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Master's Thesis of Science in Agriculture

Interaction and Transition of Actors, Rules and Agendas in Global Cocoa Governance

- Focused on Global Agreements and Declarations -

글로벌 코코아 거버넌스의 행위자, 규칙, 의제의
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Haeun Lee

**Department of International Agricultural Technology
Graduate School of International Agricultural Technology
Seoul National University**

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Supervised by

Prof. Mi Sun Park

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Haeun Lee

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Chair Seongtae Ji, Ph.D.

Vice Chair Mi Sun Park, Ph.D.

Examiner Yohan Lee, Ph.D.

Abstract

Most of the commodity crops are produced by low-income countries in the Global South and consumed in the Global North. Due to their vulnerability to price fluctuation, their prices have been regulated by commodity agreements between producing and consuming countries. However, after these prices were decided through the market, price regulation was no longer included in the negotiation agenda of commodity agreements. The cocoa sector has continued its collective global efforts to address various environmental and social issues even after the issue of price regulation was addressed. This study investigated global cocoa governance through analyzing global cocoa actors, rules, and agendas through a content analysis of global agreements such as International Cocoa Agreements, World Cocoa Declarations, and Global Cocoa Farmers Declaration. The results indicated a transition in the three aforementioned aspects over time. First, the actors and agendas in the sector diversified. Starting from the 2000s, private actors emerged and actively participated in forming global cocoa agendas and suggesting solutions to cocoa-related problems. Accordingly, more varied issues other than price fluctuation are included in the agendas. Second, global cocoa rules were softened. Treaties among countries have controlled the global cocoa industry. Recently-introduced soft laws enabled diverse issues to be addressed and facilitated the participation of various actors. Third, coordination was emphasized at the international and state level. The inclusion of varied actors and agendas necessitated the alignment of efforts for improving global cocoa governance. Aiming to tackle issues through interaction among actors, rules, and agendas, global cocoa governance has been evolving in three distinct ways: diversification, flexibilization, and coordination

Key words : Cocoa, global governance, agreement, commodity crop, diversification, flexibilization, coordination

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List of Abbreviation

COPAL : Cocoa Producers' Alliance
CSG : Cocoa Study Group
FAO : Food and Agriculture Organization
GCFC : Global Cocoa Farmers Conference
ICAs : International Commodity Agreements
ICCAs : International Cocoa Agreements
ICCFO : International Cocoa Farmers Organization
ICCO : International Cocoa Organization
ICI : International Cocoa Institution
ICO : International Coffee Organization
ICoAs : International Coffee Agreements
IGAs : International Grains Agreements
ILO : International Labour Organization
INRAs : International Natural Rubber Agreements
INRO : International Natural Rubber Organization
ISAs : International Sugar Agreements
ISCR : International Symposium on Cocoa Research
ISO : International Sugar Organization
ITA : International Tin Agreements
ITC : International Tin Council
IWAs : International Wheat Agreements
KPIs : Key Performance Indicators
NCDPs : National Cocoa Development Plans
NYDF : New York Declaration on Forests

OECD : Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

RSCE : Roundtable for Sustainable Cocoa Economy

SPS : Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards

UNCED : United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

UNCTAD : United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

USAID : US Agency for International Development

WCC : World Cocoa Conference

WCF : World Cocoa Foundation

1. Introduction

A commodity crop is an agricultural product that is mainly produced for trade. Most of the commodity crops are produced in low-income countries in the Global South and consumed in the Global North. A majority of the export earnings of these low-income countries' depends on commodity crop (United Nations Conference Trade and Development, 2019)¹. Thus, a plunge or fluctuation in commodity crop exports will cause severe damage to countries' economies and threaten the livelihoods of millions of farmers. The United Nations (UN) tried to tackle this issue through International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) on six commodity crops: coffee, cocoa, sugar, tin, natural rubber, and wheat (Gilbert, 1996).

Akin to other commodity crops, cocoa, the primary export commodity crop of many African and South American countries, is vulnerable to price fluctuation. An International Cocoa Agreement (ICCA) was first signed in 1972, when the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) was established. Since then, the ICCO has served as the central actor of the global cocoa value chain. In addition, globalization instigated the trade of commodity crops and made production and consumption more distant (Meyfroidt et al., 2013). This means that consuming countries can no longer neglect the diverse issues that prevail in cocoa-producing countries. Given the complicated and intricate nature of cocoa issues, the involvement of various actors became inevitable. Thus, the active participation of private institutions became necessary since the early 2000s.

The emergence of active public and private participation in global cocoa sector


¹ <https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/MerchandiseTrade/ByProduct.html>

demonstrated its distinct characteristics in comparison to other commodity crops. This research aims to examine this phenomenon using content analysis under the global governance theory. The research design is based on the meta-framework for conceptualizing governance modes with three dimensions of governance (Lange et al., 2013). Based on three dimensions of governance, politics, policy, and polity, this research seeks to identify and analyzed the actors, agendas, and rules in global cocoa governance.

1.1. World Cocoa Production

Cocoa is an agricultural product that is consumed globally, especially in Europe (46%), America (31%), Asia and, Oceania (18%) (Fountain and Huetz-Adams, 2018) (Figure 1). The global chocolate was valued at USD 130.56 billion in 2019 (Grand View Research, 2020). Over 14 million employees are presently engaged in cocoa production (Slavova, 2017). Moreover, according to the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF), nearly 50 million people worldwide depend on cocoa production and the cocoa and chocolate industry as their primary (Osarenren, 2016). Around 73% of the world's cocoa is produced in West Africa, 16% in South America, and 11% in Asia. Cocoa is mainly produced in developing countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Indonesia, and Cameroon (Fountain and Huetz-Adams, 2018) (Figure 1).

Figure 1. World cocoa production and consumption



Source: Fountain and Hütz-Adams, 2020.

Red: Cocoa production in 1,000 tonnes 2019/2020 (forecast)


Brown: Domestic consumption of cocoa in 1,000 tonnes 2018/2019

About 98% of the world's cocoa is produced by 5-6 million smallholder farmers with an average of 2-3 hectares of land (UNDP, 2017). However, farmers receive only 6.6% of the consumer price of cocoa product due to the structure of the cocoa industry's supply chain (Fountain and Huetz-Adams, 2018). The value-adding chain of cocoa is vertically integrated, which means that the grinding and processing stage are performed by a few international trading companies (Bass, 2006). This makes it hard for smallholder farmers to maintain their livelihood as they are already struggling with poverty. They are also vulnerable to cocoa's fluctuating market price. Even as recently as between September 2016 and February 2017, the world cocoa price fall caused a 30-40% decline in the income of smallholder (Fountain and Huetz-Adams, 2018). Although the industry is expanding and the demand for cocoa is increasing, the constant fluctuation in the market price presents a challenge to

smallholders (Dalberg, 2019). Figure 2 illustrates the fluctuation and recent decline in cocoa prices. Low prices and price instability have been the main issues plaguing the cocoa and other commodity crops such as sugar, coffee, and tin (Gilbert, 1996).

Within addition to their declining income, declining productivity due to aged cacao² trees, pests, Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus disease has been threatening farmers' livelihoods. To compensate for declining prices and productivity, farmers expand their cacao farms. Cacao has historically been a "slash-and-burn" crop (Fountain and Huetz-Adams, 2018). Thus, the creation of new cacao fields implies cutting down rainforests. Cocoa production attempts to meet the expanding demand for cocoa products such as chocolates. There has been an observed increase in global cocoa production and harvested areas since 1990 (Figure 3), but production per hectare remains almost the same compared to two decades ago (Figure 4). This signifies that

Figure 2. Changes of global cocoa price



² Cacao refers to the crop name *Theobroma cacao*. Cocoa is the product of cacao. Two concepts are often mixed, and the differences are barely distinguished. In this paper, to avoid confusion, the term cocoa is used except in a context where it precisely refers to the crop cacao.

the increase in cocoa production has mainly occurred due to cacao farm expansion, not increased productivity. In West Africa alone, 2.3 million hectares of forest land was damaged due to cocoa production between 1988 and 2007 (Gockowski and Sonwa, 2011).

Preserving forest resources during cocoa production is thus essential for the sustainable supply of raw material in the future. In addition, the volatility of cocoa prices and the vulnerability of the livelihoods of cacao farmers and communities also need to be managed.

Figure 3. Changes of world cocoa yield per hectar





Figure 4. Changes of world cocoa production and harvested area



1.2. Global commodity market

Most commodity crops are primary products and account for a high percentage of the “Global south’s exports.” For example, primary goods accounted for 77% of Africa’s exports in 2019 (UNCTAD).³ Thus prices of commodity crops significantly impact the export earnings of the countries that produce them. This results in two main problems: the fluctuation of export earnings and long-run downward trend of export earnings (Kofi, 1972). These problems can be characterized as the “*commodity problem*.” ICAs were created to ameliorate this commodity problem. ICAs involve both producing and consuming countries and aim to regulate price

³ <https://stats.unctad.org/handbook/MerchandiseTrade/ByProduct.html>

trends by establishing price ranges, export quotas, and buffer stocks (Finlayson and Wzacher, 1983). The UN, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) conducted negotiations regarding more than 25 commodities for over 35 years, but only six ICAs have been formulated. These ICAs pertain to coffee, cocoa, tin, sugar, natural rubber, and wheat (Finlayson and Wzacher, 1983). The current status of each commodity agreements is in Table 1.

In the case of coffee, the first International Coffee Agreement (ICoA) was created in 1962, and the International Coffee Organization (ICO) was established in 1963 (International Coffee Organization, 2021a). The most recent agreement was the seventh agreement adopted in 2007 and entered into force in 2011 (International Coffee Organization, 2021a). The 2007 agreement has a duration of 10 years, with a possible extension for a further eight years (International Coffee Organization, 2021a). The ICO organized four World Coffee Conferences with over 900 public and private participants (at the 4th Conference) from the coffee chain (International Coffee Organization, 2021b). The conference aims to enable discussion around critical topics in the global coffee sector (International Coffee Organization, 2021b).

Tin and sugar agreements started in 1954 as the first commodity agreement. The main concern of the two agreements was the meager price of products (Gilbert, 1996). Through the International Tin Agreements (ITAs), International Tin Council (ITC) was established in 1956. After five more agreements, the collapse in price brought the failure of ITA in 1985 (Thoburn, 1994). Some see this collapse as a consequence of a lack of legal liability in international law between States and private entities (Sadurska and Chinkin, 2017). There have been seven International Sugar Agreements (ISAs) after the first agreement. The fourth ISA ceased in 1984 and replaced with an agreement that did not contain market intervention clauses in 1987 (Gilbert, 1987). Since then, the subsequent agreement was concluded in 1992, which

was extended until 2021. The International Sugar Organization (ISO) was founded to administer the latest agreement in 1992. The ISO holds annual seminars aiming to increase knowledge and understand the sugar market and related issues (International Sugar Organization, 2021).

