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Master's Thesis of International Studies

**Germany's State Response
on Refugee Situation**
with reference to Historical Institutionalism

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Abstract

Germany's State Response on Refugee Situation with reference to Historical Institutionalism

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The Federal Government of Germany is renowned for its hospitality towards refugees and asylum-seekers since the European Refugee Crisis in year 2015, accepting the highest number of refugees and asylum-seekers from the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. Nevertheless, looking closely into Germany's state response, the hospitable policies did not seem to have been so persistent, showing quite some fluctuation.

This study carries out a qualitative research on official reports and documents from the German government and relevant organizations to examine the fluctuation in Germany's state response, especially focusing on three different crises; 1) humanitarian crisis – the European Refugee Crisis, 2) the health crisis – the global COVID-19 pandemic, and 3) the natural crisis – the Moria Refugee Camp fire disaster. Under the context of historical institutionalism, and considering the variables of the German public and the civic sector, this study evaluates Germany's differing crisis management with two different models; 1) coordination model and 2) nexus model.

This study claims that while Germany managed its humanitarian crisis through the coordination of the civic sector over the public sector, it appeared the

opposite during the health crisis, in which the public sector coordinated the civic sector – in order to curb the spread of the virus and protect its national citizens. On the contrary, Germany showed a completely different approach during the natural crisis at the Moria Refugee Camp, demonstrating a nexus between the two sectors. Claiming that the natural crisis acts as the collaboration of the former two crises – humanitarian and health crisis, and thus has brought about a nexus in Germany's state response as well, this study argues the importance of considering both public and civic sectors in implementing state policies during a crisis.

Keywords: Germany, refugee crisis management, humanitarian crisis, health crisis, natural crisis

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List of Acronyms

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)
BAMF	Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees)
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria)
DW	Deutsche Welle
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
EU	European Union
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees The UN Refugee Agency

I. Introduction

The Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to as Germany) is renowned for its hospitable approach to refugees and asylum-seekers ever since the European Refugee Crisis churned the European countries. Under such approach, Germany has experienced a great amount of influx of refugees and asylum-seekers into its territory. However, deeply reviewing the German policies, it does not show that Germany's hospitality was always persistent as it seems. This study aims to analyze such fluctuating process of Germany's changing state response on the refugee problem by reviewing its historical path and how the institution had responded accordingly. This study will provide an overview of Germany's crisis management until recently.

1. Refugee in Brief

Following the aftermath of World War II, along with the unstable circumstances around the world, the issue of refugees has been an on-going debate. Refugees are forced to flee their home country for persecution upon various claims. The following introduction will deliver what a 'refugee' is, and what the current situation of worldwide refugees is.

a. Refugee

Under the 'UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees', also known as

the ‘1951 Refugee Convention’ (hereinafter referred to as the 1951 Convention) of 28th July 1951 in Geneva, it is defined who a refugee is, what legal and social rights refugees are entitled to receive, and what responsibilities and/or obligations host countries pursue.

Article I A (2) of the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as follows;

“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”^①

As of 20th January 2020, 146 state parties have agreed to the Convention and 147 state parties have agreed to the Protocol. There are two countries that only ratified the Convention, whereas three countries (including the United States of America) only signed the Protocol.

It is also essential to note that a refugee “is recognized because he is a refugee.”^② This particular phrase brings upon a heating debate in the host countries and its politics regarding the recognition of refugees as ‘refugees.’ Article 28 of Chapter 1 (General Principles) in the ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection’ by the

^① United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Convention And Protocol Relating To The Status Of Refugees* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011): 14.

^② United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Handbook On Procedures And Criteria For Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines On International Protection: Under The 1951 Convention And The 1967 Protocol Relating To The Status Of Refugees* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019): 17.

United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter referred to as the UNHCR) states as follows;

“A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.”^③

It is essential for individual states to put emphasis on the above-mentioned article and establish an adequate policy for refugees and asylum-seekers accordingly. As Lee (2016) emphasizes, “Refugees are those who have to find a place or means to live safely while fleeing from all the dangers that threaten their existence. They are the most vulnerable minorities who are in very poor condition.”^④ Nevertheless, the following part will illustrate how the current situation of world refugees are not quite the best in assisting their poor condition.

b. Worldwide Refugee

Since the World War II broke out in 1939, refugee issue has become an on-going critical matter worldwide. Due to the severe circumstances throughout and after the World War, millions escaped their home countries in search of refuge, resulting in millions being forcibly displaced, deported and/or resettled.


Unfortunately, *Figure 1* shows how the above-mentioned aftermath of World

^③ Ibid.

^④ Jongwon Lee, “The Problems of the Refugee and the North Korean defector: Based on Agamben and Levinas’ theory,” *The Korean Journal of Christian Social Ethics* vol.34 no.0 (2016): 126-127.

War II was not the end of this crisis. Starting from the early 1950s, the bottom chart illustrates how the number of persons of concern – including refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced people (hereinafter referred to as IDPs), returnees, stateless persons and others – has continuously increased over the decades until currently in the year 2021, ranking the highest of more than 80 million.

[Figure 1] UNHCR Statistics – The World in Numbers




(Source: Refugees Operational Data Portal, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/dataviz/6>)

The UNHCR announced, celebrating the World Refugee Day in 2021 on 18th June 2021, – as shown in *Figure 2* – that the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide in the year 2020 were a total of 82.4 million, including 48.0 million of IDPs, 26.4 million of refugees and 4.1 million of asylum-seekers. It is important to note that out of the 82.4 million persons of concern, 68 percent of the refugees come from just five countries from which Syria is equivalent to 6.7 million. To

seek asylum and seek security from their persecution, these refugees are mostly hosted by countries such as Turkey (equivalent to 3.7 million) and/or Germany (equivalent to 1.2 million).

[Figure 2] Figures At A Glance



(Source: UNHCR, <https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>)

Despite the persistent assistance from various hosting countries, as well as a wide range of international organizations to enhance the status and/or rights of refugees, the number of refugees and asylum-seekers are continuously rising but the number of asylum-seekers granted of a refugee status are continuously dropping. Another emphasis would be put on the state's role to confirm comprehensive refugee protection and long-lasting resolutions for refugees.

2. Background

In the following part, an overview on Syrian refugees and its impact around the world, especially the European Refugee Crisis, will be described. This background is needed in order to understand the succeeding focus of this study; Germany's state response on the refugee situation.

a. Syrian Refugee

The Republic of Syria (hereinafter referred to as Syria) had been under the dictatorship of the Assad government since the 1960s. Even after the Ba'ath Syrian Regional Branch government seized authority through a coup d'état in 1963, there were continuous coups and changes in the Syrian government. Eventually, in 1971, Hafez al-Assad appointed himself as the president and ruled Syria as a one-party state.

Following Hafez al-Assad's death in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad followed the lead. Syrians initially had high hopes for a democratic reform, considering the fact that Bashar and his wife had both studied abroad and absorbed the goods from the Global North. Unfortunately, Bashar al-Assad failed to conduct the promised

democratic reforms and inherited the dictatorship virtues from the earlier era. Under such continuous dictatorship since the 1960s, Syria had been renowned by international observers for its exceptionally poor conditions.

The on-going poor conditions of Syria continued until the year 2010, when it confronted the uprising phenomena of the Arab Spring prevalent in the Arab region. Syria was also inspired by the major protests happening in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen and citizens protested against the dictator Assad government. To suppress the prevalent civil movements, the Syrian government intervened in the protests, which gradually increased in violence, as well as involved the participation of the Syrian Army against armed protestors. As the situation in Syria descended into the Syrian Civil War, there were a lot of casualties, as well as many displaced people. By May 2011, thousands of Syrians had become externally displaced in neighboring countries, as well as internally displaced within Syria.

In year 2014, the UNHCR reported that the total numbers of the world refugees exceeded 50 million for the first time since World War II. As shown in *Figure 3*, by the end of year 2015, more than 4 million Syrians had fled to their neighboring countries, such as Turkey (2,181,293 Syrians), Lebanon (1,075,673 Syrians), Jordan (632,762 Syrians), Iraq (244,527 Syrians) and/or Egypt (127,681 Syrians). Throughout the time span of 6 years by June 2021, *Figure 2* in the former chapter demonstrates that out of the total 82.4 million world forcibly displaced people, 6.7 million people are Syrians, ranking the top source country of refugees in the world.

[Figure 3] Syrian refugee crisis in numbers



(Source: Al Jazeera, 09 December 2015)

b. European Refugee Crisis

Filippo Grandi of the UNHCR had stated that “... *Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time, a continuing cause of suffering for millions which should be garnering a groundswell of support around the world,*” adding that more countries had to take a greater share of refugees.^⑤


Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in the year 2011, following the Arab Spring which evolved in the Middle East and North African region (hereinafter referred to as the MENA region) in late 2010 and early 2011, the humanitarian crisis has been on-going for the past 10 years. And its impact around the whole world has been massive. One of the major impacts from this crisis was

^⑤ United Nations, ‘Syria conflict at 5 years: the biggest refugee and displacement crisis of our time demands a huge surge in solidarity,’ 15 March 2016; available at <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/3/56e6e3249/syria-conflict-5-years-biggest-refugee-displacement-crisis-time-demands.html> (accessed 10 July 2021).

the ‘European Refugee Crisis’ which stroke the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU) countries heavily in the year 2015.

The various conflicts in the MENA region, as well as Europe’s relatively stable economy have made Europe the preferred destination for refugees to flee for persecution. As demonstrated in *Figure 4*, a great number arrived in the EU from across the Mediterranean Sea, mostly originating from countries with continuing armed conflict, such as the Syrian Civil War, Afghanistan War, Iraqi Conflict, and/or where international humanitarian assistance were essential. The UNHCR announced that the top three nationalities refuging to the EU countries at the peak of the European Refugee Crisis in 2015 were Syrians (46.7%), Afghans (20.9%) and Iraqis (9.4%).

[Figure 4] European Migrant Crisis 2015



(Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_the_European_Migrant_Crisis_2015.png)

As the European Refugee Crisis occurred, the EU countries were unable to agree on a unionwide policy solution as they worried how the large influx of refugees would impact their economy. Although refugees were to apply for asylum in the first country they entered under the EU's Dublin Regulation, this regulation was commonly ignored during the crisis. Individual states made respective decisions on how to deal with the crisis, gradually causing confusion among the states as well as the citizens.

In March 2019, the European Commission declared the European refugee crisis to be over. As the European Commission's first vice-president Frans Timmermans had quoted, "...*Europe is no longer experiencing the migration crisis we lived in 2015, but structural problems remain.*"^⑥ Until recently, despite the worldwide pandemic of COVID-19, the structural problems of accepting refugees around the world still endures. Especially, due to the pandemic in year 2020, a health crisis impacted not only refugees but also the hosting countries, and also a natural crisis in the Moria refugee camp in September 2020 affected thousands of refugees temporarily residing at the camp.

In this regard, this study will focus on how Germany has managed its major three crises related to the refugees over the past years. Previous studies have started analyzing Germany's crisis management models, but they are still undergoing. In regards, with the reference to the historical institutionalism theory, this study evaluates the differing Germany's crisis management in each respective crisis by focusing on two main independent variables – public sector, and civic sector.

^⑥ Jennifer Rankin, 'EU declares migration crisis over as it hits out at 'fake news',' *The Guardian*, 06 March 2019; available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/06/eu-declares-migration-crisis-over-hits-out-fake-news-european-commission> (accessed 10 July 2021).

II. Literature Review

Existing and relevant literature in the context of refugee studies are collected and reviewed in this section. In relevance to, and motivated through these previous studies, the following part aims to explain the purpose of this study. Lastly, in regards, the main research questions of this study will be posed.

