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**Master's Thesis of International Studies
(International Commerce)**

**An assessment of the benefits and results
of the Arab Spring with focus on Tunisia
for the period 2011-2020**

August 2021

Development Cooperation Policy Program
Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University

Nadia CHEBBI

**An assessment of the benefits and results of
the Arab Spring with focus on Tunisia for
the period 2011-2020**

A thesis presented

By

Nadia CHEBBI

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

Of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

An assessment of the benefits and results of the Arab Spring with focus on Tunisia for the period 2011-2020

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This article underlines that the Arab uprisings which swept across the Arab region in 2011 (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Bahrain and Sudan) surprised everyone and all States; since no one ever thought that the Arab people could provoke such phenomena and bring down such authoritarian regimes which lasted more than 20 years in this region and contradict that autocratic and authoritarian regimes can only promote political stability and economic prosperity and that no political force should challenge them. The Revolution was led by young people, who took to the streets and demonstrated against these autocratic regimes and who managed to overcome their fear of the repressive state, and thus restore their dignity. (Salih, The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, Spring 2013) The economic impoverishment of the majority of the population, spectacularly illustrated by the

skyrocketing food prices in the Arab region as well as by high unemployment rates, especially among young people under 25 years who represent around 65% of the total population of the Arab world. This is in stark contrast to the continued enrichment of the ruling elites who, through corruption, have managed to amass a huge amount of the national wealth. (Salih, *The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings*, Spring 2013) Poor, frustrated and numerous young graduates eventually rose up against the rich, corrupt ruling elites. The authoritarian and violent nature of Arab regimes is also a primary factor among the important factors leading up to the Arab uprising of 2011. Most Arab regimes are classified as a highly authoritarian system in which political power is monopolized by a few rather than shared by the greatest number. Massive human rights violations and the confiscation of basic individual freedoms such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of organization and freedom of association were also another factor causing the popular uprisings in Tunisia.

Mass media communication has been dominated and monopolized by regimes which have not allowed any individual or group to reflect views opposed to those of the government; journalists, human rights activists, politicians and trade unionists are regularly harassed by state authorities, tried on false charges, placed under constant surveillance, subjected to blackmail and sometimes exposed to physical violence.

Most authoritarian regimes were managed to muzzle the protest movements, three countries were in the grip of civil war (Syria, Libya and Iraq) then Egypt experienced, in July 2013, a military coup bringing back to the political center stage an army which

had not given up on the exercise of power. Only Tunisia seems to float and be engaged in a process of transition pact between the different political actors ((Lieckfett, 2012)). In this study, we discuss the Tunisian experience following the uprisings that marked a sudden and unexpected transition from authoritarian to democratic rule and provided a critical junction for political reform. Among the diverse and frequently interrelated reform issues, we focus on the introduction and adoption of modern democracy (Vermante, March 2013). After these uprisings, the major challenge was the deterioration of the economy and whether the government manages to pursue sound economic policies that lead to real living conditions despite the democracy expected after the political uprisings.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Arab Revolution, Democracy transition, economic development, political system

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Chapter I: Introduction

On January 14, 2011, Ben Ali fled Tunisia. Since December 17 and for nearly a month, a huge protest movement had shaken the country, starting from young people and peripheral regions, from Sidi Bouzid, and gradually affecting all generations, social classes and the " the whole of the territory following the humiliation of the young Mohamed Bouazizi, a graduate salesman on the sly who had led him to attempt to commit suicide by immolation following the confiscation of his goods for a minor offense, his death on January 2 and his message of dignity had triggered daily demonstrations of support and a bloody repression of them to the point of setting the capital ablaze and leading to the departure of the sovereign.

The palace revolution which sounded the end of Ben Ali's reign, orchestrated by the army staff and part of the elite in power for more than twenty years, intended to preempt this social movement so that it does not turn into a revolution.

The overthrow of autocratic regimes changed the political landscape following the Arab Spring in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.

Starting from the hope of a long-awaited democratic transition process in the Arab world by citizens, since the promise of democracy in the Arab countries in transition was seen as the engine of the uprisings, as well as the economic questions that have were also an equally important factor. The citizens of these countries therefore

expected governments to respond simultaneously to their political and economic demands (KHAN, 2014).

Undemocratic regimes, corruption, high unemployment and widening inequalities and disparities in income and wealth have been the main drivers of uprisings in the Arab world which have taken the form of strikes, protests, marches and rallies. These uprisings have left important changes namely the fall of these two regimes: Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Moubarek in Egypt, a civil war in Libya followed by the fall of the regime and the assassination of President Gadhafi (KHAN, 2014).

The Arab uprisings or widespread disputes have had a varying scope and intensity depending on the countries. If some have known constitutional and institutional disruptions, others were only subject to some new legislative measures.

Tunisia as a poster child of the spring has demonstrated the credibility of establishing political rights and democratic institutions as the Tunisian political landscape has been fundamentally altered for the better since 2011 and has successfully implemented its new Constitution.

But unfortunately, successive Tunisian governments have failed to prioritize economic reforms. Unlike the political situation, Tunisia's economic situation is much worse than before the Arab Spring. The country suffers from low economic growth, very high unemployment, especially among young people, growing poverty, regional disparities between urban and rural populations and growing income disparities between rich and poor.

1 .Background: Reasons and Causes of the Tunisian Revolution:

Arab uprisings are a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that have engulfed the Arab world (Kinsman, 2011). The Arab Spring changed the political landscape of the region by overthrowing autocratic regimes. These uprisings gave people the hope that this was the beginning of a long-standing phase of democratic reform in the Arab world, and that these reforms will contribute to the political independence, stability and well-being of citizens. While the promise of democracy in the Arab transition countries was seen as the driving force behind the uprisings, economic issues were an equally important factor (Kojoori-Saatchi, 2015).

The uprisings in Tunisia and after that in various other Arab countries were certainly due to adverse domestic circumstances coupled with increased social contact. The Tunisian population, which suffered a great deal from an oppressive regime that lasted more than thirty years, simply needed to mobilize against corruption and the government's existing bureaucratic barriers.

Leadership, which governs them, is a key feature of the Arab countries experiencing revolution. These states are largely autocratic, and the Arab rulers maintain a monopoly on power that manifests itself in the control of the, decision-making apparatus.

Power is thus excessively concentrated in those Arab dictators who exert almost exclusive influence over state institutions, parliaments, and the judiciary. They are distinguished by a personal authority and an executive branch based around the

character of the individual in control. The government itself cannot be isolated from the leader.

Common uprisings are frequently correlated with unfavorable economic patterns, recession, increasing unemployment, and high prices or food shortages (Headey & Fan, 2008; Bush, 2010) (DANIELE, 2012).

While the revolution was unquestionably multidimensional, most of the mobilization took place with the prospect of reforming the desperate economic circumstances that had plagued the nation as a consequence of the repressive policies of political authority; increased economic inequality was undeniably the main determinant of mass mobilization that eventually contributed to revolutionary change, a high degree of political inequality, and the rising difference between rich and poor has made a major contribution to the citizens' decision to mobilize. This chapter will describe the sudden increase in public mobilization by explaining the social, political and economic complications (Kojoori-Saatchi, 2015).

The causes varied from country to country, but primarily stemmed from internal problems such as lack of democracy, human rights abuses, systemic corruption, economic downturn, unemployment, severe poverty, increasing food prices, and a variety of demographic factors, such as a high percentage of educated and dissatisfied youth and centralized regimes that marginalize part of the population outside of capital cities. In some nations, demonstrations were directed at the displacement of the government, while the other protests asked for the improvement of living standards while leaving the core pillars of the state unchallenged. As a result, the ruling class

responded differently to the protesters: to enforce top-down changes and to "buy" social harmony through repression and armed violence (Rózsa, 2012).

1.1Corruption:

At all levels of government, it is known that their power is used to obtain money from the state for private use This phenomenon hinders the ability of the state to operate properly because it depletes the state of the resources required for infrastructure and social services (Kojoori-Saatchi, 2015).

The rise of the Trabelssi family to power and riches was the result of Leila Trabelssi's marriage to President Ben-Ali. Most state institutions in Tunisia are dysfunctional because most bureaucrats, in the upper strata of state bureaucracy, do not have the skills needed for their roles. Consequently, those who serve in public institutions often lack the merit/expertise/knowledge required to enable these institutions to work as expected (Kojoori-Saatchi, 2015).

Combined with disproportionate amounts of corruption, this lack of knowledge contributes to ineffective institutions and thus, hinders growth.

Indeed, senior positions within institutions are rewarded for loyalty to the Ben Ali regime and the Trabelssi family. The majority of high-ranking/well-paid positions in public institutions are held by individuals linked to the chef; this structure of favoritism allows for a partnership of reciprocal compromises, those close to the leader who takes the lead.

Corruption is a firm investment. This is how a more or less profitable company retains its market (Gauthier, 2001).

According to the Global Financial Integrity report released in 2011, the approximate cost of corruption in Tunisia between 2000 and 2008 is about 2% of GDP per year (equivalent to almost \$1.2 billion per year).

Corruption costs \$110 per person per year for Tunisia. After the revolution, property confiscated by the Ben Ali clan is valued at around \$13 billion (or \$1,230 per person).

The anti-corruption commission (the National Commission for the Investigation of Corruption and Misappropriation) defined the sectors most vulnerable to corruption under the Ben Ali regime. These industries include public sector businesses, substantial public spending, the public market, the granting of concessions, and the banking sector. The prevalence of corruption has also influenced justice, taxes and customs.

There is a near connection between corruption and job creation in Tunisia. Indeed if businesses do not give jobs to unemployed citizens, this is attributable, on the one hand, to the laissez-faire of public authorities in the face of tax evasion and to a complete lack of real commitment against corrupt agents.

On the other hand, the immense quantities of "racketeering" by the Ben Ali clan, which constituted a tremendous burden on the businesses, prevented the expansion of their exploitation. The weakness in law in Tunisia is an inhibiting factor in job development. The leader takes advantage of the influence he enjoys by manipulating the bureaucratic elements of the state.

Corruption and authoritarianism have seriously hindered the capacity of the Tunisian economy to ensure sustainable growth and decent employment, and have engendered significant economic and socio-economic shortcomings and inefficiencies in the country because economic reforms have been used primarily to redistribute privileges to the President's and his wife's families, to preserve their personal interests and to enhance the regime's deep domination of the private sector by implementing various instruments to impede their independence (Paciello, 2011).

1.2 The highest rates of youth unemployment

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have reported the highest unemployment rates in the world. This is mostly due to the government policies that have concentrated on the short-term interests of the plan rather than policies that take long-term interests, the disproportionate amount of corruption on the Tunisian government that has largely prevented the country's foreign investment economic complexities (Yousufi, June, 2014,).

In Tunisia, unemployment is one of the most prominent features that has fuelled the discontent and dissatisfaction of the Tunisian people. Youth unemployment rates, particularly those with secondary and higher education, have increased significantly (Mahjoub, 2010).

The high unemployment rate in Tunisia indicates a lack of commitment on the part of the government to set up large industrial systems capable of absorbing the

unemployment rate. The stagnation of the unemployment rate at relatively high levels contributes to a fall in expenditure in the value-added sectors.

