Master's Thesis of Arts

A Case Study on the Effect of 1997 Universal Primary Education Policy in Wakiso, Uganda

1997년 보편적초등교육 정책의 영향에 대한

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February 2021

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February 2021

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I would like to extend my sincere gratitude
to all of my research participants,
who are thriving to live their best life with kind hearts.

Abstract

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The need for basic education and/or primary education has received attention internationally, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s. Developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have introduced Universal Primary Education (UPE) policies, which are often accompanied by fee abolition. The subsequent rapid growth of enrollment rates has led to a variety of quantitative and qualitative limits in the educational field. In addition, the emergence and expansion of private schools has raised questions of the role they play within the post-UPE policy educational landscape.

The purpose of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of the effects of UPE in Ugandan education by examining its effects on Wakiso. This study is an exploratory case study using multiple sources of data such as interviews, observations, and news articles. The major interview participants included parents with different income levels. Officials from the Ministry of Education and Sports

(MoES) and the Department of Education in Wakiso and officials from government and private primary schools also provided input to facilitate understanding the interviews with parents. A connecting strategy is used for data analysis by deducing or inferring relevant concepts or explanations using collected data, then organizing them in their relevant "in-context" form (Maxwell, 2012).

Through this analysis, three major points are identified. First, as extra school fees appeared in government schools in Wakiso due to the competition surrounding the Primary Leaving Examination (PLE), government schools became less accessible for those who wished to stay in Wakiso. In addition, this competition has led to the outflow of teachers from government to private schools. Since the educational quality of schools is evaluated through PLE results, this has led to a test-oriented culture in education. Due to the abundance of choice and competition among schools, parents have conflated high fees and quality of instruction and education.

Second, by analyzing interview anecdotes of parents from various socio-economic classes, this study shows a widening gap among schools and students, although they all hope to achieve high PLE grades. There is a wide array of schools and options for parents to select from, from low-fee government schools all the way to high-fee private schools. It was evident that the scope of choice is dependent upon where the households are situated on the socio-economic ladder. Moreover, the interviews revealed that parents who could not afford school fees in Wakiso simply sent their children to rural areas; this shows that the educational inequality within Wakiso has been disseminated to a wider region.

Third, this study reveals the pervasive and common anxiety and instability regarding education, regardless of socio-economic class. The interviews show that children from all socio-economic levels face a variety of adversities, including

being suspended, transferred, and held back from advancing to the next grade. This happens not only for low-income families, but also for families who decide to send their children to higher-fee private schools to obtain higher PLE scores, which sometimes results in children being transferred in a manner that is disruptive to their education.

These three characteristic phenomena imply that the PLE and interests of parents in it have played important roles in shaping the educational landscape in Wakiso, Uganda. Therefore, this study suggests that a higher education examination system as well as the perception and behavior of parents regarding it must be taken into account when considering how to better understand primary education policy in Uganda as well as other developing countries.

Keywords: Primary Education, Universal Primary Education (UPE) Policy, Primary Leaving Examination (PLE), Uganda

Student Number: 2017-23155

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Study Background

Beginning with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in the year 1948, nations around the world developed an interest in cultivating a basic, humane quality of life for everyone. Education has been recognized as a core component of baseline living standards and is considered to be the means to and catalyst for a better life. The need for basic education is clearly and distinctly affirmed through the "Education for All" statement in Clause 26 of the UDHR. After this declaration, the need for basic education or/and primary education began to receive the attention of international society, though international support for quality education slowed down with a series of financial constraints, including the oil shock, of the 1970s and the 1980s.

At the start of the 1990s, interest in basic education and primary education recovered. In 1990, the First World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thailand, became the central meeting for spreading the needs and values of basic education. Through this conference, the movement of the "Education for All" (EFA) was launched with marked agreement of international society. The goals of EFA would be re-inspected 10 years later at the Dakar Conference. An exploration and evaluation of the results and impacts of the EFA movement found that more specific action plans would be required to achieve the goal. Therefore, the Dakar Framework for Action, including relatively concrete strategies, was announced. The importance of primary education is confirmed and shared through the following sentence: "All children should have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality."

In the same year as the Dakar Conference, the Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs), which had been announced and widely accepted by international society, were proclaimed. The characteristics of the MDGs were clearly different from the proposals of the previous two conferences, taking the form of a list of goals to "develop" developing countries. If the previous conferences addressed overall educational issues but underlined primary education, in the MDGs, only a few goals were related to primary education. Although differing in their focus on education, all three conferences ultimately shared an interest in meeting the need for primary education.

African governments also adopted Education for All (EFA) within the Dakar Framework for Action and have committed to developing cost plans to achieve EFA goals, supported by the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) – which was later renamed the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) in 2011 (UN Economic Commission for Africa & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2015).

The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have actively participated in this trend. Their governments have steadily allocated substantial resources to education and have made policies focusing on Universal Primary Education (UPE) (ECA & OECD, 2015). Even with budget limitations, African countries made impressive progress that was worthy of attention. As of 2016, among the 53 countries in SSA for which data are available, 42 now legally guarantee free education at the primary level (GEM Report, 2016). From 1990 to 2012, spurred by the uptake of EFA, enrollment rates soared from 62 million to 149 million in SSA. Net primary enrollment across Africa has increased by 24% in 1990–2012 to reach 79% (UN Economic Commission for Africa & OECD, 2015).

In spite of the increases in enrollment rates, UPE nevertheless had several limitations. The UPE had ordinarily been understood as increasing access to

school. In that period, there was such a single-minded focus on increasing registration rates that the phenomenon was named “enrollment fever” (HONG, 2017), referring to the vague expectation or even fantasy that once the students are sent to the school, positive results can be produced. The abolition of school fees had played a key role in the rapid increase of enrollment rates, but scholars expressed worries that existing education systems, policies, and budgets were inadequate to provide enough buildings, materials, teachers, or administrative support to operate the increased number of schools. Specifically, the achievement of a high enrollment ratio resulted in a serious lack of unit costs of schooling (Colclough & Al-Samarrai, 2000). Research in Tanzania, Kenya (Sifuna, 2007), and Malawi (Chimombo, 2005) showed stagnation or declines in the quality of education due to inadequate funding for basic teaching and learning materials, appropriate infrastructure, and a sufficient number of competent teachers.

In addition, private education has grown and is still growing in developing countries, particularly in SSA. For example, in Lagos, Nigeria, private schools accounted for as much as 70% of the pre-primary and primary levels in the 2010–11 school year (Härmä, 2011). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics (UIS) estimates show at least a doubling of the private share in primary enrollment in a wide range of countries in SSA (1999 and 2012). While available UIS data suggest that the private share of primary education is below 20% for most low and lower middle-income countries, this may be an underestimate due to undercounting of private schooling in official statistics (Dahal & Nguyen, 2014; Tooley & Dixon, 2005).

Private schools have appeared in a variety of forms, including both official and unofficial schools, charging from low to high tuitions. For parents unsatisfied with the quality of government schools, private schools play an alternative role in regions with those who could afford them, namely in urban and suburban regions.

Their students include children from relatively poor families who have sacrificed in the hopes of investing in the future. This unplanned growth of private schools in developing countries has been the subject of much debate. The schools aid in providing primary education, but questions of their impact on government schools and increasing inequality still remain.

Uganda is one representative country manifesting this phenomenon. President Museveni introduced the universal primary education policy in Uganda in the year 1997, which abolished school fees. Gross enrollment in primary schools increased from 3.1 million children in 1996 to 7.6 million children in 2003, marking a 145% increase in school enrollment (Bategeka & Okurut, 2006). Uganda has been recognized for its commendable progress in implementing UPE policies domestically.

At the same time, however, such a rapid increase in the number of students gave rise to a variety of problems. Resources had not been prepared to cope with such a rapid increase, causing the quality of education to deteriorate. The Pupil-Teacher Ratio (PTR), which has an influence on the quality of education, increased from 40:1 prior to the introduction of the UPE to 60:1 in the year 1999. The pupil-classroom ratio (PCR) had similarly increased from 85:1 to 145:1 (Bertoncino, Carla; Murphy, Paud; Wang, 2002). By trying to increase the number of teachers, government initiatives resulted in an influx of under-qualified teachers. Textbooks and various kinds of teaching materials were also insufficient (Bruns et al., 2003). Although the government of Uganda had increased financial investments related

to primary education after the introduction of the UPE policy,[1] this turned out to be absurdly inadequate to meet the rapid growth in the student body and the sudden abolition of school fees (Bruns et al., 2003). Worries regarding student academic performance arose.

The percentage of students who received satisfactory scores in mathematics and in English speaking had fallen from 48% and 92% in 1996 to 31% and 56%, respectively, in 1999 (Ssewamala et al., 2011).

In Uganda as well, primary private schools also increased in number and became established through official and unofficial methods. The Liberalization Policy promulgated in 1993, prior to the UPE policy, served as the systematic basis for the free establishment and operation of private schools. As in other developing countries, private schools were concentrated in urban regions in Uganda. Wakiso, which surrounds Kampala, is a representative region for this phenomenon, where diverse private schools that have been established with costs ranging from very low to very high.

Additionally, over 20 years after the implementation of the UPE policy, fees have also reappeared in public schools, often in the form of Requirements fees, Parents Teachers Association (PTA) fees, etc., despite the UPE's goal of abolishing

[1] The expenditure on primary education as a percentage of government expenditure on education of Uganda changed as follows: 20% in 1988, 61% in 2004, 47% in 2010, 56% in 2011, 57% in 2012, 57% in 2013, and 59% in 2014, as per UIS Data.

school fees.

Unlike the declaration of universal primary education by the Ugandan government, which had forthrightly announced the abolition of education fees in the beginning, the need for financial contributions by parents and the importance of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) began to be mentioned in official government papers. This change in the Ugandan government's policy ran parallel to a similar change on the international level. Previously taking a position emphasizing the role of the state as the highest priority, the international community began to increasingly mention the importance of non-state actors, including NGOs and corporations.

1.2. Purpose of Research

The 1997 Universal Primary Education (UPE) Policy, which abolished public primary school fees, represented a paradigm shift in Ugandan primary education. This policy has affected every aspect of Uganda's education, including the enrollment rate, drop-out rates, and completion rates, the numbers of schools, classrooms, and teachers, budgets, quality of education, and consciousness of education. Now, thirty later after this landmark policy was enacted, Uganda continues to experience and grapple with the aftereffects of UPE; the policy is widely acknowledged to have had both positive and negative outcomes.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to gain a deeper understanding of the effects of UPE in Uganda education through a focused study on its effects in Wakiso. Accordingly, this study addresses the following research questions.

1. How did the universal primary education policy affect primary schools in Wakiso?

2. How did it affect families' educational decision-making?

Chapter 2. Literature Review

2.1. Universal Primary Education

2.1.1. The Formation of Universal Primary Education Discourse

After World War II, the UN and its agencies had begun shifting their attention to education. Discourse on human rights and their importance led to the drafting of the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Constitution in 1945 and the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) in 1947. These documents outlined the importance of education as a fundamental and universal human right that should be protected and provided by the state (Adelabu & Rose, 2004; K. Lewin, 2007; PROBE Team, 1999; Robertson & Dale, 2013). In 1976, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) expanded the range of free and compulsory education from the primary to the secondary level, stating that education will be "generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education" (ICESCR 1976, article 13 (2)b).

This aim of universal education was reaffirmed again by the UN's Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1989, which stipulated that everyone has a right to education, and at the very least should receive basic education. The primary advocate of this human rights approach to education was UNESCO. These three major UN human rights treaties outlined the rights to access to education regardless of background. However, they did not include concrete experimentation or explicit action planning for monitoring, evaluation, and data collection to implement and achieve the set goals (Unterhalter, 2014).

In contrast to the human rights approach is the human resources approach,

which emphasizes the importance to economic growth and the formation of a nation of developing the education sector, based on human capital theory (Becker, 2009; Denison, 1962; Schultz, 1963). Investment in the individual by the nation would benefit the national economy by developing human capital. This approach reflects the development of economics in the 1950s, in which education was understood to promote economic growth.

This approach was spearheaded by the World Bank and the OECD. At first, the mandate of the World Bank did not include education development; however, in the 1960s, investment in education was considered crucial to economic growth in the 50s–60s in educational development cooperation projects (Heyneman, 2003, 2006). Toward the end of the 1960s, educational development cooperation projects emphasized vocational training to secure a skilled labor force (Choi et al., 2013).

The statement of the first UN Development Decade, adopted at the UN General Assembly in 1961, called for numerous initiatives to expand the basic education opportunities in each region. For example, large-scale cooperation projects such as the Karachi Plan in Asia, the Addis Ababa Plan in Africa, and the Santiago Plan in Latin America were initiated. These regional basic education development plans were aimed to improve the enrollment rate of students in primary school by 1980 and to establish a free compulsory education system (Yoo et al., 2011).

However, newly independent countries in the Asian and African regions, which gained independence after World War II, were unable to establish stable educational systems because of the limited national capacity. Furthermore, initiatives to expand basic education opportunities, mainly driven by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, were shaken by the oil crises and the economic downturn of the 1980s. This has adversely affected the educational

situation in developing countries (Choi et al., 2013).

Additionally, the rapid population growth during this period had also made it more difficult to achieve these educational goals (Jung, 2006). Subsequently, the quantity and quality of education began to decline (Choi et al., 2013). This is referred to as the first wave of Universal Primary Education (UPE), which was characterized by great increases in student enrollment, but at the cost of quality, as shown in the rapid decline of some measures of achievement (Okkolin, 2016),

Despite the poor results of the first wave due to the fluctuating circumstances of the 1980s, interest in education was rekindled by the Jomtien Declaration, drafted at the 1990 World Conference on Education for All, which began the second wave of UPE. The Jomtien Declaration reflected a global education movement that insisted that basic education is a fundamental human right that should be guaranteed for all, regardless of social, economic, and cultural background. The Jomtien Declaration also adopted a "Framework for Action" with a deadline of 2000. The meaning of basic education was not restricted to primary schooling, but included early childhood education and youth and adult literacy education. However, as the concepts reflected in the Jomtien Declaration were ambiguous, the declaration has been selectively interpreted and applied based on the stakeholder's priorities (Buchert, 1995, 1996).

As a result of these proposals for education, two differing approaches emerged to address the issues: a rights-based approach and an economic approach. The supporters of the rights-based approach insist that education is a public service that should be supported by states and assert the need for an expanded vision of education and learning, applying the concept of education articulated in the UNESCO Commission on Learning and Human Development, led by Jacques Delors (1998).

The economic perspective, urged especially by the World Bank and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), regards educational development as an investment to fight poverty (Chabbott, 1998; Heyneman, 2003). Primary education was viewed as an important driver of economic growth, as evidenced by international comparative analyses (Barro, 1991; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004). UNICEF and the World Bank regard primary education as basic education, as opposed to UNESCO's view of both non-formal and adult education as part of basic education.

The Jomtien Conference emphasized the importance of the cooperation of international agencies, thus encouraging the participation of UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP (The United Nations Development Program), UNFPA (The United Nations Fund for Population Activities), and the World Bank. Following this, the role and influence of UNESCO have shrunk (S. Lee, 2008). Furthermore, the capability of UNESCO was further reduced by the withdrawal of the United States and England (Heyneman, 2003). As a result, the EFA goals proposed in the Jomtien Conference were focused on formal primary schooling education. Subsequently, educational development cooperation projects have shifted their focus on expanding primary school education opportunities. Torres (2000) asserted that during the 1990s the discourse of EFA had been minimized from basic education to schooling (and primary education), from universalizing basic education to universalizing access to primary education, from basic learning needs to minimum learning needs, from focusing on learning to improving and assessing the school achievement, from expanding the vision of basic education to increasing the duration (number of years) of compulsory schooling, and from enhancing the learning environment to enhancing the school environment.

A decade after the Jomtien Declaration, a proposal for collective commitment to EFA was adopted by The Dakar Framework for Action with clearer

goals and timeline. The Framework co-orientated numerous objectives that sought to achieve education for all. The Dakar Conference set 2015 as the year for participants to achieve international EFA targets, urging an increased emphasis on the qualitative aspects of education. However, the Dakar Framework still viewed the quantitative aspect, represented by the number of pupils receiving education, as paramount to achieving these aims. The Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO, 2008), which examined the EFA goals, concluded that primary schooling was still the major educational interest. Additionally, it recommended that donor countries prioritize support for primary education by narrowing the meaning of basic education to primary education. As a result, the other sectors of education came to have less importance.

Interest in primary education was enhanced by the Millennium Development Goals, announced in the same year. In September 2000, the MDGs presented eight goals for the international community to combat poverty and aim for prosperity. Two of them, Goals 2 and 3, include educational goals. In particular, MDG2 commits to the target: “Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.” In other words, this education-based goal focuses on expanding school “accessibility.” The differences between the educational goals set by Jomtien and Dakar can be summed up as EFA versus UPE, respectively.

First, the perspective on and importance attached to education goals are different. Jomtien and Dakar plans are originally education-centered plans, yet the MDGs include education as a part of development goals. Therefore, a major difference between MDG and EFA objectives in education goals is that the focus of EFA is basic education, including pre-school, literacy, and non-formal education. Although this may be somewhat narrow, it is wider than the sole concern of the MDGs with primary education and schooling.

Second, the degree of participation of each country was different (Unterhalter, 2015). The Jomtien Conference emphasized developing countries' engagement in planning at the state level, recommending that countries develop their own plans and indicators based on their context and current situation. MDGs, in contrast, aim to collect global level statistics so as to apply similar indicators to every country. As Unterhalter (2015) stated, there was no democratic process to select the UPE targets. She insists that it was a "technocratic political process, a top-down approach to planning, primarily expressing the priorities of donors, and most strongly the priorities of the World Bank." The educational goals of the MDGs were not shaped through discussions with stakeholders like governments or civil society. As a result, it failed to propose more reality-based goals.