The first International Natural Rubber Agreements (INRAs) started in 1979 with the establishment of the International Natural Rubber Organization (INRO) (Khan, 1980). After the first agreement, 1987 and 1995 agreements were followed (Verico, 2013). Nevertheless, after the withdrawal notice from Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand in 1999, the agreement was terminated in 2000 (Gilbert, 2011). Accordingly, the INRO was demolished in 2001. The failure of the INRA is primarily caused by the failure to stabilize rubber prices (Gilbert, 2011).

International Wheat Agreements (IWAs) were initiated in 1933 motivated to achieve price stabilization and food security (Gilbert, 2011). The IWA was the contract between governments at the time when intergovernmental transactions dominated the wheat trade. In this transaction, prices were set or influenced by farm-supporting policies of exporting countries. However, after the grains market was handed to private companies, market price becomes the basis of the contract (Gilbert, 2011). Thus, assuring maximum price needs to be guaranteed through the subsidies which WTO requires to reduce (Gilbert, 2011). Exporting governments could no longer guarantee the maximum prices that IWA used to guarantee (Gilbert, 2011). The IWA was replaced by the International Grains Agreements (IGAs) in 1995.

The first global attempt to establish a price stabilization agency resulted creating the Cocoa Study Group (CSG) under the auspices of the FAO in 1956. Despite a few market price fluctuations, the international accord was hard to obtain (Finlayson and Wzacher, 1983). In 1961, the CSG agreed to create a Working Party to prepare a draft of regulatory agreement. However, consent between producing and consuming countries was not concluded (Short, 1975). The fundamental divergence in approach

towards pricing of both parties was a major obstacle to seal the agreement (Schutjer and Ayo, 1967; Short, 1975). Thus in 1964, the Cocoa Producers' Alliance (COPAL) decided to take unilateral action: The Cocoa Producers' Stabilization Agreement (Schutjer and Ayo, 1967). Nevertheless, the effort of COPAL had failed due to a lack of finances and storage capacity and due to the absence of schemes to regulate production (Hanisch, 1975). After several disagreements between producing and consuming countries on the cocoa price range, cocoa consultation under the auspices of UCTAD and FAO kept made an effort to make an agreement that both parties can agree upon (Short, 1975). Finally, in 1972, through the UN Cocoa Conferences, the first inter-governmental agreement, International Cocoa Agreement (ICCA), was concluded. The latest 2010 ICCA is valid, and ICCO is still functioning and cooperating with other actors throughout the cocoa value chain.

As shown in Table 1, most commodity agreements have been ceased or withdrawn due to collapses in commodity prices, a lack of legal liability, or conflict between member countries. Currently, only the cocoa sector display a sector-wide platform that includes gatherings and declarations, which are participated in by producing and consuming countries, corporates, NGOs, and other stakeholders. The coffee and sugar sectors still manage to operate their international organizations and agreements under the UNCTAD. The coffee sector has sector-wide conferences akin to the cocoa sector. However, the coffee sector is yet to reach a sector-wide declaration. Given the abrogation of previously established agreements and international organizations, no international agreements or declarations are presently in place in the tin, rubber, and wheat sectors. The rubber sector has the International Rubber Study Group; an inter-governmental organization consists of eight producing and consuming countries. The organization collects and publishes statistical information on rubber markets and provides a forum for consultation but does not reach any international agreement. WTO engages in disputes of commodity crops between countries but

does not make any international order or agreements.

Thus, the cocoa sector has followed a distinctive trajectory in comparison to other commodity crops. Despite changes in its agenda, the cocoa sector has continued its global efforts in its attempt to address diverse issues. This study aims to analyze these distinctive global efforts of the cocoa sector.

Table 1. History of international agreements of six commodity crops

Information	International Agreement of commodity crops					
	Cocoa	Coffee	Sugar	Tin	Natural Rubber	Wheat
Organization	ICCO (1972-)	ICO (1963-)	ISO (1968-)	ITC (1954-1985)	INRO (1980-2001)	
First agreement	1972	1962	1954	1954	1979	1933
Current agreement	2010	2007	1992			
Next agreement	2026 (expected)					
Final agreement				1982	1995	1967
Termination date				1985	2000	1970s
Sector-wide conference	World Cocoa Conference (2012, 2014, 2016, 2018)	World Coffee Conference (2001, 2005, 2010, 2016)				
Sector-wide declaration	2012, 2014, 2016, 2018					

1.3. Research Objective

The primary objective of this research is to examine global cocoa governance. For this purpose, this paper presents three questions:

1. Who are the global actors in cocoa decision-making?
2. What are the global rules in the cocoa sector?
3. What are the global agendas on cocoa?

This paper consists of seven chapters. The first chapter describes the general background of the research. The second chapter provides a literature review on the cocoa sector and cocoa governance. The third chapter describes the theoretical background of this research. The fourth chapter describes research design and methodology. The fifth chapter presents the result of the above three research questions. The sixth chapter discusses three characteristics of global cocoa governance based on the result: diversification, flexibilization, and coordination. The final seventh chapter summarizes the research findings and describes limitations and future suggestions from this research.

2. Literature Review

Social scientists have extensively researched the cocoa sector. Some scholars focused on the cocoa and chocolate industry. Fold (2001) studied the changes in the European cocoa and chocolate processing industry, its structural transformation in the 1990s, and the abolition of the state-controlled marketing system. Additionally, Fold (2002) analyzed structural patterns in sub-systems of the global cocoa chain through the supply system in Ghana and a regional cocoa trading-storing-grinding structure in Amsterdam. LeBaron and Gore (2020) analyzed the patterns of gender-based labor exploitation that are reflected in the cocoa supply chain.

Many studies have focused on specific regions or countries. Benjamin and Deaton (1993) utilized a survey to estimate the impact of price changes on Ivorian cocoa farmers' welfare. Ruf (2011) conducted field surveys in Ghana and illustrated that local smallholders no longer consider cocoa agroforestry with various crop species to be effective. Rather than maintaining biodiversity in a cocoa plantation, "light commercial-oriented agroforests" with a few income-generating trees such as timber trees were preferred (Ruf, 2011). Dormon et al. (2004) identified the biological and socio-economic factors of low cocoa productivity in Ghana. Gockowski et al. (2010) conducted a case study in southern Cameroon and concluded that cocoa agroforests positively affect farmers' per capita revenues. Neilson (2007) examined the role of private, multinational, and public institutions in maintaining cocoa farm profits in Sulawesi, Indonesia—a region where the cocoa sector has suffered from severe pest and quality problems. Jacobi et al. (2015) compared the social and ecological resilience of organic and non-organic farms in Bolivia through indicators.

Research on cocoa governance has focused on specific issues or regions. Bitzer et al. (2012) examined the roles and the targeted issues of global multilateral partnerships in the cocoa sector which are created to facilitate a sustainable cocoa

industry. Glin et al. (2015) analyzed the transformation of the organic cocoa network in Ghana. They noted the emergence of hybrid governance arrangements involving transnational networks within this network. Abbey et al. (2016) conducted a survey and interviews with Ghanaian cocoa farmers to explore the relationship between governance and social capital. Their results indicated a positive relationship between good governance and social capital. Wijaya et al. (2018) investigated multi-stakeholder arrangements that aim for sustainable agriculture in Indonesia. Their research highlighted the limitations of partnership projects in the Indonesian cocoa sector. It emphasized the improvement of collaboration between actors and the importance of social relations among smallholders (Wijaya et al., 2018). Pigatto et al. (2020) analyzed the establishment of governance structures between buyers and suppliers of certified cocoa in Bahia, Brazil. Carodenuto (2019) focused on the governance of the transnational private authority on zero-deforestation cocoa in West Africa. Through policy analysis, fieldwork, and interviews, the study found an evolving codependent relationship between corporate and state-led deforestation efforts.

Although sectoral and regional research has been conducted since 2010, global-level research on cocoa governance remains limited. Thus, this research is an initial attempt to analyze global cocoa governance. It is expected to provide a more macroscopic perspective on global cocoa governance than previous studies.

3. Theoretical Background

3.1. Global Governance

Governance is a concept with diverse meanings. It is employed by some to describe a complex structure and process that is both public and private, whereas others used it as a synonym for the government (Weiss, 2000). Although the definitions of “governance” are varied (Table 2), the concept implies the involvement of more diversified actors and their partnerships. Stoker (1998) described governance as follow:

Governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within the public and private sectors have become blurred. The essence of governance is the focuses on governing mechanisms that do not rest on resources and the authority and sanctions of government (Stoker, 1998).

It is a new form of political engagement in comparison to the government-led decision-making of the past. The concept of governance focuses more on the increasing participation of the private sector in the decision-making (Stoker, 1998).

Table 2. Definition of Governance

Organization	Definition	Reference
World Bank	“the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources”	(World Bank, 1994)
UNDP	“the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority of manage a country’s affairs at all levels”	(UNDP, 1997)
OECD	“the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and	(OECD, 1995)

	economic development”	
Institute on Governance, Ottawa	“a process whereby societies or organizations make their important decisions, determine whom they involve in the process and how they render account (Graham et al., 2003)”	(Institute on governance, 2021)
Commission on Global Governance	“the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”	(Commission on Global Governance, 1995)
International Institute of Administrative Sciences	“the process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life, and economic and social development”	(Fouchet et al., 2015)
USAID	Governance encompasses the capacity of the state, the commitment to the public good, the rule of law, the degree of transparency and accountability, the level of popular participation, and the stock of social capital.	(USAID, 2010)

“Globalization,” the intense connections between countries and people, has intensified the need for global rules and governance to facilitate cooperative action on environmental, economic, and political issues that affect multiple nations (Barnett and Duvall, 2009). Global governance evolved from state governance to become about individual countries engaging in power politics. The decision-making process of traditional government-led “old governance” (Pierre, 2000) can be characterized as top-down and hierarchical. On the contrary, modern global governance transcends the nation-state boundary and does not depend on territorial lines (Cadman, 2009). This “new governance” (Pierre, 2000) can be characterized a consensus-oriented system involving interaction among various actors and multi-level decision making (Jugdev and Müller, 2005; Secco et al., 2011). Since this new governance relies on the engagement of various actors in decisions-making, it is essential for public and private actors to cooperate with each other. In this arrangement collaborative networking, decision-making, coordination and, cooperation among multi-level and

multi-sectoral actors is vital (Pierre, 2000).

