCSCE02's speculation, this so-called "Bid Rigging" is how the Taipei City Government picked the favorable tender in 2004. This concern is also raised by UCSCE06:

"I think the definition of building bulk in the tender process [is quite weird]. Anyone would know the official definition of building bulk includes those affiliated facilities. However, the Farglory Group distorted it. In my opinion, this is a typical technic of "Bid Rigging". It made some potential tenders give up this case because the net profit is not significant. Only those tenders who knew the truth would expect to have another explanation to the building bulk(UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020)."

Either this suspicion in the tender process or the result of the correction does not affect the professional judgment in the EIA Committee Meeting. Instead of it, it is more related to what UCSCE02 cares the most—the social justice as the bottom line in the review standard:

“First, I think Taiwan should have a domed-stadium, but is it appropriate to put it in downtown? Then, in case you have already done it. Is it legal? That is the bottom line, isn’t it? Does this meet the social justice, fairness, and transparency? These are what you have to do during the tender process (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).

It is clear that UCSCE02 renders the EIA as a tool to achieve social justice and that UCSCE02 recognizes some problems in the tender process, which makes the Farglory Group become a suspect. Responding to this kind of doubt, UCSCE11 doubted whether the review committee could override the decision of site-selection or of the preferable tender made by the Taipei City Government:

“Is it appropriate for Taipei Dome to be here? Frankly, this is not the responsibility of the developer. It is the responsibility of the government. When the government claimed that here is the optimal place to build the Taipei Dome Complex and starts the tender, We, then, participated in the tender. Now, during the review, many committee members still keep questioning about the location of the domed-stadium. That is meaningless to us. The other thing is the total floor area of the commercial area is larger than the domed-stadium. That is the same circumstance because that is caused by what the government has designed on the BOT contract. (UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

Even though this matter is the responsibility of the government to revisit the rationale of implementing such large size domed-stadium in downtown Taipei, it is also an indisputable fact that the design of the developer puts pressure on the surroundings. Based on the UCSCE02’s experience, the result of fielding research of the Taipei Dome made him confused:



“In fact, when I was a Commissioner in the EIA committee, in addition to reading the written opinions, I will listen to all the parties, including local residents and environmental groups. Also, we have fielding research section. There is a small [553] lane next to Taipei Dome Complex. Think about it yourself. If you develop such a huge building mass, there must be tens of thousands of people ran out. Besides, what about other buildings like malls and business offices, ...etc. It would be more people there. We suggested to let out a lane form the Taipei Dome Complex, widen the [553] lane. But, since the very beginning, their attitude was really tough. [In my opinion], the development activity should be environmentally friendly (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

Because of the environmental friendliness, he believes that the impact of development on the surroundings should be carefully considered. This echoed to what UCSCE02 truly concerned about the impact from the case on

the surroundings:

“Through this process, have you taken into account the safety of the students of Guangfu Elementary School, or the residents of Lane 553, the MRT of the Bannan Line, or the residents of Guangfu South Road during your implementation? Even their daily life will be affected (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

Based on UCSCE02’s experience, the commissioners in the EIA committee obtains relative power to leverage with the government. This relative power, notwithstanding, a solid existence in the decision-making system. Throughout the process of the Taipei Dome Complex in Hau’s 1<sup>st</sup> term, the external event, correction from the Control Yuan triggered by the internal conflicts among civic groups and the political reality in Taiwan, conveyed a solid basis to the EIA committee member for restating the attribution of the Taipei Dome Complex as a pragmatic case. Within this social circumstance, the actions from the civic groups evoked critics from the

public. They successfully turned the internal conflicts into a weapon to utilize the weakness of the politician—the votes from the constituencies—for leveraging the power of the decision-making in the public sector. These external events of the correction successfully affected the government apparatus, leaving a silver lining to the opposing group. Simply put, during the First term of Mayor Hau, the opposing groups established a flexible but diverse anti-construction coalition to strategically convey their demand, for achieving their purpose by halting the case and forcing the government to build a real park in the community.

#### 4.2.3. Decision-making Process(2010~2014)

Although the opposing group took the lead in this issue in 2009, the Second term of Mayor Hau, however, regained the dominance to implement the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park in the review committee because Mayor Hau and Farglory Group had reached the consensus to reduce 18 percent of the total floor area of commercial space in Taipei Cultural and Sports Park

from 590,100 m<sup>2</sup> in June 2010 to 492,764 m<sup>2</sup> in May 2011(Wu & Chen, 2015) (see Appendix IV).

This compromise helped the implementer to first obtain the conditional approval in the 296<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee on December 9, 2010(Taipei City Government, 2010a), which was twelve days after Mayor Hau won the 2010 Mayor election. The implementer, then, got approved with conditions in the 107<sup>th</sup> EIA Committee Meeting on May 26, 2011. The summary presented as Figure 16 addressed the details in this timespan.




Figure 16. Decision-Making Process of Taipei Dome Complex(2010~2014)

Source: developed for this study

Later, the implementer got the building permit on June 30, 2011, and stated the construction on November 11, 2011, after submitting the Loan Commitments to the city government two days before the beginning of construction. In this dramatical progress, the UCSCE11 stated that:

“After he won his 2<sup>nd</sup> term in 2010, he had been impeded for another four or five years before we were allowed to build.

Moreover, the key to success is related to the Universiade.

(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

Before Taipei was preparing for bidding the 2017 Universiade in 2011, Mayor Hau attempted to bid the 2019 Asian Games. Because the date of the announcement of the bid and the time of the 2010 Mayor Election is not far apart, bidding for 2019 Asian Games is also listed as one of Mayor Hau’s political views for the second term. Within the experience of hosting the 2009 Summer Deaflympics and 2010 Taipei International Flora Exposition, Mayor Hau had the confidence to work with New Taipei City build various hardware and software facilities, including 6 sports parks, with planned funding of up

to 50 billion(Wang, 2010). Taipei Dome, of course, was the landmark in the bidding proposal. Mayor Hau and Mayor Ma, accidentally, adopted a similar route to promote building the mega-sport facilities to host a mega-sport event. This connects to the time when Taipei City prepared the bid for the 2017 Universiade, Taipei Dome was assigned as the venue for opening and closing ceremony. From UCSCE11's perspective, whether the Taipei Dome could pass all the review committee or reject from the committee, it may relate to the Mayor's attitude:

“The reason why Mayor Hau chose to hold this project for five years is because of his services in the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Therefore, he has to listen to some opinions of environmentalists. Although he and Mayor Ma are in the same party, however, he still has his way of governance. After all, they are different. He concerns about the Taipei Dome, including the scale and building mass. Therefore, with the promotion of environmental groups, the questioning from the City Council

Members. I think there are some question marks in his mind. So, carrying out this project was not that easy until he got the 2017 Universiade. Or, in the political sense, he successfully took office for his 2<sup>nd</sup> term (UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

“After the Taipei Dome project was rejected, I thought about the reason why Mayor Hau did not nail it right away. At that time, I thought Mayor Hau wanted to take down the 2010 Mayor Election, so he decided to halt this project. I am not sure, but some people think like this (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

From what has been addressed above, UCSCE11 and UCSCE02 provide a similar view with UCSCE07 about the government attitude. This implies those review committees might not have their autonomy to do the decision-making. The question is how they lose their autonomy. Here, the UCSCE07 offers a supplement perspective during the decision-making

procedure:

“Overall, during Hao's first term, the most important question is, "Whether Taipei City needs to build this big dome in this place?" So, I will position it as the policy-making decision.... This policy discussion is the most difficult. Because the structure of committee members is unfair, then, because the government is both a partner and a supervisor, there may have rooms for the government to swing it (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

As the earlier section introduced the structure of the review committee, there are two types of commissioners: official and civic commissioners. Within their discussion, the final result of the committee enforces the implementer to follow the decision-making. Theoretically, both types of the commissioner should exchange views for proposing an optimal suggestion toward the case, but it seems different in the political reality:

“Because official committee members hold a position in the government, they will think that it is the government's policy,



especially in the BOT case. They are not actually considering the impact of the environment or the rationality of urban planning. They feel that this is a government policy that must be done (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

“About the part of official committee members, I, frankly, am pessimistic about this. There is nothing difference...These official committee members are probably playing the role of swinging things(UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

Even the official commissioners represent the government attitude; there are civic commissioners to balance or to leverage such circumstances. In this regard, the review committee should maintain its relative objectivity apart from the government. To further explained how it works, the UCSCE06 provides an example:

“In some controversial cases, if the government wants to carry it out, it is useless for all the civic commissioners to vote nay because the government only needs few votes from civic commissioners.

Because an EIA committee is about one-third of the official commissioners, which means seven are assigned from the government. If more than half of the twenty-one people, which is eleven people, you can have the meeting. That is, within seven official commissioners and then four civic commissioners, you can hold the meeting. If you want to exceed half, then seven people will already pass half. So, if the government wants to pass the case, it surely does(UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

Although it implies the civic commissioners would not attend the meeting for executing their right to review the case, it truly happened in the case of Taipei Dome Complex in 107<sup>th</sup> EIA Committee Meeting on May 26 2011. According to Taipei City Government(2011), there were fourteen commissioners in that meeting, 8 of them are official commissioners and the other 6 are civic commissioners. Because the chairman should avoid the conflict of interest, so he could not vote. There were three options to vote:

approved with conditions, second stage of EIA, and rejected. Moreover, the final result was 8 votes for approved with conditions, 3 votes for second stage of EIA, and 3 votes for rejected. To explain this circumstance, UCSCE06 stated:

“Because most of the civic committee members are not present, only official commissioners are required to execute the will of the government (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

To increase the control from the higher-level, the government may replace those commissioners who are not like-minded as UCSCE07 said:

“If the government wants to implement the Taipei Dome, they can swing these things. The meaning of swing is what I have mentioned

“Does the committee replace people as long as they are not obedient? Alternatively, the information disclosed may be incomplete and cause difficulties in supervision. Also, they may have a technical interference with the supervision of civic groups.

This is all part of the policy-making that determines the method of swings (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

Based on what UCSCE07 addressed, the government apparatus could control the decision-making of the review committee by those official commissioners. If the government apparatus loses control of the issue, another step would be the disclosure of the information as well as the intervening of the supervision from both civic groups and review committee. In other words, the decision-making of the review committee could be affected by the Mayor’s attitude, which means whether the Mayor wants to implement the policy or not. Once the committee members are not like-minded, the Mayor would replace the person with another like-minded person.

This raised UCSCE02’s attention after 2010:

Those commissioners who also voted for “rejected” on June 28, 2010. I heard that some of them were replaced. Although the term of employment period of the EIA commissioner is one year only, they could renew our employment period for the other year. In my

personal opinion, there is something fishy in Hao's government. I am not saying there have something weird, but it makes people feel suspicious so that we could not get the required documents from the government (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).

When USCECE02 served as a civic commissioner in EIA committee from 2009 to 2010, the committee members realized the discretionary power was relatively limited by the government while requesting further information relating to the tender process between the government and Farglory Group. However, the autonomy of the committee, based on UCSCE02's experience, was successfully impeded the intervene from external events. After 2010, due to the end of the employment period, those documents had never handed to them. one year after, the rejection made on June 28, 2010, was overruled by the new EIA committee. When this overturn happened, it relates to how the committee members review this case:

Every year, the government can invite different people into the EIA

committee. I am not sure whether those committee members from 2011 to 2014 had such consideration to approve the Taipei Dome Project. But the government may choose those people who want to implement this project. Who knows (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020)?”

That is, the government obtains the personnel appointment power to choose those who may be consistent with government attitude, even though the case remains controversies. This might be the reason why the government did not reselect the UNSCE02 as the commissioner in the EIA committee:

“There were some groups who thought the reason why I was replaced is that I was a tough cookie against this issue, failing some people’s expectations (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

This was realized by the civic group when they participated in the EIA review committee as UCSCE15 shared:

“At the time, from 2006 to 2010, we triumphed every time on both

the Urban Design Committee and the EIA committee. We made the commissioners in the review committee not to dare to approve it. Then, we also knew some of the civic commissioners are appointed by the government. (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

Involved within the discretionary power and personnel appointment power, the government hold all the elements to implement the decision-making process, no matter how hard other civic groups or commissioners tried to stop this case before those concerns were carefully considered. The 107<sup>th</sup> EIA Committee Meeting on May 26 2011 was such an exemplar to address this circumstance. Sheng-Chung Wu, the Chairman of the EIA committee, limited the freedom of speech to a civic group in the beginning of the meeting, ignored the civic commissioners’ concerns, including the building mass, traffic plan, the vision of this project, evacuation space, and made a disputed cap of total floor area by adding the building mass with 2003 and 2010, which is 361,139 m<sup>2</sup> and 535,510 m<sup>2</sup> respectively, and divide by

two(Munch, 2011). At the end of the meeting, the committee uses this formula as 1 of the conditions to approve the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park. When it comes to those conditions, UCSCE06 doubted the power of those conditions:

“At the time, I personally think the building mass of Taipei Dome was too over. They added two numbers and divided it by two. We doubted it, but they did not review it before approving it.....About those conditions, I don’t think there cannot set any conditions. But the conditions have not been implemented, or the conditions could be easily changed. For example, in the EIA committee [of Taipei Dome], the committee said 1 lane narrowing from the building site, but the Farglory group did not do it. Instead, they used the existing space and dipped little inwards in the waiting area, setting another lane in the existing space. This was accepted by the Urban Design Committee. I couldn’t accept that(UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”



In terms of the rank of law, Urban Design Committee should take the decision-making form EIA committee as a reference to review the case. Therefore, they are not parallel to each other; instead, although any cases can apply for both committees for independent review, the design change relating to the environmental impact should be under the scope of review in the EIA committee. Because the Urban design Committee does not have the veto power, the committee, therefore, can only review the project itself, unlike the EIA committee, which has a broad definition about the scope of the review: social justice. In this regard, when the 296<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee began, civic groups raised many suspicions toward the case, such as the disputed building mass, the controversial tender process was corrected by Control Yuan, and the other policy-related concerns, for requesting the Urban Design Committee rejecting to review it(Taipei City Government, 2010a). One of the commissioners replied:

“Basically, from the perspective of the entire Taipei City, this place is better if it is a park or green space, but it is a policy to decide to

make this place a dome. There is no way for our committee to change this matter.... Due to policy issues, environmental impact assessment issues, and corrections by the Control Yuan, residents asked us not to review this case. I think this is unreasonable. In terms of responsibility, we must review this case. It's just that these problems have always interfered with us, so we have no way to focus on urban design. Just now, Commissioner Lin talked about the evacuation tension, which is what the committee wants to discuss. Assuming today, we will agree to a certain degree of approval. This is only the end of the Urban Design Review Committee, but the EIA must still *review the follow-up*(Taipei City Government, 2010a).”

This statement reflects two fundamental problems in this case: first, the civic groups do not comprehend the responsibility of each committee so that their strategy was to convey their messages regardless of the attribution of review committee; second, the lack platform for civic groups to express their

voices in terms of the policy-making process caused the civic groups to adopt such guerrilla warfare method for expanding their influence toward this case.

When it came to the decision-making moment, Yu-Chun Ding, chairman of this committee, decided to approve the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park with conditions, ignoring other committee's concerns (Taipei City Government, 2010a). Ding's call irritated one committee member—Professor Shenglin Chang from Graduate School of Building and Planning at National Taiwan University—expressed firm opposition to this decision, leaving her words “please note my words into the meeting minute that I object the approval with condition” in the 296<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee Meeting minute(Taipei City Government, 2010a). While some committee members remained silenced to this case, some of them chose to speak out their voice for calling further consideration of the Taipei Dome Complex. The result had almost led to a dead-end once the civic groups could not emphasize to the agenda set by the review committee. That is, the limitation of freedom of speech was because of a lack of civic complaint platform to provide an

appropriate venue for both sides.

After the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park got the approval from both committees, the I-Hua Lin, a KMT Council Member, proposed a bill stated the Farglory Group needed to obtain the building permit and submit financial contract from the bank no later than July 2 2011, or the contract could be terminated due to violating the contract(Chuang, 2011). This bill was approved by the City Council. Farglory Group, then, firstly applied on June 18 and obtained the building permit on June 30 2011, in twelve days. UCSCE15 addressed that:

“The Farglory Group firstly got approval from the EIA committee and Urban Design Committee. Then, the building permit went down quickly. At the time, we accessed the applications from Taipei City Construction Management Office. Usually, the cases that can be obtained within a few days are the kind of small constructions. For these complex cases, like the Taipei Dome, it would take at least two months. After obtaining the building permit, the Farglory

Group applied for design change because there are many flaws in the building permit. Later, there was another Urban Design Committee, and the Farglory Group requested to change the appearance of the domed-stadium. Because the one issued with the building permit, as far as our understanding, plagiarized an architect's design from Singapore, they wanted to change it as soon as possible. During the Urban Design Committee Meeting, the commissioners questioned the Hsin-Hua Lo, the designer of Taipei Cultural and Sports Park, the reason for the design change. "Because there might be a problem with the building structure," Hsin-Hua Lo said. The commissioner replied, "you have been issued the building permit, and there are still problems with the building structure?" This matter was not written in the minutes of the meeting. That is, if a cat's whiskers can pass through an opening, then the body can pass through(UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020)."