1. Previous Studies

Refugee studies has a long history since the mass number of refugees have been displaced as the aftermath of the World War II. In regards, in this study, literature review is conducted in two different sections; 1) review on the general refugee studies, and 2) review on the refugee studies in Germany.

Emphasis on the consolidation and institutionalization of the expansive domain of the refugee studies was brought about with the establishment of new research and teaching centers and policy institutes. The establishment of the influential Refugee Studies Programme at the University of Oxford in the year 1982 was a turning point. Since then, a big number of academic centers have been established around the world, and scholarly journals have been published specifically on refugee issues.

In 1988, the ‘Journal of Refugee Studies’ was established by the Refugee Studies Center at the University of Oxford, publishing quarterly peer-reviewed multidisciplinary academic journals on forced migration. In the very first volume, Zetter (1988) stressed the importance of assisting “the placing of this area of

inquiry, which for the most part has existed on the periphery, into the mainstream of academic enterprise.”^⑦ In regards, Zetter and the ‘Journal of Refugee Studies’ aimed to enhance theoretical development in the arena of refugee studies, conceptualizing and understanding the importance of a cohesive, integrated and multidisciplinary research. Thus, the ‘Journal of Refugee Studies’ emphasized a interdisciplinary approach on refugee studies, in which an cohesive integration of the theories and methods of social, political and medical sciences is held.

Moreover, scholars such as Liisa H. Malkki was one of the initial researchers to focus on refugees and forced migration as a distinct field of study. Malkki focused on the field of refugee studies in an anthropological approach, stressing the importance of using an interdisciplinary lens to study refugees and forced migration. Malkki (1995) puts it that “one of the main ways in which “refugee studies” has conceived its analytical object is as a problem for development, thereby linking anthropological work on displacement directly to a well-established-if theoretically dubious (35)-body of work in “development anthropology”.”^⑧ Malkki also poses possible research directions that anthropologists can take to better contextualize the study of displacement.

On a political perspective, Richard Black argues that although refugee studies are an academic field of study, its development has been closely connected with policy developments. In the early 1980s, scholars adopted a broader policy-oriented approach analyzing the political influences on refugees. Black (2001) highlights that “the majority of the scholarly literature on refugees remains in

^⑦ Roger Zetter, “Refugees and Refugee Studies - A Label and an Agenda,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* vol.1 no.1 (1988): 2.

^⑧ Liisa H. Malkki. “Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of Things,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* vol.24 no.1 (1995): 507.

broadly disciplinary or policy studies journals.”^⑨ Thus, Black stresses the importance of analyzing the refugee studies through a broader approach, even within the political domain.

Likewise, the German refugee studies has a long history. Il-Kwang Sung (2019) demonstrates the following *Table 1* which well summarizes the various topics touched upon by scholars and researchers on the refugee issues in Germany.

[Table 1] Germany refugee resources

Topic	Author, year
German asylum act	Sung Kyoung Ahn, E Sook Yoon, 2013
German refugee acceptance policy	Anne-Kathrin Will, 2018
Changes in the public acceptance of immigrants and refugees in Germany	Christian S. Czymara & Alexander W. Schmidt-Catran, 2017
German refugee discourse	Bastian Vollmer & Serhat Karakayali, 2018
German refugee policy changes	Young Sool Kim, 2018
A comparative analysis of media reports related to refugees in Germany and European countries	Mike Berry, Inaki Garcia-Blanco, Kerry Moore, 2015
The background of the growth of the German far-right party	Jeong Ae Choi, 2018

(Source: Il-Kwang Sung, 2019 – translated)

Among these resources, Young Sool Kim (2018)’s has been especially incentive providing an overview of the past research on refugee in Germany. Kim himself analyzes “the process of German refugee acceptance with three major

^⑨ Richard Black, “Fifty Years of Refugee Studies: From Theory to Policy,” *The International Migration Review* vol.35 no.1 (2001): 61.

frameworks: normative duties, interests, and values.”¹⁰ He considers the aspects of “humanitarian, institutional, and citizen refugee perceptions at the European Union level, German government level, and civil society level.”¹¹

As for other domains, it is notable that “there are reviews on how the acceptance of refugees negatively affects national security and how there is a burden on the household economy and causes crime and violence (Dowty and Loescher, 1996; Posen, 1996; Barber, 1997; Bryer and Cairns, 1997; Lischer, 2005; Nyers, 1999; Loescher and Milner, 2009).”¹² This shows how a lot of the authors or researchers focus on the state security aspect regarding refugee issues. This is not surprising, considering the fact that there are a lot of writings, papers and media articles which heavily focus on the bad deeds of refugees in the host countries.

The above-mentioned state security aspect also goes into relation with the analysis by scholars that “refugee camps also pose a threat to national and regional security as a base for arms export and inflow, human trafficking, drug smuggling, child soldiers and combat troops (Nahm, 2006).”¹³ This is another big issue dealt by lots of scholars, especially due to the fact that refugee camps are renown for its extremely poor conditions.

Nonetheless, there are also various studies on “refugee humanitarianism that deals with refugee protection and refugee status in international law (Song, 2016; Ahn, 2017).”¹⁴ Reviewing a lot of the researches done for refugees, it is common to find studies on the legal aspect of refugees in the host countries and/or their home countries. These legal aspects involve the implication of the 1951

¹⁰ Young Sool Kim, “A Study on Germany’s Policy Changes of Accepting Refugees,” *Dispute Resolution Studies Review* vol.16 no.2 (2018): 133.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 103.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Convention domestically, the Refugee Status Determination process of each country, the EU quota system for accepting refugees, the position of the United Nations and the UNHCR and many more.

Kim also mentions that “in terms of social and cultural aspects, there are analyses on refugees’ adaptation to life, the status of refugee children, refugees’ trauma and recovery experiences, and the cultural identity of refugee families. Moreover, there are also studies on refugee integration (Brücker, 2015; Holdenrieder, 2011/2012; UNHCR-Büro, 2007; Thränhardt, 2015) such as education, labor market and social support.”¹⁵

Notable from Kim’s reviews, the majority of the prior studies on refugees in Germany focused on the national security, the national economic burden, refugees’ legal status and social and/or cultural aspects of refugees. This provided the decisive impetus for the idea of this study to touch upon a slightly different domain.

Additionally, Il-Kwang Sung (2019) mentions that “Germany’s refugee acceptance in the European Refugee Crisis is the most sensitive and complex political, economic, and social issue in the host country, which requires the world’s attention and research.”¹⁶ In this regard, this study earned its stimulus to analyze Germany’s state response over the three sequential crises it experienced since the year 2015 – humanitarian crisis, health crisis, and natural crisis.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Il-Kwang Sung, “The Impact of German News Coverage on Asylum Policy Change and Its Implications,” *Journal of Mediterranean Area Studies* vol.21 no.4 (2019): 44.

2. Study Purpose

Upon such prior literature reviews, it has been noticeable that more in-depth analysis of Germany's state response on the refugee situation after the outbreak of the European Refugee Crisis is desired. Although five years have passed since the European Refugee Crisis, there are a sufficient number of reviews on Germany's state response to the refugee situation of back then, while the succeeding years have not been given more emphasis.

Also, a lot of analysis have been made on the political aspect of Germany's state response, as well as the social and/or the media approach to Germany's state response. Unfortunately, analysis on the nexus of these two aspects and/or the emphasis on either one of the two aspects has not yet fully been established. In regards, this study aims to fill the void.

This study will focus on Germany's state response in a historical institutionalist approach concentrating on the following three phases, touching upon the most recent incident regarding the refugee situation relevant to Germany; *1) the outbreak of the European Refugee Crisis, 2) the global COVID-19 pandemic, and 3) the fire outbreak in the Moria Refugee Camp in year 2020.*

The first phase focuses on the '**humanitarian crisis**.' This phase will analyze how Germany took a hospitable approach to accepting refugees once the European Refugee Crisis struck the EU countries in year 2015. Additionally, it will clarify how and why Germany had gradually shifted to a hostile response towards refugees over the succeeding years. The second phase concentrates on the '**health crisis**.' As the global pandemic of COVID-19 prevailed the whole world in year 2020, Germany – as like other countries worldwide – enforced a long lockdown. Germany refused to accept any refugees and asylum-seekers into its territory to

prevent the spread of the virus. In regards, this phase will demonstrate how the public sector and/or the civic sector had contributed in establishing a different state response from the humanitarian crisis. Lastly, the third phase focuses on the ‘**natural crisis.**’ Under the COVID-19 pandemic, a mass crisis of a fire outbreak occurred in one of the biggest refugee camps, the Moria Refugee Camp in Lesvos, Greece, in September 2020. Relevant to this event, this phase will analyze how Germany once again accepted refugees from the Moria Refugee Camp and showed a shift in its response.

Under the context of these phases, the analysis aims to focus on two independent variables to demonstrate how these variables impacted the formation of Germany’s changing (and/or modified) state response as well as certain crisis management models for each respective phase; *1) public sector* and *2) civic sector*.

Each crisis will be evaluated through the two sectors and analyzed whether either had a bigger influence on Germany’s state response or whether the two acted in nexus to form the state response. In regards, each crisis will be examined with a respective crisis management model. Additionally, this study aims to compare how each crisis management model differs to its previous model.

Thus, the goal of this study is; 1) to thoroughly explain the three sequential crises – humanitarian crisis, health crisis and natural crisis, 2) to demonstrate the institutional arrangement for each crisis focusing on two independent variables – private sector and civic sector, and 3) to analyze how Germany managed its respective crises.

3. Research Question

Germany is renowned to be one of the most hospitable country toward refugees among the EU countries. However, its state response is frequently facing ups and downs, affected by the on-going crises. Under such circumstances, this study raises and examines the following research questions;

- How has Germany altered its state response to the refugee situation since the European Refugee Crisis?
- Which crisis management model has Germany shown for each crisis?
- Which factor had a bigger influence on the change of Germany's state response on the refugee situation for each crisis?

With reference to the theory of historical institutionalism, this study strives to answer these research questions by analyzing how the institution has responded to its status quo by reviewing each phase. Relevant research design and analytical framework for this study is further explained in the next chapter.

III. Research Design

The analytical framework of historical institutionalism as well as the given condition and the variables utilized to analyze this study will be evaluated in this section. Moreover, the research design of this study is to be analyzed, focusing on a single case study through a qualitative methodology.

1. Analytical Framework

a. Historical Institutionalism

This study conducts a case study on Germany's state response on its refugee situation based on the theory of 'historical institutionalism.' Thelen and Steinmo (1992) state that "by focusing on institutions that are the product of political conflict and choice but which at the same time constrain and shape political strategies and behaviors, historical institutionalism provides a framework for directly confronting the central questions of choice and constraint in understanding political life."¹⁷ Steinmo (2008) also describes this theory to be distinguished by "its attention to its real world empirical questions, its historical orientation and its attention to the ways in which institutions structure and shape political behavior

¹⁷ Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 28.

and outcomes.”¹⁸

In such context, historical institutionalism concentrates especially on the role of institutions, the actors’ structuring behavior and/or the ways actors reshape the institutions. In other words, to examine the institutional arrangements in a historical institutionalist perspective, relevant political and social contexts are essential to be taken into consideration. As Steinmo says, “what HI scholar want to know is why a certain choice was made and why a certain outcome occurred.”¹⁹

The historical institutionalist approach “has been applied in a wide range of empirical settings, but in each case, what has made this approach so attractive is the theoretical leverage it has provided for understanding policy continuities over time within countries.”²⁰ Institutional analysis “present powerful institutional explanations that go a long way toward helping us understand not just the choice of particular policies adopted in various nations, but also sources of historical divergence and the more general paths that different countries have followed.”²¹

Based on the theory of historical institutionalism, this study aims to analyze Germany’s state response (the institutional arrangement) over the three crises (a historical path) – humanitarian crisis, health crisis and natural crisis. Furthermore, this study identifies the public sector – government and political parties – and/or the civic sector – German citizens and NGOs – as the actors in the changing state response, shaping Germany’s crisis management model. In order to analyze the changing state response in each respective crisis, thus the institutional

¹⁸ Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism,” in *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective*, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 118.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 10.