It is therefore important to research the characteristics of the Tunisian labor market and to analyze the key barriers to employment.

According to a 2010 report by the National Statistical Institute and the World Bank, 86% of Tunisian companies are single-person. These businesses produce 20% of the value added. In the other hand, businesses with 100 workers and more do not surpass 0.5 per cent and generate 35.4 per cent of the value added.

Paradoxically, one-person firms account for 28 per cent of all workers (compared to 37 per cent in companies with 100 or more employees) (Hamida&Ayari, 2014).

The lack of radical policies and plans to encourage the progressive growth of employment-generating activities. Orientation towards another industry, such as aeronautics, cable manufacturing, requiring more skilled employees, has not made it possible to reduce the number of skilled unemployed (**Group, W. B, 2014**).

Karim Bitar, an IRIS economist, summed up the situation as follows: "Except that the economy has remained dominated by industries that hire low-skilled employees. Young graduates thus find themselves in a labor market that only offers them employment in call centers, hotels and textile factories. 'The more we graduate the less chance you have of finding a job'".

Despite annual economic growth of 4 per cent over decades, Tunisia has produced an insufficient number of skilled workers, which can be explained by the small size of Tunisian companies (**Rijkers et al. 2014**). As a result, young graduates, highly skilled

employees are pushed into temporary low-wage jobs, often informal and not in compliance with decent job standards.

Paradoxically, it is a source of tension for those who benefit from the educational infrastructure but are unable to increase the standard of diplomas earned on the job market" (**Benhamouda, 2011**).

However, following the Tunisian revolution, new statistics showed a drastic, spectacular rise. However, even these new figures can underestimate the degree of youth unemployment, as they do not include many of those who, having failed to find jobs, have joined the informal economy or have chosen to move to Europe (AmirahEl-Haddad, 2020).

1.3 Growing regional disparities

The inequalities between the various regions of the country have been a major problem since the first years of independence, placing all current government testing policies at risk. Over the years, these inequalities have evolved and caused many upheavals and riots. In reality, these protest movements broke out in the deprived areas of the North West and South Centre.

The regional enlargement gap is another major factor that has undermined the legitimacy and longevity of the BEN ALI regime, despite the economic improvement, but has intensified regional inequalities. Coastal growth in Tunisia was preferred to that in the west of the country (Paciello, 2011).

“Road infrastructure was designed primarily to connect the capital with the East Coastal Regions; in particular the Center-East and Greater Tunis, where high value-added (tourism, textiles, etc.) (Akrimi, MAY 2019), industries that generate employment are concentrated.”

Further south, the coastal governorates of Sfax and Gabès are monopolizing major investments in metallurgical, chemical and petroleum fields.

Oueslati (2016), Public Policy Consultant, "With the requisite infrastructure, inhibiting and paralyzing because it has not grown in a sustainable manner, the interior regions have not attracted major Tunisian or foreign investors and investment efforts have remained modest given the enormous transport difficulties.

The North-West and Center-West regions are the most vulnerable, according to the governorate metrics on access to vital services and comfort conditions for housing. The North and Central Coastal Governments are also the most preferred.

A major difference between those areas that have benefited from robust growth rates thanks to strong public investment in tourism and offshore activities and, subsequently, a lower level of poverty.

On the other hand, poverty reduction is much slower in other parts of the world or remains largely unchanged, with the highest unemployment rate, what has shown that Tunisia's demonstrations in the poorest regions have begun to confirm that socio-economic conditions have become intolerable.

The divide between coastal and inland regions continues to expand, part of a slower dynamic of human growth in internal regions.

The widespread uprising of 2010 uncovered real anomalies in the country's model of growth. Thus, we see that the allocation of growth benefits has been inequitable across regions, and there is a lack of regional impartiality in development.

1.4 Erosion of the middle class

The effect of youth unemployment on the living conditions of the middle class was important. As social security coverage for the Tunisian population depends on getting a job in the formal economy, the growing number of unemployed meant that many Tunisians were deprived of these benefits (Ben Romdhane, 2007) (Paciello, 2011).

Tunisian buying power has also been hit hard by rising world food prices. Salaries for many public sector employees have become low on rising living costs and are no longer adequate to meet the rising consumer demands of the Tunisian middle class, as the high level of private debt shows.

Moreover, in the sense of the global crisis, the observed decrease in remittances from Tunisians employed abroad further exacerbated the living standards of many households dependent on these incomes (Paciello, 2011).

1.5 Inadequate and ineffective economic policies

While Tunisian President Ben Ali's regime has continued to prioritize socio-economic issues to ensure its survival and sustainability, the policies put in place have been ineffective in ensuring sustainable and well-balanced growth for a variety of structural, economic and political reasons (Paciello, 2011).

In Tunisia, the entry regulations for new businesses were placed on Ben Ali in the interests of his clan. The Ben Ali family has a strong interest in benefit and enrichment in the world of industry, with implications for its economy.

The country is socially resilient due to smuggling and a parallel economy that undermines the foundations of the state but at the same time, is a crucial answer to the red tape and endemic corruption that exists in the Tunisian community.

The lack of predictability of justice and the violation of the rules of law are causing thriving businesses to face the risks of predation on an ongoing basis: in Tunisia, there are two forms of predators, some who pretend to be "Helping hand" facilitators for companies trying to take advantage of tax evasion.

The "Trabelsi mafia," the nickname that the Tunisians give to the beautiful Ben Ali family, enjoys a percentage of the income of any successful company.

According to the World Bank report (Group, 2014), 'Environmental regulation in Tunisia provides fertile ground for cronyism and other anti-competitive practices that impede private sector growth and job creation in the region.'

However while fostering a relatively high degree of economic development; market-oriented reforms of the regime have not helped to generate adequate job opportunities for many skilled young Tunisians and inland regions (Paciello, 2011).

The Tunisian economy has shown a glaring imbalance between the three sectors' performance: primary, secondary, and tertiary. There has been overdevelopment of the tertiary sector, particularly tourism, to the detriment of the secondary sector, mostly processing activities carried out by foreign investors, from which they escape Tunisia. Similarly, the primary sector, consisting of agricultural and mining operations, has been limited to the selling of gross output, such as the bulk of exports of olive oil and phosphates. (Bechir, 2009) Exports were concentrated in low-skilled activities, such as garments, textiles and agricultural products, job opportunities for highly qualified newcomers to the labor market (Lahcen, 2010).

Inner areas, where insufficient infrastructure has made it difficult to attract export-oriented producers.

The increase in FDI inflows to Tunisia, particularly over the last decade, has not boosted job creation. Privatization was the driving force behind FDI in Tunisia rather than new investment opportunities (Bechir, 2009). As a result, privatization programs have made little to no contribution to job growth.

Tunisia's strong reliance on the EU as compared to other southern Mediterranean countries for exports, tourism, jobs, remittances and FDI inflows, as well as its potential vulnerability to fluctuations in the growth of the EU, which determine its

economic structure, pose a major challenge to the regime's capacity to face up to the challenges (a decrease in average real economic growth in Tunisia).

The economic and social failures mentioned above were essentially the result of political factors (Paciello, 2011).

It is mainly because of the "state of confidence" that investment is suffering in Tunisia. If not almost all of them, the majority of corporations denounce the existence of a significant economic and political "governance." crisis. In addition to parallel trade and financing issues, there is an instrumentalisation of administrative and economic structures by the ruling government; a lack of predictability of justice, the rule of law has also been flouted, with businesses thriving in perpetual conflict at risk of violation of their property rights.

This multidimensional crisis got the better of the population, suffering from a lack of growth in the internal regions of the world and a gap in the distribution of income. The recurrent social unrest that has shaken Tunisia for decades, in particular the bread revolt (1984), the mining basin in 2008, and the revolution of 2010, demonstrates the state of desperation of the citizenry in the political face.

2. Motivation of Research

In reality, to be an island of stability was a ticking time bomb set in motion by Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 (Kaboub, 12 Feb 2014). It also claims that the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime could not have taken place had it not been a leaderless

rebellion. As a consequence, the paper offers, on the one hand, a crucial study of the making of the Tunisian revolution by exploring the key factors and processes that set the stage for the uprisings.

However, despite the new political environment opening up a real potential for democratic change, deep public participation and sustainable economic revival, none of the Arab transition countries has developed a coherent and detailed economic strategy. Economic policy has become a secondary concern (Kaboub, 12 Feb 2014)

Therefore, take a closer look at the current dynamic between the movements of political Islam, secularism and the middle class. The illusion of peace, economic growth and increasing liberal democracy was created by a complex group of politicians (political Islam, secularism) and smoke screens. However, for the average Tunisian, particularly those living in non-coastal cities and towns, the harsh socio-economic reality was as plain and palpable as it could have been even after the Arab Spring uprising. The socio-economic status of the middle class has been gradually decreasing (Kaboub, 12 Feb 2014).

3. Purpose of the Study

Unfortunately, in the last nine years since the Arab Spring in Tunisia (Massinger, October 2014) under a democratic government, freedom of expression, fair and free elections have taken place; economic problems have taken the back seat of politics. The lack of attention to economic policies was possibly due to the fact that

policymakers' primary emphasis was on resolving policy problems with the expectation that, once they were resolved, they would shift to tackling the economy. The governments of the Arab transition countries have been late in recognizing that politics and economics are moving in tandem, and political stability is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if the economy is in disarray.

It is important to research, from a constitutional point of view, the causes (political, economic and ethnic causes of the Arab Spring in Tunisia) and the contribution of these revolutions.

The goal of this article is to revisit the Arab Spring study in Tunisia in order to state its roots, its creation and its implications. The key points to be discussed are as follows: what are the causes of these uprisings in Tunisia? If the government, with its political, economic, and ideological structures, succeeds in achieving the primary objectives of these revolutions under the shadow of a democratic regime?

This paper will be structured in three parts to do this. First we will present the causes of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, thus insisting on the basic elements that have led to the success of this revolution and thus to the end of the repressive regime of President Zine Alaabidine Ben Ali (Nicole Rowsell, 2012). Second, taking democracy into account, evaluate whether the economic situation in Tunisia has changed, so analyze the consequences of the Arab Spring in Tunisia. Third, the paper will conclude with the findings and recommendations.

4. Research Questions

It is important to research, from a constitutional point of view, the causes (political, economic and ethnic causes of the Arab Spring in Tunisia) and the contribution of these revolutions.

The goal of this article is to revisit the Arab Spring study in Tunisia, that is, its roots, its creation and its implications.

The key points to be discussed are as follows: what are the causes of these uprisings in Tunisia? If the government, with its collection of political, economic and ideological structures, succeeds in achieving the primary objectives of these revolutions under the shadow of a democratic regime?

Together with this article, we will pay careful attention to the two research questions that will guide us:

- (a) What are the sources and causes of the Arab Spring in Tunisia?
- b) What are the consequences and outcomes of the Arab Spring in Tunisia nine years later under the aegis of a democratic regime?

Chapter II: Methodology

1. Justification of the methodology

The research methodology explains the methods used in this analysis to provide the required answers to the research questions. The methodology outlines the study design framework, highlighting the research design strategy, the population study, the method of deciding the sample size and the sampling techniques used to select the respondents needed for the study. Finally, it offers a description of the approaches used to collect and interpret data for the analysis.

