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An Analysis of South Korea's International Veterans Affairs Programs

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To my *Lolo* (grandfather),

Eleuterio C. Gutierrez, Sr.,

(October 9, 1931 – October 24, 2020)

himself a UN Korean War Veteran.

He returned to the arms of Our Creator

just as this work was coming to completion.

He fought his battles with compassion and tenderness.

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Abstract

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The government of South Korea has acknowledged the contributions of the UN Korean War veterans and expressed its gratitude through International Veterans Affairs (IVA), consisting of programs that convey thanks and honor through commemorative events, the granting of merits, the preservation and dissemination of information on their wartime participation, and the enhancement of networks with war-related publics. Being such, IVA will have implications on Korea's national image and relationships and effectively, on Korea's diplomacy.

Despite the increasing emphasis on international veterans affairs along with the growing number and diversity of its programs, its novelty and uniqueness to Korean historical development have limited research on this topic. This research aims to examine the potential of IVA as a diplomatic tool

first by situating it within the frameworks of soft power and Korea's middle power and public diplomacy. Thereafter according to these concepts, an in-depth analysis of IVA programs is provided by gathering and organizing related policy data.

It is found that international veterans affairs go beyond the expression of thanks and honor. IVA is more than the spontaneous mix of the different programs that recompense and honor the UN veterans. Rather, IVA is a coordinated effort that results from the government's active processing of a unique historical resource into a diplomatic asset mobilized for national goals: As an expression of appreciation for the UN participation in the Korean War, IVA seeks to reinforce the universal values of freedom and peace for which the war was fought. In support of these values, IVA is explicitly geared toward improving Korea's image in the international community and strengthening partnerships with its wartime allies.

Keywords: UN Korean War, Veterans, Soft Power, Middle Power Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Veterans Diplomacy

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Chapter 1. Introduction

"The UN Korean War Veterans I met have invariably regarded Korea as their second home and take great pleasure and pride in Korea's development as if it is their own."

"There are no borders when honoring patriots and veterans. We will remember and honor the noble sacrifices through various veterans affairs programs…"

President Moon Jae-in (2020)

1.1 Background of the Study

The year 2020 marks the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. From the ruins of the war, South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) has risen to become one of the largest economies in the world and a successfully consolidated democracy. The remarkable accomplishments of Korea were only possible due to the sacrifice and contributions of the Korean War veterans who risked their lives to protect the country (The 70th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee, n.d).

A total of 1.9 million soldiers from 21 United Nations (UN) members sent their troops to assist and fight alongside ROK in the war. As the surviving UN Korean war veterans are at 88 years old on average in 2018 (Korea

Institute of Public Administration (KIPA), 2018: 44), not much time is left to express gratitude for their dedication. Indeed, tributes to the war veterans will become more meaningful as ever just until the last surviving veterans eventually perish.

Thus at this very moment, remembrance has reached a crossroads: it will either lose momentum soon after the last veteran vanishes; or continue, with its new-found purpose, in the consciousness of more people with whom it is shared. This begs to rethink and shift efforts from staging events for those remembered – towards forging networks among those who remember. These links, in turn, are built upon relationships and information.

Korea has been conducting programs in honor of the contributions of the UN veterans since 1975 when a program was launched to invite them to revisit the country. Since then, the programs have diversified into a concerted effort collectively called 'international veterans affairs (IVA).' These activities are centered on the expression of gratitude and honor to the UN veterans through commemoration and merit-granting, the preservation and dissemination of information on the UN's role in the war, and the forging of networks among war-related actors such as the veterans, their descendants, their organizations, their governments and its publics (Hyung and Yoo, 2015).

International veterans affairs were legally cemented on September 25th, 2020, with the enactment of the UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act (Act No. 17117, 유엔참전용사의 명예선양 등에 관한 법률, see

Appendix 1). The act stipulates programs necessary to promote the esteemed treatment and support to the UN veterans, intending to enhance the image of Korea by contributing to the development of freedom and democracy, as well as to promote friendship among Korea and its wartime allies.

Therefore, international veterans affairs as the expression of 'thanks and honor' to the UN veterans, are not only rooted in the imperative brought about by the UN participation in the Korean War. As commemoration is not only historical but also political, so is international veterans affairs also geared toward achieving national goals.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

It is no exaggeration that international veterans affairs – even more so, diplomacy through it – is an unchartered topic inasmuch as it is atypical and novel (KIPA, 2018: 13).

For one, academic interest in international veterans affairs is only newly found. This lies in stark contrast to the more developed studies on domestic veterans policies whose functions, cross-country comparisons, historical development, and prospects, have been comprehensively examined. Attention to international dimensions of veterans affairs has only emerged around 2015 (Oh, Young-dahl, 2015; Yoo, 2016; Hyeong and Oh, 2015; Ra, 2015), as the number of and the focus on IVA programs increased significantly.

Moreover, international veterans affairs are molded from the unique historical development of Korea: The exercise of collective security that gave the Korean War an international dimension, Korea's rapid economic development that allowed it to provide for domestic and international veterans policies, and the political background that gives the country a rationale to mobilize these resources as diplomatic assets – all limit studies on international veterans affairs within domestic research in Korea.

Notwithstanding these idiosyncrasies, an analysis of international veterans affairs is not void of insights that can be extended outside the Korean context. In particular, this study finds significance in illustrating how historical resources, such as the UN participation in the Korean War, can be transformed into assets used to achieve national diplomatic goals.

In the process, the study also contributes to the topic in two ways. First, it situates international veterans affairs within the frameworks of international relations. This includes understanding the international system in which it occurs (i.e. soft power), the position of the subject in this context (middle power), and the strategy suited for the actor given its position in the setting (public diplomacy).

Second, this study systematically itemizes each programs' objectives, modalities, actors, status, and challenges. The research takes international veterans affairs both as one coordinated activity of public diplomacy by virtue of being rooted on the same resource and goals and as individual programs

that differ in terms of the actors and modalities they involve. Taken together, these contributions aim to open new avenues for research in international veterans affairs.

1.3 Methodology

As mentioned, international veterans affairs largely remains an uninvestigated area of Korea's diplomacy. Given the scarcity of previous studies on the topic, this research adopted a descriptive approach to inquire about the workings of international veterans affairs as a diplomatic activity.

Descriptive research is regarded as the initial step in the development of new knowledge, which may lead to a tentative hypothesis for future testing or an idea for a conceptual framework to explain the action of variables. For this, the researcher will observe, describe, probe, and analyze characteristics to assemble new knowledge in an area where previous work is lacking. Hence, the researcher is interested in seeking and organizing information more than testing a hypothesis.

In particular, the researcher employed a case study approach to allow an in-depth, systematic investigation of the background, current status, and characteristics of international veterans affairs. The programs included in this study cover those from the revisit program in 1975, the pioneer activity of IVA, toward the diversification of IVA programs held regularly until most recently in 2019. The data on the programs were sourced from policy data

published mostly in the Korean language by the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, as well as policy reports by the Korea Education and Research Institute for Patriots & Veterans (Hyung and Yoo, 2015) and the Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA, 2018). News articles and official statements by related organizations were also used as supplementary references. These data were then analyzed for similarities, trends, themes, and categories following the frameworks suggested by existing literature on public diplomacy.

Such an approach however indicates several limitations to the scope of this study. Most especially, the study is confined to understanding the context, resources, and programs of international veterans affairs as a diplomatic activity – rather than evaluating its effectivity as such. For this very purpose, the scope of the data gathered is limited to the supply side of international veterans affairs.

Input from the demand side – particularly, inquiries on how IVA programs are received and interpreted by their objects – were thus reserved for further evaluative analyses. Although not covered in this study, input from the objects is nevertheless acknowledged as an important component of public diplomacy, since these activities involve two-way exchanges where information is rarely understood as intended (Snow, 2012).

1.4 Overview of Chapters

This will proceed in the following sections:

Chapter 2 lays out frameworks from which to understand South Korea's international veterans affairs. It is contextualized in an international system where the ability to set agenda and attract others through soft resources have become factors of an actor's power. Soft power, as it is called, is derived from resources such as an attractive culture, policies that live up to its values at home and abroad, and foreign policies that are perceived as legitimate (Nye, 2008: 95). Within this system, Korea has actively branded itself as a middle power in order to find partners in achieving common goals and boosting leverage in international issues (Ayhan, 2019). This explains Korea's willingness to assume technical and entrepreneurial leadership and to contribute to universal values through international veterans affairs. As a middle power in a setting that emphasizes soft power, public diplomacy acts as a reinforcement to traditional diplomatic means. It is a tool to achieve soft power by building and managing relationships, to influence thoughts, and mobilize actions to advance interests and values (Gregory, 2011: 353).

Chapter 3 recalls the participation of the UN Forces in the Korean War, in light of its implications on Korean diplomacy. On the surface when judging only at its implications on Korea, the involvement of many allies in the war creates an imperative for ROK to extend its veterans policies outside its borders (Hyeong et al., 2016). Yet, when seen in conjunction with its deep-

seated implications for the broader international community, the war could be highlighted as an illustrious triumph of collective security (Yoo, 2016: 100). This more sophisticated understanding is taken as the starting point to mobilize this historical event as a resource upon which Korea could root its contributions to peace and freedom.

Chapter 3 also discusses the welfare and symbolic components of Korea's policies towards its veterans in the domestic context (Ra, 2015: 9-11). Extending these two-dimensional policies abroad can be a means to achieve two-fold national goals: A strong groundwork of veterans policies at home, projected to the international stage, could be used to strengthen Korea's image as a moral and intellectual leader in veterans affairs and as a country that places high regard to the values of freedom and peace. Moreover, it can be used as a pretext and a platform for building closer political and social exchanges with its UN allies (Quisefit, 2013: 439-440).

Chapter 4 describes individual international veterans affairs programs. Each is elaborated in terms of their objectives, the subjects and objects they involve, their current status as well as their limitations and prospects. The programs underline the expression of gratitude and honor to the meritorious deeds of the UN veterans, and the building networks for exchange and cooperation with Korea's UN allies.

Chapter 4 also analyzes international veterans affairs following the five elements of public diplomacy proposed by Kim (2012), consisting of a

diplomatic *goal*, an *asset* derived from *resources*, and a *subject* directly communicating to its *objects* through different *carriers*. Following this framework, the UN participation in the Korean War as a historical resource does not wield soft power in and of itself. International veterans affairs, as an asset, build on this resource the themes of gratitude, honor and peace, in order to be a means to achieve national goals. The goals, in turn, are improving Korea's national image and building cooperative relations with its allies. The primary subject of international veterans affairs is the MPVA, which formulates and implements policies and programs, to create a network of objects centered around the UN veterans, their descendants, organizations and their countries' governments and publics.

Finally, in Chapter 5, the research concludes by reviewing the potential for South Korea to use international veterans affairs to enhance its image and build closer cooperative relations with its UN allies based on a public diplomacy framework. The research finds that the UN participation in the Korean War is a unique resource and that international veterans affairs is an atypical asset by which South Korea can hold a competitive advantage. On the one hand, it opens opportunities to study IVA as a new resource that could diversify Korea’s public diplomacy assets and reinforce Korea’s traditional diplomacy. Yet on the other, it calls for more studies focusing on the receiving side, as well as how IVA could be best incorporated with other public diplomacy efforts.

Chapter 2. Frameworks of The Study

The UN participation in the Korean War is rooted in the notions of collective security, freedom and peace. As external benefactors of Korea's veterans policies, international veterans affairs have the potential to be utilized for diplomatic goals. However, it must first be understood how the UN Korean War and its ensuing international veterans policies constitute a resource mobilized as an asset for improving Korea's image and building cooperative networks with its wartime allies.

This chapter delves into this question by borrowing frameworks from international relations. This will involve understanding the shifting conceptualization of power in the international system (i.e. soft power), the capacity of Korea in this context (i.e. middle power), and the diplomatic approach suited for Korea given this position in the setting (public diplomacy).

2.1 Power Shift from Hard to Soft Power

After the First World War, the power among major countries was measured according to the tonnage of their warships. Similarly after the Second World War, the main index of power was the possession of and ability to operate nuclear weapons. Hence, power was understood and quantified in terms of material resources, which included the size of population, territory, natural resources, economy and military. Such a materialistic view of power had the advantage of being concrete and measurable, which made its implications and possibilities predictable. At the onset of the nuclear age in 1945, scientific

advances related to nuclear and military weapons became the new barometer for national power. Coupled with these advances was an increase in mass destruction capabilities, which resulted in tremendous damages and losses during conflict (Nye, 1990).

Another dimension of power soon came to the fore. Especially under the US hegemony in the 21st century, power came to be attributed not only to material resources but also that to immaterial ones. This included culture, transnational communication, size of economy, level of scientific and technological development, as well as one's position in the international liberal order. The profound transformation of the concept of power in line with the rapidly changing global society posed a serious challenge to the nation-state. Power, in the traditional sense, was constantly reorganized into new forms and attributes. As a case in point, the rigid power relationship based on antagonism between and alliance within competing bipolar blocs was reconstructed after the collapse of the socialist bloc. As the post-Cold War international order allowed for more flexible power relations and made it necessary to engage others in the international order, nation-states have tended to avoid reliance on material resources such as military or economic capabilities. Diplomatic policies, too have shifted its objective from diplomacy based on military power to one compatible with the new international order, based on balanced interstate relations.

Ray S. Cline (1994) attempted to retrace the meaning of power and formalize an index from which it is to be evaluated. He measured power as

the aggregate of the state's territory, population, economic strength, military power. Most importantly, this aggregate of material aspects is to be multiplied by the intangible dimensions of strategic purpose and national will. Hence, missing the multiplier effects of the intangible dimensions of power inevitably suppresses material power. Organski (1958) has also emphasized the significance of social factors apart from the natural factors of power. On the one hand, natural factors include geographic factors, natural resources and population. On the other, social factors include level of economic development, political structure and citizen morale. Toffler (1991), in addition, describes a 'powershift' from physical sources of power to knowledge as power as a result of advances in information technology.

Indeed, the emergence of the digital revolution has made material factors an incomplete barometer of power. With the technological advances, a range of actors outside the realms of the state gained influence in the international setting. Non-state groups create issues and identities that are pan-national in nature, local boundaries are blurred, and spatial integration is underway. Given the borderless expansion of information communication technologies, national territories become less meaningful even in the field of traditional security.

This has transformed the understanding of power such that a country is now able to obtain outcomes in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. This has emphasized the ability of a country

to set the agenda and attract others rather than simply forcing them to change through the threat or use of military and economic weapons. Soft power, as Joseph Nye (2008: 94) coined, is defined as the power to get others to the outcomes one wants by co-opting rather than coercing others. Through soft power, an actor leads others to align themselves with the norms or institutions that produce behaviors that are in line with its goals. According to Nye (Ibid.), soft power works by influencing other's preferences and making them want what the actor wants. It is thus understood as power through attraction. Soft power stems from three intangible sources: whether its culture is attractive to others; whether the country lives up to its political values at home and abroad; and whether its foreign policies are perceived as legitimate and having moral authority (Nye, 2004; see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Classification of Power



Note. From Nye (2004).

Today, countries from different levels of development coexist in one interconnected global society. As the information revolution and the globalization of the economy further accelerates, the world is becoming increasingly more compact. As a result, the weight of soft power relevant to

military and economic power becomes more significant. (Nye, 2004: 70-71). In the same manner, the center of gravity of national power is gradually shifting from the tangible and material resources to those that are intangible and non-material.

2.2 Middle Power Diplomacy

While the understanding of what resources constitute power has shifted, the analysis of power as a relative concept based on systemic theory has still dominated mainstream studies of international relations. The systemic theory attempts to capture the relationship between the units of the international system (generally, the states) and the elements of the structure of the international system most relevant to their behavior. From a systemic perspective, attention has been given to the role of great powers (Mearsheimer, 2014: 5; Waltz, 1979: 73). The place of middle powers, such as Korea, has not received much consideration.

There are several considerations based on which a state is identified as a middle power. The case of Korea, even though often readily dismissed as a middle power, deserves closer examination as it actively assumes this status rather than being passively categorized identified as such.

A positional, often realist approach, focuses on states' positions in the international system based on data such as GDP, population and military strength (Holbraad, 1971). Based on these measures, it is suggested that

Korea has joined the ranks of middle powers since the 1960s (Neack, 1993: 350). Yet, the positional approach does not explain why Korea has only self-identified and behaved as a middle power at a much later time. It was only during the 90s when President Roh Tae-Woo used the term ‘middle power’ to signal a newly found confidence in playing a meaningful role in this promising world of change (Goldman 1991: 7 in Ayhan, 2019). It was even later during Roh Moo-Hyun's term (2003-2008) when Korea became more assertive in projecting a middle power identity. This suggests that while positional capabilities are necessary as an enabling factor, they are not sufficient for projecting a middle power identity.

A behavioral, often liberal institutionalist approach, stresses the normative foreign policy behaviors of middle powers. Middle powers often prefer multilateral solutions to transnational problems, based on moral authority and good international citizenship (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1993: 19; Henrikson, 2005: 69-71). In this regard, niche issue areas of Korea’s middle power diplomacy are brought to the forefront. The Korean governments’ rhetoric on climate action, development cooperation, bridging between developed and developing countries and its contributions to peacekeeping operations (PKO) are pieces of evidence of Korea's middle power behavior (Ayhan, 2019: 7-10).