²¹ Ibid., 27.

arrangements in a historical institutionalist perspective, relevant political and social contexts of the public and civic sectors will be considered. In other words, the attitude, behavior and the ways the two sectors reshape the German state response will be thoroughly analyzed.

To establish an analytical framework based on the theory of historical institutionalism, this study further implements the concept of ‘critical junctures.’ Collier and Collier (1991) describe the term critical juncture as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies.”

²² In regards, this study finds the three crises – humanitarian, health and natural crises – as a critical juncture in the changing state response of Germany in relation to the refugee situation. Throughout the three sequential crises, Germany’s state response had not always remained the same. In analyzing the different state responses and crises management, this study finds it crucial to understand the individual crises and the context in which it had occurred.

b. Variables

In relevance to the ‘critical juncture’ mentioned above, this study considers the three sequential crises – humanitarian crisis, health crisis and natural crisis – as a given condition and focuses on two main independent variables which act as the actors influencing Germany’s crisis management; the public sector and the civic sector in Germany.

The ‘**public sector**’ encompasses the German government as well as the

²² Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991): 29.

political parties. The main actors dealt in this sector will be the chancellor Angela Merkel, and the interior minister Horst Seehofer. Although Germany has a wide range of political parties, this study will mainly focus on Angela Merkel's Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU), Horst Seehofer's Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the uprising Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). At times, the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen will be mentioned as well.

On the contrary, the '**civic sector**' focuses on the civil society and its movements. The actors in this sector will mainly encompass the German citizens, the vote holders and the German Non-Governmental Organizations (hereinafter referred to as the NGOs). This variable will also consider how or whether demonstrations and protests by the citizens and NGOs have impacted the state response of Germany during a certain crisis.

Considering all these variables, this study seeks to find the critical juncture in each sequential crisis, and thus evaluate Germany's crisis management model for each. The crisis management model could be evaluated as one of the following;

1) a coordination model and/or 2) a nexus model.

These two models are this study's sole crisis management model, partially inspired by the concept of the 'coordinated market economies' mentioned by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice. Hall and Soskice (2001) identify the coordinated market economies as one of the varieties of capitalism in which it relies on formal institutions to regulate the market and coordinate the interaction of firms. This motivated this study, in which the '**coordination model**' intends to show whether the public sector or the civic sector has regulated and coordinated the other sector. As for the '**nexus model**,' the harmonious combination of the two sectors will be seen in forming Germany's state response to the crisis.

2. Methodology

a. Single Case Study

It is a general conception to conduct a research study on a comparative case. However, this study will only analyze a single case focusing on Germany. In this regard, several points are seen essential for this analysis to be conducted upon a single case, not a comparative case.

First of all, as Thelen and Steinmo (1992) claim, “there has been an enduring skepticism among many scholars of an overemphasis on science in the study of comparative politics.”²³ Single case analysis can be essential for the testing of theoretical suggestions, under the conditions that predictions are relatively precise and measurement error is low. Thus, single case study analysis can provide a nuanced, empirically-rich, complete account of the explicit phenomena, in this case the refugee situation in Germany.

Also, it is essential to note the importance of Germany’s role regarding the refugee situation. Germany’s state response to the contemporary refugee situation is worldwide acknowledged for its good. Germany is one of the top refugee-hosting countries around the world. As mentioned earlier, 1.2 million refugees have been hosted by Germany as of June 2021. Also, the Asylum Information Database (aida) has presented through the data provided by the Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration that, in year 2019, Germany had a total of 165,938 applicants seeking asylum and out of them 45,053 granted a refugee status. Thus, the refugee

²³ Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 26.

acceptance rate for the year 2019 for Germany was over 36 percent.²⁴ However, with the outburst of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, the state response has somewhat changed. Also, the outbreak of the fire in Moria Refugee Camp in September 2020 has caused another fluctuation in the state responses especially of the EU countries, including Germany.

In this regard, this study focuses on a single case of Germany's state response over the different crises occurred in different time periods. It is highly expected for this single case study to provide a nuanced, empirically-rich, and holistic overview of Germany's state response. Putting an emphasis on Germany's significant role in actively hosting refugees and asylum-seekers since the European Refugee Crisis, this study aims to analyze which sector – whether public and/or civic – had a bigger influence in Germany's different state response.

Nevertheless, although this study focuses on such a single case, it will also encompass a comparative analysis to analyze the differing state response over the three crises – humanitarian crisis, health crisis and natural crisis. Within a single case focusing on Germany, this study aims to comparatively analyze Germany's policy changes during the respective crises. In other words, for each crisis, this study analyzes whether the public sector and/or the civic sector have/has impacted the Germany's state response towards the refugees and the asylum-seekers and also evaluates which crisis management model can be implemented.

²⁴ Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration, 'Statistics Germany,' *Asylum Information Database (aida)*, 30 November 2020; available at <https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/statistics#:~:text=The%20overall%20protection%20rates%20for,%2C%20Formal%20decisions%3A%2032.4%25> (accessed 10 July 2021).

b. Qualitative Research

Such single case study will be conducted through a ‘qualitative methodology’ focusing on the historical change of Germany’s state response to the refugee situation over three phases – the European Refugee Crisis, the global COVID-19 pandemic and lastly the outbreak of the fire disaster at the Moria Refugee Camp. As the latter two crisis – the health crisis and the natural crisis – are still an on-going issue, this study is to be conducted through a qualitative research. By gathering in-depth insights of the three crises through various qualitative sources, this study will analyze Germany’s changing state response in a thoroughly descriptive manner.

The primary sources will rely on the official reports issued by the German government. Especially, yearly overview reports on statistics of refugees and asylum-seekers as well as the changing policies and asylum acts throughout the different crises which are issued by the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (translated as the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) under the Bundesministerium des Innern für Bau und Heimat (translated as the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community) will be taken into account. Additionally, official reports provided by the joint governmental organizations will be referred to, such as the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the European Migration Network (EMN).

Also, official reports issued by the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as well as the UNHCR Representation for Germany will be relied on. Various data statistics will also be taken into reference provided by UNHCR’s Refugees Operational Data Portal and the Refworld. As for NGOs, published reports and papers by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles

(ECRE) – a European network of 107 NGOs in 40 European countries – will be taken into account.

Secondary sources will mainly be news articles by German broadcasters. Specifically, Al Jazeera – first English-language news channel which its headquarter is in the Middle East, BBC and the Deutsche Welle (hereinafter referred to as the DW) – a German public state-owned international broadcaster – will be the main sources of reference. Moreover, press releases by the German government will be relied on, provided by the website of the Bundesministerium des Innern für Bau und Heimat.

IV. Germany's State Response 1: Humanitarian Crisis

From this section onwards, this study seeks to analyze the respective crises and decipher how Germany's state response was formed. For each crisis an in-depth analysis on the respective crisis, and the actions by the two sectors – the public sector and the civic sector – will be conducted, followed by an evaluation on which crisis management model Germany pursued for the crisis.


1. European Refugee Crisis

As mentioned above in Chapter 1, the European Refugee Crisis is a humanitarian crisis which occurred in year 2015, following the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war as well as various conflicts which broke out mostly in the MENA region. Due to this crisis, the majority of the EU countries were abruptly called to accept a large influx of refugees. In regards, this chapter will focus on Germany's state response on the humanitarian crisis, the European Refugee Crisis.

Demonstrated through *Figure 4*, Germany was the top refugee-hosting countries among the EU countries during the European Refugee Crisis. This can relate to *Figure 5*, which shows that out of the 292,540 asylum applications approved in the EU countries in year 2015, 140,910 claims were granted by Germany solely. This number means that Germany's total protection rate (proportion of asylum-seekers accorded refugee status or a complementary form of protection – such as the humanitarian status – by the total number of asylum

applicants) in year 2015 was equivalent to 48 percent of the total applications, which is almost half and – of course – more than any other EU countries combined.

[Figure 5] Asylum applications approved 2015




(Source: BBC, 04 March 2016)

As the number of applicants increased greatly in Germany compared to other EU countries, Germany had suggested a quota system to be implemented across the EU which allowed a more evenly distribution of the number of refugees and asylum-seekers each state hosted. This quota system was to consider each country's size and economic strength. Unfortunately, this system was not well implemented as Germany had proposed.

Since year 2015, three years has past but at the end of year 2018, according to *Figure 6*, Germany still remained the top EU country for accepting the most asylum applications. Until the end of year 2018, Germany had welcomed 593,025

asylum applicants which, compared to the number of 140,910 in year 2015, increased almost quintuple in just three years.

[Figure 6] Where have all the Syrian refugees gone?



(Source: BBC, 19 June 2019)

However, despite the continuous increase in the number of refugees and asylum-seekers in Germany, its state response had not always been so persistent. The following parts will analyze how the public sector as well as the civic sector have impacted Germany's policy implication on the influx of refugees and asylum-

seekers during and after the European Refugee Crisis, a humanitarian crisis.

2. Public Sector

The famous German Chancellor Angela Merkel first took her office in year 2005. She was originally the Chancellor of a grand coalition combining the main contemporary political parties of the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (hereinafter referred to as the CDU) and the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (hereinafter referred to as the CSU) – which represent the center-right politics – as well as the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (hereinafter referred to as the SPD) – which represents the center-left politics. During her helm of government from year 2005 to year 2017, the grand coalition of the centrism political position dominated the German politics.

However, during her position as a Chancellor, she could not avoid oppositions from other political parties. Although Chancellor Merkel won the support of left-wing voters through her policies during the European Refugee Crisis, some started to question whether she will be able to accommodate that large influx. With calls to regulate the number of refugees inflow and as Merkel faced intense criticism within the party, the opposition against Chancellor Merkel gained popularity. Even when the SPD was not part of the government in year 2009 to year 2013, it struggled to attack Chancellor Merkel from the left, since Merkel adopted various progressive policies.²⁵ Additionally, the nationalist and populist far-right political party Alternative für Deutschland (hereinafter referred to as the AfD) is well-

²⁵ Il-Kwang Sung, “The Impact of German News Coverage on Asylum Policy Change and Its Implications,” *Journal of Mediterranean Area Studies* vol.21 no.4 (2019): 65.

known for its opposition against immigration. In regards, AfD continuously has opposed against Merkel's policies towards refugees.

Angela Merkel's famous interest and tolerance towards refugees and asylum-seekers was not shown from the very beginning of the European Refugee Crisis. In fact, at the commencement of the European Refugee Crisis, Merkel had been rational and hesitant towards the refugee situation. According to Jan-Jonathan Bock (2018), in July 2015, Chancellor Merkel had met a student in the northern port city of Rostock, raised in a Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon and sought asylum in Germany four years ago. The student explained her difficulty of living in permanent uncertainty and Chancellor Merkel showed sympathy towards her situation but also remained firm and explained that Lebanon was not considered an unsafe country of origin. As the hostile remarks by Merkel became public, it was greatly criticized by the whole German society. With a greater influx of refugees and asylum-seekers later in mid-2015, pressure arose on the Chancellor to abandon her previous ignorance towards refugees and asylum-seekers and to gradually change her decisions.