A qualitative approach was suitable as a questionnaire and interview were used to gather data from the analysis. A qualitative research approach as a descriptive research approach is implemented to achieve research goals through a literature review.

2. Source of Data and Limitation

Arab policy studies are very qualitative because of the lack of statistical data used to construct a quantitative and theoretical basis and the constraints associated with obtaining statistical data.

This study is focused on topics of primary importance for a just, stable, modern and forward-looking society, which are as follows: economic growth, politics, democracy, bureaucracy, strategy, good governance, financing, equity, equality, creativity and public policy.

As a result, questions were sent to a carefully selected sample of government decision-makers, policy makers, parliamentarians, government and non-governmental organizations, scholars, economists, sociologists, business leaders and activists, on the basis of human rights parameters such as their position in the Tunisian government and their field of operation.

The results obtained for each question were processed and evaluated in order to recognize the key results of the 2011 revolution and to place them in perspective with the democratic background successfully implemented nine years after the revolution.

It is the product of more than 68 questionnaires and interviews with key figures, including senior government officials, leaders of political parties, progressive youth activists, former regime loyalists, representatives of women's and civil society organizations, military and militia leaders, tribal leaders and members of displaced communities (Fraihat, 2016).

Chapter III: Literature Review

Several lines of study have researched and examined the causes of the Tunisian revolution from 2010 to 2011 by identifying economic, sociological and political influences.

Throughout 2011, a wave of demonstrations swept across the Arab world, beginning with Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and ending tragically with Syria.

Although multifaceted, with specific causes and consequences for each country, these protests shared a number of themes, including poor economic results, outrage at corruption and lack of institutionalization in the current political system, inequality and poverty. In many instances, these uprisings have radically changed the balance between the state and society, leading to the collapse of regimes and the reversal of the de-liberalization process that has been going on in many countries for more than a decade.

Since then the wave of mobilization has spread through much of the Arab world, overthrowing the leaders of three Arab states and questioning the authority of many others. As a result of these conditions, Arab policy studies have increased significantly, unwittingly putting the Arab world at the forefront of contemporary public mobilization discussions (Kojoori-Saatchi, 2015).

This has led to the emergence of numerous studies examining the origins of contemporary Arab mobilization.

This study attempts to provide a broader illustration of the results and implications of Arab mobilization using a qualitative approach based on the analysis of questionnaires. Although there was a significant increase in the literature relating to Arab politics, much of it lacked a thorough conceptual and theoretical account of the revolution. Much of the current studies concentrate on the factors behind this mobilization rather than on the effects of the discontent of the Arab people after these uprisings.

Sertan Cinar and Ismet Grocer“(The Causes and Economic and Political Implications of the Arab Spring), The Arab Spring was caused by economic difficulties and democratic ambitions of the people (Stepan and Linz, 2013). The problem is focused on income imbalances, widespread poverty, corruption, corrupt administration (Desai et al. 2011) and nepotism, from father to son, and a lack of a word in governance” (Gocer, 2014).

High unemployment rates, notably among young people, led to insurrections in Egypt and Tunisia (Mirkin, 2013).

Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi“(The End of Spring? Democratic Transformations in the Arab World) argue that one of the common factors that led to the 2011 uprisings was the emergence of a large and diverse youth population that felt excluded by a political and economic structure that created growing levels of inequality and decreasing levels of secure employment. Better is education, and the Internet has created a generation that is more conscious of its social rights and the shortcomings of the existing political and economic order and as a result, has been hungry for change.

The choices made by the political elites; and the different strengths of the social movements that have been calling for change in every country. Tunisia has made the greatest strides because of the commitment of its political parties and civil society to work together and to find a consensus that will save the country and support the common good. It has demonstrated a political culture that can handle conflict and find consensus through sharp differences of opinion and deep social divisions” (Alison Baily, 2017).

Fadhel Kaboub (Making the Tunisian Revolution)”The rapid fall of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia on 14 January 2011 not only ignited a wave of uprisings across the Arab region, but also raised several questions about the role of socio-economic disparity, youth unemployment, corruption and government injustice in the wake of the Tunisian uprisings; provides a crucial analysis of the situation, and the processes that set the stage for the uprisings” (Kaboub, 12 Feb 2014).

In his article (The Political Economy of Arab Uprisings), **Adeel Malik**“portrays the political economy of the Arab Uprisings of 2011 as a failure of the Arab development model, especially its inability to support an autonomous and competitive private sector” (Malik, 2015).

Kamal Eldin Osman Salih“(The Roots Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings) Attempts to investigate the essence and causes of the Arab uprisings that have taken people by surprise globally during 2011 and 2012. He argues that the authoritarian, aggressive nature of the Arab regimes and their repression of individual freedoms against the backdrop of ongoing corruption and economic decline have been among the major

factors contributing to Arab revolts. He also addresses the question: why the two authoritarian regimes of Tunisia and Egypt have come so quickly to an end. (Salih, The Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, 2013)"

Larbi Sadiqi“(Tunisia: Revolution of the Citizenry ... A Revolution without a head)It was evident from the beginning that these demonstrations were not just "a revolution of empty bellies," but an expression of political consciousness of the need to fight for social justice and the redistribution of wealth. These events were the culmination of an accumulation that took place over many phases and repeated itself in the form of a massive event, the "Great Arab Revolution," aimed at formulating a new social contract focused on social justice and citizenship rights, which is what the Arab world is experiencing today” (Sadiki, 2019).

Tammam Omer Abdusattar “(Thesis: Acritical analysis of the Arab Spring: case studies of Tunisia and Egypt), The Arab world is in a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This transformation has brought both hope and fear to communities (Trabelsi 2013). Significant obstacles lie ahead in the current transformation or juncture. The "spring" was not a coherent, pan-Arab movement; instead it reflected the simultaneous disenchantment of the masses with their eternally frozen political development and stagnant or decreasing living standards, and the consequences in each case remain uncertain” (ABDULSATTAR, 2015).

Steven Heydemann “(Explaining the Arab uprisings: transformations in comparative perspective) assesses the theoretical opportunities that occur when Arab uprisings are conceived as moments of change rather than incipient, flawed, or failed transitions to

democracy—highlighting critical issues that cross and bind the experiences of political elites (PRES) and mobilized public opinion in the cases of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen” (Heydemann, 2015).

Democratic transitions in the Arab world ;cite the aftermath of the 2014 elections as a significant move forward for democracy in Tunisia when the Islamist party acknowledged its defeat by the secularist majority; and when the secularist party itself was able to collaborate with Islamist runners. It argues that the foundations for Tunisia's democratic progress compared to other upheaval countries such as Syria and Egypt can be found in its relative social and economic strengths, in particular its successful economic diversification and its high level of education, which in turn, has generated movements of civil society that have not only been able to question the status quo, but have also forged a consensus on what is going to happen (Alison Bailly, 2017).

According to the above-mentioned papers, several scholars have studied the causes and consequences of the Tunisian revolution in 2010-2011 by identifying economic, sociological and political factors; this literature describes the emergence and impact of the Tunisian revolutionary movement, but does not take specific note of the study of the democratic transition that has taken place since then.

On the other hand, Tunisia is currently facing a multidimensional crisis that desperately needs changes and plans to find solutions and revive the national economy; too little study has examined democracy to know whether it is a key factor in the success of the revolution or on the contrary just an accessory.

Chapter IV: the aftermath of Tunisian Uprisings

Under Ben Ali's authoritarian rule for 23 years, internal political and economic conditions have hindered a significant number of political mobilizations against the regime. However the political void left by the lack of strong unified opposition forces and structured outlets of speech has proven unsustainable in the light of deteriorating socio-economic conditions.

The pace at which the Tunisians set up a revolutionary movement, reflecting the potential for self-organization of the Tunisian population, is the mass mobilization thus created, constitutes the crucial stage at which the revolution is born and the reversal of the status quo is completed.

As a result, the socio-economic issues and the repression of the regime became unsustainable, causing discontent and indignation among the population and resulting in unorganized mass protests against the regime.

Post-revolutionary states also find that problems emerge as soon as the transition process starts, such as polarization, democratic transition, and the possibility of civil war. These countries must also participate in inclusive national reconciliation processes, including national dialogue, governance of the old system and institutional reform, by following a specific approach to achieving a healthy transition, durable peace and stability.

The Tunisian army, which had never been subjected to the Ben Ali regime, displayed its impartiality and neutrality during the Tunisian Revolution of 2010. The generals

declined to engage the crowds of demonstrators in order to prevent a massacre. However it issued an order to arrest members of the Trabelsi family trying to escape abroad at airports. The army preferred to dismiss Leader Ben Ali and to concentrate on the side of the population.

Its intention was to restore the Republics after the clashes in order to avoid anarchy by taking steps to protect the interests of the country. Rather than helping a monarch, she wanted to help construct democracy.

The response of the Army was not long before the events of January 14, 2011, "The failure of General **Rachid Ammar**¹ to comply with the orders of Ben Ali was undeniably crucial in the outcome of the common movement (Baduel, 2011).

Ben Ali was unable to contain public discontent or to calm the crowd and manage the situation. The fall of Ben Ali was the result of a stubborn and massive mobilization that took place outside any ideological organization or leader established. It is a "People's" revolution, from the most destitute to the bourgeois, that "invents another political dynamic where order is not pre-constructed, but in a situation of being constructed and evolving through events" (Badie, 2011).

¹"**Rachid Ammar**'s role in the key hours before Ben Ali left on a plane to Saudi Arabia has often been described as crucial. He is the man who allegedly "said no" to the order issued by Ben Ali to shoot protesters. "Okay to deploy the soldiers, to calm the situation, but the army is not shooting at the people," he reportedly told the former dictator. Rachid Ammar occupied a position of strength in the Tunisian state. He addressed a memorable speech to the crowd during the sittings of the Casbah in Tunis on January 24, 2011, and presented himself as the "guarantor of the youth revolution". "We will make sure that she arrives safely," he proclaimed among the crowd. A statement that earned him the nickname of hero of the revolution. This was his only public intervention, before the interview given to Ettoumsiya"

1. Period from 2011 to 2015

1.1 Background

Before 2011, the study points out that a large part of the reasons for the revolution are directly due to the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali, while the other part is linked to corruption in the Tunisian bureaucracy, weak governance, but nine years after the revolution, politics climatic uncertainties and government uncertainty that have a direct impact on the economic aspect that has occurred in retreat. These are rent-based economies that cannot diversify and become competitive internationally.

After several weeks of anti-government demonstrations, Ben Ali and his family left the country on 14 January 2011.

An interim government was created with the mandate to lead the first step of the democratic and political transition and to face a range of socio-economic challenges, and the Speaker of Parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, assumed the position of interim President facing the key risk of a political transition that lies in the problematic coexistence of the old and emerging power structures. Thus the progress and fate of this transformation depend on the country's willingness to dismantle the previous power system.

In an attempt to respond to the protesters' demands, the transitional government has taken a range of steps, namely the establishment of three national committees responsible for investigating human rights abuses committed by the police during

protests, the review of cases of misappropriation and corruption, and the reform of the constitution. If the interim government, led by Mohammad Ghannouchi, refused to separate itself from the previous regime, the interim government, led by BejiCaid-Essebsi, sent encouraging signals to separate with the Ben Ali regime (Wilson, 2015).

