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God and Man in the Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Kant, Nietzsche

－the theological background behind the modern self－

홉스, 칸트, 니체의 정치철학에서 그려진 신과 인간 개념에 관한 연구

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Abstract

God and Man in the Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Kant, Nietzsche
: the theological background behind the modern self

This dissertation investigates the philosophical origins of conceiving both individual and state in early modern political thought. The chief aim of the study is to reconstruct and trace the reception and use of (secular) ideas of the modern self, such as equality, rationality, and authenticity, in crafting the notion that these ideas were ideologically formed on the theological background. In particular, this project examines a tradition of political philosophers – Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Frederick Nietzsche - who sought to understand and further replace the place of traditional authority in politics, and who had specific interests in treating religious one in their efforts. If those philosophers have long been celebrated for making reasoned argument the foundation of philosophy, this dissertation recovers a neglected anthropological as well as theological assumption in their arguments. Religion is often construed as the opposite of reason, and is thought to be alternately irrelevant to, or undesirable in, a politics committed to ideals of rational progress. This project challenges this prevailing bias: for Hobbes, he found no other means to impute natural laws to the citizens; for Kant, the exalted place reason enjoys cannot be firmly established; for Nietzsche, the “end of history” cannot be revolted. It then shows how some of the most pivotal figures in the history of political thought have perennially raised the question of whether there might be a more nuanced role for traditions to play in political theory. Furthermore, a revised understanding of their legacy on these terms opens up a broader theoretical discourse concerning the place of individual in contemporary political thought.

Keyword : Modern self, God, Thelogical-Political, Thomas Hobbes Immanuel Kant, Frederick Nietzche
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Table of Content

Method of Citation

Where feasible, I have cited by book and chapter or by section number or paragraph number.

Thomas Hobbes

De Cive *De Cive*

1991. ed. Bernard Gert, in *Man and Citizens: (De Homine and De Cive)*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

(O)L *Leviathan.*

1994. ed. Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

Immanuel Kant

CPR *Critique of Pure Reason*.

1998. trans. and eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

CPrR *Critique of Practical Reason.*

2015. trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eq *History and natural description of the most noteworthy occurrences of the earthquake that struck a large part of the Earth at the end of the year 1755(1756)*

2015. ed. Eric Watkins. In *Natural Science.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

GMM *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

2012. trans, Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

IUH *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim.*

2007. trans. Robert B. Louden, in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, ed. Gunter Zoller and Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

LF *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces.*

2015. ed. Eric Watkins. In *Natural Science.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MD *Metaphysik Dohna* (1792)

1997. trans and ed. By Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon. *Lectures on Metaphysics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ML1 *Metaphysik L1* mid-1770s

1997. trans and ed. By Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon. *Lectures on Metaphysics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MM *The Metaphysics of Morals.*

2017. trans. Mary Gregor, ed. Lara Denis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

NE *New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition*

1992. trans. and ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote. *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

NF *Notes and Fragments*

2005. trans. Curtis Bowman and Frederick Rauscher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

LPR *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion*

1996. trans and ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni. *Religion and Rational Theology.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

OBS Notes on Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime

2005. trans. Curtis Bowman and Frederick Rauscher. *Notes and Fragments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

OP Opus Postumum (1786-1803)

1998. trans and ed. Eckart Förster and Michael Rosen. *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

OPA *The Only Possible Argument in support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*

1992. trans. and ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote. *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

PP *Toward Perpetual Peace.*

1996. trans, Mary Gregor, in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pr Prelegomena to any Future Metaphysics that Will be Able to Come Forward as Science.

2002. ed. Henry Allison and Pete Heath. Trans. Gary Hatfiled, Michael Friedman. *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

R Reflections

In *Notes and Fragments*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Curtins Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rel. "Religion within the boundaries of mere reason"

2001. trans, George di Giovanni, in *Religion and Rational Theology*, eds. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

TP "On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice"

1996. trans, Mary Gregor, in *Practical Philosophy*, ed. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

UNH *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens or essay on the constitution and the mechanical origin of the whole universe according to Newtonian principles.*

2015. ed. Eric Watkins. In *Natural Science.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frederick Nietzsche

D *Daybreak*

1997. trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FEI On the Future of our Educational Institutions.

2004. trans. Michael W. Grenke. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press.

UM *Untimely Meditations.*

1997. trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

UUM *Unpublished Writings from the Period of Unfashionable Observations*.

1995. trans. Richard T. Gray. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

WEN *Writings from the Early Notebooks*

2009. trans. Ladislaus Lob. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Z *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All.*

1966. trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Penguin Books.

Ch1. Introduction

"Whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority,
It is time to reform (or pause and reflect)"
- Mark Twain, Notebook(1904)

"If man were wholly ignorant of himself he would have no poetry in him, for one cannot describe what one does not conceive. If he saw himself clearly, his imagination would remain idle and would add nothing to the picture. But the nature of man is sufficiently revealed for him to know something of himself and sufficiently veiled to leave much in impenetrable darkness, a darkness in which he ever gropes, forever in vain, trying to understand himself."

- Alexis de Tocqueville[1]

The present investigation is born of my deep dissatisfaction with what I believe to be our utterly inadequate apprehension of the current moment and of ourselves living in it. Could we confidently say that we get better-off now? Modernity surely gave us abundance and tremendous improvements in our life, but with those realization came other baggage that we did not want. We have not yet dispelled apprehensions that our advanced products have been fruitless; we may have been ignorant, intentionally or not, about the negative aftereffects those have brought. We may be flirting with clever devils. With our scientific and technological advance, we are spiraling into a dystopia of violence and injustice: nuclear war and (everyday) terror.[2] The general failure to apprehend the current moment

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), vol.2, part 1, ch. 17, 487.
[2] Rhodes(2010); Hans Morgenthaus, a famous 'realist' international relations scholar, predicted that "the world is moving ineluctably towards a third world war – a strategic

points beyond itself to a more fundamental failure of understanding, namely that we do not understand ourselves.[3]

And this misunderstanding, I contend, persists because the anthropolitical framework at the very heart of Western modernity fails to comprehend man. Then, the first task of the political theorist is not to address the question "what should we do" but rather the more basic question of "who are we?" I believe any serious political thinker must first address this most fundamental question- the question of man- before turning to the equally complicated problem of politics.[4] John Calvin famously opens his *Institutes of the Christian Religion* with the declaration that "[n]early all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts, the knowledge of God and of ourselves," which implies the further question of whether man can be understood in the absence of God, a question I intend to address in the following. For the moment, we should say that man be understood in that way.

The modern 'individuality', thus, is the focus of analysis and primary concern of this dissertation. 'Individuality' is an ambiguous term that many scholars have used it in a slightly different way. Its troublesome cohabitation with the more familiar one "Individualism" also forestalls the clear demarcation. For a brief distinction, "individuality" is "personal independence and self-realization" whereas "individualism" is "antinomian

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nuclear war" (Morgenthaus 1979). 2018 U.S.-China trade war may be a portent of another world war. Elsewhere I treated this matter, "Destined for War?: Rereading Thucydides and Hobbes" presented at National Research Foundation of Korea held Dec 22, 2017 at LW convention in Seoul, South Korea.

[3] "[C]ontemporary culture," Niebuhr writes, "has no vantage point... from which to understand the predicament of modern man." Reinhold Niebuhr, *Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), 9. As Gabriel Fackre argues, "[t]he anthropolitical illusions of a secular society are the source of its social disasters." Gabriel Fackre, *The Promise of Reinhold Niebuhr* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 22.

[4] "[Y]ou simply cannot prescind on the question of human nature - some account of those beings who are the agents, whether wittingly or unwittingly, of the politics you descirbe, proscribe, or prescribe." Jean Bethke Elshtain, "On Never Reaching the Coast of Utopia," *International Relations* Vol.22, No.2 (2008), 147, 152.

and anti-social legacy".[5] In a word, individuality means self-authorship. We achieve it when we design lives of our own, lives that reflect our own values, determinations, and aspirations, absorbed from whatever given or acquired. Regarding the means for forming opinions and directing one's behavior, individuality departs from Kantian autonomy, which roughly means only rational self-direction and self-control. In this sense, I will use individuality as an encompassing term, including wide-range judgments that direct an individual in one's pursuit.

The individual in the 'secular age' is the human self who tries to be more and more independent and self-reflective and self-affirming. This modern individual[6] is much more 'secular' compared to apparently more 'spiritually oriented' self of the earlier periods. Jonathan I. Israel has depicted that during the later Middle Ages and the early modern age down to around 1650, western civilization was based on a largely shared code of faith, tradition, and authority. By contrast, after 1650, almost everything – not just commonly received assumptions about mankind, society, and the cosmos but also the veracity of the Bible --, "no matter how fundamental or deeply rooted, was questioned in the light of philosophical reason and frequently challenged or replaced by startlingly different concepts generated by the New Philosophy and what may still usefully be termed the Scientific Revolution. Of course, most people at all levels of society were profoundly disquieted by such sweeping intellectual and cultural change and frightened by the upsurge of radical thinking."[7]

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[5] About the genealogy of the two terms, "individuality" and "individualism", see Steven Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973); Yehoshua Arieli, *Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).

[6] The term 'modern' and its derivative 'modernity' raise some doubts whether from when to when we call it 'modern'. About the difficulty related to this demarcation, see Steven B. Smith, *Modernity and Its Discontents: Making and Unmaking the Bourgeois from Machiavelli to Bellow* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2016), 4. Appreciating this difficulty, there have been constant attempts to mark this transition. See, for instance, Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983).

[7] Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity*

A prevailing secular mood is, in many ways, accepted as the contemporary norm, predicated on a tacit understanding that "secular" is "a foundational dimension of modern life"; it is "the water we swim in."[8] And this conception of self was obviously situated in, and concurrently coexisted with, modern liberal democratic state visions. The quest for how 'secular identity' of both individual and state has gained its status in the modern world – based on what epistemological premises or against what ideological alternative- will be points of our discussion.

Human beings have a basic need to understand who they are, and this need becomes more urgent in times like the present when people feel a sense of alienation and anomie since many traditional values, beliefs, and institutions are in a state of crisis or have broken down altogether. One way to address this need is to study the past in order to learn how we became the kinds of creatures that we are today. In a sense it is difficult to grasp these concepts not because they are foreign to us but rather since we, as products of modern culture largely shaped by a long tradition, have long since internalized these ideas and take them to be immediately obvious and uncontroversial. We believe that human beings equally have certain inalienable rights; we think that we, as rational beings, should treat others with respect and dignity; we feel deeply that we should have the right to decide the key issues concerning our own lives. Most people are unaware that these ideas, which we moderns find wholly obvious and intuitive, were not immediately given, but instead are the result of a long process of historical development.

In this sense, the foundational works of a (political) philosophical

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1650–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 3.

[8] Charles Hirschkind, "Is There a Secular Body?," *Cultural Anthropology* 26:4 (2011), 634. As C. Wright Mills stated: "Once the world was filled with sacred-in thought, practice, and institutional form. After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, perhaps, in the private realm." C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* , 40th anniversary edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000[1959]), 32-33.

tradition were influential in many ways for our culture enjoyed in the twenty-first century. This long tradition, for good or ill, is largely constitutive of our identity. Living in the modern world, we are, so too speak, products of this tradition, whether we like it or not. We have been produced, moreover, in such a way that we naturally and reflexively engage with our past, inasmuch as we understand it to be carried forward in and by our present selves. Therefore, in order to understand the modern world and our status in it, we must go back and, by means of studying the past and its cultural artifacts, see how we arrived at where we are today.[9] The present study, for sure, does not cover the full temporal span of (political) philosophical tradition from modernity to the twenty-first century. Instead, it confines itself to the early modern world. The reason for this is partly a practical one. To continue the narrative initiated here and analyze representative texts of the modern tradition to our own day would require another or a series of full-length investigation. It thus seemed sensible for the moment to set aside this broader task and focus on the first part of the story that I wish to tell.[10]

Before closing this introductory remark, I must address another fact

[9] With this objective, this project is in line with several recent works of political philosophy. Referring to major contemporary thinkers such as Michael Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor(1990, Preface) claimed that "we cannot understand ourselves without coming to grips with this history", which is "a renewed understanding of modernity"(Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: Making of the Modern Identity* (Harvard University Press, 1990)). Charles Larmore (1996, 3) argued that history of modernity starting from the 16th century represents "a condition that is till our own" (Charles M. Larmore, *The Morals of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)). Recently, Steven Smith(2016, 6) forced us "to return to the beginnings of modernity in order to see better what is at stake." (Steven B. Smith, *Modernity and Its Discontents: Making and Unmaking the Bourgeois from Machiavelli to Bellow* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press), 2016.)

[10] Extricating the relics from early modern does not entertain the view that: early thinkers originated every concept of individuality; that a genealogical reconstruction of individuality is the only approach we can take; or that it is manifest that we have been historically upgraded through a discourse. Thus I will not share any of those arguments in that those philosophers we will cover are the inventors of the elements; that it's beyond my scope or interest to delineate the whole trajectory of intellectual discourses; or that by articulating the historical development of individuality in the modern age, we should decide either avouching the whole trajectory and declaring "the end of history" or problematizing its tale and asserting to "return".

that mainstream contemporary political theory tends to elide anthropological questions, focusing its analytical gaze instead upon investigating and evaluating the characteristics of governmental institutions, the grounds for and nature of political authority[11], the presence of absence of justice in political arrangements[12], the adequacy of various legal regimes[13] and other similarly important, yet secondary, questions. I suspect that the principal explanation for this general lack of focus on the anthropological question has largely to do with academic fashion, specifically the fact that the expressed intent to focus on anthropology itself marks out controversial territory in the field. After all, to speak of human nature invites the accusation that one flirts with the error of "essentialism," that "cardinal sin of the present moment."[14] The current trend, at least in the academic area, evades discussions that treat a moral dimension to the conditions of the natural world, in part because many evaluate such endeavor as outdated, and in part because such undertaking would easily face the deadlock.

Yet I want to insist that there is no such thing as a political theory without an anthropology. Political action requires political actors, and the accounts offered to describe, explain or justify such actions themselves incorporate some understanding of the nature of the actors. Every politics or moral theory therefore necessarily incorporates an anthropology, whether that anthropology is fully theorized or merely presupposed. As Walker Percy once observed, "[e]veryone has an anthropology. There is no not having one. If a man says he does not, all he is saying is that his anthropology is implicit,

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[11] Joseph Raz, *Readings in Social & Political Theory* (New York: NYU Press, 1990).
[12] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge and London; Belknap Press, 1971).
[13] Ronald Dworkin, *Law's Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).
[14] Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Niebuhr's 'Nature of Man' and Christian Realism," in *Reinhold Niebuhr and Contemporary Politics: God & Power,* ed. Richard Harris & Stephen Platten (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 43. See, for example, Nancy J. Hirschmann, "Freedom, Recognition and Obligation: A Feminist Approach to Political Theory", *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 83, No. 4 (1989), 1227-44; Martha Nussbaum, "Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism", *Political Theory*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1992), 202-46.

a set of assumptions which he has not thought to call into question."[15] Indeed, a casually conceptualized anthropology leaves a given political theory being ignorant of its own presuppositions and thus weakening its foundations.[16] And if the underlying anthropology of a given political theory is demonstrably false, incomplete, or otherwise unconvincing, it raises questions about the viability of the theoretical apparatus erected thereupon. So if we seek to inform and illuminate our thoughts about current political possibilities and realities, we must confront and engage with the more laborious and uncertain task of uncovering and interrogating the underlying anthropological assumptions contained within any account of politics. In short, if we are to have any realistic expectation to say what we *ought* to do or what actions we *should* take, whether individually or collectively, we must have some grasp of *who we are.*

This matter that requires some clarification with the term "anthropology," which I have perhaps unjustifiably treated as interchangeable with the term "human nature" and which is, itself, problematic. In the case of the term "anthropology," one might surmise that it assumes an understanding of man as an analytical monad, and indeed the term "philosophical anthropology" supposes a certain independence or autonomy of the human subject as object of his own inquiry. This is quite obviously a highly contestable assumption, for part of the problem we confront is the very question of whether "man" may be properly understood on his own terms or whether he is derived, constituted, or as Kierkegaard

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[15] Walker Percey, *Signposts in a Strange Land* (New York: Picador, 2000), 228. He continues, "One might even speak of a consensus anthropology which is implicit in the culture itself, part of the air we breathe. There is such a thing, and it is something of a mishmash and does not necessarily make sense. It might be called the Western democratic-technological humanist view of man as higher organism invested in certain traditional trappings of a more or less nominal Judeo-Christianity. One still hears, and no one makes much objection to it, that 'man is made in the image of God.' Even more often, one hears such expressions as the freedom and sacredness of the individual. This anthropology is familiar enough. It is in fact the standard intellectual baggage of most of us. Most of the time, it doesn't matter that this anthropology is a mishmash, *disjecta membra*."

[16] This has been one of the principal criticisms leveled against John Rawls, perhaps the most influential contemporary political theorists.

famously insisted, a "relation."[17] In other words, one must not approach anthropology in such a way as to already predetermine an answer to a central feature of the question. By "anthropology," then, I intend to refer to "the study of man" in the broadest sense. That is to say that I aim to embrace both what might technically be termed "philosophical" anthropology- the study of man as he relates to himself and to others, as well as "theological" anthropology- the study of man as he relates to God.

Modernity, I claim, marks a profound shift in anthropological thinking in which attempts to combine the philosophical insights of the classical and the theological insights of Christian view cease as the implications of each position are developed in finer grain. Relatedly, I should not at the outset that addressing the term "modernity," I do not intend a lengthy excursus into its meaning.[18] Defending a particular definition of or account of modernity as "the" account is not the focus of my investigation here; rather, as my purposes center on the anthropological question, I intend to develop each thinker's account of modern thought with respect to human nature.

1.1. Examining the Post-secular Return of Religion: reevaluation of "secularization theory"

Upon what grounds may we affirm the stature of the individual human being? Put in theological terms, can we affirm anything distinct about personality? Individuality- the notion of an independent subject, a reflective self with both will and personality- emerges from the Christian affirmation that man is created "in the image of God," that he participates in the attributes of the Creator and is therefore possessed of a unique stature and worth because of that participation and because of his relation to God.

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[17] "Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates to its own self, or it is that in the relation that the relation relates itself to its own self." Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death, 13.*

[18] See, for example, Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age;* R. J. Rengger, *Political Theory, Modernity and Postmodernity.*

What this project would argue, however, is that this same flower of individuality which could have grown only on Christian soil also can only persist on Christian soil. With the loss of the Christian conception of human nature, individuality lacks any metaphysical ground and ultimately collapses. This is the case for both the naturalist and the idealist. From the naturalistic perspective, individuality, which presupposes at least some minimal spiritual dimension, collapses because man is but matter - consciousness is effectively denied.[19] This is man as machine. Thus individuality is either submerged into rational universals as in the Darwinist model, wherein the species take center stage rather than the individual. In each case the particularity of the individual dissolves or is subsumed into some larger universal. Romanticism, too, meets a similar fate, for although it begins as a self-conscious effort to retain the primacy of the individual in the face of the collapse of individuality in idealistic and materialistic rationalism, it too, ultimately loses the individual, who merges into the collective. Rousseau's account of the general will offer a paradigmatic example of romanticism's loss of the individual in the unity of the nation:

> *Indeed each individual may, as a man, have a particular will contrary or different from the general will he has as a Citizen. His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally independent existence may lead him to look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will harm others less than its*

[19] But for the counter-argument from a philosopher of mind, see Thomas Nagel, *Mind & Cosmos: Why the Materialist NeoDarwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). "[I]t is important both for science itself and for philosophy to ask how much of what there is the physical sciences can render intelligible- how much of the world's intelligibility consists in its subsumability under universal, mathematically formulable laws governing the spatiotemporal order. If there are limits to the reach of science in this form, are there other forms of understanding that can render intelligible what physical science does not explain?".

payment burdens him and, by considering the moral person that constitutes the State as a being of reason because it is not a man, he would enjoy the rights of a citizen without being willing to fulfill the duties of a subject; an injustice, the progress of which would cause the ruin of the body politic. Hence for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the following engagement which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free.[20]

Much has been made in recent years of the supposed "return of religion" in the public sphere, and this has led theologians, philosophers, and theorists from various perspectives to being referring to ours as a "postsecular" age, in which forms of belief and practice that were to wither away apace with the modernization of societies have retained their political and cultural power. This constitutes a reevaluation of both the descriptive and normative components of the "secularization thesis."

Analyses of the empirical demise of secularism tend to fall into three overlapping conversation. First, philosophers and political theorists, often inspired by Charles Taylor's magisterial *A Secular Age*, attempt to take stock of the varieties of secularity that have been relatively unsuccessful at defeating, suppressing, marginalizing, or domesticating religion, and they invest much time in trying to think with Taylor about a notion of "the secular" that might be sufficiently hospitable to forms of religion that are willing to submit to the philosophical norms of modernity.[21] Second, the

[20] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "The Social Contract," in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings,* ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 52-3.

[21] See, for example, Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Harvard: Harvard University Press,

need for such hospitability is being explored with even greater urgency by social scientists, scholars of religious studies, and political theologians who are concerned with pacifying the often violent defensiveness of public religion, for which the perceived secular threat of prescriptive privatization breeds various kinds of reactionary and defiant confessions of faith.[22] Third, in an attempt to interrupt this "clash of civilizations," both secular ethicists and moral theologians, informed in part by Alasdair Macintyre's enormously influential *After Virtue,* try to mine the Christian tradition for resources to bridge the secular/religious divide by either questioning the legitimacy of modernity and calling for a nostalgic retrieval of an idealized religious past or translating theological notions like "conversion" into the secular language of "authenticity."[23]

Though all of these conversations abound with rich and promising proposals for situating religious discourses vis-à-vis an empirically insecure postmetaphysical and secular modernity, for the most part, they stop short of actually questioning the necessary link between the functional differentiation of value-spheres (secularization) and the refusal of transcendent accounts of normativity within and beyond those spheres

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2007): Michael Warner, Janathan VanAntwerpen, Craig Calhoun, eds., *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age* (Harvard University Press, 2010); Crig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds. *Rethinking Secularism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Judith Butler, et al., *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

[22] See, for example, Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: Th Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000): Creston David, John Milbank, Slavoj Žižek, eds. *Theology and the Political: The New Debate* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005); and Hend de Vries, Lawrence E. Sullivan, eds., *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006).

[23] See, for example, Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue,* Third Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); Lawrence S. Cunningham, ed., *Intractable Disputes about the Natural Law: Alasdair Macintyre and Critics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009); Philip Blond, ed., *Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology* (London: Routledge, 1998); Jeffrey Bloechl, ed., *Christianity and Secular Reason: Classical Themes and Modern Developments* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012); Brad S. Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2012); and Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt, eds., *Secularization and the World Religions,* trans. Alex Skinner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009).

(metaphysics). This is to say that they uncritically grant the philosophical claim of the secularization thesis that modernization requires the rejection of metaphysics. Accordingly, the degree to which they accept or reject the legitimacy of various spheres of modern value-formation tend to be overdetermined by their acceptance or rejection of supposedly competing accounts of metaphysical value. As a result, they see the "postsecular" conflict between "the secular" and "the religious" as the main target of their interventions.

In this study, I will question the necessary link between modernity and postmetaphysical thinking in order to show that the "postsecular" is really a symptom of a much deeper pathology. In what follows, I claim that while, as a normative category, the "postsecular" fails to address the underlying philosophical pathologies of modernity. These pathologies, I conclude, may involve a certain renewed interest in "religious" modes of thought, but without a prior rehabilitation of the metaphysical questions that support them, the postmetaphysical "return to religion" will serve only to perpetuate and deepen the fundamental conflicts that it seeks to resolve.

1.2. Recasting the Old Questions: Theological Reliance and Renunciation in the Political Thought of Modern Philosophers

The topic of religion is generally confined to the field of theology. However, the subject has influenced many other fields, such as politics and history. This dissertation examines the question why religion remained a topic of discussion with modern political philosophy. Concepts associated with religion, such as the concept of God as well as the end of time and the hope of a utopian age to come, remained largely background assumptions among intellectuals in the modern age. Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, and Frederick Nietzsche addressed, surprisingly rather explicitly, *contra* their commonly received image, addressed the subject in their philosophies.

With the stated aim, the present investigation follows three different

but interrelated themes through reading the works of three political philosophers who lived over an early modern period.[24] These themes represent some of the most influential questions that have haunted human beings and loomed more urgent issues in this century: Should human beings be treated equally? What is the value of our rational knowledge? What is the meaning of our existence? Specifically, this dissertation will seek out how certain concepts – equality, rationality, authenticity – have become natural elements to characterize not only individuals but liberal democratic society, based on the arguments of early modern political philosopher – Hobbes, Kant, Nietzsche – who respectively represents each way of thought, as we shall see in the following chapters.[25] In particular, I shall defend the thesis that the secular concepts of modern identity, as I attempt to show in this dissertation, originated as a thoroughly religious substitute, and not an alternative.

These philosophers who will be discussed are also in common and commonly regarded as the ones who treated religion as a problem in political, intellectual, and/or cultural arena. And the way they handle this issue affects their anthropological as well as political/cultural view. In short, Thomas Hobbes(1588-1679) defines religion in his masterpiece work *Leviathan*(1651) that "this fear of things invisible is the natural seed of that which everyone in himself calleth religion, and in them that worship or fear

[24] This project, then, shares in common with recent literatures. See, for instance, George Kateb, *The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Stanley Cavell, *Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism*(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Alex Zakaras, *Individuality and Mass Democracy: Mill, Emerson, and the Burdens of Citizenship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). However, whereas these works focus mainly one or two modern thinkers to articulate as well as defend a certain 'sort' of individuality, this dissertation takes a little wider view to delineate as well as emphasize several aspects of individuality.

[25] It might be objected that the texts treated in this study were never concerned with developing a theory of philosophical anthropology. When these authors set out to write their works, their goal might be very different, for example, to glorify a king, to criticize epistemological assumptions, or to speak in a low mumble, as if to himself. While this is of course true, these authors all had some more or less articulated understanding of what it was to be human, which they held in common with their contemporary readers. They might thus leave traces of it in their texts, even though this was never their explicit intention.

that power otherwise than they do, superstition."[26] Hobbes's further treatment of religion in the next chapter, Chapter 12, "Of Religion" explains, among other things, how religion can be used to manipulate society. Hobbes thus asserted that the Church must be subject to the State.

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is commonly known as the greatest among the Enlightenment thinkers. In his final book, *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1794), Kant stated that "everything man does to please God apart from a moral way of life is mere religious delusion and spurious worship of God." His other works, *Ground for the Metaphysics of Morals, What is Enlightenment? Prolegomena,* are explicit examples of his emphasis on 'pure reason,' and 'autonomy' of human beings as rational beings.

This way of secular or irreligious thinking was further expanded by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). His famous slogan "God is dead" had significant impact on the modern and contemporary thinkers. His emphasis on extreme humanism and 'will to power' indubitably contributed to the modern emergence of secularism and secular thinking. "What is needed above all is an absolute skepticism toward all inherited concept."[27] He concludes *The Antichrist*(1895) by arguing that the Christian church "has turned every value into worthlessness, and every truth into a lie, and every integrity into baseness of soul." As a result, he argued, the Christian church has become "the one immortal blemish on the human race."[28]

The outcome of this undertaking, as I discuss below, is the secular – or un-/anti-theological- concepts of individual, and indeed of a vision of the modern state, that has become a fixed point in modern theories of liberal democracy. However, the historical research conducted in this study contests

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[26] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Edwin Curley. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 11.26.

[27] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power,* ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), 221.

[28] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Antichrist,* trans. H.L.Mencken (New York: Knopf, 1918), 629-30.

the prevailing scholarly opinion that views the doctrine of liberal democracy gradually emerging in this irreligious context of contemporary political thought. What is in need of further research concerns the manner and form in which political theorists had constructed and justified this doctrine and the varieties of sources and intellectual traditions which political theorists had historically invoked to articulate, express, and defend it. Moreover, what this study tries to offer is an historical excavation of the antecedent philosophical sources that made such a doctrine not only possible but, indeed, positively attractive as a normative vision of the modern liberal state. These are the principal goal and themes of the dissertation, which I hope to explore in the chapters to follow.

1.3 Plan of dissertation

Over the ensuring chapters, I will explore these questions and themes, and tie them together, through examination of the ideas of political philosophers, who grappled with these issues both more abstractly, and within the course of engagement in particular political struggles. This approach will blend intellectual biography and political contexts with conceptual mapping and analysis at a more abstract level; the goal will be to show the interweaving of political-theological reflection and real politics.

The second chapter mainly focuses on Thomas Hobbes's treatment of scriptural interpretation in the second half of his masterpiece, *Leviathan.* Hobbes's knowledge of religious doctrine and use of religious rhetoric in his political writings is often glossed over in the over-emphatic scholarly attempt to establish his stature as a founder of modern political theory. Such maneuver, however, is an injustice to Hobbes, who recognized that in order to establish a stable society founded upon materialism and reason, he had to reform people's understanding of religious revelation, and Christianity itself. Rather than merely move to a wholly new epistemological foundation, Hobbes was aware that the only way to cultivate the state's religion was to

examine and undermine the foundations of religious thought in its own terms. The reformation of religious language, critique of Christianity, and attempt to eliminate man's belief in their obligation to God was done in order to promote a civil society in which religion was servant of the state. Through reforming religious language, Hobbes was able to demote religion as a worldview; removing man's fear of the afterlife or obligation to obey God over a civil sovereign. Religious doctrine no longer was in competition with the civil state, but is transformed into a tool of the state, one which philosophically founds the modern arguments for religious toleration.

Through a close reading of Immanuel Kant's late book, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, the third chapter clarifies the political element in Kant's doctrine of religion and so contributes to a wider conception of his political philosophy. Kant interprets religion in such a way as to give the Christian faith a moral grounding and even be indispensable element of improving social and political life. In the *Religion*, Kant goes beyond the philosophical analysis of the social-political context of religion, and pursues, alongside this effort, a political presentation of philosophy which is intended to relieve the tension between philosophy and political life. In short, Kant's political philosophy of religion originates from his critique of reason and is an extension of that critique into matters of faith and the resulting practices. Throughout the *Religion* we can encounter Kant's re-grounding of historical Christianity for social-political, as well as moral purposes. Kant's philosophy begins with critique but ends in doctrine and so the doctrine of religion may well be not only the conclusion but the intention of Kant's project. Certainly God, theology, and religion are still pressing concerns for Kant in the writing of his very late works, such as the *Opus Postumum*.

The fourth chapter will argue that Nietzsche's use of the language of health to describe Christianity is not simply side-effect of his mid-career interest in natural sciences; rather, it develops out of his early investigation

of the tragic and Greek responses to *nausea*, a debilitating condition of the will. Over the course of his career, Nietzsche turns his focus from Socratism to Christianity, coming to believe that the latter response to *nausea* is worse than the condition it is meant to treat. Nietzsche develops a generally naturalistic critique of Christianity that describes it as the lowest possible affirmation of life; it is a force that disintegrates and decomposes healthy bodies – both individual and social. The Christian struggle against danger in the world, carried out through the devaluation of the "animal instincts": we, according to Nietzsche, now suffer from the debasement of humanity itself. We are attracted to a "degenerated" ideal, and this seduction threatens to derail the exceptional specimens in our midst. Nietzsche seemed to think that we might free ourselves from the crushing power of the feeling of guilt through the embrace of chance as an antidote to Christianity. Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality suggests that the embrace of chance might alter our feelings about responsibility; we felt indebted to our ancestors or gods for every victory, every good fortune, and every realization of our purposes.

Chapter II. Thomas Hobbes's Use of Religious Doctrine

"If nature have made men equal, that equality is to be
acknowledged;
or if nature have made men unequal,
yet because men that think themselves equal
will not enter into conditions of peace
but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted"
(L, 15. 21).

This chapter seeks to examine the innovations of Thomas Hobbes in political philosophy in relation to his political motive to neutralize the authority of not only naturally constituted one but religion. This motive was seeking to create a political society that would have greater peace and stability than was currently in place in England during the seventeenth century. What Hobbes shows was that (some) men naturally resist being ruled. To evade this difficulty, Hobbes seeks to construct a stable political order, in the first half of the book, on the basis of natural reason alone, but is frustrated in this attempt by the ever-present seeds of religious feeling and superstition. Rather than ignoring these elements, as has been generally argued, Hobbes must co-opt religion, I argue, since he cannot replace it.

To achieve his political vision, Hobbes, as is well known, built his arguments to erect Leviathan, an absolute and undivided sovereign. To account for the necessity of this power, he developed an elaborate political anthropology, and, meanwhile, also understood that it needs to be inculcated. Sovereign could not sustain itself on theories and abstract prohibitions alone, but required in addition a means of managing popular opinion in its favor. The blueprint required for the architect of sovereign states should include the basic design of the commonwealth as well as the tools the sovereign

could manage the passions and opinions of his subjects. In the service of this first goal, a constitution form which restive subjects had as little access as possible to "private judgment of good and evil" by which they might accuse the sovereign of misrule, Hobbes closed off any appeal to natural or divine law. He did so by defining these laws as coeval with the sovereign's will. In the service of the second aim, Hobbes argued that all human relations which previous thinkers had legitimated by appealing to nature were in fact rather legitimated only by the artificial means of covenant.

Hobbes faced three hurdles to achieve his stated goals, two things respectively corresponding to the issues delineated above, and the more further complicated one, which comes from tackling both issues at the same time. Firstly, Hobbes's effort to level competing authorities within the state resulted in a straightforward denunciation of the independent existence and rulership of all feudal and ecclesiastical associations- "worms in the entrails of a natural man" (L, 29.21). For Hobbes, the consent that legitimates rule should have contractual origins. The sovereign state constituted on this consent is, at least for Hobbes, the only political organization that can stabilize the volatile psychological constitution of man.

Secondly, Hobbes does not assume that everyone comes to understand the sole authority of absolute sovereignty by reasoning, although they may be reasonable enough to be persuaded. The Hobbesian sovereignty thus rests on the other human element, passion. We, as natural beings, have a basic physiological as well as psychological needs to continue our existence; in the pursuit of self-preservation ironically, to prevent unforeseeable misfortunes, human beings aspire to rule everyone and unwittingly precipitate war. The only way saving us from this unfortunate situation is to intensify all combatants' "mutual fear" of death, a fear which is ever greater than our desire to master others (DC, 1.2-7). This magnified fear demonstrates our need of a common power over us to keep our enemies in check and to buy us some modicum of security. This account of the

universality of the fear of violent death seems to be impervious to refutation from competing theories of human nature, because as Hobbes points out, his detractors "admit by their actions what they deny in their words," which is to say, they too lock their doors at night (DC, Preface).

But it should be questioned whether the fear of death alone can bring us all the way to reason or additional help is necessary. Hobbes's anthropology seems to open up the possibility of two natures: the first seems proud but is ultimately cowardly, who is sufficiently daunted by the fear of death to make a covenant for mutual protection. But he also suggest a second type, the "evil man," who never experiences that moment of cowardice(DC, 8.2-4). Despite the relatively small number of the latter, they evidently persist as a threat to the Hobbesian commonwealth.

A further and more complicated issue remained for Hobbes is how to justify his solution of stipulating an absolute ruler. Mutual fear of death at one another's hands may induce most men to admit a common power over them - obviously based on the consent-, but it does not necessarily require that power to be an absolute and indivisible sovereign. Another element which makes his argument be hardly followed is that his definitions of power are complex. For Hobbes, power is not only command over others, but more fundamentally supremacy of both physical and intellectual capacity or possessions, as well as about the opinion of such supremacy held by others (L, 10.1-5: EL, 1.8.4.).

Hobbes demonstrates the last element of power in his first example of "the state of man without civil society" in *De Cive*. At the dinner party, we see that even our civilized friendships are only disguised contests for power in which each competitor hopes to "come away with a better idea of himself in comparison to someone else's embarrassment or weakness" (DC, 1.2). At gatherings of "Philosophers", the situation becomes more intense; attendees do not even adopt the pretense of friendship, and instead straightforwardly compete for intellectual supremacy and "actively pursue

their resentments" (DC, 1.2). "Intellectual dissension" is an even greater threat to peace than physical aggression, because intellectual dissension does not end in single combat that threatens only the two combatants, but instead issues in "the worst conflicts" (DC, 1.5).

Erecting a commonwealth with a view to protecting our bodies thus requires consolidating social power and thwarting the intellectual dissension that results in sectarian war.[29] The subjects must renounce not only their claims to external goods, but even to their own independence of mind, to "submit their wills, every one to will, and their judgments, to his judgment" (L, 17.14). Therefore, sovereign authority must neutralize the sources of public agreement and disputation that result in war, a problem which he describes in depth in his account of the role of the clergy in fomenting the English Civil War in *Behemoth:* "For the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in opinion and belief of the people" (B 16). All of Hobbes's educational institutions, including the family, but also the university and the church, are pressed into the service of inculcating and defending a homogeneity of opinion against the pressure of dissent that Hobbes feared would always devolve into war. The idea of natural authority was also anathema to Hobbesian politics, and so he denaturalized the family, and all other human relations. What is important to note is that Hobbes believed that, by dissociating legitimate political power from natural origins, it was possible to institute an emperor over men's minds.

This chapter tracks down Hobbes's tactics to leap those hurdles, and the last section assesses, then, whether he was a successful architect. It is yes and no. Hobbes could be rewarded for instantiating Leviathan, an absolute kingly rule, but I presume there would no place for (secular) Hobbes in this kind of state. To conclude, while Hobbes presented fairly convincing principles, commonly called natural laws, I claim that he should

[29] For a discussion of the role of Hobbes's sovereign in suppressing differences of opinions, see Bryan Garsten, *Saving Persuasion* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2006), 25-54.

be in a perilous state embracing his own principles.

2.1 Why Part 3,4 of Leviathan?

2.1.1 Changes over Hobbes's political works

Thomas Hobbes – a seventeenth century English philosopher, a champion of absolutism for the sovereign, a trembling, civic leader with fear – wrote three political works, *Elements of the Law*(1640), *De Cive*(1641, 1647), and *Leviathan*(1651).[30] Without questions, Hobbes lived among the middle of hotly debated political discourse- the issue of sovereignty. At the heart of the political debate over sovereignty in the period was the matter of the politically destabilizing power of religion.[31] Absolutely essential to the proper functioning of sovereignty, in Hobbes's view, was control over all religion's public forms and expressions. In a comment on *Leviathan*, Richard Tuck observes that for Hobbes "the most important area of potential intervention by his sovereign was religion."[32] Jeffrey Collings, while dealing with the same issue, argues that Hobbes's "obsessive fear of the independent power of the Christian church" was the fundamental motivation to write his political works.[33]

Hobbes stridently expressed this concern at the start of the crisis in 1641 in the remark that the conflict "betweene the spirituall and civill power, has of late more than any other thing in the world, bene the cause of civill

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[30] *Elements of Law* in *Human Nature* and *De Corpore Politico*, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin; *De Cive* in *Man and Citizen*, ed. Bernard Gert; *Leviathan*, ed. Edwin Curley. The full citations for these editions can be found in the Reference. When citing a passage from Hobbes's texts, I have provided the relevant divisions. For example, references to *Leviathan* provide the chapter and paragraph numbers.