The first shift on Merkel's political decision was shown in Merkel's visit to a makeshift reception center. After the makeshift reception center in the East German town of Heidenau was attacked by the far-right groups, including neo-Nazis groups, on 4th August 2015, several petitions were launched demanding Merkel's visit to the center and demonstration of solidarity with the asylum-seekers. In regards, Chancellor Merkel visited the Heidenau asylum-seeker reception center in late August and, a week after on 5th September 2015, announced in a press conference her characteristic slogan "*Wir schaffen das*" (translated as 'We can do this'). Since then, Chancellor Merkel adhered to an 'open-doors policy,' opening its border to refugees and asylum-seekers for about one month and permitting them to apply for

their refugee status in Germany.

As explained above, Chancellor Merkel was inevitable from facing various criticisms upon such policy. There was great skepticism on German's capacity in accepting the great influx of refugees and asylum-seekers. Also, as Bock (2018) puts it, "a significant part of disillusioned conservatives judged Merkel's defense of what they saw as uncontrolled and dangerous migration as final proof that the CDU was no longer a properly conservative party."²⁶ The CSU leader, Horst Seehofer also criticized Chancellor Merkel's immigration policies and demanded "among other things, a legal cap on the number of refugees permitted to enter the country."²⁷

Despite such criticisms, Chancellor Merkel further insisted that Germany had the economic capacity to wisely deal with the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers. She was certain that there is no limit of number in which Germany can accept refugees and asylum-seekers. She outwardly persisted her immigration-friendly course that welcomed the refugees and asylum-seekers to Germany. With her change to an 'open-doors policy,' a lot of the left-wring German voters showed support to Chancellor Merkel.

With the rising dissatisfaction towards refugees and asylum-seekers, meaning the rising opposition against Chancellor Merkel, in September 2017, the AfD succeeded in attaining seats in the Bundestag (translated as the German Federal Parliament) through the general election and becoming the third party within the parliament. Moreover, Germany's state response on refugees and asylum-seekers

²⁶ Jan-Jonathan Bock, "State Failure, Polarisation, and Minority Engagement in Germany's Refugee Crisis," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* no.31 v ol.4 (2018): 390-391.

²⁷ Matthias Mader and Harald Schoen, "The European refugee crisis, party competition, and voters' responses in Germany," *West European Politics* vol.42 no.1 (2009): 71.

showed a second shift as the CSU's Horst Seehofer took over the role of the Interior Minister in March 2018. Under Interior Minister Seehofer's plan, Germany was to reject migrants who have already been deported or have an entry ban and also turn away all migrants who registered elsewhere in the EU, no matter if these countries agreed to take them back.²⁸

Eventually, on 2nd July 2018, Germany's grand coalition faced a crisis as internal conflict intensified between the two center-right political parties, Merkel's CDU and Seehofer's CSU. Interior Minister Seehofer announced to step down from his post and persisted on his argument to reject and ban migrants from entering Germany. On the other hand, Merkel's CDU feared that such unilateral act without seeking a multilateral agreement endangered the EU's solidity. Likewise, Chancellor Merkel insisted that a multilateral refugee policy needed to be established among the EU countries. This political crisis came to an ultimate end after a 11-hour-long negotiation between Interior Minister Seehofer and Chancellor Merkel. Seehofer agreed not to resign and the two agreed on a mutual refugee policy. They had settled their difference and the key to the agreement was to reduce the further influx of refugees and to deport some of the refugees and asylum-seekers who have already entered Germany. The two parties agreed to tighten controls at the Austrian border to stop people who have applied for asylum in other EU countries from entering Germany.²⁹ It was additionally decided that transit centers be set up at the border to accommodate them until they could be sent back. Also, Interior Minister Seehofer decided to negotiate some bilateral agreements

²⁸ *Al Jazeera*, 'Merkel coalition crisis: Seehofer offers to quit over migration,' 02 July 2018; available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/2/merkel-coalition-crisis-seehofer-offers-to-quit-over-migration> (accessed 10 July 2021).

²⁹ *BBC*, 'Germany migrants: Merkel averts coalition government split,' 03 July 2018; available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44685727> (accessed 10 July 2021).

with specific countries. However, under such agreement, Chancellor Merkel had to abandon her favor of a multilateral EU agreement on a refugee policy, while Minister Seehofer had to set aside his goal to turn away all migrants directly at the border who are already registered elsewhere in the EU.

Despite Chancellor Merkel's hospitable 'open-doors policy' towards refugees and asylum-seekers throughout the European Refugee Crisis in year 2015, the rising criticism made it inevitable for her to slowly abandon her decisions. Gradually – due to the rising opposition as well as the political crisis in year 2018 – Germany's public sector transformed its position to a relatively closed policy. This policy has pursued its stance until a health crisis struck Germany in year 2020.

3. Civic Sector

During the European Refugee Crisis, not only was the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers the issue, but also was the rising cases of hatred toward refugees crucial in Germany's state response. In regards, not only the public sector but also the civic sector showed a fluctuation in their response towards refugees and asylum-seekers. In comparison to the public sector, the civic sector showed a transition from a positive position towards refugees to a gradual negative position against refugees.

In July 2015, when Chancellor Merkel's cold-hearted and stiff response towards refugees in Rostock became public, she gained great criticism by the civil society. A new hash-tag '#merkelstreichelt' (translated as '#merkelstrokes') rose among the citizens, mocking her ignorance towards the crisis. Also, in September 2015, German citizens gathered in the streets welcoming the arrival of the refugees

and asylum-seekers.

However, such hospitable welcome of the German citizens toward refugees and asylum-seekers was not always the case. With the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers, cases of hatred towards refugees also gained a big rise. As the European Refugee Crisis stroke Germany in year 2015, the cases of xenophobic attacks increased rapidly. There were 1,031 abuses in year 2015. In 2016, there were a total of 995 attacks, of which 169 were violent crimes.³⁰ In year 2017, there were a total of 264 reported attacks against refugee shelters.³¹

In act of solidarity, a big number of German citizens voluntarily jumped in to fill the gaps of the public efforts by the government and the political parties. Following the state's 'Willkommenskultur' (translated as 'Welcome culture') to alleviate the insufficient resources supporting the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers, the civil society sought to reduce the pain, isolation and confusion through their voluntary acts. Their effort was held in a vast region by a wide range of people "in small towns and large cities, urban and suburban, eastern and western Germany, by Christian and Muslim, students and professors, old and young, retired and working people, overwhelmingly, but not only, by women."³² Volunteers provided assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers in various domains as well. They tried their best to make refugees feel accepted to the German society as well as feel safe. The volunteers legally assisted the refugees and asylum-seekers with bureaucratic problems in acquiring their refugee status. Also, they assisted their livelihood situations, found homes and communes, provided medical care and

³⁰ Young Sool Kim, "A Study on Germany's Policy Changes of Accepting Refugee s," *Dispute Resolution Studies Review* vol.16 no.2 (2018): 119.

³¹ Bundesinnenministerium des Innern für Bau und Heimat, *Politisch Motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2016: Bundesweite Fallzahlen* (n.p.: BMI, 2017).

³² Nanette Funk, "A spectre in Germany: refugees, a 'welcome culture' and an 'integration politics'," *Journal of Global Ethics* vol.12 no.3 (2016): 292.

much more. Moreover, volunteers organized social activities in which refugees and asylum-seekers could foster social integration.

It is important to note that not only the volunteers but also the German citizens in general fought for the integration of the refugees in the German society. There was a case in which around 1,200 German citizens fought against the city government's decision to demolish the temporary campsite for illegally residing refugees in Oranienburg, Berlin.³³ They shouted for the government to act with a humanitarian attitude. In January 2017, 25 Central European NGOs³⁴ called for an adequate and coordinate response to the EU institutions and member states. They showed their concern on the poor European response to the European Refugee Crisis. They called for a joint European approach to a safe and legal channel for incoming refugees, and to make it available to a high number of refugees. Moreover, the NGOs stated that such channels should not create legal barriers in approaching the European protection system by persons arriving irregularly.

Despite the above-mentioned acts from the German citizens as well as many NGOs, there was quite some transition in the citizens' attitude towards refugees. In September 2015, the CDU had polled at 42 percent, whereas the AfD polled at 4 percent. This showed that Chancellor Merkel's 'open-doors policy' at the

³³ Young Sool Kim, "A Study on Germany's Policy Changes of Accepting Refugees," *Dispute Resolution Studies Review* vol.16 no.2 (2018): 119.

³⁴ The 25 Central European NGOs were as follows; Amnesty International European Institutions Office, Association Européenne pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (AEDH), Care International, Caritas Europa, Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Doctors of the World, European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA), European Network of Migrant Women, Euromed Rights, European Evangelical Alliance, Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD), Human Rights Watch, International Catholic Migration Commission Europe (ICMC Europe), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Jesuit Refugee Service Europe (JRS Europe), Justice and Peace, Migration Policy Group, Pax for Peace, Red Cross EU Office, Save the Children, Solidar, Terre Des Hommes, World Vision.

beginning of the European Refugee Crisis had attained quite a good support from the German voters. However, exactly after one year, the approval rating of the CDU dropped to 33 percent, while the AfD rose to 14 percent.³⁵ As criticism against Chancellor Merkel gained more and more support by the German citizens, eventually in September 2017, the AfD succeeded in entering the Bundestag and became the third party within the parliament by polling 12.6 percent.

Such citizens' response appeared not only in the above-mentioned voting results, but also in official survey results. In year 2016, 56 percent of the German citizens agreed in accepting refugees while around 20 percent disagreed.³⁶ In February 2016, a Deutschlandtrend survey observed that 63 percent of the respondents supported a higher limit on the number of refugees accepted into the country each year. However, in year 2017, 54 percent of the German citizens answered that they have reached their limit and disagreed in accepting refugees further more.³⁷

In November 2017, the European Social Survey announced a survey which was conducted in 15 countries in year 2014 and 2016. The survey asked the citizens about their attitudes towards immigration. It is notable through *Figure 7* that the majority of the European citizens opposed against closing the borders entirely to refugees. As for the German citizens, *Figure 7* shows that exactly half of them agreed and the other half disagreed on Germany's border closure against


³⁵ Jan-Jonathan Bock, "State Failure, Polarisation, and Minority Engagement in Germany's Refugee Crisis," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* no.31 vol.4 (2018): 391-392.

³⁶ Oliver Decker, et al., "Die »Mitte«-Studie 2016: Methode, Ergebnisse und Langzeitverlauf," in *Die enthemmte Mitte - Autoritäre und rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland*, ed. Oliver Decker, Johannes Kiess, and Elmar Brähler (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2016): 50.

³⁷ Bertelsmann Stiftung, *Willkommenskultur im „Stresstest“: Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung 2017 und Entwicklungen und Trends seit 2011/2012* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017): 11.

refugees. Also, in *Figure 8*, it is demonstrated that less than 35 percent of the German citizens did not think the government nor the EU was managing the refugee situation well. In fact, even less than 15 percent of the German citizens agreed that the EU was coping well with the European Refugee Crisis.³⁸


[Figure 7] “We must close our borders to refugees entirely, we cannot accept any at this time”



(Source: Ipsos Global Tracker)

³⁸ *European Council on Refugees and Exiles*, ‘Op-ed: Are Europeans turning against asylum seekers and refugees?’ 17 November 2017; available at <https://www.ecre.org/op-ed-are-europeans-turning-against-asylum-seekers-and-refugees/> (accessed 10 July 2021).

[Figure 8] “Do you agree that your national government/the European Union has responded well to the refugee crisis?”