Except for the controversial building permit, the extension of submitting the financial contract was the other case. The government firstly stated, “there will not have the second chance or extension to the Farglory Group if the financial contract cannot meet the requirement(Chiu, 2011)”. Later, the City Government and Farglory Group, however, reached an agreement that extends the deadline of financial contract from July 2 to November 16 in Taipei Coordination Commission(Tasi & Lu, 2011). While civic groups doubted these actions were simply helping the Farglory Group to start the construction, UCSCE06 commented that:

“Mayor Hau’ s part is relatively clear because he implemented this case in accordance with procedure, like the approval from EIA Committee, the building permit from Taipei Construction Management Office, the pragmatic financial contract. This part is linear, in terms of chronological order (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

Even the administrative procedure might have the rooms for the

government to swing. The process of the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park, however, meets every steps' requirements. That is why the Taiwan people comment about this case as a legal but non-rational project. After the construction of Taipei Dome, it frustrated the civic group and made them to give up on it:

“We were very depressed in 2011 because we’ve done lots of things since 2008, but it was still approved by the government(UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

“After the building permit was issued, no residents got out for our parade. I already felt, “Fine. No one does care about it since we have been fighting for years” (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).”

It was a shocking policy U-turn in the second term of Mayor Hau, frustrating the anti-construction coalition by mobilizing the public power to impair the supervision from the City Council Members as well as to suppress the freedom of speech among civic groups during the review committee.

Furthermore, the Chairman of the review committee representing the will of the city government ignored possible discussions with other committee members. Compared with the first term of Mayor Hau, the anti-construction alliances lost any possible way to raise public awareness for leveraging this power imbalance circumstance. When both key members, UCSCE06 and UCSCE15, were about to give up, an unexpected person encouraged them to keep fighting against the Taipei Cultural and Sports Park till the end:

“At that time, I almost gave up. It was Hsi-Yi Peng, a designer invited by the 2011 Taipei Design Expo, who came to me. We weren’t a friend. He said he took over the souvenir design work of the World Design Expo.... There is an exhibition at the World Trade Center. Hsi-Yi invited me to there for spreading out our handouts. The organizer, then, rushed to me and said, “you cannot advertise such social movement here,” and Hsi-Yi quarreled with them right after. He said, “ If UCSCE15 cannot be here, then I will refuse to participate in this exhibition”. He gave me a lot of support.



(UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).

“There is one thing that encourages me and UCSCE15. At that time, the Taipei World Design Expo was in Songshan Cultural Park. Taipei City Government invited Hsi-Yi Peng, and Hsi-Yi Peng designed a bowl with the city landscape. Because the government invited him, he supposedly promoted the government. But, after observing what we did here, he decided to design a bowl with Songshan Forest Park pattern and the other with Taipei Dome (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

In the second term of Mayor Hau, it addressed how the government utilized its power to impede other forces to supervise the Taipei Dome Complex. Without a timing external event to gain additional media exposure, the anti-construction coalition could barely address other sound arguments to persuade the public for support. On the other hand, within the intentional intervene from the higher government officials in the Taipei City Government, the pro-construction coalition demonstrated a systematical power crunch in

governance for paralyzing the actions from the rival coalition and for distracting the awareness from the public. Therefore, although the core members of the anti-construction coalition decided to keep against the Taipei Dome until this project is completed, the last hope for stopping this project was long gone.

#### 4.2.4. Decision-making Process(2014~2016)

The first term of Mayor Ko was the turning point for the anti-construction coalition because Sunflower Movement on March 18, 2014 inspired many citizens to concern their living environment for pursuing the value of transparency, justice, and fairness in our society. The summary presented as Figure 17 addressed the details in this timespan.




Figure 17. Decision-Making Process of Taipei Dome Complex(2014~2016)

Source: developed for this study

As a result, the output of the Sunflower Movement made two direct affections on this issue. First, it transited part of the citizen civic power from Legislative Yuan where was the venue for participants of Sunflower Movement to Taipei Dome Complex on April 23 2014. At the end of the Sunflower Movement, part of the citizens heard about the Farglory Group illegally transplanted trees on the pedestrians nearby the Taipei Dome Complex. Followed by their sense of justice, although they are not residents, they became the new opposing group—Songsshan Tree Protection Group(松)

山護樹), for fighting against illegal actions from Farglory Group:

“One day, my friend gave me a call. He told me the Farglory Group was going to transplant the trees and asked whether I could help. So, I just went there(UCSCE12, personal communication, January 30, 2020).

“After the Sunflower Movement, I was interested in environmental issues. I think it is a kind of civic power transferring to [Taipei Dome Complex] (UCSCE13, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

“After the Sunflower Movement, my roommate and I spent many nights nearby the Legislative Yuan. At night on April 23 2014, I heard Farglory “Group was going to illegally transplant tress, and there may need some help. Because we lived nearby the City Hall station where is close to the Taipei Dome Complex, we just went there to check it out. Actually, lots of young participants in the Sunflower Movement went there as well(UCSCE14, personal

communication, February 1, 2020).”

Compared with the participants in Songshan Forest Park Promotion Group, the reason why they decided to participate in this movement is because of the vision of new politics in Taiwan. Form previously mentioned, the politics in Taiwan formed an unbreakable chain between specific groups involved in the Taipei Dome Complex. These new participants aim to change this deadlock based on the boiling of the public’s anger from the Sunflower Movement. Regarding perspective from the participants, an inclusive society allows citizens to engage every public issue, to obtain information equally from government, and to expose those injustices in the living environment. That is, when the strong civic engagement pushes the policy-makers, they would respond to their demand, and to discuss with them. In this regard, the members of Songshan Tree Protection Group are reformist who hopes to change the government by participating in a social issue.

“2014 is the year for young generations who want to change the government. Actually, the social movement stops something, and change

something (UCSCE14, personal communication, February 1, 2020).”

Addressed by UCSCE14, under this social atmosphere, every suspicious action from the government could be excessively focused by the public, not mention about the long-disputed Taipei Dome Complex. After KMT Mayors have ruled the Taipei for sixteen years, the suspicion among the public toward collusion between the government and enterprise has evoked the ideology of anti-enterprise in the opposing groups because the Taipei Dome Complex has been labeled as a case colluded by Taipei City Government and Farglory Group in the first term of Mayor Ko:

“The reason why Taipei Dome Complex becomes such a controversial issue is that Farglory Group is too greedy (UCSCE12, personal communication, January 30, 2020).”

“Because environmental groups (the personification of justice), City Council Members, and political parties are involving in the Taipei Dome Complex, so this project becomes the target. In fact, let’s say the score of our company’s reputation was 70. It wasn’t

good enough to score 80 or even 90. But nowadays, it went below even 60. Maybe it would get better, but the reason for deducting the overall score is because of Taipei Dome Complex. Within our stance, Taipei Dome Complex is a pain (UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

These two counterstatements indicated the fact that the dynamics among pro- and anti-construction groups mainly rely on the will of the government, referring to previously addressing experience. While the Mayor Ma and Mayor Hau expressed the determined intention in contracting with Farglory Group and approved the Taipei Dome Complex to build respectively, the Mayor Ko, to the contrary, went the opposite way to reexamine this domed-stadium. However, at the end of 2014, one critical difference comparing the phase of discussion from 1998 to 2010 is that the Taipei Dome Complex had been under construction for four years and that the progress of development achieved 81.34 percent. Because the project was almost completed, this increased the difficulties to intervene in the project as UCSCE07 echoed:

“Under the circumstances with the progress of the construction, I admit that this is more difficult than the time of Mayor Hau. Much higher, I can say(UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

These presumptions formed the social background relating to the affection from the Sunflower Movement, making the first term of Mayor Ko a key moment to deal with the Taipei Dome Complex. Simply put, it made Wen-Che Ko, a rising populist politician, a strong candidate in the 2018 Taipei Mayor Election. Within his fresh image, he claimed he would build up an open government with transparency and civic participation, for solving the long-term problems of the collusion between government and enterprise in Taiwan politics. He, therefore, claimed himself as a reformist, resonating the value of young generations. Mr. Ko, thus, met the Songshan Tree Protection Group for checking the status of trees transplanted by Farglory Group on April 27, 2014, leaving a well-known saying:

“If we cannot treat trees as a life. How could we establish a society



where people respect each other? In my opinion, this is not the way to treat an old tree, not a proper action in the civilized city. I, here, recommend the public to concern this issue. We should make Taipei a civilized city (Ko, 2014).”

Because of his non-partisan background, termed the White Force, he drew lots of support from young generations. Therefore, for meeting the young generation’s expectation of reforming the politic, he targeted on five disputed BOT cases—Syntrend Creative Park(三創生活園區), Mei-Ho City(美河市), Gemini Building(雙子星大樓), Songshan Cultural and Creative Park(松山文化與創意園區), and Taipei Dome Complex(台北大巨蛋)—as the way to achieve his campaign slogan—Change. This vision was also the expectation for the opposing group to change the current status of the Taipei Dome Complex:

“At the time, it was close to the 2018 Taipei Mayor Election, and Wen-Che Ko looked like a fresh amateur politician. So, we expected that this wrong policy-implementation could be changed

while participating in this social movement (UCSCE14, personal communication, February 1, 2020).”

“It is tough to imagine there will have a miracle to demolish the Taipei Dome Complex. We once expected Wen-Che Ko, and he leaked much information that would change it into a forest park (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

“Mayor Ko started his political career from anti-Taipei Dome Complex with UCSCE15 and others (UCSCE10, personal communication, February 12, 2020).

Because Wen-Che Ko hit it off with Songshan Tree Protection Group, they were not only grouping as the anti-construction coalition but also sharing the information after Wen-Che Ko began his first term on December 25 2014. Once he took office, the first thing he made was to assign Deputy Mayor, Chia-Chi Teng(鄧家基), to form a negotiation ad-hoc to renegotiate BOT contract based on the thirty-nine corrections from Control Yuan, although the progress was sturdy(Wu, 2015). Within Mayor Ko’s charisma and his active

actions on Taipei Dome, it turned this local issue into a national-famous controversial BOT case:

“Earlier before, there were no reporters. Even there were some reporters. No news cover would be published..... Then, probably Wen-Che Ko came up with these things, or many scandals of Farglory broke out. It became a popular topic for media (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

Following UCSCE06’s statement, the rise of Wen-Che Ko in 2014 became a key external event bringing the anti-construction coalition back to the stage against the pro-construction coalition. The flame of hope, in other words, was reignited since Mayor Hau’s government had sealed every possible communication channel with the con’s groups. It was such social conditions that Wen-Che Ko determined to reopen the possible channel for solving the conflicts in Taipei, terminating long-term collusion between the politicians and enterprises. To carry out his vision of solving the five disputed BOT cases, Mayor Ko firstly established the Clean Government Committee

to investigate those cases; meanwhile, for Taipei Dome Complex, he assigned Fang-Lin Yang(楊芳齡), Commissioner of Department of Legal Affairs, to discuss the legal actions toward to Taipei Dome Complex:

“When Wen-Che Ko took office, he assigned Commissioner of Department of Legal Affairs to us, including UCSCE15 and UCSCE14. We went to discuss the details of the Taipei Dome Complex....At the time, we were hoping that will come true because they thought this case is such a problematic one. First, they would reexamine the public safety issues in the Taipei Dome Complex. If it also has problems, they will terminating the contract with Farglory Group. They even told us that they had considered turning part of the Taipei Dome Complex into the forest. They discussed this with us (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

That is, the partnership between Taipei City Government and Songsan Tree Protection Group worked toward the goal of what the anti-construction

coalition expected. Also, Mayor Ko began to investigate the long-term concern about the evacuation plan of the Taipei dome Complex by assigning another Deputy Mayor, Chin-Jung Lin(林欽榮), to establish a safety ad-hoc to reexamine the architectural design relating to an evacuation plan(Chiu, 2015). From the March 3 to April 16 2015, within thirteen meetings for examining the evacuation plan proposed by Farglory Group, this safety assessment ad-hoc identified problems with standards of safety assessment, releasing the official report on April 16 2015(Taipei City Government, 2015b). According to the official report, considering the Taipei Dome Complex(building C) and its affiliated buildings, including the cinema(building A), the department store(building B), the hotel(building E), and the office building(building D) is such a complexed sports-mega project, the seven standards of safety assessment, which is derived from the safety standards of domed-stadium in Japan, are listed below:

- 1) *The principle of safe evacuation is based on the design basis that all members leave the auditorium to the indoor evacuation space within*

*8 minutes, and must reach the evacuation space of the entire library to the outdoor evacuation space within 15 minutes(Taipei City Government, 2015b).*

- 2) The walking speed of the evacuation simulation personnel is calculated at 1.2m/s(Taipei City Government, 2015b).*
- 3) The simulation of escape and evacuation needs to be carried out according to the actual arrangement of the seats, without closing the stairs and exits(Taipei City Government, 2015b).*
- 4) The indoor evacuation space should be reasonable and safe. The evacuation space of the development unit and the auditorium should have no fire safety zoning. They should be separated from other structures or equipment with flame resistance of more than 30 minutes(Taipei City Government, 2015b).*
- 5) The calculation of the area of the outdoor evacuation space should deduct the area of planting, stair steps, fire truck moving lines, disaster relief water trucks, etc., and must not include closed*

*underground squares with floors above; the width of the fire truck operating space should be calculated at 8 meters(Taipei City Government, 2015b).*

- 6) *The density of the outdoor evacuation space is based on the movable 3 persons/ $m^2$  as the inspection standard(Taipei City Government, 2015b).*
- 7) *The walking distance of the underground parking space escape ladder is not regulated by the construction management regulations, but the distance exceeds 240 meters, which is a safety problem. This group is premised on meeting the safety conditions, taking into consideration the case of the dome in Osaka, Japan, etc. The walking distance of the underground parking space escape ladder should not exceed 60 meters(Taipei City Government, 2015b).*


Through these seven standards, the ad hoc team identified 5 problems: the large building mass causes the risk of disaster to increase, the joint-structure of the department store and domed-stadium leads to the crisis of

safety, all underground parking lots are inter-connected causing the disasters to spread easily, outdoor space cannot accommodate all escaped people, and the fire disaster evacuation plan is not feasible(Taipei City Government, 2015b). Besides, after the comprehensively reviewing the Taipei Dome Complex Construction, the government found the section of fire safety-related building codes in the building permit granted by May 2 2013 was not consistent with the Scope of Examination in the Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac issued on January 13 2012(Taipei City Government, 2015b). This report indicates the certificate issued on January 13 2012 was only for the Taipei Dome Complex(building C), while the latest certificate granted on June 8 2017 included all of five buildings in this project(see Figure 18). This difference caused the controversy between the Taipei City Government and the Farglory Group to happen.


Figure 18. The Difference of Scope of Examination in the Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac



Scope of Examination in the Certificate  
on January 13<sup>th</sup> 2012



Scope of Examination in the Certificate  
on June 8<sup>th</sup> 2017



Resource: Taipei City Government(2015b)

While Taipei City Government started to question the construction quality and safety of the Taipei Dome Complex if the project had never accordance with the blueprint and with the *Building Technical Regulations*, the Farglory Group refuted all statements from the City Government by listing counterstatements toward to the five problems identified by the safety ad hoc as presented in Table 21. Instead of increasing the opposition, such a debate also opened up more communication between both sides to reach a new consensus toward to the Taipei Dome Complex. However, the process of communication was intense and radical.

Table 21. Problems and Response from the Taipei City Government and the Farglory Group

Problems identified by safety ad hoc	Statement (the Taipei City Government)	Statement (the Farglory Group)
The large building mass	The 5 buildings expanded from 361,139m <sup>2</sup> to 492,764m <sup>2</sup> pings, excessively increased building bulk	The 361,139m <sup>2</sup> is the building bulk. It is not the total floor area. Due to the requirement of the EIA meeting, the project had reduced 42,745m <sup>2</sup> in the building bulk.
The join-structure of the department store and domed-stadium	The moving route is narrow, and the direction is concentrated, the path to the outdoor is tortuous, and it is not easy to escape	Each building is independent and has sufficient fire compartments and firewalls, free from fire, smoke, and heat from adjacent buildings.
All underground parking lots are inter-connected	The gigantic underground parking lot interconnects the buildings, and fire will affect the whole area easily.	There are no open firewalls in the underground between the buildings, and there are also semi-outdoor squares that can be exposed to the outside air, allowing people to escape quickly.
The outdoor space cannot accommodate all escaped people	The current capacity of outdoor evacuation space can only accommodate 60,000 people	140,000 people cannot stay outdoors at the same time.
The fire disaster evacuation plan is not feasible	The original design evacuated 142,096 people	The Simultaneous evacuation of 140,000

	to the inside and outside of the Taipei Dome Complex, making it difficult for fire trucks to approach	people on the ground can be completed within 27 minutes, and 120,000 people can be evacuated within 10 minutes.
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Source: United Daily News(2015, April 16) The Controversy of Taipei Dome Complex between the Taipei City Government and the Farglory Group. Retrieved from <https://theme.udn.com/theme/story/7491/841562>

When the Taipei City Government firstly requested the Farglory Group to make design revision for meeting the seven standards of safety assessment and for complying with the BOT contract, two possible revisions proposed by the Taipei City Government are: first, demolish the department store and turn it into public space; second, dismantle the domed-stadium and turn it into a forest park as Figure 19 presented(Taipei City Government, 2015b). Both, however, were rejected by the Farglory Group(United Daily News, 2015). Furthermore, it raised hackles from the Farglory Group because they doubted the legal basis of the seven standards and the safety ad hoc, claiming that the government could buy out the contract and take over the Taipei Dome Complex if the City Government maintains the two revisions(United Daily News, 2015).

