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Master's Thesis of
Political Science and International Relations

Foreign Policy towards the Non-aligned Nations during the Chung-hee Park Era

- Historical Investigation on the Establishment
of ROK-India Diplomatic Relations -

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Abstract

This study analyzes the process of establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and India to explain the cause of diplomatic relations with non-aligned, neutral countries during Park Chung-hee administration. This study criticizes existing studies that describe diplomacy towards neutral countries only with the International Political System level, while utilizing the theoretical framework of Hudson and Day (2020), which emphasizes foreign policy theory through integrating multiple levels of analysis. Although Hudson and Day (2020) categorize the framework into 9 variables, this study re-categorized and omit some levels of analysis into three levels according to the situation in South Korea at that time: Systematic level; Domestic level; and Personal level.

Until the mid-1960's, when the influence of the international political system was less due to the changes in relations among communist countries, domestic political factor and the individual wills played more important role than the systematic variable. On Domestic level of analysis, benchmarking the government agencies for economic development and improving the trade imbalances were considered more important than the competition against North Korea. President Park personally sought to establish diplomatic relations with India to develop economy and to expand the scope of diplomatic movement because those helped him to strengthen his legitimacy.

From the late 1960's, however, international political system

factor eroded the influence of domestic politics and individual level of analysis as the US sought to improve relations with communist countries. Not only did North Korea's direct threats such as the Pueblo incident and the 1.21 incident occur, but also Pakistan established diplomatic relations with North Korea, the US demanded an atmosphere of reconciliation between two Koreas and reduced the number of USFK. As a results, competition against North Korea rather than the economic factors became the biggest cause of establishing diplomatic relations with India. From the perspective of President Park, who had to protect his safety and maintain power, diplomatic relations with India were promoted to intervene North Korea in diplomacy toward the non-aligned nations rather than the economic benefits.

Key Words: Korea-India Relations, Chung-hee Park, Foreign Policy, Non-alignment Nations

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Background and Research Question


As recent changes in the international situation requires diversification of diplomacy, the need to pay attention to diplomacy towards non-aligned nations in the past is expanding. The relative weakening of the US hegemony after the 2008 Global Financial crisis and China's assertive changes since Xi Jinping took power in 2013 are raising the possibility that the US-China relationship will fall into the 'Thucydides Trap.' The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, published in June 2019, referred to China as a direct threat to the US and its allies, and public opinion is growing that the US-China decoupling should be prepared due to the acceleration of the de-globalization caused by COVID-19 Virus.¹⁾ This study, which deals with the history of foreign policy towards the neutral, non-aligned countries at a time when the pursuit of practicality is required, away from the tightrope walk in which South Korea has to choose one of the two Super powers, has a huge implication on International Relations Studies.

India has been a very important country not only now but also during the Cold War and the Détente period. Although India, a former leader of the 'Third World' non-aligned nations, failed to become an Asian regional power in the 20th century, it

1) The Department of Defense. *Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region*, June 1, 2019.; Michael A. Witt. "Prepare for the US and China to Decouple," *Harvard Business Review*, June 26, 2020.

expanded its international political significance when the George W. Bush administration provided nuclear fuel and nuclear technology assistance through the 2006 India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. Since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014, India has also strengthened cooperation with the United States and its allies by conducting joint military exercises with the US and Japan in the South China Sea. As the title of recent United States' international strategy, Indo-Pacific Strategy, demonstrates, India's political importance surrounding US-China relations has become unprecedentedly important.²⁾

[Figure 1-1] Trade between South Korea and India ('09-'19)



* Source: Korea International Trade Association (KITA)

India, which has recorded 6% annual growth rate over the past decade, is the world's 5th largest economy by nominal GDP. Although the trade volume between South Korea and India has

2) Young-Kwan Yoon. *The Era of Diplomacy*, (Seoul: Mizibooks, 2015), pp. 152-153.; Rupakjyoti Borah, "Traveling Man: Modi Goes Global in His First Year as Premier," *Global Asia*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 91-92.

been decreasing since 2011 as shown in the [Figure 1-1], India is still an economically important country in that it ranks 7th biggest counterpart in Korea's trade.

In Short, at a time that hegemonic competition between the US and China continues to intensify, South Korean government needs to pursue diplomatic efficiency. This study, which inspects the reason that the Chung-hee Park administration focus on establishing diplomatic relations with India among many non-aligned nations, may have implications to South Korea's foreign policy in the future.

With the emergence of the 'Third World' that rejects the choice between the 'Free World' and the 'Communist Camp' during the Cold War, both South and North Korean governments faced the need for foreign policy towards the non-aligned nations. While North Korea established foreign relations with Asian and African non-socialist countries, the Rhee Syngman Administration excluded all countries except the 'Free World.' As non-aligned nations continued to join the United Nations (UN), South Korea had to face diplomatic disadvantages of expanding abstention in the votes on Korean issues at the UN General Assembly.

As a result, the Myon Chang Administration, which was established after the April Revolution in 1960, advocated the active foreign policy towards non-aligned nations as it judged that the Rhee regime's US bandwagoning, anti-communist foreign policy hindered South Korea's diplomatic interest. The Chung-hee Park administration, which was established in 1961 after the May 16 coup, declared to strengthen its foreign policy towards the

non-aligned nations and sought to normalize relations with the Colombo Group countries³⁾, which were considered as the ‘Third World’ leader. However, the relationship with Colombo group except India and Indonesia did not show much effort to establish diplomatic relations.

As can be seen in [Table 1-1], Sri Lanka voted in favor of South Korea at the UN General Assembly until 1959, but withdrew from the vote in 1961. However, the South Korean government made little effort but to send a goodwill mission to Sri Lanka. Despite Sri Lanka’s proposal to set up a trade mission or a permanent mission for the Colombo Plan in 1963, South Korea refused to set up any mission in Sri Lanka saying that it lacks budget.

[Table 1-1] Colombo States’ Vote on Korean Issue in the UN

	Sri Lanka	Pakistan	Burma	Indonesia	India
1959	Y	Y	A	A	A
1960	-				
1961	A	Y	A	A	A
1962	A	Y	A	A	Y
1963	A	Y	A	A	Y
1964	-				
1965	A	A	A	NA	Y
1966	A	A	A	A	A
1967	A	A	A	A	A
1968	A	A	A	A	A

* Yes(Y), No(N), Abstention(A), Nonattendance (NA)

** Source: United Nations Digital Library

3) It refers to the participants of the 1954 Colombo Conference to discuss issues on hosting the Asia-Africa Conference, which became the hub of non-aligned nations: India; Pakistan; Indonesia; Sri Lanka and Burma,

In case of Pakistan, its government refused to establish diplomatic ties due to the existence of a military regime, when South Korea contacted it through the Japanese delegation to negotiate diplomatic relations in 1961. Nevertheless, Pakistan maintained in favor of South Korea on Korean Issue at the UN General Assembly until 1963. However, even after the Pakistani representative to the UN withdrew its favor and changed to Abstention from 1965, South Korean government did not immediately seek to establish consular relations.⁴⁾

Regarding Burma, although South Korea established Consulate Relationship with Burma in 1962, it could not even establish Consulate General office in Seoul for more than a decade because Burma suffered from poverty after advocating Burmese way to Socialism.

In case of Indonesia, South Korea made great efforts to establish diplomatic relations. However, the relationship between South Korea and Indonesia was temporarily suspended under the Hallstein Doctrine⁵⁾ as the Indonesian government established

4) Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Authorization on New Government: Burma* [MF, C-0005(691)] (Seoul: MOFA Diplomatic Archives); Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Trade Agreement between South Korea and Burma* [MF, J-0014(1167)] (Seoul: MOFA Diplomatic Archives); Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: Myanmar(Former Burma)* [MF, C-0025(7957)] (Seoul: MOFA Diplomatic Archives); Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: Sri Lanka* [MF, C-0052(4898)] (Seoul: MOFA Diplomatic Archives); Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: Pakistan* [MF, 2013-0012(18281)] (Seoul: MOFA Diplomatic Archives).

5) The policy not to have diplomatic relations with countries that establish diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic based on the principle that Germany's only legitimate

diplomatic relations with North Korea in April 1964.

On the other hand, South Korean government has been very active in establishing diplomatic relations with India. Therefore, this study seeks to find answers why did the Chung-hee Park administration focus on establishing the diplomatic relations with India among the many non-aligned nations.

1.2. Review on Existing Studies

Just before the Chung-hee Park administration, various changes were taking place in the solid US-Soviet bipolar system. After Nikita Khrushchev downgraded Joseph Stalin at the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956, Sino-Soviet relations also deteriorated due to China's ongoing the Great Cultural Revolution through 1966 and 1976. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, which successfully tested and launched an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in 1957, began to promote peaceful coexistence with the United States. At the 21st Communist Party Congress in 1959, Khrushchev reaffirmed his commitment to peaceful coexistence and actively pursued détente by visiting the United States in 1960.⁶⁾

government is the Federal Republic of Germany. South Korea also refused to have diplomatic relations with a country that established diplomatic ties with North Korea.

- 6) Sang Sook Lee (2008), "A Comparative Study on Self-reliant Diplomacy between North Korea and North Vietnam," *Unification Policy Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 61-62; Jong Chol Park (2008), "The Movement of Solidarity of Sino-North Korea in the Early Stages of Sino-Soviet Dispute," *Studies in Humanities and Social*

In this regard, most of the existing studies on the foreign policy of the Chung-hee Park administration analyzed in connection with the US-USSR bipolar system. Many of them did not pay much attention to Non-aligned nations because they focused on analyzing changes in South Korea-US relations caused by the 1969 Nixon Doctrine.⁷⁾ Some studies say that the Chung-hee Park administration did not escape from the Cold War diplomacy despite its 'Active diplomacy' campaign.⁸⁾ Do (2017) and Shin (2019) dealt with the expansion of 'Active Diplomacy' and exchanges between Non-aligned Nations and the diplomatic competition between South and North Korea during 1970s and the June 23 Declaration in 1973. The focus of the studies, however, was on the confrontation between South and North Korea under the international system rather than the relations between South Korea and Non-aligned nations itself.⁹⁾

Sciences, Vol. 21, pp. 43-46.

- 7) Jung-Bae Kim (2012), "Historical Implication of Sino-American Rapprochement," *The Korean Journal of American History*, No. 36, pp. 205-245.; Wook Hee Shin (2005), "From opportunity to deadlock: Korea-US relations during Detente period and International Politics on the Korean Peninsula," *Korean Journal of International Relations History*, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 253-285; Seong-Ji Woo (2004), "Inter-Korean reconciliation and understanding of South Korea-US alliance, 1969-1973," *Korean Journal of International Relations History*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp.91-126.
- 8) Kwang-seo Kee (2015), "Chung-hee Park Government's Foreign Policy toward the Soviet Union and China: An Analysis of Presidential Records," *The Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 78-105; Duckjoon Chang (2019). "Continent-oriented Diplomacy in the Park Chung Hee Era: Its Background and Characteristics," *Sino-Soviet Affairs*, Voll. 43, No. 2, pp. 181-226; Sungjoo Han (1980). "South Korea and the United States: The Alliance Survives," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 11, pp. 1075-1086.

Among them, Shin (2019) explains that the June 23 Declaration was a passive choice due to South Korea's inferiority in diplomatic competition. Although the June 23 Declaration may have been passive choice in consequence, diplomatic relationship with India is an example of South Korea being more active than North Korea in terms of the progress of diplomacy towards non-aligned nations and gaining some advantage. To be specific, before India established diplomatic relations with both Koreas on December 10, 1973, South Korean government strongly insisted on establishing independent diplomatic relations and it actually reached an agreement to establish diplomatic relations ahead of North Korea. Rather, North Korea did not reply despite the Indian government's invocation and only agreed to establish diplomatic relations on December 9, 1973.¹⁰⁾ Therefore, Shin (2019) fails to accurately analyze Chung-hee Park administration's foreign policy toward Non-aligned nations.

Kim (2020) made a great academic contribution by analyzing the process of 'Neutral diplomacy' of both South and North Korea from 1948 to 1968. However, he missed details because he only focused on analyzing the overall trend of neutral diplomacy. He cited the fact that core 'Third World' countries, India and the

9) Jein Do (2017), "South Korean Debates on Policy Alterations towards Neutral and Communist Countries in the 1960s," *Korea and World Politics*, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 59-90.; Jong-Dae Shin (2019), "Inter-Korean Diplomatic Competition and the June 23 Declaration," *Review of North Korean Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 200-231.

10) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Establishment of Diplomatic Relations: India, 1960-73* [MF, C-0061(5809)], (Seoul: MOFA Diplomatic Archives, Hereafter "MF, C-0061(5809)"), pp. 190-232.