Notwithstanding, Korea’s self-declared identity as a middle power status should not be taken for granted, since discrepancies between the rhetoric and the reality can be found when non-conforming evidence is taken

into account (Maoz, 2002: 163). An example is Korea's green growth initiative, a key component of the Lee Myung-Bak administration's (2008-2018) middle power diplomacy. The initiative arguably lost momentum under the succeeding administrations and Korea's share of renewable energy among OECD countries has since then remained lackluster (Lee, 2017: 15).

Also, Korea's ascension to donor status within the OECD DAC has been celebrated as 'a source of national pride' (Hwang 2017). However, the OECD DAC Peer Review (2018: 18) suggests that Korea's current domestic targets on aid volume, aid untying and multilateral aid have been less ambitious than those previously approved.

Korea's rhetoric on playing a 'bridging role between developing and developed countries' based on 'its unique development experience' (MOFA, 2017; Cho, 2012) is another significant pillar of its middle power diplomacy. Korea hosted the 2010 G20 summit, where it took the opportunity to connect the developed and developing world represented by the G7 and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), respectively. Later in 2011, it hosted the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, where it emphasized 'cooperation for effective development' over 'aid effectiveness' (OECD, 2011). In a 2013 initiative, Korea teamed up Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey and Australia to establish MIKTA. Described by the MOFA as a 'middle power cooperation forum' (2018: 176), the MIKTA is a team-up of 'like-minded countries that have a significant level of economic power and share core values and similarities to act as a catalyst or facilitator in launching initiatives

and implementing global governance reform' (MIKTA, 2015). While an important step toward making Korea's behavior match those of traditional middle powers, MIKTA is yet to move beyond being an informal platform for building confidence among member countries to assume a constructive role on the global stage.

On the one hand, these initiatives clearly show Korea's aspiration and readiness for a bridging role between developed and developing countries. Yet on the other, it is contested whether Korea managed to effect systemic change on development issues and whether such a role is sustainable for Korea since mediation requires the goodwill and trust of both parties.

Korea's participation in the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), has reaped similar observations. Korea has increased its contributions, but it is still not significant. According to data from the UN Peacekeeping, Korea's troop contributions to PKO is ranked 39th as of March 2017 (621 persons), and it ranks 49th in total contributions between 1990 and 2017 (94,215 persons).

In sum, not all evidence supports that Korea's foreign policy behavior in its self-declared niche areas represents that of a middle power. Hence, Korea's projection of middle power identity is not firmly based on its foreign policy behavior as the behavioral approach explains.

Another approach to middle powers is the functionalist perspective, which emphasizes the specific roles of middle powers as given by their positional capacity and their willingness to take responsibility to contribute

to world peace (Chapnick, 2000: 195; Cooper, 2011: 321; Robertson, 2017: 361). Yet, if Korea has not mastered the roles expected of a middle power in any of the niche areas as discussed earlier, then even a functional explanation cannot sufficiently explain the Korean case.

An alternative perspective is called for when systemic explanations to middle power statecraft fall short in describing Korea's middle power diplomacy. Ayhan (2019:5) suggests that Korea's foreign policy behavior does not immediately point to a country of middle power status. Instead, Korea's projection of an image of a middle power is a strategy it adopts to improve its international status in an attempt to improve its position in its foreign affairs vis-a-vis greater powers surrounding it and beyond.

In other words, Korea's middle power status is an assumption it makes for itself to attain its preferred outcomes. This includes finding partners with which to achieve common goals and to boost the country's leverage in regional issues. In part, Korea's aspirations to project a middle power identity come from decades of being overlooked or 'discounted' (Euh, 2010) because it has been relatively a small power in a region of political and economic giants.

States that are not readily recognized as great or small powers, like Korea, spend relatively more effort in projecting their identities as middle powers, because stakes for their legitimacy and influence in world politics are higher (Henrikson, 2005). This legitimacy is based not only on their material capabilities including economic and military power, but also relates to soft

elements as previously discussed, such as their status, prestige, reputation, standing, and how they are imagined in the world (Patience, 2014).

Hence from this perspective, Korea's more assertive projection of its middle power identity more closely resembles a nation-branding project. That is, a form of government's strategic communication that aims to alter its nation's identity or image. This involves altering the beliefs and emotions toward it, in a positive way that reflects the country's aspirations and interests (Melissen 2005, 20). Seen this way, discrepancies between Korea's rhetoric and behavior may converge in due time.

Going back to the concept of middle powers, the term is still contested despite the several perspectives from which middle powers constitute a category. Arguments have been made that the term 'middle powers' is imprecise, and perhaps even distorts the position and abilities of some states on the international stage. Chapnick (2002), for example, critiques that the term lacks conceptual clarity and is little more than a way for states to justify and extend their influence. To be sure, most definitions are too vague to possess any meaning. The Middle Powers Initiative, a program of the Global Security Institute dedicated to the worldwide reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, describes middle powers as states that are politically and economically significant. Yet, what qualifies a state as significant is problematic.

Nevertheless, there ought to be a reason why the concept remains in common use in diplomatic circles. Some states still wield considerable

influence that sets them above smaller powers, given that their resources are minified compared to the US. Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Scandinavian states are labeled middle powers in this sense. In the past, middle powers were identified on their rank-order in the international hierarchy according to their resources. Such method is justified because the term itself implies a relational measure of being in the middle of a range.

However, it is virtually impossible to objectively rank-order states. The factors, such as defense spending, which have traditionally placed states in the middle of the continuum, have become incongruent with the amount of influence those states can exert (Welsh, 2004).

So alternatively, recent discussions on middle powers have focused on the behavioral and functional implications of the term. 'Global citizenship,' 'niche diplomacy' and accepting roles as mediators, followers or staunch multilateralists have become qualifying behaviors of middle powers. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993) roots the middle powers in their ability to provide 'technical and entrepreneurial' leadership on the world stage on specific issues. Rather than middle powers playing an all-encompassing role, certain states can act as middle power states in certain circumstances and in certain subject areas (Ibid., 27). In particular, they tend to be more passive on security issues and instead place emphasis on the 'second' (i.e. economic) and 'third' (i.e. environment and human rights) agenda (Ibid., 22).

Still, there are important drawbacks to Cooper, et al.'s conceptualization. For one, not only middle powers engage in entrepreneurial

leadership strategies. Stairs (in Chapnick, 2000: 202) points out the reality that middle power states behave in all sorts of ways and the roles that have often been associated with them are in fact performed by all sorts of different countries. Similarly, Welsh (2004: 586) wrote that middle power internationalism, which is perceived to be about consensus-building, managing and mediating, is of little use in the 21st century as middle powers need to seek new roles.

To reconcile Stairs and Welsh's argument, it is useful to emphasize Cooper, et al.'s point that 'middlepowership' comprises only an aspect of, rather than an encompassing classification that restricts its foreign policy. That is, middle power states are simply prone to certain behaviors arising from their status relative to other states. In sum, they are actors that are inferior to great powers in both realist and structural terms; but emphasize multilateral solutions, are capable of exerting leadership on the world stage, and are particularly concerned with second and third agenda issues.

In understanding middle powers as multilateralists pursuing second and third agenda items, it is suggested that they are well-positioned to engage in cooperative public diplomacy by virtue of their substantial soft power and established networks. Middle powers possess significant strengths that make them powerful allies in the contest of public opinion. They have credibility and soft power, histories of innovation an inclination to work with non-state actors on global governance issues. Strengths are further reinforced when seen from the perspective of cooperative public diplomacy.

2.3 Public Diplomacy

The recent rise of public diplomacy in foreign policy agendas, as Kim (2012: 529) notes, is driven by three forces. First, the world has come to recognize the importance of soft power. Second, the revolutionary breakthroughs in information communication technology led to the mass commercialization of high technology information equipment. This formed global information networks and democratized access to information. Third, these breakthroughs ultimately facilitated a shift in power from the state to civil society.

The most dramatic catalyst to these driving forces was the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, which revealed the devastating effects that negative public opinion can wreak (Leonard et al., 2002: 1). These events remind the international community that instability is no longer constrained by geography. Radicalization of individuals in volatile regions of the world, economic disenfranchisement, rapid social and cultural change, corrupt and controlling governments, prejudice, along with the acceleration of travel, communications and weapons technology all mean that simmering resentment can pose a serious threat to targeted states. In the pursuit of domestic and international security, it is therefore becoming common for states to be proactive in addressing social and cultural drivers of twenty-first-century insecurity.

On top of these, the recent technological advances that dramatically cut the cost in the processing and transmission of information have led to a

‘paradox of the plenty’ (Simon,1998; 303-33). Faced with an overwhelming volume of information, the public hardly knows what to concentrate on. Attention rather than information therefore becomes the scarce resource, and power is wielded by those who can distinguish valuable information from background clutter. As governments compete with each other and with other organizations to enhance their attractiveness at the expense of their opponents, politics in an information age may ultimately be about whose story has the most credibility. Indeed, credibility was described by Keohane and Nye (1998: 7) as the center of gravity for soft power, and asymmetries in credibility are a key source of power.

Broadly, credibility refers to the general willingness of a public to listen to and accept information and is based on the perceptions of the source as trustworthy and reliable. As Zaharna (2005: 223) writes, it is to be built over the long-term through relationships by engaging and incorporating the concerns of other actors; and is a significant advantage from which public diplomacy is effectively employed.

Like middle powers, public diplomacy is a term widely used by practitioners and academics despite its lack of clear definition and scope. Since its first use, public diplomacy was defined on the basis of its strategies and its actors (Zatepilina, 2010: 23). Lee and Ayhan (2015: 57-58) organized these definitions into two groups. The first group contrasts public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy by recognizing the importance of foreign publics. This set of definitions view public diplomacy as official, state-centered

government-to-publics interaction connected to a state's foreign policy outcomes. For example, Malone (1985: 199) regards public diplomacy as 'one of direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments.'

The second set of scholars acknowledge new non-state actors and a more diverse array of objectives, activities and strategies for what is called 'new public diplomacy' (Melissen, 2005). Among them is Gregory's (2011: 353) definition which regards public diplomacy as 'an instrument used by states, associations of states, and some sub- and non-state actors to understand cultures, attitudes and behavior; to build and manage relationships; and to influence thoughts and mobilize actions to advance their interests and values.'

Therefore, similar to the shift in understanding power, the conceptualization of public diplomacy evolved as a consequence of changing domestic and international socio-political environments brought by globalization, democratic consolidation and technological advancements (Fitzpatrick, 2012: 435). Public diplomacy was earlier (i.e. 'old public diplomacy) regarded as a set of diplomatic tools made distinct from conventional diplomacy by virtue of its focus on foreign publics as its main target. The recent trend in the literature shows the emergence of a new public diplomacy where the approach is relational, networked and collaborative (Zaharna, Arsenault and Fisher, 2013). Table 1 summarizes the comparison between conventional diplomacy, old and new public diplomacy.

Table 1. *Comparison of the three types of diplomacy*

	Conventional Diplomacy	**Old Public Diplomacy**	**New Public Diplomacy**
Subject	Government	Government	Government; Non-government actors
Object	Government	Foreign Publics; Government	Foreign Publics; Government; Virtual Global Space
Resources	Hard Power	Soft Power	Soft Power
Medium/Carrier	Governmental Dialogues and Negotiations	PR Campaign Propaganda; Old Media	Diverse Media including New Digital Media
Communication Type	Closed Negotiations, Hierarchical	One-way, unilateral, asymmetric, closed, hierarchical	Two-way, horizontal, symmetric, open, networked

Note. Modified from Kim (2012: 533)

Public diplomacy is commonly approached as an instrument of soft power. That is, the government or policymakers use direct communication and relationship with foreign publics to pursue national interests in an international space that is increasingly under scrutiny by a large number of non-government actors. As Nye observes (2008: 9), countries at times enjoy a political clout greater than their military and economic weight because they define their national interest to include attractive causes such as economic aid or peacemaking. Nye further argues that public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of soft power, and that, in a certain sense, soft power can only be achieved through public diplomacy (Ibid., 95). In this case, a nation's image, its approach and position on certain issues, and its relationship with

the foreign public – all managed through public diplomacy, can be used as an instrument to create conditions more favorable to its foreign policy. At best, long-standing friendly relationships may lead others to be slightly more tolerant in their responses (Ibid., 102). This is what is meant by an enabling or a disabling environment for policy.

Public diplomacy's affinity to power has been a convenient ground for it to be dismissed as propaganda, making it crucial to distinguish between the two. Both propaganda and public diplomacy are geared toward influencing other nations by means of soft power, which is in turn based on indirect behavioral forces such as culture, values and ideology. However, propaganda is source-centered, cause-oriented, emotion-laden content that utilizes mass persuasion media to cultivate the mass mind in service to the source's goals (Snow, 2012: 1). The use of propaganda in itself is neither good nor bad because all social institutions – be it government, commercial or citizen-based – use it for their own purposes. The moral questions associated with propaganda rather stem from its means and ends, and its asymmetrical exchange of information that always favors the sponsor of the propaganda.

In contrast, public diplomacy, or diplomacy to publics, places human interaction in its front and center and is far less manipulative. Ideally, its target is a proactive consumer who not only passively consumes messages from the sender, but also proactively responds and persuades back in a two-way exchange of ideas (Snow, 2012: 2).

Thus, effective public diplomacy is a two-way street involving not only talking but also listening. Its efforts have to be built upon a firm understanding of how a foreign public thinks and what values are being shared. Unilaterally preaching at foreigners is not the best way to affect their views. Too often, the problem is not simply about others lacking information and so if others knew what we know, they would share the same view. However, all information is filtered by culture, and what is said is rarely understood as intended.

In further contrast to propaganda, public diplomacy distinguishes – but does not detach itself – from foreign policy. Public diplomacy, when too closely tied with foreign policy may create trust issues and face the backlash of being labeled as a manipulative act. Yet, when it cuts the grain of the country's actions, public diplomacy will appear to be a mere window dressing for hard power projection and is thus unlikely to succeed (Nye, 2008: 102). Moreover, much like even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular product, public diplomacy that appears as arrogantly presented or narrowly self-serving are likely to prohibit soft power. For instance, the selective use of international law in the pursuit of state goals; or advocating policies or actions abroad that are ignored domestically, can detriment the credibility a state enjoys. Furthermore, as public diplomacy is underpinned by credibility and trust, it must be understood as a durable pursuit aligned with mid- and long-term objectives.

Since public diplomacy must be consistent with policy, it is also closely tied with domestic policy organs. That is, public diplomacy practitioners should possess the ability to act as a genuine interface between foreign audiences and domestic policy organs. Otherwise, there is little incentive for foreign audiences to engage with public diplomacy practitioners. The content, objectives, and mechanisms of public diplomacy will change with individual programs. At its center, however, sits dialogue and promotion of mutual understanding.

Another related concept from which public diplomacy ought to be distinguished is nation-branding. Both practices take public relations as a starting point and emphasize exchanging information, reducing misconceptions, creating goodwill and constructing an image (Signitzer and Coombs, 1992). Both also respond to the importance of differentiation in an environment where national identities are becoming more homogenized.

However, the differences between the public diplomacy and nation-branding lie in their scope and focus (Melissen, 2005; 19-21). In terms of scope, branding a nation involves a much greater and coordinated effort. While public diplomacy is initiated by practitioners, branding is about the mobilization of all of a nation's forces that can contribute to the promotion of its image abroad. In terms of focus, branding is preoccupied with reshaping a country's self-image and molding its identity in a way that makes the re-branded nation stand out from the pack. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, concentrates on reinforcing the overall diplomatic effort by strengthening

relationships with non-official target groups abroad. In other words, while branding is about the articulation and projection of identity, public diplomacy is about promoting and maintaining smooth international relationships.

To this point, it has been established that public diplomacy is at its core a strategy to manage communication and relationships. As Leonard et al. (2002) describe, public diplomacy as such has three dimensions. The first and most immediate dimension is daily communications, wherein the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions are explained. This involves spreading the information to the domestic and foreign press, focusing on what and how information is released, as well as how to immediately and effectively address any forms of misleading information. The second dimension is strategic communication, wherein a set of simple themes are developed much as a political or advertising campaign does. The campaign plans symbolic events and communications over the course of a policy timeframe to reinforce central themes or to advance a particular government policy. The third dimension of public diplomacy is the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars and conferences. Each of these dimensions of public diplomacy is important in creating an attractive image of a country that can improve its prospects for obtaining its desired outcomes.

Having clarified the objectives and mechanisms of public diplomacy, one more crucial element is left to be examined: the actors, the role which they play determine whether public diplomacy is hierarchical or networked.

In reality, there are two worlds of public diplomacy that intersect, overlap, collide and cooperate in a variety of contexts (Hocking, 2005: 35).

On the one level, old public diplomacy follows the traditional, hierarchical image of diplomatic systems, where the centrality of intergovernmental relations is stressed. This approach to public diplomacy is top-down, where the foreign ministry and the national diplomatic system over which it presides act as gatekeepers who monitor interactions between the domestic and international policy environments funneling information between them. The conventional diplomatic system has been required to adapt to pressures both from within the state, as the conduct of diplomacy is diffused more widely throughout bureaucratic systems; and from a rapidly changing external environment, as actors have become more diverse, issues more multifaceted, and flows of communication more complicated. In this current environment, information delivered *en masse* through sources that are easily discredited or dismissed (i.e., government sources) are not as effective as quality information disseminated via multiple, credible sources, referred to as the what 'network paradigm of persuasion' (Zaharna, 2005: 2).