Figure 19. Comparison between the Original Design and 2 Alternative Revisions



Source: Taipei City Government(2015b)

Indeed, if we stand in the Farglory Group’s shoes, either the safety ad hoc or the seven safety standards suddenly outweighs any other legal decision-making process as UCSCE11 stated:

“I think both Deputy Mayor Lin and Commissioner Lin were using their professions to abuse Taipei Dome Complex(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

On the other hand, from the government’s perspective, there are two points concluded by the safety in the Public Safety Assessment Report, leading the government to emphasize on the possible safety issues in the

Taipei Dome Complex, for leading a revision to the current Urban Design

Review:

- 1) The verification methods and safety assessment mechanisms related to the safety assessment of building fire protection and evacuation in Taiwan today are limited (Taipei City Government, 2015b).*
- 2) It is recommended that the Construction Department at the Ministry of the Interior should consider the urban disaster prevention planning and review mechanism in the context of the urban planning scale, and it is advisable to create and reform the system (Taipei City Government, 2015b).*

The first point indicates the limitation on the construction-related legal system cannot provide appropriate tools to assess the building fire protection and evacuation in the Taipei Dome Complex because this project is, by far, the largest stadium project in Taiwan. For efficiently dealing with deficiencies in legal tools, the safety assessment ad-hoc suggested to include the urban

disaster prevention planning and related mechanism into the review system because the flexible review scope of Urban Design committee could review the building fire protection and evacuation in Taipei Dome Complex. Both were later confirmed by the Construction and Planning Agency at the Ministry of the Interior by *Official Letter No. 1040044752* on August 6 2015. According to the letter from the Construction and Planning Agency(2015), the Taipei City Government could refer to Article 6 in *Implementation Measures for Regular Comprehensive Review of Urban Planning*:

*The overall review of the urban plan should be based on the history, characteristics, and potential of urban disasters. Regarding urban disaster prevention and evacuation sites and facilities, basin-type flood storage and detention facilities, disaster relief routes, and fire delays Planning and review of issues such as fire prevention zones, and adjustment of land use zoning or use a control(Implementation Measures for Regular Comprehensive Review of Urban Planning, 2017).”*

Within this explanation, the Taipei City Government could assess the building fire protection and evacuation in Taipei Dome Complex. The reason why the Taipei City Government insisted on assessing the safety of the Taipei Dome Complex was to adopt a comprehensive safety assessment to the first sports complex project. In other words, this would be the prototype of urban disaster management in Taiwan. As the experts in architectural professions, Chou-Min Lin(林洲民), Commissioner of Urban Development and Deputy Mayor, Chin-Jung Lin, attempted to solve the safety issues in Taipei Dome Complex—This, however, raised another disputed arguments from an official in Taipei City Government because this revision, which is lack of legal basis, could override the legal decision-making procedure and destroy the credibility of the government:

“Now, you hired several Japanese scholars and experts to overrule the assessment of the Department of Construction Agency, including the building permit..... In this part, I just said from the sports point of view, when I took office, the progress of

construction has reached 80 percent(UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).”

UCSCE03 mentioned how the safety ad hoc could make such a decision that all of the professional decision-making before is probably wrong. While both government officials and Farglory Group argued with the legitimacy of seven standards of safety assessment in the official report, the Construction Management Office found there were seventy-nine parts, including seventeen stairs that were not constructed according to drawings on May 14, 2015 in Taipei Dome Complex. This caused the Commissioner Lin to halt the construction of the Taipei Dome Complex on May 20, 2015. According to the video recording from the Farglory Group, CEO Zhao stated they had reached an agreement with Taipei City Government to apply for a design change(The Taipei Dome Series, 2016). This statement, however, was refuted by UCSCE04:

“The seventeen staircases disappeared; it exists on the building permit issued three years ago. However, colleagues from the



Construction Management Office visited the site on May 14 and found the seventeen staircases disappeared. Besides, the number of floors that the seventeen staircases pass-through is the total number of floors of the entire building A to building E in the Taipei Dome Complex, which is up to nine floors, which is an absolute requirement for the shutdown, because it destroys the fire protection zoning. What a high proportion! Farglory Group is arrogant! How arrogance is the Farglory Group? They put the drawings approved by the government in their drawers and took the drawings they want to the constructor—Obayashi Construction. We later asked them to explain. They said, “since the 1<sup>st</sup> day, the drawings they got is the one that Faglory Group wanted (UCSCE04, personal communication, February 22, 2020).”

The reason why UCSCE04 emphasized on the drawing refers to the revision date of the Taipei Dome Complex Construction presented in Table 22. As earlier addressed, to begin the construction, the Taipei Dome Complex

should obtain approval from the EIA Committee, from Urban Design Review Committee, and Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac. It, then, could apply for the building permit. Similarly, if any design needs to be revised during the construction process, it is necessary to report to the corresponding committee for revision and review. Otherwise, it will be built according to the previously approved building permit. The case here was the Farglory Group misrepresented the building permit, which caused the key seventeen stairs to disappear in 2015 because the revision of the building permit had never approved to remove these stairs. In this sense, the Farglory Group should accord to the original approval of the building permit in 2011—which includes those stairs in the drawings—but they misused the second revision one to claim the design revision had approved to readjust the stairs based on third revision of Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac. The City Government, however, did not accept it based on two reasons. First, because the latest scope of examination in the Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac was pending verification

until the mid of 2017, the seventeen disappearing stairs should place where they are from Building A to Building E in the Taipei Dome Complex to meet the fire safety requirements based on the first revision of the Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac. Second, since there were no major structural changes involved in the first and second revision of the building permit, the Taipei Dome Complex Construction should accord with the original approval one because the third revision was approved on June 22 2020.

Table 22. The Revision Date of the Taipei Dome Complex Construction

	Original Approval	1 <sup>st</sup> Revision	2 <sup>nd</sup> Revision	3 <sup>rd</sup> Revision
Environmental Impact Assessment Committee	June 24 2011	—	March 22 2013	March 25 2020
Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac	June 27 2011	January 13 2012	—	June 8 2017
Urban Design Review Committee	June 28 2011	March 5 2012	April 17 2013	October 14 2019

Building Permit	June 30 2011	March 19 2012 (No major structural changes involved)	May 2 2013 (Column position adjustment)	June 22 2020
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Resource: Taipei City Government(2015b); Taipei City Government(2019); Kuo(2020)

Despite this sound argument for addressing the reason for the shutdown. the UCSCE03 offers counter perspectives to respond to the shutdown, maintaining how this reckless decision would cause unexpected affection to the project:

“Shutdown without mitigation? He is my colleague. I respect it; he is a famous architect. I respect it too. However, in general, we deal with engineering so much in the education sector, including in the sports sector. If you have defects in your building, you should have a mitigation mechanism, such as design change. But, what did he tell you directly? Shutdown? This is not flexible at all(UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).”

Considering the Taipei Dome Complex is such case in progress,

UCSCE03 as the government officials, the main responsibility is to ensure this project completes on time instead of Impeding its completion through radical means. Echoing the UCSCE03's perspective, UCSCE11 addressed what the process of doing a construction project in Taiwan is and how it works in reality, refuting what UCSCE04 claimed:

“In Taiwan, in fact, every project, no matter what scale it is, is almost always making changes while constructing it. There won't be such a case that 100 percent fits the drawings from the beginning to the last. There is no such case. There is really no one in all of Taiwan. We had drawings at the beginning, and all of them had been approved and issued with building permits. In fact, the reason why made design change was because we knew there are some areas that need to be adjusted. There are many reasons for the adjustment, and some may be due to problems found during the construction process. Some architects found that some problems could be optimized during the review process, so they made some

adjustments. Or, even some new technologies have invented, so some adjustments have to be made. Therefore, the Taiwan Construction Center is the reason for the disappearance of the 17 staircases because the drawing was followed by the Building Technical Regulations, which are really strict. Every 20 or 30 meters, we need to implement a staircase. However, if I go through the performance review, I may only need a staircase in every 40 meters (UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).

Although the UCSCE11 attempted to explain how the construction works in the real scenario, this explanation apparently could not comply with the administrative procedure in revising the design. Within such different interpretations of the design revision, not surprisingly, the sudden shutdown of the Taipei Dome Complex resulted from the lawsuits between the government and Farglory Group. Under the social atmosphere in 2015, it represented a symbol of encouragement to fight against the consortium. This was not only impacted on the Taipei City government or the civic groups but

also affected the review committee members for standing up for social justice. Under such active influence from government actions, the commissioners in Environmental Impact Assessment Committee were actively examining the damages on Songshan Tobacco Factory because of the development activity—Taipei Dome Complex—in 149<sup>th</sup> and 151<sup>th</sup> EIA Committee Meetings on April 4 and May 26, 2015 respectively. As one of the committee members in both EIA Committee Meetings, UCSCE02 stated:

“In my mind, since Wen-Che Ko was elected the Mayor of Taipei relying on fighting against the 5 disputed BOT cases—Taipei Dome Complex is 1 of them. We, then, could observe how he flipped the case because he truly had the chance. As I just mentioned the problems in Taipei Dome Complex, it was his poor construction quality that caused damage to cultural heritage assets. Then, it had the problem of not constructing according to the design drawings, and the problem of being behind schedule. This is enough to terminate the contract with the Farglory Group. Then I think that if

he really does this, I will support him. In other words, as a commissioner in EIA from 2015 to 2018, what I did in 2010 had been turned over by those commissioners in 2011. I always thought that it was wrong. So, in 2015, I accepted to be the commissioner because Mayor Ko also said he wanted to comprehend this case. We, therefore, use our professional advice to help him to deal with the Farglory Group, like terminating the contract. This is what I thought (UCSCE02, personal communication, February 13, 2020).

Because the termination of the contract became a possible option for the anti-construction coalition, they decided to change their method of conveying the voices from only ground warfare to the information warfare. This had become an advantage for Mayor Ko to maintain his high media exposure as well as for the anti-construction coalition to expand their influence on Taipei Dome Complex:

“In 2015, when Taipei Dome became the media icon, Mayor Ko also cooperated with some key opinion leaders by leaking internal



information privately (UCSCE12, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

“When we participated in this social movement, our way was to arouse public opinion on the Internet, to attract the media's attention, and to attract ordinary people. It was the media frame. Because we didn't know of a better solution to this issue, we could only rely on public opinion(UCSCE14, personal communication, February 1, 2020).”

“When you do this, I think the effectiveness of the media will be the most helpful to the whole movement. Because of which Article in Building Technical Regulations or other construction-related laws adopted by the Department of Urban Development to shutdown the Taipei Dome was drawn numerous critiques because the Department of Urban Development could not clearly explain so that the residents in Taipei could not understand what you are talking about. As a result, from the public’s perspective, the

shutdown was not very convincing. That was later, UCSCE12, UCSCE 13, UCSCE14; me and other partners went to have the meeting with the Department of Urban Development, and they explained all the reasons and details about the shutdown. Then, if UCSCE13 and UCSCE14 could not understand, they would question the government officials to provide another explanation. After two or three hours later, UCSCE14 published an article to explain the context of the shutdown on a social network platform. (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).

The changing way of delivering indicates that the anti-construction groups had learned a lesson from the frustrating experience in Hau's second term as the Mayor of Taipei and started to do media framing as a means of creating external events for leading the public opinions against the Taipei Dome Complex. This could explain why Mayer Ko was so concerned about the public opinions because he needed their support to do the political stunt, for achieving his vision toward the Taipei Dome Complex, In other words,

the information warfare became probably the most methodology to leverage the support from the public to create a social atmosphere for both civic groups and Ko's government to keep playing cards with Farglory Group. But, there is 1 crucial factor that both sides might ignore—the uncertainty of the politics makes the public tired of supporting such a pending case.

According to the poll made by the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission in Taipei City Government, the satisfaction rate toward Mayor Ko kept dropping from 76 percent in January to 66 percent in April (Chiu, 2015a). From the public point of view, because of the uncertainty, the smear campaign between the Taipei City Government and Farglory Group would not resolve any problems in the Taipei Dome Complex. That is when Mayor Ko relentlessly proposed alternatives as to the resolutions for Taipei Dome Complex, such as promising to take over by the government in April, suggesting the banks to take it over in June. Comparing his tough attitude at the beginning of 2015, Mayor Ko apparently could not make his own decision, and the most critical factor is the inconsistent stance in Ko's government:

“However, the focus they were dealing with at the beginning in the Taipei City Government was whether to continue the construction or shut down the construction. Well, there are legal offenses and defenses in it, so you should know the commissioner of the Department of the legal affair was there. But their opinions were totally on the opposite side, causing the commissioner to resign. What I mean is that because the government assumed the Taipei Dome Complex is a scandal.... It should be a professional case, but it later became a political case. That’s it (UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).”

This inconsistency led the government to reevaluate the whole direction toward the Taipei Dome Complex in a short time, firstly shaking the partnership between the government and anti-construction coalition:

“We had talked a done deal with Mayor Ko to appoint UCSCE14 as a Mayor’s secretary for access to internal data. Because all the documents were in the preparation room nearby Mayor’s office,

UCSCE14 could help them to organize those documents. I-Shan Chang(張益贍), Ko's policy advisor, suggested not to do so. Mayor Ko, then, declined this agreement. All of a sudden, I realized that the government attitude had changed (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020).

“Mayor Ko once asked UCSCE15 to the Department of Sport to organize those data in person. UCSCE13 and I were there. UCSCE15 then rejected this invitation and recommended me to do this. So, they were supposed to hire me. Later, Mayor Ko was persuaded by I-Shan Chang. That was the end of the story (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).

It is worthy to note that Ko's government was formed by partisans from various political parties, including DDP, KMT, NPP, and PFP. These seemingly diverse backgrounds, however, create the balance of terror, centralizing the power to a specific position in the government. I-Shan Chang, without a doubt, stood in that position to rule the way of governance. That is

to say, the internal difference in the government broke the partnership because they need support from the constituencies more than the support from the anti-construction coalition. This could explain why the City Government released probably 10 percent of the total internal documents organized by Songshan Tree Group from March to May 2015 when the connection between the Taipei City Government and Songshan Tree Group had faded:

“In March 2015, UCSCE15 listed the required documents for Ko’s government because Mayor Ko told us they could help us access these documents. So, they assigned an official to do so. When I had it, I firstly digitalized them and turned those soft-copies back to the government. The reason why we accessed these documents was that it should be open-resource for the public. Do you know what happened to part of those documents? A little tiny part of them was uploaded to the “Taipei Dome Open Database” by Ko’s government (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

Although the Ko's government need to meet their campaign slogan: open government, transparency, and civic participation, the inconsistency of the government attitude kept intervened in the process of decision-making toward renegotiating with the Farglory Group. It blurred the target set by the Taipei City Government, turning the whole government apparatus into tangled warfare:

“Exactly, Deputy Mayor Teng was responsible for leading the negotiation ad-hoc to renegotiate with Farglory Group. But the problem was there had never concluded. It always waited until the next meeting. The problem, then, was still whether we wanted to shut down the construction, dealing with related legal issues, and coping with those thirty-nine corrections from Control Yuan. And, how could we provide a better statement for City Council Members and the public(UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).”

“After the shutdown, we had never talked about either the

amendment of the BOT contract or the price of the royalties because it was meaningless. No one knows whether this project could keep constructing. There was, therefore, no more talk about it. The first thing first we dealt with was the possibility to complete this construction. Or, if you don't want it, it is okay to shut down the construction entirely as we had already claimed that the government could take it over. Once you take it back, no one cares whether you want to be the ruins or something else(*UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020*).

In other words, this inconsistency brought a comprehensive impact on the issue among the relationship of stakeholders. The original plan of solving the Taipei Dome Complex through a careful safety assessment and an adapted Urban Design Review Committee became not only shady but trivial. Since the shutdown, the commissioner of Urban Development kept worked on consorting with the Farglory Group and the designer of Taipei Dome, Andrew James, the Senior Principle of Populous, for reaching a consensus that the



Farglory Group would revise the design of staircases for people who could reach the egress stairs from the seats in eight minutes on August 16, 2015 and September 16, 2015, respectively(Department of Urban Development, 2016).

