Do Populist Parties Increase Civic Political Participation? Empirical analysis of 30 countries in Europe*

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Does a populist party increase civic political participation? This paper aims to contribute to the debate among scholars on whether populism serves to correct the limits of representative democracy by increasing civic political participation. Prior studies dealing with this question have conducted empirical studies by using voter turnout as a dependent variable. However, the prior studies overlook the fact that there are many other ways of political participation by citizens besides voting. To fill the gap, this paper empirically tested the relationship between populist parties and six different ways of political participation as dependent variables (participating in party or action group, participating in organization or association. wearing some political symbols (badge, sticker), public demonstration, petition signing and boycotting). The results are ambivalent. Generally, there is no evidence that the increase of civic political participation by populist parties is a universal phenomenon. However, when analyzed on more micro-level, there are results that can derive several implications. First, when left populist parties are represented in a parliament, the participation in boycotting increases. It might be related to the fact that boycotting movements are mostly associated with progressive agendas. Second, in the Central-Eastern Europe (CEE), when populist parties are represented in a parliament and their vote share in last election is higher, there is a significant impact on the participation in association or organization. Third, in Western Europe, populist parties increase the participation in party or action group when they are represented in a parliament. These regional differences seem to stem from differences of political culture in that citizens in CEE do not prefer party unlike Western Europe, where citizens are familiar with party and action group. Finally, the higher the number of seats in all populist parties, the more likely they are to participate in public demonstration. But the effect is so small that it is difficult to judge whether there is a meaningful relationship. These findings ask subsequent research to explore how different political cultures and ideological differences of populist parties make differences in the impact of populist parties on civil society.

Keywords: populism, populist party, democracy, political participation, Europe

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, populist parties and politicians have emerged as very important political actors in the West (Algan et al., 2017; March, 2011; March and Keith, 2016; Mudde, 2007; Norris and Inglehart, 2016; Van Kessel, 2015). This rise of populism naturally led many scholars to ask questions about how populism affects democracy. Populism has been considered as a threat to liberal democracy (Abs and Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2016: 3). Prior empirical studies also show the negative impact by populists on the separation

^{*} This study was supported by BK21 Solution-Seeking for Political Problems in the Age of Innovative Science and Technology in the Department of Political Science at Yonsei University Graduate School.

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of power which is essential to democracy (Huber and Schimpf, 2016; Houle and Kenny, 2018; Ruth, 2018). That is, most of the arguments about the relationship between populism and democracy are negative.

On the other hand, it has been argued that populism has a positive impact on democracy by inducing political participation (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017). This means that populism acts as a corrector for democracy by representing unrepresented political voices and mobilizing political participation (Mudde and Robira Kaltwasser, 2017: 80-86). So, several empirical studies have been conducted to verify the theory. However, it is controversial whether populism has a positive effect on the increase of political participation (Anduiza et al., 2019; Houle and Kenny, 2018; Huber and Ruth, 2017; Spittler, 2018; Leininger and Maurits, 2020a; Zaslove, 2020). This paper aims to contribute the debate. The research question is *"Does a populist party increase civic political participation?"* This work seeks to explore the relationship between populist parties and civic political participation by using statistical methodology to answer this puzzle.

Especially, this paper focuses on six specific ways of political participation (participating in party or action group, participating in organization or association, wearing some political symbols (badge, sticker), public demonstration, petition n signing and boycotting). It is because the prior studies only considered voter turnout as a dependent variable. Obviously, there are many different ways of participating in politics so there is a limit to verifying the effect of populism on civic political participation only with voter turnout. Therefore, this paper aims to fill the gap. By using data from European Social Survey (ESS), this paper targets populist parties in 30 Europe countries and analyze the relationship between populist party and various forms of political participation. Furthermore, this paper tries to find the different effect by ideological differences of populist party, and to analyze regional difference between Western Europe and Central-Eastern Europe (CEE). Through this analysis, this paper will contribute to the discussion of the relationship between populism and political participation.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

What is populism?

There are various ways to define populism by scholars so far. This is because populism is a contentious concept in nature, not only because it is used differently in different regions, but also because it has never been self-represented by people or organizations (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: 2). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 2-5) classify the existing approaches to populism into five categories: First, there is a "popular agency approach, a democratic way of life built through popular engagement in politics." Second, based on critical studies, there is "Laclauan approach", which sees populism as the essence of politics and the power of emancipation. Third, there is a "socio-economic approach" that sees populism as a type of irresponsible economic policy. Fourth, there is a perspective that populism draws supporters by a direct and non-mediated manner. Finally, there is a view that populism is "folkloric style of politics" to draw public attention by using some instruments such as media. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) acknowledge that each of these prior theories have their own point but propose the following definition that penetrates the nature of populism more commonly. According to them, populism *is "a thin-centered ideology that considers* society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people." (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: 6). This definition has been accepted in many populism studies, and many scholars recognize that populism gives a dichotomous view that divides the two groups into "pure people" and "the corrupt elite groups" respectively and establishing the antagonistic relationship between two groups in a society (Akkerman etl al., 2014; Geurkink et al., 2019; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Rooduijn, 2014; Spruyt et al., 2016; Stanley, 2008; Van Kessel, 2014). This conflicting nature of populism naturally led scholars to explore the relationship between populism and democracy.

Populism and Political Participation

Populism has generally been considered a threat to liberal democracy (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2016: 3). Populism, according to Müller (2016: 73), is not about bringing politics closer to the people or even redressing liberal democracy in the sense of reaffirming people's sovereignty. Rather, populism is very threatening to liberal democracy in that it not only causes conflict and political polarization, but also sets up opponents of the people as enemies (Müller, 2016: 3). Populism, of course, may be useful to ensure the voice of unrepresented people, but it does not justify the false claim that supporters for populists only exist and they are the only legitimate representatives (Müller, 2016: 73). In addition, populism has a negative effect on the separation of powers essential to democracy (Huber and Schimpf, 2016; Houle and Kenny, 2018; Ruth, 2018). Specifically, Houle and Kenny (2018) suggest, through quantitative analysis, that when populists take control, legal and institutional restrictions on administrative power are weakened. A quantitative study of Huber and Schimpf (2016) shows that although populists contribute to improving the quality of democracy when they are opponents, they undermine it when they are in government power. These empirical studies seem to suggest that populism is clearly an anti-democratic idea that undermines liberal democracy.

However, it has been argued that populism has a positive impact on democracy by encouraging political participation and representing unrepresented political voices (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017: 80-86). Taking this theoretical argument seriously, several studies have tried to test the relationship between populist parties and civic political participation. These empirical studies on the relationship between populism and political participation could largely be divided into "demand side" and "supply side" (Spruyt et al. 2016). In terms of demand side, "populist attitude" has been used as a quantifiable measurement tool to test the relationship between the level of populism and the level of political participation (Anduiza et al., 2019; Zaslove et al., 2020). Specifically, Anduiza et al. (2019) test the relationships between voting, petition signing, online participation and public demonstration. The study has shown that populism does not have a statistically significant impact on voter turnout, but has a positive effect on petition signing, online participation, and demonstration in some contexts. On the other hand, Zaslove et al. (2020) suggest that although people with strong populist attitude prefer support for democracy and deliberative forms of political participation, they are less likely to do protest. Although there are not many empirical studies yet in demand side, these previous studies show that two variables may have positive relationships.

In terms of supply side, the empirical results are controversial because the prior studies do not show consistent results that populism increases civic political participation (Houle and Kenny, 2018; Huber and Ruth, 2017; Spittler 2018; Leininger and Maurits, 2020a). Specifically, the study by Huber and Ruth (2017) argues that the effect of populist parties on political participation depends on their host ideology when in opposition positions. In contrast, when populist parties take power, they do not have a significant impact on the increase in voter turnout. On the other hand, the study by Houle and Kenny (2018) found that the increase in voter turnout caused by populist governments or by populist activists is not higher. In the case of the study of Spittler (2018), it shows the impact of right-wing populist parties on democracy in Europe, which, in turn, might have a positive effect on the increase in turnout. However, it is not clear that the outcome was purely caused by right-wing populist parties because the political context was not considered in the analysis such as social movement.