As Reinecke (1998) has observed, these pressures have exposed the shortcomings of a hierarchical model of public diplomacy. The capacity of governments, both acting individually and collectively, is limited in terms of their scope of activity, their speed of response to global issues and range of contacts. In response to these, Reinecke suggested the concept of a global public policy network, where while multi-government institutions could

benefit from the more diverse membership and non-hierarchical qualities of public policy networks incorporating both public and private sector actors to promote collaboration and learning and speed up the acquisition and processing of knowledge.

Building upon the importance of actor diversity and non-hierarchical strategies, a new ‘network model’ provides a different picture of how public diplomacy works in the twenty-first century. The model is based upon two important propositions: first, the significance of both public and private dimensions; and second, the indispensability of networks in managing complex policy environments as networks promote communication and trust. As Boerzel (1998) defines, a policy network is ‘a set of relatively stable relationships which are non-hierarchical and interdependent in nature, linking a variety of actors who share common interests and acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals.’

Faced with issues that have become more multifaceted, decentralized networks have an advantage over hierarchical decision-makers. Because decentralized networks are wider in scope and more diverse in composition, they can reduce transactional barriers and direct relevant information to where it will have the greatest effects. Hocking (1999) called this 'catalytic diplomacy,' a form of communication that acknowledges that a range of actors – instead of a single one – have the capacity to contribute resources to the management of complex problems. This may be in the form of knowledge, financial resources, or less tangibly, conferring legitimacy on the process.

In addition, the flow of information has shifted from hierarchical to easily cleavable, multi-directional flows. While diplomacy behind closed doors is still a normal conduct, secrecy as in conventional diplomacy is now not only harder to maintain but also less relevant to managing pressing issues. More often, the real challenge is how to manage such openness constructively.

Furthermore, the openness and permeability of a networked environment to a diversity of actors has made soft power resemble hard power, in that soft power is often used coercively in the pursuit of policy objectives. Importantly, public diplomacy as a soft power tool has become an instrument by which transnational coalitions play the 'attractive power' game against governments. As Hocking (2005: 39) depicts, 'manipulating the image of other actors, through highlighting the differences between images that countries project against the images that others deem as more accurate, has become the new great game.'

In particular, non-government organizations (NGOs) have emerged as central players in these image stakes. By branding themselves as forces for good, unconstrainted by sovereignty and untainted by realpolitik, NGOs have acquired a moral edge over governments and big businesses. The NGOs have also gained influence through their volume and visibility. Werker and Ahmed (2008) mention that the number of transnational NGOs in 2005 was estimated at over 20,000, 90% of which were established since the 1970s. With the help of advances in communications technology, they have established a strong connection with the publics and decision-makers. While NGOs still do not

have power in structural or realist terms, NGOs are increasingly becoming proficient at using networks to cultivate their soft power (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 16). Their influence has not gone unnoticed by states, who are increasingly co-opting them into legislative and executive processes.

Furthermore, an ideal partnership between NGOs and middle powers can be forged in the pursuit of second and third agenda. As discussed, middle power diplomacy is characterized by cooperation with other actors. That is, middle power's relative lack of resources places them in a position receptive to working with others to achieve shared goals. Thus, middle powers' resources, legitimacy and authority in the international system, along with NGO's mobility and credibility, underlined by common points of ideological reference, are a potentially powerful combination.

Despite its newfound interest in networks, public diplomacy is hardly a new paradigm in international politics. Instead, public diplomacy can be understood as a tool of national foreign policy located within a well-established paradigm that publics matter to governments. The shift from a hierarchical to a networked model of public diplomacy is a manifestation of governments accommodating the new configuration of world politics: the diversity of actors, the complexity of issues, and the intricacy of information flows that underpin them. In this context, public diplomacy is a strategic tool in the management of key resources namely credibility, image and relationships.

2.4 Korea as a Middle Power and its Public Diplomacy

In the previous discussions, it has been considered how Korea actively adopts a middle power status as a nation brand to attain its preferred international outcomes, including finding partners for common goals and boosting leverage in regional issues. Rather than unequivocally fulfilling the normative foreign policy behaviors of middle powers, Korea qualifies as a middle power state by virtue of its hard-power capacity, geopolitical and strategic locus and leadership intentions.

Public diplomacy is particularly important to middle powers like Korea in at least three aspects (Kim, 2012: 532-535). First, public diplomacy is a more cost-efficient way of conducting diplomacy for countries that have limited hard-power capabilities but have soft-power potentials. Surrounded by larger powers (China, Japan, Russia and US) and caught in their spheres of influence, Korea could be a permanent smaller power unless it actively engages in regional and global affairs with a combination of hard and soft power, or what is called 'smart power' (Armitage and Nye, 2007). On the one hand, Korea's economic and military size is ranked among the top ten in the world but is too far from catching up with the major powers. On the other, Korea has soft power potential given the cultural and knowledge resources stemming from its own experience of political and economic development. These resources could be leveraged to play a bridging role between the advanced countries and the rest of the world.

Second, public diplomacy is seen as an effective way to reduce reliance on great powers. On the security front, Korea's security alliance with the US is crucial in the face of an armed North Korea. On the economic front, however, Korea's reliance on China as its top trading partner is no less important. In this context of double reliance, Korea's friendly relations with like-minded countries are a crucial means to balance its bilateral ties with either great powers. The challenge of engaging other countries could be met through public diplomacy.

Third, public diplomacy is an emerging arena in international relations that no state currently monopolizes. Middle powers including Korea, which have a combination of hard and soft power resources and an intent to lead, have a competitive edge in occupying this rising niche market. Public diplomacy as a study and a practice presents new opportunities for middle powers.

According to Kim (2012: 530, See Figure 2), there are at least five elements that constitute the implementation of public diplomacy. The process starts from setting a diplomatic goal, for which the subject of diplomacy designs policies and programs targeted at a particular object. The programs and policies require resources, which are simply raw materials that will only materialize value as soft power after it is processed into tangible assets. Ultimately, these processed soft power assets are now ready to be used for public diplomacy through appropriate carriers or media.

Figure 2. *A five-phase framework for analyzing Public Diplomacy*

Note. From Kim, 2012: 530.

i) Diplomatic Goals

Diplomatic goals evolve as a function of interactions between the domestic and international environments. Since ROK's establishment in 1948, its diplomacy has evolved in four phases as summarized in Table 2 (Kim, 2012: 536-539). The first phase in 1948 to the early 1980s was preoccupied with forging a security system with the US and Japan as well as receiving foreign aid and capital. The confrontations between North and South Korea were a replica of the confrontations at the regional and global levels under the Cold War. In this background, successive authoritarian regimes set anti-communist and economic development as top national priorities. Public diplomacy was conducted by governmental organizations, which focused on unilateral public relations and propaganda supporting the regime's performance and policies at home and abroad.

Table 2. The evolution of Korean Diplomacy

Phase	Korea's Diplomacy	Period	International Environment	Domestic Environment
1	Security-focused	1948-1980s	Cold War	• Authoritarianism; • Anti-communism; • Intensive Industrializ'n
2	Trade and Economy as the Second Pillar of Diplomacy	1980s-1990s	• Post-Cold War Globalization; • American Unipolarism; • Washington Consensus	• Political Democratization • Consolidation of Export-oriented Market Economy
3	Globalization of Diplomacy Double Reliance	2000s	• Deepening of Globalization • Massive ICT Commercializ'n • Retreat of American Unipolarism (Rise of China) • Emergence of Global Space	• Democratic Consolidation; • Blossoming Civil Society; • Political Polarization; • Seeking a Sustainable Development Model
4	Paradigm Shift in Diplomacy: Public Diplomacy as the Third Pillar?	2010s-		

Note. From Kim (2012: 536-539).

The second phase spanned between 1980s and 1990s, where dramatic international and domestic changes marked a turning point in Korean diplomacy. The end of the Cold War polarized the international system toward the US, and the triumph of liberalism allowed liberal democracy and free-market capitalism to dominate the international society. As the tide made it to Korea, the country established politics and security and economy and trade as the two pillars of its diplomacy. By mid-2000s, Korea emerged as

one of the twelve largest economies in the world. During this phase, public diplomacy was still dominated by government organizations, still caught in the trap of old public diplomacy.

The third phase covers the 2000s, where a series of critical events accelerated the rise of new public diplomacy. The terror attacks and the global financial crisis which both hit the US exposed the weaknesses of the military and the economy, the two pillars of American hard power. In this background, many nations directed their attention to soft power, and eventually to a form of diplomacy that utilizes soft power.

The recognition of new public diplomacy was accelerated by breakthroughs in information and communications technology, which allowed governments and people to disseminate information across national borders easily, efficiently and effectively. In the light of these developments, Korea's public diplomacy shifted from old unilateral PR campaigns toward reciprocal exchanges. The Korean Wave is arguably its biggest success story, yet its sustainability as a driver of public diplomacy is questionable since it is anchored on and propelled by commercial interests. Hence, riding only on the success of the Korean Wave may push Korean public diplomacy into a narrow trap of cultural diplomacy (Kim, 2012: 539).

Therefore, the challenge in Korea's public diplomacy is to find a new paradigm from which public diplomacy can be expounded beyond the Korean Wave to cover geographic and thematic goals commensurate to Korea's soft power potentials. In doing so, the goals of public diplomacy must be attuned

to the demands of the object. This first involves identifying specific countries or groups of countries, and then selecting themes relevant to these objects before applying the appropriate soft power assets and media.

ii) Networking of Subjects and Objects

Another challenge to Korea's public diplomacy is the complexity of coordinating public diplomacy efforts. Kim (2012: 540), details how several ministries vie for jurisdiction over the fields of Korea's cultural products, cultural exchange programs and the promotion of the Korean language abroad. Without inter-ministerial coordination, programs and activities become redundant resulting in a loss of efficiency. To prevent this, it is crucial to have an institutional center at the governmental level that coordinates the functions of different agencies within the sub-fields of public diplomacy.

Apart from inter-ministerial coordination, people-to-people diplomacy also requires systematic correspondence between the government and civil society, as well as among civil society organizations. Particularly in Korea, civic actors devoted to people-to-people exchanges have spawned since the democratic consolidation in the late 1980s (Kim, 2012: 541). Yet, the lack of proper documentation of these civilian resources hinders their full mobilization in public diplomacy activities.

To be sure, public diplomacy features a diversity not only of subjects but also of objects. Both sides should be interwoven into horizontal networks to enhance efficiency. On the supply side, 'subject networking' involves enlacing public diplomacy institutions and individuals to coordinate their

activities horizontally. That is, within and between government organizations, between civil actors, and between government and civil networks (Lord, 2010). The primary role for the government, more than implementing top-down commands, is providing a network infrastructure and incentives that facilitate the sharing and flow of information.

On the demand side, 'object networking' interlinks foreign institutions and individuals from different target groups. This allows objects to follow up on subjects on the one hand, and allows subjects to concentrate scarce resources on diverse targets and measure public diplomacy outcomes on the other.

iii) Resources and Assets

Soft power resources and assets differ in that resources are endowed and that assets are acquired. History, traditions, culture, arts, values and policies (see Table 3), in a sense are all endowed resources in that they are not 'attractive' in and of themselves unless strategically processed and fashioned into a resource that actively attempts to resonate to specific targets.

Table 3. *Realms of Korean Public Diplomacy*

Resources	**Assets**	**Public Diplomacy Realm**
Political and Economic Values, Policies and Institutions	Information Knowledge	Knowledge Diplomacy
Cultural Heritage	Korean Wave	Culture Diplomacy

Language and Academic Resources	Korean Language and Korean Studies	Korean Studies Diplomacy
Corporate Resources	Corporate Competitiveness; Corporate Social Responsibility	Corporate Diplomacy
Sports and Tourism Resources	Sportsmanship and Competitiveness; Tourism Packages	Sports and Tourism Diplomacy

Note. From Kim (2012: 531).

Of particular interest are policies, values and institutions – historical and intellectual resources which can become important soft power assets should others want to voluntarily learn about and emulate them. Still, these resources are deep-seated in a nation's unique long-term historical development and therefore cannot be replicated nor imposed on others. For them to be voluntarily taken by the objects, they first have to be transformed into knowledge and information to be shared with and disseminated to those who are interested in them. When successful policies, institutions and values processed as such to be utilized as soft power assets, it gives way to knowledge diplomacy as a sub-category of public diplomacy.

However, reassembling these resources into assets is not as simple. Given that the information transfer now occurs at an unprecedented scope, conveying knowledge cannot disregard the cross-border and cross-cultural nature of communications. Noting this, processed soft-power assets ought to contain universal, in contrast to exclusively Korean, values. Advancing narrow Korean values could backfire and provoke anti-Korean nationalism in local societies. In contrast, universal values are not aligned with ideologies

and rather address issues of common global concern. Examples of these are peace, human rights, climate change and sustainable development which all appeal to global citizens across the international community. Korea, as a middle power, should be mindful of how it can play a bridging role between advanced and developing nations on issues related to universal values.

iv) Media and Carriers

Once resources are processed into soft-power assets, these assets are conveyed to target groups through appropriate media. In the case of knowledge diplomacy, the main medium is programs such as seminars, forums, lectures and conferences, joint research, education and training programs.

Recently, new media has become a necessary communication platform for knowledge. As of the second quarter of 2020, there are over 2.7 billion monthly active users of Facebook, while there are over 500 million Twitter communications per day. Global information networks over social media are crucial carriers of knowledge and information, as well as an effective medium for subject and object networking. From a subject perspective, social media is a far-reaching and efficient medium through which objects can be engaged. From an object perspective, a cyber community provides a platform for civil actors to share information, coordinate their activities, and naturally create an inventory of other actors involved in specific issues.

Chapter 3. The UN Korean War and Korea's Patriots and Veterans Affairs

The upcoming section provides a historical background of the participation of UN Forces in the Korean War and how its implications serve as bases for Korea's international veterans affairs policies. At the international level, the war could be understood as a successful case of collective security. For Korea, the war serves as a confirmation of international support for its liberal and democratic values. The contributions of the UN veterans have been the groundwork for peace, freedom and rapid development of Korea. They have therefore become important objects of Korea's national compensation, remembrance and reverence through veterans policies. As an external policy, these have international implications for Korea such as in improving its international stature and its relationships with its UN allies.

3.1 UN Participation in the Korean War

The UN Korean War spans from its outbreak on June 25, 1950, and ended unofficially on July 27, 1953, with the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The war was fought between North Korea, with the support of China and the Soviet Union; and South Korea with the support of the United Nations (UN), principally the US. This section details the involvement and participation of UN Forces in the Korean War to further discuss it as a historical resource of South Korea's public diplomacy.

Following the defeat of Japan in World War II in 1945, the Korean peninsula was left to split in two along the 38th parallel. The northern part was occupied by the Soviet Union and the south by the US. In 1948, two new ideologically opposite countries were established: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south. At that time, South Korean society was extremely destabilized by ideological conflicts between the left and right political spectrum. This domestic unrest was compounded by international pressures: The Soviet Union was advancing communism to the world; and DPRK under Kim Il-Sung aspired to unify the peninsula through military force, a plan to which China under Mao Zedong promised support.

The participation of the UN Forces in the Korean War is based on the collective security system stipulated as the very first provision of the UN Charter:

> "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; (art. 1, para. 1)"

The principle of collective security is underpinned by several other provisions that ensure prompt and effective action by the UN. Primarily, UN members

confer to the UN Security Council (UNSC) the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security (art. 24, para. 1). This follows that the members agree to accept and carry out the council's decisions (art. 25).

The UN has its General Assembly as its main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ, which has the power to make recommendations to the members and/or the Security Council (art. 11). However, the assembly cannot make binding measures or recommendations on matters currently discussed by the UNSC without a request from the council (art. 12). In other words, the responsibilities of the General Assembly secondary to that of the Security Council (Jo, 2000).

With regards to the settlement of international disputes, the UNSC therefore has complete jurisdiction to determine the military and non-military measures to be taken (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter), which all members are obliged to follow. Measures are binding on the members involved in the conflict, and any of the UN members in general. Should the UNSC consider that non-military measures would be or have proven to be inadequate to maintain or restore international peace and security, it may take military action by air, sea, or land forces as deemed necessary (art. 42).

The collective security system and its supporting provisions enabled the UN's prompt intervention at the outbreak of the war. Following the North's surprise invasion of the South in the dawn of June 25, 1950, the council immediately issued Resolution 82 regarding the North's action as a 'breach of peace.' The resolution called on the authorities of North Korea to

immediately halt its armed attacks and to withdraw its troops back to the 38th parallel. It also advised UN members to refrain from providing assistance to the DPRK. With the North's relentless advance to the South, the UNSC issued Resolution 83 on June 27. The council urged UN members to counter the armed attacks and provide ROK with all the support necessary to restore international peace and security.

Later on July 7th, the UNSC's Resolution 84 recommended that all members providing military troops and other forms of assistance to the ROK make these resources available to a unified command led by the US. It further suggested that the US assign the commander of such unified forces to use the UN flag at his discretion during operations against North Korean forces.

The adoption of the UNSC Resolution 83 established the United Nations Command. US General Douglas MacArthur was authorized as the Commander in Chief of the UN Forces to Korea (UNFK). The UNFK was consist of combat units from 16 UN members (see Table 4) out of the 21 countries from which military assistance was earlier requested through Resolution 83. President Syngman Rhee of ROK handed over the operational command of South Korean troops to the UNFK later on July 14th. Along with a contingent of 15 countries, ROK troops were incorporated under the command of the U.S. military to carry out the war under the UN flag against the North.