Third, there are differing views on primary education. The Dakar Framework included a provision of free and compulsory schooling, a provision not included in the MDGs. Additionally, literacy is not mentioned in the MDGs. Therefore, Colclough (2005) stated that "the MDGs are rather less fully reflective of human rights commitments (p.106)." In this case, the donors' attention had a great impact, particularly through the EFA-First Track Initiative (FTI), a financial support system implemented by wealthy, industrialized countries to ensure EFA (Munene, 2016). The key criterion for the achievement of UPE is the Gross Enrollment Rate (GER). Other important criteria include the Net Enrollment Ratio (NER), which is a percentage-based formula that calculates the completion rate and literacy rate of the enrolled students within a defined age group (Colclough, 2005). However, the aggregated indicators provide no information on the quality and equality of education (Unterhalter, 2014). This inevitably results in a lackluster overview of educational progress through, for example, the failure to accurately report dropout statistics, enrollment levels of children, types of schools, quality of learning, and social interactions between children within the classroom.

McCowan (2010) states that the mundane definition of rights, explicitly educational based, is derived from the UDHR, in which education is identified as primary schooling. As a pragmatic strategy, schooling is treated as tangible and recognizable, which eases the monitoring of access and achievement (Mccowan, 2010). In addition, the donors' overriding priority was primary schooling (Colclough & Lewin, 1993; King & McNab, 1990). King (2004) said that the shift of focus from EFA to Schooling For All (SFA) is evidence of the donors' interest in the global education agenda. However, there is an obvious limitation in equating education and schooling.

This unsophisticated approach has masked inequality in education by presenting a scattered improvement in enrollment rates (Waage et al., 2010). As the decade passed, some research has shown the complex context and inequality at multiple levels regarding gender, regions, income levels, language, tribe, etc. (Rose, 2005; Unterhalter & North, 2011). UNESCO (2012) also asserts that the disaggregated data reveal virtually no evident improvement for marginalized learners, such as those living in rural areas or regions.

2.1.2. Numbers-Focused Universal Primary Education Policy and Its Results

For the last two decades, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have introduced school-fee abolition policies (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2020). For example, Ethiopia and Malawi initiated it in 1994, followed by Kenya, Mozambique, and Ghana in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. The fee-abolition approach undertaken by Ethiopia, Kenya, and Malawi has been termed the "Big Bang" (Birger & Craissati, 2009), because fee abolition was carried out without due consideration and sufficient preparation; predictably, the most unprepared school systems revealed its limitations.

Uganda was not an exception. The government introduced the UPE policy in

1997, as stated in the 1992 Government White Paper on Education. The White Paper initially recommended gradually enrolling students to avoid overwhelming the nascent public school system (Moulton & Mundy, 2002). However, the president overrode this recommendation and made UPE immediately free and compulsory for all children. In so doing, Museveni was honoring one of his campaign pledges (Stasavage, 2005) to implement fee-free education by January 1997 (Ward et al., 2006). As UPE started, the Ugandan government not only abolished all tuition fees, but also banned Parent Teacher Association (PTA) charges for primary education (Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), 2017) which historically were a critical financial resource for many Ugandan schools.

Awareness of this groundbreaking opportunity spread quickly throughout the country. There was an incredible demand for public schools, so the initial rollout during the first week of the program was described as generally chaotic and disorganized. People formed long lines in front of schools to register. All families had to register their children during the first week of the school year (Moulton & Mundy, 2002).

Tudor (1998, p. 15) described the situation as follows:

> The registration of children was undertaken in the week leading up to 10 January 1997. Pupils already in schools were required to re-register as well as new pupils. In his report to members of parliament in June 1997 on the progress of UPE, the Minister of Education, The Honourable Amanya Mushega, stated that 5.7 million pupils had registered for primary education, an increase of 2.6 million, of which about 5.2 million reported for school in the proceeding school term. The largest enrollments were in P1 and P2 classes. He recommended that untrained teachers be replaced and that 40,000 more teachers would be needed to compensate for the increase of children in school.

In the case of Ghana, the pilot program that started in 2003 was scaled up in 2005, and in Mozambique, the decision was made in 2003 after testing, and then implemented in 2004. It was also a major part of the election promises made in Kenya, Malawi, and Mozambique. The impact of the fee-abolition policy was evident in these five countries, whose gross enrollment rates in primary education increased (Table 1).

Table 1. Changes in Enrollment Rates after Introduction of Fee Abolition Policy

	Ethiopia	Ghana	Kenya	Malawi	Mozambique
Increase in primary school enrollment	23% increase in total enrollment from 1994/95 to 1995/96; 29% growth in grade 1	14% increase in total enrollment from 2004/05 to 2005/06	18% increase in total enrollment from 2002/03 to 2003/04	51% increase in total primary enrollment from 1994/94 to 1994/95; 59% in grade 1; 76% in grade 8	12% increase in total primary enrollment from 2003/04 to 2004/05
Gross enrollment rate in primary education	1994/95: 26.2% 1995/96: 30.1% 2004/05: 79.8%	2004/05: 83.3% 2005/06: 92.%	2002/03: 88% 2003/04: 103%	1993/94: 89% 1994/95: 134%	2003/04: 89.5% 2006/07: 113%

Source: Birger & Craissati, 2009.

Interest in the primary enrollment rate is evident in the research field (e.g. Deininger, 2003; Grogan, 2008; Nishimura et al., 2008). Several studies have examined the impact of UPE on school enrollment rate in particular countries or regions, as the success or failure of the UPE policy was assessed based on the enrollment rate.

For example, Tamusuza (2011) points out that tuition fees were abolished after the introduction of UPE policy in Uganda. However, the enrollment rate was

not fully achieved, explained as due to such factors as socioeconomic status, geographical factors, and child labor. Semali (2007) asserts that many children still have not been not enrolled in school in Sub-Saharan Africa. This raises the question of why Africa has failed to secure education for all of its school-age children. Semali expands on his statement by exploring what measures policymakers must take, such as the fight against child labor, child exploitation, and early marriage of girls, to overcome this failure. He also points out that several countries still could not achieve universal primary completion by 2015. Similarly, Deininger (2003) analyzes the impact of the UPE policy in terms of variables of socio-economic class, showing an increase in school attendance, a reduction of inequality with regard to gender and income, increased regional inequality, household burdens, and a decrease in the quality of education.

The immediate effect of the increased enrollment rate after the introduction of free primary education in SSA was to reveal a lack of school resources—quality teachers, classrooms, and school supplies—showing that countries that have introduced free primary education lack the resources to handle this increase in the educational sector. Governments have reacted to this increased demand through numerous programs, such as the construction of schools, double-shifting, and public-private partnerships.

The Ugandan government also raised the overall education budget significantly, from 1.6% to 3.8% of GDP, in the early 1990s, and 70% of the education budget was allocated to basic education in FY 1997/1998, as compared to less than 40% in the early 1990s (Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES), 2018b).

However, school systems were overwhelmed by the greatly increasing enrollment rates, which left many schools in dire need of additional organizational

support and resources (Penny et al., 2008). The attrition rate was high and the learning outcomes under the UPE initiative were disappointingly low. At the national level, only 22% of the children who entered UPE in 1997 completed the seven-year primary school cycle in 2003; in Northern Uganda, only a dismal 1.7% completed this cycle (UNICEF, 2006).

To make matters worse, educators' attitudes towards UPE were not positive. They generally had unfavorable views on the policy because the bulk of the workload fell on them, and they were not compensated with extra pay or equipped with the resources to implement the program successfully. The teachers faced overflowing classrooms, to the point where many complained they could barely move through them (Moulton & Mundy, 2002). The government also announced the prohibition of PTAs, which had been a significant resource for school management. Without PTAs and appropriate budget allocations of the government, it was impossible for principals and other administrative officials to gain the support of teachers. Moulton and Mundy (2002, p. 70) remarked that some teachers even believed that grants never reached the district offices.

McGee (2000) argues that the pre-existing educational infrastructure and insufficient administrative capacity did not allow sufficient preparation of educational structures and systems to realize education reform effectively in the schools. The initial exuberance citizens felt after registering for government schools quickly turned into demands for a basic quality of education.

Mccowan (2010) notes that while access to education for all is a success in itself, it is only half the battle. The educational approach is merely an input factor that tells nothing about the quality of education or what children learn; basic education in developing countries in the 1990s only emphasized the enrollment rate, while neglecting the quality of education. It also highlights that the MDGs

neglected closely linked and critical issues such as quality and equity while emphasizing the narrow goal of enrollment (Unterhalter, 2014). Scholars have argued that the quality and equity of education should be handled together.

As the shortcomings and quality issues in government schools are currently continuing in developing countries, various forms of private schools have also mushroomed (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2020). Nishimura and Yamano (2008) explain the relationship between the UPE policy and the increase of private schools based on three years of interviews with primary school children to understand the choice and movement between public and private schools in Kenya. According to this study, Kenya's UPE policy has raised the enrollment rate but reduced the quality of public education, leading many students to move from public to private schools. This was especially evident in children of an economically higher class. Therefore, they argues, the overall equity of the education system has worsened along with the quality of public school education with free education.

Another study by Nishimura and Yamano (2013) reported a four-fold increase in private schools in Kenya in the three years since the introduction of Free Primary Education (FPE). They explain that the quality of education in public schools can be indicated by its pupil-teacher ratio, which parents began to take into consideration when choosing a school. Parents thus decided to move their children from public schools into private schooling, though the incidence of this differed depending on the wealth of the household and gender. They warn that if wealthy pupils move to private schools after the abolition of tuition, access to quality education and poverty alleviation, the intended international goal and national goal, can have unintended consequences. Oketch, Mutisya, Ngware, and Ezeh (2010) have also noted this phenomenon in Kenya since the abolition of tuition fees in a study of why parents choose private schools even though the public schools are free. As a result of the FPE policy, interest in primary education

sharply increased. However, the number of schools was insufficient, leading to the emergence of low-fee private schools. In particular, private schools increased due to differentiated demand in urban areas. Bold, Kimenyi, Mwabu, and Sandefur (2013) investigated why free education in Kenya has failed to increase the enrollment rate in public schools, finding that the abolition of tuition has resulted in a dramatic shift toward private schooling, as the influx of poor students into free schools has had the effect of pushing out the rich and increasing enrollment in private schools.

While Deininger (2003) does not necessarily focus on private schools, he does speculate that while there is no empirical evidence to measure the increase in private schools in Uganda, he estimates that education expenditure was incurred in urban areas after the introduction of UPE, which essentially means that the financial burden of urban households increased. Atuhurra describes the link between the abolition of public school tuition and the formation of private schools in East Africa, explaining that the abolition of public school tuition has resulted in massive enrollment and low performance, both of which are evident to parents through overcrowded classes and lower test scores (Deininger, 2003; Nishimura & Yamano, 2013). This has therefore led to the rapid emergence and growth of private primary schools in east Sub-Saharan Africa. These studies, which examined the changes in educational structure after the introduction of UPE policy in East Africa, conclude that the number of private schools and amount of private expenditure have increased, and while UPE policy has not been demonstrated for certain as the cause, Tooley (2005) and Oketch and Somerset (2010) point out that developing countries increasingly show this change.

2.2. Private Schools in Developing Countries

It is necessary to clarify the definition of private schools here. The term

“private school” has been used in various senses in many studies and policies. In this study, a key feature of private schools is that “all or part of the operational or development cost depends on the user’s fees.” Therefore, private schools must follow the market principle of attracting and maintaining consumers in order to remain financially viable. However, some government schools also charge subsidiary fees for books, school supplies, and other materials. Day Ashley et al. (2014) clarifies the definition of private schooling by pointing out that these private institutions require user intervention and engagement to cover their running costs to a large degree and operate independent of government intervention. Despite this standardized definition, the boundaries of private schooling remain blurry. For example, governments may still need to engage with private schools regarding state examinations, teacher registration, and so on.

2.2.1. Current Status of Private Schools in Developing Countries

Various types of private schools have distinctly emerged in developing countries (Heyneman & Stern, 2014). In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the enrollment of public primary schools increased by 52% between 1991 and 2003, while that of private primary schools increased by 113% between 1991 and 2003 (Abdul-Hamid et al., 2015).

The World Bank has determined (Baum et al., 2018) private primary and secondary enrollment as a percentage of total enrollment in SSA. As shown in Table 2, about 14.4% and 19.4% of students are enrolled in private primary and secondary education, respectively, across SSA. In most of the countries of SSA, the rate of private enrollment grew between 2000 and 2014.

Uganda and Malawi have been praised domestically and internationally for introducing free primary education, but private schools, especially low-cost private schools for the poor, have been mushrooming (Oketch & Somerset, 2010;

Rose, 2002; Tooley et al., 2008). It is still common, not just in Uganda and Malawi but also in Tanzania and Kenya, for people to pay for private education, despite the free education provided by the state (Oketch et al., 2010; Rose, 2002, p. 16–17; Tooley et al., 2008, p. 450).

Table 2. *Private Primary and Secondary Enrollment as a Percentage of Total Enrollment, Sub-Saharan Africa*

Country	Private share of total primary enrollments	Private share of total secondary enrollment		
	2014 (%)	2000–2014 increase (%)	2014 (%)	2000–2014 increase (%)
Angola	3.0	−2.2	11.0	−7.2
Benin	17.0	6.9	18.0	1.8
Botswana	5.8	0.9	3.0	−1.0
Burkina Faso	16.5	5.1	41.1	6.9
Burundi	1.2	−0.1	9.1	−2.4
Cabo Verde	0.7	0.7	10.8	
Cameroon	22.5	−4.7	27.0	−5.1
Central African Republic	13.7	4.0	9.7	
Chad	10.4	2.1	16.3	1.3
Comoros	19.1	8.4	50.4	4.3
Congo, Dem. Rep.	11.2	−1.8	16.5	
Congo, Rep.	31.1	15.9		
Côte d'Ivoire	13.0	1.4	47.7	11.5
Equatorial Guinea	54.2	21.4		
Eritrea	9.4	−0.6	5.6	0.0
Ethiopia	4.0	−2.2	11.3	
Gabon	43.9	15.6		
Gambia	29.9	16.2		
Ghana	23.	5.7	16.1	6.5
Guinea	29.5	13.4	26.3	14.2
Guinea-	27.7	8.3	12.8	0.0

Bissau				
Kenya	10.6	6.1	12.7	4.6
Lesotho	1.3	1.3	0.9	−10.2
Liberia	32.6	−5.9	60.0	22.8
Madagascar	19.1	−3.5	40.5	−1.9
Malawi	1.2	0.1	6.5	−5.9
Mali	35.3	13.4	39.5	14.7
Mauritania	14.2	11.4	25.5	16.7
Mauritius	29.7	5.7	56.8	−10.8
Mozambique	1.6	−0.8	12.7	−2.0
Namibia	5.9	1.7	4.9	0.7
Niger	3.5	−0.8	17.9	1.5
Nigeria	8.0	1.5	21.5	9.7
Rwanda	2.7	1.8	18.0	−25.7
São Tomé and Príncipe	0.5	0.5	3.8	3.8
Senegal	15.4	4.8	19.2	−7.1
Seychelles	10.5	6.2	8.6	5.8
Sierra Leone	7.8	6.1	7.0	5.1
South Africa	3.8	2.1	5.1	2.8
Swaziland	1.5	1.5	2.3	
Tanzania	2.4	2.2	21.4	
Togo	28.3	−8.6	23.3	5.6
Uganda	16.2	5.6		
Zambia	3.2	0.6		
Mean	**14.4**		**19.4**	**1.9**

Source: Baum et al., 2018

- Data points come from specified or closest available year, and are presented as percentage point increases

In the case of Cameroon, although Free Primary Education (FPE) was introduced in 2000, the cost of education still remained high (Birger & Craissati, 2009), including the fees required by public schools. According to a survey in 2011 (Birger & Craissati, 2009), parents' expenses on education reached 44% of the total expenditure for primary education; in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), this proportion is estimated at up to 80–90%.

2.2.2. Background of the Emergence of Private Schools

The emergence of private schools is a multifaceted phenomenon in developing countries. The low quality of public schooling has been pointed out as a key cause facilitating the emergence of private schools.

Parents believe that private schools provide higher quality education than government schools for a number of reasons. For example, parents in Jamaica think that the lower Pupil-Teacher Ratio (PTR) of private schools is important by enabling teachers to pay more attention to each student. Parents in Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, and Pakistan also report that they consider private schools better than public schools due to the perception that the latter are characterized by low national examination scores, over-crowded classrooms, high teacher absenteeism, and unengaged teachers (Chisholm & Leyendecker, 2008; Fiske & Ladd, 2004; Landon et al., 2006).

Oketch and Somerset (2010) explain regarding Kenya that despite the availability of free primary education, parents choose private schools, which they perceive as "good" schools. He states that with the introduction of Free Primary Education (FPE) in Kenya, "one would have expected free primary education to reduce the use of private schools. ...but the results reveal that despite free primary education, parents still are searching for a 'good' school for their child. It appears that this search is in favor of the 'low cost' private schools rather than the public schools" (Oketch & Somerset, 2010, p. 181).

The lack of public school spaces is another reason for increases in private schools (Colclough, 1996). For example, in Pakistan, although the government has ensured increased access to education, private schools are still prevalent due to a shortage of public schools (Heyneman & Stern, 2014). Most growth of private schools is occurring in rural areas, where there is a lack of schools. Pinyakong et

al. (2007) also indicate that shortfalls in public education have spurred the growth of the low-cost private sector, in particular the secondary level, in Thailand. Tooley (2005) found that, although private schools could be found throughout the country, low-cost private schools were mainly established in rural areas to meet the demand there.

In Kenya, a lack of public school supplies is also cited as an important factor in the increase in low-cost private schools, particularly in slums. With the lack of government funding, this in turn has led to the participation of local communities in education (Oketch et al., 2010). In similar fashion, Uganda (Phillipson, 2008) and Nigeria (Adelabu & Rose, 2004) also saw an increase in private schools due to a lack of public school supplies.

Härmä (2019) states that the increase in private schools is due to the failure of government policy, specifically in the role of delivering and ensuring the right to education. Existing studies indicate that parents have been led to abandon government schools for private schools primarily because the government has failed both quantitatively and qualitatively to supply adequate schools as the demand for schooling has rapidly increased.