Recently, Leininger and Maurits (2020a) criticize the prior studies because they simply focus on the system and institutional characteristics of political parties. So, Leininger and Maurits (2020a) suggest that party competition levels or local contexts should be considered. Accordingly, they further subdivided the five types of emergence of populist parties to analyze the impact of populist parties on democracy. Specifically, Leininger and Maurits (2020a) categorized populist parties by looking at (1) whether a populist party participate in the election; (2) whether a new populist party appears in the election; (3) after the last election, whether populist parties have at least one seat in a parliament; (4) in the last election, how many the total voter shares of all populist parties are; and (5) after the last election, how many the total seats share of all populist parties are. By using the typology, Leininger and Maurits (2020a) studied the case of Europe. In the case, they first tested this hypothesis in all European countries at once and tested it again by dividing the region into Western Europe and Central-Eastern Europe (CEE). Generally, Western Europe is recognized as consolidated democracy, while democracy in CEE is not because it has many postcommunist countries and have undergone a relatively recent transition to democracy. In other words, the political context can play an important role in determining the power of a populist party. According to Leininger and Maurits (2020a), in Western Europe, populist parties under the five circumstances had no significant impact on the increase in voter turnout, and CEE had a significant impact only if populist parties had already secured seats in a parliament. Leininger and Maurits (2020a) argue that the situation of each country is very important, suggesting that populist politicians or political parties may have a significant impact on the increase in turnout in some Asian countries where democracy is still at a turning point or not consolidated. So, this study suggests that regional factors may be important in the way populism works in civil society. Nevertheless, Leininger and Maurits (2020a) generally give skeptical feedback to the argument that populist parties have a positive and significant impact on political participation.

However, unlike the studies which were conducted in demand side (Anduiza et al., 2019; Zaslove et al., 2020), the prior studies in supply side only consider voter turnout. In other words, it overlooks the dynamic aspects of today's civic political participation in politics in that citizens do not express their political opinions only by voting. Especially, populism is characterized by antipathy to existing systems and order; it is difficult to conclude whether the populist party has a significant impact on political participation by only analyzing the turnout alone. This paper aims to fill the gap. Thus, this study tries to test a wider variety of ways of political participation as dependent variables to contribute to the study of relationship between populism and political participation.

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How do people who are affected by populist parties participate in politics?

It is important to consider which ways of political participation are mobilized after the rise of populist parties. First, in terms of social movement, populism is understood as "a collective action frame employed by movement entrepreneurs to construct a resonant collective identity of "the People" and to challenge elites" (Aslanidis, 2016). Therefore, populist parties are likely to influence the kinds of collective action. Thus, as mentioned above in the literature review, *petition signing* and *public demonstration*, which are important ways of collective action, may be important ways of civic political participation.

Second, this paper includes *boycotting, wearing some political symbols (badge, sticker) and participating in organization or association.* Boycotting is a kind of political consumerism which is intentional purchase or not purchase of a particular product or service by combining their political beliefs (Micheletti et al., 2004). Political consumerism is a political movement by those who have a low preference for traditional methods of political participation and a low confidence in representative democracy and consider political consumerism a more efficient way to influence politics (StrØmsnes, 2009). One example of boycotting by populist party was boycotting of Israel by Podemos, a leftist populist party in Spain (JTA, 2018). Wearing symbols related to populists is commonplace for supporters of populists to express political identity, such as wearing Trump MAGA (Make America Great Again) hat in United States (Emerson and Anne, 2020). Therefore, if a populist party stimulates civic political participation, it can be expected that citizens who support the populist party will be more likely to wear some political symbol of the party or its representative populist.

Third, populist parties may increase civic participation in organization or association. For example, Latin American populists used organizations such as trade unions to engage in civil society, while mobilizing citizens in unmediated manner (Roberts, 2006; Roberts, 2007). In Europe, extreme right-wing organizations which opposed to immigrants have contributed to the rise of ethno-nationalist populism today (Bonikowski, 2017). In terms of it, the emergence of populist parties is likely to encourage citizens to join the political organization or association. However, an empirical study shows that individuals belonging to associations are less likely to support populist (Boeri et al., 2018). It argues that "associations provide ideological anchors, identities, and voice mechanisms" so that people who belong to associations do not support populist parties (Boeri et al., 2018). Also, it suggests that "associations promote social responsibility and acts as a protective shield against populism" (Boeri et al., 2018). However, these findings will not mean that populist parties cannot make citizens participate in a particular organization. This is because there will be some organizations that support populism. Also, that research may be the result of the large number of people who are already affiliated with a strong ideological identity. Meanwhile, Boeri et al. (2018) shows that when populists take power, the proportion of people in unions decreases. However, the analysis overlooked the decline trend in union power after neo-liberal globalization (Vachon et al., 2016) and only control economic crisis as dummy variable, and the unions were the only one subject in the analysis. Therefore, this paper does not abandon the possibility that populist parties mobilize the participation on political association and organization.

Fourth, it is also expected that populist parties encourage citizens to *participate in* party or action group. Considering the fact that populists today also play politics through

institutional political party, it is natural to expect citizens who are motivated by populists to participate in political party. Then, how about action groups? Unlike political parties and general interest organizations, action groups are usually small and short-lived, but they are very purpose intensive and it is usually not for members' interest like interest groups. It is also considered as a channel for direct democracy in a highly institutionalized representative democracy (Rochon, 1982). In fact, due to these characteristics, in countries where democracy is not mature, it may be unlikely that citizens will use action groups as a medium for political activities. Notwithstanding, populism may increase its activity because it is effective way for direct democracy.

In sum, this paper will use *participating in party or action group, participating in organization or association, wearing some political symbols, public demonstration and signing in petition, boycotting,* as dependent variables.

Hypotheses

This paper uses the parts of categorization of Leininger and Maurits (2020a) for setting hypotheses, previously described in the theory section. Although this categorization was used to analyze the impact of populist parties on voter turnout, but it is also useful to conduct this study in that it assumes several situations in which populist parties could exert political influence. Of their five categories, however, this paper will not consider two situations considered to be related only to the election. Consequently, this paper use three categories, (1) whether populist parties have at least one seat in a parliament, (2) the total voter shares of all populist parties, and (3) the total seats share of all populist parties as independent variables. In case of (1), when party is represented in a parliament, it will get public funding, stronger media attention and a stake in policy making (Dinas et al., 2015). (2) and (3) are related to size of populist parties. Why is it important? Because if the size is larger, it is expected that the effects by populist parties on civil society are likely to be bigger (Leininger and Maurits, 2020a). So, the hypotheses are as follows.

- H1-(W). If a populist party is represented more than least one seat in a parliament, the degree of participation on (W) by people is higher.
- H2-(W). If the total voter shares of all populist parties in last election is higher, the degree of participation on (W) by people is higher.
- H3-(W). If the total seats share of all populist parties is higher, the degree of participation on (W) by people is higher.
- * W: participating in party or action group, participating in organization or association, wearing some political symbols (badge, sticker), public demonstration, singing in petition and boycotting

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study sets 30 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) as the subjects of study because Europe has become the central area of the rise of populist parties (Algan et

al., 2017). For example, there are successful populist parties such as Rassemblement National of Le Pen in France, Podemos in Spain, Party for Freedom of Geert Wilders in Netherlands, Golden Dawn in Greece, AfD in Germany, Jobbik in Hungary, Law and Justice in Poland, Law and Justice in Poland etc. This study only considered populist parties from the 1990s to 2016.¹

Data is "Replication Data for: Do Populist Parties Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence from over 40 Years of Electoral History in 31 European Democracies" constructed by Leininger and Maurits (2020b).² To construct the data, they collected and coded information relating to populist parties that existed since the 1970s to 2016 in 31 European democracies, where they integrated election data from ParGov database (Döring & Manow, 2016). From this data, the independent variables are constructed. The two independent variables (the total voter shares of all populist parties in last election, the total seats share of all populist parties) are operationalized into percentages, and another independent variable (whether populist parties have at least one seat in a parliament) is coded as dummy.