Table 4. *The 16 Countries that Deployed Combat Units*

Country	**No.of Troops Deployed (Persons)**	**Size of War Participation**		
		Ground Troops	Naval Force	Air Force
US	1,789,000	8 Infantry Divisions 1 Marine Division 2 Regimental Special Forces Number of Troops: 302,483	Far East Naval Force U.S. 7th Fleet	Far East Air Force
UK	56,000	1 Marine Commando Number of Troops: 14,198 2 Infantry Brigades	17 Naval Vessels (1 Aircraft Carrier included)	-
Canada	26,791	1 Infantry Brigade Number of Troops: 6,146	3 Destroyers	1 Transport Aircraft Battalion
Turkey	21,212	1 Infantry Brigade Number of Troops: 5,455	-	-
Australia	17,164	2 Infantry Battalions Number of Troops: 2,282	1 Aircraft Carrier 2 Destroyers 1 Frigate Ship	1 Combat Aviation Battalion 1 Transport Aircraft Formation
Philippines	7,420	1 Infantry Battalion Number of Troops: 1,496	-	-
Thailand	6,326	1 Infantry Battalion Number of Troops: 1,294(2,274)	7 Frigate Ships 1 Transport Vessel	1 Transport Aircraft Formation

Netherlands	5,322	1 Infantry Battalion Number of Troops: 819	3 Destroyers	-
Colombia	5,100	1 Infantry Battalion Number of Troops: 1,068	1 Frigate Ship	-
Greece	4,992	1 Infantry Battalion Number of Troops: 1,263	-	1 Transport Aircraft Formation
New Zealand	3,794	1 Artillery Battalion Number of Troops: 1,389	1 Frigate Ship	-
Ethiopia	3,518	1 Infantry Battalion Number of Troops: 1,271	-	-
Belgium	3,498	1 Infantry Battalion Number of Troops: 900	-	-
France	3,421	1 Artillery Battalion Number of Troops: 1,119(1,185)	1 Destroyer	-
Republic of South Africa	826	-	-	Combat Aviation Battalion
Luxembourg	100	1 Infantry Platoon Number of Troops: 44(48)	-	-

Note. From Dongchan, Park (2014).
(https://www.mpva.go.kr/english/front/koreanwar/statistics02.do)

- The number of troops in the size of war participation represents the maximum number of troops maintained until the end of the war (July 1953).
- The number of troops in parenthesis represents the maximum number of troops maintained during the entire war period rather than until the end of the war.

Besides, five more countries (Denmark, Italy, India, Norway and Sweden) deployed medical support units. Although not deploying its men, 20 more countries contributed by providing various forms of equipment and logistical assistance to ROK during the war (see Table 5). China fought on the side of North Korea with the Soviet Union sending supplementary military equipment.

Table 5. *International Support for ROK during the Korean War (63 Countries)*

Form of Support	**Countries**
Combat Troops (16)	USA, United Kingdom, Australia, Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, France, Philippines, Turkey, Thailand, Greece, South Africa, Belgium, Luxembourg, Colombia, Ethiopia
Medical Support (5)	Sweden, India, Denmark, Norway, Italy
Support of War Goods (32)	Argentina, Austria, Bermuda, Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Syria, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Iceland, Indonesia, Taiwan, Iran, Jamaica Japan, Lebanon, Liberia
Post-War Recovery Support (7)	Germany, Haiti, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Paraguay, Peru, Vatican
Declaring Intent of Support (3)	Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua

Note. From ROK Army Military History Institute, Organized by the Korea Defense Daily, Edited by Jeon Ok-shin (http://world.kbs.co.kr/special/kdivision/english/history/outline.htm).

The Korean War turned the whole peninsula into a battlefield, leaving tremendous human and material damage. From the South Korean side, 217,000 military and one million civilians were killed or went missing. The UNFK accounted for another 150,000 wartime casualties – with around

40,000 killed while the remaining were others wounded, missing, or captured as prisoners of war (see Table 6).

Table 6. *Casualties from the UN Forces to Korea during the UN Korean War*

Country	Total	Killed in Action (KIA)	Wounded in Action (WIA)	Missing in Action (MIA)	Prisoners of War (POW)
US	137,250	36,940	92,134	3,737	4,439
UK	4,908	1,078	2,674	179	977
Turkey	3,216	741	2,068	163	244
Australia	1,584	339	1,216	3	26
Canada	1,557	312	1,212	1	32
France	1,289	262	1,008	7	12
Thailand	1,273	129	1,139	5	-
Netherlands	768	120	645	-	3
Greece	738	192	543	-	3
Ethiopia	657	121	536	-	-
Colombia	639	163	448	-	28
Belgium	440	99	336	4	1
Philippines	398	112	229	16	41
New Zealand	103	23	79	1	-
South Africa	43	34	-	-	9
Luxembourg	15	2	13	-	-
Norway	3	3	-	-	-
Total	154,881	40,670	104,280	4,116	5,815

Note: From Korean War Casualties Statistics, MPVA. (https://www.mpva.go.kr/english/front/koreanwar/statistics03.do)

- Deaths from WIA, MIA and POW are registered as KIA.

Korean War is a historical trauma that marked a turning point in the nation's 20th-century history, dividing its history into two bitter periods: the pre-war colonization under Japan and the post-war division between the North and the South. With the war only patched up by an indefinite armistice,

the war lingers to this day. Without a conclusive post-war order between the victor and the defeated, the two Koreas remain antagonistic, and the scars of the conflict are left unhealed.

The participation of the UN Forces in the Korean War is the result of the UN's quick reprimand of North Korea's breach of peace, the swift and implementation of collective security measures through the successive UNSC resolutions and the accordance of UN members.

For the UN, the Korean War is significant as the first instance in the organization's history where the principle of collective security was put into force (Jo, 2000). Also, the assistance of the UN enabled South Korea to recover from the war and bring its own contributions to the community of nations. In this sense, the Korean War served as the touchstone for the UN to fulfill its reason for establishment and its function of preserving international peace.

However, the most frequently repeated and most well-known fact about the Korean War, especially among contemporary Western allies, is its 'forgotten' status. This widespread omission of the Korean War in popular and commemorative cultures is attributed to two factors (Huxford, 2016). First, the war was overshadowed by the discursive dominance of the Second World War as the twentieth century's most morally unimpeachable war. Second is the Korean War's ambiguous aims and ending that muted its celebration. As Preston-Bell (in Huxford, 2018) recalls, "People were fed up with war by then. They had the First and Second World War and Korea was

an unnecessary war, far away, place where nobody knew, fighting for people one didn't know and why."

This sense of being forgotten heightened over time, as the memorialization and cultural recognition of the First and Second World Wars became more widespread. Confronted with a void in public remembrance, the war veterans developed a distinct memorial culture of their own: placing both South Korean gratitude and national forgetting at the center of their identities (Huxford, 2018: 220).

For Korea, on the other side of the indelible horrors of the war is ROK's experience of support from the international community like none other. Among all regional wars, the ROK in the Korean War rallied the greatest number of supporting countries and mobilized the most number of troops. Such a showcase of support to protect liberal and democratic values remain a valuable and unique asset for South Korean history.

Today, the assistance of the UN sending countries and their war veterans are acknowledged as essential groundwork for peace and freedom and rapid development in South Korea. Today, when the country has achieved the capacity to give back, the 'forgotten' veterans become important beneficiaries of Korea's veterans' policies. The veterans, in turn, find vindication for their wartime contributions from Korea's progress and show of gratitude.

3.2 Korea's Patriots and Veterans Affairs

Patriots and Veterans Affairs(PVA, 보훈, 報勳) in Korea refers to the fundamental duty of the nation to provide relevant and reasonable compensation to those and the families of those who sacrificed their lives or well-being for the country's defense. Specifically, Patriots and Veterans Affairs refers to 1) the national compensation, in both physical and mental forms, for the cause of communal welfare development; and 2) the promotion of public remembrance and reverence for these people (Choi, 2016: 90). Policy in these affairs are governed by the 2016 Framework Act on Veterans Affairs (art. 1 & 2, Act No.14253, 국가보훈 기본법), which are directed to 1) commemorate the noble spirit of selfless soldiers of the war and public casualties; 2) guarantee their and their family members' welfare and 3) promote the patriotic spirit of the public.

Reflecting on this framework, Patriots and Veterans Affairs has two important policy dimensions (Ra, 2015; Choi, 2016). First is a symbolic aspect that holds the people of the country together. PVA policy stands as a signal reminding the public that the sacrifices of patriots and veterans are highly regarded and requited. In turn, the recognition of sacrifices made for the nation rewards and encourages the development of patriotism. As PVA positively reinforces specific values and behaviors attributable to persons of national merit, it also carves out a model for the collective identity of the nation.

Second, PVA policy has a welfare dimension. As it stands at the core of the welfare state, PVA responds to the state's obligation to ensure the well-being of its soldiers of war, its public casualties, and their family members. Ignoring the well-being of the very people who sacrificed for the country is an outright violation of the state's fundamental duty to protect its citizens. Thus, PVA is a benchmark by which the quality of a country's welfare system is assessed.

Ra (2015: 11) suggests that the symbolic and welfare dimensions of PVA mutually support each other to strengthen patriotic behavior (see Table 7). Retroactively, PVA provides material remuneration and actively acclaims contributions to the country after it is made. Proactively, it also inspires the spread of patriotic spirit through public knowledge that contributions to the nation and its values are worth making.

Table 7. *Functions of Patriots and Veterans Policy*

Function	Content
Welfare Policy (Retroactive to Patriotism)	• Honorable treatment for persons of national merit and their bereaved families • Compensation for persons of national merit and their bereaved families
Symbolic Policy (Proactive to Patriotism)	• Promoting community spirit • Cultivating patriotism

Note. From Ra, Mi-kyoung (2016: 11).

Given such roles, PVA policy has pervasive implications on national security (Oh, 2015; Choi, 2016). Committing one's life to the country is only possible when citizens are aware of the resulting guaranteed compensations from the state. They would hesitate to fully commit to their duties if they fear

risking the welfare of their families. Hence, PVA becomes a pillar of patriotism at times when communal values are overshadowed by intensifying materialism, individualism and national crises.

The government agency administering PVA in line with the above functions is the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs (MPVA, see Appendix 2). The ministry was established in 1962 as the Military Relief Office and was restructured to its current form in 1985. It consists of 5 district offices and 21 local offices spread across the country. Its vision of Korea as a country that "remembers and rewards sacrifices made for the nation" is based on four pillars of 1) uniting the nation through valuing sacrifices made for the nation; 2) strengthening national security by assisting patriots and veterans; 3) expanding support for their bereaved families; and most relevantly to this study, 4) enhancing patriots and veterans diplomacy with allies in the UN Korean war (MPVA, n.d.-a).

On the welfare dimension, the MPVA administers material compensation through pension and allowances as well as medical care, burial and memorial services for the patriots and veterans in Korea. In addition, loan benefits as well as education and employment assistance are extended to their bereaved families. On the symbolic side, the ministry also designates holidays and holds various events in commemoration of independence and democratic movements. In commemoration of wartime contributions, the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25 was designated as Korean War Day, and the signing

of the armistice agreement on July 27 was marked as the UN Forces Participation Day or Korean War Veterans Day.

Yet, as an institutional policy, the direction of PVA is intertwined with the country's context of historical development, along with social, political and cultural background (Yoo, 2016: 102). Similar to other countries, on the receiving side of domestic PVA policies are primarily the soldiers and police officers who fell casualties in the line of their duty. In the case of Korea, policy beneficiaries were expanded gradually to cover those who sacrificed for freedom during the liberation movement against the Japanese colonization, and democracy during the April 19 and May 18 movements (Choi, 2016: 93).

More importantly, the historical background specific to Korea gives its veterans' policy a unique international dimension. The assistance of the UN Forces in the Korean War is recognized as an integral part of the country's freedom, democracy and development and thus an unparalleled success of collective security (Yoo, 2016). In effect, Korea has taken up the UN Korean War Veterans as indispensable external beneficiaries of Korea's Patriots and Veterans' policy; and the commemoration of the UN Forces' participation as an imperative (Hyung and Oh, 2015).

3.3 Korea's International Veterans Affairs

While ROK's compensation for its own people of national merit takes place within the domestic system, the case of 1.94 million UN Korean War

Veterans creates important implications for foreign affairs as veterans' policy is conducted at the international level.

ROK's veterans' policy retains its welfare and symbolic components when extended to the international level components. However, international veterans policy focuses on the psychological and material compensation and reward offered to the UN Korean War allies, the veterans, their families and descendants. Furthermore, its symbolic content highlights honor for the contributions of UN Korean War Veterans in Korea's freedom, democracy and prosperity.

Perhaps the biggest difference between Korean and UN sending states' veterans of the war is the 'forgotten' status of the latter. Korean War veterans began to enjoy the benefits of domestic veterans policy as the country rose from the ashes of the war. The UN veterans, in contrast, were facing two ordeals. Of course, they were confronted with their changed status in the late twentieth century: they were no longer Cold War warriors, but the object of state support in their old age and retirement. Worse still, their sense of being forgotten heightened over time, as the cultural recognition for the two world wars became more widespread.

As Huxford suggests (2018: 220), the deprivation of public remembrance developed a distinct memorial culture among the veterans, whose identities are centered around the stark contrast between national forgetting and South Korean gratitude. As they insisted on their belief that they had been cast aside and forgotten, they sought to associate themselves

with a transnational culture to lessen their resentment at their forgotten status (Ibid). That is, they have committed themselves to cultural exchanges, such as revisit programs, with Korea. By tying their identities to a modernized and grateful Korea, they can claim recognition for their contributions in the war, which was void for them by their own country.

The international aspect of veterans' policy was further illustrated by Quisefit (2013) in his study of the French Participation in the Korean War, and how the traumatic memory can become an important stepping stone for exchanges between and among countries, groups and individuals. As he suggests, the memory of the participation of UN Forces in the Korean War can be mobilized for socio-cultural and political functions (439-440).

On the one level, the memory of the war can serve as a pretext for negotiation or dialogue between officials from both countries involved, thus presenting opportunities for political and economic exchanges. In other words, the common memory of fighting side-by-side during the war is often recollected to invoke a deep-rooted, historically-proven trustful relationship through which a venture requiring confidence between parties is to be pursued. He cites the example of the establishment of France's Saint-Mandé and Korea's Yanggu County as sister cities. The partnership is aimed at improving trade and tourism between both cities based on the commemoration of French armed forces in the Korean War.

On another level, veterans' diplomacy also uses the past as a common ground for socio-cultural exchange. A shared experience such as the Korean

War serves as a common ground ROK and its wartime allies, from which they can move beyond national and cultural boundaries to create a more positive environment for more meaningful interaction. An example of this is the youth and student exchange programs between Saint Mande and Yanggu. This way, the memory of the Korean War not only bears fruits on the state-to-state level but also at the lowest, individual level.

Indeed, the memorialization of the Korean War is not confined among Koreans but is rather a transnational experience shared among its participants outside Korea. In this regard, international veterans affairs is meaningful because it establishes and shares a memory that speaks beyond national boundaries.

Despite their parallels, Korea's domestic and international veterans' policies are not detached from each other. Indeed, domestic PVA policy could have international implications. First, like other domestic policies, PVA contributes to the overall image that Korea projects in a community of nations. In particular, PVA demonstrates to a foreign audience who it regards as persons of national merits, what values and ideals they foster, and how they are commemorated and compensated. Second, domestic PVA grants credibility to Korea's attempts to take a moral and intellectual leadership role in veterans' policies on the international stage. In this regard, Korea's international veterans' policies will only be worth emulating if it is consistent with how its domestic PVA is conducted, and if domestic PVA policies have garnered success and support at home. The other way around, the

international behavior could complement the domestic, as the international helps reinforce the message at home that honor and compensation are granted based on contributions, and not of nationality.

Given this transnational dimension, Korea's external veterans' policy is closely linked to ROK's broader goals and strategies that guide its interactions in the international system. In this sense, Korea's compensation for UN Korean War Veterans has an element of a foreign policy tool, for which it is referred to as 'veterans diplomacy.'

Oh (2016) describes veterans diplomacy as expressing gratitude to Korea's wartime allies, and through this create 1) a common memory and bond of sympathy with the peoples of these countries and 2) a basis for cooperative and friendly foreign relations with these countries. In other words, veterans diplomacy mobilizes Korea's external veterans' policy to achieve national interests such as prosperity and improved international stature.

Veterans Diplomacy (보훈외교) was first adopted by the MPVA in its five-year plan for 2014-2018 (MPVA, 2014: 75-81). Through this plan, the agency aims to 'strengthen veterans diplomacy' through different activities that portray 'Koreans who remember kindness' and a 'Korea that repays kindness' to the international society. It will also pursue cooperative relations with UN Korean War participant countries in the future and transform the story of the Korean War from a 'forgotten war' to a 'war of victory.'