(Source: Ipsos Global Tracker)

Thus, it is notable that the German citizens showed a shift in their attitude towards refugees and asylum-seekers reaching Germany during the European Refugee Crisis. Despite its early support and voluntary acts to help their social integration into the German society, the surrounding circumstances – both political as well as social – have made it difficult for the German citizens to pursue their stance. Eventually, compared to its previous attitude, the German citizens showed quite some disagreement and dissatisfaction to the acceptance of refugees and to the policies held for them.

4. Evaluation

‘Hospitality,’ and ‘Wirkommenskultur’ are the words which Germany’s state response to the European Refugee Crisis is typically described as. Being the top refugee-hosting country in Europe, Germany is renowned to receive the greatest number of refugees and asylum-seekers during the European Refugee Crisis. However, looking into its state response, fluctuation is detected in both the public sector and civic sector’s attitude toward the refugee situation.

As the European Refugee Crisis commenced in early 2015, Germany’s public sector had ignored the crucial issue and showed inaction. However, such indecision had faced a mass criticism by the civic sector, causing a ‘#merkelstreichelt’ movement. Such contraposition between the public sector and the civic sector continued until the mid-2015, when a big influx of refugees and asylum-seekers from Syria and neighboring countries arrived to Germany and other EU countries.

Under the pressure of criticism by the civic sector, the public sector eventually announced the ‘open-doors policy’ through the slogan “*Wir schaffen das*” by Chancellor Merkel. Although this policy faced even more criticisms from both the public sector, as well as the civic sector – due to doubts whether Germany had the capacity to accommodate so many refugees and asylum-seekers, Chancellor Merkel pursued her political decision and stressed that Germany did have the capacity to accept more refugees and asylum-seekers.


Despite the criticisms, the majority of the civic sector showed support to Chancellor Merkel’s early immigration-friendly policy. Following the ‘Wirkommenskultur,’ citizens gathered in the streets to welcome the incoming refugees and asylum-seekers. Moreover, the civil society – encompassing citizens and NGOS – conducted various voluntary acts in a wide range of domains such as

the legal, social and many other fields.

However, as the European Refugee Crisis endured for several years, not only the public sector, but also the civic sector grew their disagreement over Chancellor Merkel's decision. Votes and surveys in Germany demonstrated that the dissatisfaction with CDU's decision grew over the year 2016 and 2017, while the AfD's argument gained more support. Additionally, more than half of the German citizens showed dissatisfaction to accepting more refugees in Germany. Thus, affected by the changing opinion of the civic sector, the public sector decided to reject migrants and conduct a unilateral act towards refugees and asylum-seekers as Horst Seehofer sat as the Interior Minister in March 2018. Germany had decided to tighten its Austrian borders and reduce the influx of more refugees and asylum-seekers.

Germany's state response towards the humanitarian crisis has shown a great fluctuation throughout the years 2015 to 2019, as shown through *Figure 9*. The transformation of the German public sector from an ignorant approach to a receptive approach of the 'open-doors policy,' and then again to a passive approach has impacted the implementation of the German refugee policy. However, such state response was not merely built through the public sector's decision, but the civic sector had an even bigger role. Starting from the public sector's ignorant approach, the civic sector intervened in their attitude by raising criticisms, then supporting via voluntary acts, and then again to criticizing the public sector's decision.

[Figure 9] Germany's State Response 1: Humanitarian Crisis



(Source: created by author)

In sum, during the humanitarian crisis, the civic sector showed a predominant position in shaping Germany's state response, representing the '**coordination**' crisis management model. The civil society influenced each decision of the public sector, which formed the state response. Nonetheless, despite such fluctuating state response, Germany remained the top refugee-hosting countries in the EU.

V. Germany's State Response 2: Health Crisis

1. COVID-19 Pandemic

First discovered in Wuhan of the People's Republic of China, the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the COVID-19) quickly spread across the world and thus was declared a 'pandemic' by the World Health Organization on 11th March 2020.

As of 10th July 2021, there are 186,889,177 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and more than 4,036,000 deaths across 222 countries. Out of these 222 countries, only 15 have either fully recovered from the infection or has had an outcome and has no more active cases. This means that, although a year and a half has passed since the outbreak of the pandemic, the remaining 207 countries are continuously combatting the virus.³⁹

Having COVID-19 present in almost all countries worldwide now, the world's 82.4 million refugees and forcibly displaced people are regarded as the most exposed and vulnerable. The COVID-19 crisis is intensifying vulnerabilities among refugees and host countries. The immediate effects of the pandemic included restrictions on mobility which were set by countries to limit the spread of the virus. Mobility restrictions and stricter border management regulations have greatly impacted refugees and other persons of concern to easily access host countries. The border closures and lockdown measures by many countries have led to a dramatic

³⁹ *Worldometers*, 'Coronavirus,' updated daily; available at <https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/> (accessed 10 July 2021).

decrease in mobility for these populations. It has been evaluated that asylum claims in the EU countries dropped by 31 percent in the year 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

As a result, many refugees and asylum-seekers have been left stranded in host countries and/or their home countries, without the accessibility of adequate amount of food, shelter, access to essential services or the ability to return home. Also, they have limited availability to seek asylum and protection, to meet legal requirements or access appropriate visa processes, to benefit from the exceptions to border closures and in the MENA region, and additional challenges were shown in the rescuing and disembarking processes for those moving towards Europe.

In regards, this chapter will focus on Germany's state response and how the public sector and the civic sector have affected its response on refugees and asylum-seekers during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, a health crisis.

2. Public Sector

With the health crisis prevailing the whole world, many nation-states have decided to close their borders for non-citizens to prevent further spread of the virus and to protect their citizens. In regards, many countries and organizations have pinpointed that refugees and undocumented migrants as some of the most vulnerable people. Thus, countries have gradually shown a shift in their policies and responses towards refugees and asylum-seekers during the pandemic, and Germany is one of them.

On 18th March 2020, during an unprecedented television speech, Chancellor Merkel appealed that “... *Since the German reunification, no, since the Second*

World War, there has not been a challenge to our country that depends so much on our joint solidarity... Let me assure you: For someone like me, for whom freedom of travel and movement was a hard-won right, such restrictions can only be justified as an absolute necessity... This is why the tightened border controls and entry restrictions to some of our most important neighboring countries have been in force since the beginning of the week... The situation is serious and it is open."⁴⁰

In regards, Germany had announced that it will shut its borders to non-citizens and stop taking in refugees and asylum-seekers. Germany also cut off its refugee pact with the Republic of Turkey and temporarily suspended transfers under the Dublin Regulation to and from all EU countries until further notice. This policy showed how Germany pursued to protect its citizens at its highest priority to restrict the spread of the virus. Nonetheless, lockdown was not only conducted on the borders. Some states in Germany conducted lockdown policies on refugee reception centers and/or refugee camps in order to limit the spread of the virus from the centers and/or camps to other regions. For instance, the Thuringia state had put an entire reception center of more than 500 people into complete lockdown after one asylum-seeker was tested positive of COVID-19.⁴¹

There are 144 countries that still have border closures in place, and more than 60 have not made any exceptions for refugees or asylum seekers.⁴² Demonstrated in *Figure 10*, 132 countries out of a total of 195 countries worldwide have denied


⁴⁰ *General Anzeiger*, 'Appeal to the people living in Germany: Angela Merkel's speech about the Corona virus in full,' 19 March 2020; available at https://ga.de/ga-english/news/angela-merkel-s-speech-about-the-corona-virus-in-full_aid-49639811 (accessed 10 July 2021).

⁴¹ David Kamiab Hesari, et al., 'Germany and COVID-19: What About the Refugee s?' *Global Health Now*, 02 June 2020; available at <https://www.globalhealthnow.org/2020-06/germany-and-covid-19-what-about-refugees> (accessed 10 July 2021).

⁴² Eric Reidy, 'One year on: How the pandemic has affected refugees, asylum seekers, and migration,' *The New Humanitarian*, 10 March 2021; available at <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/3/10/one-year-how-pandemic-has-affected-refugees-asylum-migration> (accessed 10 July 2021).

or put restrictions on access to territory to prevent the transmission of the virus. On the other hand, 36 countries have imposed no restrictions related to COVID-19. Germany is one of the 81 countries where restrictions on access to territory apply with exceptions for asylum-seekers.

[Figure 10] COVID-19 Platform Temporary Measures and Impact on Protection



(Source: Refugees Operational Data Portal, updated 7 July 2020)

In November 2020, Chancellor Merkel announced a partial lockdown of Germany as the second wave of COVID-19 swept the country. However, compared to the previous lockdown which restricted all non-citizens entering the country, this lockdown applied an exception to the transport ban and the restriction on entry to those from areas of variants of concern. Such variants of concern included “persons travelling to Germany for urgent humanitarian reasons,” which also included

“individuals admitted for humanitarian reasons in case of threat to life or limb” and “persons in need of international protection or protection for other humanitarian reasons”⁴³ which is relevant to the refugee criteria.


Moreover, since December 2020, Germany has announced to start vaccinating against COVID-19. In regards, the Federal Ministry of Health has presented the COVID-19 vaccination regulations including the priority groups. According to the regulations, the ‘highest priority group’ focuses on population groups at particular risk, especially very elderly people. The ‘high priority group’ encompass everyone aged 70 or more. Also, this priority group includes police forces, close contacts of people in need of care, pregnant women and people living in shelters for the homeless or asylum-seeker accommodation. The ‘heightened priority group’ embraces people aged 60 or more as well as people with a higher-than-average risk of suffering a severe outcome, people with precarious working conditions, and much more.⁴⁴

Figure 11 demonstrates that Germany is one of the EU countries which includes refugees and undocumented migrants in their vaccination campaign. As stated above, refugees and asylum-seekers living in initial reception centers and communal collective accommodation facilities belong to the second group (high priority), and will be prioritized accordingly in Germany’s vaccination campaign. If they do not live in such a center, they will be given access to COVID-19 vaccination after the vaccination of the ‘heightened priority group’ has been completed.

⁴³ Bundesministerium des Innern für Bau und Heimat, ‘Coronavirus: Frequently Asked Questions,’ BMI; available at <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/faqs/EN/topics/civil-protection/coronavirus/coronavirus-faqs.html> (accessed 10 July 2021).

⁴⁴ Bundesregierung, ‘We must protect the weakest first,’ 20 January 2021; available at <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/issues/vaccination-rules-1830284> (accessed 10 July 2021).

[Figure 11] European vaccine strategies to include or exclude undocumented migrants or refugees



(Source: DW, 24 February 2021)

The prevalence of the virus in year 2020 and its continuity until year 2021 has brought about a fluctuation of the government's decision. In the early period Germany took a strong restriction on its border to protect its national citizens from the virus. However, over the year, Germany gradually changed its decision and accepted exceptions for refugees and asylum-seekers to enter Germany. Not only their entry, but also their access to COVID-19 vaccination has also been approved under conditions that they live in perilous conditions.

3. Civic Sector

Despite the fluctuation of the public sector's attitude towards and/or against refugees and asylum-seekers due to the pandemic, the civic sector has continuously proclaimed that refugees and asylum-seekers are one the most vulnerable people during the health crisis. In regards, the civil society have stood up to provide a better situation for the refugees and asylum-seekers.