Nevertheless, there is a discussion on how this ‘new governance’ can be reliable and democratized when non-state actors share powers and decision-making is dispersed across borders (Courville, 2006). Problem and problem-solving are now occurring globally with pluralized actors’ collective action in the ‘new governance.’ International institution governance tends to exclude the interests of major stakeholders such as local communities and employees, despite some compromise to demonstrate certain transparency and accountability (Cadman, 2009). Despite the inherent democracy deficit due to its characteristic of dispersed decision-making across the borders, global governance can be another opportunity for open participation (Warren, 2002). Cadman (2009) argues that it is more of a question of how to effectively design the global institutions with participation and deliberation by multi-stakeholders.

With the participation of global actors, democratically accountable operation, effectiveness and legitimacy became more doubtful than government-led top-down models (Cadman, 2009). Participation of non-state, private actors in the policy arena made “good” schemes necessary for the legitimacy of the governance. The concept of “good governance” is defined as public administration process that maximizes public interest in the perspective of state governance (Keping, 2018). In global governance, the good governance scheme is derived from legitimacy (Cadman, 2011). Legitimacy is more than just democracy. It concerns accountability, representation of interest, transparency, and effectiveness (Bäckstrand, 2006; Cadman, 2009; Courville, 2003). The quality of the governance is often considered in terms of the quality of a system. Each element for governance’s quality are described as follow:

Representation of interest (Participation)

Inclusion or inclusiveness of various stakeholders is considered as a crucial part of global governance (Koenig-Archibugi, 2006). It is about both access and weight (Koenig-Archibugi, 2006). Access is about how many relevant stakeholders that are bounded and affected by a given policy participate in the process. Weight is to what extent the influence is distributed to participants. Thus, it goes along with the power dynamics of participants (Koenig-Archibugi, 2006). Identification of actors affected by a policy thus can demonstrate inclusiveness.

Accountability and Transparency

Traditionally, accountability was the ‘vertical’ system of national democratic accountability, meaning the system of elected representatives and their centralized management. In governance, vertical accountability is supplemented by ‘horizontal’ accountability. Horizontal accountability is more of an external concept. It is more related to transparency and public access to information in the process of decision-making (Kerwer, 2006). Transparency, as openness of information to the public, can facilitate the participation of interest parties in the policy process and scrutiny of public decision-making (Smismans, 2004). Transparency is a precondition of accountability because it is impossible for the public to account if the operation is not open to the public (Scholte, 2004). Disclosure of the decision-making process and election procedures are needed for transparency.

Effectiveness

Effectiveness is a concept focused more on the policy output rather than process. It is the concept to what extent a policy successfully tackled the addressed problem (Zaelke et al., 2005). It can be divided into problem-solving effectiveness and behavioral effectiveness (Skjærseth et al., 2006; Underdal, 1992). The former is how significantly to solve the problem, and the latter is how significantly to shape the behavior of relevant target groups (Underdal, 1992). An international institution can be effective when it contributes to solving the problems by shaping the behavior of related target groups (Underdal, 1992). Through case studies⁴ on international environmental governance, Skjærseth et al. (2006) pointed out that transformation or incorporation of soft law into hard law can help to improve the effectiveness of international norms. Although norm-hardening can facilitate compliance activities, soft law enables compliance activities since it can be instrumental for adopting much more precise norms in some cases (Skjærseth et al., 2006). Thus, effective governance needs to entail not only achievement of targets through implementation and compliance to rules but also security of the space for developing the new target through the soft law institution.

Coordination

Coordination in policy is defined; “A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in it such that the adverse consequences of anyone decision for other decisions in the set are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, counterbalanced, or outweighed” (Lindblom, 1965). This concept of avoiding

⁴ Three case studies in global norms on 1. Protecting the Northeast Atlantic, 2. Reducing Transboundary Air Pollution, 3. Constraining Fisheries Subsidies were selected. The study investigated global soft and hard laws regarding three issue areas.

conflict is called negative coordination (Scharpf, 1994). On the other hand, positive coordination goes one step further and aims to search for ways to cooperate on solutions that can profit all stakeholders (Scharpf, 1994). Metcalfe (1994) developed a policy coordination scale with nine stages⁵, from total independent decision-making to central strategy. Coordination can be achieved through networks, collaboration, and hierarchy (Peters, 2018). Networks often create coordination through interaction among civil servants. This network of social actors and governments provides coordination from the bottom up. Social actors interact while having information about different organizations and identify contradictions among them (Peters, 2018). In sum, coordination can be defined as “a process of creating the common understanding of the problem” (Bardach, 1998) and reaching an agreement on the nature of the problem among actors (Peters, 2018).

3.2. Modes of Governance

Modes of governance is defined as “forms of realizing collective goals by means of collective action.” (Lange et al., 2013). While the concept of governance emerges, several scholars approached to identify multiple typologies of governance modes with diverse ways (Gong et al., 2020). In particular, Rhodes’ (Rhodes, 1997) study focused on politics, Rosenau (Rosenau, 2009) was more focused on polity and Héritier (Héritier, 2002) on the polity dimension of the governance. Despite the considerable insights that each study provides, it is insufficient to comprehend the

⁵ 1. Independent Decision-Making, 2. Communication with others, 3. Consultation with others, 4. Avoiding divergence, 5. Search for agreement, 6. Arbitration of Policy Difference, 7. Setting limits on actions, 8. Establish central priorities, 9. Central strategy

complexity of governance (Lange et al., 2013). More recently, some researchers made an effort to incorporate the complexity by including multiple aspects in the governance analysis (Howlett et al., 2009; Hysing, 2009; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Tollefson et al., 2009; Van Leeuwen and Van Tatenhove, 2010). However, the foundation of agreement on the distinguishing and understanding governance modes was unconcluded. Hillman et al. (2011, p.409) thus highlighted the necessity for better analytical clarity for empirical research since attempts to conceptualize modes of governance have sometimes led to more confusion than clarity.

Thus, Lange et al. (2013) attempted to overcome this vagueness and identified a substantiated way to approach modes of governance. They present a meta-framework for conceptualizing governance modes. Following this meta-framework, the inherent complexity of the modes of governance is exposed through the dynamic relations among politics, polity, and policy. The *politics dimension* is concerned with the process aspects of governance—actors and interaction processes inherent in the governance mode. The *polity dimension* covers the structural side of governance and is mostly understood as “rules of the game” that shape actors’ interactions. The *policy dimension* denotes the content of governance—formulation and implementation of political objectives and instruments. These three dimensions are crucial elements of governance that realize collective goals through collective action (Lange et al., 2013). It also aligns with the characterization of governance that involves the question “who governs, how do they govern, and what do they govern?” (Hillman et al., 2011).

Politics dimension

The politics dimension is reflective of the relationships among actors, which include their initiation and coordination during the governance arrangement process (Lange

et al., 2013). The manner in which divergent preferences and varied interests are transformed into policy choices and collective action reveals the politics dimension of governance (Stoker, 2016). Policy actors are defined as “any individual or group that is directly or indirectly, formally or informally affiliated with or affected by the policy process at any stage” (Margaret, 2003). Actors include governments, inter-governmental organizations, business entities, civil society, NGOs, and research institutions, and individuals related to policy processes and outcomes (Margaret, 2003). Thus, identifying actors is the first step in examining the politics dimension.

Polity dimension

Politics and policy-making take place within the institutional architecture and the general interaction patterns among actors (Lange et al., 2013). Polity is “an institutional system forming the framework for political action and covers the concrete normative, structural elements of politics set out in the constitution” (Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union, 2015). Both unwritten and written rules as a polity form the framework of the political share (Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union, 2015). Thus, the patterns of interaction among actors in a formal and informal system can reveal the embedded governance in the institution (Ostrom, 2009; Scott, 2013). Thus, analyzing such a rule can show the polity dimension of governance.

Policy dimension

The policy dimension reflects the content of governance which includes formulation of policy problems (agenda setting) and implementation of policy instruments and strategies to achieve specific goals (Lange et al., 2013). As content or material dimension of politics, policy tends to be formed as a political agenda (Association

of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union, 2015). Agenda setting is a critical policy process that positions specific issues to become the center of the public's attention (Portz, 1996). It is a political process that involves the elevation of particular issues to a policy deliberation (Weiss, 1989).

Agenda is a set of selected issues to be addressed in a policy (Kingdon and Stano, 1984; Princen, 2007). According to the attention given to issues, there is a degree of agenda rather than simply being “off” or “on” to the agenda (Princen, 2007). In general, there are three types of agenda; The “formal” or “political” agenda handled by decision-makers, the “systematic” or “public” agenda shared by the public (i.e., public opinion polls), and the media agenda covered by the media (Princen, 2007). In this study, the term agenda is used as “formal” and “political” agenda. Agenda setting is affected by the problem definition, which is the way in which people conceive and evaluate issues. Problem definition is not an objective process; it involves people's perceptions and interpretations (Portz, 1996). Thus, policy agendas are formed through problem definitions that are a “strategic representation of the situation” of policy actors (Stone, 1988). Thus, analyzing agendas can show which issues are formulated and included as policy content.

3.3. Treaty and Declaration

According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (United Nations, 2005), a treaty is defined as “an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by national law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” The international law embodied the Charter of the United Nations, which contains: principles of equal rights of the sovereign equality and independence of all States,

non-interference in the domestic affairs of States, prohibition of the threat of use of force of human rights and, fundamental freedoms for all (United Nations, 2005). The treaty is usually a negotiation between plenipotentiaries of governments with the “full power” (Shaw, 2019). In bilateral treaties, the signature manifests the countries’ intention to be bound by the treaty (Shaw, 2019). In multilateral treaties, the signature is ordinarily subject to formal ratification by the governments (Shaw, 2019). Therefore, the instrument is not formally binding until the ratifications have been exchanged unless explicitly expressed in the provision (Shaw, 2019). The states became parties to the treaty through accession, and only party states go into effect to the treaties after ratifications are attained (Shaw, 2019). In case of a breach, multilateral treaties may be terminated or suspended if unanimously agreed by all parties (Shaw, 2019). Excluding the member who breached a treaty is also an option. In commodity agreements, suspension or collapse of treaties are primarily due to disagreement of members based on their interests (Gilbert, 1996). The interest of the member states is deeply related to economic circumstances such as price and market change (Gilbert, 1996).

ICCA is one of the UN multilateral treaties on commodity crops. The UN Treaty Handbook sets that “a treaty or international agreement must impose on the parties legal obligations binding under international law” (United Nations, 2012). Thus, ICCA has legal effects as a treaty. Accordingly, treaties need to follow regular procedures to be deposited and joined by member countries. The entry into force, dispute resolution, and compliance mechanisms, amendments and withdrawal, and termination are specified as critical events in a multilateral treaty (United nations, 2012).