United Arab Republic,¹¹⁾ were not included in the Asia-Africa goodwill mission to assert the neutral diplomacy of the Myon Chang Administration was not as active as the Chung-hee Park administration.¹²⁾ It is well known that the Myon Chang Administration's foreign policy towards non-aligned nations was not as active as the Chung-hee Park administration. However, the ambassador to the United Kingdom indirectly identified the Indian government's attitude toward the votes on Korean issue at the UN General Assembly and establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, while noticing the beginning of the 2nd republic and changes in foreign policy through talks.¹³⁾

Although it has already been 50 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and India in 1973, there is a lack of research on the dynamics surrounding the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Tayal (2015) described the Korea-India relationship from the myth that the queen of Gaya was Indian to the 2010s, but has limitations that the relationship between the two countries in the 1960's and 1970's was analyzed only through Indian diplomatic archives.¹⁴⁾

11) After the Suez Crisis in 1956, Egypt and Syria agreed to establish a single government in 1958. With the withdrawal of Syria in 1961 and the change of Egypt's national name, United Arab Republic was extinguished in September 1971.

12) Do-Min Kim, "A Study on the Diplomacy of South and North Korea towards 'Neutral Countries' from 1948 to 1968," Ph. D dissertation, (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2020), p. 177.

13) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 5-25.

14) Skand R. Tayal. *India and the Republic of Korea: Engaged Democracies*. (London: Routledge, 2014)

1.3. Theoretical Framework

The aforementioned studies have analyzed the international system, the bipolar 'Cold War' system, as the level of analysis. A country's decision making, however, is also related to internal variables as mentioned by several studies, including Putnam (1988), Rosenau (1974), Allison (1971), Hudson and Day (2020), Morin and Paquin (2018).¹⁵⁾

Putnam (1988) noted that negotiations between states are linked to domestic politics, proposing the Two-Level Game theory to explain the outcome of negotiations. According to his study, national representatives must conduct negotiations with interest groups (Level 2) for the domestic ratification of negotiation results as well as negotiations between the counterpart national representatives (Level 1). The greater the win-set that needs to be secured for domestic ratification, the higher the possibility of agreement between countries. Although Putnam's Two-Level game theory refers to the link between international and domestic politics, it is not suitable to explain why Korea tried to establish diplomatic relations with India because it is a theory to explain the negotiations between countries.¹⁶⁾

15) Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1971); Valerie M. Hudson and Benjamin S. Day, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*, 3rd Ed. (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020), Jean Frédéric Morin and Jonathan Paquin, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox*, 2nd Ed. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

16) Robert Putnam (1988), "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427-460.

Rosenau (1974), whom Putnam criticized for accumulating no research other than explaining domestic and international dispute behavior, suggest the clue to explain the Chung-hee Park administration's foreign policy decision. Rosenau analyzed international political cases and defined five variables that influence countries' foreign policy decisions. According to his categorization, Korea from 1961 to 1973 can be seen as a 'Small, Low Developed, Closed Country' type that the leader has the greatest influence on the foreign policy.¹⁷⁾ In this regard, South Korea established diplomatic relations because President Park wanted. However, since Rosenau's study is not a formal theory, just like Rosenau himself mentioned, it lacks explanation and needs additional theoretical analysis such as Allison (1971), Hudson and Day (2020).

Allison (1971) provides a better framework of foreign policy making by using the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Prior to his study the Rational Actor model, which was influenced by Economics, held a unique position in the International Relations. However, Allison criticize Rational Actor model as a "Black Box Model" because a Nation state is not the only actor and nor the rational actor. He suggests alternative frameworks: Organizational Process Model; Bureaucratic Politics Model. He uses three levels of analysis to integrate the explanations at different levels

According to Allison (1971), the Organizational Process Model assumes that the state/government is not a single actor but a segmented actor composed of several organizations. Allison

17) James N. Rosenau, *Comparing Foreign Policy: Theories Finding and Methods* (New York: Sage Publications, 1974)

focuses on the interaction between decision maker and agencies in foreign policy making. The organizations/agencies participating in the policy making set goals based on SOP (Standard Operating Procedures) that reflect their organizational culture and try to ensure that policies are determined in the direction in which they benefit their organizations.

The Bureaucratic Politics model analyzes that foreign policy is not the best option for solving problems, but rather the result of political actions such as competition, and negotiation between the representatives of each governmental organizations.

Hudson and Day (2020), which agree with Allison (1971) that Rational Actor model cannot fully demonstrate the foreign policy, reviews the history of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and tries to suggest a framework that integrates nine levels of analysis: 1) Individual decision maker; 2) Small Group Dynamics; 3) Organizational Process; 4) Bureaucratic Politics; 5) Culture; 6) National Identity; 7) Domestic Politics; 8) Levels of National Attributes; 9) International System.

As Hudson and Day accurately pointed out, theoretical integration of multiple level of analysis improves explanation by permitting us to assess the interrelationship among factors. This study uses Hudson and Day's research as the theoretical frame to analyze the root cause of South Korea's attempt to establish diplomatic relations with India during the Chung-hee Park Era.

According to Hudson and day (2020), there are 8 conditions when National leader's characteristics are more likely to matter in the foreign policy making.¹⁸⁾

18) Hudson and Day (2020), p. 40.

- 1. When a leader governs a regime that imposes relatively few constraints on them*
- 2. When a leader is interested in foreign policy*
- 3. During crisis*
- 4. When decision-making proceeds in an information poor, ambiguous, or uncertain environment, or when long term strategic planning is task*
- 5. When a leader is inexperienced in foreign policy*
- 6. When a leader has expertise in a particular issue area or region of the world*
- 7. When a leader has a "hands-on" leadership style*
- 8. When certain group dynamics prevail.*

Considering the comprehensive situation during the Chung-hee Park administration, condition 1, 2, 5 are related to the importance of President Park's characteristics in the foreign policy making. Because president Chung-hee Park took over the power by the coup, there were few constraints on him. President Park was interested in foreign policy although he lacks experience.

However, Hudson and Day (2020) mentioned that a single leader cannot make foreign policy by him/herself and needs help from particular organization or several organizations. In inspecting the affect of Group Decision-making, which resembles Allison's analysis, they argue that foreign policy decision-making follows certain tendencies. According to them, routine foreign policy issues follow the Organization behavior model and

Non-routine problems tends to follow Small Group Dynamics or Bureaucratic Politics Model. If the problem is Crisis or has high stakes to national interest, it is dealt with the Small Group that have only few executive members. Non-routine but Non-crisis issues, however, follows the Bureaucratic Politics model.¹⁹⁾ Since the diplomacy towards the non-aligned nations falls into the Non-routine but Non-crisis type, this study excludes Small group dynamics and Organization behavior and examines whether Bureaucratic Politics model can be applied.

Hudson and Day (2020) point out that domestic power struggles between the government branches, political parties, and society including the think tanks and voters by citing Mesquita, Bruce and Lalman (1992) and Putnam (1988).²⁰⁾ However, opposition parties, media, common voters could not affect much on foreign policy during the Chung-hee Park era as President Park had the transcendent power. Therefore, it is fair enough to reckon there is no difference between the domestic politics and inter-agency group decision making.

Although Hudson and Day (2020) mentioned culture and national identity as level of analysis, they admitted that these variables have been the domain of social sciences like anthropology, sociology and so on rather than International Relations.²¹⁾ Culture and national identity did not affect much in Korean diplomacy, not only in the Chung-hee Park era but also

19) Hudson and Day (2020), pp. 75-76.

20) Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)

21) Hudson and Day (2020), pp. 122-123.

the entire history after South Korea was established in 1948. Therefore, this study excludes the culture and national identity.

Hudson and Day (2020) also mention National Attributes, such as the size of the territory, natural resources, geography, demographics, political system, military capabilities, economic capabilities may affect one state's foreign policy.²²⁾ Many of the National Attributes of South Korea, however, did not change during the Chung-hee Park administration. The size of the territory, natural resources, geography were the same. Although General Park seized the power in a military coup, the political system did not change because the Park administration ostensibly advocated democracy. Military/Economic capabilities increased during the Park administration but it was the result rather than the cause of the change in foreign policy.

The last, but not the least, level of analysis of Hudson and Day (2020) is the International System. The power distribution among states, such as Unipolar, Bipolar or Multipolar System, or some change in the international system, such as Détente, or the Power transition from one superpower to another one, may affect one state's foreign policy.²³⁾ Regarding the South Korea during the Park administration, the Cold War and the Dètent, Inter-Korean relations, which is affected by the US-USSR relations, may have affected South Korea's foreign policy.

In short, this research integrates three levels of analysis to explain South Korea's foreign policy towards the non-aligned nations, especially India, during the Chung-hee Park Era:

22) Hudson and Day (2020), pp. 170-180.

23) Hudson and Day (2020), pp. 180-188.

President Chung-hee Park himself (Personal Level); Group decision making within the Administrative Branch or between the Administrative and Legislative Branch (Government Level); International System including the Cold War and Inter-Korean relations (Systematic Level). By integrating these levels of analysis, this study tries to assess the interrelationship among factors.

1.4. Methodology and the Composition of Research

This study qualitatively analyze which factor affected the most to the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and India. To assess the effect of President Park on the foreign policy towards India, this study tries to analyze President Chung-hee Park's personal perceptions and values through his own books.²⁴⁾ The System-level and government-level analysis is based on the archive data of South Korea and India, which were the direct parties to establishing the diplomatic relations. This study also look into the US diplomatic archives because the US had a huge Impact on South Korea's diplomacy at that time.

India, along with Indonesia, Burma, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, was major '3rd World' country that led the first Asia-Africa Conference. In addition, as its political importance is increasing recently, this study selected India as the case to demonstrate

24) This study cites President Chung-hee Park's books, which were republished in 2017 by Guiparang: *The Way of Our Peoples* (1962); *The Nation, the Revolution and I* (1963); *The Power of Korean People* (1971).

South Korean government's diplomacy towards non-aligned nations. The time span of this study is set from 1961, when the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction was established after the May 16 Coup, to 1973, when South Korea established diplomatic relations with India.

South Korea's diplomatic materials for this research period were obtained through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives. This study also identifies exchanges between South Korea and India, which were not mentioned in South Korean diplomatic materials, by inspecting Indian diplomatic materials. India's Ministry of External Affairs runs a library, which is similar to South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic archives. The MEA library collects and publishes *Annual Reports*, and the *Foreign Affairs Records* includes some diplomatic documents that are not mentioned in the *Annual Reports*.²⁵⁾

The US Department of States also provide access to its policy making and diplomatic activities by releasing *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* from Lincoln to Clinton administration.²⁶⁾ However, as we can see from the fact that the Nixon administration supported Pakistan, not India, during the 3rd Indo-Pakistan War in 1971, the United States maintained closer ties with Pakistan than India during the 1960s and 1970s.

25) Ministry of External Affairs of India. *Annual Reports*. (New Delhi: MEA Library) <https://mealib.nic.in/?2386?000> (Last Searched: December 2nd, 2020); Ministry of External Affairs of India. *Foreign Affairs Report* (New Delhi: MEA Library) <https://mealib.nic.in/?2588?000> (Last Searched: December 2nd, 2020)

26) U.S. Department of the State. (Last Searched: December 2nd, 2020) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments>

Therefore, diplomatic documents during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations are used only as auxiliary materials to understand the US perception on Korean Issue at the UN and on South Korea-India relations.

This study analyzes the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and India in 3 periods. Chapter 2 of this study, Seeking Consular Relations, demonstrates South Korea-India relations from May 1961, when General Chung-hee Park seized power by the May 16 coup, to March 1962, when South Korea and India established Consular Relations.

Chapter 3 of this study, Enlargement of exchanges with India, covers from March 1962 to November 1968, when Indian Consular General was established in Seoul. Although India established consular relations with both Koreas in March 1962, it did not set up consular offices in Seoul and Pyongyang until 1968, citing financial difficulties. During the 6-year period, South Korea attempted to expand exchanges with India to establish consulate office in Seoul and to become superior to North Korea within the diplomatic competition.

Last but not least, Chapter 4, Promoting the Diplomatic Relations, demonstrates the 5 year period from the establishment of consulate office in Seoul to the simultaneous establishment of Diplomatic relations between South/North Korea and India in December 1973.

Chapter 2. Pursuing the Consular Relations

2.1. Negotiations to establish Consular Relations

Although exchanges between South Korea and India existed during the Syngman Rhee and Myon Chang administrations, they were not as active as North Korea. To be more specific, although the South Korean Ambassador to the UN held talks with Indian Ambassador to the UN, C.S. Jha, the only agenda then was that South Korea's foreign policy would deviate from the former one-sided stance toward the US after the start of the Park regime.²⁷⁾ A telegram sent by the South Korean Embassy in the UK to the Foreign Minister on March 17th, 1961, demonstrates that there was little direct exchange with Indian Government until the friendly mission was dispatched.