[31] See Paul Dumouchel, "Hobbes and Secularization: Christianity and the Political Problem of Religion," *Contagion* 2 (1995), 38; Mark Lilla, *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West* (New York: Vintage, 2007, 74-91; Jeffrey L. Morrow, "The Bible in Captivity: Hobbes, Spinoza, and the Politics of Defining Religion," *Pro Ecclesia* 19.3 (2010): 285-99; and "*Leviathan* and the Swallowing of Scripture: The Politics Behind Thomas Hobbes' Early Modern Biblical Criticism," *Christianity and Literature* 61.1 (2011): 33-54.

[32] Richard Tuck, "Introduction," in *Leviathan,* ed. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xxxviii.

[33] Jeffrey Collins, *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5.

warre."[34] It was at this historical moment, the early 1640s, that the need for the sovereign to have overarching control over religious matters, at least in the public expressions, became a heightened concern for Hobbes. While this matter was inchoate in *Elements of Law*, it was significantly expanded in *De Cive*.[35] In an annotation printed in his revised edition of 1647, Hobbes, referring to religious claims of authority independent from the sovereign, asks rhetorically, "for what civill war was there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from, or waw nourisht by this Root?"[36] At the prima facie level, in this work Hobbes appears to be reproducing the conventional view of the Church of England; while the clergy's authority could only be exercised with the sovereign's permission, it nonetheless possessed a divinely given spiritual power that entailed special authority with respect to scriptural interpretation (DC, 249).

However, it has been argued that the seemingly traditional statements reproduced in *De Cive* is in contradiction and thus belied by the work's overall view, which in fact assigns the ultimate authority over religion, obviously including scripture interpretation in the sovereign orders. Johann Sommerville and Jeffrey Collins both point out that, predating *Leviathan*, in *De Cive* the sovereign possesses the power to define what is spiritual and what is temporal, and that the sovereign's publicly declared scriptural interpretation must be followed, even if it goes against to that of the ecclesiastics.[37] Tellingly, Hobbes's dogged opponent Bishop John Bramhall perceived that in *De Cive* Hobbes was already drifting toward the subsumption of ecclesiastical authority by the sovereign.[38]

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[34] Hobbes's letter to the Earl of Devonshire, qtd. in Johann P. Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context* (London: St. Martin's, 1992), 113.

[35] For *De Cive* as a turning point in Hobbes's developing religio-political reflection in the early 1640s, see Collins, 2007, 62.

[36] Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive: The English Version,* ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 96.

[37] Johann P. Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context* (New York: St. Martin's Press,1992), 120-27; Collins, 2007, 67. For the ultimate authority of the sovereign over scriptural interpretation, see *De Cive*, 248.

[38] Jon Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of*

Hobbes's more conventional statements in *De Cive* were perhaps included in order to placate Charles 1 and the royalists in the 1640s; in *Leviathan,* which was written in a wholly different context, where the king had been executed and the new Commonwealth government established, Hobbes could show his view more frankly.[39] Within this new situation, Hobbes's argument about the absolute power of the sovereign over religious matters appeared in its most starkly unqualified form, and received its most developed and expansive treatment.

Hobbes's concern against religion's independent claim to power and authority persisted later in his life. It encompassed an opposition not only to the spiritually based dissent of some sectarians, but also to more established ecclesial models like episcopacy and Presbyterianism, insofar as these models claimed an authority and power separate from what was granted them by the sovereign. In his historical dialogue *Behemoth,* written late in his life in 1668, after the publication of *Leviathan*, Hobbes reflected on political crisis happened in the earlier period, and referred to religious claims as the essential cause of the crisis.[40] Additionally, he gave an warning to those who claimed their special gift in hearing God's commands. One of the speakers in the dialogue of *Behemoth* claims that "the interpretation of a verse in the Hebrew, Greek, or Latine Bible, is oftentimes the cause of Civill Warre, and the deposing and Gods anointed."[41] Throughout this book, Hobbes reiterated his concern with existing clerical authority claims.

While those three political works of Hobbes show this similar, albeit

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Thomas Hobbes in England, 1640-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 43.

[39] Collins suggests that the execution of Charles, along with the rise of the Cromwellian Independents, triggered the writings of *Leviathan*. For the timeline of its composition, see Collins, 2007, 116-17. Previously, in *De Cive*, writing about the sovereign's power over the manner in which God is publicly honored, Hobbes proclaims that "whatsoever is commanded by [sovereigns], both concerning the manner of honouring God, and concerning secular affaires, is commanded by God himselfe."(DC,196).

[40] Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth,* ed. Pagul Seaward (Oxford: Clarendon, 2014), 109, 135.

[41] *Behemoth*, 302.

slightly different, concerns, the question of how these political works are related to one another has been an important and difficult one, spouting out vast literature on this issue.[42] To put it bluntly, the question that have discomfited scholars is that if all of those three books deliver the same message, what led Hobbes to write and even publish his latest book of those, *Leviathan*, unless he was an altruist or parrot. The on-going endeavors can be broadly classified into three categories.

The conventional view is that towards *Leviathan* Hobbes had tried to build a unified philosophical system linking his natural account to his moral/political theory. That is, Hobbes is a systematic thinker who attempts as much as possible to provide a solid foundation for understanding not only nature but human beings. Johnston argued and substantiated this view by elaborating the contemporary reception of *Leviathan*.[43] Ryan, scrutinizing Hobbes's works, claimed that Hobbes's political philosophy is derivative from his natural philosophy.[44] However, this overarching aspect of Hobbes's system has not been clearly conceptualized as yet; it has generated more controversy than agreement. For example, Warrender contended that Hobbes's moral and political philosophy is separate from his materialism.[45] Other scholars do not array themselves exclusively on both sides of this line.

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[42] see, e.g., Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis*, Trans. Elsa M. Sinclair (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Richard Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories: Their Origins and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[43] *Leviathan* was received as a "comprehensive vision of the world, which united metaphysical, theological, and political arguments into a single distinctive outlook." (David Johnston, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), xv). See also A.P. Martinich, *The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Nicholas Dungey, "Thomas Hobbes's Materialism, Language, and the Possibility of Politics," *The Review of Politics* 70(2008),190-220.

[44] Alan Ryan, *The Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1970); see also Richard Peters, *Hobbes* (London: Penguin Books, 1967); Thomas Spragens, *The Politics of Motion* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973); M. M. Goldsmith, *Hobbes's Science of Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

[45] Jerry Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957).

Taking a more nuanced tone, Watkins[46] has recognized that Hobbes's commitment to materialism may influence his formulation of moral and political theory, while hedging a direct connection between the two areas.[47] On the more practical level of argument, Stauffer[48], emphasizing the immediate importance of repudiating Aristotle's (meta)physics for Hobbes, suggests the rhetorical strategy Hobbes may take in bringing natural philosophy into civil science-- "to douse fire with cold water".[49] These recent studies, eventually, are advancing the view that although Hobbes has a general tendency to construct an exhaustive theoretical foundation, he has a distinct aim in writing political works.

Taking this present-day (re)discovery, another view, which focused more or less on restoring the contemporary political discourse, has proposed that there are some significant, if not developmental, changes in Hobbes's views between *The Elements of Law* and his later published political works. This shift of scholarly focus has been greatly debt to Skinner's works, quite roughly characterized as a contextual approach.[50] Re-enacting the

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[46] John W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes's system of ideas: A study in the political significance of philosophical theories*, Second revised edition (Aldershot, Hants, England, 1989).

[47] Malcolm(2002, 155) shares this view: "Hobbes's formal science of rights and obligations assumes the existence of a human nature which can be described a mechanistic science of causes; but it is not itself a product of that science."(Noel Malcolm, *Aspects of Hobbes*(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002)).

[48] Devin Stauffer, "'Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy': Hobbes's Critique of the Classical Tradition." *American Political Science Review* 110:3(2016), 481-494.

[49] "If scholastic metaphysics was like strong wine given to men already inclined by nature to alcoholism, Hobbesian "metaphysics," as a kind of anti-metaphysics, provides the cold shower that can bring men back to their senses and prepare them for the tough task ahead." (Stauffer, 2016, 492). The "touch task" is dealing with a more realistic, thus rational fear -- a fear of violent death. We will discuss more fully on this in the following section, section 2. But for the fuller account, see Johnston,1986, 100-1, 120-21; *Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?* (Glencoe: Free Press., 1959), 181.

[50] It has often been claimed that it's inaccurate to call Skinner's discipline as a contextual approach. Schochet(1974, 263) says that "Skinner's position is far more than another well-fortified interpretation of a classic work from the vantage point of its own historical setting."(Gordon Schochet, "Quentin Skinner's Method." *Political Theory* 2:3(1974), 261-276); Skinner(2002, 101) defends himself by stating that "I have not been concerned, however, to lend support to this very strong versions of what F.W. Bateson called the discipline of contextual reading."(Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Vol. 1. Regarding Method*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)). The fuller description of Skinner's interpretive method is beyond the scope of this chapter (I've discussed this issue

ideological battle between monarchical writers and parliamentarian ones, Skinner claimed Hobbes's novel conception of liberty as non-interference: he portrayed Hobbes as the first author to answer the revolutionaries who shared a classical republican view of liberty as non-domination. In addition, Skinner argued that Hobbes delivered his "definitive" version of this concept of liberty no sooner than *Leviathan*. More specifically, Skinner maintained that Hobbes's later works involved a repudiation of his earlier ideas[51]. These arguments have been subject to scholarly criticism in various aspects.[52] Foremost of these is that although Skinner meticulously traced Hobbes's thought on liberty in various texts, he dismissed that the fundamental tenet of Hobbes's conception of liberty remained almost unchanged.[53]

I do not discredit these endeavors. Rather they have been useful for us to understand more about Hobbes's thought: several works have shown his acquaintance with natural scientists and other philosophers such as Galileo, Gassendi, and Descartes, and their influence on Hobbes[54]; no fewer works has done to show Hobbes's influence on the discourse of liberty by either narrowing the intellectual context -- revitalizing the political and

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in another paper, Kim(2015)). And yet, contextualism or contextual approach seems to become a byword to refer his interpretive style. For instance, the title of Lamb's article is "Quentin Skinner's Revised Historical Contextualism." (Robert Lamb, "Quentin Skinner's Revised Historical Contextualism: A Critique," *History of the Human Sciences* 22:3(2009),51-73). Thus, this dissertation follows the common parlance.

[51] Quentin Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also F.C. Hood, "The Change in Hobbes's Definition of Liberty," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 17:67(1967), 150-163; Robin Douglass, "Thomas Hobbes's Changing Account of Liberty and Challenge to Republicanism," *History of Political Thought* 36:2(2015), 281-309. Others show some reservations on this view. See Perez Zagorin, *Hobbes and the Law of Nature* (Princeton University Press, 2009).

[52] See, i.e. Jeffrey R. Collins, "Quentin Skinner's Hobbes and the Neo-Republican Project," *Modern Intellectual History* 6:2(2009), 343-67.

[53] Daniel J. Kapust and Brandon P. Turner, "Democratical Gentlemen and the Lust for Mastery: Status, Ambition, and the Language of Liberty in Hobbes's Political Thought," *Political Theory* 41:4(2013), 652. Compare the definition of liberty Hobbes elaborates in *De Cive* and *Leviathan*. Liberty is described, in *De Cive*, as "the absence of obstacles to motion"; in *Leviathan*, "the absence of Oppisiotion; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion)"

[54] See, e.g. Malcolm, 2002.

religious storms of his time -- or widening it to encompass other philosophers of different era.[55] However, despite these valuable insights, undue concern has drawn scholars not looking earnestly pursued Hobbes's own words. Furthermore, most of the previous discussions have focused on the former parts of *Leviathan*, while skimming through the latter parts.

The reason is partly that since Hobbes has been regarded as a non-believer or atheist even from his contemporaries, his biblical exegesis comprising most of the latter half looks nonsensical and meaningless. As previous scholars have argued, if Hobbes needs just the former part of *Leviathan* to explain his ideas or to support his political position, he could have ended his book by that part. However, we cannot denounce his work as the ravings of a senile old man, since he has been regarded as a master rhetorician. James Harrington, one of Hobbes's contemporaries and an English political theorist of classical republicanism, "could find nothing to admire in Hobbes's politics, was nevertheless moved to compliment him extravagantly as one who 'is and will in all future ages be accounted the best writer at this in the world'".[56] Johnston says that for Hobbes, "it was less important to demonstrate the truth of his political doctrines than to drive those doctrines into the minds of his readers, to express them in language that would leave a deep and lasting impression upon them".[57] Considering how witting and cautious writer Hobbes was, therefore, I, in line with the third view, attempt to uphold the importance of the last half of Leviathan for Hobbes in the following.

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[55] See, Richard Tuck, *Philosophy and Government:1572-1651* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Duncan Ivison, *The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government* (Cornell University Press, 1997).

[56] Samuel I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 20.

[57] David Johnston, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 80.

2.1.2 Why Part 3,4 of *Leviathan*?: the importance of the last half of the text

A starting point for this section's inquiry lies in the following question: Why Thomas Hobbes pays special attention in interpreting scripture in *Leviathan* (1651)? If we glanced at *Leviathan*, Hobbes seems to have put unneeded labor writing it. The whole project delineated in *Leviathan* is not much different from that of *De Cive*. We can summarize his whole discussion, a study of "the right of the sovereign, and the duties of the citizens, which were to be deduced from the principles of natural reason" (OL, 31.41). In a nutshell, Hobbes seems to support absolutism without reservation, so much so that the sovereign can rightfully enforce law, order, and even use censorship; citizens should follow the dictates of their sovereign unless those go against the natural laws, a precept to preserve life. There Hobbes adds that the sovereign should direct the natural religion as he sees fit. With this proviso Hobbes asserts that all political questions have been solved.

Granted that he has reasons to write *Leviathan* as several scholars such as Skinner has claimed, Hobbes looks as if he did not intend to write the latter parts of it. The book was meant to be dedicated to sovereigns and their principal ministers. In the last chapter of Part II, Hobbes particularly points out that it is more needful and useful for sovereign, "who will consider it himself (for it is short, and I think clear), without the help of any interested or envious interpreter, and by the exercise of entire sovereignty in protecting the public teaching of it, convert this truth of speculation into the utility of practice." (L, 31.41) Here Hobbes, with qualification, divulges his intention in writing this short and clear book. This boldness and overtness give his book a unique character, more akin to a broad theme formulated in the genre of the mirror for princes, a genus most famously represented by Niccolo Machiavelli.[58] It is noteworthy that Hobbes inserts this message in

[58] For the influence of Machiavelli on Hobbes, see, for example, Leo Strauss, *What Is*

the last chapter of part II, rather than the end of his book; for earlier humanists including Machiavelli, the usual fashion to conclude their books is to put that advice near the end.[59] Then, to follow his predecessors, Hobbes could have finished his book by part II, and Chapter 31 truly appears to be the end of the book. Oakeshott says that "even an attentive reader might be excused if he supposed that the argument of Leviathan would end here. Whatever our opinion of the cogency of the argument, it would appear that what was projected as a civil philosophy had now been fulfilled." Following neatly this apparent advice, most scholars have ended their discussion on Hobbes until this far. However, Oakeshott cautions that such stopping is not the view of Hobbes, but rather the project of the second half of the argument of *Leviathan* is "the problem that Hobbes now considers with his accustomed vigour and insight".[60] Readers, if they are willing to avouch Hobbes's teaching, have to read more pages than they have done.[61]

That the book does not end here, part II, raises the question, 'what was the purpose of writing the rest of the book?' To this question, recent scholarships have felt the need to (re)investigate this unaccountable ending. As is well known, the remaining parts of Leviathan deal with religion, particularly but arguably Hobbes's view on Christianity. In fact, questions regarding Hobbes's position on religion and Christianity, have been central to understanding *Leviathan* since its publication.[62] For his unconventional, if not atheistic religious view, Hobbes gained much notoriety among his

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Political Philosophy? (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959); Skinner, 2008.

[59] For the genre of 'mirror-for-prince', see Skinner,1979.

[60] Michael Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1975), 50-1.

[61] In the 1651 Head edition, the first half of the book (from Epistle Dedicatory to chapter xxxi) is 193 pages; the second half (from chapter xxxii to Review and Conclusion) is 203 pages.

[62] "The tension between thought and the apparently serious purpose of Hobbes's theology was an issue that perplexed his readers then just as it does today." (Jon Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640-1700 (Ideas in Context)*, Reissue Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 93).

contemporaries, earning nicknames such as "the 'the Monster of Malmesbury', the arch-atheist, the 'bug-bear of the nation'".[63] Hobbes's name became a by-word for atheism, though he never professed it; he consistently confessed that he believed in God, and even devoted a chapter to not only explicate but repudiate atheism. However, his brusque tones of the scriptural scholars and the satirical mood raise the suspicion that Hobbes was not a sincere believer but an anti-religious figure.

That view of Hobbes as an atheist has been contested recently. Scholars began to ask that if Hobbes had not believed as the way he wrote in the last half of *Leviathan*, why Hobbes had devoted such large portions of his latest published book. Glover argues that "those who consider Hobbes atheist are forced to assume that he did not mean what he said on religion, and he said a great deal".[64] Martinich further points out that if we recall a non-believer by using the term "atheist", we misunderstand the seventeenth century terminology; Englishmen called anyone whom they disagreed with on religious matter an atheist.[65]

Conceding that Hobbes was a believer, scholars have wrangled over his religious view. The most appealing way to investigate this is to testify and distinguish Hobbes's view from other ones, the endeavor to embed *Leviathan* within contemporary debates between radical religious sects and their more conservative critics. This attempt to contextualize *Leviathan* and even Hobbes is well-qualified and worthwhile in that it broadens our

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[63] Mintz, 1962, vii. Hobbes, especially after Leviathan's publication, was accused of anticlericalism by both Anglican ministers and (Oxford) university professors such as Ward and Wallis. (Parkin, 2010, 133, 152; Douglas M. Jesseph, *Squaring the Circle: The War between Hobbes and Wallace* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), 313; Cf. Siegmund Probst, "Infinity and creation: the origin of the controversy between Thomas Hobbes and the Savilian Professors Seth Ward and John Wallis," *British Journal for the History of Science* 26(1993), 271-9. "To the greater majority of his contemporaries he was the *pontifex maxims* of infidelity." (Mintz, 1962, 20).

[64] Willis B. Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," In *Hobbes: Studies*, ed. Keith C. Ed Brown (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965).

[65] A.P. Martinich, *The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 34.

understanding the current and real debate at that time and thus helps us identify Hobbes's friends and enemies. However, Hobbes's glaring contradictions and inconsistencies regarding the same subjects such as prophecy, conscience, anointment and other religious matters have bred more disagreements and thus dissatisfaction.[66] This disappointment has steered scholars towards another direction – to underscore the rhetorical aspects of *Leviathan* --, but this alternative, quite sadly, cannot serve to bridge a gap; it rather stokes the debate.[67] To argue it out may be to wander into a Daedalian labyrinth of conjectures. Therefore, I suggest another way-out by returning back to the starting point, *Leviathan*.

Chapter 43, titled "Of what is Necessary for Reception into Heaven", is the last chapter of Part III. At the very end of that chapter, Hobbes epitomizes the whole part, confirming "the power of civil sovereigns and the duty of their subjects." (L, 43.24) Advancing this recurrent theme, Hobbes abruptly interjects his exegetical rule in a way to justify his interpretation or "allegation" of Scripture: "I have endeavoured to avoid such texts as are of obscure or controverted interpretation, and to allege none but in such sense as is most plain and agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole Bible." After justifying his procedure, Hobbes does not close this part, but continues to broach his hermeneutics. It is considered worth quoting fully.

"it is not the bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true light by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist upon

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[66] Depending on the subjects and supporting materials and texts they deal with, scholars have positioned Hobbes in the opposite camp. Some argued that Hobbes supported the revolutionary circle, while others contended that he refuted the claims of the rebels. See, for example, for the former, Martinich,1992; Skinner,2002; Collins,2007: for the latter, Glenn Burgess, "Contexts for Hobbes's Leviathan," *History of Political Thought* 11:4(1990), 675-702; Noel Malcolm, *Leviathan,* Vol. 1. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012).

[67] Taking into account the rhetorical aspects, Strauss situated Hobbes on the side of impiety(Strauss, 1963). For the opposite view, see, for instance, J. G. A. Pocock, "Time, History, and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes," In *Politics, Language, and Time* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989).

single texts, without considering the main design, can derive nothing from them clearly, but rather by casting atoms of Scripture, as dust before men's eyes, make everything more obscure than it is – an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own advantage."

Hobbes's admonition to fathom out "the scope of the writer" behind "the bare words" leads us going back to his broaching statements of Part III. There, Hobbes say that what he handles next is about "the nature and rights of a CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH" and the grounds of his following discourse must be "not only the natural word of God", which refers to the natural reason and he had dealt in the first half of Leviathan, "but also the prophetical," since the nature and rights of that commonwealth "dependeth much upon supernatural revelations of the will of God". Hobbes cautions that although we follow the prophetical word of God, it does not imply that we "renounce our sense and experience" or "our natural reason". However, regarding "many things in God's word above reason", he proposes "to captive" our natural reason and, instead, have a will to obey the lawful authority, who "speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken" (L, 32.1-4).

Who can be the lawful authority? He cannot be a religious private prophet, since "seeing miracles now cease, we have no sign left whereby to acknowledge the pretended revelations or inspirations of any private man, nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine farther than it is conformable to the Holy Scriptures" (L, 32.9). Is he a sovereign? Perhaps yes, but Hobbes never mentions any name. Rather in Review and Conclusion, Hobbes promulgates that "there is nothing in this whole discourse (nor in that I write before of the same subject in Latin), as far as I can perceive, contrary to the Word of God" (L, Review. 16). The lawful authority to whom "trust and faith reposed" might be Hobbes himself. If so, and I assume, the latter parts of *Leviathan* should be understood as a supporting evidence for his wider

discourse as well as a hermeneutical guide to interpret his whole book.

2.1.3 Scripture as a hermeneutical guide

Hobbes beings Chapter 32 by reminding his readers that, in order to deal with a specifically Christian form of politics, he will no longer be able to rely on natural reason alone. Hobbes writes,

"I have derived the rights of sovereign power, and the duty of subjects, hitherto from the principles of nature only; such as experience has found true or consent (concerning the use of words) has made so; that is to say, from the nature of men, known to us by experience, and from definitions (of such words as are essential to all political reasoning) universally agreed on. But in that I am next to handle, which is the nature and rights of a CHRISTIAN COMMONWEALTH, whereof there dependeth much upon supernatural revelations of the will of God, the ground of my discourse must be, not only the natural words of God, but also the prophetical" (L, 32.1).

The first half of *Leviathan* was based on the "principles of nature" and the "nature of men," which are discovered through experiencing the world with carefully defined words. This part, by following the principles of natural reason, builds an argument to show a completely systemized politics, which is as certain as a as a Euclidean theorem. Hobbes, at the beginning of Part 3, is announcing that the remainder of his work will serve as a supplement to an already complete system, in which "the ground of my discourse must be, *not only* the natural word of God [*i.e.* that which is known by reason alone], *but also* the prophetical [*i.e.* 'supernatural revelations of the will of God']" (L, 32.1).

But the truth of revelation are not truths we all can reach; we are left to wonder about the precise status of the truths of revelation as well as the method according to which we must apply to arrive at knowledge of them.

According to Hobbes, we have no surer guide:

"For though there be many things in God's word above reason (that is to say, which cannot be natural reason be either demonstrated or confuted), yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskillful interpretation or erroneous ratiocinaiton" (L, 32.2).

Hobbes says that anything found abhorrent to reason, i.e. anything conflicting with the system set forth in the first half of *Leviathan*, must be understood to be the "fault" of either "unskillful interpretation or erroneous ratiociation" (L, 32.2). While he states about the limited role of our reason, he delineates the scope of our firm knowledge:

"Therefore, when anything therein written is too hard for our examination, we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words, and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion as with wholesome pills for the sick, which, swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure, but chewed, are for the most past cast up again without effect." (L, 32.3)

The request being made is that we must suspend the work of philosophical logic, i.e. the work of the linguistic and geometric science that is the only certain path to truth, and instead "captivate our understanding to the words." When scripture is "too hard for our examination," i.e. when is speaking of matters "above reason," we must shackle ourselves to the revealed word and not "labour" to "sift our a philosophical truth." The reason we must do so is that reasoning is fundamentally destructive to believing in scriptural claims. The claims of scripture, when swallowed whole without chewing any portion of those, are helpful in that they can be a medicine to cure a natural defect of the body politic. But when these truths are chewed, i.e., analyzed by natural reason and torn apart in search of truth, attempting to believe them is more likely to make us wretch.

That Hobbes has political motives in captivating reason, rather than

philosophical or theological motive, is shown in the next paragraph. He directly states that "by the captivation of our understanding is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man, but of the will to obedience, where obedience is due… We then captivate our understanding and reason when we forbear contradiction, when we so speak as (by lawful authority) we are commanded, and when we live accordingly; which, in sum, is trust and faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken" (L, 32.4)

We must be obedient to the lawful commands of those whom we have authorized to command us. We must put "trust and faith" in the words of these commanders, regardless of whether they are intellectually overwhelming or not. However, it is unlikely that those words reflect God's laws since God does not dictate his order in that way. Hobbes distinguishes two ways for God to communicate, "... either immediately or by meditation of another man to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately" (L, 32.3). Here Hobbes introduces the dichotomy between special revelation, on the one hand, and the mediation of God's chosen persons- prophets- on the other. Regarding the former, he says little: "How God speaketh to a man immediately may be understood by those well enough to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood by another is hard, if not impossible, to know" (L, 32.5).

Hobbes does not deny the possibility of experiencing special revelation; he merely says that only those few who have experienced it could ever understand it. Hobbes could not find a way to prevent the mass from believing that God has somehow chosen certain individuals to deliver his message. Instead, Hobbes asks rhetorically about what condition we can have a firm belief in who can be the prophets and what they would say: "For if a man pretend to me that God hath spoken to him supernaturally and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce to oblige me to believe it" (L, 32.5).

Scripture cannot be a means of direct communication because it always requires interpretation, as shown historically in the debate or dispute over its genuine meaning. Rather it should be mediated by "the prophets… the apostles, or… the church" (L, 32.6). God speaks to "all other Christian men" in the same way, but no one can claim a special authority based on his ungrounded ability to interpret scripture alone. Hobbes says that anyone who claims to be a prophet "obliges no man to believe he hath so done to him that pretends it, who (being a man) may err, and (which is more) may lie." (L, 32.6). In short, Hobbes admits that special revelation is in principle possible, and then he shows that any claim to it is a kind of deception in practice. Hobbes asks another question that will continue to appear throughout his remaining book: "How, then, can he to whom God hath never revealed his will immediately (saving by the way of natural reason) know when he is to obey and not obey his word, delivered by him that says he is a prophet?" (L, 32.7).

Hobbes is able to provide a solution from another part of scripture: "I answer out of the Holy Scripture that there be two marks by which together, not asunder, a true prophet is to be known. One is the doing of miracles; the other is not teaching any other religion than that which is already established" (L, 32.7). Regarding the former, miracles are required for prophecy, but miracles have ceased in our age; therefore, prophecy itself has ceased: "Seeing therefore miracles now case, we have no sign left whereby to acknowledge the pretended revelations or inspirations of any private man, nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine farther than it is conformable to the Holy Scripture, which since the time of our Savior supply the place and sufficiently recompense the want of all other prophecy, and from which, by wise and learned interpretation and careful ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without enthusiasm or supernatural inspiration, may easily be deduced" (L, 32.9).

Where direct revelation having ceased, according to Hobbes's deductive argument, the Bible should be the only option. But this depends on "wise and learned interpretation and careful ratiocination." Here, Hobbes announces the methodological principle that he follows throughout Book 3: "and this Scripture is it, out of which I am to take the principles of my discourse concerning the rights of those that are the supreme governors on earth of Christian commonwealths, and of the duty Christian subjects toward their sovereigns." Hobbes will proceed in the rest of Part 3 to interpret the Bible, which is the source of all currently available revelation.

2.1.4 Erecting Supreme Governors on the earth of Christian commonwealth

Why such revelation is still needed in the commonwealth? Hobbes was still lingering on the issue of salvation. One element that is consistent throughout Hobbes's political writing is that faith and obedience are all that is necessary for salvation, either eternally or temporally. In *The Elements*, salvation was understood in terms of eternal life in heaven and was an immediate consequence of faith and obedience to the laws of the kingdom of Heaven. In *Leviathan*, however, Hobbes explicitly defines salvation merely as safety and security against temporal evils: "to be saved is to be secured, either respectively, against special evils, or absolutely, against all evil (comprehending want, sickness, and death itself)... to be saved from sin is to be saved from all the evil and calamities that sin hath brought upon us" (L, 38.15). This relatively momentous relief can be achieved only if people exit the state of nature for the safety offered by the sovereign in a commonwealth.[68] No sovereign can offer full salvation because they cannot guarantee another life in the heaven. Salvation in the most complete sense in this world, then, can only be offered in Christ's future kingdom, which will

[68] As Martinich notes, this "saving" is one of the features of Hobbes's doctrine of sovereignty that renders the sovereign a mortal god. See Martinich, 1992, 47.

not be in heaven, but on earth: “it is evident that salvation shall be on earth, then, when God shall reign (at the coming again of Christ) in Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of the Gentiles that shall be received into God's kingdom” (L, 38.23). The entry into God’s kingdom, according to Hobbes, requires well-established faith and obedience to existing spiritual authority.

The preparatory work of ecclesiastical leaders becomes the work of the sovereign once sovereigns become Christians. In *Leviathan*, depending on whether the sovereign is Christian or not, the way religious authority is exercised dramatically changes. Hobbes divides Christian history on this account: from Christ to Constantine and from Constantine to Hobbes's day. The primary feature that distinguishes this time period is that, in the latter period, ecclesiastical authority no longer exercises its power independently from the sovereign.

For Hobbes, before sovereigns were Christians, members of the laity were always limited by civil laws in how they act externally. Christian teaching based on the Bible can always be taught as counsel or advice for external actions when the sovereign is silent on relevant issues. It cannot override the sovereign’s order:

“When, therefore, any other man shall offer unto us any other rules, which the sovereign ruler hath not prescribed, they are but counsel and advice, which, whether good or bad, he that is counselled may without injustice refuse to observe; and when contrary to the laws already established, without injustice cannot observe, how good soever he conceiveth it to be. I say: he cannot in this case observe the same in his actions, nor in his discourse with other men, though he may without blame believe his private teachers, and wish he had the liberty to practise their advice, and that it were publicly received for law. For internal faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all human jurisdiction, whereas words and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of

our civil obedience, are injustice both before God and man" (L 42.43).

It should be noted that Hobbes remains a place for retaining private beliefs internally. Since ecclesiastical leaders have no legal authority to stipulate laws, they cannot subsume the precepts of scripture in civil wars without the sovereign's acknowledgement. Nevertheless, in a way not previously expressed in either *The Elements* or *De Cive*, Hobbes considers the possibility that the entire canon of the precepts of Christianity could be made a part of the civil law. Here he opens a possibility that Christians wish a day to come when sovereigns convert and make all Christian precepts law, thereby liberating Christians to act externally from within in all cases pertaining to religious belief. Another hurdle for this could happen is the way to convert sovereigns. It is theoretically possible that ecclesiastical leaders can give sovereigns advice concerning Christian doctrine. However, since the act of teaching is always an external act, it cannot happen if sovereigns have another belief. In order to understand how the ecclesiastical authority operates in non-Christian commonwealths, we must first examine the extent and origin of the sovereign's authority to teach religion. In chapter 12, Hobbes discusses the origin of religion and the disposition that humans have for religious belief. He argues that religious

"seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they that have nourished and ordered them according to their own invention. The other have done it by God's commandment and direction. But both sorts have done it with a purpose to make those men that relied on them the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society" (L, 12.12).

In this passage, Hobbes indicates that all religion established by sovereigns is designed to make people fit for making contract, entering into commonwealth, and continuing their life without further trouble in the commonwealth. All sovereigns can use religion for inculcating civil obedience. This aim of religion is consistent with a broader responsibility

that Hobbes gives to sovereigns: “it is his duty to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his duty, but his benefit also, and security against the danger that may arrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion” (L, 30.6). In fact, almost half of the sovereign's duties described in chapter 30 involve teaching: he is to provide “public instruction” (L, 30.2), to ensure that citizens' rights are “diligently and truly taught” (L, 30.4), and citizens are “to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in their neighbor nations, more than with their own, nor . . . to desire change” (L, 30.7). They are to be taught by the sovereign not to speak evil of the sovereign (L, 30.9), to honor their parents (L, 30.11), to know what justice is (L, 30.12), and, perhaps most importantly for our purposes, “they are to be taught that, not only the unjust facts, but the designs and intentions to do them . . . are injustice, which consisteth in the pravity of the will as well as in the irregularity of the act” (L, 30.13).

Based on the list of sovereign’s teachings, we can assume that, contrary to the existing scholarly arguments, Hobbes implicitly assigns the sovereign the right, authority, and responsibility to teach people how to act not only externally but internally. The right of sovereigns to teach the inner realm naturally fits the design of religion “to make those men that relied on them the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society” (L, 12.12). It would seem, then, that for Hobbes, all sovereigns, Christian and non-Christian alike, have always possessed the right to teach and instruct people's conscience. As we will see, this interpretation is confirmed in Part III where Hobbes claims that the Christian sovereign's pastoral office to teach existed before the conversion of sovereigns.

As is well known, Hobbes allowed sovereigns to require external obedience to civil laws, although they are not in tune with Christian doctrine. Naaman was not obedient in his heart to his civil sovereign when he performed the actions the civil sovereign authored, even though Naaman was externally obedient to the civil law. For Hobbes, the teaching of

Christianity can never justifiably result in civil disobedience. However, the act of teaching Christianity apart from civil authority can only persist in commonwealths if church leaders are authorized to do so independent from their sovereign: it is “done by commission or licence from him whose right it is” (L 16.4), who, in this case, is God. In non-Christian commonwealths, ecclesiastical authority was passed to men chosen by local churches by the laying on of hands, who themselves were authorized by Christ and his apostles (L 42.2, 56-57, 60). In his discussion of martyrdom, Hobbes explores the extent how such authority might persist in spite of the prevailing non-Christian sovereign's authority to teach religion.

For Hobbes, there are two sorts of Christians: “some have received a calling to preach and profess the kingdom of Christ openly; others have had no such calling, nor more has been required of them than their own faith” (L, 42.12). Only those who have a calling from God to preach and teach Christian doctrine in non-Christian commonwealths are justified in persisting in their external activity to the point of death:

“he that is not sent to preach this fundamental article [that Jesus is the Christ] . . . [is] not obliged to suffer death for that cause; because, being not called thereto, it is not required at his hands. . . . None, therefore, can be a martyr . . . that have not a warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none but such as are sent to the conversion of infidels. For no man is a witness to him that already believeth, and therefore needs no witness, but to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. Christ sent is apostles, and his seventy disciples, with authority to preach; he sent not all who believed” (L 42.14).

Hobbes's doctrine on Christian martyrdom was meant to rule out the possibility of civil disobedience for religious reasons within Christian commonwealths. It should be noted, however, that Hobbes reserves a group of Christian leaders who have a unique calling from God to act externally so that the aims of the church can persist in non-Christian commonwealths.

Hobbes confirms this point later on:

"Besides these magisterial employments in the Church—namely, apostles, bishops, elders, pastors, and doctors, whose calling was to proclaim Christ to the Jews and infidels, and to direct and teach those that believed—we read in the New Testament of no other. . . . [Nothing makes] an officer in the Church, save only the due calling and election to the charge of teaching" (L, 42.55).

According to Hobbes, the calling of Christian leaders is derived from God in order to preserve the church's missions in non-Christian commonwealths. Even under non-Christian sovereigns, God authorizes those who can act externally on their own about the religious aspects insofar as to the extent that is needed to ensure God's willing; that his message would spread to others who cannot experience special revelation as well as disciples who are undergoing hardships to prepare another life in the Kingdom of God to come. To acknowledge these God-authorized individuals is to say that they represent God's words apart from sovereign orders. Therefore, when non-Christian sovereigns conflict with ecclesiastical leaders, it is actually God that the sovereigns confront rather than the natural individuals who represent him.

Having discussed the former period, we are now in turn to discuss the ecclesiastical authority under Christian sovereigns. Hobbes divides chapter 42, "Of Power Ecclesiastical," by the condition whether or not sovereigns are Christians. At paragraph 66 he sums up what he had described previously about ecclesiastical authority when sovereigns are not Christian. From paragraph 67, Hobbes talks about Christian sovereigns: "We are to consider now: [g] what office in the Church those persons have who, being civil sovereigns, have embraced also the Christian faith" (L 42.67).

The very first subject that Hobbes brought out was about the sovereign's right to teach religion: "And first, we are to remember that the

right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace, and to be taught the subjects, is in all commonwealths inseparably annexed . . . to the sovereign power civil. . . . And therefore, in all commonwealths of the heathen the sovereigns have had the name of pastors of the people, because there was no subject that could lawfully teach the people but by their permission and authority" (L, 42.66-67).

For Hobbes, one of the most important things that happen when sovereigns become Christians is that they become the teachers and pastors of Christianity in virtue of their sovereign power. When the sovereigns are non-Christian, ecclesiastical leaders were authorized by God to do the same task through the laying on of hands (L, 42.2, 56-57, 60). For the Christian sovereign to be the supreme Christian teacher and pastor, no such formalities are required because the sovereign becomes the head of the church in virtue of holding the position of sovereign rather than because any right to teach is inherited from Christ via intermediary church leaders. Hobbes is emphatic on this point:

"This right of the heathen kings [to teach and be pastors] cannot be thought taken from them by their conversion to the faith of Christ, who never ordained that kings for believing in him, should be deposed (that is, subjected to any but himself) or... be deprived of the power necessary for the conservation of peace amongst their subjects and for their defence against foreign enemies. And therefore, Christian kings are still the supreme pastors of their people, and have power to ordain what pastors they please, to teach the Church (that is, to teach the people committed to their charge) (L, 42.68).