If the interim government led by Mohammad Ghannouchi refused to differentiate itself from the previous regime, however the young people, who were the main players in the Tunisian revolution, continue to demand a new government, wary of the interim government led by BejiCaid-Essebsi, which in the light of his previous political career, is seen as belonging to the old system of power occupying the key positions, and thus able to influence the future course of the political transition in Tunisia.

This chapter describes the effects of the uprisings in Tunisia by discussing the social and economic implications of the Arab Spring. It will also discuss the political-structural changes that have occurred as a result of these uprisings and how the state and the institutions have changed.

After the 2011 revolution, Tunisia underwent a significant economic transition. The nation experienced a range of economic problems, primarily due to the political uncertainty of the government, the lack of implementation of a five-year action plan focused on a collection of quantified goals and indicators, lack of leadership and skills leading to major main issues of the country and action, the presence of a law that slows down the leadership initiative due to a small margin for modernization and thus no improvement in anything obsolete.

Arab uprisings have brought about shifts in government policy thus reawakening and reinvigorating parts of society that have been abolished by previous regimes and the emergence of new players in the political sphere.

Arab uprisings have drawn attention to the crucial role of opposition parties in initiating political change in the Arab world. In particular, Islamist groups took center stage in the Arab Spring due to their popular approach to politics (Kojoori-Saatchi, 2015). They have been able to expand their political influence and reach out to significant segments of the Tunisian population, such as the Islamist Ennahda, a political actor who has gained a lot of attention, both in Tunisia abroad. In addition, which has been integrated into the political transformation process despite the generally held view that Islamist parties can seriously threaten the transition of Arab countries to democracy through their radicalized expressions and may lack a large electoral district. Assuming that this leader of the political party was Rachid Ghanouchi, who returned to Tunisia after 22 years of exile after the government had approved the amnesty for political prisoners, mostly moderate Islamists, and the authorization to legalize the party.

Ennahda's electoral success in Tunisia reflected new political realities through its ability to gain mass support while seeking to market Islam as the only effective way to tackle the oppressive existence of politicians. However since 2014, secular powers, specifically the group known as NidaaTounis, have gained a majority in the Tunisian state and share power with Enanahda (Kojoori-Saatchi, 2015).

1.2 The elaboration of the Constitution of 2014

After the departure of President Ben Ali from power on January 14, 2011, under the pressure of popular protest movements, the various actors used in the Tunisian revolutionary process opted for writing a new Constitution and election of a National Constituent Assembly. In this scenario involving the drafting of an electoral law, the High Authority for the achievement of the objectives of the revolution, political reform and democratic transition (HIROR) played a fundamental role in shaping the initial legal-political framework of Post-Ben Ali Tunisia (Abstracts, 2018).

The High Authority for the achievement of objectives of revolution, political reform and transition democratic (HIROR), was created by a decree-law dated February 18, 2011, composed of appointed members, supposed to represent the main political currents and forces of Tunisian society, which had to materialize one of the "[priority] objectives of the revolution": to draw up legislation election allowing the "revolutionary people" to express their will sovereign through the election of the ANC. By taking an interest in the High Authority for the achievement of the objectives of the revolution, political reform and transition democratic (HIROR), it is about understanding how the actors of "Tunisian revolution" scripted the passage of a situation of political rupture, when power falls, deprived of resources of legitimacy, to a situation of political transition (Steve Buckley, 2013).

The Tunisian Revolution of 2011 transformed the state by introducing at 23/10/2011; the 1st free and transparent elections organized since the country's independence in

1956 of the first poll organized since the beginning of the Arab Spring, resulting in the election of National Constituent Assembly(NCA) that brought together representatives from all sides of the political spectrum with the task of writing and approving a new constitution that was ratified by lawmakers in January 2014 after three years of negotiations (the drafting of the new Constitution has been a unique experience in Tunisia combining the work of elected representatives, recommendations from civil society and direct and indirect contributions of all sections of civil society(the people's Constitution: the contribution of civil society to the constitutional dialogue in Tunisia), the opening up the process to civil society, working towards a participatory drafting of the Constitution and including politicians and representatives of organizations from civil society.

This participative approach demonstrates that experts cannot just develop a Constitution because the principal objective of the Constitution is to guarantee citizens' rights and freedoms; it is a tangible demonstration of participatory democracy and the spirit of the Revolution; it would be a mistake to shut ourselves away and try to make unilateral decisions.

The process with a participatory dimension can only move Tunisia forward, and that is what gives meaning to a democratic civil state and produce a participatory text that can be implemented easily in contrast with a text drafted unilaterally and challenging to implement in order to remain faithful to the principles of freedom that the revolution embodied.

The involvement of experts was also very significant; experts in constitutional law, academia and political experts and diverse Political families (nationalists, left-wing movements, movements close to political Islam and liberals).

This Constitution acts as a unicameral parliament and a democratic system primarily centered on the feeling of freedom, equity, and fraternity.

"It was produced by the elected Constituent Assembly, not as a technical process of institution building aimed at creating a new political system, but as a re-constitutive phase of politics aiming at a radical transformation of power relations within the state and society and seeking to re-invent society itself. (Zemni, 2014)"

"In January 2014, Tunisia adopted the most democratic constitution in the Arab world, earning worldwide recognition, including the Nobel Peace Prize. (Maboudi, 2019) The Constitution itself was the result of months of discussions and a surprisingly inclusive process involving a variety of national dialogs with people who were given a rare opportunity to meet with the drafters of the Constitution and make constitutional proposals and demands, civil society and various political parties, as well as a number of constitutional workshops and conferences, and online crowd sourcing constitutional proposals to establish more inclusive and democratic constitutions (Maboudi, 2019).

The Tunisian constitutional process was as such a success story as it integrated different voices but restricted the influence of powerful interests and demands, resulting in an inclusive and democratic constitution. (Maboudi, 2019)"

Reform of the constitution, which has essentially dictated the course and shape of the democratic change.

1.3 The Democracy Transition

The collapse of the Tunisian authoritarian regime has caused a challenging political process in Tunisia, a transition from one political structure to another and a re-establishment of politics and society (Zemni, 2014).

Tunisia, which has been engaged in a democratic phase since the 2011 revolution, oscillates between a challenging economic situation and a desire to achieve a sustainable democratic, economic and social transformation.

This study provides an account of Tunisia's incipient democratization, contextualizing it nine years after the Arab Spring; critically assesses the importance of the country's democratization process and briefly explores concerns and contributions relevant to democratic awareness while evaluating the measures taken towards democratic reconstruction. The Tunisian revolution has changed the framework of Tunisian society by introducing a democratic form of government and the growth of civil society organizations, which is especially crucial to the democratization process.

Numerous researches have shown that natural resources are increasing the survival of autocratic regimes. They are also incompatible with attempts at democratic change. Ross (2001) found that petroleum and other forms of natural resources, such as non-combustible minerals, impede the prospect of democratization (see also Boix, 2003; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004).

The abundance of natural resources is turned into a way of inducing or attracting, and even more so, a method of "buying" a potential opposition party, thereby preventing the democratic process (Wintrobe, 1998).

The latest example of this obstruction to democratization is Saudi Arabia, following the widespread uprising in 2010-2011. In fear of an imminent overthrow of the regime, the Saudi state increased the salaries of its entire people by 15% to "Buy" social harmony and stop the Libyan Chao (AOL News, 2011). Smith (2004) noted that oil-rich states, even during the oil crisis, were able to prevent instability during widespread uprisings: "Leaders have invested oil money in establishing reliable institutions and organizations that could implement them at the agreed time."

During the 1983-1984 bread uprising in Tunisia, oil exports accounted for more than a third of total goods exports: 45.5 per cent in 1983 and 52.49 per cent in 1980. On the basis of what has been said before, we can see that the formula for oil during the bread rebellion made it possible for the states to confront the widespread insurrection and avoid anarchy. On the other hand, during the winter revolution of 2010-2011, oil exports were below the threshold of 33 per cent (14.18 per cent in 2010). Without being able to buy social harmony, the regime yielded to rebellion movements, and the collapse was inevitable.

The issue that emerges is as follows: has the Tunisian Government, in a democratic transition, been able to demonstrate its commitments and challenges to the advantage of people who have chosen to revolt for a country that is not only democratic, but guarantees the necessities of life, equality, a country that is economically established.

1.4 The political System Transformation

The collapse of the Tunisian authoritarian regime has caused a complicated political process in Tunisia (Zemni, 2014), not only a transition from one political structure to another. However, at a time when politics and culture have been reconstructed, with the exception of the advent of new political movements in the political sphere, there have been no major political changes.

After the departure of Ben Ali and since its founding, the interim government has faced a number of difficulties that have significantly eroded its legitimacy and support and its ability to establish a consistent and consensual policy. Although the first two provisional governments were made up of representatives who were notoriously connected to the previous regime, reluctant and vague to break from the old establishment, these governments remained mostly irresponsible towards the Tunisians who continued to demand radical reform.

Given the pace of events following the uprisings, most Tunisians are still not aware of the evolving political environment in their country, but the dissolution of the RCD is apparently not enough to abolish the old regime. The trajectory of Tunisia's political transition will therefore rely on the position of political and social forces and in particular, on the degree to which they can form the course of political events and display great vitality and remarkable ability to negotiate with the interim government.

1.5 The economic situation Transformation

Economic conditions have not improved and economic growth has continued to deteriorate, partly as a result of a decline in the agricultural sector and a decline in the value added of non-manufacturing industries especially those in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors; on the other hand, Tunisia has experienced significant declines in tourism and foreign investment, mainly due to government instability.

Decreased investment may also explain low performance in terms of economic growth. Since 2011, uncertainty and security (a series of attacks that have hit the country) and the economic environment have been a source of reticence for investors.

With regard to inflation, the upward trend observed since the beginning of the revolution has steadily declined since 2014. However, inflation has rebounded at the end of 2016. According to the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT), inflation is forecast to hit 4.6 per cent and 5% in 2017.

Increasing consumer prices slow down household consumption, which is detrimental to growth. The purchasing power of homeowners is also marked by the deterioration of the Tunisian dinar, which raises imports. The problem of unemployment remains especially sensitive to post-revolutionary Tunisia.

The unemployment rate was 13% in 2010, the year of the beginning of the Tunisian revolution. The loss of 137,000 workers raised unemployment in 2011, from 13 per cent to 18.3 per cent in 2011. This large loss of employment is the product of social and political events following the Tunisian revolution. After a peak in unemployment

in 2011 (18.3%, according to the World Bank), the unemployment rate fell slightly and stabilized around 15.5% in 2016. According to the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics, unemployment affects women more than men, particularly graduates (Steve Buckley, 2013). Higher education with a rate of around 30% in 2016. These figures highlight the difficulties faced by the Tunisian government in terms of jobs and result in the need to change the education system, in particular by adapting training to the labor market (proximity to enterprises, help to the private sector to encourage employment, etc.).

Nevertheless, despite attempts by the Tunisian government to reduce unemployment, such as the development of the National Jobs Fund, the unemployment rate remained high and led to a rise in poverty.

The failure of the Tunisian government to fulfill the need for realistic jobs for the unemployed has ruined all the hopes for a better life for this rising young population.