The dependent variables are from European Social Survey (ESS), which were conducted every two years from 2002 to 2017. These eight waves survey ask questions in the section "Now we want to ask a few questions about politics and government." And They ask "There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?" Based on the questions, the surveys commonly provide data about "worked in a political party or action group" "worked in another organization or association," "worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker," "Taken part in a lawful public demonstration," "Boycotted certain products" from the respondents. The respondents conducted the survey by choosing "yes" or "no" answer to whether they did or are doing each activity. Based on it, this study coded the degree of each political participation as percentage by country so that it becomes possible to test hypotheses in country-level. In fact, since this data provides data from 2002, this study inevitably limits the period of research every two year from 2002 to 2016.

In case of control variables, this study controls 7 variables. Stockemer (2014) reviews and aggregates the vast existing studies and presents five macro variables that can affect a country's level of political participation. The first variable is "A country's material wealth." The more economically developed countries, people will participate in politics. In this study, it is operationalized into (Log) GDP Per capita and the data is from World Bank. The second variable is "democracy." The more democratic a country is, the easier people participate in politics because it guarantees individual rights and freedom. In this study, the level of democracy is operationalized based on the Polity V (2020) data. The third is "income inequalities." Income inequality could be a major cause for people to feel deprived (Stockemer, 2014). And if the relative deprivation increases, the likelihood of protest by individuals who are dissatisfied with reality could also increase (Seidman, 1994). So, the income inequality could affect political participation. In this work, it is operationalized into GINI coefficient and the data is from World Bank. The fourth variable is "turnout in the last election" because the trend of conventional political participation could affect unconventional political participation. The turnout is obtained from the data established by Leininger and Maurits (2020b). But the variable "Federalism" suggested by Stockemer (2014) is not considered in this study because of collinearity which is from non-change of

¹ For a list of populist parties used in the study, see Leininger and Maurits (2020b).

² I exclude Malta because there is no available data in ESS in terms of a limited research period.

the political system in each country within the research period. Additionally, this study adds unemployment rate, trade openness and the level of education in each country. In the case of unemployment rate, the left-wing populist party is particularly likely to draw votes from citizens (Rooduijn et al., 2017). In this vein, high unemployment rates could lead to civic political participation. This data is from World Bank. Often, the success of populist parties in Europe is attributed to losers due to globalization (Bornschier, 2010; Kaltwasser, 2015; Kriesi et al., 2006). Therefore, it is reasonable to control trade openness which is symbol of globalization. Trade openness is operationalized into the sum of country's exports and imports as a share of that country's GDP (in %) and the data is from Feenstra et al. (2015). Finally, education is an important factor affecting political participation because critical thinking helps people understand the political process (Marien et al., 2010). Education is coded as the average years of education in the total population aged 15 years and older by country. The data is from V-dem data made by Coppedge et al. (2020).

Basically, the database is a panel data so that Hausman test was conducted. The result is significant so that this study should proceed the analysis by fixed effect model. Especially this study uses year-fixed effect model because it makes more robust model, and each country is clustered. Also, the results of the multicollinearity test shows that there is no multicollinearity problem in that VIF index is lower than 3.

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics is shown in Table 1. In terms of populist party variables, observation is 240, but that of dependent variables are 180 (Organization or Association (OA) is 178). It means that there are missing observations because ESS database often omits some countries in each wave. Meanwhile, the low share of votes or seats indicates that the populist parties never dominated Europe from 2002 to 2016 generally.

| Table 1. Descriptive Statistics | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|--|--|--|
| Variable | Obs | Mean | S.D. | Min | Max | | | | |
| Populist Representation | 240 | 0.68 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 | | | | |
| Populist Vote Share | 240 | 14.3 | 15.53 | 0 | 69.4 | | | | |
| Populist Seat Share | 240 | 12.29 | 15.16 | 0 | 69.28 | | | | |
| Left Populist Representation | 240 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 | | | | |
| Left Populist Vote Share | 240 | 2.05 | 5.25 | 0 | 35.46 | | | | |
| Left Populist Seat Share | 240 | 1.85 | 5.72 | 0 | 48.33 | | | | |
| Right Populist Representation | 240 | 0.45 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 | | | | |
| Right Populist Vote Share | 240 | 8.77 | 13.48 | 0 | 69.4 | | | | |
| Right Populist Seat Share | 240 | 6.95 | 11.93 | 0 | 61.25 | | | | |
| Turnout | 240 | 68.9 | 12.61 | 40.51 | 91.92 | | | | |
| Party or Action Group (PA) | 185 | 4.24 | 2.13 | 0.83 | 14.24 | | | | |
| Campaign Badge or Sticker (CBS) | 185 | 8.04 | 7.05 | 0.85 | 43.97 | | | | |
| Boycotting (BC) | 185 | 16.02 | 11.21 | 0.44 | 47.75 | | | | |
| Public Demonstration (PD) | 185 | 6.73 | 5.26 | 1.38 | 33.64 | | | | |

T I I **I** D

| Variable | Obs | Mean | S.D. | Min | Max |
|----------------------------------|-----|--------|-------|-------|--------|
| Signing in Petition (SP) | 185 | 22.48 | 12.73 | 2.83 | 57.65 |
| Organization or Association (OA) | 178 | 15.44 | 10.82 | 0.88 | 49.47 |
| Log GDP per capita | 240 | 10.26 | 0.72 | 8.42 | 11.6 |
| GINI | 222 | 0.3 | 0.04 | 0.22 | 0.4 |
| Democracy | 224 | 9.67 | 0.61 | 8 | 10 |
| Education | 216 | 11.15 | 1.19 | 7.44 | 13.3 |
| Unemployment Rate | 240 | 8.47 | 4.48 | 2.55 | 26.49 |
| Trade Openness | 240 | 109.17 | 56.32 | 47.54 | 413.52 |

Now, Table 2 shows the results of the analysis of all 30 European countries. The analysis shows that populist parties have no significant effect on each way of political participation. These results can be interpreted to mean that the rise of populist parties does not mobilize people to participate in politics, at least within Europe. Therefore, the result not only does not support our hypotheses, but also add skeptical evidence to the universal applicability of the theory that populism could increase civic political participation.

| Table 2. Case of All 50 European Countries | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | | | | | |
| Variables | PA | OA | CBS | PD | SP | BC | | | | | |
| Populist Representation | 0.59 | 2.04 | 1.15 | 0.61 | 0.17 | 0.92 | | | | | |
| | (0.36) | (1.30) | (0.70) | (0.58) | (1.78) | (1.66) | | | | | |
| Populist Vote Share | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.03 | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.04 | | | | | |
| | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | | | | | |
| Populist Seat Share | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.00 | 0.05 | 0.03 | -0.00 | | | | | |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.02) | | | | | |

Table 2. Case of All 30 European Countries

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05

Now, we look at whether there are differences in the ideological difference of populist parties. Table 3 analyzes only the case of left-wing populist parties, while Table 4 analyzes only the case of right-wing populist parties. According to the analysis, right-wing populist parties have no significant results. On the other hand, if the left-wing populist party is represented in a parliament, the participation rate of *boycotting* (p<.05) increases by about 3.27% with statistical significance. It might be that boycotting movement is usually associated with progressive agendas. Political consumption, such as boycotting, plays a major role in achieving progressive goals such as social justice, human rights, equality and so on (Micheletti & Stolle, 2008). A study found that left-leaning people are more active in political consumption (StrØmsnes, 2009). Therefore, it is plausible scenario that the left-wing populist parties encourage people to do boycotting for progressive agenda. In other words, leftist populist parties might successfully mobilize people who support progressive ideas such as anti-capitalism, anti-neo liberalism and anti-corporate products.

| | Table 5. C | ase of Left I | opunsi i un | 105 | | |
|------------------------------|------------|---------------|-------------|--------|--------|--------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Variables | PA | OA | CBS | PD | SP | BC |
| Left Populist Representation | -0.16 | -0.06 | 0.09 | -0.29 | -1.01 | 3.27* |
| | (0.84) | (1.79) | (0.50) | (1.20) | (1.60) | (1.23) |
| Left Populist Vote Share | 0.08 | 0.16 | 0.00 | -0.09 | -0;06 | 0.21 |
| | (0.05) | (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.11) | (0.15) | (0.16) |
| Left Populist Seat Share | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.24 |
| | (0.05) | (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.15) |