Even though the church possessed a God-given authority to teach in non-Christian commonwealths, its power collapses when sovereigns are Christians. If so, all authority, civil and religious, is derived from the Christian sovereign rather than from the church's intermediate message from Christ. The sovereign is now the supreme pastor: "But if every Christian sovereign be the supreme pastor of his own subjects, it seemeth that he hath

also the authority, not only to preach (which perhaps no man will deny), but also to baptize and to administer the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, and to consecrate both temples and pastors to God's service"(L, 42.72). Apart from the right to teach, the Christian sovereign takes in charge of pastoral office.

With the appearance of Christian sovereigns who are appropriating pastoral roles, the dichotomy between the church's authority to teach God's willing and the civil authority to make laws disappears. The disappearance of independent ecclesiastical authority only happens in Christian commonwealths. The sovereigns of Christian commonwealths have no pedagogical competition because they come to represent God's pastor to their citizens. Christian sovereigns become the voice of God: "he which heareth his sovereign ([his sovereign] being a Christian) heareth Christ; and he that despiseth the doctrine which his king (being a Christian) authorizeth, despiseth the doctrine of Christ" (L, 42.106). The privilege that sovereigns speak on God's behalf belongs only to Christian sovereigns because non-Christian sovereigns are not members of kingdom of God, but, rather, are part of the ominous kingdom of darkness that Hobbes discusses in Part IV. Accordingly, sovereigns of such kingdoms can lead and teach their own religions, but they cannot speak for God because, even though they are legitimate sovereigns, they are not God's pastors.

When the preparatory mission of the church is handed to the Christian sovereign, the sovereign becomes obliged to use his sovereign office to undertake Christ's plan on the earth; all other Christians fulfill their obligation by following the sovereign's laws. Therefore, the civil sovereign "ought indeed to direct this civil commands to the salvation of souls, but is not therefore subject to any but God himself" (L, 42.125). In practice, Christian sovereigns are obliged to include all the precepts of scripture in the civil law because they must use their office to actualize the precepts of the Bible: "And this law of God that commandeth obedience to the law civil, commandeth by consequence obedience to all the precepts of the Bible,

which... is there only law where the civil sovereign hath made it so, and in other places but counsel" (L, 43.5). When Christian sovereigns proclaim the precepts of scripture as a part of the civil laws, Christians are obliged to follow the civil laws for their salvation.

The fact that Christ's teachings become law means that the civil laws of the Christian sovereign provide a route for citizens to enjoy life in the kingdom of God to come. The kingdom of God to come will be a place of unending felicity (L, 35.1). Since the essence of salvation is "to be secured, either respectively, against special evils, or absolutely, against all evil (comprehending want, sickness, and death itself)" (L, 38.15) and felicity is "continual prospering" (L, 6.58), salvation and felicity are closely linked concepts that are perfectly commensurate and only ultimately achieved in Christ's kingdom.

These considerations underscore Hobbes's claim in Part I that eternal felicity depends entirely on the commonwealth: "As for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of heaven by any way, it is frivolous, there being but one way imaginable, and that is not breaking, but keeping of covenant" (L, 15.6). It seems clear that Christian commonwealths best serve its citizens to procure perpetual felicity because its sovereigns do everything within their reach to procure felicity and protection from evil for their citizens. They will do everything they can to place people into the kingdom of God to come, the only locale of perfect temporal safety and protection. In contrast, insofar as they are part of the kingdom of darkness, non-Christian commonwealths are antithetical to the perfect felicity and salvation of its citizens.

2.2 Hobbes's Use of Religious Doctrine: Undermining Obligations to God

2.2.1 Mimicking the Imagery of Creation: the Use and Abuse of the Theological-Political idea of Covenant

Based on the renewed interest in his religious doctrines, could we confidently say that Hobbes was a religious figure or a sort of theologian, who would persuade sovereigns to be Christian? I argue in this section that rather than enthroning Christian sovereigns for providing every citizen for entering into the kingdom of heaven, his relentless voice for keeping laws of nature, in the end, is for the sake of providing a fertile grounding for philosophy.

It has been widely accepted that the emphasis Hobbes places on individual self-preservation corresponds with the formal and contentless nature of his conception of religion. Scholarship of the last several decades has challenged a straightforward acceptance of the reactionary, demonic caricature of anti-religious Hobbes that persisted for centuries by showing continuities linking him with contemporary thinkers.[69] At the same time, however, contextualization should not mute Hobbes's religious radicalism; that Hobbes shared certain ideas with his contemporaries does not mean that aspects of his thought were not novel and radical, or that the overall account he advanced did not amount to a something highly heterodox.[70] The fact remains that Hobbes's treatment of Christianity departs in fundamental ways from many of the perennial tenets that had defined historical Christianity. Indeed, while he received support form some of his contemporaries[71], the view that Hobbes subverted Christianity has been prevalent since the earlies reception of *Leviathan*.[72]

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[69] See Parkin, *Taming;* Quentin Skinner, *Hobbes and Civil Science*, vol.3 of *Visions of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 238-323.

[70] Parkin, *Taming*, 92.

[71] Jon Parkin, "The Reception of Hobbes's *Leviathan*," in *Cambridge Companion to Leviathan*, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 444.

[72] Paul D. Cooke, *Hobbes and Christianity: Reassessing the Bible in Leviathan* (New York: Rowman and Little field, 1996), 181; G. A. J. Rogers, "Hobbes and His Contemporaries," in *Cambridge Companion to Leviathan*, 428. It has been claimed that Hobbes was the single most controversial thinker in the seventeenth century, and perhaps even "the most maligned philosopher of all time," judged on the basis of how many outraged reactions to his work appeared in print (Rogers, "Hobbes and His Contemporaries," 413). See the historical studies of contemporary reactions in Samuel I.Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas*

Hobbes's reduction of religion to individual self-interest is evident in *Leviathan* when he explains the minimum belief necessary for salvation, this being, as he had earlier stated in *Elements* and *De Cive*, simply that "Jesus is the Christ." "By the name of *Christ*," Hobbes writes, "is understood the King, which God had before promised by the Prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world, to reign (over the Jews, and over such of other nations as should beleeve in him) under himself eternally" (43.324: 938). Instead of any sense of a transformed life, or of communism with God, in his discussion of salvation Hobbes asserts submission to superior power rooted in the desire for self-preservation.

With this complexity surrounding Hobbes's position, scholars as diverse as Leo Strauss, Quentin Skinner, David Johnston have noted the rhetorical character of *Leviathan*.[73] Furthermore, they characterized Hobbes, with a slightly different perspective though, as an author who manipulates rhetorical tactics elegantly: Leo Strauss sees Hobbes as a modern type of esoteric authors, who wrote esoterically, which "concealed their views" between the lines, but, being contra to earlier type of writers, intended to "communicate their thoughts" and thus, "to enlighten an ever-increasing number of people who were not potential philosophers."[74]; Quentin Skinner also argues that Hobbes was rhetorical, especially when writing *Leviathan*. Hobbes, according to Skinner, believed that "the moving force of eloquence" was needed to demonstrate moral or political issues.[75] With a slightly different perspective, David Johnston trailed Hobbes's argument of

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Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962) and Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan.* For Hobbes's heterodoxy, see Cooke, *Hobbes and Christianity;* J.G.A. Pocock, Time, History, and Eschatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes," in *Politics, Language, and Time: Essays in Political Thought and History* (New York: Athenaeum, 1971); Collins, *Allegiance,* 11-57.

[73] Much more scholars share this perspective. To name the few, Kahn(1985); Miller(2011); Peter Ahrensdorf, "The Fear of Death and the Longing for Immortality: Hobbes and Thucydides on Human Nature and the Problem of Anarchy," *The American Political Science Review* 94(2000), 579-94; , Ioannis Evrigenis, *Images of Anarchy: The Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes's State of Nature* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[74] Strauss, 1980, 33-4.

[75] Skinner 1996, 5.

science and technology rather than that of politics, but reached the same conclusion. Johnston says that for Hobbes, "it was less important to demonstrate the truth of his political doctrines than to drive those doctrines into the minds of his readers, to express them in language that would leave a deep and lasting impression upon them".[76]

We can say with confidence that Hobbes was rhetorical or, at least, felt that he should use rhetoric. However, we cannot put aside the qualms whether we view Hobbes from our own perspective without considering him living in the seventeenth century. Those appraisals of Hobbes's writings, mostly criticisms, from his contemporaries make our minds off those worries. John Dowel, a vicar of Melton Mowbray in Leicestershire, a writer against Hobbes, worries that Hobbes "had so fine a Pen, that by the clearness, and propriety of his Style, and exactness of his method, he gain'd more Proselytes than by his Principles." Mintz notes that James Harrington, one of Hobbes's contemporaries and an English political theorist of classical republicanism, "could find nothing to admire in Hobbes's politics, was nevertheless moved to compliment him extravagantly as one who 'is and will in all future ages be accounted the best writer at this in the world.'"[77] Most notably, Edward Hyde, the first Earl of Clarendon -- an English statesman, one of the most important historians of England, and the greatest contemporary reader and critic of *Leviathan* -- accurately depicts Hobbes's style.

The novelty and pleasantness of the Expressions, the reputation of the Gentleman for parts and Learning, with his confidence in Conversation, and especially the humor and inclination of the Time to all kind of Paradoxes, have too much prevail'd with many of great Wit and Faculties, without reading their context, or observation of the consequences, to believe

[76] Johnston 1986, 80.
[77] Dowell,1683, iii; Mintz,1962, 20.

his Propositions to be more innocent or less mischievous, then upon a more deliberate perusal they will find them to be; and the love of his person and company, have rendered the inquiry of his Principles less discernible[78].

Not only recent scholars but Hobbes's contemporaries share the similar view on Hobbes: Hobbes used rhetoric willfully as well as gracefully. If it is all we need to know about Hobbes, however, the still on-going debates about him, or, so-called Hobbes scholars might not have existed. We seem to have a firm ground to say what Hobbes was doing, but we are in a dither about what he was trying to do and whether he was successful. Therefore we should go back to his original thesis. In this section, I will investigate the destabilizing condition that provoked Hobbes to broach the recurrent thesis.

In Review and Conclusion of *Leviathan*, Hobbes is longing to see his book "be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities." Universities are important institutions for Hobbes, because he regards those as "the foundations of civil and moral doctrine." After studying there, the preachers and the gentry disseminate the knowledge like sprinkling "such water as they find" upon the people. And "by that means the most men, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the ambition of a few discontented persons in their purposes against the state."[79] I assume this last quote exposes the dreadful condition that Hobbes has to confront.

How can make people less subject to serve those discontented but ambitious persons and thus more willing to obey the sovereign? Three passions – desire, fear, and hope – are noted, by Hobbes, for fundamental human passions to invoke men's actions. The question that, out of three passions, what is Hobbes's main concern has been widely addressed in

[78] Edward Hyde, 1676, iv-v.
[79] L, Review, 16

previous literature. Scholars tended to reduce this three-fold account of passions to one, namely, fear of death.[80] In *De Cive*, Hobbes "set down for a principle, by experience known to all men and denied by none", a truth that "every man will distrust and dread each other."[81] In *Leviathan*, Hobbes enhances this principle by stipulating 'state of nature' condition.[82] If that be so, it seems correct to say that fear is the root of all three in that Hobbes illuminates the paramountcy of fear in his account of political motivation and obligation: for the beginning of commonwealth, "the original of all great and lasting societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had towards each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each other"[83]; for the political obligation, "of all passions that which inclineth men least to break the law is fear. Rather it is the only thing that makes men keep them."[84] This line of interpretation, however, has been questioned recently. Although fear of death is the most reliable passion to found and preserve the commonwealth, it is merely a bottom line; fear of death is a necessary but not sufficient factor. Since Strauss[85] succinctly points out that "as its very title expresses, it [Leviathan] is directed primarily against the passion of 'pride'", numerous scholars have followed this thesis.[86] Hobbes repeatedly points out that "vain-glory" is the most frequent cause of crime.[87] That is, in in the state of nature, pride or vainglory is the foremost among passions that breed conflicts that expose the need for absolute sovereignty; in the absence

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[80] Ahrensdorf, 2000; Martinich,1992; Oakeshott 1972

[81] *De Cive*, Preface.

[82] Hobbes argues that human beings in the 'state of nature' would feel unsafe. Without the state, we would be left to fend for ourselves. But since we need material goods to survive and there is a scarcity of the goods, there is bound to be competition among us for these goods. No one can be safe in this individual struggle for survival because no one is invulnerable, and there is a relative equality in strength and shrewdness among human beings. (*De Cive*, 1; L, 13.)

[83] *De Cive*, 1.

[84] L, 27.19.

[85] Strauss,1963, 55.

[86] See, e.g. Deborah Baumgold, "Hobbes's Political Sensibility: The Menace of Political Ambition," In *Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory*, ed. Mary G. Dietz. Lawrences (KS: University Press of Kansas,1990); Christopher Scott McClure, "War, Madness, and Death: The Paradox of Honor in Hobbes's Leviathan." *The Journal of Politics* 76:1(2014),114-25.

[87] L, 27. 13

of a fair arbiter, altercations surrounding reputation can easily escalate into mortal combat. Chastening vainglory is a prerequisite for establishing a commonwealth. Even where Hobbes appears to explicate the importance of survival, fear ensues, glory is never omitted: "There is nothing more afflicts the mind of man than poverty, or the want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of life and honour." [88] We should not overstress the effectiveness of this overwhelming passion since Hobbes explicitly argues that this sense of vanity cannot be a reliable foundation for erecting a stable commonwealth: "no society can be great or lasting, which begins from vain glory. Because that glory is like honour; if all men have it no man hath it, for they consist in comparison and precellece"[89]

In a sense, these discussions seem to fondle two sides of the same coin, because it is on the basis of the fearfulness of man, his vanity can be subdued.[90] This deflation coincides with the realization of the equality of human beings. In the ninth law of nature, 'against Pride', Hobbes insists that "*every man acknowledge other for his equal by nature*".[91] Hobbes defines equality slightly differently depending on the context – vulnerability, ability, right. He might not feel a burden to provide an exact meaning of it, since Hobbes premised it as an unwavering principle. Why does Hobbes toil hard to evince the principle of equality? I argue that this postulation is needed for a more demanding but important task, advancing a thesis, "to seek peace" -- "articles of peace, upon which man may be drawn to agreement. These articles are the Law of Nature".[92]

Hobbes asserts that "all men agree on this, that Peace is Good."[93], or

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[88] *De Cive*, 13.
[89] *De Cive*, 1.
[90] Cooper(2007, 520) exemplifies this point: "in these battles, combatants experience one passion, fear of violent death, which pierces inflated ego, prompts rational deliberation, and inclines men to contract."(Julie E. Cooper,. "Thomas Hobbes on the political theorist's vocation." *The Historical Journal* 50:3(2007), 520.)
[91] L, 15. 21.
[92] *De Cive*, 2; L, 13.14.
[93] L, 15.40.

to put it differently, peace is good and everyone can recognize and accept it. Once more, Hobbes does not make any single effort to verify its truthfulness. Several scholars have found nothing in Hobbes's text to substantiate the allegation.[94] This statement is more problematic because Hobbes earlier proclaims that "there is no such *Finis ultimus* (utmost aim) nor *Summum Bonum* (greatest good) as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosopher."[95] What makes Hobbes to claim this thesis, recognizing the risk that he looks being illogical and presumptuous? Hobbes, like an inattentive thinker, might not consider that his assertion needs to be qualified. On the contrary, he can blame us for being lazy, with the admonition, clearing dust before our eyes.

In chapter 46 of Part IV, titled "Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy and Fabulous Tradition", Hobbes justifies his unwarranted principles. In advance of this discussion, I consider the location of this chapter off since, until this chapter, Hobbes has dealt with issues in religion and scripture. All of a sudden, here he brings out the topic of philosophy. Hobbes argues that although the savages of America can have "some general truths"[96], they cannot be called philosophers. The reason is that they have those truths only based on gross experience and conjecture, rather than method and the faculty of reasoning. The cause of this ineptness is, for Hobbes and I presume it is crucial, "the want of leisure from procuring the necessities of life and defending themselves against their neighbours." Thus for the savages of America, or for people living in the natural state, philosophy is impossible "till the erecting of great commonwealths". For Hobbes,

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[94] For instance, Kateb notes that Hobbes "says nothing about why staying alive is the highest good." McClure also argues that "by assuming the goodness of peace rather than arguing for it, Hobbes treats a controversial proposition as obvious." (George Kateb, "Hobbes and the Irrationality of Politics." *Political Theory* 17(1989), 373;McClue 2016, 202).

[95] L, 11.1.

[96] In the following, Hobbes explicates more on this: "there have been divers true, general, and profitable speculations from the beginning, as being the natural plants of human reason." (L, 46.6.)

"Leisure is the mother of philosophy" but this requirement is not possible until the founding of great commonwealth; Commonwealth is "the mother of peace and leisure".[97] Hobbes's relentless voice for keeping those two principles is for the sake of providing fertile ground for philosophy. With this philosophy, I presume, Hobbes wants to erect Leviathan as a kingdom of God.

2.2.2 Political Philosophy of Hobbes: an insufficient blueprint to build Leviathan

How can we define the meaning of Hobbes's political philosophy? It has been widely accepted that Thomas Hobbes -- if not a prime mover but surely a formidable thinker--, broke with the classical tradition of political (or moral) philosophy and put it on a new dimension. It is further claimed that we, not turning back, are living in the world Hobbes has created, and that our domineering thought or ideology, which can be broadly characterized as modern liberalism, has its firm root in Hobbes's thoughts such as individual rights, equality, and the primacy of secular political ends.[98]

Quite surprising to some who have had this path-breaking image of Hobbes, he did not discredit all the previous endeavors. As Hobbes consistently calls his endeavor as 'civil science', he appointed Socrates as "the first who truly loved this civil science." And after Socrates, "come Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and other philosophers, as well Greek as Latin."[99] However, his seemingly apparent praise is not his genuine appraisal. Although they loved this civil science, or moral philosophy, Hobbes

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[97] L, 46.6.

[98] Stauffer,2016; Ryan,2012; Lucien Jaume, "Hobbes and the Philosophical Sources of Liberalism," In *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan*, ed. Patricia Springborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 199-216; , Pierre Manent, *An Intellectual History of Liberalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); J. Judd Owen, "The Tolerant Leviathan: Hobbes and the Paradox of Liberalism.," *Polity* 37:1(2005),130-48; Strauss,1953: Richard Tuck, *Hobbes,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)

[99] *De Cive*, Preface.

dauntlessly asserts that "it does not necessarily follow that there was philosophy." Instead, it was "a certain phantasm with a superficial gravity (though inside full of fraud and filth) that somewhat resembled philosophy." [100] Hobbes pinpointed Plato, Aristotle, Cicero as the "maintainers of the Greek and Roman anarchies".[101]

Hobbes's stance toward Aristotle is more complicated, and this complexity draws scholars to focus more on Hobbes's criticisms on Aristotle and, more broadly, classical philosophy. As I hinted in the previous paragraph, Hobbes occasionally acknowledges that Aristotle should be at least regarded as a great philosopher, unlike his followers. [102] This acknowledgement does not necessarily imply that Hobbes whole-heartedly agrees with Aristotle. Rather Hobbes's harshest, if not exclusive, criticisms on classical philosophy directed toward Aristotle. [103] Recently, several scholars have made a suggestion that Hobbes's remarks were not directly related to Aristotle himself, but "Aristotelity."[104] However, we should not be straining every nerve to chase a culprit and monitor how Hobbes had done it. Rather we have to put more effort to confirm Hobbes's loss – why did Hobbes felt destined to make such criticisms?

Hobbes's view of the predicament he confronted with is complex. On the one hand, Hobbes deplores that the status of civil science[105] has been

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[100] *Do Corpore*, Ed. Ded.

[101] *De Cive*, 12.3.

[102] L, Appendix, Ch. 2. Here Hobbes states that "I think the founders of the sects themselves(Plato, Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus) really were philosophers." Regarding the influence of Aristotle to Hobbes, see Spragens,1973 ; Brandt puts this view to the far end, arguing that Hobbes was "most frequently in agreement" with Aristotle (Frithiof Brandt, *Thomas Hobbes's Mechanical Conception of Nature* (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, 1927), 57).

[103] See, *Leviathan*, Ch. 43. In his biography of Hobbes, Aubrey(2015) reports: "I have heard him say that Aristotle was the worst teacher that ever was, the worst Politician and Ethick."(John Aubrey, *John Aubrey: Brief Lives with An Apparatus for the Lives of our English Mathematical Writer*, ed. Kate Bennett. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.))

[104] For this discussion, see, for example, Evrigenis,2014; Stauffer,2016; Tom Sorell, "Hobbes and Aristotle," In *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, eds. Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 1999).

[105] Hobbes refers this civil science as "doctrine of morality" or "science of justice." (*De Cive*, Preface).

lowed to mere quibbles: "Now at length all men of all nations, not only philosophers but even the vulgar, have and do still deal with this as a matter of ease, exposed and prostitute to every mother-wit, and to be attained without any great care or study".[106] For Hobbes the civil science is foremost important of all our arts because it is directly related to our life. If it is not dealt with caution, it would generate devastating effects; other subjects, like natural science, would not incur the similar effect, but we could spend only our leisured time.[107] On the other hand, Hobbes cautions that there is a boundary that people are not capable, thus should not try to overcome. But following Greek philosophers, they are struggling to transcend this limit.[108] Hobbes, thus, deplores the situation that moral or political philosophy has been squandered. If political philosophy is in such danger, can't we circumvent all those pitfalls by abandoning it wholly? For Hobbes, this cannot be the panacea since "in those things which every man ought to mediate for the steerage of his life, it necessarily happens not only from error, but even from ignorance itself, there arise offences, contentions, nay, even slaughter itself".[109] Hobbes, unless he was a "detached observer who looks at political things in a way in which a zoologist looks at the big fishes swallowing the small ones"[110], should give us wholesome pills to be swallowed – the scope of political philosophy.[111]

Hobbes defines philosophy as the knowledge of properties, or consequences, that has its aim as the production of such effects in order to

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[106] *De Cive*, Preface.

[107] "For in such matters as are speculated for the exercise of our wits, if any error escape us, it is without hurt; neither is there any loss, but of time only."(*De Cive*, Preface).

[108] On this point, several scholars have claimed that Hobbes restricts the horizon of philosophy, if not moral and political "domain", and this shrinkage becomes the characteristic of modern philosophy.

[109] *De Cive*, Preface

[110] Hobbes observes the current situation as follows: "My country, some few years before the civil wars did rage, was boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of dominion and the obedience due from subjects." *(De Cive*, Preface)

[111] Strauss 1959, 90.

improve human life: "the knowledge acquired by reasoning[112] from the manner of the generation of anything to the properties, or from the properties to some possibly way of generation of the same, to the end to be able to produce, as far as matter and human force permit, such effects as human life requireth."[113] And this knowledge is "general, eternal, and immutable truth".[114]

What is moral or political philosophy then? Since "the tree of philosophy divides itself" depending on the subject matter, we need to know with which subject this kind of philosophy deals. Hobbes introduces the subject as the "investigation of natural justice" and thus defines the moral or political philosophy as the science of the laws of nature: "the science of the laws of nature is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil".[115] It should be noted that morality comes not from nature but consent, because, for Hobbes, there is no *a priori* definition of good and evil. However, there are diversities of appetites from equal human beings, the city, or the sovereign determines the contents of morality.[116] In what way can moral philosopher contribute to improvement of human life? It is 'useful' since "the exercise of the natural law is necessary for the preservation of peace" and "mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace".[117] Hobbes flaunts his new doctrine of morality "will not only show us the highway to peace, but will also teach us how to avoid the close, dark, and dangerous by-paths of faction and

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[112] Hobbes seems to equate the faculty of "reasoning" to "method," a "proceeding from the elements, which are names, to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another, and so to syllogisms, which are the connexions of one assertion to another." (L, 3.11, 46.6, 5.17) In other places, without much difference, Hobbes defines reason as "the reckoning of the consequences of general names" (L, 5.2).

[113] For the utilitarian aspect of Hobbes's philosophy, See, Sorell 1986, 26; Gauthier 1969, 2; Oakeshott 1975, 16.

[114] L, 46.1-2.

[115] *De Cive*, EP. Ded.; L, 15.40.

[116] *De Cive*, 14.

[117] *De Cive*, 5, EP. Ded.

sedition."[118] He sneers at the ignorance or incompetence of earlier moral philosophers, who "could not observe the goodness of actions to consist in this, that it was in order to peace, and the evil in this, that it related to discord".[119] But didn't we conclude in the previous section that Hobbes's purpose of writing those political works is to achieve and preserve peace for the sake of philosophy? Then aren't we locked in vicious circle?

We may break this circle, arguing that Hobbes's political philosophy, like "the help of a very able architect", is needed only for erecting the great Leviathan.[120] But if so, it is now Hobbes who confronts the ultimate dilemma between becoming an ordinary subject like everyone else and remaining as a philosopher outside his monolith. Dwellers in the commonwealth, since they all pass the litmus test, are being afraid of death above all; "death- being the *summum malum*, while there is no *summum bonum*- is the only absolute standard by reference to which man may coherently order his life.[121] They share a worldview "in which there is no immortality of the soul, and no sense in striving to leave reputation for great deeds to posterity. Without any reasonable hopes for any kind of transcendence, life here on earth matters much more".[122] If Hobbes countenances this view, he should stop doing what he has done: he no longer hopes his books be printed and taught in Universities; he would not be allowed to speculate novelty; and he should not produce any doctrine of artificial body.[123] He would become truly idle in the great Leviathan he designs.

For Hobbes, one may contend that Hobbes can identify himself with

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[118] *De Cive*, Preface.
[119] *De Cive*, 3.
[120] L, 29.1.
[121] Strauss 1963, 16. See also, Oakeshott ,1991, 253; Laurence Berns, "Hobbes," In *History of Political Philosophy*, eds. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, Third Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 339; Ahrensdorf, 2000, 582; A.P. Martinich, *The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 267 ; Evrigenis,2014, 139.
[122] McClure, 2016, 54-5.
[123] L, Review. 16, 17.

the frontispiece of *Leviathan*. Earlier Corbett and Lightbown(1979)[124] discussed that the sovereign in the image is supposed to be Hobbes. This resemblance violates Hobbes's own asseveration. Where he is agonizing over the chances that his work would be "as useless as the commonwealth of Plato", Hobbes admits that his Leviathan appears similar to Plato's Republic in that Plato "also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of state, and change of governments by civil war, ever to be taken away, till sovereigns be philosophers." However, after the qualification that "But when I consider again", differentiating his work from Plato's, Hobbes can "recover some hope.": for Plato, the philosopher-king should be a true philosopher who have mastered "the sciences mathematical; for Hobbes, the sovereign needs and should not be a philosopher but a practitioner, the one who has knowledge of "the sciences of natural justice" as well as will to implement it into "the utility of practice."[125] Contrary to my view, Cooper argued that "acute consciousness of mortality – rather than lust for immortality – moves Hobbes to philosophize." She further claimed that "for Hobbes, being an ordinary mortal is not inconsistent with the political theorist's vocation" Her argument is interesting but counter-intuitive as herself acknowledged. Moreover, it lacks any supporting evidence except, more or less, a tautological premise that "philosophy is preparation for death".[126] Even if her thesis is more convincing than I have evaluated, it would not contradict my contention. We can verify that the problem is not whether Hobbes is willing to continue his philosophical activity, but whether dwellers in Leviathan would welcome Hobbes.[127] Hobbes, hoping

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[124] M. Corbett and RW. Lightbown, *The Comely Frontispiece: The Emblematic Title-Page in England, 1550-1660* (London: Routledge., 1979).

[125] L, 31. 41.

[126] Julie E. Cooper,. "Thomas Hobbes on the political theorist's vocation." *The Historical Journal* 50:3(2007), 536, 543-4.

[127] This question is somehow related to the discussion on authority, raised by some scholars, particularly Tregenza. Trengenza(2003, 109-112), while commenting on the Oakeshott's interpretation of Hobbes, argues that sovereign power is conditional on subject's willingness to give him such a power (Ian Tregenza, *Michael Oakeshott on Hobbes: A Study in the renewal of philosophical ideals* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003)).

to remain what he has been, must answer a similar question that had been raised for Socrates in *the Republic*. There, when Socrates was asked to give a justification for justice, he, quite surprisingly, claimed its usefulness. Can Hobbes do the same thing for natural justice? If he cannot, he will be compelled to abandon his vocation as a philosopher. Otherwise, he will be ostracized. Either way, this commonwealth, Leviathan, has no place for philosophy. The harsh choice for Hobbes still remains – "poor worm" or ineffectual "architect".

2.3 Conclusion

At the end of our consideration of (un)intended consequences of Hobbes's political philosophy, I called an attention to the predicament Hobbes might confront. In the text I have discussed, Hobbes introduces his hermeneutical rule through the task of biblical exegesis, with a hope that his own work will be learned in the same way. He may think this guideline unnecessary since his book, compared to mysterious Bible, is short and clear. However, as a cautious writer, Hobbes prefers working overnight so that his future reader, a sovereign, will not be lost while reading the book by himself; he does not want to leave it to Fortuna. Hobbes hopes to achieve two goals by crafting this literary manual. First, Hobbes aspires to have his principles – equality of human beings and the first law of nature, to seek peace – influence the public mind, especially those who are ambitious but discounted with their present status. Second, when Hobbes asserts these principles as undeniable truths, he ensures that his texts will introduce peace to the commonwealth, a situation that endangers philosophy. Hobbes's philosophy has utilitarian shades in that it produces certain effects as human life requires. His moral or political philosophy, in this sense, is needed for erecting a stable and peaceful commonwealth. We stopped our discussion here, showing the dilemma Hobbes might face after his work done as an "architect".

Some may ask why we should sympathize with Hobbes and agonize over his choice. They are absolutely right. We are living in a world where freedom (of choice) trumps all other values, and where minimalistic and individualistic social contracts are the foundations of politics. Each human being thought he was wiser than others, and this, according to Hobbes himself, was proof of their equality.[128] By the time that we all know about the laws of nature, morality, why do we need a political philosopher? At this point, we can ask these following questions: what might Hobbesian society be like in practice? Do all people actually follow the laws of nature? Did Hobbes really imagine this society could exist? Hobbes argued that the natural laws teach that each must acknowledge other as an equal and if so, people would enjoy civil peace to abide by those laws. But if "vain esteem" is left unchecked, there will be no end to human misery.[129]

In trying to make a summary evaluation of the Hobbesian innovations to political philosophy, we need an evaluative basis to judge those changes. Was Hobbes a true innovator who made necessary changes to modernize political philosophy in order to make it more relevant to safeguard the interests of society? Or were Catholic critics of modernity correct in their assessment of the issues that plagued modernity? Then, can all the troubling issues cited by Catholic critics be solely attributed to Hobbes? How does anyone judge whether a change is for the better or for the worse?

The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes has become intertwined with a variant of liberalism associated with an exceedingly individualistic conception of the self.[130] Noel Malcolm argues that Hobbes's treatment of

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[128] *L*, 13.

[129] Hobbes, *De Cive,* Ch. 1. See also Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), for the view that Hobbes wished "[to found] a state so constituted that the problems created by passionate men are solved once and for all" (p. 31).

[130] See e.g. Tuck, Richard. "Hobbes and Democracy". In *Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, edited by Annabel Brett, and James Tully, 171–190. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

psychology and perception also exemplifies individualism in several important ways. Hobbes rejected scholastic philosophy's view that perception involved the apprehension of an entity's immaterial essence, an essence that connected the entity to the whole order of reality. Instead, perception for Hobbes consisted for a series of discrete mechanical events. Along with his rejection of the reality of essences was a rejection of the scholastic account of reason involving an intuition of universal values; these are replaced with values ascribed by the individual perceiver.[131]

Likewise, much has been written about Hobbes's intention to support for natural equality, but a great deal of his specific argumentation and remarks have remained opaque, thus controversial. The first question regarding this issue mostly starts from whether Hobbes actually believes in natural equality or he instrumentally uses this concept in order to instantiate absolutism. At the edge on the latter side, one version of interpretation argued that Hobbes, manipulating basic thesis of his opponents, exponents of parliaments, presented a counter-argument against them more successfully.[132] A recent version of this so-called "instrumental view" delineated by Hoekstra made Hobbes's tactics more clearly shown: Hobbes "does not argue that in principle there can be no natural inequalities: indeed, he insists on and even depends on them", but at the same time provides arguments for the recognition of equality in order to "discourage bellicose presumption." According to this view, in short, Hobbes is a mere rhetorician who sets out principles without concerning its authenticity.

But obviously Hobbes does or does seem to hold the notion that

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131 Malcolm, *Aspects of Hobbes,* 29-31.

132 "Whereas the Puritans and the more radical religious and political sects in England during the 1640s used these ideas to argue for a limited, representative government, Hobbes used them to argue that only institution of an absolute sovereign could secure social peace." Hampton(1986, 25-27); "As we shall see, one of [Hobbes's] most characteristic techniques was to take commonly held views and, by introducing a few changes, employ them to reach unfamiliar conclusions." Sommerville(1992, 2); Unlike Filmer, in fact, Hobbes insists that the natural condition is one of liberty, equality, and the most extensive individual rights imaginable.

people are naturally equal. Clarendon, his contemporary critics, in *A Brief View and Survey* says that Hobbes "is very solicitous, like a faithful Leveller, that no man may have privileges of that kind by his birth or descent, or have farther honor than adhereth naturally to his abilities."[133] He even raises a doubt the applicability of natural laws by questioning "that by the Law of Nature every man is bound to acknowledge other for his equal by nature?"[134]

With regard to this issue, Hoekstra argues that propagating equality among human beings is neither Hobbes's aim nor his legacy, by raising the question "why we would turn to Hobbes if we are looking for a satisfactory or stimulating theory of equality."[135] According to Hoekstra, this tendency starts from Strauss's influence. In the early 20th century, Strauss presented the innovative and modern character of Hobbes's argument by saying that according to Hobbes "because all men are equal… the difference between the wise minority and the unwise majority loses the fundamental importance it had for traditional political philosophy… when the equality of all men is exalted to a principle, a new philosophy becomes possible".[136] This image of modern philosopher who breaks all previous links with traditional political philosophy has enlarged ever since.[137] But Hoekstra argues that this characterization is idolatry mystification by saying that "A glance at the relevant intellectual history should be enough to establish the falsity of the widespread view that Hobbes's assertion of the natural equality of human

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133 Edward Earl of. Clarendon, *A Brief View and Survey of the Dangerous and Pernicious Errors to Church and State in Mr. Hobbes's Book, Entitled Leviathan*. (Oxford: Bathurst, 1676), 182.

134 Clarendon, *A Brief View,* 36.

135 Kinch Hoekstra, "Hobbesian Equality," In *Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century* , ed. S. A. Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012),93.

136 Strauss, 1963, 101-2.

137 Bertman,1976; Baumrin,1989. Martin A. Bertman concludes his "Equality in Hobbes, with Reference to Aristotle" (*The Review of Politics* 38.4 (1976): 534-44) similarly: with his doctrine of equality, Hobbes "reversed the pivotal concept of classical political thought" (544)

beings was itself a great innovation."[138]

What Hoekstra finds an innovating feature in Hobbes's political philosophy is rather that Hobbes utilizes the other natural law, 'to seek peace', to vanquish the vanity of the few or almost everyone. Hobbes says that "almost all men" have a thoroughly distorted perception of their own wisdom in that "they have in greater degree, than the Vulgar."[139] But in order to enter into society, live together, enjoy peacefully and contently, people must acknowledge each other as his or her equal: "For what else is it to acknowledge the equality of persons in entering into society to attribute this very equality to those who otherwise would not be required by reason to enter into society?"[140] Hoekstra(2013, 104) argues that "Hobbes propounds equality as a kind of noble lie. Hobbes would thus be trying to convince his audience to believe a politically necessary myth for their own collective good."[141] Koekstra's interpretation is convincing, but cannot properly deal with the other side of the same coin. What if people would not want to form society, but rather live independently and peacefully?

On this issue, Thomas Lewis writes that "Hobbes explains that political equality and the right of nature are not empirically discernible human attributes.[142] They are, instead, decisions to think of humans in a certain way – decisions recommended by Hobbes – to be made and to be implemented by the perspective sovereign as he uses man as matter to construct a commonwealth." To this end, Hobbes argues that physical coercion or political punishment cannot persuade men: "faith hath no relation to nor dependence at all, upon compulsion or commandment, but only upon certainty or probability of arguments drawn from reason or from

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[138] Hoekstra mentions several earlier thinkers who propose the idea of equality. To name the few who lived in the relatively early modern period, Luis de Molina, Juan Azor, Roberto Bellarimino, Francisco Suárez, and Leonardus Lessius. (2013, 96).
[139] *L*, 13.2. cf. *The Elements of Law,* 1.14.4, 2.9.5; *De Cive,* 1.4; *L*, 11.10; XV.22; *De Homine,* 13.
[140] *De Cive*, 1.14. cf. *De Cive*, 1.2, *L*, 14.4-5.
[141] Hoekstra, 2012, 104.
[142] Thomas Lewis, 2003, 41.

something men believe already".[143] Hobbes was unsure about the reliability of reason: "These dictates of reason men use to call by the name of laws, but improperly; for they are but conclusion or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defense of themselves, whereas law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others".[144] Then, does Hobbes's argument that we could all together live peacefully in Leviathan depend essentially on his being an "unarmed prophet"?

Hobbes writes that it is "in no man's power to suppress the power of religion".[145] Elsewhere, he expresses his belief that religion "can never be so abolished out of human nature, but that new religions will spring from them, if suitable cultivators exist".[146] In several places, Hobbes writes that the natural laws are the same as the laws of God.[147] In other words, natural laws are obligatory so as laws of God: "Old Covenant, or Testament, and containeth a contract between God and Abraham, by which Abraham obligheth himself and his posterity, in a peculiar manner, to be subject to God's positive law (for the law moral he was obliged before) as by an oath of allegiance)".[148]

How can Hobbes impute this new religion to others? Strauss suggests that Hobbes proposes 'bourgeois morality' based on fear, "which makes man prudent" (Strauss, 1963, 116).[149] However, although this new morality makes people follow his dictates, it would not verify their steadfast loyalty. The means by which to govern men is to redirect their passions in

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[143] L, 43.9.
[144] L, 15.41.
[145] Behemoth, 82.
[146] L, 12.23.
[147] Natural laws "are those which have been laws from all eternity" (L, 26.37); "The laws of God, therefore, are none but the laws of nature" (L, 43.5); natural laws are "therefore an eternal law of God" (L, 26.41).
[148] L, 35.4.
[149] This argument is generally agreed among his contemporaries, for example, Oakeshott, 1975; Schmitt,2008, as well as recent scholars such as Tuck,2004. Tuck further argues that "if Hobbesian man were to live according to the laws of nature, he would not only renounce his individual judgment to his sovereign, but would live a strikingly passionless life."(Tuck, 2014, 134).

such a way that they become to be esteemed highly, “to encourage obedient citizen[s]”, through honoring them: “the signs of honour from the superior to the inferior, are such as these: to praise or prefer him before his concurrent; to hear him more willingly; to speak to him more familiarly; to admit him nearer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather; to like his opinions; and to give him any gift rather than money.”[150] Likewise, while Hobbes himself is indeed unable to coerce beliefs in his readers through other means, he can nevertheless persuade and instill this notion that they are intellectually on an equal status. He has no other way “to suppress the power of religion”.