This was turning to another entangled warfare when Andrew James listed some cases of mega sports venues against the improper reasons of shutdown made by Department of Urban Development on February 19, 2016, although those examples—including Yankee Stadium(USA), O2 Stadium(UK), Etihad Stadium(Australia), Fisht Olympic Stadium(Russia), and Natal Stadium(Brazil)—in Andrew James' video clip were not resonating with the context of Taipei Dome Complex where is a joint-structure, and high-density cluster with such large-scale interconnected underground parking lot(approximately 148,761m<sup>2</sup>)(Taipei City Government, 2016; The Taipei Dome Complex Series, 2016a). In the Video Clip from The Taipei Dome Complex Series(2016a), Andrew James claimed the Populous could take all the responsibility for the design of the Taipei Dome Complex, the Department of Urban Development redressed this false statement. Because Andrew James

acknowledged that the Populous only designed the domed-stadium and had no idea about the interconnected underground in two meetings hold on August 14 and September 14 in 2015 (Taipei City Government, 2016; Dai & Zou, 2018). In contrast, other affiliated buildings were designed by Archasia Design Group(瀚亞國際設計)(Taipei City Government, 2016).

The relentless debates between Farglory Group and the Taipei City Government, however, becomes a double-bladed sword. On the one hand, within the spotlight from the media press, the Taipei City Government could leverage with the Farglory Group to renegotiate the BOT contract. On the other hand, some government officials in the Taipei City Government could not agree with such an approach to initiate the dicussion. That is to say, since the Taipei City Government opened several battlefronts with Farglory Group, including the renegotiation of BOT contract, the safety assessment of Taipei Domed Complex, the controversial shutdown of construction in 2015, this long-term uncertainty caused the political struggle inside the City Government, separating into dove and hawk:

“I told you that Commissioner Lin had a strong attitude because he is the so-called hawks. Frankly, I am more of a dove because doing things well is always my first principle. Especially, I majored in management. We can communicate, talk, coordinate for reaching the agreement. Every time, Commissioner Lin found there were defects, and he directly requested to shut down or to ask for compensation. Then, at that time, there was the so-called problem of more than 30 billion NTD for us to take it over. Could you tell me whether the city government may have the budget? How could you convince the people? It means all the decision-makings we have made were wrong.” So, when you read those minutes of meeting in the City Council, there were lots of debates (UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).

The controversy over the attitudes towards the Taipei Dome Complex was related to the approval rating dropped to a fifteen-month low of 43 percent in the poll made by the magazine in March 2016(Chiu, 2016). To

solve this critical problem for his political career, Mayor Ko's political advisor reminded him that:

“[His political advisor told him that if you could not solve this problem, how could you win your second term, not mention the opportunity of being the president of Taiwan (UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).”

At the moment, the Ko's government had stepped into an awkward stance caused by their fluctuations in the first half in his first term. Once they needed to consider the political reality, there were nothing differences between former mayors and himself.:

“At first, it may not be as ugly as we thought. At least there were somethings that he wanted to change. However, he thought about his second term. As long as politicians start to want to be re-elected, he will have a lot of scruples. He wouldn't dare to correct things drastically. In addition, many of the people around Mayor Ko are black sheep (UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3,

2020).

Instead of changing in a flash, the adjustment of government attitude, however, took relatively slower because this process is another political struggle based on the direction of decision-making made by the Mayor himself:

“I think the Mayor himself suspected this case. Of course, we could not make sure whether he was advised by other staff. ....His important decision-making group includes Deputy Mayor Lin and Commissioner Lin are professions in architecture. If I were a decision-maker, was it possible for me to be influenced by them? Again, I am not said whether this is right or wrong. It just that staff would give advice when Mayor Ko made the decision (UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).”

That is to say, until the members in the decision-making group are replaced by certain people, Ko’s government would have suffered this fluctuation. On June 19, 2016, when UCSCE03 chose to leave the

government, UCSCE03 shared:

“The reason I chose to leave was not because of malfeasance. I had nothing wrong with preparing the 2017 Universiade. I was unhappy that Mayor Ko treated a civil servant because of the scandal in Taipei Municipal Stadium. I could not stand with it....At the time, I took the initiative to resign. Other officials were directly fired by Mayor Ko or indirectly fired by Bi-Ru Tasi(蔡壁如), secretary of Mayor’s office. Can you get it(UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020)?”

As the thirtieth higher official who left the Taipei City Government, the experience UCSCE03 offers a vision of the policy U-turn that would happen inside the City Government. By far, since Mayor Ko had stretched the battlefronts, wearing down the momentum of the anti-construction coalition. This drastic change caused them to disintegrate because they would have no support from the external environment as well as form an internal government apparatus.

#### 4.2.5. Decision-making Process(2016~2018)

The second half in Mayor Ko's first term in the Taipei City Government was the turning point for the Taipei Dome Complex. It was not surprising that the reality of the Taiwan politics undeniably affects the decision-making of Ko's Government when he confronted a deadlock between his Government and the Farglory Group. The decision-making herewith indicates how the decision was made by a specific group in Ko's Government, executing the power to affect the government apparatus. From 2014 to 2016, Mayor Ko firstly ended the partnership with the anti-construction coalition, weakening its affluence on both Government and public. This process apparently, contracted the authority from the public back to the Government. While Ko's Government had crippled the impotent anti-construction coalition, the conflict among higher officials had been raised by Ko's inconsistency. This political struggle, without doubt, dominated the second half in Mayor Ko's first term, making the Taipei Dome Complex a completely political case.




Figure 20. Decision-Making Process of Taipei Dome Complex(2006~2010)

Source: developed for this study

This transition presented as Figure 20 above addressed the details in this timespan. The changes in government attitudes caused the collapse of the anti-construction coalition, crunching the power to the small group in Ko's government. This, however, drew the hostility from the rival coalition and aroused the conflict among government officials as earlier addressed. Although this seeming crisis damaged Mayor Ko's political career, he did not compromise with it; instead, the burden of politics has guided him into another logics, for fixing this matter through the politics:



“In these gaffes and flip-flops, he entered another logic of politics, which is the logic of consideration of votes, polls, and media exposures(UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

If we assume the politics is to mediate among stakeholders in a real event by redistributing the limited resource for the public, another logic of politics raised by UCSCE07, to the opposite, is to leverage an issue obtaining majority constituencies’ support for the next campaign. Mayor Ko, in this sense, recognized the approval rate from the public and the media exposure as a means to continue his political career, responding to the USCEC07 commented. In other words, Mayor Ko outweighs his political career than other matters. However, this consideration competed with what Mayor Ko believed in early 2015 when he holds the five disputed BOT cases. Contradicting of his positions, Mayor Ko jeopardized himself into the mud when the hesitation of decision-making in the case of Taipei Dome Complex step by step:

“When we were discussing the solution for the Taipei Dome Complex every time. We did come out with some. [For those possible solutions], you know how much official documents were approved by myself? [But,] later, the Mayor thought, “what should I do now?” [At that moment,] Deputy Mayor Lin would suggest another solution. Because, including Commissioner Lin, they are so-called hawks. The Mayor believed in them in a certain period. So, they made the scenario about the maximum capacity of the Taipei Dome Complex [for evacuation inspection]. But it has been discussed since 2015 when they decided to shut down the construction. Now, the problem is still there (UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).”

From UCSCE03’s statement, it is obvious that Mayor Ko could only rely on the professional opinions from his team and barely premeditate each step before actions. Based on what has happened in the first half of his term, this could interpret as the audacious play representing the lucky hit, the lack of

omniscient ability cost him facing questions from public and Farglory Group about the solutions after halting the Taipei Dome Complex Construction. To solve this dispute, terminating the BOT contract was once the sound solution, but the Taipei City Government did not apply it. To answer what causes Mayor Ko to act waveringly about terminating the contract, UCSCE07 identified one crucial factor—the possible litigations:

“Mayor Ko is most afraid of long-term litigation. Then he will involve in legal disputes. That is because of various legal disputes on the contract between Taipei City Government and the Farglory Group. [Besides,] what Mayor Ko confronted is the progress of construction in Taipei Dome Complex. Here, is it possible for him to solve it (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020)?”

Although this statement contradicted with what Mayor Ko’s Commissioner of Legal Affairs once promised they would take action firstly to the anti-construction coalition, the possible indemnity from this litigation

made Mayor Ko indecisive because this action would cost at least 30 billion NTD for taking over the Taipei Dome Complex once the government decided to terminate the contract:

“At that time, 30 billion NTD was on the table [if we want to] take it[the Taipei Dome Complex] over. How does the city government deal with the budget? How could you convince the people? It means all the decision-makings we have made were wrong. So, when you read that minutes of meeting in the City Council, there were lots of debates (UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).”

After Taipei City Government officially gave the due date of improving the safety issues in Taipei Dome Complex for the Farglory Group on March 13, 2015, those debates included terminating part of BOT contract, informing the leading lead bank of syndicated to take over the construction loan, requesting the Farglory Group to revise the safety issues within a time limit, and terminating the entire BOT contract(Chiu, 2015a). Deputy Mayor Teng

declined the first option because the government had suspended the construction, and he claimed unless we are going to tear it down or it is meaningless (Chiu, 2015a). The second option, later, declined by the Deputy of the leading bank, Wan-Hui Lu(呂蕙蓉), because the leading bank did not involve in the dispute of the BOT contract between the Taipei City Government and Farglory Group(Financial Wealth Management Center, 2015). The third option was due until September 8, 2016, when Mayor Ko reached the consensus on seven safety standards with Farglory Group, holding the option of terminating the contract(Chiu & Chang, 2016) Although last one proposed by Shih-Chien Wang(王世堅), a DPP Taipei City Council Member, obtained the support from the City Council on June 19, 2015, it had never been adopted by Mayor Ko(Liberty Times, 2015a). Mayor Ko, to solve such a hot potato without paying a dime to the Farglory Group, chose to negotiate with the Farglory Group to accept the seven public safety standards. This first did not make the Farglory Group yield. Instead of compromising, the Farglory Group thought the scandals of the CEO Zhao could not be the

reason to accuse Taipei Dome Complex of any illegal actions.:

“CEO Zhao thought, “maybe I made a mistake in other cases, but at least I did not do anything wrong with the Taipei Dome Complex” . Since there is nothing wrong from the beginning to the end, why the government wants to suppress us like this? How can I give in? If I did, it means I am wrong(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

Such an unyielding attitude rejected any space to compromise with Taipei City Government while UCSCE11 once suggested doing so. The CEO Zhao refuted it and maintained his own opinion to fight against Taipei City Government for their justice since April 2015:

“I told him that “politicians usually want others to give face; they don’t want to be embarrassed. Look at those four disputed BOT cases. They just involved a little give and take.... So as long as we give them a little, and make them feel that as if they get what is they want.” CEO Zhao, however, questioned that “How do you

know that after we give up, they will not ask us to make the second and third steps? Can you guarantee?" .... Therefore, our entire policy was to go all out with the city government(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020)."

In such zero-sum competition, both City Government and Farglory group would not give it in until one side is willing to compromise. For the Farglory Group, there was almost nothing to lose if they could balance their financial leverage. On the other hand, the Taipei City Government, it did not merely relate to the possible lawsuit, or lack budget, but pertain to Mayor Ko's political reputation and his career. In this regard, proposing an alternative that could meet both expectations, Mayor Ko needs to leverage his limited time as well as his reputation when the approval rating kept dropping. At this critical moment, what Mayor Ko was looking for is timing to make a policy decision, rather than stepping into the lawsuits with Farglory Group. The timing, here, refers to the support from the public as UCSCE07 addressed:

"Both Mayor Hau and Mayor Ko's attitude on this issue were

indecisive. [but,] They did not lack legal tools. In fact, I think what they lack is the policy decision, and this policy decision is probably sufficient for a democratically elected representative. This does not mean that he can be arbitrary. Of course, there are still some members of their decision-making group. I don't think there is a lack of legal tools. Then go a little further, of course, support from the public will involve in the decision-making progress (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020)."

Responding to UCSCE07, from March 2015 to June 2015, the approval ratings of Mayor Ko dropped from 75 percent of satisfaction to 59 percent of satisfaction (Liberty Times, 2015; Tseng & Lin, 2015), causing Mayor Ko to be dubious of making decisions. Indeed, since the Mayor Ko took office in late 2014, his subordinate, including the competent authority of Taipei Dome Complex, ad-hoc investigating the Taipei Dome Complex, and review committees reviewing the Taipei Dome Complex, had provided at least four solutions as earlier presented. Those options were handy for Mayor Ko to



make such a policy decision and to sidestep the possible litigations when his approval ratings were high. From UCESCE07's point, however, even though Mayor Ko lost support from the public, he could release the required documents for further policy discussion, thereby making the approval ratings bounce back.

Considering the approval ratings, however, Mayor Ko had missed at least five timings to look for support from the public. The first timing was when the ad-hoc found public security problems in April 2015(Li, 2018). The second timing was when the Clean Government Committee announced the "Investigation Report of Taipei Dome" in May 2015(Li, 2018). The third timing was when the Building Management Office found seven-nine defects during the construction on May 14, 2015(Li, 2018). Fourth timing was when Shih-Chien, Wang, obtained support from the Taipei City Government for taking over the Taipei Dome Complex on June 19, 2015(Li, 2018). Last and the fifth timing was when he reissued the ultimatum within a three-month deadline improvement to Farglory Group on June 8, 2016(Li, 2018).

From all these five chances, Mayor Ko could place the blame on the Farglory Group because they failed to meet the BOT contract, terminating the contract without indemnity. Mayor Ko, however, missed four times to look for support from the civic society. That is what UCSCE05, UCSCE07, and UCSCE15 had mentioned—civic participation in the decision-making process:

“The reason causing these disputed cases is because of the failure to adjudicate following the *Administrative Procedure Law* and *The Freedom of Government Information Law*....Once you released all the documents, you could host the hearings. Only in this way, it could proceed according to the matters required by the hearing. Why is this government unwilling to conduct a hearing(*UCSCE05, personal communication, February 2, 2020*)?”

UCSCE05 addressed the first type of civic participation—the hearing. Within such a policy discussion platform, even though the perception between the public and government could not reach the consensus, such a

democratic procedure could help the people to comprehend the circumstance of the government. However, the progress of the construction would delay once again. Except for this legal tool, there are other methods to reach the same purpose:

“We need to open that closed policy-decision by the referendum, polls, public forums, and various legal analytic tools. We have these tools to make our political or policy decisions. Whether it is Mayor Hau or Mayor Ko, I think that in such a case like Taipei Dome Complex, as I just said, they had some time to make the decision. I could not say that it was wrong for them if they did not do it. When I was a City Council Member, I just didn’t know how their decision came out because they did not communicate well with civic society by these tools(UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

UCSCE07 repeatedly conveyed the fact that the government does not lack tools to initiate the policy discussion form for the public. This was

precisely an elected official should consider instead of being arbitrary. Mayor Ko, however, decided not to release the chance to discuss with the public, failing his campaign slogan of building an inclusive government because he might fear the loss in the next election:

“He never thought to make it clear to the residents of Taipei, and to let them understand why we should do so. I believe those residents are smart enough. Although the election results may not meet his expectation, for this kind of public issue, people could understand. We have to know how to solve the traffic problems, and to increase the quality of life environment in the future. If he kept his goals down to earth, the residents in the neighborhood would support him. What was he terrified of(UCSCE15, personal communication, February 3, 2020)?”

The imbalance of information between the public and the government caused the misunderstanding of the decision-making process as UCSCE15 concerned, but this could not shake the determination of Ko’s government

pursuing the politics for their interests. Instead of promoting such civic participation to break the deadlock, Mayor Ko herewith missed the last chance to do so. On September 8, 2016, the D-day of the three-month ultimatum while the government officials were making the final confirmation to declare the news of terminating the BOT contract with Farglory Group in an internal meeting, Pi-Ru Tasi, the secretary of the Mayor's office, did one thing that flipped the plan to terminate the BOT contract:

“At the morning meeting, right before we were going to announce the decision of terminating the BOT contract, she stood up and said, “one day, you will leave here, but only me and Wen-Che Ko will stay. Why don't you stand in the Mayor's shoes?” At that movement, we were shocked. Then, they hold the decision (UCSCE04, personal communication, February 17, 2020).”

Since then, Mayor Ko abandoned what he trusted in earlier 2015 by closing the legal dispute in the BOT contract, shifting the battlefield to the Urban Design Committee for guarding the seven safety standards. Within the

decision-making of renegotiating with the Farglory Group on September 8, 2016, those alternative plans (see Taipei City Government(2016a)) for solving the safety issues made by Deputy Mayor Lin, Commissioner Lin, and other ad hoc members were in vain because the Urban Design Committee could not enforce the Farglory Group to follow the alternatives. To resolve the safety issues, Commissioner Lin held his position as a professional architect to review the Taipei Dome Complex from October 17, 2017, to November 1, 2018. During a certain time, five meetings were held—including three Executive Meetings, the 506<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee Meeting, and the 510<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee(Taipei City Government, 2017; Taipei City Government, 2018; Taipei City Government, 2018a; Taipei City Government, 2018b; Taipei City Government, 2018c). In these four meetings, the simulation of the evacuation plan was repeatedly discussed, but failing the communication between the committee and Farglory Group because both sides hold different opinion toward the simulation:

“I always mentioned this to Commissioner Lin. The simulation is

a reference, and the discussion will start only after the simulation.