Table 3. Case of Left Populist Parties

* p < 0.05

| Table 4. Case of Right Populist Parties | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--|--|--|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | | | | |
| Variables | PA | OA | CBS | PD | SP | BC | | | | |
| Right Populist Representation | 0.20 | 0.32 | 1.16 | 0.40 | -1.33 | 1.29 | | | | |
| | (0.43) | (1.76) | (0.84) | (0.91) | (1.39) | (1.72) | | | | |
| Right Populist Vote Share | -0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.03 | -0.00 | -0.04 | | | | |
| | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.02) | | | | |
| Right Populist Seat Share | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.03 | -0.01 | | | | |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.03) | | | | |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05

Finally, this study tested whether there are regional differences. Table 5 shows the analysis of CEE. The result shows that when populist parties are represented in a parliament, the number of people *participating in organization or association* (p<.05) increases by about 2.45%. Also, when the populist vote share increases one percent, the number of people participating in organization or association (p<.05) increases by about 0.03%, but the coefficient is extremely small so that it is not certain whether the effect really exists. Meanwhile, Table 6 shows the analysis results for Western Europe. Here, when populist parties are represented in a parliament, the *participating in party or action group*(p<.05) increases by approximately 0.97%. On the other hand, if the Populist Set Share is 1% higher, the *public demonstration* (p<.05) is shown to increase by about 0.08%, but it is also unclear whether its influence is meaningful because the effect is too small. This very weak effect is also in line with a prior study that populist tendencies do not affect participation in public demonstrations (Zaslove, Geurkink, Jacobs and Akkerman, 2020). According to Hutter and Kriesi (2013), the right-wing populists tend not to like protests. Based on the argument, even those who have a high populist tendency will likely not participate in public demonstrations if they are ideologically right-wingers. However, this perspective could not explain why the left-wing populist party also fails to mobilize public demonstration. Therefore, follow-up research should explore this subject.

Then, why is there a regional difference? Why are the people in CEE more likely to participate in the political organizations, but the people in Western Europe are more likely to go to the party politics or action groups? Maybe it is because two regions have different political background. In all the post-communist countries in CEE, the people have been losing interest in becoming members of political parties because the parties were connected to the compromised Communist Party in one way or another (Klingemann, Fuchs and Zielonka, 2006: 196). On the contrary, newly created interest groups and organizations are more popular than political parties in CEE (Klingemann, Fuchs and Zielonka, 2006: 196).

In sum, people in Western Europe, where democracy is consolidated through party politics, appear to support populism through an institutionalized party. But in CEE, the people seem to support populism through organizations outside the institutional sphere. Whatever is true, follow-up research has to try to explain these differences.

| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | | | | | | |
|--------|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| PA | OA | CBS | PD | SP | BC | | | | | | |
| 0.91 | 2.45* | 1.06 | 0.88 | -0.68 | -1.66 | | | | | | |
| (0.77) | (0.75) | (0.88) | (1.04) | (2.66) | (1.61) | | | | | | |
| 0.00 | 0.03* | -0.00 | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.01 | | | | | | |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.02) | | | | | | |
| -0.00 | 0.02 | -0.00 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 | | | | | | |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | | | | | |
| | (1) PA 0.91 (0.77) 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) | (1) (2) PA OA 0.91 2.45* (0.77) (0.75) 0.00 0.03* (0.01) (0.01) -0.00 0.02 (0.01) (0.01) | (1) (2) (3) PA OA CBS 0.91 2.45* 1.06 (0.77) (0.75) (0.88) 0.00 0.03* -0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) -0.00 0.02 -0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) | (1) (2) (3) (4) PA OA CBS PD 0.91 2.45* 1.06 0.88 (0.77) (0.75) (0.88) (1.04) 0.00 0.03* -0.00 0.02 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) -0.00 0.02 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) | (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)PAOACBSPDSP 0.91 2.45^* 1.06 0.88 -0.68 (0.77) (0.75) (0.88) (1.04) (2.66) 0.00 0.03^* -0.00 0.02 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) | | | | | | |

Table 5. Case of CEE Countries

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05

Table 6. Case of Western Europe Countries

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|-----------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Variables | PA | OA | CBS | PD | SP | BC |
| Populist Presentation | 0.96* | 2.80 | 1.17 | 0.80 | 1.48 | 2.00 |
| | (0.40) | (1.34) | (0.96) | (0.71) | (2.01) | (1.31) |
| Populist Vote Share | 0.00 | -0.07 | -0.02 | 0.01 | 0.03 | -0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.07) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| Populist Seat Share | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.08* | 0.08 | 0.02 |
| | (0.03) | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.05) |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05

CONCLUSION

In most cases, the impact of populist parties on various ways of participating in politics is not statistically significant. Therefore, there is still no evidence to support the theory that populist parties could increase civic political participation. However, this study led to some significant results when the analytical units are split more microscopically. First, when left populist party is represented in parliament, boycotting participation reveals higher with statistical significance. It might be that boycotting is usually for progressive agendas such as environment, human rights, social justice and so on.

Second, when Western Europe and CEE are analyzed separately, there are some significant results. When populist parties represent in a parliament in CEE and the larger the total number of seats in all populist parties, people are more likely to participate in association or organization. In Western Europe, when populist parties are represented in a parliament, people are more likely to participate in participate in participate.

Then, why does this regional difference occur? As mentioned, this may be due to different political contexts in Western and Eastern Europe. Western Europe, on average, has a longer and more solidified history of democracy than CEE. Moreover, since most of CEE was under communist rule, political parties would be linked to the Communist Party and perceived negatively by citizens and people in CEE usually prefer the activities of association or organizations rather than participating in party (Klingemann, Fuchs and Zielonka, 2006: 196). Also, since action groups tend to develop in highly institutionalized democracies (Rochon 1982), it would be natural that action groups are not statistically significant in CEE.

Finally, the larger the total number of seats in all populist parties, the more likely people are to participate public demonstration, but the effect seems so small that it is difficult to consider the result as meaningful. This weak effect is in line with the existing claim that those who support right-wing populist do not like protests (Hutter and Kriesi, 2013), but further research is needed because it cannot fully explain the result in that left-wing populist party also seems incapable of mobilizing public demonstrations.

So, what is the implications of this study? First, it implies that there is still a lack of empirical evidence supporting the argument that populism could increase civic political participation. Second, the impact of populism on civic political participation could vary by region and country, and especially political culture could create the difference. As seen in the differences of result between Western Europe and CEE, various historical and political experiences of countries in each region would lead to different political behaviors, which could also change the way populists influence civic political participation. Third, it is unclear whether populist ideological differences have significantly different impacts on civic political participation. Although there is a difference in boycotting, there are no differences in other dependent variables. However, this study inherently has the limitations of macro-level quantitative analysis but also through qualitative analysis of how populists influence the behavior of civic political participation at more micro-level units (regions, countries) and whether there are significant differences in their ideological characteristics.

Finally, this study does not reflect the period since 2017 when U.S. President Trump began his term. Given President Trump's widespread influence on populists around the world, follow-up research needs to be conducted by extending the research period.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Prof. Taedong Lee and Prof. Byungwon Woo in Department of Political Science & International Studies at Yonsei University, Seoul. They gave me valuable comments on previous version of this article. In addition, I would like to thank BK21 Solution-Seeking for Political Problems in the Age of Innovative Science and Technology in the Department of Political Science at Yonsei University Graduate School for funding.