[150] Elements, 8, 5-6.

Chapter III. Immanuel Kant's Doctrine of Religion as Political Philosophy

"I did not commit to this investigation
before I made sure I was safe with respect to the duties towards religion.
My fervour was doubled as I saw how with each step the fog was lifted,
a fog behind whose darkness monsters appeared to be lurking,
and after the darkness was lifted
the glory of the highest broke through with the most vivid brilliance."
(UNH, 1:221f)

The canon helps to contextualize sub-fields and major disciplines within the full range of the academic world: a canon provides the common language needed for individuals to engage fully and direcly in their community. These functions of both measuring off limits and granting access can be accomplished only if the canon has an authoritative power to propagage the core assumptions and tendencies operating within a discipline. The freedom of rational inquiry, to which modern philosophy prominently appeals, is filtered through such limits that provide a means to communicate reason's supposedly universal right. Any approach to this tendency first must consider the legacy of Kant's critical philosophy. Specifically, his dismissal of traditional metaphysics and demarcation of the limits of reason together fuel common assumptions that religious ideas have limited place within rational discourse of modern liberal societies. However, his assumptions show dubious characteristics.

Kant, like his contemporaries, viewed religion through the lens of the rational theologies of Hume, Leibniz, and Wolff. Wood explores Kant's reception of these systems and notes that while modern rational theology did continue scholastic discussions in some sense[151], Kant's positive consideration of rational theology (overshadowed by the success of his overall critique of the discipline) was developed primarily as a means of improving aspects of Cartesian and Wolffian thought.[152]

These rational theologies dramatically curtail modern philosophy's scope; philosophy tends to consider the religious field as amorphous and as mere doctrinal statements of certain traditions. Once philosophy identified itself with pure reason, the discipline came to reduce religious thought to a body of dogmatic propositions that could be properly considered only from the supposedly universal *a priori* perspective of philosophy. Religions, to the extent that they offer a theoretical framework for their adherents, could appear only as *a rival to* a universal *a priori* philosophy. By reading Kant's works, the following sections demonstrate the degree to which each of these options is untenable and to which the modern philosophical assumptions regarding religion must be challenged. Kant's philosophy of religion itself seems to illustrate the inadequacy of characterizing religion as an inferior by-products of our thoughts and minds.

Contemporary readers cannot divorce their own interpretations from the complex history of the critical philosophy's reception, a problem indicated by the sentiment implicit in neo-Kantian works of the later nineteenth century: "it is not enough to insist upon the necessity of going back to Kant. All depends upon the way in which we go back to him, and there are different ways of going back."[153] This chapter tries to evade this issue; by considering rhetoric of the post-Kantian era, the following justifies the focus on Kant's philosophy of religion (even though Kant framed it

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151 Allen Wood, *Kant's Rational Theology*(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 62-3.
152 Wood, 1978, 147.
153 Stoke, "Going Back to Kant," 275.

mostly as a tangential concern) rather than either the epistemological or moral theories that were considered his principal concerns.

For a brief overview, in the first *Critique*, Kant not only criticizes religion in the form of rational theology (though the critique is closely tied to the criticism of rational psychology and rational cosmology), but allows the space for faith opened by critical reasoning. This duplicity rests on his covertly questionable assumptions and constitutes a basic problem of Kant's philosophy of religion and, I further argue, his whole system of philosophy. Later his second *Critique* and *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, quite surprisingly without further elaboration, do not address this duplicity. By limiting reason to make a way for faith, Kant framed religion as dependent on reason and subject to its authority (leaving the authority of 'faith' relevant only in margins that Kant barricades philosophy against). In this chapter, I will examine his dubious assumptions regarding reason and religion.

As Kant's influence over modern philosophy has been so prominent, it is unsurprising that conflicting interpretations have developed around his corpus. As such, any critical engagements with his thought must position themselves amidst fundamentally different readings of the sprawling corpus:

"For some, [Kant] was the philosopher of empirical science; for others, the enemy of dogmatic metaphysics; and for still others, the rescuer of morality and religion from skepticism. The neo-Kantians themselves, ostensibly the true legatees of Kant, did not always agree on what facet of Kant's philosophy to emphasize" (Willey, *Back to Kant*, p. 131)

Perceptions of the critical philosophy change significantly depending on which focal point one adopts, and these changes impact how Kant's philosophy of religion is interpreted. For many, Kant's philosophy simply destroyed traditional religious dogmas, though full consideration of his corpus reveals various perspectives regarding religion that cannot be exhausted by such a simple description. For others, those who focus on the

first *Critique*, read as a scientific epistemology, will view the later philosophy of religion as a problematic, however trivial, curiosity. Alternately, approaches that start from the practical philosophy typically emphasize the critical philosophy's consequences for religion; within this milieu, the relation of religion and popular morality has been unsurprisingly a central concern for Kant scholarship.

This approach still presents challenges, however, as Kant's study dedicated specifically to this consideration, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, generally complicates the relation between the moral and the theoretical branches that constitute his philosophical system. Kant presented religion, which takes on different meaning in each branch of the critical philosophy, as a distinct subject though the nature of its science remains obscure. It is predominantly approached as a moral concern, and perhaps superfluous in that role:

"So far as morality is based on the conception of the human being as one who is free but who also… binds himself through his reason to unconditional laws, it is in need neither of the idea of another being above him in order that he recognize his duty, nor… of an incentive other than the law itself… Hence on its own behalf morality in no way needs religion" (Religion, 6:3).

As Kant argued that religious ideas are not essential for moral theory, he seems to suggest that religious concepts are fundamentally irrelevant for philosophy. However, religious ideas help to connect the theoretical and moral spheres of the critical philosophy and indicate the transitions between each sphere. Because of this very tension, *Religion* offers a promising focus for engaging the critical philosophy by drawing attention to the transitional point that connects the entire system and the limitations of Kant's general schematic.

The following emphasizes a significant problem with the way in which Kant articulated his philosophy of religion rather than focus on

determining what he intended or the various interpretive possibilities regarding religion within the framework he developed. Such interpretations of Kantian philosophy of religion merit consideration, but the current study focuses how Kant's system led him to frame religion as a problem for philosophical theory to solve. *Religion* addresses a core issue that exposes problems within the critical philosophy generally, and specifically with the attempt to delineate a pure philosophy free to criticize religion apart form any reciprocal appraisal. The text approaches religion through Kant's moral philosophy and thus depends on the context created by the transition between the first and second *Critique,* especially as made evidence in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Moral*.

By focusing on Kant's philosophy of religion, this chapter concentrates on the broad consequence of the critical philosophy rather than the many intricate and technical arguments that occupy much of Kantian scholarship. Kant's goal, summarized in the B edition introduction of the first *Critique* as "to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith"[154] was to delineate the boundaries of possible experience and knowledge. That this concession is room for faith beyond knowledge suggests the importance of religion beyond what an isolated pure knowledge can acknowledge as theoretically viable. While claiming to make room for faith, Kant' metaphorical description of the first *Critique'*s aim – to delineate the island of truth surrounded by the sea of illusion-[155] indicates the essential challenge that religion poses to the conception of philosophy as *a priori* science of reason; the heterogeneity of religious thought challenges the

[154] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* p. 117 [Bxxx]. This seems to correspond with his famous avowal: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on the: *the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me* (*Critique of Practical Reason,* p. 269 [5:161])." These statements have been cited as evidence that Kant saw his work as strengthening faith independent from philosophy. Such a view that Kant was open to a legitimate religious theory is unlikely, as Marti critically noted: "Kant meant only knowledge of an objective kind, and by faith he meant faith in reason which leads beyond the limits of *objective* knowledge and leads to philosophical insights("Young Schelling and Kant", pp. 475-6)."

[155] *Critique of Pure Reason* [A235-6, B294-5].

attempt to demarcate a single, universal, and "pure" philosophical interpretation of human experience.

3.1 Introduction: From Critique to Doctrine

"The bird flights its way out of the egg. The egg is the world. Who would be born first must destroy a world. The bird flies to God. That God's name is Abraxas." These well-known sentences were written down in a note given to Emil Sinclair in a novel *Demian*. This note was unsigned, and most readers, including Sinclair himself, presume that it is from Max Demian. However, I argue that this message comes first from Immanuel Kant in his old age. Although Kant, throughout his whole life, tries to build a rational foundation for getting out of incomprehensible world, he eventually as well as ironically comes to reach the most mysterious, theological symbols and concepts for being relieved.

This claim seems implausible given the fact that Kant, perhaps more than any other thinker, is associated with both the project of Enlightenment and the primacy of reason. Furthermore, Kant has been generally understood, leaving aside the issue whether he achieved what he had intended, as a systematic thinker par excellence to ground morality on solid rational foundations. Regarding this issue, scholars' views can be classified broadly into three groups: Kant wrestled to bridge the gap between metaphysical foundation and moral practices, but eventually failed to do so[156] (Allison 1990, 2011; Guyer 2007; Ameriks 2000a); Kant has managed to find a way grounding ethics in a theoretical account, but mostly adjusting the latter (Korsgaard 2008, 2009; Wood 2008; Williams 1985); distancing Kant from both Wolffian rational natural laws and later the moral

[156] Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Henry Allison, *Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary*(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); P. Guyer, *Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*(New York: Continum, 2007); Karl Ameriks, *Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000a).

sense theory of Scottish Enlightenment, a few scholars problematize Kant's common image as a foundational and secular philosopher (O'Neill 1989; Strong 2012; Chignell 2007; Pasternack 2011; Stevenson 2003). I am in line with the last, third view.

Kant's view on morality cannot be dealt properly without considering his works on politics. Obviously Kant did not envisage a moral human being in a vacuum. Personally, he was a political being who not only happened to live through the French Revolution, Europe's most cataclysmic political event in the 18th century.[157] Also, intellectually, he developed his legal and political philosophy until late in his life.[158] For Kant, creating a perfect constitution, domestically or internationally, remained the most difficult task: "out of such crooked wood as the human being is made, nothing entirely straight can be fabricated" (IUH 8:23). However, although Kant wrote with caution, his political vision was not confined to the existing realities. In both *Perpetual Peace* (1795) and *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), Kant proposes the option of non-coercive congress of states for seeking (international) perpetual peace (PP 6:343-7, MM 6:350).[159] Therefore, I presume that throughout his life Kant has developed his ideas toward the ideal of "perpetual peace".

But Kant provides few details about the procedure how to achieve this state. And this reticence has brought a wide-ranging interpretation from an implausible plan (i.e. Hoffe 2006) to a well-planned one (i.e. Mikalsen 2011). The only clue leading to his ambitious hope is that for Kant the lawful constitution of republics would obviate these latent obstacles to international peace (PP 8:356). With what great potential, however, can these lawful republics remove the stumbling blocks? He, by way of reply,

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[157] Recently, there have been some notable works situating "Kant's Politics in Context" (to cite a book title). See, for instance, Maliks(2014); Kleingeld (2012); Byrd and Hruschka(2010).

[158] Kant displays a bias against the solitary life (e.g., Rel. 130).

[159] Smith points out the enlarged view of thinkers, including Kant obviously, of that time: "people began to think in terms of very different possibilities. One such person who began to think of politics in this new international vein was Immanuel Kant" (Smith 2016; 131-2).

abruptly presents a conditional claim that since the aim for perpetual peace cannot be refuted rationally, such nations have a duty to attempt it (MM 6:354).

Kant further complicates this seemingly wishful thought by almost closing the chance that an unlawful republic would be revolutionized; while he defends individual right such as equality, liberty, and independence, he rejects a right of resistance and revolution, even when the legislature or executive infringes on the most basic principles of law (TP 8:299). This denial of revolution, for most Kantians, cannot be merely treated as one of political views Kant could take; this disclaimer betrayed his commitment to individual autonomy.[160] To guard him from baffled critics, several troops of scholars have provided an interpretation to reconcile his political views and rational moral principles -- resisting against a state with rational judgment of each individual (i.e. Westphal 1992; Henrich 1993; Rosen 1993; Korsgaard 2008). However, this resolution is only possible if either "a public declaration of resistance requires unanimity in a people" (MM 6:320) or people judge that they would no longer live in a "rightful constitution", that is, a legitimately established state (MM 6:371). Is either way feasible in practice? How might we know that every citizen be capable and thus entitled to do so? To this question, Kant undoubtedly endorses the view that human beings will become aware of their capacity for moral autonomy and increasingly act upon laws of reason without further authorization: "conformity with ethical laws is its morality…the freedom to which the latter [laws] refer is freedom in both the external and the internal use of choice, insofar as it is determined by laws of reason"(Rel. 6:188; MM 6:214). But on what grounds does Kant justify such an assuring view on an

[160] Recent treatments on this issue, see, for instance, Frederick Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 1790-1800*(Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1992); Sarah Williams Holtman, "Revolution, Contradiction, and Kantian Citizenship," in *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays*, ed. Mark Timmons(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Jr, Thomas E. Hill, "Questions about Kant's Opposition to Revolution," *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 36(2002),283-98.

individual?

If we go back to Kant, there can be two escapes. One is to argue that Kant did not intend to articulate any positive foundation for morality, but just to give us a way of thinking morally: "we indeed do not understand the practical unconditioned necessity of the moral imperative, we do comprehend however its incomprehensibility, which is all that can fairly be required of a philosophy which strives in its principles up to the very boundary of human reason" (GMM 463).[161] This view is tenable but it merely entertains the impossibility of any extra-moral ground for morality. To the contrary, Kant's central concern, especially throughout the 1790s, was to reconcile theory and practice: after writing his critical corpus, in 1793, Kant published a separate article(TP) on this topic.

The other way is to remind Kant's aims of writing his critical project, one of which is to establish the limits to knowledge "in order to make room for faith"(CPR, preface).[162] Following the latter view, I will argue tentatively yet that his commitment to faith is at least part of what motivated the critical corpus, and thus that, for Kant, our commitment to morality ultimately depends upon faith: faith, as a "choice, in which a free interest of pure practical reason decides", allows "extension of pure reason for practical purposes" without depending on experiences (CPrR 5:146, 5:314). This is the reason why "morality inevitably leads to religion" (Rel. 6:8n).

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[161] Cf. Larmore (2008); Rainer Forst, *The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice*(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).Although they are not Kantians, or rather a critic of him, they share this moral point of view, demanding oneself continually to justify one's position.

[162] Over the past few years there has been a significant rise in support for the positive elements of Kant's philosophy of religion in general. On the relation between religion and metaphysics, see Stephen R. Palmquist, "Philosophers in the Public Square: A Religious Resolution of Kant's Conflict," in Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist(Eds.), *Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion*(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); on the philosophical character of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, see, John E. Hare, *The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and Divine Assistance*(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); for overall treatment of this issue, see, Gordon E. Michalson Jr, *Kant and the Problem of God* (Oxford: Blackwell. Michalson,1999).

While verifying this view, I attempt to shed new light on the Kant's view on morality through investigating what made him in fuddle, and then following how he has unraveled the puzzle. It assumes that, just like Emil Sinclair in *Demian,* Kant had struggled through the various stages of his life that led to a profound change in his *Weltanschauung* or worldview. To take this chronological and all-encompassing approach in order to seek out what Kant intends to do is fully justified by his own statement. Kant stresses not a few times that his philosophy or system must be viewed as a whole in order for its parts to be understood properly; Kant says that "another peculiarity of this sort of science [i.e., the science of Critique] is that one must have an idea of the whole in order to rectify all the parts, so that one has to leave the thing for a time in a certain condition of rawness, in order to achieve this eventual rectification" (Prolegomena 10:317). Therefore, Kant argues that much time must be spent "in the collection of materials in a somewhat random fashion at the suggestion of an idea lying hidden in our minds" before "it first become[s] possible for us to discern the idea in a clearer light, and to devise a whole architectonically in accordance with the ends of reason." The philosopher, whose task it is to construct systems, must therefore "hold his object [i.e., and idea] in midair before him, and must always describe and examine it, not merely part by part, but within the totality of a system as well (the system of pure reason)" (CF: 113).

Following this approach, the following part is divided into two main sections, and a conclusion. Section two traces how Kant had undergone a complete transformation in the early period and how those experiences had affected not only his worldview but his way of thinking. Meanwhile, I also briefly sketch Kant's intellectual debt to Rousseau, who has been generally understood as a thinker in fomenting Kant to develop his theory. I will characterize Kant as a pitiful but relentless thinker who, with his deeply ingrained theological beliefs, wished to convince his place in the universe. Section three shows how Kant constructed one of his important concepts,

spontaneity and God, throughout piling up his works. To conclude, I, with an advantage of an interpreter, try to evaluate Kant's overall arguments. And I will argue that, contrary to well-received image, Kant, rather than a stuffy rationalist, was, or at least should be if he remains a sincere (systematic) philosopher, a humble truth seeker, who leaves a place for religion.

3.2 Interpretations of Kant's Political Thought in Relation to his Metaphysical Underpinnings

3.2.1 Kant's early writings: foundation for metaphysics

It is unthinkable how Kant, the Sage of Königsberg, was a devout religious man. On the one hand, following this common sense, most interpreters tended to downplay or even disregard the significance of whatever religious beliefs Kant might have held. On the other hand, several scholars, following Nietzsche's characterization of Kant, had been roughly divided into two groups: one group argues that Kant used Christian symbols and religious words in order to appear more religious than he was; the other renders Kant's approach to religion as a way of proving himself as an atheist based on his professed claims – his denial of the possibility of proving that God exists, his claim that human duties are determined quite apart from an awareness of God's commands; and his downplaying of the importance to affirm God's interventions in human history and of the clerical leadership in guiding the religious lives of ordinary believers.[163]

But contrary to the widely held view, the eighteenth century in the Continent, especially German lands, was not just Age of Reason, but also

[163] See, for example, A. Reath, "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 26:4 (1998); Adina Davidovich, "Kant's Theological Constructivism," *Harvard Theological Review* 86:3 (1993); Davidovich, *Religion as a Province of Meaning: The Kantian Foundations of Modern Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994); P. Guyer, *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Guyer, *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2005); James Dicenso, *Kant, Religion, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Dicenso, *Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

the age of "consolidated Pietism and of the Franck Foundation".[164] As Israel writes: "all new streams of thought which gained any broad support in Europe between 1650 and 1750… sought to substantiate and defend the truth of revealed religion and the principle of a divinely created and ordered universe."[165] Gillespie(2008, xii) also characterizes this period as "from the very beginning modernity sought not to eliminate religion but to support and develop a new view of religion and its place in human life, and it did so not out of hostility to religion but in order to sustain certain religious beliefs… to find a new metaphysical/theological answer to the question of the nature and relation of God, man, and the natural world."

Personally, Kant was raised in a deeply devout Pietism milieu, with an emphasis on sincere personal devotion to God and a commitment to upright conduct in one's interactions with other people. Kant's mother, a devout pietist, whom he greatly respected later on, "laid great stress on radical inwardness" and involved "intensity of emotion". As he once told his friend, "she planted and tended the first seeds of good in me."[166] Tempting though it may be to think of Kant as renouncing all religious convictions

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[164] N. Hinske, Die tragenden Grundideen der deutschen Aufklärung. Versuch einer Typologie. In R. Ciafardone (Ed.), *Die Philosophie der deutschen Aufklärung. Texte und Darstellung* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1990), 409.

[165] J. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750 g* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 15.

[166] Donald A. Crosby, "Kant's Ideas about Ultimate Reality and Meaning in Relation to His Moral Theory: Critique of an Enlightenment Ideal," *Ultimate Reality and Meaning* 17:2(1994), 122; Willibald Klinke, trans. M. Bullock, *Kant For Everyman* (London: Routledge, 1952), 16. For more on Pietism's influence on Kant, see Lewis White Beck, *Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1969); Michael Despland, *Kant on History and Religion* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973). Less recognized and discussed than the facts of his biography are the religious themes of his philosophical writings themselves. However, Kant's religious philosophy has seen some increased attention in the last two decades. For a classic treatment, James Collins, *The Emergency of a Philosophy of Religion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Allen Wood, *Kant's Rational Theology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). For more recent works, Onora O'Neill, *Kant on Reason and Religion*, ed. Grethe B. Patterson (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1997); James Dicenso, *Kant, Religion, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Regina Dell'Oro, *From Existence to the Ideal: Continuity and Development in Kant's Theology* (New York: Peter Lang, 1994).

after horrific days at the Collegium, Kant went on to matriculate as a theology student of the University of Königsberg and there he continued to study under several Pietist teachers.[167] Therefore, although we can never be certain about another person's private beliefs, we may infer that under the influence of these early exposures, Kant never abandoned the basic religious convictions instilled in him as a youth. We also have heard the well-known caricatures of Kant, which testifies his religiously driven behaviors: that he never strayed more than ten or twenty miles from his birthplace; that his rigidly structured daily schedule, so "mechanically regular" that his neighbors supposedly set their clocks by his daily comings and goings.[168]

Intellectually, in his early pre-critical works, Kant delineates the well-ordered world which is created by God. In *Living Forces(1749),* his first published work, Kant alleges the optimistic view of Enlightenment when he writes in the Preface: "the human intellect has rid itself happily of the chains ignorance and admiration that once locked it in" (LF, 1: 7). He explicitly shows his confidence to escape "the tyranny of errors ruling over human understanding, which has at times lasted whole centuries in a row" (LF, 1: 95). This early metaphysical view, though, had a theological agenda.[169] Regarding this outlook to be happened, Kant confesses God's omnipotence by saying that if "there are extensions of different dimensions, then it is also very probable that God has really produced them somewhere" (LF, 1: 25).

According to Kant, God's wisdom leads all those created things toward the good, barely defined concept yet, with God's striving "towards the greatest possible perfection of created things and towards the happiness of the spiritual world" (NE, 1: 404). Eventually, God's own nature is

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[167] Cf. B. M. G. Reardon, *Kant as Philosophical Theologian*, Totowa, N.J. (Barnes & Noble Books, 1988).

[168] Frederic H. Hedge, *Prose Writers of Germany* (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1849), 57-8. The period of Kant's highly regular lifestyle was mainly from 1783 to 1802.

[169] H.-G. Redmann, *Gott und die Welt. Die Schöpfungstheologie der vorkritischen Periode Kants* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 38.

diffused into every corner of our world, bringing order, harmony, and goodness: "accordingly, the possibilities of things themselves, which are given through the divine nature, harmonize with his great desire. Goodness and perfection, however, consist in this harmony. And since goodness and perfection harmonise in one single principle, it follows that unity, harmony and order are themselves to be found in the possibilities of things" (OPA, 2: 91-2).

This cheerful determinism that Kant finds in the created order is similar to the Liebniz's notion of '*Fatum Christianum'*. Leibniz launches into something of a paean: "our Lord explains thoughts more sublime, and even instructs us in the means of gaining contentment by assuring us that since God, being altogether good and wise, has care for everything" (Theodicy, Preface, 55). Both Kant and Leibniz share a homely view through theological determinism.[170] With this calm and robust mindset, Kant seems to remain aloof from moral and especially political issues for a time. And in fact, all of Kant's early writings, roughly around 1750s, were dominated by a single ambition: to provide a foundation for metaphysics: "It has been my fate to be in love with metaphysics." However, as we will see, this homely realm of day, good, and Christian had not been the whole world for him.

3.2.2 Kant's later writings: political thought to situate the fallen men in the ordered world

Though living in the realm of light, he was curious about and attracted to the realm of darkness. During his thirties, Kant appears to have

[170] Obviously, Kant and Leibniz do not share every detail. To note one simple but not minor difference between the two thinkers, whereas for Kant the cosmic order is pre-determined by God, for Leibniz it is pre-established by God. For Kant, unlike Leibniz, the cosmic order and ensuring beauty are "good consequences that appear to be the plan of a highest wisdom" rather than his will (UNH, 1:225). To seek out further the continuities/differences between the two thinkers is also an important subject, but not quite relevant here. If interested, see, Ohad Nachtomy, "Leibniz and Kant on Possibility and Existence," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 20:5(2012), 953-972.

loosened, or completely broken, the commitments he once had to organized religion; he began to lead a lively social life and even had several love affairs. Kant seems to be wholly abandoning the doctrines of pietism in later life. One time, he complained that the Pietist was the person who "tastelessly makes the idea of religion dominant in all conversion and discourse."[171] Apart from these interpersonal experiences, his meditation on social events and accordingly theodicy pushes Kant to speculate on the relation between God and human beings.

In *Universal Natural History* (1755), Kant expresses his awe for the wisdom and beauty of God's creation. He even counters the trustfulness of scientific assumptions if those were in contradiction with the divine truth: "the conviction about the infallibility of divine truths is so powerful to me that I would consider everything which contradicts them as fully refuted, and would reject it" (UNH 1:222). Kant's universe is a created universe, created by a being with infinite "wisdom, benevolence, power" (UNH 1:256). There are many more examples to show Kant's religious commitments in the *Universal Natural History*. He speaks about the "infinity of the whole of creation", its "infinite diversity and beauty" which reflect God (UNH 1: 265, 306).

It is through God's dictate, which is the laws of nature, on which our structured world is organized, being conducive to beauty: as Kant puts it, "Matter, determining itself according to its most general laws, the dictate of 'a highest wisdom; generates through its natural behavior… through a blind mechanism fair consequences, which appear to be the intention of a highest wisdom" (UNH 1:225). This conception of natural laws follows that nature "has no freedom to digress from this plan of perfection" (UNH 1:228, 1:334). Everything in nature is interconnected, and some of its parts are more perfect and harmonious than the other. Kant expresses this view by

[171] Wood, "Kant's Life and Works," in *A Companion to Kant*, ed. Graham Bird (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 10-31.

quoting the poem as follows:

> *"What a chain, which from God its beginning takes, what natures,*
> *From heavenly and earthly, from angels humans down to animals,*
> *From seraphim to the worm! O distance that the eye can never,*
> *Attain and contemplate,*
> *From the Infinite to you, from you to nothing!"* (UNH 1:306)

In this circle, human beings cannot be "the master piece of Creation" (UNH, 1:318), since nature is constantly on move toward perfection but everything is followed by destruction. Kant's whole explanation, however, cannot be claimed as universal one since it disregards the exception from the rules of nature, and rather lies in the generality and steadfast validity of these very laws.[172] This way of explanation gained currency in the seventeenth and eighteenth century: scientists as well as thinkers tend to observe general phenomenon and draw an inference, in order to explain other particularities.[173] Following this line of reasoning, Kant presumed that Providence 'wills', that is, deals only with structure, not 'directs' more local phenomena. To show how it works in our real world, Kant tried to give an explanation on a disastrous event, earthquake that devastated the Portuguese capital in 1755.

Kant rejects any plain theological interpretation of such a disaster. To claim it happened as a punishment by God is just human hubris pretending to know God's intentions. We should admit our ignorance about God (Eq, 1: 460). Then, how could we interpret God's will by experiencing natural catastrophes such as the Lisbon earthquake? These calamities, according to Kant, invites us contemplate our place in the world and reawakens our sense of humility: "it gives man a sense of humility by

[172] Lebner (2007, 241).
[173] Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 461.

making him see that he has no right, or at least that he has lost any right, to expect only pleasant consequences from the laws of nature that God had ordained" (Eq, 1: 431).[174]

Humility, in this sense, means that in the face of an unexpected as well as inexplicable phenomenon, we have to know our inferior status towards God, crush our inappropriate pretensions, and respects God. Human beings should realize that "man is in the dark when he tries to guess the intentions that God envisages in the ruling of the world" (Eq, 1: 460-1).[175] This argument amounts to the view that we cannot know under God's beneficent will, and that we sometimes, or quite often, suffer from natural disasters as well as evil doings (Cottingham, 2014: 106)[176]. Kant was not quite about our miserable, helpless fate on this earth. However, to quell our fears, he entertains the possibility that immortal soul would survive and achieve a kind of perfection: "Shall the immortal soul, in the infinity of its future duration, which the grave does not interrupt, but merely modifies, remain forever stuck to this location in space, our Earth? Shall it never partake from closer up in the other wonders of the Creation?" (UNH, 1: 367)[177]

Kant's longing for understanding eternity continues. He proclaims his aim in the preface of *The Only Possible Argument* (1763) as to "rise to the cognition of God by means of natural science." However, during this

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[174] For an excellent discussion about theodicy, see Kibly(2003).

[175] One may think of other philosophers or theologians who hold a similar view on theology, such as Leibniz, Augustine. To seek out the continuities/differences between those is also important, but not quite relevant here. If interested, one may consult Ohad Nachtomy, "Leibniz and Kant on Possibility and Existence," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 20:5(2012), 953-972 for Leibniz; and Lewis Ayres, "God. In Catherin," ed. M. Chin and Moulie Vaids, *Late Ancient Knowing: Explorations in Intellectual History* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015),134-51 for Augustine.

[176] J. Cottingham, *Philosophy of Religion: Towards a More Humane Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 106.

[177] Kant continues to praise autonomous immortal soul: "immortal spirit shall raise itself, with a quick swing, above all things finite and continue its existence in a new rapport to nature, a rapport which flows from an intimate connection with the highest begin" (UNH, 1:367).

period of writing, Kant begins to be skeptical about importance of theoretical undertaking partly, because of the influence of Rousseau.[178] At the end of this work, Kant confesses that he finds himself living in an age in which there is no possibility to found a trustful metaphysics (OPA, 2: 66). This "weakness of reason" had already been debated in the Enlightenment period (Tonelli 1971)[179], and Kant's attitude towards metaphysics also wavers, swaying between a wholeheartedly hopeful, constructive undertaking and a desperately fallen rejection of its ambition.

His intellectual encounter with Rousseau, which began as early as 1762, had further driven Kant to the other world, the world of darkness, scandal, and reality. According to Kant's remarks, the problem with speculative metaphysics is not that it is false but that it is useless.[180] About Rousseau's influence, on *Observations on the Feeling of the Benefit and the Sublime,* the early essay on aesthetics in 1764-5 and commonly referred to as the *Remarks,* Kant confesses, as often quoted:

"I myself am a researcher by inclination. There was a time when I believed this alone could constitute the honor of humankind, and I despised the rabble who knows nothing. Rousseau has set me right. The blinding prejudice vanishes, I learn to honor human beings, and I would feel by far less useful than the common laborer if I did not believe that this consideration could impart a value to all others in order to establish the rights of humanity" (OBS 20:44).

The claim that Kant's thinking was influenced by Rousseau has been widely accepted in the history of philosophy. Indeed it is attested to not

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[178] Brandt (2009, 64) suggests that prior to Kant's encounter with Rousseau, the influence of Spalding was also influential to change Kant's view.

[179] G. Tonelli, "The 'Weakness' of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment," *Diderot Studies* 14(1971), 217–44.

[180] See, for example, J. H. Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Susan Shell, *Kant and the Limits of Autonomy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Richard Velkley, "Transcending nature, unifying reason: on Kant's debt to Rousseau,", in *Kant on Moral Autonomy*, ed. Oliver Sensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

only by written sources, but several anecdotes, including that Rousseau's portrait was the only one to hang in Kant's study, and the sole time Kant failed to take his daily afternoon walk was the day he received the copy of *Emile,* where Rousseau proposes an ideal moral program for educating the young. [181]

Kant weighs Rousseau's importance in the moral realm with Newton's in the physical realm (OBS, 2: 219-20). Scholars have examined their intellectual relationship and attempted to pinpoint the precise nature of Kant's philosophical debt.[182] Most of these studies have claimed that Kant's "encounter with Rousseau" "would push him in the direction of political philosophy", and since then Kant has an "interest in the problems of political theory" (Beiser 1992, 32). However, as we are all aware, Kant, unlike any other political philosophers, never wrote comprehensive political treaties. This fact has pushed several scholars to reconstruct the "political philosophy that Kant never wrote."

Beginning with Hannah Arendt, many readers have located Kant's political philosophy in his mature work of aesthetic theory, the *Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790).* There is no question that *Judgment* plays a role in Kant's political

[181] *Emile* is widely accepted as the work where we can find Rousseau's concern how to deal with passions, one of the most disputed concepts in late 17th and onwards (A. O. Hirschman, *The passions and the interests: Political arguments for capitalism before its triumph* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977) Hobbes, Thomas. 1680. *The Life of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*. London).The overall aim for educating Emile is to have "a healthy body, agile limbs, a precise and unprejudiced mind, a heart that is free and without passion. *Amour-propre*, the first and most natural of all the passions, is still hardly aroused in him" (*Emile* 208). There are numerous works dealing with Rousseau's educational program or tactics delineated in *Emile.* For some recent work, see Daniel Tröhler, "Rousseau's *Emile*, or the Fear of Passions," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 31(2012), 477-489; Christopher Scott "War, Madness, and Death: The Paradox of Honor in Hobbes's Leviathan." *The Journal of Politics* 76:1(2014), 114-25.

[182] For example, Frederick Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 1790-1800* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); , Richard James, *Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependence and Necessity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Richard Velkley, *Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989).

thinking.[183] But in *Judgment* he does not mention any political purpose of writing it explicitly. Moreover, after his "silent decade", Kant did not publish a work on politics but rather surprisingly a work of epistemology, the *Critique of Pure Reason (1781)*, which implies that he once again became "a researcher by inclination." Even after the publishing three *Critiques*, the first book he wrote was *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793).* This publication history does not surely tell the whole trajectory about how Kant developed his own thinking. However, we should be noted about Kant's professed statement that all "true science" must proceed "systematically" (MM 375). This avowedly systematic character of his undertaking makes us wonder which guide Kant follows when publishing his series of works after his "silent decade". A close investigation of his lecture notes and unpublished writings from this period might reveal his program and further his objective of doing "true science" or philosophy, which we will discuss later.

For Kant, human beings are fallen creatures, whose dignity being corrupted. They aimlessly wander around: "Where do I find fixed points of nature which man cannot remove and which give him signposts as to which bank of the river he should hold to?" (OBS 20:46). Human beings need a firmer ground to "to take up his position in Creation appropriately" (OBS 20:41). Kant is influenced by Rousseau's view of "natural man" who is morally better than the "man of culture." In short, a civilized man – seeking opulence, pleasure, knowledge- lives a more corrupted life than man in a nature, who enjoys a simplistic and complacent life. Natural man can even lead a happier life without religion and the knowledge of God: "Christians cannot become blessed, if their faith is not alive" (OBS 20: 104).

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[183] Arendt argues for the political importance of *Judgment* in her *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Arendt was neither the first nor last thinker to regard *Judgment* as the key to Kant's thinking. In addition to Goethe, Schelling, and Hegel during or shortly after Kant's time, more recent scholars, including Ernst Cassirer, Leonard Krieger, Yirmiahu Yovel, and Patrick Riley have made similar claims. For a critique of Arendt's reading of Kant, see Patrick Riley, "Hannah Arendt on Kant, Truth, and Politics," in *Kant's Political Philosophy*. ed. Howard Lloyd Williams (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).

With this conception, Rousseau was not optimistic about the way human beings would behave morally. On the individual level, a human being is driven by a lust for unachievable ends. Influenced by his predecessor's concern, Kant, before embarking on the educational program, tries to emphasize a human being's place in the universe, which is ordered but unknown: "the greatest concern of the human being is to know how he should properly fulfill his station in creation and rightly understand what one must be in order to be a human being" (OBS, 2: 216). To know where we are placed in the created order is crucial, since if a human being thirsts for something "above or beneath him, his lust "will himself disturb the beautiful order of nature and only be ready to damage it". He then becomes not only worthless but dangerous person: "Since he is not content to be that for which he is destined, where he has left the sphere of a human being he is nothing, and the hole that he has made spreads its own damage to the neighbouring members" (OBS, 2: 216).

On the societal level, the situation becomes worse. In the *Remarks* Kant similarly follows Rousseau's discussion on social pathology and its suggested cure. Human beings' agony has intensified since we entered the society. Like Rousseau, Kant stipulated the natural "goodness" of the human being: "The human being who has no other desires… than are necessary is called the human being of nature" (OBS, 20:6). In such a state one can be "satisfied by little", and thus "good without virtue" (OBS, 20:6; 20:11). What deprives us of our goodness is the unsatisfied need, engendered by our entry into society. Civilization expands our physical needs by creating new forms of pleasure (OBS, 20:11). As we accustom ourselves to art, fine food, and comfortable conditions, we come to relate to them not only merely as luxury but as necessities (OBS, 20: 77-8; cf. see also "Essay on the Maladies of the Head"). And this leads to avarice, competition, and anti-social behavior as we pursue them even at other's expense (OBS, 20:88; 20:91-6; 20:163-5). On the other hand, socialization also gives rise to

dependence on esteem (OBS, 20:55). In society people are evaluated on the basis of their perceived abilities.[184] Thus this "drive for honor" results in dependence (OBS 20:165; p, 180). To live under another's thumb is to live as an object, a mere instrument of another's will. It is to be stripped of one's sense of worth and equality: "The human being who is dependent in this way is no longer a human being; he has lost this rank, he is nothing except another human being's belonging" (OBS 20:94).

Rousseau and Kant were not in agreement in every detail, however. For Rousseau there is no point in being virtuous without belief in God and an afterlife, because there is no guarantee that his moral acts will be rewarded. For Kant belief in those cannot be a motivating cause for being virtuous: "the common duties to not require hope for an afterlife; greater sacrifice and self-denial have an inner beauty, but our feeling of pleasure from it can never be so strong as to outweigh the displeasure of adversity, were it not for the idea of a future state of the permanence of such moral beauty and the happiness that will be thus increased to make one feel more capable of action" (OBS 20:21). This kind of belief is an indication of our moral weakness. Kant leaves a surprising comment soon after. Because human beings are "incapable of unmediated moral purity", they should be guided by religion which encourages them to become morally better ones "by means of the rewards of the future life." But he adds that "if purity is effected in him in a supernatural way, the future rewards will not have the character of motivation grounds any longer" (OBS 20: 28). He leaves a room for Providence being able to make sense of the human soul "in a supernatural way".[185] For Kant, Rousseau was over-confident on man's autonomous perfectibility (Kelson, 1949, 5ff; Brandt 2012: 278f).

