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Master's Thesis of International Studies

Factors Leading to Success or
Failure of Land Reform
- The Case of South Korea and Chile -

토지개혁의 성패를 결정짓는 요인
- 한국과 칠레의 사례를 중심으로 -

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Factors Leading to Success or Failure of Land Reform

– The Case of South Korea and Chile –

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Abstract

Land reform has been pointed out by many scholars to be one of the main policies that explain the unprecedented growth of South Korea and its relatively equal social structure. This has been contrasted with the case of Chile. Chile, despite its promising economic performance relative to its neighboring countries, has maintained high levels of land inequality that has been extended to many facets of social-structural inequality. There have been many attempts of land reform in Chile since the 1960s, but they have been regarded by various scholars as a failure. This study has tried to compare the land reform of South Korea and Chile in a multidimensional manner, in order to find out what factors decide the success and failure of such policies. From the analysis of post-World War II land reform in South Korea and the land reform introduced during the Frei and Allende administrations in Chile, it has been found that the geopolitical environment plays a big role in the process of introducing the land reform and sustaining it. Strong motivation in providing great amounts of financial and administrative support by the U.S. to key allies, in the cases analyzed, were crucial factors leading to successful redistribution of land.

Keyword : land reform, inequality, U.S. foreign policy, South Korea, Chile, peasants, landowners.

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List of Abbreviations

Acronym	Name in Full
ALRAA	Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act
BID	Inter-American Development Bank (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo)
CEPAL	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Comisión Económica de las Naciones Unidas para la América Latina)
CERAs	Agrarian Reform Centers (Centro de la Reforma Agraria)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDA	Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agrícola)
CORA	Agrarian Reform Corporation (Corporación de la Reforma Agraria)
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación)
GARIOA	Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Areas
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo)
IICA	Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias

	Agrícolas)
INDAP	Institute of Agricultural Development (Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario)
KCP	Korean Communist Party
KDP	Korean Democratic Party
OEA	Organization of American States (Organización de Estados Americanos)
SNA	National Agriculture Society (Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura)
UNKRA	United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency
USAMGIK	United States Army Military Government in Korea

Chapter 1. Introduction

Land inequality has been pointed out as an important phenomenon that negatively affects development in third world countries. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has mentioned the inter-generational impact of land inequality in limiting the possibilities of achieving further development (FAO, 2016). Solon Barraclough argued that the “existing inequalities in the distribution of wealth, power and social status, which in turn impede the efficient use of disposable resources, depress the rates of investment in industry as well as in agriculture and prevent the achievement of minimum social and political stability,” creating a vicious cycle of underdevelopment.

In terms of economic growth, South Korea and Chile have been star performers of the outward oriented neo-liberal economic policies¹ introduced in the 20th century. They have both been able to achieve positive economic growth, which distinguished them from other underperforming countries in their respective regions. These countries have also been included in the Third Wave of Democratization², being among the both economically prosperous

¹ In Latin America these were introduced through the Washington Consensus proposed by John Williamson in 1989. They were policies aimed for decentralization and economic liberalization in previously inward-oriented Latin American countries. Look at Birdsall, N., Caicedo, F. V., & De la Torre, A. (2010). *The Washington consensus: assessing a damaged brand*. The World Bank. for more on the Washington Consensus.

² Category made by Samuel P. Huntington in his 1991 book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*.

economies and politically democratic countries in the early 1990s. Yet, inequality-wise these two countries have experienced differing paths.

Extensive land redistribution policies were introduced in East Asia in the mid-20th century after the end of World War II. Ever since, South Korea has been able to maintain low levels of inequality³, showing strong correlation between land reform and inequality (Kay, 2006), whilst Chile has experienced high peaks in distributional outcomes⁴ along with failed attempts of land distribution (Teichman, 2012). Through this study, we are interested in finding out what were the determinants that caused the success and failure of land reform in South Korea and Chile were respectively.

South Korea introduced such land distributional policies early after it was liberalized from Japan. Chile implemented land reform since the 1960s, and after various attempts they were considered to be a failure. Today, Latin America is being recognized as the most unequal region in the world, in terms of land tenure, especially, Chile, possessing a Gini coefficient for land distribution of 0.91. This estimate poses a serious concern in that Chile has been considered as the most unequal country in Latin America with only Paraguay being ahead of it (FAO, 2011). Additionally, Guereña (2016) has found that the largest one percent of farms in Chile comprise of 74.49 percent of the total agricultural land. It is important then, to find the causes of

³ According to the World Bank estimate, South Korea has a Gini Index of 0.31 as of 2016.

⁴ Chile had a Gini Index of 0.44 in 2016 as estimated by the World Bank, and possesses one of the highest levels of inequalities in terms of land.

such inequality since it can serve as an obstacle to further development of a country with high potential.

Both South Korea and Chile have introduced extensive land reform programs throughout the 20th century. A particularity of these two specific countries is that, the United States has been playing a part in their domestic policymaking, especially in relation to the land issue. This study will initially argue that the involvement of the United States, in whichever form, had a significant influence in both the success and failure of land reform in the two analyzed countries, under the Cold War geopolitical environment.

The following sections will be organized as follows. First, there will be a section dealing with previous studies regarding land reform and the different perspectives that exist regarding this field. This section will include a compilation of factors based on previous studies that have been pointed out as affecting the success or failure of land reform. This will be followed by a section introducing the analytical framework: the Fogg Behavior Model, the most-similar case approach and the Motivation-Capability-Trigger Model in which this study will be based on. Third, the analytical framework introduced in the previous section will be implemented to the two country cases of South Korea and Chile and the interpretation of the analysis. Fourth, the previous section will be followed by the interpretation of the findings and lastly, this study will be wrapped up by an introduction of the limitations and implications that have been derived, and the concluding remarks of the author.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

Commonly, the term land reform and agrarian reform are distinguished in that the former is used to refer to the redistribution of land itself from landlords to tenants, and the latter includes socio-economic and political aspects of land tenure structure (Thiesenhusen, 1989). Nevertheless, land reform in general, has been considered as an effective political tool because of the socio-political meanings it entails. It is considered by many scholars as an effective tool by which poor farmers can be empowered through the redistribution of land (Jacobs 2010; Gauster & Isakson 2007). From these insights, this study will use the two concepts interchangeably, to refer to both the redistribution of land from landowners to peasants, and to the socio-economic effects it entails.

In regards to the actor carrying out the land redistribution policies, they are often led by the state, the market, or other external forces. The U.S. intervention in post-World War II Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam land reform could be a clear-cut example of external forces influencing such redistributive policies. Borras, Kay, and Lodhi (2007) in their article *Agrarian Reform and Rural Development: Historical Overview and Current Issues*, have classified the main actors into four categories: free market-led reallocation of land resources, state-led pro-poor reallocation of land resources, peasant-led mobilization, and state/society driven. Land reform tends

to show differing outcomes depending on the different actors involved, and the manner it is dealt in. Nevertheless, one should know that there has been no consensus or agreement in which is the best way of implementing land reform.

Yet, the motivation behind international organizations and domestic politicians in pushing forward land reform, stems from the positive effects it can have in society as a whole. An example would be the argument that more equal distribution of land leads to the flourishing of democracy (Montgomery, 1984; Prosterman and Riedinger, 1987), which has been the logic behind U.S. intervention in transitioning economies, in the latter half of the past century.

Related to this argument, there are those who argue in favor of the efficiency of top-down induced land reform as a solution to reduce social unrest in rural areas by implementing policies aimed at reducing inequality in the concerning areas (Walisnky 1977; Deere and León 1987; Thiesenhusen 1995; Huntington, 1968). Finding evidence that government induced land reform is the best of the existing options to achieve such social distributive conditions. In another viewpoint, land reform can also be initiated by a rural community whose anger is stemming from the historical roots of their population. These studies of grassroot movements view the infuriated outsiders as having been discriminated or exploited by colonial powers among others, and the demands for redistribution as being the outcome of such unequal situation (Wolf, 1969; Stavenhagen 1971; Hobsbawm 1974; Landsberger 1974; Kerkvliet 1993; Huizer 2001; Kay 2001; Redclift

1978). While studying the Asian region, Wolf Ladejinsky argued that the only manner by which Asian peasants would gain power and influence over their lives would be to introduce and promote Western-style democracy (Walisnky, 1977). On the other hand, already established democracy can be revoked or altered by the powerful landlords when their interests are at stake, as can be seen from the case of Guatemala during the 1954 coup d'état backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (Guereña, 2016). Land reform is a complex process where many actors are engaged in protecting their core interests. Such complex conditions have made it hard for some countries to achieve successful land reform, whilst it has been an advantage for others. Through these studies we are able to link the close relation that land reform has with domestic politics and social forces.

Another important field of study related to this topic is the correlation between land reform and economic development. More equal distribution of land is proven to have positive effects in poverty and inequality reduction as well as allowing that country to attain faster economic growth (Griffin K. et al 2002; Alesina and Rodrik 1994).

Scholars have proposed as one of the key motivators for inducing land reform in developing countries, the low productivity of land and labor prevailing in the large concentrations of land (Borras, Kay and Lodhi 2007; Barraclough, 1973). Land has proved to be a crucial factor especially influencing developing countries, which has a labor structure highly devoted to the sector of rural agriculture

(Todaro & Smith, 2011). As argued by early development economists such as W. Arthur Lewis (1954) in his article *"Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor"*, and Simon Kuznets, agriculture has been considered as an influential tool for achieving industrial development. Yet, both economists have failed to show the central role it plays in attaining economic development. The seriousness of food shortage in rural areas, with high poverty concentration in under-performing developing countries have called for the importance of undertaking agrarian reform in these regions (FAO, 2003). This fact displays the linkage existing between rural poverty and underdevelopment. In order to solve the issue concerning developing countries with high levels of rural concentration, studies have been undertaken. Among others, there are those scholars proposing agrarian reform as a solution for overcoming this obstacle. Altogether, these studies have proven the importance of implementing land reform from different perspectives of the society.