Baum et al. (2018) also suggests "differentiated demand," meaning "consumer desires for education services of differential values or quality," as another perspective to explain the growth of private schools. Religious education is one example of the differentiated demand for education. Religious education has played a major role in increasing private education in many countries. In Tanzania and Pakistan, for example, interest in religious education is an important reason for the increase in demand for low-cost private schools (Heyneman & Stern, 2014). This phenomenon is also observed in Venezuela (Allcott & Ortega, 2009), Sierra Leone (Wodon & Ying, 2009), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC;

Backiny-Yetna & Wodon, 2009), and India (Jodhka & Bora, 2009). There is in general a variety of demands in education, not just for religious education but also for cultural education, English-focused education, and others. Kitaev (2007) explains that as economic disparity has grown, it has led to increased diversity and upgraded teaching and learning conditions in education. The public system cannot satisfy all educational demands, but private for-profit schools can offer an alternative for those able to pay the school fee.

2.2.3. Governmental Authority over Private Schools

The emergence, expansion, and stabilization of private schools show the effects of governmental influence. Government intervention in private schools can be supported, opposed, or simply ignored.

For example, in Malawi, privatization was implemented as a part of the decentralization policy urged by international agencies. Decentralization permits the transfer of responsibility and power from government to the private sector. The evidence from Malawi, however, demonstrates that while the decentralization policy was implemented under this design, the central government still hoped to exert control over the education sector, yet was unable to greatly influence the privatization that has spread over Malawi, allowing the mushrooming of low-cost, low-quality, and unregistered schools as the center unintentionally loses its role as regulator (Rose, 2005). This study shows that private schools may expand regardless of the government's will.

Not all governments seek to control private schools. The Côte d'Ivoire government has supported private schools through a government subsidy program (Sakellariou & Patrinos, 2004). A government's public-school policies nonetheless affect the formation of private schools even if they do not directly target private schools. Madagascar is an example. The Madagascar government raised tuition

fees to finance public schools, which resulted in a significant increase in low-cost private schools, contrary to the government's expectations of expanding public schools (Glick & Sahn, 2006). Thus, the expansion of private schools is influenced in various ways by governmental policies and the government's ability to implement them effectively. Although private schools are directly or indirectly affected by government policies, many scholars have asserted that governments in developing countries are failing in practice to regulate and manage private schools.

A lack of reporting and of data on school status has been also pointed out as more important than the increase or expansion of private schools per se(Day Ashley et al., 2014), as the government basic lacks knowledge of private schools—the size of this sector, the location of schools, the merits and limitations of private schools, the reason for parents' choice, and private sector providers (Humayun, S., Shahza, R., Cunnginghuman, 2013; Sommers & Fulbright Fellow, 2011). Day Ashley et al. (2014, p. 35) explains that "there is consistent evidence across a range of contexts that attempts by governments to intervene in the private education sector are constrained by a lack of government capacity, understanding and basic information on the size and nature of the private sector. Attempts…to apply regulatory frameworks suffer from poor implementation."

Some studies also show that current regulations have unintended consequences. One is the generalized bribery that has been singled out as common in the process of regulation of private schools (Härmä & Adefisayo, 2013; Heyneman & Stern, 2013; Ohara, 2013). Härmä (2019) describes how bribes have become general in private school registration and inspection in the capitals of Nigeria, Uganda, and Ghana. Tooley and Dixon (2005) show that bribes are also common in India. This implies that the under-resourced inspectorate system fails to sustain the regulatory roles over private schools.

Another unintended result is an increase in unregistered schools, which reduces the ability of the public system to control the private schools by the. Härmä (2011) explains that strict regulations on private schools in Nigeria's capital, Lagos, have resulted in the non-registration of most low-cost private schools. As of 2011, 76 percent of Lagos's private schools were not registered. According to a household survey conducted in a slum in Lagos, 40 percent of unregistered schools answered they did not register due to the strict regulations (Härmä & Adefisayo, 2013, p. 146), suggesting that the excessive complexity of the registration or licensing procedures hinders the systematic and effective provision of the needs of the private sector.

Baum et al. (2018) examined policies on private schools in 20 countries in SSA, focusing on the relationships between private sector regulation and private sector growth in education. They argue that "restrictive market entry regulations offer constraints on the growth of official private education markets, but that the same restrictive regulations are likely to facilitate the growth of unofficial markets if demand for education is not being fully met by the supply of government service provision."

These studies show the gap between the political will of regulation and reality of private schooling. Additionally, it demonstrates that so long as inadequate access and low quality of public education persists, stringent regulations will only drive private education into an unregistered, unmonitored, and low-quality state.

2.2.4. Private Schools in Urban Regions

Although researchers have demonstrated the mushrooming of private schools in many developing countries, some studies have found it to be more evident in urban areas with high levels of participation. These are commonly characterized as low-cost, unregistered, or unrecognized private schools, and they are closely

associated with low-income families (Adelabu & Rose, 2004; Härmä, 2019; Oketch et al., 2010; Tooley et al., 2008).

Wakiso, Uganda, is one of the cities with high numbers of private schools to meet the demand of families interested in education. The high price of land in Kampala is one of the reasons that Wakiso has come to be home to many private schools, as it shares a border with Kampala. The rapid urbanization of Kampala fueled an exorbitant increase in land prices. A report on the Ugandan poverty assessment process in Kampala (Bryceson & Potts, 2006, Chapter 7) describes how land in Kampala became the ultimate means of production and source of income in the land markets.

As the land price escalated, peri-urban areas, normally defined as a place between 10 or 20 km outside the city, became an increasingly attractive alternative, as they allowed for a strong linkage of rural and urban livelihoods with a semi-rural lifestyle and supplementary farming. Thanks to the growing availability of minibuses since the 1990s, peri-urban belts broadened around African cities (Briggs & Mwamfupe, 2000). Wakiso is a peri-urban area that serves as a receiving center for incoming migrants from rural areas who moved in search of better opportunities, as well as those from Kampala who could no longer afford the cost of living there, offering them cheaper rents than the inner city.

Wakiso is also known for its good educational environment for children, even better than Kampala's in certain respects. The school fees in Kampala are higher than in Wakiso even with similar quality due to the high land prices. Moreover, commuting to school is difficult in Kampala due to serious traffic jams. Wakiso has thus become a region with many private schools and popular enthusiasm for education.

Several researchers have specifically studied private schools in urban

localities. Oketch et al. (2010) researched the background and causes of high participation in private education by low-income households even though the government schools are fee-free in urban Kenya, based on longitudinal data collected in slum and non-slum areas on enrollment, transitions, dropout, and progression among children. Data on school and household characteristics were also collected, allowing the determination of the number of children enrolled in private schools, wealth indices, trends in school enrollment in the areas by year, school availability, and the cost of schooling in the informal settlements.

The rate of private school use by wealth quintile shows that the number of pupils attending private schools from the poorest families is higher than that of less poor families in slum areas. The situation is the opposite in non-slum areas, where the number of pupils attending private schools increases with wealth: 5.3% of the poorest families in the non-slum area have children attending private schools, while 35.3% of those from less poor families attend.

The trends in enrollment after Free Primary Education (FPE) also show the difference in slum and non-slum areas in urban Kenya. According to statistics from 2003, when FPE was introduced, the enrollment rate of government schools increased in slum areas. This tendency was different in the non-slum area, however, where FPE was not accompanied by a noticeable change in the enrollment rate of public and private schools.

The analysis of school availability and school supply also showed that the number of schools was higher in slum areas, but the number of pupils was much higher. In the research sites, for example, the number of public schools (4) in the slum areas had a higher number of pupils (2,415) than the non-slum area, which has three public schools and fewer pupils (209). The analysis of enrollment trends after FPE shows that school availability and shortage of school supply remain an

ever-present problem.

Oketch et al. (2010) continue that in the non-slum area, the public system was perceived as providing low-quality education, which contributed to the increased use of private systems, thought to be of high quality. In non-slum areas, this structure can be seen as providing a "choice," but the situation in the slum area is different. The rise of low-fee private schools in slum areas can be seen as a reaction to fill the gap of demand and supply, due to the insufficient public school supply.

Using the theory of James (1994), they suggest two major perspectives to understand this situation: excess demand and differentiated demand. These concepts are usually utilized in economics by defining education as an impure good that can be provided by both the public and private sectors. Based on this theory, they conclude that the utilization of private schools is triggered by the excess demand in slum areas, but by the differentiated demand in non-slum areas.

In another study, Oketch et al. (2010) focus on the reasons for transfers between slum and non-slum schools in Kenya. Overall, there are many transfers in both slums and non-slums in Nairobi, but more in slums. There are also more cases of going from private to private and from public to private than of going from private to public. Among the reasons given by respondents for transferring, transfers from public school to private school were often made because the quality of public schools was perceived as low, while transfers from private schools to other private schools were often made to find a better quality of education.

Interestingly, schools with few transfer students in slum areas often had electricity or piped water, presumably indicating that it is difficult to transfer to a school with good conditions because it is already over-subscribed.

Under circumstances where the number of private schools in urban areas in

developing countries is increasing, Härmä (2019) explains, based on through interviews with stakeholders and various related literature in Niger-Abuja, Ghana-Acra and Uganda-Kampala, that the government is failing to regulate low-cost private schools in the capital area. One of the key factors behind regulatory failure is the unsustainable and non-feasible design of the system due to unrealistic regulations and insufficient resources. According to this study, many private schools do not or cannot register with the state system because the regulations are too complex and difficult to meet, thereby excluding themselves from the official system. Generalized bribery in the process of registration and inspection is also common.

It has been known that students in urban areas will evidently enjoy more complete educational rights than those in rural areas due to the "urban advantages" that result from better facilities that are more accessible than those in a rural setting. However, a recent study by Mugisha (2006) suggests that these "urban advantages" are minuscule. He explains that children in rural areas have longer school enrollments: Comparing urban slum children with rural children shows that the enrollment of slum children actually decreases starting at 9 for females and 11 for males, despite overall high enrollment levels in urban areas, while that of rural areas increases or remains constant. Additionally, the enrollment rate in the secondary-school-going ages is higher in rural areas than in the slums.

Silva-Laya et al. (2020) reviewed 66 articles on the educational experience of lower class in urban children covering the period 1995–2017, finding that lower-class urban children and the schools they attend struggle to provide quality education and face a variety of obstacles. Thus, education seems a lackluster resource for social mobility, since pupils' educational trajectory reflects stratification by socio-economic status.

2.2.5. Private School Discourses in Developing Countries

The debate on the appropriateness and effectiveness of private schools has been contentious since evidence on the emergence of private schools in developing countries came to light from the late 1990s (Day Ashley, Mcloughin, et al., 2014; Kingdon, 1996; Kitaev, 1999; Nguyen & Raju, 2014). Opinions on private schools have been strongly divided. From one perspective, it is expected that the market principle will raise educational effectiveness, promoting the aim of Education for All. From another, however, it has been argued that the provision of education is a function of government as a public good, since it is a fundamental human right for all people.

Questions have been asked regarding private schools and how they are contributing towards Education for All. A positive stance towards private schools argues that private schools with commercial purposes improve the access to or quality of education. Proponents state that the availability of private schools improves accessibility and competitiveness, which in turn improves the quality of education and reduces burdens on the public sector (LaRocque & Fielden, 2008; Patrinos et al., 2009). In particular, in the context of developing countries, it has been argued that the role of low-cost private schools is important in expanding basic education (Alderman et al., 2001).

Opponents, however, have raised concerns that a market-driven education policy will seriously hinder progress in social justice and equity for the sake of operational efficiency. From this perspective, education provision by the non-state sector is a threat to free and universal education as well as human rights (Mundy & Menashy, 2014; Robertson & Dale, 2013; Verger et al., 2016). As a basic human right, education is a moral and legal responsibility that should be fulfilled by the state. If the state takes control of educational operations, it could protect minorities

and diminish exclusion from schools (K. Lewin, 2007, p. 42). Moreover, since education is critical for constructing the modern conditions of humankind, preserving educational opportunities for all in an equal manner could also ensure lowered social inequality for generations (Oketch et al., 2010).

Liberalization by the Uganda government reflects this trend. From the mid-1980s, with increased interest in primary education, there was a general enthusiasm in Uganda for "liberalizing" several areas of governance, including education, and allowing these areas to respond to market principles. Uganda liberalized education in 1993 in line with broader Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) emphasizing privatization, "Laissez Faire" deregulation, and market principles in policy implementation in diverse economic and social sectors (Ogawa & Nishimura, 2015). Since the Ugandan government liberalized its education sector, thousands of schools and educational institutions have been created by various non-state actors, including religious groups, private investors, and NGOs (Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES), 2018a).

There has been much discussion of the effects of private schools on social inequality. Some empirical studies indicate that private schools have exacerbated social inequality, showing that the increase of private school facilitates has benefited advantaged students disproportionately to disadvantaged students (Akresh et al., 2012; Aslam, 2009; Bangay & Latham, 2013; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2006; Maitra et al., 2011; Waslander et al., 2010). Lincove (2007, p. 2) admits the benefits of private schools, but still raises concerns that relying on the private market can weaken equity.

Some studies, however, have shown that low-fee private schools are becoming more accessible to low-income households. For example, in Ghana, the school fees in low-fee private schools require 12% of the minimum wage,

compared to 14% if one attended public school (Akaguri, 2014). Therefore, low-fee private schools are regarded as a more economical alternative. A report by Save the Children (2007) found that "there is a multitude of private schools catering to lower-income groups, both in urban and rural areas" (p.4). Another study, by Heyneman et al. (2014), shows that in Kenya and India, most of the low-fee private schools are based in poor areas and accept low-income families.

It is partly acknowledged that some low-fee private schools afford disadvantaged students access. However, a majority of studies contends that the current situation is far from fulfilling the requirements of universal education (PROBE Team, 1999; Srivastava, 2008; Watkins, 2004). Researchers have shown that private schools mostly expand in rich or urban areas by serving the better-off households (Watkins, 2004). Private schools are more expensive than government schools, because they charge additional school fees as well as having hidden costs. They can therefore be more selective in the students they take than lower-cost schools. Studies in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda suggest evidence of economic inequality by showing that the richest families are three times more likely to attend private schools than the poorest (Alcott & Rose, 2016).

Many studies have also shown that only few children from low-income families access private schools due to economic limitations that keep them out of private schools. Even if children from poor families go to private schools, this is often through scholarships or welfare benefits, in lieu of which continued attendance is difficult to sustain (Day Ashley et al., 2014).

Families who send their children to private schools will generally bear a significant financial burden. For this reason, many families may not be able to send their children to school, has suggested by the fact that when school fees were abolished for public schools, there was a surge in enrollment, indicating that

"school fees" constitute financial burdens that make families hesitant to send their children to school.

Watkins (2004) points out that school fees are still the key obstacle for parents to securing education for their children. The increase of enrollment in private schools does not necessarily mean that private schools have become "affordable" for parents. Tooley argues that paying 4 dollars is "affordable," but Watkins (2004) explains that this expenditure is the total income for some families. Additionally, the school fee is only part of the cost of educating children. He argues that parents spend money on education not because they have the ability to pay, but because they think education is an important way to get out of poverty. He says, "Willingness to pay is not the same as availability to pay."

Nevertheless, many low-income families are sending their children to private schools regardless of their financial situation. The question that the arises is whether private schools contribute to the improvement of learning outcomes. Alcot (2016) explains that private schools increase children's chances of gaining basic skills such as reading and writing, but this does not reduce the difference in learning outcomes resulting from wealth differences. In Kenya and Uganda, private school children performed better than public school children, but the learning outcomes of the poorest children in private schools and those of the richest children in public schools were similar. In Tanzania, private schools do not seem to promote the learning of poorer children, but do that of the richer children, indicating that wealth differences affect learning outcomes more than the type of school does (Alcot, 2016). Watkins (2004) also explains that it is difficult to say that private schools have better learning outcomes regardless of family wealth.

Another major argument of proponents of private schools is that private schools improve the quality of public schools through competition (Friedman,

1955). Lewin argues that there is no historical evidence in OECD countries or growing countries of a reliance on non-state or private entities to achieve universal access to basic education. Lincove (2007, p. 3) explains that the quality of private schools varies from country to country, and that it is hugely dependent on the quality of public schools. For instance, if there is a lack of public school supply in an area, private schools in turn are usually of low quality. In this scenario, private schools are not "good schools" but just a "second-chance" for children who do not have access to public schools. Consequently "the effect of policies that promote private schools on quality or quantity will depend on the context of the available public supply. (…) When public school capacity is low, private schools fill the gap but with no competitive incentive to improve quality" (Lincove, 2007, p. 3).

There are also concerns that increases in private schools will hamper the growth of public schools, thus impairing the overall education system in the long run. Generally, private schools are for wealthy families who, due to their stature in their community, hold political influence. Given this fact, if they move from government schools to private schools, this will reduce the political pressure to improve the quality of government schools. Watkins (2004, p. 10) insists that this will lead government schools, to lose influence in policy-making processes, thereby feeding a vicious circle of under-investment in the public education system.

2.3. Educational Structure and Parents

The roles of parents are an important issue in their children's education (Brown, 1990; Durning, 1994, 2006). Parents, along with teachers and students, are the key players in education, in that they are the stakeholders who pay taxes, tuition, and extra fees such as textbook, uniform, and Parent Teacher Association (PTA) fees. They also have final say on such matters as school types and education methods. The actions, perspectives, and attitudes of parents define and structure

the educational landscape, while being deeply affected by it. This creates an almost cyclical effect, where stakeholders are impacted by their own actions (H. Seo, 2014).

The relationship between structure and an individual is complex. Some believe that an individual's position in a given structure determines the social his or her position (structure without agency), while others believe that most things are determined through individual decisions and actions; through this lens, individual agency can overcome social obstacles and barriers (agency without structure). The former is mainly criticized for leaving no room for roles and responsibilities of individuals, while the latter is criticized for downplaying the impact of social power and blaming individuals themselves for negative consequences. However, if we observe reality, we can easily find both phenomena to occur simultaneously. We can witness this interplay through the lens of parents and education; parents may be influenced by the structure of education, and vice versa. In other words, parents, social structure, and educational structure mutually interact.