[184] As Kant puts it in a later note, "The human being does not play for himself alone. He would neither seek to hit billiard balls artfully nor toss bowling balls nor play bilboquet or solitaire. If he does any of this he does it only in order subsequently to show his skill to others." (NF &987).

[185] Obviously, Kant claims that knowledge of God is not required for true morality (OBS 20: 57). Rather the speculative knowledge of God "is uncertain and subject to dangerous errors" (OBS 20: 57).

Rousseau's innocent natural man cannot be qualified as Kant's moral man, since mere actions in accordance with virtue are not good enough for Kant: Kant asks "does it not suffice for us that a man never lies, even if he has a secret inclination to lie that would develop under given circumstances?" (OBS 20:15).

Their difference conceded, Rousseau gave Kant a way as to how man could fit into the ordered world. Kant expresses confidence that Rousseau's "moral sentiment", a principled law for morality, allows us to enter into this world (Brandt 2012, 274). Not only shared the rather pessimistic view on the status of human beings, Kant praised Rousseau for his theory on free will, which he called "hidden law", as a suggested cure: "Rousseau discovered for the very first time beneath the manifold forms adopted by the human being the deeply hidden nature of the same and the hidden law, according to which providence is justified by his observation" (OBS 20:58-9).

Like his predecessor, he constructs an analogy between divine will and the general will of a society: "The divine will would contradict itself if it willed there to be human beings whose will was opposed to its own will. The will of human beings would contradict itself if they willed something that they would abhor according to their general will" (OBS 20:161). Because we express our freedom via the general will, a violation of society's laws is morally wrong: "An action that contradicts itself, when considered from the perspective of the general will… is externally morally impossible" (OBS 20:161).

3.3 Room for faith: Epistemology, Morality and the *Religion*

3.3.1 Metaphysical difficulty: the possibility of human spontaneity in relation to the will of God

As we have seen in the previous section, Rousseau's emphasis on moral freedom struck a sympathetic cord in Kant. However, we are all

aware that Kant's goal of research was to set philosophy firmly upon "the secure path of a science" (CPR vii). In May of 1768, Kant penned a letter to Johann Gottfried Herder to tell him of the imminent arrival of his moral theory. "At present my vision is directed chiefly at recognizing the authentic determination and the limits of human capacities and inclination," Kant writes, adding that "I believe that I have succeeded in as far as morals is concerned."[186]

Kant returns back to epistemology not only because he intended to systemize the moral theory, but because he perceives unacceptable assumptions in Rousseau's understanding of free will. Rousseau's general will indicates the will for altruism rather than any single author's will for selfishness; yet Rousseau leaves the content of our altruistic will largely unspecified. Consequently, there is nothing to stop an enterprising person or state from manipulating the general will, redefining good and evil according to its own morally dubious criterion. For Kant, "nothing is more opposed to freedom than that the human being have a foreign author" (NF 1021). Moreover, since Rousseau had stressed psychological elements like conscience and emotion as the source of our moral motivation, his argument leaves room for other feelings such as love and esteem by others would be taken into account. In this case, the freedom we might enjoy is not wholly different from "freedom of the turnspit."[187]

This issue does not bother earlier Kant, who had a quite different conception of freedom. Kant, in the 1750s, thought that to be free does not require to be wholly responsible for one's actions. All that is required for an action to be free comes from the single fact that one wants to do it. This account has been called "compatibilist" in that our being free is

[186] Kant, "To Johann Gottfried Herder, May 9, 1768," *Correspondence*.

[187] A turnspit is a machine used for rotating meat. To one observing its operation, a turnspit would appear to be moving freely on its own, driven by forces contained within itself. In fact, its motion is merely derivative, powered by unseen force. Kant uses this metaphor throughout his published and unpublished work to refer to any moral-psychological theory that gives the human being only the appearance, but not reality, of free will (LM 28:267; NF &6077).

"compatible" with all events happened in the world, which is already ordered by the highest being. When asked whether a compatibilist is free, she is free if she says "yes" to the following questions, "do you know what you are doing and do you want to do this?" (see Vilhauer 2004). She is free because "human actions are called forth by nothing other than motives of the understanding applied to the will" (NE 1: 403). Until 1750s, Kant had no obstacle speaking of one's freedom which in the 1770s he terms negatively "turnspit spontaneity" in relation to the divine creator.

After an encounter with Rousseau, his conception of freedom alters. Influenced by Rousseau's aversion to servitude, Kant maintains that "no misfortune can be more terrifying to one who is accustomed to freedom, who has enjoyed the good of freedom, than to see himself delivered to a creature of his own kind who can compel him to do what he will (to give himself over to his will) (OBS, 2: 230). Kant is vocal in the distress at the state of the one who is compelled: "the person how is dependent in this way is no longer a person, he has lost his rank, he is nothing but a belonging of another person" (OBS, 2: 230). Kant becomes interested in another level of freedom, called "absolute spontaneity" or "transcendental freedom," which must be "self-activity from an inner principle according to the power of free choice." His conception of freedom is neatly elaborated in the following passage: "freedom consists in the capacity to act independently of external determining grounds in accordance with the intellectual power of choice" (R 3872).

Now for Kant, the problem how can human beings, as created beings, enjoy freedom in relation to God looms large enough to be reconsidered: "freedom is the capacity to produce and effect something originally. But how original causality and an original capacity for efficient causation obtain in a created being is not to be comprehended at all" (R 4221). Unlike feeling at ease with defining divinity, Kant confesses the difficulty comprehending and having insight into human freedom. The

question whether human beings, created beings, can enjoy "absolute freedom" independently with the dictates of God, the first mover, seems insurmountable. Kant asks himself:

"But it is asked: do the actions of the soul, its thoughts, come from the inner principle which is determined by no cause, or are its actions determined by an external principle? If the latter were [the case], then it would have only spontaneity in some respect… and thus no freedom in the transcendental sense…. This is a difficulty which detains us here. Were it an independent being, then we could in any event think in it absolute spontaneity." (ML1, 28: 268)

Kant confesses that this issue is the "only unsolvable metaphysical difficulty" (R 5121). In the metaphysics lectures, he directly asks that "do I have transcendental spontaneity or absolute freedom?" (ML1, 28: 268). Kant's response can be dealt with two different ways, depending on whether we focus on "transcendental" or "spontaneity."[188] First, by (re)defining

[188] To clarify the intimidating term "transcendental idealism", before delving into its application, would be helpful. Kant was, surprisingly but still not quite enough, kind in that he was willing to deliver his daunting definition in ways that are convenient to readers by using comparison. First of all, the contrasting term to "transcendental" would be "empirical." And something is empirical if it pertains to that which appears and that which we experience. "Transcendental" thus pertains to that which makes experience and knowledge possible. The contrasting term to "idealism" would be "realism." Realism means that something is independent of mind. Then idealism means something dependent upon mind. So "transcendental idealism" points to the notion that experience and knowledge are possibly only through the receptive and organizing activity of mind. Only in the two places in the first *Critique* does Kant explicitly define transcendental idealism. The first definition goes as follows: "I understand by the *transcendental idealism* of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that time and space are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed *transcendental realism*, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility)" (A 369). The second definition reads: "All objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call transcendental idealism." (B 518-9). In a nutshell, "Transcendental idealism" is opposed to "transcendental realism"; transcendental realism claims that what makes possible experience (which is transcendental) is thoroughly independent of the receptive status or activity of mind; on the other hand, material or empirical idealism deals with a

space and time, Kant had managed to find an escape hatch. If space and time are features of the world as it is in itself(transcendental realism), we have no other option but to follow deterministic causation: "Regarding space and time as determinations belonging to the existence of things [would also lead to] fatalism of actions" (CPrR, 5: 102). Only if space and time are features of our reception of the world(transcendental idealism), there is a possibility that we stand outside of space and time as well as outside of the determining features and enjoying freedom. In his first *Critique,* Kant defines space and time are "forms of our intuition… but not condition of objects as things in themselves" (A369).

Second, by comparing human spontaneity to divine spontaneity, Kant tries another escape. In *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God,* Kant argues that the divine being creates nature of our world according to a system of fixed laws. Because God will only the good, God's creation, nature, must be also good. However, as our experience tells us, nature does not remain always good: the "course of nature" will run "contrary to the will of God" (OPA 2:110). This deorbit, in fact, justifies the deity intervening in the course of nature: "miracles are possible in order to complement this imperfection" (MD 28:219). Thus, miracles are "events which interrupt the order of nature" (MD 28:220). By way of analogy, Kant describes the basis of human moral freedom. If a person's faculty of moral choice (Willkür) is to be genuinely free, she must be capable of choosing independently from any bodily urges, physical relations of cause and effect. Then she must act with a supreme power, with a "new beginning," and with an "absolutely first action" (NF 5220; 5619).[189]

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knowledge claim about the fundamental conditions of reality (Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism," in *A Companion to Kant* , ed. Graham Bird (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010),111).

[189] "A substance that is not externally determined to produce something that previously did not exist acts freely, and this freedom is opposed to internal or external natural necessity. It acts from the free power of choice (Willkür**)** insofar as the causality of the action lies in its preference" (NF &3857). As Kant puts it in a later fragment, "freedom is the independence of causality from the conditions of space and time" (NF &5608)

By this definition, an act made using our faculty of choice (Willkür) is comparable to a miracle done by a deity to nature.

Kant continues this analogy further. Kant refers to the divine attribute capable of performing miracles as "absolute spontaneity"; he refers to the human attribute capable of performing moral actions using the very same term.[190] But for the human being to act like the divine being, she must also in a similar condition with the diving being: "The question of whether freedom is possible is identical with the question of whether the human being is a true person and whether 'I' is possible" (NF 4225). That Kant derives his conception of the "I" through an analogue with the deity becomes clear in a number of places, foremost among them in his lectures from the 1770s on anthropology and metaphysics. Kant includes a list of core "concepts" that he ascribes to the "I." While these lists vary slightly in order and terminology, they all share four attributes: "substantiality," "simplicity," "immutability" and "spontaneity."[191] It is exactly these four attributes that Kant ascribes to the divine being. He describes God as "necessary," "simple in substance," "immutable in constitution," and having the "power of choice" (OPA 2:89; 2:101).[192]

To the exact meaning of human spontaneity, Kant seems to find a way of arriving it by comparing it to divine spontaneity. However, by positing metaphysics of the self, he risks dipping back into the metaphysical speculation he had dismissed earlier. In *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics*(1766), published anonymously, Kant had insisted on an epistemological skepticism. Kant shows that all metaphysical philosophy, in spite of its academic pretensions, has no firmer grounding than the most speculative theology.

Dreams is manifestly an attack on the Swedish theologian Emanuel

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[190] For Kant's attribution of "absolute spontaneity" to God, see LPR 28:1067. For his attribution of "absolute spontaneity" to the human being, see Pr 5:99.
[191] See LA 25:10-3; 25:244-6; 25:473-6; LM 28:225-6, 28:265-88.
[192] See also, LPR 28:1037-9, 28:1067. Here Kant lists God's attributes as "substantiality," "simplicity," "immutability," and "absolute spontaneity."

Swedernborg, a "spirit-seer" who claimed both the power of prophecy and insight into the heavenly "mysteries" (DSS 2:348).[193] These questionable abilities allows him to fabricate an entire "spirit-world" populated by "spirit-being", despite it having no basis in verifiable experience and containing "not a single drop of reason" (DSS 2:360). According to Kant, the same can be said for metaphysical undertaking: "the philosophy with which we have prefaced the work was no less a fairy-story from the *cloud-cuckoo-land* of metaphysics" (DSS 2:356). Such "dreams," both metaphysical and theological, arise out of wishful thinking or a yearning for certainty about things beyond our experience. But in fact the book is also a sarcastic attack on rational metaphysics, including his own. Consequently, they "only have significant weight when placed on the scale-pan of hope"; on the "scale-pan of speculation," they "weigh no more than empty air" (DSS 2:350). And the fact that "absurdities" of this kind "have found acceptance even among rational people" does nothing to enhance their veracity (DSS 2:357).

His first attempt to demonstrate human spontaneity by way of theological analogy could be successful only with this kind of "wishful thinking". Already at this stage Kant renounces to explain the true cause of our morality, which clashes with our selfish inclinations, in a similar way in which Newton formulated the law of gravity (DSS 2: 335). We can just simply assume that our moral sentiment is "the felt dependence of the private will on the general will" and justifies this in light of its consequences (DSS 2: 335). Human reason is radically limited: "human reason was not equipped with strong enough wings to dispel those high clouds that hide the secrets of the other world from us" (DSS 2: 373).

Thus, Kant faces a dilemma -- whether he disavows his earlier discussion or become another "spirit-seer". If Kant does indeed claim

[193] Commenting on Swedenborg's work, Kant laments that he "went to the expense of purchasing a lengthy work, and, what was worse… [is] the trouble of reading it as well" (D 2: 318).

knowledge or experience of freedom of our status, this would violate his epistemic declaration; Kant argues that knowledge must be restricted to that which appears to us as we experience the world through spatial-temporal dimensions. About things as it is in itself, apart from our experience, we can have only justified beliefs. In a note from the late 1770s, we can find the way how Kant deals with this situation. There he claims that "in this darkness, the critique of reason lights a torch" (NF 5112). And after the "silent decade" of the 1770s, he published the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

3.3.2 Moral/Political difficulty: the prevalent evils in relation to human spontaneity

Kant's another attempt to conceptualize spontaneity is undertaken while he explains the origin of our evil doings. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, dealing with the concept, spontaneity, Kant presents a conflict between two views of nature in a chapter of the book known as the "Antinomy of Pure Reason". Both sides in the debate acknowledge that nature is by appearance deterministic, seemingly governed by immutable relations of cause and effect. Where they disagree is whether, in spite of this appearance, it is nonetheless necessary to appeal to power which is not restricted in these relations. The power is "absolute spontaneity," the "power of beginning a state from itself" (CPR A533/B561). Regarding this issue, whereas the "thesis" side argues that positing spontaneity is necessary, the "antithesis" side argues that it is not. Each position proceeds by attempting to demonstrate that the other is logically impossible. Here Kant argues that while absolute spontaneity cannot be vindicated in the reality which we access via our sense (the "phenomenal" world), it may yet exist in the deeper substratum of reality from which our sensual experience derives (the "noumenal" world). At the very least, the possibility that such spontaneity exists cannot be conclusively denied (CPR A531-67/B560-95).[194] However,

[194] Cf. "In the judgment of free actions, in regard to their causality, we can get only as far

demonstrating that something is hypothetically possible does not verify that it actually exists. Obviously Kant recognizes this unbridgeable gap. Thus what he concludes rather cautiously is that reason itself "creates the idea of a spontaneity," even without being able to demonstrate its reality (CPR A533/B561). It has a "legitimacy" which "need not be proved" (CPR A776/B804). Conceding his argument that this quasi-divine spontaneity is real and that every human being has it, we should always theoretically refrain from exploiting, abusing, or dominating others: it is unthinkable that God with an absolute spontaneity does any evil doing. However, societies in real life are characterized by too many outright evils. If the source of our agency is the absolute spontaneity, how can we explain this prevalence of wrong? Kant argues quite surprisingly that its origin is embedded in the very ground of human freedom itself.

This view on evil seems contradictory to his earlier view, which he shared with Rousseau. As we have seen, young Kant had echoed his predecessor's anthropological view on human nature. Human beings for Rousseau are naturally "good." If their needs are properly met, they will not do "evil" things. Moreover, this description was unproblematic for Kant as long as he shared Rousseau's moral psychology of innate conscience, the "hidden law." But Kant's unpublished notes and fragments from the late 1760s and 1770s testify to his gradual transition away from Rousseau's view of humanity's natural goodness and towards his mature position of radical evil (NF 3856; 5541; 6906). Kant further raises this issue in his anthropology lectures from the 1770s: "One is always accustomed to asking,

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as the intelligible cause, but we cannot get beyond it; we can know that actions could be free, i.e., that they could be determined independently of sensibility, and in that way that they could be the sensibly unconditioned condition of appearance. But why the intelligible character gives us exactly these appearances and this empirical character under the circumstances before us, to answer this surpasses every faculty of our reason, indeed is surpasses the authority of our reason even to ask it… Yet the problem which we had to solve does not obligate us to answer these questions, for it was only this: Do freedom and natural necessity in one and the same actions contradict another?" (CPR A557/B585, p. 545).

where does evil come from? But one ought rather to ask, where does the good come from? The beginning is made with evil out of freedom" (LA 25:694).

To this issue, Kant declares in the *Groundwork* (1785) that to investigate our foundations of morality, it must be free "of everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to anthropology" (GMM, 4: 389). Following this guideline, we should then know about what noumenal beings, independent of any sensuous experiences, will as an end. Theoretically, noumenal beings, conforming to the demands of reason, should follow moral laws. Then, the moral community where these noumenal beings consist of becomes the "kingdom of ends" (GMM, 4: 438). Isn't this logical step quite simple enough? It hardly seems to be. We have no way of verifying whether noumenal beings are or will be truly rational and thus moral agents. Regarding this issue, Kant goes on to speak in a negative definition by saying that if the will seeks the law "in a property of any of its objects – heteronomy always results", because "the will in that case does not give itself the law; instead the object (*das Object*), by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it" (GMM, 4: 441). Instead Kant desires a "completely isolated metaphysics of morals" (GMM, 4: 440).[195]

If the will can have no principle or reality that is heteronomous, from outside of itself, then if follows rationally that it must make itself its own object. (GMM, 4: 432). This idea is immersed in his well-known statement: "It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation, except a good will" (GMM, 4: 393). Where might we find such a free good will? Moral freedom, if it exists, must exist in the world prior to, and independently of, the spatio-temporal dimension, since space and time are

[195] There are many excellent works on the concept of autonomy, which is helpful to pinpoint the context where Kant was located or distinguished from. See, Terence Irwin, "Continuity in the History of Autonomy," *Inquire: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* 54:5(2011), 442-59; J. B. Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

entirely structured by natural determinism.[196] This demand leads Kant to state that "reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independently of alien influences" (GMM, 4: 448).

Now, for Kant, evil must be the result, not of the "sensuous nature of the human being," but the "free power of choice" (Rel. 6:34-5). It must be something that people not only find themselves doing, but actively will to do, a "deed of freedom" (Rel. 6:21). This is not to say that material and emotional factors have no impact on our ability to choose.[197] Nor is it to deny that under limited circumstances, like infancy and insanity, moral freedom can be completely impossible.[198] But it is to insist that at the end of the day, any normal human being, when confronted with a moral decision, is capable of making this evil decision with real freedom: "for whatever his previous behavior may have been, whatever the natural causes influencing him, whether they are inside or outside them, his action is yet free and not determined through any of these causes; hence the action can and must always be judged as an original exercise of his power of choice" (Rel. 6:41).

When we have a chance to choose between good and evil with absolute spontaneity, why do we so often choose evil? Kant's answer is the "radical evil" of humanity. What makes human evil "radical" is that it is contained within our very faculty of moral choice: it is the "propensity of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others" (Rel. 6:30).[199] The reason why human beings have such a propensity for evil cannot be understood. Though it must be "imputed to us," it nonetheless "remains inexplicable to us" (Rel. 6:21; 6:43).

To bring this question in a wider context, Kant coins the phrase "nation of devils" in Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch as a way of

[196] Ameriks(2000a, 13-4).
[197] For this argument, see Guyer 1993, 389-90.
[198] See, Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 59.
[199] Here Kant is careful with his choice of words. He distinguishes a "propensity," which inclines a person to decide a certain way, from a "predisposition," which entirely determines her decision (Religion 6:32)

depicting a state made up with self-oriented individuals. In this essay, Kant seems to follow the route his predecessor in England had pioneered. He adamantly states that the task of "setting up a state does not involve the moral involvement of man" (PP, 112-3). On the contrary, it assumes nothing more than that we will naturally attend to our own welfare as if he admits a contract theory, arguably established by Thomas Hobbes (PP, 112). Eager for domination, but equally fearful of the "hostile attitudes" of others, people will "submit to coercive laws". Without presuming any change in citizens' "internal moral attitudes", "a condition of peace" can be achieved "within which laws can be enforced" (PP 113).[200] Theoretically a stable state can be instituted with amoral or immoral citizens-- Kant further argues that a "nation of devils" is a "society of radically evil persons" (LE 27:317). Regarding this phenomenon, Kant's another term, "unsocial sociability" aptly describes social behaviors happened in a society. Kant coins the term in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,* defining it as the "tendency to come together in society, coupled… with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up" (IUH 44). In other words, while an individual "cannot bear" other people, she also "cannot bear to leave" them (IUH 44).[201]

If such an evil tendency has deep roots in us and such tendencies are manifested in a society without incurring problems, how can it be

[200] Kant also makes a similar argument in his essay "The Contest of the Faculties," in *Kant: Political Writings*.

[201] This idea of "radical evil" and "unsocial sociability" has been widely discussed by not only Kant's contemporaries but contemporary thinkers of our age. On the one hand, Schiller, Goethe, and Karl Barth saw the idea of radical evil as a "stain" on Kant's moral thought, a philosophically inconsistent concession made so that, in Goethe's phrase, "Christians too might be attracted to kiss his hem". On the other hand, some more recent interpreters, like Allen Wood, have tried to collapse the distance between Kantian "unsocial sociability" and Rousseunian amour proper, regarding them as "one and the same doctrine" (Wood, 1999, 291). The relationship between radical evil and unsocial sociability has also been the subject of debate. A number of commentators have argued, for example, that radical evil is not a deep feature of human psychology but rather the historically contingent consequence of the unsocial sociability of modern market societies. However, as we have seen, radical evil, far from a sycophantic compromise with Christianity, follows logically from Kant's conception of human beings. Unsocial sociability, in turn, is manifestation of radical evils of each individual in a society.

overcome? Is it possible for Kantian human beings to be moral? If so, how? To answer these questions, Kant again should consult theology. According to Kant, the divine being offers not only an analogical model for the structure of human agency, but a real-world ideal for directing an individual's behavior. The way the deity makes moral choices – consistently in favor of reason and Wille, consistently against inclination and immorality- should guide how we ourselves should make moral choices. In Religion, Kant's term for this ideal is "holiness": "It is our universal human duty to elevate ourselves to this ideal of moral perfection, i.e. to the prototype of moral disposition in its entire purity… to the ideal of holiness" (Rel. 6:61).[202] Kant readily admits that actually achieving such a lofty state is impossible. Nonetheless, holiness should serve for humanity as a standard, an end toward which we should direct ourselves. And the deity itself should serve as our moral archetype, the "standard measure of our life conduct" (Rel. 6:119). This ideal, however, cannot guarantee its realization in our world. To this issue, several scholars have been skeptical of the very idea of a Kantian program for the moral education and progress of the individual. Friedrich Herbart, who took over the chair at the University of Königsberg previously occupied by Kant, was an early and harsh critic of the idea: "How did Kant imagine moral education? As an effect of transcendental freedom? Impossible, for the concept of the latter comes to an end, as soon as one thinks it is not entirely free from every causal nexus. Transcendental freedom does what it does by itself; one cannot hinder it through anything, one cannot help it through anything."[203] But Kant did not lose his hope; he rather envisioned that political community could undertake this task. This vision was laid out in his works of politics on which topic he never wrote before 1970s.

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[202] See also Kant's second *Critique*, in which he defines holiness as "the complete conformity of dispositions with the moral law" (CPrR 5:122).

[203] See Robert B. Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 19-22, 42.

As he writes in On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, But it Does not Apply in Practice', the aim of the state is not merely to provide for stability and happiness, as it is in Hobbes, but to realize moral freedom (TP 73-87).[204] Through public justice and coercive law "a great step is taken toward morality (although this is still not the same as a moral step)" (PP 121n). Therefore, "without the foundation of a political community, [the ethical community] could never be brought into existence by human beings" (Rel. 6:94). However, Kant argues that juridical order alone does nothing to address the informal forms of moral wrong doing. In Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explicitly distinguishes between the formal or legal equality and a deeper equality in social life (MM 6:314-5). Here Kant implies that politics is necessary but not sufficient condition for cultivating moral freedom. Then, which element is needed more?

The ethical community, which concept is first introduced in *Religion*, is thus designed to achieve what politics cannot solely deal with.[205] Kant argues that the "highest moral good will" cannot be achieved "solely through the striving of one individual person for his own moral perfection" but "requires rather a union of such persons into a whole toward that very end" (Rel. 6:97-8). However, the function of this ethical community is far from being easily written down as a manual. If it is to fulfill its given function, the ethical community must not simply cultivate a public moral culture as suggested by Rousseau. If this kind of external force or stimuli initiates a transformation of moral free will within each individual, it violates the very concept of spontaneity. It would be self-contradictory to force citizens in a political community to be virtuous, given that virtue is by definition a willing choice to obey internal laws: "the political community to

[204] Shklar surmises that for Kant "the purpose of politics is to serve our capacity, minuscule though it be, for putting together a better set of dispositions that we have done so far… Kant's purpose was to get vice-ridden men out of their Machiavellian world" Shklar(1984, 234).

[205] About the practical way to form an ethical community, see Philip Rossi, *The Social Authority of Reason: Kant's Critique, Radical Evil, and the Destiny of Humankind* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2005), 62.

coerce its citizens into an ethical community would be a contradiction" (Rel. 95.25-34).

To surmount this problem, Kant, in Religion, looks to a source for cultivating morality: "the goodness of God."[206] This idea is the heart of Kant's rational justification for theism – the "religion" contained within the "boundaries of mere reason". Human being is morally "driven" to posit the existence of a supreme being. She is compelled to believe in God. That belief in God, while not rationally demonstrable, is practically necessary for our self-perception as free moral agents. Kant confesses that "One can neither resist nor tolerate the thought of a being represented as the highest of all possible things, which may say to itself, "I am free eternity to eternity, and outside me there is nothing except what exists though my will; *but whence then am I*"" (Rel. 28:1033). Kant, a thinker in the bones of modernity, could utter such extraordinary words, that we can neither "resist nor tolerate" the thought of God.

When examined closely, however, this confirmation of rational faith engenders problems for Kant's philosophy. There is a contradiction between the idea of the human being as absolutely spontaneous and a person's practical need as a moral agent for divine assistance. Like an educational program instituted by the ethical community, the potential for God's intervention divest an individual of the absolute spontaneity.[207] And without a genuinely absolute spontaneity, it is no longer possible to impute any morally wrong choice to that person. While from the outset Kant seeks to establish the rational foundation for human spontaneity, he eventually diminishes its potential of saving autonomy. Kant, therefore, appears to be forsaking his purpose of arguments, which is to repudiate moral fatalism and

[206] "Since by himself the human being cannot realize the idea of the supreme good inseparably bound up with the pure moral disposition, he finds himself driven to believe in the cooperation or the management of a moral ruler of the world, through which this end is possible" (Rel. 6:139).

[207] Earlier, Kant cautions the concept of God as "ruler of the world" cannot be taken to imply this intervention (i.e. GMM 442-3; CPrR 41).

thus to establish human being's "absolute spontaneity".

If we cannot square absolute freedom with divine intervention, we have no grounds for believing that the essence of human moral choice can change. We have no warrant for thinking that our propensity for non-moral maxims will be replaced by a propensity for moral ones. We have no rational basis for presuming that our radical evil can be overcome- whether by politics or ethical community. "To found a moral people of God is a work whose execution cannot be hoped for from human beings, but only from God himself" (Rel. 6:100). And Kant himself seems admitting this conundrum. While God "must have a means of compensating, from the fullness of His own holiness, for the human being's inadequacy with respect to it", this nonetheless "goes against the spontaneity… according to which the required goodness must stem from a human being itself, not from someone else, if it is to be imputable to him" (Rel. 6:143). At this point, Kant, rather than clarifying his view, finished with an open-ended statement: our "very freedom when applied to the final object of practical reason is alone what inevitably leads us to sacred mysteries" (Rel. 6:138).

3.3.3 Theological difficulty: the possible way to understand God

As we have seen, the concept of God incurs a central tension in Kant's overall thought. We need God, if we are to attain freedom, "the highest good", which is the *summum bonum*. On the other hand, God must withdraw for freedom to be possible. But as God withdraws, it becomes harder to understand how the highest good will be attained. Kant claims or is claimed to achieve resolution, either he could not help being pulled into traditional Christianity or could restrain it within the boundary of his mere reason.[208] Before reviewing his resolution, in this section, we will first

[208] For an alternative religious account of how Kant resolves this tension discussed in this section, see Lawrence Pasternack, "The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief: The Highest Good, the Practical Postulates and the Fact of Reason," *Kant-Studien* 102:3(2011), 290-315; C. J. Insole, *Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem* (Oxford:

investigate his concept of God and examine his argument about the way we understand God.

When reading Kant on God, it is helpful to grasp that the God-concept is split into two parts for Kant: the divine understanding and the divine will. Kant writes: "All the unity and harmony I observe around me is only possible because a Being exists which contains within it the grounds not only of reality but also of all possibility." (OPA, 2: 152-3) In another place, he deals the same idea more fully:

"This Supreme Being embraces within itself everything which can be thought by man, when we, a creature made of dust, dares to cast a spying eye behind the curtain which veils from mortal eyes the mysteries of the inscrutable. God is all-sufficient. Whatever exists, whether it be possible or actual, is only something in so far as it is given through Him. If it be permitted to translate the communigs of the Infinite with Himself into human language, we may imagine God addressing Himself in these terms: *I am from eternity to eternity: apart from me there is nothing, except it be through me"* (OPA, 2: 151).

He goes onto reflect that:

"This thought, of all thoughts the most sublime, is still widely neglected, and mostly not considered at all. That which is to be found in the possibilities of things and which is capable of realizing perfection and beauty in excellent schemes has been regarded as a necessary object of Divine Wisdom but not itself as a consequence of this Incomprehensible Being. The dependency of other things has been limited to their existence alone. As a result of this limitation, a large share in the ground of so much perfection has been taken away from that Supreme Nature, and invested in I know not what absurdity" (OPA, 2: 151).

To follow his own statements, we need to understand what precisely

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Oxford University Press, 2013). Even if it may be going too far to claim that Kant was putting forward a version of Pietist theology(Palmquist, 2016), he was certainly "fundamentally a religious thinker." (Insole, 2013)

Kant means by saying that the possibility of all things "depends" upon God. Kant helps us here, by distinguishing between what he calls "moral" and "non-moral" dependency upon God. We have "moral" dependence when God decides, through his will, to create something out of nothing, and to sustain it in existence. In other words, things depend for their existence upon the divine will. On the other hand, "non-moral dependence" means the structure by that although God is not constantly intervening, God does not withdraw. In other words, the structure of real possibilities is given independently of the divine will. Without the divine understanding, however, there simply are no possibilities at all. In short, God's will is constrained fundamentally by God's nature. Every law of nature, governing the properties of everything from sand to human beings to even universe, is an actualization of real possibilities contained in the divine nature. On the other hand, something can depend upon God without being the product of divine will. With such room given, human being's freedom, the moral law, through which we can become autonomous, could exist independently of the divine will; it could still, nonetheless, be an aspect of divinity. Kant, twenty years later, in the height of his mature critical philosophy, kept this view.

In both the first *Critique* and his *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion,* given in the mid-1780s, Kant was vocal delivering his view on the primitive character of our knowledge about God. In the first *Critique*, Kant asks us to hold in mind the concept of the "All of reality," which "contains as it were the entire storehouse of material" from which all possibilities derive. In his lecture, he was more specific: "here everything falls away beneath us, and the greatest perfection, as much as the smallest, hovers without any support before speculative reason, and it costs reason nothing to let them both disappear, nor is there the least obstacle to this" (Rel. 28: 1033).

Kant was not optimistic, on the other hand, that we would ever discover a rational demonstration to claim that "there is a God" or "a future

life": "For whence will reason derive the ground for such experience and their inner possibility? (A 742/B 770)." Theoretical knowledge requires reliable experiences as both its background and guarantee. For something to be a reliable experience, it must have a spatial and temporal location and be accessible to all rational people: it must occur in this place, for certain duration of time, such that all properly rational people would also experience it. However, even if we lack such an experience of God, this experiential ignorance does not constitute grounds to doubt the existence of God, at least for Kant. Kant was certain that "no human being" will ever be able to assert that there is no God (A 742/ B 770): rather "the same grounds for considering human reason incapable of asserting the existence of such a being, when laid before our eyes, also suffice to prove the unsuitability of all counter-assertions. (A 641/ B 669)."

Kant in his early period did consider that we could arrive at the rational knowledge on God on the basis of thinking about its existence, or at least the possibility of its existence: that there is something rather than nothing entails that there is a necessary being. Later Kant retracted his earlier confession knowing about God, but instead to believe in God without knowledge. Kant even tells us that we should "thank heaven" that "our faith is not knowledge": "For divine wisdom is apparent in the very fact that we do not know but rather ought to believe that a God exists" (Rel. 28: 1084).

3.4 Conclusion: The relation of Reason to Miracle and Mystery

Back to our original question, we can notice that the project of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* is often read as a philosophical attempt to bridge the "abyss" between freedom and nature. The unification of nature and freedom provides an *a priori* foundation for Kant's claim that progress in the project of transforming nature by the light of reason is not just morally desirable but actually possible. In this work, judging is defined as an autonomous power that is capable of responding to particulars for which

we have no control: "Judgment can be regarded as mere[ly] ability to *reflect*, in terms of a certain principle, on a given presentation so as to [make] a concept possible, or as an ability to *determine* as underlying concept by means of a given empirical presentation. In the first case it is the *reflective*, in the second the *determinative*, *power of judgment*" (CJ "(First) Introduction," Section 5).[209]

Kant does not present this reflective judging as an impoverished form of determination. Rather, it is a different way of relating particulars to making certain rules. Regarding this point, Kant parses the difference as a distinction between "technical" and "artistic" relations to particulars: "So when reflective judgment tries to bring given appearances under empirical concepts of determinate natural things, it deals with them *technically* rather than schematically. In other words, it does not deal with them mechanically, as it were, like an instrument, guided by the understanding and the senses; it deals with them *artistically,* in terms of a principle that is universal but also indeterminate: the principle of a purposive arrangement of nature" (CJ "(First) Introduction," Section 5).

Then what to do with the feeling that some phenomena incur our judgment that prompts us recognizing the notion of a natural purpose? Although Kant cautions that, "strictly speaking, the organization of nature has nothing analogous to any causality known to us," Kant raises the "special causality" of human freedom to propose that teleological judgments produce an analogical relation between nature and freedom that does not otherwise have any reality for us (CJ I/65, 254). Just as our own freedom is the noumenal substrate that we refer to in order to perceive our actions in the empirical world as self-caused, Kant's analogical reasoning goes, the presence of purposive objects in nature may be thought of as the effect of a

[209] For an excellent account of the distinction between objective teleological explanation and reflective teleological judging, and the implications for scientific inquiry of Kant's affirmation of the latter, see James Kreines, "The Inexplicability of Kant's *Naturzweck:* Kant on Teleology, Explanation and Biology," *Archiv fur Geschichete der Philosophie* 3: 87 (2005).

causality that is unknown to us - presumably God's intention-, but which we can represent to ourselves by a rule of natural purposiveness, an analogue to the idea of human freedom as the power to act in accordance with self-produced ends.

In teleological judgments, this idea of purposiveness is used as a guide to represent nature as the source of the meaning, but as we have seen in the earlier sections, Kant acknowledges that this guide is indeterminate. We might presume that nature is meaningfully organized, but this assumption cannot guarantee the genuine purpose for which nature exists. There is a possibility that our judgment operates "artistically", as it must produce an analogy between the causality of freedom and the causality of nature. We may further think of ourselves as an agency that would take the form of "intellectual intuition," also referred to by Kant as an "intuitive understanding" (CJ I I /76).

However, far from embracing the God-like position, Kant raises this non-judging being in order to contrast its qualities with those of human subjects. For Kant, although we can make an analogy between human subject and God, human subjectivity is radically unlike the "intuitive understanding" of the idea of God. The "concept of an absolutely necessary being", a divine being for whom judgment would be superfluous, is thinkable by human reason, but "for human understanding" such a concept remains "an unattainable problematic concept" (CJ I I /76). We are tempted to say that nature itself exhibits evidence that we can be sure of. But Kant tries to dispel this gut-feeling by reminding us that we can only experience beauty and meaning via the meditation of the experience of our freedom: the primary risk posed by teleological judgments is the temptation to confuse the rule produced by judging for an *a priori* rule of rationality. Teleological judgments, "if left to themselves," Kant warns, "invite reason to inferences that may stray into the transcendent" (CJ, "(First) Introduction", Section 5). His critique of teleological judgment exposes this reason's bias.

Regarding a necessary solution to a particular problem, Kant asks himself in his 1798 essay, "Contest of the Faculties", that is it possible to identify a pattern of gradual progress in the aggregate of events that constitute the historical record of human civilizations, a hidden law that has not only governed the past, but will show the future direction of human affairs? Kant argues that we can only "obtain a prophetical historical narrative of things to come by depicting those events whose *a priori* possibility suggest that they will in fact happen." But this "*a priori* possibility" cannot show that the prophet is right to assert a claim about what '"will in fact happen" ("Contest" 177). Predictive histories cannot claim objective validity, for of "freely acting begins," we can "*dictate* in advance what they *ought* to do," but we "cannot *predict* what they actually *will* do" ("Contest", 180).

However, as I have pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, throughout his writings on political topics, Kant argues that progress in collective life should be judged by the degree to which political constitutions are moving towards the universal actualization of the idea of a political commonwealth ordered by "the principle of right," that is, the juridical principle by which "the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom" (MM 133). Theorizing a political state that "springs purely from the principle of right" as a republic, Kant proposed that it is only under conditions of universal republican governance that we experience political laws as fully harmonizing with the idea of freedom that we have as rational subjects. Kant thus proposes a moral duty to further reason's idea of political progress, arguing that reason demands of each of us that we act in such a way that our action contributes to the progressive actualization of the idea of political commonwealth, as this political state is a necessary condition of progress toward the end of a moral world. This idea of progressive actualization of the idea of a political state that accords with the principle of right is "a

social goal" rather than the idea of progress toward the moral end of becoming a virtuous man (R 88-9).