As the government announced a border shut-down in March 2020, PRO ASYL, a German NGO for refugees and asylum-seekers, called for a general stop in the temporary suspension of transfers under the Dublin Regulations. PRO ASYL proclaimed that such temporary suspension affects the asylum-seekers and neglect them in a limbo. Also, NGOs working with refugees warned EU governments over the high risk of COVID-19 hitting refugee camps and called for an urgent epidemic response to be put in place.⁴⁵

With the continuing restriction of refugees and asylum-seekers entering Germany, the civil society turned towards the refugees and asylum-seekers within Germany. They worried that the refugees and asylum-seekers in Germany during such health crisis are vulnerable in accessing important announcement regarding the virus. Moreover, as most of them depend on their own social networks for information, missing or misleading information often led to fear and irrational decisions. In regards, NGOs have found ways to deliver crucial information in multiple languages for refugees and asylum-seekers. For instance, PRO ASYL published information into refugees' native languages on COVID-19, how to

⁴⁵ Raphaella Stavrinou, 'NGOs call on EU governments to protect refugees and migrants amid COVID-19 outbreak,' *New Europe*, 19 March 2020; available at <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/ngos-call-on-eu-governments-to-protect-refugees-and-migrants-amid-covid-19-outbreak/> (accessed 10 July 2021).

protect against it and the various precautionary measures being taken by the federal offices.

Additionally, the civil society worried foremost on the vulnerability of refugees and asylum-seekers to COVID-19 due to their poor living conditions which disproportionately increase their risk of contagion. Most refugees and asylum-seekers living in refugee camps and/or centers are found in a very overcrowded, unhygienic condition. Although social distancing is essential in the context of a health crisis, it is almost impossible in such conditions. Such poor situation makes refugees and asylum-seekers much more vulnerable to the virus. However, this is not the end of the tragedy; their limited access to adequate health care makes them even more vulnerable. Relevant to all the concerns from the civil society, the European Commission submitted a draft proposal to amend the general budget 2020 in order to urge measures for the European countries to protect the migrant populations in the nation-states. As everyone is at the risk of carrying or transferring the virus, the European Commission worried that the migrant populations can be excessively affected because of their risky social, economic and legal contexts. They may be confined in unsanitary and cramped conditions, as well as not seek proper care for fear of being reported to the authorities.⁴⁶ Thus, the European Commission appealed that the refugees and asylum-seekers be supported at least through financial measures.

As the German government announced its COVID-19 vaccination campaign, NGOs also called on the importance of including refugees and asylum-seekers in the target list. The aid group Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, translated as Doctors

⁴⁶ *Privacy International*, 'The EU needs to provide assistance to migrants affected by Covid-19. But their latest proposal does nothing of the kind,' 02 April 2020; available at <https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/3582/eu-emergency-fund-greece> (accessed 10 July 2021).

Without Borders) reported that refugees are three times more likely to be exposed to infection than people living in regular settings.⁴⁷ The more vulnerable they are to the virus under a world health crisis, NGOs appealed that refugees and asylum-seekers not be left out from the vaccination list.

Since the global pandemic has commenced in March 2020, the civil society – international organizations and NGOs – have continuously pursued their argument to include the refugees and asylum-seekers in the state response. A call for a stop in the temporary suspension of the Dublin transfer, concerning the vulnerability of refugees and asylum-seekers to the virus, and providing them with important information were the essential issues by the civil society. As the health crisis is an on-going issue, it is foreseen for more acts by the civil society be conducted in support of a better condition for the refugees and asylum-seekers.

4. Evaluation

The humanitarian crisis – the European Refugee Crisis – had not yet been completely taken care of by the EU countries, as well as Germany, when a global health crisis struck the whole world. As the World Health Organization declared that the world was going through a pandemic on 11th March 2020, Germany's state response towards refugees and asylum-seekers showed a shift from its response from during the humanitarian crisis. Like the humanitarian crisis, the Germany's public and civic sector also demonstrated a fluctuation in its responses throughout the health crisis.

⁴⁷ Olivera Zivkovic, 'Refugees and undocumented migrants must be vaccinated, NGOs warn,' *DW*, 24 February 2021; available at <https://www.dw.com/en/refugees-and-undocumented-migrants-must-be-vaccinated-ngos-warn/a-56664623> (accessed 10 July 2021).

Following the passive approach at the latter phase of the humanitarian crisis, as soon as the health crisis broke out in early 2020, Germany's public sector took a further passive approach by shutting down its borders. Germany closed its borders to non-citizens in order to curb the spread of the virus, and also temporarily suspended the transfer of refugees and asylum-seekers via the Dublin Regulations.

However, such policies faced criticism from the civic sector. The civil society called for a stop on the suspension of Dublin transfers and thus NGOs gathered to submit a proposal calling for measures to protect refugees and asylum-seekers under a health crisis. Also, the civil society worried the vulnerability of refugees and asylum-seekers, especially those accommodating in refugee camps. Under the context of a health crisis, it was seen inevitable for refugee camps with inhumane living conditions to be free from the virus, and thus urgent actions for the camps were called for. Moreover, the civic sector voluntarily assisted the refugees and asylum-seekers to protect their vulnerability within the society. For instance, some NGOs translated important information regarding COVID-19 into the refugees' home languages.

Such criticisms and acts by the civic sector had impacted the public sector, and when Germany's second wave of COVID-19 was declared in November 2020, the public sector announced a partial lockdown with an exception of travel and entry to Germany to refugees and asylum-seekers. Bundesministerium des Innern für Bau und Heimat had clarified that people with humanitarian reasons and in need of international protection, which abides to the criteria of a refugee/asylum-seeker, were granted access to travel and enter Germany despite the lockdown.


Furthermore, the civic sector emphasized the importance of including refugees and asylum-seekers in Germany's vaccination campaign. Considering their high vulnerability to the virus, the civic sector emphasized that refugees and asylum-

seekers not be left out from the target list of the COVID-19 vaccination. In regards, the public sector had announced in December 2020 that refugees and asylum-seekers living in asylum reception centers and/or camps are included in the second target group, the ‘high priority group.’

Throughout the health crisis, it can be seen as if the civic sector had impacted the public sector to establish policies and design the German state response. However, one crucial point to note is that although the civil society had stood up against and/or for the public sector’s response, there was no significant response shown by the German citizens. To clarify, it was notable of German NGOs and social organizations acts. However, compared to how the German citizens had actively represented during the humanitarian crisis, their acts were not very noteworthy during the health crisis.

Thus, the flow of the fluctuation of the public and civic sector’s response during the health crisis can be verified through *Figure 12*.

[Figure 12] Germany’s State Response 2: Health Crisis



(Source: created by author)

Under the given condition that Germany had to protect the further spread of the virus, Germany’s state response was greatly influenced by the public sector. Despite the civic sector’s attitude, the public sector had the predominance in

constructing the state response, in goal of reducing the spread of the virus as well as protecting its national citizens. This shows that Germany, once again, managed its crisis through a ‘**coordination**’ model, but through the regulation of the public sector, not the civic sector. In sum, during the health crisis of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the public sector had a greater impact on Germany’s state response and sought to control the civic sector.

VI. Germany's State Response 3: Natural Crisis

1. Moria Refugee Camp Fire Disaster

*“The worst refugee camp on earth”*⁴⁸ is how BBC had described the Moria Refugee Camp in August 2018. Moria Reception and Identification Centre (hereinafter referred to as the Moria Refugee Camp) was the largest refugee camp in Europe, built in September 2013. Located outside the village of Moria, near Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, it was the forefront refugee camp in the Hellenic Republic (hereinafter referred to as Greece) among the many other refugee camps located in neighboring islands; Samos, Chios, Kos, Leros and more. Lesbos is the third largest island in Greece, located in the northeastern Aegean Sea and offers easy access to boats due to its sandy and smooth terrain.⁴⁹ As the European Refugee Crisis stroke the EU countries, Greece became the gateway to Europe for asylum-seekers in hope of finding safety. It served as the ‘hotspot’ for asylum-seekers fleeing to the EU through the Mediterranean Sea.

This camp was originally built to accommodate around 3,000 refugees and/or asylum-seekers. However, UNHCR (2015) announced that “over 45 percent of the 770,838 refugees and asylum-seekers who arrived in Europe in year 2015 have landed in the Greek Island of Lesbos.”⁵⁰ The number of refugees and asylum-


⁴⁸ BBC, ‘The worst refugee camp on earth,’ 28 August 2018; available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v-OHi3iGQI> (accessed 10 July 2021).

⁴⁹ Vasileia Digidiki, *HUMANITARIANISM IN GREECE: Lesbos, Greece* (n.p.: Harvard FXB Center for Health and Human Rights, 2016).

⁵⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *UNHCR Factsheet: Lesbos Island*

seekers which flowed into the Moria Refugee Camp in year 2015 alone was 506,919.⁵¹ Such situation did not ease over the following years. As demonstrated through *Figure 13* by the Aegean Boat Report (2019) – a Norwegian NGO which monitors and reports on issues related to people movement in the Aegean Sea – although the official capacity on the Greek islands was only 9,209 people, the population in the end of year 2019 had exceeded it by 355 percent. Lesbos island, in which the Moria Refugee Camp is located, has accommodated the most asylum-seekers of 20,785 out of the total population of 41,899 people across the Greek islands.

[Figure 13] Population on each island (2019)



(Source: Aegean Boat Report, 2019)

Despite its big role in accommodating a lot of refugees and asylum-seekers, the Moria Refugee Camp was referred to as an ‘open-air prison’ by many

d – Greece (n.p.: UNHCR, November 2015): 1.

⁵¹ Refugees Operational Data Portal, ‘Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response - Mediterranean,’ *UNHCR*, 16 February 2016.

practitioners. The overcrowded camp and its dire conditions have been held up by critics as a symbol of failures in the EU's migration and refugee policy.⁵² Such conditions worsened the situation under the health crisis from year 2020. The overcrowded, unhygienic and inhumane living conditions in the Moria Refugee Camp was put into lockdown to curb the spread of the virus and, thus, have made the refugees and asylum-seekers very vulnerable to the virus within the global pandemic. Maddalena Avon from the Centre for Peace Studies in Croatia said, "... *National governments... must consider using public and private empty buildings to accommodate people in overcrowded refugee camps and asylum seeker centers, in order to ensure basic health services and proper hygienic living conditions to inhabitants. EU and national governments should also ensure solutions for all those refugees finding themselves in unstable and unsafe situations at the external borders of the EU.*"⁵³

Under the context of facing great criticism on its continuing inhumane living condition and – unfortunately – its continuous acceptance of overflowing refugees and asylum-seekers, the Moria Refugee Camp confronted a natural crisis when it burned down in September 2020. On 8th September 2020, a devastating fire severely damaged the Moria Refugee Camp, affecting all the 20,000 asylum-seekers residing at the camp. This fire was seen to have been deliberately ignited by five asylum-seekers, protesting against quarantine measures after positive COVID-19 cases were detected within the camp. By 10th September 2020, the Moria Refugee Camp was completely destroyed and more than 13,000 asylum-


⁵² *Al Jazeera*, 'Thousands protest after Greece's Moria refugee camp burns down,' 11 September 2020; available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/11/thousands-protest-after-greeces-moria-refugee-camp-burns-down> (accessed 10 July 2021).

⁵³ *European Network Against Racism*, 'Leaving no one behind in the coronavirus crisis: ENAR calls for system change now to achieve real equality,' 19 March 2020; available at <https://www.enar-eu.org/Leaving-no-one-behind-in-the-crisis-ENAR-network-calls-for-system-change-now-to> (accessed 10 July 2021).

seekers were left homeless on the street. They were left rough without protection, support and – even more – prevented by the police from accessing the main town of Mytilene.

After the fire disaster has stroke across the Moria Refugee Camp, the Aegean Boat Report (2021) has reported a noteworthy change in the number of refugees and asylum-seekers remaining in the Lesvos Island. As shown in *Figure 14*, despite the official capacity on the islands of 16,800 people, the total population was only 40,139 by the end of March 2020. This figure is, in fact, lower than the total population at the end of year 2019 (shown in *Figure 13*; 41,899). Also, compared to 20,785 migrants residing in the Lesvos Island at the end of year 2019, there has been a big drop of number. By the end of March 2020, only 8,161 migrants have continued their stay in the Lesvos Island.