Therefore, because we know that the scenario is essential for disaster prevention, so when you start the scenario, it must have a solid basis. We will start the discussion by reviewing the scenario (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

For UCSCE01, the simulation offers the real scenario that helps the committee members to review the detail of the design so that it will find the optimal way to revise the design for meeting the requirements of the safety standards. The discussion, here, indicates the communication between both sides because the Urban Design Committee is the venue for exchanging opinions for producing the ultimate compromising design. To the contrary, the Farglory Group recognized the simulation should not include into the scope of review in the Urban Design Committee:

“As you have already known, the “computer simulation” has been arguing for a while in the Urban Design Committee. This is a critical point in those meetings, but no one went to check if the

review scope in the Urban Design committee includes computer simulation. It is not in the review scope. Computer simulations are not included in the necessary item for the Urban Design Committee (UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).

Here, as we had addressed in the 4.2, the review committee has such a flexible review scope, including the one requested by public safety ad-hoc led by Deputy Mayor Lin. Therefore, what Urban Design Committee needs to clarify is not only items listed on the *2019 Taipei City Urban Design and Land Use Development License Review Committee Review Reference Examples* but also those that are not covered by the current Urban Design Review system. In other words, the Urban Design Review system is not as rigid as the Building Permit Review because the former one offers such a field for the designer and committee members to reach the consensus on the project. In contrast, the latter represents the highly regulated codes that are almost impossible to negotiate. Besides, UCSCE01 emphasized that both EIA Review and Urban Design Review systems are the platforms to introduce new



design concepts and other art-of-state technics for meeting the current demands and for preparing future issues:

“Taiwan is a country with rigid laws. Therefore, all our laws must be reviewed by the Legislative Yuan before they could implement it. However, our laws and regulations are twenty years behind reality. That thing must be made up, how can it be made up? That is to make up for this review. Therefore, this review, including the Urban Design Review, including the Environmental Impact Assessment Review. It is not a rigid review. The rigid review is based on items. If you want to rigid review, you don’t need to review it. Because once we check it on the list, we have known the result. If the case didn’t meet the list, they just took it back to revise. Therefore, that is the work for the building permit review. The Urban Design Review and the Environmental Impact Assessment Review are flexible reviews. Through these reviews, we can bring in new knowledge and new technic. After bringing in new concepts,

at least apply the current concepts to deal with future issues (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

For implementing the new knowledge and new technic, UCSC01 expressed a firm opinion about how this review system could make a supplement to current status. The urban disaster prevention, in this sense, should include in this project because the Taipei Dome Complex is the first sports-mega project with 40,000 seats in Taiwan. On the other hand, the position hold by Farglory Group indicated the Urban Design Review is:

“Commissioner Lin was very persistent, and he just didn’t want to approve this case. Therefore, he often puts forward some unreasonable parts in the review process and will use another terminology “urban disaster prevention.” However, from our perspective, I don’t know what this project has to do with “urban disaster prevention,” or what is called “urban disaster prevention.” This is not related to this case (UCSCE11, personal communication,

February 5, 2020).”

The lack of agreement to include the urban disaster prevention as an item in the review scope led the worst scenario to happen since the communication between both sides has not at the same level, causing no progress during these four Urban Design Committee meetings. For further explaining the reason why the committee members emphasized on the result of the simulation, UCSCE01 offers two key facts:

“The first is about the hardware [in this case]. I can check up your design through the simulation. The second relates to the software. [That is,] how do people’s behavior and psychology involve in this review, and how do they interact with such a space [in the Taipei Dome Complex]. Every venue has to do so before it starts to operate in the world. Let’s assume the result of the simulation may not meet our expectations. We, then, need to revise the design based on that result (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

UCSCE01 renders the simulation is an essential reference for the Taipei Dome Complex for revising the design. On the surface of it, the design revision represents the importance of aesthetics and rational analysis. When it comes to real events, however, this revision means how much human life we can save if the emergency happened in this venue:

“What I care about is the safety of the people. Every life matters in Taipei. So, how could you act so sloppy to this issue? The Farglory Group even told us that if you want to enter the Taipei Dome [for a baseball match], you should be here at 3 O’clock in the afternoon. You can check that minutes of the meeting, and their transportation consultants came up and said that the audience has to enter at that time. Is there such an exaggerated management style in the world(UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020)?”

The intriguing result from the simulation raised more safety-related concerns from the Urban Design Committee because the more detail they

checked, the more loophole they found in the design of the Taipei Dome Complex. This turns into another mud between the Urban Design Committee and the Farglory Group:

“If you check their traffic simulation, you can find both Keelung Rd. and ZhongXiao East Rd. are empty. It is not simulation because your event will not be held at that time. So, from the beginning to the end, you can check my statements. I have been talking about the scenario. The scenario is the key to this case. Everyone [, unfortunately,] imagines the completely different scenario(UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

For a further explanation of this concept, the UCSCE01 addressed the scenario in the context of the environment at the time you set. This definition provides the clue of how the local context affects the operation of Taipei Dome Complex as well as the risk to the surroundings where the neighborhood is for thousands of populations and is one of the most popular locations in downtown Taipei. In this sense, all the simulations represent

different scenarios, containing various settlements of parameters based on the different local contexts. Still, the real situation in the field of Urban Design Review was:

“Simulation is all about the settings of parameters. I can tell you that my simulation will pass the review because I only need to adjust some parameters. But, for experts, they will examine whether the parameters are reasonable, revising the design based on the result of simulation. So, when we checked their simulation, we focused on those crowded nodes because they could not complete the evacuation in a certain period, so we need either to widen the aisles or to dispatch these people to other nodes (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

The parameters determine whether the result of the simulation closes to reality in the local context. If the settings fail to meet the real events, the unexpected outcome from the accident may cause risk to human life and the city environment. In this regard, UCSCE01 gave an example of how the

simulation works in the case of the Taipei Dome Complex:

“I care about how the people leave the building with the most reasonable distribution way as well as in the shortest time. This is step one. After the step of leaving the building is completed, the second step will gather in the square, right? But is my square enough for so many people to stay? The scenario is different depending on the time. Assuming the baseball match will start at 18:30, the entry time would be around 16:30 to 17:00. Is it the rush hour for both ZhongXiao East Road and Guangfu South Road? In case some emergencies happened, when these two major roads are packed by cars in either before the game or after the game, are they going to evacuate right away and stay in that square because they could not get out on the packed roads. This is step two, is the capacity of space enough to keep everyone? The third step is, how do these people leave the Taipei Dome Complex? We are talking about safety, and they must integrate these three steps [with one

solid evacuation plan] (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).

Based on these three steps, UCSCE01 conveys critical information about how the Urban Design Committee reviews the urban disaster prevention in terms of site planning and other support measurements from surroundings. In this sense, UCSCE01 offered the other clear statement for identifying the scope of safety issues in the Taipei Dome Complex:

“Three steps as I mentioned: from indoor to outdoor, and from outdoor to our of the Taipei Dome Complex. For those indoor [safety issues], I have always emphasized that it is not my focus. I just want to know how much time they need to evacuate from indoors to outdoor space. Because the Taiwan Architecture & Building Center took the responsibility to review *the Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety* in the buildings, the focus of urban disaster prevention is on outdoor spaces. The Farglory Group, however, did not tell us how many people came



out of the building. How do I know how many people are in the outdoor space? Therefore, I regard it as a prerequisite. You have to tell me that people can evacuate from the building, and then [tell me] how many people gather in this [outdoor] spaces (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

In other words, instead of focusing on the buildings, the Urban Design Committee adopts a macro perspective to examine whether the possible evacuation space would have enough capacity for the people from indoor to outdoor space in the Taipei Dome Complex to leave the lot safely. Responding to the Urban Design Committee, UCSCE11 maintained the position in the design of Taipei Dome Complex:

“They do not believe our simulations [to the Taipei Dome Complex]. Is it that dangerous? Let’s say Mayor Hau forced us to reduce the total floor area around 33,000m<sup>2</sup>[in 2011]. Let’s be more realistic. Mayor Ko only asked us to lower the total floor area around 330m<sup>2</sup>. Does it matter to the safety issue? It is all about

politics. From the beginning to the end, that traffic, safety, and other issues are not problems if we view it professionally (UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

In the sense of UCSCE11, the safety issue is always related to politics, not to mention the detailed review scope of safety issues. The different standpoints toward the meaning of urban disaster management not only failed the communication for both sides but also raised the most controversial conflicts to reach the consensus on the number of the maximum capacity of the Taipei Dome Complex for doing evacuation simulation. According to Taipei City Government(2018), the Farglory Group set the amount of the maximum capacity of the Taipei Dome Complex was 140,669 persons in total, while the evacuation number was only 53,733 persons in total(Taipei City Government, 2018). This was corrected by later Supreme Administrative Court Decision No. 315 2018. According to the Court Decision, when the Farglory Group operates the Taipei Dome Complex, the total number of maximum capacity should accord with the conclusion from the EIA Review,

which is 59,833 persons in total (Taipei Dome Complex Construction, 2018). Although the 506<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee set 59,833+X—the 59833 persons represent indoor capacity, and X means possible outdoor persons—as the total number of maximum capacity for people in the domed-stadium and other space in the complex, Farglory Group, however, proposed 70,000+13733 as the maximum capacity in 510<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee Meetings(Taipei City Government, 2018b;Taipei City Government, 2018c; Lin, 2019).

This inconsistent number of maximum capacities would cause the Farglory Group to redo the EIA Review because the EIA review obtained a higher legal position than Urban Design Review, as presented in Section 2 in Chapter 4. Besides, the different number of maximum capacities not merely lead to the discrepancies in each simulation, it represented the uncertainty of the risk management when emergencies happened. For solving this deadlock for both sides, Wen-Tsung Li(李文宗), the Director in Mayor's office, holds two internal meetings with higher officials—including Chou-Min Lin; Li-

Che Li(李再立), Commissioner of Department of Sports; Shiu-Hiu Yuan(袁秀慧), Commissioner of Legal Affairs; Che-Yang Chang(張哲揚), Chief Secretary of Taipei; Min-Long Liu(劉銘龍), Commissioner of Environmental Protection Bureau; Shi-Hao Chen(陳世浩), the Representative of Taipei Dome Complex Preparation Office; Chun-Hong Wu(吳俊鴻), Commissioner of Fire Department— on November 6, 2018, and November 29, 2018, for discussion for the solution of Taipei Dome Complex in terms of the maximum capacity (Lin, 2019).

In the first meeting, Wen-Tsung Li warned that if Chou-Min Lin still maintains his rigid review style, it will seriously affect the sale price of the Taipei Dome Complex(Lin, 2019). When it came to the second meeting, Wen-Tsung Li requested Chou-Min Lin to modify the conclusion made in the 506<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee, but Commissioner Lin rejected it because it does not follow the administrative procedure(Lin, 2019). According to Lin(2019), Wen-Tsung Li clearly stated, “if Commissioner Lin maintains his tough position to review the Taipei Dome Complex, it will affect the sale

price of Taipei Dome Complex” . It implies the reason why Farglory Group raised the maximum capacity is to increase possible profit in the near future. Besides, the Farglory Group would sue the Taipei City Government if the government lower the maximum capacity(Lin, 2019). Responding to Wen-Tsung Li’s statements, Commissioner Lin claimed that the reviewer does not need to consider the potential profit of the Taipei Dome Complex and that both Environmental Impact Assessment and Urban Design should be consistent with the same number for maximum capacity: 59833+X(Lin, 2019). If Farglory Group wants to change the amount of maximum capacity in Urban Design Committee, it should submit an analysis of the difference between current environmental conditions and environmental conditions at the time its development activity based on Article 16-1 in *Environmental Impact Assessment Act*(Lin, 2019):

“When a developer starts development activity more than three years after the approval of its environmental impact statement or environmental impact assessment report and the acquisition of

development activity permission granted by the industry competent authority, the developer shall submit an analysis of the difference between current environmental conditions and environmental conditions at the time its development activity permission was granted and a strategy evaluation report to the competent authority for review. A development activity may not start prior to the completion of the review by the competent authority (Environmental Impact Assessment Act, 2003).”

On December 11, 2018, it was fourteen days before Chou-Min Lin forced to leave the Government (Lin, 2019). Because of the gridlock in this case, Che-Yang Chang and Wen-Tsung Li said to Chou-Min Lin that “once Chou-Min Lin quit the Commissioner of Urban Development, the review of Taipei Dome Complex would be easier to approve” (Lin, 2019). On December 24, 2018, Wen-Che Ko successfully continued his office, removing Chou-Min Lin from the Commissioner of Urban Development. Here, UCSCE04 stated the change of Wen-Che Ko from 2014 to 2018:

“Mayor Ko took office on December 25, 2014, and it has now been five years. Five years and two months. When Mayor Ko was campaigning, pointing at the Taipei Dome Complex was a scandal during the 2014 election. From December 25, 2014, to the end of 2016, he still insisted that the contract and the design of the Taipei Dome Complex have great controversial rooms to fix. From the beginning of 2017 to the day when his first term ended, it was December 24, 2018, Mayor Ko’s behavior, however, was no different from Mayor Ma and Mayor Hau(UCSCE04, personal communication, February 17, 2020).

That is to say, after 2018, the second term of Mayor Ko did not bring the change to Taipei, but leading this civilized city back to the old times as it experienced under Mayor Ma and Mayor Hau. After Commissioner Lin was forced to leave the Taipei City Government, the safety issues in Taipei Dome Complex was still pending to be redressed by the Mayor Ko’s team.

#### 4.2.6. Decision-making Process(2018~)

Since 2018, the anti-construction coalition had disintegrated, the pro-construction coalition had obtained the control for leading the future directions of the Taipei Dome Complex. While the Ko's government and other pro-construction alliances had determined to implement the Taipei Dome Complex(see Figure 21), the safety issues—including the disputed evacuation simulation, the number of the maximum capacity in the Taipei Dome Complex, and the examination of fire compartment in staircases—are pending for the Urban Design Committee to review, for carrying out the construction of Taipei Dome Complex. To clarify the exact circumstances in each safety issue, Chin-Mao, Huang(黃景茂), the new Commissioner of Urban Development, hosts another five review meetings to discuss the abovementioned issues.






Figure 21. Decision-Making Process of Taipei Dome Complex(2018~)

Source: developed for this study

First, the 514<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee Meeting on January 3, 2019, maintained the decision with the 506<sup>th</sup> Meetings on September 20, 2018, that the number of maximum capacities is 59,833+X persons in the Taipei Dome Complex(the L-shape lot, see Taipei City Government(2011a) in Appendix IV), but reaching a new consensus on the settings of parameters (Taipei City Government, 2019b). According to Taipei City Government (2019b), the parameters of simulation need to fulfill the requirements listed below:

1) The walking speed of people who are in the simulation should be

*1.2m/s(Taipei City Government, 2019b).*

- 2) Three persons per square meter should inspect the density of the evacuation space. The calculation of the outdoor area should be deducted if there is a difference in height, including planting, stair steps, etc. (Taipei City Government, 2019b).*
- 3) The time parameter accords to the standard with the Taiwan Architecture & Building Center(Taipei City Government, 2019b).*
- 4) Please set various disaster conditions, such as earthquake, fire, terrorist attack, etc., for confirming the number and location of evacuation entrances and exits when different types of disasters occurred(Taipei City Government, 2019b).*
- 5) 0.6 m/s as the speed of evacuation and walking in crowded conditions, and the density of the evacuation space should be inspected by one person per square meter (Taipei City Government, 2019b).*

The reason for proposing these standards was because some committee

members noticed the simulation was not right in previous review meetings, as UCSC01 observed:

“Based on their simulation, the evacuation speed of 59,833 persons is as same as 70,000 persons. This is a world record. So you know they might move behind those numbers. How could 59833 people evacuate at the same speed rate as 70,000 people? This is such a simple logic(UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

Following on the standard, it initiated a possible communication to bridge the Urban Design Committee and the Farglory Group instead of concerning about the story behind the simulation. The other reason is all the simulation is the prospective affection to the reality from future events in the Taipei Dome Complex:

“For me, I am more concerned about what will happen. That is, how the evacuation plan works. Let’s assume a large-scale earthquake happen right now, should those people in the Cultural and Creative

Park escape from it? If so, you cannot assume anybody there. You cannot say the people there have nothing to do with you, does it(UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020)?”

This statement refers to the scope of review in the Taipei Dome Complex since the dispute on the area covered by the evacuation plan was disputed since 2018(Taipei City Government, 2018; Taipei City Government, 2019b ). While the block where Taipei Dome Complex situated had next to the Songshan Cultural and Creative Park, the decision of 514<sup>th</sup> meetings emphasize on the people in the area of Taipei Dome Complex. This, however, does not mean the Farglory Group could ignore the possible crowds in the Park, but taking those people staying outdoor into account.