A social goal is an end that cannot be accomplished by a single individual, "but requires rather a union of such individuals into a whole toward the same goal- into a system of well-disposed men, in which and through whose unity alone the highest moral good can come to pass." This "highest moral good" is the moral telos of an ethical community toward which human history ought to progress, and its accomplishment requires the actualization of the idea of political right. But "the idea of such a whole, as a universal republic based on laws of virtue, is an idea completely distinguished from all moral laws (which concern what we know to lie within our power); since it involves working toward a whole regarding which we do not know whether, as such, it lies in our power or not." (R 88-9). Likewise claims to knowledge about what collective actions will bring out in the future founder on the very fact of human freedom. On the other hand, Kant expresses his worry that individual freedom might disturb progress from being a possibility: "we can scarcely help feeling a certain distaste on observing [human] activities as enacted in the great world-drama, for we find that, despite the apparent wisdom of individual actions here and there, everything as a whole is made up of folly and childish vanity, and often of childish malice and destructiveness." (IUH 42).

In another place, Kant also writes that:

"[i]t is misfortune… that we are unable to adopt an absolute point of view when trying to predict free actions. For this, exalted above all human wisdom, would be the point of view of *providence*, which extend even to *free* human actions. And although man may *see* the latter, he cannot *foresee* them with certainty (a distinction which does not exist in the eyes of the divinity); for while he needs to perceive a connection governed by natural laws before he can foresee anything, he must do so without such hints or guidance when dealing with *free* actions in the future." (Contest, 117-8)

Only by denying that freedom can affect change in the world in which we live, could we represent the future an object of knowledge. Admitting that he cannot predict the future on the basis of his judgment alone, Kant writes that "the hope for progress… it to be expected only on the condition of a wisdom from above (which bears the name of Providence if it is invisible to us)" (Contest, 169) Kant turns back to causality in nature, secured only by divined providence.

Someone who may share Arendt's judgment that objective teleology is particularly threatening to a politics of freedom when it takes the form of a law of "Infinite Progress," might welcome Kant's ambivalent positions.[210] However, rather than reading Kant's wavering stance as a sign of failure, we can see it as his effort to counter, in practice particularly, the temptation to objectivity that is ever-present risk in judgments of meaning. What Kant is offering is a picture of what the whole of history is "meant to be," but this picture could not be secured as true or false by any amount of empirical data.

Then, we should raise Kant's third question of trilogies: "what can I hope?" Kant's answer, in short, is that "in the end, truth, perhaps, is sad." It would be desirable if things worked as delineated; but it does not always and we have no evidence for supposing that it ever will. Kant with "complete certainty" claims to know that the purpose of the moral law can only be achieved if "there be a God and a future world," and that "no one else knows of any other conditions" that can guarantee properly ordered happiness (A 829/ B 857): "I will inexorably believe in the existence of God and a future life, and I am sure that nothing can make these beliefs unstable, since my moral principles themselves, which I cannot renounce without becoming contemptible in my own eyes, would thereby be subverted" (A 829/B 857). Kant (again) finds God "like the seafaring man on the desert of waters", leans on him as his guide, and follows him as if he would reach his

[210] Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 77.

destiny.[211] The concept of God is required to have, in order to make possible our striving to be good. Belief in God is an essential element of reason in its practical use. Kant is willing to locate God in the human heart as a necessity of practical reason, while becoming more skeptical about proving his existence.

Kant concludes his theodicy essay(1791) with a lengthy reflection on "sincerity of heart" being superior to "distinction of insight." He concludes that "it must be that sincerity is the property farthest removed from human nature – a sad comment, since all the remaining properties, to the extent that they rest on principles, can have a true inner value only through that one" (MPT 266-70). Surely Kant is not arguing that everybody will believe in God, but is insisting that to have a faith is necessary for her to be moral. And as we have seen, Kant in his old age constantly gives the message that the only way to achieve virtue is to supplement morality with religion by striving for the higher goal of "holiness."[212] He assumes that any rational human being could embrace the claim that divine revelation might occur by an "example whose possibility and even necessity of being for us an archetype to be emulated (as far as human beings are capable of this), without either the truth of those teachings or the standing and dignity of the teacher needing any other authentication". Given man's frailty, Kant cannot expect this imperative to be formulated into anything more than an ideal, since to become a truly good man rather a virtuous one is to become "a man through a sort of rebirth, comparable to a new creation and change of heart" (Rel. 6:47).[213] Without a real hope for a true rebirth, aided by

[211] This is an adaptation and modification of Carl Schurz's address statements in 1859. Original statements follow. "Ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in touching them with your hands. But like the seafaring man on the desert of waters, you choose them as you guides, and following them you will reach your destiny."

[212] Kant writes: "we have to strive with everything that is in our powers for the holy ethos of a moral conduct that may please God in order to be able to believe that God's love for mankind will complement, in whatever form they may be, the failure in our actions" (Religion, 6:120).

[213] Cf. Reardon(1988, 171).

grace, being good would be an illusory goal.

The bird depicted in a note which was sent to Sinclair may represent an aspect of young Kant who was yearning to break free. The bird flies to Abraxas, which is the name given by Gnostic Christians to denote the embodied form of God. Likewise, in order to be truly free or "true self", Sinclair must embrace all aspects of himself – both good and evil. Hermann Hesse positions the war at the end of the novel in order to present the challenges of the world to Sinclair. The book ends with the war unresolved. What about Kant?

With this question, we may consult Kant's definition of philosophical undertaking. Kant's definition of philosophy is in continuity with ancient classics in that philosophy should lead us to good. On such a conception, philosophy is a way of life, ordering us toward happiness and wisdom, more than it is an abstract set of principles or knowledge. Late in his life, Kant confesses that the "keystone of the edifice" of philosophical undertaking is "moral practical" and "not just technical-practical" (OP, 28: 489). However, since "only the supreme being is wise" (OP, 28: 38), Kant writes, all that we can possess is the "love of wisdom" and philosophy is a "progression" (OP, 21: 155). Kant clearly professes that the "ancient philosophers" are those who approach "the model of the true philosopher." Such an "idea of the philosopher" can only be an ideal, as "there exists no philosopher corresponding to this model, any more than there exists any true Christian." The "philosopher" is only an idea. Perhaps we may glace at him, and imitate him in some ways, but we shall never totally reach him (LPE, 29:8). Kant was in a progress toward such an illusory goal.

Like this goal at an individual level, Kant offers an opportunity for his readers to think about the improvement in human affairs which demands our autonomous judgment. Unwilling to propagate his position with certainty, for the sake of a politics of freedom, Kant asks us to subject his opinion, with all other claims regarding the same issues, to our own

judgment. This attitude should be maintained, I argue, in order to vindicate our political goals as well as ways of life which are promulgated in this system: “A doctor who used to console his patients from day to day with hopes of imminent recovery, telling one that his pulse was better, and others that their faces or perspiration heralded an improvement, etc., received a visit from one of his friends. ‘How are you my friend, and how is you illness?’ was the first question. ‘How do you think,’ was the reply. ‘*I am dying of sheer recovery!*’ (Contest, 189-90).

Ch. 4 Nietzsche's Critique of Christianity as an embracing of chance

"What is great about human beings is that they are a bridge and not a purpose: what is lovable about human beings is that they are a *crossing over* and a *going under*. I love those who do not know how to live unless by going under, for they are the ones who cross over. I love the great despisers, because they are the great venerators and arrows of longing for the other shore." (Z Prologue:4).

"My task, preparing the way for humanity's moment of highest self-examination, a *great noon* when it will look bakc and look out [ahead], when it will escape from the domination of chance [nature] and priests [idealism] and, for the first time, pose the question 'why?', the question 'what for?' *as a whole* -" (EH 3, "Daybreak", 2)

4.1 Introduction: Thoughts on/of *Untimely Meditations*

This chapter focuses on investigating the influence of Homeric ideals on Nietzsche's conception of individual life in a society. Recently among Nietzschean scholarship, there is a growing interest in depicting his thought as agonistic(contest-based), thus concurrently in emphasizing the importance of Homeric ideals in forming Nietzsche's arguments.[214] I fully agree with this way of approach reaching Nietzsche's ideas, but argue that its focus is misplaced. By invoking Homeric ideals, Nietzsche, rather than

[214] Christa David Acampora, "Nietzsche Contra Homer, Socrates, and Paul," *Journal Of Nietzsche* Studies 24: 1 (2002): 25-53; Acampora, Contesting *Nietzsche* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Lawrence J. Hatab, "Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 24: 1 (2002): 132-47; Hatab, *Nietzsche's Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2005); Herman Siemens, "Nietzsche's Agon with Ressentiment: Towards a Therapeutic Reading of Critical Transvaluation," *Continental Philosophy Review* 34: 1 (2001): 69-93; Siemens, "Agonal Communities of Taste: Law and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy of Transvaluation," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies:* 24 (2002): 83-112.

questioning our mode of ethics, asks us to examine our conception of time, and of history.[215]

Few thinkers are more furiously concerned with challenging traditional, totalizing narratives than Nietzsche. Nietzsche is issuing a challenge to the modern idea of history, which is either linear or dialectic development; his well-known idea of eternal return does not correspond to this modern invention. According to his notion, since each moment recurs eternally, there is little or no development at all. There is no end point, because all moments recur; whereas men in modern times focused on the 'end' only. This very idea of progress is being questioned in Nietzsche's idea of the eternal recurrence. In what follows, I seek out this alternative historical account, particularly by his meditations on a Homeric past. Such account, I argue, can provide us with important resources for checking democratic political as well as individual capabilities. Eventually, in the broadest sense, the argument of this chapter assumes that every concept of politics does/should incorporate a theory of history.[216]

Nietzsche sees an increasing tendency to find universal systems and inexorable formulae in history as endemic to the democratic age. The contemporary historians, Nietzsche argues, are fervently collecting an inexhaustible number of facts and molding them into scientific knowledge to be taught in educational institutions or even daily life. The result is a kind of history that has a single narrative, a single motivation and a fixed viewpoint. The evolutionary theories of social progress and the political foundational myths of liberalism conform to this kind of grand narrative. The masses write history, the facts of history are turned into statistics, and those statistics into a system. "What can statistics prove that there are laws

[215] "One can best approach Nietzsche's thought by recognizing that he is the heir of the philosophy of history" (Thomas Pangle and Timothy, *The Key Texts of Political Philosophy: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 410-2).

[216] Cf. Hayden White makes the claim that "every philosophy of history contains within it the elements of a proper history. (Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 1985), 428.

in history?" If there are such laws, "then the laws are worthless and the history is also worthless " (UM 113).

By rendering history a system with universal propositions and predictable outcomes, any wonder and singularity within history should be disregarded. This intellectual conversion brings forth an arrogant historical attitude, "a twilight mood," in which it is thought that, "as men now are they were bound to become, none may resist this inevitability" (UM 107). For these twilight mood historians, the use of the past lies in its general propositions and extrapolations; the meaning of history lies only in statistics and its conclusion. They "take what comes at the end (unfortunately! Since it should not come at all!), the 'highest ideas,' which means the emptiest, most universal ideas, the last wisps of smoke form the evaporating end of reality – and they should put it at the beginning, *as* the beginning" (TI 168). They are democratic historians.

Rather than using history, men are taught to have nothing left to do but enjoy its zenith. "For it almost seems that the task is to stand guard over history, to see that nothing comes out of it except more history, and certainly no real events!" (UM 84). For most Europeans the present is the pinnacle of historical achievement; sometimes the superiority of Western culture is unquestioned. This attitude is politically and culturally dangerous because it can turn men into epigones: every generation is following the last, instead of leading the next. For Nietzsche, European man is the worst kind of epigone – a self-satisfied one, who believes he has reached the pinnacle of civilization but has in fact just stalled, paralyzed by the weight of his own knowledge: "Overproud European of the nineteenth century, you are raving! Your [historical] knowledge does not perfect nature, it only destroys your own nature. Compare for once the height of your capacity for knowledge with the depth of you incapacity for action" (UM 108).

Making history disputable and undogmatic may seem like a call for diversity or liberal attitude in all areas. In private arena, for example, no one

would- some might say ‘should’- be compelled to make his or her decisions about life by external resources or others. On this view, something is right because I choose it, independently of the actual content of what I choose. The only criterion is that I am the one making the choice and no one else enforces me to follow his other direction. Put it simply, it is merely a formal principle that amounts to the individual having license to do whatever he or she thinks right and whatever he or she wants. This realization of (a kind of) Romantic’s principle is celebrated as a sign for achieving truly freedom. But this is the exact opposite of what Nietzsche has in mind. When you let the marketplace control historical thought, the result will be the democratization of history: “There still remains a dreadful species of historian, efficient, severe and honest of character but narrow of mind; the will to be just is there, as is the pathos attending the office of judge: but all their verdicts are false, for approximately the same reason as the verdicts of ordinary court juries are false” (UM 90).

In modern democracies, men are factional, but they are rarely revolutionaries; they focus on changing the details of politic, but rarely the fundamentals. From another vantage point, lethargy could be re-defined as satisfaction; to spend one’s life hanging loose is usually regarding a successful one. For Nietzsche, by contrast, this lack of revolutionary zeal indicates a broader and more serious malaise. He is concerned about the dangers of the enervation of democratic citizens despite the ensuring benefits of political stability and economic well-being; if men are not reminded of the possibilities of grand ambitions, they will lose the capacity not only to revolt, but also to defend themselves from social and political tyranny. A society based on equality and comfort can create a very high standard of living, but little or no worthy cultural accomplishment.

To counter this trend, unlike the hard-realistic historians and philosophers, who believe that wisdom is founded solely upon reason and recognition, Nietzsche sees the possibility of wonder, passion and perplexity

as the foundation of wisdom.[217] "How did logic come into existence in man's head?" Nietzsche asks in *The Gay Science*. "Certainly out of illogic, whose realm originally must have been immense" (GS 171). Error and mystery are ubiquitous and natural, and out of them flows what is true and known. Rather than trying to cling to logic and truth, Nietzsche believes that men must accept error and ambiguity, and find meaning even in enigmas and paradoxes.

Therefore, when the genuine historian must be able to see history as it really is, this involves preserving its mysteries and illusions. "When the historical sense reigns without restraint, and all its consequences are realized, it uproots the future because it destroys illusions and robs the things that exist of the atmosphere in which alone they can live" (UM 95). In a systematic view of history, there are few, if any, illusions: all elements of the phenomena are accounted for and explicable. By contrast, history must allow "a future already alive in anticipation to raise its house" (UM 95). History must retain illusions in order to preserve a future alive in anticipation – it must preserve uncertainty and forgetting in order to preserve a space for human agency. In Nietzsche's view of history, the inexplicable must remain unknowable because otherwise human beings are simply performing in a drama written by another's hand. This is a merely a secularly re-imagined providence, without the benefit of an unknowable God. But Nietzsche seems to contradict himself by saying "the concept of free will is… the shadiest trick theologians have up their sleeves for making humanity 'responsible' in their sense of the term." (TI 181). Nietzsche's saying is not that there is no such thing as freedom: he objects to the idea

[217] Christian Emden argues that: "Nietzsche is acutely aware of the double meaning of *thaumazein*, especially in Aristotle: it refers to 'wonder' not only in terms of 'admiration' or 'astonishment' but also in terms of 'being perplexed.' Being 'perplexed' in the face of an unknown situation, or while encountering a difficult problem, represents for Aristotle the beginning of a critical and analytical thought." (Christian Emden, *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of History* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 127-8). See also Thomas Brobjer, "Nietzsche's View of the Value of Historical Studies and Methods," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 65:2 (2004),314.

that we were given our freedom by other higher power in order to be made responsible for our sins. Human power and free will comes from within each man and "starts in humanity". But this loftiness is not a quality of all men equally; it is for the "higher men" to realize "how much is still possible!" (Z "On the Higher Man":15)

Likewise, in Nietzsche, one need not read too far before encountering this celebration of the great individual and his tremendous fear of modern society's tendency to squelch such individuality. A casual reading of many of Nietzsche's major works reveals that he has a penchant for "big" individuals, like the "philosopher" (*Philosoph*) of the future in *Beyond Good and Evil*, the overman (Übermensch) and higher men (Höhere Menschen) in Zarathustra, the sovereign individual (souveraine Individuum) in Genealogy of Morality, and the "knowers" (Erkennenden) of various works, among other ideals and exemplars. This theme permeates Nietzsche's oeuvre, thus having constantly drawn scholars' attention.[218] But existing literatures on this topic still remains focused on clarifying exact characteristics of great individual. I will argue in this chapter that beneath those fluctuations of each individual type Nietzsche presents, his conception of time and history form a main current.

In the next section, I will briefly sketch previous literature on Nietzsche. In the following section, I will clarify problems Nietzsche raised over his whole work. In the remaining sections, I will attempt to seek out Nietzsche's account of great individual, with comparison to Homeric Hero.

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[218] Excellent discussions of Nietzsche's particular ideal types can be found in the following works: on the "philosopher of the future", see Lampert (2001); on the overman, see Lampert (1986), Gillespie(2005), and Rosen (1995); on the sovereign individual, see Gemes (2006). (Laurence Lampert, *Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986); Lampert, *Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil*. Yale University Press, 2001); Michael Allen Gillespie, "'Slouching Toward Bethlehem to Be Born': On the Nature and Meaning of Nietzsche's Superman," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 30 (2005),49-69. Stanley Rosen, *The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Ken Gemes, "Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy and the Sovereign Individual," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 80 (2006), 321-8.

Understood as an adaptation of Homeric account, I will propose a positive Nietzsche account, one that begins with the acknowledgement of persons as capable of transforming the contingent, painful experiences of life into moments of enacted personal value.

4.2 Putting Nietzsche in Context: literature review

Almost every recent work on Nietzsche starts with the following declaration. 'The ambition of the present work is to fill the gap in the literature on Nietzsche by demonstrating how an understanding of this – which can be either other thinker's work or his doctrine – promises to illuminate Nietzsche's thought.' In other words, scholars claimed that such a comparative undertaking would shed another brighter light on broadening our understanding of Nietzsche. In fact, the recent proliferation of commentary has brought with it a good deal of work on the figures, which might have been claimed to shape Nietzsche's views. Reaching beyond the more obvious cases in which Nietzsche himself credits some thinkers as having exerted a formative influence on his thought (such as Schopenhauer) or in which he maintained the kind of close relationship intellectually as well as personally (with the Wagner or Paul Rée), there has been increasing interest in seeking his debt to other areas such as sciences (for instance, Boscovich, Mach) and arts (Schiller, Shakespeare, the Greek tragedians), and to broader intellectual trends both antique (Skepticism) and modern (Darwinism).

I would not intend to discredit this recent undertaking. Rather, their efforts to take another interpretative perspective are admittedly fair in that previous literature on Nietzsche have reached a certain deadlock. Moreover, Nietzsche's work contains a vast number of explicit references to ancient philosophers, from pre-Platonic thinkers, through Socrates and Plato, and to the Hellenistic schools of the Stoics and Epicureans. He also explicitly boasts his engagement with early moderns such as Descartes, Spinoza, and

Leibniz, as well as with late moderns such as Kant, Schopenhauer. This recent way of interpreting Nietzsche is also fairly understandable since Nietzsche's positive philosophical positions- e.g., the will to power, the eternal recurrence, or the Overman – are notoriously ambiguous and invoking seemingly endless controversial. Secondary literature had not been successful in illumination his thoughts, if not creating the haze around his ideas. Some of them identified the one text, the one idea, or the one doctrine that might, as claimed, serve as a focal point and provide a fundamental organizing principle for the rest of Nietzsche's work.[219] Other systematic interpretations have organized Nietzsche's thought with respect to a central problem rather than a certain teaching.[220] Another emphasized disorderliness of his writings to signal the lack of a central, systemizing thought and adopt a piecemeal thematic approach.[221] With this murky contour of interpretative results, it seems sensible to start considering what avenues must be closed off by investigating Nietzsche's censure of others and moving back toward his original position. This might lead to a more fine-grained understanding of his own positive positions.

Brobjer's work, *Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography*, is an example of a work that shows the advantage of such comparative undertaking.[222] There Brobjer rummaged the contents of Nietzsche's library, through which he says we may "better understand and make known the general context in which Nietzsche thought and wrote and his dependence on this context. It is only when this context is known that we can hope to understand more fully what he meant and the reasons for this

[219] Alexander Nehamas, *Nietzsche, Life as Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
[220] John Richardson, *Nietzsche's System* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
[221] Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982); Maudemaris Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Peter Poellner, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Peter Berkowitz, *Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
[222] Thomas Brobjer, *Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008).

attacks on other views". Surely, there is more than a kernel of truth in the claim that if either intellectual or social context in which Nietzsche was situated decisively shaped his thoughts, a familiarity with that context will grant us a richer understanding of those. However, it should be noted that simply possessing bare facts about which books Nietzsche owned or excavating hidden annotations he made in certain texts is insufficient to make strong claims of influence. Brobjer himself admits that "it is difficult to determine with certainty the details of the influence".[223]

In line with the recent development and with this caveat, I, throughout this chapter, suggest approaching Nietzsche's main ideas by properly excavating his intellectual milieu – a philologist as well as classicist.[224] [225] This proposal sounds puzzling since, as well known, Nietzsche avowedly declined to be characterized as such. There are three reasons for this unexpected proposition to be taken considerably. First, the primary sources which Nietzsche were most familiar and actually acquainted with were ancient texts. There are abundant works to show his understanding of more modern texts and those influence on forming his thoughts, but, in fact, he seemed to eavesdrop on that subject through his

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[223] Brobjer, 2008, 2, 24.

[224] Jessica Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 29.

[225] Just in case, a few more words on Nietzsche's early career would be helpful understanding his fuller acquaintance with Greek tradition. In 1864, at the age of nineteen, Nietzsche enrolled for theology and philosophy at the University of Bonn for the 1864/65 winter term, but as soon as the following spring term started, he changed his studies to philology. When his teacher Friedrich Ritschel moved to the University of Leipzig, Nietzsche followed him at the next year. From October 1865 to February 1869, Nietzsche stayed there, and received an offer of appointment at Basel. A year after he was made a full professor in philology. Surely, as well known, Nietzsche did not continue his career in Basel. Latacz(2014, 21-22) comments that "Basel became the place where Nietzsche experience his crucial turn. The city had appointed a great philologist, and saw a great philologist fail. But from this failure emerged a great thinker" In a draft for a letter to the publisher of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche claims to seek "to explain Greek tragedy in a totally new way," in that he "for the time being [!] wants to refrain from any philological approach on the question and only wants to focus on the aesthetic problem" (to Engelmann, April 20, 1871; KSB 3, 193f). (Joachim Latacz, "On Nietzsche's Philosophical Beginnings," in *Nietzsche as a Scholar of Antiquity*, eds. Helmut Heit and Anthony K. Jensen. (Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).

conversation with others or to skim those texts. For example, one thinker whom he is most frequently linked is Rousseau, but "Nietzsche had neither a subtle, nor a sophisticated, reading of Rousseau's thought, of its complexities and paradoxes, but that nevertheless his work can be seen to provide a major insight into the impasse which Rousseau's thought reaches on the problem of history and the fate of civilization.[226]

The second related evidence is that Nietzsche had little knowledge on and even put any single effort to learn other European languages such as French and English. Although he is claimed to have a full knowledge of other contemporary thinkers such as David Hume, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Jean- Jacques Rousseau, he most likely relied on his acquaintance's translation if needed.[227] This lack of linguistic tools raises some doubts since he was well-known for his linguistic dexterity in ancient language from quite early age.

Thirdly, the structure of his oeuvre follows that of Homer's epic poem *Odyssey*[228] in that the middle part of the story is interrupted by the change of the narrator: in the middle part of *Odyssey,* the hero, not the story-teller, gives a long account of his wanderings; only in *Zarathustra*, which chronologically comprises the middle-period works of Nietzsche, Zarathustra rather than Nietzsche speaks in his own voice. I presume that at the middle part of both, each writer delivers their true message with other

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[226] Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Nietzsche and Modern German Thought* (London: Routledge, 1991), 16.

[227] Christine Swanton, *The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche* (Wiley, 2015); Ansell-Pearson (1991). There are numerous anecdotes showing his lack of fluency in both languages. "Since Nietzsche's facility with French lagged behind his skills in the classical languages, he began to read and discuss works with friends from whom he urged translation" (Jessica N. Berry, "The Pyrrhonian Revival in Montaigne and Nietzsche" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 65:3 (2004), 505).

[228] *Odyssey* consists of 24 books. If we skip the first part (Book 1-4), which tells the story of Odysseus's son Telemachus, the whole storyline of Odysseus can be seen as containing three units. The first section (Book 5-8) recounts the final part of Odysseus' journey to Ithaca. This narrative is interrupted when Odysseus is asked by the King Alkinnos to tell his story. The hero then gives a long account of his wanderings and adventures, which represent the second unit (Book 9-12). The final part of the work resumes the previous storyline and tells of Odysseus after his arrival in his homeland. Odysseus is represented as a special kind of Greek hero in that he is known for his intelligence.

parts, before and after that, containing "the usual information to explain the middle part."[229] In addition, Nietzsche always refers Homer throughout his publication history. Homer, Homeric figures, and quotes as well as allusions to Homer appear in all of Nietzsche's philosophical works – in the early (*The Birth of Tragedy*; the notes before 1879), as well as in the middle (*Human, All-Too Human)* and late period (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra; Beyond Good and Evil; On the Genealogy of Morals;* and the late notes).

4.3 Two Ethics, Two Pathos: Nihilism and *Ressentiment*

4.3.1 Nihilism: the aftereffect of Enlightenment tradition

The central features of Nietzsche's problem that pervades his oeuvre may be found in his retelling of the parable of Silenus.

"There is an ancient story that king Midas hunted in the forest for a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus, without capturing him. When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. Fixed and immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill laugh and broke out into these words: 'Oh wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond you reach: not to be born, not to *be*, to be *nothing*. But the second

[229] Latacz (2014, 12-13), while introducing Nietzsche's philological work in Leipzig, points out that "in one of his fruitful work on the 'Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi', Nietzsche pays special attention to the text's tripartite structure: of its 18 sections, only the middle eight sections (6-13) deal with the sort of 'contest of Homer with Hesiod'. Before and after this contest, sections 1-5 and 14-18, contain the usual information to explain the middle part." Tanner(1994, 59) acknowledged the central importance of *Zarathustra* in Nietzsche's work but showed a different view from this chapter's perspective while commenting on other works: "everything he wrote after TSZ was a commentary on it, but that seems to have been more in the nature of an attempt at self-reassurance than a genuine assessment of their nature or quality. (Michael Tanner, *Nietzsche: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 59). For one thing, the Übermensch is never heard of again; the Eternal Recurrence rarely recurs… For another, the progress through the first post-TSZ book, Beyond Good and Evil, through his masterpiece The Genealogy of Morals, to the torrential pamphlets of the last year, has little do with anything stated or adumbrated in TSZ." In contrast, this chapter holds the view that other works of Nietzsche support his main ideas introduced in Zarathustra.

best for you is – to die soon." (BT 22-3).

The insight of Silenus can be summarized as 'best never to be born, second best to die soon.' For Nietzsche, the modern secular world is oriented by the goal of seeking "the preservation and advancement of mankind." But Nietzsche adds a qualification: "Preservation of *what*? Is the question one immediately has to ask. Advancement *to what?*" To answer by himself, he says that the modern secular cause is simply "an expression of the desire for a formula, nothing and nothing more", which opposes Nietzsche's proposition to "live *in such a manner* that you will have to *desire* to live again." (DB 106). This totalizing but superficial narrative of modern history has made individual life meaningless in the two quite distinct ways.

First, Nietzsche is concerned with the ways that individual life and distinctions are subsume into modern group memberships, by which individuals may be managed without further difficulty. The logic of the modern political project can so easily manage and dispose of individual life and individual values in the name of group well-being:

"One never tires of enumerating and indicting all that is evil and inimical, prodigal, costly, extravagant in the form individual existence has assumed hitherto, one hopes to manage more cheaply, more safely, more equitably, more uniformly if there exist only *large bodies and their members*. Everything that in any way corresponds to this body… is felt to be *good*." (DB 132)

The logic of the state reinforces a way of relating one's own life to a purpose that has been supplied for the individual, along with the social relations of compassion. This situation is "the modern undercurrent of our age; individual empathy and social feeling here play into one another's hands." (DB 132) For Nietzsche, this democratic social behavior, hypocritically, has more to do with the existential and moral comfort of the individual than it does with an honest attempt to sympathize with actual

suffering of others:

"If you who adhere to this religion [of pity], have the same attitude towards yourselves that you have towards you fellow men; if you refuse to let your own suffering lie on you even for an hour and if you constantly try to prevent and forestall all possible distress…, then it is clear that beside your religion of pity you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of pity: the *religion of comfortableness.* How little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or as in you care, *remain small* together" (GS 338).

Moreover, a shared, universal experience effectively brackets the specific cause, context, faced by a specific individual. As Nietzsche puts it, "When people try to benefit someone in distress, the intellectual frivolity with which those moved by pity assume the role of fate is for the most part outrageous; some simply knows nothing of the whole inner sequence and intricacies that are distress for me or for you." (GS 338) Nietzsche points out that such appeals to shared pity can impose a narrative of exchangeable suffering, like as other commodity, where none exists. The universal mandate to preserve life need not make room for distinct views about what constitutes a fulfilling and meaningful life. However, it should be noted that Nietzsche does not think that preservation of life is inherently bad. Nor is he arguing we should overlook the suffering of others. The danger is just to follow those manuals without any critical judgment.[230] Nietzsche's point, further, is that preservation alone should not be the end we assign human existence. He writes, "I want to teach them that what is understood by so few today, least of all by these preachers of pity: *to share not suffering but joy*." (GS 338)

Would this pitiable situation be different if someone reflects on this

[230] Michael L. Frazer, "The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy and Strength," *The Review of Politics* 68(2006), 69.

phenomenon deeply? Nietzsche's diagnosis is not too much different, if not worse. Nietzsche argues that in dissolving all human conventions, the reflective individual bottoms out in coming face to face with nature; the individual learns the "terrible truth" that nature is meaningless in itself (BT 7). After enduring through hardships, the only truth he gets is the "tragic knowledge", which is the knowledge of the falsity of all human conventions and the meaningless of nature.[231] Discerning all traditionally constructed forms of meaning illusory as well as nature a realm of randomness, the individual is thrown into the melancholy state of longing for meaning. Thus for Nietzsche such "tragic knowledge" creates a tortured individual – the one who longs for meaning but finds it nowhere. This recognition makes him or her worse off than animals. This hopelessness does not haunt animals, which live moment to moment, but it does haunt human beings, who shudder at the thought that all their efforts, their striving, will come to nothing at the end of their life. Such a fear may make us wonder what the point of constant striving, of the incessant worries of our day-to-day lives is. If our constant strivings "do nothing to change the eternal essence of things," then what is the point of living (BT 7)?[232]

This tortured human subjectivity is reached high in the modern rational age "when we have sought a 'meaning' in all events that is not there: so the seeker eventually becomes discouraged… becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing" (WP 12). Goethe's Faust dramatizes this phenomenon, that "human beings themselves" with endless searching and not being satisfied with their knowledge. Goethe's play is an attempt to answer Mephistopheles' charge that man "would have an easier time of it

[231] See BT 7 on the "terrible truth" of the meaningless of nature, and BT 15 on the "tragic knowledge" that nature is not wholly rational.

[232] The confusions and terror brought by this "terrible truth" are repeated in *Gay Science*: "What were we doing when we unchanged this earth from its sun? Where is it moving to now? Where are we moving to? Away from all suns? Are we not continually falling? And backwards, sidewards, forwards, in all directions?" (GS 125)

had you not let him glimpse celestial light".[233] Nietzsche argues that "Faust, who storms unsatisfied through all the faculties, who has devoted himself to magic and the devil out of the drive for knowledge; we only have to compare him with Socrates to realize that modern is beginning to sense the limits of the Socratic lust for knowledge" (BT 18).

Accordingly, for Nietzsche, the "coming generations" will be faced with this "terrible" dilemma: "either abolish your venerations" through increased skepticism or "yourselves" as distinctively human beings. The dilemma is this: either we abandon our current values ("reverences"), perhaps at the cost of losing all normative guidance; or we, ourselves, deserves to be repudiated. Both, Nietzsche claims, are forms of "nihilism" that we moderns must avoid (GS 346), because a full acknowledgment of the complete meaningless of our existence would lead to "suicidal nihilism" (GM, 3:28).[234] This uneasiness, according to Nietzsche, had driven human beings the opposite way, to be soaked in religious haven, allured in Christianity.

4.3.2 *Ressentiment*: the effect of Christianity

According to Nietzsche, a priest, painting an "*entirely fictitious world*", indirectly but more powerfully, hoodwinks people. By "teaching people to see the highest spiritual values as sinful, as deceptive, as *temptations*", he depicts "the strong human being as reprehensible, as 'depraved'" (A 5). Why did the priest sketch this false world? The reason is that he is weak but cunning. He is weak in that in a current situation he cannot achieve what he wants. He always tries to turn the disadvantageous situation to his benefits, but is powerless to change the reality; his

[233] Goethe (1985, 19).

[234] For more extended explications of Nietzsche's concept of nihilism, see Tracy B. Strong, *Politics without Vision: Thinking without a Banister in the Twentieth Century* (University of Chicago Press, 2012); Michael Allen Gillespie, *Nihilism Before Nietzsche* (University of Chicago Press, 1995); Bernard Reginster, *The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism* (Harvard University Press, 2006), ch.1.

manipulation "is rooted in a *hatred* of the natural (-of reality!-)" (A 15).[235] But he is cunning in that instead of surrendering his wishes, he wholeheartedly finds the means to subdue this situation and accomplish his aim. To accomplish this aim, "this type of person has a life-interest in making humanity *sick* and twisting the concepts 'good' and 'evil', 'true' and 'false' to the point where they endanger life and slander the world" (A 24). How do priests manipulate this process? "They performed a miracle of falsification." They, "with a warped and deceitful attitude" had abused "the name of God" and "had stipulated once and for all *what they wanted*." Using the name of God, they set the criterion of good and evil. They had taken "everything *intrinsically* valuable" and rendered it "fundamentally worthless." (A 9, 26) This falsification moves "people over to nothingness!"[236] In order to coat this nihilistic appearances, they coins several slogans - "'the beyond'; or 'God'; or 'the true life'; or nirvana, salvation, blessedness" (A 7).[237]

Far from being beneficial, the fiction of God and the afterlife is in fact extremely harmful. With this line of argument, Nietzsche shifts his focus from the theoretical credentials of the belief in God to its practical utility. "The concept of 'God' invented as a counter-concept of life – everything harmful, poisonous, slanderous, the whole hostility unto death against life synthesized in this concept in a gruesome unity! The concept of 'beyond', the 'true world' invented in order to devaluate the only world there is – in order to retain no goal, no reason, no task for our earthly reality!" (EH, 4:8).[238]

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[235] The priest's "most basic instinct of self-preservation does not allow any scrap of reality to be honoured or even expressed" (A 9).

[236] "Parasitism as the church's *only* practice; drinking all the blood, all the love, all the hope out of life…. against health, beauty, against anything well constituted, against courage, spirit, *goodness* of the soul, *against life itself*…" (A 62).

[237] For Nietzsche these priests are "petty, misshapen liars and idiots started claiming the ideas of 'God', 'truth', 'light', 'spirit', 'love', 'wisdom', 'life' for themselves, as synonyms for themselves" (A 44).

[238] Since our highest values cannot be realized under the conditions of our life in this world, and since the good life is elsewhere, then the only appropriate way of living it out is ascetic

To propagate this worldview, the priest should become "the only one who can 'redeem'" (A 21). To remain as a sole judge, he has to silence the voice of a potential competitor – a scientist, doctor, or philosopher. Presenting his own exegesis of the Bible, Nietzsche argues that the priest shares the same fear which the old God had earlier. The old God creates human beings because of boredom: "the human is entertaining" (A 48). But as soon as human beings acquire "the tree of knowledge", "the old God was sacred". With scientific knowledge, they can seize the place of God: "people had turned out to be his *biggest* mistake, he had created a rival for himself, science makes you *godlike,* - it is all over for priests and gods when people become scientific" (A 48).

For priests and gods to retain the throne, they should evict people from the original paradise: human beings no longer enjoy abundance, happiness, and idleness which "give rise to thinking." They stigmatize the search of scientific knowledge as a sin, "the *first* sin, the seed of all sins, the *original* sin." And they further creates other notions of sin for people "to be made unhappy" so that to relieve this suffering "people should *not* look to the outside, they should look within." If they cannot endure it, "they always in in need of a priest. – Get rid of doctors! *People need a savior"* (A 48-49).[239] The priest provokes masses to invoke and lead this movement. "In Christianity, the instincts of the subjugated and oppressed come to the fore: the lowest classes are the ones who look to it for salvation" (A 21). The masses are easily recruited because they commonly want to lead a comfortable life under God's blessing. The only thing the priest needs to do is arouse their sense of guilty: since "morality is the best way of leading

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self-denial: "If one shifts the center of gravity of life *out* of life into the 'Beyond' – into *nothingness* – one has deprived life of its center of gravity… *So* to live that there is no longer any *meaning* in living: *that* now becomes the 'meaning' of life" (A 43).

[239] This strategy has been well received in the Christian institutions: "The idea of *abolishing* any distress ran counter to the church's deepest sense of its own advantage, - it lived on distress, it *created* distress in order to eternalize *itself"* (A 62).

people", "the priest *lives* on sin, he needs 'sinning' to happen" (A 26, 44).[240]

Some may raise the doubt that in a secular world, where Nietzsche himself proclaimed a state "God is dead", aforementioned *ressentiment* would not inflict us anymore. But "The greatest recent event- that "God is dead", that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable- is already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe… how much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined because it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it." (GS 343). Once people realize that they were basing values on a lie or nothing, nihilism was a necessary outcome. Nietzsche is more concerned that when human beings' highest values and belief in supra-natural origins are gone, people, rather than overcoming this situation, cheerfully accept it, even if they hear the "death of God". Nietzsche calls these people as the "last humans" in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra.*

As desperate as he believed things were, Nietzsche was not without hope. Indeed, he believed that the coming collapse would wipe clutters so that a new beginning would be possible. After this crisis, Nietzsche espouses an ascent from the modern decadence to the Übermensch: "Now Zarathustra looked at the people and he was amazed. Then he spoke thus: 'Mankind is a rope fastened between animal and overman – a rope over an abyss…'" (Z Prologue:4). In order to understand his project fully, we need to examine the grounds for Nietzsche's conviction, and what he believed was necessary to achieve it. Before delving into these controversial issues, we would better to start with the plain one – the varieties of Nietzsche's great individual – for having preliminary knowledge about his general thesis to deal with those complexities.