The ICCA enters into force when “the Governments representing at least five exporting countries accounting for at least 80% of the total exports of countries and Governments representing importing countries having at least 60% of total imports


have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Depositary”. The liabilities of members of ICCAs are limited to the extent of its obligations regarding contributions provided in the agreement. Members are responsible for providing the ICCO with information on stocks of cocoa beans and cocoa products and with information on pertinent domestic regulations and measures concerning cocoa consumption in their countries.

A declaration is “the means by which the actors express their will, intention, or opinion when acting in the field of international relations” (Dörr, 2019). Some declarations are made to specify the treaty commitments, and in a formal sense, it generally indicates solemnity and the intention of public notice (Dörr, 2019). A declaration can have a legal effect through certain produces, such as creating virtue or acting as a customary law (Dörr, 2019). Declaration has been used as a political device to convey official intentions and views and to elucidate common positions. A classic example of an international declaration is the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which is concluded at United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The UNCED provides the global guideline for sustainable development and represents major milestones in the evolution of international environmental law (Sand, 2007). Another example is the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF). The NYDF is a voluntary and non-binding international declaration to induce actions to halt global deforestation by 2030 (United Nations Climate Summit, 2014). To achieve it, Bonn Challenge was used as an implementation vehicle. As two examples show, international declarations set a standard and provide a basis for global action for a common goal. There is no general rule requiring declarations to be made in a specific form according to Guiding Principle No. 5 adopted by the International Law Commission (Commission, 2006).

4. Research Design and Methodology

To examine the global cocoa governance, related actors, rules, and policy agendas are investigated at the global level. This study is based on the meta-framework for conceptualizing governance modes by Lange et al. (2013). The meta-framework presents three interdependent dimensions in modes of governance. Three dimensions are politics, policy, and policy which can be determined by analyzing actors, norms, and policy objectives, respectively (Figure 5). By applying the framework, analyzing global cocoa actors, rules and agendas can help to identify the relationship and coordination of actors (politics dimension), normative elements of politics (polity dimension), and content of politics (policy dimension) of global cocoa governance.

Figure 5. Meta-framework for conceptualizing governance modes



Adapted from the meta-framework of Lange et al. (2013).

In this research, first, the main global cocoa actors were identified whose purpose and activities are focused on the cocoa issues. Second, rules in the global cocoa sector and their agendas were identified. Through this two process, politics, polity and policy dimensions of global cocoa policy governance was interpreted. Analyzing identified actors, rules, and agendas is expected to contribute to understanding the structure of global cocoa governance.

Materials

To investigate global cocoa actors and events, 17 ICCO Annual Reports⁶ (from 1998-1999 to 2014-2015) and six WCF World Cocoa Partnership Meeting Summary (from 2017 to 2019) are analyzed. The ICCO Annual Report helps to understand the major events and participated actors in the cocoa sector. The WCF World Cocoa Partnership Meeting is a global meeting gathering 300 to 500 participants from public and private sectors to accelerate the effort to achieve sustainability in the chocolate and cacao sector. The summary of the meeting shows the key participants representing the global cocoa organization.

To investigate the global cocoa agendas, eleven main materials are analyzed: seven International Cocoa Agreements (ICCA)⁷ and four International Cocoa Declarations⁸ (Table 3). All ICCAs' forms are identical and consist of chapters and articles. 16 to 17 chapters and 56 to 75 articles consist the agreement (Table 3). In ICCAs, each chapter has its own subjects such as *Objectives, Finance, Supply and Demand*, and relevant articles on the subjects. On the contrary, declarations have their distinctive forms and deliver the key messages through Main principles,

⁶ Downloaded from: <https://www.icco.org/icco-documentation/annual-report/#toggle-id-2>

⁷ Downloaded from: <https://www.icco.org/who-we-are/agreements/>

⁸ Downloaded from: <https://www.icco.org/icco-documentation/>

Recommendations, Priority areas, and Sector sustainability recommendations.

Table 3. Analyzed materials to investigate global cocoa agendas

Type	Title	Year	Components
Treaty	International Cocoa Agreement, 1972	1972	16 Chapter 75 Article
	International Cocoa Agreement, 1975	1975	17 Chapter 69 Article
	International Cocoa Agreement, 1980	1980	16 Chapter 72 Article
	International Cocoa Agreement, 1986	1986	16 Chapter 67 Article
	International Cocoa Agreement, 1993	1993	16 Chapter 63 Article
	International Cocoa Agreement, 2001	2001	16 Chapter 56 Article
	International Cocoa Agreement, 2010	2010	17 Chapter 63 Article
Declaration	Abidjan Cocoa Declaration	2012	4 Main principles
	Amsterdam Cocoa Declaration	2014	8 Priority areas
	Bavaro Cocoa Declaration	2016	6 Priority areas
	Berlin Cocoa Declaration	2018	4 Recommendations
	Global Cocoa Farmers Declaration	2018	10 Provisions

Methods

Based on the selected documents, global actors in the cocoa sector are identified. Actors that are consist of global stakeholders and focused on activities in the cocoa industry are investigated.

To achieve research objectives on global cocoa actors, agendas and rules, content analysis is applied. *Content analysis* is defined as “any technique for making

inference by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 1969). It is also “a research technique for making replicable and valid inference from texts to the context of their use” (Krippendorff, 2018). Thus, a conclusion can be drawn through the inductive, deductive process (Gheyle and Jacobs, 2017). Therefore, some guidelines for inference and procedural or coding rules are used in content analysis to transform unstructured text into answers to research questions (White and Marsh, 2006). In this study, the contents are categorized through the inductive and ex-post processes. It is not a process of quantifying agendas and issues by counting the frequency of a particular word. Rather, it focused on qualitative analysis of the contents and their changes over time.

The analysis is focused on actors, agendas, and rules. Actors that are consist of global stakeholders with interests in the cocoa industry are investigated. Issues appeared in the text, and consistent, emerging and disappeared issues throughout the time are analyzed. The ICCA content analysis went under the two-step process. In the first stage, the name of Chapters and Articles are listed. Through this process, the name of Chapters and Articles of seven agreements were listed up and compared with the other six agreements. To be thorough, if the chapter or the article is missing compared to the previous agreement, verification is conducted whether the contents are moved to the other Chapter of Article. If the new Chapter and Article appear, also of the verification is conducted whether the previous agreements contain the contents in the other Chapter or Article. In the second stage, categorizing is proceeded. The titles of Chapters and Articles can be categorized. After recording, categories were created according to subjects. After a thorough investigation of the full text of ICCA, the related issues are regrouped, and agendas were divided into continuous agendas and emerging agendas. Unlike ICCA, declarations are more descriptive and do not have fixed forms. Since agendas and issues are dispersed throughout the declarations’ contents, the analysis focused primarily on their key

messages which include their main principles, recommendations, and priority areas.

As mentioned above, the approach of content analysis is more qualitative rather than quantitative. The analyzing materials are already agreed upon and standardized in the international policy decision-making process. Thus, mere quantification of stated words can have limitations to show the implication of emerging or consistent agendas. The full-text analysis and categorization can show the transformation of the actors, agendas, and rules of global cocoa governance.

5. Results

5.1. Global Actors in the Cocoa Sector

Global actors in the cocoa sector are those who are involved with interests or concerns in the global cocoa industry. Certain notable organizations have been leading actors in cocoa producing and consuming countries, such as the Cocoa Producers' Alliance and International Cocoa Organization. As a private organization, World Cocoa Foundation is representing corporate actors. International Cocoa Initiative is representing civil society and corporates partnerships. International Cocoa Farmers Organization is representing farmers. Each actors' background, activity, and characteristics are followed (Table 4):

The Cocoa Producers' Alliance (COPAL)

The *Cocoa Producers' Alliance (COPAL)* is an intergovernmental organization that was established in 1962 by representatives of the governments of five cocoa-producing countries: Ghana, Nigeria, Brazil, Cameroon, and Côte d'Ivoire. After the enrolment of the Dominican Republic, Gabon, Malaysia, São Tomé e Príncipe and Togo, Copal members presently account for approximately 75% of global cocoa production. The COPAL is also a member of the Consultative Board on the World Cocoa Economy, Working Group for ICCA, and an observer of the UN Cocoa Conference.

The Alliance participated in conducting meetings and international workshops on cocoa. In addition, the Alliance implements and monitors the production management programs for member countries (COPAL, 2011). However, currently,

the Alliance seems to be less active after the 17th International Cocoa Research Conference in 2012. It participates in UN Cocoa Conference as an observer, but its activities are unnoticeable. This may be due to the disaccord between members on the positions on the world market (Essegbey and Ofori-Gyamfi, 2012).

International Cocoa Organization (ICCO)

The *International Cocoa Organization (ICCO)* is an inter-governmental organization that was established in 1973 under the auspices of the UN. Its purpose was to put into effect the first ICCA, which was negotiated at a UN Cocoa Conference. The members of ICCO is composed of exporting and importing member countries. The headquarter of ICCO is situated in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire since 2015. ICCO specifies its mandate to “improve the livelihoods of cocoa farming communities on the one hand, while on the other hand, to respond to consumer demands related to food quality and security, and address environmental and social issues” (International Cocoa Organization, 2021).

ICCO provides credible statistics and researches and implements and supports cocoa development programs in cocoa-producing countries (Fold and Neilson, 2016). As of 2021, in partnership with Member countries, 19 projects have been completed, and five projects are under development and implementation (ICCO, 2021). In addition, the ICCA organized the International Symposium on Cocoa Research (ISCR) in 2017 with over 500 participants from 37 countries (International Cocoa Organization, 2017). The organization held three significant international conferences: the UN Cocoa Conference, the Roundtables for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy (RSCE), and the World Cocoa Conference (WCC).

UN Cocoa Conferences sought to discuss cocoa agendas and conclude an ICCA. The Conferences were held in 1972, 1975, 1980, 1986, 1993, 2001, and 2010, which led to finalization of seven ICCAs. ICCA as a treaty is a binding agreement between

exporting and importing countries under the auspicious of the UN.

Two RSCE were held in Ghana (2007) and Trinidad and Tobago (2009). The second roundtable resulted in the *Declaration of Trinidad and Tobago* containing ten principles for a Sustainable Cocoa Economy. However, with the objection of some producing nations on the declaration, the operation of the roundtable has been halted. Partly as a continuation of the RSCE, the ICCO organized WCCs. WCCs were held in 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 as a biannual conference and concluded with Abidjan, Amsterdam, Bavaro, and Berlin Declaration, respectively, named after each conference's venues. The declarations are agreed upon with various stakeholders in the cocoa sector, including producing and consuming governments, private corporates, civil society, and NGOs. The declaration is a non-binding statement of various private and public actors in the cocoa value chain.