Previous studies have mainly focused on the effect of land reform in development in countries located in Asia (You, 2017; Grey, 2013). This region has specifically been the focus of attention due to the rapid development of these countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan. Nevertheless, there has been limited number of studies on land reform that have been taken cross-regionally. This fact has motivated the author of this study to engage in a cross-regional two country case analysis on the effects of land reform. Yet, there have been studies comparing Latin America and East Asia as a region,

mostly focus on the industrialization process of both.

In the field of land reform, the authors point out to the factor determining the success of such reforms as the timing in which they were implemented, which is argued to have taken place before the industrialization process within the successful country (Kay, 2002; Teichman, 2012). This timing is explained to have been closely related to the industrialization of such countries, and in the perspective of Judith Teichman (2014), to have been accompanied by a middle-class identifying themselves with the lower strata of the society, in the case study of Chile.

Other scholars have proposed an ‘interactive state/society’ perspective to analyze the different types of political strategies that have been taken to implement land reform (Borras, Kay & Lodhi, 2007). This is differentiated to the commonly used dichotomy of ‘state-led’ and ‘peasant-led’ land reform (de Janvry, Sadoulet & Wolford, 2001). Again, there has been little agreement on the effect that either forms of land reform implementation have had in deciding the success or failure. Additionally, land reform is a complex process that cannot be comprehended by analyzing one aspect only.

2.1. Existing Studies on Factors Affecting Land Reform

There are several conditions and/or variables that have been pointed out by scholars for explaining the success and failure in domestic land reform performance of various countries. Here I put

together the several variables mentioned in diverse literatures and give an explanation based on the arguments that the numerous authors give. The variables are divided into internal and external conditions, where the former refers to the country-specific factors and the latter to foreign forces influencing domestic land reform. This section is crucial for this study due to its relation to the analytical framework. The analytical framework; which will be explained in the following pages, will include the variables classified and compiled within this section.

Internal Conditions

Domestic Landowner Class

Clash between the landowner class and the peasants has been a mode of living that has been inherited into the lives of the modern civilization. These class conflicts can be regarded as the historic legacy that indirectly show the ground roots that a society has been built in. This can be clearly reflected within the socio-political and economic inefficiencies, as the Latin American *latifundios* or the Japanese-owned colonial farms in East Asian countries which have experienced colonial rule.

Kay (2002) and Gold (1986) have mentioned the fragility of the colonial-rooted landowner class in South Korea and Taiwan, characterized by its relative ethnic and cultural homogeneity, during the process of land reform, as one of the main reasons why these two countries succeeded in implementing such distributional policies. This

has been contrasted with the experience of Latin America, where the powerful landowner class, mainly composed by colonizer's descendants, managed to stall and/or reverse the process of land reform (Kay, 2002). Some country's powerful landowner class have been negatively affecting the outcome of land reform, by utilizing this movement as a tool for further enriching themselves. This has been achieved by modernizing their lands and making them capitalist farms, emphasizing efficiency at the expense of equity (de Janvry, 1981; Kay, 1988a).

Administrative & State Capacity:

In this section we deal with existing studies arguing for the importance of an effective administration managing land reform which is complemented and reinforced by strong state capacity. Based on a compilation of literature on this issue this category can be divided into two sub-categories: first, compensation to "losers." The losers here refer to those landowners giving up and selling their lands, in line with the government's policy to endorse agrarian reform. Evidenced by successful cases of redistribution, landowners must be adequately compensated in order to reduce the tension and power of these politically powerful groups further reducing the possibility of fueling revolts led by the rights (CIA FOIA, 1985). Second, post-settlement Support for "winners." Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize, in his study of South African land reform has stated poor or late arrival of post-settlement support for those peasants receiving land, to be one of the

reasons why they have failed in such policies. Investment and support for the post-settlers have a delay and/or are given for purposes other than the recipient's needs (Business Enterprises, 2014). Redistribution must be accompanied by public investment, state loans, and technical assistance for it to be effective (Borras and Mckinley, 2006; Todaro and Smith, 2012). As can be derived from the Egyptian case, there should be significant support for peasant's earnings by the government as that of Nasir's Government and the 1952 land reform efforts.

Land Reform Implementation Ideology

Based on the classification by Alain de Janvry (1981) there are four ideologies in land reform implementation that are differentiated in terms of the economic and political motivations. First, the Conservative Model refers to the land reform that takes place when the current social class status quo is being contested from beneath. Thus, superficially the landed class along with the domestic bourgeois will implement "limited" reforms in the agrarian sector to stabilize the displeased social groups. This was the case of many countries in Latin America. Second, the Liberal Model sees land reform as a tool for reducing inequality and discrimination towards agricultural production goods of farmers. Additionally, it is also motivated by the idea that a reduction in inequality will create a basis for democracy to flourish. An example is El Salvador implementing land reform in 1980 through a coalition between the right-wing Christian Democrats and the military officers with the purpose of achieving political and social

change (CIA FOIA, 1985). Third, in the Populist Model land reform is an efficiency maximizing tool for increasing productivity by exploiting surplus of labor and distributing it into more effective small farms, that can be contrasted to large farms. Lastly, the Radical Model views land reform as a means for achieving a drastic social change. Its purpose is not limited to domestic social change but rather a global change in the social system by the active involvement of the peasant groups.

Organization of Farm Production

Central to the objectives of land reform are that of how the expropriated farm should be distributed. Some have argued for capitalist commercial farms for its economic efficiency (Collier & Dercon, 2014), whereas some in the opposing view emphasize the important role that small farms play in development (Graeub et al., 2014; McIntyre, Herren, Wakhungu, & Watson, 2009; Silva, 2014). Such is the argument in the study by Albert and Cline (1979) on the enhanced productivity derived by small farms and the inefficiency that can be observed as farm sizes grow.

Based on the article by Ban, Moon, and Perkins (1980), South Korea's successful land reform implementation and sustainability can be reflected in the data on the proportion of tenants pre- and post-reform, which fell from 48% in 1945 to 7% in 1965. In addition to these statistics, we are able to derive from Alain De Janvry's (1981) work, that there is a consensus in the countries that achieved outstanding results in terms of distributional outcomes from land reform. Which

were those who were located in the reform type 4;⁵ South Korea, Taiwan, and Iraq. Based on this data, we are able to see that most Latin America and other South Asian countries with persistent land inequality have been situated in capitalist estates or capitalist farms (Barraclough & Domike, 1966; de Janvry, 1981).

Scholars investigating cases of land reform failure in South Africa have been able to commonly detect the emphasis that policy-makers put into developing successful commercial farms and introducing cooperative farming models as their main objectives (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014). These studies point to the significant role that small; in some cases, family farms play in achieving equity and productivity enhancing land reform.

Causation of Land Reform

Here we compile the existing literature on the causation of land reform, and its effects. First, there is the initiation of land reform through counterinsurgency. Many studies have viewed land reform as a remedy for alleviating rural tensions (Huntington, 1968; Mason, 1986, 1998; Paige, 1975; Wood, 2003). Others argue that land reform caused by social revolutions have had the greatest effects in Latin America, providing as evidence the 1917 Mexican revolution, and Bolivia's in 1952 (Kay, 1998). In the case of South Korea, it is referred by many

⁵ In *The Role of Land Reform in Economic Development: Policies and Politics*, Alain de Janvry presents a table containing thirty-three land reforms in twenty countries. They are classified by mode of production in whole society; capitalist or socialist, and mode of production in agriculture; semifeudal, capitalist estates, capitalist farms, peasant farm, and socialist farms.

scholars that thanks to the biggest peasant revolt that took place in 1946, the implementation of land reform was fueled further leading to its success (Teichman, 2014; Borras & Mckinley, 2006). In some cases, land reform is state-led. These governments induced land reform with the purpose of modernizing the state; as the Iranian reform under Shah, and in order to reduce the power of the landowner class, further gaining the support of the peasant population, are argued to have been useful (CIA FOIA, 1987). Others are market-led land reforms, born as a manner to replace the inefficient state-led model of land reform. This has been strongly advocated by international financial organizations with the purpose of leaving the buy and sell of land by landowners to the market (Borras & Mckinley, 2006). Lack of regulation by the state, have caused problems, such as the experience of South Africa where such measures were introduced by powerful elites to evade their responsibility enforced by the government (Lahiff, 2006).

Timing of Implementation

It is argued by some scholars that land reform that takes place before or during the initial stages of industrialization, tend to be for effective in terms of distributional outcomes and discrepancy between the rural and the urban sectors (Teichman, 2012). Judith Teichman states that in such cases where land reform is implemented in early stages of industrialization, social forces arguing against such distributional policies tend to be weaker than otherwise, further

increasing the chances of succeeding.

Studies comparing the relative successful case of agrarian reform and industrialization of East Asian countries to that of Latin America provide as an explanation to such discrepancies also the timing of agrarian reform and its consideration as a prerequisite for industrialization (Kay, 2002; Borras, Kay, and Akram-Lodhi, 2007).

External Conditions

U.S. Foreign Policy

U.S. foreign policy has been proved to have had a significant impact, both positive or negative, over domestic land reform. One example is stated by Patricia M. Plantamura on her case study of Guatemala under former President Jacobo Árbenz⁶. On her study, she explains the significant positive impact that the land reform law, also known as Decree 900 (Decreto Numero 900), had on the lives of the rural workers in Guatemala, yet she explains the limitations this land reform law had due to the restrictions posed by conflict of interested between U.S. officials and the rural population in this country (Plantamura, 2013; Kay, 1998). Judith Teichman (2012) has also argued the negative impact that a close alliance between domestic landowner class with the U.S. has in achieving significant amounts of land reform (Teichman, 2012).