Despite the ministry's official use of the term veterans diplomacy, its definition relies on wide objectives rather than narrowly-defined mechanisms and targets. One reason the concept lacks an operational definition among its practitioners and scholars is its specificity to the Korean policy context (KIPA, 2018: 18). As already mentioned, ROK's veterans' policy is linked to the Korean War being an exceptional triumph of collective security. Compounding this is Korea's rapid transition from an aid recipient to a donor country, placing it in a unique situation to repay the sacrifices of its wartime allies. In this regard, Korea is a pioneer in bringing veterans affairs onto an international sphere for which it could have diplomatic implications. At its initial stages and lacking an existing reference case, the definition and frameworks of international veterans diplomacy are at its best nascent. It takes its shape after the programs designated under it, rather than the other way around.

Despite a lack of comparison abroad, veterans diplomacy has recently attracted domestic academic attention since MPVA's thrust following its 2014-2018 five-year plan and the 60th anniversary of the Korean War and the legal provisions set in 2013. In general, existing literature (Oh Young-dahl, 2015; Oh, Il-Whan, 2015; Ra, 2015; Hyung and Oh, 2015) supports the imperative for ROK to show gratitude to the UN Korean War Veterans, without whose sacrifice the economic prosperity and political freedom that the ROK enjoys now could not have been possible. Oh Young-dal (2015), Oh Il-hwan (2015) and Yoo Ho-geun (2015) relate veterans diplomacy to soft

power and how it can be leveraged by Korea to forge security ties with its wartime allies. Ra (2015) focuses on how domestic veterans' policies create a national identity, and how the extension of these policies to the international level through veterans diplomacy can help improve Korea's national image.

These studies suggest therefore that the importance of international veterans affairs goes beyond the expression of gratitude. Further, it is strategically purposed for diplomatic goals, namely, to improve South Korea’s national image and strengthen its cooperative ties with the participant countries.

Chapter 4.

Korea’s International Veterans Affairs Programs

As discussed in the previous sections, Korea's international veterans' policy is a reflection of its domestic patriots and veterans affairs policy to the international level. Such extension beyond the domestic is by virtue of the international dimension of the UN Korean War. As such, it focuses on the symbolic and material compensation toward Korea's allies in the war, the veterans, their families and descendants. As an external veterans' policy, the appreciation toward the UN Forces for their contributions to Korea's freedom, democracy and prosperity has it has implications on diplomacy. That is, the creation of a common bond of sympathy based on the war become a basis for cooperative and friendly relations with its allies, and improved stature for Korea on the international stage in general.

This definition of international veterans affairs concurs with its legal foundations. On March 13, 2018, the South Korean government enacted the Act on Honorable Treatment of War Veterans and Establishment of Related Associations (Act No. 13609, 참전유공자예우 및 단체설립에 관한 법). The Act is aimed at “upholding the honor of war veterans and cultivate the spirit of patriotism among the people by according appropriate honorable treatment and support to war veterans…” (art. 1, Act No. 13609). Contained in the act is the obligation of the state and local government to implement programs “to promote friendship with the combatant nations in the Korean

War.” Yet apart from this, the Act generally targets domestic war veterans of the Korean and the Vietnam war and its provisions do not pertain to UN Korean War veterans (art. 2, Act No. 13609).

More importantly for international veterans affairs, the UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act (Act No. 17117, 유엔참전용사의 명예선양 등에 관한 법률, see Appendix 2) came into force on September 25th, 2020. The purpose of the act is

> “to *enhance the national image* of the Republic of Korea in the international community and contribute to the development of freedom and democracy; by stipulating programs necessary for promoting the honorable treatment of UN Korean War veterans who devoted themselves to the protection of democracy in the Republic of Korea, and *promoting friendship with the UN participating countries*” (art. 1, Act No. 17117, emphasis added).

Under the general plan of the law (art. 6, Act. No. 17117), the MPVA shall formulate every five years a master plan aimed at promoting the honor of the UN Korean War Veterans and friendship with the UN participant countries. The plan shall include the basic objectives, directions and specific policies for the said goals. The act specifically stipulated the creation of an organization, support of private sector initiatives and the use of domestic and international public relations measures to promote exchange and cooperation with the UN participant countries. In formulating the plan, the MPVA shall consult with the heads of central administrative agencies, and if necessary,

hear the opinions of the governments of the participant countries, local governments and related organizations.

Hence, whereas Article 4-4 of Act No. 13609 made only an initial mention of international veterans affairs, Act No. 17117 came later to entirely commit itself toward UN Korean War veterans and UN participant countries. Therefore, Act No. 17117, has a significant meaning in that it has laid legal foundations for international projects for veterans affairs.

In line with this legal foundation, the main subject of international veterans affairs programs is the MPVA, particularly its Department of International Cooperation. According to the MPVA (n.d.-b), the department takes charge of matters concerning the following:

1. Planning and supervision of international exchanges in the field of international veterans affairs;
2. Activities relating to UN Korean War participant countries and assisting UN Korean War veterans abroad;
3. Exchanges with the governments of, Korean embassies in, and UN Korean War veterans' associations from UN sending countries;
4. Matters concerning the collection, analysis, and identification of trends in the field of international veterans affairs;
5. Operations of an English website for MPVA.

Most importantly, the department is in charge of specific international veterans affairs programs. These programs (see Table 8; MPVA, 2017: 363-365) are classified into four general objectives, namely 1) to express gratitude

to the UN allies and their veterans; 2) to honor the veterans' meritorious deeds; 3) to strengthen networks with the veterans and their descendants, and 4) to provide support for Korean War Memorial sites abroad. The upcoming section details the programs under Korea's international veterans affairs (국제보훈업무), their goals, activities, current state and achievements.

Table 8. *MPVA's International Veterans Affairs Programs*

Goal	**Program**
Expressing Gratitude to the UN Korean War Veterans	Commemoration Activities held in UN Korean War participant countries
	Revisit Korea Program
	National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day
	Turn Toward Busan
Honoring the Meritorious Deeds of Korean War Veterans	Data collection and publications on the History of the UN Participation in the Korean War
	Digital Archiving of Stories in the Korean War
	Recapturing and Rewarding the Achievements of UN Korean War Veterans
Strengthening Networks with UN Korean War Veterans and their Descendants	UN Peace Camp for Youth
	Scholarship and Networking Programs for the UN Korean War Veterans' Descendants
	Medical Missions to Lower-income UN Sending Countries
	Workshop for International Veterans affairs
Processing requests regarding Korean War Memorial Sites abroad	

Note. Reconstructed from KIPA (2018: 63); MPVA, 2017: 363-365.

4.1 Korea's International Veterans Affairs Programs

A. Expressing Gratitude to the UN Korean War Veterans

The commemoration of and the expression of appreciation toward the contributions of UN Korean War veterans to the freedom and democracy in ROK is the common and basic theme programs under international veterans affairs. As pronouncements of gratitude and commemoration, not only are programs in this category the most intimately linked to the veterans themselves but are also more ceremonial in that they are characterized by a publicized display of symbols. Among Leonard et al.'s (2002) three dimensions of public diplomacy, these ceremonies most closely resemble a form of strategic communication, where symbolic events communicate simple themes that reinforce central causes: whereby, the commemoration of 'brotherhood' during the war and 'expression of gratitude' and fighting side-by-side during the war are suggested as pretexts toward friendly relations and improved international stature for Korea.

i) Revisit Korea Program

The Revisit Korea Program was the first official program under the MPVA's international veterans affairs which commenced in 1975. The UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act in its Article 10-1 stipulates the invitation of the war veterans to revisit Korea, as well as memorial events held in UN participant countries as a means to strengthen exchange and friendship among ROK and its allies. According to the MPVA, the goal of

the Revisit Korea Program is to build pride among Korean War Veterans, by allowing them to witness and experience how Korea enjoys peace and prosperity thanks to their noble sacrifices and dedication (MPVA, n.d.-c). Indeed, many of the visitors under the program acknowledge that "Korea is the only country that invites (them) to visit their country as a way to express their gratitude" (Kang, 2015). Moreover, revisit programs are often recalled by many veterans as a significant experience where they sense a magnification of their contributions by a grateful and modernized Korea – in contrast with their forgotten status at home (Huxford, 2018).

Every year, the program invites around 600 individuals to Korea. The invitees are Korean War veterans bringing with them one family member. From 1975 to 2014, the number of veterans and their accompanying family members have totaled around 30,000. Currently, the Korean government shoulders half of the airfare cost for the veteran and 30% for the guest family member. Full travel costs are covered for the invitees from lower-income UN sending countries such as Ethiopia, India, Colombia, Turkey, Thailand and the Philippines.

The program schedule consists of visits to memorial sites such as the Seoul National Cemetery, the Korean War Memorial in Seoul, the UN Cemetery in Busan and the site of armistice negotiations at Panmunjeom. Participants also visit battle sites relevant to each participating nation, where they hold wreath-laying and commemoration ceremonies. Lastly, they attend official receptions and award banquets hosted by the MPVA.

As shown in Table 9, most of the veterans and their families invited to Korea for the Revisit Program and other MPVA's commemoration activities such as the UN Participation Day and Turn Toward Busan were veterans from the western allies such as the US (56%), Canada (9%), UK (8%), Australia (4.4%), followed by neighboring Thailand (2.6%) and the Philippines (2.3%).

However, the challenge for the program is the diminishing number of living veterans able to revisit Korea. According to the MPVA in 2018, the estimated average age for the UN Korean War Veterans is 88, with only one out of five veterans alive and fewer able to revisit. If revisits were to expand networks across more countries, the task at hand is less about matching the number of invitees with the proportion of their troop size during the war. Apart from focusing on inviting more veterans from already overrepresented countries, it is more urgent to invite the remaining veterans in underrepresented countries while still possible. Colombia, Greece and Ethiopia, for example, have had fewer opportunities to revisit in proportion to their troop deployment size. Revisits from countries that sent medical support personnel (Sweden, India, Denmark, Norway and Italy) also have remained meager and irregular.

Table 9. *Number of participants invited to MPVA's Revisit Programs*

	Troops Deployed (No. of Persons)	**Survivors (2017 est.)**	**'75-'10**	**'11**	**'12**	**'13**	**'14**	**'15**	**'16**	**'17**	**Total**
US	1,789,000	366,082	16,531	323	379	370	278	340	427	350	18,998
UK	56,000	11,841	2,150	125	93	140	62	51	85	36	2,742
Canada	26,791	5,631	2,432	89	104	96	87	118	76	40	3,042
Turkey	21,212	3,041	480	28	43	40	24	23	15	62	715
Australia	17,164	1,736	1,225	60	57	36	24	21	22	31	1,476
Philippines	7,420	1,566	672	8	30	20	19	9	20	14	792
Thailand	6,326	1,327	734	28	9	19	15	17	16	25	863
Netherlands	5,322	1,115	513	3	10	8	2	10	18	20	584
Colombia	5,100	1,057	204	9	11	15	11	14	15	11	290
Greece	4,992	1,028	611	0	7	12	5	3	11	5	654
New Zealand	3,794	808	627	44	31	29	13	7	12	9	772
Ethiopia	3,518	728	185	5	10	12	7	6	13	12	250
Belgium	3,498	728	517	7	12	17	6	7	10	4	580
France	3,421	677	530	32	10	25	5	7	9	17	635
South Africa	826	170	109	0	2	5	3	2	4	2	127
Luxembourg	100	18	139	0	2	5	0	0	2	0	148
Sweden	1,124	239	246	0	0	7	11	8	6	6	284
India	627	133	68	0	0	8	7	2	4	5	94
Denmark	630	134	149	0	4	4	3	2	2	0	164
Norway	623	133	297	0	0	20	3	3	2	0	325
Italy	128	27	74	0	0	6	9	2	0	2	93
Switzerland	0	0	116	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	119
Total	1,957,616	398,219	28,609	761	814	894	594	652	769	654	33,747

Note. From KIPA (2018: 97).

ii) Commemoration Events in UN Participant Countries

In the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, the MPVA formed the Committee for the Commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War (6.25 전쟁 60 주년 기념사업위원회). The committee conducts various local commemoration events in the UN Korean War participant countries. The events were planned in consideration of Korean War veterans abroad who are unable to participate in the Revisit Korea Program due to health conditions and old age. Commemoration events are held in local Korean War memorial sites, led by respective Korean embassies, attended by the UN Korean War veterans, their families and veterans organizations. Similar to other commemorative activities, the objective is to express gratitude and to the veterans' sacrifices during the war, their contribution to Korea's national development and freedom.

As the event is held abroad, the commemoration is taken as an opportunity not only to recount historical relations, but also more notably as a pretext to strengthening cooperative bilateral partnerships in the future. One of the representative examples is found in the speech of the Korean ambassador to the Philippines during a commemorative event that inaugurated the Korean War Memorial Hall in the Philippines. He commended

> "the support of the Filipino people during the 'darkest time' of Korean history. The Philippines deployed… troops to fight together with the Republic of Korea and other United Nations Forces to uphold the democracy of Korea…

> We are proud that our two countries achieved outstanding development in our partnership on the bedrock of the solidarity that we have forged during the Korean War… The Philippines continues to be a steadfast supporter of the peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and beyond" (Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Philippines, 2012).

In his speech during the same event, Philippine president Benigno Aquino III said that the inaugurated memorial hall is aimed to "immortalize our men's gallantry and serve as a fitting symbol of the enduring friendship between the Philippines and South Korea" (Ibid).

iii) National Korean War Armistice and Veterans Day

The UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act (Act No. 17117) in its Article 5-1 designated July 27th, the date of the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, as the Day of Participation of the UN Forces in the Korean War. The provision is aimed at honoring the sacrifices of UN combatant nations and their war veterans and for future generations to inherit their great achievements.

Every July 27th of the year, the MPVA in cooperation with the Korean War Commemoration Committee under the Prime Minister's Secretariat holds various events to mark the UN Forces Participation day. Activities include a gathering among the diplomatic corps of the combatant countries. Notable among these events is an awarding ceremony for the war veterans who made distinguished contributions during the war as well as for foreign civil organizations dealing with veterans affairs.

iv) Turn Toward Busan

The UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act in its Article 5-2 designates November 11th as the International Memorial Day for UN Veterans. This provides for an opportunity to jointly commemorate with the other UN participant countries the sacrifices and contribution of UN veterans who defended liberal democracy in ROK.

In line with this, the memorial ceremony 'Turn Toward Busan (부산을 향하여)' is carried out at the UN Memorial Cemetery in Busan, Korea at 11:11 AM every November 11th in Korean Standard Time. The 21 UN allied nations and other countries around the world participate in this service from their own respective countries by facing toward Busan and observing a minute of silence at local times that synchronize with the time of service in Korea. The ceremony was the brainchild of the Canadian war veteran Vincent Courtenay and was first held in 2007. The ceremony consists of the march of the national flags of the UN sending states, the Pledge of Allegiance, a minute of silence, remarks by representatives of the sending states and veterans, and performances. The venue, the UN Cemetery in Busan, is significant as the only UN cemetery in the world. Once the burial ground for the more than 11,000 casualties of the war, there now only remains 2,300 graves following the repatriation of casualties from Belgium, Colombia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Philippines and Thailand.

B. Honoring the Meritorious Deeds of Korean War Veterans

Article 13 of UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act (on the Rediscovery, Preservation and Utilization of UN War Records) stipulates that the MPVA 1) recapture and preserve records of high historical value regarding the UN participation in the Korean War and 2) make these records easily available to the public through translation, publications, information services and others.

Programs in this category are most closely related to Leonard et al.'s (2002) daily communications dimension of public diplomacy, as they relate with 'what' and 'how' information is shared. In this sense, the records on the UN participation in the Korean War are communicated through various media as the basis of strengthening the ROK's national image and cooperative ties with its wartime allies.

i) Publications on Korean War Participation History

The MPVA compiles the history of the UN participation in the Korean War as a way of memorializing and raising awareness about the service of veterans who defended peace and freedom of the Republic of Korea and strengthen the ties forged between these nations.

Among those documented in the publications is the ROK's social and political development from national independence to the Korean War. Too, the writings recount the circumstances of each nation's decisions to participate in the war – outlining the political processes, the raising of army, naval and air force units. In addition, the writings chronicle the battles fought

by each nation's armed forces, the lives of prominent individual servicemen, the common bonds and experiences of their troops on the battleground, the impact of the war on the men's' families and the public opinion in their home countries. Last but not least, the materials also describe the post-war diplomatic, economic and cultural interchange between South Korea and the participating nations.

Since MPVA commenced the publications in 2004, materials on the participation of France, US, Greece, Colombia, Turkey, Philippines, Thailand, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ethiopia and South Africa have already been published and distributed in English, Korean and the respective national languages (Ra, 2015: 23). While written records remain as a primary medium for the documentation of the Korean War, it faces limitations on its ability to reach and attract a wider audience. Digitalization has become an important tool in addressing this challenge.

ii) Digital Archiving of Stories in the Korean War

Like print publications, digital archives also intend to preserve and disseminate the stories of the Korean War as the number of its survivors dwindle. The digital archiving program involves the tape-recording of wartime stories, interview data and the collection of personal materials. These resources are then compiled into an easily retrievable and accessible database homepage. According to the MPVA in 2015 (in Hyung and Yoo, 2015: 129), the database already stores interviews with 408 war veterans, of whom several are war prisoners, war correspondents and honorary medal recipients.

Besides, the archives also include a collection of military operation maps, veterans' certificates, photos, letters and diaries.