"...regarding the Korean National Treasure Exhibition in the UK...after two weeks I had sent the invitation to Mrs. Pandit, the High Commissioner of India in the UK, she responded her acceptance... Given the fact that Mrs. Pandit had considerable time to spare in response to her acceptance, it is assumed that there was at least informal consultation with her brother, Prime Minister Nehru, who is currently in London. Mrs. Pandit's attendance at the reception is considered significant for the future of diplomatic relations between South Korea and India..."²⁸⁾

27) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 22-25.

On the other hand, North Korea already had close contact with India around March 1958 to agree to exchange civilian trade representatives. A North Korean trade delegation visited India in May 1961 to discuss ways to expand the types of trade products and trade volume between the two countries. During the visit, North Korea's Deputy Minister of Trade, Gye Eung-tae signed a one-year trade agreement with the Joint Secretary of Commerce, K.R.F. Khilnani, which to be settled in Indian Rupees. As a result of the trade agreement, North Korean Trade Representatives was established in New Delhi, India. North Korea imported minerals including manganese, mica, and agricultural, industrial products from India and exported chemical fertilizers, zinc and steel to India.

"... Letters were exchanged in New Delhi today between K.R.F. Khilnani, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India and Mr. Kei Eung Tai, the visiting Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, setting out arrangements for the development of trade. The arrangements are for a period of one year commencing June 1st, 1961. Under the arrangements, trade between the two countries will be in terms of non-convertible rupees..."²⁹⁾

28) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 26.

29) Ministry of External Affairs of India. *Foreign Affairs Record, 1961* (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs Library, Hereafter MEA Library), Vol. 7, No. 6, p.189.

With South Korea lagging behind in the diplomatic competition against North Korea, General Park's military regime, which was established after the May 16th Coup in 1961, vowed to strengthen its diplomacy toward non-aligned nations. Judging that it is urgent to establish diplomatic relations with India, Burma, and the United Arab Republic, which play a leading role among Asia and Africa neutral countries, the Foreign Ministry suggested promoting consular relations with the countries concerned. Based on this judgement, President Chung-hee Park sent a goodwill mission to Asian Countries in July 1961 to discuss the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Vice Foreign Minister Desai. At that time, Indian government expressed its opposition to establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea due to its neutral policy, but agreed to exchange the consul general. On September 12 1961, the South Korean government ordered the Ambassador to the UK to contact the Indian Embassy to establish consular relations.

*"As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recommended to establish consulate relations with India and Burma respectively... the goodwill mission to Asian countries visited two countries and discussed that issue. As both nations welcomed our offer to establish consulate relations, please contact with their diplomatic envoys in the UK to commence the negotiation and be sure to report the results to realize this matter as soon as possible."*³⁰⁾

The ambassador to UK visited the Indian Embassy to discuss the establishment of consular relations and he reported that he received a reply from Indian Embassy saying, "We welcome the plan to set up a consulate in South Korea and we will forward this issue to home country and notify you as soon as possible." In response, South Korean government sent the *Comprehensive Report*, which was written by the Asian Goodwill Mission, to the Korean Embassy in the UK as a reference, while commencing the formal negotiations with India through Korean Embassy in the UK. Since North Korea had already agreed to exchange trade representatives in March 1958, and trade representatives at the government level in June 1961, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to establish consular relations to gain an upper hand in diplomatic competition against North Korea.

"...The establishment of consulate general in India could give South Korea a head start over North Korea, which already established trade mission, while also providing conditions for formal diplomatic relations in the future. Consulate General established in India can promote the expansion of diplomatic activities of South Korea to neutral countries, while promoting diplomatic or consular relations with other Asian-African block countries..."³¹⁾

South Korean government, which hoped to establish consular general relations within 1961, ordered the ambassador

30) MF, C-0061(5809) p.46.

31) MF, C-0061(5809) pp. 53-54.

to the UN and Thailand to conduct side negotiations.

“...Regarding the issue of opening a consulate general office in India and Burma, please note that formal negotiations are already under way through the Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and please conduct side negotiations to realize this issue by contacting the ambassadors from both countries where you preside.”³²⁾

As a result, the ambassador to the UK could receive a reply from the Indian Embassy on October 12th saying, “We welcome the South Korean government’s proposal to establish a consulate general, and I hope Korean Foreign Minister will make an official, written proposal to the Indian Foreign Minister.” On October 23rd, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a formal letter in the name of the Foreign Minister to the Indian Foreign Minister through the South Korean Embassy to the UK.

2.2. Establishment of Consular Relations

After sending the formal letter proposing to establish consular relationship, the Indian government did not show any response until a month later. The Ministry of Foreign affairs, which planned to establish the Consulate Relations within 1961, ordered the ambassador to the UK on November 21st to complete the consular negotiations within November but as the reply from

32) MF, C-0061(5809) p. 50.

India was delivered on December 19th. The reply sent from Indian Ministry of External Affairs included that if North Korea wants, it would establish consular-general relations with North Korea as well according to its neutral principle.³³⁾

“...The Government of India welcome the proposal to establish a Consulate General in New-Delhi. In Accordance with Government of India’s practice to give equal recognition to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to the Republic of Korea, the DPRK will also be given the opportunity to establish a Consulate General in India if they so desire...”³⁴⁾

South Korean government was concerned that it could lose its foothold in diplomatic relations toward non-aligned nations if it lags behind North Korea in diplomatic relations with India. Thus, South Korean government recognized that Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ reply constituted a bilateral agreement on establishing consular relations and ordered the ambassador to the UK to discuss the agreement with the Indian High Commissioner in London. In addition, it suggested Indian Ministry of External affairs to announce to the press the agreement between the two countries on January 5th or 10th, 1962 but did not receive any reply from the Indian counterpart. South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs then issued the following telegram to the Korean Embassy to the UK.

33) MF, C-0061(5809) pp. 51: 66-67.

34) MF, C-0061(5809) pp. 66-67

“As the government of India sent the letter regarding the establishment of Korean consulate office in New Delhi, India on December 19 last year, the government reckons it is fair enough to recognize that India agrees to establish consulate relation with South Korea. Therefore, the government believes it is okay to set up a consulate office and appoint the consulate general. Please let us know your opinion as soon as possible.”³⁵⁾

A reply from the ambassador to the UK, however, said that the Indian government had agreed to establish consular relations with North Korea as well, and that the India asked South Korea for the announcement of joint statement on March 1st, 1962, on the same day that North Korea and India were to announce the joint statement in Pyongyang and New Delhi, respectively.³⁶⁾ In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a joint statement stating that South Korea agreed on consular relations with India before North Korea and sent it to the ambassador to the UK.

“The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of India, in pursuance of the agreement reached on December 19th, 1961, decided to establish consular relations between the two countries by exchanging consular representatives at a Consul General level.”³⁷⁾

35) MF, C-0061(5809) p. 69.

36) MF, C-0061(5809) p.70.

37) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 71

Meanwhile, the ambassador to the UK asked Indian government to announce the joint statement at noon on February 28, earlier than March 1, when the joint statement with North Korea was scheduled. However, the Indian government relied that it would announce the statement on March 1st because it is impossible to announce at the same time as Seoul on February 28th. In response, Korean foreign ministry demanded that the announcement be made separately and be announced in advance but India did not mention the order of the announcement. Although the joint statement between South Korea and India stated that the two countries reached the agreement before North Korea, South Korean government had no choice but to establish consular relations on March 1st, 1962, simultaneously as North Korea.³⁸⁾

2.3. Summary and Findings

As mentioned before, most of the existing studies analyze in the international systematic level. According to them, the Chung-hee Park administration pursued diplomatic relations with India in order to win diplomatic competition against North Korea along with the change in the bipolar Cold War. Around the late 1950's to early 1960's, bipolar system between the US and Soviet Union was experiencing dynamic changes including the changes in relations among communist countries.

After the Polish and Hungarian rebellion against the Soviet

38) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 73-78.

Union in 1956, Khrushchev asked Zhou Enlai to visit Poland and Hungary to stabilize the situation. As Mao Zedong demanded so much including the recognition of its authority among communist countries in return, Sino-Soviet relations started to dismantle. As the Soviet Union began to promote peaceful co-existence with the United States, Chinese leaders criticized Soviet Union and the leaders of two countries confronted ideologically.

When General Chung-hee Park took power through the coup, the Cold War system weakened after Khrushchev's visit to the US in 1960. When the influence of Systematic factors decreases, domestic politics and the leader's will affects more on the foreign policy. Although the diplomatic competition against North Korea triggered South Korea to contact India, domestic politics and economic factors including the economic development plans, and reorganization of government agency caused the Chung-hee Park administration to pursue diplomatic relations with India. Personal desire of President Park to promote economic growth also played a major role in establishing Consular Relations with India.

In the Government level of analysis, the Park administration benchmarked India's Economic Planning Committee, which had authority on both budget planning and foreign investment, from the preparatory stage of the establishment of the Economic Planning Board in 1961. Based on the results of the benchmarking, the Cabinet office explained that the Economic Planning Board shall be established for the efficient operation of the national economy, implement the plan and to have jurisdiction over economic coordination with foreign or

international economic institutions stationed in Korea.³⁹⁾

A. Abolish the Ministry of Construction

B. Department of General Planning, Logistics Planning, Treasury Budget Office and Statistics Office of the Ministry of Construction are succeeded by the Economic Planning Board.

D. The jurisdiction of the Land Construction Bureau under the Ministry of Construction shall be succeeded by the Land Construction Administration under the Economic Planning Board.

E. The jurisdiction of Community Bureau under the Ministry of Construction shall be succeeded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry...

Article 5. (1) The General Planning Bureau shall have department of Comprehensive Coordination, Primary industry, Secondary industry, Tertiary industry and the Economic Investigation...

Article 6. (1) The Budget Bureau shall have department of General Budget, Administrative Budget, Investment Budget and the Corporate Budget...

Article 7. (1) The Logistics Planning Bureau shall have department of Economic Cooperation, Facility Investment,

39) Haggard, Kim and Moon(1991), "The Transition to Export-led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 4, p. 856; National Archives, *Operation System of Economic Planning Board (proposal)*, [BA0085213] (Daejeon: National Archives, hereafter 'BA0085213'), pp. 114-124.

Logistics Supply and Demand, Technology Management and Audit...

Article 8. (1) The Statistics Bureau shall have department of Statistical Standards, Demographics, Economic Statistics and Editing...

It is astonishing considering that the Economic Planning Board's Authority is now the same as the combined authority of the Ministry of Economy and Fiance, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, and the Statistics Korea. During the 23rd meeting of Finance Committee, members of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction held Q&A on the reorganization.⁴⁰⁾

Personal desire of President Park to promote economic growth also played a major role in establishing Consular Relations with India. In his 1963 book *The Nation, the Revolution and I*, which was published two years after the Coup, President Park evaluated that the national economy was "empty as if he had taken over a stolen, abandoned house." He also emphasized the need for economic development, noting that the reason for May 16 coup was to settle the accumulated hardships until the liberation from the Japan so that all Korean people would never be poor, weak or inferior again.⁴¹⁾

40) National Assembly, *Minutes of the 23rd Standing Committee of the Supreme Council on National Reconstruction* (Seoul: National Assembly) pp.1-2.

41) Chung-hee Park, *The Nation, the Revolution and I*, (Seoul: Guiparang, 2017), pp. 26, 88.

“In Article 4 of the Revolutionary Pledge, which mentioned that “the government will urgently resolve public welfare and make all-out efforts to rebuild the nation’s economy”, meant the establishment of the nation’s self-reliant economy. For the first time since Korea’s foundation, we have established a 5-year economic development plan and have taken steps towards that. It would be enough to be an example of how much interest the government has in rebuilding the nation’s economy and how important it is as a matter of life and death for the people.”⁴²⁾

In addition, President Park, who was interested in economic development, criticized the existing one-sided diplomacy with the US as ‘dormant ideology’ and emphasized active diplomacy to non-aligned nations and presented foreign policy goals as follows.

Gain understanding and support for the Revolution.

Strengthen ties with the Free Allies and expanding diplomatic relations.

Promote cooperation with UN and other international organizations.

Strengthen external economic cooperation.

Resolve the pending issues between Korea and Japan.

Improve the status of overseas Koreans and guide, protect them.

Introduce and promote Korean culture/technology and

42) *The Nation, the Revolution and I*, pp. 89-90.

*strengthen public relations activities.*⁴³⁾

Among them, there are 3 goals which may have affected South Korea to establish diplomatic relations with India: 1. To gain understanding and support for the revolution; 4. strengthen external economic cooperation; and 7. Introduce and promote Korean culture/technology and strengthen public relations activities.