This anomaly is a significant socio-economic barrier on the part of the population of the interior of the world.

The degree of poverty in Tunisia dropped from 20.5% in 2010 to 15.2% in 2015. Poverty, nevertheless, has more to do with non-communal areas especially the interior regions, the cradle of the revolution, with poverty levels of 26% in 2015, according to the INS.

This statement illustrates the disparity between the various regions of Tunisia. The Gini coefficient was 36.1 per cent in 2013 compared to 35.8 per cent in 2010, which indicates the prevalence of inequality.

With respect to public finances, the budget deficit tends to widen. According to the BCT, the public debt has continued to grow since 2010. The deficit decreased in 2014 and 2015 (about 5 per cent of GDP).

The expansion of the budget deficit is related to a decline in tax revenues, partially due to a fall in expenditure, and to the necessity fund operating expenses, in particular the public sector wage bill, which accounts for about 14 per cent of GDP and is in the order of 13 billion dinars, for a total budget of 32 billion dinars. Public spending, particularly spending on infrastructure and capital goods, meets practical needs that are difficult to reduce, which describes the expansion of the deficit – a rise in public debt.

Public debt continues to grow. It increased from 40% of GDP in 2010 to more than 60% of GDP in 2016. This debt is expressed in the favorable terms of lending by international organizations, in particular the IMF (long maturities and low interest rates). Despite being considered manageable by the IMF, this debt, generally denominated in foreign currencies, persists a burden to be managed, especially in Tunisia, characterized by a decline in the value of the dinar, which raises the cost of the debt (risking an unacceptable currency risk).

2 Period from 2015 to 2020

Transparent and well-organized elections in the autumn of 2014 represent the end of the constitutional process of the transition to Tunisia. The 2019 national elections in Tunisia marked another significant landmark. Held against the backdrop of citizens' growing uneasiness with the economic situation and disappointment of their

political leaders, the Tunisians elected Kais Said a political outsider, as president, and rebuked the establishment of political parties (Nicole Rowsell, 2012). Elected politicians must now resolve the pressing problems of unemployment, security and regional development disparities—the same concerns that pushed Tunisians into the streets in 2011 (Nicole Rowsell, 2012).

2.1 The Implication of the election of 2015

Following the opening of its office in Tunis in 2011, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has partnered with Tunisian political parties and civic organizations to promote a more efficient and representative political climate in which political parties compete on behalf of citizens' interests, lawmakers discuss constituent needs in fulfilling their duties, and civil society plays an active role in overseeing citizens' interests (Nicole Rowsell, 2012).

NDI has assisted political parties and the Parliament in creating responsive legislation, representing the needs of their constituents, overseeing the executive and engaging with the public (Nicole Rowsell, 2012).

It has also conducted frequent qualitative public opinion surveys and shared its results with decision-makers, and has sponsored Tunisian citizens' groups to monitor every election since the revolution, including most recently the 2019 legislative and presidential elections.

With NDI support, Mourakiboun carried out an advanced statistical observation, also known as parallel-vote tabulation (PVT), of the 2014 and 2019 elections, enabling

them to verify the confidence of Tunisians in the election process and the results of the elections (Nicole Rowsell, 2012).

2.2 Tunisian's government

The instability, incoherence and polarization of political parties have led Tunisia to face a number of challenges that could jeopardize its economic growth and ultimately, its long-term viability.

The political landscape has been a model, but it does not provide food; almost ten years have passed, and many things have happened in the country's timeline. Yes, there have been free elections, which demonstrate the will and dedication to what started on 17 December 2010. The nation experienced terrorist attacks and murders of rivals and the adoption of a new constitution and two free presidential elections. However, Tunisia does not take off economically, and this is a blow, a disappointment, and a spiritual decline in the expectations of many young people.

In 2010 and 2011, what the nation called for was, on the one hand, greater economic opportunities, improved social conditions and greater freedoms. This has resulted in a demand for more and better jobs, less corrupt bureaucracy, better financial conditions for entrepreneurs, better access to public services and better urban infrastructure.

Tunisia is a country of conversely; substantial progress has been made in the constitutional transition to an open and democratic management structure, but economic and social changes are not imminent.

An elected parliament that is more divided than before will make policy formulation difficult, hinder attempts to address chronic economic challenges and hold political turmoil high.

2.3 The economic Situation

The revolution has taken place since 2010 and has fundamentally changed the democratic structure, but it has not affected the corruption system. The Tunisian economy before the revolution is based on a rentier system, a rentier economy that grants important privileges to a small minority of legal market players who have used their proximity to the old regime to gain privileges, licenses, loans, market share, market security, or an illegal market that allows them to preserve the impact of random sourcing in order to satisfy the demands of this big market for all questionable and invalid products. Due to the success of such an economic policy, this category of stakeholders has been able to forge strong links with the administration, redeem its liabilities, and create many legal "deceptions", if you will, to legalize most of them operations and conceal them so that they are not irreproachable.

These "networks" have acquired over time sufficient experience to cover them. And of course, it made big money and big profits. The revolution overthrew the previous regime and its immediate surroundings, and did not overthrow the economic system, in its two dimensions; Rent-seeking on the legal market and on the illegal market.

On the contrary, after the revolution, it contributed to their empowerment after this group of stakeholders became the main financier of political parties, thus facilitating their mission, and these parties hastened to finance them and thus protect them.

Economic development has gradually declined since the start of the revolution. The economic condition was below estimates in 2016. Slower growth, two twin deficits (public and current), continuing unemployment and inequality, decreasing investment.

Forecasts for economic growth at the beginning of 2016 were positive (about 2.5 per cent, according to the World Bank). A downward revision was reported at the end of the year.

Economic development in 2016 is projected to be limited to 1.5% (according to the IMF). This is partly due to a decline in the agricultural sector and a decrease in the value added of non-manufacturing industries, notably the hydrocarbon and mining sectors (by 3% and 3.3% respectively).

Deterioration of tourism activity can indeed be the reason of moderate growth in 2016. Security insecurity and the series of attacks that hit the country in 2015 resulted in a 33 per cent decrease in tourism revenues between 2014 and 2015 and a further 4 per cent decrease in 2016.

Chapter V: Analysis and finding

1. Analysis


The data used in this study was obtained from senior government officials, political party leaders, progressive youth activists, former regime loyalists, representatives of women's and civil society groups, military and militia leaders, tribal leaders and members of displaced communities (Fraihat, 2016).

In total, 69 responses were sought during an in-depth interview and questionnaire with respondents.

First, respondents' general demographic characteristics were examined by gender, age, education level, marriage status, and current professional status.

In total, 48 of the 69 respondents were men representing 69.9% of total respondents, while 21 of 69 respondents were women representing 30.4% of the respondents. It, therefore, indicates that more men responded to the study than women. This reflects the gendered nature of general issues of politics, economics, and governance (Graph 1).

Graph 1 Respondents' Gender




The respondents' age to this study reveals that all the people belonging to the political, economic, civil, or governmental community were between 40 and 49 years old, with a total of 30 people (43.5%) out of 69 respondents. The 30 to 39 age group comes second with 15 (21.7%) out of 69.

11 (15.9%) respondents out of 69 are those aged 50 to 59, while the minority of respondents is attributed to the age group 25 to 29 and 60 to 69 and represents several 6 (8.7%) and 7 (10.1%) respectively for every slice out of 69.

The graph below shows the age groups of the respondents (Graph2):

Graph 2: Respondents' age

age




47 (68.1%) were married, while 16 (23.2%) had never married. The majority of respondents have married, and 6 (8.7%) are separated.

The graph below shows the marital status of the respondents (Graph 3):

Graph 3: Respondents' Marital Status

Marital Status



This study aims to analyze the perception of the Tunisian government parties and the responses of the social community, economists, journalists, accountants, experts, professors, and all other parties who can analyze the benefits and results of the Revolution in Tunisia.

Through individual questionnaires, we want to study the advantages and results of the Revolution on the country's democratic transition experiences from 2011 to 2020 and to be able to carry out this analysis, the choice of our target of respondents must be carried out carefully to lead to answers made by people specialists and experts in the matter who can help to identify the main factor of the failure of economic growth in Tunisia and then to fix axes of recommendations which can serve as possible solutions

to the current crisis, therefore the majority of respondents occupy the post of politicians (member of the Tunisian parliament, deputy, politician, deputy of the people's chamber), experts in economics, consultants, accountants, officials of ministries, CEOs , CFOs, economists, journalists, professors of international law and economics, A Deputy Fund Manager, a C Consultant & Owner VUCA Management, an Expert in Urban Foresight, a Business Intelligence Advisor, a Manager of a private company, an Engineer, a Surgeon, a Business Development Manager, directors in public administration, doctors, a Communication Consultant, a Chartered Professional Accountant, a Deputy Head of Division at the Central Bank of Tunisia, an Entrepreneur / CEO and Head of Service at the Customs Department.

As was well mentioned at the start of this study, the Arab Revolution took everyone by surprise because no one expected that it could have happened in authoritarian regimes of more than 20 years. Several studies were carried out to analyze the causes and implications of these uprisings, and Tunisia was an example of the Revolution's success. However, unfortunately, the reality shows the opposite because the country faced a multidimensional crisis not only economic but also political and social, which leads to thinking why a country like Tunisia that succeeded in the democratic transition has not succeeded in economic development.

To answer this question, we have turned to a heterogeneous sample of specialists, elites, and Tunisian experts to highlight the significant factor that hinders economic growth under democracy's umbrella of democracy.

It starts by analyzing the democratic transition that represents the Tunisian citizens' primordial desire who led the Revolution, the political transition that represents the fruit of this democracy, and the governance and the economic situation ten years after the uprisings.

2. Finding

2.1 The Tunisian Constitution in 2014

As the Constitution functions as a unicameral parliament and a democratic structure, it focuses mainly on the feeling of equality, justice and fraternity.

"The elected Constituent Assembly has written it not as a technological process of institution building targeted at establishing a new democratic structure, but as a re-constitutive phase of politics aiming at a fundamental transformation of power relations within the state and society and attempting to re-invent society itself" (Zemni, 2014). We asked the respondents to assess the constitution drawn up after the Revolution in 2014 and rate their level of agreement over a 5-point Likert-type scale where CODE; 1 = Agree Strongly, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Disagree and 5 = Disagree Strongly.

36(Director, professor, accountant, assistant fund manager, public servant, CEO, consultant, member of Tunisian parliament, economist(52.94 per cent) of the 68 respondents accept that popular involvement in the constitutional process democratizes

the constitution and encourages the democratic transition; 28(director, accountant,CEO, consultant, member of Tunisian parliament, economist(40.57%) of the 68 respondents agree that the constitution as a legal document expresses public demands while maintaining that it has a consistent and democratic substance that satisfies all political and social groups, 33(director, professor, accountant, public servant, member of Tunisian parliament(47.82%) respondents out 68 agree that the public inclusion in the writing of the constitution had a remarkable impact on the constitution, but regarding if the elaboration of the Tunisian Constitution in 2014 was beneficial for economic development; 18(Director, public servant, CEO, member of Tunisian parliamentrespondents agree, 18(professor, accountant, consultantwas Neutral, and 18 (assistant fund manager, CEO, expert, economistdisagree.