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APPENDIX

| Table 7. Case of all 30 European Countries (Party or Action Group, Organization or Association, Campaign Badge or Sticker) | | | | | | | | | |
|--|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| VARIABLES | PA | PA | PA | OA | OA | OA | CBS | CBS | CBS |
| Populist Representation | 0.587 | | | 2.038 | | | 1.155 | | |
| | (0.358) | | | (1.304) | | | (0.696) | | |
| Populist Vote Share | | -0.00716 | | | -0.0272 | | | -0.00879 | |
| | | (0.00912) | | | (0.0231) | | | (0.0165) | |
| Populist Seat Share | | | -0.00268 | | | -0.00792 | | | -0.00403 |
| | | | (0.0152) | | | (0.0329) | | | (0.0232) |
| Log (GDP) | 3.930 | 2.902 | 3.016 | 5.828 | 2.214 | 2.671 | 7.390 | 5.475 | 5.606 |
| | (2.414) | (2.240) | (2.231) | (8.345) | (7.469) | (7.717) | (5.227) | (4.617) | (4.747) |
| Democracy | -0.140 | -0.0930 | -0.115 | 1.801* | 1.975* | 1.877* | 0.219 | 0.282 | 0.259 |
| | (0.168) | (0.243) | (0.237) | (0.849) | (0.729) | (0.718) | (0.308) | (0.330) | (0.382) |
| GINI | -1.468 | 0.640 | 0.358 | -15.89 | -8.488 | -9.561 | -15.09 | -11.16 | -11.51 |
| | (4.265) | (4.521) | (4.593) | (15.66) | (18.60) | (19.03) | (9.301) | (11.13) | (11.08) |
| Turnout | 0.0102 | 0.00832 | 0.0116 | -0.108 | -0.116 | -0.104 | 0.135† | 0.133† | 0.137† |
| | (0.0409) | (0.0406) | (0.0396) | (0.124) | (0.125) | (0.125) | (0.0677) | (0.0663) | (0.0687) |
| Education | -0.848 | -0.412 | -0.492 | -7.960 | -6.406 | -6.751 | -1.778 | -1.018 | -1.102 |
| | (1.541) | (1.598) | (1.628) | (4.777) | (4.658) | (5.005) | (2.942) | (2.964) | (2.965) |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.103 | 0.0880 | 0.0897 | 0.157 | 0.105 | 0.113 | 0.121 | 0.0941 | 0.0959 |
| | (0.0806) | (0.0751) | (0.0770) | (0.203) | (0.185) | (0.191) | (0.0990) | (0.0914) | (0.0949) |
| Trade Openness | -0.00780 | -0.00537 | -0.00641 | -0.0747 | -0.0659 | -0.0698 | -0.0669* | -0.0627* | -0.0641* |
| | (0.0112) | (0.0112) | (0.0108) | (0.0449) | (0.0487) | (0.0469) | (0.0265) | (0.0272) | (0.0282) |
| Constant | -25.83 | -20.80 | -20.96 | 40.31 | 57.70 | 57.40 | -51.76 | -41.71 | -42.01 |
| | (25.67) | (22.38) | (23.11) | (74.62) | (64.74) | (67.02) | (52.95) | (47.92) | (46.97) |
| Observations | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 |
| R-squared | 0.173 | 0.161 | 0.158 | 0.378 | 0.365 | 0.361 | 0.259 | 0.243 | 0.242 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses

| | (Publi | c Demor | istration, | Signing | in Petitio | п, воусо | tting) | | |
|----------------------------|----------|----------|------------|----------|------------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) |
| VARIABLES | PD | PD | PD | SP | SP | SP | BC | BC | BC |
| Populist Representation | 0.614 | | | 0.174 | | | 0.925 | | |
| | (0.579) | | | (1.775) | | | (1.663) | | |
| Populist Vote Share | | 0.0164 | | | -0.00966 | | | -0.0352† | |
| | | (0.0150) | | | (0.0348) | | | (0.0176) | |
| Populist Seat Share | | | 0.0503† | | | 0.0326 | | | -0.000347 |
| | | | (0.0271) | | | (0.0411) | | | (0.0205) |
| Log (GDP) | 0.882 | 0.292 | 0.556 | 14.05 | 13.59 | 14.18 | 9.413 | 7.307 | 8.019 |
| | (3.880) | (3.816) | (4.712) | (9.031) | (8.293) | (8.605) | (7.835) | (6.779) | (7.212) |
| Democracy | 0.240 | 0.160 | -0.0605 | 0.553 | 0.607 | 0.355 | 1.037 | 1.239 | 1.051 |
| | (0.334) | (0.398) | (0.453) | (1.388) | (1.478) | (1.452) | (1.055) | (0.867) | (0.906) |
| GINI | 1.969 | 3.220 | 3.807 | -10.67 | -9.745 | -10.17 | 14.75 | 19.02 | 17.62 |
| | (4.379) | (4.867) | (4.883) | (16.22) | (15.54) | (15.42) | (16.50) | (19.57) | (20.09) |
| Turnout | 0.0705 | 0.0795 | 0.0715 | -0.211 | -0.215 | -0.211 | -0.160 | -0.174 | -0.158 |
| | (0.0682) | (0.0697) | (0.0671) | (0.138) | (0.136) | (0.139) | (0.129) | (0.124) | (0.127) |
| Education | 3.965† | 3.982 | 3.315 | 5.750 | 6.017 | 5.212 | 1.006 | 2.132 | 1.492 |
| | (2.273) | (2.541) | (2.560) | (4.073) | (4.094) | (4.405) | (4.726) | (4.463) | (4.712) |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.0757 | 0.0707 | 0.0886 | 0.354† | 0.346† | 0.366† | 0.141 | 0.107 | 0.122 |
| | (0.0600) | (0.0593) | (0.0709) | (0.191) | (0.186) | (0.195) | (0.163) | (0.157) | (0.158) |
| Trade Openness | 0.00209 | 0.00167 | 0.00669 | -0.0662 | -0.0646 | -0.0638 | -0.124** | -0.118** | -0.122** |
| | (0.0261) | (0.0265) | (0.0249) | (0.0409) | (0.0404) | (0.0412) | (0.0415) | (0.0388) | (0.0402) |
| Constant | -55.18 | -49.22 | -42.75 | -171.5† | -170.2* | -165.4† | -87.75 | -80.53 | -79.54 |
| | (43.30) | (41.16) | (44.18) | (84.21) | (80.90) | (83.35) | (76.01) | (72.06) | (71.58) |
| Observations | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 |
| R-squared | 0.109 | 0.109 | 0.131 | 0.286 | 0.286 | 0.290 | 0.494 | 0.499 | 0.491 |

 Table 8. Case of all 30 European Countries

 (Public Demonstration, Signing in Petition, Boycotting)

| (Part | (Party or Action Group, Organization or Association, Campaign Badge or Sticker) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | | |
| VARIABLES | PA | PA | PA | OA | OA | OA | CBS | CBS | CBS | | |
| Left Populist Representation | -0.163 | | | -0.0576 | | | 0.0944 | | | | |
| | (0.842) | | | (1.788) | | | (0.497) | | | | |
| Left Populist Vote Share | | 0.0765 | | | 0.164 | | | 0.00220 | | | |
| | | (0.0485) | | | (0.119) | | | (0.0603) | | | |
| Left Populist Seat Share | | | 0.0673 | | | 0.221† | | | 0.0376 | | |
| | | | (0.0480) | | | (0.118) | | | (0.0617) | | |
| Log (GDP) | 2.962 | 2.888 | 2.737 | 2.735 | 2.425 | 1.743 | 5.704 | 5.649 | 5.480 | | |
| | (2.395) | (2.218) | (2.178) | (8.113) | (7.669) | (7.686) | (4.789) | (4.685) | (4.709) | | |
| Democracy | -0.140 | -0.126 | -0.173 | 1.826* | 1.841* | 1.692* | 0.240 | 0.235 | 0.211 | | |
| | (0.198) | (0.218) | (0.207) | (0.768) | (0.720) | (0.715) | (0.296) | (0.294) | (0.297) | | |
| GINI | 0.383 | 0.0526 | 0.0616 | -9.561 | -10.22 | -10.53 | -11.53 | -11.52 | -11.67 | | |
| | (4.574) | (4.363) | (4.336) | (19.02) | (18.77) | (18.50) | (11.05) | (11.08) | (11.14) | | |
| Turnout | 0.0115 | 0.0141 | 0.0161 | -0.104 | -0.0984 | -0.0889 | 0.137† | 0.137† | 0.140* | | |
| | (0.0399) | (0.0370) | (0.0367) | (0.125) | (0.118) | (0.115) | (0.0686) | (0.0676) | (0.0663) | | |
| Education | -0.481 | -0.473 | -0.346 | -6.882 | -6.753 | -6.253 | -1.216 | -1.177 | -1.069 | | |
| | (1.494) | (1.439) | (1.458) | (4.794) | (4.442) | (4.285) | (3.083) | (3.082) | (3.134) | | |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.0906 | 0.0872 | 0.0876 | 0.116 | 0.108 | 0.105 | 0.0982 | 0.0978 | 0.0960 | | |
| | (0.0776) | (0.0740) | (0.0732) | (0.191) | (0.186) | (0.181) | (0.0929) | (0.0938) | (0.0930) | | |
| Trade Openness | -0.00603 | -0.00858 | -0.00969 | -0.0692 | -0.0743 | -0.0806 | -0.0639* | -0.0639* | -0.0657* | | |
| | (0.0116) | (0.0122) | (0.0125) | (0.0481) | (0.0495) | (0.0504) | (0.0279) | (0.0277) | (0.0281) | | |
| Constant | -20.30 | -19.71 | -19.09 | 58.60 | 60.37 | 63.41 | -41.62 | -41.43 | -40.62 | | |
| | (24.22) | (22.82) | (22.24) | (68.66) | (66.25) | (64.95) | (49.21) | (48.70) | (48.15) | | |
| Observations | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | | |
| R-squared | 0.158 | 0.173 | 0.173 | 0.361 | 0.367 | 0.377 | 0.242 | 0.242 | 0.243 | | |