When the Urban Design Committee brought these on the table in the 521<sup>st</sup> Meetings on March 28, 2019, the committee set up the bottom-line for the Taipei Dome Complex by meeting three requirements: a sound evacuation simulation, the resolution to the route of disaster relief in the north side of the Taipei Dome Complex, and the parking and dispatching plan for fifty-seven

buses in the north side of the Taipei Dome Complex (Taipei City Government, 2019c). The fact that fifty-seven parking buses are impractical because the road located on the north side of the Taipei Dome Complex does not have enough capacity for those buses. Responding to this, UCSCE01 stated that:

“We have a lot of students carrying their architectural model from the northern side to enter into [the Songshan Cultural and Creative Park, for participating in the exhibition every year.] Is it possible to park [fifty-seven] tour buses there? This is called reality. But when all your things are ignorant of reality, there is no room to talk about it(UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

The statement raised by UCSCE01 offers an insight based on his observation and life experience when using the Songshan Cultural and Creative Park as an exhibition hall for students' open house. Also, this road relates to the disaster relief issue because the road width does not meet the *Principles for Designing Disaster Relief Space for Fire Fighting Vehicles*(Taipei City Government, 2019c). According to *Principles for*

*Designing Disaster Relief Space for Fire Fighting Vehicles*(2013), the minimum road width for the Taipei Dome Complex should be eight meters wide, while the current road width is less than the requirement(Taipei City Government, 2019c). Regarding this, the UCSCE11 made a supplement to this regulation:

“About the fire lane, it is more than professional. Our regulations require four and a half meters. However, we are forced to elevate that standard from four and a half meters to eight meters. But we can only reach a maximum of six meters as a result of the Songshan Tobacco Factory where has a lot of *Liquidambar formosana* in the north side of the Taipei Dome Complex. Six meters herewith is still exceeds our legal standards (UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

UCSCE11 refers its statement to the Subparagraph 2 of Article 1 in *Principles for Designing Disaster Relief Space for Fire Fighting Vehicles* that buildings, where are over 6 floors, should at least maintain four meters in

width and four and a half meters in height for firefighting vehicles (Principles for Designing Disaster Relief Space for Fire Fighting Vehicles, 2013). On the other hand, the Taipei City Government(2019c) maintained that the fire lane should conform with the Subparagraph 2 of Article 2 for specific requirements because the maximum number of floors in the Taipei Dome Complex is 20 floors:

“[Space for Aerial Ladder Fire Truck,] Buildings above 6 floors but not up to 10 floors should be 6 meters wide and 15 meters long; buildings above 10 floors should be 8 meters wide and 20 meters long(Principles for Designing Disaster Relief Space for Fire Fighting Vehicles, 2013).”

In other words, the north side of the Taipei Dome Complex may fit the usual circumstances for fire engines, while the whole complex comprised of theater, hotel, office building, and department store may need much more space for fire relief vehicles. Although UCSCE01 proposed the same concern during the 521<sup>st</sup> meeting, the UCSCE11 refuted the possible safety concern

and proposed another bus dispatching method to make sure the capacity is enough for carrying all buses(Department of Urban Development, 2019). Regarding this, the UCSCE11 offers a concern about the committee members' profession:

“I hope the committee members use their profession in transportation, in architecture, or in evacuation simulation, rather than crossing the line to the other profession, for proposing any possible idea of revision. If so, anyone can be the committee member. This is the most annoying thing in the review procedure. Of course, I have to say committee members hold their position. Some members may support the case, while others do not support it(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020)”.

The decision of the 521<sup>st</sup> meeting firstly respected the plan, which will come out with a detailed guideline before the operation of the domed-stadium, proposed by the Department of Transportation and Fire Department (Taipei City Government, 2019c). Also, the committee requested the Farglory Group



to submit the digital file of evacuation simulation for further examination because the simulation did not follow the required parameters (Taipei City Government, 2019c).

All of these decisions, however, did not resolve in the 530<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee Meeting on May 30, 2019. First, the evacuation simulation did not meet the required parameters—including the speed of evacuation set from 0.8m/s to 1.2m/s instead of 0.6m/s; the maximum capacity was 70000+X instead of 59833+X(Taipei City Government, 2019d). Second, the route of disaster relief in the north side of Taipei Dome Complex needs the Department of Sports to confirm whether the Farglory Group had ever submitted related documents in September 2011(Taipei City Government, 2019d). Third, although Farglory Group asserted the traffic issues could be solved if the Taipei Metro increases the shift, this did not meet the leader of Shin-Ren Villiage's expectation(Taipei City Government, 2019d). Despite these established decisions, after checking the Article 97 in the *Building Technical Regulations*, Taipei City Government(2019d) stated

that the 530<sup>th</sup> Meeting raised a vital issue about the outdoor escape ladder located in the basement first conforms *the verification in Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac* on June 8, 2017.

Based on Table 20 and Taipei City Construction and Management Office(2018), the outdoor escape ladder located in the basement first in the Taipei Dome Complex cannot be exempted from the Article 97 and Article 127 in the *Building Technical Regulations* because the Taiwan Architecture & Building Center claimed the Ministry of Interior has never authorized them to review *Plan of Performance-based Design of Fire Safety and Evac* for exempting from those two articles(Taipei City Construction and Management Office, 2018). The Taipei City Construction and Management Office, therefore, had informed the Farglory Group to revise the escape ladder based on the Article 97 in the *Building Technical Regulations*(Taipei City Construction and Management Office, 2018). Regarding this, if the Farglory Group rejected to revise those eleven escape ladders—including ST-433, ST-434, ST-121, ST-442, ST-443, ST-439, ST-436, ST-435, ST-127, ST-128, ST-

430—to meet the Article 97, the Farglory Group would not be possible to obtain the building permit license(Department of Urban Development, n.d).

This, however, was overruled by the Taipei Dome Complex Meeting on August 15, 2019. The participants are the representatives from Taipei City Government and Farglory Group(Taipei City Government, 2019a). The representatives from Taipei City Government include Che-Yang Chang, Ming-Long Liu, Shi-Yu Lo(羅世譽) who is the Deputy Commissioner of Department of Urban Development, and Chi-Xue, Yu who is the Deputy Chief Engineer in the Taipei City Construction and Management Office, while the representatives of Farglory Group include Wen-Chia, Zhao(趙文嘉) who is the CEO, Chia-Feng Tang(湯佳峯) who is General Manager, Shun-Chin Yang(楊順欽) who is the Deputy Manager, and Xin-Xien Chen(陳星憲) who is the project manager(Taipei City Government, 2019a).

During this meeting, both sides reached three significant consensuses. First, Farglory Group agrees to use 59,833 persons as the maximum capacity for the evacuation simulation, and the revising proposal will conform

*Regulations on the Capacity of Specific Places in Taipei City* to regulate the department store and cinema in the Taipei Dome Complex(Taipei City Government, 2019a). This, however, contradicts with the Supreme Administrative Court Decision in 2018 about the maximum capacity in the Taipei Dome Complex should be 59,833 persons.

Second, after following all the required review procedure, the government agrees to issue the building permit and to resume the construction; meanwhile, if the Taipei City Construction and Management Office concerns about Article 97 in the Building Technical Regulations, it could be controlled by the government and could request the Farglory Group to revise it before obtaining the building use permit(Taipei City Government, 2019a). This statement does not conform to the position of Taipei City Construction and Management Office, as aforementioned.

Third, the Taipei Dome may not be used for any purpose other than the original authorized building use permit; if there are such cases, Farglory Group should apply for the provisional application to the Taipei City

Government (Taipei City Government, 2019a). Apparently, this violates the Article 127 in the *Building Technical Regulation*, which is the floors below the evacuation floor, the auditorium seat should be within 7 meters below the ground of the lot or road surface because the auditorium seat in the Taipei Dome is 10.5 meters below the ground and the road surface (Department of Urban Development, n.d). In addition, the UCSCE04 criticized this consensus based on the Taipei Dome Complex Operation Plan:

“40 percent of the fifty-year operating period is non-sports activities. Farglory Group could apply for provisional application every time when they host those non-sports activities. How can they do this? If there are 99 percent of the activity relating to sports and only 1 percent of them are non-sports ones, then I can apply for that. Sports will not make money, but Jay Chou ’s Fans Club will. Taipei Dome Complex is very likely to account for more than 40% of the activity relating to non-sports. Let me ask you, as a competent authority, when I see that 40% of total activity in your

executive plan as non-sports. Could I issue a building use permit for sports activities? How could I do so (UCSCE04, personal communication, February 17, 2020)?”

Apart from the disputed building use permit, Although the Article 97 and 127 in the Building Technical Regulations represent the last straw that breaks the camel's back, the UCSCE04 had been discussed this with Mayor Ko:

“Mayor Ko once asked me what kind of official letter [from the Ministry of Interior] would make me grant the building permit [to the Farglory Group]. I replied, “unless the Ministry of Interior initiated an official letter indicates that the Taipei Dome Complex meets Article 97 and 127.” After Mayor Ko checked the contents of the letter [written by myself], he said, “that is not possible for the Ministry of Interior.” I know it because we do not need to change the regulation for an enterprise (UCSCE04, personal communication, February 17, 2020).”

In UCSCE04’s opinion, there is no room for the Taipei City Government

to negotiate with Farglory Group based on Article 97 and 127. It must redesign for two reasons: first, it should conform with the legal regulations; second, it should be revised for the safety issues in the Taipei Dome Complex.

While these disputed regulations remain unknown for future directions, in this case, the 534<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee on August 29, 2019, kept examining the result of evacuation simulation, the route of disaster relief, and the dispatching plan for fifty-seven buses (Taipei City Government, 2019e).

Here, the committee members confirmed the disaster relief plan, the intelligent traffic management in operation plan, the dispatching plan for buses, and 4 out of 6 scenarios of the simulation(Taipei City Government, 2019e). The other two scenarios were pending for the examinations from software developers because those scenarios caused the simulation software, the EXODUS, to shutdown under specific settings of parameters (Taipei City Government, 2019e). To comment on the reason for the shutdown, the UCSCE01 hold the position to criticize the profession of Urban Design Review:

“First, the scope Urban Design Review does not include computer simulation, but the government requested us to do so. It’s okay. However, they set some conditions while doing evacuation simulation. You found those recommended parameters caused the whole system to shut down, making the software company laugh at us. From the perspective of the profession, no one changes those settings, but our committee members did so and brought the whole system to shutdown. This is not even a profession(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).

On the other hand, when the 534<sup>th</sup> Meeting is the first Urban Design Committee Meeting reviewing the commuter simulation, it drew attention from Chou-Min Lin. As the former Commissioner of Urban Development, he criticized the result of the computer simulation should use for design revision instead of being the bottom-line for the Urban Design Committee (Chang & Yu, 2019). Besides, he indicated that the optimal scenario simulated by the Farglory Group—which only simulate people were packed in either domed-



stadium or department store, leaving the cinema or any other settings in the department store that might cause the evacuation to be difficult—failed to meet the reality because no committee members expertized in a computer simulation(Chang & Yu, 2019). Responding to this, Chin-Mao Huang, the Commissioner of Urban Development, stated the Urban Design Committee would keep the professional review in this case and hire Tsung-Xi, Hsu(許宗熙), who is architecture as the consultant to review those simulations(Chang & Yu, 2019).

To solve this dispute, the Department of Urban Development mailed to the software company for inquiring the reason of shutdown when simulating the scenario 1(the optimal situation) and scenario 2(the worst situation) on September 24, 2019(Taipei City Government, 2019e). One week before the 538<sup>th</sup> Urban Design Committee Meetings on October 14, 2019, the Taipei City Government host an Urban Disaster Prevention Computer Simulation Meeting on October 7, 2019, to decide that the shutdown was caused by both unreasonable parameter combination and the limitation of the EXODUS and

that the committee should base on those four confirmed scenarios to discuss the strategies toward specific nodes(Taipei City Government, 2019g). Within the consensus from October 7, 2019, during the 538<sup>th</sup> Meetings, Commissioner Huang rendered this case has been thoroughly discussed by the committee members, deciding to conditionally approve the Taipei Dome Complex because there were not necessary to review the simulations(Department of Urban Development, 2019). This decision raised the anger from Chien-De, Wu(吳建德), the Leader of Shin-Ren Village who has concerned about this case for six-year, shouted at Commissioner Huang with “ Now, I understand how your transparency works”(Taipei City Government, 2019f; Department of Urban Development, 2019a).

Reviewing all the procedure from Commissioner Lin to Commissioner Huang, the UCSCE01 commented about the following changes of the government, although the UCSCE01 are still confused about the nuances between both commissioners:

“First, I think the Taipei City Government had misunderstood. I

didn't know if Commissioner Huang 's information was not clear enough after taking office because I resigned after only following him once. But, but ... I think they were not clear about the logic of public safety. Instead, he emphasized the very trivial details (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

Even Commissioner Huang's agenda was different from former Commissioner Lin; it caused by unknown reasons because the simulation was from a reference for the design revision to a bottom-line of the Urban Design Committee Review. Besides, from UCSCE01's point of view, the Farglory Group has never met the requirements from the committee because they have never revised their design:

“I have never met a company that does not want to revise the design.

The Farglory Group, however, had never done it. We have numerous meetings; they had never revised the design. It means no matter how hard you try, and they would not give you any responses (UCSCE01, personal communication, February 13, 2020).”

Responding to this approval with conditions, although UCSCE04 renders this is the most abominable decision in the history of Taiwan, he simply commented about the endless controversy of the Taipei Dome Complex in the future:

“It was partial to the Farglory Group. However, things are not over.

The safety issues have not been reviewed yet. This issue will continue to be verified (UCSCE04, personal communication, February 17, 2020).”

As earlier addressed by UCSCE04, the so-called public safety issues are relating to Article 127 and Article 97 in *Building Technical Regulations*. According to the current design, the Taipei Dome Complex will not meet both Articles, which are fire protection, and the auditorium seat should set within 7 meters. To solve this problem, the government planned to allow the Farglory group to apply provisional application while hosting non-sports activities so that the Building Management Office could issue the building use permit once the Taipei Dome

Complex completed (Taipei City Government, 2019a). This, however, could cause a severe violation of the conduct of building use permit.

To explain the reason why Ko's Government was eager to pace up the administrative procedure, it is not only the changes of the government attitude but also those people who simply want an answer to the Taipei Dome. That is, both advocacy coalitions were collapsed due to this long-war. Nor had the civic force been drained out or the City Council Members chose to put their effort on other issues instead of struggling on this dying issue:

“One reason is the city government. I felt the will of the government; that is, they had no rooms to discuss with you. Although they looked very polite, they had no intention of stepping back. Second, I feel that the support of this society is not to solve the problems of Taipei Dome Complex; instead, everyone just wants to have an answer as soon as possible (UCSCE09, personal communication, February 11, 2020).”

That is, during this long-war, the external forces, which represent an essential variable to affect the decision-making process, had no longer aroused unexpected events to influence the institutional rules. In this case, the public once supported the government in solving this case because they want social justice. The government apparatus, however, led by the Mayor of Taipei, leading the Taipei Dome Complex toward the final stage of construction by a power mechanism to meet the construction-related regulations.

Regarding this, the Taipei City Government somehow compromised with the Farglory Group by making loose regulations. By far, there is no way to predict the future of Taipei Dome, but its decision-making process, as this research has discussed, leaving a huge question mark on its public safety issues, on its administrative procedures, and its purpose of development activity. After all, this decision-making process, through these 30 years, had never changed since there are no other external events to stipulate the possible to change, for revising an inclusive decision-making mechanism in our

society. Within this in mind, two members in the anti-construction coalition stated the disappointment to all of the decision-making process:

“In the past few years, I felt that there was only a position, only a political position, and no professionalism(UCSCE10, personal communication, February 12, 2020).

“I think that when it involves too much interest, you are bound to be disappointed with the decision-making mechanism. You will be disappointed. There is no way. The structure of Taiwan ’s government seems to be disappointing (UCSCE06, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

Both interviewees pinpointed the structure of the government where centralizes the power of decision-making and the rule of politics in Taiwan where fails to achieve the vision of social justice. In part, the highly politicized Taipei Dome Complex construction demonstrates how politics affect the decision-making process. Responding to this, the UCSCE11 offers the other perspective to this case:

“To be honest, the DPP caucus in Taipei City Council has never reached the consensus about the controversy of Taipei Dome Complex since 2006(UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).”