In summary, the respondents consider that the constitution of 2014 was a step towards facilitating a democratic transition, especially with citizen participation in drafting this legal document. However, on the other hand, the constitution was not beneficial (See graph four and Table 1 below).

Graph 4: Respondents assessment of the Constitution of 2014




Table 1: Respondents assessment of the Constitution of 2014							
Rating Code		1 Agree Strongl y	2 Agre e	3 Neutra l	4 Disagre e	5 Disagre e Strongl y	Tota l
1/ Did the public participation in the constitutional process democratize the constitution and facilitated democratic transition?	Number	8	36	13	9	3	69
	Percentag e	11.59	52.17	18.84	13.04	4.34	100
2/ Does the constitution as a legal document reflects public demands while ensuring it has a cohesive and democratic content that satisfies all political and social groups?	Number	6	28	14	16	5	69
	Percentag e	8.69	40.57	20.28	23.18	7.24	100
3/ The public inclusion in the writing of the constitution	Number	10	33	13	8	5	69
	Percentag e	14.49	47.82	18.84	11.59	7.24	100

had any remarkable impact on the constitution?							
4/ The elaboration of the Tunisian Constitution in 2014 were beneficial for economic development ?	Number	3	18	17	18	13	69
	Percentage	4.34	26.08	24.63	26.08	18.84	100

2.2 Ways of Governance:

To assess the ways of governance as it is one of the pillars of the success of the country's development,

23(professor, consultant, expert, economist(33.33%) agreed that Tunisia has a Bad leader and 16(assistant fund manager, member of Tunisian parliament was neutral, 27(professor, accountant, public servant, CEO, consultant, member of Tunisian parliament, economist(39.13) approved that there is an excellent Democratic Political System after 2011, and 20(Director, was neutral; however, 34(Director,public servant, assistant fund manager, member of Tunisian parliament, expert, economist think that

the Government instability after the revolution is very bad and 18 was neutral (See **Graph 5 and Table 2**below).

Graph 5: Respondents assessment of the Ways of Governance




Table 2: Respondents assessment of the Ways of Governance							
Rating Code		1 Very Bad	2 Bad	3 Neutral	4 Good	5 Very Good	Total
1/ Having a Strong Leader	Number	12	23	16	12	6	69
	Percentage	17.39	33.33	23.17	17.39	8.69	100
2/ Having a Democratic Political System after 2011	Number	2	8	20	27	12	69
	Percentage	2.89	11.59	28.98	39.13	17.39	100
3/ Government Instability	Number	34	18	7	7	3	69
	Percentage	49.27	26.086	10.14	10.14	4.34	100

2.3 The Tunisian Political System:

Through this analysis, 31(professor,assistant fund manager,public servant, expert(44.92%) respondents out of 69 agree that the Tunisian Political system ten years ago was bad, and 14(CEO(respondents mention it is very bad. The Tunisian Political system before the 2011 uprising was evaluated very bad by 30(professor,assistant fund manager,member of Tunisian parliament (43.47%) respondents and bad by 20(public servant, CEO, expert, economist.

The Tunisian Political system AFTER the new constitution in 2014 was bad by 27(Director,assistant fund manager(39.13) respondents, good by 16(professor;public servant, economistrespondents, and 14 (professor, CEO, member of Tunisian parliament, expertwere neutral.

26(accountant, expert, economist(37.68%) respondents considered that the Tunisian Political system PRESENTLY is bad and very bad by 19 respondents (Director,assistant fund manager and 16(CEO, member of Tunisian parliamentwere neutral.


The Tunisian political system's Futures evaluated as good by 18(Director, professor,member of Tunisian parliament(26.086%) respondents, bad by 15(expert,economistrespondents, and most respondents were neutral (accountant, assistant fund manager,public servant, CEO,consultant

After the revolution, the multiplicity of political parties is evaluated as good by 20(28.98%) (Assistant fund manager, CEO,consultant,member of Tunisian parliament, economist, very bad by 18(professor, , and bad by 17 respondents (Director,expert.

In summary, most respondents almost agreed that the Tunisian political system, whether before or after the revolution, was and remains bad.

Neutrality and a little hope were given to evaluating the future political system, but most do not agree with the multiplicity of political parties after the revolution (See Graph 6 and Table 3below).

Graph 6: Respondents assessment of Tunisian Political System



Graph 6: Respondents assessment of Tunisian Political System




Table 3: Respondents assessment of Tunisian Political System							
Rating Code		1 Very Bad	2 Bad	3 Neutral	4 Good	5 Very Good	Total
1/ Where on this scale would you put the Tunisian Political system 10 years ago?	Number	14	31	12	11	1	69
	Percentage	20.28	44.92	17.39	15.94	1.44	100
2/ Where on this scale would you put the Tunisian Political system before 2011 uprising?	Number	20	30	12	7	0	69
	Percentage	28.98	43.47	17.39	10.14	0	100
3/ Where on this scale would you put the Tunisian Political system AFTER the new constitution in 2014?	Number	12	27	14	16	0	69
	Percentage	17.39	39.13	20.28	23.18	0	100
4/ Where on this scale would you put the Tunisian Political system PRESENTLY?	Number	19	26	16	8	0	69
	Percentage	27.53	37.68	23.18	11.59	0	100
5/ Where on this scale would you put THE FUTURE of Tunisian Political system?	Number	8	15	23	18	4	69
	Percentage	11.59	21.73	33.33	26.08	5.79	100
6/ What do you think of the multiplicity of political parties	Number	18	17	8	20	4	69
	Percentage	26.08	24.63	11.59	28.98	5.79	100

after the revolution?							
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2.4 Democracy Transition in Tunisia:

Regarding the Democracy transition in Tunisia, 40 (professor, accountant, assistant, public servant fund manager, member of Tunisian parliament, expert) (57.97%) respondents think that before the Revolution, the Democracy was very bad in Tunisia, 18 (Director, CEO) think it was bad.

Five years after the Revolution, Democracy is raking as good by 38 (Director, professor, assistant fund manager, CEO, consultant, member of Tunisian parliament) (55.07%) respondents, and 15 (professor, accountant, public servant) were neutral.

Democracy still raking good by 31 respondents (Director, assistant fund manager, CEO, consultant, member of Tunisian parliament currently) (See **Graph 7 and Table 4** below).

Graph 7: Respondents assessment of Democracy Transition in Tunisia





Table 4: Respondents assessment of Democracy Transition in Tunisia							
Rating Code		1 Very Bad	2 Bad	3 Neutral	4 Good	5 Very Good	Total
1/ Where on this scale would you put THE democracy in Tunisia before the revolution?	Number	40	18	8	3	0	69
	Percentage	57.97	26.086	11.59	4.34	0	100
2/ Where on this scale would you put THE democracy in Tunisia 5years after the revolution?	Number	2	12	15	38	2	69
	Percentage	2.89	17.39	21.73	55.072	2.89	100
3/ Where on this scale would you put THE democracy in Tunisia 10years after the revolution?	Number	7	14	15	31	2	69
	Percentage	10.14	20.28	21.73	44.92	2.89	100

The question of this study was based on the impact of democracy that despite its existence, the government fails to demonstrate its promises regarding the desires of Tunisian citizens so that this analysis will highlight the assessment of the respondents of the impacts of the democracy on:

- The political system that 26 (professor, accountant, assistant fund manager, CEO, consultant, member of Tunisian parliament, economist) (37.68) respondents agree that democracy positively impacted it, 26 agree strongly
- The economy, 19 (accountant, member of Tunisian parliament) (27.53) respondents agree that it was also positively impacted, but 18 (Director, and 10 (assistant fund manager, public servant, CEO, expert) disagree and disagree strongly, respectively
- Maintaining Law and order, 18 (26.086) (Director, professor, assistant fund manager, member of Tunisian parliament, economist) agree that democracy was good, 13 strongly agree, and 18 (accountant, CEO, consultant) was neutral, but 17 (public servant, expert) disagree.

The majority of respondents strongly agrees (27) (professor, accountant, assistant fund manager, member of Tunisian parliament) and agrees (24) (CEO, economist) that democracy is better than any other form of government (See **Graph 7-1** and **Table 4-1** below).

Graph 7-1: Respondents assessment of Democracy Transition in Tunisia



**Table 4-1: Respondents assessment of
Democracy Transition in Tunisia**

Rating Code		1 Agree Strongly	2 Agree	3 Neutral	4 Disagree	5 Disagree Strongly	Total
1/ Is democracy affect the political system positively?	Number	17	26	10	12	4	69
	Percentage	24.63	37.68	14.49	17.39	5.79	100
2/ Is democracy affect the economy positively?	Number	11	19	11	18	10	69
	Percentage	15.94	27.53	15.94	26.086	14.49	100
3/ Democracy	Number	13	18	18	17	3	69
	Percentage	18.84	26.08	26.086	24.63	4.34	100

are good at Maintaining Law and Order?	e		6				
4/ Democracy may have its own problems but it still better than any other form of Government ?	Number	27	24	10	7	1	69
	Percentage	39.13	34.78	14.49	10.14	1.44	100

2.5 The Economy:

Apart from 15(member of Tunisian parliament neutral respondents, they are grouped into two equal groups, 27(CEO strongly agree (9) and agree (19) (accountant,consultant, expert. The same number is opposed (9) (assistant fund manager, economist public, servantdisagree and strongly disagreed (19) as to whether the newly elected authorities might provide more substantial economic opportunities and develop new policies and strategies to boost the economy. The majority strongly agree (39=56.52%) (Professor, accountant, CEO, expert, economist) and agree (18) (Director, assistant fund manager,public servant, consultant, member of Tunisian parliament) that the political leaders must immediately address the economic stagnation that has gripped the country since the revolution (Nicole Rowsell, 2012).

The government officials responsible for resolving the country's economic crisis strongly agreed and agreed by most of our respondents (30 assistant fund manager,

CEO, expert) and 24(professor, accountant,consultant, member of Tunisian parliament, economistrespectively).

Forty-two(professor, assistant fund manager, CEO, consultant, member of Tunisian parliament) respondents strongly agree with 18(director, accountant, expert, economist)who agree that the Reform of public administration will be required to build more responsive institutions – another key benchmark in determining economic progress.

40(professor, assistant fund manager, CEO, consultant, member of Tunisian parliament) respondents strongly agree with 18(director, accountant,) who agree that the areas requiring reform are: the economy, healthcare, education, agricultural production and transport, and service industries (Nicole Rowsell, 2012).


Thirty-nine (professor, assistant fund manager, CEO, member of Tunisian parliament, economist) respondents strongly agree with 22(director, accountantpublic servant, consultant) who agree that the unstable government composition (which may not last longer than a year) is one-factor hampering economic development.

31 (accountant,consultant, member of Tunisian parliamentrespondents, expert, economist) agree with 19 (professor, assistant fund manager, public servant, CEO)who strongly agree that the concern attributed to political issues at the expense of economic reform

38(assistant fund manager, public servant, member of Tunisian parliament respondents, economiststrongly agree with 17(professor, accountant, CEO, who agree that Corruption is one of the primary factors hampering the economic development

Apart from 22 (professor, who were neutrals, respondents are divided on agree (economist) and disagree. However, the majority disagreed (17) (member of Tunisian parliament and disagreed strongly (9) (accountant, assistant fund manager, expert that as a developing country, Tunisia has benefited from the democratic transition to demonstrate the achievement of objectives and challenges since the Revolution (See **Graph 8** and **Table 5** below).