For example, in Korea, where parents have a strong passion for their children's education, their enthusiasm for education is understood as underlying various phenomena in Korean education (J. Lee, 2014). According to Seth (2002), parents played crucial roles in the expansion of education in Korea. Korea has long been a state-administered society, so the government has pushed ahead with education policies with enormous vigor, but parents have intervened and participated in education with a potent "educational zeal" that has been instrumental in the development of Korean education. This zeal for education in Korea has been criticized for increasing the burden of private education costs, creating a hyper-focus on testing, causing conflict within the family, and even for contributing to the high rate of suicide within the youth population. However,

despite some of these perceived negative ramification of "education zeal" on the part of parents, it is acknowledged to have had positive effects, including the rapid growth of Korean education (Park, 2009; Ryu et al., 2015; Seth, 2002). Also, it is not always expressed as a competitive educational zeal, but sometimes rather as an interest in alternative education that pursues community building, or a win-win approach (D. Seo, 2018; Suh, 2004). Therefore, researchers who want to understand Korean education have paid attention to parents' behaviors (Hwang, 2015; Kang, 2017; Oh, 2008).

There are also studies supporting a somewhat market-led position that parents' behavior can have a positive impact on education structure when operating in the realm of preference and choice. For example, Schneider et al. (1997) point out that preferences and choices for schools stemming from parents' interests will stimulate competition, resulting in overall school growth. In particular, considering that the bureaucratic monopoly centered on public schools has made internal reforms impossible, education can be improved when parents, as new actors, are included in the process. This has mainly been handled through discussions of private schools.

James Tooley is one of the leading scholars arguing that parents' participation through choice can improve the quality of schools and further promote equality of education. He notes the possibility of meeting the demands of parents in developing countries, especially through low-cost private schools. He explains that these low-cost private schools have emerged due to various problems in public schools, including frequent absenteeism of teachers and lack of financial support from the government. As a result, parents send their children to low-cost private schools instead of public schools. This would serve to increase the quality of education accessible to low-income families, as well as the quality of public schools through competition with private schools. Therefore, they argue that

private schools contribute to greater educational equality as a result (Tooley & Dixon, 2005, 2014; Woodhead et al., 2013).

In particular, this provides support for the expansion of private schools based on parents' choice and demand in developing countries. Chubb and Moe (1990) and Finn (1990) also argue that this affords low-income and minority children access to better quality schools. Alderman et al. (2001) analyzed the choices of parents whose children were in public or private schools, and found the use of private schools by low-income people regardless of income level. He argues that this is why private schools are important for expanding education in developing countries.

These choices are also interpreted as helping to restore democracy in the long run. It is regarded as an extension of parental citizenship (Corwin & Schneider, 2005). It assumes that parents are endowed with the power of citizens and consumers, and would increase the expansion of "strong democracies," which accentuate the participation of all citizens(Rogers, 2007; Schneider et al., 1998).

On the other hand, it is pointed out that the structure affects parents' agency of expression, which is why there is a limit. An individual's behavior is inevitably determined by the "possible" range of choices that can be taken within their social-cultural structure (De Gaulejac & Taboada-Léonetti, 1994, p. 184–185). Vincent (2001) states that there is an interrelationship between parents' agency and social class that is heavily influenced by the latter. The opportunities to exercise one's agency are mostly available only to those above the professional middle class. In contrast, the working-class is placed in a position making it difficult to pose any effective challenge, and due to the absence of appropriate cultural, material, and economic capital, it tends to be dominated by "survival issues" (Vincent, 2001; Vincent & Martin, 2002).

The available emotional resources generated while supporting children's education also differ by social class. Gillies (2006) examines this phenomenon by conducting a case study of British parents. He notes that parents from different classes create different emotional resources. Specifically, parents in the working class and their children usually experience school with feelings of conflict and stress, while middle-class parents will intervene in their children's education to ensure better academic performance and positive experiences, suggesting that material and social contexts shape parents' emotional commitment and that parents in the working-class usually must work harder for their children to "survive in school."

These above-mentioned studies show that these choices do not always create new equal opportunities, particularly for low-income and minority parents, nor are they even guaranteed safety in the market-driven school environment, which is only amenable to privileged or middle-class parents (Olson Beal & Hendry, 2012). The argument that this allows parents to exercise their agency in the form of school choice is only true for certain social classes (André-Bechely, 2004; Blank & Archbald, 1992; Metz, 2003). Some studies of voucher systems, which afford parents a wider range of educational institution options, argue that this can lead to enormous inequality because more socioeconomically-advantaged parents can more easily navigate the system and access better schools for their children (Carnoy & McEwan, 2003; Lara et al., 2009; Molnar, 2001).

Menashy (2012) thus firmly asserts that "Choice, moreover, is a concept that should not be confused with the agency, or opportunity." Ball (2010) argues that educational opportunities transform structural background capital into individual achievements through an increase of "choice":

> A conceptual and very practical shift, from education as an intrinsically

> valuable, shared resource which the state owes to its citizens, to a consumer product or an investment for which individuals who reap the rewards of being educated (of their families) must take first responsibility (Ball, 2010, p. 160).

As education evolves from a state-protected right to a product and service at the mercy of capitalist forces, the responsibility for bearing the consequences is left to the individuals.

Moreover, Hursh (2017) points out that a privatized education structure that prioritizes freedom of choice defines students and parents as customers necessarily dilutes the democratic function of education by encouraging competition for limited resources, which will finally re-define the social relationship using market principles and terms. When democracy and equality are rearticulated in market terms, the focus will move from the community to individuals and the former "right to education" will be reduced to goods produced by their own efforts.

Ball (2003) states based on interviews with middle-class parents that they now face the "risk" of school choice. He notes that they are working harder to maintain their advantages under the new conditions of choice and competition in education. Parents are focusing on the fact that the characteristics of a risky society appear within education. He focuses on parents to reveal the characteristics of a risky society.

Aspirations constitute an important criterion in making choices. Hart (2012) examines the formation of aspirations in education, finding that "what seemed important was not the individual factors." According to Hart (2012, p. 166),

> In a sense what seemed important was not the individual factors that may be linked to fields related to family, educational institutions, work, and social networks as well as individuals' own perceived abilities and traits. There was a sense that many of the individuals who had given up, put off, or

> adopted their aspirations did this in response to the overall impact of constraints rather than necessarily as a consequence of any one factor.

So, it appears that having "choices" is problematic. Jonathan's findings (Jonathan, 1990, p. 20) can help to clarify the meaning of the discussion so far. In his "State education service or prisoner's dilemma," he writes the following:

> Being unable to affect the social situation of progressively less equal shares but having the opportunity only to try and secure an advantageous share for those whose interests they hold in trust, they are under pressure to adopt a conservative and prudential social stance, thus contributing to cumulative social changes they have not directly chosen, and may very well not endorse.

Therefore, the choice of parents affected by these structural factors makes it difficult for them to fully demonstrate their agency. For example, if parents choose based on their own self-interest, as most of them do, they will seek an educational environment that would maximize their children's opportunities (Bankston III & Caldas, 2002, p. 72), leading to the creation of segregated and homogeneous populations in schools. Chubb and MoES (1990, p. 32) also point out that "markets are less likely to generate the diversity, quality, and levels of services that consumers want." Michael Apple (2000, 2013) criticized this as "cocooning."

Chapter 3. Methodology

3.1. Case Study

The purpose of this study is to gain an in-depth insight into the effects of UPE policy in Uganda, specifically Wakiso. This study is primarily focused on a case study. A case study allows one to understand a real-world case in depth within its specific context, especially with cases in which it is difficult to evidently divide phenomenon and context (Yin, 2017). Case studies admit that phenomenon and context are not always sharply distinguishable, and as a result, they do not try to intentionally divide the phenomenon from its context. It rather takes a holistic approach within its real-world context. Therefore, it makes phenomena that are too complex for surveys or experimental methods easier to investigate.

Yin (2017) put forth three types of case studies: exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive. Yin argues that case studies in general are appropriate when asking "how," "why," "what," and "who" questions. An exploratory case study, however, has its limitations to "how" and "what." This study posed the questions on "how" the universal primary education policy affected primary schools in Wakiso. It also questioned "how" this policy affected the family's educational decision-making. These questions do not have the predetermined outcomes, which are the key to an exploratory case study. Moreover, scholars choose to conduct exploratory case studies in order to gain an extensive and in-depth description of social phenomena (Yin, 2017).

This study sought to build and gain further insight upon quantitative data that has been already collected regarding the effects of UPE. For instance, enrollment rates, drop-out rates, completion rates, and the change in the number of active schools after the UPE policy introduction, their budgets, and the scores on basic

assessments. In this study, I chose an exploratory case. Understanding the effects of a policy is not a simple task, rather one should consider various elements such as other policies, systems, economical situations, and the behaviors of each educational stakeholder. All these are interconnected in a complex way. Therefore, an exploratory case study is appropriate in that it can allow us to examine the complexity which cannot be gained in a survey or experiment (Yin, 2017).

Case studies rely on multiple sources of evidence including documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts, and so forth (Yin, 2017). This study also used multiple resources: interviews, documentation, and participant-observation.

Patton (1990, p. 169) suggests purposeful sampling instead of probability sampling or convenience sampling for some qualitative research. Purposeful sampling is generally chosen to achieve representativeness or typicality of the settings, individuals, or activities. It also can give more plentiful information rather than random or accidental sampling with the same size.

Wakiso was chosen as it is the educational representative region in Uganda. This is indicated by the rapid increase of enrollment alongside the emergence and expansion of private schools. This indicates that Wakiso is of great importance to help understand the other regions of Uganda or developing countries.

The results of a case study cannot be statistically generalized like experimental research. A specific case is generalizable to theoretical propositions (analytic generalizations) and not to populations or a universal census (Yin, 2017). This is mainly because a case does not represent an entire population under scrutiny. It is rather representative as an opportunity to empirically explore some theoretical concepts or principles or help to improve the current concepts by corroborating, modifying, or rejecting them. This study presents contextual

substance which adds to the understanding of shared characteristics, tendencies, or problems regarding Uganda, East Africa, and other developing countries that face comparable educational hindrances as a result of their socioeconomic limitations.

3.2. Data Collection

This study used multiple sources of data to answer the proposed research questions. Interviews are one of the most important sources, especially when it comes to explaining the "hows" and "whys" of the key events in question (Yin, 2017). In this study, interviews were also the fundamental sources of data, particularly interviews with parents.

The documentation included in the study is composed of formal studies or evaluations of studies, as well as news clippings and other articles appearing in the mass media or in community newspapers (Yin, 2017). The data from documentation is a reliable source because it can be reviewed repeatedly and can contain the exact names, references, and details of an event. In this study, the news clippings and articles are used to support the interview data.

The participant-observation method is useful since it covers actions in real time, and it also covers the case's context. It could range from formal to casual data collection activities (Yin, 2017). The contents of this study mainly come from participant-observation that was carried out while I visited Uganda from January 8th to February 27th, 2019. This facilitated me to have a relationship with the interviewees and residents, thus this allowed participant-observation to be carried out rather than just observation. Although my observations within Wakiso were not formal, I was able to observe meaningful scenes first-hand over two months. This provided the means to gather additional information; for example, visiting

the primary leaving examination (PLE) center, government and private schools, and parents' house for example.

I found some limitations during the field research regarding interview data collection. For example, parents from relatively low socioeconomic backgrounds use Luganda instead of English, so a translator was required. Even with a translator, parents felt uncomfortable freely expressing their ideas and gave shortened answers. These interactions only collected the factual data on individuals such as the type of school being attended, economic means of attending, and so forth. As a result, it was difficult to understand the context and reality of their life. As time went on, some of them gave more informative answers, but there was still a need to use more supporting data to answer the research questions and to ensure the validity of parents' answers.

Therefore, news articles and literature were utilized throughout the research as well as the observations that were documented. Using multiple sources is the major strength of the case study because triangulation is likely to be more convincing and accurate (Yin, 2017). Interviews in Wakiso, firstly, were processed with some parents, officials from the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES), and teachers from government and private schools. Based on their answers, the repetitive characteristics are additionally explored with other interviewees and news articles.

After analyzing the interviews and observations, I found a characteristic key word, Primary Leaving Examination (PLE). For more context, I examined news articles from the two major Uganda newspapers: The Observer (https://observer.ug/) and New Vision (https://www.newvision.co.ug/). I searched the articles with the keywords "Primary Leaving Examination (PLE)" and "Wakiso" from 1997 to 2019. The data collection in Uganda took place from January 8th to February 27th,

2019. The additional data collection in Korea for news articles was carried out from July to August 2019.

3.2.1 Interview Participants

Parents

The criteria considered in selecting parent participants are as follows. First, it is required to meet parents of various income levels. However, there was a difficulty of clearly grasping the income of parents because it was unstable, intermittent, or not officially reported. For example, when they were selling vegetables or fruits on the road, the range of income varied considerably from time to time. Low-income people only have temporary income when part-time work such as laundry comes in, rather than having a full-time job. Therefore, the method of estimating income was based on the observations and interview data, even though it was roughly figured out to select the interview participants from the various economic status. The type of house in which they live (e.g., owner, monthly rent, etc.), the type of car they have, how many meals they have a day, and what they usually eat helps to estimate their economic situation.

The search for participants for the interview took place from November 3rd to 5th and 12th to 13th, 2018. This visit for research planning allowed me to participate in a "Mother's Gathering" which was organized by mothers who are not well off. They regularly met and shared their own situations and discussed how to stand on their own feet. Through this gathering, it was possible to simply identify the participants' approximate economic status, the name of the school that their children attended, their tuition, the difficulties of sending them to school, and their thoughts about the school and education. Based on this information, the participants from low-income interviews were firstly selected. Interviewees in the middle and high-income levels were recommended through the officials of high-

fee private schools in the village.

The second criterion to select the appropriate interviewee was the number of children they have. Among the interviewee candidates who are from a similar income level, the parents who had more than one child were preferable. This was because these parents have more experience regarding children's education, and this many times allowed them to make suitable changes in their choices and decisions as time went on. It was difficult to find enough cases of multiple children among parents in the middle- and upper-income brackets, as they generally had smaller households.

Third, it was necessary to have both parents who sent their children to government and private schools. School types are significant factors to understand parents' educational decisions. Based on the three criteria, the following six types of interviews are formed [Table 3]. [Table 4] is the list of parent interviewees.

[Table 3] Categories of Parents

	No Schooling	Government school	Private school
Low-Income	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3
Middle-Income	Type 4	Type 5	Type 6
High-income	Type 7	Type 8	Type 9

[Table 4] List of Research Participants: Parents

Name	Type	Regular income	No. of Children
Namazzi	Type1, 2	No	4
Natukunda	Type 2, 3	No	6
Doris	Type 2	No	5
Dembe	Type 5, 6	Yes	4
Miremba	Type 5, 6	Yes	10

Akiki	Type 9	Yes	2
Mukasa	Type 9	Yes	2

All interviews were conducted at least once, but some required a second interview. Any interviewees that required one interview, generally lasted up to an hour. In the first interview, the questions were fashioned in a way towards the interviewees that allowed gathering of specific information. For instance, income estimation, the period of residence in Wakiso, the number of children and their general education status, reasons for school selection, and the degree of satisfaction towards the school, and so on. After the first interview if not enough information was gathered or unclear from both parents, the second interview was conducted focusing on follow-up questions. For example, the experience of transferring schools or dealing with child suspension. The second interview lasted from 15 minutes to an hour, depending on the amount of content to be reaffirmed. In particular, if different information existed for the same event or issue, it was supplemented by the second interview.

All interview data collected in this way has been confirmed differently. For example, in the case of low-income parents, there were cases in which parents did not know the exact school fees. These parts were reconfirmed through a school visit. In addition, when statements about "facts" differ between parents, they were reaffirmed in a formal manner, such as documentation or news articles.

Officials from MoES or Department of Education in Wakiso

In the case of the interviews with the officials from Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) and the Department of Education in Wakiso, the participants were introduced by the education program for Uganda public officials in the education sector hosted by the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), which was held in October 2018 in Seoul KCCI. Through these people, I got the

list of interview candidates who could provide more needed information. I sent an email to the interview candidates and figured out what kinds of information they can provide for me. Accordingly, participants were decided as follows in [Table 5]. In the interview, the role of the department and interviewees' work experience was asked. More specific questions were asked to resolve questions arising from parents' statements. All names are pseudonyms. The interviews were conducted one time for each person for about one hour.

[Table 5] List of Research Participants: Officials from MoES or Department of Education in Wakiso

	Name	Position
1	Nathan	Commissioner, BTVET (Business, Technical, Vocational Education and Training), MoES
2	Sylvia	Data Manager in Department of Education, Wakiso

Officials from Schools

School officials were chosen based on two criteria. The first is officials from schools that were mentioned by parents, and the second is officials from schools which are composed of three categories: public schools, low-cost private schools, and high-level private schools. Accordingly, the interview participants are as follows in [Table 6]. Questions were asked to better understand the issues raised in interviews with parents. For example, the informal costs and PLE scores. All interviews were conducted at least once, but one interviewee required a second interview to get more information. The second interview lasted for about 30 minutes.

[Table 6] List of Research Participants: Officials from Government and Private Primary Schools

	Name	School name (Government / Private)	Position
1	Caroline	Karajowa (G)	Teacher
2	Kaikara	Blessing (P)	Director of Study
3	Diana	Sunshine (P)	Financial Officer

3.2.2. List of Schools

There were five schools that are repeatedly mentioned by parents. Here is the list of schools with a pseudonym, type of school, school fee, and additional charges. The definition of low-fee private schools is diverse. Phillipson (2008) estimates that low-fee private schools charge about 15,000-28,000UGX[2], while Ush and Härmä (2020) estimate roughly about 80,000–100,000UGX (21.43-26.79USD). It shows that defining a price as low or high is a relative concept. In this study, I divided the mentioned schools into three types, low-fee, middle-fee, and high-fee. This was devised by comparing them amongst each other and by the statements from parents and teachers about their schools.

[Table 7] List of schools

School Name	Karajowa	Bright Junior	Blessing	Winter Land	Sunshine
School Type	Government	Low-fee Private	Low-fee Private	Middle-fee Private	High-fee Private

[2] The exchange rate is calculated 1USD = 3,733.14UGX (2020.11.08). This value has been rounded to the nearest two decimal places, making the exchange rate 10,000 UGX for every 2.68USD.