In his 1962 book *The Way of Our Peoples*, President Park mentioned “We need a lot of foreign capital to promote economic development plans such as US, West Germany, Italy or even Japan.” He also stated in his 1963 book *the Nation, the Revolution and I* that among his many foreign policies, joining the Colombo Conference, sending envoys to India and Southeast Asia was also part of economic diplomacy, including loan negotiations with West German, Italy, Canada and France, Korea-Germany investment negotiations, and establishment of the Korea-US Chamber of Commerce.⁴⁴⁾ Therefore, in the personal level of analysis, President Park sought Consular Relations with India to improve economic situation.

In short, the impact of the Cold War decreased because of the peaceful coexistence between the US and the Soviet Union and due to the conflicts within the communist camp in a way that did not threat the national security or the political life of President Park. Therefore, it can be analyzed that South Korean

43) *the Nation, the Revolution and I*, p. 123.

44) Chung-hee Park, *The Way of Our Peoples* (Seoul: Guiparang, 2017), *the Nation, the Revolution and I*, p. 178.

government sought diplomatic relations to utilize India as example which had transcendent governmental agency to lead economic development and President Park, who took power with a coup, pushed for diplomatic relations with India because economic development could benefit his political life.

Chapter 3. Enlargement of exchanges with India

3.1. Economic factor becomes top priority

After India established consular relations with South and North Korea in March 1962, North Korea criticized India on the Chinese side after the China-India War, which led to the estrangement of the North Korea-India relationship. In a 1963 state visit to China, Choi Yong-gun, the chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, supported China's position on the border dispute between China and India, while criticizing India for aggravating China-India relations.

“At the conclusion of the State visit of the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK to the People's Republic of China, a joint statement issued made of a few partisan and factually incorrect references about india in the context of Sino-Indian boundary question. The DPRK supported China's so-called consistent stand for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through negotiations and “warmly praised the unprecedented measures taken on China's initiative of cease-fire etc.” The Statement went further and described India's stand as “wrong” and accused India of continuing “to poison Sino-Indian relations.”⁴⁵⁾

45) Ministry of External Affairs. *Annual Report 1963-1964*, (New

The relations between North Korea and India have deteriorated rapidly as the Indian government sent a letter to the North Korean government saying it is deeply regrettable that North Korea's move constitutes an act of unfriendly interference in its domestic affairs.

*"In a protest note dated 20 July 1963, the Government of India pointed out to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that this was an unfriendly act amounting to interference in the internal affairs of the Government of India."*⁴⁶⁾

Taking advantage of this deteriorating relationship between North Korea and India, South Korean government has accelerated private cooperation as well as intergovernmental exchanges. Specifically, the South Korean government sent a high-ranking official from the Korea Housing Corporation to New Delhi in August 1962 to examine the overall housing status. Shortly thereafter, through September and October, a government-level cultural mission and a children's choir composed of 34 Korean War orphans were dispatched to expand cultural exchanges.

"... A delegation consisting of three senior officers of the Korean Housing Corporation, a semi-Government Organization of the Republic of Korea, visited Delhi in August 1962, and made a general study of housing in

Delhi: MEA Library, hereafter "AR 1963-1964"), p. 44.

46) AR 1963-1964, p. 44.

India.... A goodwill and cultural mission from the Republic of Korea visited India in September 1962...An Orphan's Choir...from South Korea visited India in October 1962, and held performances at Calcutta and Delhi..."⁴⁷⁾

In October 1962, the 10th Indo-Pacific Fisheries Commission Meeting in Seoul expanded exchanges within International Organizations as the Indian government dispatched K. Gopinatha Pillai, Fisheries Development Advisor. However, since India has not established a consulate general in Seoul and the Indian Embassy in Japan has served as the Korean consulate general, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursued for frequent visits and trade relations with India since June 1963.

[Report from the South Korean Mission in Japan]

1. Regarding the past instructions, Secretary Hee-Chul Moon, visited the 1st secretary of Indian Embassy in Japan as follows:

A. R. K. Jerath, the 1st secretary of Indian Embassy for Commercial issues, plans to visit South Korea for about a week from July 15th.

B. The purpose of the visit is to explore the possibility of mutual trade to strengthen tie with South Korea.

C. During his visit, he hopes to meet officials of the

47) Ministry of External Affairs. *Annual Report 1962-1963*, (New Delhi: MEA Library, hereafter "AR 1962-1963"), p. 30.

Trade Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Trade Bureau of Ministry of Trade, Chamber of Commerce, the Korean International Trade Association and one or two sound civilian trade corporations if possible.

Mr. Jerath hopes South Korean government to arrange abovementioned meetings.

2. Regarding the continuous visit of the Indian Embassy in Japan, Indian Government will decide after the visit of the 1st Secretary Jerath.

3. The Secretary Jerath mentioned that his visit to South Korea may facilitate the establishment of Indian Consulate in South Korea.

4. The Secretary Jerath said that he will keep in touch with the Korean Mission to Japan regarding his visit to Korea. We will report the related results frequently. The End.⁴⁸⁾

After his visit to Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Consul General Ki-bong Han reported to Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the visiting plans of 1st secretary Jerath and M. J. Desai, the Assistant Deputy Foreign Minister of India, who mentioned that he hopes to improve trade relations between South Korea

48) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Korea-India General Affairs, 1963-64* [MF, C-0024(2512)], (Seoul: Diplomatic Archives, hereafter "MF, C-0024(2512)") pp.11-12.

and India.

“...H.E. Desai mentioned that although the trade between South Korea and India has been deterred by India’s foreign exchange situation, the problem of the settlement can be solved by ‘Barter,’ just like European Payment Union in the 1950s, and paying in cash only if the payment is exceeded without clearing up to a certain amount of seating. He thinks trade between South Korea and India would be possible if both sides agree on export items. At the end of the meeting, he said that it would be good for South Korea to send a trade mission to India after the specific negotiations proceed...” 49)

Upon receiving the news, the government tried to invite Desai, the deputy secretary of External Affairs to the UN and the highest ranking official on Korean relations, but Desai refused. In response, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered the Mission to Japan to contact Mr. Desai, a key figure in the establishment of the consulate office in Seoul, Korean issues in the UN and the promotion of trade between Korea and India, before the visit of 1st secretary Jerath to Seoul.

1. According to the report of consul general to New Delhi, India’s Foreign Secretary M. J. Desai will make a 7 day

49) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Trade Agreement between Korea and India* [MF, J-0015(1172)] (Seoul: Diplomatic Archives, hereafter “MF, J-0015(1172)”), p.13.

visit to Japan around June 30. He is said to be a very important figure for South Korea in terms of India's establishment of the consulate general in Seoul, Korean affairs at the UN, and the promotion of trade between South Korea and India.

2. In addition, as it is time for Indian diplomats in Japan to visit South Korea in accordance its Government's policy, contact him to create a friendly atmosphere for improving Korea-India relations.

P.S. Consul General to New Delhi asked for M. J. Desai's visit to South Korea but he was told that it was impossible due to his schedule.⁵⁰⁾

In response, Eui Hwan Pai, the South Korean Missionary to Japan, visited the Japanese Embassy and Secretary Desai to listen their opinion about the establishment of a consulate general in Korea, frequent visits by Indian Embassy to Japan, Korean affairs at the UN. At that time, Desai said that it would be impossible to set up a consulate general in Korea for the time being due to budget and manpower shortages caused by the India-China border dispute and instead would send the Indian Diplomat in Japan to South Korea every three months for 10 days. He also suggested that he would support the South Korean government at the UN General Assembly as India did in 1962.⁵¹⁾

50) MF, C-0024(2512), p. 16.

51) MF, C-0024(2512), p. 19

During the meeting with Sung-guk Ji, manager of South East Asia department, Secretary Desai, who visited government ministries and private traders during his 5 day visit to South Korea, talked about the transfer of the regime from the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction to civilian government, Seoul's Position on the Sino-India dispute and India-Pakistan border dispute over Kashmir, promotion of trade between Korea and India.⁵²⁾

As mentioned earlier, South Korean government benchmarked India's Economic Planning Committee, which had both budget planning and foreign investment authorities, from the preparation stage of the establishment of the Economic Planning Board in May 1961. Although it was not mentioned in the South Korean diplomatic archives, Indian diplomatic archives demonstrate that South Korean government has shown great interest in India's economic planning and trade relations since the establishment of consular relations. Regarding the Economic Planning, South Korean government dispatched Brigade General Jung-moo Kim, a Cabinet Planning and Control Officer, in November 1962 to investigate India's state of Indian Government's planning and budget.

*"Brigade General KIM Jung Moo, Director-General of Cabinet Plans and Control, Republic of Korea and his party visited India from 7 to 9 November, 1962 to study the actual operation of planning and budgeting of the Government of India."*⁵³⁾

52) MF, C-0024(2512), pp. 25-34.

Through April 1st to 3rd 1963, an economic research team led by Jae Suk Chung, the planning department director of Economic Planning Board, was sent to observe the achievements of India's 5-year development plans. During the visit, Director Chung met with Indian officials. In September of the same year, South Korean government dispatched Seh Jun Soon, Deputy Minister of Cabinet Office, to observe the duties and functions of the Planning Commission and discussed with Commission members to accomplish the first 5-year development plan.

*“An Economic Research Mission, consisting of three members under the leadership of Mr. Jae Suk Chung, Director of Overall Planning Bureau, Seoul, visited India in April 1963, to study and observe the achievements of India's first, second and third Five Year Plans. During the Mission's stay in India, the members had discussions with officials of the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade... In September 1963, Mr. Seh Jun Soon, Vice-Minister of the Cabinet Administration of the ROK, visited India to study the organizational set-up and functions of the Planning Commission. He had discussions in this regard with Prof. M.S.Thacker, member of the Planning Commission.”*⁵⁴⁾

Meanwhile, South Korean government carried out the basic work to establish a trade agreement with India, including

53) AR 1962-1963, p. 32.

54) AR 1963-1964, p.32.

investigating trade-able items shortly after the establishment of the Consulate General Relationship. In 1962, trade between South Korea and India showed that exports to India amounted only \$10,000, compared to \$10.3 Million in imports. In response, the South Korean government hoped to promote exports to India and achieve a balance between imports and exports through trade agreements between the two countries.

A-(1) The trade agreement with India has a fundamental intention to promote mutual interest and to build a foundation for increasing trade volume in the future, even if it does not have instant effect.

A-(2) Although there are political considerations as well, if trade agreement with India is established, it would build foundation to expand the trade volume and help improve bilateral understanding as well as the friendship...

B. Although it is still difficult to estimate annual import and export amount between the two countries at this stage, there is possibility of import/export transactions for the items referred to in the attachment... 55)

[Table 3-1] Trade-able items between Korea and India

Export Item in 1961	Import Item in 1961
Grocery, Seafood, Agar	Sugar, Molasses, Coffee, Linen (Cannabis, Jute), Non-food raw materials, Fiber, Animal/Plant

55) MF, J-0015(1172), pp. 4-8.

	Raw Materials, Natural Plants, Plant Seeds, Chemicals, Beef Oil, Mercury
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[Table 3-2] Possible future items

The data were extracted in accordance with current import/export performance following the establishment of trade agreement with other countries in India

Export Item	Import Item
Canned fish/fruit, Silk, Rubber products, Plywood, Fiber, Fabric (Cotton, Silk, Wool), Thread (Cotton, Silk, Rayon, Synthetic Fiber), Fishnet, Tile, Glass, Porcelain, Iron bar, Tin Plate, Toys, Ginseng, Medicine, Crafts, Dried Fish, Rice, Etc.	Sugar, Molasses, Coffee, Cocoa, Cigarette, Leather, Cotton Thread, Pima seeds, Oil collecting seeds, Raw Rubber, Wood, Rayon Pulp, Cotton, Asbestos, Zinc, Mineral Fuels, Linen(Cannabis, Jute), Natural plants, Mercury, Animal Raw Materials

As South Korea continued to make efforts through Senator V.M. Chordia to ask India's parliament in writing about the possibility of a bilateral trade agreement, India's Foreign Ministry wrote memorandum with Ki-bong Han, South Korean Consul General to New Delhi, on the Korea-India trade agreement. India also ordered D. K. Srinivaschar, Assistant Deputy Minister of Trade, to visit South Korea during his tour of Southeast Asia and Far East Asia to identify potential trade promotion between two countries. Upon Obtaining the information, the consul general to India asked the government to prepare an itinerary, including meetings with the Ministers and officials of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry and Key businessmen.⁵⁶⁾

South Korean government's move to promote trade with India can be attributed to domestic factors in 1964. At that time, not only the National Assembly but also the Ministry of Foreign

56) AR 1963-1964, p. 44; MF, J-0015(1172), pp.35-40; 69-70.

Affairs had skepticism about the efficiency of costs to expand the vote in favor of South Korea at the UN, and there was an atmosphere of emphasis on economic and trade diplomacy rather than ideology. Specifically, Moon-bong Kang, who participated in the founding of the South Korean army and later served as ambassador to Sweden and Switzerland, criticized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for spending too much money on UN voting in 1964. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs also acknowledged that the utility of the vote at the UN was limited compared to budget spent and said he would pursue trade diplomacy and practical diplomacy.