⁶ Jacobo Árbenz served as the democratically elected president of Guatemala during the period of 1951 to 1954.

Additionally, from time to time, there have been U.S. presidents especially interested in expanding their influence throughout the world. This has been true for former U.S. President John F. Kennedy and his Marshall Plan which took place on a Cold War context that focused on the development of Latin America, with special focus on the lowest strata of the population (Gray, 2013). This plan formed the Alliance for Progress (Alianza para el Progreso) which consisted of numerous Latin American countries with the purpose of achieving development in many sectors to avoid radicalization (Dunne, 2013). This Alliance especially focused on providing financial aid to the member countries putting special effort in reducing counterinsurgency movements⁷.

These interventions have been criticized by many scholars who have accused U.S. foreign policy as being that of expansionism based in a liberal hegemonic ideal (Ikenberry, 2011). In fact, there are those who support such interventions by the United States, justifying such actions as a being for securing a prosperous and stable geopolitical environment (Bredo, 1986).

Geopolitical Environment

Closely related to U.S. foreign policy, the geopolitical environment at the time of land reform introduction has had enormous effects in deciding the fate of such redistributive policies. Such studies

⁷ For more on the Alliance for Progress see: <https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/alliance-for-progress>

show the experience of East Asian countries in order to prove the significant impact that tensions in the region have in the decision-making process of that country's leaders to actually introduce such policies. Some scholars argue the great influence that a belligerent China exerted in Taiwan, during the early years into the Cold War, in pursuing land reform with the help of its close ally, the United States (You, 2017; Gon & Park, 2013). In addition to this, the North Korean 1946 land reform is pointed out as the factor that encouraged former South Korean president Syngman Rhee to pursue land reform in an attempt to prevent the spread of communist propaganda in a highly rural country (Lee, 2011; You, 2017).

Chapter 3. Analytical Framework

In order to find out which factors are critical in deciding whether a country's land reform will be successful or not, this study will introduce a modified version of the Fogg Behavior Model (FBM). This behavior model was developed by social scientist at Stanford University, Brian Jeffrey Fogg, through his article *A behavior model for persuasive design* published in 2009. The Fogg Behavior Model is considered as one of the most influential human behavioral change models based in three aspects: motivation, ability and prompt which will be further explained.

The study will be a qualitative research of two country cases that had different land reform outcomes: Chile and South Korea. These two countries have been selected and analyzed based on the 'most-similar case' approach developed by associate professor of political science at Boston University, John Gerring in his book *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*.

The case of South Korea will deal with the land reform implemented since the immediate post-liberalization timeline. This is due to the characteristic of land reform implementation in South Korea that had a more continuous nature. In Chile, the nature of land reform changed drastically depending on the period of implementation and the government in charge of inducing it. Thus, for the Chilean case two time periods will be undertaken: the 1964–1970 Eduardo Frei land

reform, and the 1970–1973 Salvador Allende land reform. The logic behind this specification is because of the consideration that land reform under these two administrations were those that were considered to be most influential. This analysis will be proceeded by the close analysis of various existing sources that have dealt with the land issue of both countries. The following section will explain the basic model of the analytical framework that will be used in this study.

3.1. The Fogg Behavior Model

The Fogg Behavior Model has been commonly applied in studies relating to public health and education (Meekers, Onuoha & Olutola, 2020; Agha, Tollefson, Paul, Green, & Babigumira, 2019). These studies have been comprised of a study of individuals' behavior that tries to answer the question of what the possible motivating factors fueling such actions are.

BJ Fogg's behavior model (FBM) has been designed with the purpose of explaining what causes specific human behavior. The model proposes three factors along with its subcomponents that when simultaneously combined bring about the targeted action of the individual. These are (1) a relatively high level of individual motivation, (2) the personal ability to perform such actions, and (3) the adequate trigger that will eventually bring about the behavior (Fogg, 2009). Based on the Fogg Behavior Model, the target action is most likely to take place when the motivation is in the highest level, the actors have

the needed ability and there is an adequate form of prompt, all of course occurring at the same time.

This Behavior Model has also categorized the individuals into four groups ranging from those with both high motivation and ability, high motivation but low ability, low motivation and low ability, and lastly, low motivation but high ability.⁸ Thus, in situations where the prompts are situated above the action line, the action tends to take place more commonly (Fogg, 2019). This study emphasizes not only the importance of individual motivation and ability, but also puts great focus on the external prompts as being decisive for a behavior to take place. This factor will be significant for the study undertaken here, which will be explained in the following section.

3.2. Most-Similar Case Approach

Case study, among the qualitative methodology, deals with a smaller pool of population in comparison to other forms of research. Yet, in contrast to these other research methodologies, it is imperative that the sample be chosen, for any given study, in a purposive manner (Gerring, 2007). In order to achieve this, John Gerring (2007) has enumerated nine techniques that make up nine different case study types: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, crucial, path-way, most-similar, and most-different. All these types explain diverging

⁸ Professor and developer of the Fogg Behavior Model has explained this categorization in his webpage: <https://behaviormodel.org>

manners by which a researcher can select the samples needed for each study, evading the problem of selection bias.

Among these types, to analyze the case of land reform in South Korea and Chile the ‘most-similar’ case study method has been selected based on its characteristics. As Gerring (2007) has defined, the ‘most-similar’ case study is a method of selecting two or more cases that are similar in all aspects except the variable(s) of interest. This methodology consists of three different variables. These are, the variables of interest (X_1), the “control” variable (X_2), and the outcome (Y). The selection of the case of South Korea and Chile under this methodology can be justified in that they both experienced similar patterns of development but differed in their land reform outcomes as mentioned in the introductory section.

Additionally, Gerring (2007) puts forth two different case types which are classified depending on the way one approaches the research. First, in the hypothesis-generating (A) method, the outcome (Y) differs for the two cases being analyzed, whilst the “control” variable(s) (X_2) is similar or equal. Thus, this type of research will try to find the factors that differ (X_1) that will make the research significant. In the hypothesis-testing (B) approach, the researcher will try to look for cases with differing variables of interest (X_1) that are already known, and similar “control” variables (X_2) with the purpose of proving the initial hypothesis. [Table 1] visually represents these two case study methods.

[Table 1] Most-similar analysis with two case types.

(A) Hypothesis-generating (Y-centered):

		X1	X2	Y
Case Types	A	?	0	1
	B	?	0	0

(B) Hypothesis-testing (X1/Y-centered):

		X1	X2	Y
Case Types	A	1	0	?
	B	0	0	?

Source: John Gerring (2007, p. 132)


3.3. Motivation–Capability–Trigger Model

Who implements land reform, and what causes the disparities in outcomes between those who are successful and those who remain with high levels of land distributional inequality? There have been numerous attempts by scholars to answer these two questions in the political-economy arena (de Janvry, 1981; Kay 1988; Teichman, 2012).

In this research, the author has inserted a combination of the Fogg Behavior Model and the Most-Similar Case study methodology to the case study of two individual states– Chile and South Korea. Instead of considering the individuals as the main element to be analyzed, the various actors involved in the process of land reform implementation, have been taken as the unit of analysis for the desired action.

Based on the study of previous literature, it has been possible to filter out some, not to say most, of the factors of interest (X₁) that have affected land reform despite geographical and timing differences. This study will use the most-similar case of land reform in South Korea and Chile, with special focus on the ‘hypothesis-generating’ approach shown in [Table 1] (A). Additionally, based on the basic framework of the Behavior Model, these factors of interest (X₁) have been categorized into three sectors depending on their role in the land reform implementation process– Motivation, Capability, and Trigger as has been visually presented in [Figure 1].

[Figure 1] Schematic representation of the Motivation–Capability–Trigger Model applied to the case of Land Reform.



Source: Author

First, within the motivation factor, there are three actor-based

subcategories; the state, the landowner class, and the peasant class. This subcategory refers to the motivation that these three actor groups have had for pursuing land reform. Second, the subcategories of the capability factor are the state administrative and financial capability to enforce and sustain land reform long enough for it to be successful. Lastly, within the factor of trigger in the case of land reform, the geopolitical environment has been included, which has been followed by the domestic political competition, and the peasant mobilization, these three will be included. In the following section the Motivation–Capability–Trigger Model will be applied to the land reform case of South Korea and Chile. Here one will be able to identify the differences that caused disparities in distributional and policy outcomes.

A key aspect that should be mentioned within the analytical framework taken in this study, is that the factors of interests (X_1) will be rated either weak, medium, or strong depending on their influence in land reform. This aspect is different from that of the most-similar case of hypothesis-testing (Gerring, 2007), in that it not only finds out whether it has impact (1) or not (0) as shown in [Table 1], but it measures the actual degree of influence it has.

In this study, ‘weak’ refers to those factors that have very small influence over the decision and implementation of land reform. It is based on the literature and official documents of the participation of this group, that is either bound by law, or has overtly opposed to land reform. ‘Medium’ compounds the groups that have had the

intention to introduce land reform, yet, its influence has been limited. Nevertheless, those factors classified as 'medium' have been in most cases weak factors that have been upgraded with the help of other external factors. Classification of 'strong' has been labelled to those with both strong overt and covert influence in both the introduction, implementation, and sustenance of agrarian reform. One exception to these criteria has been the case of the 'landowner class'. It has been found that this class' strong influence in society leads to negative rather than positive outcomes, in the case of land reform. Thus, for this case we have stated the effect it has in land reform- either positive or negative- within the analysis.