Non-government actors have also taken part in digital archiving. For example, the Korean Peninsula Affairs Center of Syracuse University in the US launched in 2011 the Korean War Veterans Digital Memorial (KWVDM). Besides digitizing the records of the Korean War, the goal of the KWVDM is to engage the younger generation and prevent the Korean War from becoming a truly forgotten war (Han, 2015). The program connects students with a local Korean War veteran, wherein the veteran mentors students about lessons from their wartime experience. The students use the digital memorial to upload more information about their veterans to the online database.

Digital archiving plays a valuable role not only in maintaining the historical integrity of the war but more so in communicating its story. That is, digitization focuses not only on the collection of wartime accounts but also on presenting these materials in ways that are more interactive and engaging especially for the younger generations. Audio-visual technology, dramatization and creative story-telling methods are indispensable tools for this purpose.

Beyond creating its own digital memorial, the KWVDM has also reached a bigger public as their materials found their way through print and broadcast media. For example, the interviews from KWVDM's database have been used as primary references for various programs broadcasted in the US by C-SPAN (Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network, a nonprofit widely

known in the US for televising government proceedings and public affairs programs) (Han, 2013). In 2013, the interviews were also referenced for the contents of Korea's MBC special documentary for the 60th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice (정전 60 주년 특집 다큐: 60 년의 약속).

In sum, the efforts toward digital archiving emphasize the importance of non-government initiatives; as well as the role of digital technology in the preservation, communication and improving the accessibility of the stories of the war for a wider public. As shown by the case of the KWVDM, the younger generation is not only an important resource in the process of archiving, but is also the crucial audience to whom the stories of the war are to be made known. So far, the digital archiving efforts have focused on the US' participation in the Korean War and will have to involve other participant countries.

iii) Recapturing and Rewarding the Achievements of UN Korean War Veterans

Article 9-1 of the UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act stipulates that the MPVA implement projects that recapture the meritorious achievements of the veterans during the war and grant them with appropriate merits, as a way to honor their sacrifices and promote friendly relations with the participant countries.

An imperative part of this goal involves the excavations that the South Korean military has been conducting annually since 2000. The operations are

conducted to retrieve the registered soldiers' remains and artifacts in the battle sites during the three-year conflict and repatriate them to their bereaved families. Until 2017, some 9,500 bodies have been recovered, with most of them being identified as South Korean soldiers (Choi, 2017). In 2018, the North and South's militaries signed a bilateral military accord to begin joint excavation of war remains in Hwasalmeori (Arrowhead) Hill in Cheorweon along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), but the South has operated alone due to a lack of response from the North (Cho, 2020). While the work has focused on the DMZ area, it is set to gradually expand across the country.

Besides excavations, the other component of the program is the granting of honors to the veterans. Not only Korean combatants, but also several UN Korean War veterans, have been included in the Order of Military Honors (무공훈장) based on their wartime contributions. The process of granting honors begins with the MPVA submitting a shortlist of candidates that it refers to the Ministry of Defense. The latter conducts examinations and deliberations on the contributions of the candidates and submits a referral to the Ministry of Interior and Safety. Lastly, this ministry makes a final decision on the conferral of the merits (Kim, 2014) awarded during the UN Forces Participation Day. Moreover, UN veterans who also made contributions to national development, apart from their wartime participation, are eligible for recommendation to be granted the Order of Civil Merit (국민훈장) (Hyung and Yoo, 2015: 128).

The efforts to recapture and reward the contributions of UN Korean War veterans are still in their early stages. To recapture and reward the achievements of UN Korean War veterans, the order of military merits will have to be expanded to the newly identified contributions both of those already awarded with military honors, and to those who are yet to be acknowledged as persons of merit. Doing so will require the MPVA to closely correspond with the governments of the participant countries, so that the ministry can pick up from the participant country's own records of their military honor lists during the war. Moreover, Korean War veterans' associations abroad will also be an important source for collecting data regarding the veterans' first-hand experiences. Knowledge-based organizations such as Korea's Institute for Military History and the Military Academy can be tapped on to conduct research and verification of historical facts. Therefore, given that the process from retrieval to reward spans over a long course involving different agencies, the challenge for MPVA is streamlining the system.

Nonetheless, Korea's initiatives to recapture and recognize the achievements made by its allies' veterans – by the same standards that it applies to its own veterans – indicate the value it attaches to their contributions. Notably too, in as much as the process from retrieval to recognition is complicated, it also opens more opportunities for subject and object networking. That is, the complexity of this task provides a rationale to

forge closer working relationships within the government, with other governments, and veterans' associations abroad.

C. Strengthening Networks with UN Korean War Allies

Article 10-4 of the UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act on the 'Promotion of Exchange and Cooperation Projects with UN Participant Countries' mandates that the MPVA implement programs that pursue human and information exchange with the UN sending countries in cooperation with their government agencies and civil society organizations. With its goals resting on building relations and networks, this set of programs coincide with Leonard et al.'s (2002) third dimension of public diplomacy, which is the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars and conferences.

i) Medical Outreach Activities

Since 2001, the MPVA has sent medical missions to lower-income countries that participated in the Korean War. Apart from showing appreciation to UN allies and their veterans, the more pronounced objective of the program is to boost exchange and cooperation between the ROK and its allies at the civilian level. In 2012, these medical missions were classified as an official development assistance (ODA) program (MPVA, 2012).

Every year, the MPVA selects two low-income nations among the UN allies – not only from those who sent combat troops but also from those

who provided medical and material support during the war (see Table 5). MPVA provides financial support to procure medical and pharmaceutical supplies for these missions. The MPVA posts an open call for applications for civilian organizations and private individuals to participate in these missions.

For example, a mission comprised of 35 volunteers was sent to Thailand in 2012 (Lee, 2012). The activity targeted UN Korean war veterans, their families and their local community in Chonburi. As regular participants to the missions, the outreach was led by medical professionals from the Korea Open Doctors Society. The private company GS Shop provided five additional volunteers.

The medical missions, although relatively small in size and not included among the specific programs stipulated by the UN War Veterans Act, highlight important insights on international veterans programs. For one, the programs can open themselves to the closer participation of for-profit and civil organizations, private individuals and local communities. As exemplified by the medical missions, the MPVA could instead provide network infrastructure rather than imposing top-down controls over the entire program. Moreover, the classification of the missions as an ODA program sheds light on the possibilities of linking international veterans' policies to a wider foreign aid strategy under the framework of public diplomacy.

ii) UN Peace Camp for Youth

The UN Peace Camp for Youth is an annual summer camp that brings together around 200 youth from Korea and abroad who are third or fourth-generation direct descendants of Korean War veterans. Held in Korea for seven days and six nights during June and July summer break period, the camp invites the descendants from the participant countries through their respective Korean embassies and Korean War veterans' associations.

The program consists of lectures and historical site visits in Korea such as the UN Memorial Cemetery, the Korean War Memorial, and the DMZ. The program is tailored to "provide the participants a first-hand experience of Korean culture, travel, industries and technology that has come to contrast vividly with the agrarian Korean society during their grandfathers' time of service contrasts vividly with the agrarian Korean society during their grandfathers' time of service" (MPVA, n.d.-d). Team-building activities are also held to foster friendship among the participants.

Since its launch in 2009 with only 30 participants from the Philippines, the program has since expanded annually to include over a hundred youth from Korea and other participating countries. Until 2019, the number of descendants invited to the program already totaled around 1,500 participants (see Table 10).

Over the years, the UN Peace Camp has also gone beyond its original scope of objectives, setting and target participants. Since 2016, the camp started to invite around 10 to 30 school teachers and college

professors of history and sociology from the US to enhance their awareness of the historical meaning of the Korean War (MPVA, 2016: 1).

Furthermore, the UN Peace Camp is being brought to one participating country per year to raise awareness about the Korean War, especially as publics in the UN participant countries are barely familiar with their own country's participation in the Korean War. Titled the 'UN Vision Camp,' the overseas version of the UN Peace Camp brings together the descendants from Korea and the host country, which was the Netherlands in 2018 and Thailand in 2019, and New Zealand in 2020.

The core objective of the UN Peace Camp is to expand human networks and vitalize exchange among the descendants of the veterans. The program seeks to extend the blood relations built during the Korean War into sustainable friendly relations among the participant countries. Most importantly, the program envisions to foster among the descendants the same dedication to peace in the Korean peninsula and the world in the likeness of their forebearers' service during the Korean War (MPVA, 2013 in Hyung and Yoo: 32).

By adopting slogans such as 'Thanks and Honor,' the UN Peace Camp aligns itself to the primary goal of veterans diplomacy activities, which is to commemorate and pay tribute to the contributions of UN Korean War Veterans and show that Korea is a country that values and repays the help it once received.

Moreover, themes such as ‘Commemorating Commitment and Friendship,’ ‘One Heart Towards One Future’ and the alignment of the camp's pilot program in 2009 to the celebration of the 60th anniversary of Philippine-Korea diplomatic relations also refer to the experience Korean War as a pretext for the current and future ties between Korea and the participant countries.

As the youth counterpart of the Revisit Korea Program, the UN Peace Camp also serves to build a sense of self-awareness and identification with the Korean War among its participants. In particular, the UN Peace Camp intends to acquaint the upcoming generation with the contributions of their forebears and instill in them the values of freedom and peace. These goals are embodied in the themes ‘We are Peace Makers’ and ‘We are Peace Ambassadors.’ By underlining these universal values (see Kim, 2012), the UN Peace Camp is relevant to Korea’s attempt at playing a bridging role and contributing to peace.

Table 10. *UN Peace Camp for Youth (2009-2019)*

	Date	**No. of Participating Countries**	**No. of Youth Participants**	**Theme**
1st	2009.05.27 ~ 06.01	1 (Philippines)	30	Attached to the Revisit Korea Program for Filipino veterans in the 60th anniversary of Korea-Philippines Relations

2nd	2009.07.01 ~ 07.07	6	115	Commemorating 59 years of Commitment and Friendship
3rd	2010.07.01 ~ 07.07 2010.07.20 ~ 07.26	19	313	Commemorating 60 years of Commitment and Friendship
4th	2011.07.03 ~ 07.09 2011.07.24 ~ 07.30	13	162	We are Peace Makers
5th	2012.07.08 ~ 07.14	16	145	Thanks and Honor
6th	2013.06.23 ~ 06.29	21	200	We are Peace Ambassadors
7th	2014.06.23 ~ 06.29	21	75	
8th	2015.07.23 ~ 07.29	17	104	
9th	2016.07.22 ~ 07.28	17	170	
10th	2017.06.24 ~ 06.30	21	110	
11th	2018.07.03 ~ 07.09	22	120	One Heart Towards One Future
12th	2019.06.30 ~ 07.06	15	114	
Total Persons 1,658				

Note. Compiled by author.

iii) Scholarship Programs for the UN Veterans' Descendants

The MPVA in 2010, in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Korean War, commenced the scholarship program for the direct descendants of UN Korean War Veterans. The scholarship program is another way to express gratitude for the sacrifices of UN War Korean Veterans. Two types of scholarships are currently made available for the UN Korean War veterans' descendants: one for the primary and secondary education students back in their home countries and another for students from these countries studying in universities in Korea.

The MPVA works with the Korean War Memorial Foundation (KWMF) in operating both the scholarship programs. The KWMF, a non-profit public interest organization, was established in 2010 primarily to

provide educational opportunities in the ideals of peace and exchange for the descendants of UN Korean War veterans (KWMF, n.d.). The KWMF is financed by both government funding and donations from the private sector.

The scholarship program for primary and secondary students back in the participant countries began with a 2009 initiative by the MPVA (MPVA, 2010b; Hyung and Yoo, 2015: 138). A small portion of the salary (maximum of 1,000 KRW) of each employee under the government ministries and local government units were allotted for raising the scholarship funds. A total of 22 billion KRW (approximately 18 million USD) was collected to provide 30,000 KRW (25 USD) to every scholarship recipient per month (see Table 11). During the 2010-2013 period, a total of 784 million KRW (650,000 USD) was disbursed to 8,845 recipients from four recipient countries. The target is to support 1,000 students at any given time – 600 from Ethiopia, 200 from Colombia and 100 each from Thailand and the Philippines. Scholarship recipients are selected by their respective Korean embassies and Korean War Veterans' associations in the respective countries. Applicants should be attending public schools and should not be receiving financial support from other organizations, although exceptions are made if students come from low-income households under the criteria set by the MPVA.

Table 11. *Basic Education Scholarship Funds for the UN Korean War Veterans' Descendants in Low-income Countries*

Country	**Recipients (Students)**	**Annual Amount per Student**	**Annual Amount of Assistance**	
			(in 10,000 KRW)	**(in USD)**
Ethiopia	430		15,480	131,580

Colombia	200	360,000 KRW (300 USD)	7,200	61,200
Philippines	120		4,320	36,720
Thailand	100		3,600	30,600
Total	850		30,600	306,000

Note: From the Korean War Memorial Foundation, 2020.

The MPVA also invites the direct descendants to pursue college or graduate education in South Korean universities (KIPA, 2018: 99-100). The distinctive goal of the program is to nurture a network of talented younger generations of the war veterans. The length of the program also provides the invitees an opportunity to immerse themselves in Korean culture and society so that they can bridge their home countries and Korea.

The university scholarship program was commenced in 2010 through an MOU between the MPVA and Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Since then, the program has expanded to include a total of 6 domestic universities including Hanyang University and Seoul National University. The program waives the recipients' tuition fees for a year-long Korean language training and a degree program of 2 or 4 years, as well as their lodging expenses during their study. Each year, around 20 students from the 21 participant countries receive the scholarship benefits.

However, several students especially from low-income countries have dropped out of the program due to the difficulty of keeping up with their daily living expenses in Korea (Ibid.). Accordingly, after negotiations within the Korean government, the Office of the Prime Minister decided to allot 1.07 billion KRW (908,000 USD) in 2013 to assist students with their living

allowance. These funds granted 300,000 KRW (255 USD) monthly to each scholarship beneficiary. Since 2010, the KWMF has also been assisting the MPVA in providing for the students, prioritizing those from low-income countries (see Table 12).

Table 12. *Financial Assistance for Descendants of UN Korean War Veterans in Korean Universities*

Year	**KWMF**		**MPVA**	
	Persons	Amount	Persons	Amount
'10	2	800	0	0
'11	17	4,300	17	5,000
'12	15	7,600	14	5,250
'13	16	7,800	18	6,300
'14	18	8,800	22	7,560
'15	14	8,400	19	6,300
'16	16	8,600	21	7,230
'17	11	5,600	22	7,740
'18	11	4,300	21	6,660
'19	18	2,760	18	5,820
Total	138	58,960	172	57,860

Note. From MPVA and KWMF, 2020.

- Amount in 10,000 KRW units.

Notwithstanding, the current level of funding at around 1 billion KRW for financial assistance of around 300 USD monthly per student is far below the recommended levels. Excluding monthly rent, a student is expected to spend around 800 USD per month (Korea University Global Services Center, 2017). This huge gap will have to be bridged if the program were to promote a positive image of Korea among the recipient descendants.

Besides monetary support, other types of assistance geared toward the network-building goal of the program should be considered. For example, the scholarship program could be tied with a diverse array of other cultural activities, helping the descendants connect with each other outside their university life. Special training programs for the recipients and the alumni could also help direct them as talents into positions where they have more opportunities to play a bridging role between their own country and Korea.

iv) Workshop for International Veterans Affairs

Article 10 of the UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act (on the Promotion of Exchange and Cooperation with UN Participant Countries) stipulates that the MPVA conduct an international conference (art. 10-2) and joint international study (art. 10-3) on veterans affairs as a means to promote exchanges and friendship with the UN participant countries.

In line with this, the ministry has been conducting an annual workshop for international veterans affairs since 2005. The workshop's objective is through knowledge sharing 1) promote policy exchanges in the field of veterans affairs, 2) strengthen the capacities of veterans' policy networks, and 3) develop quality veterans policies that can respond to the new needs in the age of globalization (MPVA, n.d.-e). The workshop invites participants from countries, especially UN sending states, with well-developed veterans support systems in place. The participants, mostly bureaucrats from veterans affairs departments and scholars of veterans' policies, come together for a few

days to discuss, compare and analyze the veterans' policies of their respective countries.

The 15-year history of the workshop (see Table 13) has seen constant participation of the US; regular participation from Canada, Australia and New Zealand; and occasional attendance of Germany and France. The U.K. has yet to join the workshops. Turkey and the Philippines, UN sending countries where the field of veterans policy is recently emerging, had participated once. Taiwan, which is not a participant country in the Korean war, took part in the first five years of the workshop.

The workshop's agenda over the years have revolved around three bigger themes. First are on themes that deal with improving welfare systems for veterans, specifically on their health, medical, nursing, disability, rehabilitation and burial benefits, as well as their family's employment and education opportunities. Second are on issues of veterans affairs with symbolic and ideological implications for the love of country, such as commemorative events and spaces, and educational policies. The first two themes relate to the welfare and symbolic dimensions of veterans' policies as earlier described by Ra (2015).

The workshop's focus on policy exchange and knowledge diplomacy – be it on the welfare or symbolic aspects of veterans policy – is what differentiates it from other international veterans affairs programs. Through it, a more assertive role in convening and setting agenda in the niche of veterans policy comes to the fore, still of course with the expression of

gratitude in the background. As such, the workshop becomes a valuable setting where certain agenda can be injected to influence the discourse on veterans policies, such as 'servicewomen,' veterans' 'communities' and 'inter-government cooperation' across national/federal and local levels. In this regard, international veterans affairs presents itself as a niche area, where Korea could exercise middle power diplomacy by embodying moral and intellectual leadership.