International Cocoa Initiative (ICI)

The International Cocoa Initiative (ICI) is a non-profit foundation established in 2002 based in Switzerland. It was established as a result of the 2001 Harkin/Engel Protocol to address child labor and forced labor in the cocoa supply chain (The International Cocoa Initiative, 2015). The ICI consists of Board Members, Contributing Partners, and Advisors consisting of 21 private sector companies, ten organizations or individuals representing civil society, and three UN organizations (International Cocoa Initiative, 2021a). From 2007, ICI started to operate in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire to address child labor and forced labor chain (The International Cocoa Initiative, 2015). Through Annual Stakeholder Meetings, the ICI convenes key stakeholders and discusses challenges and solutions in the cocoa sector. The ICI collaborates with international corporates and assists them in designing programs and reducing child labor and other risks (International Cocoa Initiative, 2021b).

Between 2015 and 2019, the ICI aided 381,000 children in cocoa-growing communities (International Cocoa Initiatives, 2020). In addition, through its website, the ICI disseminates various documents related to children in cocoa-growing communities.

World Cocoa Foundation (WCF)

In a bid to combat unsustainable cocoa production, international cocoa corporates gathered and created a non-profit membership organization called *World Cocoa Foundation (WCF)*. WCF is an international organization created by cocoa and chocolate companies in 2000 to promote sustainability initiatives. Members of WCF consists of 96 member companies in the cocoa industry, representing over 80% of the global market (Glasbergen et al., 2007). The WCF became a crucial actor in the cocoa value chain by providing considerable financial and technical resources through a public-private partnership.

The WCF holds an annual WCF Partnership Meeting, which gathers public and private sector participants to discuss sustainability in the cocoa sector. The WCF disseminates information on partnerships to the public through its website, conferences, press releases, and newsletters. Most importantly, the WCF funds six cocoa initiatives⁹ and programs in major cocoa producing countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Brazil, and Colombia. Through public and private partnerships, these initiatives and programs aim to restore cocoa forests and improve cocoa farmers' livelihoods.

⁹ Cocoa & Forest Initiatives, CocoaAction, CocoaAction Brazil, Cocoa Livelihoods Program, African Cocoa Initiative II, Climate Smart Cocoa.

International Cocoa Farmers Organization (ICCFO)

The *International Cocoa Farmers Organization* (ICCFO) was established in 2014 to defend the interests of cocoa farmers worldwide. It is an umbrella organization for cocoa farmers and its members include cocoa farmer cooperatives, unions, and associations. The headquarter of the organization is based in Côte d'Ivoire and the secretariat in the Netherlands. The ICCFO aims to ensure its members' inclusion in dialogues and decision-making at the national and international levels in the cocoa sector. The ICCFO organized the 1st Global Cocoa Farmers Conference (GCFC1) in 2018 with Farmgate Cocoa Alliance¹⁰ in Accra, Ghana. It was the first farmer-driven conference in the cocoa sector. It resulted in the first Cocoa Farmer's Declaration, which was made with participation of farmers, governments, traders, processors, chocolate manufacturers, civil society organizations, etc.

The first global cocoa actor was the COPAL, followed by ICCO, as a main intergovernmental organization. Since the 2000s, private actors have started to emerge in the global cocoa sector. Private actors, especially private corporates, gained more power in the global cocoa sector, and their participation and cooperation were inevitable in the global cocoa industry. In addition, cooperation and partnership between these private actors and intergovernmental organizations were started around the 2000s to tackle several issues along the cocoa value chain. Cocoa farmers started to participate through ICCFO who represents cocoa farmers' voice to protect their interests. ICCFO also strengthens the position of farmers in cocoa sector policy at the national and international levels.

¹⁰ The Farmgate Cocoa Alliance was established in 2017 to support, facilitate and strengthen cooperatives and groups worldwide. It is an alliance formally registered in the Netherlands under civil society ("stitching"). The alliance consists of 14 members, mainly cocoa farmers' cooperatives.

Table 4. Global cocoa organizations

Name	Est. Year	Headquarter	Type	Members	Activities and Output
The Cocoa Producers' Alliance (COPAL)	1962	Lagos Nigeria	Intergovernmental organization	10 cocoa producing countries	-Member of Consultative Board on the World Cocoa Economy -Observer of United Nations Cocoa Conference
International Cocoa Organization (ICCO)	1973	Abidjan Côte d'Ivoire	Intergovernmental organization	47 cocoa producing and importing countries (2010 agreement)	-Organize UN Cocoa Conference, Roundtable for Sustainable Cocoa Economy and World Cocoa Conference -Provide daily cocoa price and related statistics -Prepare cocoa development projects -Organize International Symposium on Cocoa Research
World Cocoa Foundation (WCF)	2000	Washington, D.C USA	Non-profit organization	Over 100 member corporates	- Member of Consultative Board on the World Cocoa Economy -Provide resources for cocoa projects and programs -Disseminate information on a partnership to public
International Cocoa Initiative (ICI)	2002	Geneva Switzerland	Non-profit organization	14 cooperatives	-Organize Annual Stakeholder Meetings -Design and participate in project and program focused on child labor
International Cocoa Farmers Organization (ICCFO)	2014	Abidjan Côte d'Ivoire	Cocoa farmers umbrella organization	12 cooperatives from producing countries	-Organize Global Cocoa Farmers Conference (GCFC1) -Produce Cocoa Farmers Declaration

5.2. Global rules in the Cocoa Sector

There are Agreements and Declarations that contain global agendas in the cocoa sector. Seven ICCAs and the four world declarations have been selected and analyzed in this research.

The draft was prepared by the UNCTAD in 1968 as a result of the UN Cocoa Conference in 1967 (Kofi, 1972). The first *ICCA* was concluded in 1972, taking into account the Final Act of the first session of the UNCTAD. The agreements are negotiated at a UN International Cocoa Conference, and ICCO was created in 1973 to administer the 1972 agreement. It is the only agreement concluded among the governments of cocoa exporting and importing countries under the auspices of the United Nations.


There have been seven ICCAs since then, the latest of which was reached in 2010. The Agreements are subjected to be signed by cocoa exporting and importing countries. They shall enter into force only if the instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession with the Depositary are made with countries that account for specific points of exports and imports of cocoa. In ICCA 2010, signed by 47 countries and another five countries joined later. 22 out of the 52 countries that signed the 2010 ICCA are exporting countries that account for about 95% of global cocoa exports, whereas the other 30 countries account for approximately 72% of global cocoa imports (Anga, 2014). Initially, ICCA 2010 was to remain in force until 2022. However, the ICCO council recently announced a plan to extend the agreement until 2026.

World Cocoa Declarations resulted from the four ICCO-organized a world-scale bi-annual conference with nearly 1,500 participants from over 55 countries. The first WCC (WCC1) was held in Abidjan, and was followed by WCC2 in Amsterdam, WCC3 in Bavaro, and WCC4 in Berlin. WCCs involve the participation of several relevant stakeholder groups, which include the government of producing and consuming countries, farmers, processors, grinders, traders, civil society, research institutions, and many others. The Declarations

serve as non-binding statements that are agreed upon by various private and public actors in the cocoa chain.

The first Abidjan Cocoa Declaration (2012) set the roadmap to sustainability in the global cocoa sector through the Global Cocoa Agenda, which aimed for the development of new prospects of conciliation of technological innovation, sustainability, and productivity within the cocoa value chain (Naranjo-Merino et al., 2017). The Abidjan Declaration was signed not only by cocoa-producing and consuming countries, but also by the global leaders of the cocoa and chocolate industry and members of civil society. The subsequent Amsterdam (2014) and Bavaro (2016) declarations were also concluded during WCCs that included over 1,500 participants from the cocoa sector. After the latest Berlin Cocoa Declaration (2018), consecutive the WCC5 was scheduled to be held in 2020 in Bali, Indonesia. However, due to the COVID-19 it is postponed to 2022. The timeline of each agreement WCC, and declaration are illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Timeline of the actors and rules of global cocoa governance



5.3. Global Agendas in the Cocoa Sector

5.3.1. Consistent Agendas in ICCA

Table 5 shows the agendas of each ICCAs. The sub-category is the actual name of chapters or articles, and the counterparts are recorded accordingly. Given its characteristic as agreement, all seven ICCAs contain administrative and finance provisions; *Membership and Organizations and administrative, Privileges and immunities; Finances*, etc. *Final Provisions* Chapter consists of articles that articulate the administrative process such as *Signature, Ratification, Exclusion, Entry into force*, etc.

Market and Price related clauses are also included in every ICCA. However, the buffer stock clause existed until the 4th Agreement in 1986. Price setting was also continually included in ICCAs with some alterations over the period. Daily price clauses were included in every agreement except ICCA 2010. From the ICCA 1972 to 2001, daily prices were deemed to set by the future market: “the average taken daily of the quotations for cocoa beans of the nearest three active future trading months on the *New York Cocoa Exchange*” (changed to *New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange*,¹¹ in the ICCA 1986 and *Board of Trade of the City of New York* in ICCA 2001) at noon and on the London Cocoa Terminal Market (changed to *London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange* (LIFFE)¹² in the ICCA 2001). The ICCA 2010 did not contain a daily prices clause, but it presented that the indicator price was to be set by the future market in London and New York. In other agreements, the indicator price is set based on the daily prices. Only the ICCA 1993 and 2001 did not contain indicator prices. Others set the indicator price by the average of daily prices over a certain period (15 days in the 1972 and 1975 agreement, five

¹¹ New York Cocoa Exchange merges with New York Coffee, Sugar Exchange in 1979.

¹² Existed from 1982 to 2014

days in the 1980 Agreement, and ten days in the 1986 Agreement and). Due to the shift in focus from market intervention to dialogue and promotion of sustainable production and market information programs, market-related clauses such as *Market transparency and Market analysis* were added from the 6th Agreement.

All ICCAs have the provision that the ICCO acts as a center for the dissemination of information. *Information and studies* Chapter consists of *Information, Studies and Annual review* and/or *Annual report*.

5.3.2. Emerging and Withdrawn Agendas in ICCA

In the Market and Price category, *the Sustainable cocoa economy* article was created in ICCA 2001. In addition, market-related provisions were newly added at ICCA 2001: *Market Committee, Market Transparency, and Market Analysis*. The article *Commercial transactions with non-members, which* inhibited cocoa trade with non-member countries was included in five consecutive Agreements but was withdrawn in the 2001 Agreement.

In the information and reporting category, the article on *Scientific research and development* article was newly added at the ICCA 1980. In the ICCA 1986, the article was moved to the chapter Supply and demand. In the ICCA 1993 and 2001, the article belonged to the *Information and studies* chapter. Peculiarly, in the ICCA 2010, the article belonged to the *Market transparency* chapter.