Chapter 4. Case Study

4.1. South Korea

4.1.1. Land Reform Nature of South Korea

Land reform in South Korea took place under special circumstances. It was initiated by the United States Army Government in Korea (USAMGIK) with the end of the Japanese colonial rule in September 8, 1945 (Kim, 2916). At the time, although there was consensus among the Korean public as well as the U.S. army government regarding the necessity of performing land reform, diverse opinions persisted in the manner by which it should be performed. As the results show, the political rightist (KDP) stance of providing compensation to landlords and selling the land to farmers prevailed over the other leftists and centrist approaches. The USAMGIK, the Korean agricultural expertise, and the Legislature Assembly at the time, drafted the South Korean Land Reform Law in 1947, which consisted of making the land purchasable by the government who could then sell it to tenant-farmers with a limit of 2 *chungbo*⁹. This is believed by many scholars to have influenced the successful establishment of the March 10, 1950 Land Reform Act as Law No. 108 that was executed on April of the same year (Shin, 1976).

⁹ 1 *chungo* is the same as 2.45 acres.

Hong (2013) has argued that despite the success of South Korean land reform, the anticipated and voluntary sale of land by landowners¹⁰ in January and May of 1946 and between November 1947 and March 1948 have played an important role in deciding the fate of land redistribution in this country (Hong, 2013). According to this scholar farms owned by independent farmers in South Korea increased from around 35 percent in 1945 to 96 percent in 1951 after the land reform took place, eventually leading to the end of the landlord system (Hong, 2013).

4.1.2. Application of MCT Model to South Korea

Some scholars argue that land reform in South Korea was first implemented between 1949 and 1950 (Gon & Park, 2013), whilst there are others who locates it far behind to the immediate post-war period (Teichman, 2012). Although there is no unanimous agreement of when exactly was land reform introduced and finalized in South Korea, here because of its concentrated and relatively stable application, it will be analyzed within the single parameter of post-World War II land reform.

MOTIVATION

State: *Weak*

Immediately after the termination of World War II, the Korean

¹⁰ According to Hong (2013), landowners voluntarily sold their lands especially during the two periods where land reform was most likely to take place.

Peninsula found itself devastated by the remnants of the war and divided with a Soviet Union led-communist north and a south controlled by the U.S. In such conditions it is fair to define South Korean state motivation for implementing land reform as weak. As reported by General Hodge to General Douglas MacArthur, South Korea was left in chaotic political conditions complemented by numerous domestic competitions among the left-wing and right-wing political parties in order to fill in the power vacuum (Kim, 2016).

Nevertheless, despite this chaotic situation, Choi and Park (2013) have pointed out that one of the underlying reasons why South Korea actively implemented land reform in the post-U.S. military government period, was due to the political interest of President Syngman Rhee in repressing the economically influential political landowning class (Choi and Park, 2013). Being a right-wing politician belonging to the Korean Democratic Party, President Rhee is characterized for his strong anti-communist sentiments. In addition to this, the devastation of South Korea under Japanese rule with the flow-out of agricultural resources from Korea to Japan during the war, had left this country in extreme poverty, which left the state with the upmost goal of achieving socio-economic development through agricultural production (Shin, 1976). Such attempt can be said to have influenced to the state to gradually attain land reform.

Landowner Class: *Weak (Positive Effect)*

Historically, South Korea had been dominated by absentee-

landlords collecting high rate of rent and poor tenant-farmers demanding reform (Shin, 1976). Nevertheless, in the post-World War II era landlords had been the primary focus of anger relief for the exploited peasant class, whilst peasants were influential in many aspects of post-World War II society and politics (Cole and Lyman, 1971; Pak, 1956; Jeon & Kim, 2000). Thus, there is a consensus that the landowner class that had been in power since the colonial era, was successfully disempowered during this period (Gold, 1986). Additionally, the Korean war was a decisive element that eliminated any form of opposition towards land reform implementation (Kay, 2002). Under such conditions, in which their long-rooted wealth and power were at stake, landowners had little motivation for redistributing their ownings. In such sense, the landowner class has been classified as being weak in terms of their influence in land reform, but this finally served as a positive reinforcer for such policies.

Peasant Class: *Strong*

The Korean peasant class has had an active role in Korean politics from the early 20th century. Evidence shows that during the Colonial Rule of Japan, South Korean peasants have engaged in numerous occasions in disputes regarding rents and tenancy rights with both Japanese and Korean landlords who had worsened living conditions for this group (Chōsen sōtokufu, 1934, 1940a; Shin, 1976; Shin, 1994). These peasants were also responsible for the deaths of numerous landlords thought to have been collaborating with the

Japanese authorities during the colonial period (Cumings, 1981). From the Korean politicians and the U.S. military government's perspectives, their demands were almost impossible to overlook, if one was aiming to stabilize the South Korea society. Land reform had much to do with this powerful peasant group together with politicians aiming to satiate their demands.

CAPABILITY

State Administrative Capability: *Medium*

Post-liberalized South Korea lacked the administrative capacity to manage the country's sociopolitical needs. Thus, it resorted to the help of the U.S. military government to introduce and implement its first attempt of land reform. Under such conditions, although South Korean state administrative capacity was weak, it was complemented by the U.S. military government which was relatively more mature in such sense. This turn led to the early attempts of land reform in the south, although it achieved only moderate redistribution.

After the establishment in August 15, 1948, of the first Government of the Republic of Korea, not without strong opposition from the right and with pressing demands from the U.S., the Agricultural Land Reform Amendment Act (ALRAA) was passed on March 10, 1950 (Jeon & Kim, 2000). The state was left in charge of redistributing to landless farmers, government purchased land from landlords and government owned land, which included land confiscated from Japanese owners. Although the expectations were high, because

of the Land Committees' intense relationship with local elites along with the many exceptions in the subjects of land expropriation, the Government could merely expropriate 63.4 percent of the total land (Shin, 1976). In terms of the repayment of purchased land by former tenant-farmers, according to the data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, although the completement of payment for the land was set for 5 years after the purchase, the actual completement of the purchase was made 9 years after the legally approved date. Thus, we are able to derive that attempts to introduce land reform were successful, but due to the deficiency of administrative capacity from the part of the Korean Government, the payments for redistributed land were completed with an approximate of 10 years of delay, despite its eventual conclusion (Shin, 1976).

State Financial Capability: *Medium*

South Korea not only lacked financial capability to sustain land reform in post-1945, but it also lacked a governmental body to finance and organize the process of such reform. The war had left the country in a severe economic crisis, lagging far behind the north in terms of industrial development, and with levels of inflation peaking that made the standard of living poor for most Koreans. In face of such economic situation, South Korea had to depend highly on U.S. aid provided by various channels throughout the years. Thus, in the process of implementing land reform, there was obviously a delay of approximately 9 years in the compensation to landlords who had sold

their lands. Despite this deficiency in state financial capacity, eventually a 97.2 percent of land purchased was completed or it was given in the form of Land-value Bills that enabled these groups to purchase infrastructure that would serve for the purpose of industrialization (Shin, 1976). Such financial deficiencies were eventually supplemented with the continuous aid provided by the U.S. even after the end of the military government. In addition to the compensation in expropriated land, the government provided public investment, state loans and technical assistance to the newly land-owning peasant groups which were necessary for these classes to sustain their newly given lands (Borras and Mckinley, 2006).

TRIGGER

Geopolitical Environment: *Strong*

The geopolitical environment when land reform was being implemented in the south of Korea was that of chaos and continuous threat by external forces. It occurred immediately after the termination of the Second World War, and in an environment where there was Power politics going on in the Korean peninsula against the Soviet-led north. One big event was that of the 1946 North Korean successful implementation of land reform (Kim, 2009; You, 2017). This event, is argued by Kim (2009) and You (2017) to have been the driving force behind the first Korean President; Syngman Rhee, for implementing land reform in the south to prevent the spread of Communism.

Another argument is that of the United States-led early land

reform implemented due to the fear of communist ideology spreading throughout the southern region of the peninsula, due to the political and social instability fueled by the peasant rebellion of 1946 (Cumings, 1981; Teichman, 2012; Kim, 2000). In fact, post-liberalized South Korea was comprised of mostly peasants, who, in a survey carried out by the U.S. military administration, were found to have a high proneness towards socialism and communism (Park, 1993). Such tendency of post-liberalized Korean public, enhanced the motivation of the United States to get actively involved in the domestic affairs of the South. Hence, U.S. was mainly responsible of successfully implementing the first land reform in post-liberalized South Korea by imposing Ordinance No. 9¹¹ and Ordinance No. 173¹², which efficiently redistributed one-third of the total tenanted paddy fields formerly owned by the Japanese (Shin, 1976). Additionally, the establishment of the New Korea Company¹³ in 1946 by USAMGIK to expropriate and administer former Japanese-owned land, proved effective as a land reform implementation measure, which redistributed 80 percent of the land expropriated by the agency to the public by 1948 (McCune, 1947; Bunce, 1948).

¹¹ USAMGIK Ordinance No. 9: Ordinance of “Maximum Tenant Farmers Rents Fixed” created on the 5th of October 1945 by USAMGIK, introducing a ceiling to the rent for landlords. <http://www.history.go.kr/>

¹² USAMGIK Ordinance No. 173: Ordinance of “Creation of National Land Administration” passed on the 22nd of March 1948 allowing American Military Government in Korea to expropriate and distribute former Japanese-owned land. <http://www.history.go.kr/>

¹³ USAMGIK *Summations* referred to the New Korea Company; after renamed as New Korea Company Limited as an independent agency of the Military Government of Korea for selling formerly Japanese-owned land to landless tenant-farmers.