This brings about the third set of themes to the workshops, which take up the Korean War as a starting point to tackle the international dimension of veterans policies. Agenda in this set are geared toward raising awareness on the importance of the armistice agreement and the participation of the UN Forces, which are envisioned to foster friendly relations among the countries.

Notwithstanding, several aspects of the workshops will have to be improved to maximize its potential as a valuable diplomatic setting. To date, the participants at the workshops have been almost exclusively bureaucrats and academics from within veterans policy circles (Hyung and Yoo, 2015: 139). As earlier suggested by the network approach to diplomacy (Reinecke, 1998), policies are now more diffused throughout bureaucratic systems and issues have become more multifaceted. To tackle this, the workshop will have to diversify its participants to include those from outside the participant countries' veterans affairs departments such as health, welfare, culture and education practitioners. Non-government actors especially war veterans organizations as well as the private sector will also have to be engaged. By

doing so, discussions on veterans policy can come to address real constraints such as resources, legitimacy and barriers to policy communication. Furthermore, the participant countries should also be diversified not only to include those with advanced veterans' policies, but also those with emerging policies that show good and innovative practices.

Table 13. *Timeline of MPVA's International Workshop on Veterans Affairs*

Year	**Countries**	**Agenda**
15th 2019.09.23 ~ 09.27	US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand	Entitlement evaluation system
		Medical, employment, and educational support for veterans
14th 2018.09.17 ~ 09.22	US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand	Nationwide memorial ceremonies and programs
		Fostering a network between UN allied nations
13th 2017.09.26 ~ 09.30	US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand	Snapshot of policies for discharged servicewomen
		Comparison of veterans agencies in each country
12th 2016.09.06 ~ 09.11	US, (3) Australia, Canada, New Zealand	Implications of the Korean War on world history
		The role of the Armistice Agreement and UN Command
		Ways to improve rehabilitation policies for veterans
11th 2015.10.21 ~ 10.22	(4) US, Australia, Canada, Germany	How to strengthen cooperative ties among UN allied nations and how to help maintain the ties for the next generation
		Education program to enhance the patriotic spirit
		Customized welfare service for elderly veterans
10th 2014.10.13 ~ 10.14	(2) US, New Zealand	Medical support system for Veterans affairs
		Veterans employment support program
		Direction for foreign affairs in Veterans affairs to raise awareness on the importance of the Armistice agreement, the UN Force Participation

9th 2013.09.03 ~ 09.04	(4) US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand	Commemoration of 60th Anniversary of Armistice and succession to Next Generation
		Veterans' policy and job creation measure
8th 2012.09.03 ~ 09.04	(4) US, Canada, New Zealand, Turkey	Compensation for persons of national merit
		How to facilitate veterans rehabilitation program
		System and program to enhance love of nation
7th 2011.09.01 ~ 09.02	(5) US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany	Physical examination system for re-assessment of national meritorious persons and examination standards regarding national meritorious persons with tinnitus, post-traumatic stress disorder and/or complex regional pain syndrome
		Provision of medical services to aged national meritorious persons, etc.
6th 2010.08.26 ~ 08.27	(6) US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France, Philippines	How do the public (central/federal and local governments) and private sectors cooperate to ensure effective delivery of services for veterans
		Key activities of the veterans' organizations for their members and community, and their ways to cooperate with the central/federal and local governments
5th 2009.08.31 ~ 09.01	(6) US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, Taiwan	Commemoration ceremonies to inspire patriotism
		Policy and systems for the rehabilitation of veterans
4th 2008.09.02 ~ 09.03	(5) US, Australia, Canada, France, Taiwan	Administration of National Cemeteries and Burial Benefits
		Employment support for veterans and assisting their readjustment to civilian life
3rd 2007.06.26 ~ 06.27	(5) US, Australia, Canada, France, Taiwan	Classification system for progressive diseases among veterans
		Long-term care and nursing for aged veterans
2nd	(5) US,	Disability evaluation and benefits system among veterans

2006.08.28 ~ 08.29	Australia, Canada, France, Taiwan	Health care for aged veterans
1st 2005.06.22 ~ 06.23	(6) US, Australia, Canada, France, Taiwan, New Zealand	Introduction of each nation's veterans programs

Note. Compiled by author.

v) Operation and Maintenance of Korean War Memorials

Article 11 of the UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act (on Supporting the Establishment of UN Korean War Memorial Facilities) provides that the MPVA may, within budgetary limits, provide the necessary assistance to domestic civilian organizations or governments or civilian organizations in UN participant countries seeking to establish facilities that commemorate the meritorious deeds of UN Korean War Veterans.

In contrast to the immaterial programs and activities earlier detailed, these memorial facilities stand as the physical and tangible symbols of commemorating the contributions of veterans. These monuments portraying UN veterans' nobility and courage that inspires peace, liberty and friendship among their countries. As such, these serve as solemn venues where commemorative functions related to the war are observed.

In Korea, there are 69 memorial facilities dedicated to the participation of UN Forces in the Korean War (see Table 14; MPVA, 2010a). Among these, 10 are devoted to the United Nations including the UN Cemetery in Busan. The others are monuments commemorating certain

troops, battles, and heroes of the Korean War from the UN sending countries, while some are memorial halls that exhibit artifacts and records of these countries' participation in the Korean War. The facilities were established by a myriad of actors such as local government units, Korea Tourism Organization, Ministry of National Defense, groups from ROK armed, international communities, businesses and veterans' associations. The local administrative units are commonly in charge of the facilities' maintenance.

Table 14. *Korean War Memorial Facilities Dedicated to UN Forces (located in Korea)*

UN	10	Colombia	1
US	31	Greece	1
UK	2	New Zealand	2
Canada	2	Ethiopia	3
Turkey	1	Belgium and Luxembourg	1
Australia	1	France	4
Philippines	2	South Africa	3
Thailand	1	Medical Support Nations	5
Netherlands	2	**Total**	**69**

Note. Data reconstructed from MPVA, 2010a (Korean War Memorials in Pictures).

Abroad, the functions of Korean War memorials are even more pronounced. For the veterans, these stand as isolated but firm symbols of the recognition spared from them in their own countries. For their bereaved families, these are consoling spaces where the valor of their veterans is immortalized. For a largely unknowing public, these are uncommon sites where they can consociate with the history of their own compatriots who

fought an obscured war. For their countries, these are tangible marks of an enduring friendship with Korea.

Around 379 of these memorial facilities are found in UN participant countries according to a 2020 report by MPVA (see Table 15). The MPVA plays a role in the establishment of these facilities abroad. Requests to construct memorial facilities are done by Korean communities and businesses abroad, by Korean War Veterans' associations or by national or local governments to the Korean embassies. Forwarded to the MPVA, the ministry's Memorial Facilities Division (see Appendix 1) conducts deliberations on how much support it could provide for these requests. The ministry could provide partial or full funding (MPVA, 2011: 693-695).

As shown in Table 15, Korean War Memorials abroad are not anymore scarce in number. Only India remains to be the participant country yet to establish a Korean War memorial, with one undergoing construction in New Delhi (Ahuja, 2020). Greece and the Netherlands, which have already built memorials, are seeking to establish facilities in their capital city to increase presence.

Table 15. Korean War Memorials Abroad

US	270	Australia	7
Canada	22	France	7
UK	10	Philippines	5
New Zealand	8	Others	50
Total	**379**		

Note. From MPVA, 2020.

Hence, the emerging challenge is less about the quantity and more about the visibility, care-taking and functionality of the existing facilities. In the US, for example, where more than two-thirds of these overseas memorials are sparsely distributed, a unified system for facility management is needed. Non-state actors such as Korean communities and businesses as well as other public interest groups could also contribute resources to maintain and retrofit the sites. Too, it should be reconsidered how these locations are not merely commemorative fixtures but instead have the potential to function as dynamic spaces that could offer an educational experience on the Korean War to raise awareness among the public, especially to the younger generations.

Figure 3. *Veterans Diplomacy as Public Diplomacy*



4.2 International Veterans Affairs in a Public Diplomacy Framework

Power has come to be understood not just in material terms. The concept of soft power has led actors such as states to pursue intangible sources of power

such as institutions, values, culture and policies to set agenda and attract other actors in line with its interests (Nye, 2008). Korea is not an exception.

The concept of middle powers sheds light on how Korea mobilizes these sources given its position in the international system. Whether Korea's diplomacy accords to the positional, behavioral and functional explanations of middle powers is debatable. Nevertheless, middle diplomacy remains a useful conceptual tool because Korea actively adopts middle power diplomacy as a strategy to elevate its international status and improve its position in international affairs. Korea's internationalism, in turn, is reflected by its willingness to play a bridging role, promote global citizenship, and seek partners in pursuing its agenda and adopt its own niche areas of diplomacy.

Given these goals, public diplomacy is an indispensable diplomatic tool available to Korea. Public diplomacy, defined as a strategy for direct communication with foreign publics, is aimed at influencing their ways of thinking and feeling and creating a positive national image. Rooted in the concept of soft power, public diplomacy hinges on credibility, two-way symmetrical relationships and networks.

Public diplomacy is also a framework from which to view Korea’s international veterans affairs following that outlined by Kim (2012; see Table 16 and Figure 3). Under the lens of public diplomacy, international veterans affairs can be understood as an asset – which is mobilized toward an objective, derived from a resource, communicated by a subject to an object through diverse media and carriers.

A. Goals

International veterans affairs are geared toward two specified agenda: to enhance Korea's national image in the international community by contributing to the development of freedom and democracy; and to promote friendship with the UN participating countries (Art. 1, Act No. 17117). These goals, in turn, reflect Korea's middle power internationalism. First, the enhancement of national image mirrors the country's high stakes for projecting its legitimacy and status, given that it is not readily recognized neither as a great nor as a small power. Second, it reflects Korea's willingness to promote values that are universal, such as freedom and democracy, to be able to remain inclusive and therefore play a bridging role. Third, that it speaks of Korea's pursuit for partnerships with its wartime allies to create a positive environment for its foreign policy objectives.

B. From Resources to Assets

Moreover, as a public diplomacy asset, international veterans affairs earns its soft power leverage only after being refined from a resource. That said, IVA has its roots in a historical resource embedded in Korea’s national development: particularly, the UN participation in the Korean War by virtue of collective security. At its very core, international veterans affairs and its programs are an expression of commemoration and gratitude to the UN forces who contributed to the restoration of peace and freedom. Their assistance is conceived to have laid foundations for Korea to become itself a contributor to precisely to these values.

Yet, attractive universal values in and of themselves are not sufficient to bring about influence. As with other soft power resources, attraction also relies on credibility. In the case of international veterans affairs, credibility arises from being grounded on an established system of veterans policies at home. Seen this way, IVA for Korea does not end as an expression of commemoration and gratitude made for the values of peace and freedom. Indeed, it is also an attempt to project its moral and intellectual leadership in the area of veterans policies.

C. Subjects and Objects

Viewing IVA under the lens of public diplomacy also highlights its contrast with conventional diplomacy. In terms of subjects and objects, veterans' diplomacy as a form of public diplomacy extends the participation beyond the government to civilian actors.

On the subject side, IVA programs have mostly been implemented top-down by the MPVA. The challenge however is to increase efforts to bridge and provide incentives to other potential subjects of IVA (e.g. other government institutions, businesses, non-profit organizations) to procure resources for its programs. The MPVA is taking small initial steps toward this direction. Notable examples include the engagement of research and educational institutions for technical knowledge (e.g. in data collection and archiving), as well as for-profit and volunteer organizations (e.g in outreach activities and construction of war memorial facilities). As this trend also illustrates, increasing the diversity and scope of IVA programs can also create

more opportunities for MPVA to develop closer working relations with more actors.

Similarly, neither the objects of IVA are confined to the governments of UN sending states. It instead focuses first and foremost on the UN Korean War veterans abroad, their descendants, families and organizations. IVA's objects, however, are more disaggregated and thus pose a challenge for the MPVA on concentrating its resources on diverse targets and the measurement of the outcomes of its programs.

At the center of object networking for IVA are the Korean War veterans' associations as these are the representative bodies of IVA's targets. Despite these associations being spread across the sending countries, they are hardly in contact with each other. Worse, they struggle with the dwindling number of veterans and are therefore reliant on the interest of their families and broader communities for their very existence.

A function for IVA, therefore, is to provide them with opportunities, and indeed a raison d'être, to continue through various programs that revitalize their representative role. This is currently being done by engaging them in sourcing participants for events held in Korea; in facilitating programs in the UN sending countries; and in serving as contact points for gathering information and concerns related to their veterans in their localities. And yet, the bigger challenge for MPVA is to implement programs that will not only give life to veterans organizations, but also those that will create incentives for them to connect with each other.

D. Media/Carriers

Last but not least, adopting a public diplomacy standpoint allows IVA to be analyzed at the program-level. After the previous chapter has detailed individual programs, it becomes apparent that IVA is one coordinated effort that intersects especially in terms of goals and resources. Leonard et al.'s (2002) concept of three-dimensional public diplomacy presents a useful framework to view IVA as composed of separate yet coherent sets of activities.

The first and most explicit level is made up of the what's and how's of the information that IVA seeks to communicate on an everyday basis. On the one hand, the content component (i.e. the contents) includes the efforts to document the UN participation in the Korean War, its role in Korean development and in the post-war relations between Korea and its allies. On the other, the medium component involves the different means used to disseminate this information such as through print publications, digital archives, and even physical spaces as well as official statements to the media and on commemorative events.

The second level consists of simple themes such as ‘thanks and honor’ and ‘peace,’ which are invariably and repeatedly conveyed in many means. This way, these messages have become staple symbols incorporated into all the IVA programs, so that the programs themselves serve to reinforce the goals of improving Korea's image and promoting friendly relations with its allies.

On the third most implicit level are efforts that pursue lasting relationships with key individuals such as the veterans, their descendants and those involved in veterans policy circles through many years of revisit programs, scholarships and workshops.

These three dimensions are found across international veterans affairs, with some dimensions more salient in some programs and less in others. This however confirms that IVA programs, while indeed maintaining their distinct features, act as one coherent attempt centered at direct communication of information, at strategic goals and at relationships. Table 16 summarizes IVA Programs as seen from a Five-phase Public Diplomacy Framework, along with objectives and challenges.

Table 16. *Summary of International Veterans Affairs Programs*

Program	**Objectives**	**Challenges**	**Subjects**	**Objects**	**Medium/ Carrier**
Commemoration Activities held abroad; Turn Toward Busan	Extending commemorative events held to the UN participant countries	Enhancing the visibility of commemorative events beyond the veterans and their families toward the general public abroad	MPVA, Korean embassies abroad	Veterans and their families and organizations, governments of UN sending countries	Overseas Commemorative Events
Revisit Korea Program	Inviting UN veterans to Korea as an expression of gratitude; creating a sense of pride among veterans	- Expanding the amount of travel assistance to veterans from developing countries; - Inviting more participants from and underrepresented countries - The depleting number of available veteran participants	MPVA, Korean embassies abroad	Veterans and their families and organizations	Commemorative Events in Korea
Publications on the UN Participation in the Korean War	Documenting war history and dissemination to the general public	The limited reach and ability of print media to arouse interest among the general public	MPVA	General public abroad	Print Media

Digital Archives	Documenting Korean War records and resources into an accessible and retrievable database	- Expanding the program beyond the US - Strengthening the involvement of civil actors especially the youth - Adopting new techniques to create interactive learning materials	MPVA, research and educational institutions	Foreign and domestic media and their audience, youth participants, local veterans' organizations	Digital Media Archives
Recapturing and Rewarding the Achievements of UN Veterans	Rediscovering the veteran's contributions and extending appropriate national merits	- Expanding the types of national merit granted to UN veterans - Closer collaboration with other actors in gathering data	MPVA, military history research institutes, Korean armed forces	Veterans and their organizations, governments of UN sending countries	Programs
Medical Outreach Activities	Boosting exchange and cooperation between the ROK and its allies at the civilian level	- Enhancing the role of civil actors and local communities - Network infrastructure role for MPVA - Linking with other ODA strategies	MPVA, for-profit and civilian organizations, private individuals	Veterans, their families and their local communities	Outreach Activities in Local Communities Abroad

UN Peace Camp for Youth	- Forging a network among descendants with an identity as peace advocates - Instilling a sense of pride among descendants by appreciating their forefathers' contributions	- Expanding participation to non-descendants - Involving educators from abroad - Conducting camps abroad	MPVA	Korean and UN veterans' direct descendants	Activities
Scholarship Program for the Descendants of UN Korean War Veterans	- Providing educational support for the descendants abroad - Forging a network of talented descendants who can bridge Korea and their home countries	- Increasing amount of assistance - Training and connecting alumni to active positions in diplomacy	MPVA, Korean universities, Korean War Memorial Foundation	Veteran's direct descendants in Korean universities	Program

Workshop on International Veterans Affairs	Providing a platform of exchange on veterans' policies, creating an international veterans' policy network	Inviting participants outside existing veterans' policy circles to reflect ideas from other fields and countries	MPVA	Veterans policy practitioners and academics	Activities
Korean War Memorials in Korea and Abroad	Maintaining and operating physical facilities that make visible and stand as important spaces for commemorating UN participation in the war	Seeking new functions for commemorative places, such as spaces for interaction and learning	MPVA, various government agencies and local administrative units	General public, international communities, veterans' organizations, business communities	Physical structures and spaces in Korea and abroad

4.3 Fitting International Veterans Affairs into Diplomacy

As discussed in Chapter 4.3, public diplomacy rests on the well-established idea that publics matter to governments, and is therefore hardly a new paradigm in world politics. Instead, it is a new strategy of accommodating the diversity of actors, the complexity of issues and the intricacy of its underpinning information flows. Similarly, the networks formed by international veterans affairs between civilian subjects and civilian objects are not isolated linkages. Rather, they act as valuable reinforcements to the conventional government-to-government diplomacy between Korea and its UN allies (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. *The relationship among International Veterans Affairs, Public Diplomacy and Traditional Diplomacy*



By the same token, the expansion of actors under the framework of public diplomacy accommodates more diverse channels of exchange beyond government negotiations and exchange. As described, IVA is mediated by citizen-level interaction through commemoration activities in and out of

Korea, student and academic exchange, veterans' policy workshops, media communication and even physical structures.