[Figure 14] Population on each island (2021)



(Source: Aegean Boat Report, 2021)

The natural crisis has affected not only the refugees and asylum-seekers, but

also the state responses under the context of the continuing health crisis. The following parts will analyze the public sector as well as the civic sector impact on Germany's policy implication regarding the refugees and asylum-seekers in the Moria Refugee Camp.

2. Public Sector

As soon as the Moria Refugee Camp was hit by a natural crisis, the EU countries – including Germany – had respectively announced their position towards the refugees and asylum-seekers left homeless. Not all states have shown positive towards the disaster. However, following its fame since the European Refugee Crisis, the German government, once again, took the lead to accept refugees and asylum-seekers from the Greek islands.

Before the natural crisis struck the Moria Refugee Camp, in March 2020, Interior Minister Seehofer had followed the agreement within the Federal Government and decided to take in 53 unaccompanied minors as well as 243 children in need of medical care and their immediate families from the refugee camps in the Greek islands. This agreement was under the context of a European aid effort in which 11 EU member states⁵⁴, Serbia and Norway are taking part.⁵⁵

After the Moria Refugee Camp experienced the fire disaster, Heiko Maas, the German Foreign Minister, requested other EU countries to take in refugees and asylum-seekers. He uploaded on his Twitter account that “... *What happened in*

⁵⁴ The 11 EU member states are as follows; Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia.

⁵⁵ *Bundesministerium des Innern für Bau und Heimat*, ‘Refugees from Greek islands arrive in Germany,’ 16 October 2020; available at <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/EN/2020/10/kinder-grc-20201016-en.html> (accessed 10 July 2021).

*#Moria is a humanitarian catastrophe. We have to clarify as quickly as possible with the European Commission and other helpful EU member states on how to support Greece. This also includes the distribution of refugees among those willing to accept admission in the EU. (translated)*⁵⁶ Additionally, Chancellor Merkel stressed the importance of a joint initiative by the other EU member states in a livestream held by Adenauer-Stiftung on 10th September 2020. She commented that “... *It's not just a German problem - we have the Council Presidency. And that is why there must be more of a European responsibility. (translated)*”⁵⁷ Simultaneously, she stated that Germany is willing to take in 400 unaccompanied children from the destroyed camp, adding on that this is an act of compassion but cannot be a viable long-term solution.

On the other hand, Interior Minister Seehofer offered to help Greece in dealing with its natural crisis but through livelihood assistance such as tents, food and medicines. Seehofer, as well as the CSU, showed their disagreement over migrants thinking they can get around established procedures for the granting of asylum and also called for a EU-wide policy to deal with refugee issues. Thus, as an initial response, on 11th September 2020, Interior Minister Seehofer declared that Germany was prepared to take in only 150 unaccompanied minors. However, it was unclear whether this figure was to be from the Moria Refugee Camp. Under his regulations, Germany blocked the arrival of refugees through federal reception initiatives, insisting on the need for a coordinated European response.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Available at <https://twitter.com/HeikoMaas/status/1303617869897445376> (accessed 10 July 2021).

⁵⁷ Available at <https://twitter.com/RegSprecher/status/1304112969165475841?s=20> (accessed 10 July 2021).

⁵⁸ Philip Oltermann and Harriet Grant, ‘Moria camp: Germany, France and other EU countries to take 400 child refugees,’ *The Guardian*, 11 September 2020; available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/11/germany-to-take-up-to-150-child-refugees-from-burnt-moria-camp-lesbos-greece> (accessed 10 July 2021).

Such Interior Minister Seehofer's policies faced quite some criticisms and federal states of Berlin, Thuringia, North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria as well as the mayors of ten German cities, argued that they are prepared to defuse the humanitarian catastrophe and proclaimed that they were willing to accept displaced asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp immediately. They stressed that they had enough space and capacity to accept asylum-seekers and protested against the inaction from the federal government. In regards, Chancellor Merkel and Interior Minister Seehofer from Germany's ruling coalition government went through a negotiation and agreed that Germany takes in additional asylum-seekers displaced from the Greek islands. On 15th September 2020, Germany announced its plan to accept 1,553 asylum-seekers from the Greek islands, which is ten times more than Seehofer's initial response. The 1,553 migrants encompassed individuals from 408 families in the Greek islands who had been identified by the Greek authorities as persons entitled to protection.

Unfortunately, even despite such announcement, there were continuing dissatisfaction on Germany's measures. Opposition parties like Bündnis 90/Die Grünen – a center-left political party – has called for Germany to take in more than 5,000 people, commenting that “... *Four thousand are living on Lesbos alone, according to the UNHCR (the UN's refugee agency). Do we leave them in need?*”⁵⁹ Moreover, the SPD demanded that a “high four-figure sum”⁶⁰ be taken in from the Moria Refugee Camp.

Although Germany is, again, one of the top hosting countries of the displaced

⁵⁹ *Deutsche Welle*, ‘Germany to take in some 1,500 migrants from Greece,’ 15 September 2020; available at <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-take-in-some-1500-migrants-from-greece/a-54930075> (accessed 10 July 2021).

⁶⁰ Christoph Hasselbach, ‘The EU's refugee policy: Doomed to division?’ *DW*, 17 September 2020; available at <https://www.dw.com/en/the-eus-refugee-policy-doomed-to-division/a-54961827> (accessed 10 July 2021).

and unoccupied refugees and asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp, it has shown some fluctuation in its political responses. Before the natural crisis occurred, the German government called to accept more than 300 unaccompanied minors. Once the fire disaster broke out, at the initial phase the German government only accompanied 150 minors from the Greek islands. However, confronting criticism from Chancellor Merkel as well as fellow political parties, the government approved to accept more than 1,500 asylum-seekers. Until the end of April 2021, the German government has taken in more than 2,765 asylum-seekers from the Greek islands. As Interior Minister Seehofer put into words, “... *We made a commitment to admit 2,750 women, children and men from the Greek islands, and we have kept our word. I hope that the other EU countries honor their commitments.*”⁶¹

3. Civic Sector

In contrast to the public sector which showed a fluctuating response regarding the Moria Refugee Camp fire disaster, the civic sector showed a persistent approach towards the incoming asylum-seekers. Protesting against the inhumane living conditions in the Moria Refugee Camp, the civil society continuously called for Germany to take in more refugees and asylum-seekers. Considering that the fire incident was held under the context of a health crisis, the civil society has shown some considerable number of actions for refugees and asylum-seekers.

Before the fire broke out in the Moria Refugee Camp, continuous protests by

⁶¹ Bundesministerium des Innern für Bau und Heimat, ‘Another flight from Greece: A total of 2,765 people have arrived in Germany,’ 22 April 2021; available at <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/EN/2021/04/flight-grc-20210422.html> (accessed 10 July 2021).

the civil societies were held across Germany. On 7th September 2020, 13,000 chairs were set up at the Platz der Republik in front of the Reichstag (translated as the German parliament) building in Berlin. The 13,000 chairs represented the residents in the overcrowded Moria Refugee Camp. This form of protest was to call attention on the inhumane conditions of the Moria Refugee Camp and to awake awareness of the vulnerability the asylum-seekers face under the continuing health crisis. Furthermore, activists called on politicians to finally put an end to the humanitarian catastrophe at the European external borders and evacuate the camps.⁶²

Such initiative acts by the civil society – encompassing both NGOs as well as the German citizens – continued even after the natural crisis struck the Moria Refugee Camp. As soon as the crisis became public, on 9th September 2020 and 19th September 2020, more than 3,000 people came out to the streets and demonstrated under the motto “*Wir haben Platz*” (translated as ‘We have room/space’). They insisted that Germany should offer shelter to more asylum-seekers unaccompanied in the burnt Moria Refugee Camp. Moreover, they stressed that, especially in a pandemic time, it is urgent for the German government to act accordingly and to do more.


Right after the natural crisis caused confusion across the EU continent, ZDF – a German public-service television broadcaster – published a poll by the Mannheim research group Wahlen. The interviews were conducted by telephone from 14 to 16 September 2020 from 1,241 randomly selected voters.⁶³ As demonstrated through the poll results in *Figure 15*, majority of the German citizens

⁶² *Deutsche Welle*, ‘Berlin chair protesters call for evacuation of Moria refugee camp in Greece,’ 07 September 2020; available at <https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-chair-protesters-call-for-evacuation-of-moria-refugee-camp-in-greece/a-54840567> (accessed 10 July 2021).

⁶³ ZDF, ‘Flüchtlingsaufnahme aus Moria umstritten,’ 17 September 2020; available at <https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/politbarometer-corona-proteste-100.html?slide=20200917-0903-57-1016> (accessed 10 July 2021).

were in support for Germany to take in more refugees from the Moria Refugee camp, regardless of it to be under a certain condition. 43 percent of the German citizens believed Germany should take in a larger share of asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp, while 46 percent argued that asylum-seekers should only be accepted under the condition that other EU countries act equally. Only around ten percent completely disagreed on Germany's further acceptance of asylum-seekers.

[Figure 15] Should Germany take in a larger share of refugees from Moria? (translated)




(Source: ZDF, 17 September 2020)

ZDF's poll also demonstrated that most of the German citizens viewed that more refugees and asylum-seekers will make their way to Europe again once Germany takes in a larger share of asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp. As viewed in *Figure 16*, 62 percent of the German citizens answered yes that more asylum-seekers will head towards Europe, while 34 percent did not expect such consequence. Among the Green supporters, only a minority (four percent) expects that such a decision will trigger a larger movement of refugee towards Europe, while the majority of all other party supporter groups expect it.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Ibid.

[Figure 16] If Germany takes in refugees, will more refugees come to Europe again? (translated)



(Source: ZDF, 17 September 2020)

As such, compared to the public sector, the civic sector has shown an enduring support in accepting more refugees and asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp, both before and after it was devastated by the natural crisis. A common argument of the German civil society was criticism against Germany's inaction upon the natural crisis at the Moria Refugee Camp, and the importance of Germany to take an immediate act to alleviate the crisis. Moreover, the German citizens have shown their positive attitude towards taking in a larger share of asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp.

4. Evaluation

The natural crisis at the Moria Refugee Camp has occurred in a combination of the former humanitarian crisis and the health crisis. The Moria Refugee Camp being the outcome of the humanitarian crisis was undergoing the health crisis like elsewhere, until in September 2020 it experienced a collaborative and intensified natural crisis. Germany's state response on refugees and asylum-seekers affected by the natural crisis have seemingly shown a different trend to that of the previous responses.

As the humanitarian crisis – the European Refugee Crisis – struck the EU countries in year 2015, the Moria Refugee Camp in Lesvos, Greece was the hotspot of the incoming refugees and asylum-seekers from the MENA regions. Out of the total population flowing into Europe, 45 percent of them sought shelter at the Moria Refugee Camp. Although the Moria Refugee Camp was originally planned to accommodate only 3,000 asylum-seekers, much more were accepted in the camp. By the end of year 2019, the population of migrants residing in the Moria Refugee Camp exceeded by more than 300 percent, accommodating over 20,000 refugees and asylum-seekers. Moreover, the Moria Refugee Camp was renowned for its inhumane, overcrowded and unhygienic living conditions. With the prevalence of the health crisis – the global COVID-19 pandemic – in year 2020, it was seen that the refugees and asylum-seekers residing in such poor living conditions of the Moria Refugee Camp were one of the most vulnerable groups of people to the virus.