In addition to political aid, the U.S. was actively involved in providing financial aid to South Korea during and after its years of military occupation through various bodies such as the Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). Much of the aid received by South Korea until 1971, which comprised of approximately USD 5.7 billion, had been devoted to the redistribution of formerly Japanese-owned land and the following land reforms (Krueger, 1979). The intense emphasis of the U.S. military government in Korea for land reform, despite high levels of right-wing political opposition from the powerful Korean Democratic Party, had the purpose both of repressing left-wing groups by legitimizing the right-wing political party and to eradicate communist ideology in highly fragmented and unstable South Korea (Korean Institute of Public Administration, 2008).

Domestic Political Competition: *Strong*

Ever since South Korea was liberalized, a strong competition among leftist and rightist political parties prevailed in domestic politics. During the elections of the Interim Legislative Body in 1946, the communist-party along with other leftist forces led by Hon-yong Park caused riots and rebellions, which were more strongly felt in Daegu (McCune, 1947). This tension has been traced back to the U.S. military government and their close alliance with conservative pro-American personnel and their assignation to the early administrative

bureaucracy. Eventually, in 1948 with the help of a democracy promoting U.S. military government, the first government of South Korea was formed under President Syngman Rhee. This was carried out, not without clash and conflicts, among the Soviet backed Korean Communist Party (KCP) led by Hon-yong Park, and the U.S. backed conservative Korean Democratic Party (KDP) (Kim, 2016). Thus, the prevailing domestic political situation in the south of Korea can be said to have been a reflection of the Cold War situation among the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Under such strong competition among rightist and leftist political parties, land reform proved to be a very important policy that would lead to the seizure of power of one of either party.

Peasant Mobilization: *Strong*

South Korean peasants' groups and other social coalitions have been historically known for their strong unity and coordinated actions. Examples of such social mobilization is the March 1st Independent Movement, or *Sam-il* movement, where thousands of protesters from various background led to the streets and fought for their independence from Japan.

Before the outbreak of the well-known 1946 Uprising, where more than 2.3 million peasants participated, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) had not been much interested in the demands of the South Korean peasants for land reform (Shin, 1994; Shin, 1998; Teichman, 2012; Borrás and McKinley, 2006). Beginning on the first of October, 1946 in Daegu, what started as a strike, spread rapidly to the central regions of the country and

transformed into a peasant revolt demanding distribution (Shin, 1994). Thus, a group of strong South Korean peasants along with strong coordinated actions, were partly responsible for the implementation of redistributive measures in the country.

4.2. Chile

Chile has experienced numerous attempts for implementing land reform. Some have classified it by the change in land production structure (de Janvry, 1981), and others have done so by political parties; starting from Frei's administration (Castillo & Lehmann, 1982). Here I have divided the land reform attempts by different periods ranging from 1964–1973. During this period there were two attempts of redistributing land. The first attempt by the Frei's administration from 1964–1970, and another from 1970–1973 during the short-lived Allende's period which were later greatly influenced by the actions taken by the authoritarian government of Augusto Pinochet. What is different from the classification taken in this research to other works will be that I will include the role of the Alliance for Progress, led by the United States in the early 1960s. This will be included within the Frei administration due to the short-liveliness and unstructured nature of the land reform under former President Jorge Alessandri.

4.2.1. Land Reform Nature of Chile

Land reform has been an important socio-economic policy that many politicians have prioritized from early in history. Regardless of the many attempts, Chile's land distribution continues to be one of the most unequal in the world. One of its attempts in modern history was through the establishment of Law 4496 in 1928 through the Bureau of Agricultural Colonization (*Caja de Colonización Agrícola*) which persisted until the 1960s. This organization's role consisted of colonizing and/or expropriating land and operating them in order to increase productivity¹⁴, giving the power to the state and individual entities (Garrido, 1988). Becket (1963) has pointed out the lack of financial soundness of those administering the *caja* as being the main reason for its failure (Becket, 1963).

Despite the failure of sustaining the *caja*, future efforts were made by the international Latin community to create the Alliance for Progress, focusing on the redistribution of land as a measure for achieving development. The main actor within the Alliance for Progress was the Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (CIDA)¹⁵, who were in charge of gathering the

¹⁴ This information has been extracted from the *Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile*, section of *Ley Chile*.

¹⁵ CIDA was an organization created jointly by the Organization of American States (OEA), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), and the Inter-American Institute for Agriculture (IICA) in order to plan the agricultural reform needed in the region.

information needed for introducing adequate land reform measures (Garrido, 1988). The central figure of this international cooperation group in Chile was agricultural engineer Jacques Chonchol¹⁶, whom played a significant role as the vice-president of the Institute of Agricultural Development (INDAP) during Frei administration, and later on became Minister of Agriculture under Allende's presidency (Garrido, 1988).

4.2.2. Application of MCT Model to Chile 1964–1970

MOTIVATION

State: *Medium*

The motivation of the Chilean state for introducing land reform, were neither strong nor weak. Eduardo Frei under the Christian Democratic Party (1964–70); center, left wing coalition supported by the urban bourgeoisie and the landowner class, introduced one of the first official attempts of redistributing land in Chile.

The motivation behind this movement however, has been criticized as merely having political motivation for obtaining the votes of the rural peasant groups (Chonchol, 1976). During the 1964 presidential elections, both Eduardo Frei from the Christian Democratic Party and Salvador Allende from the Popular Front, had

¹⁶ Jacques Chonchol put forth the ideal of creating a communitarian society in rural Chile in order to avoid the risk of a Socialist or Capitalist turn (Chonchol, 1976).

promised to implement land reform as an attempt to gain support from these rural groups, which were exercised at the expense of the landowner class (Silva, 1988).

Nevertheless, the diverse interest groups that the Frei administration had to satisfy, led to a moderate and undecisive stance when adopting new policies (Teichman, 2012). In sum, from these actions taken by the Frei administration, which was dependent on different sectors of the state, it is fair to say that the state had a fragile vase from which it retrieved power for enforcing land reform and other forms of political control. Thus, it led to delays in the passing of the land reform law¹⁷ and in moderate expropriation.

Landowner Class: *Strong (Negative Effect)*

The landowner class' influence in land reform has been found to be strong, yet the effects it had in the successful performance of these redistributive policies have been classified as having been negative. Historically, Chile's social structure has been highly influenced by the propertied class. It is a consensus that in the rural areas, there existed a firm and hardly contested hierarchical-patriarchal relationship between the peasant-tenant class and the landowners. In addition to this, another big characteristic to be emphasized is the intra-sectoral role that the landowner class engages in. This intra-sectoral activity of the Chilean landowners is shown in

¹⁷ Law No. 15020.

the findings of Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1975) where 42 per cent of the bankers in Chile were found to be landowners themselves in the mid-twentieth century (Zeitlin & Ratcliff, 1975).

This trend started to shift with the introduction of the 1958 electoral law which significantly reduced the influence that the landlords could exert in political outcomes (Teichman, 2012). Peasant groups being able to have their own vote and to influence domestic politics, meant that left and center political parties could target and represent these groups in rural areas, gradually diminishing the political power of landlords. Yet, the political influence of the deeply rooted landlords could not be underestimated. Their active participation in the repression of rural unions until almost the final stages of Frei's term in office, show the political influence that this group continuously exerted. Therefore, although the peasants group gained political power during the Frei administration, this was not enough to diminish or alter the influence of the Chilean landlords. Especially, the National Agriculture Society (SNA) composed by the *latifundistas* exerted enormous influence on the president's policies regarding land reform (Garrido, 1988). The specific repressive actions taken by the landowner class will be dealt with in the following section.

Peasant Class: *Weak*

Peasant's mobilization was not common during the early 20th century due to the repressive actions taken by the Popular Front government; political left-wing coalition, which ruled the country from

1937–1941. Regardless of being a left-wing coalition, such repressions were due to the high emphasis that they devoted to industrial development in Chile.¹⁸ Backed by both the industrial middle-class and the rural landowners, in accordance to their political objectives, the Popular Front was able to prohibit rural unions which continued to be used in practice until 1967 (Drake, 1978).

Additionally, such movements were unexpected due to the heterogeneity prevailing in the rural landscape, which was composed of *inquilinos*, sharecroppers, and small and middle-sized landowners (Teichman, 2012). As Affonso et al (1976) have pointed out, before 1965, peasants lacked the power and the capacity of organized mobilization to influence domestic politics. This heterogeneity can be contrasted to the homogeneous rural society that prevailed in South Korea during the years that land reform was implemented.

However, in 1967, Frei's administration successfully passed the Law of Agrarian Unionization, which led to the escalation and solid establishment of peasant unions by the end of his presidency (Gomez, 1982). This along with the introduction of land reform led eventually to the increase of peasant radical actions rather than organized use of political power at the end of his years. Such radical movements will be dealt with in the period of Allende's administration.

¹⁸ For more information, see: <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-3427.html#presentacion>

CAPABILITY

State Administrative Capacity: *Medium*

In this section the state administrative capacity under Eduardo Frei is argued to have had medium capacity. After Frei's Agrarian Reform Law (No. 16,640) was passed in 1967, the farms were transformed into co-operatives called *asentamientos* and were to be managed by a Council which included a member of the Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA) who would be in charge of vetoing on institutions that were not feasible (Castillo & Lehmann, 1982). CORA funds were provided by the government budget, which highly depended on the political attitudes of the Congress towards the current administration (Sands, 1982). This meant that there was a continuous need to satiate the interests of the opposition party in the Congress.