In the Relationship category, cooperation within and outside of the organization emerged as an agenda in the ICCA 1993. *Relationship with the common fund for commodities* article was newly added at the ICCA 1980 where it was preparatory until the following agreement before the fund was created in 1989.

In the Producing condition categories, the *Fair labour standards* chapter was inserted into the agreements from the ICCA 1980 until 1993. In the ICCA 2001 and 2010, the discussion

was moved to the article on *Standards of living and working conditions*. In the ICCA 1993, the *Environmental aspect* chapter was newly created and agreed to the sustainable management of cocoa economy bearing in mind the principles of UNCED held in 1992. In the ICCA 2001 and 2010, the article *Sustainable cocoa economy* contained the corresponding context.

Programs and project categories show that Working programme and project articles were first included in the ICCA 2001. However, the ICCA 1993 contained provisions that promotes cocoa promotion management and consumption programs, as mentioned in the article *Production and Consumption*. Starting from the ICCA 2001, the programs were more focused on development programs.

The creation of new boards and committees was also an emergent agenda. In the ICCA 2001 and 2010, *The consultative board on the world cocoa economy* chapter consists of articles of establishment, composition, mandates, and board meetings. In the ICCA 2010, the organization went through organizational changes and created the Finance and Economic Committee. Thus, a corresponding *Finance Committee* and *Economic Committee* chapter was created and contained articles related to establishment, composition, and meetings of each committee.

Table 5. Categorization of International Cocoa Agreements' agendas

		Session (year)						
Category	Sub-category	1 st (1972)	2 nd (1975)	3 rd (1980)	4 th (1986)	5 th (1993)	6 th (2001)	7 th (2010)
Objectives and definitions	Objectives and definitions	C1,2	C1,2	C1,2	C1,2	C1,2	C1,2	C1,2
Administration & Finances	Membership and Organizations and administrations	C3, 4	C3, 4	C3, 4	C3, 4	C3, 4	C3, 4	C3, 4*
	Privileges and immunities	C5	C5	C5	C5	C5	C5	A5
	Finances	C6	C6	C6	C6	C6	C6	C7
	Relief from obligations	C14	C14	C13	C13	C12	C13	C15
	Consultation, disputes, and complaints	C15	C15	C14	C14	C13	C14	C16
	Final provisions	C16	C17	C16	C16	C16	C16	C17
Market & Prices	Daily and/or indicator prices	A28	A28	A26	A26	A35 (D)	A40 (D)	A33 (I)
	Quotas, buffer stock	C7	C7	C7	C7	-	-	-

	Production and stocks/ Promotion of consumption	C10	C9	C9	C10	C8	C8	C9, A37
	Processed Cocoa	C11	C11	C10	C10	-	-	-
	Cocoa Substitutes	A52	A53	A48	A52	A33	A38	A32
	Fine or Flavor Cocoa	A33	A33	A29	A29	C11	C12	C11
	Commercial transactions with non-members	A55	A55	A51	A55	A34	-	-
	Sustainable Cocoa Economy	-	-	-	-	-	A39	A43
	Conversion factors	.**	.**	A28	A28	A37	A41	A34
	Market Committee	-	-	-	-	-	A 34	-
	Market Transparency	-	-	-	-	-	A 35***	C9 (A30)***
	Market Analysis	-	-	-	-	-	-	A36
Information and Reporting	Information and studies	C13 (A56, 57)	C12 (A57,58)	C12 (A52,53)	C12 (A56,57)	C9(A38,39)	C11 (A42,43)	A38
	Annual Review/Annual report	C13 (A58)	C12 (A59)	C12 (A54)	C12(A58)	C9 (A41)	C11(A45)	A18, 38
	Reporting and Control measures	A48	A49	A36	A47	-	-	-
	Scientific Research and Development	-	-	A49	A53	A40	A44	A35

Relationship	Relationship with the Common Fund for Commodities	-	-	A32	A33	A27	A28****	A41****
	Consultation and Cooperation with the cocoa industry	A27	A27	-	-	-	-	-
	Cooperation within the cocoa economy	-	-	-	-	C10	-	-
	Cooperation with other organizations	-	-	-	-	A13	A13	A13
	Cooperation among members	-	-	-	-	A28	-	-
Producing conditions	Fair labour standards	-	-	C15	C15	C14	-	-
	Environmental aspects	-	-	-	-	C15	-	-
	Standard of living and working conditions	-	-	-	-	-	C15	A42
	Sustainable cocoa economy	-	-	-	-	-	A39	A43
Programs and projects	Work Programme	-	-	-	-	-	A21	A17
	Projects	-	-	-	-	-	A29*****	A40 (A40)
	Programme							
Board and Committee (establishment, composition, mandates,	Consultative Board on the World Cocoa Economy	-	-	-	-	-	C7	C14

meetings)	Finance Committee	-	-	-	-	-	-	C6
	Economic Committee	-	-	-	-	-	-	C8

C: Chapter, A: Article

** (The name of the chapter is changed to THE INTERNATIONAL COCOA ORGANIZATION and THE INTERNATIONAL COCOA COUNCIL, but the articles' compositions are the same.)*

*** The same contents are existing in the “scope of export quotas” article*

**** Before, the same contents are existing in the “information” article*

***** Relationship with the Common Fund for Commodities and other multilateral and bilateral donors*

****** The name of article is Role of the organization concerning projects*

5.3.3. Agendas in International Cocoa Declarations

Four declarations have their own forms and direction. The key messages of each declaration are presented in Table 6.

In the Abidjan Declaration, the *Global Cocoa Agenda* to promote sustainable cocoa production, provided four main principles: Strategic Management of the Sector, Sustainability of Production, Sustainability of the Industry Chain, and Sustainability of Consumption. The Abidjan Declaration had nine key messages under these four principles. The Key messages emphasized international and national coordination through National Cocoa Development Plans and the framework of initiatives and participation in a voluntary process. International regulation and agreement with respect to environmental and food safety issues were recommended. In addition, the Declaration promoted efforts for improving the living standards of farmers and the provision of education and training support for farmers. Lastly, the Declaration also sought the promotion of cocoa consumption and an efficient, traceable, and sustainable cocoa value chain.

The Amsterdam Declaration contained further efforts to enhance the implementation of the aforementioned agenda. The second WCC agreed on the eight priority areas as next steps, in line with the *Global Cocoa Agenda*. The implementation of National Cocoa Plans was recommended as they prioritized empowering farmers and improving their income in a measurable way. The National Cocoa Plan also emphasized undertaking cocoa inventory and performing the planning and evaluation policies. The country-focused and local context-based approach were recommended with regard to the establishment of working groups. Akin to the first declaration, the international coordination of sustainability efforts, was highlighted. Adopting Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to evaluate the impact of policies and initiatives and establishing Global Cocoa Sustainability Funds were also included as the priority areas.

The WCC3 was held with the purpose of mapping the progress of the implementation of the *Global Cocoa Agenda* and reviewing new challenges and opportunities. The Bávaro Declaration agreed to intensify efforts using the *Global Cocoa Agenda* as the roadmap and adopted six priority areas: 1) injecting innovation in cocoa farming, including strengthening farmer-based organizations; 2) increasing the living incomes for cocoa smallholders; 3) raising women's voices and attracting a new generation of young cocoa farmers; 4) marketing cocoa quality, sustainability and origin; 5) Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): measuring progress in the implementation of the *Global Cocoa Agenda*; 6) sustainable funding of the cocoa sector.

The Berlin Declaration provided recommendations to achieve sector-wide sustainability, divided into four sectors; Sustainable Production; Sustainable Industry; Sustainable Consumption; Sustainable; Sustainable Management. The sectors consist of 18 recommendations. As in the previous declarations, coordination between national and regional policies and developing, strengthening National Cocoa Development Plans were highlighted in recommendations. In addition, the evaluation and monitoring of sustainability efforts, the realization of a sustainable value chain, and the empowerment of cocoa farmers and women were also included. Provisions regarding environmental protection and the stimulation of research and development first appeared in this declaration. Given its number of key messages (18 recommendations) it is apparent that the, Berlin Declaration contained diverse and focused agendas, including cocoa farmers living income, access to credit and insurance, agroforestry, SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures) requirements.

The GCFC1 Declaration consisted of ten provisions. The declaration mostly encouraged farmers' participation in the global cocoa communication and decision-making processes, which included climate change and deforestation initiatives, sustainability initiatives, and the cocoa market and trade sector platform. Through the Declaration, the ICCFO affirmed

its commitment to the cocoa sector agreements and sustainability initiatives such as ICCAs and the Consultative Board on the World Cocoa Economy. In addition, the ICCFO affirmed its commitment to the Cocoa and Forest Initiatives and Cocoa Action Program and other international sustainability and environmental platforms.

Table 6. Key messages of World Cocoa Declarations


Abidjan	Amsterdam	Bavaro	Berlin	Farmers declaration
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Design and implement national cocoa development plans •Provide framework for coordination of initiatives •Apply international regulation and agreement •Improve living standards of cocoa sector, particular children and women •Participate in a voluntary consensual process •Technology improvement to increase productivity and quality of cocoa •Promote and support farmers group through education and training •Efficient and traceable sustainable value chain 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Design and implement National Cocoa Plans (empower farmers) •Coordination between sustainability initiative and national plans •National cocoa plan: undertake cocoa inventory and process of planning and evaluation of policies •The country specific- issue focused and local context approach •Coordination between private cocoa initiatives and framework of national plans •International coordination between cocoa sustainability •Adoption of Key Performance Indicators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Innovation in cocoa farming (farmer-based organization) •Increase living incomes for smallholders •Raise women's' voices and attract young farmers •Marketing Cocoa quality, sustainability and origin •Measure the progress of the Global Cocoa Agenda through KPIs •Sustainable funding of the cocoa sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Strengthen National Cocoa Development Plans (inclusive and transparent, include tenure security, infrastructure, extension services, farm diversification, inventory) •Coordination between national and regional policy •Governments re-evaluate the effectiveness, transparency of investment •Implement policies for farmers living income, strengthen women's right •Enable and empower small scale farmers •Policies and practices for environmental protection •Eradicate child labor •Appropriate evaluation and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defines and clarify roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders in cocoa sector •Establish effective monitoring of sector activities for transparency and accountability •Participate in climate change and deforestation initiatives •Participate in sustainability initiatives in the cocoa value chain •Play role at sector platforms on market, contract bodies, cocoa trade •Signatory to all existing and future cocoa sector agreements and sustainability agreements •Signatory to the

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Promote consumption 	<p>(KPIs)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Establish Global Cocoa Sustainability Fund 		<p>monitoring framework of sustainability efforts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Supply chain traceability for sustainable value chain •Promote consumption •Policies ensuring environmental protection •Comply with SPS requirements •Stimulate scientific research and R&D for sustainable production and consumption •Strengthen human rights (potential regulatory measures by governments 	<p>international sustainability and environmental platforms (CFI, CocoaAction)</p>
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6. Discussion

Three characteristics—diversification, flexibilization, and coordination—were identified through the analysis of the actors, rules, and agendas in global cocoa governance (Figure 7).