Graph 8: Respondents assessment of Tunisian’s Economy



Graph 8: Respondents assessment of Tunisian’s Economy




Table 5: Respondents assessment of Tunisian's Economy							
Rating Code		1 Agree Strongly	2 Agree	3 Neutral	4 Disagree	5 Disagree Strongly	Total
1/ Newly elected authorities could deliver greater economic opportunity and develop new policies and plans to improve the economy?	Number	8	19	15	19	8	69
	Percentage	11.59	27.53	21.73	27.53	11.59	100
2/ The political leaders must immediately address the economic stagnation that has gripped the country since the revolution?	Number	39	18	3	9	0	69
	Percentage	56.52	26.086	4.34	13.043	0	100
3/ The government officials responsible for resolving the country's economic crisis?	Number	30	24	6	9	0	69
	Percentage	43.47	34.78	8.69	13.043	0	100


4/ Reform of public administration will be required to build more responsive institutions – another key benchmark in determining economic progress?	Number	42	18	6	3	0	69
	Percentage	60.86	26.086	8.69	4.34	0	100
5/The areas requiring reform are: the economy, healthcare, education, agricultural production, and transport and service industries?	Number	40	18	4	6	1	69
	Percentage	57.97	26.086	5.79	8.69	1.449	100
6/Unstable government composition (which may not last longer than a year) is one of the factors hampering economic development	Number	39	22	3	4	1	69
	Percentage	56.52	31.88	4.34	5.79	1.449	100
7/The concern attributed to political issues at the	Number	19	31	15	3	1	69
	Percentage	27.53	44.92	21.73	4.34	1.449	100

expense of economic reform							
8/Corruption is one of the primary factors hampering the economic development	Number	38	17	9	5	0	69
	Percentage	55.072	24.63	13.043	7.24	0	100
9/As a developing country Tunisia has benefited from the democratic transition to demonstrate the achievement of objectives and challenges since the Revolution?	Number	7	15	22	17	9	69
	Percentage	10.14	21.73	31.88	24.63	13.046	100

63(91.3%) respondents explicitly denied that after ten years of the revolution, has the government shown its promise for the benefit of the Tunisian people who have uprising for their dignity, employment, economic development, regional development, and political and economic exclusion of entire regions(See **Graph 9**below).

According to you, after 10 years of the revolution, has the government shown its promise for the benefit of the Tunisian people who have uprising for their dignity, employment, economic development, regional development and political and economic exclusion of entire regions?

69 réponses



In order to determine why the Tunisian state has struggled to achieve progress and economic growth, a series of interviews were also conducted outside the questionnaire with our respondents in order to identify the factor that hindered this achievement ten years after the revolution. Survey participants evoked from their objective perception, their economic and political knowledge, their expertise and in particular, their neutrality the factors that prohibit Tunisia from economic development, so that each of them presented upwards of one factor, but most of those respondents agreed on corruption, which is the main factor accompanied by political instability and unprofessionalism, disputes and conflicts between political parties and government instability, and lack of policy plans and goals accompanied by a rent-based economic structure, though suggesting that Tunisia has not yet completed its democratic transition, on the opposite, democracy is a process that is still progressing.

Chapter VI: Conclusion and recommendations

The Tunisian Government should be conscious of the need to take initiatives to maintain economic transformation across multiple medium-term structural reform plans related to the battle against corruption, the enhancement of the business environment and social inclusion in order to optimize the pace of growth, guarantee the fluidity of economic development and stability, social security, enhance the competitiveness of the State in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), restructure public finances and public institutions, boost the country's international competitiveness, adjust the social security framework and reinforce the financial and banking sector.

In order to foster social harmony, attempts must be made to reduce the differences between regions. This could lead to a better distribution of resources and public investment programs, decentralization and above all, regulation of the informal economy and jobs in the informal sector) through better control and better law enforcement.

Tunisia is now faced with a double challenge: struggling with the economic crisis, which has undoubtedly been triggered by political upheaval and the resolution of systemic socio-economic problems, which were inherited from the previous regime and led to its demise (Paciello, 2011).

Tunisia desperately needs a systematic and cohesive plan to reduce youth unemployment, reduce regional inequalities and diversify its economic structure.

Tunisian political parties also lack concrete socio-economic reform programs and have concentrated their resources on political problems while neglecting socio-economic issues.

Within lack of successful policies aimed at alleviating the crisis and resolving the urgent socio-economic problems of Tunisia, youth unemployment and regional inequalities will increase, exacerbating social unrest and instability.

If concrete steps do not resolve the constraints of Tunisia's political economy, crony capitalism and pervasive corruption would hinder the emergence of a critical, autonomous and competitive business sector that could help to respond to the problems of unemployment through job creation and thus meet the challenges of the labor market.

Cooperation and cooperation between all government members in the context of respect for the legislative institution and a mutual understanding of the financial and economic challenges of the country, in order to find the requisite effective and rapid solutions.

The need to address the reality of the economy by making laws and keeping up with changes in the financial, banking and investment sectors, adds: "There are urgent financial and economic plans to raise growth rates and minimize financial pressures and bank surpluses on people and investors, release the economy from constraints and boost the regulatory and market environment.

The ultimate challenge is to rebuild trust internally, to reinvigorate investment and externally to provide capital and encourage investment.

Economists and donors believe that Tunisia deserves a new economic development model.

The nation needs the right decisions of the Government and the Central Bank to establish a positive investment climate and the Presidency of the Republic to enhance economic diplomacy in line with the vision of the Government and the House of Representatives.

The political belt in the House of Representatives needs to pass the requisite legislation as soon as possible and to engage in a serious and meaningful dialog with the social stakeholders represented in national organizations.

As a fundamental solution to corruption in Tunisia; The barons of illegal importation, which number in the dozens, must be eliminated, and all licenses and privileges granted to feed the legal rentier economy for decades must be eliminated, changed, those privileges removed and the rest of the investors must be allowed to enter and work in these markets.

With a clear policy to resolve this dilemma, corruption will be reduced at all, and the majority will benefit from the wealth of the country by allowing many actors to access these monopolized or semi-monopolized markets, and individual incomes will improve and one of the goals of the revolution (dignity) will be achieved.

1. South Korea's model of Economic Development

After a military coup in 1961, Park Chung-hee, the father of the Korean Miracle (1961-1979), who was concerned with expanding the size of Korea's economic pie, vigorously tried to unite his people under the banner of economic development. From outside, General Park gradually repaired the barriers with the United States and, internally, the escape from lengthy poverty became the root of legitimacy for Park's leadership. The core of governance under President Park is often characterized as a development state, aiming at rapid and substantial economic development while at the same time protecting private property and the market economy; in the 1960s, the Park regime pursued export-led industrialization; and in the 1970s, a massive and chemical industrialization program was also adopted:

South Korea's impressive economic transition has attracted the world's attention not just for its performance, but also for the sustainability of the success of economic growth that has turned South Korea from a beneficiary nation to a donor in recent decades.

South Korea has attempted to shift from an agriculturally based to a high-tech society; the corporate sector has been central to industrialization efforts.

East Asian countries have seen Japan as a model of progress. Japan stands for the strength of example and creativity. The country's industrialization method was borrowed from a mixture of American, British, and German industrialization models.

Japan's technocracy, driven by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), played a crucial role in its remarkable rise in the post-war era. A strong collaboration between government and industry, encouraged and driven by MITI, was at the heart of the country's growth (Soko, 2020).

This government-business prototype was later replicated by Taiwan and South Korea, and it was the root of the East Asian growth model (Soko, 2020).

In the case of China, the world recognizes the remarkable progress that the country has made because it is the 1st largest economy in East Asia and the 2nd largest in the world, and China's rise can have an impact not only on the regional order but also on the international order; hence, we highlight the rivalry and competitiveness between China and the US.

In the case of South Korea, the State-led Planning (1962-1976) three first Five-Year Economic Growth Plans (1st, second and third) and to support the implementation of the planned government focused on the establishment of Sector Investment Plans and the mobilization and allocation of domestic and external capital.

Referring to the planning (1977 to 1996) represented in the 4th, 5th and 6th Five-Year Economic Growth Programs and the last Strategic Plan (1992-1999) and to implement these 7 Policies, the Government is starting to establish primary industries for import Substitution and Expansion of SOCs for the 1st Plan, the development of labor-intensive manufacturing for the 2nd Plan, and the development of mass and chemical industrialization from the 3rd Plan.

This Economic Development Plan was a mixture of government-led economic development and private market economy-based initiatives, acted as a political instrument for mobilizing and directing economic activities towards achieving quantitative growth goals such as the Gross GNP Per Capita Income and Total Exports, with flexible execution tailored to the ever-changing word and domestic economic objectives.

Rather than import substitution industrialization, some countries in East Asia (Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, China...) have developed trade policies that encourage exports to targeted industries and have experienced rapid growth in various export sectors and rapid economic growth in general, and are thus called 'Asian high-performance economies.' They have emerged as the best-practice creation of various models with different aspects of the Japanese model and more applicable to the changing international economic climate of the twentieth century.

Several academic efforts have been made to find a suitable models of economic growth that have shown a remarkable transformation of development and growth and a useful tool that can be imitated or copied for the right policies to increase the growth rate of a Third World country and boost people's standard of living. The academic community has begun to pay attention to the East Asian development model, as the pace of growth has been remarkably fast with industrial sophistication, especially in South Korea and Taiwan, which give a more applicable East Asian development model to most developing countries.

The appropriate development model for other countries should incorporate three qualities, such as fast and sustainable economic growth, the efficiency of structural change and the applicability of other countries, to suggest ways of accelerating growth, avoiding mistakes and seeking shortcuts to development. Korea's economic model, dubbed the Korean Miracle, has made considerable progress on per capita income as Korea's growth record looks distinctive, and the Korean industrial transition can be aptly called a metamorphosis from a subsistence economy to one of the world's industrial forces, and it is well represented in its export products and has become increasingly sophisticated with technological improvements. Its volume swelled significantly to become the ninth nation to exceed its trade volume.

Korean economic development is due to the pace of growth, industrial transition and income distribution.

The question therefore deals with whether Korea, as an example of an East Asian country, can be a valid model for African countries seeking the right model of development?

The development direction of several African countries is perceived to be a failure; Africa's development crisis is exceptional. Not only is Africa the most vulnerable region in the world, but it was also the only central developing region with negative per capita income growth. Africa's health conditions are by far the poorest on the world due to the lack of effective public health services (AIDS, malaria, etc.), ecological stress on economic pressures, policy-based lending (structural reform loans), heavy debt burdens, in general, Africa remains mired in poverty and debt (extremely high

transport costs and limited market size, low productivity agriculture, very high disease burdens, adverse geopolitics, very slow diffusion of technology from abroad) (JohnO.Okpara, 2011).

There are significant gaps between the two regions (Asia and Africa), such as the demographic transition, the agricultural sector and tertiary education.

When Africa gained independence, leaders wanted to modernize their mainly agricultural economies and reduce their dependence on the former colonial powers.

The centerpiece of the industrialization effort was the creation of large-scale, mostly capital-intensive manufacturing industries owned and controlled by the state.