Moon-bong Kang (Commissioner of National Assembly):
“How much do we have to invest to get the votes in the United Nations? What profit did we get from spending the national budget into that issue? I think we have been spending too much money on UN voting...”

Il-Young Chung (Deputy Foreign Minister): “From this time on, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take advantage of economic area, including market development, foreign capital attraction, technological aid. Therefore, we will not invest billions of dollars for the marginal utility of 1 or 2 votes on Korean issue at the UN, but rather engage in practical diplomacy in the usual way...”⁵⁷⁾

The Director of External Affairs at Ministry of Foreign

57) National Assembly. *Minutes of the 49th National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee 3rd Meeting* (Seoul: National Assembly), pp. 4-5.

Affairs also assessed that non-aligned nations including India have little influence in the UN. The Deputy Foreign Minister reiterated his intention to move away from ideology and pursue diplomacy that values trade.

Jun-Tae Ji (Director of External Affairs at MOFA): "Now in the neutral camp, people think there is no point in making any suggestion on general Korean issue, only encouraging the Cold War. So, they think why would Indonesia or other neutral country suggest something that would not work..."⁵⁸⁾

Il-Young Chung (Deputy Foreign Minister): "Until now, our foreign policy has been ideology oriented. But I believe that trade and politics should be combined, or in some ways trade should be considered more important than politics. Depending on the region, Foreign Ministry will focus a lot of its personnel on the economic side..."⁵⁹⁾

Reflecting the above-mentioned domestic political dynamics, South Korean government has prepared meeting material to take into account economic factors such as trade imbalance with India, India's trade volume by country and the future trade prospects and challenges.

58) National Assembly. *Minutes of the 44th National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee 2nd Meeting* (Seoul: National Assembly), p. 8.

59) National Assembly. *Minutes of the 44th National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee 1st Meeting* (Seoul: National Assembly), p. 3.

[Meeting with Srinivaschar]

[Table 3-3] Trade Volume with India

	Export to India	Important from India
1962	\$10,000	\$1,031,000
1963 (Jan-July)	\$16,000	\$83,000

As demonstrated in the table above, there was a severe imbalance in 1962, but the imbalance narrowed significantly in 1963. The government has sought to sign a trade agreement with India to correct the imbalance between the two countries. On July 4th this year, the Consul General to New Delhi visited the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and established diplomatic ties with Aide Memoire on the signing of the South Korea-India trade agreement.

When the 1st secretary in charge of commerce at the Indian Embassy in Japan visited our country in mid-July this year, government officials asked for an increase in imports of Korean goods to correct the imbalance in trade volume.

[Table 3-4] India's Trade Volume by Country (unit: \$1,000)

Country	1961		1962	
	Import	Export	Import	Export
USA	687,875	215,540	490,374	245,529
UK	456,025	362,210	408,494	338,427
West Germany	257,287	41,729	248,249	43,418
Japan	127,639	74,060	123,087	84,697
Iran	62,061	11,353	99,440	9,556
Italy	54,528	19,475	49,729	19,709

France	44,365	18,559	33,558	26,975
Canada	41,697	36,992	34,874	36,535
Australia	37,359	47,010	47,744	33,664
UAR	34,485	28,161	25,292	27,139
USSR	33,323	60,505	74,181	67,345
Etc.	518,755	433,280	546,082	467,192
Total	2,355,399	1,348,874	2,181,104	1,400,186

* This table was reclassified based on import volume in 1961.

As shown in the table above, India's imports exceed exports because of the high demand for capital goods and machinery to push ahead for the accomplishment of its Economic Development Plan.⁶⁰⁾

According to the South Korean diplomatic archive, South Korean government judged it would be difficult for Korean products to enter the indian market except for some minerals because India, which put emphasis on exports, provide subsidy and tax cuts to domestic products. Although exports to India would not be increased instantly, the South Korean government stressed the need for trade agreement, citing that it can lower GATT tariff than the existing general rate and check North Korea, which already has established trade agreement with India. In this regard, South Korean Government considered increasing machinery exports to India in the future and using US AID funds to purchase Indian products.

During his visit to Seoul, Srinivaschar said in a meeting with the Foreign Ministry's Director of Trade that he hopes to expand bilateral trade from \$1.1 million to \$2 million. He also

60) MF, J-0015(1172), pp. 86-87.

mentioned that he had received information on the *Aide Memoire* with Consul General at New Delhi and discussions on trade agreement from the 1st secretary of Indian Embassy in Japan. In this regard he presented his opinion on the plan for the memorandum, the implementation of the agreement through the Korean Government's trade mission, and the expiration date.

"...I think it would be beneficial for Korean side to send a trade mission to New delhi in November or December this year to sign a trade agreement. India and South Korea will be able to sign trade agreement as soon as possible by India sending the reply to South Korea's Aide Memoire and Korea sending the Draft Agreement through the Trade Mission. After I return to home country, I will send the reply to Aide Memoire sent by South Korea by November 15th. The Indian custom for the basic validity period of the agreement is 2 or 3 years, but because it is 1 year for Korea, it is okay to decide as Korea wants."

South Korean Foreign Ministry's Director of Trade welcomed the proposal by Deputy Minister Srinivaschar, adding that the validity period of the agreement is not an important issue because it is Korean practice to automatically extend the agreement's validity unless the other country requests it in written form. Since then, the two sides have talked about improving ties between South Korea and India, including bilateral economic cooperation through annual payments, regional cooperation including ECAFE(Economic Commission for Asia and

the Far East) meeting and technological cooperation.⁶¹⁾

On November 5th, a month after the India's Deputy Minister of Trade, Foreign Minister Yong-Sik Kim asked India's Consul General to send India's draft of the trade deal as soon as possible, while pushing for negotiations so that South Korea can decide when to send the mission.

"If India submits the draft as promised in mid-November, and if it is acceptable for our country, we will be able to send a delegation to sign the draft. However, if we have to propose an alternative to India's draft, we must re-arrange our opinions of both sides. Therefore, even if the delegation is dispatched, we will have no choice but to adjust our opinions based on the alternatives we took as a preparation for the formal signing.... Send India's draft of the trade agreement as soon as possible, while pushing ahead with preliminary negotiations so that South Korea can unilaterally decide when to send the delegation and reporting its progress frequently..."⁶²⁾

In late November, Indian Parliament and the Senate had internal hearing on the establishment of Trade Agreement but India's response was delayed due to the attendance of the Deputy Minister Srinivaschar to overseas ministerial meeting. In response, South Korean Foreign Ministry drafted and sent the draft to the Consul General in New Delhi on December 9th, 1963

61) MF, J-0015(1172), pp. 94-99.

62) MF, J-0015(1172), pp. 90-91.

and ordered him to contact the Indian Government. Counsulate General, Ki-bong Han visited Srinivaschar and received the draft with a response saying that India hopes to send a formal delegation within January 1964 after skipping working-level talks.

"Dear Mr. Kibong Han,

Kindly refer to the Aide Memoire regarding the proposed trade arrangement between the Republic of Korea and India forwarded with your letter No.102/717, dated the 13th August, 1963... I mentioned that the Republic of Korea might consider the desirability of sending a trade delegation to India sometime in the second half of January 1964 to negotiate and conclude a trade arrangement. I shall be grateful if you could kindly convey the invitation on our behalf of your Government and let us know when the visit would take place..."⁶³⁾

The trade delegation led by Deputy minister of Commerce Cheol-Seung Lee, arrived in India on January 18 after trade negotiations with Burma and met with an 8 member Indian delegate, including Deputy Trade Minister Srinivaschar. Initially, South Korea insisted on signing a 'Formal Agreement,' but as the Indian Government insisted on a 'Letter Exchange' with countries that did not have diplomatic relations with India, the negotiation was once broken. Since Indian government said there is no difference in effect between the 'Agreement' and the

63) MF, J-0015(1172), p. 121.

‘Arrangement’ and that it could be revised depending on the relationship between the two countries, it resumed the talks and signed a trade agreement on January 22th.⁶⁴⁾

This agreement was introduced to the State Council on March 27th, 1964 and passed as the original draft. In response, the Foreign Ministry proposed President Park to sign and announce the establishment of trade agreement between South Korea and India. The trade agreement between the two countries was formally established after President Park’s approval on April 11th and signed by the Consul General in New Delhi on April 29th.

“After deliberation and resolution by the State Council in March 27th, 1964, it was approved by the President on April 11th of the same year and signed by the Consul General of New Delhi on behalf of the government on April 29th, 1964.” ⁶⁵⁾

The establishment of trade agreement between South Korea and India contributed to the promotion of trade between the two countries and the enhancement of relations. In 1963, when South Korea was pushing for the trade agreement, exports to India increased 2.5 times compared to 1962’s \$10,000, easing the imbalance between imports and exports, which once reached 100:1. Although exports did not explode as India provided benefits to its products, trade between the two countries grew rapidly, reaching an annual average of 46.7 percent by 1973,

64) MF, J-0015(1172), pp. 204-204; AR 1962-1963, pp.30, 44.

65) MF, J-0015(1172), pp. 393-398.

when diplomatic relations was established.

3.2. Competition between South and North Korea

Diplomatic relations between South Korea and India were also affected by changes in the political landscape between communist countries in the mid to late 1960s. As has already been mentioned, North Korea, which had chosen China amid worsening Sino-Soviet relations, has been trying to jump on China's growing international influence over its successful nuclear test in 1964. However, as the cultural revolution that lasted for 10 years from 1966 to 1976 caused frequent conflicts with neighboring countries, the relationship between North Korea and China deteriorated rapidly due to a series of incidents in which North Korea directly criticized China.

Later, North Korea strengthened diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, while promoting relations with the regime of Leonid Brezhnev and improving relations with India through the Soviet Union. Feeling a sense of crisis, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs judged that it was necessary to establish diplomatic relations with India before the two countries improved.

Regarding North Korea's approach to India, Consul General Byung-jik Lim noted in his *Comprehensive plan on the establishment of South Korea-India relations* that India is interested in North Korea's efforts to access the Soviet Union and that India believes that if North Korea turns neutral or pro-Soviet on Sino-Soviet conflict, there will be political benefits,

such as support for India or at least neutrality in India-Pakistan border dispute as well as the Sino-India conflict.

A. The number of countries hostile to India will decrease as at least the number of Pro-China countries will decrease.

B. As seen in the example of pro-Soviet communist countries, India can maintain relatively friendly relations with North Korea.

C. North Korean government's approach to India is greatly beneficial to India in India's isolation due to the economic power of China in the Asian and African bloc.

D. North Korean government will support India or at least take a neutral stance in the India-Pakistan dispute.⁶⁶⁾

He explained that "Indian Government's basic policy is not to recognize either divided country as a nation, but only as a divided political fact." However, it is contradictory as India recognized West Germany but did not recognize East Germany because of its diplomatic benefit. In order to establish diplomatic relations before North Korea, Consul General Byung-jik Lim thought that it is necessary to provide military assistance in the event of China's invasion of India or to create tensions on the South Korean border to directly affect India's national interests or to obtain cooperation from the US and other allies.⁶⁷⁾

However, South Korean government sent a reply to the

66) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 106

67) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 107-120

Consul General in New Delhi to consider establishing diplomatic relations with India after it establishes Consul General in Seoul and after the foreign policy of the new government, which was established after Prime Minister L. B. Shastri's death, becomes clear.

A. As the new Indian government was established recently, the direction of foreign policy of the new government is not clear yet.

B. Not only is the US response to our offer of military assistance to India unpredictable,

C. It is impossible to predict whether India will accept prior consultation on South Korea's military assistance proposal, considering India's non-aligned foreign policy and pro-Soviet attitude.

D. There is no guarantee that India will not establish diplomatic relations with North Korean government after establishing diplomatic relations between South Korea and India.

E. In the worst case scenario, even if North Korea establishes diplomatic ties before South Korea, the current Consul General can be maintained. However, after establishing formal diplomatic relations, the foundation established in India will collapse.

Taking these points into account, consider establishing diplomatic relations after India establish Consulate General in Seoul, which can confirm India's attitude toward South

*Korea, and after the new government's foreign policy becomes clear.*⁶⁸⁾

South Korean Foreign Ministry, which was trying to figure out the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations through allies such as Germany and Australia, asked US State Department officials to cooperate in normalizing diplomatic relations with India.⁶⁹⁾ However, the Johnson administration had stopped providing military assistance to both India and Pakistan, and had shown little interest in India and Pakistan after the Indo-Pakistan War, letting the Soviet Union take the lead in the 1966 Tashkent peace treaty. The fact that the US was preoccupied with the Vietnam War may have had some impact, but as India and Pakistan showed mutual confrontation without confronting with communist countries, there was a public opinion within the US that South Asia was not important in terms of anti-communist policy and regional security issues.⁷⁰⁾ The Johnson administration, skeptical of massive aid that could not bring political benefits, eventually reduced economic aid and food aid to India and Pakistan. As a result, India became closer to the Soviet Union than the United States in 1966, with Prim Minister Indira Gandhi visiting Moscow.⁷¹⁾

68) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 121-147.

69) Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *North Korea-India relations* [MF, D-0004(725.1)] (Seoul: MOFA Diplomatic Archives, Hereafter "MF, D-0004(725.1)"); MF, C-0061(5809), p. 100.

70) Carina van de Wetering, *Changing US Foreign Policy Toward India: US-India Relations since the Cold War*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp 41-42.

71) US Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States*,

With no significant assistance from the US, South Korean government has been keeping North Korea in check and deepening relations with India in various ways. First, South Korea expanded exchanges with India through international conferences, academic research, and friendly organizations. South Korea, which hosted the 14th Pacific Tourism Association General Assembly in 1965, welcomed Indian delegation including Deputy Commissioner for Tourism of India and Princess Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur Kingdom in Rajasthan. It also expanded academic exchanges, including international conferences on Family Planning and inviting experts on research on contraception methods through intra-uterine devices.

“At the 14th annual conference of the Pacific Area Travel Association, held in Seoul in March/April, 1965, India was represented by Maharani Gayatri Devi, M.P., and the Deputy Director General of Tourism of the Government of India. A number of experts from India visited South Korea in connection with the Family Planning Conference and to study the IUCD programme.”⁷²⁾

Next, South Korea expanded inter-government exchanges. In April 1966, South Korean government sent a trade mission headed by the Deputy Foreign Minister to extend the trade agreement and sent an additional 13-member trade mission to

1964-1968, Vol. XXV, p.1640; Wetering(2016), p. 43.

72) Ministry of External Affairs of India. *Annual Report 1965-1966*, (New Delhi: MEA Library), p.35.

follow up.⁷³⁾ In the following year, South Korea dispatched 2 officials to India to receive education and training on the process and policies of attracting foreign capital in India. Meanwhile, Parmeshwaran, the head of Indian Rail Authority, visited Korea and signed a deal worth \$11 million.⁷⁴⁾ Lastly, South Korea expanded its exchange with India through various methods, including cooperation using international organizations, such as UNESCO, WHO, and the Colombo Conference, and the establishment of a friendly organization in Seoul in 1967.

“Under the UNESCO and WHO plans, the services of some Indian experts were made available to the Republic of Korea. Training facilities in India for Korean officials have also been provided under the Technical Cooperation Schemes of the Colombo Plans, while facilities for study, research and training were provided to a number of Korean nationals under fellowships from the WHO, UNICEF, International Cooperative Alliance, UNTAP, Etc... An India-Korea friendship society was formed in Seoul in February, 1967.”⁷⁵⁾

As North Korea-India relations improved despite the move, the two Koreas engaged in a diplomatic competition over India. When South Korean government sent a delegation led by Deputy

73) Ministry of External Affairs of India. *Annual Report 1966-1967*, (New Delhi: MEA Library, Hereafter AR 1966-1967), p. 29.

74) Ministry of External Affairs of India. *Annual Report 1967-1968*, (New Delhi: MEA Library), p. 35.

75) AR 1966-1967, p. 30.

Foreign Minister Hwang Ho-eul in August 1968 to discuss expanding trade and economic cooperation between the two countries, North Korea also agreed to a total of 70 million rupees, which is about \$9.33mil, in November of the same year.

“Energetic steps are being taken to promoted trade with both DPRK and ROK and high level delegations from both visited India in 1968. The Republic of Korea Delegation was led by Mr. Ho-Eul Hwang, Deputy Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs...had talk with the Ministry of Commerce on matters relating to the expansion of trade and economic co-operation between the two countries.

In November, an official trade delegation led by Mr. Kim Suk Jin, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Trade, of the DPRK visited india and negotiated a new trade arrangement under which it is expected that there will a flow of Rs. 35 million worth of trade either way.”⁷⁶⁾

3.3. Summary and Findings

The early 1960's also shows that domestic politics and political leader's will drive the foreign policy when the influence of International Political system is weak. Since North Korea sided with China on the Sino-Indian war and jumped on China,

76) Ministry of External Affairs of India. *Annual Report 1968-1969*, (New Delhi: MEA Library), pp. 28-29; Ministry of External Affairs of India. *Annual Report 1971-1972*, (New Delhi: MEA Library) p. 37; MF, D-0004(725.1). p. 6.

DPRK-India relations was deteriorated. During Yong-gun Choi's state visit in 1963, North Korea publicly criticized India for exacerbating Sino-India relations and this criticism worsened DPRK-India relations. The fact that North Korea established Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty, which declares the two nations undertake all necessary measures to oppose any country or coalition of nations that might attack either nation, with china, not the Soviet Union, demonstrates that North Korea was closer to China rather than the Soviet Union.

In the early 1960's, economic factors were considered more important in domestic politics than the Cold War and ideological competition against North Korea. As mentioned during the 49th National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, there were skepticism amongst congressmen about spending too much money on the ideological competition including the UN votes. Ministry of Foreign Affairs also agreed to become less ideology oriented and to consider economic advantage more than the marginal benefit of getting votes on Korean issue at the UN.

Since the early 1960's, South Korea tried to expand exports for economic growth. In 1962, however, the amount of exports to India was less than a hundredth of its imports from India. Therefore, South Korea wanted to establish trade agreement with India in order to obtain tariff benefits in the short term and to increase exports to India in the long term. In other words, it can be analyzed that the economic benefit was the top priority in which South Korea promoted diplomatic relations with India.

President Park's willingness to increase exports and improve

trade imbalances for economic development also played a major role. During that period, President Park was preoccupied with economic development aimed at modernizing and building the foundation for the self-reliant economy. In his address at the National Assembly on January 10th, 1964, President Park stressed the importance of the government's infrastructure construction activities throughout the economy, while expanding the free-market based economic activities.

Feeling the need to improve trade imbalances along with the construction of such infrastructure, President Park reinforced policies to promote trade while suppressing domestic demand for exportable items. In addition, he emphasized to reduce materials imports that have low importance in people's lives and to use facilities only to produce important goods to secure raw materials for the export-oriented industry through such costs.⁷⁷⁾

President Park had no choice but to implement an open foreign policy as international trade cannot be revitalized by controlling domestic demand. In this context, President Park stated in his 1971 book *The Power of Korean People* that he thought active openness would expand contact with foreign countries and promote economic development accordingly.

"We have brought national independence and anti-communism to our indicators since shortly after taking

77) Presidential Archives. *President Chung-hee Park's State of the Union address in 1964*, (Sejong: Presidential Archives) (Last Searched on February 28th, 2021. <https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp>.

power, but we did not intend to take a closed position. Rather, by actively using an open policy, we had to have wide cultural contacts with foreign countries to receive a lot of stimulation and strengthen the driving force for development, thereby promoting mutual understanding and international status as well as economic development we aspire to. Therefore, we have made inroads into neutral countries, visited by heads of state, dispatched envoys, and other active measures..."⁷⁸⁾

However, due to the changes in relations between communist countries, North Korea's foreign policy changed to induce competition between the two Koreas, and the influence of system variables expanded along with the Vietnam war. The incidents that threatened national security and the life of political leader made other levels of analysis less important than the system level.

The dynamics amongst communist nations this time, which was caused by China, caused change in North Korean diplomatic policies. The Cultural Revolution, which was caused by Mao's mobilization of the Chinese against each other and resulted to sacrifice huge number of people's lives because of the Red Guards, caused frequent conflicts with neighboring countries.⁷⁹⁾ As the Cultural Revolution threatened North Korean leaders,

78) Chung-hee Park. *The Power of Korean People*, (Seoul: Guiparang, 2017), pp. 163-164.

79) Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform 2nd ed.* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), pp. 112-119.

North Korea criticized China directly and the Sino-DPRK relations deteriorated rapidly. To cope with some kind of isolation, North Korea tried to contact and establish diplomatic relations with neighboring nations including the Soviet Union.

Judging that communists' win in Vietnam could turn the entire Indochina peninsula into communism, the US asked its allies to dispatch army to Vietnam in 1964. Accordingly, the international systematic issue began to affect South Korea's foreign policy. Although North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Japan received military aid from the US, they refused to dispatch armed forces. However, South Korea, which was worried about decrease in aid, dispatched military troops for 3 times through 1965 to 1967.

North Korean threats including the 1.21 incident, which North Korean armed forces infiltrated South Korea to assassinate President Park, and the Pueblo Incident, which North Korea captured the USS Pueblo, directly influenced domestic politics. The chairman of the National Assembly, Hyosang Lee, made the following remarks at the provisional National Assembly on January 31th, 1968:

“North Korea has violated the cease fire agreement and committed several atrocities, and this time it attempted to invade South Korea by infiltrating armed guerrillas to assassinate major figures and destroy government agencies. On January 23, North Korean forces also attacked and captured USS Pueblo... Although we confront and argue domestically, there should be no distinction

between the ruling party and the opposition party in diplomacy and defense in the time of emergency...”⁸⁰⁾

In short, the domestic politics toward the ROK-India relations was subordinated by the international political system. During the period that Systematic issues did not affect much, South Korea emphasized economic benefit more than politics. However, as North Korean threat increases because of the change in international political system, economic benefit became obsolete and the competition against North Korea became the top priority for the establishment of diplomatic relations with India.

In the late 1960's, President Park considered his own safety and maintenance of the regime more important than establishing diplomatic relations with India. President Park, who needed aid from the US to maintain his regime, received the Brown Memorandum, which promised to revise the Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty to immediately dispatch the US military in case of North Korea's invasion and to assure South Korea to enter south Vietnamese market, in exchange for the dispatch to Vietnam.⁸¹⁾ Although President Park expressed his concern that the dispatch to Vietnam might cause negative effect to the diplomacy toward the 3rd world, he mentioned that he thinks it is right to dispatch troops.

80) National Assembly. *Minutes of the 63th provisional National Assembly Meeting* (Seoul: National Assembly), p. 1.

81) U.S. Department of the State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1969, Vol. XXIX*, pp. 125-128.

“The final decision to dispatch troops to Vietnam is only possible with the consent of the National Assembly. As far as I’m concerned, the dispatch to Vietnam is right. The US will not back out of Vietnam. We received support from 16 free nations during the Korean War. I think we cannot stand by when our allies are threatened by communism... I’m concerned about how the dispatch to Vietnam will affect diplomacy towards UN and the 3rd world. But I will try to persuade the neutral countries to understand the intention of protecting freedom.”⁸²⁾

It is noteworthy that President Park was aware of the existence of the comprehensive plan for the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and India, which was reported to the Foreign Minister in January 1966. President Park ordered the Chief of Staff, Hu-rak Lee, to have the foreign minister to report directly although the foreign minister already rejected the idea of Consul General in New Delhi because it is impossible to predict whether India will accept the proposal.

“Please report directly to the President about the idea of Byung-jik Lim, who is currently returning home, on the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with India as soon as possible.

Following the President’s order, Chief of Staff Hu-rak

82) “The possibility of Korea-Japan would be decided within this year” The Kyunghyang Shinmun. January 9th, 1965

Lee. ⁸³⁾

Despite President Park's interest, the 1.21 incident, which attempted to assassinate President Park, made him shift his attention to other areas including his own safety and domestic solidarity rather than diplomatic relations with India.

83) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 151.

Chapter 4. Promoting the Diplomatic Relations

4.1. After the establishment of Pakistan-North Korea relations

In July 1969, North Korea sent a goodwill mission led by Vice Foreign Minister Hee-kyung Kwon to discuss mutual interest including international issues, economy, culture and trade. Then, South Korean government also sent an economic delegation led by Ambassador to Thailand, Pyo-wook Han, to discuss mutual interests centered on promoting trade and economic relations through August 6th-12th.

“A goodwill delegation from the DPRK led by Mr. Kwon Hew Kyung, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited India between July 16 and 22, 1969. The Delegation held discussions with the delegation from the Ministry of External Affairs led by Foreign Secretary on the international situation and matters of mutual interest, including trade, economic and cultural cooperation...”