School Fee in UGX (USD)	P1[3]	10,000 (2.68)	153,000 (40.98)	222,000 (59.46)	480,000 (128.58)	650,000 (174.12)
	P2	10,000 (2.68)	158,000 (42.32)	222,000 (59.46)	480,000 (128.58)	650,000 (174.12)
	P3	10,000 (2.68)	168,000 (45.00)	247,000 (66.16)	480,000 (128.58)	700,000 (187.51)
	P4	10,000 (2.68)	188,000 (50.36)	247,000 (66.16)	N/A	700,000 (187.51)
	P5	60,000 (16.07)	198,000 (53.04)	257,000 (68.84)	N/A	750,000 (200.90)
	P6	70,000 (18.75)	N/A	257,000 (68.84)	N/A	750,000 (200.90)
	P7	85,000 (22.77)	N/A	307,000 (82.24)	N/A	900,000 (241.08)
Registration Fee		Not implemented	20,000	Not implemented	30,000	Not implemented

3.3. Analysis and Limitations

This study tried to discover relevant concepts or logical explanations using various forms of data. Specifically, after each interview, the interview notes were made and adjusted based on the transcription and field notes. Writing down the transcriptions, observations, extra questions allowed tentative analysis to take place as qualitative research simultaneously conducts analysis with data collection (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p. 2). During the time that I carried out data collection, I regularly reviewed previous data that had been culminated during the previous

[3] P1 means first grade in Primary schools. In this study, it will use the abbreviation such as P1, P2, …, P7.

interviews and transcriptions. This helped to identify additional necessary interview questions and information. If necessary, any additional interviews were conducted.

To analyze data, a connecting strategy is used. A connecting strategy finds the relationship among various elements within a text so that it understands the data in context. It then takes this contextual data and re-structures it into a comprehensible and cohesive catalogue of relevant information.

This strategy is used in many case studies (Atkinson, 1992, p.460).

> I am now much less inclined to fragment the notes into relatively small segments. Instead, I am just as interested in reading episodes and passages at greater length, with a correspondingly different attitude toward the act of reading and hence of analysis. Rather than constructing my account like a patchwork quilt, I feel more like working with the whole cloth...To be more precise, what now concerns me is the nature of these products as texts.

After conducting a tentative analysis with the data collected via interviews and observations in Uganda, I used news articles to supplement my initial key concepts to better understand the context of the events explained by participants.

During the study, there were also linguistic limitations. There was a linguistic difference between the researcher's native language, Korean, their second language English, and also their local language, Luganda. Although the researcher was able to use English, the communication was likely limited. To complement this limitation, firstly, I had a communication with an English-Korean translator about the concept and purpose of this study. After every interview and upon writing the transcription, I discussed with the translator the parts I felt were not clear so that I could delve further into that area in the next interviews. Secondly, the Luganda-English-Korean speaker who accompanied me in the interviews was

only there in case the interviewees were not good at English. She has lived in Wakiso for more than five years and had a relationship with interviewees. She did not participate as a translator, but she assured the quality of the translation.

3.4. Ethical Considerations

Before the commencement of data collection, the study was submitted to the IRB (Institutional Review Board) of Seoul National University for the ethical process of research and it passed on January 14, 2019 (IRB No.1901 / 001-012). Through this process, a research plan, consent form for research participants, research participant recruitment method, research questionnaires, confidentiality agreement for translation were reviewed.

A visit to Uganda was undertaken in November 2018. This was a visit prior to finalizing the field research plan and thus allowed time to find possible interview candidates. Since this is before the affirmation by IRB, the information collected in November 2018 was not used in this research. The data collection after the affirmation by IRB took place from January 8th to February 27th, 2019.

Before interviewing, the researcher explained the purpose of the study with the consent form paper that was given to the individual participants. In particular, a voice recording, a list of personal information, management of the collected information, and withdrawal of research participants were introduced, then they voluntarily signed on th consent form. In case of agreement on participation but not on the recording, the interview was recorded only through the researcher's memo.

Most of the research participants were able to speak English fluently, but for those who were not fluent in English, the translator explained the same process to them. The content of the interview was also translated if required. In addition, the

translator also signed a confidentiality agreement.

In this study, all names are treated as pseudonyms to ensure the anonymity of the research participants, and thus all names related to their organization and departments were also used as pseudonyms.

3.5. Overview of Uganda and Wakiso

Uganda

Uganda is an inland country in eastern Africa and its capital is Kampala. It was under British colonial rule from 1894 and became independent in 1962. The first president, Apollo Milton Obote (1966-1971) was ousted by Idi Amin(1964-1986), and Uganda's political instability continued. Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986, he still remains in power, while his wife. Janet Museveni, has held the position of education minister since 2016.

Primary education in Uganda takes seven years, followed by four years of lower secondary and two years of upper secondary, after which there are two to five years of higher education or tertiary education. There are two years of early childhood education for three years, but the majority of children do not attend nursery schools (Ejuu, 2012). The progression from one level to the next is through national examinations such as Primary Leaving Examination (PLE), Uganda Certificate of Education (UCE), and Uganda Advanced Certificate of Education (UACE) which are organized by Uganda National Examinations Board (UNEB), therefore, it contains the selective system from primary level.

The PLE is of utmost importance in the Ugandan education system as it is regarded as the determining factor for a school’s success. For both public and private schools, most activities are organized with the aim of achieving high PLE

scores.As a result of this,, PLE puts public and private schools at competition with each other.

The PLE, which is a mandatory certification for the completion of primary education, has been in place for over 50 years. It is also a prerequisite for secondary education. The exam comprises different subjects including Mathematics, English language, Science, and Social Studies. The passing scores

<Figure 1> Uganda education system



range from Division One to Division Four, One being the highest to Four being the lowest. <Figure 1> below illustrated the structure of Uganda's formal education system (Ekaju, 2011).

Source: Government of Uganda (GOU, 1992), Government White Paper on the Education Policy Review Commission Report

Wakiso District

The Wakiso area is the region surrounding Kampala, Uganda's capital. Wakiso has the highest population density followed by Kampala (1,997,418) and 48% of the population is under 18 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), 2017). The official language of Uganda is English and Swahili, but most of the people

speak English, and the local language of Buganda, a Kingdom within Uganda which also includes Kampala is Luganda. As these regions have a close proximity to the capital city, the influence of national policy and administration is relatively greater than that of other regions. The Wakiso region is a vibrant area and as a result many people live here because it is far more affordable due to the high land value within Kampala.

Children aged 6-12 attending primary school is 85.1 percent (Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), 2017). However, 79 percent of primary schools were managed by the private sector according to the Wakiso District local government report (Wakiso District Local Government, 2017). According to this report, public education in the Wakiso area has faced many limitations throughout the rapid population growth and the demand for quality services has increased. Many government schools lack adequate and sufficient infrastructure and tend to have low academic performance. This fact has given an opportunity for private school providers to excel and attract willing parents to enroll their children. The changes in the percentage of private school enrolment among the total enrolment in Wakiso from 2000 to 2016 are as follows in <Figure 2>.

Wakiso is also known for its prestigious schools including Budo Junior School, Gayaza Junior School, and Namugongo Girls' School. These are the most prestigious schools in Uganda. PLE scores are also high in Wakiso. According to the PLE result of 2019, the best performing school in Wakiso was St Savio Kisubi primary school . Also, Wakiso was ranked sixth for the percentage of candidates in Division 1 at 21.5 percent (Kampala is 27.9 percent). In 2018, Wakiso was the only district that had two of the top ten schools based on PLE results (The Observer, 2018). In previous years, Wakiso took the third slot in district PLE performance in 2009 (Vision Reporter, 2010). Also noteworthy is the fact that according to the results released by UNEB in 2009, the top schools in Kampala and Wakiso have

<Figure 2>Private School Enrollment Ratio compared to the Overall Enrollment of Wakiso



Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Enrollment Ratio (%)		38	32	27		32		35			52	47		58	57	50	51

Source: Statistical abstract from 1990 to 2016. Extracted.

relatively small classes and are mainly private (Vision Reporter, 2010). In 2016, The Observer (2015) published the article titled “City Parents, Kampala parents shine" after the announcement of the PLE results.

Chapter 4. Findings

This chapter comprises two major sections. The first section illustrates the complex phenomena surrounding the coexistence of private schools and government schools in Wakiso and demonstrates how the Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) is a critical factor shaping the educational landscape. The second section presents interviews with seven households from different socio-economic backgrounds and identifies three major points regarding parents' educational choices.

4.1. Preference for Private Schools

Miremba, a mother of ten children, sends her all children to school except one disabled child, in spite of their intermittent suspensions for financial reasons. One notable point is that every child is in private school—albeit a low-fee private one—except the first one, in secondary school, even though her economic situation is inadequate to support their schooling.

During the interview, the interviewer asked: "Why didn't you send your children to a government school, like Karajowa?" Before Miremba answered, Shakira, the fourth child, continued to murmur something near her mother. I asked her "Do you want to say something?," and she answered with a shy but clear voice, "I do not want to go there." I asked Miremba another question: "If you could choose a school, where would you want to send your children?" Even before Miremba answered, Shakira and the other children again murmured, saying "Sunshine."

Sunshine is one of the most expensive schools in this area, Bunamwaya,[4] even featuring a swimming pool. Its school fee is 650,000–900,000UGX (174.12–241.08USD) per term. Compared to the school fees of government schools and other private schools, which range from 10,000 to 85,000UGX (2.68 to 22.77USD) and 150,000–480,000UGX (40.18–128.58USD), respectively, Sunshine is among the high-fee private schools.

Shakira is not the only one eager to go to Sunshine. Most parents mentioned Sunshine as their favored school in response to the questions, "What is the best school?" and "Which school would you want to send your children to?" Sunshine school was the envy of parents, as a private school in Bunamwaya that most parents and children are eager to attend.

Also notable in this regard was an interview with Mukasa, who is sending his children to a high-fee private school. He expressed a resolute distrust of government schools. He said:

> Mukasa: I personally couldn't take my child to UPE [Universal Primary Education] School,[5] unless I really don't have any income. If I don't have income, I will borrow or do anything, but not to take my child to UPE School.

[4] Bunamwaya is one of the parishes in Wakiso.

[5] People use "UPE school" as a synonym for government schools since they are funded by the government.

(2019.01.30, individual interview)

The preference for private schools is not just because they ensure good quality, but even more from a strong distrust and reluctance toward government schools. Each parent has their own way to decide to evaluate the quality of schools, and most government were characterized as an over-crowded classroom, teacher absenteeism, unengaged teachers, and low Primary Leaving Exams (PLE) Scores (Heyneman & Stern, 2014).

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2015) said that "the growth of private education has been encouraged by the government," which "raises the concern of the government gradually releasing itself from the obligation to provide quality public education."

4.1.1. Primary Leaving Examination (PLE), the Critical Factor for Preferring Private Schools

What then is the most crucial and decisive factor influencing parents' judgment? When asked why Sunshine and other private schools are good, and thus why they want to send their children there, the answer parents most commonly gave was "good performance." Sunshine was famous for having the best PLE scores in Bunamwaya, Wakiso. Parents also mentioned as an advantage that they provide English classes from the first grade and have more teachers per students than government schools, reflected in the low Pupil-Teacher Ratio (PTR), so that teachers can better attend to their children's needs. Yet, as the conversations continued, the above-mentioned reasons proved to be important because they were associated with high PLE scores of private schools.

In her interview, Dembe, some of whose children studied in government schools and others in private schools, explained why she prefers and trusts private

schools rather than government schools.

Researcher: So, your first son studied in Karajowa [the Government School], and were you satisfied?

Dembe: [very strongly] NO!!!

[People in the room laughed aloud, because her answer was very strong and decisive.]

Researcher: Okay, then why?

Dembe: Me, I wanted [a] school like Warm Parents School and Sunshine.

Researcher: Why do you think that they are better than Karajowa?

Dembe: Karajowa is a government school. The teachers…. They don't teach well.

Researcher: How do you know that?

Dembe: The performance [meaning PLE] is poor. […] I wanted to get first division, but she got division 2.

[She says that private schools care for children]

Researcher: Then how do you know that they are caring for your children?

Dembe: When we see the performance, we can see that they are caring.

(2019.02.05, individual interview)

To judge the teaching ability or the care for children in schools, Dembe took PLE as the critical standard. In the interview with Natukunda and Mukasa, they also shared similar opinions. Some of Natukunda's children are staying in the rural area studying there. I asked her, "What do you think of the schools in the rural area?" She said:

Natukunda: The school is good. They are very good school[s]. (…) Because last year, they were very good at PLE.

(2019.01.21, individual interview)

When Mukasa moved to Wakiso, he searched through the schools in the area when deciding on his children's primary schools. He visited and observed the schools and had a discussion with a head teacher. He chose the Sunshine School.

> Researcher: Do you have any reasons you chose the Sunshine school?
>
> Mukasa: Because one, it is near [to] home. […] We live about 500 meters from here. So, it's near. [Two], their performance is really good.
>
> Researcher: You mean PLE?
>
> Mukasa: Yes, PLE. So, for me, the main reason was near[ness] and good PLE results.
>
> Researcher: So even though there are many private schools near here, you chose Sunshine among them.
>
> Mukasa: Yes, because of performance.
>
> […]
>
> Researcher: Then, are you now satisfied with it?
>
> Mukasa: Yes, to [a] great extent, I am satisfied. My children are doing well in performance. First one did very well and even the second one did better, they all got first grade. And the third one is exceptionally doing very well. So, I am satisfied.

(2019.01.30, individual interview)

Kaikara, who is the director of the study in a low-fee private school in Wakiso, explained that parents decided on the schools based on the PLE results. He said:

> Kaikara: Parents do give a comparison between the standards. They look at the standard because [there are] so many [schools]. [...] They want our learners to have a good foundation. So, they compare the standard, the private one, and the government one. For them, private schools, of course, have a higher standard compared to government schools.

(2019.02.02, individual interview)

A 2018 article corroborates the statements in these interviews, observing that "When a parent picks a primary school for their child, all they care about are the chances of the child performing well in primary leaving examinations" (The Observer, 2018).

Fieldwork observations also demonstrate people's dedication to the PLE. Through observation, I was able to sense the widespread social atmosphere in which people care about and cherish the PLE. My field research period overlapped with significant PLE events.

My first research trip in November 2018 included the date that the PLE was administered. On the morning of the PLE, I could sense the excited and nervous atmosphere around the testing center. At the school for pre-primary and lower primary students where I was staying, some parents would drive their own children to school. However, on that day, parents were either late or sent other drivers to take their children to school, because they were occupied with their older siblings who were taking the PLE. During the exam, I walked around the PLE center. At first, I did not notice that it was the PLE center but only that it was very quiet. As I approached the testing center, a guard came out and stopped me, asking me to stay quiet and stay away. This interaction highlighted the tension around PLE.

My second field research in January 2019 coincided with the month when the PLE results were announced and published. It was not difficult to find people in restaurants reading the newspaper that announced the PLE result, and some people bought a bunch of newspapers to commemorate the event. Every year after the PLE exam, Uganda's major newspapers' front-pages are covered with pictures and names of students and schools that have achieved good results in PLE (Kizza, 2018; Uganda National Examination Board (UNEB), 2018). Half of the contents are

stories and interviews of the top PLE students as well as the school rankings, from 1 to around 2,000. This national emphasis on scores and rankings may explain parents' desires for particular private schools based on the PLE results in *The Observer* (Nangonzi, 2020). Mukasa also explained:

> Mukasa: Do you know how many children [sit] for PLE like last year? I think there are like a hundred thousand. I think. I didn't come to my report. So if there are children seated for PLE, that means that a hundred thousand parents want to know the performance. And maybe two or four hundred thousand, because there are a father and mother and there are relatives, so may[be] five hundred thousand. Half a million people are interested. So, these newspapers, they always want to make money. So they pick out issues that are going to sell. Many people buy newspapers during the PLE. Just because of that.
>
> (2019.01.30, individual interview)

Competition Surrounding PLE Among Private Schools

Since PLE results are the most significant factor affecting parents' choices of their children's schools, private schools must market their PLE results in order to attract customers, in this case parents. PLE results decide their reputations and financial sustainability, and as a result, the possibility of their survival in the educational market.

This stimulates serious competition, which can even lead to misconduct regarding the PLE, for to heighten the PLE results, some private schools use a variety of methods, some of which have come to the fore as problematic social issues. For example, UNPEIA (Uganda National Private Education Institutions Association) pointed out exam malpractices in 2010. The UNPEIA chairman, John Bosco Mujjumba, stated that "UNPEIA are working with the UNEB [Uganda

National Examinations Board] to wipe out exam malpractices in private schools," and added "that schools found guilty of any examination malpractice should have their UNEB centers suspended for five years or for good and head teachers not only sacked but prosecuted as well" (Mugagga, 2010).

Another method used to improve PLE results is to only allow children to register for the PLE who have already qualified through a pre-registration examination, whereby schools identify which children are already prepared to earn a high score on the PLE (Kizza, 2018). To prevent this kind of filtering of students, the First Lady and Education Minister Janet Museveni banned pre-registration examinations in January,2020. Mrs. Museveni described pre-registration tests for PLE candidates as "unacceptable," calling on education actors across the country to immediately stop conducting such tests (Businge, 2020). To ensure that all children are able to register for PLE, the MoES also issued a new directive in 2019 regarding which the commissioner of MoES, Dr. Tony Mukasa Lusamba announced:

> You miss the examinations if you die. But you must sit for their Primary Leaving Examinations [PLE]. I implore you, teachers, to ensure that all the pupils write their PLE, […] We have come up with a new directive as MoES, no school will be allowed to stop any candidate from sitting their examinations even if you find them pregnant. (Waiswa, 2019)

For schools without their own PLE centers, administrators have to decide whether they will send their students to government school PLE centers or to private school centers. This allows some low-fee private schools to "sell" their high-achieving P7 candidates to other PLE centers that want to raise their rankings. Some large private schools transfer their students to different PLE centers depending on their predicted scores, resulting in there being one center for those who are likely to have high grades, and another center for the rest, so only the

results from the high-grade center will be reported in their official ranking (The Observer, 2018).