Figure 7 . Illustration of three characteristics of global cocoa governance



6.1. Diversification

Diversifying actors

The ICCO started to address the cocoa sector problem by gathering delegates of cocoa-

producing and consuming countries after its establishment in 1973. The ICCO held five conferences and patched up ICCAs to stabilize prices and administrate cocoa production and the cocoa market. Although COPAL is less active in recent years, the alliance as an inter-governmental organization facilitates the exchange of technical and scientific information related to cocoa production in the member countries (Essegbey and Ofori-Gyamfi, 2012).

The global cocoa actors have diversified since the 2000s. Likewise, other commodity market shifts to market-based approaches because environmental and social issues became impossible for only government delegates to handle. Thus, International commodity agreements started to involve more private sectors.

The partnerships between these actors also increased during the time (Bitzer et al., 2012) as stakeholders began to realize the importance of the engagement of public actors and their collaboration within the partnership for a sustainable cocoa supply chain (Shapiro and Rosenquist, 2004). Partnerships are formed into organizations such as the ICI and WCF. The ICI is the most significant partnership in child labor issues in West Africa, organized with 31 business and civil society organizations (Bitzer et al., 2012; International Cocoa Initiative, 2021a). According to Bitzer et al. (2012), the WCF strengthens the linkage between cocoa partnerships not only through its participation in various multi-stakeholder partnerships but also through organizing biannual World Cocoa Foundation Partnership meetings and provides a forum for stakeholders, strengthening cooperation and coordination of partnerships. Although its contribution to the cocoa sector, by bringing industry, civil society, and governments together and setting the sustainability agenda in the cocoa sector, WCF does not engage in rule or standard settings. Without formal authority, the WCF seems to have developed the capacity to coordinate sustainability efforts in the cocoa industry with voluntary standards.

From the Roundtable, participation from various stakeholder groups gets more active. In preparing the Second Roundtable, the International Cocoa Council agreed to establish an independent Working Group, the Consultative Board recommended. The Working Group consists of the representatives of cocoa producing and consuming Member countries, NGOs, UNCTAD, trade and industry associations, the Chairman of the Consultative Board, and ICCO Spokesman (ICCO, 2008). The website dedicated to the Second Roundtable was launched in 2008 to enable interaction and discussions among stakeholders and disseminate information on Roundtable initiatives' further development (ICCO, 2008). The preparatory meeting for the Second Roundtable was held in Abidjan, where over 200 key stakeholders were participated (mainly from the West Africa regions) who cannot attend the Second Roundtable. The participants in the meeting convened and discussed issues about sustainable production and consumption of cocoa (ICCO, 2009).

Likewise, the declarations include much more participants in their decision-making process than the treaty. In the preparation of the WCC, four Working Groups that consisted of key cocoa sector stakeholders gathered and prepared the *Global Cocoa Agenda* (ICCO, 2012). The WCCs were participated in by over 1,400 stakeholders in the cocoa sector including cocoa farmers. The participation of farmers was significant in terms of their number and geographic areas in favor of the host country's sponsorship (ICCO, 2014).

The diversified actors can be interpreted as a representation of various interests, one of the elements of governance quality. The number of diversified participants throughout the roundtables and WCCs can show high accessibility aspects of participation in the communication process. However, identifying the weight aspects of participation which is the extent of influence and its distribution to participants, needs further research, such as analysis on power dynamics of actors.

Diversifying agendas

The diversified actors enabled the inclusion of varied agendas in the global cocoa value chain. In vice versa, diversified agendas are based on the participation of various actors in decision-making. As the result shows, the ICCAs expend their agendas to address multiple issues other than prices even after the price stabilization schemes were not part of the negotiation. Apart from fundamental provisions for agreements in the Administration and Finances category, some categories show slight changes, and the others show significant changes (Table 7).

In the beginning, the price stabilization objective was the primary concern not only to ICCAs but also to other International Commodity Agreements (Burger et al., 2007). Overall, price control measures such as quotas and buffer stock were deleted since the 1993 agreement. The buffer stock is a stock to stabilize the price and control demand by releasing stocks when the price rises and purchasing when the price goes down. Just as in the cocoa case, other commodity markets were intervened by the governments until the late 1980s. Commodity crops were exported and imported through a single channel where the government managed. To regulate the price, two market instruments are used by governments: buffer stocks or export controls (Akiyama et al., 2001). However, the Commodity Agreements started to fail and to be strained financially. The sugar agreement collapsed due to the ineffectiveness of the price stabilization mechanism. Coffee agreements lapsed due to the deprivation of support from consumers and producers. Most of the market intervention of the commodity market has failed, and consequently, commodity agreements are collapse. If not, the price regulation clause is disappeared.

In the cocoa case, from the ICCA 1972 to 1986, where the buffer stock-based approach was applied, the cocoa price continued to remain above the buffer stock intervention range (Gilbert, 1996). However, utilizing buffer stock schemes is an expensive instrument,

especially when dealing with low prices for the long term (Gilbert, 2011). It is evident that the ICCA was also handicapped from the lack of finance (Gilbert, 2011). In the 1970s, cocoa production countries held 250 thousand buffer stocks and settled to set the export limitation volume (Ryan, 2012). In 1989, the unpaid expenses exceeded 90 million dollars, half of which were in debt to Côte d'Ivoire, due to low cocoa prices (Ryan, 2012). To cover the annual maintenance expenses of the stock fund, cocoa stock needed to be sold.

In addition, through the price stabilizing era of the 1970s and 1980s, many high-income countries started to focus more on development issues rather than price stabilization in the international commodity debate (Gilbert, 2011). Moreover, some producing countries urged free from a “planned” commodity economy where most of them had failed from price stabilizations. Though continuing UNCTAD negotiations, other industry groups are more motivated by political reasons than commercial concerns (Gilbert, 2011). Consequently, the position of the EU was shifted, and the Council Group on Commodities adopted “Helsinki principles” in 1999 and stated that direct market intervention should be avoided (Burger et al., 2007). ICCAs were also influenced by the trend where the markets for tropical export commodities started to be “liberalized”, and national stabilization agencies (e.g. caisses de stabilization of Côte d'Ivoire) went through dissolved or power reduction (Akiyama et al., 2001). Consequently, the buffer stock was abolished from the fifth ICCA (1993) and allowed the possibility of market intervention. However, it was estimated that ICCAs' effect on the cocoa market is insignificant compared to other International Commodity Agreements due to lack of finance and country coverage (Gilbert, 2011, 1996). In addition to the limited impact of ICCA, International Commodity Agreement seemed anachronistic and less imperative in liberalized commodity markets, and naturally, the government's power and intervention were reduced. In contrast, the private sector became more important in global commodity arrangements. In the sectors of coffee and cocoa, where the operation of the market is highly concentrated with private

firms, the private sector's involvement proves to lead to better and efficient decision-making (Burger et al., 2007).

Instead of demolishing price regulation clauses as the primary objective, ICCAs choose to include and address other issues emerging in the cocoa sector. Relationship and cooperation with other organizations in the cocoa value chain started to be mentioned from the ICCA 1993 and specified with the article "relationship with multi-lateral and bilateral donors." Under the article, provisions recommend "to cooperate with other international organizations, as well as with multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, in order to obtain financing for programmes and projects." The cooperation became inevitable as the ICCO started to participate in programs and projects which require technical and financial resources, with the establishment of the Common Fund for Commodities in 1989. Accordingly, Articles related to projects are also newly added since the 2000s.

The agendas related to the environment, social aspects, and overall sustainable cocoa economy were newly included from the ICCA 1993. Article "Fair labour standards" existed starting from the second Agreement. The article's name and the term in the article transformed to "Standard of living and working conditions." Notably, in ICCA 2010, ILO standards were mentioned as a recommended standard. The term sustainable was first included in the article "Environmental Aspects" of the ICCA 1993 under the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. In the ICCA 2001 and 2010, the term sustainable emerged at the Chapter name, "Development of a Sustainable Cocoa Economy" and "Sustainable Development," respectively. Under each Chapter, the article "Sustainable Cocoa Economy" recommended consideration of principles of Agenda 21 and MDGs in the development of the sustainable cocoa economy. In the World Cocoa Declarations, more specific issues related to sustainable cocoa were mentioned, such as tenure, child labor, empowering women, and deforestation. Comparing the *Objectives* of each ICCAs also shows the diversification of agendas in ICCAs (Table 8). From the ICCA

1972 to 1980, the objectives were focused on the economic perspective and price stabilizations. In the ICCA 1986, 1993, and 2001, cooperation in the sector, transparency, and promotion of sustainable cocoa economies were highlighted. In the ICCA 2010, the objectives contained more concrete and well-being issues such as fair price, food safety, poverty alleviation, and strengthening local communities.