... A goodwill and economic mission from the Republic of Korea led by Dr. Pyo-Wook Han, Republic of Korea's Ambassador in Bangkok, visited India from August 6 to 12, 1969. The Mission held talks with the delegation from the Ministry of External Affairs led by the Foreign Secretary on matters of mutual interest with particular

emphasis on further promotion of trade and economic relations between the two countries.”⁸⁴⁾

In the 1970s, South Korea has shown more interest in relations with India than before, dispatching ministers and vice ministers, which is higher in rank than ambassadors, to India. In October 1971, Vice Foreign Minister Suk-hun Yoon visited India, and Foreign Minister Yong-sik Yoon, who visited India through August 17th-21st, 1972, met India’s Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh, President V. V. Giri, Prime Minister Shrimati Indira Gandhi to promote trade, cultural exchanges and to stress that South Korea is making efforts for peaceful unification through the Red Cross talks and the 7.4 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration.⁸⁵⁾

After President Park’s October 17th declaration of ‘Yushin Regime’, a long-term dictatorship, Consul General Shin-young Roh met Indian Vice Foreign Minister S. K. Banerji on to explain about the change and to claim it’s time to promote bilateral relations to Ambassador relations but India evaded the question.

The Presidential declaration of October 17th, which is a measure to promote dialogue between the two Koreas and achieve peaceful reunification, will further promote South

84) Ministry of External Affairs of India. Annual Report 1969-1970, (New Delhi: MEA Library), p.47.

85) Ministry of External Affairs of India. *Foreign Affairs Report* (New Delhi: MEA Library, 1972), Vol. 12. pp. 548-549.; Ministry of External Affairs of India. Annual Report 1972-1973, (New Delhi: MEA Library, Hereafter “AR 1972-1973”), pp. 28-29.

Korea's foreign policy and relationship with foreign countries...

...I mentioned India has approved East Germany on October 8th, 1972 and claimed it is time to promote the relationship between Seoul and New Delhi, especially in light of the growing trade volume between the two countries. Despite Vice Minister Banerji acknowledged that South Korea-India relations has improved very much, he only replied that it would take more time...⁸⁶⁾

As Pakistan suddenly approved North Korea in November, South Korean Foreign Ministry thought it should strive for the establishment of Diplomatic Relations with India because it analyzed that Pakistan's approval was a combination of North Korea's Support for the Kashmir conflict, military aid related to the Pakistan-India war, South Korea's close relationship with India. Foreign Minister Yong-sik Kim ordered Consul General Shin-young Rho to contact the Indian government to convey Pakistani government's decision to approve North Korea and reiterate his hope of establishing diplomatic ties with India. Consul General Shin-young Roh sought to establish diplomatic relations with India through influential figures such as India's Labor Minister and Vice Foreign Minister.⁸⁷⁾

I explained our hope of establishing diplomatic relations between South Korea and India as soon as possible, and

86) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 168.

87) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 169-170.

asked labor minister Khadikar and other influential figures to exert influence on our hopes to come true quickly.

Although all three of the vice foreign ministers, Kaul, Banerji and Atal, were all dismissed through November and December, I arranged a meeting with V. Trivedi, who is believed to replace Banerji.

Since the prime minister's office and the foreign ministry are considered to be the most important in establishing diplomatic relations with India, we will focus our efforts in this direction and focus on influencing the administration by contacting pro-Korean figures in Indian Parliament and public media as much as possible... 88)

Consul General at New Delhi, who had consecutive meetings with prominent figures including V.C Trivedi, the new Vice Foreign Minister, and George G. Swell, Deputy Speaker of House representative, reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Indian officials want to maintain consulate relations with North Korea although they consider South Korea more important.

C. As India is closer to South Korea relative to North Korea, it is expected that India will promote economic, trade and cultural exchange with South Korea...

D. However, India cannot change its foreign policy in a way that is impulsive or spontaneous such as Pakistan...

E. Because India has close ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Communist Bloc...The approval of South

88) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 171.

Korea alone, aside from North Korea, would greatly stimulate those countries...

G. Therefore, India hopes that the current consular relationship with North Korea will remain intact until a new outbreak occurs... 89)

After the report, South Korean Foreign Minister ordered the Consul General at New Delhi to persuade Indian figures that India's approval would not affect India-Soviet relations and that the benefit from relations with South Korea would be greater than the damage from severing diplomatic relations with North Korea. The Consul General met the Speaker of Indian House Representative G. S. Dhillon, Prime Minister's Secretary General P. N. Haksar and the Foreign Minister Swaran Singh. Although the Indian Foreign Minister acknowledged that India is closer to South Korea than North Korea, he rejected establishing diplomatic relations excluding North Korea because it may negatively affect relations with Soviet Union and Eastern Communist Block, Inter-Korean relations after the 7.4 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration.⁹⁰⁾

South Korean government expressed much interest in sending a delegation, led by former Consul General to New Delhi Byung-jik Lim, and Minister of Commerce Nak-sun Lee to the 3rd Asia International Trade Fair held in New Delhi on November 3rd. As the Indian government's position did not change despite Minister Lee asked Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to

89) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 171-172.

90) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 175-178.

consider establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries, South Korean government pushed for the establishment of diplomatic relations through informal routes.⁹¹⁾

As a result of your efforts to establish diplomatic relations between South Korea and India, South Korean government's intentions have been fully communicated to the top officials of the Indian government, and the Indian government's position has been identified.

Although you need to continue negotiations for this diplomatic relations, avoid direct contacts with Indian high-rank officials and create positive conditions through indirect channels and methods. I want you to establish and implement a negotiation plan in this direction and report process frequently...⁹²⁾

4.2. Negotiation for the Diplomatic Relations

South Korean government strengthened bilateral relations by sending Kyu-ha Choi, a former foreign minister, as the presidential envoy through August 26th-29th, 1973 and then the head of Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute and a judicial team from the Ministry of Justice. Meanwhile, side negotiations were held using various methods.⁹³⁾

91) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 181; AR 1972-1973, pp. 28-29.

92) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 182

93) Ministry of External Affairs of India. Annual Report 1973-1974, (New Delhi: MEA Library) p. 39.

On September 14, 1973, Indian Vice Foreign Minister Trivedi asked the Consul General Shin-young Noh a visit and announced that India had decided to promote consular relations to diplomatic relations. Vice Minister Trivedi asked him to keep silent on the contents and timing of the announcement until the formal agreement of establishment of diplomatic relation. He also mentioned that it would be inevitable for India to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. Consul General Shin-young Roh requested the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea at intervals of considerable time after establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea.

At 12:30 on September 14, 1973, I visited the Vice Foreign Minister Trivedi at his request...

Vice Minister Trivedi informed that India has decided to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, adding that Gandhi's great interest in South Korea was the driving force behind the decision. Trivedi also asked both governments to keep it secret until both countries reach an agreement on the content and timing of the announcement.

I thanked Vice Minister and asked if the decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea meant establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea as well ...Vice Minister Trivedi mentioned that Prime Minister Gandhi had no choice but to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea as well considering the pressure from the Communist Party in the Parliament and the ruling

Nationalist Congress Party.

I understand the political position of Prime Minister Gandhi, but... Even if India establishes diplomatic relations with North Korea, I strongly asked for a considerable period of time after establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea.

Vice Minister Trivedi said he will forward my request to Prime Minister Gandhi and mentioned that India's true friendship will be in South Korea even if it establishes diplomatic relations with North Korea... He also mentioned India would dispatch a much more senior Ambassador to Seoul than Pyongyang...⁹⁴⁾

Upon receiving aforementioned report, Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided that it would be advantageous to announce a joint statement in New York in consideration of the impact of the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and India on other non-aligned nations. Meanwhile, Foreign Ministry called in the Indian Consul General to Seoul A. K. Anand to listen to his opinion on establishing diplomatic relations and to ask help improve South Korea-Soviet Union relations. Korean Consul General to New Delhi Shin-young Roh pushed for a joint announcement between the foreign ministers of two countries in New York, while contacting leading figures in the ruling party of India and asking them to cooperate for an early announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations.⁹⁵⁾

94) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 190-191.

95) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 192,197-201.

In a meeting with Consul General Shin-young Roh, Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Paranjpe who was in charge of East Asian Region expressed disappointment that North Korea was not responding to India's push for diplomatic relations and said India would announce the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and India after the discussion on South Korean issues at the UN, regardless of North Korea's responds.

Deputy Minister Paranjpe did not hide his displeasure with North Korea's attitude but made it clear that the Indian government would hold the announcement until the end of discussions on Korean Issues at the UN in consideration of disputes from non-aligned nations.

When I asked "What if the North Korea does not respond after the end of the discussion on Korean Issues at the UN?", Deputy Minister Parnjpe made clear his plan to announce the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and India despite Pyongyang's refusal or refusal to answer..⁹⁶⁾

After the meeting, Korean Consul General met with Indian Diplomats and tentatively agreed to announce the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries by December 1st, following a visit of Brezhnev to India. However, South Korean government decided to re-negotiate after the return of Vice Foreign Minister Kewal Singh from his visit to Sikkim. India has repeatedly called North Korea for a response to the promotion of

96) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 202.

diplomatic relations, but said it could announce regardless of Pyongyang's response because North Korea, which has opposed the simultaneous approval of the two Koreas, did not respond.

I've been negotiating with the Indian Foreign Ministry officials on the announcement of establishment of diplomatic relations, but because the visit of Brezhnev, the Secretary of Communist party of the Soviet Union, to India commandeered all officials from the Ministry of External Affairs, we have reached a tentative agreement that the announcement will be possible by December 1st, the day after Brezhnev's departure... However, India's Foreign Ministry said it would have no choice but to renegotiate and set a date for the announcement only after Vice Minister Kewal Singh returned to office from his visit to Sikkim.

In response, I strongly asked Deputy Minister Paranjpe to tell me if there is any inevitable reason to delay the announcement. He said there is no reason and said it would be able to announce by the end of next week after Kewal Singh return to office.

...India's Ministry of External Affairs... called in North Korea's Consul General, Seong-jin Yoo, 3 times and urged Pyongyang to reply. Deputy Minister Paranjpe mentioned that Seong-jin Yoo repeatedly said he would report to Pyongyang but did not get response.

As Deputy Minister Paranjpe repeatedly made it clear that India intends to make an announcement regardless of

Pyongyang's response... I plan to make a visit to Vice Minister Privedi to discuss this matter.⁹⁷⁾

Indian Vice Foreign Minister Trivedi said in a meeting with South Korean Consul General Shin-young Roh on December 2nd that the Indian government would tie the knot sometime next week and announce the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries on December 10th. In addition, the final meeting was to be held around December 6th-8th to coordinate the joint statement.

Vice Minister Trivedi said that although India would establish diplomatic relations only with South Korea since North Korea did not respond, he mentioned, considering India's domestic politics, that the announcement will include a sentence saying "India decided to establish diplomatic relations with both South Korea and North Korea and accordingly change Consulate General to the Embassy". In response, South Korean Foreign Ministry said it would not oppose India if it wants to reveal its attitude toward North Korea, but said it is impossible to mention North Korea in the joint announcement between South Korea.

Establishing diplomatic relations should be a joint announcement between the two countries, and no mention of North Korea is possible. The following is the draft but the wording is on your discretion unless there is any change in the content.

97) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 204-205.

The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of India have agreed to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries with a view to strengthening and developing further the friendly relations existing between the two countries. Accordingly, they have decided to raise the present Consulate-General Representation to Ambassadorial level as of...

If India wants to reveal its attitude toward North Korea separately from the joint announcement, South Korea will not oppose it.

Please report the results of the contact with Indian counterpart frequently.⁹⁸⁾

South Korean Consul General Shin-young Roh, who visited the Ministry of External Affairs on December 4th at the invitation of Deputy Minister Paranjpe, strongly opposed India's bid to unilaterally announce its plan to upgrade diplomatic relations with both Koreas in consideration of domestic politics and international relations. After another consultation with Vice Minister Trevedi and Deputy Minister Paranjpe, he agreed to make a joint statement without mentioning North Korea and to publish the announcement on the morning newspaper on December 10th.

Meanwhile, North Korean Consul General Seong-jin Yoo, who also visited Ministry of External Affairs on the same day, insisted that India establish diplomatic relations only with North

98) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 206-208

Korea and not with South Korea in accordance with Viet Nam case, which excluded Viet Minh. Deputy Minister Paranjpe, who delivered the information to South Korea, explained that only North Korea and Vietnam will remain consulates as of December 10th and that India is the first to decide to establish diplomatic relations only with South Korea among the countries that both Koreas established Consulate General.

*“The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of India have decided to establish Diplomatic Relations at Embassy level with effect from December 10, 1973. Appointment of ambassadors will take place in due course according to the convenience of each country. ”*⁹⁹⁾

Recognizing the decision to establish a stand-alone diplomatic relationship between South Korea and India, North Korea mobilized leftists and lobbyists in India's parliament through December 5th-6th, while North Korean Consul General Seong-jin Yoo and Deputy Consul General Ryang-jin Choi visited Foreign Minister Swaran Singh to protest South Korea-India diplomatic relations. Realizing that such operation was impossible, North Korea insisted that diplomatic relations with North Korea be announced faster than South Korea, but this was also rejected. On the afternoon of December 9th, North Korea telephoned to inform that it agrees to establish diplomatic relations with India on December 10th.¹⁰⁰⁾

99) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 209-211.