UCSCE11 listed three critical reasons for the statement: first, from Mayor Hau to Mayor Ko, DPP has moved its stand from real opposition party to a relatively neutral position; second, the complexity of the Taipei Dome Complex controversy brings about the differences in supervision among the DPP City Council Members; third, the variations of personal standpoint among DPP City Council Members(UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020). For the first reason, the differences in political parties endow the check and balance between the ruling party and the opposition party. KMT and DPP, especially, are long-term political rivals since the 1970s. It was because Mayor Ko, who was lifted as the Mayor of Taipei by DPP, caused the DPP City Council Members to wait and see. When it goes to the second reason, the numerous controversies in Taipei Dome Complex—



including BOT contract, construction, environmental issues, etc.—furthered explained how those members choose their topic of interest, increasing the difficulty of consensus (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020). Third, the internal differences among DPP City Council Members either choose to support this project or fight against it because the DPP City Council Members have their autonomy:

“The DPP Taipei City Branch has no contact with the DPP Headquarter. Therefore, there is no guiding relationship between the branch and the headquarter in the case of the Taipei Dome Complex. The differences in attitudes were formed within the party members because they do have their judgments, personal connections, and considerations about their constituencies (UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).

Rather than the will of the political party, the seeming result of the Taipei Dome Complex caused by the political struggle is the outcome of the power of the Taipei City Government since Mayor Ma to Mayor Hau. Following the

UCSCE07's point of view, the critical factor that affects the decision-making process is the Mayors involving in this case because they obtain the absolute power to decide whether to carry out the Taipei Dome Complex or not. Apparently, the Mayor Ko decided to carry this case out with courage when Commissioner Huang conditionally approved this with valor on October 14, 2019(Liu, 2019), while the traffic, light pollution, and the design of fire protection are pending to solve.

On March 25, 2020, even three Taipei City Council Members—Shu-Pei, Chien(簡舒蓓), Shu-Hua, Hsu(許淑華), and Liang-Chun, Lin(林亮君)—repeatedly raised the issues of possible traffic for Guanfu South Rd. Caused by the new parking lot entrance, of the light pollution from the reflection of the rooftop of Taipei Dome Complex to Guangfu Elementary School, and of the design of fire protection among eleven staircases as aforementioned, respectively (Department of Environmental Protection, 2020). The 221<sup>st</sup> EIA Review Committee, however, conditionally approved the Taipei Dome Complex without proposing another EIA Investigation Report to Farglory

Group because the Farglory Group promised they would take care of those issues (Taipei City Government, 2020). After the Farglory Group completed all of the review procedures, the government is ready to reissue the building permit to them on June 22, 2020, and ready to resume the construction in August 2020(Kuo, 2020), meeting the consensus on August 15, 2019, leaving all other pending issues abovementioned behind.

#### 4.3. Conflict Issues in the Decision-making Process

By adopting the policy network model, it is clear to review the changes in policy networks and the policy change from 1998 to nowadays. As the figure presented, from 1998 to 2006, Mayor Ma simply controlled all the information in order to promote the implementation of the Taipei Dome Complex(see Figure 22). While there were opposing groups against this policy, It was not that effective to shack the policy network occupied by other powerful decision-makers. It was mainly relied on an external event, the scandal during the tender process, to raise the public awareness of this issue.

When it comes to the period of Mayor Hau, this, however, did not impact gathering the opposing groups because the relationship among opposing groups was relatively loose and strategic. Based on this structure of the organization, although the opposing group could not have a significant influence on the case, they could obtain part of the information from the City Council Member.

After Mayor Hau successfully continued the office in 2010, he comprehensively controls the policy network for meeting the government attitude. At the beginning of Mayor Ko, however, he once adopted relative progressive coordination with the civic group to solve the Taipei Dome Complex. Because of the consideration of political career, Mayor Ko changed his way, which tore apart the civic society, thereby disintegrating the anti-coalition group. Although the policy change, based on Taiwan's distribution of power, has been challenged, the accessibility of Data has increased because of the prosperity of the internet.

Through this process, we could observe three types of manipulation in

decision-making. These three are interconnected among stakeholders from the P/L1 to P/L 3.

First, direct manipulation indicates that the stakeholders obtained the top power level with leadership could implement the policy arbitrarily. That does not mean the decision-making was made by one person, but the other stakeholders are relatively weaker. They may need to cooperate with stakeholders of P/L 3 or to group with stakeholders of P/L2 from different sectors. For example, during the second half of the first term of Mayor Ko, his government officials, such as Deputy Mayor or Commissioner of Urban development, coordinated with the Mayor Ko so that they could perform a great influence in pampering the implementation of Taipei Dome. In addition, as in the second terms of Mayor Hau, it was not only relying on the direction of decision-making from higher officials but also depend upon those commissioners of review committees to unite as a solid pre-construction group. They, therefore, can successfully execute their power in the decision-making progress.

Second, the indirect manipulation mainly depends upon the personnel appointment power to those position obtained P/L2 or P/L3 capabilities. It would spread out as a group. In the context of Taipei Dome Complex, the review committee and city council members are in this category. Although the attribution of stakeholders is mostly homogeneous, there are other exceptions, like the relationship at the beginning of Mayor Ko and Songshan Tree Protection Group. When the mayor Ko cooperated with them for reorganizing the official documents of Taipei Dome Complex.

Third, the crowding-out manipulation simply indicates the process of exclusion of those stakeholders within the different interests in the same sector. This happened during the first term of Mayor Hau when the environmental groups decided to separate with the other member who was pursuing the political campaign. Also, during the first term of Mayor Ko when the former Commissioner Lin forced to back down from his position.




Figure 22. Policy Network and Policy Change in the Decision-making Progress

Source: adapted from Source: Adam & Kriesi (2007).

Regarding the abovementioned, UCSCE15 and UCSCE04 identified the three actions among professionals in the Taipei Dome Complex. Summarizes how and what the professionals' attitudes toward this case. First, professionals obtaining the power forgo making decisions; second, professionals, to the contrary, who do not have the power are not respected by the decision-makers; third, professionals who are positioned as the decision-makers are forced to back down(UCSCE04, personal communication, February 17, 2020; UCSCE15, personal communication,

February 2, 2020). Their statement resonates with the three manipulations derived from the P/L analysis and the decision-making process.

To identify other conflict issues in the decision-making process, the matrix presented as Table 23 indicates that each stakeholder from different sectors would confront the various scale to matters under specific ideology. That is to say, the developmental context of Taiwan results from such ideologies that lead stakeholders to take action.

First, the clientelism means a hierarchical relationship based on exchanging benefits for obtaining political support. This could be identified in the public sector in general because politicians often adopt this model for continuing their political careers. In the context of Taipei Dome Complex, from Mayor Ma to Mayor Ko, basically, the political career often outweighs other goals in the decision-making process. This causes the USCEC14 to identify Taipei Dome Complex as a controversial case in Taiwan:

“[Taipei Dome Complex] is such a pork-barrel, whether it is political or economic (UCSCE14, personal communication,



February 1, 2020).”

Second, the Oligarchy in the meso level indicates specific interest groups obtain the structure of the review platforms in this case study. For example, during the second term of Mayor Hau, Hau’ s government executed the personnel appointment power to assigned like-minded civic commissioners to promote the policy implementation. The UCSCE12 identified this in the decision-making process:

“Review procedure is the rule of man. It is the so-called majority decision or consensus decision. The so-called consensus decision does not come from the collective will(the public) or those people in power. Also, it does not come from the force of support or opposition. The final decision comes from those people in power. For example, Shu-Te Li, Ying-Jeou Ma, Pi-Ru Tasi, and Wen-Che, Ko(UCSCE12, personal communication, January 30, 2020).”

Third, the Iron Law of Oligarchy mainly indicates obedience in the same sector as we can identify this phenomenon throughout the government sector

that the institutional rules depriving an individual's autonomy to do decision-making. Even there is an exception like UCSCE03 and UCSCE04, and they were forced to leave the government once they refused to yield. One example identified by UCSCE03:

“Everyone knows that Mayor Ko took advantage of those five disputed BOT cases. [But,] Mayor Ko and Commissioner Lin render the Taipei Dome Complex with bias. So, if you are their officer in Building Management Office, you would not have the choice to follow their command(UCSCE03, personal communication, February 4, 2020).”

Fourth, the Developmentalism has been discussed for several decades in Taiwan. As we put the economic growth in the first place, there causes an exclusion effect to happen for creating a capital society without moral values. This, though, could be identified in a specific part of the case of Taipei Dome Complex, the term, here, represents the developmental imbalance methodology. To establish a more inclusive developmental state, it is

necessary to not only focus on one entity as the case of the Taipei Dome Complex abovementioned. Simply put, adopting a more comprehensive perspective, the adjustment of the Taipei Dome Complex would genuinely benefit the future of Taipei. Such development-oriented thinking is attractive to the Taiwan people because it has rooted in the deep of our society, as UCSCE13 stated:

“Since our parents’ generation, people have placed money-making as their lifetime goal. So, they think it is good to have a department store because everyone would make some money [from those facilities] (UCSCE13, personal communication, January 31, 2020).”

Fifth, utilitarianism can be identified through interviews with the representative of the Farglory Group. Although the private sector is about to maximize their profit, the possibility of implementing CSR or establishing more platforms to break the boundaries between different sectors could benefit the future of Taiwan, as UCSCE11 identified:

“Before the opening of Taipei Arena, the performing arts market

and the concert market in Taiwan were also bad. Under such circumstances, if we think it would be that easy for money-making with such large-scale domed-stadium, we will put some commercial facilities support the stadium because those facilities cannot merely support themselves but also offer financial support to the domed-stadium(UCSCE11, personal communication, February 5, 2020).”

Sixth, the symbiotic alliance is such a controversial issue in this case study since civil society has a bias toward the enterprise. In the context of Taipei Dome Complex, it was because of the conflict issue of building bulk made by the government that causes the Farglory Group to design nearly 500,000m<sup>2</sup> floor area, which jeopardizing the surroundings. As UCSCE02 addressed:

“The tender and the 2003 EIA Statement Report were used to deceive people. It's just that most people think they can't make so much money. Then, They[the Farglory Group] already knew that

in the future the government would reinterpret the definition of the building bulk for the whole buildings (UCSCE06, personal communication, February 6, 2020).”

Seventh, the representative democracy in Taiwan causes civic engagement to decrease so that people are lack interest in public issues. Several interviewees indicate this is the fundamental problem of why this issue has relatively lower mobility than other social issues, as UCSCE15 stated:

“As long as you are involved in politics, the legitimacy of these issues on the issue or the issues that should be reviewed will be obscured, and the people will start not caring. Whether it is real or not, it is all about politicians quarrel and fights for trouble(UCSCE15, personal communication, February 2, 2020).”

Eighthly, the tokenism in civic engagement means there is a lack of a civic platform for the public to participate in the policy-making process or policy-decision process. Through participating in the civic platform, although

it would need more time to form the consensus, the outcome of the discussion could reach the maximum census. Regarding this, UCSCE07 expects the government would learn a lesson from this case, making this process an example of civic participation:

“In the past two or three decades, many people have concerned about the Taipei Dome Complex, including labors, citizens, leaders from various villages, and other environmental groups. Okay, it will complete under contradictions and conflicts. In addition to doing academic research, UCSCE15 and my experience should be with it(UCSCE07, personal communication, February 12, 2020).

Ninth, conventional public engagement indicates the limitation of freedom of speech during the decision-making process. To expand civic participation, the promotion of freedom of speech could help the civic society to convey their voice. Responding this, UCSCE15 gave a solid opinion about how to initiate such engagement from civic education:

“I think we must start with the implementation of civic

education because we do environmental education. We always think that starting from the most basic education is the most important force for changing society and changing the world in the future. We talk a lot now, and now we can make decisions, and now we have the right to vote. How many citizens have the capability of making correct judgments? You can see it from the result of the election. Those candidates standing with the consortium will continue to win the election as well as those standing with the underworld. Those politicians who promote wrong policies favoring the consortia will keep winning. Why? It does not matter to regulations, but lack of civic education. The people are not capable of reflecting, of criticizing [those injustices](UCSCE15, personal communication, February 2, 2020).”

Table 23. Metrix of Identification of Conflict issue

	<b>Macro Level (Social Institution)</b>	<b>Meso Level (Review Platforms)</b>	<b>Micro Level (Sector)</b>

<b>Public Sector</b>	Clientelism	Oligarchy	Iron Law of Oligarchy
<b>Private Sector</b>	Developmentalism	Utilitarianism	Symbiotic Alliance
<b>Civil Society</b>	Representative Democracy	Tokenism in Civic Engagement	Conventional Public Engagement

Source: developed for this study



## Chapter 5. Conclusion

### 5.1. Conclusion

Taipei Dome Complex is such a complicated project involving multiple interdisciplinary subjects. Rather than promoting the development of the sport, the development of the Taipei, and the development of an inclusive society, Taipei Dome Complex demonstrates a politically contested case that fails to meet the expectations from the fans of Taiwan baseball, residents of Taipei, and professions of review committee during the decision-making process.

The framework of Environmental Justice provides a contested field for stakeholders. Based on the decision-making process, the EJ demonstrates how stakeholders have competed for the authenticity of justice in the Taipei Dome Complex from 1998 to 2020. Although the anti-construction coalition failed to stop the Taipei Dome Complex in 2020, it does not mean the winner

takes everything. In this ongoing case, many uncertainties are still pending to identify, to discuss, and to fix for further concerns.

From the stakeholder analysis, the power imbalance among stakeholders affects the decision-making process. It indicates those stakeholders obtained power and leadership in certain positions could dominate the process of decision-making. Moreover, the internal difference of the stakeholders from different sectors offers a dynamic analysis to locate those stakeholders in the case of the Taipei Dome Complex.

In the discussion of the decision-making process from 1998 to 2020, The policy-oriented learning process would benefit both coalitions to identify the chance of creating external events. Still, the mechanism of government apparatus could take the leading role back easily in this case. The participants in Taipei Dome Complex have contributed to the anti-construction coalition, although the limitation of the power of leverage impeded them to amplify their influence during these years. Also, external events, in this case, are the key pillars for both pro- and anti- coalitions, leading this case toward an

intriguing situation. It, however, indicates that the policy implementation in Taiwan is partial to those stakeholders obtained power and leadership.

The structural problems, in this case, are not mainly about the loopholes of the legal system or the administrative procedures, but the stakeholders obtained the executive power, causing the malfunction of the governance. Therefore, for promoting a better quality of life, a stadium project offers the vision toward a better future, while the stakeholders of the project represent the key pillars to decide whether this vision could come true.

## 5.2. Future Directions

Taipei Dome Complex is an ongoing project that needs more attention from academia. It would help future sports administrators to comprehend such a complicated project that inspires sports administrators to communicate with others from a different professional background. In this sense, based on the context of this case, four recommendations for future directions addressed below as the first step to rethink this case:

First, the lack of civic platforms causes civic engagement to decrease. To expand the civic participation in the decision-making process as well as for reaching the consensus between the government and the public, the public sector should reestablish such platforms for the people to engage in either the policy-making or policy-decision process.

Second, it is better to redesign the structure of the Review Committee so that it could be the institution to leverage the power imbalance between the government and the public. In the context of Taipei Dome Complex, the Review Committee system is an unstable decision-making mechanism depending upon those stakeholders positioned in certain social positions.

Third, to change the current status of the social atmosphere, the civic education relating to the engagement in public affairs, environment, and other social issues could inspire future citizens to rethink the relationship between the development activity to meet the vision of sustainability.

Fourth, it is necessary to rethink the power structure in the government apparatus and the character of government in terms of public-private

partnerships for creating a more balance governing system. Although Taipei Dome Complex has provided lots of lessons for future Taiwan, the structural problems relating to the attribution of public-owned land or the urban tax should be considered to elevate the public sector to develop those lands, avoiding over privatization.

Taken together, the Case of Taipei Dome Complex could be the exemplar to detailed examine the reasons for the implementation of a sports stadium among stakeholders. It can not only help sports administrators to build up a whole map about how the decision-making process can be designed to meet most people's expectations, about what kind of stakeholders that affect the most, and about how those influential stakeholders execute their power to influence other stakeholders.

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## Appendix I Interview Question (General)

	Interview Questions
1	Could you tell me how many years you have followed the Taipei Dome Complex? And how you have involved into this issue?
2	Could you share your why the Taipei Dome Complex make you interested?
3	In your opinions, could you share why Taipei or Taiwan needs a domed-stadium? How could it either benefits or impairs Taiwan Baseball, Taipei City, and our living environment?
4	In your opinions, could you share about Taipei Dome based on its history, political, or social context?
5	In your opinions, could you identify the controversial issue(s) of Taipei Dome Complex? Why do you think it is the disputed issue(s)?
6	Corresponding to the above question, could you share how the disputed issue(s) is made? And which part do you think it causes the disputed issue(s)?
7	Corresponding to the above question, would you identify it as the systematical problem(s) in Urban Planning, Sports Policy, or Environment Policy? If so, what is your suggestion to the problem(s)?
8	In your opinion, who do you think is responsible person/people for the big dome? why you think this person/these people should shoulder this responsibility?
9	In your opinion, what do you think about the decision-making process of Taipei Dome Complex? Could you Identify some problems from the process?