State Financial Capacity: *Medium*

Chile can be characterized for its unstable economic conditions that are in a continuous boom-and-boost cycle. Chilean economy has been highly dependent on foreign income from exports of primary products such as nitrate, which accounted for 60 per cent of total exports beginning in the late nineteenth century (Subercaseaux, 1988). This made the country highly susceptible to changes in the world economy. To elaborate, repercussions from a drop in the Chilean export prices, or recessions in other closely allied world economies, would be strongly felt in the economic conditions of this country. This in turn would both increase or reduce the financial capacity needed for

implementing land reform.

During Frei's land reform, land expropriated from landowners who possessed land exceeding 192 acres, which was the limit set by the agrarian reform law, were compensated by the state in what can be considered as unbeneficial manners (Sands, 1982). Additionally, investment in the industrial sectors by the incumbent government required revenue that eventually caused high inflation engaging in the vicious circle that primary product export dependence would deepen (Sigmund, 1977). Nevertheless, these vacuums in financial resources were in some degree filled in with the aid provided by the U.S. President John F. Kennedy through the Alliance for Progress, under the Christian Democratic Party. This will be explained within the *Geopolitical Environment* section that follows.

TRIGGER

Geopolitical Environment: *Strong*

The geopolitical environment of this period was tense in Latin America. During this period, Latin America proved to be, especially, an important region for the geopolitical interest of the United States. Back then U.S. president John F. Kennedy and his New Frontier Policies led to the formation of the Alliance for Progress along with many Latin American countries. This movement had the purpose of democratically engaging in redistributive reforms and discouraging the fondness towards the communist and socialist ideology (Sands, 1982). These policy-makers argued that they would bear with

authoritarianism from the right rather than allowing revolutionary movements from the left (Dunne, 2014). This was the case of Chile in the 1970s, which will be explained in the section of Salvador Allende.

Fidel Castro coming into power in 1959 through the Cuban Revolution, strongly threatened the national security and the international stability of the U.S. administration in the Cold War setting. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was especially significant for the region, since it is believed that it could easily have escalated to another ideological war (Allison, 2012).

The Alliance for Progress consisted of aid being allocated for ten years by the Kennedy administration to all Latin American countries except for Cuba, with a total of more than \$20 billion for purposes of enhancing social and economic conditions of the recipients. Experts compare this program to the Marshall Plan taken in reconstructing Western Europe and Japan after World War II. Yet, they argue that neither the sum of the aid provided nor the intentions were the same for the U.S., whose main purpose was to secure the home businesses in Latin America rather than promote social and political reform¹⁹.

In addition to this, the Cold War geopolitical environment led the U.S. to engaging in a “Scare Campaign” during the 1964 Chilean elections to prevent the spread of communist ideology that was

¹⁹ For more information visit the JFK Library website article of the Alliance for Progress, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/alliance-for-progress>

believed to be the main goal of the opposition party; that of Salvador Allende (Power, 2008). The United States' fear of their southern neighbors turning left, was a strong motivator for them to get involved in domestic affairs and pushing forth policies that would target those in the lowest strata, who were considered to be the most susceptible to such socialist ideologies.

Domestic Political Competition: *Strong*

Eduardo Frei came into power defeating Salvador Allende from the Socialist Party. The 1964 presidential elections consisted of a heated competition among the coalition of Socialists and Communists led by Allende, and a moderate left and center coalition led by Frei. Especially, the U.S. and the elite political class, had a lot in stake during these elections, where Allende threatened to nationalize the U.S. domestic copper companies along with its geopolitical concerns in the region, and the elite were threatened with socialist styled policies that aimed at redistributing their wealth (Power, 2008). Thus, Frei was able to gather the support of the political right, the U.S. and the middle-class, who feared the Socialist policies proposed by Allende and the repercussions they would have in the existing status quo (Teichman, 2014).

Whilst Frei derived its political support from the above-mentioned groups, Allende had the support of the working class and the rural workers dependent on wage labor. As Teichman (2012) has argued, the political support from peasants was crucial for winning the

presidential elections of 1964, which Frei successfully obtained by proposing one of the first official attempts for implementing distributive land reform.

Peasant Mobilization: *Weak*

There were no major mobilizations by the peasant groups during this period. The prohibition of peasant unions by law until the 1967 signified a relative stability in the countryside for the Frei administration's early years. This peaceful situation was also supplemented by the hierarchical nature among landowners and peasants that had been maintained for centuries. Nevertheless, during the latter years of the Frei administration, the number of strikes and *tomas* increased throughout the country, but these were repressed by a militant landowning class (Silva, 1988). The lack of political power recognition by the government accompanied by a strong landowner class limited the influence that the peasant class could exert in the domestic arena.

4.2.3. Application of MCT Model to Chile 1970–1973

MOTIVATION

State: *Strong*

Salvador Allende becoming president in late 1970, meant the entrance of the left-wing political party of *Unidad Popular*. This

political group was backed mainly by the lowest strata of the population. Thus, land reform was a very important political issue that had to be dealt with. The U.S.-led land reform under the Alliance for Progress; which was later regarded as a big failure, was mainly criticized by Allende and his followers as an imperialist move by the donor country in order to extract resources from Chile (Sands, 1982). The following moderate land reform implemented during the years of Frei's Christian Democratic Party, led Allende to take a more radical populist stance during his presidential elections. Allende harshly criticized the prevailing government policies that were in favor of the influential few—where the landowning class were included²⁰. Thus, he argued in favor of the end of U.S. imperialism, and the collapse of a system where the rich got richer and at the expense of the poor. Allende was inclined to creating a socialist Chile in favor of the people rather than the few elite. In such sense, successful land reform was imperative. In turn, this strong political, social, and economic motivation of Salvador Allende led to the expropriation of 3,278 farms in two years in contrast to 1,412 farms expropriated in six years under Frei's administration (Castillo & Lehnmann, 1982).

Landowner Class: *Weak (Positive Effect)*

Several events led to the weakening of the landowner class

²⁰ Unidad Popular (Chile). Programa básico de gobierno de la Unidad Popular: candidatura presidencial de Salvador Allende. Disponible en Memoria Chilena, Biblioteca Nacional de Chile <http://www.memoriachilena.gob.cl/602/w3-article-7738.html>. Accedido en 2021. 4. 22.

during this period. The increase in peasant's assertiveness during the initial years of the Allende administration supposed a concern for the landlords. The increase in *tomas* by angry peasant groups, along with a pro-peasant government meant that landlords often had to remove livestock and machinery from their farms in order to assure resources for their future livelihood (Kay, 1981). This in turn reduced the productiveness of the newly landowning peasant class who had received land but lacked the basic infrastructure for cultivating it. Additionally, the former landlords' initial response to the *tomas* was of a militant stance, that left some dozens of peasants' dead during the Allende administration (Steenland, 1974). The continuous threats by a strengthened peasant group supposed the diminishing of the long-held power of the landowner class. This reduction in landowners' powers has been found to have positively affected the introduction of land reform.

Peasant Class: *Strong*

Peasant groups were strongly empowered during the Allende's short presidency. Salvador Allende's political support was strongly backed by the peasant groups. He put forth the ideal that the peasants had to be integrated into the domestic politics as a social class, giving them the power to influence matters related to land distribution and social policies destined to the increment of living standards in the rural areas (Winn & Kay, 1974). This in turn gave the peasant class the power to strongly influence the destiny of land reform that took place

during this short period.

CAPABILITY

State Administrative Capacity: *Medium*

Facing the problem of being a minority within Congress, in order to efficaciously and as quickly as possible implement the land reform promised by the *Unidad Popular*, Allende and his administrative staff preserved the Land Reform Law of 1967 (Winn & Kay, 1974). This enabled them to reduce time devoted to the complex administrative process of creating the laws and clauses for implementing land reform. Thus, it made up for the criticisms faced by the Frei administration regarding its slow implementation process. This slow implementation had brought about the frustration of peasants, which the Allende administration used as an effective strategy for accelerating the expropriation process.

In addition, the Allende government used the CERA (Centro de la Reforma Agraria) as the main organization that would implement the reform. This group was composed by peasants, who would get advice from the experts in agrarian strategy and state agrarian agencies. These people were elected by the same peasants that belonged to the CERA (Winn & Kay, 1974). In such conditions, it is fair to say that there was a possibility that far from optimal policies and experts were allocated to the land reform process.

State Financial Capacity: *Weak*

Lack of economic growth along with continuous increase in wages by a government trying to satisfy the lower strata of the population, led to stagflation and an inflation rate reaching 30 per cent during Allende's second year in office (Castillo & Lehmann, 1982). What this meant was that the compensation that was given in exchange of the expropriated land would be of a low value in face of spiking domestic inflation. Landowners would have no choice but to look for ways to evade expropriation of their land, or find safe havens to send their money. Additionally, the decreasing world copper prices; which comprised of Chile's main commodity export, pressured the national budget which made it impossible for Allende to continue with his social policies (Spence, 1978). This situation led to the worsening of economic conditions for Allende who was already struggling to keep domestic stability, except for those of the lowest classes. Allende's strong proposition of aiding the working class brought about the frustration of the propertied class and the bourgeoisie who could feel the side effects of such economic situation (Peterson). Thus, economic instability was a widely accepted condition in Chile during these three years.

TRIGGER

Geopolitical Environment: *Weak*

Chile under Allende was strongly affected by the Cuban Revolution that had taken place the previous decade under Fidel

Castro (Green, 2017). It is argued by Harmer (2011), that Castro and Allende had shared the same political ideas in terms of how to engage in domestic politics, and similar negative sentiments towards the United States.

In such sense, land reform was not a priority for the U.S. during the presidency of Salvador Allende, in contrast to its actions with the Frei administration. It is known that U.S. foreign policy under Nixon had been of containing the spread of communist forces within Latin America, due to the strong influence that Allende had been receiving from back then enemy; Castro. These scholars put forth this argument to state the logic behind the 1973 coup that led to the demise of Allende and the rise of a U.S. backed authoritarian politician; Augusto Pinochet (Hinds, 2016).