This is not a recent development, as shown by Lewin's (2009) research in 2009, which found bottlenecks in the flow of children from Grade 6 to Grade 7. The research also compares the 2004 enrollment numbers in Grades 6 and 7 in the early 1990s and in 2004. In the early 1990s, enrollment for Grade 6 was about 30% higher than for Grade 7. However, by 2004 the number of enrollments in Grade 6 was 90% greater than the number of PLE candidates in Grade 7. Thus, the number of children who failed to move on from Grade 6 to 7 is much higher than before. Lewin (2009) explains: "The most likely explanation was that pupils were being kept out of the Grade 7 PLE and repeating Grade 6 if they were thought unlikely to do well. School examination results are published and strongly influence a school's reputation."

There are also people who profit from parents' aspirations for their children to do well on the PLE by duping parents and children. Some schools offer fake PLE exams in order to swindle parents for the registration fee, even going so far as to bring in fake supervisors to make them believe that they are sitting for real UNEB final papers (Mugagga, 2010; Mulondo, 2016).

These practices show not only the fierce competition surrounding PLE results among private schools, but also demonstrate the high status of the PLE itself. Earning a high score in PLE, and indeed just taking the PLE exam, is regarded as an important right by parents, governments, and other school stakeholders in Uganda.

4.1.2. Private Schools Driving up PLE Scores

As this paper has shown, parents prefer private schools, mainly because of

their impressive PLE results. Private schools strive to ensure the best results on the PLE in order to attract more students. Government schools compete with private ones over the PLE. The question thus arises: Do students of private schools really do better on the PLE? Even though there are no longitudinal statistics on this issue, some reports and newspapers claim that the PLE scores in private schools are higher than those of government ones *as a result* of their high quality. However, these numbers do not actually demonstrate the quality of education in private schools, but only the "results" of PLE scores. These results, however, have a strong influence.

In the past, New Vision (Vision Reporter, 2001) reported that schools under the UPE program "have never shown signs of challenging the traditional private and urban schools for the top positions in the PLE."

A UNEB report (Talemwa & Bakalu, 2014) explained that 585,622 pupils participated in the 2013 PLE exams nationwide, of whom 457,808 (78.1 percent) candidates were from government schools, while the rest were from private schools. Of those, 35,439 candidates from the higher-priced private schools were ranked in the first division, numbering 9,922 more than the top scores from UPE schools, which only numbered 25,517.

In January 2015, an article in *The Observer* (Talemwa, 2015) analyzed the announced PLE score results in conjunction with the amount of fees charged by the schools based on the school fees of the top 5–20 schools in 45 districts. The average fees per term amounted to 750,000UGX (100.90USD), which is high. *The Observer* noted that the schools attended by 98.6% of the pupils who earned Division 1 received about 1,200,000UGX (321.45USD) per term from their families.

Fred Mwesigye, the executive director of the Forum of Education NGOs in

Uganda (FENU), said that "there is very little hope for success in schools that charge affordable tuition." He also asserted:

> The more you pay to get an elite education, the more [marks] you get. If you opt for a cheaper school, you may not get into a good secondary school in the long run. (Talemwa, 2015)

In 2015, both the worst and the best performing schools were in Wakiso. Frederick Kiyingi, the district education officer, pointed out that the worst performing schools were UPE schools, while the private schools "raised the flag of the district" (Vision Reporter, 2015).

National Assessment of Progress in Education (NAPE) reports compare the proportions of pupils rated proficient in government and private schools, finding higher proportions of proficient students in private schools than in government schools in 2014, 2015, and 2018. This disparity also appears in both numeracy and literacy, in P3 and P6. Figures 3 and 4 show the constant difference of proficiency.

Figure 3. Proportions of P3 pupils rated proficient in Numeracy by school ownership



Source: UNEB, 2018

Figure 4. Proportions of P3 pupils rated proficient in Literacy by school ownership



Source: UNEB, 2018

Due to the overwhelmingly higher scores of private schools, some have expressed skepticism of the high performance of the few UPE schools. Patrick Kaboyo, the national secretary of Federation of Non-state Education Institutions (FNEI) said:

> That cannot be true [that some village UPE schools are beating Kampala schools] because many private schools with brilliant learners have no examination center numbers […] So, they teach and only take learners to sit PLE under government schools. Some of the top performers listed could be products of private schools.

High scores on the PLE are also key determinants for entering prestigious government secondary schools (Munene, 2016). Since private schools, especially high-fee private schools, dominate with excellent performance, children from high socioeconomic status families also tend to be awarded entry to these prestigious secondary schools. Previously, significant numbers of students from government

primary schools attained high scores on the PLE (Munene, 2016), but this no longer holds true.

Akiki, who is sending his children to private schools, said that to enter Makerere University, the top university in Uganda, it is necessary to go to a prestigious secondary school. High-quality private schools and PLE results are seen as the starting point to attain that goal. The following is a portion of an interview with Akiki:

> Akiki: I am talking about the [secondary] schools which provide the first-class education, quality education, I am talking about Buddo, Gayaza...
>
> Researcher: So, children from those schools can go to the Makerere?
>
> Akiki: YES!! Most of them, most of those children will go to Makerere on government sponsorship. Now for us who went to low or middle primary and secondary schools, you can't make it [there], except when you are a genius. Now the choice that remains for us is to apply [to] private [primary school].
>
> (2019.02.11, individual interview)

Kaikara, the director of study in a low-fee private school in Wakiso, also states that "You find [out] why... parents need those shining results…[so] that they may take their children to the so-called 'big schools.'" Musiga, Deputy Executive Secretary in the Business and Technical Examinations Board, also states:

> Musiga: Because PLE, because it will take you to the good, we call the first-class secondary school. And once you get the first-class secondary school, Namagunga, Kisubi, Gayaza, Budo... then it means you are likely to get the government slots at the university. Because they are very very few. It only pays for very very few. Once you go to [those first-class] schools then you are almost sure [to go to university with government sponsorship], so

they want to do whatever, so they would rather spend more at primary school by taking them to private primary school. So as long as they are able.

(2019.01.18, individual interview)

UNEB Executive Secretary Matthew Bukenya states that "The more you pay to get an elite education, the more [marks] you get. If you opt for a cheaper school, you may not get into a good secondary school in the long run" (Talemwa, 2015).

As the competition surrounding PLE gets serious, merely achieving first grade scores is not sufficient to secure admission to reputable secondary schools. Students need to score an aggregate 4, meaning top scores in each subject. In 2018, King's College Buddo, St Mary's Kitende, and Uganda Martyrs Namugugongo only admitted boys who had scored aggregate 4 (The Observer, 2018).

The division that happens during the entry process to secondary schools remains consistent in the next levels—high secondary schools and universities. Stephen Bwire, a writer for *The Observer* and a teacher, explains that "the rich monopolize university government sponsorship as the poor folk's children from UPE schools remain mere statistics." Reflecting on all these results and phenomena, an NGO activist who works to provide meals and care for children in government schools in Wakiso, stated, "I think the future of the children depends on whether they go to the government or private schools in Uganda."

4.1.3. The Effects of Competition over the PLE

The emphasis placed on PLE and the resulting preference for private schools negatively affect government schools in two ways. Major issues observed during field research and data collection are the outflow of teacher resources from government schools to private schools and the necessity of extra fees in government schools to overcome the limitations of financial resources.

Outflow of Teachers from Government to Private Schools

In Uganda, government schools have been struggling to retain qualified teachers after the introduction of UPE (Aguti, 2002; Guloba et al., 2010). With the rapid increases in pupil enrollments, the government responded by training more primary school teachers (Guloba et al., 2010). However, the increase in the number of teachers still cannot match the increase in pupils. The high PTR rate since 1997 demonstrates the shortage of teacher resources.

In this situation, the growth of private schools and competition over the PLE provides financial incentives for teachers to migrate from government schools to private schools. In general, private schools are known for offering more attractive conditions and terms of service for teachers (Jesse, 2011). For example, according to an article in 2014 (Talemwa & Bakalu, 2014), a head teacher in one government school was paid 320,000 UGX per month, yet a teacher in a private school earned 1.5 million UGX.

> Musiga, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Business and Technical Examinations Board, also explained in an interview:
>
> Musiga: So when we go to private schools, they perform better. Why do they perform better? They are paid better. They are motivated better...But, in private they can still continue to encourage them.
>
> (2019.01.18, individual interview)

Okello, who has worked in public service, argues that it is not surprising that teachers choose private-owned institutions because of the low pay in government schools, and explains that there is competition among private schools to scout out qualified teachers (Talemwa & Bakalu, 2014).

Caroline, who is a teacher in a government school, answered that she would

choose a government school if she had options. Because other teachers prefer to teach in private schools, she thought there was a need for teachers in government schools. She said:

> Caroline: So if everybody says, "No, I will not teach for the government," now who will teach for the government? If you say, "Okay, let me go for money" [to the] private [school] which gives a lot of money, then who will handle these young ones?
>
> (2019.02.18. In an individual interview)

In Kampala, it has recently been pointed out that teachers have started their own private schools after leaving government schools. Patrick Kaboyo, the national secretary of Federation of Non-state Education Institutions (FNEI), said:

> Most of the teachers in big government schools in Kampala started their own private schools and they know where to put their focus. [….] Government should remunerate teachers to curtail internal migration of teachers in search for greener pastures. These teachers looked at the future and how they can best appreciate themselves by starting their own schools. (Nangonzi, 2020)

Wakiso is not exceptional in this regard. The area has relatively more teachers than the other regions (Talemwa & Bakalu, 2014), because teachers move from rural areas to Wakiso or Kampala in search of better work conditions. Yet they are also facing a teacher shortage in UPE schools (Vision Reporter, 2015). Since teachers prefer to work in private schools, the government schools were and are still struggling due to the lack of teachers, particularly qualified ones. Frederick Kiyingi, the Wakiso district education officer, says, "this [lack of teachers in UPE schools] has led to poor quality of teaching, as pupils do not get the required services. […] private schools have almost three teachers per a class compared to

one teacher in UPE schools" (Vision Reporter, 2015).

Private schools, however, are not always the best options for teachers in terms of job security, because one can be fired immediately for even minor reasons. Thus, some teachers opt to "keep one leg" in government schools (Talemwa & Bakalu, 2014). Patrick Kaboyo, Chief Executive Officer of the Coalition of Private Schools and Teachers' Association, said "they (teachers) maintain their stay there (in government schools) as a fallback." This demonstrates the instability teachers face and implies the lack of school quality in both types of schools—government and private.

Extra Fees in Government Schools

Another effect of the PLE and of private school competition on government schools is the need for extra fees. Requiring extra fees or supplementing school resources with parents' money or labor are not recent phenomena. However, these practices have been exacerbated by this competitive environment, as shown in a 2012 resolution passed in Wakiso allowing the district government to charge all Primary 7 candidates a fee of 5,000UGX to bolster government school funds. Hamid Nsubuga, the chairperson of the district education committee that presented the motion, voiced its concern that "UPE schools have continued to perform badly compared to private schools due to lack of coordination" (Vision Reporter, 2012). He also stated that the committee agreed that the fee would be used to improve the performance ofn UPE schools. The fee covers payment for Form X, which costs 800UGX per student for the first term, as well as for two mock exams at 1,200UGX and 2,000 UGX and 1,000 UGX for marking (Vision Reporter, 2012).

Wakiso's resolution in 2012 was official, but there are unofficial forms of "private arrangement" in government schools. The decision to require extra fees depends on the head teacher's decision and is then finally confirmed through the

school committee. In the case of Karajowa Primary school in Bunamwaya in Wakiso, three "private" teachers were hired in order to facilitate expanded school hours. Caroline, a teacher in Karajowa, explains:

> Caroline: We begin teaching at 8 am and end at 3 pm. In the government, we are supposed to teach from 8 o'clock to 1 pm but you can find out that, when you don't give these children extra time, they don't perform well, so we decided to come in the morning before 8 am, and even after 1 o'clock. We teach up to 4 pm so that they can even take homework which can help them at least to perform well, that is why here, we can perform better than the other government schools over there because of this extra work we give to the children.
>
> (2019.02.18, individual interview)

The hiring of extra teachers was based on the head teacher's judgment that existing courses were insufficient for students to "perform well." As a result, teachers received "additional allowances," covered by parents. These changes in government schools have been called "private arrangements."

Though unofficial, these private arrangements are not illegal in Uganda. An official in charge of statistics in the Department of Education in Wakiso explains:

> Sylvia: Yes, all teachers in government schools are paid by the government. But, you can make private arrangements, you have to agree with parents, with the management committee, teachers, PTA [Parent Teacher Association], and maybe student representatives, if you have [any]. [Let's] make an agreement. Let us bring in more [teachers], two or four teachers to boost this study, our pupils will pay extra money. That is according to an agreement. You have to agree.
>
> (2019.01.31, individual interview)

According to Sylvia, government schools are allowed to charge extra money to hire extra teachers, but it should be based on an agreement with many stakeholders. However, parents in interviews complained that they have never been a party to such agreements. Dembe said:

> Dembe: When they came to school, we used to pay the PTA. […] So when the government comes in, they [require] the PTA, […] they should [have arranged the fee] with parents, but they have not.
>
> (2019.01.31, individual interview)

These pervasive unofficial fees have crept back into the UPE system (Jesse, 2011). On the one hand, government schools introduce these charges to make ends meet, as the gap between the UPE plan and actual available funding systems necessitates these private arrangements. Recent reports by civil society organizations have found that government funds are most of the time delayed, swindled, or at times not released at all, so that UPE schools are struggling to operate (URN, 2018). On the other hand, the need for extra fees is deepened by the competition over the PLE among government and private schools, which is notable in the Wakiso region.

Musiga, Deputy Executive Secretary in Business and Technical Examinations Board, also mentioned that sometimes government schools are even more expensive than private schools due to extra fee-charging. He explains as follows:

> Musiga: Actually, some of them pay even higher than the private ones. They are gov schools, by name, but they control what they call Parent-Teacher Association (PTA). That imposes some money... [to] supplement and motivate teachers. So the government doesn't pay fully.

(2019.01.18, individual interview)

4.2. Educational Choices and Experiences of Parents

This chapter describes each parent's behaviors and experiences within their specific contexts. The parents interviewed in the following section ranged from low-income to relatively higher-class, and they had each brought up at least two and as many as nine children. They chose government schools or private schools ranging from low-fee to high-fee. Among the seven parents, there were only two who had no experience with suspensions, deferments (deferring a grade or grades in school), "non-achieving" (remaining in the same class for another year or more), and transfers in school.

4.2.1. The Story of Namazzi

Namazzi originally had lived in Wakiso District, but then married and moved to another district. After conflict with her family, especially with her husband, she returned to Wakiso alone, because the district is where she originally lived and is close to the city. In Wakiso, she was officially separated from her husband and her family then became more financially unstable. At the time of the interview, Namazzi did not have a steady income and made money by doing temporary work like washing laundry, and, as many Ugandans do, she went to the countryside to find food.

When I went to interview her, Namazzi was preparing a meal and her oldest daughter was taking a shower. This shower was in a communal facility in the village, an outdoor, semi-private structure framed with twigs. The second child had gone to fetch water. At 4 pm, four children and Namazzi had their first meal of the day, which was a soy-based sauce on pocho made of cornflour. Five people in this family lived in their house, which measured about four square meters.

Namazzi was bringing up four children: a 10-year-old daughter, a 7-year-old son, a 5-year-old son, and another son, age unknown. None of the four children went to school. Her first child, 10 years old, had been suspended from school after the second semester of 4th grade at a nearby government school. Her second child, 7 years old, had been suspended from school after the second semester of first grade. The main reason for their suspension was their financial situation.

She was paying about 95,000UGX (25.45USD) per child for the government school at that time. For comparison, the rent for the house where Namazzi was living was 40,000UGX (10.71USD) per month. She considered her separation from her husband the greatest reason for the worsening of her family's situation; her children had been suspended from school after she separated from her husband.

This interview took place on 30 January 2019. Since then, Namazzi has experienced two great changes in the education of her children. First, thanks to a missionary's donation, she was able to send two of her children back to school. Her second and third children, a primary school student and a preschooler, respectively, were the lucky ones. For the second child, she chose the government school that she used to attend and from which she had been suspended in the second term of P1. The decision to choose two of her four children to send to school was made by the missionary sponsor and not by Namazzi herself.

She was exceedingly pleased that her two children had regained access to education, but at the same time she was deeply concerned about the requirements and requirement fees. The requirements are a list of items to bring to school, including some amount of paper, pencils, brooms, etc., and the requirement fees include the entrance fee, the PTA (Parents Teacher Association) fee, and the fee for school uniforms.

More news came after I returned to Korea. Her oldest child had moved to

another area on her own, primarily because she could not continue to study in Wakiso District because the school fees in Wakiso are higher than in rural areas. The oldest child is now studying in the rural area and staying with Namazzi's relatives.

During the interview, I asked various questions about her children's educational experience, but in many instances she could not recall specific information. Even though she could not devote enough attention to securing their education and supporting her children, her aspiration to send her children to school was evident. At every Wednesday worship service, she always prayed for the school fee, asking for the mercy of God. She always told her children they should go to school.

4.2.2. The Story of Natukunda

Natukunda lived in a house located within a 10-minute walking distance from the site in which I stayed. She had lived near the Wakiso District for a long time and in her current house for about five years. Natukunda lived in a space of about 9 square meters and paid 90,000UGX (24.11USD) for monthly rent. Her major source of income was selling sambusa in front of her house, and she raised her children without the support of her husband.

She had six children but lived with only two of them. The six children were an 18-year-old son, a 16-year-old daughter, a 13-year-old son, an 8-year-old daughter, a 7-year-old son, and a baby born the previous year. The two children living with her were the 7-year-old son and the newborn baby. The other children were scattered in various areas.

Her first child, the 18-year-old son, had stayed with her until P2, when he was a primary school child. He was then sent to his aunt's house and graduated primary

school there as the family financial situation became difficult.