Since IVA is mediated through various means with the similar aim of enhancing Korea's image abroad, questions are therefore raised as to how IVA can complement other soft power assets that already constitute their own PD realms (see Table 3). IVA, for example, can be incorporated to knowledge diplomacy as in the case of International Workshop for Veterans Affairs; to development aid as in the case of medical outreach services in UN sending countries. It may also be well explored how information materials on the UN participation in the Korean War can be incorporated into academic resources on Korean Studies; how memorial facilities and sites can be incorporated into tourism resources; and how IVA programs can better harness resources from the business sector through corporate social responsibility initiatives; and how for example the Korean Wave and IVA, through the engagement of young publics, can benefit from each other.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

The UN participation in the Korean War has to be understood not only on the basis of the imperative it creates for Korea to extend its veterans policies to UN veterans. Instead, it has to be viewed in connection to the universal values for which the war itself was fought. This way, this turning point in Korean history can speak not only of thanks and honor, but also of freedom and peace. In turn, these ideals can become appealing messages that will bolster Korea's image and its existing partnership with its wartime allies.

To that end, the Korean War taken in and of itself could not stand as a diplomatic resource. It has to be transformed from a retired story to a dynamic narrative. It has to be a compelling groundwork for an active campaign – for policies and programs – that rewards and proclaims the values rooted in the war. To be sure, the recompense for national sacrifices through welfare and its reinforcement through symbols are the founding pillars of Korea's established domestic veterans policies.

Extended beyond Korea, international veterans affairs ought to anchor its moral foundations on well-founded domestic veterans policies, and embody the values of peace and freedom as derived from the UN participation in the Korean War. Only when universal values underpin an international policy that is consistent with domestic actions, does the Korean War constitute a diplomatic resource. This is consistent with Nye's (2008: 94) conception of soft power resources: namely, whether the country lives up to

its political values at home and abroad, and whether its foreign policies are perceived as legitimate and having moral authority.

Korea, not readily recognized neither as a small nor as a great power, has high stakes in legitimacy and influence. As a self-identified middle power, it spends relatively more effort in improving its image and status in the international system in order to find partners with which to achieve common goals and boost its leverage on regional and international issues.

Given these capacities and goals, international veterans affairs constitute a promising diplomatic resource for Korea. First and foremost, IVA, as rooted in the unique historical experience and interpretation of the UN participation in the Korean War. In so being, it epitomizes an image of a nation that knows no borders in remembering and rewarding contributions made for freedom and peace. Second, these universal values are well-suited to Korea's goals of middle power diplomacy particularly in bridging gaps in the international community. Rather than directly tackling political or economic agenda, IVA relies on the more agreeable aims of 'global citizenship' as a pretext for exchange. Third, IVA capitalizes on puts to use already-existing alliances forged during the UN Korean War consist of developing and developed countries. This way, IVA could serve as a network infrastructure to bridge these fronts and connect to more partners. Lastly, veterans affairs is a niche area where Korea has the potentials to pioneer: technically, given its background of established domestic veterans policies;

and morally, in combination with its willingness to promote universal values through this area.

Meanwhile, bolstering Korea's national image follows both its relationship with the foreign public and its approach on certain issues, which are in turn communicated through information flows. Public diplomacy, as the management of both factors, accordingly becomes an indispensable tool to make the nation's image more attractive. This significance is even more salient for Korea as a middle power, given its higher stakes in attraction, influence, and seeking partnerships with other state and non-state actors.

International veterans affairs, inasmuch as it is geared toward improving national image towards and relationships with Korean War-related publics, can benefit in analysis from a public diplomacy framework. Among the key points reiterated in the foregoing chapters is that the historical resource of the UN participation in the Korean War can be processed into a public diplomatic asset that is international veterans affairs – on the conditions that 1) the historical resource is rooted on the universal values of peace and freedom; and that 2) the historical resource is used as a groundwork for both international and domestic veterans policies that are consistent with each other.

A public diplomacy framework also sheds light on the current challenges to international veterans affairs. The success of IVA programs as a public diplomacy activity hinges not only on relationships but also on information flows. By way of explanation, IVA can only establish and

strengthen partnerships to the extent that it is understood by and resonates to the foreign publics. IVA programs, therefore have to focus on communicating the values of the UN Korean War.

This is indeed a daunting task given the war's notorious 'forgotten' status: When, the publics in the UN sending states themselves are mostly oblivious of the war; when, the UN sending states themselves are wanting in efforts to remember their own men that they sent to the war; and when, the veterans themselves – the primary storytellers of the war – face extinction. Nevertheless, IVA as diplomacy among the publics, nurtures a commitment to remembrance from among a diverse range of actors – rather than solely relying on government exchanges for commemoration.

A public diplomacy framework also illustrates the insufficiency of this study to provide a complete picture of IVA as a diplomatic tool. While this research has gathered and organized knowledge on the transformation of resources to assets through a supply-side analysis, an assessment of IVA as a diplomatic tool also warrants a demand-side analysis. Since public diplomacy involves two-way exchange where messages are not taken exactly as its subjects intend, further research will have to inquire on how IVA is received by Korean-War related objects. The interpretations will vary due to several factors. For example, IVA programs will be received by the UN sending countries from the developing world in ways different from that of western allies.

Finally, even after these foregoing discussions on the supply-side, some remaining fundamental questions on IVA require a closer, more systematic inquiry. Even when Korea is regarded as a pioneer in veterans diplomacy, it is still unclear *why* this strategy emerged. This in turn calls for identifying the factors that led to the employment of IVA as a diplomatic tool: the increase in IVA's emphasis along with the number and diversity of its programs. This research has nevertheless encountered several points to consider. Is the emergence of veterans diplomacy related to Korea's increased capacity for veterans affairs? To a need to engage partners in the security front? To a sense of urgency given the depleting number of UN veterans? Or did IVA simply emerge as part of a wider branding strategy as a middle power through public diplomacy?

As this study concludes, IVA programs did not automatically emerge as an imperative to recompense its UN war veterans. IVA is a result of an active process to refine a historical resource into a diplomatic asset geared to the achievement of national goals.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. UN Korean War Veterans' Dignity and Honor Act, original text in Korean

유엔참전용사의 명예선양 등에 관한 법률 (약칭: 유엔참전용사법)

[시행 2020. 9. 25.] [법률 제 17117 호, 2020. 3. 24., 제정]

국가보훈처(국제협력담당관) 044-202-5911~3

제 1 조(목적) 이 법은 대한민국의 자유민주주의 수호를 위하여 헌신한 유엔참전용사의 명예를 선양(宣揚)하고 유엔참전국과의 우호를 증진하는 데 필요한 사항을 규정함으로써 국제사회에서 대한민국의 국가이미지를 제고하고 자유민주주의 발전에 이바지함을 목적으로 한다.

제 2 조(정의) 이 법에서 사용하는 용어의 뜻은 다음과 같다.

1. "6 · 25 전쟁"이란 「참전유공자 예우 및 단체설립에 관한 법률」 제 2 조제 1 호에 따른 전쟁을 말한다.
2. "유엔참전용사"란 6 · 25 전쟁에 참전한 국제연합(UN: United Nations)군 소속의 군인을 말한다.
3. "유엔참전국"이란 6 · 25 전쟁에 참전한 국제연합 회원국으로서 별표의 국가를 말한다.

제 3 조(국가와 지방자치단체의 책무) 국가와 지방자치단체는 유엔참전용사의 명예선양과 유엔참전국과의 우호증진에 필요한 시책을 수립·추진하여야 한다.

제 4 조(다른 법률과의 관계) 유엔참전용사의 명예선양에 관하여 다른 법률에 특별한 규정이 있는 경우를 제외하고는 이 법에서 정하는 바에 따른다.

제 5 조(유엔군 참전의 날 및 유엔참전용사 국제추모의 날) ① 6 · 25 전쟁에 참전하여 대한민국의 자유민주주의를 수호한 유엔참전국의 공헌을 기리기 위하여 매년 7 월 27 일을 유엔군 참전의 날로 한다.

② 6 · 25 전쟁에 참전하여 대한민국의 자유민주주의를 수호한 유엔참전용사의 희생과 공헌을 기념하고 이들을 유엔참전국과 함께 추모하기 위하여 매년 11 월 11 일을 유엔참전용사 국제추모의 날로 한다.

제 6 조(기본계획) ① 국가보훈처장은 5 년마다 유엔참전용사의 명예선양과 유엔참전국과의 우호증진에 관한 기본계획(이하 "기본계획"이라 한다)을 관계 중앙행정기관의 장과 협의하여 수립하여야 한다. 이 경우 국가보훈처장은 필요하면 유엔참전국의 정부, 지방자치단체의 장 및 관련 단체의 장의 의견을 들을 수 있다.

② 기본계획에는 다음 각 호의 사항이 포함되어야 한다.

1. 유엔참전용사의 명예선양과 유엔참전국과의 우호증진 정책의 기본목표와 추진방향
2. 유엔참전용사의 명예선양과 유엔참전국과의 우호증진을 위한 주요 정책의 수립 · 조정, 평가 및 제도개선
3. 유엔참전국과의 교류 및 협력 기반 조성 방안
4. 유엔참전용사의 명예선양과 유엔참전국과의 우호증진을 위한 재원 조달 및 운용 방안
5. 유엔참전국과의 교류 및 협력을 위한 민간 부문에 대한 지원 방안
6. 유엔참전국과의 우호증진 관련 국내외 홍보 방안
7. 그 밖에 유엔참전용사의 명예선양과 유엔참전국과의 우호증진을 위하여 국가보훈처장이 필요하다고 인정하는 사항

③ 제 1 항과 제 2 항에서 규정한 사항 외에 기본계획의 수립에 필요한 사항은 대통령령으로 정한다.

제 7 조(시행계획) ① 국가보훈처장은 기본계획에 따라 매년 유엔참전용사의 명예선양과 유엔참전국과의 우호증진에 관한 시행계획(이하 "시행계획"이라 한다)을 수립 · 시행하여야 한다.

② 시행계획의 수립 · 시행에 필요한 사항은 대통령령으로 정한다.

제 8 조(실태조사 등) ① 국가보훈처장은 기본계획 및 시행계획을 효과적으로 수립 · 시행하기 위하여 유엔참전용사 현황 등에 관한 실태조사를 하거나 통계를 작성할 수 있다.

② 제 1 항에 따른 실태조사의 대상·방법과 통계의 작성·관리에 필요한 사항은 대통령령으로 정한다.

제 9 조(유엔참전용사 명예선양사업의 추진) 국가보훈처장은 유엔참전용사의 명예선양을 위하여 다음 각 호의 사업을 추진할 수 있다.

1. 6 · 25 전쟁에서 공적을 세운 유엔참전용사의 발굴 및 공훈 선양
2. 유엔참전용사의 사망 또는 국내 안장(安葬) 시 예우 및 지원
3. 그 밖에 유엔참전용사에 대한 추모 및 기념 사업

제 10 조(유엔참전국과의 교류협력사업의 추진) 국가보훈처장은 유엔참전국과의 교류 및 우호증진을 위하여 유엔참전국의 정부 또는 민간단체와 협력하여 다음 각 호의 사업을 추진할 수 있다.

1. 유엔참전용사를 위한 국내 초청행사 및 유엔참전국 현지 보훈행사
2. 유엔참전국과의 보훈 분야에 관한 국제회의 개최
3. 보훈제도 관련 국제 공동 연구
4. 유엔참전국과의 인적 교류 및 정보 교환

제 11 조(유엔참전시설의 건립 지원) ① 국가보훈처장은 국내 민간단체나 유엔참전국 또는 그 국가의 민간단체가 유엔참전용사의 희생과 공훈을 기리기 위하여 기념관·전시관·기념비 등의 유엔참전시설(이하 "유엔참전시설"이라 한다)을 건립하는 경우 그에 필요한 지원을 할 수 있다.

② 국가보훈처장은 제 1 항에 따른 건립 비용 외에 필요한 경우 유엔참전시설의 관리 비용의 일부를 예산의 범위에서 지원할 수 있다.

③ 제 1 항과 제 2 항에 따른 건립 또는 관리 비용의 지원 대상, 요건, 절차 및 그 밖에 필요한 사항은 대통령령으로 정한다.

제 12 조(민간단체에 대한 지원) ① 국가보훈처장은 유엔참전용사의 명예선양과 유엔참전국과의 우호증진 사업 또는 활동을 수행하는 국내 및 유엔참전국의 민간단체에 대하여 그 사업 또는 활동에 드는 경비를 예산의 범위에서 지원할 수 있다.

② 제 1 항에 따른 경비 지원에 필요한 사항은 대통령령으로 정한다

제 13 조(유엔참전기록의 발굴·보존 및 활용) ① 국가보훈처장은 역사적 가치가 높은 유엔참전에 관한 기록을 발굴하고 보존하여야 한다.

② 국가보훈처장은 제 1 항에 따라 발굴・보존된 기록을 번역・출판 및 정보화 등의 방법으로 국민이 쉽게 활용할 수 있도록 하여야 한다.

제 14 조(관계 기관 등의 협조) ① 국가보훈처장은 다음 각 호의 업무를 수행하기 위하여 필요하면 관계 중앙행정기관의 장, 지방자치단체의 장 및 관련 기관・법인・단체의 장에게 자료의 제출 등 필요한 협조를 요청할 수 있다. 이 경우 협조를 요청받은 관계 중앙행정기관의 장 등은 특별한 사정이 없으면 그 요청에 따라야 한다.

1. 기본계획 및 시행계획의 수립・시행・평가
2. 제 8 조에 따른 실태조사 등
3. 제 11 조에 따른 유엔참전시설의 건립 지원
4. 제 13 조에 따른 유엔참전기록의 발굴・보존 및 활용

② 국가보훈처장은 이 법에 따른 업무의 원활한 추진을 위하여 외교부장관과 협의하여 재외공관의 장에게 협조를 요청할 수 있다. 이 경우 국가보훈처장은 재외공관에 관련 업무의 추진에 필요한 경비를 예산의 범위에서 지급할 수 있다.

부칙 <제 17117 호,2020. 3. 24.>

제 1 조(시행일) 이 법은 공포 후 6 개월이 경과한 날부터 시행한다.

제 2 조(다른 법률의 개정) 참전유공자 예우 및 단체설립에 관한 법률 일부를 다음과 같이 개정한다.

제 4 조의 2 를 삭제한다.

Appendix 2. Organizational Structure of the MPVA



국문초록

한국의 국제보훈사업에 대한 연구

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국제협력전공

한국 정부는 유엔참전용사들의 기여를 인정하고 감사를 표현하는 일환으로 국제보훈사업을 추진하였으며, 이는 기념 행사 주최, 훈장 수여, 참전 당시 기록 보존 및 발간, 참전용사 관련 외국인사들 간의 네트워크 강화 등의 프로그램으로 구성되어 있다. 따라서 국제보훈사업은 한국의 국가 이미지를 제고하고, 유엔참전국과의 우호를 증진시켜 결과적으로 한국의 외교에 영향을 미칠 것으로 판단된다.

국제보훈사업의 중요성이 강조되며 이에 따른 프로그램 증진 및 다양화가 이루어지고 있음에도 불구하고 한국역사 상 국제보훈사업이 가지는 독특함과 새로움으로 인하여 이에 따른 연구가 활발히 이루어지지 않았다. 본 연구의 목적은 국제보훈사업을 소프트 파워와 중견국로서의 한국의 위상, 그리고 공공외교의 틀

안에서 외교적 도구로서의 가능성을 검토하는데 그 의의가 있다. 이후 이러한 틀에 따라 관련 정책 데이터를 수집, 정리하여 국제보훈사업 프로그램에 대한 심층 분석을 제공하고자 한다.

국제보훈사업은 감사와 명예라는 표현을 넘어, 국제사회에서의 이미지 제고와 UN 참전국들과의 협력 강화라는 한국의 국가적 목표를 달성하기 위한 외교적 자산으로서의 의미를 가진다. 국가보훈사업은 경쟁력 있는 외교적 자산으로서, 그것은 독특한 역사적 원료를 통해 가공된 산물이다. 국가보훈사업은 유엔의 한국전쟁 참전에 대한 감사를 표시하며, 유엔이 전쟁을 통해 이룩하고자 했던 자유와 평화의 보편적 가치를 강화하고자 한다.

주요어: 한국전쟁, 소프트파워, 중견국 외교, 공공외교, 보훈외교

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