| Table 9. Case of Left Populist Parties |
|---|
| (Party or Action Group, Organization or Association, Compaign Badge or Sticker) |

| | (Put | blic Demo | onstration. | , Signing | in Petitioi | n, Boycol | ung) | | |
|---------------------------------|----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) |
| VARIABLES | PD | PD | PD | SP | SP | SP | BC | BC | BC |
| Left Populist Representation | -0.286 | | | -1.009 | | | 3.272* | | |
| | (1.201) | | | (1.603) | | | (1.230) | | |
| Left Populist Vote Share | | -0.0890 | | | -0.0640 | | | 0.212 | |
| | | (0.108) | | | (0.149) | | | (0.159) | |
| Left Populist Seat Share | | | 0.0139 | | | 0.0347 | | | 0.244 |
| | | | (0.0965) | | | (0.133) | | | (0.146) |
| Log (GDP) | -0.191 | 0.144 | -0.106 | 13.26 | 13.92 | 13.63 | 9.741 | 7.583 | 6.896 |
| | (3.637) | (3.486) | (3.669) | (8.679) | (8.214) | (8.245) | (6.974) | (7.097) | (7.157) |
| Democracy | 0.234 | 0.242 | 0.240 | 0.502 | 0.550 | 0.534 | 1.221 | 1.064 | 0.898 |
| | (0.410) | (0.350) | (0.351) | (1.347) | (1.381) | (1.428) | (0.803) | (0.885) | (0.915) |
| GINI | 3.925 | 4.226 | 3.814 | -9.951 | -9.879 | -10.28 | 17.04 | 16.78 | 16.56 |
| | (5.026) | (4.896) | (5.103) | (15.67) | (15.74) | (15.61) | (19.82) | (19.70) | (19.41) |
| Turnout | 0.0718 | 0.0691 | 0.0729 | -0.211 | -0.212 | -0.208 | -0.156 | -0.151 | -0.142 |
| | (0.0676) | (0.0702) | (0.0669) | (0.138) | (0.140) | (0.137) | (0.125) | (0.116) | (0.110) |
| Education | 4.394† | 4.202 | 4.324 | 6.232 | 5.781 | 5.942 | 0.216 | 1.681 | 2.203 |
| | (2.246) | (2.524) | (2.631) | (4.176) | (4.028) | (3.920) | (4.504) | (4.287) | (3.984) |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.0627 | 0.0681 | 0.0629 | 0.347† | 0.353† | 0.348† | 0.132 | 0.112 | 0.110 |
| | (0.0592) | (0.0603) | (0.0582) | (0.187) | (0.187) | (0.185) | (0.156) | (0.155) | (0.152) |
| Trade Openness | 0.00409 | 0.00641 | 0.00299 | -0.0644 | -0.0638 | -0.0675 | -0.126** | -0.128** | -0.134** |
| | (0.0265) | (0.0278) | (0.0275) | (0.0413) | (0.0420) | (0.0440) | (0.0406) | (0.0411) | (0.0418) |
| Constant | -49.20 | -50.72 | -49.39 | -168.1† | -170.6* | -169.1* | -85.25 | -77.06 | -74.07 |
| | (42.16) | (40.76) | (40.81) | (81.69) | (80.96) | (80.70) | (69.70) | (68.96) | (67.85) |
| Observations | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 |
| R-squared | 0.106 | 0.110 | 0.105 | 0.287 | 0.287 | 0.286 | 0.510 | 0.502 | 0.511 |

 Table 10. Case of Left Populist Parties

 (Public Demonstration, Signing in Petition, Boycotting)

| (Party | (Party or Action Group, Organization or Association, Campaign Badge or Sticker) | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | |
| VARIABLES | PA | PA | PA | OA | OA | OA | CBS | CBS | CBS | |
| Right Populist Representation | 0.198 | | | 0.322 | | | 1.157 | | | |
| | (0.426) | | | (1.760) | | | (0.839) | | | |
| Right Populist Vote Share | | -0.00109 | | | -0.0145 | | | 0.00241 | | |
| | | (0.0115) | | | (0.0195) | | | (0.0161) | | |
| Right Populist Seat Share | | | 0.00565 | | | 0.00277 | | | 0.00592 | |
| | | | (0.0194) | | | (0.0313) | | | (0.0264) | |
| Log (GDP) | 3.172 | 3.072 | 2.894 | 2.968 | 3.096 | 2.690 | 6.382 | 5.599 | 5.493 | |
| | (2.147) | (2.190) | (2.186) | (8.070) | (7.330) | (7.263) | (4.945) | (4.631) | (4.452) | |
| Democracy | -0.115 | -0.127 | -0.156 | 1.856* | 1.890* | 1.817* | 0.332 | 0.224 | 0.209 | |
| | (0.169) | (0.227) | (0.227) | (0.768) | (0.753) | (0.770) | (0.346) | (0.318) | (0.361) | |
| GINI | -0.104 | 0.371 | 0.516 | -10.31 | -9.343 | -9.492 | -14.18 | -11.55 | -11.34 | |
| | (4.914) | (4.614) | (4.572) | (18.09) | (18.82) | (19.29) | (9.338) | (11.09) | (11.13) | |
| Turnout | 0.0138 | 0.0110 | 0.0122 | -0.100 | -0.112 | -0.103 | 0.150* | 0.139† | 0.138† | |
| | (0.0425) | (0.0424) | (0.0408) | (0.134) | (0.129) | (0.125) | (0.0662) | (0.0685) | (0.0687) | |
| Education | -0.660 | -0.523 | -0.687 | -7.092 | -6.622 | -6.974 | -1.857 | -1.226 | -1.329 | |
| | (1.550) | (1.551) | (1.645) | (4.724) | (4.678) | (5.097) | (2.790) | (3.029) | (3.112) | |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.0933 | 0.0910 | 0.0921 | 0.120 | 0.116 | 0.117 | 0.111 | 0.0981 | 0.0990 | |
| | (0.0768) | (0.0759) | (0.0772) | (0.197) | (0.185) | (0.192) | (0.102) | (0.0935) | (0.0957) | |
| Trade Openness | -0.00591 | -0.00619 | -0.00543 | -0.0688 | -0.0684 | -0.0689 | -0.0618* | -0.0640* | -0.0630* | |
| | (0.0116) | (0.0112) | (0.0113) | (0.0458) | (0.0484) | (0.0461) | (0.0264) | (0.0280) | (0.0285) | |
| Constant | -20.89 | -21.09 | -17.37 | 58.01 | 51.83 | 60.07 | -43.19 | -40.35 | -38.08 | |
| | (23.89) | (24.47) | (26.32) | (69.00) | (63.31) | (64.15) | (49.09) | (47.37) | (44.24) | |
| Observations | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | |
| R-squared | 0.159 | 0.157 | 0.159 | 0.361 | 0.362 | 0.361 | 0.260 | 0.242 | 0.242 | |

(Party or Action Group, Organization or Association, Comparing Bodge or Sticker)

Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1

| (Public Demonstration, Signing in Petition, Boycoung) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|
| | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | |
| VARIABLES | PD | PD | PD | SP | SP | SP | BC | BC | BC | |
| Right Populist Representation | 0.402 | | | -1.333 | | | 1.291 | | | |
| | (0.913) | | | (1.395) | | | (1.719) | | | |
| Right Populist Vote Share | | 0.0346 | | | -0.00321 | | | -0.0385† | | |
| | | (0.0216) | | | (0.0371) | | | (0.0207) | | |
| Right Populist Seat Share | | | 0.0699† | | | 0.0324 | | | -0.0145 | |
| | | | (0.0358) | | | (0.0463) | | | (0.0297) | |
| Log (GDP) | 0.212 | -0.831 | -1.944 | 12.95 | 13.86 | 12.91 | 8.836 | 8.901 | 8.419 | |
| | (3.570) | (3.702) | (4.184) | (8.047) | (8.163) | (8.346) | (7.492) | (6.812) | (6.723) | |
| Democracy | 0.282 | 0.102 | -0.0485 | 0.443 | 0.569 | 0.417 | 1.157 | 1.212 | 1.111 | |
| | (0.321) | (0.373) | (0.431) | (1.564) | (1.451) | (1.408) | (1.186) | (0.843) | (0.922) | |
| GINI | 2.946 | 3.329 | 5.877 | -7.056 | -10.08 | -9.201 | 14.64 | 18.23 | 17.20 | |
| | (4.795) | (4.977) | (4.946) | (15.65) | (15.58) | (15.76) | (16.76) | (19.45) | (20.66) | |
| Turnout | 0.0765 | 0.0919 | 0.0801 | -0.225 | -0.212 | -0.207 | -0.143 | -0.180 | -0.160 | |
| | (0.0679) | (0.0723) | (0.0707) | (0.133) | (0.134) | (0.139) | (0.135) | (0.125) | (0.127) | |
| Education | 4.048 | 3.612 | 2.516 | 6.620† | 5.903 | 5.019 | 0.730 | 2.233 | 1.853 | |
| | (2.409) | (2.566) | (2.823) | (3.757) | (4.151) | (4.678) | (4.750) | (4.452) | (4.807) | |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.0681 | 0.0659 | 0.0759 | 0.335† | 0.350† | 0.356† | 0.137 | 0.120 | 0.120 | |
| | (0.0578) | (0.0615) | (0.0755) | (0.173) | (0.186) | (0.195) | (0.165) | (0.154) | (0.157) | |
| Trade Openness | 0.00440 | 0.00158 | 0.0139 | -0.0681† | -0.0656 | -0.0610 | -0.120** | -0.120** | -0.124** | |
| | (0.0250) | (0.0275) | (0.0254) | (0.0374) | (0.0404) | (0.0412) | (0.0393) | (0.0387) | (0.0396) | |
| Constant | -50.30 | -33.80 | -9.917 | -167.9* | -171.4* | -151.4† | -81.42 | -97.17 | -87.76 | |
| | (40.40) | (41.38) | (42.41) | (77.41) | (82.20) | (85.87) | (71.86) | (70.30) | (67.81) | |
| Observations | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | 153 | |
| R-squared | 0.107 | 0.121 | 0.149 | 0.293 | 0.286 | 0.289 | 0.499 | 0.499 | 0.491 | |

 Table 12. Case of Right Populist Parties

 (Public Demonstration, Signing in Petition, Boycotting)

| (Party or Action Group, Organization or Association, Campaign Badge or Sticker) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| VARIABLES | PA | PA | PA | OA | OA | OA | CBS | CBS | CBS |
| Populist Representation | 0.914 | | | 2.445* | | | 1.061 | | |
| | (0.766) | | | (0.746) | | | (0.884) | | |
| Populist Vote Share | | 0.000449 | | | 0.0289* | | | -0.00210 | |
| | | (0.00975) | | | (0.0121) | | | (0.0120) | |
| Populist Seat Share | | | -0.00123 | | | 0.0190 | | | -0.00211 |
| | | | (0.00641) | | | (0.0114) | | | (0.00898) |
| Log (GDP) | 5.592 | 1.858 | 1.643 | 2.666 | -2.682 | -5.373 | 6.099 | 1.327 | 1.440 |
| | (3.962) | (1.973) | (1.552) | (8.997) | (5.713) | (5.681) | (4.423) | (4.290) | (4.350) |
| GINI | -0.781 | 0.424 | 0.406 | -16.71 | -15.69 | -12.55 | -2.888 | -1.281 | -1.542 |
| | (3.054) | (2.834) | (2.628) | (11.90) | (12.52) | (11.87) | (4.940) | (4.538) | (4.613) |
| Turnout | 0.0984** | 0.0763** | 0.0761** | 0.173** | 0.128† | 0.111 | 0.200** | 0.173** | 0.174** |
| | (0.0220) | (0.0164) | (0.0151) | (0.0390) | (0.0558) | (0.0597) | (0.0392) | (0.0378) | (0.0372) |
| Education | -0.959 | -0.847 | -0.762 | -4.390 | -5.552† | -4.973 | 1.743 | 2.012 | 2.006 |
| | (0.818) | (1.336) | (1.171) | (3.221) | (2.620) | (2.942) | (2.237) | (2.635) | (2.547) |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.0572* | 0.00564 | 0.00514 | 0.0480 | -0.0927 | -0.0814 | 0.112 | 0.0526 | 0.0515 |
| | (0.0222) | (0.0496) | (0.0476) | (0.0717) | (0.0624) | (0.0610) | (0.0605) | (0.0832) | (0.0820) |
| Trade Openness | 0.0286† | 0.0320 | 0.0312 | 0.0365 | 0.0548 | 0.0547 | 0.00682 | 0.00989 | 0.00954 |
| | (0.0126) | (0.0175) | (0.0165) | (0.0306) | (0.0351) | (0.0384) | (0.0217) | (0.0233) | (0.0230) |
| Constant | -47.35 | -12.51 | -11.33 | 15.05 | 79.96† | 98.22† | -84.39† | -41.30 | -42.20 |
| | (32.55) | (9.187) | (10.84) | (64.14) | (38.92) | (47.15) | (36.44) | (25.80) | (29.41) |
| Observations | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 |
| R-squared | 0.522 | 0.473 | 0.473 | 0.516 | 0.510 | 0.467 | 0.614 | 0.590 | 0.590 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses % The variable "Democracy" is deleted in this table because of collinearity ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1

| (Public Demonstration, Signing in Petition, Boycotting) | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|--|
| | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | |
| VARIABLES | PD | PD | PD | SP | SP | SP | BC | BC | BC | |
| Populist Representation | 0.880 | | | -0.682 | | | -1.665 | | | |
| | (1.043) | | | (2.660) | | | (1.611) | | | |
| Populist Vote Share | | 0.0206 | | | -0.00571 | | | -0.0100 | | |
| | | (0.0169) | | | (0.0139) | | | (0.0152) | | |
| Populist Seat Share | | | 0.0230 | | | -0.00783 | | | 0.000300 | |
| | | | (0.0197) | | | (0.00753) | | | (0.0140) | |
| Log (GDP) | 1.951 | 1.734 | 0.893 | 1.486 | 3.371 | 3.441 | 3.756 | 9.014 | 10.73† | |
| | (10.01) | (8.747) | (8.739) | (21.89) | (16.03) | (15.29) | (10.94) | (5.232) | (4.689) | |
| GINI | 4.384 | 3.935 | 6.592 | -11.14 | -11.61 | -12.41 | -2.242 | -3.702 | -4.488 | |
| | (8.739) | (10.18) | (7.950) | (12.92) | (13.38) | (12.65) | (21.74) | (20.96) | (19.76) | |
| Turnout | 0.0734 | 0.0623 | 0.0501 | 0.354* | 0.368* | 0.371* | 0.182* | 0.217* | 0.223** | |
| | (0.0534) | (0.0447) | (0.0528) | (0.134) | (0.110) | (0.110) | (0.0618) | (0.0674) | (0.0627) | |
| Education | 3.592 | 2.636 | 2.574 | -9.881† | -9.681† | -9.592† | 0.249 | 0.530 | -0.0139 | |
| | (5.623) | (6.139) | (5.908) | (4.386) | (5.008) | (4.763) | (3.649) | (3.387) | (3.623) | |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.0969 | 0.0453 | 0.0575 | 0.00348 | 0.0425 | 0.0384 | 0.303* | 0.398** | 0.397** | |
| | (0.216) | (0.160) | (0.159) | (0.243) | (0.213) | (0.209) | (0.0909) | (0.0458) | (0.0556) | |
| Trade Openness | -0.0220 | -0.0120 | -0.00733 | -0.0327 | -0.0370 | -0.0390 | -0.0173 | -0.0266 | -0.0231 | |
| | (0.0535) | (0.0527) | (0.0543) | (0.0681) | (0.0701) | (0.0693) | (0.0526) | (0.0567) | (0.0582) | |
| Constant | -57.87 | -44.91 | -37.51 | 82.61 | 62.12 | 60.91 | -44.21 | -98.25* | -108.6* | |
| | (137.5) | (99.82) | (104.7) | (208.8) | (159.2) | (158.4) | (83.46) | (39.35) | (36.37) | |
| Observations | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 41 | |
| R-squared | 0.274 | 0.302 | 0.318 | 0.567 | 0.566 | 0.567 | 0.469 | 0.452 | 0.447 | |