From the U.S. National Security Decision Memorandum of 1970, we are able to derive the strong motivation within the geopolitical environment of the Cold War, that Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger had. Who were strongly devoted to eliminating the possibility of a left turn in Chile. Now it is known that the CIA took covert and overt actions by their own hands by providing financial aid comprising of a total of seven million dollars in support for the political opponents of Allende, beginning as early as 1964²¹. This money was partly used in promoting anti-Allende propaganda, which utilized the worsening economic situation along with the support

²¹ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile."

of the unsatisfied bourgeois class²². This was efficiently achieved through a combination of covert actions by the CIA as well as economic pressure that would eventually lead to the demise of its copper export-dependent economy. To sum, United States from 1970–1973 was putting all their efforts to containing Allende, rather than implementing land reform to stabilize domestic rural forces.

Domestic Political Competition: *Strong*

The *Unidad Popular*, led by Salvador Allende, regardless of having won the presidential elections of the time, were outnumbered within the legislative body and the Congress by the opposition party (Winn & Kay, 1974). Strong opposition from the competing party, made it hard for President Allende to enforce the desired policies in a populist manner, targeting the poorest and most marginalized groups of the Chilean society. Additionally, the opposition party; the Christian Democratic Party, used the distrust that had developed overtime among the peasants regarding CERA, having been accused of using CERA as a political tool to encourage a national strike in 1971 (Winn & Kay, 1974). Nevertheless, the peak of domestic political competition under Allende came with the U.S.-backed coup led by the authoritarian leader Augusto Pinochet in 1973, that eventually led to the death of Salvador Allende and the reversal of his socialist policies.

²² Senate, U. S. (1975, December). Covert action in Chile 1963–1973. In 94th Congress 1st Session, Washington (Vol. 18).

Peasant Mobilization: *Strong*

Two events during the Frei administration led to the radicalization of the peasant population. One was the introduction of land reform along with the intensification of their political participation, and the other was the passing of the Law of Agrarian Unionization in 1967. The number of land seizures; *tomas*, and strikes increased drastically from 1967 to 1971 reaching its peak during Allende's administration (Gomez, 1972; Winn & Kay, 1974). According to the study of Gomez, the number of strikes doubled during this period, and the land seizures increased from 9 in 1967 to 1,278 in 1971. All these were propelled by the more than doubling number of rural union members during the short-lived administrative years of Allende²³. These rural unions were classified into five national rural confederations: right-wing confederations ('Libertad', 'Triunfo Campesino', and 'Sargento Cand') and left-wing and moderately radical confederation ('Ranquil') which comprised the second biggest peasant confederation (Silva, 1988). Nevertheless, due to the Pinochet's authoritarian government coming into power in the early 1970s, these rural unions could not consolidate its internal structure and lacked the political power to survive the strong repression that followed (Silva, 1988).

²³ This number increased from 140,293 in 1970 to 282,617 in 1972 (Silva, 1988)

Chapter 5. Interpretation

Based on the previous analysis, we are able to derive some assumptions from the Motivation–Capability–Trigger Model taken for the two–country case study.

MOTIVATION

The case of the South Korean land reform is exclusive in that it occurred under special circumstances. The land reform process was initiated by the United States Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), and went on during the administration of its first democratically elected government in 1948. During the period, we have found that South Korean state’s motivation for land reform was weak. Yet we have also found that Syngman Rhee’s political ideology consisted of an especially anti–communist stance, which led to a relatively active implementation of distributional policies in South Korea with the purpose of pleasing the peasant groups. This situation was complimented by a weak landowner class and a strong peasant class that actively proposed land reform from early years of post–liberalization from Japan.

In contrast, the Chilean case under the Frei administration (1964–1970) shows a medium strength state, a disempowering situation that can be explained with the strong influence that the landowner class had historically been exerting in domestic politics.

[Table 2] Summary of Motivation–Capability–Trigger Model

MOTIVATION– CAPABILITY–TRIGGER MODEL		SOUTH KOREA	CHILE	
		Post-WWII	1964–1970	1970–1973
MOTIVATION	I. State	Weak	Medium	Strong
	II. Landowner Class	Weak	Strong	Weak
	III. Peasant Class	Strong	Weak	Strong
CAPABILITY	I. State Administrative Capacity	Medium	Medium	Medium
	II. State Financial Capacity	Medium	Medium	Weak
TRIGGER	I. Geopolitical Environment	Strong	Strong	Weak
	II. Domestic Political Competition	Strong	Strong	Strong
	III. Peasant Mobilization	Strong	Weak	Strong

Source: Author

Although one of the first official attempts for implementing land reform occurred during this period, we have found out through the analysis that it was highly manipulated by the landlords at the expense of a weak peasant class, whose survival depended on the former. This

situation experienced a drastic change with the entry of the radical socialist party led by Salvador Allende (1970–1973) backed by the peasant class. The motivation of the state in this period was strong in the sense that Allende pushed forth the biggest and the fastest land reform attempts of Chilean history. Having a strong political support from the peasants, this group experienced an increase in political participation whilst the landowner class' political power became relatively weak.

CAPABILITY

Capability has been divided into two groups: state administrative capability and state financial capability. This analysis the capacity of states to carry out land reform once it has been implemented. The former deals with the capability of states to carry out land reform in an effective manner. The latter is an analysis of the financial ability of the state forces to provide the necessary means for achieving land reform.

In almost all cases, we have found that both South Korean and Chilean state administrative and financial capability for implementing and sustaining land reform has been medium. With the exception of the Allende administration's financial capability, that was found to have been weakened due to the world economic recession that hit Chile during this period. An important fact that should be mentioned is that both South Korea and the Frei administration had been receiving great sums of aid from the United States during the period of land reform

implementation. Especially, Chile under Frei had been part of the Alliance for Progress led by the U.S. which the Allende administration had not. Thus, it was not that the state had financial capacity to implement land reform, but both states were being complimented by the foreign aid from the United States.

TRIGGER

This section analyzed the effect of some external and internal factors that led to the success or failure of land reform implementation. All three land reforms occurred during the Cold War geopolitical environment. In South Korea more than in Chile, the Communist threat posed by a belligerent Soviet backed north Korea was felt more strongly. Yet, the heated confrontation between Cuba and the U.S. in the 1960s led the latter to get actively involved in domestic political anti-communist campaigns in Latin America.

The difference in U.S. stance between the Allende and the Frei administration would be the high support that Frei received. In fact, the United States, in fear of Allende implementing communist ideas in Chile, backed the 1970 military coup led by the following military dictator Augusto Pinochet. Although this factor is highly scrutinized by the international community, the effects that this forceful governmental transition had in land reform cannot be overseen. With the entrance of neoliberal Pinochet, the land reforms that had been achieved during the past years were reversed. He not only dismantled the *asentamientos* and the CERAs, but he even returned the

expropriated lands back to their former owners, giving back the power base of the landowning class (Castillo & Lehmann, 1982).

Domestic political competition in South Korea and Chile were both strong. Domestic politics was a consistent fight between left and right parties in the two countries. Especially during the Cold War geopolitical environment, this competition was intensified by the United States trying to avoid a communist turn of its key strategic allies by providing resources to U.S.-friendly political parties as can be seen during the 1964 Chilean presidential elections and the 1970 military coup.

Peasant mobilization has proved to be crucial for the initiation of land redistributive attempts in countries with high inequality of land assets. In South Korea such protests were strong. Such that it actually was one of the factors that led the state to actively introduce land reform policies. During the Allende administration they were also strong, which explains the rapid and active implementation of redistribution. In the case of Eduardo Frei, landowners and the state law repressed such movements. Thus, the redistributive outcomes of land reform were moderate when compared to the above-mentioned cases.

Based on these findings that are summarized in **[table 2]**, we are able to derive some preliminary conclusions. In the case of South Korea and Chile, land reform was triggered by similar factors. But we can in some degree agree that land reform is most likely to be initiated when

the state and the peasant class is highly motivated. In addition to this, the United States, threatened by a belligerent geopolitical environment, should be willing to provide some form of aid in order to fulfill the gaps in the government finance of developing countries that is necessary to accomplish such goal of redistribution. For example, from the experience of Salvador Allende's administration, we can observe that land reform can be implemented when the state's motivation is really strong, but it cannot be sustained without the help of the United States, or with a strong domestic political opposition group. Also, domestic competition is important in that it motivates political groups to aim for land reform implementation, although it may lack redistributive purpose, but it pushes even rightest political groups.

5.1. 'Hypothesis-generating' Interpretation of MCT Model

Additionally, by classifying the previous findings into the 'hypothesis-generating' model of the 'Most-similar' cases (Gerring, 2007) we are able to derive the following [table 3] and [table 4]. These tables classify the variables in the rows X₁, X₂, and Y. As mentioned previously, the variables of interest are grouped together under the row X₁. These have been filtered out through the previous analysis based on the Motivation-Capability-Trigger Model. X₂ is a compilation of the control variables that have shown similarity for both

country cases. These variables will be held aside in the interpretation section since they will not be significant for what is being dealt in this study. Variable Y shows the differences in land reform outcomes that the author wants to explain through this analysis. Finally, the far-right columns contain the country cases of land reform used for this case study; post-World War II South Korea and Chile in the 1964–1970 and 1970–1973.