100) MF, C-0061(5809), pp. 219-227.

Although India established diplomatic relations with both South and North Korea simultaneously on December 10th, 1973, it is noteworthy that India agreed to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea first despite North Korea's opposition. At that time, the Hindustan Times, a local media, said India disagreed with Il-sung Kim's claim that reunification of the two Koreas should take precedence over establishing diplomatic relations with South or North Korea.

"The establishment of full diplomatic relations by India with the two Koreas is characterized as the culmination of a policy of Equal Relationship with both parts... But the Indian action is also seen by observers here as a major effort by Asia's leading non-aligned nation to steer clear of the controversy dragging the continuing South-North Korean dialogue aimed at reconciliation and Detent, and finally reunification. India evidently does not share the viewpoint of the North Korean leader, Mr. Kim Il-Sung, that reunification of the two Koreas must precede moves by friendly foreign nations to establish diplomatic relations with any of the Korean governments..."¹⁰¹⁾

4.3. Summary and Findings

As the Cold War system weakened again after the Nixon Doctrine, the influence of the System level on foreign policy

101) MF, C-0061(5809), p. 240.

decreased and the domestic politics, leader's personal will became more important. However, the importance of the system variables seems to have been maintained because the reduction of US troops in Korea made the government and President Park feel threatened and made South Korea to put more emphasis on the competition against North Korea than the economic benefit. The Nixon administration, which began in January 1969, announced a remark so called 'Nixon Doctrine' in July 1969. Nixon Doctrine implies that the US will maintain support for Asian countries but will not intervene in conflicts in Asia, such as the Vietnam War, and that Asian problems should be resolved by Asian countries.

"Asians will say, in every country that we visit, that they do not want to be dictated from outside: Asia for Asians. And that is what we want, and that is the role we should play. We should assist but we should not dictate... We will give assistance... We will keep the treaty commitments that we have... But... we must avoid the policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam"¹⁰²⁾

The Nixon administration announced the doctrine because it

102) Richard Nixon, "Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 544-556.

had no choice but to accept the weakening of US influence. First, the economic growth in Europe and Japan in the late 1960s led to the end of the Bretton Woods System, which fixed 1 ounce of gold to \$35. Second, the Soviet Union's nuclear arms build-up and the Vietnam War also weakened the US military supremacy. As a result, the US demonstrated a change from the bipolar system to the multi-polar system consisting of the US, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan and China.

Nixon and his assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, who believed that improving relations with the Soviet Union and China could create a new international order in the Linkage based Grand Design, dramatically changed foreign policy toward China.¹⁰³⁾ During his visit to Beijing in 1971, Kissinger met Zhou Enlai to agree on President Nixon's visit to Beijing, and President Nixon, who visited Beijing for 6 days from February 1st, 1971, met Mao Zedong and agreed on the Shanghai Statement. After his visit to China, President Nixon also visited the Soviet Union to sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT).¹⁰⁴⁾

Within the atmosphere of Detent, the US reduced the number of US troops in South Korea. The reduction of US troops in South Korea represented increasing threats in national security and economic development to South Korean government. The US policy gave a sense of crisis that South Korea might be overwhelmed by North Korea.

103) Richard Nixon, *US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A Report to the Congress*, February 9, 1972, pp. 28-29.

104) Jun-Kab Chang (2009). "Nixon Administration's Asian Detente and Korean-American Relations," *History & the Boundaries*, Vol. 70, pp.195-220.

As a result, the Chung-hee Park administration pushed for self-defense and diplomatic expansion to replace the existing US dependent policies. After President Park to establish one-man dictatorship through the Declaration of National Emergency on December 6th 1971 and the Yushin Constitution on October 17th 1971, the Government level of analysis became obsolete.

The US policy moves, including the Nixon Doctrine, represented the possibility of reduction or withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. During the ROK-US summit in July 1969, President Nixon told President Park that he has no plans to reduce the number of US troops in South Korea. In November 1969, however, President Nixon ordered Kissinger to prepare the plan to halve the number of US troops in South Korea by the end of the year.¹⁰⁵⁾

“...If North Korea provokes another provocative incident, we... are prepared to react and will take measures harsher than the enemy provocation... We will honor the US-ROK Defense treaty... As you know, public opinion here demands reduction of troops we have all over the world, I rejected the idea of decreasing the number of our men staying in the ROK. I will make this view clear to the public to warn Kim Il-Song...”¹⁰⁶⁾

105) Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Presidential Visit to the United States of America, Aug. 20th-25th, 1969* [MF, C-33(1)] (Seoul: MOFA Diplomatic Archives).

106) Nixon Library. *Talks between President Nixon and President Park*, pp. 1-6.

In March 1970, the Nixon administration made decisions to withdraw 20,000 US soldiers from South Korea by the end of 1971. The US Ambassador to South Korea William J. Porter informed President Park of the US intention to withdraw one division of US forces, approximately 20,000 personnel, from South Korea.¹⁰⁷⁾

“Following NSC review on US policy and programs toward Korea, the President has decided to reduce the US military presence in Korea by 20,000 personnel by the end of FY71... The President directs that consultation be undertaken with President Park to inform him of the President’s intentions and explore with him the timing and conditions of withdrawal... The under secretaries committee shall submit a plan, based on conditions... for consultations with President Park to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs no later than April 1, 1970.”

President Park sent President Nixon a personal letter saying that the number of US Forces in Korea should be maintained until 1975, when South Korea can achieve economic growth and have self-defense capabilities. Although President Park emphasized North Korea’s threat, the Nixon administration withdrew a division of US troops South Korea by June 1971, with

107) National Security Council. *Nixon to Kissinger*, November 24, 1969, H-41.; National Security Council. *National Security Decision Memorandum 48: US Programs in Korea*. March 20, 1970.

the condition of the modernization of South Korean military.¹⁰⁸⁾

In conclusion, the change in the international system, Détente, gave a sense of crisis to President Park and South Korea's domestic politics. It can be analyzed that South Korea actively pursued the establishment of diplomatic relations with India as Pakistan established formal diplomatic relations with North Korea at a time when South Korea was expanding its diplomatic realm to reduce its dependency on the United States.

108) Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Korea-US talks regarding South Korea's security: 5 year plans for modernizing South Korean military and reducing the US Army in Korea*, [MF, G-20(3)] (Seoul: MOFA Diplomatic Archives); Sang Yoon Ma, Won Gon Park (2009), "ROK-US Conflicts during the Era of Detente: Nixon, Carter, and Park Chung Hee," *Critical Review of History*, pp. 113-139.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

This study analyzed the process of establishing diplomatic relations between South Korea and India to demonstrate why the Chung-hee Park administration sought diplomatic relations with non-aligned countries. In analyzing South Korea-India diplomatic relations, this study inspected the three levels of analysis, international political system, domestic politics and individual leader by utilizing the framework of Hudson and Day (2020), which emphasized the need to integrate several levels in Foreign Policy Analysis.

First, on Systematic level of analysis, changes in relations amongst communist countries, US-USSR relations, US-China relations and subsequent changes in North Korea's foreign policy have affected South Korea's foreign policy. Although North Korea commenced diplomatic relations with India before South Korea, DPRK-India relations deteriorated because North Korea, which chose to rely on China amid worsening relations between the USSR and China, criticised on India about India-China border disputes. However, as China's domestic political issues have alienated DPRK-China relations, North Korea has sought to improve relations with India again. During that period, South Korea's purpose of establishing diplomatic relations with India was not affected by International system much.

As the United State's political and economic influence has shrunk after the Vietnam War, President Nixon has pushed to improve relations with China and the Soviet Union. The policy

led to the withdrawal of 20,000 US troops from South Korea, which resulted in the two Koreas reducing their dependence on the US and the Soviet Union, respectively, and intensifying competition against each other. In other words, changes in the International political environment caused by Détente led the Park administration to push for diplomatic relations with India, the leader of the 3rd world, to keep up with diplomatic competition against North Korea.

Second, the domestic politics continued to change around the inter-agency issues within the government and the dynamics between National Assembly and the Administration. Looking at the inter-agency issue within the government first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that diplomatic relations with India should be pursued to prevent the expansion of the abstention vote in the UN as more and more neutral countries join the UN. Except for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government needed a state agency with enormous power to push ahead with its economic development plan. Although the purpose was different, the Government agencies had something in common in that India was able to exert a lot of influence on other non-aligned countries and that India was operating a transcendent government agency called the Economic Planning Committee.

Even after establishing consular relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to prevent the increase of abstention votes in the UN by strengthening friendly relations with India, and other government agencies promoted the expansion of trade. However, the National Assembly criticized Ministry of

Foreign Affairs that its policy toward the UN lacks utility and argued that relations with India should be approached from an economic perspective. Since then, the Foreign Ministry has also pushed for establishing diplomatic relations between South Korea and India considering economic interests rather than the political factors.

From 1968 to 1973, however, there was less mention of establishing diplomatic relations with India in the Administration and the National Assembly. In particular, after the National Assembly was dissolved due to the Yushin Constitution in 1971, which banned any kind of political activities, domestic level of analysis became obsolete.

Last but not least, the cause of President Park's pursuit of establishing diplomatic relations with India on a personal level has changed over time. In the early days of his regime, economic factors played a larger role. Shortly after he took power, President Park felt that South Korea's economic situation was too poor and to develop economy, diplomatic relations should be pursued not only with developed countries like Japan but also with neutral countries such as India. India, a 3rd world leader and a country running state-led economic development plans, would have been the attractive cooperation target for President Park, who had no choice but to use anti-communism and economic development as the basis for maintaining the regime.

However, from the time of South Korea's dispatch to Vietnam war, the international political factor affected more on President Park's decision-making. In particular, his own life was

threatened by the 1.21 incident in 1968 and his political life was also threatened by President Nixon's decision to withdraw 20,000 troops from South Korea. As a result, President Park has implemented policies to reduce reliance on the US and seek competition against North Korea by pursuing the establishment of diplomatic relations with India.

To sum up, it is true that changes in the international political system have had a significant impact on South Korea's pursuit of diplomatic relations with neutral countries, including India, as the existing studies have argued. However, although the change in the international system, so called the Cold War, affected South Korea's foreign policy, it should not be overlooked that the President Park's personal perception or value, domestic factors like economic development and inter-agent dynamics have been deeply engaged. In a nutshell, the Chung-hee Park administration's attempt to establish diplomatic relations with India was to keep North Korea in check amid a changing international political environment and to seek economic benefits.

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국문 초록

본 연구는 박정희 정부 시기 대한민국이 중립국들과 외교관계를 수립한 원인을 설명하기 위해 한-인도 외교 관계 수립 과정을 분석한다. 본 연구는 중립국 외교를 체제 변수만으로 설명한 기존 연구들을 비판함과 동시에, 복수의 분석 레벨을 통한 외교 정책 이론을 강조한 Hudson and Day (2020)의 분석틀을 활용한다. Hudson and Day (2020)에서는 분석틀을 아홉 가지로 정리하였으나, 본 연구는 당시 한국의 정치 상황에 맞춰 국제정치적 체제 수준, 국내정치 수준, 지도자 개인 수준에서 인도와 외교 관계를 추진한 원인을 분석한다.

공산주의 국가들 간의 관계 변화로 국제정치 체제의 영향이 적었던 1960년대 중반까지는 체제 변수보다 국내 정치적 요소와 대통령 개인의 의지가 중요하게 작용하였다. 국내 정치적으로는 경제개발을 위한 정부 기관 벤치마킹, 무역 불균형 개선 등이 북한과의 경쟁보다 우선시되었다. 박정희 대통령 개인적으로도 냉전 체제가 변화하는 상황에서 경제 개발이 자신의 정당성을 강화해줬기 때문에 경제개발과 외교적 운신의 폭 확대를 목적으로 인도와 외교 관계 수립을 추구하였다.

그러나 1960년대 후반부터 미국이 공산주의 국가들과의 관계 개선을 추구하면서 국제정치체제 요인이 국내 정치와 개인 변수의 영향을 잠식하였다. 푸에블로호 사건, 김신조 사건 등 북한의 직접적 위협이 발생했을 뿐만 아니라 파키스탄이 북한과 국교를 수립했음에도 불구하고 미국은 주한미군을 감축하고 남북한 간의 화해 분위기 조성을 요구하였다. 이로 인해 국내적으로 경제적 요인 보다는 북한에 대한 견제가 인도와 외교관계를 수립하는 가장 큰 원인이 되었다. 자신의 안위를 보호하고 정권을 유지해야했던 박정희 대통령 개인 측면에서도 경제적 이익보다는 북한 견제를 목적으로 인도와의 외교관계를 추진하였다.

주요어: 한-인도 관계, 중립국 외교정책, 제3세계

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