Defense of the domestic market against imports was seen as crucial for sustainable industrial growth and especially appealed to post-colonial leaders as a means of securing "economic independence." (Charles Ackah, 2014)

The centerpiece of the industrialization effort was the creation of large-scale, mostly capital-intensive manufacturing industries owned and controlled by the state.

Defense of the domestic market against imports was seen as crucial for sustainable industrial growth and especially appealed to post-colonial leaders as a means of securing "economic independence."

The level of adequate tariff security for the manufacturing sector was very high and production quality, calculated in terms of foreign prices, was low. In certain cases, final-stage consumer products have been manufactured at negative value-added at foreign prices.

Contrarily to the goal of the import substitution policy, reliance on imports has increased.

There was considerable excess capacity in public manufacturing enterprises, many of which were severely constrained by the lack of imported intermediates and labor capital. Import substitution was therefore gradually seen as a high-cost road to industrialization, and public companies were commonly found to be less productive than privately owned firms.

Between 1985 and 2000, more than 30 African countries implemented adjustment programs that introduced exchange rate and trade policy reforms.

A large increase in ODA transfers to Africa, but any aid policy must confront several difficulties, in particular with regard to the conditions under which aid is given. Unrestricted assistance flows would possibly have been absorbed rather than invested.

East Asia has long been a heavily populated area with a strong workforce. Africa, on the other hand, is relatively scarce in terms of labor and abundance of land. However by 2050, the population of Africa is projected to rise by 160 per cent, leading some countries to become relatively labor-intensive economies, with a drastic effect on the dynamics of growth and the evolution of possible comparative advantages.

African policymakers have not been resistant to the "Asian miracle" obsession of the planet.

But what is fascinating is that if we compare South Korea before its economic growth and after the Korean War, we can see that it was in trouble much worse than Africa for a variety of reasons;

The nation was divided, poor after the war, the quasi-war status of military conflict, the country is small in scale, resource-poor but populous, Korea must import all oil at the highest cost. The Korean model of growth is flexible to be extended to many low-income countries stuck in all problematic circumstances.

However the Korean model of development can easily be extended to many African countries in particular those sharing similarities with Korean experiences and similarities in economic and non-economic factors affecting development.

It may not be easy to adapt the model of a country to another model, but the strategy of a nation may easily be influenced by different policies with diverse priorities and strategies. Each country has its own indigenous culture, history and natural setting, thus needing a specific solution that fits into its policy context. However, scholars have tried to recognize common factors in economic development; the Special Commission has published one of the recent studies on this growth and development initiative, which identified five common factors for the high growth output of the 13 economies: leadership and governance, macroeconomic stability, future orientation, market allocation and transparency, and this framework has largely correlated with the success factors of the Commission.

However each developing country should carefully revise its best practices to fit with its own culture and structure.

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ANNEX 1 the Survey

The thesis aims to analyze the Perception of Tunisian government parties and the social community responses, economists, journalists, accountants, experts, professors, and all other parties who can analyze the benefits and results of the Revolution in Tunisia.

Through this individual questionnaire, we want to investigate the benefits and results of the Revolution on the transitional experiences of the country's Democracy from 2011 to 2020.

We would highly appreciate it if you would take some time to complete this questionnaire. Your responses would be treated as confidential and would be used for academic purposes only.

Thank you so much.

1-Presentation of respondents

ITEM	RESPONSE	CODE
1/ Gender	1/ Male 2/ Female	
2/ Age	1/25 - 29 2/ 30 - 39 3/40- 49 4/ 50 – 59 5/60- 69 6/ 70+	
3/ Current Marital Status	1/ Married 2/ Never Married 3 /Separated 4/Unrecognized Marriage/union 5/ Widowed	
4/ Current Occupation		

1/ the Tunisian Constitution in 2014

Kindly read carefully and rate your level of agreement or otherwise with the following statements over a 5-point Likert-type scale where

CODE; 1 = Agree Strongly, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Disagree and 5 = Disagree Strongly.

Views	Rating code				
Constitution	1	2	3	4	5
1/ Did the public participation in the constitutional process democratize the constitution and facilitated democratic transition?					
2/ Does the constitution as a legal document reflects public demands while ensuring it has a cohesive and democratic content that satisfies all political and social groups? constitution had any good impact on the content of the constitution					
3/The public inclusion in the writing of the constitution had any remarkable impact on the constitution?					
4/ The elaboration of the Tunisian Constitution in 2014 were beneficial for economic development?					

3/ – GOVERNANCE IN Tunisia

Kindly read carefully and rate the Way of Governance in Egypt over a 5-point Likert-type scale where **CODE; 1 = Very bad, 2 = Bad, 3 = neutral, 4 = Good, and five = Very Good.**

Views	Rating code				
Ways of Governance	1	2	3	4	5
1/ Having a Strong Leader					
2/Having a Democratic Political System after 2011					
3/ Government Instability					

4/ Political System in Tunisia

Kindly read carefully and rate Tunisia's political system over a 5-point Likert-type scale where CODE; 1 = **Very bad**, 2 = **Bad**, 3 = **neutral**, 4 = **Good**, and 5 = **Very Good**.

Views	Rating code				
Political system	1	2	3	4	5
1/ Where on this scale would you put the Tunisian Political system ten years ago?					
2/ Where on this scale would you put the Tunisian Political system before the 2011 uprising?					
3/ Where on this scale would you put the Tunisian Political system AFTER the new constitution in 2014?					
4/ Where on this scale would you put the Tunisian Political system PRESENTLY?					
5/ Where on this scale would you put THE FUTURE of the Tunisian Political system?					
6/ What do you think of the multiplicity of political parties after the revolution?					

5/ Democracy

Kindly read carefully and rate your level of agreement or otherwise with the following statements over a 5-point Likert-type scale where

CODE; 1 = Agree Strongly, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Disagree and 5 = Disagree Strongly.

Views	Rating code				
Democracy	1	2	3	4	5
1/ Where on this scale would you put THE democracy in Tunisia before the revolution?					
2/ Where on this scale would you put THE democracy in Tunisia 5years after the revolution?					
3/ Where on this scale would you put THE democracy in					

Tunisia 10years after the revolution?					
1/ Is democracy affect the political system positively?					
2/ Is democracy affect the economy positively?					
3/ Democracy is good at Maintaining Law and Order?					
4/ Democracy may have its own problems but it still better than any other form of Government?					

6/ Economy

Kindly read carefully and rate your level of agreement or otherwise with the following statements over a 5-point Likert-type scale where

CODE; 1 = Agree Strongly, 2 = Agree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Disagree and 5 = Disagree Strongly.

Views	Rating code				
Economy	1	2	3	4	5
1/ Newly elected authorities could deliver greater economic opportunity and have to develop new policies and plans to improve the economy?					
2/ The political leaders must immediately address the economic stagnation that has gripped the country since the revolution?					
3/ The government officials responsible for resolving the country's economic crisis?					
4/ Reform of public administration will be required to build more responsive institutions – another key benchmark in determining economic progress?					
5/The areas requiring reform are: the economy, healthcare, education, agricultural production, and transport and service industries?					
6/Unstable government composition (which may not last longer than a year) is one of the factors hampering economic development					
7/The concern attributed to political issues at the expense					

of economic reform					
8/Corruption is one of the primary factors hampering the economic development					
9/As, a developing country Tunisia has benefited from the democratic transition to demonstrate the achievement of objectives and challenges since the Revolution?					

국문 초록

아랍의봄의혜택과결과에대한평가;

2011-2020 기간동안의튀니지사례

나디아케비

국제지역연구

국제대학원

이 기사는 2011 년 아랍 지역 (튀니지, 이집트, 리비아, 예멘, 시리아, 요르단, 바레인, 수단)을 휩쓸었던 아랍 봉기가 모든 사람과 모든 국가를 놀라게했다는 점을 강조합니다. 아랍인이이 지역에서 20 년 이상 지속 된 권위주의 정권을 무너 뜨리고 독재 정권은 정치적 안정과 경제적 번영만을 촉진 할 수 있으며 어떤 정치력도 도전해서는 안된다는 것과 모순되는 아랍인들이 그러한 현상을 유발할 수 있다고 아무도 생각하지 않았기 때문입니다. 그들. 혁명은 거리로 나가 이러한 독재 정권에 대항하여 시위를 벌였으며 억압 국가에 대한 두려움을 극복하고 존엄성을 회복 한 젊은이들에 의해 주도되었습니다.

인구 대다수의 경제적 빈곤은 아랍 지역의 급등한 식량 가격과 높은 실업률, 특히 아랍 세계 전체 인구의 약 65 %를 차지하는 25 세 미만의 젊은이들 사이에서 두드러지게 설명됩니다. 이것은 부패를 통해 엄청난 양의 국부를 축적해온 지배 엘리트들의 지속적인 풍요와는 극명한 대조를 이룬다. (Salih, 2013 년 봄) 가난하고 좌절하며 수많은 젊은 졸업생들이 결국 부유하고 부패한 지배 엘리트에 대항했습니다. 아랍 정권의 권위주의적이고 폭력적인 성격은 2011 년 아랍 봉기를 이끄는 중요한 요인 중 주요 요인이기도 합니다. 대부분의 아랍 정권은 정치적 권력이 소수에 의해 공유되기보다 소수에 의해 독점되는 매우 권위적인 체제로 분류됩니다. 가장 큰 숫자, 대규모 인권 침해와 표현의 자유, 언론의 자유, 조직의 자유, 결사의 자유와 같은 기본적인 개인의 자유의 몰수 역시 튀니지에서 대중 봉기를 일으킨 또 다른 요인이었습니다.

대중 매체 커뮤니케이션은 개인이나 집단이 정부의 견해에 반대하는 견해를 반영하는 것을 허용하지 않는 정권에 의해 지배되고 독점되었습니다. 언론인, 인권 운동가, 정치인 및 노동 조합원은 정기적으로 주 당국에 의해 괴롭힘을 당하고, 허위 혐의를 받고,

지속적인 감시를 받고, 협박을 당하고, 때로는 신체적 폭력에 노출됩니다.

대부분의 권위주의 정권은 시위 운동을 총구로 삼았고, 세 국가는 내전(시리아, 리비아, 이라크)에 휘말렸고, 이집트는 2013년 7월 군사 쿠데타를 경험했습니다. 권력 행사를 포기했습니다. 오직 튀니지만이 떠다니며 서로 다른 정치 행위자들 간의 전환 협정에 참여하고있는 것입니다 ((Lieckfett, 2012)).

이 연구에서 우리는 권위주의에서 민주적 통치로의 갑작스럽고 예기치 않은 전환을 표시하고 정치 개혁을위한 중요한 교차점을 제공 한 봉기 이후의 튀니지 경험에 대해 논의합니다. 다양하고 자주 상호 관련된 개혁 문제 중에서 우리는 현대 민주주의의 도입과 채택에 초점을 맞추고 있습니다 (Vermante, 2013년 3월). 이러한 봉기 이후 가장 큰 도전은 경제 악화와 정치 봉기 이후 예상되는 민주주의에도 불구하고 정부가 실제 생활 조건으로 이어지는 건전한 경제 정책을 추구 할 수 있는지 여부였습니다.