4.4 Nietzsche's Dionysian Philosophy: Nietzsche's thoughts on

[240] Nietzsche sums up this development as follows: "Sin, this supreme form of human self-desecration, was invented to block science, to block culture, to block every elevation and ennoblement of humanity; the priests *rule* through the invention of sin" (A 49).

great individuals

The production – or breeding – of the genius, the lofty ideal of the *Übermensch*, the breeding of a higher, stronger human type, the great man, are all variations on a single theme. Throughout his works, Nietzsche's insistence on the same – or extremely similar – theme confirms the continuity of his thinking about such an issue; while the terms to denote this individual changed over time, the content did. For Nietzsche, the true goal of mankind is achieving the genius. Everything else is subordinate to this, highest aim. Taking account of its importance, Nietzsche's *Übermensch*, the free, independent, self-mastering individual, has been the subject of a large and growing debate in the secondary literature.[241] The debate is in fact sparked by disagreement over the character of this individual, and it owes partly to Nietzsche's seemingly shifting views over his works. Therefore, to understand the implications of his ideas more fully, I examine Nietzsche's portrayal of this great individual by following a frequently observed division in Nietzsche's work between three periods.

In the initial period, which lasted to the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy*(1872), Nietzsche was at his most romantic. Referring to several artists who were commonly understood as a 'genius' in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche expresses his hope that the artistic individual could lead the people in a cultural reawakening. In this period, the cult of the genius had captured Nietzsche's imagination. In the middle period, which included *Human, All Too Human*(1878), Nietzsche vociferously rejected the metaphysics of romanticism and explicitly re-evaluated many of his

[241] On the favorable side, see Deleuze(2008, 32-8), who depicts the overhuman as the one exhibiting creative forces, while expelling nihilistic ones. On the other hand, Jaspers(1997, 167-8) disparages this ideal as a substitute for God. Müller-Lauter(1999, 72-121) takes the middle ground by emphasizing the unresolvable ambiguity of this concept. (Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. H. Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, trans. C. F. Wallraff and F. J. Schmitz (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Wolfgang Müller-Lauter , *Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy*, trans. D. J. Parent (New York: University of Illinois Press, 1999)).

youthful hopes for an inspired cultural genius. The idea of great individuals still remained important in this period, but primarily in terms of the ability to study carefully the effects and limitations of history on oneself, others and shared human values. In the final period, beginning with *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*(1883), the free individual was to transcend and escape the limitations of knowledge and history that constrain the average mass of people.

4.4.1 The initial period

Nietzsche's work leading up to and including *The Birth of Tragedy*(1872) was the most romantic of his career. The theme of nihilism lies at the heart of this book, and tragic art was supposed to provide "a consolation to the Hellene… whose piercing gaze has seen to the core of the terrible destructions of world history and nature's cruelty; and who runs the risk of longing for a Buddhistic denial of the will. He is saved by art, and through art, life has saved him for itself" (BT 7). As a teenager Nietzsche's favorite writers were Hölderlin, Schiller and Byron, with whom he developed a romantic perspective that was in tension with the growing realism of his living period. To counter the trend and justify his own perspective, Nietzsche scouted for evidence in various artists.

His incessant endeavor can be found in his works: Goethe was Nietzsche's primary example, cultivating one's innate and unique talents through education and art; Nietzsche was drawn to Byron for living up to the challenge of making his own life worthy of poetry and storytelling; Nietzsche also found his heroic artist in Wagner. In his first published work, *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche described the pre-Socratic appreciation of Greek tragedy and suggested ways of reawakening it. Why is this rebirth necessary? Through tragedy, an artist could promote an alternative consciousness that had been overshadowed by the veil of rational consciousness. To explain this practice, Nietzsche broached the distinction

between Apollonian knowledge and Dionysian awareness. Apollo represents the rational power to create beautiful illusions “through which life is made both possible and worth living”, thus maintaining the boundaries of the individual (BT 16). On the other hand, Dionysian awareness denotes the intoxicated state where the boundaries of individual are inoperative and “subjectivity becomes a complete forgetting of the self” (BT 17). The artistic genius experiences the perfect balance between the rational Apollonian knowledge and the passionate, intuitive Dionysian awareness.

Introducing Greek tragedy, Nietzsche presented not only his worldview but the artistic individual’s way of life. This inclusion implies a farewell message to his former teacher, Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer had seen the world of the will as a negative because the will is the drive to survive and nothing else, and thus one’s will is in constant conflict with others’ one. In such a seemingly Hobbesian state, the only way that Schopenhauer’s genius takes is to renounce the will. Nietzsche agreed that the will is the fundamental reality. However, he rejected the idea that the will must always be renounced; the Greeks had shown that this reality could be confronted with joy (BT 80).

4.4.2 The middle period

Nietzsche was open to new ideas, particularly those that served to refute his old ones. Personally, Nietzsche was humiliated for having been taken in by the excesses of the romantic Wagner. He also wrote of his developing difference with Schopenhauer: “In terms of almost all his general claims I do not take his side; even while I was writing about him I noticed that I was already beyond all questions of dogma” (op. Krell and Bates, 83). He himself had succumbed to the appeal of the romantic notions of an ideal artistic world and genius. However, Nietzsche came to see that metaphysical and romantic ideas were not removing layers of delusions, but adding to them. Nietzsche turned to Enlightenment thinkers for a way of

understanding and studying history.

Over the course of the six years after the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche underwent several developments in his thought on history. Nietzsche had been critical of the historicist view of culture and politics that was dominant at that time in Germany. This view assumes that each historical period must be understood in its own terms. For earlier Nietzsche this meant simply a study of the past and a gathering of knowledge for the sake of gathering information. He had been opposed to knowledge for its own sake. For later Nietzsche, however, knowledge, especially of the past, should be a means of attaining personal awareness and development.

In the essay "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life", the second essay in *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche compared human beings to cows. Nietzsche believed that forgetting the past allows one to live in the moment unburdened by the "chains" of history (History, 60-1). Because cows, such as any other animals, do not remember, or even know history, they are content in the moment and free. A person who always remembers is unduly fettered, thus unable to live happily. To avoid this unfavorable situation, Nietzsche advocated a limited or balanced use of history in the service of life, and he called this bounded use of history as a horizon. The man who can limit his horizon is strong; unlike the cow, the strong person does not forget everything but forgets and uses history selectively. Nietzsche calls this ability as the "plastic power of a man, a people, a culture." The man with this capacity "transform[s]" at least the parts of history within which he builds his horizon: "The stronger the innermost roots of a man's nature, the more readily will he be able to assimilate and appropriate the things of the past; and the most powerful and tremendous nature would be characterized by the fact that it would know no boundary at all at which the historical sense began to overwhelm it" (History, 62-3).

Later in *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche pushes this idea further to create the Free Spirit: "It calls itself a book for *free* spirits: practically every sentence in it expresses a victory – with it I liberated myself from what in my nature *did not belong to me*…a spirit that has *become free*, that has seized possession of itself again" (EH HH1). The Free Spirit is the one who is free from what is accorded to him, or "who thinks differently from what we expect of him on the basis of his origin, environment, his social rank and position, or on the basis of the prevailing views of the time. He is the exception, the constrained spirits are the rule" (HH 225).[242]

4.4.3 The final period

By the time he wrote *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche had wholeheartedly given up a hope for overcoming the modern situation through slow, methodical study of history. The seemingly salutary limitations of knowledge and history that Nietzsche had called 'horizons' a decade ago had been transformed to the "strange simplification and falsification mankind lives in!"(BGE 55). In *Beyond Good and Evil*(1886) and *The Antichrist*(1888), Nietzsche repeatedly insists that only stronger, higher human type can flourish when these harsh conditions dominate: "How is freedom to be measured, in individuals as well as nations? By the resistance which must be overcome, the efforts it costs to stay *on top*. The highest type of free men would need to be sought in the place where the

[242] *Human, All Too Human*, originally published in 1878, had a dedication "to the memory of Voltaire," followed by a short explanation of late publication date. There was his "wish to offer a timely personal tribute to the greatest liberator of the human spirit." This dedication is interpreted as a change of Nietzsche's general intellectual view from the time he dedicated his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, to Wagner. Simply put, Wagner represents a leading figure of Romanticism, whereas Voltaire is an advocate of the Enlightenment. But when he reissued *Human, All Too Human* in 1886, Nietzsche changed his attitude by deleting the epigraph from Descartes. He expresses the need to disavow – not disregard- previously accepted general claims if one wants to know oneself. Gillespie argues that the 1886 prefaces are designed by Nietzsche to show that "while his earlier works had been errors, each had been a necessary error, and his readers had to understand how he had overcome these errors." (Michael Allen Gillespie, *Nietzsche's Final Teaching* (University of Chicago Press, 2017), 69).

greatest resistance is constantly being overcome" (TI Skirmishes 38).[243]

The crucial point is that a species or a type grows strong in "constant *unfavourable* conditions". For example, when an aristocratic community such as an ancient Greek polis or Venice was established with "the aim of *breeding*" the strong, self-reliant individual, harshness was crucial component (BGE 262). In contrast, in Nietzsche's time, European "herd-animal morality" – with focus on security, comfort, and easy living for everybody - was prevailing; great men were scarce. Repudiating the claim to establish a "universal green pasture-happiness", Nietzsche argues that exactly the "*reverse* conditions" must be sought – the list includes danger, harshness, violence, inequality of rights, and even slavery. These are essential for the blooming of the plant man. A reversal of values will help to establish them and "to breed a ruling caste – the future *masters of the earth"* (WP 957; BGE 44).

Rather than being a shadow educator to teach this undisclosed lesson, Nietzsche was a transformative activist who trumpeted it for upbringing great individuals. Nietzsche says that the ideal human type was not non-existence in our history, but they "as an exception" came out "as a stroke of luck". Nietzsche exhorted his (future) readers not to live upon a mere hope, not to stay enclosed, and not to be unfree. Why did Nietzsche overreact as such? He seemed to perceive that his words would not leave the pages, thus being unable to change people's opinion. There is a double-layered barrier: the first hurdle is that people are wholly ignorant about what to do; the stronger barrier is that people detest hearing those words. Great individuals, including himself, are not idols that people readily glorify, but "the paradigm of the terrible" so that "people feared most". Since people had this conception, "the opposite type was willed, bred, achieved: the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick animal" (A 3). Against these

[243] On the political spur to self- overcoming that Nietzsche has in mind, consider further Hugo Drochon, *Nietzsche's Great Politic*s (Princeton University Press, 2018), 87, 95-96.

unfavorable conditions, Nietzsche entrusted philosophers to behave like a "doctor" to cure this "unhealthy modernity" (A 7). The recommended surgeries should be undertaken on two levels – societal and personal.

4.5 Nietzsche's Anthro-culturalism: The Revaluation of All Values

4.5.1 Nietzsche's Realistic Vision for the Great Politics of Cultural Renewal: Thought on Socio-Political arrangements

Learning from antiquity is one of the central themes of Nietzsche's thoughts. Nietzsche regarded himself as "a pupil [Zögling] of older times, especially the Greek" and emphasized the singular importance of ancient exemplars (History, Forward). The outstanding significance of the Greeks is that they offer – against the tendencies of modern times – an exemplary model for education great individuals, as well as the political framework where the production of great men would not be left to mere chance.

Concerning Nietzsche's life-long interest in Greeks, it is not an astonishing fact that he was engaged with Plato. In the early 1870s, Nietzsche gave a course on Plato and the Platonic dialogues. Afterwards, although not mentioning directly Plato, Nietzsche communicated constantly with Plato throughout his writings. Several scholars pointed out that Nietzsche exploited Plato's philosophy as a background for developing his own ideas. Nietzsche claimed in the preface to *Beyond Good and Evil* that his "task" is to fight Plato's "dogmatist's error" of the "invention of pure spirit and the good in itself" (BGE P). However, such blunt words cloaked several surprising convergences between the two. In fact, Plato's thinking provides a structure that Nietzsche would draw an inspiration from and deepen over the course of his own thinking.

That a hierarchical society as described in the Plato's *Republic* is needed for philosophers to emerge is what Nietzsche entirely agrees with. Nietzsche also argues that each stratum in the hierarchy plays an

indispensable role in the production of a healthy culture: "Caste-order, *order of rank*, is just a formula for the supreme law of life itself, splitting off into three types is necessary for the preservation of society, to make the higher and highest types possible, - *unequal* rights are the condition for any rights at all. – A right is a privilege. Everyone fins his privilege in his own type of being…. A high culture is a pyramid: it needs a broad base, its first presupposition is a strongly and healthily consolidated mediocrity" (A 57). He argues that all strata should be taught the value of their respective roles; each type of individual, whether the few or the many, has its own area of work and its own feeling of perfection and mastery. This also implies that each type – if they are to become perfect by their own standard and if culture is to be permanently elevated – must overcome its hostility towards the other type. The higher type must overcome their repugnance whereas the lower types must moderate their *ressentiment*. But would those unmitigated feelings be easily expunged from either mind?

The first task should be how to change the attitude of masses.[244] In *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche wistfully expressed his distress that people in general cannot overcome themselves. Obviously, Nietzsche loved humanity, as Zarathustra says explicitly and repeatedly (Z, Prologue). But it is evident from Zarathustra's interactions with the masses that they are unacceptable. They refuse to listen to Zarathustra's truths because the truth is too subversive and challenging. Zarathustra is even almost killed by the people because of their fear of losing their moral systems and of ignorance.

Regarding this issue, later in *Anti-Christ*, Nietzsche expounds on what's wrong with the masses. According to him, they are fanatical as well as obstinate. They are imprisoned by themselves; they are too convinced with their held opinions to consider other possibilities. Worse than that, their

[244] Appel(1999, 28-9), to the contrary, claimed that Nietzsche does not believe the masses can be improved: "Nietzsche repeatedly insists on the incommunicability of [higher taste] to most people. The 'goodness' that his imagined higher caste embodies can never become a 'common good'… it would be sheer folly to attempt to teach the many about the rank order and self-overcoming."

opinions are not their own ones. They are dazzled by "the grand poses struck by" picturesque priests: "humanity rather see gestures than listen to *reasons*…" The hallucinated people cannot set their goals by themselves. Eventually "the 'man of faith' does not belong to *himself*", leading to "self-abnegation", or "self-alienation" (A 54).

Several scholars claimed that Nietzsche considered education central to counter this deplorable situation.[245] However, his educational program is not systematic and therefore does not provide a satisfactory blueprint for extinguishing *ressentiment* of the masses. Moreover, Nietzsche seems not to consider this option since he was opposed to the "education of the people" (*Volksbidung*) as it would rather hinder the development of a high culture; the proponents of mass education, while purporting to off an equal education to all individuals no matter what their talents or backgrounds, are actually attempting to undermine culture. Their vision was already realized in Nietzsche's time: "what conditions the decline of German culture? That 'higher education' is no longer a privilege – the democratization of *Bildung*, which has become 'common' – too common… In present-day Germany no one is any longer free to give his children a noble education" (TI, "What the Germans Lack", 5).

To whom Nietzsche intended to give his higher teaching? Nietzsche clearly mentions his potential readers by classifying humanity: those who are eligible to understand his books and who are not.[246] On this point, Nietzsche quite uncommonly lists the attitudes and qualities of those future readers. First, as commonly said, they should be equipped mentally to keep reading his book to the end despite all the difficulties involved in doing so. Second, they should be indifferent to worldly interests while seeking noble

[245] Paulus Smeyers, "Nietzsche and education: Learning to make sense for oneself or standing for one's ideas," in *Nietzsche's Legacy for Education: Past and Present Values,* James Marshall, Michael Peters, and Paul Smeyers (Praeger, 2000), 91-106.

[246] Those who are eligible are not confined to his contemporaries. Rather Nietzsche seems to be more skeptical with the possibility that they are living: "This book belongs to the very few. Perhaps none of them are even alive yet. Maybe they are the ones who will understand my *Zarathustra*" (AC Preface [3]).

aims. Rather than seeking to live in splendor with their claimed knowledge, they should live an ascetic life with a strong will to find an undiscovered truth; the pathway to reach truth is not a joyful group tour but lonely journey. Third, they should train and become a new type of human beings with keen ear, clear eye-sight, and strong heart. Finally, they must care and love themselves. For Nietzsche, it means to enjoy an absolute freedom.[247] And for Nietzsche this is the first step to cure modernity: "we ourselves, we free spirits, already constitute a 'revaluation of all values'" (A Preface)

Reading this book, his future readers might reevaluate all values, educate themselves, and be cured. But what about other people who are not going to or capable of reading his book? For Nietzsche, "the rest are just humanity." So the potential readers "need to be far above humanity in strength, in *elevation* of soul, - in contempt…" (A Preface). This declaration has provoked not only general public but his potential audiences. Any reader who comes across this statement may hold back and raise these questions. Who are the rest? Why are they being far below the free spirits? For Nietzsche, they are "the modern" men who could not find "the way out of the labyrinth of whole millennia." These modern men, rather than seeking the way out, deplores the situation which has been caused by "indolent peace", "cowardly compromise", and "the whole virtuous filth of the modern yes and no" – each of these might represent the core teaching of Hobbes, Kant, and Christianity. The modern men are too blind even to evaluate this situation: "'I don't know where I am; I am everything that

[247] "The conditions required to understand me, and which in turn *require* me to be understood… When it comes to spiritual matters, you need to be honest to the point of hardness just to be able to tolerate my seriousness, my passion. You need to be used to living on mountains – to seeing the miserable, ephemeral little gossip of politics and national self-interest *beneath* you. You need to have become indifferent, you need never to ask whether truth does any good, whether it will be our undoing… The sort of predilection strength has for questions that require more courage than anyone possesses today; a courage for the *forbidden*; a predestination for the labyrinth. An experience from out of seven solitudes. New years for new music. New eyes for the most distant things. A new conscience for truths that have kept silent until now. *And* the will to the economy of the great style: holding together its strength, its *enthusiasm*… Respect for yourself; love for yourself; an unconditional freedom over yourself…" (A Preface)

doesn't know where it is' – sighs the modern man." Furthermore, they are not being on an average. They are corrupted humanity "in the sense of decadence". It means that "it loses its instincts" and "there is no will to power." (A 6[6]): it only has "tendencies hostile to life" (A 7[7]).[248]

As such, Nietzsche wrote of a vast difference between superior individuals and "the rabble". Gone was the possibility of leading the masses to a more knowledgeable, self-aware consciousness. Instead, Nietzsche believed that the people were so much below the free individual as to be offensive: "what serves the higher type of man as food or refreshment must to a very different and inferior type be almost poison". And the "books for everybody are always malodorous books: the smell of petty people clings to them. Where the people eats and drinks, even when it worships, there is usually a stink" (BGE 61-2). At this point in his work, Nietzsche had decided that the limit of the average person was a contagion that had to be avoided. The question then remains how Nietzsche proposes to develop a culture while embracing the masses. While he outlines what the ideal society is in *The Antichrist*, he does not articulate how it is to come about.

However, from the earlier years, Nietzsche has emphasized its importance to bring this condition:

"The true invention of the religion-founders is first to establish a certain way of life and everyday customs that work as a *disciplina voluntatis* while at the same time removing boredom; and then to give just this life an *interpretation* that makes it appear illuminated by the highest worth, so that

[248] Nietzsche specifies contemporary modern people to whom his criticism levels against. He says that he is willing to understand his ancestors and their unintended errors and false opinions, but his "feelings suddenly change" when he considers "more recent times, to *our* time." Nietzsche finds more fault with deceitfulness than ignorance; whereas his previous generations made wrong judgments because of their ignorance, his contemporaries willingly accept falsities with full awareness if this compliance brings about their benefits: "These days anyone with even the most modest claim to honesty *has* to know that every sentence pronounced by a theologian, a priest, a pope, is not only wrong, it is a *lie*, - and he is not free to lie out of 'innocence' or 'ignorance' any more." Even "the priests themselves are known for what they are, the most dangerous type of parasite". "Everyone knows this: *and yet everything goes on as before*" (A 38).

henceforth it becomes a good for which one fights and under certain circumstances even give one's life. Actually, the second invention is the more important: the first, the way of life, was usually already in place, though alongside other ways of life and without any consciousness of its special worth. The significance, the originality of the religion-founder usually lies in his *seeing* and *selecting* this way of life, in his *guessing* for the first time what it can be used for and how it can be interpreted" (GS 353).

Pippin critically evaluates this proposal by saying that "despite what can seem the hortatory character of Nietzsche's rhetoric, many of the passages… do not really directly encourage readers to *do* anything"[249] Nietzsche lowers down reader's expectation by giving a political program which cannot guarantee its realization. If our trust was misplaced, then his oeuvre as a whole would seem to lose its groundbreaking power. However, I argue that Nietzsche's invocation of Homeric image and retelling it in his own work make Zarathustra deliver more messages than a mere rhetoric.

4.5.2 Nietzsche's "Aristocratic Agonism": Thoughts on the Disciples of Dionysus as Agents of Revitalization

4.5.2.1 Recent efforts to Democratize Nietzsche: Previous literature

Nietzsche argues that "feeling of power, will to power, power itself" are crucial elements to lead a meaningful life, because, for him, happiness is nothing else than "the feeling that power is growing, that some resistance has been overcome" (A 2). This conception of what human beings should achieve for a better life seems to be directly opposed to what his predecessors claimed. He sees the desire for peace and prosperity at odds with nobility and human thriving, denies that freedom guarantees getting out of either internal or external impediment, and despises equality: human

[249] Robert B. Pippin, *Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 116.

beings should seek "not contentedness, but more power; not peace, but war; not virtue, but prowess" (A 2).[250] In other words, for Nietzsche, life is "for growth, for endurance, for the accumulation of force, for power" (A 6). This outrageous teaching has been deterring both scholars and general readers from wholly embracing his thoughts. Surely Nietzsche loves humanity, but his adoration requires seclusion. Nietzsche calls humanity to awe-inspiring heights, but, as we have seen, argues that these heights can be attained only by a few extraordinary human beings. Although many have agreed with his critique of modernity and sympathized with his appeal for new nobility, his unstinting elitism as a cure for modernity can't be harmonized with liberal/democratic ideas that most people would cherish.

In an effort to exploit his thought to reinforce contemporary liberalism/democracy as well as to prevent this abomination, many scholars have argued that Nietzsche's anti-egalitarianism and praise of violence are merely literary tropes. More recently, particularly for those who identify Nietzsche as a political thinker, Nietzsche has been enlisted into attempts to refound democracy on a radicalized, postmodern, and agonistic basis. This group of scholars has treated Nietzsche's heroic, self-overcoming, agonistic individual as an exemplar of how people can and should behave in democratic societies.[251] But it needs more evidence to show that his words did not convey those scandalous stories. And this group focused only on the qualities of an individual *Übermensch* without reflecting on a broader

[250] In TI("Arrows and Epigrams" 12[157]), Nietzsche argues against the utilitarian view by saying that "People *don't* strive for happiness, only the English do."

[251] Representative of this strand are political theorists such as Bonnie Honig, "The Politics of Agonism: A Critical Response to 'Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action," *Political Theory* 21: 3 (1993), 528-33; Wendy Brown, Dana (2000), William Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Mark Warren, *Nietzsche and Political Thought* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).For example, Warren(1998) argues that Nietzsche provided the basis of a postmodern politics in which individuals have agency. Alongside Nietzsche scholars such as Lawrence Hatab, Alan Schrift(1996), Jeffrey Church(2006), and David Owen(1995) maintain a similar view. For instance, Owen(1995) argued that the agonism of Nietzsche's Übermensch can be used as a model for political community.

political structure, and thus unjustifiably assumed that individual agency and autonomy are sufficient for democracy. Moreover, while these scholars offer new, subtle, and provocative interpretations, they qualify Nietzsche's unceasing references to elitism by overstating other aspects of his philosophy, rather than maintaining a balanced view. For instance, Dombowsky(2000) argues that these "radical liberal democratic" interpretations wrongly assume that Nietzsche's undemocratic and authoritarian ideas are inconsistent with his pluralistic and egalitarian ideas of perspectivism and agonism, thus can be fairly treated as aberrations in his thought.[252] Nietzsche's blunt words are surely less preferable, but we should not overlook the darker and less hospitable aspects of his thought. In this regard, I concur with a traditional view that considers Nietzsche as a defender of thoroughly elitism.[253]

However, although I am in agreement with many aspects of the elitist interpretation, I'm skeptical with the argument that Nietzsche proposed a(nti)political individual. I argue yet that, for us to achieve a meaningful life, Nietzsche calls an attention to the social or political meaning of the individual life beyond the self-serving dedicated one. Since one cannot be an exemplar individual being oneself, Nietzsche, as we have seen, seems to give a more demanding but important task for society – a genuine education.[254] The goal of education is not to "habituate the young

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[252] Surely scholars who proposed democratic interpretations pointed out lack of hermeneutic sophistication of the elitist interpretations. For example, Conant(2001) argued that those who see Nietzsche as elitist misread his use of the term exemplar. According to Conant, Nietzsche encourages not only a few persons but everyone to seek an exemplar.

[253] See MacIntyre(1981); Rawls(1971); Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Fredrick Appel, *Nietzsche contra Democracy*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thiele(1990); Ansell-Pearson(1991); Don Dombowsky, "A Response to Alan Schrift's 'Nietzsche for Democracy?'" *Nietzsche-Studien* 29(2000), 278-90; Kymlicka(1989); Fennell(2005); Hillesheim(1990); Jenkin(1982); Aviram(1991). This group of scholars, more or less, highlights Nietzsche's desire for aristocratic elite that combats the 'levelling' effects of modern democracies.

[254] Richardson(2004) suggests this point nicely(John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)). Cf. Tamsin Shaw, *Nietzsche's Political Skepticism*. (Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 2007), 5. Although she

human being to a strict obedience under the scepter of genius", but rather to encourage the young "to have his own opinions about the most serious things and persons" (FEI 49-50).

But I raise a doubt that, through this genuine education, exemplar individuals can become truly political beings. Receiving the education, would those "blond beasts" be civilized? Or would they remain (willingly) outside the citadel? In other words, Nietzsche tries to inspire his readers to become a type of *Übermensch*, who is free from the spirit of revenge and whose violence will not be directed to his own community. But does Nietzsche give an account of either education or political system that would offer any hope of directing *Übermensch*'s gaze? Is such a being possible? If such a being is possible, is he likely to come into existence? Is Nietzsche's *Übermensch* any more likely than Plato's philosopher-king? These questions are similar to the ones Nietzsche himself raises in *Twilight of Idols*. At the end of the first part of that book, Nietzsche mentions fours questions of conscience, all of which are essentially delivering the same message: would the great individual "come along" with others, or lead them "as a shepherd", or look "the other way, goes off to the side"?[255] To this question, I argue that we might find this type of individual in the epic poem, *Odyssey*, and that Nietzsche tries to employ this image for his purpose.

4.5.2.2 The Myth of the 'Eternal Recurrence' out of the Reality

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touches a different point, she helpfully illuminates this notion in Nietzsche's thought: "states, through their control of apparently independent institutions – for instance, educational and religious institutions – have powerful means of implicitly asserting control over belief. States can thereby manufacture the very normative beliefs to which they can appeal in their claims to legitimacy."

[255] The full list of questions as follows: You are running *ahead*? – Are you doing it as a shepherd? Or as an exception? A third case would be when someone is running away… *First* question of conscience…; Are you for real? Or only an actor? A representative? Or the represented? … *Second* question of conscience; Are you someone who looks on? Or who lends a hand? – Or who looks the other way, goes off to the side?... *Third* question of conscience; Do you want to come along? Or go ahead? Or go by yourself? … People need to know *what* they want and *that* they want. *Fourth* question of conscience. (TI, "Arrows and Epigrams" 37, 38, 40, 41 [161]).

of Becoming

"Existence under the bright sunshine of such gods is regarded as desirable in itself, and the real pain of Homeric men is caused by parting from it, especially by early parting: so that now, reversing the wisdom of Silenus, we might say of the Greeks that 'to die soon is the worst of all for the next worst- to die at all.' Once heard, it will ring out again' do not forget the lament of the short-lived Achilles, mourning the leaf-like change and vicissitudes of the race of men and the decline of the heroic age. It is not unworthy of the greatest hero to long for a continuation of life, even though he lives as a day laborer" (BT 43).

With the question raised in the previous section, I will investigate the influence of Homeric thought on Nietzsche, and also the ways in which he adopts and modifies Homeric ideals to suit his purposes. His interest in Homer was evident early in his career. His unpublished essay *Homer's Contest* (1872) details his basic thought on agonistic ethics.[256] There he argues that contest, the essential component of Hellenic life, not only protect the Greek culture from being savaged but promoting it being exalted: "without envy, jealousy and competitive ambition, the Hellenic state, like Hellenic man, deteriorates. It becomes evil and cruel, it becomes vengeful and godless, in short, it becomes 'pre-Homeric' – it hen only takes a panicky fright to make it fall and smash it. Sparta and Athens surrender to the Persians as Themistocles and Alcibiades did; they betray the Hellenic after they have given up on the finest Hellenic principle: contest" (HC 100). However, contrary to widely discussed view, Nietzsche is not simply seeking to recreate Homeric, heroic values in modernity. Rather, as Christa Davis Acampora notes, he "takes on the imposition of the constraint of 'Homer'… and then he strives to conquer that ideal by producing something still more beautiful and more powerful."[257] What does Nietzsche recover in

[256] Nietzsche (2006, 95-100).
[257] Acampora(2002, 25).

the figure of Homeric hero, and what does he seek to surpass?

First, it has been suggested that Nietzsche understands an individual's psychological constitution as an internal contest between competing drives.[258] For Nietzsche, the life task of an individual is to bring these drives into some sort of order, analogous to a piece of music or a harmonious city-state.[259] Achieving this internal order is important for ethical social relationships: "A society in which corruption spreads is accused of laxity; and it is obvious that the esteem of war and the pleasure in war diminish, while the comforts of life are now desired just as ardently as were warlike and athletic honours formerly. What is usually overlooked, however, is that the ancient civil energy and passion, which received magnificent visibility through war and competitive games, has now transformed itself into countless private passions and has merely become less visible; indeed in times of 'corruption' the power and force of a people's expended energies are probably greater than ever, and the individual spends them on a lavish scale which he could not previously have afforded- when he was not yet rich enough! And thus, it is precisely in times of 'laxness' that tragedy runs through the houses and streets, that great love and great hatred are born and the flame of knowledge blazes up into the sky" (GS 23).

Second and not less importantly, I argue, Nietzsche maintains the view that to be a genuine human being, one should realize to live with others in a passage of time, rather than alone in a departed island, lonely desert, or high mountain. The decisions made by Odysseus may be the bedrock forming Nietzsche's idea. The story of the *Odyssey* is straightforward. Odysseus, one of the heroes from the Trojan war, attempts to return home, Ithaca, with his group. Along the way, they endure several hardships. After losing all of his men, Odysseus, with the assistance of the

[258] Katsafanas(2013, 2014, 2016); Parkes(1994).
[259] Parkes, 1994.

sympathetic Phaeacians, finally makes it back home. Odysseus has been taken to represent both the Greek spirit and the Western spirit generally. But what kind of a hero was he?

Contrary to the heroic image and reputation as a great warrior at Trojan war, the first scene he is glimpsed in the *Odyssey* is that he is being languished on the island of the beautiful goddess Kalypso. He has been shipwrecked and has no way of continuing his journey: "he was sitting on the seashore and weeping as was his custom/ tearing at his heart with tears and groans and anguish, and / all the time as he wept looking out over the restless sea" (Book 5, lines 82-4).[260] His situation seems hopeless to leave the island, without boat and other men. However, he is soon to be taken care of by the goddess Kalypso. She even wants to make him a divinity, becoming immortal. (Book 5, lines 135-6, 208-9). But yet, Odysseus, rather than seizing the offer, insists on returning to his home. For him, the good life is not all about physical comfort, sensual pleasure, or immorality. Later he says, "there is nothing sweeter to a man than his own land/ and parents" (Book 9, lines 34-5). This seems significant since his choice underscores the importance of social relations for a wholly genuine human life. Odysseus cannot flourish isolated on an island with plentitude. To be who he is, he must be a part of a human community with fellow citizens. A human being deprived of human relationships cannot be fully human.

Although Odysseus himself was tired of continuing his life on the island, there was nothing that he could change the situation. The only thing he could do is crying on the beach; only the gods can change his situation. At the beginning of Book 5, it is told Athena urges Zeus, the king of the gods, to intervene. Zeus agrees and sends Hermes down to the island to tell Kalypso that she must help Odysseus going out. Kalypso is obliged to concede to Zeus' will, by providing Odysseus with the tools he need to make the raft. (Book 5, 234-61). Thus, without the urging of Athena, the

[260] Homer(2016).

intercession of Zeus, and the obligation of Kalypso, Odysseus could do nothing. Even though he is one of the greatest of Greek heroes, his agency is extremely limited.[261]

In Book 9, Odysseus begins to recount to his hosts, the sympathetic Phaeacians, the hardships that he had overcome during his adventure back to home. He recollects the moment he encounters Lotus-Eaters (Book 9, Line 82-104). The Lotus-Eaters are people who eat a sweet-tasting lotus plant. This plant has narcotic effect, making people blissful and forgetful of their normal lives and responsibilities: "whoever of them ate the honey-sweet fruit of the lotus, / no longer wished to come back" (Book 9, Lines 93-7). This story contrasts with the story of Odysseus on the island of Kalypso; there he was offered mindless bliss and simple physical satisfaction forever. The threat that eating the lotus plant represents losing oneself: it turns people into nameless, with no identity. Without any challenges or hardships, for Odysseus, such a life would become meaningless.

Odysseus thus refuses this kind of bovine life. He repeatedly resolves resuming his adventure, fully aware of the perils awaited; previously Kalypso warns him that if he chooses to leave, he will have to endure great difficulties and struggles. Odysseus replies to this goddess: "if/ one of the gods wrecks me on the wine-dark sea, I shall/ endure it, since the spirit in my breast can bear suffering;/ already I have borne much hardship and many labours/ on sea and water; so let this too come on." (Book 5, Lines 221-4).

Many of the stories that are told in the *Odyssey* are variants of the same basic theme. Like the Lotus-Eaters, Odysseus, with his physical needs are met, is said to be languishing on Kalypso's island. These stories show what a fully human life amounts to. Human life involves meaningful tasks as well as community. When Odysseus comes back to Ithaca, he must re-establish his relations. While he regains his relationships, he also resumes

[261] Williams(1993, 21-3); Lesky(1999, 384-403).

his identity. Even his wife must be convinced that he is really Odysseus before she grants him his previous position. Odysseus comes back from being an anonymous stranger in the land of the Phaeacians to being who he truly is. He becomes fully human again. This whole story shows how human flourishing is necessarily bound up with our relations to other people. English poet John Donne nicely captures this message by saying that "No man is an island". [262] As human beings, we are who we are in our relations to other human beings. Moreover, this story tells that although we celebrate self-sufficiency and individual achievement, we are bounded creatures not only spatially but also willingly. While we can take credit for some of our achievements, we should not lose sight of the much broader context in which our own activity takes place.

4.5.2.3 'Philosophy of Life' of Zarathustra: Nietzsche's positive innovations

In many works, Nietzsche constantly argues that the Christian worldview introduces a linear model of time based on the creation of the world with an absolute beginning and end. On the other hand, Nietzsche's cosmological theory has neither beginning nor end. By proposing a circular and closed conception of time, in opposition to a Judaeo-Christian linear view of the world, Nietzsche provides a non-teleological and non-linear conception of time, which does not devalue a human being's life. This idea of eternal recurrence is the central theme of his most well-known work, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra.*

In the work's first few lines, Zarathustra descends from his mountain. After spending ten years of solitary life, peacefully as well as contently, at the mountain away from his home, Zarathustra changed his mind, stepping down the mountain. Awake at the dawn, he asks of the sun whose overflowing illumination has sustained him in his solitude for whole

[262] Donne(1839, 575).

time: “You great star! What would your happiness be if you had not those for whom you shine?”[263] Having ripened to the point of overflow himself with the benefit of the sun’s sustenance, Zarathustra has become “weary of my wisdom, like a bee that has gathered too much honey,” and so his happiness in turn, just like the sun, depends on bestowing the fruit of that wisdom upon “hands that reach out”. Having grown tired of his solitude in this way, “Zarathustra wants to become human again” (Z Prologue:1).

When Zarathustra makes his journey back to society, he meets an old holy man in the forest, who cannot understand why Zarathustra is leaving his solitude. Zarathustra explains to the old man: “I love mankind.” The old man, rather than wondering Zarathustra’s reason, asks himself: “Why… did I go into the woods and the wilderness in the first place? Was it not because I loved mankind all too much? Now I love God: human beings I do not love. Human beings are too imperfect a thing for men. Love for human beings would kill me.” This unwelcomed remark inspires Zarathustra to make a second statement: “What did I speak of love? I bring mankind a gift.” Being parted from the old man, Zarathustra says to himself: “Could it be possible! This old saint in his woods has not yet heard the news that *God is dead*!” (Z Prologue:2). Zarathustra, regardless of his opinion on human beings, has no reason to follow the old man’s step, since God is dead; “for him there is nothing that could bring comfort to complete solitude.”[264]

The gift that Zarathustra brings to human beings is his teaching about the “Overman”, or *Übermensch*: “I *teach you the overman*. Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?” To that end, Zarathustra speaks to the people as follows: “Truly, mankind is a polluted stream. One has to be a sea to take in polluted stream without becoming unclean. Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this lightning, he is this madness!-” (Z Prologue: 3) In order to deliver this

[263] Gooding-Williams (51) and Lampert (14-15) elaborate on Zarathustra’s understanding of the sun’s neediness.
[264] Lambert (17).

teaching, Zarathustra tells the crowd of the repellent "last human" as a way of comparison. However, it generates an unexpected, a wholly opposite result: the assembled crowd exclaim their enthusiasm for becoming last humans, rather than overman. Being a little shocked, Zarathustra is compelled to reflect anew on what requires about his fuller engagement with human beings.[265] Zarathustra promises to return when he is able to celebrate the "Great Noon" at which "the sun of his knowledge" will stand at its peak. Returning to solitude though, Zarathustra appears to be gripped by concern and this feeling draws him down from his mountain once again: "Truly, there is a lake in men, a hermit-like and self-sufficient lake; but my torrent of love tears it along- down to the sea!" (Z "The Child with the Mirror"). At this time, Zarathustra is more concerned with explaining his own understanding, rather than delivering his teachings in vain.[266]

About his self-reflective result, the key discussion of Zarathustra's wisdom occurs over a sequence of five chapters of Part 2: "On the Famous Wise Men," "The Night Song, "The Dance Song," "The Grave Song," "On Self-Overcoming."[267] In the speech "On the Famous Wise Men," Zarathustra sketches the character of two alternatives to himself, the "famous wise" and the Free Spirits. The "famous wise" are those who have sought after truth only to the extent of finding it in objects of popular reverence, and so ultimately in "the people" themselves. The Free Spirits, on the other hand, are distinguished by the intransigence of their "will to truth", rendering them to dwell in "godless deserts", "redeemed of gods and adorations, fearless and fearsome, great and lonely."[268]

In the final sequence, "On Self-Overcoming," Zarathustra reflects

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[265] Pangle (143).