Table 7. Consistent and emerging agendas of International Cocoa Agreements

Category	Session	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th
	Year	1972	1975	1980	1986	1993	2001	2010
Objectives & definitions	Objectives & definitions	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Administration	Organization	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Administration	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Finance	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Final provisions	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Prices and market	Buffer stock	√	√	√	√			
	Daily and/or indicator price	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Consumption promotion	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Cocoa substitutes	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Commercial transaction with non-members	√	√	√	√	√		
Information and scientific researches	Information and studies	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Annual review (and report)	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Scientific research and development			√	√	√	√	√
Participation and cooperation	Relationship with ... multilateral and						√	√

	bilateral donors							
	Cooperation with other organizations					√	√	√
Projects	Role of the Organization concerning projects						√	
	Projects							√
Sustainability	Fair labour standards		√	√	√	√		
	Standard of living and working conditions						√	√
	Environmental aspects					√		
	Sustainable cocoa economy						√	√
	Market Transparency					√	√	√

Table 8. Objectives of International Cocoa Agreements

1972, 1975, 1980	1986	1993	2001	2010
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • alleviate serious economic difficulties • prevent excessive fluctuations of cocoa price • stabilize and increase the export earnings of producing countries • accelerate economic growth and social development of producing countries • assure adequate supplies at reasonable prices • facilitate expansion of consumption • secure an equilibrium in the long term between supply and demand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • alleviate serious economic difficulties • prevent excessive fluctuations of cocoa price • stabilization of the world cocoa market • assure adequate supplies at reasonable prices • facilitate expansion of consumption • secure an equilibrium in the long term between supply and demand • development of international co-operation in all sectors of the cocoa economy • facilitate the expansion of international cocoa trade • provide an appropriate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • stabilization of the world cocoa market • assure adequate supplies at reasonable prices • facilitate expansion of consumption • secure an equilibrium in the medium and long term between supply and demand • development of international co-operation in all sectors of the cocoa economy • provide an appropriate forum for the discussion • promote transparency in the world cocoa economy • collection, analysis, and dissemination of relevant statistics • promote scientific 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • promote and encourage consumption of cocoa-based products • promote international cooperation in the world cocoa economy • increase demand for cocoa in close cooperation with the private sector. • promote transparency in the world cocoa economy • collection, analysis, and dissemination of relevant statistics • promote research and the implementation of its findings • strengthen the national cocoa economies through the preparation of appropriate projects • provide an appropriate framework for the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • promote and encourage consumption of cocoa-based products • promote international cooperation in the world cocoa economy • promotion of the positive attributes of cocoa in close cooperation with the private sector • promote transparency in the world cocoa economy • collection, analysis, and dissemination of relevant statistics • encourage research and the implementation of its findings through the promotion of programmes • strengthen the national cocoa economies through the preparation of appropriate projects

	forum for the discussion	research and development in the field of cocoa	discussion of all matters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • promote a sustainable cocoa economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • provide an appropriate framework for the discussion of all matters • promote a sustainable cocoa economy in economic, social and environmental terms • obtaining fair prices leading to equitable economic returns • encourage to promote cocoa quality and to develop food safety procedures • develop strategies to enhance the capacity of local communities and small-scale farmers • contribute to poverty alleviation of small-scale farmers • facilitate the availability of information on financial tools and services
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6.2. Flexibilization

An ICCA plays the role of a hard law as a legally binding agreement. As a UN treaty, ICCA is an international agreement between cocoa-producing and consuming-countries. The agreement specifies the process of a contract between countries and the exclusion of members in case of a breach. On the other hand, a World Cocoa Declaration is a “non-legally binding expression of support” mentioned in the declaration. The Declarations provides guiding principles for the sustainable cocoa sector to signatories.

The term “hard” and “soft” law in international governance has been actively discussed in law and social science literature. Generally speaking, the term hard law generally refers to legally binding obligations, and soft law is a non-binding arrangement. Nevertheless, these concepts are more than a mere binary (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). According to Abbott and Snidal (2000), legalization in international relations has three varying dimensions obligations, precision, and delegation. The hard law refers to “legally binding obligations that are precise and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law” (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). If one of these three dimensions is weakened in legal arrangements, the “soft law” realm begins (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). They implemented three dimensions to characterize laws as “harder” or “softer” and argued that international actors choose softer forms of law due to the advantages it has over hard laws in international arrangements (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). In this context, especially in international affairs, legal arrangements are not typically hard laws.

As mentioned above, in international arrangements, actors deliberately choose softer forms of legalization owing to its specific advantages, First, soft laws can avoid the costs incurred to enforce of hard laws (Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Lipson, 1991). Second, soft

laws provide a path to deal with uncertainty regarding new and complex issues that actors are unwilling to legally bind themselves to. In this case, actors can reduce the precision of their commitments or obligations. If the consequences are unpredictable, actors cannot reach the precision of the hard law. Legally bound but unprecise agreements provide protection and flexibility for actors to construct normative guidelines.

In this context, the declaration provides more flexibility to facilitate the participation of various actors. Although ICCAs have a “soft” side in terms of precision and delegation, their legally binding characteristic restricts and set a higher boundary for certain parties to sign it. In addition, soft law is more suitable for setting guidelines and commitments than hard law. The softer forms of rules and declarations made it possible for them to espouse more agendas as international guidelines that aim for the realization of sustainable cocoa value chains. However, softer law comes with a cost of incompliance. Acknowledging this limit, the Berlin Declaration stated, *“While acknowledging the commitments of the cocoa sector to achieve sustainability, it is time to review the means by which these have been measured and enforced, recognizing that voluntary compliance has not led to sufficient impact.”* In this sense, market intervention for compliance and coordination of such efforts into national and regional development plans become important. It is also related to the effectiveness of international norms. As Skjærseth et al. (2006) pointed out that hard laws are necessary to improve the effectiveness of international arrangements. However, this effectiveness needs to entail the much more precise norms that are adopted through the soft law institution. The combination between ICCAs and declarations indicates the flexibilization of the global rule in the cocoa sector.

6.3. Coordination

As more actors participate in global cocoa governance to tackle the problems in the cocoa sector, the alignment of their efforts was emphasized. The ICCO specified that the purpose of declarations were designed to avoid the proliferation of coordinated effort (International Cocoa Organization, 2018). The first Abidjan Declaration highlighted the global framework. The Amsterdam and Bavaro Declarations underlined the importance of coordination between global private sustainability initiatives and national plans. In Berlin Declaration, coordination between national and regional policy were emphasized. In all four Declarations, the development and implementation of National Cocoa (Development) Plans were highlighted. The National Cocoa Plans are also an output of the coordination of national plan with global efforts (ICCO, 2012). The ICCO council agreed to the necessity of National Cocoa Development Plans to coordinate and monitor the cocoa sector. The Farmer's Declaration shares common agendas with the declarations, which include establishing effective monitoring to ensure transparency and accountability. The signatories of the declaration also agreed to participate in sustainability initiatives and other environmental initiatives in the cocoa value chain. The participation of farmers can facilitate the implementation of global initiatives at the local level. The declarations also recommended that actors should facilitate effective cocoa governance by participating in all future cocoa sector agreements and promoting international sustainability and environmental platforms such as the Cocoa Forest Initiatives and the CocoaAction. The consistent efforts for alignment through global strategies reflect the importance of coordination in the global cocoa sector.

7. Conclusion

This study examined the transformation of global cocoa governance through the diversification of actors and agendas in the process of global cocoa negotiation. Unlike other commodity crops, the cocoa sector shows distinctive transitions resulting from of its varying actors, rules, and agendas. By analyzing actors, rules, and agendas, the study found that the transitions of three governance elements were interconnected and transformed organically. More diverse actors have begun to participate in global cocoa governance over time. These diversified actors have promoted the inclusion of diverse agendas and vice-versa. Diversified agendas require more various actors to solve the related issues. Flexibility in rules has enabled the inclusion of diverse actors by lowering the barriers to the agreement. In addition, diverse actors have made rules more flexible by facilitating the inclusion of even more diverse actors and agendas. As participants became varied and diverse agendas emerged, coordination became an important factor for improving global cocoa governance. Moreover, the flexibilization of laws enabled the inclusion of coordination strategies as a policy agenda. Since the first declaration was made in 2012 and the projected eighth Agreement appears to be postponed to 2026, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of contemporary global cocoa governance. However, the global cocoa governance has distinct characteristics the most notable of which is its transformation to facilitate the inclusion of more stakeholders and cooperation structures than other commodity crop industries.

Although this research provides meaningful findings, it has some limitations. This research depends on the content analysis of policy documents related to the global cocoa industry. It does not include interview with relevant stakeholders. For a better

understanding of global cocoa governance, an in-depth analysis should be conducted as future research. For example, the study regarding on the industry's power relations and decision-making processes can improve our understanding of global cocoa governance. Furthermore, the quality of the global cocoa governance can be evaluated using the criteria of transparency, accountability, and participation.

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Abstract (Korean)

국 문 초 록

글로벌 코코아 거버넌스의 행위자, 규칙, 의제의 상호작용과 변화

이하은

국제농업개발협력전공

서울대학교 국제농업기술대학원

대부분의 상품 작물은 남반구의 저소득 국가에서 생산되고 북반구에서 소비된다. 가격 변동에 취약한 상품 작물은 수급 불균형 예방과 수출국 농가의 생계유지 등에 대한 이유로 수출 수입국 사이의 상품작물 조약을 통해 가격을 조정해왔다. 그러나 시장을 통한 가격 결정이 이루어지면서 가격 조정은 주요 협상 의제에서 사라졌다. 다른 상품작물과 달리 코코아 산업은 가격 조정 이슈가 사라진 후에도 산림 벌채, 아동 노동, 농가 저소득 등과 같은 다양한 환경, 사회, 경제 문제를 해결하기 위해 조약을 통한 협상을 꾸준히 추진하는 독특한 특성을 보여준다.

본 연구는 거버넌스 프레임워크를 사용하여, 코코아 산업 내 문제를 해결하기 위해 등장한 글로벌 코코아 거버넌스 시스템을 분석하였다. 국제 코코아 협정 (International Cocoa Agreements), 세계 코코아 선언 (World Cocoa Declaration), 국제 코코아 농부 선언 (Global Cocoa Farmers Declaration) 등 국제 협약과 선언을 분석대상으로 글로벌 코코아 산업과 관련된 행위자, 규칙, 의

제를 규명하고 분석하였다.

분석 결과, 글로벌 코코아 거버넌스의 세 가지 특징이 증명되었다. 첫째, 행위자와 의제가 다양화되었다. 2000년대부터 민간 부문 행위자들이 등장하여 글로벌 코코아 의제를 구성하고 코코아 관련 문제에 대한 해결책을 제시하는 데 적극적으로 참여하였다. 이에 따라 가격 변동 외에 더 다양한 이슈들이 의제에 포함되었다. 둘째, 글로벌 코코아 규칙이 유연해졌다. 법적 구속력이 강한 국가 간 조약이 글로벌 코코아 산업의 주요 규칙으로 기능함과 동시에, 최근 법적 구속력이 약한 선언을 통해 다양한 의제가 강조되기 시작했다. 이와 같은 변화는 다양한 행위자들의 참여를 독려함으로써 글로벌 코코아 거버넌스를 형성과 추진에 기여하였다. 셋째, 국제 정책과 국가 단위 정책 간 조정을 위한 노력이 시도되었다. 의제와 행위자가 다양해짐에 따라 글로벌 코코아 거버넌스의 효과성 향상을 위해 서로 다른 수준의 정책 간 조정과 조화가 더 중요해졌다.

본 연구는 글로벌 코코아 산업에서 드러나는 거버넌스 현상을 집중적으로 분석하였다는 데 의의가 있다. 글로벌 코코아 거버넌스는 세 가지 특징-다양화, 유연화, 정책 조정을 나타내며 변화해왔다. 코코아 산업은 행위자, 규칙, 의제가 상호 작용하면서 글로벌 거버넌스의 전환 과정을 거치고 있다.

주요어: 코코아, 글로벌 거버넌스, 협약, 상품작물, 다양화, 유연화, 정책조정

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