[Table 3] Interpretation of the MCT Model Findings through the Hypothesis-generating Model (part 1)

Hypothesis-generating Model			CASES	
			South Korea	Chile(1964–1970)
VARIABLES	X1	State	Weak	Medium
		Landowner Class	Weak	Strong
		Peasant Class	Strong	Weak
		Peasant Mobilization	Strong	Weak
	X2	State Administrative Capacity	Medium	Medium
		State Financial Capacity	Medium	Medium
		Geopolitical Environment	Strong	Strong
		Domestic Political Competition	Strong	Strong
	Y	Land Reform Outcome	Success	Limited

Source: Source: Modification from the original ‘hypothesis-generating’ model of John Gerring (2007).

The [table 3] compares the land reform experience of South Korea after World War II and the land reform performed under former President Eduardo Frei during 1964–1970. The variables of interest grouped in this comparison are: state, landowner class, peasant class,

and peasant mobilization. We can derive that when state capacity in whichever form is the same for both countries, there is strong U.S. geopolitical interest in implementing land reform, and strong domestic competition, land reform can succeed, as in the case of South Korea, when there are strong peasant groups with the sufficient pressure to redistribute land. This situation can be complemented by the existence of a weak landowner class and a weak state that cannot be manipulated by the interests of bureaucrats and a peasant class strong enough to check-and-balance the activities of the state.

[Table 4] Interpretation of the MCT Model Findings through the Hypothesis-generating Model (part 2)

Hypothesis-generating Model			CASES	
			South Korea	Chile(1970-1973)
VARIABLES	X1	State	Weak	Strong
		State Financial Capacity	Medium	Weak
		Geopolitical Environment	Strong	Weak
	X2	Landowner Class	Weak	Weak
		Peasant Class	Strong	Strong
		State Administrative Capacity	Medium	Medium
		Domestic Political Competition	Strong	Strong
		Peasant Mobilization	Strong	Strong
	Y	Land Reform Outcome	Success	Limited

Source: Modification from the original 'hypothesis-generating' model of John Gerring (2007).

As for the comparison of Post-World War II South Korea and Chile under President Salvador Allende (1970-1973) land reform, the situation changes. The variables of interest are reduced to three: state, state financial capacity, and geopolitical environment. In this case we can derive that all other variables held constant, the existence of a strong state willing to implement land reform, as in the case of Chile (1970-1973), such redistributive policies can be implemented successfully. Yet from the experience of South Korea and Chile during this period, we have found out that the lack of U.S. geopolitical interest and aid for the subject country can lead to failure of land reform. This factor can directly affect the state financial capacity to finance land reform.

In a nutshell, through the Motivation-Capability-Trigger Model and the following hypothesis-generating tests we have been able to derive some main findings of this analysis that can be summarized as follows:

First, the presence of a highly motivated peasant class and a weakened landowner class can be a useful catalyst to initiate land reform.

Second, state financial and administrative capacity in the most successful cases of land reform have been highly complimented by U.S. monetary aid.

Third, U.S. foreign policy under a Cold War geopolitical environment has been found out to be crucial for introducing, maintaining and sustaining land reform in these two developing countries.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

6.1. Findings

Land reform has been a priority social policy taken in South Korea in the years after the end of World War II. Although it was initially undertaken by the U.S. Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) in the immediate post-war period, these redistributive policies were actively implemented during the presidency of Syngman Rhee; the first president of South Korea. The outcome of the land reform in Korea was that of elimination of powerful landowner class along with more equal land distribution, a situation that persists to the present date. Land reform has been one of the key factors held responsible for the incomparable economic growth achieved in South Korea since its liberation (Jeon & Kim, 2000).

Meanwhile in Chile, the case has been the opposite. Chile is still one of the countries with the highest level of Gini inequality in terms of land possession in the world. Large land assets in the form of *latifundios* are still in the hands of few powerful landowners. This situation has persisted despite numerous attempts of implementing land reform in the 20th century. Such failures in redistributing land have not only caused exacerbating urban-rural social conditions (Jaimovich & Toledo-Concha, 2020), but it has also affected economic growth in the region by limiting productivity of land and labor (Borras, Kay and

Lodhi 2007; Barraclough, 1973).

This study has dealt with the contrasting fates of Chilean and South Korean land reform. The Fogg Behavior Model and the Most-Similar Case methodology have been merged and modified into the Motivation-Capability-Trigger Model, in order to make it fit for the case dealt here. Based in the analysis of previous studies, it has been possible to extract some key factors influencing the success and failure of land reform in developing countries, which have been used in the case study of South Korea and Chile.

The Motivation-Capability-Trigger Model has made it possible to derive some implications from the failed attempts of land redistribution in Chile. These have been the following: first, the success and failure of land reform in Chile has been settled in many cases by the powerful landowner class, who in South Korea lost influence in the early years after the end of the Second World War. Second, strong domestic political competition and peasant movements are powerful catalysts for introducing land reform. In the South Korean case, the 1946 peasant protests proved strong enough to push the state and the U.S. in making land reform a priority. In the case of Chile under Eduardo Frei, a powerful opposition left-wing political party led by Salvador Allende, during the 1964 presidential elections, forced the former to pledge for land reform in exchange of the peasants' votes. Under such strong domestic political competition one of the first official attempts for land reform was initiated in 1964. Third, land reform in the case of South Korea was found to have been highly

influenced by external forces; mostly by the U.S. The geopolitical environment when the land reform was implemented in the Asian country was one of strong ideological competition among the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Under such conditions, it has been found that the U.S. is more actively involved in achieving redistributive outcomes with the purpose of satiating rural peasants that could turn left. U.S. motivation for aiding the Allende-led land reform can be said to have been small. The U.S. priority was to stall the Chilean president rather than help him in fear of Chile turning red.

In conclusion, for developing countries with high levels of inequality that is lacking the power and resources to achieve successful land reform, the strong will and aid from a foreign power; in this case the U.S., may decide the fate of such redistributive policies. In the South Korean case, land reform promoted by the United States in the Cold War environment was influential enough to contain those powers opposing land redistribution. In Chile, on the other hand, land reform was in many cases obstructed by powerful landowners, the state, and the United States.

6.2. Implications and Further Studies

This study has tried to figure out in an organized manner, which factors catalyze the move for land reform and which causes its eventual success. Yet, during the process of research, this study has been subject to some limitations that should be dealt in further studies.

One of the limitations of the analytical framework taken in this paper, is the incapacity of controlling variables not dealt with but that could have indirectly affected the prospects of land reform. Cultural differences may be one of these variables that cannot be controlled for. It has been argued by many sociologists, that culture affects the public policy from the stages of goal setting to strategy implementation (Swidler, 1986). Whilst comparing two countries that are distant in geographical terms, it is hard to ascertain that culture has not played a role in the policy-making and implementation process of land reform. Judith Teichman has argued that the high levels of sympathy that the South Korea middle class felt towards the rural peasants led to the increased emphasis in the implementation of redistributive policies. This was contrasted to the case of Chile, where the middle-class were more prone to relate themselves with the elite rather than the lower classes (Teichman, 2015).

Another would be the time and context differences where land reform was implemented. Although the three cases of land reform took place in the broad context of the Cold War, geopolitical differences could have affected each country's political activities in differing manners. In addition to this, the U.S. foreign policy has also varied drastically among presidents. Here we have dealt with the U.S. under three different presidents, each of whom have had their own strategy for dealing with external issues and for containing the Soviet Union. Such differences can be seen through the more outward-oriented measures taken by the Kennedy administration, to that of the Truman

administration after the catastrophe in Vietnam.

However, this study has attempted to analyze the land reform attempts of three different administrations in a manner that can be generalized to other country cases. The conclusion that has been derived points out to the important role that the U.S. played in these three attempts. This study argues that an intense U.S. prompt can be a key factor leading a country with high levels of land inequality to achieve satisfactory outcomes of land reform. Jong-sun You, has engaged in a comparative study of land reform in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. He has pointed out U.S. pressures and geopolitical environment as being the definitive cause that brought about land reform success in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, whilst the lack of such interests from the U.S. led to the failure in the Philippines (You, 2014).

To conclude, the area of land reform should be approached multidimensionally, as this study. There are advantages to this type of analytical framework in that there is the possibility to give differing weight to disparate factors that are involved in the process of land reform. In the case study of Chilean and South Korean land reforms, we have been able to find that external influence has played a crucial role in deciding the success or failure. Further studies should pay close attention to these external factors that can decide the fate of countries with high levels of land inequality.

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초록

많은 학자들이 농지 개혁은 한국의 전례 없는 경제 성장과 상대적으로 동등한 사회 구조를 설명하는 주요 정책으로 주목한다. 이것은 칠레와 라틴 아메리카 전체의 상황과 대비되기도 한다. 칠레는 이웃 국가에 비해 유망한 경제적 성과에도 불구하고 심각한 토지 불평등과 사회의 여러 측면에서의 구조적 불평등을 유지하고 있다. 1960년대부터 칠레에서는 토지 개혁을 도입하려는 시도가 여러 차례 있었지만 많은 학자들은 이를 실패로 여기고 있다. 본 연구는 이러한 정책의 성공과 실패를 결정짓는 요인 또는 요인들을 찾기 위해 한국과 칠레의 농지 개혁을 비교하고자 하였다. 제2차 세계대전 이후 한국의 토지개혁과 칠레 프레이와 아옌데 정권에서 각각 도입된 토지개혁을 분석 한 결과, 토지개혁 도입 및 유지 과정에서 당시 지정학적 환경이 큰 역할을 한 것으로 드러났다. 특히 이러한 환경 속에서 동맹국에 대한 미국의 강력한 동기와 재정적, 행정적 지원은 한국 토지 재분배를 성공으로 이끄는 데에 중요한 역할을 한 것으로 나타났다. 이 외에도 재분배를 위해서는 지주 계급의 정치적 영향력을 제한하는 것이 중요하다는 사실을 본 연구를 통해 밝혀졌다.