 Table 13. Case of CEE

 (Public Demonstration, Signing in Petition, Boycotting)

| Iable 14. Case of Western Europe (Party or Action Group, Organization or Association, Campaign Badge or Sticker) | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|
| (1 001) 01110 | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | |
| VARIABLES | PA | PA | PA | OA | OA | OA | CBS | CBS | CBS | |
| Populist Representation | 0.965* | | | 2.804† | | | 1.169 | | | |
| | (0.401) | | | (1.342) | | | (0.961) | | | |
| Populist Vote Share | | 0.00105 | | | -0.0714 | | | -0.0205 | | |
| | | (0.0268) | | | (0.0746) | | | (0.0405) | | |
| Populist Seat Share | | | 0.0185 | | | 0.00892 | | | 0.0250 | |
| | | | (0.0289) | | | (0.0768) | | | (0.0403) | |
| Log (GDP) | 3.307 | 3.449 | 4.034 | 11.25 | 7.879 | 11.82 | 13.11† | 12.17 | 14.08 | |
| | (3.135) | (3.830) | (3.678) | (14.19) | (14.66) | (15.41) | (7.411) | (8.253) | (8.170) | |
| Democracy | -0.184 | -0.182 | -0.308 | 1.912 | 2.275* | 1.870† | 0.130 | 0.237 | -0.0376 | |
| | (0.174) | (0.259) | (0.295) | (1.110) | (0.939) | (0.957) | (0.355) | (0.426) | (0.488) | |
| GINI | 0.350 | 2.983 | 2.539 | -7.175 | 1.601 | 0.303 | -21.51 | -17.99 | -18.92 | |
| | (5.117) | (5.384) | (5.175) | (21.19) | (24.79) | (23.04) | (13.67) | (15.43) | (15.10) | |
| Turnout | -0.0317 | -0.0172 | -0.0188 | -0.203 | -0.156 | -0.161 | 0.118 | 0.137 | 0.133 | |
| | (0.0483) | (0.0496) | (0.0496) | (0.139) | (0.157) | (0.154) | (0.0942) | (0.0901) | (0.0895) | |
| Education | -2.215 | -1.396 | -1.790 | -10.65† | -6.710 | -8.407 | -1.787 | -0.337 | -1.329 | |
| | (1.747) | (2.195) | (2.129) | (5.965) | (7.099) | (7.229) | (3.940) | (4.257) | (4.133) | |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.138 | 0.124 | 0.144 | 0.217 | 0.0938 | 0.184 | 0.178 | 0.137 | 0.188 | |
| | (0.0993) | (0.108) | (0.106) | (0.264) | (0.295) | (0.291) | (0.142) | (0.158) | (0.147) | |
| Trade Openness | -0.00246 | -0.00698 | -0.00844 | -0.0756 | -0.0839 | -0.0893 | -0.0964† | -0.100* | -0.104* | |
| | (0.0145) | (0.0143) | (0.0149) | (0.0647) | (0.0677) | (0.0699) | (0.0456) | (0.0429) | (0.0436) | |
| Constant | -2.487 | -14.15 | -14.55 | 17.87 | 3.181 | -15.58 | -108.0 | -116.5 | -122.7 | |
| | (34.98) | (34.91) | (35.99) | (149.5) | (145.5) | (155.5) | (80.04) | (92.87) | (90.41) | |
| Observations | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | |
| R-squared | 0.225 | 0.196 | 0.203 | 0.429 | 0.417 | 0.408 | 0.266 | 0.256 | 0.257 | |

 Table 14. Case of Western Europe

 Comparing Badge or Sticker)

| | (Public Demonstration, Signing in Petition, Boycotting) | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|--|
| | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | |
| VARIABLES | PD | PD | PD | SP | SP | SP | BC | BC | BC | |
| Populist Representation | 0.802 | | | 1.479 | | | 2.003 | | | |
| | (0.711) | | | (2.014) | | | (1.306) | | | |
| Populist Vote Share | | 0.0138 | | | 0.0305 | | | -0.0334 | | |
| | | (0.0302) | | | (0.0637) | | | (0.0472) | | |
| Populist Seat Share | | | 0.0805* | | | 0.0846 | | | 0.0184 | |
| | | | (0.0318) | | | (0.0553) | | | (0.0468) | |
| Log (GDP) | -3.032 | -2.256 | -0.187 | 14.24 | 15.92 | 17.28 | 21.42 | 19.90 | 22.24 | |
| | (7.233) | (8.154) | (9.523) | (14.59) | (15.39) | (17.42) | (17.79) | (17.80) | (18.93) | |
| Democracy | 0.233 | 0.172 | -0.328 | 0.520 | 0.385 | -0.0641 | 1.765 | 1.940† | 1.650 | |
| | (0.416) | (0.503) | (0.588) | (1.366) | (1.569) | (1.639) | (1.181) | (0.965) | (0.986) | |
| GINI | 2.324 | 4.317 | 2.528 | -10.55 | -6.948 | -8.587 | 25.72 | 31.73 | 30.76 | |
| | (7.495) | (7.035) | (6.338) | (22.96) | (20.72) | (20.26) | (25.37) | (28.47) | (27.32) | |
| Turnout | 0.0877 | 0.0990 | 0.0925 | -0.407* | -0.386* | -0.392* | -0.237† | -0.205 | -0.208 | |
| | (0.0838) | (0.0816) | (0.0800) | (0.176) | (0.174) | (0.173) | (0.118) | (0.126) | (0.125) | |
| Education | 4.206 | 4.616 | 3.101 | 3.313 | 3.963 | 2.706 | 5.242 | 7.689 | 6.574 | |
| | (2.898) | (3.661) | (3.425) | (5.225) | (5.587) | (5.890) | (4.234) | (4.608) | (4.598) | |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.0605 | 0.0639 | 0.138 | 0.422 | 0.434 | 0.494 | -0.0407 | -0.109 | -0.0508 | |
| | (0.0860) | (0.0934) | (0.110) | (0.274) | (0.291) | (0.307) | (0.175) | (0.182) | (0.188) | |
| Trade Openness | 0.0221 | 0.0175 | 0.0117 | -0.0585 | -0.0673 | -0.0723 | -0.106* | -0.113† | -0.117† | |
| | (0.0350) | (0.0389) | (0.0382) | (0.0440) | (0.0457) | (0.0513) | (0.0492) | (0.0559) | (0.0564) | |
| Constant | -19.10 | -32.14 | -31.47 | -133.5 | -158.8 | -154.0 | -269.0 | -284.0 | -293.3 | |
| | (90.30) | (102.2) | (104.6) | (141.4) | (149.0) | (165.4) | (185.4) | (191.5) | (198.1) | |
| Observations | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | 117 | |
| R-squared | 0.115 | 0.111 | 0.141 | 0.364 | 0.360 | 0.370 | 0.632 | 0.622 | 0.620 | |

 Table 15. Case of Western Europe

 (Dublic Demonstration Signing in Patition Demonstration)