[266] Pippin(2016, 167) remarks that he "seems to have realized that part of the problem with the dissemination of his teaching and writings lies with him, and not just the audience."

[267] On the importance of reading these five chapters as a sequence, see Lampert (100-129).

[268] Nietzsche identifies the Free Spirits with the lion will in the "loneliest deserts," where it is driven to debunk all established idols, but remaining incapable of furnishing that replacement itself. (Z "On the Three Metamorphoses"). On this identification, see Franco (165-6).

on this "will to truth." At the root of all life is only will to power, a will to constant self-overcoming, not directed toward any given end.[269] Zarathustra stresses that most people have misunderstood this meaning of 'will to truth': they rather abuses it. Zarathustra admonishes them as follows: "You still want to create the world before which you could kneel: that is your ultimate hope and intoxication." Pointing out their wrong way of solving "the riddle of" hearts, Zarathustra urges people to "overcome themselves out of themselves again and again." In the "On a Thousand and One Goals" of Part 1, Zarathustra defines "the tablet of the good" over each people or civilization is "the voice of their will to power" – a means through which the people collectively challenged and overcame itself. Such tablets initially emerged only through communal consciousness, and each individual member of the society trains oneself for the sake of meeting this criterion: "First peoples were creators and only later individuals; indeed, the individual himself is still the youngest creation." Later Zarathustra contrasts the lifestyle of the Free Spirit to these "lovers and creators." The Free Spirit as an individual is "truly, the sly ego, loveless, wanting its benefit in the benefit of the many." On the other hand, "lovers and creators", just like him, are who "created good and evil" for the herd. And Zarathustra testifies himself as a creator in "On Redemption" of Part 2.

Zarathustra is told that although his teaching has finally begun to win over the people, in order for them to fully accept his teaching, he must show that it can persuade even the crippled among them. Zarathustra questions whether he could even bear to be human, if he did not better the whole of humanity: "all my creating and striving amounts to this, that I create and piece together into one, what is now fragment and riddle and grisly accident. And how could I bear to be a human being if mankind were not also creator and solver of riddles and redeemer of accident? To redeem those who are the past and to recreate all 'it was' into 'thus I willed it!" –

[269] Reginster (2006,138-39).

only that would I call redemption!" (Z "On Redemption")

However, Zarathustra recognizes an intractable obstacle that the willing liberty is "itself still a prisoner". The failure to accept this fact has been responsible for turning the will into an instrument of revenge. Rather the will must unconditionally embrace its own temporal as well as situational limits: "Has the will already become its own redeemer and joy bringer? Has it unlearned the spirit of revenge and all gnashing of teeth? And who taught it reconciliation with time, and what is higher than any reconciliation? That will which is the will to power must will something higher than any reconciliation – but how shall this happen? Who would teach it to also will backward?" (Z "On Redemption")

Zarathustra fell silent. His attempt to teach others stands in need of being re-thought in light of those limits. For Pippin, this reflects Zarathustra's ultimate failure to make decisive progress.[270] Surely, Zarathustra does not set out to self-consciously teach the world a life-giving illusion. Zarathustra is forced to confront the limits of the will. These remarks on Zarathustra were not inspired by Nietzsche's reluctance to seeking truth. Rather, those were meant to provoke certain characteristics of truth-seeking conducted by modern science. It assumes and overestimates the compatibility of truth with the demands and desires of human life, rather than recognizes and emphasizes a tension between them. "Faith in science presupposes" an ideal of "the truthful man" as opposed to a polytropic Odysseus, and concurrently denies "*our* world" while "*affirms another world* than that of life, nature, and history." This form of faith makes modern science crypto-religious. Moreover, it propagates ascetic morality, which demands turning away from the world.

This point is stressed and elaborated in earlier in *Genealogy of Morality,* particularly in the aphorism titled "What Do Ascetic Ideals Mean?" Nietzsche questions the master status which modern sciences reigns

[270] Pippin (2016, 176).

over. In the following section, he labels those devotees of modern science as "the last idealist among philosophers and scholars", or "free, very free spirits." In the third essay of the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche explains for what reasons ascetic ideals are appealing to those spirits: "there has likewise existed a characteristic philosophers' prepossession and cordiality regarding the whole ascetic ideal; one ought not to entertain any illusions about this or against this. Both belong, as noted, to the type; if both are absent in a philosopher then he is always – of this one may be certain- only a 'so-called' philosopher." (GM 3:7)

The ascetic ideal attracts philosophers because it appears to be a means toward their most desired end: independence: "the philosophical spirit always had to slip into the disguise and chrysalis of the *previously established* types of contemplative human beings" (GM 3:10). Nietzsche argues that while the teachings of Christianity radically diminished pride, modernity has rashly encouraged it. The development of this runs as follows. Christian inversion of values took the first step by making good into evil and bad into good, and through this inversion the priestly caste made humility better than pride and weakness preferable to strength (GM 65). The Church taught that all men were equally base, and all should be equally humble regardless of their quality or stature. In the modern age, Nietzsche argues that this teaching becomes inverted. Modern men are taught to be equally proud of the vast scientific and social achievements of civilized culture. Hobbes's argument for the equality of all men continues or reinforces. "Consequently our modern, noisy, time-consuming industriousness, proud of itself, stupidly proud, educates and prepares people, more than anything else does, precisely for 'unbelief'" (BGE 58).

The idea that all men are equally great has, more than anything else, prepared them to reject the teachings of any authority. The modern pride that accompanies unbelief also infects man's view of his own power. Regarding what missed in this pride man's awareness, Nietzsche says that

"close beside the pride of modern man there stands his ironic view of himself… his awareness that he has to live in an historicizing, as it were a twilight mood, his fear that his youthful hopes and energy will not survive into the future" (UM 107). The inverted pride of modern man has corrupted not only his faith in God, but also his faith in history and the faith in his own agency. Modern hubris, in short, has actually contributed to diminishing pride. Modern man finds pride in his achievements no matter how meager: he has therefore embraced hubris, but not excellence: "compare the heights of your capacity for knowledge with the depths of your incapacity for action" (UM 108). In notes from the time of the publication of Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes, "We speak so stupidly about *pride* – and Christianity has even made us feel that it is *sinful*! The point is: he who *demands and obtains great things from himself* must feel remote from those who do not – this *remoteness* is interpreted by those others has 'a high opinion of himself'; but he knows it (the remoteness) only as ceaseless labor, war, victory, by day and night: all of this, the others know nothing!"[271]

In a conversation between Zarathustra and his dwarf, in the section 'The Vision and the Riddle', both find themselves in front of a gateway, which has the word 'Moment' inscribed above it. The gateway is the point where the two eternities of past and future merge together. Zarathustra says to the dwarf that "It had two faces. Two paths meet here; no one has yet followed either to its end. This long lane stretches back for an eternity. And the long lane out there, that is another eternity. They contradict each other, these paths; they offend each other face to face, and it is here at this gateway that they come together." Zarathustra continually asks the dwarf if he knows that the paths contradict each other forever. The dwarf sneers and answers sarcastically that "all truth is crooked; time itself is a circle." Zarathustra scolds the dwarf's frivolous comments by implying that the doctrine of eternal recurrence does not simply convey that simplistic meaning: "'You

[271] Quoted in Heidegger(1977, 78).

spirit of gravity,' I said angrily, 'do not make things too easy for yourself! Or I shall let you crouch where you are crouching, lame foot; and it was I that carried you to this *height*."

Regarding Zarathustra's admonition, Keith Ansell-Pearson claims that Nietzsche tries to deliver the importance of the 'moment', the inscribed word at the gateway. According to Ansell-Pearson's interpretation, as we are "undergoing the experience of eternal return we experience for the first time the passing away and infinite movement of time", thus having a chance to experience the dimensions of time and to recognize "that life is the unity of opposites, of pleasure and pain, of joy and suffering, of good and evil."[272] On the other hand, with the notion of the Christian linear conception of time, people would wish to obviate, eventually in vain, the other (darker) side of life, thus making life meaningless. This teaching reminds us of the story of Odysseus on the island of Kalypso. At that time, Odysseus declines an offer to give him a countless bliss and forever joy. Like Odysseus, by embracing the fact that we should experience the moment, the events of our temporal life, Zarathustra rises to the heights by "Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and hardest problems."

4.6 Conclusion

Francis Fukuyama's concept of "The End of History", of the world having found its fully-developed form of life and form of politics, embodies the optimism of twentieth century. He could announce that "good news has come" – news that "a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism." Therefore,

[272] Keith Ansell-Pearson, *An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 111.

"the *ideal* of liberal democracy could not be improved on."[273]

As Fukuyama proclaimed, many of us have lived long enough within liberal democratic traditions that generally maintain deeply rooted principles such as, for example, the notion of the fundamental equality of human beings. For Nietzsche, one of the most egregious aspects of the tyranny of this conformity is, quite surprisingly, that it is anti-pluralistic. His turn to a radical form of spiritual aristocracy can be seen his (intentionally or not) provocative attempt to account for the possibility of pluralism. Although Nietzsche has been interpreted - in fact he is sincerely concerned with – advancing the individual, all of the accounts are for defending our species from the dangers that conformity may entail. Therefore, throughout this chapter, I have argued that Nietzsche's defense of the individual is for the culture and even might entail to defend democracy, though his teachings would defy several elements of so-called democratic notions. This chapter might end up with the following simple question: How Nietzsche's elitist thoughts be helpful in invigorating a democratic vision?

Rather than simply rejecting egalitarian principle of democracy, Nietzsche criticizes it because it entails a worldview that he finds monolithic, stifling- it demands allegiance. He worries that democracy has a tyrannical voice rather than pluralistic articulations; it demands allegiance without revolt. The unjustified belief that we have discovered and even reached the final phase of life-style, state-system, and even world-order is the most objectionable. And this harsh criticism also applies to critics of democratic ideals who still hold singularity of their discovery: "These Nay-sayers and outsides of today who are unconditional on one point- their insistence on intellectual cleanliness… they certainly believe they are completely liberated form the ascetic ideal as possible, the 'free, *very* free spirits'; and yet, to disclose to them what they themselves cannot see- for they are too close to themselves… They are far from being *free* spirits: *for they still have*

[273] Fukuyama (2006, xi).

faith in truth." (GM 3:24).

In order to achieve this aim, the historian "gains strength through reflection on past greatness… the knowledge that in earlier times someone passed through this existence infused with pride and strength" (UM 69). The historical knowledge "is also capable of evoking great effects and hopes for the future in both an individual and a nation, provided we regard ourselves as the heirs and successors of the astonishing power of antiquity and see in this our honor and our spur" (UM 103). Nietzsche is arguing that one solution to the problem of dwindling pride in democratic times is to show the enduring connections between past, present and future through history: "What I do or do not do now is as important for everything that is yet to come as is the greatest event of the past: in this tremendous perspective of effectiveness all actions appear equally great and equally small" (GS 233). What make man heroic is his ability to go "out to meet at the same time one's highest suffering and one's highest hope" (GS 268). This man can be a philosopher, and artists, or an educator; there is no prescribed role.[274] Nietzsche loves "the one who justifies people of the future and redeems those of the past: for he wants to perish of those in the present" (Z 1:4).

[274] Thiele (1990).

Ch.5 Conclusion: The Dialectic of the Modern principles and Contemporary discourses

5.1 Legacy of Hobbes, Kant, and Nietzsche

Despite his theological critiques, Hobbes does not merely do away with religion, rather his method is a reformulation of religious concepts in order to make them consistent with civil society placing him firmly in the civil religion tradition.[275] One of Hobbes's primary concerns regarding religion was the practical effect Christian beliefs have upon the action of the citizens, noting "the most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war" which arises when citizens must choose to "obey at once both God and man…when their commandments are one contrary to the other" (L, 43.1). Hobbes's reformation of religious language is designed to show there is no conflict between the command of the sovereign and the necessities of religious belief. One way Hobbes accomplishes this reformation is to address the basis of human obedience to God. Hobbes examines common arguments of why a Christian is required to obey God and through his analysis, shows that these arguments are false forms of obligation.

Obligation plays a central role in Hobbesian. As Skinner notes, "the concept of obligation became a major issue at two moments in the constitutional upheaval of the seventeenth century".[276] Hobbes's particular iteration of obligation is so central to his political doctrine that contemporaries and scholars often used it has a heuristic to determine if someone was or was not a Hobbist.[277] Hobbes's intense interest stemmed from the recognition that competing objects of obligation were the most frequent causes of civil war. This often arises when man thinks he is obligated both to the civil sovereign and to God, yet they offer opposing

[275] Beiner, 1993
[276] Skinner, 2002, 270.
[277] Skinner, 1972, 116.

commands (L, 43.1). This raises the question of whether there is an inherent tension between man's obligation to the sovereign, as derived from man's natural right and law of nature (L, 15), and the obedience to God. This question has led to divergence of opinion in Hobbesian scholars. Some have argued that for Hobbes, obligation, particularly to the natural law, necessitated a belief in a God because such laws can only be obligatory if they are understood to be the commands of a higher power.[278] Others, have argued that Hobbes's emphasis on reason and the individual permits an understanding of obligation as merely enlightened self-interest [279] or identical to prudence[280], and therefore do not necessitate a deity. While not directly entering into the discussion of obligation in relation to the natural law, though agreeing with the latter interpretations, this study examined something that the vast majority of Hobbesian scholars seem to miss: that the specific linguistic presentation of Hobbes's forms of obligation in relation to the creation of civil society is rife with religious words and rhetoric.

The second chapter argued that to properly understanding Hobbes's theory of obligation in relation to civil society, one must recognize Hobbes's own framing of his creation of the Leviathan as an example of mimicry of the Biblical creation account. Secondly, it showed that Hobbes's view of obligation seeks to alter the Christian understanding of the terms of future promises, grace, and faith; showing that these are false forms of obligation and cannot be the source of man's obligation to obey the commands of God. Third, it showed how Hobbes uses the religious connotation of the covenant tradition in order to strengthen man's obligation to the commonwealth.

Hobbes frames his philosophic and political tomes as mimicry of God's act of Creation.[281] In the introduction to Leviathan, Hobbes draws the

[278] Martinich 1992; Taylor 1938; Warrander 1957
[279] Darwall 1995, Nagel 1959, Newey 2008
[280] Peacock 2010
[281] Miller 1999, Brandon 2001

reader's attention to the similarities between his account of the construction of the Leviathan and God's act of creation, noting that Leviathan is a descriptive manual for the establishment of an artificial man, which is an imitation of nature, "whereby God hath made and governs the world" (L, Intro.1). Hobbes insinuates that he will guide mankind to the pinnacle of human achievement; "this generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God" (L, 17.13). Through his deifying the creation, Hobbes is showing how his work is an imitation, and an improvement, on the natural creation by God. Yet, this imitation is not merely a reference to a general idea of creation, rather for Hobbes, his Leviathan is a direct mimicry of the creation account in the book of Genesis, for "The pact or covenants by which the parts of this body politic were at first made…resemble that fiat or the let us make man, pronounced by God in the creation" (L, Intro.1).

A reader, particularly one primed by the awareness of Hobbes imitation of God's act of creation, becomes distinctly aware that Hobbes's analysis of obligation is rooted predominately in the use of religious words: faith, grace, covenant, and future hope. The discussion of these terms arises in Hobbes's chapter "Of the First and Second Natural Laws and of Contracts." Given this title, it may seem that political obligation is a topic semi-detached from the more prominently featured natural laws. However, such diminishing of the centrality of obligation within these chapters would be in error, because obligation and contract are necessary consequences of his second law of nature: "That a man be willing, when others are so too…to lay down his right to all things, and be contended with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself" (L, 14.5). This law, rooted in a fundamental equality of mankind, requires that each person know whether others are also willing to divest themselves of certain rights. Given the equality, individuality, and formlessness of man in the state of nature, it becomes difficult to determine when and how

individuals are willing to lay down their rights. In order to address this, Hobbes creates a tree of different derivations of the ideas of contract and obligation. Obligation, for Hobbes, involves the transfer of right and/or object (L, 14.6-7). The conceptual transfer, or transfer of right, is based upon signs of express or inference, generally verbal (L, 14.13-14). Neither being the creature, nor God's power subject all men to obey because "in the kingdom of God are not bodies inanimate…,nor atheist, nor they that believe not that God has any care if the actions of mankind" (L, 31.2). Subjection to the authority of God is derived from His ability to "propound rewards and punishments" to mankind (L, 31.2) and the natural kingdom of God is ruled "by the natural dictates of right reason", and hence obligation to the natural law is rooted in the reason, prudence, and self-interest of the individual.[282]

Christians, particularly those emerging from the Protestant Reformation, who are seeking to establish the necessary obligation to God may point to their relationship with God as being based upon faith, the basis of salvation. While Hobbes did not fully agree with the concept of faith derived from the Protestant Reformation, he recognized the necessity of dealing with the idea in order to weaken the obligation to God. For Christians, faith is the present "assurance" of a future promise.

Having undermined man's obedience to God through multiple avenues, Hobbes turns to his discussion of true forms of obligation. Hobbes not only mimics the Biblical account of creation, taking formless void mass and makes it into a creative commonwealth, but he also uses and redefines religious words in his description of Obligation. In order to establish his commonwealth on an foundation which avoids "the most frequent pretext of sedition and civil war, in Christian commonwealths" (L, 43.1) the inherent diseases of distraction and weakness that arises when there are split loyalties of two masters by the citizen, Hobbes seeks to undermine any argument for

[282] Darwall 1995; Nagal 1959, Newey 2008; Peacock 2010

man's obligation to God (L, 29.6;7). He does this by showing that the Christian arguments of man's obligation to obey God based upon future promises, grace, and faith are false forms of obligation. Through the weakening of religious man's obedience to God, Hobbes is able to articulate a position in which full obedience to the sovereign replaces or encompasses obedience to God. By removing the pretend means of man's obligation to God, there is never a tension between obedience to God and Obedience to the Sovereign (L, 43.22). Hobbes carefully chooses the theological-political term of covenant as the conceptual foundation for the origin of a commonwealth because of the historic and religious connotations associated with the term. Through use of covenant, Hobbes is able to rhetorically prime religious citizens to adhere to his particular argument of a single all powerful ruler.

The goal of the third chapter was to illuminate the political element in Kant's doctrine of religion. I argued that the *Religion* is not at all theological or exclusively moral in nature but constitutes Kant's political philosophy of religion, which, in addition to its ostensible purpose of clarifying, extending, and even vivifying his moral philosophy, reinterprets and represents religion in such a way as to reground the Christian faith for moral-political purposes. The effort of regrounding is necessary to make possible the vision of political life in which politics and morality are not at odds with each other; the chief obstacle of this vision is religion – or, more properly stated, church faith. The political philosophy of the *Religion* springs from an initially moral-individual consideration of what determines whether man is good or evil; the resulting presentation of the moral components of human nature is projected in terms of a moral existence that must be contextualized in terms of both a nonhuman moral legislator and of man's social existence with other men – with a consequent philosophy of God restricted to moral considerations and, much more importantly, an ecclesiology that is not ultimately tied to, and explicitly designed to shed,

any historical revelation. In thus presenting a religious culmination of his investigation into morality, Kant at the same time offers a critique of existing Christian faith and religious practice, a critique which has an intended and essential connection to social-political life.

In supporting this claim, I relied on the *Religion* as the expression of the doctrine of religion and as a whole and unified book, for the teaching of the book is not merely the doctrinal content as expressed but includes both the fact and the manner of its expression: Underlying the work are reminders of Kant's labors in the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to make problematic the claims of speculative rational theology. In the *Religion*, as in Kant's writings as a whole, this is tied to an expanded realm of claims on behalf of practical moral faith, which, too, leaves behind the transcendent claims of theology – traditional problems of which are taken up and considered in the Religion in more purely moral terms. By presenting, in light of these previous steps, a philosophy of practical-moral religion in terms of human sociality, and comparing it with historical manifestations of revealed faiths, the *Religion* provides the basis not only for a proposed reenvisioning of the basis of existing religious creeds and practices, but along with this a devastating critique of them in particularly moral terms. But this is only half of what constitutes Kant's political philosophy of religion; Kant goes beyond the philosophical analysis of politics through a presentation of religion and pursues, alongside this effort, a political presentation of philosophy which is intended to relieve the reader's anxieties about the seeming tension between philosophy and political life that it is in the interest of the partisans of the church-faith to encourage.

In short, Kant's political philosophy of religion originates from his critique of reason and is an extension of that critique into matters of faith and the resulting practices such that the reader may view in a new light, and perhaps see as problematic from his original perspective, the history of his

church, the basis of his faith and religion, the meaning of historical revelation as communicated by scripture, the purpose and efficacy of cultic and sacramental practice, and the psychology of the priest. Throughout the *Religion* we can encounter Kant's re-presentation of these things, and will find that the intention of this representation is, in addition to the clarification of Kant's moral teaching, the regrounding of historical Christianity for social-political, as well as moral purposes. Kant's philosophy begins with critique but ends in doctrine and so the doctrine of religion may well be not only the conclusion but the intention of Kant's project. Certainly God, theology, and religion are still pressing concerns for Kant in the writing of his very late works, such as the *Opus Postumum*.

In the fourth chapter we learn that from the Nietzschean standpoint, the cause of our modern ailment is not epistemological nor is it primarily axiological but cultural and ontological, resulting in passivity and loss in vitality and life. From Nietzsche's point of view, the 'death of God' arises as the foundational problem for the West and modernity in the aftermath of the Enlightenment; because even if people continue to rigidly uphold the Christian values such as slave morality for a while, Nietzsche's profound observation is that those values have nevertheless lost their grounding and been devalued.

From the Nietzschen perspective, disagreements and conflicts are not just a particular feature of modern life but life in general, necessitating agon as an ever-present fact of human life and a characteristic of all spiritual undertaking for man within which 'agreement's is forged. In this agonistic process, thinking persons, who are opposed to everyday common people who are simply instinctivized and habituated in the dominant paradigm of meaning and value that defines their culture-complex at a given time, will fundamentally gravitate t those conceptions of reality which they find express their inner disposition and 'pathoses' most accurately and faithfully.

Within his own account, Nietzsche manages to thwart the charge of

intellectual relativism from two different directions. First, Nietzsche comes to develop a dualistic typological classification toward the tragic circumstance of life. In characteristic bio-physical language, he calls them “strong”, “healthy” and generative wills on the one hand, “weak”, “unhealthy” and decadent ones on the other hand. Moreover, Nietzschean genealogy points to a positive correlation between the presence of strong and courage wills and the historic period of higher and healthy culture. Secondarily, for Nietzsche, 'truth' is not a substantive ideal to attain but instead an approach. Truth lies in being honest about life.

Last but not least, we need to consider the practical implications of Nietzsche's anthro-cultural account, informed by his tragic realism. Nietzsche casts and supports his radically aristocratic and hierarchical vision of society for the actualization of creative cultural projects. For Nietzsche, it is not ideas that generate action but personalities; therefore, for him political practice should be especially mindful of differences among personalities and organize them properly to generate cultural action. For Nietzsche, the only genuine form of authority is that of 'cultural authority' embodied in the Übermenschen- this being established personally and through the grand spiritual competition between wills to power: a process which itself necessitates 'politics as agon'. It is this cultural authority and the sort of transformative agency that emanates from it that are sorely lacking in modernity and which agonistic aristocracy is meant to remedy. for him ‘cultural authority’ is not something which could be rationally adjudicated or arrived at consensually; it is physiological, primal, and fated and must be positively affirmed and cultivated through “breeding” to actualize. Physics, not reason, is its source—nomos must only reflect and affirm it. For Nietzsche, the (healthy) community, whose establishment—as a hierarchical, socio-political, and complex structure that affirms ‘aristocracy’—constitutes the immediate goal of the state, is just a means for attaining higher culture and securing future cultural growth.

While many of us moderns (especially in the West) might appropriately feel that we today live under democratic regimes, Nietzsche casts tremendous doubt on the reality of this suggestion. Modern politics, despite its radically democratic and egalitarian thrust/posturing, remains in the paradoxical position of being both intrinsically hierarchical and socially fragmented. Nietzsche aims to fundamentally change both that mindset and the politics of subverted hierarchies and false elites that epitomize modernity, deeming them both positively dangerous if we are to have any hope for cultural regeneration. His substitute for them is a genuine (neo-)aristocracy of rightful elites (cf. Übermenschen) underpinned by an 'ethic of distance' based in values such as criticality, virtù, desert, honesty/realism, and magnanimity: in other words, a restoration of the archaic, proportional conception of equality that for him amounts to 'natural justice' itself.

Ultimately and perhaps ironically, Nietzsche suggests that the intensification in modernity of social leveling, spiritual democratism, and general uniformity and conformity culminating in the 'last men'—whose only religion is 'equality as such' and only ethos *ressentiment*—could pave the way for the coming of tyrants and despots who would use the levers of the modern state to fully dominate the masses. Yet, Nietzsche also points out that the abysmal condition which spawns such catastrophic men could be the same one to propel also the Übermenschen (as spiritual/geistig masters) to reclaim their throne at the top of the human pyramid. Thus, despite his radical pessimism, Nietzsche holds out hope for the future ascendancy of the Übermenschen and thus affirms the possibility that mythopoetic activity and cultural generation could be kickstarted once more, revitalizing the West.

When all is said and done, Nietzsche's overall philosophy is not only focused on life as such but rather is one which especially privileges becoming and change in his conception of life, something that is further rooted perhaps in his biological view of time. With respect to his practical (or affirmative) philosophy, this general emphasis entails a radical focus on

the conditions and requirements for realizing social and cultural change. How could human societies undergo fundamental transformations and paradigm shifts in such a way as to preserve their dynamic nature in history? This is a formative and central question in Nietzschean philosophy. Nietzsche' tragic and humanist realism seeks the sources of such changes not in ideas *per se* but in a special kind of life-affirming, active, and creative human agents who imagine, will, and actualize them—the Übermenschen. He thus advocates for a (healthy) 'order of rank' and an aristocratic organization of society not as goods in themselves, but because he sees them as inherently necessary for the generation and breeding of these outstanding individuals. Therefore, in a time when ideas such as grassroot, collective activism and bottom-up, popular revolution are held up as surest paths and beacons to achieving fundamental social changes, Nietzsche provocatively proposes that the sort of fundamental cultural and spiritual transformation which is necessary requires instead a 'top-down' approach predicated on a re-affirmation of hierarchy (as both fact and value) within human societies. Structural change, he suggests, needs hierarchies and orders of rank to accomplish. But really it is (dynamic) 'cultural agency' that he seeks to invigorate and protect. Like his contemporary J.S. Mill, Nietzsche is especially cognizant of the fact that values and orders of men could in time crystalize into 'dead dogmas' and orthodoxies, which are solely given to conserving the status quo in a community and resisting changes to it. Nietzsche' aristocratic and tragic understanding of liberty (reserved for the Übermenschlich), then, is meant as a corrective mechanism to allow the great poetic and visionary persons of a culture to break the old encrustations and replace the deadening routinized values with new tablets that are hopefully regenerative and life-enhancing.

Nietzsche's recognition of the deep practical-poietic relationship between value-creation or "revaluation" and (great) politics—a coming together of theoria, poiesis, and praxis—makes his project as a whole much

more consistent, leaving it on a more solid and philosophically defensible ground. But what about the standards with which to make sense of this clash/agon, what are the rules of the competition and how would the victors be determined? In his tragic and visionary realism, Nietzsche downplays the significance of reason within such historic, future-guaranteeing clashes, emphasizing the centrality of power to the agonistic struggle over meaning and value. Spiritual power, imagination, and creativity, in the Nietzschean account, need not and ultimately could not be justified—they simply are, as a force of life. Few happen to have them, thus permitting them to take active part in the coming wars; other do not— This, for Nietzsche, is not a moral statement but an empirical fact, albeit one with profound ethical implications.

5.2 Concluding Remarks

The present work has focused on a complex set of issues concerning the development of individuality. We have seen how these ideas, which constitute an important part of our modern self-conception, were discovered and refined through the course of time. The story traced in this work has generally been one of liberation, as people have gradually freed themselves from the oppression of group, tradition, culture, and religion. It is easy for us living in the twenty-first century to identify with this story of emerging freedom since we generally celebrate the value of individuality. We recognize that being equally treated is a constituent element in the development of what it is to be fully human. We are happy to have the right to make the key decisions about our own lives, and we resent being pressured to do things that run contrary to our thought or personal preference. Most of us believe that we know best what will lead to our own happiness and flourishing.

However, in our modern world there has been a high price to pay for this hard-won individuality. As these modern principles develop, other

traditional principles begin to recede. It is worth looking at these to see what has been lost. This will in turn allow us to understand our own modern age from a new perspective. Specifically, it will provide insight into what is ultimately at stake in the principles of individuality.

Furthermore, at the outset of this investigation I proposed that political theory suffers from a deepening inadequacy to the increasingly intractable political problems of the current moment. I suggested that though political theorists, and more particularly historians of political thought, inhabit a unique perspective from which to apprehend current political problems, we have had little of substance to offer regarding contemporary politics. I further posited that this failure of perspicuity points to a more significant and deeper failure of understanding having to do with our grasp of the human condition itself. The last three chapters have pursued this proposition through examining the anthropolitical question in detail; first by considering Hobbes's self-interest(Chapter 2), then by investigating Kant's rationality (Chapter 3), and finally by Nietzsche's authenticity (Chapter 4). Throughout I have insisted, against the recurrent efforts to “secularize” thoughts of modern thinkers, that those thinkers must be understood theologically - that is to say that one cannot arrive at the insights of political theory of those without working through the foundational theological anthropology which grounds the theory.

When civilization confronts crisis, a robust culture may withstand the hardship. But when culture itself is in crisis, this spiritual hardship only heightens the political turmoil, raising the probability of both civilizational and cultural collapse. What we confront today, I argue, is not merely political confusion and polarization, but rather a cultural, and therefore spiritual, crisis. If our problems are in fact not primarily political, but in fact cultural and spiritual, then theorists of politics must attend to the available cultural and spiritual resources if we are to offer adequate counsel. Yet modern culture, and more particularly modern political theory, has busied

itself treating everyday issues. This project, therefore, is not more political argument or policy prescription, but rather recovery and renewal of the spiritual capital of our common culture. Those thinkers we have covered serve as a wise guide to our retrieval of those long neglected resources. Armed with a realistic wisdom regarding the possibilities and limitations available to human beings in the political and cultural worlds, we can then tackle our cultural and civilizational problems.

We quickly discover, however, that this is no easy task; inquiry into our own nature perplexes us because the various claims we make regarding our reason, our virtue and our significance inevitable push us to face the contradiction when confronted with the known facts of existence. As in Kant, assertions regarding the perspicuity of human rationality confront the reality of extreme wrongdoings.[283] Insistence on human virtue runs aground upon the "admitted evils of human history" for which man must bear some responsibility, and claims of human significance or uniqueness confront the reality of our biological "kinship with the brutes," not to mention the stark and painfully obvious truth that man is "only a little animal living a precarious existence on a second-rate planet, attached to a second-rate sun."[284]

This project's point, however, did not simply hold the pessimist view that man is irrational, unvirtuous and insignificant; rather, my claim is that our commonly held self-understanding- one which reflexively and rather unreflectively elevates those qualities- is astoundingly optimistic, rather naive. We modern "children of light," Niebuhr contends, actually believe that our reason and capacity for moral virtue ground the distinctiveness of human being and establish our significance when the obvious, empirical truth is far more complex. "The Consistent optimism of

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[283] "So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we *have* to misunderstand ourselves, for us the law 'Each is furthest from himself' applies to all eternity- we are not 'men of knowledge' with respect to ourselves," (GM, 1).

[284] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation* (New York: Carles Scribner's Sons, 1946), vol. 1, 1-2.

our liberal culture has prevented modern democratic societies both from gauging the perils of freedom accurately and from appreciating democracy fully as the only alternative to injustice and oppression." [285]

This project, or at least the first step in this task, was to explore the philosophical ground upon which we maintain such unwarranted optimism. And while theoretical in nature, the consequence of this investigation could not be more significant; our childlike naïveté regarding human nature portends disastrous consequences both in the case of the individual and with respect to our political societies and their projects. The broader implication is that the dominant modern self-understanding which views man as essentially rational and morally perfectible blinds us to the truth of the human condition - leaving us both doomed to perpetual disappointment and frustration when political reality inevitably fails to accord with lofty expectation, as well as vulnerable to external enemies- the so-called "children of darkness" who are not so naive regarding the fundaments of human being. Lacking an adequate understanding of the limits of reason and the power of self-interest, we are left personally vulnerable to despair at our apparent powerlessness and insignificance and politically vulnerable to darker, more anarchic forces which threaten the future of our democratic polities:

> *The preservation of a democratic civilization requires the wisdom of the serpent and the harmlessness of the dove. The children of light must be armed with the wisdom of the children of darkness but remain free from their malice. They must know the power of self-interest in human society without giving it moral justification. They must have this*

[285] Reinhold Niebuhrs, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defence* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), xii. For a paradigmatic exemplar of this optimistic view, see Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declines* (New York: Viking Penguin Books, 2011).

> *wisdom in order that they may beguile, deflect, harness and restrain self-interest, individual and collective, for the sake of the community.*[286]

An accurate assessment of human nature matters because the stability of our culture and the competence of our polities depends upon it. If we are to develop a more adequate, insightful self-understanding, then we must both confront the darker angels of human nature and learn from them. And this will require a sober-minded acknowledgment of the limitations we encounter and their consequences for us individually and collectively. Although we may not wish ourselves children of darkness, we must nonetheless recognize the darkness within and understand its consequences for the world without. My central contestation regarding human nature is that the modern confronts a basic tension between two largely antagonistic positions: the predominant modern, liberal account grounded in an unmerited optimism regarding the human condition and an alternative chastened, Christian account grounded in recognition of human limitation and theological-eschatological hope. I have attempted to develop each of these in turn in order to clarify and illuminate the choice presented. This required me to engage with several prominent modern thinkers and traditions.

My goal in this dissertation was to provide inchoate awareness of these political as well as moral problems delineated above, principally by investigating the political philosophy of the early modern period. One of the core questions I pose in this dissertation runs as follows: assuming that we want a pluralistic liberal society- that is, a modern, prosperous, stable, heterogeneous society that aims to maximize individual freedom, what are the conditions that make such a political society possible? Specifically, what is required besides a good constitution, good laws, and good culture? I argue

[286] Niebuhr, 1944, 40-1.

that traditional values such as religion, tradition, and history are required and thus should be reconsidered. Hobbes, Kant, and Nietzsche understood, even assumed, this – though implicitly. They began to work out in their accounts of political society, the nature, mechanisms, and development of each element that constitute our shared form of life.

What has liberal democracy been done addressing the issue to secularize our worldview? Living in a secular world, we would - or should- not look towards God, but towards men. With the weakening of ties to family, community, and traditions, people become increasingly occupied with themselves as individuals, who would lose what were formerly key elements of their traditional identity. Given the absence of meaningful external points of identification, individuals are obliged or pressed to create their own identity wholly on their own. This view implies that there is no objective truth about the matter, and that everything is just image, ideology or political spin. To appreciate how far we have come in such this matter, we need only recall the arguments of Socrates that we need to go to the expert in any given area that we want to know about.[287] But Today all views and opinions are in fact leveled, and thus everyone's opinion has equal weight and value, even if one person is a clearly recognized expert in the field. The result of this is a general relativism and rejection of any external truth. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that we live in a post-truth world.[288]

Having good men will not solve everything for sure; and a politics in which good men participate will seldom be attained. But the struggle for a better (never a perfect) world – a world of less cruelty and suffering, humiliation and deprivation, of greater and more justly distributed freedom, respect, safety and opportunity- must continue, unendingly. But how? We

[287] See, for example, Plato, *Laches*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 185a-e; Plato, *Apology* in The Last Days of Socrates, trans. Christopher Rowe (London: Penguin, 2010), 24d-25b.

[288] See, for example, Lee McIntyre, *Post-Truth* (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2018).

need to unify the two views, that is, the objective and the subjective. We need to strive to create a public order that is generally recognized by individuals as true and rational but at the same time holds customs, traditions, and religions. This is the formula for overcoming the repression of the ancient and the alienation of the modern. With the idea of the tension between dialectical opposites such as individuality and traditional authority, we have a useful tool for evaluating our own time and ourselves.

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국문초록

본 논문은 근대 정치사상에서 개인과 국가를 어떻게 그려내는지 그 철학적 전제를 탐구하고자 하는 목적을 내세우고 있다. 구체적으로, 인간은 모두 평등하며, 합리적 사고를 통해 자신의 진정한 삶을 개척해 나가는 존재이며, 국가는 이러한 개인들로 구성된다는 근대 세속적 관념이 어떻게 형성되었는지 규명하는 것을 주요 목적으로 삼는다. 이러한 탐구는 근대 정치철학자인 홉스, 칸트, 니체가 제시한 주장을 검토하면서 이뤄진다. 특히 주목하는 바는 세속적인 정치 질서 형성을 저서의 목적으로 내세우고 있는 세 정치철학자가 종교적 논의를 상당 부분 참고하고 활용하고 있다는 점에 있다. 홉스는 리바이어던 3부와 4부에서 성서해석 문제를 다루고 있으며, 절대적 주권자가 시민의 내적 신념까지 지도할 수 있어야 안정적인 정치 질서를 이룰 수 있다고 주장한다. 칸트는 마지막 출판 저서로 종교에 관한 저작을 남겼으며, 신과 인간이 누리는 창발성을 비교하며 인간이 누리는 자유와 이성의 한계를 명확히 제시했다. 니체는 허무주의와 르상띠망을 문제시했던 사상가로 알려져 있지만, 실제로 그가 중점적으로 다뤘던 문제는 계몽주의와 기독교에서 내세우는 단일한 역사관, 세계관이었다. 이러한 검토를 통해 본 연구는 흔히 종교가 이성과 대척점에 자리하며, 따라서 합리적 진보 개념에 기반을 두는 정치 영역에서 배제되어야 한다는 통념에 새로운 시각을 전한다. 그리고 이렇게 근대 정치 사상가들이 남긴 유산을 재검토하면서 본 연구는 현대 정치사상에서 개인을 어떻게 규정할지를 두고 벌어지는 논의에 좀 더 풍부한 이론적 자원을 제공할 것이다.

주요어 : 근대 개인, 신, 정치-신학적 논의, 토마스 홉스, 임마누엘 칸트, 프리드리히 니체

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