Her second child, who was of secondary school age, and her third child, who was of primary school age, are staying with their aunts and studying in government schools in that region. When I asked why they were going to school there, she replied that she had no choice but to send them there because there were many more private schools nearby, and their school fees were higher than in other areas. In addition, the rent was too expensive to get a house for all her children. She also explained that as the aunt had only one child, she had fewer burdens because her children already had completed primary school. Her fourth child, who was of primary school age, stayed at a grandmother's house in another area for similar reasons.

Natukunda said she has occasionally sent some money to her relatives. Her family used to help each other to educate their children. For example, if they collected some money for Natukunda's third child this year, then Natukunda would send some money for other children's education next year. However, if Natukunda could not afford to send money, she said, her child would stop going to schools there and eventually come back to Wakiso.

Her fifth son, the 7-year-old, stayed with her because he had a disease that caused him to suffer intermittently from severe pain. Natukunda thus decided to stay with this child and sent him to the nearest private school. He was going to a low-cost private school, which was a two-minute walk away. His school fees were 222,000UGX (59.47USD) for P1 per semester. This was a financial burden on Natukunda even though it was a relatively low fee for a private school. She said that if he had not been sick, she would have sent him to his aunt to study there also. Though he was enrolled until the third semester of the first year, he was no longer able to attend after that point because of a lack of payment. Natukunda promised

the school to pay the school fee in the middle of the semester, but she could not make it.

She pointed out the high level of rent as her main financial difficulty. She had already made a move because a place near where she had lived was developed with the construction of new buildings. As shops came in, the house rent significantly soared to a level she could not afford. This previous home was closer to Kampala, the capital of Uganda. I asked her if she intended to move to a rural area where her children were studying. She explained that her own economic base was here where she was, and there would be no opportunities to make money elsewhere were she to go to another region.

4.2.3. The Story of Doris

Doris lives within a 10-minute walking distance from the government school. It had been 2 or 3 years since she moved to the Wakiso District because of misunderstandings with her ex-husband. She lived in a studio of about 10 square meters, which was a relatively clean and well-organized home. Doris's main source of income was selling agricultural produce that she picked in the rural area.

She had five children: a 19-year-old daughter, a 16-year-old son, a 13-year-old daughter, an 11-year-old son, and a 4-year-old son. She lived with four of the children except for her second child, the 16-year-old, who lives with her ex-husband in another area and attending the government school there. She explained that he was the closest to her ex-husband among her children. The third child, 13 years old, was at the nearby government school P4; a 13-year-old child is usually P7, but Doris's child had been left behind. Her fourth child, an 11-year-old, was in P1, whereas an 11-years-old is usually at P5 level. Both children had been suspended or left behind in school for economic reasons, having to stop going to school at times because they failed to pay tuition within the school deadline. They

went to school but failed to advance to higher grades because they had failed to pay for their grade examination, and because their test scores were lower than the standard.

She said, “I make too little money. So, they sent them back home. So, they missed the test.” The fees for the school are 10,000UGX (2.68USD) for both P1 and P4 in the form of the registration fee and admission fee, plus 20,000UGX (5.36USD) for uniforms and 60,000UGX (16.08USD) for school development fees and examination fees. For lunch, fees are 45,000UGX (12.05USD) for food and 15,000UGX (4.02USD) for porridge. Doris’s children are currently not eating lunch, and Doris sometimes allows them to buy a snack if they can afford it.

4.2.4. The Story of Dembe

In 2000, Dembe had moved to Wakiso with her husband in anticipation of greater economic opportunities. Before moving to Wakiso, she explained, she was “digging and did not have a job.” She was now running a hair salon near her house. She lived in her own house, about 25 square meters, without renting. Her husband was involved in a car accident in 2015 while their current house was being built. Since then, her family’s financial situation has become increasingly difficult. Her husband had worked as a Boda Boda[6] driver. His limp greatly reduced the number of customers, and so the construction of her house had come to a standstill while

[6] The Boda Boda is a motorcycle taxi. Drivers generally gather on the streets to wait for customers or use an application that customers find useful and safe to use to request a Boda Boda.

it was under construction. Dembe later explained that her income from the beauty salon accounted for most of the family income.

Dembe has four children: a 19-year-old son, a 15-year-old son, an 11-year-old son, and a 4-year-old daughter. Her first child graduated from government primary school. Her second child graduated from a private primary school last year. Her third child was attending a private primary school. Her fourth child was attending a private pre-primary school.

The third child went to the same school that the second child graduated from but later transferred to a higher-fee private school in the third semester of P5. The new private school cost 280,000UGX (75.00USD), including a development fee for P5 higher than that of the previous private school, which cost 190,000UGX (50.90USD). A fee of 115,000UGX (30.81USD) was also included for the uniform, and, if her third child wanted, 70,000UGX (18.75USD) for lunch. She could transfer her third child because of outside sponsorship. Dembe decided to spend the additional money from the sponsorship to transfer her child to a better school.

I asked about the school selection criteria throughout the educational journey of her children. She explained that when her first child was in primary school, she wanted to send him to a private school but was unable to afford it because of the rent. As a result, she inevitably had to choose a government school. When she no longer had to build her own house and pay the rent, Dembe and her husband sent all the children to private schools.

4.2.5. The Story of Miremba

Mirenmba lived with her husband and nine children: a 21-year-old daughter, a 19-year-old daughter, a 16-year-old daughter, a 12-year-old daughter, a 10-year-old son, an 8-year-old daughter, a 7-year-old son, a 4-year-old son, and a 2-year-

old son. At the time, the house they shared was about 35 square meters with a common yard that altogether cost 250,000UGX (66.97USD) a month in rent. Miremba's husband would start work early in the morning and return home late at night, including weekends. Miremba, meanwhile, was in charge of raising their children and doing household work.

When I visited her house for an interview, her children rushed excitedly to bring me some drawings they had made at school, which they were very adamant to show me. The children's works were actually collages, composed from pictures torn out of magazines and newspapers, as well as drawings they had made of their dreams and about themselves. Some children had drawn themselves as doctors, others as students at a university, as parents of a family of five, as professional musicians, and as charity leaders helping the poor.

Miremba's first child had graduated from a primary school in a different region of the country, where her grandmother had once lived by herself. According to Miremba, at that time she paid around 7,000UGX (1.88USD) in school fees for her firstborn. Her second child had an intellectual disability and did not go to school.

Her third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh children all graduated from private elementary schools or were currently attending them. Some of them experienced transfers between the private schools, Moonlight and Bright Junior. Both are classified as low-fee private schools, but the fees at Bright Junior are higher: Moonlight cost about 120,000UGX (32.14USD) per child per semester, while Bright Junior cost between 150,000 to 200,000UGX (40.18 to 53.57USD). Miremba thought that the quality of Bright Junior was better, so she would let her children stay in it if her financial situation allowed it.

Her third child graduated from Moonlight School. Her fourth child

transferred from Moonlight to Bright Junior. The fifth child attended Bright Junior but transferred to Moonlight and moved back to Bright; the move from Bright to Moonlight occurred when her family's financial situation was difficult. Her sixth and seventh children were also attending Bright Junior.

As of January 2019, all of Miremba's children who were still in the primary school system were attending Bright Junior School. When I visited Bright Junior School in late February 2019, the sixth and seventh children were not in school. Miremba explained that due to financial difficulties, she had decided not to send them to school that year. She said that because she has many children, "Sometimes some go to school, sometimes they don't."

4.2.6. The Story of Akiki

Akiki grew up in a rural area and moved to Wakiso District to study at the local university and to find a job. He explained that although he was poor throughout his childhood, he was able to continue studying thanks to the fact that his parents were both educated. A school administrator mentioned to me that Akiki was known as one of the kindest parents at the school: Every morning, he would drive his children to the gate and send them off with high-fives and hugs. At the time, Akiki was working at a bank while his wife had started her own business. It should be noted that working at a bank in Uganda is considered to be a stable and decent job.

Akiki had three children: a 7-year-old daughter, a 5-year-old son, and a 3-year-old son. His daughter was attending a high-fee private primary school called Sunshine. The school fees ranged from 650,000UGX to 900,000UGX (174.12 to 241.08USD) per student per semester, with the school uniform costing an additional 200,000UGX (53.57USD). Sunshine School was consistently mentioned by most of the parents I interviewed as the school with the best

academics and facilities in the area.

Akiki visited nearby primary schools to decide where to send his children. He compared the overall situation, including facilities, the number of students per class, and school fees; finally he chose Sunshine.

Sunshine is one of the most highly evaluated schools in the nearby area. It requires accepted applicants to pay high school fees to attend—650,000UGX (174.12USD) for P1, exclusive of other extra fees such as uniforms or meals. He said that even though his family has a stable income, it is not easy to pay for his children's education. He explains it like this.

> We always struggle. But we try. I think the owner of the school knows the financial condition of the parents. Like here, we first pay half, and look for the balance while children study.
>
> (2019.02.11, individual interview)

He thought of transferring his daughter to a school that is known to cost less than Sunshine but is still of good quality. He planned to transfer but finally decided not to do so because it might negatively affect her studies.

4.2.7. The Story of Mukasa

Mukasa works at a research institute that deals with addiction problems in society. He studied in Belgium and has a doctorate. All four of his children have graduated from a high-fee private elementary school or are currently attending one.

His third child is now in Sunshine, the same elementary school as Akiki's. Despite having a full-time job, he was struggling to pay for all of his children's education, including school fees, school uniforms, and school buses. He sometimes pays in installments.

He chose Sunshine based on two criteria: proximity and Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) performance. First, he listed the schools near his home and picked Sunshine, which was known to score high on the PLE. He was completely satisfied with Sunshine's quality in that his three children, who studied there, graduated from elementary school with high grades on the PLE.

He thinks the PLE is crucial in that it determines who goes to secondary school and which school they enter. Even though he valued the PLE and made it a key criterion for choosing schools, he considered the valuation of the PLE exaggerated, and worried about the serious competition on the PLEs and its impact on his children. According to his explanation, Sunshine's students studied from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m., especially those at P7. He thought this was harsh for children, but said, "The school has a very good reason for doing so." He said children sometimes leave school if their academic performance is not good. He thought this high level of competition was a key factor in attracting parents.

4.2.8. Three Different Integral Decisions Observed from Individual Families

Through the above interviews, we may observe three main types of choices emerging from the anecdotal evidence we acquired: First, whether parents enroll their children in schools or not; second, which type of schools they will choose; and third, where their children will stay, Wakiso or rural areas.

Before further discussing the results of analysis of the interviews, it may be beneficial to clarify how we categorized the various interviewees. After evaluating them through a mixture of quantitative and qualitative metrics, we grouped the interviewees into three groups based on their perceived economic status. The first group consists of Namazzi, Natukunda, and Doris, who have the lowest incomes of the participants in the study. This group was labeled the "low-income" group. The second group, which includes Dembe and Miremba, features interviewees that

have moderate, albeit unstable, sources of income; we classified these participants as “middle income.” Members of the third group are participants whom we have identified as having relatively high income, mainly because they possess steady and reliable jobs and are members of two-income households. They work in comparatively stable-earning positions in Uganda; for example, a researcher or banker would fit well in this category. To be clear, these groups are not at all based on national economic classifications, but instead based on the overall economic circumstances we observed for each interviewee.

Each individual interview starts with questions concerning a general description of each participant’s household, including information regarding where they live and their employment. After that, the number of children in the family and their respective ages are elicited, as well as their primary education experiences and noteworthy phenomena that emerge from their stories. Finally, at the end of this section, the three types of educational decisions prevalent throughout the interviews will be summarized and analyzed.

The First Decision: Whether to Send Children to Schools

Each parent that was interviewed values education, and they all hoped to enroll their children in schools. However, there were cases in which they could not manage to do so, primarily due to economic obstacles. The parents in the low-income group were only able to enroll their children when they were prepared to pay school fees for government schools. As their financial situation was not stable, their children often experienced transfer or suspension, or were left behind from advancing to the next grade. The children in middle-income households also experienced transfer or temporary suspension; however, their types were different in that they sent their children to low-fee private schools even at the risk of suspension or transfer. For high-income families, there were no instances in which

they were prevented from sending their children to school.

The Second Decision: Public vs. Private

The second major observation drawn from the anecdotal evidence relates to the type of schools. All of the parents interviewed expressed their preference for private schools over government schools. Parents' options were limited according to their educational background as private school fees were generally higher than those of government schools. When their economic situation is more stable, children get a chance to go to private schools, with fees ranging from low to high.

There are also cases in which some children in one family are given the opportunity to attend private schools, while the other children are enrolled in government schools. Dembe and Miremba are both examples of this dynamic. The oldest child in both families attended a government school; as their financial situation improved, the rest of their children were afforded the opportunity to attend private schools. Both parents also made clear that they would have sent their oldest children to a private school if they had possessed the financial means to do so at the time.

Choosing private schools is not always an easy decision, even for the parents in a better financial situation. Dembe and Miremba sent some of their children to private schools, but that did not mean that they were well prepared for the school fees, which in fact they could barely afford. In the case of Dembe, her first and second children were not able to attend private schools. Only her third child was able to do so as her financial situation improved. Miremba's children transferred from one private school to another private one that charged lower school fees.

This issue is not just one facing low-and middle-income families. Although Akiki and Mukasa can more easily afford middle-range private schools than the

high-fee private schools where their children are currently attending, they chose to send their children to the more expensive option in order to better their children's education. They explained the financial burden during their interviews, stating that they paid the school fees in installments. When I asked the school financial officer in Akiki and Mukasa's children's school to explain the financial status of high-fee private schools, she explained that most parents are struggling to pay their school fees on time and are making payments in installments (Diana, 2019.02.25, individual interview).

The Third Decision: Wakiso vs. Rural area

We note first that land prices and living costs in Wakiso tended to be higher than in rural areas. In addition, education costs are higher than in rural areas even in government schools, as they require additional fees. This means that some parents cannot afford to raise all their children at home, and instead have no choice but to send their children to rural areas where living and education costs are lower than Wakiso.

Four of the seven interviewees in this study (Namazzi, Natukunda, Doris, Mirembe) reported making the choice to send some of their children to rural areas for study to ensure the family's financial subsistence.

We might consider how parents decide which children will be sent to rural areas to promote their education. They all know that education is essential for children to build skills for a successful life and that Wakiso is a good region for quality education.

Namazzi, and Natukunda, in fact, did not have a choice in the location of schools they sent their children to; by virtue of their financial constraints, they were limited in the type and quality of schools their children could attend. Thus, it

is difficult to say that they had made a "choice" regarding their children's education. Namazzi was only able to afford government school for two of her four children after obtaining donations. Unfortunately for Namazzi, she was not able to decide herself, as her children's school fees were subsidized by the donor; this decision was ultimately made by the donor. After the donor settled on the two children that would receive funding, Namazzi was forced to send her children to schools in rural, remote areas.

Natukunda sent most of her children except the disabled and newborns to rural areas. She strongly accepted the benefits of education but struggled to afford school fees in Wakiso. In addition, she spent much money caring for her disabled son, which accounted for a large part of her expenditure. However, she could not leave Wakiso because her income depended heavily on her connections in the community. She thus concluded that she had no choice but to send some of the children to her mother's or sister's home in a rural area. Natukaunda decided which children would reside in each home, depending on the strength of their relationship with the caregiver.

Unlike Namazzi and Natukunda's children, Dembe and Miremba's are studying in Wakiso. In the case of Miremba, her oldest daughter—who is currently 21 years old—studied in a rural area because her mother faced temporary financial setbacks when she was of school age. Since then, Miremba's income has increased and her financial standing has improved, and she is thus able to send all the rest of her children to school in Wakiso.

As our anecdotes indicate, families struggling financially, like those of Namazzi and Natukanda, do not have the luxury of choosing their children's education, and often feel coerced into making difficult choices. Contrariwise, Dembe and Miremba, who both enjoy average albeit occasionally unstable

incomes, chose their children's education. Ultimately, both elected to keep their children in Wakiso. Akiki and Mukasa, with rather higher incomes than the rest of the families interviewed, did not send any of their children to rural areas; instead, they elected to send their children to the best private school they could afford in Wakiso.

Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion

This study aims to understand the characteristic phenomena that have emerged within primary education after the introduction of UPE, and how these phenomena manifest themselves in many families' educational decisions and experiences.

This section discusses three major points. First, it examines the effects of the UPE policy on primary education in Wakiso from two major perspectives: quantitative and qualitative. Second, it examines the deepening education gaps among schools and students through a close analysis of the parents' statements ranging from the government schools in rural areas to high-fee private schools in Wakiso. Third, it discusses the pervasive anxiety surrounding education, regardless of socio-economic status.

5.1. Effect of UPE policy on the primary education landscape

In the 1990s and 2000s, countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa implemented Universal Primary Education (UPE) policies and abolished school fees. This policy shift resulted in soaring enrollment rates without a corresponding rise in the number of schools and other necessary resources, which of course caused issues surrounding the quantity and quality of public schools. Wakiso has faced these same challenges. Based on the findings of this study, we now explore quantitatively and qualitatively how these matters have been situated in Wakiso.

As pointed out in Chapter 2.2, Uganda implemented a liberalized education system in 1993, which caused education institutions created by various non-government stakeholders to mushroom, before introducing the UPE policy (1997). To understand the rapid expansion of primary education quantitatively after the UPE policy, we must take into consideration that the new policy occurred under a

situation allowing the free establishment and management of private schools The expansion of primary education has accompanied the growth of private primary schools in Wakiso.

5.1.1. Quantitative Perspective

Due to the over-concentration of students in government schools and the threat that this posed to the quality of education, a number of students were switched by their parents to private educational schools in Wakiso. This conclusion is supported by the high number of private schools and enrollment rates and by interviews with the parents. This means that the switch of some students from government to private schools opened up space for some students who had been unable to access the government schools due to overconcentration.

However, it is difficult to argue that this trend contributed to expand access to education for children from low-income families. The basic constraint here is cost-based; even lower-end private schools still charge fees that are unattainable for the average low-income resident of Wakiso. As Day Ashley et al. (2014) point out, economic limitations are to this day a detrimental factor keeping them out of private schools.