In regards, the public sector of Germany had fulfilled its European aid effort to accept 53 unaccompanied minors and 243 children as well as their families from the Moria Refugee Camp. However, this has been regarded as Germany taking a passive approach to the refugee situation in the Moria Refugee Camp. Protesting against the government's action, the German civic sector had demonstrated in September 2020, calling for more acceptance of refugees and asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp to protect them from the catastrophic living conditions. 13,000 chairs, which represented the migrant residents at the Moria Refugee Camp, were laid in front of the German parliament in Berlin, protesting against Germany's reluctant response.


Unfortunately, under the context of the undergoing humanitarian crisis and the health crisis, the Moria Refugee Camp had to experience a new, a even worse crisis, a natural crisis – the Moria Refugee Camp fire disaster. On 8th September 2020, the

camp was completely burned down and more than 13,000 migrants were left unaccompanied and displaced. As soon as the natural crisis at the camp was made public, the EU countries showed different responses. Germany, which had already been pursuing a somewhat passive position, was greatly criticized by not only the civic sector but also the public sector for its reluctant response. As Interior Minister Seehofer announced to accept only 150 minor migrants and focused more on providing the refugees and asylum-seekers in Greece with livelihood materials, sufficient amount of criticism was raised by both the public and civic sectors.

The public sector, especially states of Berlin, Thuringia, North Rhein-Westphalia and many more, stressed that Germany had the capacity to take in more refugees and asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp. As for the civic sector, more than 3,000 German citizens came out to the street to demonstrate against Germany's inaction upon the hazardous natural crisis. This is significant to note because during the health crisis, the German citizens had not particularly acted for and/or against the refugees and asylum-seekers. However, even though the health crisis was an on-going issue and thus the German citizens are open to the rapid spread of the virus by accepting more refugees and asylum-seekers from elsewhere, German citizens stood up for the refugees and asylum-seekers at the Moria Refugee Camp.

Under the pressure of mass criticism, as shown in *Figure 17*, the German government decided to take a receptive approach to the natural crisis and announced to accept more than 1,500 unaccompanied minors from the Moria Refugee Camp. As of April 2021, Germany has accepted more than 2,700 refugees and asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp and it is seen to take in more over the next few months.

[Figure 17] Germany's State Response 3: Natural Crisis



(Source: created by author)

It was continuously said that refugees and asylum-seekers should be accepted into Germany over the humanitarian crisis as well as the health crisis. However, there were elements within the German public and civic sector that prevented German's active response. Nonetheless, the fire disaster at Moria Refugee Camp is considered as a natural crisis that – in fact – is seen as a combination of the two previous crises, the humanitarian crisis and health crisis. Upon such natural crisis, Germany has demonstrated that the '**nexus**' crisis management model has offset the negative variables inside Germany, putting the safety of refugees and asylum-seekers in the Moria Refugee Camp at their top-priority.

VII. Conclusion


With a rising number of wars, conflicts and violence around the world, more and more people are fleeing their home country, hoping to seek shelter in a place thought to provide them with a better living condition. However, it was not until the EU confronted a major humanitarian crisis, that the great powers started actively acting towards the severe situation.

This study has focused on Germany's state response on the refugee situation in and nearby Germany, especially focusing on three different phases; 1) the humanitarian crisis of the European Refugee Crisis in September 2015, 2) the health crisis of the global COVID-19 pandemic in year 2020, and 3) the natural crisis of the fire disaster in the Moria Refugee Camp in September 2020. This study conducted an in-depth analysis on the respective crises referring to the theory of historical institutionalism by concentrating on the acts of the public sector and the civic sector in Germany. The analysis on the two sectors has provided an overview on how the German state has responded to each crisis. Following the analysis, an evaluation was given on Germany's crisis management model for the respective crises – whether it adhered to a coordination model or a nexus model.

This study was conducted under the initial goal to thoroughly analyze the three crises – the historical path, demonstrate the different state response – the institution – for each crisis and evaluate Germany's crisis management model accordingly. Its research questions were the following; 1) How has Germany altered its state response to the refugee situation since the European Refugee Crisis, 2) Which crisis management model has Germany shown for each crisis?, and 3) Which factor had a bigger influence on the change of Germany's state response on

the refugee situation for each crisis? In regards, *Figure 18* demonstrates a summary of the whole study and answers all the research questions.

[Figure 18] Germany's State Response on Refugee Situation



(Source: created by author)

During the humanitarian crisis, from year 2015 to approximately year 2018, Germany showed a big fluctuation in its response towards refugees and asylum-seekers. Under the coordination model, the German government implemented their policies greatly influenced by the civic sector. For instance, although the public sector showed ignorance in the beginning of the crisis, they had to change their decision and take a receptive approach towards the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers due to the high criticism by the civic sector. Additionally, the great influx of refugees and asylum-seekers to Germany due to its receptive policies have gradually caught criticism and protests by the German citizens. As several unpleasant problems related to refugees occurred within Germany, the cases of xenophobic attacks by the Germans against refugees and asylum-seekers increased. As years went by, votes and polls showed that the dissatisfaction to the decision of the German public sector increased greatly. Eventually by the end of year 2018, Germany, once again, changed its state response and took a passive approach in accepting refugees and asylum-seekers into their territory.

Such passive approach continued even after the health crisis struck Germany

in March 2020. To control the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the German government decided to shutdown its borders and limit non-citizens – including refugees and asylum-seekers – from entering its territory. This act was again greatly criticized by the civic sector, emphasizing the vulnerable conditions refugees and asylum-seekers are facing during such pandemic, and the importance of providing assistance to them. It was not until November 2020 that the German government conducted a partial lockdown on Germany, providing an exception to refugees and asylum-seekers on their travel to and from Germany. Also, Germany pursued its receptive approach to the refugees and asylum-seekers during the health crisis regarding its vaccination campaign. As the German government announced the priority target groups for COVID-19 vaccination, it included the refugees and asylum-seekers accommodating in refugee camps and/or centers in the second priority group. This demonstrated that, during the health crisis, Germany managed its crisis through the coordination by the public sector, prioritizing the curb of the virus and the protection of its national citizens.

It was not long after the health crisis occurred when the natural crisis called for Germany's state response once again. Even during the health crisis, the Moria Refugee Camp was negatively renowned for its inhumanly poor living conditions, and thus the civic sector protested for Germany to act upon it and accept refugees and asylum-seekers from the camp. This continued even after the natural fire disaster crisis broke out in the Moria Refugee Camp in September 2020. However, the German public sector adhered to a passive approach, rather emphasizing the importance of assisting refugees and asylum-seekers with urgent materials. This approach faced a much bigger criticism by not only the civic sector, but even also the public sector. Several political parties as well as federal states went against the federal government's decision, arguing that Germany had the capacity to take in

much more refugees and asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp. Eventually, the German government had to re-take a receptive approach and accept more than 2,000 refugees and asylum-seekers from the Moria Refugee Camp.

The natural crisis can be seen as the integrated form of the former humanitarian and health crisis. The Moria Refugee Camp acted as the EU's most important refugee camp in result of the humanitarian crisis in year 2015, and with the health crisis still undergoing in September 2020, the natural crisis has brought about an even more severe humanitarian catastrophe. In regards, although the humanitarian and health crisis have been managed through a coordination model by Germany – greatly influenced by the civic and public sector respectively, the natural crisis has shown a combination of these two management models, the nexus model. Despite the prevailing notion by the public sector to restrict the entrance of refugees and asylum-seekers to curb the virus, and also despite the continuous criticism by the civic sector on the government's inaction to the crisis, the German government has managed to negotiate on the policies in which both sectors' acts and opinions are not left out.

Upon such research, it is important to note that there are two essential limitations in this study; 1) *lack of theory implication* and 2) *lack of explicit explanation*. First of all, although this study has strived to implicate the theory of historical institutionalism in its analysis, there are parts in which the theory was unable to be adapted adequately. Kindly note that the theory was to be connected with the analysis by evaluating how the institution, thus the German state, responded to its refugee situation over the historical path during specific incidents, thus the three crises. Secondly, this study shows limitation in clearly distinguishing the public sector and the civic sector. Not only is the barrier between the two sectors rather vague, but also the various organizations within the civic sector –

whether for and/or against refugee issues – were not introduced in detail within this study. All these limitations have been well-noted, and these will definitely be regarded as future tasks in further developing and progressing this field of study.

Despite such limitations, since the outbreak of the European Refugee Crisis, and even with the Moria Refugee Camp fire disaster, Germany remains to be the EU top refugee-hosting country. Although significant shifts in the state response were shown regarding the refugee situation throughout the three crises, Germany has continued to maintain its fame of accepting the most refugees and asylum-seekers among the EU countries and implementing an immigration-friendly policy. With the humanitarian and health crisis still prevailing the world in year 2021, as well as the possibility for other crises to abruptly occur, it seems essential for Germany as well as other countries to prepare themselves for further refugee issues. Most importantly, it is crucial to note that as Funk (2016) analyzes, “state policy to absorb the many refugees could not have been implemented without civil society.”⁶⁵ Thus, it is important the governments manage their future crises through a nexus model, well-collaborating the public sector with the civic sector. As Chancellor Angela Merkel quoted, “... *This is the hour of multilateralism... We see that in such an existential case the attempt to isolate fails long term.*”⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Nanette Funk, “A spectre in Germany: refugees, a ‘welcome culture’ and an ‘integration politics’,” *Journal of Global Ethics* vol.12 no.3 (2016): 292.

⁶⁶ Hans von derBurchard, ‘Merkel: Retreat from multilateralism is world’s ‘biggest threat’,’ *Politico*, 20 April 2021; available at <https://www.politico.eu/article/merkel-calls-retreat-from-multilateralism-biggest-threat-to-the-world/> (accessed 10 July 2021).

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초록

난민 사태에 대한 독일 정부의 대응: 역사적 제도주의를 중심으로

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독일 연방 정부는 2015년 유럽 난민 위기 이후 난민과 비호 신청자를 환대하며 중동 및 북아프리카 지역에서 온 난민과 비호 신청자를 가장 많이 수용한 것으로 유명하다. 하지만, 독일의 국가 대응을 면밀히 살펴보면 독일의 환대 정책이 생각보다 상당한 변동을 보이고 있다.

이 연구는 독일 정부 및 관련 기관의 공식 보고서 및 문서에 대한 질적 연구를 수행하여 독일의 국가 대응 변화를 조사한다. 특히, 세 가지 다른 위기에 초점을 맞춘다; 1) 인도주의적 위기 - 유럽 난민 위기, 2) 보건 위기 - COVID-19 팬데믹 그리고 3) 자연 위기 - 모리아 난민 캠프 화재 재난. 역사적 제도주의의 맥락에서 독일 정부와 시민사회, 두 가지 변수를 고려하여 이 연구는 두 가지 다른 모델 - 1) 조정 모델 및 2) 넥서스 모델 - 로 독일의 서로 다른 위기 관리를 연구합니다.

이 연구는 독일이 인도주의적 위기 때는 시민사회가 정부를 조정함으로써 위기를 관리했지만, 보건 위기 동안에는 정반대로

바이러스의 전파를 억제하고 자국민들을 최우선으로 보호하기 위해 정부가 시민사회를 조정하는 위기 대응법이 보여진다고 주장한다. 반대로, 모리아 난민 캠프에서의 자연 위기가 터지자 독일은 완전히 다른 위기 대응 방식을 보이며, 정부와 시민사회가 연계되어 있음을 주장한다. 자연 위기가 이전의 인도주의적 위기와 보건 위기의 화룡점정을 보여주며 독일의 위기 대응에도 두 변수의 연계를 가져왔듯, 이 연구는 위기 대응에 있어 국가가 정책을 수립할 때 정부와 시민사회 두 분야를 모두 고려하는 것이 중요하다고 주장한다.

주요어: 독일, 난민 위기 대응, 인도주의적 위기, 보건 위기, 자연 위기

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