10	Corresponding to the above question, could you identify the specific problem(s) about the decision-making process? And what is your suggestion to solve this problem?
11	In your opinion, how could you convey your expertise with other interests' groups who are also involved into the Taipei Dome Complex?
12	Corresponding to the above question, if the answer is no, would you share your opinion about how to surmount the barrier of communication?
13	In your opinion, what will be the best solution to solve the Taipei Dome Complex?
14	In your opinion, what do you think about the future of Taipei Dome Complex
15	In your opinion, have you ever disappointed with either the policy-making or decision-making in Taipei Dome Complex? Could you share your opinions about it?

Source: Developed for this study.

## Appendix II Interview Question (Specific)

	Interview Questions
Domed-Stadium Operator/the real-estate developer	
1	As a Domed-Stadium Operator, what is your vision for Taipei Dome?
2	As a Domed-Stadium Operator, what makes Taipei Dome Complex a controversial PPPs Project?
3	Corresponding to the above question, could you identify specific problems during the decision-making process? Why do you recognize it as problems?
4	As a Domed-Stadium Operator, how could you persuade the government officials, the expert in Urban Planning, Urban Design, or Environmental Impact Committee to support your project?
5	Could you identify specific problems during the decision-making process? Why do you recognize it as problems?
6	Could you share your thought about those people who are either pro or against this project?
Lawyer	
1	As a Lawyer, could you share your opinions about the decision-making procedure of Environmental Impact Assessment? In addition, are there any problems or issues in current Environmental Impact Assessment Act?
2	As a Lawyer, how do you think about those law suits against the Taipei Dome Complex? Do you think the justice system can solve this complicated case?
3	As a Lawyer, do you have any suggestion to amend those Acts, including Urban Planning or Environmental Impact Assessment Act, for preventing the repeat of history itself?



4	Could you identify specific problems during the decision-making process? Why do you recognize it as problems?
5	Could you share your thought about those people who are either pro or against this project?
(former) government officials	
1	As a (former)politician/ government officials, what is your vision to the Taipei Dome Complex?
2	As a (former)politician/government officials, what may be the most difficult issues of Taipei Dome Complex to mediate between different interests' group?
3	As a (former)politician/ government officials, why the central government/ Taipei city government wants to implement the Taipei Dome Complex? And how they think about the circumstance of Taipei Dome Complex?
4	As a (former)government official, would you consider the PPPs model in Taiwan a problem? Or, is there any possible solution to fix the loophole of our legal system to prevent the next Taipei Dome Complex?
5	Could you identify specific problems during the decision-making process? Why do you recognize it as problems?
6	As a former government official, since a lot of news revealing the cause of your resignation was because of Taipei Dome Complex, could you share your thought with us how you think about the controversial of Taipei Dome Complex, and why it is so hard that no one can solve it?
7	Could you share your thought about those people who are either pro or against this project?
(former)committee member of Urban Planning, Urban Design, or Environmental Impact Committee	
1	(former)committee member of Urban Planning, Urban Design, or Environmental Impact committee, is there any possible solution to improve the decision-making process?

2	As a (former)committee member of Urban Planning, Urban Design, or Environmental Impact committee, how do you comment about these Committees? Is there any possible solution to improve the decision-making process?
3	As a (former)committee member of Urban Planning, Urban Design, or Environmental Impact committee, how could you sure other committee member may properly evaluate the Taipei Dome Complex?
4	As a (former)committee member of Urban Planning, Urban Design, or Environmental Impact committee, is there any possible occasion for you to discuss the Taipei Dome Complex with other expertise coming from the field of sport, city, or environmental studies?
5	Could you share your thought about those people who are either pro or against this project?
Residents/Songshan Tree group Volunteers	
1	As a resident/volunteer, what is your vision about Taipei Dome Complex?
2	As a resident/volunteer, why you consider the environment protection as your first priority? How do you think about either economic benefit or social benefit of the Taipei Dome Complex?
3	As a resident/volunteer, have you ever participated into Urban Plan, Urban Design, and Environmental Impact Assessment Committee? Could you share your thought with me?
4	As a resident/volunteer, how do you comment about current Urban Plan, Urban Design, and Environmental Impact Assessment Committee? Is there any possible solution to improve the decision-making process?
5	Could you share your thought about those people who are either pro or against this project?

Source: Developed for this study

## Appendix III Definitions of Stakeholder Characteristics

- A. **I.D. #:** given the stakeholder on the questionnaire.
- B. **Position and organization:** Position the stakeholder has and the organization that he/she works for.
- C. **Internal/External:** Internal (I)—stakeholders that work within the organization that is promoting or implementing the policy; all other stakeholders are considered external (E).
- D. **Knowledge of policy:** This column is divided into two parts. The first part, D1, is the level of accurate knowledge the stakeholder has regarding the policy under analysis. This knowledge should be rated from 3 to 1: 3 – a lot; 2 – some; 1 – none. Final rankings should be reviewed to ensure consistent scoring among all of the stakeholders.

The second part of the column, D2, is to record how each stakeholder defines the policy in question. The information gathered in question #3 of the questionnaire should be noted here in the stakeholder's own words.

- E. **Position: Supports/Opposes/Neutral:** Position refers to the stakeholder's status as a supporter or opponent of the policy. The position of the stakeholder can be obtained by gathering information directly from the stakeholder (i.e., self-reporting); and through information gathered indirectly from other stakeholders or secondary information (i.e., others' perceptions). Thus, the reporting in this column represents the self-reported classification (column E1), the classification by others (column E2), and a final classification considering both (column E3). The position of the stakeholder should be reported from this final classification (column E3).

Stakeholders who agree with the implementation of the policy are considered supporters (S); those who disagree with the policy are considered opponents (O); and those who do not have a clear opinion, or whose opinion could not be discerned, are considered neutral (N). Those who express some agreement, but not total agreement with the policy should be classified as moderate supporters (MS). Finally those who express some, but not total, opposition to the policy should be classified as moderate opponents (MO). Thus, in column E1, the position of the stakeholder as they state it in the interview should be entered (S, MS, N, MO, or O).

In column E2, the position of the stakeholder as perceived by other stakeholders and/or from secondary information should be entered with a reference to the ID number of the person who stated that opinion. For example, S 32 would mean that stakeholder number 32 stated in his or her interview that the stakeholder under analysis would support the policy. In column E2, the position of the stakeholder as others perceive it should be entered (S, MS, N, MO, or O) with the ID number for each opinion.

Lastly, in column E3, the final determination for the position of the stakeholder should be entered (after entering data from all interviews). This position should take into account the self-reported position as well as other stakeholders' opinions. S, MS, N, MO, and O can be entered in this column.


Source: Schmeer (1999)

- F. Interest:** Interest refers to the interest the stakeholder has in the policy—or the advantages and disadvantages that the implementation of the policy may bring to him or her or his or her organization. Advantages and disadvantages mentioned by each of the stakeholders should be entered into this column in as much detail as possible, since the information will be used primarily in developing conclusions and strategies for dealing with the stakeholders' concerns.
- G. Alliances:** "a union or relationship" (Webster, 1984). Alliances are formed when two or more organizations collaborate to meet the same objective, in this case to support or oppose the policy in question. Any organizations that are mentioned by the stakeholder in the questions related to this item (see connection chart in Annex 7 for specific question references) should be entered in this column.
- H. Resources:** "a source of support or aid" (Webster, 1984). Resources can be of many types—human, financial, technological, political, and other. The analysts should consider the stakeholder's access to all of these resources.
- The resource category is divided into two parts: the quantity of resources that a stakeholder has within his or her organization or area, and the ability to mobilize those resources. The quantity of resources should be classified by the analysts as 3 – many, 2 – some, 1 – few and inserted into column H1 of the stakeholder table. Since this score is relative, final rankings should be reviewed to ensure consistent scoring among all stakeholders.
- The ability of the stakeholder to mobilize resources should be quantified in terms of 3 – the stakeholder can make decisions regarding the use of the resources in his or her organization or area; 2 – the stakeholder is one of several persons that makes decisions regarding the use of resources; 1 – the stakeholder cannot make decisions regarding the use of the resources. This score should be inserted into column H2. For example, if the stakeholder has personnel that work for him or her, it can be concluded that the stakeholder has the ability to mobilize these resources because he or she has direct influence over them.
- I. Power:** "the capacity or ability to accomplish something...strength, force or might" (Webster, 1984). Here, power refers to the ability of the stakeholder to affect the implementation of the health reform policy due to the strength or force he or she possesses.
- Since "power" is defined here as the combined measure of the amount of resources a stakeholder has and his or her capacity to mobilize them, the two resource scores implied should be averaged, resulting in a power index between 3 and 1: 3 – high power, 2 – medium power, and 1 – little power. The final rankings should be reviewed to ensure consistent scoring among all stakeholders.
- J. Leadership:** "to direct the activity...to start, begin...front, foremost" (Webster, 1984). Leadership is specifically defined here as the willingness and ability to initiate, convoke, or lead an action for or against the health reform policy. The stakeholder either has or lacks this characteristic. This is represented with "yes" or "no."

Source: Schmeer(1999)

## Appendix IV Design of Taipei Dome Complex(2003~2015)

Taipei Dome Complex(2003)




Total Floor Area: 361,139 m<sup>2</sup>

Source: Taipei City Government(2011a)



### Taipei Dome Complex(2010)

項 目			99 年 6 月提送之 環境影響說明書
體育園區	巨蛋 體育館 及附屬 設施	體育館主體	98,461 m <sup>2</sup>
		展 場 商 店	26,469 m <sup>2</sup>
		小 計	124,930 m <sup>2</sup>
	百貨娛 樂商場	含商場、文化城 (影城)小計	133,896 m <sup>2</sup>
		一 般 事 務 所	50,850 m <sup>2</sup>
	辦公 大樓	商 場	265 m <sup>2</sup>
		小 計	51,115 m <sup>2</sup>
		一 般 空 間	71,372 m <sup>2</sup>
	旅館	商 場	268 m <sup>2</sup>
		小 計	71,640 m <sup>2</sup>
		停 車 空 間	195,359 m <sup>2</sup>
	園 區	設 施 小 計	576,940 m <sup>2</sup>
	其 他	台 電 變 電 設 施	10,358 m <sup>2</sup>
		捷 運	2,802 m <sup>2</sup>
小 計		13,160 m <sup>2</sup>	
體 育 園 區 小 計		590,100 m <sup>2</sup>	




Total Floor Area: 590,100 m<sup>2</sup>

Source: Taipei City Government(2011a)

### Taipei Dome Complex(2011/2)

項 目		100年2月提送之替代 方案環境影響說明書	
體育園區	巨蛋 體育館 及附屬 設施	體育館主體	105,850 m <sup>2</sup>
		展 場 商 店	16,534 m <sup>2</sup>
		小 計	122,384 m <sup>2</sup>
	百貨娛 樂商場	含商場、文化 城(影城)小計	127,860 m <sup>2</sup>
		一 般 事 務 所	50,475 m <sup>2</sup>
	辦公 大樓	商 場	—
		小 計	50,475 m <sup>2</sup>
		一 般 空 間	67,020 m <sup>2</sup>
	旅館	商 場	—
		小 計	67,020 m <sup>2</sup>
		停 車 空 間	187,965 m <sup>2</sup>
	園 區 設 施 小 計	555,704 m <sup>2</sup>	
其 他	台電變電設施	9,294 m <sup>2</sup>	
	捷 運	5,512 m <sup>2</sup>	
	小 計	14,806 m <sup>2</sup>	
	體 育 園 區 小 計	570,510 m <sup>2</sup>	




Total Floor Area: 570,510 m<sup>2</sup>

Source: Taipei City Government(2011a)

# Taipei Dome Complex(2011/5)

項 目			100 年 5 月提送之替代 方案環境影響說明書
體育 園區	巨蛋 體育館 及附屬 設施	體育館主體	105,850 m <sup>2</sup>
		展 場 商 店	16,534 m <sup>2</sup>
		小 計	122,384 m <sup>2</sup>
	百貨娛 樂商場	含商場、文化 城(影城)小計	127,860 m <sup>2</sup>
		一般事務所	50,475 m <sup>2</sup>
	辦公 大樓	商 場	—
		小 計	50,475 m <sup>2</sup>
	旅館	一 般 空 間	67,020 m <sup>2</sup>
		商 場	—
	—	小 計	67,020 m <sup>2</sup>
		—	停 車 空 間
	園 區 設 施 小 計		518,546.09 m <sup>2</sup>
	其 他	台電變電設施	10,999.49 m <sup>2</sup>
		捷 運	5,964.42 m <sup>2</sup>
小 計		16,963.91 m <sup>2</sup>	
體 育 園 區 小 計		535,510 m <sup>2</sup>	



Total Floor Area: 535,510 m<sup>2</sup>

Source: Taipei City Government(2011a)

# Taipei Dome Complex(2011/6)


設施項目	樓地板面積	容積樓地板面積	建 物 高 度	
			含屋突	不含屋突
巨蛋體育館及附屬設施	122,384 m <sup>2</sup>	115,719 m <sup>2</sup>	—	H= 64m
商 場	89,451 m <sup>2</sup>	74,900 m <sup>2</sup>	H= 55.5m	H= 46.5m
文化城(影城)	25,657 m <sup>2</sup>	21,375 m <sup>2</sup>	H= 41m	H= 32m
辦公大樓	34,461 m <sup>2</sup>	30,726 m <sup>2</sup>	H= 108.15m	H= 99.15m
一般旅館	53,041 m <sup>2</sup>	43,657 m <sup>2</sup>	H= 100.35m	H= 91.35m
停車空間	150,807 m <sup>2</sup>	—	—	—
園區設施小計	475,801 m <sup>2</sup>	286,377 m <sup>2</sup>	—	—
其 他	台電變電設施	10,999.49 m <sup>2</sup>	—	—
	捷 運	5,964.42 m <sup>2</sup>	—	—
合 計	492,764.91 m <sup>2</sup>	286,377 m <sup>2</sup>	—	—



Total Floor Area: 492,764.91 m<sup>2</sup>

Source: Taipei City Government (2011a)

Taipei Dome Complex(2004)



Taipei Dome Complex(2015)



Source: Taipei City Government (2015b)

Taipei Dome Complex(2004)



Building Coverage Ratio 46%  
Building Mass: 47,189 m<sup>2</sup>  
Vacant Space: 55,396 m<sup>2</sup>

Taipei Dome Complex(2015)



Building Coverage Ratio 54.5%  
Building Mass: 55,909 m<sup>2</sup>  
Vacant Space: 38,044 m<sup>2</sup>

Source: Taipei City Government (2015b)



국 문 초 록

# 스포츠, 도시와 환경의 갈등 관계의 이해:

타이페이 돔 건설 사례

Chun-Chieh Lin

글로벌스포츠매니지먼트 전공

체육교육과

서울대학교 대학원

본연구의 목적은 타이페이돔의 건설을 둘러싼 갈등을 담론, 통치성, 그리고 이해관계자의 행위를 중심으로 분석하는 것이다. 타이페이돔의 건설, 즉 타이페이 문화 스포츠 공원 프로젝트는 스포츠 발전, 환경 문제, 그리고 도시 발전을 둘러싼 시각들이 교차하는 복잡한 케이스이다. 이 공공건축은 당초 타이페이를

더욱 포용적인 사회로 만들어 더 나은 미래를 제시하려 했지만, 고도로 정치화된 의사결정 구조로 인해 그러한 기획 의도는 관철될 수 없었다. 본 연구는 상기된 요소들의 관계에 대한 논의를 통해, 거대한 스포츠 프로젝트가 어떻게 스포츠 경영, 환경 정의, 그리고 도시 발전 등의 학제간 논의를 촉발시켰는지에 대한 분석한다. 의사결정과정에서 갈등이 유발된 원인을 보다 상세히 이해하기 위해서는 타이페이돔을 둘러싼 이해관계자들의 스포츠, 도시, 환경에 대한 인식을 이해할 필요가 있다. 이에 따라 본 연구는 세가지 연구문제를 제기한다. 첫째, 타이페이돔 건설을 둘러싼 이해관계자는 누구이며 각자가 추구하는 이익은 무엇인가? 둘째, 타이페이돔 건설의 의사결정과정은 무엇인가? 셋째, 의사결정과정에서 어떠한 이슈가 있었는가? 첫번째 연구문제에 대해 본 연구는 이해관계자 분석 방법론(Stakeholder Analysis)으로 타이페이돔을 둘러싼 이해관계자를 찬성과 반대연맹으로 분류하고자 한다. 두번째 문제에 있어, 본 연구는 먼저 찬성연맹의 프레임이 처음에 타이페이 돔의 의사결정과정을

형성하는 과정을 보여준다. 그리고 환경 정의의 프레임을 통해 본 연구는 타이페이 돔을 둘러싼 이해관계자들의 상호작용을 1998년부터 2020년까지 연대기적으로 분석한다. 세번째 연구문제는 앞선 두 연구문제에 대한 논의를 기반으로, 타이페이 돔과 관련된 의사결정과정에서의 갈등을 드러냄으로써 향후 연구의 방향성을 제시하고자 한다.

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**주요어:** 타이페이 돔, 스포츠, 도시, 환경

**학 번 :** 2018-25653