The other noteworthy point is that these so-called “no-fee” government schools still collect fees from parents for a variety of reasons. Due to the Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) competition and generally to the high living and operating costs in Wakiso, government schools are still collecting funds from parents; the amount of fees are mostly higher than in rural schools. This defeats the entire purpose of UPE and creates a significant cost barrier for low-income children in Wakiso. As Watkins (2004) points out, school fees are still the key obstacle for parents to educate their children, which negates the entire purpose of UPE, which was to make schools more accessible for children regardless of their

socio-economic background. In this respect, we can argue that UPE has had unintended long-term effects on educational accessibility that are rather negative in Wakiso.

5.1.2. Qualitative Perspective

There have been long and contentious discussions of the coexistence of public and private schools that still continue. The supporters of private schools have argued that their existence provokes positive competition, improving the overall quality of education. Despite this narrative, Wakiso demonstrates that private schools do not have this effect on communities and educational quality.

The first issue that complicates this positive narrative about private schools is that they typically attract qualified teachers who often leave their positions in government schools for the comparatively high salaries and benefits offered by private educational institutions. This harms students attending nearby government schools. Private schools, as providers of education operating under market principles, must find ways of maintaining their consumer base, parents, if they wish to turn a profit. Since PLE results are the universally accepted standard for judging the quality of schools, qualified teachers are crucial to maintain high test scores and stay competitive. Moreover, given the shortage of teachers in Uganda, finding and retaining teachers is already challenging enough without the threat posed by private schools. This example shows how this competition created by private schools has not benefited both parties, but has simply enabled the continued growth and strengthening of private schools.

Second, after the implementation of UPE, there was a notable shift toward using standardized testing to evaluate students and schools. An individual's high PLE score is considered the gateway to success in both a professional and an educational capacity. This is especially true in Wakiso, which has a reputation for

being populated with people interested in improving their social status through a better job or education.

This exacerbates the sense of competition around the PLE; private schools will often boast about their high PLE scores in advertisements. While the providers of private education advertise their PLE results, the media perpetuate this mentality by incorporating PLE scores in school rankings and other mechanisms to evaluate school performance. The obsession surrounding PLE is so severe that it has even resulted in numerous instances of malpractice or inappropriate conduct on the part of school officials. In some instances, school officials have gone so far as to deny children the opportunity to take the PLE if they feel the children will score poorly. These situations make it difficult to say that the overall education quality is raised, but rather that the definition of quality education has narrowed down.

Third, the perspective that those who pay large sums deserve quality education is widely accepted among educational stakeholders. The statements collected from parents support the notion that this is a widespread mentality; one parent went so far as to say that "if you want quality you have to pay for quality" (Akiki, 2019.02.05, individual interview). Quality education is not for all, but only for those who can pay. This means that education is no longer perceived as a public good, but rather as a private good that each individual can obtain through their own efforts. As Ball (2010, p. 160) maintains, "individuals who reap the rewards of being educated (of their families) must take first responsibility" when the concept of education shifted "from shared resources which the state owes to its citizens, to a consumer product or an investment."

The arguments listed above should dispel the notion that competition between educational providers will automatically result in a general increase in quality for

students. Instead, private schools seem to reinforce the inequality of quality education already embedded within society by ensuring that only the affluent are able to afford quality education.

5.2. Widening Disparities Among Schools and Students

Parents have the right to choose among the various types of schools, as the Ugandan government does not designate which school students will attend. There are various types of schools, from government schools and low-to-high-fee private schools. By and large, they can be categorized into four groups: government schools, low-fee private schools, middle-fee private schools, and high-fee private schools. These options are theoretically available to all parents, but in reality, the scope of options is stratified by their socio-economic status.

This point lends itself to a general discussion of who has actual opportunities to choose and how individuals come to make decisions. An individual's behavior is inevitably determined by the "possible" range of choices that they can take within their social-cultural structure (De Gaulejac & Taboada-Léonetti, 1994, p. 184–185). According to the findings of this study, it is difficult to argue that low-income families enjoy the right to choose freely. Many cannot even manage to afford government schools, and even when they can afford it, children from low-income families are often suspended, transferred, or generally neglected and left behind.

The middle- and high-income families among the interviewees often have a broader scope of options; they can send their children to either government schools or low-fee private schools. Most of them choose a low-fee private school when they are able to pay the school fees, while parents from a high-income background choose high-fee private schools.

Vincent and Martin (2002) explain that for many low-income families, their choices regarding education are seen as "survival issues." Contrariwise, those with more favorable economic status make decisions regarding education by factoring in academic performance and prioritizing their children's sense of fulfillment and happiness. Thus, the existence of options does not necessarily mean that individuals universally enjoy similar scopes of rights to choose. Rather, it intensifies the gap between schools and the quality of the education that children can obtain if there are supports to reduce this widening disparity.

There are other types of disparity that were observed in this study. It was easy to find parents who decided to send their children to rural areas unaccompanied by family members. Most low-income parents point to the high living costs and school fees in Wakiso to explain their ultimate decision to move their children. Most of them had arranged for their children to travel to rural areas to continue their studies.

This raises the question: If most impoverished families are sending their children away to be educated, who are the schools in Wakiso actually meant to serve? Opolot (2001) expands on and answers this question; as he observes, "children of the poor [are] wasting away in ill-equipped rural UPE schools, where access to school premises is all they can obtain. On the other hand, children of the rich have the choice to enjoy a good education in private and public primary schools." Thus, any list of educational options for parents in Wakiso should not only include government schools, low-fee private schools, middle-fee private schools, and high-fee private schools, but also government schools in rural areas. These are the schools that are actually educating the youth who come from low-income backgrounds in Wakiso.

Those who support the continued freedom to choose schools argue that this

structure improves overall school quality by engaging parents. They sometimes assert that the excessive bureaucracy in the public system can be reformed through the engagement of parents, which represents the enlargement of parents' citizenship (Corwin & Schneider, 2005).

In Wakiso, however, parents do not express their interest and engagement in the education of their children by advocating for reform to improve public schools. Rather, they swiftly and completely escape from government schools to private schools once they can financially afford it. These are all individualized efforts to overcome the issues surrounding education. Olson Beal and Hendry (2012) explain that "education is seen as a private rather than a public good, and citizenship is equated with individual, consumer-oriented rather than collective, civic behavior." People are individualized and find their own ways to survive; this provokes the common anxiety that will be discussed at length in the following sections.

5.3. Pervasive Anxiety Surrounding Education

The case studies in the earlier sections illuminated the ways in which citizens from high-income backgrounds typically have access to a broader scope of options that afford them access to higher quality education. However, regardless of their socio-economic status, anxiety and instability are found among all interviewees in this study. The anecdotes of interviewees reveal the different forms of instability that children can face in their educational experience.

The first case is children from a low-income background who attend government schools in Wakiso or rural areas. They often experience suspension from school due to financial constraints, and as a result they are generally transferred to a different school. However, their transfer is often not just within the Wakiso District, but from Wakiso to another region (Namazzi, Natukunda, Doris).

While some children stay in Wakiso, they are not able to attend school, or even if they can, they are often suspended for financial reasons. For example, some of Doris's children were able to stay and study in Wakiso, but they were often suspended or failed to advance to the next grade.

The second case is families whose income is higher than the previous group's (Dembe, Miremba). Some of their children previously studied in government schools, but as of the time of their interview, their primary-age children were all attending private schools. Even though their financial situation was better than the previous group's, their children also experienced transfers inside Wakiso. These parents' educational aspirations for their children led them to send their children to study at schools with fees that they were not always able to afford, which created further educational instability for the children, as their parents were sometimes forced to transfer their children out of their schools, or even suspend their education mid-semester due to an inability to pay school fees. Their anecdotes show the new type of instability surrounding private schools.

As mentioned above, Akiki and Mukasa, who have relatively higher incomes with stable jobs, also struggled to pay school fees, as they decided to send their children to high-fee private schools. Although Akiki and Mukasa's children have not experienced suspension or transfer due to financial constraints, the financial officer in their children's school, Sunshine, explained as follows:

> Diana: They [parents] come and ask us and tell us, please we are going to take them away but if money is gone, we will bring them. And there are those who have taken them, indeed when they get the money, they bring them back.
>
> (2019.02.25, individual interview)

This essentially means that higher-income families are not immune to the need to change or suspend their children from their schools.

Bauman explains that in modern society, individuals are “bearing full responsibility for the consequences of investing” their trust (Bauman, 2013, p.31) and “that life is fraught with risks” (p. 86). Parents in Wakiso suffer instability and anxiety due to the pressure of continuing their children’s education and of ensuring stability for their children’s future life. These characteristics seem to stem from the characteristics of Uganda's education, in which individuals are responsible for education rather than the state.

5.4. Implications

Many studies have revealed problems resulting from the introduction of UPE policies that lacked sufficient consideration and preparation. Scholars have found that the government lacked capability to leverage free education for all and to manage the exponentially increased enrollment. Educational stakeholders such as teachers, parents, and children have adapted to this new educational landscape in their own ways. In the process of adaptation, a variety of responses appeared. The three points discussed in the paragraphs above indict the Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) as the key factor behind those characteristics.

First of all, the competition surrounding PLE has exacerbated the competition between private and government schools, which has driven government schools to require extra fees from parents in the Wakiso region, thereby raising higher barriers for low-income families to access government schools. Additionally, teachers in government schools moved to private schools for better job conditions, negatively impacting the quality of government schools.

Second, the desire to achieve higher PLE grades was similar across all groups,

but the schools that children actually had access to differed based on their socio-economic status. This phenomenon was not just limited to the Wakiso region and its wide range of schools from government to high-fee private schools, but even resulted in some children from low-income backgrounds being moved to rural areas for education.

Third, the findings show that the responsibility to educate children, including choosing schools and paying for school fees, falls on individual families. Accordingly, the stability or quality of education was highly dependent on the individual household's socio-economic situation. The effects of such individualized responsibility goes beyond low-income families. Even parents with comparatively stable income sources who chose higher-fee private schools to get better PLE scores constantly face instability regarding their education experience. In conclusion, the instability and anxiety regarding education were common for all parents.

Therefore, this study suggests the necessity of considering the roles and effects of PLE or any other forms of examination system when further discussing the policies on primary education in Uganda or other developing countries. Although some scholars have concluded that the rapid and sudden introduction of UPE failed to provide quality education for all with sufficient budget and management, it is evident that primary schools have expanded in Uganda. This expansion has usually been attributed to the government policy on fee abolition, but the Wakiso case illustrates a different side; education can be expanded by individuals' aspirations toward education, not just by state-driven policy. This study shows that PLE works as a systematic medium for people to express their aspirations for education.

This study also showed the importance of parents' roles in expanding

education. A demand-driven education expansion is similar to the process of Korean education expansion. Seth (2002) states that the "education fever" of Korean parents has affected, both positively and negatively, the formation and expansion of education. Korean education is sometimes considered state-driven, but on the other hand parents have played an important role in its expansion. Therefore, many scholars (Hwang, 2015; Kang, 2017; Oh, 2008) argue that it is necessary to understand the behaviors and characteristics of parents to fully comprehend the development of Korean education. Additionally, the college-examination system in Korea works as a systematic medium for parents to express their "education fever" (Hong, 2017). This is also relevant in Ugandan education. Therefore, further research on how parents perceive the PLE and their expectations related to primary education as well as high PLE scores can help us better grasp the formation and expansion of primary education and private schools.

Additionally, it is helpful to examine other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that introduced UPE policies with fee abolition and have similar primary completion examinations, as this could reveal differences and similarities with the case of Uganda, affording us greater insight into the primary education landscape in Sub-Saharan Africa.

5.5. Limitations

Like most academic studies, this study has certain limitations. First, after selecting the parents to interview, it was found that five of the seven participants were women or mothers, and among these five, three women were taking care of their children without a husband. Although Uganda is a patriarchal society (Omona & Aduo, 2013), it seems that women have undertaken the role of primary caregiver. In fact, maternal kin have increasingly become the first line of defense and primary provider for children orphaned by HIV and AIDS (Bukuluki et al., 2017) in

Uganda. If maternal kinship in caring for children is considered an educational decision in Wakiso, this could reveal other insights.

Second, there were some prominent schools in Uganda such as King's College Budo (established in 1906); St Mary's College Kisubi (established in 1906); Busoga College Mwiri (established in 1911); Gayaza High School (established in 1906); Namilyango College (established in 1902); and Mengo High School (established in 1895); these are known as the "centenary schools," and form part of Uganda's heritage (Nantulya, 2006).During the interviews, people mentioned these schools as their dream schools, but unfortunately the institutions they spoke about were beyond their means. Some of these schools are situated in Wakiso, which is one of the reasons for the high educational interest in Wakiso. The existence of these schools seems to affect the primary education landscape, but they are not considered in this study. For example, King's College Budo has produced three Ugandan presidents, one vice president, a speaker of Parliament, two chief justices, and several ambassadors and politicians (Nantulya, 2006). Although these schools are unreachable for most Ugandans due to the high school fees and requirement of high PLE results, it seems that their existence affects the views of educational stakeholders. It would be worthwhile to examine the meanings and roles of these prestigious secondary schools in Uganda and their effects on the overall educational landscape.

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국문초록

1997년 보편적초등교육 정책의 영향에 대한 우간다 와키소 지역 사례연구

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강예린

국제사회는 1990년대부터 2000년대까지 기초교육 또는 초등교육의 필요에 지대한 관심을 보여왔다. 이 시기에 사하라 이남 아프리카 개발도상국들은 학비폐지를 기조로 하는 보편적 초등 교육 정책을 도입하였다. 이러한 보편적 초등 교육 정책의 도입은 급격한 등록률 향상을 이끌었고, 이는 교육 현장에 교육 공급의 부족과 교육의 질 저하를 가져왔다. 이와 더불어 초등사립학교의 등장과 확산은 보편적 초등교육정책 도입 이후 사립초등학교의 역할을 어떻게 이해해야 하는지에 대한 질문을 낳았다.

이 연구는 1993년 보편적 초등 교육 정책을 도입한 우간다의 와키소 지역을 중심으로 진행한 사례연구이다. 본 연구는 교육 공급의 부족, 교육의 질 저하, 그리고 초등 사립 학교의 등장과 확산이라는 교육적 지형 속에서 보편적 초등교육정책의 도입이 우간다의 와키소 지역에 가져온 영향에 대해 깊게 이해하는 것을 목적으로 한다.

본 연구는 탐색적 사례연구로 진행되었다. 인터뷰, 관찰, 문헌자료 등 다양한 방식으로 데이터를 수집하였다. 주된 연구 데이터는 다양한 사회·경제적 지위의 학부모를 대상으로 했으며, 그외에 교육부 및 공·사립학교 관계자가 포함되어 있다. 인터뷰 자료가 데이터 수집의 핵심이었으며, 그 내용을 구체화하고 검증하기 위해 관찰을 통해 얻은 데이터와 지역 뉴스 기사 데이터를 활용했다.

이 연구를 통해 크게 세 가지의 특징적인 지점을 확인할 수 있다. 첫째로, 초등학교 졸업시험(Primary Leaving Examination, PLE)을 둘러싼 경쟁이 와키소 공립 학교의 질에 영향을 미쳤다. 와키소의 공립 학교들은 경쟁력 확보를 위해 추가 학비를 부과했다. 이에 따라, 와키소 공립 학교들에서 다른 지역에 비해 더 높은 학비 장벽이 나타났다. 또한, 이러한 시험 경쟁 속에서 공립 학교의 교사들이 사립 학교로 유출되었다. 초등 학교 졸업시험의 결과에 따라 학교의 평가가 좌우되어, 학교가 좋은 교사를 확보하기 위한 경쟁에 뛰어들었기 때문이다.

둘째로, 모든 학부모, 학생들은 좋은 학교에 진학하여 높은 졸업시험 성적을 달성하고 싶어했지만, 사회·경제적 지위에 따라 접근할 수 있는 학교의 수준이 달랐다. 와키소 학부모들에게는 공립 학교부터 저가, 중가, 고가 사립 학교까지 다양한 학교 선택지가 존재했는데, 실질적으로 선택할 수 있는 범위는 해당 가정이 위치한 사회·경제적 지위에 따라 달랐다. 게다가, 와키소에 거주하고 있을지라도 와키소의 공립 학교나 저가 사립 학교의 학비를 감당하기 어려운 학부모들은 자녀를 지방에 보내어 공부하게 하는 방식을 택했다. 이는 교육의 불평등이 단순히 와키소 지역 안에서 강화되는 것만 아니라, 더 넓은 지역에 걸쳐 확산되고 있음을 의미한다.

셋째로, 와키소의 학부모들은 교육에 있어 만연하고 일상적인 불안과 불안정성을 가지고 있었다. 본 연구에서 진행한 학부모 인터뷰는 사회·경제적 수준이 높은 학부모부터 낮은 학부모까지 모두 자녀 교육에 있어 다양한 형태의 곤경을 겪고 있음을 보여준다. 특히, 졸업시험 고득점에 대한 열망은 학부모들이 무리해서 고가 사립 학교를 선택하게 만들어, 교육에 대한 불안과 불안정성을 강화해왔다. 이러한 어려움은 국가 중심이 아닌 개인 중심으로 이끌어지는 우간다 교육의 특징에서 비롯된 것으로 보인다.

이 세 가지 특징은 모두 초등학교 졸업시험에 대한 교육 이해 관계자들의 강렬한 관심과 열망에 연결되어 있다. 즉, 초등 학교 졸업 시험은 와키소 지역의 교육 지형을 형성하는 데에 중요한 역할을 하고 있다. 따라서 이 연구는 초등 학교 졸업 시험을 비롯한 진급 시험 시스템이 운용되는 방식과 학부모가 이를 인식하고 받아들이는 방식이 교육 지형을 이해하는 데 중요하게 다뤄져야 함을 제안한다. 이러한 요인을 중점으로 하여 교육 지형을 살펴본다면, 이는 우간다를 비롯한 다른 개발도상국들의 초등 교육 정책을 이해하는 데에 도움이 될 것이다.

주제어: 초등교육, 보편적 초등교육 정책, 초등학교 졸업시험, 우간다

학번: 2017-23155